A Post-Cold War Clash of Civilizations?

A New Approach to Testing Huntington's Thesis

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October, 2002

Acknowledgements

I have had the benefit of much support and assistance throughout writing this thesis. The people who have spent most time hearing about this thesis and assisting me with it, are probably my fiancée Inger Karin Fuglesteg, and thereafter Svein Olav Krøgli, who has provided invaluable assistance operating GIS software. Without their support I would definitely not have accomplished this work within the prescribed time of one year. A great share of this accomplishment is, no doubt, due to my tutors, Bjørn Erik Rasch at the University of Oslo and Tanja Ellingsen at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), who have provided excellent guidance through every step of the process. Not only have Tanja and Bjørn expertly guided me through this field of research, they have also been available for me at all times. The same goes for my tutors and good colleagues at PRIO, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Håvard Strand. In addition, I have profited much from the scholarly environment at PRIO through my residence with a student scholarship at this excellent research institute. The Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, has provided extra funding for generating data. Fredrik Skribeland has proofread the thesis and provided valuable comments. I would also like to thank David W. Throup at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, with whom I had many enlightening discussions on the topic during our time as election observers in Sierra Leone.

Bård Ludvig Thorheim

Table of Contents

Maps and Tables

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

A major area of interest after the Cold War, among academics as well as world leaders, has been to reveal new sources of armed conflict. What will be the causes of war in the post-Cold War era? The "grand theories" of international relations have been applied also in this field, although the debate has been more focused on the extent of war in the new era rather than on specific causes. While liberal institutionalism claims that armed conflict can be avoided the next decade with a "continuous pattern of cooperation" (Keohane 1993), realists like John Mearsheimer, claim that there is no promise of more stability going from a bi-polar world to a multi-polar world (Mearsheimer 1995). Some empirical research has been conducted in order to detect changes when proceeding to a new era. For instance, Oneal & Russet (1999: 36) conclude: "The post-Cold War era is full of affirmations about the importance of democracy, freedom, and prosperity built on interdependent markets." And further: "Analytically, we are progressing towards a synthesis of Kantian and realist influences and of dyadic and systemic perspectives" (Oneal & Russett 1999: 36). Fukuyama (1992) has perhaps the most commonly known contribution claiming that the end of the Cold War marks the "The End of History". The traditional lines, and eventually all lines of conflict, will disappear, according to Fukuyama, as the nation-states acknowledge the "universal principles" of democracy and liberal markets. It will be the end of all international wars, except minor conflicts between the states that are still "in history", and the ones that have reached the "end of history".

On this background, Samuel P. Huntington created great controversy with his article "The Clash of Civilizations?" in 1993 and the follow-up book

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order in 1996. Instead of harmony in "the new era", Huntington focuses on emerging conflicts based on cultural dissimilarities. He makes precise predictions about causes of conflict and wars after the fall of the Iron Curtain: "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural." (Huntington 1993: 22). This proposition started a discussion that reaches far beyond academic circles. After the events of September 11 2001, Huntington's theories are discussed with renewed enthusiasm.[1]

1.2 Overall Objective and Research Questions

The overall objective of this thesis is to investigate into the relationship between culture (religious, ethnic and linguistic differences) and conflict. As a point of departure, I choose to test the validity of Huntington's "civilizations theory". This is a theory that emphasizes the importance of culture as a determinant of conflict, and it holds many explicit propositions concerning the relationship between culture and conflict. Specifically, I seek to answer the following questions, derived form Huntington's theory: *Do conflicts occur along the fault lines of civilizations? And if they do – is this a phenomenon strictly evident in the post-Cold War era? Are certain civilizations significantly more prone to conflict than others? Are the Muslim and Western civilizations more prone to conflict than other pairs of civilizations?* If the empirical findings suggest that the answer to these questions is yes (hence, support for Huntington's thesis), this calls for a further inquiry into: *What are the mechanisms that explain how cultural dissimilarity may be a cause of armed conflict?*

[1] *The Economist* September 22 2001; *Newsweek* December 2001; *Aftenposten* 24 October 2001: 8.

