Partnership and Discord

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1.0 Introduction

The theme of this dissertation is Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe from 1991 to 2000.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War entailed fundamental changes in our conception of world politics. There seems to be a general agreement among scholars of International Relations (IR) that these two related developments terminated the bipolar structure that had for decades served as an important premise for the study of IR in general and of many security issues in particular. There is less consensus with regard to what constitutes the new international structure and how IR can best be accounted for today. This study takes as one of its starting points IR theory and contemporary academic debates around concepts like ‘international structure’, ‘power’ and ‘security’.

A second point of departure is the recent revival of an old debate in Russia on the question of national identity. Post-Soviet Russia covers vast areas of the European and Asian continents. It makes sense, therefore, to regard Russia as integral to, yet still something apart from, ‘Europe’ (Davies 1997; Baranovsky 2000a). Historical identity debates in Russia have turned on diverging perceptions of Russia’s relative sameness with, and distinctiveness from, ‘Europe’ and a broader ‘West’ (Neumann 1996). These debates focused partly on the degree of ‘westwardness’ perceived appropriate for Russia’s foreign policy. A related issue centred on whether Russia should copy the political and economic models of the (‘advanced’) West, or, in light of Russia’s specific cultural and ideological heritage, pursue a distinctly ‘Russian way’. These questions resurfaced with the birth of a new Russia in 1991. This dissertation inquires into the implications of this renewed debate in Russia on national identity and foreign policy for the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.

The aim of this study is twofold. First, I want to show how some recent developments in IR theory can be applied in analyses of Russia’s foreign and security policy. Hence, the study is an attempt to answer calls made by some scholars to bridge the gap between IR theory and analysis of Russia’s foreign and security policy (Hopf
Second, in light of the puzzling combination of partnership and discord that has characterised Russian–Western security relations during the last decade, I want to cast light on the link between national identity and foreign policy with outlook to providing a better understanding of Russia’s approach to institutionalised security cooperation with the West from 1991 to 2000.

### 1.1 Demarcation of central issues and dimensions

These introductory paragraphs call for some clarifications with regard to the exact scope of this study. First, with regard to time span, the analysis centres on events stretching from the gradual dissolution of the Soviet Union in the second half of 1991 to President Yeltsin’s retirement on the eve of year 2000. However, in light of some recent developments in Russia’s foreign policy, and particularly what has been interpreted as policy changes in the wake of 11 September, I will briefly indicate in the concluding chapter how the theoretical framework applied here may be relevant also in analyses of Russia’s foreign policy under President Putin and beyond.

Second, although my focus is on security relations between Russia and the West, the spatial delimitation of this study is ‘supra-regional’ in the sense that it encompasses the Euro–Atlantic and Euro–Asian regions as defined by membership to OSCE on 1 January 2000. Accordingly, the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘European region’ include areas that are conventionally not conceived of as part of Europe proper (i.e., North America, the Caucasus, Central Asia). These terms will be qualified if I speak of Europe in a more conventional sense (i.e., to the west of the Urals) and of European sub-regions (i.e., Western Europe, CEE).

By ‘foreign policy’ one may understand ‘actions and ideas designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some kind of change in the environment – that is, in the policies, attitudes or actions of another state or states’ (Holsti 1983:97). There is obviously a close link between the foreign policy and the security policy of most states. In this study I treat security policy as an integrated part of a state’s foreign policy.
policy. However, as I shall discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, the term ‘security’ raises several questions that need to be addressed prior to a study of this kind.

Furthermore, this analysis focuses on Russia’s relations with NATO and OSCE as the two perhaps most important institutional components of a still emerging post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. This choice has been conditioned by the two objectives outlined above and by limitations in the space available. Nonetheless, the exclusion of Russia’s relations with EU calls for a brief comment. First, (Western) European integration is in one sense premised or incorporated as an assumption in the conceptual lens applied here. As I shall elaborate below, EU is an important part of the cement that may justify a conception of Western Europe and a broader ‘West’ as a highly integrated security community to which Russia is not a constituent member. Thus, although Russia’s relations with EU/WEU will not be studied in detail, her institutional exclusion from EU/WEU is an important underlying premise in this study.

Adding to this, although European integration can be regarded as a ‘security-through-integration’ project, EU/WEU has not been a central Russian–Western point of contact for dealing with issues defined in terms of security. EU has until recently been a marginal actor with regard to the handling of post-Cold War security affairs; has had only limited ambitions in the security field (at least on a military-operational level); and has yet to develop instruments that might provide it with a more prominent role in this regard. Accordingly, Russia has regarded EU primarily as an economic and political organisation (Leshukov 2000; Barabanov 2000; Baranovsky 2002). Seen from Moscow, EU has been unproblematic in terms of security or the (perceived) potential for conflicting interests with Russia. In fact, as a counterweight to the role of US/NATO, EU/WEU were to some extent ‘idealised’ in official Russian readings, since European integration might potentially contribute to weaken the transatlantic ties and thus strengthen Russia’s role in Europe (Barabanov 2000:96). Signs of a fundamental shift in Russia’s perception of EU and of its role as security actor – arguably in a more balanced direction with recognition of a certain potential for both

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2 The term ‘security architecture’ denotes a whole complex of international institutions (regimes, organisations, norms/informal rules etc.) that regulate security relations among states. See Chilton (1995) for a discussion of its emergence as metaphor in European and Russian–Western security discourse.

This being said, my central task is to examine Russia’s approach to NATO and OSCE as the two most important Russian–Western points of contact for dealing with security issues. Accordingly, I investigate how Russia has sought to position herself vis-à-vis these two security bodies, but also how and to what extent she has sought to influence the relationship between NATO, OSCE and herself along three dimensions:

1. Russia’s ‘weight’ in European decision-making processes

The first dimension pertains to Russia’s access to institutional arrangements dealing with European security matters, which may in turn serve as instruments and arenas for voicing Russian interests and concerns and for influencing developments in Europe. Defining features of Russia’s ‘weight’ is her formal status (or role) and her level of participation in decision-making processes. Hence, my focus is partly on questions concerning Russia’s (and other states’) membership in, or formal association with, OSCE, NATO and other frameworks for security cooperation with the West that were derived from the Western alliance (i.e., NACC/EAPC, PfP, Founding Act/PJC). However, a related issue concerns the relative importance envisaged by Moscow for OSCE, NATO and NATO-affiliated bodies as arenas and instruments for regulation of security matters in Europe. Accordingly, this first dimension also concerns the desired weight of the various institutional arrangements themselves as seen from Russia.

2. The functional ‘scope’ of OSCE, NATO and related structures

The second dimension concerns the functional area of responsibility desired by Moscow for various cooperative bodies, or the type and/or extent of different security issues and ‘cases’ perceived to be relevant or appropriate for the different institutional arrangements. Here I will focus on Russian views with regard to the treatment of ‘hard’ vs. ‘soft’ security issues respectively, and particularly on Moscow’s approach to the institutional handling of peacekeeping and conflict management, which emerged as one of the most important security issues in post-Cold War Europe.³

3. The geographical ‘domain’ of NATO and OSCE

³ A related issue that will not be dealt with separately here is Russia’s insistence on handling certain security matters bilaterally, whereas others are brought to various multilateral arenas.
The third dimension concerns the geographical area of influence desired by Moscow for various institutional arrangements. Central questions in the analysis will be how, why and to what extent Russia has sought to influence scenarios of NATO enlargement and a role for the Western alliance out of area. However, there is obviously a close link between the second and third dimensions. Thus, the discussion will also focus on Russia’s use of various institutions and arenas (NACC, PfP, OSCE, CIS, PJC) to deal with security issues outside the territory of NATO’s member states.4

The current analysis examines apparent tensions and contradictions in Russia’s policy, which have contributed to making both partnership and discord ingredients to Russian–Western security relations (Baranovsky (ed.) 1997; Arbatov, Kaiser and Legvold (eds) 1999). For instance, how can we understand Russia’s intense opposition to NATO enlargement and the alliance’s out-of-area operations in light of Russia’s own formalised cooperation with this institution (i.e., NACC/EAPC; PfP; PJC/the Founding Act)? How can we conceive of Moscow’s enduring position that OSCE should be the cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture, considering what many observers have interpreted as Russian obstruction of, and non-compliance with, OSCE decisions and norms?5 This study seeks to answer these questions.

1.2 Theoretical approach – a first cut

In this study I shall apply the theoretical framework presented in A model for post-Cold War security thinking (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001).6 The report in question presents a particular way of conceptualising the dynamic interplay between attributes of states and the international system as conditions for state behaviour and outcomes in international politics.7 It draws on insights from both (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism as two dominating perspectives on world politics (Morgenthau 1985 [1948]; Waltz

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4 The terms ‘weight’, ‘scope’ and ‘domain’ originate from Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), but will be used here with the adaptations made in Kjølberg and Jeppesen (2001).

5 The case of Chechnya is only one of many examples. As one Russian scholar puts it: ‘While having a clear interest in upgrading the OSCE, Russia remains one of its most difficult participants’ (Baranovsky 1997:552).

6 The report was published in Norwegian under the title ‘En modell for sikkerhetstanken etter den kalde krigen’ (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001), and sought to substantiate theoretically a conceptual model that was developed by Anders Kjølberg at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in the early 1990s.

7 An alternative approach might have been one of foreign policy analysis, with independent variables being (primarily) the type of political leadership and political culture; the character of bureaucratic structures, domestic institutions and decision-making processes; domestic constellations of pressure groups etc. See Godzimirski (ed.) (2000), Malcolm et al. (1996) and Wallander (ed.) (1996) for recent examples of analyses along this line.
However, by focusing on the role of ideas, norms and national identity for state interests and behaviour, it takes seriously also some assumptions usually associated with constructivist theory (Wendt 1999; Wendt 1992; Katzenstein (ed.) 1996; Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998; Goldstein and Keohane (eds) 1993). Hence, the analytical lens applied here both complements and challenges so-called mainstream paradigms. Pending a more detailed presentation in Chapter 2, I will present only a brief outline of the theoretical framework at this point.  

1.2.1 Levels of analysis

There is some scope for choice with regard to what levels of analysis one includes in a study. Here, sources of explanation behind Russia’s behaviour are sought primarily on the systemic (the global international system), the sub-systemic (the regional European system) and the unit (state) levels of analysis. The dependent variable – Russia’s policy – is located on the state level. With regard to outcomes, the regional and state levels are central. However, this analysis takes the form of tracing a process of action and interaction over time between various sources of explanations and outcomes. Decisions taken at one point by Russia (and others) will presumably affect outcomes on the regional level and thus affect systemic or sub-systemic variable values, be it in terms of new institutional arrangements or the general climate for interaction (i.e., Russian–Western relationship of enmity–amity). Accordingly, both decisions and outcomes serve as a premise for their future interaction, and may therefore have an independent effect on Russian decisions in the next round.

1.2.2 Basic assumptions: Agency, structure and purposive behaviour

The distinction between agent and structure is essential for any understanding of social behaviour. In a fundamental sense, agents and structures are interrelated entities (Carlsnaes 1992:246). Yet it is not so clear exactly how they relate to each

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8 Ongoing debates in IR theory encompass questions of ontological, epistemological, methodological and normative character. See Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds) (1996) for an overview and discussion of some central developments and tendencies, some of which are also reflected in Kjolberg and Jeppesen (2001).

9 Arguably, the following five are the most frequently used levels of analysis in IR studies: 1) international system; 2) international subsystem; 3) unit (state); 4) subunit, and 5) individual (Buzan et al. 1998:5).

10 Buzan, Jones and Little (1993:29–80) present an argument in favour of seeing (systemic or sub-systemic) interaction as a separate level of analysis. Although the current approach is essentially concerned with the systemic conditions that lie at the core of these authors’ attempt to refine Waltz’ (1979) theory (i.e., concepts like ‘interaction capacity’, ‘distributional structures’, (action-interaction) ‘process formations’ a.o.), I will stick here to the more conventional levels of analysis indicated above.
other. There are two problems to this issue. The first concerns the very nature of agents and structures (Wendt 1987:339). This is an ontological question, and turns on how the two stand in relation to each other with regard to make-up or constitution. Here, I shall side with the social constructivist argument and see the relationship between agent and structure as one of mutual constitution (Wendt 1999; Adler 1997; Checkel 1998; Hopf 1998). I regard this as a necessary step for conducting this analysis, because it entails a possibility for detecting changes over time in the constitution of both agents (Russia) and structures (Russia’s ‘environment’) and for tracing both the causal and the temporal relationship between them.\(^{11}\)

The second question concerns the epistemological issue of integrating different types of variables into explanatory models or theories of social behaviour (Wendt 1987:339–340). The explanatory framework applied here attaches relatively much weight to structure compared to agency, and focuses on the manner in which features of a broadly conceived international environment affect foreign policy decisions. Yet this is not to say that structure is more important than agency, or that the former has greater explanatory force than the latter. It simply means that I am particularly concerned with how and to what extent Russia’s actions have been conditioned by attributes of the (social and material) environment in which she operates.

Also, structure does not determine behaviour or outcomes. Structure can be regarded as a dispositional force that conditions the behaviour of agents/states (here: Russia). I assume in the following that states’ foreign and security policies express their goals and intentions: *States are purposive agents*. Their international behaviour can be understood as reflecting national interests defined through a process of domestic bargaining or by use of another decision-making procedure.\(^{12}\) Agency, therefore, is conceived here as the freedom states or governments have to choose behaviour when taking into account domestic room for manoeuvring and structural constraints in terms of variations in costs and benefits related to different actions or

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\(^{11}\) The argument that agents and structures are mutually constitutive is central to the constructivist project (Checkel 1998:325; Hopf 1998). Alternative ways of approaching or ‘solving’ this problem in foreign policy analysis would be to reduce one or both entities to be ontologically ‘given’ or ‘primitive’ (Wendt 1987:339).

\(^{12}\) I am aware that some (self-proclaimed) liberal scholars prefer to speak of ‘preferences’ rather than ‘interests’ and that the difference between the two can be related to the ‘incommensurability thesis’ as a feature dividing the realist and liberal traditions (see Moravcsik 1997). This problem will not be addressed here.
policies. This is essentially a utilitarian understanding of behaviour, and implies that Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe – the current study’s dependent variable – is assumed to reflect rational means–ends calculations by the Russian government.

Accordingly, I also make the assumption that Russia will commit to cooperative security arrangements with the West only when a cost–benefit analysis in Moscow produces an expected utility gain for Russia in comparison to status quo. The notion of status quo dictates certain analytical sensitivity also to ‘path dependency’ or to assumed limitations in the extent to which agents may ‘interfere’ in history and bring about changes in their environment ‘independently’ from already established structures and existing patterns of behaviour. As has been noted, Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy did not emerge in a vacuum or from an institutional tabula rasa (Robinson (ed.) 2000). At the outset of the 1990s, there was an ‘institutional overhang’ in terms of both domestic bodies engaged in policymaking and international cooperative arrangements to which Russia was a part (ibid.:8–9). In one sense, this overhang reflects a starting point for decision-making that may contribute to a certain degree of continuity in foreign policy in the sense that it structures the environment in which decision-makers operate and give birth to new policies and decisions.

It is always difficult to ‘measure’ the effects of path dependency or the extent to which historical legacies and institutionalised patterns of behaviour constrain agents who want to bring about changes in the external environment. Yet it is fair to assume that ‘effects’ on a state’s foreign policy and international outcomes stemming from path dependency or an established pattern of behaviour may be particularly strong if the capacity of the state is weak or under condition of particular constraints on the state’s diplomatic resources (financial, personnel a.o.). This was arguably the situation in Russia during the 1990s (Robinson (ed.) 2000). The current analysis is concerned with how we can understand Russian agency and behaviour at particular moments under conditions of institutional overhang and constraints on Russia’s diplomatic

13 Although Putnam’s concept of ‘two-level games’ (1988) will not be explicitly applied here, his depiction of domestic–international interaction as condition for international outcomes has inspired the current approach.
14 The concept of ‘rationality’ applied here is obviously less strict than what we find in some game theoretical analyses of international cooperation. See Hovi (1998) or Axelrod (1984) for detailed discussions.
capacities. Thus, I want to cast light on the rationale underlying not only Russia’s own initiatives at various stages, but also Russian decisions once questions regarding cooperative security arrangements with the West became part of their shared agenda.

1.2.3 States, system and the international power structure

States are the central units of the international system (Buzan 1991). The attributes of states are important in shaping their behaviour. Yet the behaviour of states is affected also by the environment in which they exist, or by systemic factors that constrain them from taking particular actions and dispose them towards taking others. Waltz (1979) assumes that the distribution of material capabilities – ‘the international structure’ – is the central systemic feature affecting outcomes of world politics. Others have argued that various social or non-material features (norms, international institutions, culture etc.) also deserve attention, and that these are equally or perhaps even more important than material factors in shaping state behaviour and international outcomes (Bull 1977; Wendt 1999; Keohane 1989; Katzenstein (ed.) 1986).

In A model for post-Cold War security thinking (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001), we argue that the concept of ‘international power structure’ may be a useful starting point when trying to determine the relative importance – under various systemic conditions – of different factors that affect state behaviour and therefore also outcomes in world politics. This term denotes an actor’s image of how power or the possibilities to influence actors and developments are distributed among states in a system (ibid.:8). The international power structure is not visible to the actors and has no objective existence per se. Actors cannot observe it, measure it, or count it. Rather, structure is here regarded as a perceptual or interpretive phenomenon. Images of power relations emerge through the feedback states receive on their behaviour. Accordingly, consistent feedback over time can be regarded as a reflection of an international power structure, which is in turn assumed to affect the behaviour of states by creating windows of (more or less) ‘realistic’ opportunities or ranges of feasible actions and policies.

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15 Waltz (1979; 1986; 1996) constructed a theory of international politics (outcomes) and not a theory of foreign policy. Still, his ‘logic of behaviour’ may be relevant also for studies of states’ foreign policy (Elman 1996).

16 These scholars differ profoundly with regard to research focus and theoretical claims. Here I simply have in mind their common concern with ‘social’ or ‘non-material’ factors (the role of ideas; formal and informal institutional arrangements; international organisations; international laws, conventions and common understandings; norms and implicit rules of behaviour etc.) as opposed to Waltz’ materialist perspective.
This approach implies that states may ‘see’ and interpret the power structure differently. In other words, the international power structure may look different to actors that are differently positioned with regard to the factors that determine power relations among states in a system or sub-system. I assume that the Waltzian distribution of capabilities or material (military, economic) resources will often be constitutive to actors’ images of power relations. I also assume that material resources in some ultimate cases represent a necessary condition for power projection. Accordingly, states will strive towards improving their own (material) resource basis, be it through alliances or a build-up of own capabilities. These are essentially realist arguments (Morgenthau 1985 [1948]; Waltz 1979).

Nevertheless, state behaviour will often be affected by norms or informal rules of behaviour; by the character and extent of formal institutions (organisations); by geography; and by the distribution of technology within a system (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993). In many international systems or sub-systems, norms and institutions are important in regulating how and under what conditions power can be projected, but also what type of power that can be applied. Similarly, geography and technology may often inhibit or encourage particular actions or patterns of behaviour. These factors can therefore be regarded as intermediate and arguably also systemic variables that should be accounted for when we analyse state behaviour and international outcomes.\footnote{Although Buzan, Jones and Little (1993) regard Waltz’ theory (1979) as a good starting point for developing a comprehensive theory of international politics, they basically argue that he fails to capture important effects on state behaviour that originate at the systemic level, but which are not structural in a narrow, material sense (i.e., ‘distribution of capabilities’): By reducing everything that is not structural to unit level causes, Waltz ‘confuses structure with system’ (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993:69). In their own approach, the character and distribution of institutions, norms and technology – a system’s interaction capacity – are integrated in the analyses as conditions for the type and quality of interactions and the patterns of behaviour that may emerge in a system (ibid.:69–80).}

The term ‘international power structure’ appears useful because it arguably captures the important role of material factors that lie at the core of many (neo)realist readings of world politics, while at the same time being sensitive to other factors that are relevant for the character of power relations among states. The current approach also acknowledges the fact that actors in world politics are not only differently positioned in the international power structure, they may also interpret the power structure itself, and the relative importance of the various factors that constitute the power structure, in different ways. In this study, Russia’s policy is analysed from the
perspective of how Russia has sought to influence the form and function of institutional arrangements that complement the distribution of material capabilities, and which are therefore relevant as power factors in the European system.\textsuperscript{18}

1.2.4 Centres, peripheries and security behaviour

An international power structure can be depicted in terms of centres and peripheries. Such a structure is characterised by a type of power relations in which centres – states or groups of states – dominate and attract actors situated in the surrounding peripheral areas.\textsuperscript{19} The notion of ‘regional centres’ pertains to states or groups of states that are of limited relevance for the global power structure, but which play a certain role for the character of interstate relations inside particular regions. However, the character of power and security relations \textit{within} and \textit{between} the world’s centres and peripheries may differ profoundly with regard to the relative importance of military power, norms and international institutions. As one may understand, this makes the international power structure a very complex one.\textsuperscript{20}

A depiction of the international power structure along these lines bears relation to states’ foreign and security policies through the assumption that actors’ relative positions in this world of centres and peripheries influence their identities, interests and security perceptions. I shall use the term ‘security logic’ to denote the \textit{security thinking} and the related \textit{security strategies} that can be derived from a particular reading of the international power structure and of one’s own place in this structure (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001:15).\textsuperscript{21} The tool for analysing a state’s policy is derived from combining this conception of the international power structure with the notion of

\textsuperscript{18} Thus, I sympathise with the constructivist claim that the international ‘environment’ (or ‘structure’) in which states (and other actors) operate is social as well as material (Checkel 1998; Hopf 1998). Yet this does not imply that every study of an IR issue should necessarily deal with \textit{all} (social and material) features of this environment.

\textsuperscript{19} Models in terms of centres and peripheries are incorporated in many geopolitical approaches also in the Russian academic community. For a recent example, see Kolosov and Mironenko (2001:223–233), who combine a model of concentric circles with the notion of ‘sectors’ (of influence) going out from the ‘Russian heartland’.

\textsuperscript{20} Just like alternative depictions of (conceivably) central features of world politics, a centre–periphery approach raises some important normative questions with regard to policy recommendations, let alone also the danger of contributing to the construction or re-construction of particular worldviews that do not reflect the ‘real’ constitution of the world (i.e., an existing ontological order). These and other normative issues are beyond the scope of this study. I should remind the reader that the model applied here was developed in a policy-oriented environment, and that \textit{A model for post-Cold War security thinking} (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001) was published by an institution intimately entangled in the formulation of Norwegian security and defence policy.

\textsuperscript{21} See Chapter 2 for an elaboration on the concept of ‘security logic’, which is not a conventional IR term, and which is intimately linked to the conceptual model applied in this study.
‘securitisation’ formulated by scholars of the so-called Copenhagen school (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1995). In brief, these authors argue that security manifests itself through ‘speech acts’ or the attachment (by actors) of a security label onto a specific issue or phenomenon with the aim of legitimising certain political actions or influencing policies or outcomes. Security, in other words, is an intersubjective discourse that takes the form of presenting specific referent objects (a state, an identity, a role etc.) as existentially threatened (by a particular actor or development).

Thus, if one accepts the assumptions that states may securitise issues like national identity or a particular role in world politics and that these are (at least partly) based on their readings of the international power structure and of their own place in this structure, an ‘existing’ world order or a power structure widely recognised to be in the making may produce different security logics for states which regard their national interests differently as a consequence of their (material and/or institutional) position in the system. With some adaptations, I shall use the basic logic underlying the ‘speech act’ approach as an instrument to analyse Russia’s policy.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{1.2.5 Post-Cold War security thinking: A conceptual lens}

Today, the global world order can largely be described as unipolar. The West, with the US as its core, constitutes the dominant centre in world politics. In a European context, the West makes up a power centre and a highly institutionalised security community of which Russia is not an integrated part, and to which Russia represents a periphery.\textsuperscript{23} A central argument in this study is that Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe can be understood partly as an attempt to integrate into this Western centre, which is characterised by order, stability and predictability. These represent values that are essential to any state pursuing the goal of national security. Yet integration into the dominating Western centre will also ensure Russia a voice, a place at the table and potentially some minimum weight in the handling of European security affairs in a situation where

\textsuperscript{22} The ‘Copenhagen school’ label seems to originate from the McSweeney’s (1996) article in Review of International Studies, where he forwarded criticism against the theoretical approach to security studies applied by a group of scholars associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.

\textsuperscript{23} The term ‘security community’ is derived from Deutsch \textit{et al.} (1957) and denotes a group of states that do not regard each other as potential military enemies and which do not perceive the use of arms as a relevant means to solve conflicts between them. See also Adler and Barnett (1998) and Buzan’s (1991) notion of ‘mature anarchy’.
Russia’s relative power position, measured in terms of economic resources and military capabilities, has deteriorated dramatically compared to that of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, cooperation with the West may provide Russia with a security dividend and serve as an appropriate answer to many of Russia’s security concerns.

Model for post-cold war security thinking (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001)

However, Russia can also be depicted as a centre in her own right in relation to the West and to the post-Soviet space. There are actually two levels to this assertion. Firstly, Russia can be read in terms of her (real or potential) self-sufficiency or ideological, economic and political independence from a broadly conceived West (Davies 1997; Neumann 1996). There is a strong cultural–ideological dimension to this view, with Russia representing values that differ from, and stand partly in direct opposition to, those of (Western) Europe. Secondly, Russia has also been depicted as the heart of a distinct universe or an organic whole that essentially stretches beyond the borders of Russia proper (Trenin 2001). For centuries, Moscow has been a nucleus of power from which political influence and control have been spread into surrounding geographical areas. Historical Russia has therefore been encircled by peripheries of her
own, or by concentric circles of Russian domination, and with the level of Russian influence and control decreasing with increasing distance from the Russian centre.

These historical considerations – Russia as periphery and Russia as centre – lie at the core of my approach. The Cold War gave new impetus to the idea of a divided Europe through the construction of physical and ideological walls, by the competitive relationship it introduced between East and West as opposing political-economic systems, and by the rise of US–Soviet military antagonism (Buzan 1991; Tunander et al. (eds) 1997). During this period, the bipolar international structure to a great extent ‘defined’ the security policies of European states. This has been described as systemic ‘overlay’ or the suppression of regional security dynamics resulting from superpower antagonism and the physical presence of two power centres in Europe (Buzan 1991).

This study purports that an East–West dimension is still relevant for the study of Russia’s security relations with the West. I basically argue that apparent tensions and contradictions in Russia’s policy during the 1990s can be traced to the interplay between two different security logics derived from the centre–periphery and East–West dimensions respectively. On the one hand, the security logic derived from a depiction by the Russian policymaking elite of Russia as Europe’s periphery and from recognition of the West as a dominating centre largely dictates a policy of integration into the Western centre and adaptation to the Western security structures. On the other hand, a depiction of Russia as a separate centre, which reflects an alternative reading of Russia’s identity and of Russia’s place in the international power structure, induces a conception in Russia of relations with the West more in terms of a zero-sum power game. The security logic derived from this alternative worldview largely dictates policy measures aimed at balancing the influence of the Western centre. Accordingly, the two security logics give rise to different prescriptions for Russia’s foreign policy.24

The model introduced above incorporates a third dimension constituted by a North–South or Christian–Muslim divide. This dimension reflects a widely conceived

24 A similar way of conceptualising post-Cold War security thinking can be found in Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, Territory and Identity (Tunander et al. (eds) (1997)); see particularly Tunander’s chapter on what he calls ‘a synthesis of a bipolar friend–foe structure and a hierarchic cosmos–chaos structure’ (pp.17–44). The focus in their work on access to decision-making centres and on the role of ‘in-between structures’ (ibid.:6) has inspired the approach chosen in this study. Still, the notion of ‘security logic’, which reflects an actor’s (subjective) reading of ‘self’ in relation to ‘structure’, represents an important difference in our approaches.
difference in the values and norms that dominate the Christian and the Islamic worlds respectively. As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, the model depicts Russia and the West on the same side of this split. One hypothesis is that security identities and threat perceptions shared by Russia and the West on the basis of securitisation of norms and values associated with the notion of a distinct (Christian) civilisation should increase the potential scope for Russian–Western security cooperation and facilitate the establishment and use of shared institutional arrangements to pursue shared interests.

This model should be seen as a conceptual lens, a mind-map or a depiction of how actors may structure their identities, their threat perceptions and their reading of security relations with other actors. The basic logic underlying the model is that where actors stand or see themselves in relation to the three dimensions is central in shaping their security thinking and therefore also their security behaviour. I will argue in this study that the three dimensions in the model seem to capture facets of Russian security thinking that were central in shaping Russia’s security interests and behaviour during the 1990s, and that the model can therefore be used to cast light on Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War European security architecture. In Chapter 2, I will present the model in more detail, and put forward some hypotheses concerning expected (patterns of) behaviour with regard to institutional security arrangements.

1.3 A few methodological reflections

This study is based on a qualitative methodology, which can be described as a non-statistical approach characterised by few units and many variables (Andersen (ed.) 1990:13–14; Hellevik 2000:110–111). My choice of a qualitative methodology has been conditioned by the study’s theme and key issues outlined above, but also by the underlying goal of understanding or interpreting the particular and the unique in Russia’s policy rather than explaining the latter in a strict, (positivist) scientific sense or producing knowledge about general causal laws governing state conduct (Andersen (ed.) 1990; Andersen 1997). As has been argued, rather than producing ‘explanations’, the qualitative approach may be helpful in bringing about ‘deep knowledge’ about the whole complex constituting Russia’s foreign policy, since it may provide for intensive
examination of various sources on a wide range of variables pertaining to Russia’s foreign policy conduct (Andersen (ed.) 1990:14).

1.3.1 Research design: The single case study approach

Within a broad qualitative methodology, the research design chosen here is that of a single case study (Yin 1994; Andersen (ed.) 1990:122–127). Yin (1994:13) defines case studies as empirical investigations into a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, and where the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In this study, an overall goal is to analyse in depth one particular phenomenon: Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. However, Yin’s definition of case studies points to the problem delimiting the phenomenon itself from its context. This will always be an arbitrary business and can essentially be regarded as part of the case study itself.

Yin (1994:38–41) outlines three rationales for choosing the single case design. First, a case may be critical for testing a well-formulated theory or a set of theoretical propositions. Although the framework applied here does not constitute a consistent scientific theory, this rationale appears relevant for the current analysis. In Chapter 2, I shall put forward some hypotheses about Russia’s expected behaviour that can be drawn from the theoretical framework and the conceptual lens briefly introduced above. And although the model applied here appears particularly well suited for analysis of Russia’s policy, it reflects considerations on the new international power structure that go beyond a European context and which relate also to other actors and levels of analysis. In one sense, therefore, this study can be regarded as a ‘test’ of the analytical tool presented in Kjølberg and Jeppesen (2001).

A second rationale for choosing a single case approach can be found when a phenomenon represents an extreme or unique case (Yin 1994:39). As indicated above, Russia has often been treated as a ‘special’ case left to ‘Sovietologists’. Although one aim of this study is to present an argument in favour of attaching studies of Russia’s foreign policy closer to developments in IR theory, Yin’s second rationale underlies the current approach in the sense that it has been motivated by a strive towards deeper understanding of Russia’s as an ‘extreme’ or ‘unique’ case. In itself, Russia’s imperial legacy may legitimate seeing her as a ‘unique’ case with regard to identity formation.
and foreign policy. Yet the ‘Russian question’, or the widely acknowledged view that Russia’s role is crucial with regard to overall developments in European security, serves as an equally important rationale for in-depth studies of her foreign policy.  