Obviously, these are important questions to decision-makers who deal with foreign affairs and multilateral matters. But also academically, these questions are of high interest. Although Huntington's civilizations theory has met virtually nothing but criticism in quantitative assessments (Henderson 1998; Henderson & Tucker: 2001; Russett, Oneal & Cox 2000), Huntington claims that their results are due to methodological shortcomings (Huntington 2000). Hence, one objective is to contribute with a more appropriate methodological approach to testing Huntington's theory. Second, I aim to contribute to the theoretical debate between primordialists, instrumentalists and constructivists on how cultural dissimilarity is linked to armed conflict (see Chapter 2). Through the findings of my analysis I wish to shed more light on this relationship and hopefully contribute to the research in this field (Carment & James 1995; Ellingsen 2000; Fox 2001; Geertz 1973; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Horowitz 1985; Väyrynen 1994).

1.3 Theory

Huntington's civilizations theory is first and foremost an attempt to describe the emerging world order after the collapse of the bi-polarity structure during the Cold War (Huntington 1996: 13-14). Huntington suggests that, as part of an evolution from earlier eras of world history, the post-Cold War era will mark a turning point, following which "culture" is the key to understanding the nature of world trade, world politics, co-operation – and conflict. Huntington claims that, in the new era, the factor determining the nature of conflicts is cultural. Huntington suggests that identity, the question of "who am I?", will become increasingly important to all individuals after the Cold War. This change at the individual level will eventually reach the level of the broadest cultural identities – civilizations. Thus, civilizations will be dominant actors in world affairs. "Clashes" of these cultural entities will, allegedly, be the primary source of

armed conflict. In Huntington's words: "The conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilizations" (Huntington 1993: 25).

In a theoretical setting, one may argue that this theoretical view belongs to the primordial "school" of conflict, although Huntington does not present an entirely mono-causal explanation. In the primordial view, cultural dissimilarity is a traditional feature that is naturally linked to conflict. This perspective is contested by instrumentalists, who claim that elites of society construct cultural differences in order to mobilize the masses and use them as instruments to pursue their personal agenda. The constructivists oppose Huntington from yet a different angle: they agree that cultural dissimilarity may play a role as a cause of armed conflict, but only when facilitated by certain socio-economic background factors. These different perspectives will be further discussed in Chapter 2.

1.4 Definitions

"Conflict" may be defined as a situation in which one or more distinct parties have preferences that are incompatible with each other. Conflict, as defined here, is usually the prerequisite for "war", which is defined as a conflict between a state A and one or more other states, involving more than 1,000 battle-related deaths (Singer & Small 1972; Holsti 1992). We need, however, a more refined definition in a time when wars are internal, external and often subjected to international intervention. Also, wars often involve less than the definition 1,000 battle casualties; still, they are referred to as wars. In this thesis I will generally refer to war by Singer & Small's definition, but I will mostly use the term "armed conflict". By armed conflict I refer to the definition of the PRIO/Uppsala dataset, which again refers to all types of armed conflict that are: "A contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between the two parties results in at least 25

battle-related deaths. Of these two parties at least one is the government." (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619, and Gleditsch et al. 2001: 5. Appendix 1)[2].

The concept "culture" stems from anthropology. An agreed definition of the concept is hard to find. Some view culture a shared orientation, others as a shared interpretative framework, and others again as a common social heritage in custom and norms (Geertz 1973). In most cases, culture is linked to factors like ethnicity, religion, and language. Now that culture is defined, it is easier to explain what Huntington means by "civilizations". Civilizations are the broadest cultural entities; it is culture writ large (Huntington 1996: 43). A civilization is most commonly defined by religious commonality, but also by ethnic and linguistic commonalities, and by tradition and history. Huntington identifies nine distinct civilizations (see Map 1, Chapter 2). "Clash of civilizations" refers to disputes among these large cultural entities. These disputes are, according to Huntington, the primary cause of armed conflict in the new era.

1.5 Research Design and Methodology

I choose to explain the research design step by step in accordance with the framework (content) of the thesis. Since I aim to test the validity of the civilizations theory, the first step will be to present and to scrutinize the theory. What are its premises, how does it relate to other theories in this field, what is the main critique against this theory? This will provide a basis for later discussion of the validity of the theory in light of the results. Next, I pinpoint the specific areas of the theory that I would like to test (the causes and nature of conflicts). I then derive verifiable "empirical statements" from Huntington's specific theoretical statements. This means that I formulate a certain expectation of an empirical phenomenon that occurs, or does not occur,

[2] It is important to notice that I will in this assignment often mention "conflict" and "armed conflict" (and sometimes even "war"), while referring to the same minimum definition from the PRIO/Uppsala dataset.

provided that Huntington's theory corresponds with reality. In other words: "After this logical deduction of empirical statements from the theory, one can make the observations called for in the empirical statements to see whether or not they are true" (Stinchcombe, 1968: 15-17). The formulations of empirical statements are hypotheses that I set out to test empirically in the analysis.

The analysis seeks to test Huntington's theory, but at the same time it is a design for generalizing about the phenomenon "armed conflict" within a certain period. Since there are many cases of conflict in the relevant period (before and after the Cold War), it is probably not appropriate to apply any sort of case study to test the validity of this theory. The selection bias of a case study and possibility of tendentious relationships calls for a large N-study. I choose as units all armed conflicts from the PRIO/Uppsala dataset ten years of the Cold War and ten years after the Cold War – 1979-2000. From Huntington's theory I have derived certain expectations (hypotheses) of the features of these conflicts. The analysis tests the existence of a certain relationship between the locations and nature of conflicts, and cultural borders. I do so by expecting certain correlations and properties of the measured variables. One very central variable in the analysis is "distance", which I have generated (see Chapter 3). This variable is simply a ranking of the conflicts: to what extent does a conflict "occur along the fault lines of civilizations". Every conflict is measured by its distance to the nearest civilizational fault line, or border. According to the hypotheses, this variable is expected to have certain properties, when controlled for pre- and post-Cold War, and bivariate correlations with other relevant variables in the dataset.

The most central question to be answered through the quantitative analysis is whether conflicts are more frequent along the fault lines of civilizations, since this refers to Huntington's overall claim. Another essential question is whether such a relationship is more evident in the post-Cold War era, like Huntington claims. I have already pointed out that a case study approach is not suitable for testing the general validity of Huntington's thesis. However, in order to investigate into the micro foundations behind the

existence, or non-existence, of a relationship between cultural difference and armed conflict, such an approach is fruitful. A limited case study will provide a basis upon which to interpret the results in a suitable context and to provide a better understanding of the matter studied. Whereas the initial quantitative analysis tests *whether* there is such a relationship, i.e. the validity of Huntington's overall claim, a case study may indicate *how* cultural differences may, or may not, play a role as a (primary) cause of armed conflict. For this purpose, I choose to study the causes of the war in Bosnia 1992-95 (Chapter 5). I stress, however, that the quantitative test is the main focus of this thesis; the case study is primarily intended to be a basis for discussing the results in an appropriate context. Therefore, the whole of Chapter 3 is dedicated to explaining the methodology of the quantitative test, focusing on the validity and the reliability. Regarding methodological aspects of the case study, I will mention these in the introduction of Chapter 5. The case study is very limited and may just as well be viewed as an extended discussion of the large-N analysis and its results.

For the following, Chapter 2 presents the theory, its premises, critique, and logical derivations in form of hypotheses. In Chapter 3 I present the data, explain how I generated a "civilizational variable", and discuss problems of validity and reliability. Chapter 4 provides presentation and discussion of the results from the quantitative analysis. Chapter 5 is a qualitative approach with main focus on investigating into the causes of the conflict in Bosnia. In Chapter 6 I sum up the thesis, including the results, and suggest directions for further research.