The *revelatory case* is a third rationale for single case studies (ibid.:40). This situation exists when an investigator has the opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provided IR scholars with a whole new area of studies related to states’ identity formation and foreign policy. The birth of a new Russia was part of this development. In one sense, this analysis only supplements an already established body of literature on these matters. However, by applying the theoretical framework introduced above, central to which is the notion of ‘security logic’, this study aims to reveal the link between Russia’s identity, security thinking and foreign policy as they evolved in the wake of Soviet dissolution. Ideas are likely to shape policy more under conditions of uncertainty or when the external environment is in flux (Wallander 1996). Accordingly, post-Soviet Russia can be regarded as a *revelatory case* that may give insight to the role of identity not only for Russia’s own behaviour, but also for the link between states’ identity and foreign policy in general.

This leads me to a separate point: Generalisation is not a main concern in this study. In fact, generalisations are often regarded as an important limitation to qualitative studies (Andersen (ed.) 1990:13). Case studies cannot be generalised to statistical propositions for a population or a universe. However, Yin (1994:10) asserts that even single case studies can be generalised to theoretical propositions or serve as basis for analytical generalisations, which may in turn be used for the purpose of theory construction. Case studies have an inductive character. Accordingly, findings in this study may (potentially) contribute to development of IR theory on the link between national identity, security thinking and states’ foreign policy.

**1.3.2 Sources and empirical evidence**

Yin (1994:13) argues that case studies should rely on multiple sources of evidence and calls for data to ‘converge in a triangulating fashion’. In one sense, this
study contains nothing new. It does not reflect findings from interviews or archive materials that have never previously been examined. Rather, the analysis is based on findings from an unstructured collection of data from various Russian and Western newspapers, periodicals and web sites. I rely on a number of independent sources ranging from officially sanctioned doctrines or concepts regulating aspects of Russia’s foreign policy to analyses by Russian and Western scholars of matters pertaining to the theme of this study. Central sources are periodical and newspaper articles that convey information about Russian statements, initiatives, proposals, responses and decisions regarding Russian–Western relations in general and Russia’s policy vis-à-vis NATO and OSCE in particular. Texts reflecting Russia’s formal commitment to cooperative security arrangements with the West are also important. With regard to Russian political statements, utterances by members of the executive branch of government constitute the main bulk of evidence (i.e., president, foreign minister, defence minister, high-ranking policy officials etc.), although inputs from a broadly conceived political and intellectual ‘elite’ are also incorporated.

Variations in the dependent variable will be traced largely by means of textual analysis and interpretation of these documents and of Russia’s commitments to formalised security cooperation with the West. I have sought to the best of my ability to triangulate both data and investigators by using multiple sources of evidence and by seeking to create converging lines of inquiries with support from both various sources and from Russian as well as Western observers (Yin 1994:90–94). Some secondary analyses applied in the analysis reflect a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology, which contributes to a certain degree of methodological triangulation. With regard to statements made by Russian officials or people in a broadly conceived elite, I have sought to evaluate both the contents and addressees of these. This reflects my concern with being sensitive to the fact that sources may convey not only (more or less credible) information about a course of events, but also represent ‘performative’ or ‘speech’ acts (Dahl 1994:34–37; Buzan et al. 1998). In other words, some sources can be seen as attempts to influence Russia’s policy or the overall course of events.
1.3.3 Texts and objective reality: The importance of interpretation

Although concern with textual analysis and the (instrumental) use of language as means to influence policy is part of this study, I have chosen not to adhere to a stringent methodology of discourse. As I shall elaborate later, by regarding security as a speech act, I am concerned with how actors’ discourses on security work within a social context and may induce particular security thinking and contribute to the adoption of policy measures. I sympathise with the view that the construction of (competing) discourses may be relevant for many IR studies (Neumann 2001). Also, the observation that actors may use language instrumentally as means to influence policy is relevant for this study. This is arguably the very essence of politics.

Nevertheless, discourse methodology is applied here only implicitly. This choice has been conditioned by an observed weakness of discourse analysis related to the danger of reading too much into documents and texts and to put too much focus on the discourses themselves. As Buzan et al. (1998:177) point out: ‘Discourse analysis can uncover one thing: discourse.’ Discourse analysis is less helpful in uncovering the material and social structures that underlie the discourses themselves. Transferred to this study, discourse analysis is a poor instrument when we seek to reveal more or less plausible ‘causes’, intentions and motives behind Russian policy and commitments. Since focus here is not on the different Russian security discourses themselves but rather on understanding or interpreting the rationale behind Russia’s foreign policy, I will pursue a more traditional political analysis of units interacting and of the various facilitating conditions that affected policies and outcomes.

An analysis of this kind by necessity leaves much to the researcher’s interpretation of sources in a given context. It is an extremely difficult exercise to ‘measure’ variables like identity, threat perceptions and amity–enmity considerations. And even if there exists an ‘objective reality’ or a distinct combination of factors that constitute the ‘real’ explanation of Russia’s policy, this study cannot claim to have uncovered these. What I can do is to present my interpretation of events or one reading of Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture.

This raises the challenge of securing reliability and validity, which can be seen as criteria for evaluating the quality of a study. Reliability refers to accuracy in the
operations performed during the research process (Hellevik 2000:51). A high degree of reliability is achieved if another researcher would come out with the same results if he had repeated the steps in the research process. Validity, or construct validity, concerns the manner in which theoretical concepts are made operational, or the degree of coherence between concepts applied on the theoretical and empirical levels (ibid.). However, these notions of reliability and validity are intimately linked to a positivist conception of science and to the belief that there exists ‘hard facts’ or an ‘objective reality’ that can be uncovered. This arguably makes them less applicable here.

Given the largely interpretative approach chosen in this study, considerations regarding validity and reliability to a great extent rest on the credibility, confirmability and trustworthiness of the argument (Yin 1994:32–38). Thus, relevant questions for judging the quality of this study are: Are the basic assumptions outlined above fair or reasonable? Is the argument consistent in the sense that the conclusions drawn are compatible with the assumptions made at the outset? Are the data relevant for the issue under study (i.e., ‘data validity’)? Have I used the most important sources available? Are the sources applied sufficiently central to legitimate their application? Are my interpretations of the meaning and importance of these sources reasonable or at least plausible? Confirmative answers to these questions may reflect high quality. Yet I cannot exclude that if another researcher sat down with the same material, he or she might still interpret some texts differently and attach different meanings or relative importance to some sources. Through conscientious triangulation of data, investigators and methodology I have sought to increase the credibility of the argument. However, the final judge regarding the quality of this analysis is the reader.

I should add one final comment with regard to the perceived relevance and centrality of some basic texts and to the danger of attributing too much significance to particular documents. As indicated above, I draw explicitly on some documents that were adopted at various stages in the 1990s, and which can be regarded as part of the doctrinal basis for Russia’s foreign and security policies. I assume that these officially sanctioned doctrines or basic policy concepts are relevant and can be used to cast light on Russia’s approach to institutionalised security cooperation in Europe. Foreign Minister Kozyrev wrote in 1993 that Russia’s newly adopted foreign policy concept
‘generalises key directions’, ‘reflects fundamental interests’ and represents ‘a flexible system of guidelines for day-to-day foreign policy practice’. Similarly, then Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin (1997) wrote that the national security concept adopted in 1997, which also includes assessments of and prescriptions for Russia’s foreign policy, can be seen as ‘the backbone’ and ‘ideological basis’ for the construction of Russia and of Russia’s security policy. Hence, these documents contain more than empty phrases. There is no saying that they were crucial or at least not the only factors shaping policy. However, they reflect officially sanctioned views on Russia’s foreign and security policy, and were central in shaping domestic debate on questions of national identity, security and foreign policy. Thus, if treated with appropriate care, and if triangulated with other data, they appear particularly relevant for this study.

1.4 Structure of the study

These introductory sections indicate that I have made some choices that will have implications for the structuring and interpretation of the empirical data to be analysed. These choices entail several questions of ontological and epistemological character, some of which will be dealt with in Chapter 2. By seeing constructivism as well suited for developing a theoretical framework that takes account of insights derived from both realist and liberal theory, I may cause confusion and perhaps even anger among scholars who see themselves as members of a particular IR ‘camp’, and who feel that there is little or no room for debate across theoretical divides. Of course, alternative theoretical approaches or analytical lenses could have been chosen. However, any modelling of state behaviour will fail to incorporate features – perhaps even significant ones – of the phenomenon being analysed. I feel comfortable with the choices made here, and believe that they provide a good basis for analysing Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.

26 See Kozyrev’s cover letter to then Chairman in the Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties Yevgeny Ambartsumov, which accompanied the text of the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept (‘Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993)).

27 Here I have in mind the notion of ‘incommensurability’ or the view that there can be no borrowing of basic assumptions from one worldview to another and that different (IR) theories (or paradigms) cannot be tested against each other because they ‘don’t speak the same language’ and don’t use the same terms/concepts (Waever 1996:158–161). A second objection against integration of components from different world perspectives relates to the observation that these also reflect different normative programmes (ibid.:172; Little and Smith 1991).
The rest of this study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the concept of ‘security’ and presents in more detail the explanatory framework briefly introduced above. Chapter 3 analyses what I label ‘the formative years’ of Russian policy (1991–93). Here, focus is on the domestic debate on Russia’s national identity and national interests, which by 1993 had evolved into a certain consensus regarding main orientations in foreign policy. In light of this debate, Chapter 3 also examines Russia’s relations with NATO and CSCE during this early period. Chapter 4 analyses two later periods (1993–96 and 1996–2000), central to which were Russian opposition and policy responses to emerging NATO-centrism as the basis for Europe’s security architecture. Chapter 5 provides some concluding remarks, and points to questions for further research on the basis of a brief assessment of how the analytical framework applied here may be relevant for analysing developments in Russian foreign policy under President Putin and particularly in the wake of 11 September.28

28 In a study of this kind, any classification of time periods will be arbitrary. None of the intervals applied here are ‘natural’ in the sense that the temporal boundaries reflect fundamental shifts in Russia’s policy or constitute sharp and unquestionable changes in the subject under study. Arguments may be presented in favour of choosing alternative intervals. The rationale behind my choice is sought reflected in the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4.
2.0 Security: A framework for analysis

This chapter introduces in more detail the theoretical framework that will be applied in the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4. I start by looking at the very concept of ‘security’ in IR theory (2.1). Section 2.2 provides a brief outline of how security has been conceptualised and studied within the realist and liberal traditions. The main part of this chapter (2.3) is devoted to an in-depth presentation of some central components in Kjølberg and Jeppesen (2001), which portrays a way of incorporating insights from both the realist and liberal traditions into analyses of state behaviour and international outcomes. On the basis of this framework I then (2.4) derive some hypotheses about Russia’s expected behaviour with regard to security cooperation with the West.

2.1 The concept of ‘security’ in International Relations theory

The concept of security is central to the study of IR. In one sense, it is what the study of world politics is all about. Nonetheless, as one scholar argues, there is ‘no common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are’ (Haftendorn 1991:15). In a similar mode, Buzan (1991:3–12) describes ‘security’ as an ‘ambiguous’, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘neglected’ and ‘essentially contested’ concept. Consequently, there is also no single manual or universally recognised prescription for how to conduct studies of security issues.

Despite this lack of consensus as to what ‘security’ entails and how it can be studied, we may identify some connotations or features commonly attached to this label. First, security relates to perceived or actual insecurity or to a feeling or condition of (intense) risk or (existential) threat against a ‘referent object’ (Buzan et al. 1998:36; Buzan 1991:26). Referent objects are essentially answers to the question: ‘The security of whom (or what)?’ These are things or phenomena that may be subject to risks and threats and that are perceived to have some legitimate claim to survival (i.e., a state, an individual, a nation, a culture, core values, etc.). Security, therefore, can be regarded as the absence of, or the pursuit of freedom from, risks or threats to acquired values or tangibles that are viewed as vital in some sense (Buzan 1991:18).

29 The notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’ reflects the view that some scientific concepts by necessity seem to entail unsolvable debates about their meaning and application (Buzan 1991:7). In other words, the disputes around a concept of this kind cannot be settled by empirical investigation.
Semantically, the term ‘security’ has an absolute flavour to it. Nevertheless, security is often regarded (by actors) in relative terms. Security is something of which one can have more or less (Baldwin 1997:16). It makes sense, therefore, to speak about degrees of security and insecurity. This is of course not to say that security is a good of which one should always seek more. Although it may appear wise to introduce measures aimed at increasing the perceived level of security, there will often be a price to pay in terms of political, economic or social costs (ibid.; Wæver 1995). Security must therefore often be traded or balanced with other core values, such as ‘freedom’ or a broader notion of ‘welfare’, or even with the security (or core values) of others (Herz 1950). What is to be avoided is excessive scarcity or total absence of security.

Security should also be understood in relational terms (Buzan 1991). The concept has to do with the interplay among units. The ‘source’ of insecurity is often perceived to be a phenomenon outside of, or external to, the referent object. This leads one to think of security in terms of spatial proximity. For instance, if we are interested in security relations between states, geography becomes a relevant factor. Threats and risks are often felt more acutely over short distances. Yet a strict inside/outside divide is not always helpful when conducting security studies. Risks and threats may work over long distances and may arise also from within the referent objects themselves.

Adding to this complexity, the concept of security has both an objective and a subjective side to it. Threats and risks may be ‘real’ in the sense that they exit objectively and independently of actors’ perceptions. This implies that a unit exposed to threats and risks may sometimes be unaware of their existence. In other words, the referent object of security – for example, a state – may be insecure even if it does not recognise that this is the situation. If that is the case, then ‘real’ threats in the international system – the existence of a hidden nuclear arsenal combined with an unexposed intention to use it for aggressive purposes – do not necessarily influence the behaviour of their potential or intended victims. The opposite is also true: Threats and risks may be constructs of mind. A state or an individual may feel insecure or threatened even though there may exist no ‘real’ basis or ‘objective’ reasons for this feeling. The objective/subjective dichotomy, therefore, points to the importance of perceptions – and misperceptions – in international relations (Jervis 1976).
Last, but no least, security implies concern with (potential) developments and events in the future (Baldwin 1997:17). Although the term ‘security’ often entails assessments of a present situation, it is intimately linked to (uncertain) forecasts about conditions in the future. These forecasts emerge from calculations of intentions and probabilities, and may often involve different scenarios for the future, be it in an immediate, medium or long-term perspective. Predictability, therefore, and (the obtainment of) credible information about what is going to happen in the future, is often integral to actors’ security concerns. In one sense, predictability can be regarded as a universal core value, because it provides actors with the opportunity to address security issues and threats and to adopt policy measures in due time.30

2.2 Security in the realist and liberal traditions

Realism and liberalism can be regarded as different perceptual lenses or as ‘complementary views of the world’ (Kauppi and Viotti 1993:5). One may argue that the two images are theoretically equipped for dealing with different aspects of world politics, and that they are not equally fit for addressing the same issues or for answering the same questions. Since they differ in research focus, they also tend to ‘see’ different things (ibid.). Thus, depending on what is being studied, there is reason to assume that insights from both traditions could be useful in many analyses.31

2.2.1 Realism: Anarchy, military power and the primacy of national security

Realist analyses start from a state-centrist worldview and from the premise of international anarchy (Kauppi and Viotti 1993:5–7; Donnelly 2000; Frankel (ed.) 1996). Since the international system is essentially a self-help order, some realists regard security as the prime motive behind states’ behaviour (Waltz 1979). Others

30 See Baldwin (1997), Haftendorn (1991) or Buzan et al. (1998) for more detailed discussions of ‘security’ in IR theory. The latter work also provides a useful introduction to the ‘wide vs. narrow’ debate, which concerns the (analytical and normative) wisdom of extending the application of the term ‘security’ to encompass non-military and non-state issues (i.e., environmental security, economic security, global security, societal security etc.).

31 A third main IR school or tradition is variably referred to as Marxism, radicalism, structuralism or globalism (Kauppi and Viotti 1993; Wæver 1996). There is some discussion as to whether these three traditions or schools can be regarded as theories of IR. This ambiguity arises partly from the term ‘theory’ itself, and partly from the related difficulty of defining a set of ‘liberal’, ‘realist’ and ‘globalist’ assumptions about how the world hangs together. For instance, Frankel (1996:xiii) asserts that ‘realism is a paradigm, not a theory’. He speaks of realism as a ‘collection of assumptions’ and of ‘different realist schools’ belonging to a broader ‘realist family’ (ibid.:xi–xiv). In his turn, Donnelly (2000:6–9) sees realism as an ‘approach’ that reflects a philosophical disposition, a mode of thinking, or a distinct, but still diverse, style or tradition of analysis. Here I regard both liberalism and realism as ‘worldviews’ or ‘perspectives’ rather than as ‘theories’ in a more strict, scientific sense.
argue that lust for power is their main driving force (Morgenthau 1985 [1948]). In either case, realists assume that states’ pursuit of these objectives generate a struggle for power in the international system (Donnelly 2000). And since military capabilities are regarded as the ultimate means of power states can possess, concern with balancing (or outweighing) the military capabilities of others lies at the core of the international power struggle. Thus, realists start from seeing states having incompatible interests, and assume that this fosters tensions and inhibits cooperation among them. Realists also tend to focus on the potential for war and conflict in world politics. Accordingly, there are strong sentiments of pessimism in the worldview of many realist writers.\(^{32}\)

Realism is a useful starting point for this analysis because it emphasises the important role of national security as a driving force behind state behaviour. Realists assume that ‘within the hierarchy of international issues, national security usually tops the list’ (Kauppi and Viotti 1993:7). This ontological claim reflects the view that before states do anything else, they must make sure that they will survive as political-territorial units. As one scholar puts it: ‘Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities’ (Waltz 1979:91).\(^{33}\)

The current approach sympathises with this argument. Concern with national security – and the means to achieve it – is assumed to lie at the core of Russia’s foreign policy conduct. I regard as relevant also the realist assumption that states’ concern with security entails concern also with their (relative) power position. However, this does not imply that Russia has a fixed perception of what the actual or desired conditions for national security are; that power is regarded by Russia only in terms of military capabilities; or that Russia cannot formulate interests that go beyond the goal of mere survival. In fact, it is the very application of the term ‘security’ and the manner and extent to which national security, power considerations and other state interests have affected Russia’s policy that constitute the theme of this study.

\(^{32}\) Some realists would not agree with this view. Glaser (1994) speaks explicitly of realists as optimists. Spirtas (in Frankel (ed.) 1996) identifies two different realist schools of ‘tragedy’ (systemic-driven) and ‘evil’ (motivation-driven), in which the former is apparently rooted in a more pessimistic worldview than the latter.  

\(^{33}\) On the basis of this argument, Waltz (1979) assumes that states will be driven towards seeking a minimum of power defined as capabilities that may secure survival. Since the ability of states to survive in the ultimate case will depend on their material capabilities and their relative position in the international structure (weaponry, economy, alliances), the obtainment of these become central motives in states’ behaviour.
2.2.2 Liberalism: Anarchy revisited and security redefined

Liberal approaches to IR have confronted realism along several dimensions: By challenging its state-centric worldview; by questioning the utility of treating states as ‘unitary, rational actors’; and by disputing the (pessimistic) implications drawn by realists from international anarchy (Little 1996:74–77; Kauppi and Viotti 1993:7–8; 228–232). To be sure, most liberals accept that ‘anarchy’ captures an important feature of world politics (Kauppi and Viotti 1993:231). They also acknowledge that anarchy may foster distrust and fear among states, and that this may pose an obstacle to international cooperation and peace. However, rather than seeing anarchy produce a world of conflicting interests, liberal scholars assume that there exist a mixture of shared, complementary and incompatible interests among states (ibid.:233). Liberals have also been concerned with how anarchy is modified: By actors’ interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977); by the existence of international institutions (Keohane 1989); and by other factors – systemic or unit attributes – that contribute to make the world less brutal or conflicting. Accordingly, liberal scholars tend to find greater scope for international cooperation (and peace) than their realist counterparts.34

In a fundamental sense, therefore, liberalism paints a more complex picture of world politics than does realism. With regard to security, some important differences are reflected in their (relative) research focus. Firstly, there has been a tendency among liberal scholars to leave studies of military/national security to the realists. Indicative to this, neither interdependence theory nor neoliberalism have been theoretically or empirically concerned primarily with security issues. Secondly, to the extent that liberal scholars have engaged explicitly in security studies, many have regarded security in collectivist rather than national or state-centred terms, or approached it through a prism of individual security (Buzan 1991). This arguably reflects their concern with interdependence among various actors in world politics and their rejection of the idea that there exists a hierarchy of issues in world politics. Thirdly, whereas realists tend to see security and power in terms of military capabilities, liberal

34 Neorealism and the interdependence school are only two branches of a broadly conceived liberal worldview concerned with how anarchy is modified. Others would stress the importance of shared identities, norms and informal rules of behaviour, or argue that ‘anarchy’ itself is socially constructed (Wendt 1992; 1999; Katzenstein (ed.) (1996)). There is arguably a close link between liberalism/neoliberalism and constructivism when it comes to criticism of a (material and conflict-oriented) realist worldview (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001:23–25).
sophists have been more concerned with ‘issue-specific capabilities’ and the role of institutions and norms as constraining factors on military power projection in world politics (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1989).

Liberalism has contributed with some useful correctives to the rather narrow frameworks of many realist writers. Here I shall draw particularly on insights from neoliberalism\(^{35}\) regarding the role of international (security) institutions. Institutions can be defined as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations’ (Keohane 1989:3). Keohane (ibid.:2–3) assumes that international institutions are important because they affect the environment states operate in: By increasing the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate; by improving the ability to make and implement decisions and to monitor each other’s compliance with agreements; and by inducing expectations with regard to interstate behaviour. And since actors in the international system are differently positioned with regard to formal and informal institutional arrangements, they can also be expected to behave differently (ibid.).

In a work devoted to the particular role of security institutions, Haftendorn et al. (eds) (1999) have outlined some important security dividends for states that can be derived from participation in such arrangements. Most fundamentally, access to security institutions is an investment in information that may reduce uncertainty and increase predictability and thus enable states to design security strategies appropriate to their situation (ibid.:1–4). Institutions not only provide information about the interests, capabilities and intentions of other states and thus complement states’ threat assessments. They can also serve as informational or signalling mechanisms with regard to own interests and intentions. Hence, security institutions are arenas for communication and tables for mediation of states’ security interests and concerns. Furthermore, security institutions may foster development of norms and rules that regularise state behaviour and facilitate realisation of shared interests with regard to challenges or risks that are ‘unintentional’ or not posed by any particular actor(s). Haftendorn et al. (eds) (1999) assume that these (potential) security dividends

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\(^{35}\) Or ‘neoliberal institutionalism’; the terms usually apply to the same group of scholars/works (Baldwin 1993).
contribute to make participation in institutional arrangements attractive for states. This assumption is an important starting point for the current analysis of Russia’s policy.

Insights from a broadly conceived liberal perspective have inspired my approach in one additional and important way. Although states are assumed to be purposive agents that approach decisions in a cost–beneficial or utilitarian manner, I sympathise with the liberal (and constructivist) arguments in favour of opening up the ‘state box’ and look also at internal features that may affect the formulation of states interests and decisions at a given point. At one level, this dictates a certain sensitivity vis-à-vis various societal conditions (i.e., the internal Russian ‘state of affairs’) and the (potential) effects on Russian decisions resulting from domestic political pressure groups. Yet on a more fundamental level I am also concerned with how changes and continuities in Russia’s (officially accepted) ‘identity’ constrained or disposed the government’s decisions. However pragmatic, this stance may arguably contribute to make the analysis more rich and comprehensive.36

2.3 A model for post-Cold War security thinking

The preceding sections show that there exists great diversity when it comes to conceptualisation of ‘security’ in IR theory and some fundamental differences in the way two dominating traditions have approached security issues. Beyond the basic concept of ‘anarchy’, realism has contributed with some lasting insights regarding power politics, the centrality of states, the logic of survival, and the dynamics of security/insecurity in world politics (Buzan 1996:59–61). Nonetheless, a broadly conceived liberal tradition has contributed with some necessary correctives based on the observation that world politics is often more complex and less conflicting than what is often depicted by realists. As indicated above, I believe that insights from both traditions may be helpful in an analysis of Russia’s policy.

36 During the 1980s and early 1990s, debate between representatives of neorealism and neoliberalism emerged as perhaps the defining feature of IR theory (Wæver 1996; Ruggie 1998:4–11). Both ‘neos’ underwent development in direction of becoming IR ‘theories’ in a more strict, positivist (‘scientific’) sense. The two were also seen as increasingly compatible (‘neo-neo synthesis’), with scholars from both camps engaging in empirical studies on the consequences of anarchy, on the scope and likelihood of international cooperation, and on the role of international institutions (Baldwin (ed.) 1993). Arguably, it was the theoretical minimalism and the largely positivist conception of science in these studies that sparked the ‘constructivist turn’ in IR theory in the 1990s (Checkel (1998); but see also Hopf (1998) and Ruggie (1998)).
2.3.1 Subjective security and the notion of ‘securitisation’

This study posits security primarily in subjectivist terms: Security is a feeling or a perceived condition. Presumably, Russia’s behaviour is affected not by the ‘objective existence’ of risks or threats, but rather by the security thinking and threat perceptions that prevail among the policymaking elite in Moscow. With this in mind, I find the concept of ‘securitisation’ advocated by scholars such as Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan a useful instrument (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). In their view, security is essentially about the framing (by actors) of phenomena as existentially threatened with the aim of justifying particular actions or influencing decisions or outcomes. These scholars start from the idea that any public issues can be depicted on a scale according to its perceived urgency or priority: Issues may be non-politicised, politicised or securitised (Buzan et al. 1998:23). These categories are in principle open in the sense that actors may have different opinions with regard to what issues should be treated in terms of security. Thus, security manifests itself through an intersubjective discourse in which some actors – the ‘securitising actors’ – ‘speak’ security by declaring certain objects as existentially threatened (ibid.:23–42; Wæver 1995). In other words, security issues emerge on the public scene through ‘speech acts’ or utterances regarding threats and survival. Securitisation, then, can be understood as the (successful) moving of an issue into the third category or its elevation into a matter of high(est) priority.

In essence, therefore, this approach implies focus on how actors attach the security label onto particular phenomena or tangibles with the aim of justifying the use of instruments that are usually considered to be beyond the borders of regular politics in order to influence decisions and outcomes. Yet there is no saying that a speech act or a ‘securitising move’ will always be accepted or bring about its intended effects, which essentially implies that the issue has been successfully securitised (Buzan et al. 1998:25–26). Also, an actor who wants to securitise an issue does not necessarily use the term ‘security’, while the utterance of the word ‘security’ does not always constitute a speech act (ibid.:33). Thus, security analysis within this framework consists in disclosing whether actors’ discourses take a form of (consciously) presenting referent objects in terms of survival and existential threats (ibid.:23–42).

This is of course not to say that ‘objective’ factors are irrelevant.
In world politics, states value and therefore securitise different referent objects. This is reflected in their policies and resource allocations. The state itself, and its survival as a political-territorial unit, is usually a top priority for states. Yet beyond this, states differ profoundly when it comes to defining issues in terms of survival and existential threats or as vital in a broader sense (i.e., a religion, ideas, a value-based order, a role, etc.). This may inhibit international cooperation, since it implies that states operate with different value scales and regard issues through different lenses.

One assumption that is not discussed explicitly by Buzan et al. (1998), but which will be incorporated in the current analysis, is the notion of securitisation as a means to detract political, military or economic concessions or compensations. By attaching the security label onto an object, an issue or a development, actors may not only legitimise resource allocations and the use of extraordinary political or military measures. They may also increase individual payoffs in processes of political bargaining and negotiation. A state which succeeds in convincing an international audience that it has particular security interests connected to a matter being discussed, may (potentially) also increase its own payoffs if decisions made in a process of bargaining and negotiation appear to run counter to those proclaimed security interests. Securitisation as a means to detract different compensations or concessions appears appropriate to describe situations where ‘political gravity’ and the assumptions of realist theory concerning material constraints work against an actor’s interests.

Buzan et al. (1998) present a rather extensive framework for analysis. One problematic feature in their approach is their failure to define more explicitly when an issue has been successfully securitised. However, with regard to my study, the adoption of official concepts and doctrines regulating Russian foreign, security and defence policy can arguably be regarded as the successful securitisation of particular speech acts or securitising moves. An important part of the analysis below consists in tracing the Russian discourse on security (i.e., threat, survival etc.) in order to see how certain issues became elevated to security issues or were defined as vital national interests. This implies inquiry into how and why arguments were presented (by various securitising actors) in favour of seeing certain issues as particularly important or as existentially threatened (i.e., the survival of the state; instability in periphery; the
protection of Russians abroad; the revival of a great power role; the potential rise of NATO-centrism etc.). The findings from this inquiry will then be used to address questions concerning implications for Russian–Western security cooperation.

2.3.2 The notion of ‘international power structure’

Most IR scholars would accept the assumption that a broadly conceived ‘international environment’ or ‘structure’ influences the behaviour of states in the sense that it keeps them from taking certain actions and disposes them toward taking others. Here I shall apply the concept of ‘international power structure’ suggested in Kjølberg and Jeppesen (2001:12–14). ‘Power’ can be defined as the ability of actors to influence the behaviour of other actors and to have other actors take oneself and one’s own interests into account in their behaviour (ibid.:13). Accordingly, ‘international power structure’ can be defined as the actors’ image of a system’s power distribution, or their picture of how the possibility to affect behaviour (and outcomes) is distributed among actors in world politics (ibid.:8;13). As argued earlier, this power structure becomes visible to the actors as ‘feedback’ on their own and other actors’ behaviour.

Again, this approach is derived from the assumption that states’ behaviour is conditioned not primarily by an objectively existing distribution of capabilities, but rather by their perception of power relations. This is where international institutions and norms enter the picture. I assume here that international institutions and norms are the medium or the intervening substance required to transform economic resources and military capabilities into influence or effects on state behaviour and outcomes in world politics. I also assume that actors recognise this fact. States take norms and institutions into account as a structural constraint on their own behaviour and expect that other states do the same. Theoretically, the range of possible state actions is almost infinite. However, behaviour that breaks with a system’s existing formal and informal rules or standards of behaviour will usually entail sanctions in terms of economic, political or military costs. Thus, institutions and norms are important because they affect states’ cost–benefit analyses when it comes to deciding on actions or behaviour.

Accordingly, since actors in the international system are differently positioned with regard to institutional arrangements, they can also be expected to behave differently. In other words, variations in states’ relative connectedness to international
institutions may have significant impact on their behaviour. There are actually two
levels to this assertion, one of which concerns actors’ relative positions vis-à-vis
formal institutions, the other vis-à-vis a system’s norms. As argued by Haftendorn et
al. (1999), there is often a long-term perspective underlying states’ commitments to
formal institutions in the sense that these – over a longer time span – can be expected
to give rise to norms and more informal rules of behaviour that may increase overall
predictability in a system. Accordingly, it is also fair to assume that states have an
interest in trying to affect both the normative and institutional ‘make-up’ of a system.

More precisely, since ‘power structure’ is more than distribution of capabilities,
I assume here that states will seek to improve their relative positions vis-à-vis the other
power factors in a way that may serve their own interests. In a highly institutionalised
environment, this implies that states will try to increase their own level of participation
in decision-making processes. In other words, states will try to increase their own
weight in terms of access to, participation in and relative heaviness on these formal
and informal arenas. I also assume that states will seek to affect the functional scope
and geographical domain of international institutions and norms, or the range of issues
and extent of values that are regulated by these intermediate factors. Arguably, states
will seek to expand the functional scope and geographical domain of institutions and
norms that give good prospects for one’s own possibility to project power and
influence developments, and to limit the scope and domain of institutional
arrangements and informal rules perceived to be detrimental to one’s own interests.

By incorporating international institutions and norms into the notion of
‘international power structure’, the current approach challenges the rather ‘material’
structure depicted by Waltz (1979). I still regard his argument as relevant for many
security analyses, and believe that the systemic distribution of economic resources and
military capabilities is often incorporated in states’ perception of power relations.
Also, material capabilities can in some cases be regarded as necessary conditions for
the exercise of power. However, the term ‘international power structure’ incorporates
something more and suggests a conception of structure that is more sensitive to some
additional effects on states’ behaviour that stem from a broadly conceived ‘systemic
environment’, but which may still vary in importance across different systems.
Again, the role of perception is an important difference between structure as ‘capability distribution’ and structure in terms of ‘power distribution’. Distribution of capabilities is a relatively concrete phenomenon. This largely material structure can be ‘measured’ more or less independently of actors’ perception or interpretation of it. The notion of ‘power structure’ will also have a certain basis in concrete and objectively existing phenomena. However, since the international power structure is essentially an actor’s (subjective) image of power relations that comes about through interaction with an external environment, there is not always a common understanding among actors as to what constitutes the power structure. In other words, there may be divergent views as to what the external environment looks like and therefore also with regard to what is considered legitimate or appropriate behaviour. This is important when we seek to understand the behaviour of actors that are differently situated in terms of both geography and a system’s material and institutional composition.

2.3.3 The new international power structure

The new (global) international power structure can be seen as unipolar, with the West making up a single dominating pole and with the US constituting the ‘core’ of this Western centre (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001:31–36). This depiction is based on several arguments. First, the West has an overwhelmingly dominating position when it comes to (material) power resources in terms of military, economic and technological capabilities. Second, the Western institutions (NATO, EU, G–8, IMF, WB) appear to be the most important arenas and instruments for regulation of international military, political and economic affairs. Thus, these institutions are attractive in the sense that membership or formalised association with them is desirable for many outside actors. This leaves the West with possibilities to influence actors that are aspiring to these arenas. Third, the disappearance of (Soviet) communism as a competing political and economic system has made the world more receptive to ‘Western’ norms (free trade, democracy, human rights) and contributed to give these a rather dominating position in world politics. In other words, the informal rules of international politics are shaped by premises that largely origin in the West. In sum, therefore, these arguments may justify seeing the post-Cold War international power structure as unipolar.
However, this picture is of course very simplistic. In terms of economy, there are obvious signs of (emerging) multipolarity. Adding to this, the norms of the West are of course not the only ones manifest in world politics. Thus, the international power structure is complex and multifaceted. With regard to the analysis below, I should again stress its subjective and relative character: What the international power structure ‘looks like’ depends to a great extent on where actors ‘see’ themselves and on what issue or issue area is being considered. Also, its expressions and significance for states’ behaviour may vary in different parts of the world, with regional centres or poles often serving as interfering factors. These are states or groups of states that possess a significant power potential in material, normative and/or institutional terms, but whose power does not affect the global structure, and which are important for security relations only within geographically defined regions. Thus, not only may the constitution or make-up of the international power structure be a disputed matter. Its importance for states’ behaviour may also depend on their subjective interpretation of this structure and of the costs implied by failing to comply with its broad ‘dictates’.

2.3.4 Power structure, identity and security logics

Let us return now to the conceptual model introduced in Chapter 1. This model can be seen as the particular expression of these reflections in a European context, albeit supplemented with considerations on identity alignments. It incorporates three dimensions assumed to be important in shaping the security thinking, and therefore also the security behaviour, of European states. The first dimension depicts Europe in terms of centres and peripheries. The second denotes an East–West divide of the European continent. The third is constituted by a Christian–Muslim split along the southern borders of Europe and through the southern parts of the former Soviet Union. The logic behind the model is very simple: Where actors’ stand in relation to each of the three dimensions is assumed to bear on their understanding of self (their identity) and on their perceived security interests. In other words, the model is assumed to capture some important features that structure actors’ security thinking, their threat
perceptions and consequently also their security behaviour. Let us now take a closer look at each of the three dimensions.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{2.3.4.1 Centre–periphery relations}

As argued in Chapter 1, the international power structure in a European context can be depicted in terms of centres and peripheries. Here, the Western centre makes up a highly institutionalised security community based on shared norms and a high level of political and economic integration. The West can also be depicted as ‘cosmos’ or as a zone of relative peace, order, stability and predictability. Arguably, NATO and EU are the most important institutional components or the cement that binds together this Western community of states, which is characterised by a particular type of security relations: Within the Western world, states do not consider each other as adversaries or potential enemies. This is an important part of their collective security identity. As a consequence, military power is seldom a relevant means to pursue state interests or solve conflicts inside the Western community of states.

This depiction stands in some contrast to the centre’s outlook on surrounding peripheries. Seen from the centre, the periphery represents (relative) chaos and disorder. Actors in the periphery are situated outside the stable political, military and economic community of the West and are not regarded as part of the ordered world. These ‘outsiders’ are instead associated with political instability, economic failure and societal disorder. This induces a distinct ‘cosmos–chaos’ security logic in the West (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001:16). I defined ‘security logic’ as the security thinking and the related security strategies that can be derived from a particular reading of the international power structure and of one’s own place in this structure. Here, seen from the centre, the periphery does not represent a direct military threat. On the contrary, it is the possible negative consequences of (broadly conceived) chaos and disorder in the periphery that are perceived as a potential threat to the relative stability in the centre.

Accordingly, security challenges in the West will be viewed partly in terms of keeping the centre together and consolidating the already established Western security community, and partly in terms of preventing possible negative influence from chaos.

\textsuperscript{38} Let me remind the reader that this model is a conceptual lens or a way of mapping actors’ security perceptions in terms of ‘self’ and ‘other’, of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. The exact projection of dividing lines for each of the three dimensions onto a geographical map is a matter of empirical study rather than a feature of the model itself.
instability and disorder in the periphery. Yet this reading will also leave the centre with a limited set of alternative security strategies vis-à-vis actors in the periphery. First, the centre may try to integrate (parts of) the periphery by providing access to institutions and cooperative arrangements and thereby seeking to spread the centre’s norms and informal rules of behaviour. A strategy of integration essentially implies removal of hinders to interaction between centre and periphery. This presupposes a certain will in the centre to change perceptions of ‘we’ and ‘them’, of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, but will entail political and economic costs and may imply exposition to new challenges and commitment to engage in solving problems in the periphery.

If the immediate costs of integration are perceived to be too high, the centre can instead seek to intervene or influence economic, political or societal developments in the periphery. This strategy presupposes (temporary) upholding of borders between ‘we’ and ‘them’, and aims at stabilising conditions in periphery areas in order to facilitate their possible future integration or to reduce the risks of negative effects (in the centre) resulting from perceived chaos in the periphery. This strategy will include measures of financial, political and material support to economic reforms and domestic institution building in the periphery, but in the ultimate case also military intervention.

Finally, the centre may adopt a strategy of shielding by limiting engagement in common activities with periphery actors and seek to fence off perceived chaos-threats by keeping these actors on a firm distance. Tightening of border control and denial of access to institutional arrangements can be relevant measures in this strategy, which is essentially aimed at building physical and institutional ‘walls’ around the centre.

These strategies will seldom be pursued in their pure form. Rather, one may find that the centre’s policy towards the periphery is a combination of measures and instruments reflecting each of the three main strategies. The exact choice of policy will depend on cost–benefit analyses related to the centre’s own interests and ambitions, its material and institutional capabilities, and on the perceived receptiveness in the periphery to norms and political measures originating in the centre.\footnote{The exact choice of policy will of course also depend on the centre’s ability to speak with one voice and act as one (coherent) actor.}
Similarly, actors in the periphery may pursue different strategies towards the Western centre, ranging from full integration to shielding. First, they may seek full integration by trying to appear ‘acceptable’ to the West in order to become an integral part of the centre. Actors who pursue this strategy will have to convince the centre that the costs of integration will be limited or that their integration may contribute something to the Western community. An important step towards integration can be to adopt the norms or standards that regulate intra- and interstate behaviour in the West.

In terms of security, the potential gain resulting from integration may be twofold. First, access to markets and decision-making arenas may stimulate domestic economy and thereby facilitate political stability, prevent social unrest and increase the state’s autonomy as an actor on the international scene. Security challenges resulting from internal chaos may therefore be avoided or dealt with more effectively. However, integration with the West also entails participation in institutional arrangements that make up much of the cement in the Western security community. Thus, in line with a liberal argument, integration may therefore serve as an appropriate answer to military concerns stemming from uncertainty about the intentions and interests of others, since the periphery actor itself becomes a constituent part of this security community.

The costs implied by full integration and participation in institutions relate primarily to limitations in actors’ freedom of action. Formal institutions often develop norms and rules that regulate behaviour concerning matters that are handled by these arrangements. These rules are aimed at making behaviour and interstate relations more predictable. Thus, since there will usually be sanctions associated with a breaking of these, a formal commitment to norms and standards of behaviour will often ‘bind’ the actors when these make decisions or choose among different courses of behaviour.

If full integration is not an alternative, or in the absence of resources that might be attractive to the centre, periphery actors may seek affiliation or a more limited access to institutions and decision-making arenas considered relevant for their own interests. This strategy is an attempt to gain some weight in an already established institutional environment when full integration is either denied or not sought. By presenting oneself as an external resource, a periphery state may seek to convince the centre that it is in the latter’s own interest to consult with the periphery state on
particular matters and to take the latter’s views and interests into account when making decisions in the centre. If faced with a centre unwilling to provide full integration, control with strategic resources or policy instruments that may serve as means for the centre in its attempt to influence developments inside or beyond its immediate periphery can be convincing arguments for a periphery actor pursuing this strategy.

A third way to influence policies and developments in the centre may be to develop particularly close ties with an actor that has full access to, or is perceived as an integral part of, the centre, and then to have this actor voice one’s own interests. This strategy of agent inside may be particularly relevant in situations where some actors in the centre appear more forthcoming or receptive to one’s own interests.

If the centre is reluctant to give periphery actors any type of participation or a formal say-so in decision-making processes, periphery actors may chose to adapt their policies in a way that makes them more in accordance with policies pursued by the centre. The aim of adaptation is to reduce the negative consequences of being an outside actor, to facilitate greater goodwill in the centre, and thereby to increase the prospects of closer association and a possible future integration with the centre.

Finally, periphery actors may choose a strategy of shielding parallel to the one identified for the centre. This strategy is relevant for actors who find that the costs of integration, ‘quasi-membership’ and different types of adaptation are too high. For a periphery actor, the aim of shielding is to sustain a feeling of political, economic and/or cultural autonomy in a situation where influence from the centre is perceived as a threat. This strategy is derived from securitisation of ‘self’ (national identity, culture, values etc.) and of the freedom to pursue policies arrived at nationally and (more or less) independently from the centre’s influence. This will often imply a policy of isolation and some degree of dissonance between the centre and the periphery actor, since the latter essentially seeks to fence off any influence from the centre.

As indicated earlier, Russia can be read both as Europe’s periphery and as a centre of her own. This is an essential point with regard to my analysis. It is namely an important hypothesis here that a conception (in Russia) of Russia as a centre may trigger a cosmos–chaos logic as basis for Russia’s policy vis-à-vis her own periphery. In other words, if Russia regards herself as a separate centre, her security concerns can
be expected to concentrate on internal consolidation, projection of (relative) stability into the periphery, and prevention of ‘chaos spill-over’ from the periphery into the Russian centre. However, the success of strategies adopted in Russia will to a great extent be contingent to how the other actors in the system interpret the international power structure and Russia’s place in it and to external receptiveness with regard to Russian views and security interests. And, as I shall elaborate below, a depiction of Russia as centre may induce a completely different security logic based on a reading of relations with the West in terms of a zero-sum game of power and influence.

In any case, actors in the periphery have to take into account that power, in terms of both material capabilities and structural power associated with control over norms and formal institutional arrangements, is largely concentrated in the Western centre. This means that periphery actors face a ‘force of gravity’ that will affect international outcomes relevant for their national interests more or less independently of policies chosen by these actors themselves. This ‘objective’ force can be seen as the effect on outcomes in world politics determined by the behaviour of the Western centre alone. Thus, if the West is determined to intervene or influence developments in the periphery more or less independently of policies pursued by periphery actors, then the costs of shielding may become very high for these actors. This needs to be recognised and incorporated in the cost–benefit analyses of actors in the periphery, and may dispose them for a more integrative or adaptive policy vis-à-vis the centre.

2.3.4.2 Overlay or residual Cold War antagonism

In world politics, states and other actors may change behaviour and perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’. However, such changes will usually come about only gradually, because patterns of thinking and behaviour are often institutionalised. Here I assume that identities and threat perceptions associated with the former bipolar international structure may still be present in the minds of policymakers in both Russia and the West. In other words, the East–West divide, which is largely an identity dimension associated with Cold War antagonist views, mutual suspicion and a zero-sum game of (military) power balancing, may contribute to structure the mind-sets and policy options for actors in the European region.
This reflects a security logic that differs fundamentally from the cosmos–chaos logic introduced above. I argued that a depiction (in Russia) of Russia as a centre of her own might trigger a logic of chaos as basis for Russia’s policy vis-à-vis her own periphery. However, if Russia regards herself as a centre of her own, this may also induce a zero-sum thinking and a balancing logic vis-à-vis the West. In other words, if Russia looks upon herself as a separate pole in the international power structure, one may expect the adoption of security strategies that are (at least partly) incompatible with those of the Western centre. A principal task in the analysis is to trace how and to what extent this East–West dimension and the security logic of power balancing has affected Russia’s policy regarding formalised security cooperation with the West.

2.3.4.3 Identity in terms of ‘Christian civilisation’

The third dimension in the model is based on perceived differences in culture, norms and values between the Christian and Muslim worlds respectively. The Christian and Muslim worlds are often described as two different ideological camps, civilisations or cultural communities. Accordingly, actors can be identified as ‘we’ and ‘them’ in terms of perceived differences in the culture, norms and values that dominate each of the two camps. In the analysis, I seek to trace the extent to which Russia’s identity debate and security thinking have related this dimension, and how this has influenced Moscow’s approach to security cooperation with the West. This implies addressing the following questions: To what extent is Russia associated with the perceived uniqueness of a Christian civilisation as opposed to an Islamic system of norms and values? To what extent has this Russian identity been connected to ‘security’, ‘threat’ and a perceived need for measures of protection against influence from the culture, norms and values of the Islamic world? And finally, how has this influenced Russia’s approach to the construction of Europe’s security architecture?40

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40 One may of course argue that there is no firm ontological basis for speaking about Christian and Muslim ‘worlds’ or ‘civilisations’. The point here is that in an analysis of actors’ behaviour, questions concerning the (‘objective’ or ‘real’) existence of different civilisations are subordinate to actors’ perception or to the question of what actors think exists. The model is based on the assumption that actors located to the North and South of the line see themselves as belonging to a Christian and Muslim sphere respectively, and that they associate each other with perceived differences in norms, values and culture.
2.4 Hypotheses on Russia’s behaviour and cooperative outcomes

As stated above, the model assumes that actors’ identities, threat perceptions, and understanding of security interests can largely be derived from the interplay between these three dimensions. I should add that geographical proximity to one or both of the Christian–Muslim and East–West ‘borderlines’ is likely to increase the relative importance of these dimensions for an actor’s security thinking. Accordingly, Russia’s role as an actor on the European stage may be a more urgent concern for states in CEE than for Portugal. Similarly, Russia may have a more immediate awareness regarding the Christian–Muslim split than do the Scandinavian countries. Thus, actors’ security thinking will depend not only on where they stand in relation to the centre–periphery dimension, but also on their geographical distance to the East–West and Christian–Muslim dimensions respectively. This is what produces divergent security policies for actors who are differently situated on the European continent.

2.4.1 Shared identity and shared interests foster security cooperation

In general, one would expect that the potential for security cooperation between Russia and the West is great when they have a shared (security) identity and shared (security) interests. This implies situations where they largely agree on where the security label is appropriate and when their threat perceptions relate to the same phenomena and developments. This should foster development and use of institutional instruments to address security issues of common Russian–Western concern.

Accordingly, a shared securitisation of norms and values associated with the notion of a distinct ‘Christian’ civilisation and a depiction of Russia and the West on the same side of the Christian–Muslim divide should provide the two with a basis for security cooperation. To the extent that Russia looks upon the West as a power centre and Russia as a periphery in this (largely value-based) Christian civilisation, one might expect a Russian policy aimed at integration with the West. In its turn, the response of the West to a Russian policy of integration, which rests on a cost–benefit analysis in the West, could in turn have an effect on Russia’s own policy in the next round.
2.4.2 Cosmos and chaos: Shared concern with stability in the periphery

The cosmos–chaos logic derived from the centre–periphery dimension suggests that Russia and the West should have a shared interest in facilitating stability in Europe’s peripheries. To the extent that Russia regards herself more as a part of the Western periphery than as a centre of her own, this thesis seems reasonable. However, to the extent that Russia regards herself as a separate centre, a certain level of Russian–Western security cooperation might still be expected on conditions of 1) a shared Russian–Western understanding of security in terms of consolidation of the two centres and of the relationship between them and 2) a shared concern with facilitating stability in areas that are periphery to both. In both these cases, one might expect Russia to pursue a policy aimed at developing a security framework perceived capable of providing security for both Russia and the West and in their shared peripheries.

2.4.3 Russia as centre: The logic of military and institutional balancing

The security logic derived from the model’s East–West dimension suggests that an opposing force may sometimes be at work. Here, Russia’s relationship with the West is regarded in competitive or even confrontational terms, seeing politics between them as a zero-sum game of power and influence between two independent centres. In other words, to the extent that Russia regards herself as a centre of her own, she may take on an interest in balancing the power and influence of the Western centre. Under these conditions, there may also emerge conflicting interests and competition between the two centres with regard to power and influence in areas that are periphery to both.

There are actually two levels to this security logic of power, which reflects the assumption that the international power structure is constituted by both material and institutional factors. A confrontational worldview may not only entail a perceived need to balance the military power of the other centre by building up one’s own capabilities or entering into alliances. To the extent that the two centres share an understanding that they are not military enemies and that military power is not a relevant means for resolving conflicts of interests between the two, they will still seek to balance each other’s institutional powers, and to enhance one’s own possibility to project non-military power and influence developments by means of institutional arrangements.
Thus, one should expect that increased salience in Russia and/or the West of a perceived confrontational East–West divide and the existence of a zero-sum power game would inhibit the potential for Russian–Western security cooperation. To the extent that Russia regards herself as a competing centre to the West, and beyond potential measures of military power balancing, one would expect Moscow to seek a build-up and/or strengthening of institutional security arrangements perceived favourable to Russia and believed to potentially undermine the power and influence of the West, not least beyond the latter’s ‘core’ areas. This essentially implies the adoption in Russia of a shielding strategy vis-à-vis the West. Accordingly, Russia should be expected to seek to limit the functional scope and geographical domain of Western or Western-dominated security institutions; to increase the relative weight of, and Russia’s own weight in, ‘cross-system’ cooperative security arrangements dealing with issues in their common periphery; and to establish a firm institutional basis for influencing her own periphery. These are all developments that might contribute to a relative gain in institutional powers as seen from Moscow, and hence potentially increase Russia’s weight with regard to (future) influence on developments in Europe.

As with the security logic of chaos, geography is relevant in the sense that concern with power and possibilities to influence is usually regarded as most expedient in areas that are close to one’s own borders. Yet this may change with variations in the ambitions that the centre has on other systemic levels. To the extent that Russia claims to be a global power, concern with institutional powers and influence on external developments may have policy implications beyond neighbouring areas, and thus entail attempts to influence developments also further away from the Russian centre.

The security logic of power, which obviously draws on some basic realist ideas, will expectedly also induce a reading of international institutions as policy instruments and arenas more than as independent actors. In a realist-driven agenda, institutions are assumed to have limited value in their own right and only marginal ‘independent’ effect on state behaviour. They are instead regarded as policy instruments for states’ power projection and legitimisation of behaviour. Thus, to the extent that Russia regards herself as a centre of her own, European security institutions are presumably regarded (by Moscow) in terms of states’ motivations and the question of how Russia
and other European states can use – and are believed to use – these as arenas and instruments for power projection and legitimisation of their (realist-driven) behaviour.

2.4.4 Contingency of external perceptions and strategies for actions and outcomes

I should again stress that Russia’s expected behaviour, as well as its effects on institutional outcomes and overall political developments, is conditional to security perceptions and strategies adopted in the West and by other actors in the European region. Not only does the overall potential for Russian–Western security cooperation depend on a certain level of shared Russian–Western interests. Russia’s influence on the shape of institutionalised security arrangements will to a considerable degree depend on how the international power structure and Russia’s position in it are interpreted by other actors. Accordingly, if we accept the assumptions that institutions may provide states with security dividends and (at least partly) reflect outcomes of political negotiations, Russia may agree to the establishment of security arrangements perceived less favourable to Russia in light of the latter’s proclaimed interests, but still better than having no security arena at all. The outcomes of these negotiation processes may in turn affect Russia’s security perceptions and behaviour in the next round.

The assumed interdependence of actors’ security perceptions and policies is relevant in order to understand how security cooperation is facilitated or inhibited. For instance, cooperation between Russia and the West may be inhibited when the two perceive each other to be operating according to completely different security logics. One actor may claim to be operating according to the logic of chaos, yet be perceived by the other to be acting on the dictates of power politics. To the extent that the latter regards actions by the former as threatening to its interests, this will inhibit security cooperation. In an opposite case, the potential for Russian–Western cooperation is much greater when the two regard peripheries through a non-confrontational lens and interpret the other’s actions to be dictated by the logic of chaos. However, security cooperation may also emerge between two actors that are driven by different security logics. For instance, a periphery state may seek integration with a centre in order to enjoy the fruits of stability (i.e., it operates according to the logic of chaos), but obtain cooperation with a centre operating on the dictates of power balancing. Perceptions,
therefore, of others and of their motivations, are important when we seek to explain both states’ actions and outcomes in terms of cooperative security arrangements.

The two security logics of chaos and power should be regarded as analytically distinct from the different strategies of integration/non-integration discussed above. These latter strategies concern only centre–periphery relations, whereas the two security logics are derived from the centre–periphery and East–West dimensions respectively. As discussed above, the two security logics and the interplay between them create opportunities for both cooperation and conflict, for both partnership and discord. In fact, they essentially reflect the realist and liberal worldviews briefly introduced above. Accordingly, they also entail different interpretations of how political influence in world politics is best attained (Wolfers 1962). The power logic basically reflects the view that influence is best attained through coercion or through projection of (ultimately: military) power. By contrast, the chaos logic derived from the centre–periphery dimension dictates influence through cooperation and by means of affecting the environment in which states interact.

The analysis below is concerned with the interplay between the two security logics and the Christian–Muslim dimension as driving forces behind Russia’s foreign policy in the 1990s. I basically discuss the relative impact of these three dimensions on Russia’s policy and ultimately also on Russian-Western security cooperation or institutional outcomes in a European context. As I try to show in the analysis, the constructivist notion of ‘securitisation’ and the related concept of ‘security logic’, both of which accentuate the important role of actors (i.e., states, policymakers a.o.) in defining security threats and in adopting worldviews as basis for foreign policy, may be helpful in revealing how cooperation is facilitated and inhibited, and consequently also under what conditions ‘expectations’ about state behaviour and international outcomes from the liberal and realist worldviews find empirical support. Thus, the chapters below in a sense constitute a ‘test’ of the model applied to a case where realists and liberals could forward their different claims and interpretations.
3.0 The formative years 1991–93

This chapter discusses Russia’s approach to security cooperation with the West from 1991 to 1993. The central question is: In light of the domestic debate on national identity and foreign policy that emerged in Russia from 1991, how can we understand Russia’s approach to NATO and CSCE as remaining components in the post-Cold War European security architecture? I address this question in several steps. Section 3.1 provides a brief introduction to historical trajectories of ‘Europe’, ’the West’ and ‘Eurasia’ as guiding concepts for Russia’s identity and foreign policy, and analyses their re-emergence as central features of the post-Soviet identity/foreign policy debate in the early 1990s. Section 3.2 examines early relations with NATO, central to which were revised perceptions of the Western alliance in the Russian policymaking elite. This section also discusses why Russia joined NACC and came to use this body to handle matters of military security that pertained to post-Soviet territories and to areas of former Soviet influence. Section 3.3 examines relations with CSCE, and centres on the role and functional scope envisioned by Russia for this security body inside the post-Soviet space. The last section (3.4) provides some concluding remarks.

My central argument is that while Russia was initially (1991–92) driven by a cosmos–chaos logic that was based on accentuation of Russia’s shared identity and shared interests with the West and which prescribed Russia’s westward integration and adaptation to the Western security structures, she increasingly came to regard relations with the West through the prism of a zero-sum power game. By 1993, consensus had emerged in Russia around the need for a more balanced foreign policy and to restore Russia’s (allegedly) ‘natural’ role as an independent centre of power. The security logic derived from this new reading of Russia’s identity and of relations with the West dictated a more instrumental view of security institutions as means to pursue and protect particular Russian national interests. As a consequence, Russia came to favour the construction of a European security architecture that would facilitate the revival of a hegemonic role for Russia in the post-Soviet space, while at the same time providing her with a great power role in Europe and possibilities to influence overall political developments in the West.
Accordingly, while Russia was initially not in opposition to an enhanced role for NACC and (a reformed) NATO in the emerging European security architecture, with security functions potentially pertaining even to post-Soviet territories or areas of former Soviet influence, the security logic from 1992–93 dictated Russian obstruction to a prominent role for these bodies and a more instrumental use of CSCE in defence of particular Russian national interest in the post-Soviet space and in Europe at large.

3.1 West, East or South? In search of a foreign policy balance

For more than 500 years, the cardinal problem in defining Europe has centred on the inclusion or exclusion of Russia. Davies (1997:7–26) found that whatever cultural and religious fault lines he drew on the European continent, Russia ended up as a bad fit and always to the east of these dividing lines. The conceptual problem of defining Europe with or without Russia arguably stems from a historical relationship of mutual alienation. Seen from the West, Russia has often been depicted as a learner on the European periphery. Yet her orthodoxy, autocracy, economic backwardness and perceived Asian-barbaric features have continuously served as premises for excluding Russia and for treating Russia as external to Europe proper. On the other side, the Russians themselves have never been sure whether they wanted to be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of Europe (ibid.; Neumann 1996). Seen from Russia, Europe and a broader West have been subject to everything from admiration, criticism, antagonist views and enemy perceptions. Thus, in conceptual and factual history, there has been a tendency in both Russia and Europe/the West towards defining each other at least partly in terms of mutual alienation and (political–cultural–ideological–military) opposition to the other.

This historical legacy notwithstanding, trajectories from the Cold War period are presumably particularly relevant for analyses of Russian identity debate in the early 1990s. During the Cold War, the West became the most important ‘other’ for Russia in terms of constituting the military enemy of the SU (Neumann 1997:159–162). Despite fundamental changes during the Gorbachev years, there is reason to assume that at the outset of the 1990s, residuals from Cold War security thinking and enemy perceptions were still present in the minds of both ordinary Russians and a
broadly conceived Russian elite, and were perhaps also institutionalised in the new, post-Soviet Russian state structures.\(^{41}\)

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union regarded itself, and was largely recognised by the international community, as a ‘superpower’. This word invokes greatness and respect, but also privileges and special responsibilities. It signifies a superior status in relation to (most) others, and entails connotations of (more or less) legitimate areas of interest and influence. Although post-Soviet Russia inherited a permanent seat in the UNSC, the break-up of the Soviet Union put in question the basis for Russia’s continued great power status in world affairs. This issue became central to Russia’s debate on identity and foreign policy during the 1990s.

3.1.1 National identity and foreign policy: Westernisers vs. Eurasianists

Early identity debate in post-Soviet Russia can be characterised as a struggle between two opposing camps: Westernisers and Eurasianists.\(^{42}\) As semantics indicate, each group departs from a distinct outlook on the geographical relationship between Russia and the surrounding world. Westernisers regard Russia through a prism of westward inclination or as integral to a geographical space of which the West is also a constituent part. This arguably expresses the historical view that Russia is essentially a European country (Baranovsky 2000a). Eurasianists, on the other side, stress Russia’s uniqueness as the link between the European and the Asian continents. Her location and vastness in territory give the country a distinctly Eurasian identity (Trenin 2001).

Still, if we go beyond spatial metaphors, there exist fundamental differences between Westernisers and Eurasianists with regard to conception of Russia’s cultural, ideological and geopolitical identity. These in turn entail diverging interpretations of

\(^{41}\) Although New Political Thinking (NPT) and changes in Soviet foreign and security policy under Gorbachev’s rule (1985–91) are beyond the scope of this study, they obviously served as background for debate on Russia’s identity and foreign policy from 1991 onwards. Some important developments during the Gorbachev years were: Democratisation of foreign policy; revision of the West as an inherently militaristic, aggressive and imperialistic enemy; calls for demilitarisation and denuclearisation of world politics; and a shift from ‘parity/superiority’ and ‘offensive defence’ to ‘reasonable sufficiency’ and ‘defensive defence’ as guiding principles for military policy. For detailed accounts, see Checkel (1993), Krasin (ed.) (1998), Wettig (1991), Simon et al. (1992), Herman (1996) and Gorbachev’s Perestroika (1987).

\(^{42}\) Stankevich (1994:25) argues that this dichotomisation captures debates in Russia on identity and foreign policy all the way back to Peter the Great. Nevertheless, it obviously cannot account for the full diversity of Russian views on these matters. See Arbatov (1993), Chafetz (1996), Sergounin (2001) and Kassianova (2001) for more detailed accounts. Some authors also prefer alternative labels (‘Romantic nationalists’; ‘Atlanticism’) for the two main categories applied here (Neumann (1996); Flikke (1998)).
Russia’s national interests. Consequently, the two camps also adhere to different prescriptions concerning main orientations in the country’s foreign and security policy.

3.1.1.1 Westernism

In general terms, Westernisers identify Russia with democracy, modernity and Western culture (Chafetz 1996:672–673; Baranovsky 2000a:444). In their view, the break-up of the Soviet Union implies the separation of ‘Russia’ from connotations of (Tsarist/Soviet) authoritarianism, militarism, imperialism and Marxism. Since post-Soviet Russia is argued to be a (liberal) democracy, she is also inclined towards the norms and values of the civilised, Western world. Principles of market economy, rule of law, individual freedoms and human rights are regarded as appropriate designs or ‘models’ for Russia. Westernisers also recognise a component of shared Russian–Western/Russian–European identity based on affiliation with the Christian civilisation (Baranovsky 2000a:444). Thus, properties of ideational, cultural and civilisational kinship with Europe and a broader West lie at the core of Russia’s identity as conceived by Westernisers (Chafetz 1996; Baranovsky 2000a).

Most Westernisers adhere to liberal readings of world politics (Arbatov 1993; Kassianova 2001). Arbatov (1993:9) argues that people in the ‘pro-Western group’ tend to downplay or neglect both geopolitical and strategic considerations in their assessments of international relations. Instead, they give greater prominence to foreign economic relations and stress arguments of interdependence and the need for international cooperation. In terms of security, the ideological basis of Westernism incorporates components from New Political Thinking, which served as guideline for Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s (Kassianova 2001:824; Sergounin 2001:2–4). Central to this body of thought were the two concepts of ‘indivisible security’ and a ‘Common European Home’, which were largely adopted by the post-Soviet Russian leadership. Arguably, the elevation of these concepts into policy-guiding ideas had two important consequences for the conceptualisation of security relations with the West from 1991. First, the notion of a ‘common home’ depicted Russia firmly as a member of the European ‘family’, or as integral to a perceived European community of states. Second, by accentuating the interdependency of actors’ security, the concept of
‘indivisible security’ signalled a certain move away from the notion of ‘national security’ and the belief that states can obtain security independently from other actors.