2 Theoretical Framework

This thesis is based upon Huntington's theory of a "clash of civilizations". Under the heading "The Next Pattern of Conflict", Huntington stated in his 1993 article: "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world [referring to the post-Cold War era] will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural" (Huntington 1993: 22). And he concludes: "The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future" (Huntington 1993: 22). In 1996 Huntington published the book *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*, which is a more detailed argument for the hypothesis presented in the article. The renewed interest for this hypothesis following the September 11 attack on the US, calls for an inquiry into this theory, its premises, and the validity of its conclusion[3].

The focus of this chapter will be to present the "clash of civilizations" theory, primarily based on the argument in the book. Initially, I will present the overall theory of Huntington, focusing on its premises (2.1). Next, I will identify what the position of Huntington is in the context of the theoretical debate on cultural differences as a cause of conflict (2.2). Then follows an account of some attempts to test empirically the part of his argument that concerns causes of armed conflict (2.3). Finally, I will review Huntington's specific propositions with regard to causes of armed conflict and deduce hypotheses that can be tested empirically (2.4).

[3] Huntington has changed focus slightly towards demographic explanations of armed conflict following September 11; see Newsweek December 2002 and parts of Chapter 4.

2.1 The theory of Civilizations

In order to understand Huntington's theory properly, it is convenient to clarify some basic questions first. Is this a descriptive or normative theory? What is the purpose of launching the theory? Many have been led to believe that the civilization theory is somehow normative, making the West alert that it is losing relative power to other civilizations and, thus, pointing out how the West *ought to* react in this situation. The theory may also seem to be provocative, as it focuses on the increase of conflict and describes different cultures in a harsher, and less subtle, manner than is the norm in world politics, e.g. "Islam's bloody borders" (Huntington 1996: 254, 257-258).

However, following Huntington's argument, it becomes clear that the purpose of the theory is to *describe* what he sees as an emerging world order after the Cold War. "The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world" (Huntington 1996: 20). This passage clearly demonstrates that Huntington's endeavor is to describe features of changing world politics, regardless of how politically incorrect it may seem. However, Huntington also attempts to present a concept for policy-makers to "act on". His "advice" to policy makers is normative in the regard that they express "this is how you *ought to* act granted that the theory corresponds to reality". This, however, does not mean that the theory per se is normative. Huntington endeavors to describe the emerging world order – the distribution of power and potential for conflict in this new era. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid perceiving the theory as normative guidance to (Western) world leaders. This is due to both his "advice", and the fact that the topic, cultural differences, is so subjective. Whatever way Huntington is perceived by the reader, it is important to stress the fact that this thesis, and indeed this chapter, is an attempt to present and test Huntington's theory as objectively as possible. Testing Huntington's propositions is merely a starting point for acquiring more knowledge about the causes of conflict.

2.1.1 A World of Civilizations

Huntington's central argument is that culture (history, language, tradition, and most importantly, religion) is the primary factor shaping the post-Cold War era with regards to politics, economic co-operation, military alliances and the pattern of conflict. This is a result of the de-alignment of the strict bi-polarity of the Cold War. In the emerging world of modernization and globalization, people have more interaction across cultures, but this development also urges people to search for and find their cultural belonging and identity. This identity has become increasingly important. Culture, in this regard, both unites and divides us. As examples of the striving for identity after the Iron Curtain came down, Huntington mentions the fighting on former Yugoslav and Soviet territory, the struggles over identity within Russia, Turkey, and Mexico, and many ethnic and religious conflicts, such as in Somalia and Sri Lanka.

Although Huntington does not neglect the role of states, he claims that in order to understand essential developments in this new era, we must also look at the relations between the largest cultural entities – civilizations. Civilizations will shape world affairs in most respects: economic, political, and military. And most importantly, the clashes of civilizations will explain the pattern of conflict. Huntington claims that the clash of civilizations is the primary factor for explaining armed conflict. Civilizational conflicts are apt to happen as civil wars (which is by far the most common type of conflict after the Cold War) in countries that are located along the fault lines of civilizations. These fault line (civilizational) conflicts are prone to escalate into more severe interstate conflicts, and possibly even erupt into inter-civilizational world wars.