Taken together, therefore, the worldview and conception of Russia’s identity advocated by Westernisers, which were intimately linked to a liberal reading of world politics, largely removed every reason to suspect the West of having hostile motives vis-à-vis Russia and to interpret the West as Russia’s a priori adversary or enemy. On the contrary, assumptions of interdependence and shared interests and accentuation of Russia’s ‘sameness’ with Europe and the West led Westernisers to prescribe a foreign policy directed at developing particularly close ties with the prosperous and economically strong West, and to pursue Russia’s speedy political and economic integration into the Western-dominated world community of democratic states.

3.1.1.2 Eurasianism

Eurasianists, by contrast, emphasise Russia’s uniqueness in both geographical and cultural–civilisational terms. By ‘Eurasia’ one may understand the idea of ‘great Russia’, regarding ‘Russia’ as synonymous with the ‘tsardom of Muscovy, the empire, the Soviet Union’ (Trenin 2001:12). In spatial terms, this implies seeing Russia as stretching beyond the borders of the post-Soviet Russian Federation. In other words, areas that are currently located outside Russia are perceived to be in some sense integral to the Russian state or to the state’s orbit of (legitimate) interests. In cultural and civilisational terms, the notion of ‘great Russia’ is ambiguous, and has produced some rather peculiar philosophical ideas and stances with regard to foreign policy. Yet key shared postulates have been that in civilisational terms, Russia cannot be regarded as a part of Europe, and that Russia has a particular responsibility or mission in history (Sergounin 2001:5). Thus, Eurasianism essentially expresses the view that Russia

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43 An alternative view would be to see ‘Eurasia’ as the (spatial) sum of Europe and Asia.
44 With regard to the notion of ‘great Russia’, some have postulated Russia as the ‘real’ bearer of Christendom, seeing Moscow as a ‘third Rome’ and Orthodoxy as morally superior to perceived Roman (Western) ‘heresies’ (Neumann 1996:6–8). Accordingly, Russia’s moral responsibility in world politics consists in protecting the link between ‘true’ Christendom and the Russian lands. A related idea has been asserted by disciples of Slavophilism, which re-emerged in Russian identity debate in the early 1990s and which can be seen as a separate version of Eurasianism (Sergounin 2000:221). Slavophiles largely equate ‘grand Russia’ with ‘all Slavs and their lands’, and regard this link between territory and supra-ethnicity (‘Slavs’) as a distinct civilisation between East and West. Policy prescriptions derived from this school have suggested that Russia should pursue her own revival as empire by means of a Slav Union (Sergounin 2000:221–222; Trenin 2001:51–52). A third group of Eurasianists have depicted Russia as the heart of a Eurasian ‘organism’ constituted by a ‘symbiosis of nature, spirit and land’, and as the ‘centre’ in a largely self-contained and self-sustained ‘universe’ or ‘microcosm’ (Trenin 2001:39–40;
constitutes something greater and/or larger than an ordinary (European) nation-state, and that this justifies the pursuit of particular objectives in Russia’s foreign policy.

Sergounin (2001:5) asserts that Eurasianism can be characterised as ‘an exotic mixture of geopolitics and realism’. This phrase signals Eurasianists’ concern with the link between geography, power and (national) security. In traditional Russian/Soviet security thinking, a geopolitical worldview has been reflected in concepts like ‘hostile encirclement’ and a perceived need for external ‘buffer zones’ around the ‘Russian heartland’. Today, these concepts again structure much security discourse among Eurasianists (Trenin 2001:56–66). In line with the realist tradition, adherents of this worldview accentuate the world’s conflicting character. They question the basis for shared Russian–Western interests in world politics and the allegedly naïve assessment of the West as inherently ‘good’ or ‘friendly’ (Sergounin 2001:5–7). Accordingly, they are sceptical concerning excessive westward orientation in Russia’s foreign policy. With reference to Russia’s geopolitical heritage, Eurasianists have argued in favour of a relative downscaling of relations with the West, and that priority should be given to consolidation of economic, political and security ties with the former Soviet states.

3.1.2 1991–92: Securitising ‘democratic Russia’ through a Western link

From late 1991 to mid-1992, President Yeltsin and his foreign policy team pursued a course dominated by Westernist ideas (Arbatov 1993:9–10; Sergounin 2001:2–5). The proclaimed goal of the Russian government was political and economic integration with the West. Foreign policy was directed at establishing relations with the international financial institutions (IMF, WB) and the Western political-economic community (GATT, G–7, OECD, EC/EU). These priorities reflected a perceived need to distance Russia from her totalitarian past, and to facilitate Russia’s ‘return to Europe’, after having been pushed to the sidelines of international developments during the Soviet period (Sergounin 2001:2; Malcolm 1994:164–165).

Questions concerning security were largely regarded through the same lens of westward integration. At the time, the Russian–Western agenda incorporated both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues in terms of strategic (START) and conventional (CFE)
arms control and a CSCE-sponsored dialogue on human rights and individual security. Foreign Minister Kozyrev frequently proclaimed the idea that Russia is part of a shared European security space, and emphasised the need to see interdependence as a starting point for addressing European security issues (Malcolm 1994:164–165). He and other Russian officials held out that the West represented the (potential) solution to security threats emerging inside the old Soviet empire (ibid.:165). Accordingly, Russia’s security was largely regarded in terms of security for Europe as a whole.45

In an early 1992 article titled ‘Russia: A chance for survival’, Kozyrev (1992a) presented another security argument in favour of a westward policy orientation. This article constitutes a discussion of Russian policy choices in the wake of the failed August 1991 coup and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Kozyrev argued that the fate of Russia as democracy was dependent on successful economic reforms, and that the latter could be facilitated only through integration with the West. In fact, as the title indicates, he asserted that Russia would simply not survive unless the government succeeded in implementing fundamental reforms: ‘We can no longer live without measures carried out by the government to introduce a free-market economy, privatisation and liberalisation of the entire economy’ (Kozyrev 1992a:10; my italics). As he saw it, these reforms depended on political and economic support from the West, which dictated an overall westward orientation in Russia’s foreign policy.

This article can therefore be regarded as a securitising move, or as an attempt to legitimise the government’s policy by asserting that westward integration is a matter of Russia’s survival. It was basically ‘Go West or go under’. Note, however, that it is not the Russian Federation as a political-territorial unit that is threatened; it is Russia as a democratic state. In other words, Kozyrev sought to securitise Russia’s democratic regime, and regarded the survival of democracy as conditional to Russia’s successful integration into the Western political community and a Western-dominated world economy. He even combined this argument with explicit references to Russia’s great power identity. However, he regarded Russia’s democratic and ‘normal’ nature as the basis on which foreign policy should be developed (ibid.:15). Hence, this argument

45 Although Kozyrev and other Westernisers adopted some central ideas and concepts from NPT, they were also critical to some of its contents. For instance, NPT had a more ‘global’ and ‘harmonic’ outlook on the world than what was advocated by Kozyrev and early post-Soviet liberals (Malcolm 1994:157–163; Sergounin 2001:2–5).
apparently reflects the security logic of chaos, which prescribed Russia’s integration with the West as the potential solution to internal problems of transition and reforms.

Since Kozyrev’s article was published in *Foreign Affairs*, there is reason to believe that his speech act was addressed primarily to a Western (or international) audience with a view to political and financial support for democratic transition and economic reforms, which might prevent the return of an authoritarian regime in Russia. Yet the same argument was later reiterated in newspaper articles presumably addressed to a broad domestic audience (Kozyrev 1992b; 1992c). Here he warned against the threat from emerging national-patriotic forces inside Russia. This threat amounted to a potential undermining of Russia’s democratic nature and the adoption of concepts with neo-imperial flavour, which Kozyrev believed might lead Russia into isolation from the civilised international community. With regard to foreign policy, Kozyrev saw a Russian interest in sidelining with the international community and warned against the prescriptions advocated by national-patriotic forces in Russia: ‘Internal democracy cannot go hand in hand with national–communist methods in foreign policy ’ (ibid.). The liberal worldview adopted by leading figures in the government couldn’t have been expressed more clearly. Hence, by seeking to securitise the link between ‘Russia’ and ‘democracy’, Kozyrev sought both domestic and international support for the government’s policy of westward integration.

3.1.3 1992–93: A Eurasianist call for adjustment

Kozyrev’s articles indicate that foreign policy had now become subject to domestic political debate. Throughout 1992, President Yeltsin and the makers of Russia’s foreign policy were increasingly attacked from various segments of the

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46 The perceived link between internal ‘chaos’ and the potential return of an ‘old’ regime in Russia was being considered in both Russia and the West. Omang (2001) found that Russia during this period possessed a certain level of ‘passive chaos power’ vis-à-vis the West in the sense that concern with negative consequences of military chaos, economic collapse or social unrest in Russia made the West more receptive to Russian views and affected Western policies, particularly with regard to financial aid and non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

47 At the time, ‘nationalists’, ‘national-patriots’, ‘neo-communists’ and ‘national-communists’, but also non-conventional terms like ‘red-browns’ and ‘hurrah-patriots’, were used largely as synonyms to demarcate the (main) domestic opposition against the government’s policy (Arbatov 1993:13).

48 The quoted article (Kozyrev 1992b) was a reply to proposals forwarded in the Russian parliament in favour of a more assertive Russian stance in defence of Serbia in the international community’s handling of Balkan issues. These proposals were largely derived from the Eurasianist idea that Russia and Serbia are connected by a ‘Slav brotherhood’ that dictates particular Russian interest in the Balkans. Kozyrev (ibid.) denounced any basis for an unconditionally pro-Serbian Russian policy or a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis the West on these matters.
Russian elite for what many perceived as excessive Westernism in the government’s policy. The criticism was twofold. First, attacks were directed against what was largely perceived as a ‘policy of yes’ and ‘diplomacy of smiles’ vis-à-vis the West (Arbatov 1993:17). These attacks involved accusations that the government was selling out Russian interests and conceding to easily to Western stances on important international issues (i.e., arms control, UN sanction policies on Iraq and Yugoslavia a.o.).

A second line of criticism was directed against the allegedly disproportionate attention given to the West as opposed to the East when it came to foreign policy priorities. In a frequently quoted article, state counsellor Sergei Stankevich called for adjusting policy more in direction of Russia’s Eastern interests and paying more attention to developments in the post-Soviet space (Stankevich 1992). Two geopolitical considerations lay at the core of his prescriptions. First, Stankevich argued that the distance between Russia and the heart of Europe ‘objectively’ dictated a relative downscaling of relations with these states compared to states in the CIS area. Second, he also believed that the Islamic world was increasingly gaining foothold in the post-Soviet space, and that this might have a destabilising effect on the CIS area, since many states in this area were politically and economically weak. In fact, he saw an ‘arch of crisis’ forming to the south of Russia, and believed that chaos and disorder were already beginning to diffuse into the Russian mainland (ibid.). This dictated a relative increase in Russia’s attention towards developments in the post-Soviet space. 

Stankevich largely equated Russia’s security with stability in the CIS area. His argument was explicitly framed in an ‘Atlanticism vs. Eurasianism’ context, and can be read as an attempt to develop the latter as basis for Russia’s policy. The unease with which he regarded the gradual advance towards Russia of the Islamic world and the related accentuation of chaos-threats and (the potential for) instability along Russia’s southern borders led him to prescribe a more balanced foreign policy. A correction of the government’s pro-Western bias could come about only through a strengthening of

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49 Stankevich’s article was printed in Nezavisimaya Gazeta under the title ‘Derzhava v poiskakh sebya’. Interestingly, it also appeared in The National Interest (1992 (Summer), pp. 47–51) under the title ‘Russia in Search of Itself’. The contents of the two are identical. Given the ambiguous meaning of the word ‘derzhava’ (‘power’ or ‘great power’; the word arguably has an implicit connotation of ‘great strength’ to it, signalling something more than ‘ordinary’ power), the two titles open for an interpretation of the texts as statements belonging to two different discourses on Russia; a domestic one and a Western/international one. One may only speculate whether the author has consciously sought to adapt the titles to two different audiences.
ties with states in the CIS area, and was needed in order to facilitate stability in the post-Soviet space, which he saw as Russia’s ‘mission’ at the current stage of history.50

The argument in favour of a more balanced foreign policy was underpinned by yet another concern: The fate of Russians ex patria. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, approximately 30 million ethnic Russians found themselves living outside the borders of the Russian Federation (Arbatov 1993:27). As a consequence of nation-building projects in the former Soviet republics, these Russians were exposed to what they perceived as discrimination and suppression of basic civil rights (Kolstoe 1995).51 Stankevich had obviously detected this development. Accordingly, the well-being of ‘ours’ abroad, who had allegedly been neglected in the Kremlin and by the makers of foreign policy, was now to be regarded as an important Russian national interest.52

Stankevich’s depiction of Russia and of Russia’s national interests can be interpreted as a speech act, or as the inscription to ‘Russia’ of a special responsibility for stability in the entire post-Soviet space. As he saw it, Russia’s security interests consisted not primarily in deterring the potential threat from military aggression. Rather, they lay in preventing perceived chaos and instability in Russia’s (southern) periphery from developing and spreading into ‘home territory’, but also in projecting relative internal stability into Russia’s immediate environment. To act as a moderating force in the former SU was believed to reduce the conflict potential within Russia’s own periphery. It would also enable Russia to keep ‘them’ and ‘their influence’ – the approaching Islamic world – from advancing too close to Russia’s borders.53

3.1.4 Towards consensus: Adjusting the foreign policy balance

Criticism of the government’s foreign policy was conditioned by several interrelated factors. One important facilitating circumstance was the growing feeling of domestic political and economic crisis (Arbatov 1993:15). Yet perhaps equally

50 Which was also vested in Russia’s larger ‘historic’ mission: To ‘balance East and West, North and South’, and to be an ‘upholder of dialogue’ and ‘a conciliating force’ in a world of conflicting interests (Stankevich 1992).
51 It is not always clear exactly who these Russian expatriates are. Conventionally, however, the label applies to both ethnic Russians and Russian citizens living outside the Russian Federation (Kolstoe 1995).
52 Kozyrev (1992c; 1992d; 1992e) on several occasions denounced allegations made by Stankevich and other Eurasianists that the government ignored or paid too little attention to the CIS area and the fate of Russians.
53 Although he did not discuss the latter point in detail, Stankevich’s article (1992) was essential in bringing about a new foreign policy language on Russia’s relations with the post-Soviet space/Near Abroad (Matz 2001). Arguments concerning the (potential) ‘Islamic threat’ were elaborated by other Eurasianists and by specialists on Asia and the Islamic world (ibid.; Malcolm 1994:167).
important were the government’s failure to identify more explicitly Russian national interests and main priorities and its pursuit of a pro-Western policy without any sound institutional and popular support (ibid.:19–23). These ‘deficiencies’ were regarded as inadmissible in light of what many Russians were starting to perceive as Western reluctance to engage with Russia on new terms (Arbatov 1993:23; Malcolm 1994:166–172). In a fundamental sense, many Russians felt that Russia was not welcomed with (the expected) enthusiasm as a natural part of Europe and the West. This fostered intense criticism of the government’s pro-Western and allegedly concessive policy, since it entailed a certain potential for Russia’s humiliation in world politics.

Criticism contributed to a certain shift in the country’s foreign policy during the fall of 1992 (Arbatov 1993:18–24; Malcolm 1994:166–172). In brief, this shift implied a reorientation away from the West towards greater focus on ‘the Near Abroad’ (ibid.). Yet criticism also entailed a more intense debate on the need for a new doctrinal basis for the state’s foreign and security policy. Arguably, debate over these issues during the subsequent months can be read as a national exercise of self-demarcation, with various actors in a broadly conceived political elite advocating arguments about Russia’s identity and foreign policy that can again be structured in two main camps: Westernists and Eurasianists (*RFE/RL* 1993; Crow 1993; Malcolm 1994:166–172).

In the spring of 1993, the government adopted a foreign policy concept (FPC’93) that provided some officially sanctioned ideas about Russia’s identity and some key directions for the state’s foreign policy. The document is strikingly dualistic with regard to Russia’s identity. On the one hand, it accentuates Russia’s democratic nature and conveys a feeling of sameness between Russia and other normal, democratic and civilised states. On the other hand the text contains passages that point more to Russia’s uniqueness and to vague ideas about a special Russian role and status in world affairs. For instance, Russia is referred to as a ‘great power’ with a ‘unique geopolitical position’ (FPC’93). Without elaboration, the document also

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54 Kozyrev (1992d) had earlier rejected the idea that Russia needed a foreign policy concept: ‘There can be no plan (*shkema*). There are only reactions to specific situations, and in these [reactions] Russia’s national interests are exposed.’

55 Again, the dichotomisation cannot account for all views. For instance, some ‘red-browns’ or ‘national-communists’ spoke out in favour of resurrecting the Russian empire and Russia’s role as a (Soviet-style) superpower, which obviously goes beyond the ambition of more moderate Eurasianists (Arbatov 1993:13–14).

56 See ‘Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993), hereafter referred to as FPC’93.
purports the existence of certain ‘specifics’ in Russia’s historical, geopolitical and economic interests, and depicts Russia as a bearer of ‘inherited rights and responsibilities’ in world politics. References to ‘interests’ and a ‘special role’ for Russia in ‘countries of traditional Russian influence’ (i.e., the FRSU and to some extent CEE) are equally intriguing.

Arguably, connotations like ‘great power’ cannot pertain to all states. FPC’93 purports that it is an appropriate label for Russia. Yet beyond some explicit references to Russia’s permanent seat in the UNSC, the basis for Russia’s great power status is not elaborated. Likewise, the perceived uniqueness of Russia’s heritage, interests and geopolitical position signals a belief in the existence of a particular role for Russia in world politics. Still, the contents of this role are not specified. Consequently, the text left the makers and practitioners of foreign policy with great room for interpretation.

The adopted foreign policy concept has a consensus character (Crow 1993). It incorporates some central ideas from both Westernism and Eurasianism, and balances between the CIS area and the West as the two main foreign policy orientations. Although some differences in views remained, many liberals and former critics of Kozyrev welcomed its adoption (RFE/RL 1993). President Yeltsin, who rarely engaged in public debates on foreign policy, made the following remark prior to its formal approval: ‘Russia’s independent foreign policy started with the West. It started with the United States, and we feel that this was justified. We had to lay the main foundation (…) on the basis of which it would be easier, afterward, to build relations with any country, be it from the West or East, Europe or Asia’ (Yeltsin quoted in Neumann 1996:182). Apparently, this expresses a view shared by many liberals in

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57 FPC’93 incorporates some central ideas advocated by the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP), a loose network of government officials, academics and people from the military establishment. In August 1992, this network presented a document that suggested some main priorities for Russia’s foreign policy (‘Strategiya dlya Rossii’). The SVOP strategy basically argued that Russia should develop close relations with the West and pursue an ‘enlightened post-imperialist integrationist course’ vis-à-vis the former Soviet republics. The argument was elaborated by Karaganov and Vladislavlev (1992), who state that: ‘You cannot run from yourself’, signalling thereby that Russia cannot run from the special responsibility conferred on her by history with regard to the post-Soviet space, which is so intimately tied to Russia through history, culture, economic interdependence a.o.
1993 and an emerging mood of consensus in Moscow around main orientations in
Russia’s foreign policy.\footnote{Opinion polls undertaken inside the foreign policymaking elite during this period show that there was a
marginal overweight of sympathisers to Westernist ideas (52%) compared to Eurasianist (45%) (Crow 1994:6).}

Debate on Russia’s identity and foreign policy was never about choosing either
a Eurasianist or a Westernist course; it was a question of how to adjust the balance
between the Western and Eastern priorities (Sergounin 2001:7).\footnote{Although Kozyrev continued to defend the government’s focus on relations with the West, he too adopted
some concepts and ideas that had been advocated primarily by Eurasianists: The notion of Russia’s ‘special responsibility’ for peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space (1993a); the conception of the former SU as a sphere of
‘legitimate Russian interests’ (1993b); and the fear of having a ‘security vacuum in the CIS filled by others’
(1993d). Yet he was apparently more watchful than many Eurasianists about possible negative reactions from the
West if these concepts received a neo-imperial flavour. He was also very cautious with regard to the potential for
eegative reactions from the Islamic world and from the large minority of Muslims in Russia if Moscow were to
take on conceivably ‘anti-Muslim’ stances in international affairs (Balkans, CIS) (Kozyrev 1993c).}
With regard to the
analysis below, the proclaimed ambition of having the former SU and (to some extent)
CEE recognised as Russian spheres of influence is one of the most interesting features
in the FPC’93. The document comes close to proclaiming a hegemonic role for Russia
in the CIS area. The new policy consensus reflected a belief in Russia’s self-evident
right and moral duty to act as a defender of Russian minority populations in the FRSU
(Kolstoe 1995:287). Yet the tonality of the FPC’93, its unquestioned conception of
Russia as a great power, and the vague content of some Eurasianist ideas included in
the text, are rather intriguing. I assert that the dualism contained in the FPC’93 implied
official sanctioning of competing worldviews that entailed two different security logics
as the basis for Russia’s policy. I will argue later that Moscow’s use of these
ambiguous concepts, and the failure to fill them with clear content in interaction with
the West, to some extent constrained the potential success of Russia’s policy with
regard to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.

\section*{3.2 Relations with NATO 1991–93}

During the 1990s, NATO changed fundamentally in character and purpose.\footnote{Arguably, NATO has gone from being an (‘exclusive’) military alliance to become a (more ‘inclusive’) security management institution, or from ‘collective defence’ (focus on territorial defence) to ‘collective security’ (concern with task beyond territorial defence) (Wallander and Keohane 1999; Yost (1998)).}

These changes came about only gradually and not without hesitation among the actors
involved. However, an important step towards transformation was taken already at the
Rome summit in November 1991 when the alliance approved a new strategic concept
that called for NATO to become a more political alliance with security missions beyond the basic task of territorial defence of its member states.61 A second step was the establishment of NACC in late 1991, which became NATO’s ‘outreach program’ to states in the former Eastern bloc (Kugler 1996), and which established a forum for consultations on a wide range of military and political issues. Thus, in the immediate wake of Soviet dissolution and the 1989–91 geopolitical shift in Europe, Russia faced questions regarding how to conceive of the former military enemy, and also whether and how to formalise security relations with NATO.

3.2.1 Revised perceptions of a former enemy

During the first couple of years, the Russian government had a largely positive view of NATO (Sergounin 2001:3–4). The Western alliance was not perceived as an aggressive organisation with offensive motives vis-à-vis Russia. Although many started to question NATO’s raison d’être after the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in early 1991, Russia’s foreign policy officials did not insist on a corresponding Western dissolution of NATO. On the contrary, utterances and decisions that might have invoked suspicion in the West of a remaining confrontational worldview appear to have been carefully avoided by Moscow officials. In liberal Russian circles, the transatlantic alliance was in fact frequently recognised as a guarantor of stability in Europe, and as an important instrument for improving East–West relations.

At the outset (1991–92), the question of NATO enlargement was not high on the international political agenda. To the extent that an enlargement scenario was discussed, Russian officials refrained from opposing it (Sergounin 2001:3). President Yeltsin and high-ranking figures in the government even embarked upon the idea that Russia herself might one day become a NATO member, although this was regarded as conditional to fundamental changes in the character and purpose of the alliance.

Despite a generally non-confrontational attitude, Russia’s government remained somewhat sceptical with regard to an extensive role for NATO in European affairs. NATO’s composition was based on exclusive membership. This contradicted the idea of indivisible security, which was central to the security thinking of Russian liberals. In a 1992 interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Kozyrev (1992d) also ruled out an

61 The text is available on NATO’s home page: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm (2002-08-14).
extension of the alliance’s functional scope to incorporate peacekeeping missions out of area, a question that had emerged in light of Balkan developments. As he saw it, any role for NATO in this regard needed sanctioning by the UNSC. Thus, although NATO was not regarded as an enemy, Russia was wary of an extensive role for the Western alliance unless it was transformed in terms of both character and purpose.

3.2.2 NACC and the expansion of NATO-sponsored activities

Nonetheless, when NATO invited Russia to join NACC as a framework for politico-military consultations and cooperation, there was apparently little hesitation in the policymaking elite in Moscow. Russia joined NACC in March 1992 (NATO Handbook 2001:40), and participated actively in its activities during the first couple of years. The agenda was extensive, but focused primarily on problems in CEE and in the FRSU. In fact, Adomeit (1994:50–51) found that NACC became an important arena for managing complex intra-CIS security issues. During 1991–92, Russia found it increasingly difficult to deal with some controversial issues in the post-Soviet space. One cluster of problems related to the dissolution of the Soviet Army (the division of forces and military equipment; the status of military units and infrastructure; the elimination and redistribution of nuclear weapons, etc.). A second group of problems concerned emerging Russian efforts at crisis prevention and management of conflicts on post-Soviet territories. Some CIS member states were openly wary of Russian great power ambitions and attempts by Moscow to reassert a dominant role in the region.

The question of CFE ratification and the division of ‘Soviet quotas’, which involved a number of ‘non-Soviet’ Eastern European countries, added substantially to the first group of problems. However, despite the fact that NACC did not have the authority to decide on these matters, it facilitated their partial resolution (Adomeit 1994:51). Russia used NACC as an arena for achieving agreements with the CIS states and former Warsaw Pact members on implementation of CFE provisions and a number of military issues that were essentially intra-CIS or intra-East in character. In effect,

62 In the framework of the CSCE summit in Paris in November 1990, the 22 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact had signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE treaty established limitations for particular types of military equipment and their geographical concentration on the continent. The quotas for each of the two sides were to be internally distributed by the alliances themselves. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (February–July 1991) complicated questions of ratification and implementation of the treaty.
therefore, by agreeing to deal with these matters inside a NATO-affiliated body, Moscow contributed to expand the functional scope and geographical domain of NATO itself. The fact that Russia did not oppose the access of NATO countries to discussions on ‘internal’ post-Soviet/post-Warsaw Pact affairs is equally intriguing.\footnote{NACC was less successful in contributing to solving issues of conflict prevention and peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space. However, Russia’s initial position was rather forthcoming with regard to a (potential) future role for NATO also in these matters, although this had to be sanctioned by the UNSC (Adomeit 1994:52).}

**3.2.3 Joining NACC: A step westward?**

If Russia was in opposition to a prominent role for NATO in the post-Cold War security architecture, at least in any ‘old’ and ‘exclusive’ variant, how can we explain the decision to join NACC and the use of this forum to deal with intra-CIS/intra-East issues? In his address to the first NACC meeting of foreign ministers in March 1992, Kozyrev said: ‘We consider the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to be another mechanism to help us join the international community’ (Kozyrev quoted in Adomeit 1994:50). This statement fits nicely with the proclaimed goal of westward integration, although it indicates a Russian look beyond the limited Western world. Apart from (potential) security dividends resulting from politico-military consultations and interest mediation, NACC was only one in a number of bodies that confirmed Russia’s ‘return’ to world politics as a reliable partner and as a normal, democratic and civilised state.

However, officials in Moscow obviously regarded relations with NATO and NACC through a prism of military security and institutional payoffs. In itself, the geopolitical shift and a fear of political isolation was essentially a question of Russia’s strategic security situation. The goal of westward integration was vested in a view of Russia as part of a larger security space shared with the West. Within this space, NATO remained an important institution. This facilitated a perceived need for some formal link to this body. Kozyrev (1992a:13) stressed ‘openness in the military-strategic sphere’ as an important function of NACC, and regarded it in the perspective of creating favourable external security conditions for implementation of internal Russian reforms. This apparently reflects Kozyrev’s personal belief in the assumed benefits of cooperation and international security institutions formulated by authors in the liberal tradition (Checkel 1993).
These sections suggest that the East–West dimension was close to absent in the security thinking of the Russian government during this period (1991–92), or at least that it was of little importance with regard to policy. Arguably, a confrontational view of the West and perceptions of NATO as an aggressive military alliance would have triggered a power logic and dictated strong Russian opposition to any expansion of the geographical domain and functional scope of NATO and NATO-associated structures. There is little evidence to support such a thesis. On the contrary, Kozyrev and other liberal figures were concerned with having Russia recognised as a normal, civilised, and European state, and were driven by the security logic of chaos, which dictated Russia’s integration into the Western security structures. At the time, Russian interests to a great extent corresponded to the interests of the West. The two shared an interest in consolidating their improved political relations and in facilitating dialogue and development of mutual confidence in the politico-military sphere. They also had a shared interest in settling a number of problems concerning arms control and military security, many of which pertained to their common periphery (i.e., CEE, the Caucasus, Central Asia). Thus, disposed by the largely non-confrontational view of NATO and the West that dominated the Russian policymaking elite, the benefits of joining NACC were believed to greatly exceed the expected costs of non-participation.

3.2.4 NACC and the absence of a ‘Russian’ institution

To be sure, Cold War images of NATO and the West remained strong within certain segments of the Russian society. This was particularly evident in the Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces, but was expressed also by Eurasianists and others in opposition to the government’s pro-Western course (Allison 1996; Pravda 1996). If these views had any influence on policy, one could expect the adoption of Russian countermeasures and attempts to balance NATO’s role by establishing ‘Russian’ institutions.

However, after the break-up of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, Moscow was left without a strong institutional basis for influencing political and military developments in CEE. By 1992, Russia was already detecting a certain westward drift and an interest in several CEE states to formalise relations with NATO. Thus, Russia was left with no immediate prospects for establishing a new ‘Russian’ institution that could potentially
counterbalance NATO in this part of Europe. And as I shall discuss in more detail later, the slowly emerging CIS structure never became a well-functioning institution or an effective policy tool for Russia. Under these conditions, the Russian government in a sense ‘conceded’ to seeing NACC take on the role of hosting consultations on hardcore security issues that were essentially ‘internal’ to the (former) East. Given the fact that the Russian military establishment actively used NACC as a policy instrument, it is probably fair to assume that Russia’s decision to join this framework was also affected by the urgent need to address military questions creating political tensions with some CEE states and former Soviet republics. Russia had enough problems at home, and needed to create favourable external conditions for their resolutions. NACC might potentially serve as one contributing factor in this regard.

Hence, to the extent that Cold War overlay was present in the minds of policymakers, it bore little effect on Russia’s decisions. The 1989–91 geopolitical shift was obviously a constraining factor with regard to establishing a new ‘Russian’ institution. Besides, Russia and the West had a shared interest in consolidating the gains of mutual rapprochement and in facilitating the resolution of difficult military issues. At the time, NACC stood out as a suitable table to deal with these matters. And since NATO was also no longer an enemy, the benefits of cooperation exceeded the expected costs as perceived by the liberal-minded foreign policy leadership.

3.3 Relations with CSCE 1991–93

The Soviet Union was the initiator and a key contributor to the process that led to the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This document was the outcome of an East–West dialogue on a wide range of political, economic and security issues, and started a process of gradual rapprochement between the two opposing blocs in Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s, CSCE had evolved into a framework for regular political consultations and was increasingly becoming an institutionalised component of the European security architecture. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia soon came to favour an extensive role for CSCE in European political and security affairs. Nevertheless, some ambiguities surfaced already from 1992 with regard to the exact content of this role as envisioned by the new Russian leadership. The following
sections trace Russian decisions with regard to the weight, geographical domain and functional scope of CSCE, and seek to analyse the rationale behind these decisions.  

3.3.1 CSCE – advantages and disadvantages as seen from Russia

The CSCE process is essentially a liberal project in the sense that it reflects a comprehensive approach to security; is inclusive in terms of membership; has a norm-building character; and applies a consensus rule of decision-making. These features made CSCE attractive to the new Russian leadership (Baranovsky 2000b:153–154). Seen from Russia, CSCE had the additional advantage of being an inexpensive policy instrument, which was important in light of financial constraints on Russian policy (ibid.:154). In contrast to NATO, EC/EU, WEU and other Western institutions, Russia was also full participant to CSCE. This was an arena where Russia could voice her interests and concerns vis-à-vis other European states, with the consensus rule giving Moscow a right to veto decisions perceived to be detrimental to Russian interests.

To be sure, the disadvantages of CSCE are reflected in these same values: No decision without consensus; too extensive an agenda; universal membership fosters disagreement on CSCE role, functions and priorities; and scarce resources make it a weak instrument to formulate policy and monitor implementation of decisions. Still, CSCE was generally spoken of in favourable terms in Moscow and was regarded as a preferred framework for political consultations and security cooperation in Europe.

3.3.2 Bringing Central Asia into Europe

There is some truth to allegations made by several critics that the government’s Western orientation in 1991–92 was accompanied by a certain neglect of relations with the former Soviet republics (Zagorski 1994; Stenseth1999). This neglect was arguably caused by a belief in the dictates of (economic) interdependence in the post-Soviet space (Zagorski 1994:266–267). Moscow simply took for granted that the CIS states would eventually gravitate back to Russia. Yet a facilitating factor may also have been

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64 Key CSCE/OSCE documents and an overview of developments from 1975 are available on the organisation’s home page: www.osce.org (2002-06-25). At the CSCE Budapest summit in December 1994, CSCE became OSCE, which reflected a higher degree of institutionalisation of this security body from January 1995.
scarcity in the government’s foreign policy resources, which were largely concentrated on developing relations with the West (Lough 1993a; 1993b).  

With the break-up of the USSR, the states of Central Asia might easily have fallen outside CSCE, which is an explicitly European institution. There is reason to assume that path dependency and the value of continuity in political relations was an important factor contributing to their recognition as CSCE members. However, when faced with some sceptical voices in the West concerning the enormous geographical distance between Europe and Central Asia, the Russian government made certain diplomatic efforts in late 1991/early 1992 to help the Soviet–Asian republics remain members to CSCE. Thus, when the question came up: Why did Russia actively seek to ‘pull’ these states into the CSCE processes, thus contributing to maintaining a geographical domain that covered North America, Europe and the former SU?  

The zero-sum logic suggests that Russia was trying to draw friendly states or perceived allies into an already established institution in order to increase Russia’s own weight by means of a post-Soviet bloc inside CSCE. If the new states were themselves interested in becoming members, and if Moscow was pursuing a policy of ‘wait-and-see; they-will-come-back-to-us’, Russian facilitation of their CSCE membership might in fact create a certain political goodwill in these states and accelerate their ‘return’ in terms of reintegration in the post-Soviet space.  

However, this explanation is hardly tenable. Given CSCE decision-making procedures, where the principle of unanimity lies at the core, why would Russia need ‘allies’ to back her own stances? Russia enjoyed equal status with the participating states in the conference, and could veto any decision perceived to be detrimental to her own interests. To be sure, a ‘N–1’ mechanism was introduced in the fall of 1991 that made it possible to send CSCE missions to investigate human rights situations without the consent of the ‘–1’ party in question (Flynn and Farrell 1999:519). However, the

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65 Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev (1992), who was in charge of relations with the CIS area in the Russian Foreign Ministry, said in an interview that only about ten persons in the ministry were engaged in CIS matters.  
66 Arguably, the Caucasian states are ‘more European’ than the five republics of Central Asia. Also, the fact that the former were entangled in the CFE process may have presented a stronger rationale for their continued inclusion in CSCE. Although some arguments in the following paragraphs may be relevant also with regard to the Caucasian region, I limit the discussion here to the question of CSCE membership for states in Central Asia.  
67 With the exception of Georgia (March 1992) and the Baltic states (September 1991), all the former Soviet republics were recognised as members to CSCE in January 1992 (OSZE-Jahrbuch 1999).
mechanism was a complex one and applied only to this very limited area of the CSCE human dimension. Thus, there is little reason to believe that Moscow considered this mechanism to be a potential ‘threat’ that might outweigh the exclusion of Central Asia.

Besides, Moscow was already beginning to feel a certain wariness in several CIS states concerning what these perceived as signs of Russian neo-imperial ambitions (Zagorski 1994). As indicated earlier, scepticism in the former WP states and in some former Soviet republics concerning Russia’s policy was particularly evident with regard to questions of military security. Some Central Asian states openly sought to fence off Russia and to counter political initiatives originating in Moscow, fearing that these might undermine their own sovereignty (Stenseth 1999). Thus, leaders in Russia must have known that a decision to help these states into CSCE did not necessarily imply that Moscow was providing a seat at the table for ‘friends’ or ‘allies’ of Russia.

Adding to this, Russian diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing sceptics not only in the West, but also at overcoming reluctance in some CIS states themselves towards joining CSCE (Kozyrev 1995a:176–177). The Russian decision may therefore have been conditioned by an emerging fear in Moscow of losing altogether Russia’s institutional basis for influencing developments in the CIS area. If it was becoming increasingly clear to the Russian government that it would not be able to preserve a union-like structure with a leading role for itself, it may have regarded CSCE as a policy instrument that might prevent certain ‘Russophobic’ or ‘hostile’ CIS states from drifting out of Russia’s sphere of influence altogether. Given the uncertainties in late 1991/early 1992 about future developments, one cannot exclude that a perceived need for some sort of ‘guaranteed’ institutional leverage on Central Asia was part of the picture underlying Moscow’s decision.

Yet as Zagorski (1994:66–67) argued, there was a strong belief in Moscow at the time that the dictates of (economic) interdependence would eventually facilitate a certain level of integration on the basis of CIS. This obviously weakens the argument above. I suggest instead that Russia wanted to make sure that the states of Central Asia were tied to a world of democratic and ‘civilised’ states, and thus prevent them from becoming potential subjects to Islamic fundamentalism. In a discussion of Russia’s foreign policy that took place within the framework of SVOP in early 1993, Kozyrev
said that the government in 1991 found it to be in Russia’s security interest to facilitate attachment of Central Asia (and the Caucasus) to ‘everything that the European political culture carries in it’ (Kozyrev in *RFE/RL* 1993:16). In his words, Russia was to be surrounded ‘not by ‘asianness’ (aziatchina)’, but rather by a ‘CSCE space of high principles, democratic norms and marked standards’ (ibid.:15–16). For the sake of Russia’s security, therefore, all the CIS states needed to become members of CSCE.

There are actually two dimensions to Kozyrev’s argument, both of which point to an explicit security dividend for Russia. Seen from Moscow, Central Asia is located on the border between the Christian and Muslim worlds. Emerging societal tensions inside several CIS states made the liberal government in Russia wary that this region was particularly exposed to the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, which was regarded as the very counterforce of democracy, basic freedoms and human rights. The attachment of Central Asia to CSCE would imply formal adoption by these states of democratic norms and values, and thus prevent these states from embarking upon identities and policies that made them alien to Russia and the Western civilisation. Thus, his argument contains strong sentiments of pessimism with regard to the potential for conflict derived from value-based or civilisational differences.68

The second dimension is intimately linked to the first, but does not entail the same accentuation of perceived differences in values or civilisation. Rather, it reflects Russia’s concern with facilitating order and stability in the CIS area as favourable conditions for Russia’s transition and reforms and for peoples lives in the post-Soviet space. Kozyrev had great personal belief in the benefits of democracy as a condition for societal development and international peace, but also in the potential contribution to international security stemming from institutional cooperation (Checkel 1992:20–21; Kozyrev 1992a:12–13). Accordingly, the attachment of Central Asia to CSCE was regarded as a means to foster stable democratic regimes, human rights and economic

68 Early Russian discourse on relations with the ‘Near Abroad’ often implied references to a vague link between hyper-nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism as (potential) threats to Russia (Matz 2001). Kozyrev was always careful not to define ‘Islam’ in itself as a source of danger to Russia’s security. This reflects his fear of invoking negative reactions in the Muslim world and among Russia’s large Muslim minority (Kozyrev 1993c). Rather, the security argument that facilitated Russia’s decision to help the Central Asian states into CSCE was derived from the potential threats from ‘Islamic fundamentalism or other extremist forces’ (Kozyrev in *RFE/RL* 1993:15).
development in this sub-region, which would in turn make these states less vulnerable to various expressions of political extremism.

Thus, the decision in Moscow to advocate the inclusion of Central Asia into CSCE was dictated by the security logic of chaos and by Russia’s securitisation of the link between these states and the values of a (liberal) Western, European or Christian civilisation. Concern with potential chaos in the periphery lay at the core of Russia’s rationale, but was strengthened by a scenario of Islamic fundamentalism gaining territory and advancing toward Russia and a broader civilised order. Arguably, initial reluctance in the West towards having the Central Asian states entangled in the CSCE process reflects the geographical distance to these threats of chaos and Islamic fundamentalism. Yet the West also had an interest in facilitating the spread of CSCE norms and values in the European region. Accordingly, since the costs of inclusion were low, it didn’t take a lot of bargaining to concede to the Russian view.

Russia’s decision obviously served the liberal-minded government well in creating a favourable image of Russia in the West. It not only expressed Moscow’s recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the FRSU. It also signalled a commitment to CSCE principles and norms and a willingness to serve as a projector of shared Russian–Western values along Russia’s southern and eastern perimeters. Here, the two sides had a shared interest. Yet the incorporation of Central Asia into CSCE also contributed to binding these states to a security body of which Russia was a member. Thus, it eased in one sense the complex task of handling Russia’s external relations in a period of disintegration and domestic transition. It also compensated for the institutional vacuum some people in Russia saw emerging in Central Asia, and was believed to (potentially) hamper attempts by these states or external actors to establish alternative security arrangements in this sub-region.

3.3.3 CSCE and its role in the post-Soviet space

With the end of the Cold War and a belief in both Russia and the West that the danger of global war was significantly reduced, issues of conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement became central to the international agenda. This development was conditioned not least by the emergence of a number of violent conflicts in the former SU. Some of these were internal conflicts vested in
ethnic and/or religious disputes. Yet they often had international implications through claims made by various groups for political autonomy, national sovereignty, revision of borders, and, in some cases, integration/reintegration with other states. In addition, increasing attention to human rights entailed questions concerning how far principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention really went as norms in world politics.

CSCE soon became entangled in these matters. During the early 1990s, the parties to CSCE sought to strengthen the human dimension and policy instruments pertaining to ‘soft’ aspects of security. They also committed themselves to developing CSCE capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management. These measures aimed at making the conference an effective tool for peaceful settlement of disputes. The promotion of democracy and human rights was important in this regard.69

In July 1992, CSCE was recognised as a regional agency as defined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter authorised to carry out peacekeeping operations. In light of the Russian government’s proclaimed understanding of international security, one might expect that Russia would favour strong involvement by the conference in post-Cold War peacekeeping. Yet developments from 1992 brought to the surface a Russian ambivalence concerning the role of CSCE in these matters. They also disclosed different views between Russia and the West as to how these conflicts might be approached and resolved.70

3.3.3.1 Early Russian involvement: Pro-active prevention of military chaos?

During a period from 1992 to 1994, Russia became involved in peacekeeping operations in Tajikistan, Transdniestria/Moldova, Georgia/South Ossetia, Georgia/Abkhasia, and Nagorno–Karabakh.71 It has been argued that Russia’s military
involvement in these conflicts came about at least partly as a response by the Russian Defence Ministry to an emerging threat of losing control with the Armed Forces, and that the Foreign Ministry was in some cases taken by surprise (Baev 1998; Allison 1994). As events on the ground evolved, the generals in Moscow feared that armed groupings might become ‘nationalised’ by the conflicting parties (Baev 1998:28).

Although liberals in the government were concerned that an interventionist approach to intra-CIS conflicts might damage the policy of westward rapprochement, combat orders from the Defence Ministry were often treated in the Foreign Ministry with ‘benign neglect’ and even supported by ‘semi-official Go-Aheads’ (Baev 1996:151).

There is also some evidence that a strong, nationalist-minded military lobby pushed for involvement in these conflicts in defence of Russian expatriates (Allison 1994:22–25; Lough 1993b:23–24). From early 1992, perceived suppression of the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian minorities in the FRSU emerged as central to Russia’s debate on foreign policy. Thus, under the pretext of defending the interests of ‘ours’ abroad, Russian commanders claimed a legitimate right to intervene in intra-CIS conflicts. From a military point of view, this would also serve the additional strategic interest many generals saw in continued presence of Russian troops in the region.

Arguably, both these explanations can be derived from the centre–periphery dimension of our model. Concern with military disintegration and armed chaos reflects Russia’s obvious security interest in having conflicts on post-Soviet territory settled before these escalated and began to spread into Russia herself. Yet the invocation of particular interests with regard to defence of ethnic Russians in the CIS area has an additional flavour to it that reflects a conception of Russia in more Eurasianist terms. The evidence above suggests that Russia’s initial involvement came about as ad hoc responses by the Russian military to challenges of perceived chaos and disintegration, and that neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Kremlin were the primary driving forces. There was apparently a more urgent feeling amongst the military that Russia needed to act. This reflects their immediate contact with emerging challenges on the battlefield, but also a certain dominance within the Russian military leadership of a (realist-

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72 Baev (1998) is concerned with secessionist conflicts, and does not discuss the case of Tajikistan.
73 In the 1993 military doctrine, the fate of Russians abroad is regarded as ‘a potential source of external military danger’ to the Russian Federation. See ‘Osnovnye polozheniya voennykh doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993).
driven) security logic of power vis-à-vis the West, which dictated pro-active Russian involvement and strategic presence in the CIS area. And since a pro-active policy by the Defence Ministry in a time of flux might potentially facilitate conflict resolutions on terms perceived favourable to Russia and Russian expatriates, it was largely left to the generals to deal with these matters. Hence, military responses were undertaken as needs arose and by means of Russian troops already present in the conflict areas.  

### 3.3.3.2 Ambiguities in Russian peacekeeping activities

Analyses of Russia’s conduct in these operations have documented a certain discrepancy between Russia’s military involvement and internationally recognised standards for peacekeeping. This concerns particularly the principles of impartiality of peacekeepers and non-imposition of external solutions (Flikke (ed.) 1996). For instance, in a case study of Russia’s role in Tajikistan, Lena Jonson (1996) found that Moscow’s bias in favour of the regime in Dushanbe greatly inhibited Russian peacekeeping efforts. Similarly, Fuller (1994) goes quite far in suggesting that the Russian Defence Ministry, with at least tacit support from the Russian government, conducted ‘mediation’ in Nagorno–Karabakh in early 1994 that clearly favoured the Armenian side. This ‘mediation’ was conducted parallel to a CSCE-sponsored negotiation process agreed to by both sides and (at least officially) supported by Russia, a process to which the Azerbaijani authorities were clearly more sympathetic.

These findings are intriguing because they indicate that Russia may have been pursuing additional interests than the goal of peace and stability in the post-Soviet area. In the case of Tajikistan, Jonson (1996:85) concludes that Moscow had ‘given priority to strengthen its presence and influence rather than finding a lasting solution to the conflict’. Likewise, Fuller (1994:13) interprets Defence Minister Grachev’s 1994 ‘diplomacy’ in Nagorno–Karabakh as an attempt by Moscow to ‘assume a monopoly on peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet sphere of influence’. Russia also

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74 In the case of Georgia/Abkhasia, Baev (1998) found that Russia’s involvement was not so much the result of a pro-active policy by the Russian Defence Ministry. Instead, he suggests that as the conflict started, Russian forces stationed in Abkhasia suddenly ‘found themselves on that side of the battlefield’ (ibid.:23).

75 The observed readiness amongst Russian authorities to use considerable military force even in ‘peacekeeping operations’ is a separate case (Allison 1994). This issue has raised some concern in both Western and Russian liberal circles that Russia does not adhere to internationally accepted norms and particularly to the *jus in bello* principle of avoiding unnecessary or excessive use of military force. This issue will not be dealt with here.
intervened and expanded her conflict management activities in the post-Soviet space ‘with little regard of the UN and pan-European organisations’, and with mandates being ‘invariably questionable’ (Baev 1998:30). In face of critical voices, Moscow presented the operations as CIS-led rather than Russian-led (Allison 1994:11). Still, this development raised questions concerning international authorisation and the role envisioned by Russia for CSCE and the West in these matters.

3.3.3.3 Western involvement: The question of authorising Russian-led operations

It should be noted that in the early 1990s, many Western leaders had no clear vision of how to deal with post-Cold War peacekeeping and conflict management in Europe. In June 1992 NATO declared its willingness to support the UN and CSCE in peacekeeping activities on a case-to-case basis (Laugen 1999:26). Over the subsequent three years, the Western alliance became deeply involved in the war in Bosnia, which constituted the first operational phase of NATO’s out-of-area policy. However, there was no talk of having NATO become militarily involved in operations on post-Soviet territories, which would be unacceptable also to the Russian military and the Russian political opposition. In fact, it appears that non-engagement in CIS affairs was the prevailing Western approach during the first couple of years (Baranovsky 1994; Baev 1998). Accordingly, reactions in the West to Russia’s peacekeeping activities varied from ‘mild disapproval to tacit encouragement’ (Baev 1998:30). This arguably reflected the absence of vital Western interest and reluctance to engage in matters far from the Western centre, but also acceptance that Russia could be left with the task of pursuing a shared Russian–Western interest in suppressing signs of chaos and instability in their common periphery (CIS).

However, the question of Western involvement and international authorisation of Russia’s military operations lurked in the background. At an early stage, Russia apparently favoured an extensive role for NACC in this regard (Allison 1994:37–41). Some Russian experts saw NACC as a particularly suitable body for implementing UN-mandated operations in the post-Soviet space. NACC not only encompassed the main powers and the states threatened by instability. One might also count on using NATO infrastructure if decisions were taken to launch peacekeeping operations. In
this scenario, NACC might develop into a joint Russian–Western instrument for dealing with conflict management and peacekeeping even in the Soviet space.⁷⁶

Foreign Minister Kozyrev was no stranger to this idea. However, it appears that he regarded a role for NACC in peacekeeping operations on former Soviet territory as conditional to a development of this body into a structure independent from NATO (Allison 1994:39–40; Mihalka 1994:36–38). He also made it clear that any role for NACC in these matters would have to be linked to CSCE. At first, these two bodies were seen as in some sense overlapping structures, in which NACC would deal with military issues, and CSCE with political and other matters. However, in early 1993 Kozyrev suggested that a vertical line of responsibility be established from the UN and CSCE to NACC in questions of peacekeeping in the CSCE area. At the same time, President Yeltsin called for international organisations to grant Russia ‘special powers’ as guarantor of peace and stability in CIS area. By early 1994, Kozyrev’s model had developed into a proposed framework in which CSCE would assume the task of ‘coordinating’ peacekeeping efforts by the various regional institutions (Allison 1994:39–40). Now, NATO, NACC and CIS were depicted as belonging to an identical organisational level in a security framework that had CSCE at its centre.⁷⁷

Parallel to these developments, the Russian government sought to increase the status of CIS by suggesting that it should receive observer status in the UN and that it should be formally recognised as a regional structure with responsibility for peacekeeping as defined in the UN Charter (Allison 1994:34–35). Russian military authorities also sought to develop a joint CIS military framework including collective peacekeeping forces and an integrated command structure to deal with intra-CIS conflicts (ibid.:11–16). Yet many CIS states were either unwilling and/or unable to provide personnel, equipment and funding for this structure. Scepticism towards Russia’s intentions also facilitated orientation to the West and preference for a CSCE framework for peacekeeping. Accordingly, these Russian efforts largely failed.

⁷⁶ Among others, Russian academic Dmitri Trenin put forward this argument. See Allison (1994:40).
⁷⁷ See Allison (1994) and Crow (1993) for detailed accounts of Russian diplomatic initiatives and proposals on these matters. Allison (1994:48–49) found that Russia from late 1993 to the summer of 1994 developed a more assertive policy by moving away from an initial willingness to see Russian-led operations being monitored by CSCE representatives, and came to regard as less expedient the formal sanctioning (by CSCE) of her operations.
This evidence suggests that Russia now promoted an institutional framework that would give CSCE an extensive role in the European security architecture as a whole, but only a limited role with regard to peacekeeping and conflict management in the CIS area. Arguably, this development can be derived from the security logic of a zero-sum power game, which was increasingly influencing the formulation of Russia’s policy vis-à-vis the West. As the political elite in Moscow came to regard Russia as an alternative centre with legitimate rights and a special responsibility for stability in the post-Soviet space, Russia became concerned with developing an exclusive institutional basis for Russian influence and power projection. And although there was apparently an emerging feeling in Moscow that one needed international sanctioning of Russian peacekeeping activities in the CIS area, there were limits as to how expedient this was regarded. The foreign policy concept adopted in March 1993 called explicitly for activation of ‘primarily bilateral forms of Russian mediation and peacemaking’ and for international sanctioning only ‘if necessary’ and ‘as the need arises’ (FPC’93). Thus, the document contains a clear message to the West: This is our area, and we’ll let you know if your services are needed.78

Obviously, an emerging scenario of NATO enlargement underlay developments in Russian–Western relations from mid-1993 (Kugler 1996:62–63). To some extent, manifest reluctance in the West towards an extensive role for CSCE in the emerging European security architecture facilitated the 1993 shift in Russia in direction of seeing CIS as Moscow’s preferred instrument for authorising and mandating peacekeeping operations. Still, there is little (if any) evidence that Russia’s policy on these matters was dictated by fear of an emerging hostile West or an aggressive NATO alliance, which would dictate balancing in terms of military build-up and alliance formation. Rather, what we see is the reflection of a Russian great power legacy or a depiction of Russia as an alternative centre to the West which sparked a need for institutional balancing and for limiting Western influence on developments in Russia’s own periphery or ‘backyard’. Arguably, this was particularly important in face of emerging internal and external constraints on Russia’s economic capabilities and military power.

78 There are strong indications that Russian calls for international support to peacekeeping operations in the CIS area may have been motivated primarily by financial considerations, with Russia seeking a sharing of burdens more than legitimisation of her own conduct (Kozyrev 1993a; Kozyrev 1995a:117–118; Raphael et al. 1993:40).
3.3.3.4 CSCE and the promotion of democracy and human rights

If CSCE were to be a ‘cornerstone’ in Europe as a whole, but have only a limited role with regard to peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space, what exactly was the functional scope of CSCE in the CIS area as envisioned by Moscow? During 1993 and early 1994 arrangements were made for CSCE observers to be deployed in South Ossetia, Transdniestria, Abkhasia and Nagorno–Karabakh (Allison 1994; Baev 1998). However, in most cases, these decisions came about only after ‘much quarrelling’ (Baev 1998:30). Also, Russian concessions were in many cases given only in terms of inspection powers in the human rights field. Arguably, this reflects Russian unwillingness to see any substantial role for CSCE in ‘hardcore’ security issues in the CIS area, and points towards seeing ‘third basket issues’, or the promotion of democracy and human rights, as Moscow’s envisioned role for CSCE in this region.

Several CEE and CIS states were inclined to seeing an extensive role for CSCE also in areas of former Soviet influence. Allison (1994:48–49) found that these states prevented the adoption in 1993 of a CSCE framework for conflict monitoring proposed by Russia that the Western states were close to accepting, and which would imply de facto legitimisation of Russian activities in the CIS area, but only limited CSCE presence through observers. However, during 1993, on the basis of observed developments in the CIS area, worries grew also in the West that Russia was pursuing not so much peace and resolution of conflicts, but rather the revival of a Russian sphere of influence (Crow 1993). This concern fostered a growing Western interest in developing instruments that might facilitate monitoring of Russia’s military conduct and make it possible for CSCE to play a greater role.

Again, these developments can be derived from our model. Promotion of democracy and human rights in the CIS area had been securitised in Russia in 1991–92 as conditions for stability in the post-Soviet space. From 1992–93, the security logic of power dictated a shielding strategy in terms of Russian policy measures aimed at

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79 In the case of Nagorno–Karabakh, agreement on having the CSCE ‘Minsk group’ act as mediator in the conflict was reached already in 1992.
80 In an address to the UN General Assembly in September 1993 Kozyrev explicitly dismissed the idea that Russia would concede to seeing third parties undermine Russia’s ‘special responsibility’ as peacekeeper in the CIS area (Crow 1993:4). On another occasion he linked this argument explicitly to geopolitics and the need to protect Russian ‘positions that took centuries to conquer’ (Kozyrev quoted in Crow 1993:4).
balancing or fencing off Western influence in the CIS area, while at the same time preserving a certain Russian weight in the handling of European security affairs to Russia’s west. The promotion of a prominent role for CSCE in Europe at large served the latter interest, while the adoption of CIS as Russia’s preferred instrument for conflict management in the post-Soviet space served the former. 81 Nevertheless, as pressure grew from the West and from states in Russia’s periphery to provide CSCE with a functional scope in the CIS area, Russia conceded to letting CSCE play a rather limited role through observers and mandates pertaining primarily to ‘soft’ issues. Consequently, the perceived costs of these concessions must have been lower than the potential costs of being regarded by others as a neo-imperial state. 82

On its side, the West was reluctant towards becoming heavily involved in the CIS area, and was increasingly regarding NATO as its preferred security instrument. However, Russia and the West had a shared interest in promoting democracy, human rights and basic freedoms as conditions for peace in their common peripheries. Both regarded CSCE as a suitable instrument in this regard. Yet their motivations vis-à-vis CSCE differed somewhat from 1993. To the West, CSCE might serve the additional purpose of monitoring Russia’s peacekeeping conduct on former Soviet territory. Seen from Russia, CSCE provided an institutional arena where the rights of Russians in the FRSU could be raised and defended (Zagorski 1997:525). Accordingly, although the functional scope and the perceived appropriate role of CSCE became subject to Russian–Western controversies later in the 1990s, there was a shared interest in preserving this body as one component in the emerging European security architecture.

3.4 Some conclusions 1991–93: The rise of an alternative centre

This chapter suggests that some ambiguities developed in Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War European security architecture already in the formative years of Russia’s post-Soviet existence. Whereas the policymaking elite was

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81 In the 1993 foreign policy concept, CSCE is depicted as a ‘central channel’ for Russia’s involvement in European affairs, and as an instrument to ‘bring the CIS area up to a European level’ in matters of human rights and basic freedoms (FPC’93). The document also advocates institutionalisation and transformation of CSCE into ‘a fundamental element’ in a new international architecture (ibid.).

82 Any involvement by CSCE in these matters would be (at least partly) on terms dictated by Moscow. Also, given the limitations set to CSCE involvement, the presence of international observers might actually give some legitimacy to Russia’s unilateralist or allegedly CIS-sanctioned peacekeeping efforts (Baev 1998).
initially not in opposition to an extensive role for (a reformed) NATO, Russia soon came to favour CSCE as her preferred framework for dealing with security issues in Europe at large. However, inside the post-Soviet space, Moscow from 1992–93 in effect contributed to limit the functional scope of CSCE to ‘soft’ issues by insisting on treating peacekeeping and conflict management as an exclusive Russian responsibility, if necessary with institutional backing from the rather hollow CIS structure. Thus, there emerged a strong discrepancy between what Russia said and what she did with regard to the role of CSCE in European security affairs. There was no consistency in the functional scope and geographical domain of CSCE as envisioned by Moscow.

These ambiguities are intimately linked to the debate on national identity and foreign policy, which produced two different security logics as basis for Russia’s policy. At the outset of the period, the Russian government largely depicted Russia as a normal and democratic state situated on Europe’s periphery. The dominating view among policymakers entailed a conception of Europe as a shared security space, and accentuated Russia’s shared identity and shared interest with the West. The security logic derived from this reading of Russia and of Russia’s place in the international system dictated westward integration and adaptation to Western security arrangements (NATO, NACC). During this period, there were few conflicting interests between Russia and the West. The inclusion of Central Asia into CSCE and the use of CSCE as means to promote democracy and human rights reflect shared Russian–Western interests in facilitating peace in their common periphery, with Russia herself being integral to the Western periphery. Shared concern with (potential) ‘chaos’ and disorder and the (potential) advance of Islamic fundamentalism was also part of this picture.

However, the government’s largely pro-Western policy soon became subject to domestic debate. By 1993 consensus had emerged in Russia on the need to resurrect Russia’s great power identity and to have the post-Soviet space recognised as an area of legitimate Russian interests and influence. As has been argued by one scholar, the adoption of the concept of ‘Near Abroad’ meant that the former Soviet republics ended up being ‘neither under the remit of foreign, nor domestic affairs, but somewhere between’ (Wæver 1997:73). Thus, the adoption of a Russian Monroe Doctrine vis-à-vis the post-Soviet area essentially implied a projection of Russia’s external borders to
go beyond those of Russia proper and to incorporate a space that was now made up of several independent republics. This is of course not to say that Russia claimed that these states are, or should become, parts of Russia de jure. Rather, the new outlook in Moscow reflected strong geopolitical sentiments and implied unilateral demarcation of the CIS area as a zone of (‘legitimate’) Russian influence and responsibility.83

Accordingly, Russia increasingly came to regard relations with the West through the prism of a zero-sum power game. The security logic derived from this new reading of Russia and of Russia’s place in the international power structure dictated a more instrumental use of institutions as a means to pursue and protect particular Russian national interests.84 Russia now came to favour the construction of a European security architecture that would facilitate the revival of a hegemonic role for Russia in the post-Soviet space, while at the same time providing her with possibilities to influence overall political developments in the West. This implied advocacy of a prominent role for CSCE in Europe at large and obstruction to an extensive role for an exclusive NATO and for other NATO-affiliated structures. The new security logic also provided a rationale for fencing off Western influence in the CIS area by pursuing ‘unilateral’ (or bilateral) peacekeeping efforts and by seeking to create a separate institutional basis for dealing with CIS security matters on Russia’s own terms.

The apparent ambiguities in Russia’s policy were to some extent conditioned by reluctance in the West towards becoming heavily engaged in the CIS area. There were some geographical limits as to how far the logic of chaos could dictate the security policy of the Western centre. However, Russia’s ‘success’ was constrained by the policies of some states in Russia’s periphery that were concerned that Moscow was pursuing the revival of an empire, but also by a Western unwillingness to provide CSCE or an independent NACC with a prominent role in the emerging architecture. Thus, when plans for NATO enlargement surfaced from 1993, Russia and the West came to pursue incompatible strategies. This is the theme of the next chapter.

83 The term ‘Monroe Doctrine’ was apparently first applied by then Presidential Advisor Andranik Migranyan and Supreme Soviet member Yevgeny Ambartsumov (Matz 2001:168–169).
84 I.e., Russia’s policy was vested in a conception of Russia as a ‘great power’ and in the notion of ‘national interests’ from the very start (see Kozyrev 1992a for an example). It is the government’s reading of Russia’s greatness, and the (alleged) content of these national interests, that changed in 1992–93 and brought about policy changes. This argument goes counter to the belief of some authors that the notion of ‘national interests’ became the basis for Russia’s foreign policy only from 1992–93 (see Williams and Neumann (2000) for an example).
4.0 Tracing the humiliation of a troubled great power

This chapter analyses developments in Russia’s policy from 1993 to 2000. Section 4.1 discusses the period from 1993 to 1996 and analyses Russian attempts to counter NATO-centrism as an emerging constraint on Russia’s foreign policy. As plans for NATO enlargement took shape and as the Western alliance took on a more active role out of area, Russia saw herself being pushed to the margins of Europe and became increasingly concerned with sustaining a level of Russian influence and avoiding Russia’s isolation altogether from the handling of European politico-military and security affairs. This was reflected in a largely unsuccessful diplomatic campaign in 1994 to increase the relative weight of OSCE vis-à-vis NATO, but also in the establishment of the Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia and in Russia’s (rather reluctant) agreement to participate in NATO’s PfP program.