Huntington identifies six main civilizations among nine altogether (see Map 1). Huntington holds that the Latin American and African civilizations (including Sub-Saharan Africa) are not mature and well-established civilizations, but they are emerging. Although Huntington includes the Buddhist civilization, he finds it difficult to speak of this as a distinct civilization, partly because Buddhism is

split in two – Theravada (including Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia), and Lamaist (including Tibet, Mongolia, Bhutan). Huntington presents geopolitical world maps to illustrate the evolution towards a "world of civilizations": The 1920 paradigm map ("The West and the Rest") shows the Colonialist West and the rest of the World, the Cold War paradigm map shows the world divided into the Free World, the Communist Bloc, and Unaligned Nations 1945-89, and finally he presents the post-Cold War map showing nine civilizations from 1990 and onwards displayed on Map 1 (Huntington 1996: 20-28).

Map 1: The map "The World of Civilizations" from Huntington's book.

> This picture of the post-Cold War world politics shaped by cultural factors and involving interactions among states and groups from different civilizations is highly simplified. It omits many things, distorts some things, and obscures others. Yet if we are to think seriously about the world, and act effectively in it, some sort of simplified map of reality, some theory, concept, model, paradigm, is necessary. (Huntington 1996: 29).

Huntington draws this map based on anthropological assessments and what he sees as "the broadest defined cultural differences". These are religious, ethnic and linguistic differences, the religious difference being the "principal defining

characteristic of civilizations" (Huntington 1996: 253). This does not imply that he ignores the "finer" cultural/identity borders that are within states, small regions and even municipalities, but they are not displayed when showing a world map of civilizations. For example, Huntington has not bothered to draw a border around Israel representing the Western civilization or perhaps a distinct Jewish civilization. Also, many would question why Kazakhstan is among the Orthodox civilization and not the Muslim. There are many examples of civilizational borderlines, or lack of such, that may seem less successful in capturing what are the present civilizations and where are their borders. Many would strongly disagree on where the lines are drawn, on what basis they are created, and on whether it is fruitful even to theorize along these lines. Nevertheless, Huntington claims that these cultural borders provide the most suitable basis for explaining (patterns of) conflict today. Therefore, I choose to focus on the civilizations and their borderlines on Map 1, since this is the only way to present, and eventually to test, Huntington's theory on Huntington's own terms.

Huntington attempts to explain how – in this post-1990 "world of civilizations" – some civilizational relations promote integration and cooperation, while other civilizations clash. Since this thesis is concerned with causes of conflict, I will concentrate on the latter. One distinct feature is that the West is losing relative power to the other civilizations. This may, according to the theory, result in a "West against the rest" scenario. At the same time, the West imposes its values (Western democracy, liberal markets, etc.) on other civilizations. The Muslim civilization is the least tolerant towards the West imposing its values. Hence, clashes of the Western and Muslim civilizations are the most likely to occur. Huntington also mentions the possibility of the Muslim civilization aligning with the Sinic (Chinese) civilization in this dispute. In general, the argument holds that the Western and Muslim civilizational borders are most conflict prone. This will be further reviewed in 3.4.2.

2.1.2 Premises for the Civilizations Theory

A basic assumption that Huntington takes for granted is that the end of the Cold War creates a whole new era for world politics. It is taken for granted that the "events" of 1989 form a turning point in world affairs that will create many further substantial changes. Among them, changes in how we think at the individual level, in how states perceive one another, and, eventually, in the patterns of conflict. At the highest level, it will increase the significance of civilizations in world affairs. However, the underlying assumption is that the structural change after the Cold War causes of all the other changes.