Section 4.2 discusses the period from 1996 to 2000. Moscow regarded developments in direction of NATO-centrism with growing dislike. Opposition to a US-dominated world order in which NATO was regarded as Washington’s primary policy tool gave rise to the notion of ‘multipolarity’ as a guiding concept for Russia’s foreign policy. Policy measures adopted during this period can largely be ascribed to the security logic of power and to a reading of relations with the West in terms of balancing the institutional weight of the other. In fact, scenarios of NATO enlargement and operations out of area presented Russia with a particular security threat related to relative decline in institutional powers, which was inadmissible in light of Moscow’s conception of Russia as a great power. In other words, since the policymaking elite saw Russia as a great power almost per se, relative losses in institutional powers were essentially regarded as security threats to Russia (Fyodorov 2001; Wallander 2001).

However, developments put on display a substantial gap between Russia’s foreign policy ambitions and her ability to influence developments in a way perceived favourable to Russian interests. Events in Kosovo and the failure to prevent NATO enlargement were telling in this regard. Yet as I show in section 4.3, Russia also lacked other feasible policy options that might provide her with greater influence on external developments and on the shape of the emerging European security architecture. I also argue that Russian diplomacy during the late 1990s came to
advertise Russia’s weaknesses, and that this brought Russia into some humiliating situations in terms of institutional ‘defeats’ and ‘concessions’ vis-à-vis the West.

4.1 1993–96: Responding to emerging NATO-centrism

As discussed in earlier sections, the question of NATO enlargement was not high on the international agenda during 1991–92. However, during 1993 a certain momentum was created in the West in favour of enlargement (Kugler 1996:60–61). Within a few months, both the US and the German government signalled a preference in this direction. This shift came about not least as a result of intense lobbying by leaders from several CEE states, perhaps most forcefully by the presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic (ibid.; Bluth 1998:333). With reference to developments in Russia, Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel expressed concern that the potential return of a nationalist–communist regime in Moscow might pose a direct military threat to the CEE states. Both had detected growing popular support to the Russian opposition and particularly to outspoken ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who advocated a Russian foreign policy reminiscent of the country’s imperial past. Accordingly, it was argued that the West should not deny CEE states their legitimate claim to security in the wake of newly gained independence from Soviet influence.  

Formal affirmation that the alliance was open to new members came at a NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994 (NATO Handbook 2001:61). At that meeting, NATO also launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Invitations were forwarded to all NACC and CSCE states to engage in defence-related cooperation with the alliance on the basis of individual agreements. As with NACC, PfP did not incorporate collective defence assurances. From NATO’s perspective, PfP had the advantage of facilitating defence cooperation with a great number of states in the European region, while at the same time providing for particularly close ties with a

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85 Although it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse in-depth policies pursued by states in CEE, it appears that the two security logics of ‘chaos’ and ‘power balancing’ can be relevant also here. A depiction by CEE states of ‘self’ as ‘periphery’ dictated integration or adaptation to the Western structures in order to facilitate resolution of mounting problems of domestic transition and economic reforms. However, in terms of (military) security, relative proximity to (a potentially dangerous or imperial) Russia also presented many of these states with an incentive to ‘change side’ or step into the Western camp in a perceived Russian–Western game of power. In other words, they were close to a perceived East–West divide and wanted to cement a firm foot in the West.
more limited number. Thus, the program was largely designed to prepare potential members for future admission to the alliance (Kugler 1996:61).  

Although several factors inhibited early endorsement of NATO enlargement, the perhaps most important constraint had been worries in the West regarding negative reactions in Russia (Kugler 1996:60–62).  

However, this concern was to a great extent eased in August 1993. During two official visits to Poland and the Czech Republic, President Yeltsin was asked about Russia’s attitude towards potential NATO membership for these states. Although he was clearly not enthusiastic about the idea, the Russian president proclaimed the right of all sovereign states to choose their own political orientations and alliances, and that aspirations in these states to join NATO did not run contrary to Russia’s interests. Many in the West interpreted this as evidence that Moscow would not object to NATO enlargement. Thus, by alleviating one of the strongest arguments against it, Yeltsin may have contributed to the shift in favour of enlarging the Western alliance (ibid.; Zagorski 1997:532).  

4.1.1 NATO enlargement and Russia’s fear of institutional isolation

The elevation of NATO enlargement to the top of the international agenda to some extent caught Moscow ‘off guard’ (Kugler 1996:62). As the Russian government detected a Western shift in favour of enlargement, the ‘official’ reading of NATO apparently underwent a change from seeing it as a stabilising force in Europe to regard it increasingly in negative terms. Although many liberals were somewhat indifferent to the issue, they questioned the rationale for enlarging the alliance. In light of growing popular support to the nationalist–communist opposition, many were also worried that enlargement might stimulate anti-Western, anti-US and anti-NATO forces inside Russia. The December 1993 parliamentary elections provided some evidence that this

86 In December 1994, NATO launched a comprehensive ‘Study on enlargement’, where the question of whether to admit new members was largely reduced to questions of how and why (NATO Handbook 2001:61–62).
87 Many Western leaders were also concerned that enlargement would weaken the alliance’s security guaranties and that potential new members would be unable to meet NATO standards (Kugler 1996:60; Kjølberg 1999:44).
88 There are some indications that Yeltsin’s statements had not been coordinated with the Foreign Ministry and the Russian military establishment in advance. Russian diplomats were quick to denounce interpretation of his statements as Moscow’s go-ahead to NATO enlargement. Also, in letters to influential Western leaders in the fall of 1993, Yeltsin expressed a more negative attitude to the enlargement scenario. Given the circumstances pertaining to official state visits, it is difficult to imagine that the Russian president could have avoided a scandal if he had answered differently on these direct questions. Nevertheless, as one Russian scholar has observed, Yeltsin’s statements in effect ‘reopened’ a debate on NATO enlargement that had for some time not been on the international agenda and indirectly contributed to an impetus in its favour (Zagorski 1997:532).
concern was warranted (Pravda 1996). Sentiments of Cold War enemy perceptions were already widespread in the military establishment and parts of the policymaking elite (Allison 1996; Sundal 1998). Allison (1996:251–258) also found that the Russian Defence Ministry became increasingly involved in the formulation of foreign policy during 1993–94, and that its influence on decisions involving key security issues grew as a consequence of its support to President Yeltsin in the October 1993 confrontation with the parliament. Thus, there is reason to argue that a more negative view of NATO and scepticism vis-à-vis Western enlargement motives gained foothold both in Russia’s public opinion and in the policymaking elite during this period.

Accordingly, emerging signs of NATO-centrism, central to which was the question of expanded membership, became the main factor shaping Russia’s policy from 1993–94 (Baranovsky 2000b; Zagorski 1997). Both President Yeltsin and Kozyrev expressed concern that NATO enlargement would create ‘new dividing lines’ and bring about ‘Cold Peace’ in Europe (Kozyrev 1995b; Kugler 1996:64). These worries were accompanied by frequent and loud complaints from Russian diplomats regarding negative implications for Russia and for European security. As discussed earlier, late 1993 and early 1994 saw intense Russian diplomatic efforts aimed at enhancing the status of CSCE by having NATO become subordinate to this body, or, alternatively, by having CSCE ‘coordinate’ the activities of NATO and other regional structures. Russia also suggested that a regional security council be established on the design of the UNSC (von Plate 1998:56–57). This body would enjoy the exclusive power to sanction use of force to promote European security. Thus, it appears that Moscow was now advocating a pro-CSCE design that would limit the overall ‘weight’ of NATO in handling European security affairs (Baranovsky 2000b; Zagorski 1997).

How do we explain this development? I suggest that intense Russian opposition to NATO enlargement from 1993–94, and, more generally, to NATO-centrism in the emerging European security architecture, can again be derived from a reading of

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89 In the elections, LDPR (headed by ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky) received 23% of the popular vote. When taken together, the three main parties constituting a broadly conceived ‘patriotic’ or ‘national-communist’ opposition (LDPR, KPRF and the Agrarians) received close to 45%. Pravda (1996:182) found that these ‘centrist’ and ‘Pragmatic Nationalist’ preferences, which entailed more negative views of the West, gained weight on foreign policy from mid-1993, but particularly after the parliamentary elections in December 1993.

90 Baranovsky (2000b:148) found that opposition to NATO enlargement reflected a ‘consensus’ that ‘for the first time in modern Russian history’ united the entire political spectrum in Russia.
Russia as an alternative centre and from the associated security logic of power balancing vis-à-vis the West. However, it is primarily the perceived existence of a zero-sum game of institutional powers that shaped Russia’s policy. The officially accepted view of Russia as a great power dictated a need for institutional powers that might facilitate Russian influence on European political and politico-military affairs. As seen from Russia, NATO enlargement would tie new members states to the West and inhibit Russian influence on their behaviour and on political developments in CEE. Thus, the geographical zone of Russian influence would shrink, which was inadmissible in light of the newly adopted outlook on Russia great power identity. In fact, any development in direction of NATO-centrism in the new European security architecture would imply a relative decline in the weight of CSCE and therefore also in Russia’s institutional powers vis-à-vis the West. Accordingly, Russia had an interest in upgrading the role of CSCE in an attempt to ‘balance’ and potentially ‘outweigh’ NATO’s role.

I argued in Chapter 3 that Russia and the West in 1991–92 shared many security concerns and had few conflicting interests regarding how to handle security challenges in the CEE region. However, developments in Russia and in Russia’s foreign policy made the West more receptive to calls by CEE states for security guaranties. This is reflected in the 1993 US shift in favour of NATO enlargement, which was crucial in shaping subsequent developments (Kugler 1996). Feffer (1999) found that Washington’s pro-enlargement decision reflected a change in the Clinton administration’s conception of CEE as a neutral zone in Europe. He asserts that NATO enlargement was driven by a US policy of ‘soft containment’ or ‘containment lite’ vis-à-vis Russia, central to which was the perceived need to fence off Russian political influence in CEE (ibid.). At the same time, the Russian political elite was convening around a foreign policy concept that defined Eastern Europe as an area where Russia had legitimate interests (FPC’93). The document also expressed explicit concern with perceived attempts to ‘push Russia out’ of this part of Europe (ibid.). Thus, there was evidently a feeling in Moscow that Russia and the West now had conflicting interests with regard to the institutional handling of CEE as a periphery to both Russia and the
West. Accordingly, Russia came to regard developments in terms of potential losses in a zero-sum game of power, central to which was the issue of NATO enlargement.

At first sight it is not so clear to what extent this Russian security logic reflects residuals also from Cold War antagonism and a fear of aggressive military motives vis-à-vis Russia. In other words: Did worries concerning NATO enlargement reflect a fear in Russia that this might represent an existential threat to Russia? As discussed in Chapter 3, disappointment with Western policies were to some extent instrumental in bringing about the 1992–93 shift in Russia’s foreign policy. Signs of ‘containment’ in US policy provided the Russian elite with some grounds for concern. Large segments of the military elite still adhered to a confrontational view of NATO (Allison 1996:251–258). Accordingly, many regarded NATO in terms of military capabilities and interpreted NATO enlargement as a (potentially aggressive) move directed against Russia. This security thinking apparently reflects a ‘worst case scenario’ and concern with the potential for relative decline in Russia’s military power vis-à-vis the West.

Nevertheless, I believe that Russia’s policy should be interpreted more in terms of relative decline in institutional powers and in the (perceived) possibility to influence overall political developments in the heart of Europe. The military doctrine adopted in 1993 explicitly asserts that the threat of large-scale war had been significantly reduced, a view shared by many in the West. Arguably, this increased the relative importance of institutions as means for regulating interstate relations. In this perspective, Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement from 1993–94 can be assigned to an emerging feeling in Moscow that NATO was de facto becoming the most important security institution in Europe. NATO enlargement confronted Russia with the threat of isolation in the sense that she might become more or less excluded from the handling of important European politico-military affairs. Russia was not a member to the Western alliance and would not become one anytime soon. These worries of institutional isolation were reinforced by the absence of a formal association to NATO that was perceived to correspond to Russia’s great power status. Thus, a development

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in direction of NATO-centrism was inadmissible because it was believed to imply a relative reduction in Russia’s possibility to influence developments in Europe.\textsuperscript{92}

Note that these concerns are vested not in a confrontational worldview or the security logic of a zero-sum game of military power. Rather, they reflect the notion of a shared Russian–Western security space inside which threats and challenges largely can be derived from ‘the logic of chaos’, but where institutional balancing is part of the picture. Here, there is no saying by Moscow that Russia and the West will always be of one opinion and without exceptions have shared interests regarding how to deal with current and future security issues. Rather, it reflects the view that European states needed a common arena for mutual exchange of views and mediation of their security interests. Implicit in this argument is Moscow’s assumption that Russia and the West have some shared interests based on (at least partly) complementary threat perceptions. The Russian elite had inscribed Russia with great power status and consequently also a legitimate role as player on the European scene. Yet as NATO enlargement rose to the top of the Western security agenda, Moscow faced being left on the sideline when all the other members of the European family negotiated common approaches to post-Cold War security challenges in Europe at large.

To be sure, the idea that NATO was an aggressive alliance posing a direct military threat against Russia remained latent in some parts of the Russian society and the policymaking elite. NATO enlargement was clearly a dire scenario to the military establishment: The ‘enemy’ was gaining military strength and adding new territory to its geographical domain (Allison 1996). The military leadership was also concerned that NATO enlargement would displace the Russian–Western force balance and undermine the emerging arms control regime in Europe (Zagorski 1997).\textsuperscript{93} Given the state of affairs in the Russian military, such a scenario was perceived to be in Russia’s disfavour. The Armed Forces were already struggling with a chronic lack of finances,

\textsuperscript{92} The influential Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP) in May 1994 pointed to this as a potential security threat to Russia. If the West sought to construct a NATO-centred security system in Europe, this would imply ‘military-political isolation of Russia’ and allegedly ‘reduce Russia’s possibilities to influence the external environment’ (vneishnyy mir) and to defend her interests in world affairs. See ‘Strategiya dlya Rossii (2)’ (1994).

\textsuperscript{93} The military doctrine adopted in 1993 expresses deep concern about the potential deterioration of Russia’s military-strategic position. And although NATO enlargement is not mentioned explicitly in these sections, it is difficult to imagine that references to ‘some states and coalitions of states’ and to a potential ‘stationing’ and ‘build-up’ of armed groupings closer to Russia’s border do not involve the Western alliance. See ‘Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993).
structural reforms and adaptation to a new security environment (Allison 1997; Baev 1996). The disastrous war in Chechnya (1994–96), which displayed the inability of the Russian forces to deal even with a (relatively) small conflict, only added to these challenges. Thus, there is reason to assume that concern with relative losses in military capabilities was part of Russia’s analysis of NATO enlargement and its consequences.

Nevertheless, it appears that opposition to NATO enlargement was dictated more by political and institutional considerations and a fear of becoming isolated or marginalised in the emerging European security structure. Most parts of the policymaking elite did not consider NATO enlargement as a direct military threat to Russia (Zagorski 1997:532). Critics of enlargement plans also failed to suggest any rationale for US/Western aggressive motives vis-à-vis Russia. A 1994 Foreign Ministry planning document argued instead that enlargement of NATO would create a security system in Europe that ‘would embrace most of CEE, but not Russia’ (Bluth 1998:334). This was believed to impede Russia’s participation in the handling of security affairs in Europe, but also threaten Russia’s strategic interest in developing partnership relations with the West (ibid.). Thus, although the Russian security logic dictated power balancing vis-à-vis the West, opposition to NATO enlargement reflects first and foremost concern with a potential relative decline in institutional powers and a fear of being left without arenas where Russia could voice her security interests and concerns.

4.1.2 Junior partner for peace?

An interpretation along these lines may also account not only for loud Russian opposition to a prominent role for NATO in general, but also for some intriguing shifts and ambiguities in Russia’s policy during the subsequent years. For instance, when NATO launched PfP in January 1994, both President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev signalled Russia’s willingness to join the program (Zagorski 1997:534). The new framework proposed by NATO envisioned individual security agreements with (potentially) all states in the European region. Thus, PfP did not imply a strengthening of NATO’s role per se. Seen from Russia, an individual partnership agreement with NATO might in fact contribute to a realisation of shared interests and produce mutual benefits for Russia and the West in the security sphere (Kozyrev 1994:61).
However, it appears that Moscow initially regarded PfP as a substitute to NATO enlargement (Zagorski 1997:534; Kugler 1996:62). As it became clear to the Russian government that the program was designed to prepare potential NATO members for future accession, two factors contributed to Russia’s hesitation with regard to joining PfP. First, the program did little to alleviate a feeling in Moscow that Russia was being pushed to the rim of the European heartland as a consequence of NATO’s enlargement plans (Mihalka 1994). Yet perhaps equally important was the fact that PfP treated Russia as equal in status to all the other states in Europe that were not members of NATO. Although the program envisioned individual partnership agreements, it contained no formal recognition of Russia’s role as a great power. PfP essentially put Russia in the same category as Lithuania and Georgia. Accordingly, participation in the program hardly conformed to Moscow’s view of Russia as a great power or to the role envisioned for Russia in European affairs.\(^{94}\)

Nevertheless, Russia joined PfP in June 1994. Kjølberg (1999:46) suggested that this decision came about through something of a package deal with the West. Within few days, Russia signed the PfP program with NATO, a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU, and received access to the G–7 forum. The latter point, and the fact that NATO formally acknowledged Russia as a ‘major European power’, may certainly have eased Moscow’s reservations.\(^{95}\) Signals from Washington that CSCE would be given a greater role were perhaps also part of Moscow’s analysis (Kugler 1996:63). However, the development of an individual partnership program (IPP) was to a great extent hampered by unwillingness in the Russian military to engage in close cooperation with NATO. Also, the backing to PfP from the political elite remained ambiguous (Kugler 1996:63-66; Bluth 1998:332).\(^{96}\)

\(^{94}\) In an elaboration on Russia’s attitude to the PfP program, Kozyrev (1994:61) explicitly argued that Russia’s ‘status and significance as world power’ needed to be recognised by the West.

\(^{95}\) In a *Ministerial Communiqué* from the 22 June 1994 meeting between NATO foreign ministers and Russia’s Foreign Minister Kozyrev, NATO’s recognition of Russia’s status and role as a great power is reflected in several passages. For instance, the document states that NATO and Russia have agreed to develop an individual PfP program ‘corresponding to Russia’s size, importance and capabilities’. Russia’s potential contributions are also viewed in light of ‘its weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power’. See [www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940622a.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940622a.html) (2002-04-29).

\(^{96}\) Sourness in Russian–Western relations resulting from Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya from December 1994 may also have hampered implementation of Russia’s individual partnership program (IPP).
Thus, Russia’s attitude to PfP can be derived from a reading of Russia as a great power and from the related security logic of institutional power balancing vis-à-vis the West. Seen from Russia, NATO enlargement was perceived to strengthen the Western alliance, whether this was regarded as an aggressive military ‘enemy’ or as a security institution that was not directed against Russia. Yet if PfP was not an alternative to enlargement but rather a step on the way to preparing particular states for future accession to the alliance, the partnership program had the potential of undermining the significance of two other security institutions: NACC and CSCE (Zagorski 1997:533). In other words, PfP might contribute to limiting the weight and functional scope of collective security arrangements to which Russia was herself a member, and which represented consensus arenas where Moscow’s voice would be heard. This, together with the absence in PfP of a special status for Russia, may largely explain Moscow’s hesitation with regard to joining the program, and also a general unwillingness in the political and military elite to substantiate Russia’s individual partnership program.

However, PfP presented Russia with a formal link to NATO in a situation where US policy showed emerging signs of ‘soft containment’. By 1994, the Western alliance was de facto recognised as the central security institution by both the West and the CEE states aspiring for NATO membership. To Russia, PfP was in one sense a potential answer to the threat of isolation (Mihalka 1994). In terms of political orientation, PfP supplemented NACC and was perceived to contribute to the overall goal of developing good relations with the West. In terms of security, PfP also went beyond NACC. Moscow would now have an individual arena for cooperation and interest mediation with the West on important security issues, which might potentially evolve into a strategic relationship. PfP could potentially be used to influence decisions and developments in the West. Thus, when faced with an emerging threat of isolation from decision-making processes on European security altogether, PfP was in the end seen by Moscow as a lesser evil or as a viable, but far from ideal, solution.

### 4.1.3 Being ignored: NATO’s move out of area

Parallel to plans for enlargement, NATO became more involved in out-of-area operations. The Balkans largely staged this development. In the case of Bosnia–Herzegovina, Laugen (1999) found that NATO from 1992 to 1995 went from being
'UN assistant’ to ‘independent enforcer’. A decision to support UN peacekeeping activities on a case-to-case basis was taken in 1992. This initiated early involvement in the war in Bosnia–Herzegovina. Yet in December 1995 NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced forces under UN command. A new commitment was undertaken with the late 1996 decision to prolong NATO’s involvement through a Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Thus, NATO gradually adopted a new role as projector of peace and stability outside the territory of its own member states (ibid.).

In one sense, both Russia and the West regarded the Balkans through a lens of potential ‘chaos’ and a fear of having ethnic conflicts escalate into large-scale war. However, developments on the ground soon displayed diverging views regarding how to achieve peace and stability in this sub-region. In 1995, Moscow protested against the transfer of authority to IFOR, which in effect cut UN civilian authorities from the chain of command (Laugen 1999:59). Some Russian–Western controversies also surfaced with regard to interpretation of UN mandates and concerning the legitimacy and effects of NATO decisions. And although NATO operated under mandates sanctioned by the UNSC, Russia regarded developments with some concern.

Apparently, Russian outcries reflected unease with seeing NATO take on a more independent approach to security matters without consulting Moscow and with Russian concerns largely being neglected by the West (Sherr 1995; Parrish 1995). It is arguably in this perspective that we should interpret the Russian initiative to establish a Contact Group for the FRY in 1994, which led to closer Russian diplomatic involvement as mediator in the Bosnian conflict. This body, which has an ad hoc character, compensated in some sense for the lack of institutional arrangements where Russia could voice her interests and influence decisions regarding the Balkans. This Russian initiative can be interpreted as an attempt to create a separate body inside a largely Western-dominated security architecture that would provide Russia with

97 Iraq was arguably the second geographic area where NATO’s out-of-area policy evolved. Laugen (1999:10) suggests that NATO largely ‘stumbled’ into this new role, with policy developing ‘almost by accident’. This is at best only partly true. However, Laugen’s depiction of a stumbling alliance seems to capture one important factor: NATO’s out-of-area commitments were largely event-driven, and came about as answers to challenges that erupted from beyond NATO’s own territory and control, and which were perceived to demand urgent responses in order to prevent them from escalating into regional war or foster instability in adjacent areas.

98 The Contact Group was established in April 1994 on a Russian proposal (Yesson 2001:202). Its original members were the US, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, and with EU holding observer status.
certain say-so in a functionally and geographically limited set of security issues. The West was not ready to have CSCE play a major role and hence commit to a formal Russian veto on these important matters. Yet given Moscow’s ties to Belgrade, Russia might represent an external resource to the West in attempts to resolve Yugoslavia conflicts. Thus, the establishment of the Contact Group reflects recognition by major Western states that that it might be in their own interest to engage and cooperate with Russia in the handling of important European issues, and, in particular, Balkan issues.

Thus, although the question of enlargement was the most important issue during this period, NATO’s emerging activities out of area represented a second strain on Russian–Western relations. Seen from Russia, there was a close link between the FRY, NATO’s enlargement plans, and the restoration of ‘blocs’ in Europe, where Russia increasingly felt that she was being marginalised with regard to influence the course of events (Sherr 1995; Parrish 1995). These developments presented Russian leaders with a set of fundamental security questions: Why does the West ignore our expressed interests and concerns? How far is NATO willing to go in its out-of-area activities, not only in terms of geography, but also in the degree of ‘unilateralist’ decision-making? Are there any ‘hidden’ motives behind NATO’s new policy? Arguably, the rise of these questions to the Russian agenda reflects a feeling in Russia of being looked upon as a marginal player and as an outsider to the European security community, where the voice and interests of all states were taken into account prior to important decision.99

However, there is little evidence that NATO’s emerging role out of area was perceived as a potential military threat to Russia. Rather, Russia’s behaviour reflected concern with institutional influence, a concern that came to affect Russia’s policy more and more during this period. In the West, NATO’s military operations in the Balkans were largely dictated by the security logic of ‘chaos’ and a perceived need to project stability into the Western periphery. However, CEE and the Balkans in particular were increasingly regarded by Moscow through the lens of a Russian–Western zero-sum game of power and influence. Accordingly, the alliance’s move out of area was interpreted as just another step by the West in the direction of having

99 The perhaps most humiliating event signifying Russia’s increasingly marginal role as player in the Balkan conflict was NATO’s intense bombardments of the Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo in late August 1995, when Moscow was notified only after the strikes had already begun (Parrish 1995:30).
NATO become the central security institution in Europe (Baranovsky 2000b). This was inadmissible to a Russia that was increasingly aware that NATO-centrism would imply a relative decline in Russia’s institutional powers vis-à-vis the West and hence reduced possibilities to influence developments in a way perceived to be favourable to Russia’s national interests.100

4.2 1996–2000: Weakness at display

The sections above suggest that Russia from 1993 onwards began to recognise that there was a certain gravity in the West and CEE towards having NATO become the preferred security arena in Europe. Russia’s policy was interpreted as (more or less successful) attempts to counter and adapt to this development. However, closely related to the Russian fear of institutional isolation or marginalisation was a concern that Russia was de facto being neglected as a great power, and hence that Russia’s influence on decision-making processes might easily fall short of her ‘natural’ or ‘appropriate’ weight. In other words, Moscow was beginning to detect a certain dissonance between the role Russia ascribed to herself and the role other states in the region, including the West, were willing to recognise or provide her with.

4.2.1 Identity revisited: Russia and the notion of ‘multipolarity’

I argued in Chapter 3 that a degree of domestic consensus was arrived at in 1993 regarding Russia’s identity and some implications for foreign policy. Central to this consensus was the conception of Russia as a great power with legitimate interests and a right to influence developments in areas of former Soviet influence and a special responsibility for stability in the post-Soviet space. However, debate on these matters continued and was affected by both external and internal Russian developments.

In December 1997, Russia adopted a national security concept (NSC’97) that depicts two opposing trends in world politics.101 On the one hand, it detects a (still emerging) multipolar world order in which Russia makes up one of the leading

100 The failure to prevent emerging NATO-centrism and the largely unsuccessful Russian diplomacy in the Balkans brought about intense domestic criticism against President Yeltsin, the government and particularly Foreign Minister Kozyrev. In fact, they were instrumental in bringing about Kozyrev’s resignation and Primakov’s takeover as foreign minister in January 1996 (Mlechin 2001:564–568).

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centres. On the other hand, it identifies emerging signs of *unipolarity* and a strive by certain forces to create an international power structure based on unilateral decisions and on extensive use of military force in dealing with key international questions.

However, the depiction of Russia as a leading centre is rather intriguing in light of the extent to which the document elaborates on Russia’s financial, economic and socio-economic problems, which are painted explicitly in terms of security: ‘An analysis of threats to Russia’s national security shows that the bulk of these, today and in the foreseeable future, are non-military and primarily of internal character’ (NSC’97). The concept devotes remarkably much space to elaborate on the ‘crisis traits’ (krizisnye yavleniya) in the Russian society and acknowledges Russia’s technological backwardness and dependency on the West. Also, economic decline and decrease in Russia’s military, scientific, technological and demographic potential are assumed to be the cause behind Russia’s ‘significantly reduced influence’ in world affairs, which is recognised as a fact (ibid.). This contributes to give the document a rather contradictory character. Arguably, the presentation of ‘what is’ does not fit very nicely with the notion of ‘what should be’. NSC’97 also conveys a strong feeling of business unaccomplished.102

The adopted security concept is intimately linked to the name of Primakov and to the notion of ‘multipolarity’, which became the guiding concept for Russia’s foreign policy in the late 1990s. Fyodorov (2001) argues that NSC’97 put an equation mark between *security* and *Russian influence* understood as the upholding and strengthening of Russia’s great power role in world politics. As he puts it: ‘Russia’s security is primarily her influence on the world arena; reduced influence weakens her security’ (ibid.:40). Thus, more than being a question of Russia’s survival as a political-territorial unit, Moscow came to regard security in terms of the strategic goal of regaining and upholding a certain level of Russian influence in world politics. In other words, Russia’s role as a great power had essentially been *securitised*.

Since Russia’s military and economic capabilities were seen to be in dramatic decline, this made it ever more important for Russia to gain access to institutional arrangements and decision-making arenas and to avoid institutional isolation or

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102 I.e., ‘great power’ is variably something Russia ‘is’ and ‘will become’ (NSC’97).
marginalisation. In fact, these issues became questions of Russia’s security defined as possibilities to influence international developments and the environment in which international outcomes are determined. If Russia were to play a major role in European and world affairs, she needed access to arenas where Moscow’s voice could be heard and where Russia’s national (security) interests could be mediated with those of other dominant actors. Despite Moscow’s permanent seat in the UNSC, Russia had only limited institutional basis for influence in world politics. Thus, the notion of Russia’s greatness was largely an empty phrase.

Accordingly, Western reluctance with regard to integrating Russia into central European/Euro–Atlantic institutions and to give OSCE a prominent place in the emerging European security architecture in reality deprived Russia of the possibility to find coherence between her great power identity, the ‘objective’ state of affairs or the factors that (might) constitute the material and institutional basis of this identity, and other actors’ view of Russia and of Russia’s role. As I shall elaborate below, recurrent Russian complaints in the late 1990s regarding signs of unipolarity and perceived US and/or Western solo runs on important security issues can be interpreted in this perspective and in terms of a related gap between Russia’s foreign policy capabilities and ambitions. I will also argue that the failure among Russian policymakers to keep ‘what is’ analytically apart from ‘what could be’, or even ‘what should be’, may explain intriguing ambiguities and shifts in Russia’s policy during this period.

4.2.2 Bedrock or rocking bed? Founding an uneasy partnership

As it turned out, Russia’s individual partnership program (IPP) with NATO proved unsatisfactory to both Russia and the West. During 1996 and 1997, Russia and NATO engaged in negotiations on a new body for consultations on security issues. Although NATO’s plans for enlargement were taking shape and continued to sour Russian–Western relations, the scope and speed of enlargement, and its implications for Russia, remained issues unresolved. Accordingly, negotiations focused primarily on the type of compensations Russia would be given along with NATO’s enlargement, with Moscow seeking a maximum level of ‘damage limitation’ (Bluth 1998:338).

103 The idea that Russia and NATO might develop a ‘special relationship’ with consultations outside PfP was discussed already in the spring of 1994, and may actually have been instrumental in bringing about Russia’s June 1994 decision to join PfP (Zagorski 1997:534).
The West did not want to stimulate negative Russian perceptions of NATO. Yet developments in the Balkans had convinced the alliance that it needed to be able to act independently of Russia when situations so demanded. Moscow, in its turn, wanted veto or at least a say-so with regard to important NATO decisions and guaranties that enlargement would not imply negative military consequences for Russia. In particular, Russia demanded constraints on NATO deployment of nuclear as well as conventional capabilities and on development of military infrastructure on the territory of new member states (Bluth 1998:337–339). Moscow also called for a review of CFE provisions in order to compensate for changes in Russia’s security situation (ibid.:337).

The outcome of these negotiations was the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation’ adopted in Paris on 27 May 1997.104 This document laid down the principles according to which the parties would engage in mutual consultations on matters of common interest in order to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation with the overall aim of contributing to security and stability in the Euro–Atlantic area. For this purpose, a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was established. Here, NATO and Russia would meet regularly on various levels for mutual consultations, and, ‘where appropriate’, make joint decisions and take joint action. The alliance acceded to a central Russian demand by formally restating the so-called ‘three ‘no’s’: that the alliance has ‘no intention, no plan and no reason’ to deploy nuclear weapons or establish nuclear storage sites on the territory of new NATO member states. It also agreed to adapt the CFE treaty in light of changes in the European security environment. Beyond this, NATO did not commit to any constraints on matters of internal military planning and force posture.

The Russian obsession with non-deployment of NATO military capabilities and infrastructure in the new member states reflects a zero-sum reading of Russian–Western relations and may have been dictated by a need to ease remaining concerns in the Russian military derived from the security logic of East–West military antagonism. This was particularly important at a time when the armed forces were experiencing some serious difficulties with regard to internal finances and structural reforms (Baev

104 The text of the Founding Act is available on: www.nato.int/pfp/nato-rus.html (2002-04-30).
1996). On several occasions, the Russian government had threatened to respond to NATO enlargement by withdrawing from various arms control agreements, to deploy nuclear weapons westwards, and to form new military alliances (Oldberg 1999a:14; Bluth 1998:336). Yet the credibility of these threats, and the feasibility of Russian alternative security strategies, had to be questioned by the West. As a consequence of the poor performance of the Russian military in Chechnya, there was a growing feeling in the elite that one couldn’t escape the need for structural reforms and a downscaling of the armed forces. And let alone the absence among central policymakers of a perceived need to balance the military might of the West, Russia simply couldn’t afford it – taking into account also that ‘the West’ was extending its geographical boundaries. Hence, the poor state of the Russian economy and armed forces, which was increasingly being recognised in official and quasi-official policy documents, undermined any threats by Moscow to adopt costly military measures in response to NATO enlargement.

Accordingly, the fact that Russia signed the Founding Act can be assigned to a perception of this as a potential answer to the threat of institutional isolation. In one sense, the alternative was in a sense self-imposed isolation. PJC presented Russia with an exclusive security arena where Russia could voice her interests and concerns and consult with NATO countries on a wide range of security issues. The new arrangement also reflected a special status vis-à-vis NATO and apparently eased Russia’s fear of being neglected as a major European power. Still, the Founding Act and PJC did not remove altogether the concern in Russia that she might be kept out of important decision-making processes. The West had decided on NATO enlargement and a more active role out of area despite Russia’s strong objections. Also, the Founding Act contained no legally binding guaranties that NATO would consult with Russia on security issues perceived to affect Russia’s interests. Accordingly, there remained some concern in Russia that she might still be deprived of influence on important political decisions and on overall security developments in Europe.

105 The Founding Act lists 19 areas for (possible) consultation and cooperation. This includes conflict prevention, crisis management, arms control, non-proliferation, information concerning security strategies and military doctrines, conversion of military industry, terrorism, civil emergency and other issues.
During 1998 and early 1999, NATO and Russia met regularly in the PJC format to discuss security issues from areas listed in the Founding Act. The new body arguably had a certain potential for increasing Russia’s ‘weight’ and for mediating Russian–Western interests and differences in views concerning how to handle security matters of common concern. However, it appears that neither the West nor Russia had the political will to realise this potential, and consequently put little effort into making PJC a constructive arena for security cooperation and consultations. In many cases, the West was ready to listen to the Russian views only after NATO decisions had (already) been taken. This rendered the PJC format rather meaningless from a Russian point of view (Wallander 2002). On the other side, Russian politicians and diplomats signalled little interest in listening to NATO’s arguments and often adopted an excessively confrontational language vis-à-vis the West in defence of proclaimed Russian interests. Hence, consultations in PJC had a pro forma character and often amounted to having the two sides state and restate views and arguments already well known. This impression stems not least from the handling of events in 1999.

4.2.3 The ‘watershed events’ of 1999? Kosovo and a first round of enlargement

On 24 March 1999, NATO started an intensive air campaign against the FRY. This act caused strong reactions in Russia. On 23 March, Prime Minister Primakov cancelled his trip to the US in mid-air to protest against the expected air strikes. When NATO’s campaign commenced the next day, Russia immediately cut off all military contacts with the alliance except those affecting interoperability on the ground in Bosnia–Herzegovina (Godzimirski forthcoming). Moscow also suspended participation in PfP activities, froze bilateral military cooperation programs with NATO countries, and refused to participate in NATO military exercises. President Yeltsin also recalled Russia’s military envoy to NATO.

106 Press releases from the PJC meetings are available on NATO’s home page: www.nato.int (2002-05-06). These give a brief account of what NATO and Russia discussed at each PJC meeting from 1998 to date. 107 NAC meetings were usually held immediately prior to meetings in the PJC format. Hence, NATO countries had a chance to mediate views among themselves and speak with a unified voice when Russia entered the room. 108 See Laugen (1999:94–96) for an outline of events leading up to NATO’s decision to launch this operation. 109 For a comprehensive overview and analysis of Russian reactions to NATO’s air campaign in the FRY, see Godzimirski (forthcoming). The subsequent paragraphs draw extensively on his work. See also RFE/RL Newsline reports from late March to June 1999: www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/ (2002-05-03).
These immediate measures were accompanied by threats of additional military and political responses and by almost unanimous Russian condemnation of NATO’s air strikes as an ‘act of aggression’ against a sovereign state. As a member of the UNSC, Russia had supported international efforts to end the conflict by peaceful means. During the last couple of weeks prior to 24 March, Moscow regarded NATO’s preparations for war with great concern. Russian officials had warned strongly against any use of force that was not sanctioned by the UNSC. Thus, NATO’s decision to act militarily therefore reflected an outright disregard of Russia’s voice.

Seen from Russia, the air campaign violated the letter and spirit of the Founding Act and was perceived to undermine the newly established NATO–Russian partnership. However, at the core of Russia’s criticism against NATO’s war in Kosovo lies concern with what Moscow perceives as violation of the UN Charter and of the exclusive right of the UNSC to sanction use of military force in world politics. NATO’s air strikes were arguably not sanctioned by the UNSC. Accordingly, Russian leaders pointed to the danger of precedence and argued that NATO threatened to jeopardise the whole framework of international law (Godzimirski forthcoming). Russian officials also expressed scepticism regarding the notion of ‘humanitarian interventionism’ as the motive behind the military operation. Foreign Minister Ivanov interpreted it rather as an expression of the alliance’s ‘aggressive’ nature (Ivanov 2001:23). In line with the multipolarity thesis, he saw NATO as a US policy instrument serving Washington’s strategic goal of world hegemony. The air campaign against the FRY was just another step in a policy aimed at constructing a unipolar world in which the US would act as world police in disregard of international law (ibid.).

110 Defence Minister Sergeyev and other officials hinted that Russia might be forced to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and Kaliningrad and supply Belgrade with air defence and other military equipment. Russian responses were also linked to the fate of arms control agreements (START II, CFE). See again RFE/RL Newsline reports from late March and early April 1999 for details: www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/ (2002-05-03).

111 The Founding Act states that NATO and Russia will ‘refrain from the use of threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence’.

112 The legality of NATO’s air campaign in the FRY remains a controversial issue. Here it suffices to say that Russia, together with several other states and large parts of the population also in many NATO countries, disputed the view that use of force had been sufficiently sanctioned by the UNSC.

113 The intensification of US/UK air strikes against Iraq in December 1998 had already fostered strong reactions in Russia. Although this was not a NATO operation as such, it contributed to shaping the Russian view of
Russian criticism of NATO and the US was stimulated even further when NATO held its summit in Washington in April 1999. Here, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were officially adopted as new members to the alliance, with NATO leaders declaring that these three ‘will not be the last’ (NATO Handbook 2001:22). In Washington, NATO also adopted a new strategic concept. Ever since the last concept was adopted in 1991, the alliance had sought to legitimise a new role for itself in world politics. Seen from Russia, vagueness in formulations concerning the possible use of NATO military capabilities outside the territory of its member states caused great concern. In light of the ongoing air campaign in the FRY, the political elite in Russia largely interpreted the new concept as legitimising NATO’s emerging out-of-area policy, which undermined the UNSC and consequently also Moscow’s voice.  

Arguably, the Russian–Western controversy over Kosovo and the resumption of loud Russian criticism of NATO enlargement can again be assigned to the interplay between the two security logics of ‘chaos’ and ‘power’ respectively. The West apparently regarded Kosovo (primarily) through the lens regional stability and a felt need to prevent the potential escalation and spread of chaos (inter-ethnic war, poverty, refugees, etc.). As the humanitarian situation in Kosovo was seen to be worsening, this security logic dictated projection, if necessary even by force, of a ‘liberal order’ (democracy, human and minority rights etc.) perceived to be favourable with regard to facilitating stable societal conditions and regional peace.

It appears that the elite in Russia read these developments more according to the security logic of power, yet in two very different ways. Some outcries in Russia exposed concern regarding the West’s ‘real’ intentions and the possibility that Russia or post-Soviet territories might become subject to NATO’s out-of-area activities. These concerns focused largely on NATO’s military capabilities, but were closely linked to perceptions of NATO as a potentially aggressive alliance. In other words, NATO might be out to challenge Russia’s very existence. Arguably, these threat perceptions are ‘legitimate’ in the sense that they reflect a ‘worst case scenario’


114 Symbolic to Moscow’s opposition to these developments, Russia declined an invitation to NATO’s summit in Washington. With the exception also of Belarus, all the other EAPC member states were present here.
derived from a realist-driven agenda, central to which were the military capacities of
the West and the (potential) threat to Russia’s survival.

Others regarded Kosovo more through the lens of Russian–Western institutional powers and a perceived relative decline in Russian influence. Russia’s interests in the Balkans have deep historic roots. This facilitates a general unease with regard to having other actors influence developments in this sub-region independently from Russia. In the case of Kosovo, a majority of Russians were more sympathetic to the Serb cause (Godzimirski forthcoming). This arguably reflects the Eurasianist notion of a ‘Slav brotherhood’ touched upon in Chapter 3. Accordingly, NATO’s air campaign caused massive public protests and street rallies all over Russia. In this particular reading, Moscow was now being deprived of its legitimate right to protect ‘ours’ and have a say-so with regard to future developments in South-Eastern Europe.

However, perhaps more importantly, Russia’s interest in Balkan issues derived naturally also from the great power role Moscow ascribed to Russia with increasing strength from 1993 onwards. If the notion of Russia’s great power status were to have any meaning at all, Russia needed to influence developments and decisions also inside the now expanding West. Arguably, Kosovo put on display the limitations to Russia’s influence on the European course of events. Adding to this, if the West took a more unilateral approach to resolve security challenges in the Balkans under the flag of humanitarian interventionism, Moscow had no guarantee that the post-Soviet space might itself not become subject to the same exercise at one point. If this were to happen, it might not only undermine Russia’s role as a great power in Europe proper, but also threaten her influence on developments deep inside Russia’s own periphery.

Note, however, that this concern is vested not so much in fear of NATO’s capabilities and their potential threat to Russia’s existence. Rather, NATO’s self-assumed role as security provider out of area threatened to undermine the established security system in Europe and contribute to a relative decline in Russia’s institutional powers. In other words, the alliance’s disregard of the UNSC threatened Russia’s role as a great power, and might contribute to render future developments in the Euro–Atlantic region excessively subject to the interests and preferences of the West. Thus, more than reflecting a perceived existential threat, these Russian concerns express
worries that Russia was deprived of her appropriate institutional ‘weight’ and her possibility to influence European decision-making processes and developments in a way perceived favourable to Russia’s interests.

As indicated in section 4.2.1, the notion of ‘multipolarity’ became the guiding concept for Russia’s foreign policy from the mid-1990s. At the core of this concept lies a Russian feeling of antipathy towards unipolarity or observed developments in the direction of having the US constitute the dominating centre in world affairs (Primakov 2001; Ivanov 2001). This dislike regarding US dominance is reflected in Russia’s concern that NATO was emerging as the most important European security institution. NATO increasingly came to be regarded as a US policy instrument aimed at world hegemony. As seen from Moscow, this US policy would undermine the role of the UNSC, which was Russia’s most important institutional tool in world politics. Here, Russia has a permanent seat to voice Russian interests and to veto decisions perceived to be detrimental to these interests. Accordingly, US dominance, NATO enlargement and a more active role for the Western alliance out of area were perceived to work in direct opposition Russia’s interests. In fact, they threatened Russia’s security in the sense that they undermined Russia’s self-ascribed role as an independent centre of influence, a role that had largely been securitised in the NSC’97.

This worldview dictated a Russian policy aimed at multipolarity and the revival of a leading role for Russia in world politics. In an outline of main priorities in Russia’s foreign policy in the late 1990s, Foreign Minister Ivanov writes: ‘Our choice in favour of a multipolar world order is conditioned primarily by national interests. At the current stage of Russia’s development, this is the most favourable system with regard to facilitating a worthy (dostoynyy) place in the world community’ (Ivanov 2001:26). Arguably, in a highly institutionalised environment, participation in institutional arrangements and decision-making processes can be seen almost as a defining feature of influential powers. Thus, the official reading in Moscow of Russia as a great power dictated a need for access to the main European security arenas. As

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115 Yevgeny Primakov served as foreign minister from January 1996 and as prime minister from September 1998 to May 1999. His successor in the office of foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, served as 1st deputy foreign minister under Kozyrev, then under Primakov. Russia’s foreign policy apparently changed little with Ivanov’s takeover as head of the Foreign Ministry in September 1998, with the concept of ‘multipolarity’ remaining an important guiding principle (Mlechin 2001).
seen from Moscow, signs of NATO-centrism absent any prospect that Russia might become fully integrated in the Western alliance were perceived to be detrimental to Russia’s security interests. As Primakov (2001:239) puts it: ‘NATO-centrism (…) pushes Russia into a zone of isolation from decisions concerning common world problems’. Again, therefore, the fact that the Russian elite elevated the officially acknowledged conception of Russia as a great power to something of a guide for the state’s foreign policy in effect ‘forced’ Moscow to oppose an enhanced role for NATO. It is arguably in this perspective we should interpret Russia’s intense opposition to NATO’s military operation in Kosovo and the first round of enlargement in 1999.

Notably, this interpretation is vested not in a Russian perception of NATO as a potential military threat or a reading of relations with the West in terms of military capabilities. Rather, it reflects Moscow’s strategic interests in securing a certain level of influence on the course of events in Europe. An enhanced role for NATO was believed to entail a relative loss in Russia’s institutional powers, which made Russia’s formal veto in the UNSC ever more important. Cultivation under Primakov’s leadership of bilateral ties with some European states, in particular with France and Germany, can arguably be interpreted in this same perspective of Russian concern vis-à-vis perceived US domination in global affairs and NATO-centrism in the European region. Large parts of the public opinion and political elite in these states remained sceptical to NATO enlargement and to the alliance’s new role out of area. Accordingly, as seen from Moscow, they were potentially more receptive to Russian views and interests and might serve as agents inside with regard to influencing future developments and decisions in the West. Thus, multipolarity, which entailed a competitive more than confrontational view of the US, dictated Russian development of good relations with potential friends inside NATO circles, and strengthened the rationale for ‘splitting’ the Western centre across the Atlantic divide.

To be sure, many in the political and military elite said that they regarded NATO enlargement as a direct military threat against Russia (Oldberg 1999a:17). Large segments of the Russian society also remained sceptical to the West and
continued to regard NATO as a potential enemy.\textsuperscript{116} Yet to the extent that NATO enlargement was perceived to pose a direct military threat, these worries must have been eased in the eyes of policymakers with formulations in the Founding Act that committed NATO not to adopt certain military measures. Already in 1996 Defence Minister Rodionov, whose room for manoeuvring was perhaps more limited than that of leaders in the Kremlin and in the Foreign Ministry, had stated that enlargement of the Western alliance was no threat to Russia (Oldberg 1999a:22). Also, as Bluth (1998:333) rightly observes, an interpretation of NATO enlargement as an existential threat to Russia presupposed that the West was regarded as an enemy or an adversary with potential aggressive motives vis-à-vis Russia. There were few indications that the policymaking elite looked upon the West in this way. Accordingly, the proclaimed fears of becoming subject to NATO military attack and recurrent threats to respond to NATO enlargement by military countermeasures were simply not credible.

The dominating view in the Russian policymaking elite apparently centred on discontent with having Russia’s interests and voiced concerns being ignored in the West. It also appears that the political leadership over time conceded to accept emerging NATO-centrism as an ‘objective fact’ serving as a constraint on Russia’s influence. As Foreign Minister Primakov said to his Polish colleague in a 1998 meeting: ‘You have to understand that we are not glad about the enlargement of NATO. We know it will happen. Just don’t ask us to be happy about it’ (quoted in Williams and Neumann 2000:359). This arguably signals dislike more than existential fear, and was a strong indication that the issue was in reality not regarded as a question of Russia’s survival. These considerations were surely part of cost–benefit analyses in the Western capitals prior to the decision to go forward with NATO enlargement and ‘unsanctioned’ out-of-area commitments in spite of strong Russian objections.

How then do we explain frequent Russian invocations regarding NATO’s ‘aggressive character’, a term that was applied even by Russia’s Foreign Minister Ivanov? Beyond a genuine concern that the UN-centred world order might be in

\textsuperscript{116} In an analysis of perceptions of ‘the West’ in Russia from 1991 to 1997, Kobrinskaya (1997:117) found that the Russian public opinion to a great extent held on to Cold War perceptions of the West, and that outlooks on the West changed to a ‘significantly less degree’ among ordinary Russians than inside a broadly conceived elite. Hence, she argues that the public opinion largely served as a ‘conservative corrective’ to elite views (ibid.). Her argument is based on public opinion polls and on textual analysis of various media.
danger, I believe that the answer can be sought at least partly in terms of pleasing a
domestic demand that Russia should not yield too easily to the West. Yet it was also
a way of signalling to the West the Russian discontent with having Russia’s interests
and concerns being ignored. Since the West was essentially not perceived to be an
enemy, and since Russia was regarded in Moscow as a great power, emerging NATO-
centrism made it ever more important to gain institutional concessions and possibility
to influence decision-making processes. Thus, by securitising Russia’s role as a great
power or an influential player in world affairs, Moscow sought to elicit institutional
arrangements that might serve as some sort of guaranty that Russia would have a voice
and that Russian interests would not be ignored in the emerging NATO-centred order.

4.3 Alternative options: The ‘dead ends’ of Russia’s foreign policy

Sections 4.1 and 4.2 centred on Moscow’s struggle to come to terms with
emerging NATO-centrism as an ‘objective’ constraint on Russia’s foreign policy in
the heart of Europe. However, already from 1993, and not exclusively as a response to
emerging NATO-centrism, Russia pursued other policy directions and adopted some
measures that aimed at strengthening Russia’s power position in her own immediate
periphery and beyond. This section analyses Russian policy moves and initiatives in
this regard, which were all constrained by factors beyond Russia’s own control and
influence, and which contributed to create a gap between Russia’s foreign policy
capabilities and ambitions. I also address the question of whether Russia’s obsession
with being recognized by others as a great power had a constraining effect in itself on
the potential success of Russia’s own policy.

4.3.1 The failure of CIS, the weakness of OSCE and Russia’s ‘no allies’ situation

I hypothesised in Chapter 2 that to the extent that Russia regards herself as an
alternative centre to the West, one would expect Russia to seek a build-up and/or
strengthening of institutional arrangements perceived as favourable to Russia and
believed to potentially undermine or balance the power and influence of the West.
Intense Russian diplomatic efforts in 1994 to increase the weight of CSCE/OSCE vis-

117 The way in which Russian leaders exploited (domestically) the occupation by Russian forces of the airport in
Prishtina (Kosovo) in June 1999 – however brief and symbolic – points in this direction.
à-vis NATO can be interpreted in this perspective, as can the (largely unsuccessful) Russian diplomacy in 1994–95 to prevent NATO’s role in the Balkans from becoming too independent from the UN and the UNSC (Parrish 1995; Sherr 1995).

Still, with regard to OSCE, most Russian initiatives appeared to be motivated by the intention to undermine the role of NATO. This largely discredited any pro-OSCE designs in the eyes of the West (Baranovsky and Arbatov 1999:62). Also, OSCE had no value in itself for Russia. It served strictly *instrumental* purposes in Russian foreign policy (von Plate 1998). In fact, it appears that Russia to some extent lost interest in OSCE when Moscow did not succeed in convincing the West that this institution should be given a more prominent place in the emerging architecture (ibid.; Zagorski 1997). This largely corresponds to expectations derived from our model: As Russia increasingly came to look upon herself as a separate centre entangled in a zero-sum game with the West, she also took on a more instrumental approach to institutions and regarded OSCE more through the lens of securing a level of Russian participation in European affairs and as a policy tool in the pursuit of particular Russian interest. Indicative to this approach was the use of OSCE in defence of Russian minorities and their civic rights in the FRSU, perhaps most intensely in Latvia and Estonia. Russian obstruction to a substantive role for OSCE in matters of peacekeeping and conflict management in the post-Soviet space arguably reflects the same tendency.\(^\text{118}\)

The latter assertion points to a separate issue: Although Russia’s concerns regarding signs of emerging NATO-centrism centred on her possibility to influence developments in Europe proper, there are some indications that Moscow adopted policy measures aimed at fencing off or balancing Western influence also in the post-Soviet space. Attempts to strengthen CIS as an institutional arrangement were important in this regard. However, it appears that the potential success of these measures was to a great extent hampered by Russia’s domestic problems and her ‘unattractiveness’ as an alternative centre, but also by a US policy that focused increasingly on constraining perceived imperial impulses in Russia’s foreign policy.

\(^{118}\) With regard to peacekeeping and conflict management in the post-Soviet space, the security concept adopted in 1997 states explicitly that OSCE will be drawn on only ‘some time in the future’ (v perspektive) (NSC’97).
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Russian elite in 1992–93 convened around the idea that there was a need to reintegrate the FRSU and to make the post-Soviet space a zone of continued Russian influence. Kerr (1995:978–981) found that this reflected certain recognition in Russia that geopolitics today entails not only military superiority and control of territory, but also a degree of political legitimacy and the effective use of institutional arrangements. However, to the extent that there have been present in Russia a political will and diplomatic resources to pursue the goal of reintegration, Russia experienced great difficulties with regard to institutionalising CIS relations in a way perceived favourable to Russian interests (Hagström 1998; Jonson 1998).

In a study of developments from 1991 to 1997, Hagström (1998) identified both integrative and disintegrative tendencies in the CIS area. Yet the overall impression was that CIS lacks bodies and mechanisms that might facilitate the adoption and implementation of shared decisions, and that this institutional framework therefore remains a poor policy instrument for Russia (ibid.:35–37). The perhaps strongest factor inhibiting CIS integration has been the policies adopted by some former Soviet republics that were not eager to become subject to Russian dominance in the wake of newly won independence (Hagström 1998; Jonson 1998). With the break-up of the Soviet Union, some CIS states looked more to the West and to Western institutions as ‘anchors’ in their external relations. Arguably, there has emerged a group of ‘core states’ that counts Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which are generally positive to CIS integration (Hagström 1998:19–21). Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Moldova and Ukraine have been more reluctant in this regard.119 With this in mind, the consensus principle of decision-making has greatly inhibited integration of CIS into a unified structure. As states have pursued various initiatives perceived favourable to their own interests, a great number of bilateral and multilateral arrangements have come into being, with CIS looking like a

119 Although this categorisation is a simplification, it appears to grasp one central tendency in intra-CIS relations. See Hagström’s appendix for a detailed overview of the commitments made by various states to agreements within the CIS framework (1998:40–41). Turkmenistan has joined a number of these agreements, but has declared itself a ‘neutral’ state and is often considered to pursue a (partly) isolationist policy.
complex ‘web of relations’ (Jonson 1998). Thus, CIS remains an ineffective and weak institution and only a poor policy instrument for Russia (ibid.; Hagström 1998).\textsuperscript{120}

This general observation concerning a lack of effective decision-making bodies and procedures appears valid also with particular regard to matters of military security (Jonson 1998:29–40; Zagorski 1998). The Tashkent Collective Security Pact from May 1992 represented a first attempt to establish a joint CIS defence organisation. By December 1993, all CIS states minus Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Moldova were signatories to this treaty. Nevertheless, the parties did not substantiate the treaty with close military cooperation or integration of armed forces and command structures. Russian efforts in this direction were intensified from 1994 (Oldberg 1999a:14). Yet although some success was achieved with regard to common air defence and border control, Russia failed to facilitate integrated bodies and joint commands also here (ibid.; Jonson 1998:38–39).\textsuperscript{121} Additional Russian initiatives forwarded in 1996–97 were met by the same cool attitude. In fact, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, which were generally more pro-Western than pro-Russian regarding their institutional affiliation, responded by establishing a separate framework for security consultations (GUAM). Although the latter remains a relatively loose body, it contributes to undermine the role of CIS as envisioned by Moscow. Thus, also in terms of (military) security, CIS remains largely an empty structure and consequently also a poor policy instrument for Russia (Zagorski 1998).\textsuperscript{122}

To be sure, CIS meetings on various levels have served as instruments for consultations on a wide range of security issues. Russia largely shares with the other CIS states threat perceptions associated with growing problems related to smuggling, organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal trespassing (Jonson 1998:39). Of shared concern are also perceived challenges from Islamic fundamentalism/extremism in adjacent areas (ibid.:30). However, Russia faces a dilemma that strongly inhibits the

\textsuperscript{120} This is of course not to say that Russia is left without possibilities to influence developments in neighbouring CIS states. Bilateral ties to some extent compensates for the lack of an effective CIS framework, with Russia possessing considerable political, economic and military leverages in this regard (Hagström 1998; Jonson 1998).

\textsuperscript{121} Oldberg (1999a; 1999b) sees a close link between plans for NATO enlargement and more intense Russian efforts aimed at CIS integration from 1994.

\textsuperscript{122} This is of course not to say that Russia is left without possibilities to influence developments in the CIS area. As Hagström (1998:35–37) argues, Russia’s bilateral agreements with CIS states compensates to some extent for the lack of a unified institutional structure. My point here is that CIS has failed to develop into a strong policy instrument for Russia that might potentially serve to fence off or balance Western influence.
potential for CIS integration and close military cooperation in particular. On the one hand, Russia is in a sense needed in order to facilitate order and stability in the post-Soviet space. Russia’s relative superiority in power creates a rationale in the CIS states for having Russia engaged in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Seen from Russia, the CIS area is a buffer against external threats and dangers stemming from Islamic fundamentalism. Yet the CIS states may themselves represent a source of instability and fertile soil for the ‘Muslim threat’. In either view, there is also a Russian rationale for involvement in terms of intervention or attempts to influence developments in the region. Arguably, this partly shared rationale for Russia’s political and military engagement in the CIS area can be ascribed to the same security logic of chaos that has dictated Western policy vis-à-vis CEE, and is reflected in the establishment of CIS peacekeeping forces, which, although they serve under CIS auspices, are essentially Russian-led and dominated by Russian contingents (Baev 1998; Jonson 1998).

On the other side, Russia is often perceived by some CIS states to be pursuing interests that go beyond the goal of stability. As discussed in Chapter 3, conflicts on former Soviet territories were instrumental in bringing to the surface ambiguities in some CIS states regarding Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space. Russia is herself party to some intra-CIS conflicts. This facilitates unease in some CIS states regarding Russia’s role in the region. For them, integration poses a danger of increased dependence on Russia. Accordingly, as I have sought to convey in the sections above, Russian claims for a hegemonic role and a special responsibility in the CIS area also reflect Russia’s great power identity and the security logic of power balance vis-à-vis the West. This greatly inhibits CIS integration beyond being a loose network for consultations and undermines the CIS framework as a policy tool for Russia.123

Institutional developments in the CIS area were conditioned also by external developments and by the policies of other actors. For instance, Jonson (1998:30ff) suggests that the Taliban take-over of Kabul was an important factor facilitating more intensive Russian efforts aimed at military integration from 1996–97. Yet of particular importance as a constraint on CIS integration were developments in US policy vis-à-

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123 Russia faces an additional challenge with regard to accentuation of the ‘Islamic threat’. According to several estimates, Muslims constitute 15-20% of the Russian population (Glinski-Vassiliev 2001). This dictates a clear distinction between Islam as such and Islamic fundamentalism in Russian security discourse and foreign policy.
vis Russia. Arguably, signs of ‘soft containment’ had by 1996 developed into ‘geopolitical pluralism’ as the guiding concept for Washington’s approach to the CIS area (Feffer 1999; Migranyan 1998). This policy is associated with US analyst and former presidential security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who in 1994 wrote an article in Foreign Affairs that basically argues that consolidation of geopolitical pluralism in the post-Soviet space is the best strategy available for the US in a situation where the prospect for Russia’s democratic development was still in doubt (Brzezinski 1994).124

This prescription was important in facilitating institutional fragmentation in the CIS area (Migranyan 1998:73–75; Feffer 1999). To the south of Russia, Washington now started to pursue closer ties with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan (Feffer 1999). Symbolic to this development, Uzbekistan in April 1999 joined the GUAM states in a ceremony that took place in Washington on the fringes of NATO’s summit. In a European context, Ukraine became an important US partner. In 1997, Ukraine signed a separate agreement with NATO intended for development of closer ties. Although the NATO–Ukraine Charter was less ambitious than the NATO–Russia Founding Act, the document in some sense reduced the significance of Russia’s agreement with the alliance. Thus, Washington from 1996 increasingly adopted policy measures that contributed to undermine CIS integration and Russia’s policy.

Let alone CIS fragmentation and developments in US policy, several states in the West, in CEE and in the CIS area displayed an increasing interest from 1994 in having OSCE become more involved in the post-Soviet space, not least as instruments for monitoring Russia’s peacekeeping behaviour (Zagorski 1997; Baev 1998). Over time, OSCE increased its physical presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia not only through monitoring missions and observers in some conflict areas, but also through the

124 In brief, Brzezinski (1994) asserts that Russia’s imperial impulse remains strong and that Russia cannot be both democratic and imperial. Since it is in the US interest to have Russia become a democratic state, he argues that Washington should seek to constrain Russia’s imperial impulse by encouraging Moscow to develop good neighbourly relations to the post-Soviet states independent of the ‘final fate’ of Russia’s democratic transition. In terms of policy measures, this should also entail increased US receptiveness to calls made by some CIS states to engage in the post-Soviet space and more active US political and financial support to forces inside the CIS area that might potentially serve as a counterbalance to Russian political and military influence.
establishment of centres or agencies dealing with ‘soft’ security issues like human
rights, inter-ethnic dialogue, education and development of democratic institutions.\footnote{125}

It appears that this development was regarded with some discomfort in
Moscow. In a speech to the Russian Diplomatic Academy in June 2000, Deputy
Foreign Minister Gusarov argued that there had emerged a ‘functional and
geographical imbalance’ in the role of OSCE (Gusarov 2000). In functional terms,
OSCE focuses predominantly on ‘third basket’ issues like the protection of human and
minority rights. Despite its role as sponsor for the CFE process and other CSBMs in
the military sphere, the organisation largely fails to address important security
challenges in the politico-military, economic and ecological sectors. Also, in terms of
geography, OSCE concentrates on three sub-regions: the Balkans, the Caucasus and
Central Asia. There are, as Gusarov points out, no OSCE missions or assistance groups
in Western Europe or North America (ibid.). This tendency is regarded as negative for
Russia, since the Western states apparently prefer to handle important issues inside the
‘closed circles’ of NATO and EU, and since Russia’s former allies are becoming
increasingly attached to the West and to the Western institutions (ibid.). Accordingly,
Gusarov goes quite far in suggesting that OSCE is essentially being turned into an
instrument in a Western strategy aimed at undermining Russia’s influence in the post-
Soviet space and traditional zones of Russian interests (ibid.).\footnote{126}

Gusarov’s speech points to the essence of Russia’s ambiguity vis-à-vis OSCE.
With regard to the European region as a whole, Russia has an interest in expanding the
functional scope of OSCE to include a greater number of ‘hardcore’ security issues
and thus increase the relative institutional weight of OSCE vis-à-vis NATO and other
arenas to which Russia has no access or where Russia’s voice is only marginal. This
would secure a high level of Russian participation in a greater number of decision-
making processes and give Moscow the right to veto decisions perceived to be

\footnote{125 An overview of OSCE presence in these regions and of the mandates of various offices, agencies and
missions is available on: \url{http://www.osce.org/field_activities/} (2002-08-10).

\footnote{126 The text of Gusarov’s speech is available on the official website of Russia’s Foreign Ministry under the rubric
available on this site show that Gusarov since 1999 on several occasions has raised with his OSCE colleagues
the issue of a functional and geographical ‘imbalance’ in the work of OSCE (See for instance his ‘Remarks’ at
the OSCE Council meeting of foreign ministers in Vienna on 28 November 2000). More recently, the observed
imbalance has entailed Russian proposals for a more active role for OSCE in the West.}
detrimental to its interests. However, with regard to the more limited post-Soviet space, Russia has an interest in delimiting the functional scope of OSCE and particularly in preventing a Vienna takeover of the institutional responsibility for peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space from the loose CIS umbrella. In other words, it is perceived in Moscow not to be in Russia’s interest to have a greater say-so for the ‘old’ and ‘new’ West with regard to the handling of hardcore security issues in the CIS area.

It is arguably in this perspective that we should understand ambiguities in Russia’s policy, but also Russian–Western tensions and disagreements regarding institutional handling of security challenges both in Europe proper and in the post-Soviet space. To a great extent, developments can be traced to the complex interplay between the two security logics of ‘chaos’ and ‘power’ respectively. Facilitation of relative order and stability in the post-Soviet space is a shared interest for Russia and the West. Yet in light of perceived ‘spill-over’ potential, geographical proximity makes stability in the Caucasian and Central Asian sub-regions a more expedient matter for Russia than the West. This may largely explain why the West has been rather reluctant with regard to becoming too heavily involved in developments in these areas and particularly concerning military involvement in peacekeeping and conflict management. Increased OSCE commitments to the post-Soviet space in the late 1990s have been dominated by relatively inexpensive policy measures.

Thus, Russia’s policy vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space reflects the same security logic of chaos that dictated Western military interventions in the Balkans. Russia wanted to facilitate order and stability in Russia’s own periphery. Yet Moscow’s concern with balance of power was also important in shaping developments. As the Russian elite increasingly came to regard Russia as a great power and as an alternative centre to the widely recognised Western one, the security logic of power prescribed facilitation of an institutional environment that would ensure Russian influence on developments and prevent a relative decline in Russia’s institutional weight vis-à-vis the West. To Russia’s west, this logic dictated Russian opposition to emerging NATO-centrism and initiatives aimed at making OSCE a cornerstone in the emerging architecture. However, as Russia went from integration to shielding and adaptation as
the basis for policy vis-à-vis the West, there was a strictly instrumental rationale behind Russian calls for a greater role for OSCE, central to which was Moscow’s strategic goal of sustaining a level of Russian influence on developments in Europe.

To Russia’s south, the security logic from around 1993 prescribed reintegration of the CIS area into a unified structure under Moscow’s leadership. Attempts to limit the physical presence of external actors in the post-Soviet space and to fence off Western influence in the CIS area by confining the functional scope of OSCE followed logically from the new reading of relations with the West in terms of a zero-sum game of power between two competing centres. This greatly inhibited the potential for Russian–Western security cooperation, and is reflected in tensions not only over the division of competence between OSCE and the loose CIS structure with regard to authorisation of peacekeeping operations and conflict management, but also concerning the role and mandates of various OSCE missions in the CIS area.

By 1996, Russia’s policy had developed into something of an obsession with being internationally recognised as a great power. Despite an evident collapse in Russia’s material power basis, multipolarity and the resurrection of Russia as an independent pole in world politics became guiding principles for foreign policy. This development only cemented a perceived need in Moscow for institutional structures that might ensure a certain level of Russian influence and potentially undermine the institutional powers of the West. Yet the policies of other actors, which often reflected a combination of suspicion vis-à-vis Russian policy motives and low receptiveness to Russia’s views and interests, to a great extent countered Russia’s own efforts and ambitions. Most importantly, unwillingness in the West and particularly in the US to include Russia in decision-making processes and to let OSCE become a preferred security tool to a great extent curbed the potential success of Russia’s policy.

In fact, the observations above indicate that from around 1996, both Russia and the US were driven by the security logic of power. Seen from Washington, closer ties with Uzbekistan and Ukraine and political support to the GUAM/GUUAM network might contribute to balance Russian influence in the CIS area. During the latter half of the 1990s, the US also became more forthcoming with regard to prospects for NATO membership for the Baltic states. Thus, as Russia adopted the notion of multipolarity
and as the Clinton administration gradually started to pursue Brzezinski’s prescriptions of geopolitical pluralism in the post-Soviet space, both started to regard the construction of Europe’s security architecture in terms of a zero-sum power game and were driven by the motive of balancing the institutional weight of each other. This left them with incompatible interests and greatly inhibited their potential for security cooperation.127

Evidently, Washington was more successful than Moscow with regard to realising its preferred security order. This arguably reflects a reduction in Russia’s power or ability to affect external developments in a way perceived favourable to Russian interests. For instance, the Baltic states did not concede to a combination of Russian pressure and conciliatory moves to keep them from developing closer ties with NATO (Oldberg 1999b:34–42). Russia also failed in her efforts from 1995–96 to bring about a shift in the delicate balance between a Russian and a Western orientation in Ukraine’s foreign policy and to change Kiev’s largely positive outlook on NATO and NATO enlargement (Oldberg 1999b:50–57). And despite some integrative successes and close bilateral ties with some CIS states, including a union-like bond to marginal and politically isolated Belarus, Russia became ‘involuntary disengaged’ in the CIS area (Jonson 1998). States in Russia’s periphery apparently gravitated more to the West and to a NATO-centred security structure than to the Russian centre.

Thus, developments put on display a substantial gap between Russia’s foreign policy capabilities and ambitions (Garnett 1997; Fyodorov 2001). Russia was in some sense forced to make concessions with regard to the strategic goal of resurrecting Russia’s role as a great power, which necessitated an increase in Russia’s institutional weight in the emerging European security architecture. She did not succeed in her attempts to strengthen the role of OSCE vis-à-vis NATO. Although the Contact Group reflects a successful external resource move vis-à-vis the West, she largely failed also to facilitate alternative institutional bases for Russian influence. In the post-Soviet space, CIS never became a strong, unified structure or an effective policy instrument for Russia. In fact, Russia suffered from a ‘deficiency in allies and reliable partners’

127 A more active US and Western policy in the post-Soviet space in the latter half of the 1990s should also be regarded in light of Western economic interests attached to petroleum resources in the Caspian Sea.
(Baranovsky and Arbatov 1999:48), which reflects the observation that Russia not only lost many of her former allies, but also failed to attract any (significant) new ones. Thus, adding to a relative decline in military capabilities, these developments reflected a relative decline also in Russia’s institutional powers.128

Accordingly, disposed by domestic problems and the lack of other feasible policy options (i.e., isolation from the West, military build-up etc.), this largely left Russia with the difficult task of adapting to an institutional environment that Moscow didn’t like at all. Since a momentum had been created in favour of NATO-centrism that Russia was simply unable to stop, developments left the self-defined great power in a ‘take it or leave it’ situation with regard to cooperative institutional arrangements proposed by the West. At various stages, this led to some humiliating Russian ‘retreats’, with Russia finding herself being hostage of her own loud and frequent criticism of that same NATO-centrism to which she de facto conceded.

4.3.2 Humiliation self-imposed? On the implications of ‘speaking’ security

The sections above suggest that the ‘objective’ weight of Russia and ‘Russian’ institutions was in relative decline. To some extent, this reflects the political will of the powerful West and, most importantly, the United States. Yet there is reason to ask whether Russia’s own policy has been to some extent counterproductive with regard to the stated goal of resurrecting Russia’s role as a great power. Some Russian statements and policy measures evidently fostered concern in the West and among states in Russia’s periphery about her potential imperial motives. These worries facilitated ‘anti-Russian’ policies in some CIS states and among former Soviet allies. Concerns regarding Russia’s imperial legacy were also important in bringing about US policies of containment vis-à-vis Russia and areas of Russian traditional influence. From time to time, Russian politicians and diplomats also fostered sourness in Russian–Western relations by adopting an extremely confrontational language in their interactions. This was reflected not least with regard to NATO enlargement and in the handling of

128 Although commercial interests and economic considerations are also a part of the picture, Russia’s ‘no allies’ situation led Moscow to pursue development of ties with actors outside the Euro–Atlantic region, perhaps most importantly with China and India, but also with some states commonly perceived as ‘rogue states’ or ‘enemies’ of the West (Baranovsky and Arbatov 1999:48; Oldberg 1999a:18–19). Yet these ties have yet to develop into deeply cemented institutional structures or anything close to integrated politico-military alliances.
Balkan issues. It is hardly far-fetched to assume that this may have contributed to undermine the West’s confidence in Russia’s allegedly constructive or cooperative approach and potentially also its receptiveness to Russia’s proclaimed interests.

Developments around NATO have been crucial in shaping Russia’s policy. Signs of emerging NATO-centrism from around 1993 were interpreted in Russia in terms of a zero-sum Russian–Western game of power and influence. The West did not succeed in convincing Moscow that projection of stability, which was derived from the security logic of chaos, was the ‘real’ and only rationale behind NATO’s enlargement and out-of-area activities. The West obviously had an interest in facilitating a non-confrontational relationship with Russia. Western leaders also came to recognise that a certain formalisation of relations with Russia might not only ease the enlargement process itself, but also facilitate more workable relations with Moscow altogether. This is reflected in various institutional arrangements proposed to Russia for consultations and cooperation with NATO (NACC/EAPS, PfP/IPP, PJC/Founding Act).

However, the West had no interest in fostering a role for Russia that was in accordance with the rather exorbitant place Russia ascribed to herself. To Russia’s obvious disfavour served also the fact that only a limited number of European actors regarded Russia as an attractive centre of her own. Receptiveness to Russian views has been limited in both the West, in CEE and to some extent also in the post-Soviet space. In one sense, therefore, Russia’s place in the still emerging security architecture reflects the outcome of a number of ‘best deals’ feasible at various stages in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, there is reason to ask whether Moscow could have struck better deals at some stages in this process if policymakers and the political elite in Moscow had been less obsessed with having the world recognise ‘great power’ as an appropriate label for Russia and less outspoken with regard to the strategic goal of resurrecting Russia’s ‘natural’ role in world politics – i.e., that of a great power. Arguably, it might also have been helpful if Russia had managed to present a rationale for why she should be regarded as a great power. When Primakov in January 1996 took over as foreign minister, he assumed that ‘Russia was and is a great power despite its present hardships, and its foreign policy should be tailored to this status’ (quoted in Oldberg 1999a:16). Likewise, in a recent book on Russia’s foreign policy, Foreign
Minister Ivanov concludes his introductory chapter by asserting that Russia over the last decade has become – i.e., already is – ‘one of the influential centres of the contemporary world’ (Ivanov 2001:51). Yet he also argues that Russia possesses the resources necessary to assume – in the future – a ‘worthy’ (dostoynyy) place in the new world order (ibid.). This apparently reflects certain confusion between the current situation and a possible development in the future, and between the notions of Russia’s great power status, role and potential. The evidence studied here has far from convinced me that the policymaking elite in Moscow has managed to keep these analytically apart when formulating policy. The observed gap between Russia’s capabilities and ambitions, which presumably caused both irritation and frustration in Russia, may probably cast light on the ‘status at any price’ mentality and on the anti-Western rhetoric that was adopted from time to time by high-ranking Russian officials, and which was not always helpful in bringing about positive results for Russia.129

Ivanov’s argument invites me to reflect upon a final issue that is relevant to any state in its external relations and which should be present in the minds of all makers of foreign policy. In politics, agents can (relatively) easily ascribe various labels onto objects and seek to ‘sell’ them to an audience as legitimate or natural traits of the object in question. Yet there is no saying that the audience (an electorate, other politicians, etc.) will ‘buy’ this link between label and object or respond to the move in a manner expected by the agent in question. In world politics, states’ identities are – at least to some extent – in flux and contingent upon the views or perceptions of other actors. A state may certainly look upon itself as a great power. Yet the status and role of great powers are not questions of states’ self-definitions alone. They do not emerge in a social vacuum, and can be regarded instead as reflections of intersubjective understandings. Accordingly, a state’s position in the international system depends on acceptance by other states of a particular role as ‘appropriate’ to the state in question.

This assertion seems to capture a dilemma and a challenge for Russian policymakers at the current stage of Russia’s development. Around 1993, the Russian elite largely adopted the idea that Russia – almost by definition – is a great power. This was arguably a political choice that entailed particular readings of what was to be

129 The phrase ‘status at any price’ is taken from Baranovsky and Arbatov (1999:55).
regarded as Russian national interests. Russia could have been defined as ‘Russia’ only, or as a ‘normal’ great power more in the reading of early Russian liberals. Yet debate in Russia on her new role in world politics and the use of terms like ‘great power’, ‘worthy place’, ‘special responsibility’ and ‘zones of legitimate interests’ appear to have suffered either from the imprecise and confusing meaning attached to these notions by various actors, or from attachment of meanings to these that were strange to the intra-Western security discourse and which would obviously cause suspicion and concern in the West. In other words, Russia appears to have had no clear conception of what makes Russia a great power: Is it Territory? Culture? Weapon arsenals? History? Population size? I defined ‘power’ as an actor’s ability to influence the behaviour of other actors and to have these take oneself and one’s own interest into account in their behaviour. Although Russia still possesses considerable military capabilities, the relative importance of these as ‘power factors’ in a European context was significantly reduced with the end of the Cold War. In economic terms, Russia’s weakness became ever more obvious throughout the 1990s and was also recognised in official policy documents. The relative decline in institutional powers and the low receptiveness to Russian views detected in this study only contribute to the impression that Russia’s overall position in the international power structure has been ‘objectively’ weakened. In this perspective, and in light of some openly revanchist motives advocated by prominent figures in Russia with regard to areas of newly won political independence from Moscow, the failure to give any credible rationale for Russia’s great power status could only stimulate suspicion and concern about her policy motives.\(^{130}\)

Russian politicians and diplomats needed not – and need not – accentuate Russia’s heritage and notions like ‘great power’ and ‘legitimate zones of interests’ as guiding principles in the country’s foreign policy, at least not in the manner and to the extent that they have in the past. As one observer puts it: ‘True greatness…does not need advertising’ (Adomeit 1995:35). On some ‘objective’ parameters, Russia is a great power (i.e., territory, military capabilities, population size). To some extent, this

\(^{130}\) In a 1993 newspaper article, Kozyrev (1993c) quoted the following message conveyed to him on a visit to a former Soviet republic: ‘You are not a great power, you are only Russia.’ This sentence elegantly captures Moscow’s enduring concern that Russia’s status as great power has not been sufficiently recognised.
is also reflected in the way other states, including many Western ones, approach her. Yet one may argue that Russia’s obsession with being recognised as a great power and a perhaps excessively outspoken dislike of the emerging institutional environment in Europe have made it difficult for both Russia and other actors in the region. For Russia, it put on display an obvious gap between capabilities and ambitions or a lack of correspondence between Russia’s stated goals and her ability to influence external developments. This gap can largely be assigned to the failure by Russian authorities to realise that a permanent seat in the UNSC notwithstanding, Russia does not possess power instruments (i.e., institutional access, economic strength, normative attraction a.o.) that may secure Russian influence on the behaviour of other actors in a European, post-Cold War context, but also that the utility of Russia’s main power instruments – military capabilities – is reduced in the sense that they can seldom be transferred into political influence. Thus, Russia’s great power identity and the (often related) reading (in Moscow) of the international power structure in terms of military capabilities have to some extent been out of touch with other actors’ perception of Russia and of her power position and ‘appropriate’ role in the European region.

This brought the self-proclaimed great power into some rather humiliating situations. Since Moscow failed to prevent decisions perceived to be detrimental to Russia’s loudly and frequently expressed interests, she also failed to influence developments in a way that one might expect from a ‘real’ great power. Thus, by regurgitating Russia’s being a great power, Moscow actually came to advertise Russia’s obvious weakness. And since Russia’s security was explicitly linked to her influence in world affairs, developments in the late 1990s unavoidably had to cause strong reactions in Moscow, because they reflected this very decline in Russia’s ability to influence the course of events. Also, by adopting a language that involved frequent references to NATO as an aggressive alliance directed against Russia, Russian diplomats and politicians caused some embarrassment for themselves when Russia retreated in the next round from harsh criticism of NATO and conceded to institutional ‘deals’ or partnership arrangements that were largely dictated by the West. Humiliation, whether or not self-imposed, is seldom a good starting point for constructive cooperation.
Developments in Russia’s policy raised several questions and dilemmas also for the West. In Western readings, Russia could be perceived both as a political and economic partner, as a source of chaos, and as a (potential) military enemy. History and geography contributed to make ‘the Russian question’ a very difficult one. It is beyond the scope of this study to explain policies adopted in the West. Yet I have argued that Western policies came about at least partly as a result of developments in Russia and in Russia’s foreign policy. Moscow’s proclaimed ambition to resurrect Russia’s status as a dominant pole in world politics and to be an active player on the European stage dictated a delicate balance in the West between policy measures aimed at fencing off Russian influence and constraining perceived imperial impulses, while at the same time contributing to political and economic integration with the West and a broader world community.\textsuperscript{131}

Yet in one sense the West has not accepted Russia’s role as a great power. Even though a certain \textit{modus vivendi} has developed in Russian–Western security relations, the West has largely denied Russia’s access to NATO as the perhaps most important arena for decision-making on European security affairs and thereby also limited the level of Russian integration into Europe’s institutional environment in a broader sense (Haslam 1998).\textsuperscript{132} It should be clear from the above that the Western decision to go ahead with construction of a NATO-centred security architecture that essentially excluded Russia from important decision-making processes was one of the most important factors shaping Russian security thinking and foreign policy in the latter part of the 1990s. Russia at the turn of the century remained discontent with the emerging order and could essentially be regarded as a revisionist state.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{131} This is not to say that the West has always succeeded in managing this delicate balance in a way that fostered European security and a positive development in Russian–Western relations. Nor do I claim that the West could not have been more receptive to Russian concerns or taken on a more accommodating attitude vis-à-vis Russian stances and interests at various stages in the processes discussed in this study.\textsuperscript{132} For a contrary view, see Odom (1998).\textsuperscript{133} By ‘revisionist state’ I understand a state that feels threatened by, or at least hard done by, status quo or the existing pattern of interstate relations (Buzan 1991:304). Revisionist motives largely derive from a feeling of being denied the enjoyment of core national values. Accordingly, ‘revisionists tend to view security in terms of changing the system, and/or improving their position within it (ibid.). This seems to capture the main rationale behind Russia’s foreign policy in the late 1990s.
5.0 Concluding remarks

This chapter provides a summary of some central findings and seeks to put these into a broader perspective. Section 5.1 restates two central arguments in light of the main objectives of this study. In its turn, section 5.2 reflects briefly on the fairness of some basic assumptions and choices made in this study and on the ‘significance’ of its central findings. Section 5.3 suggests some questions for further research, and indicates how the theoretical framework applied here may be relevant in this regard.

5.1 Central findings: Two arguments restated

A main objective of this study has been to answer some recent calls for linking the study of Russian foreign and security policy closer to contemporary debates on IR theory. There is no reason not to apply general IR tools also in analyses of Russia’s foreign policy. My study suggests that realism, liberalism and constructivism may all – in their very different ways – contribute to understand Russia’s foreign policy and some related institutional outcomes in Russian–Western security relations. Findings here indicate that constructivism may be helpful in revealing the link between events and developments on different levels of analysis that are relevant for the analysis of Russia’s behaviour; how Russia’s post-Soviet identity took shape and affected the formulation of Russia’s interests and foreign policy; and how/under what conditions ‘hypotheses’ from realism and liberalism about Russia’s behaviour and institutional outcomes in Russian-Western relations (i.e., cooperation) find empirical support.

The theoretical framework applied here is eclectic in the sense that it draws on different IR perspectives. Some would argue that it is non-scientific in the sense that it cannot be falsified and that its theoretical components are incommensurable since they rest on different ontological and epistemological assumptions and reflect different normative programs. There may be some truth to these claims. However, the current framework should be regarded more as a conceptual lens for interpretation of policies and outcomes than as a ‘theory’ in a strict, (positivist) scientific sense. There exists no single, all-encompassing IR theory from which we can derive undisputed explanations of state behaviour and international outcomes. By advocating the concepts of ‘security logic’ and ‘international power structure’, this study represents a humble attempt to
contribute to debate on the relevance of different IR paradigms under various systemic conditions. And since any theory or modelling of state behaviour ultimately rests on empirical observations and will fail to incorporate some aspects of the study object, we need not be constrained by the notion of incommensurability as such (Wæver 1996).

The second objective of this study has been to examine the link between Russia’s national identity and foreign policy with the aim of understanding Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. The conceptual model applied here seems to capture some central facets of Russian identity formation and foreign policy in the 1990s. At the outset (1991–92), the liberal foreign policy leadership depicted Russia as a normal, democratic and explicitly European state. It also accentuated shared Russian–Western interests and a shared identity based on affiliation with a Christian ‘civilisation’, and downplayed Russia’s (potential) role as an alternative centre to the West. The security logic derived from this reading of Russia’s identity and of the international power structure largely dictated integration with the Western centre and adaptation to the Western institutional arrangements.

Thus, Russia was initially not opposed to a prominent role for (a reformed) NATO in the emerging security architecture. Both NATO and CSCE were regarded as viable arenas for addressing issues of common concern, with NATO-affiliated bodies (de facto and potentially) dealing with ‘hard’ security issues even in traditional areas of Soviet influence. I have also argued that the attachment of Central Asia to CSCE reflects a shared Russian–Western interest in preventing ‘chaos’ and in constraining the potential advance of Islamic fundamentalism in their shared periphery.

From 1992–93 the policymaking elite increasingly came to conceive of Russia as an alternative centre. To be sure, leading figures in the government never seized to look upon Russia as a great power. Yet it was only after some time that they started to accentuate this identity trait as an important premise for Russia’s foreign policy. The ‘new’ conception of Russia as an alternative centre entailed demarcation of the CIS area as an ‘exclusive’ zone of Russian influence and a reading of relations with the West more in terms of conflicting interests and a zero-sum game of power.

Accordingly, I assert that from around 1993, there has been a rather consistent Russian line in trying to affect the weight, functional scope and geographic domain of
NATO and OSCE respectively. With regard to NATO, the goal has been to undermine and limit its role. This is reflected in opposition to NATO enlargement and its role out of area, but also in proposals and demands to have the West handle a greater number of security issues in bodies where Russia’s voice will be heard (i.e., the UNSC, OSCE, Contact Group a.o.). Although Cold War enemy perceptions were manifest in large segments of the Russian society, policymakers regarded NATO-centrism primarily in terms of a relative decline in Russia’s institutional powers and her possibility to influence European and global developments. In fact, the question of sustaining a level of influence was essentially regarded as security matter for Russia, and was explicitly linked to the goal of resurrecting Russia’s role as a great power in world politics. Accordingly, emerging signs of NATO-centrism, which threatened to undermine Russia’s veto in the UNSC, were in direct opposition to Russia’s security interests.

As for OSCE, Russia has sought to increase the relative weight and functional scope of this institution in Europe as a whole, while at the same time seeking to limit its role in the post-Soviet space. This ambiguity arose already around 1992–93, and reflects Russia’s conception of the CIS area as Russia’s ‘exclusive’ periphery. Even though a modus vivendi was achieved with regard to the handling of peacekeeping and conflict management in the post-Soviet space, certain discord surfaced between Russia and the West in the latter half of the 1990s concerning the functional scope of OSCE in the CIS area, with Russia seeking to constrain the role of this ‘external’ actor. With regard to Europe proper, Russian pro-OSCE initiatives have largely failed or at least not been materialised in accordance with the underlying Russian intentions. Thus, I have argued that developments in the late 1990s revealed limitations in Russia’s ability to influence the external environment and that this was reflected in the ‘shape’ of the European security architecture at the turn of the century. In conceding to realities, Russia has continuously sought to adapt to the emerging order and to compensate for a relative decline in institutional powers by obtaining more limited access to European decision-making arenas and by committing to institutional arrangements that were perceived as better than having no security cooperation with the West at all. Thus, Russia’s policy largely supports the hypotheses derived from the model in section 2.4.
5.2 Reassessing the basic assumptions: Russia’s policy coherence

I shall refrain from an in-depth assessment of the validity or ‘quality’ of this study and only direct attention to questions that were raised in section 1.3 and which may be relevant in this regard. Yet there is always a danger of oversimplifying through assumptions and of overestimating the significance of a study object or a ‘case’. Here I have focused on Russia’s relations with NATO and OSCE. There are some related issues that have not been elaborated in detail, and which might contribute to ‘correct’ the overall impression of Russia’s decline in power and of its significance for Russia’s foreign policy. For instance, I have treated the West largely as a unity and downplayed Russia’s bilateral relations with states in Europe and beyond. Also, by focusing mainly on two institutions, I largely ignored Russia’s position vis-à-vis other ‘components’ of the European security architecture. Nonetheless, I believe that central findings in this study would be supplemented rather than rejected in a more detailed account.

Another important simplification here has been the assumption that Russia can be regarded as a rational actor or that her policy reflects cost–benefit analyses. Some authors claim that Russia’s foreign policy is still in a ‘state of flux’, and that it remains ‘puzzling’, ‘unstable’, ‘incidental’ and is often affected by ‘arbitrary’ factors (Bluth 1998:323; Zagorski 1997:521). The time period studied here has been characterised by economic decline, military collapse and domestic political turmoil, all of which have constrained Russia’s foreign policy capacity. Adding to this, ‘policy’ in the early 1990s was only weakly institutionalised, which was reflected in frequent shifts in both formal competence and real influence on decisions between various domestic figures, bodies and institutions (Arbatov 1997). These factors may have contributed to undermine policy coherence, perhaps even rendering it meaningless to speak of one Russian foreign policy.

However, Russia’s foreign policy is hardly unique in being puzzling, unstable and arbitrary, or in displaying ambiguities. Arguably, these traits do not undermine the basic assumption that at the point where Russian leaders had to make policy decisions, these ultimately reflected calculation of expected costs and benefits derived from available policy options. Although several institutions have been involved in decision-making, the Foreign Ministry has from 1993 served as the most important institution.
shaping Russian decisions (Shearman and Sussex 2000; Malcolm et al. 1996). And although there still exists great diversity in Russian views with regard to questions of security, national identity, foreign policy and Russia’s place in world politics, integral to which are also different perceptions of Europe and the West, I have detected here a fairly consistent policy line aimed at constructing a European security architecture perceived favourable to the pursuit of Russian interests. This arguably strengthens the rationale for treating Russia as a ‘rational’ actor in analyses of her foreign policy.

5.3 A look ahead: Questions for further research

The new doctrinal basis for Russia’s foreign and security policy adopted in the spring of 2000 to a great extent reflect developments in ‘official’ Russian views from the late 1990s. Central to these were discontent with US dominance in world affairs and the related Russian calls for world ‘multipolarity’. However, already from the outset of his service as president, Putin started to convey rather sober assessments of Russia’s domestic state of affairs and of the severity of Russia’s current economic, financial and military problems. He advocated concentration of state resources on a few vital tasks. He also argued that foreign policy should be dictated by domestic demands and not by lofty ambitions. This apparently reflects Putin’s recognition of the current limitations and constraints to Russia’s power. Arguably, he sought to close the gap between foreign policy capabilities and ambitions, and seemed to believe that Russia should adapt the latter to the former instead of vice versa. In other words, Putin conveyed a relatively moderate conception of the ‘real size’ of the Russian centre, which might dispose Russia in direction of a more Western-oriented foreign policy.

11 September marked a shift in Russian–Western relations (Godzimirski 2002). Events this day called new attention to threats stemming from international terrorism, and have facilitated a shared Russian–Western interest in adopting measures to counter these threats. This is reflected both in cooperation in the ongoing war on terrorism, but also in the establishment of a new body for Russian–Western consultations on security


135 See for instance his letter to the Russian voters prior to the presidential elections: ‘We need to recognise the superiority of internal goals over external ones. If this or that international project is not in the interest of our citizens…then we should stay out of it…. We must weigh up our possibilities and maybe wait’ (Putin 2002).
issues (i.e., NATO ‘at 20’). It appears that 11 September made Western leaders more receptive to Russian arguments about the link between international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.\(^{136}\) Thus, there is a component of shared identity underlying their recent rapprochement. Yet events following 11 September also displayed Russia’s potential as an external resource for the West in the fight against international terrorism. This may arguably increase Western receptiveness to Russian views and interests altogether. Seen from Russia, 11 September provided an opportunity to contribute in the global war on terrorism and thus (potentially) to increase Russia’s status in world affairs. If the West is willing to let Russia ‘cash in’ for participating in the war on terrorism by providing political or economic dividends, 11 September may in fact prove instrumental in facilitating resolution of some domestic problems in Russia and thus contribute to increase her influence on world affairs in the future.

It appears therefore that developments under President Putin both prior to and after 11 September can be related to the conceptual model applied in this study. Still, these questions need more research. Two issues stand out for further inquiry. First, more work could be done to substantiate and develop the theoretical framework applied here, a task that goes right into contemporary debates on IR theory. Beyond some intriguing questions concerning meta-theory and normative implications, the conceptual model used in this study has some limitations with regard to ‘measurement’ of the ‘real’ and ‘perceived’ size of the two centres, let alone also the problem of identifying centres and peripheries on other systemic levels that should be accounted for in analysis of Russia’s policy. These issues could be addressed more thoroughly.

Second, on the empirical level, although relations with NATO and OSCE are important, in-depth studies of Russia’s foreign policy and her security relations with the West should perhaps be more sensitive to the role of EU, which is very important to a feeling in Russia of institutional isolation from (the rest of) the Western part of Europe, and which is increasingly taking on security tasks that will also have implications for Russia and for her role with regard to European security affairs.

\(^{136}\) With regard to the case of Chechnya, Foreign Minister Ivanov said in a speech to the Council of Europe in 1999: ‘In essence, Russia is protecting the common borders of Europe against the barbaric advance/intrusion (nashestvie) of international terrorism, which is persistently and step by step strengthening its axis of influence: Afghanistan – Central Asia – the Caucasus – the Balkans’ (Ivanov 2001:195).
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