A second, more explicit, premise leading to the theory of "a world of civilizations", is that processes at the individual level can be aggregated into explaining major developments at both group, state, and world level. Huntington's model of the "new world" is a multi-polar world, since states are still central actors in world affairs. At the same time, it is multi-civilizational and multi-level world. With some resemblance to a Hobbesian approach, Huntington assesses what the reaction of the individual is to the new world of modernization. He emphasizes that people will become more concerned with the basic question: "Who am I?" as opposed to "Whose side am I on?" during the Cold War.

> In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations (Huntington 1996: 21).

The process at the individual level will also be evident at meso- and macro-levels. This describes the impact on nation states:

> Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalties, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations (Huntington 1996: 21).

A core element of the theory is hence to focus on "identity" or "commonality", initially at the individual level, eventually forcefully at all levels. This notion of "identity" may to Huntington be linguistic, historical, ethnic, and religious. All these factors fit to the concept "cultural". These identities, "culture writ large", constitute civilizations. Cultural borders also exist at lower levels, even between people from different parts of the same constituency. However, it is the broad cultural borders – civilizational borders – that Huntington claims are significant to the nature of conflict.

Third, Huntington bases his theory on the assumption that we are experiencing a development along long historical lines. He tries to predict the "next phase" that will naturally and logically follow from the previous phases:

> All these developments have led many to see the gradual end of the hard, "billiard ball" state, which purportedly has been the norm since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and the emergence of a varied, complex, multi-layered international order more closely resembling that of medieval times (Huntington 1996: 35).

Huntington predicts that the next step in the evolution of world affairs has resemblance to previous eras, e.g. medieval times. This theoretical perspective has resemblance to Hegel's and Marx's explanations of evolution. The basic assumption is that there are mechanisms (ideas and substance) of evolution. One stage of development is an evolution based on earlier stages. Huntington claims that when the bi-polarity world becomes history, the "new" world order that emerges will bear some resemblance to the old world order before the Cold War and even before the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This logic implies that the forces in the evolution of world affairs remain the same throughout the different eras.

Fourth, Huntington has a theoretical basis for his argument. Although he does not devote many pages to a theoretical debate, Huntington does make some references to other ideas about what forces will shape world affairs after the Cold War. Ideas of Mearsheimer (1995) about the "New World Order" and Fukuyama (1992) are characterized as "describing features" of the new era. Moreover, Huntington gives some credit to attempts to view the world as

divided between North and South, and paradigms suggesting the rising of other world actors than states – NGOs, international crime organizations, terrorist organizations, etc. At the same time, Huntington criticizes these theories and uses them as starting points for his own theory. Although Huntington recognizes that: "States are and will remain the dominant entities in world affairs" (Huntington 1996: 34), he also claims that states pursue their interests differently from one historical period to another. In the post-Cold War era, the way states perceive threats and intentions by other states are "powerfully shaped by cultural considerations" (Huntington 1996: 34). Meanwhile, Huntington criticizes Fukuyama for painting a far too harmonic picture of the world. Huntington claims that the civilizational paradigm is a sort of synthesis of all these theories. It is the right combination of "parsimony and realism" (Huntington 1996: 36-39).

2.1.3 Empirical Evidence

As reviewed above, Huntington's theory has some theoretical basis and assumptions, but it is just as much based on empirical observations, and on his prediction of the consequences of a perceived turning point in the history of world affairs. Huntington draws historical lines from medieval times and even more ancient times, to today. Huntington points at significant events in contemporary global politics and explains them as part of a development towards a multi-civilizational world. In this regard, the basis of the theory is to a large extent empirical examples describing the contemporary world from a civilizational perspective. "Paradigms also generate predictions, and a crucial test of a paradigm's validity and usefulness is the extent to which the predictions derived from it turn out to be more accurate than those from alternative paradigms" (Huntington 1996: 37). Huntington puts much effort into showing how the civilizational approach is superior to the realist approach in predicting and describing/explaining the post-Cold War era:

> A statist paradigm, for instance, leads John Mearsheimer to predict that "the situation between Ukraine and Russia is ripe for the outbreak of security competition between them […] A civilizational approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the close cultural, personal, and historical links between Russia and Ukraine and the intermingling of Russians and Ukrainians in both countries, and focuses instead on the civilizational fault line that divides Orthodox eastern Ukraine from Uniate western Ukraine, a central historical fact of long standing which, in keeping with the "realist" concept of states as unified and self-evident entities, Mearsheimer totally ignores. While a statist approach highlights the possibility of a Russian-Ukrainian war, a civilizational approach minimizes that and instead highlights the possibility of Ukraine splitting in half, a separation which cultural factors would lead one to predict might be more violent than that of Czechoslovakia but far less bloody than that of Yugoslavia. The different predictions, in turn, give rise to different policy priorities (Huntington 1996: 37).

The empirical examples discussed by Huntington are generally cases where the civilizational approach presumably has a stronger explanatory force than other approaches. The empirical examples of the book can be divided into two kinds. One kind of empirical examples is of civilizations in history, before 1989. These serve two purposes. First, to demonstrate that conflicts between civilizations, and indeed civilizational wars, have persisted throughout history. Further, that the bi-polarity of the Cold War era diminished the role of civilizations, and that now, after the end of that era, civilizations will again play a greater role. Second, these examples provide a basis to understand the nature of civilizations and inter-civilizational issues. They will be useful lessons and provide guidance for an emerging multi-civilizational world.

The second type of empirical examples is from more recent times (1989-96). Huntington applies the civilizational approach when explaining several recent events and conflicts. He refers to a large extent to the Balkans conflict and the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Huntington views the wars of the former Yugoslavia as purely cultural (ethnic and religious in origin), and hence a result of a clash of civilizations. On pp. 38-39 Huntington makes reference to 19 events in world affairs during a six-month period in 1993. These are incidents in world affairs that Huntington believes can be best explained with a civilizational approach. He claims: "A comparable list of events demonstrating the relevance of the civilization paradigm could be compiled for almost any other six-month period in the early 1990s" (Huntington 1996: 39). His book is rife with examples of conflicts and wars, both inter- and intra-state, involving religious and ethnic rivalries. Huntington makes no explicit distinction between

types of conflict, however, he theorizes about which inter-civilizational relations are most prone for conflict (see 2.4.1 and 2.4.2).

2.2 Huntington's Thesis in a Theoretical Context

Huntington's civilizational theory has been criticized from many different angles[4]. This is hardly surprising since the theory has become so widely known and comprises parts of many different subjects, such as religion, political science, history, sociology, and anthropology. One common critique is that the theory has too high ambitions – that it aspires to be "all-comprising". For the purpose of this thesis, it is fruitful to narrow the scope. I will strictly review critique concerning the causes of armed conflict. Specifically, I will present challenging views to the assertion that civilizational clashes are the "primary cause" of armed conflict.

I will initially make some brief remarks concerning the problematic term "civilization". Next, this section seeks to locate where to place Huntington in the debate on culture as a cause of conflict. Are cultural differences per se a cause of conflict? Or are cultural differences simply emphasized and exploited by interest-driven political leaders? Or are the determinants of conflict rather political and economic factors, such as poverty, unequal distribution of resources, and type of regime?

2.2.1 The Notion of "Civilization"

As mentioned in the introduction and earlier in this chapter, Huntington views civilization to be "the broadest way" in which people identify their belonging to a community. Religion is the foremost definition of such an identity, or "cultural difference", followed by ethnicity and language. In addition, other

[4] See among others Ahari 1997; Ajami 1993; Esposito 1995; Gregg 1997; Harris 1996; Hassner 1997; Henderson 1997; Kirkpatrick 1993; Kurth 1994; Murphey 1998; Pfaff 1998; Rosencrance 1998; Yamazaki 1996.

identity factors play a role, like history, ancestry, and tradition. This is a foundation for the whole theory. Nevertheless, many scholars of various disciplines contest this basic assumption. I will not go into this criticism, but only mention that there are considerable problems in viewing any of these "cultural differences" (religion, ethnicity and language) as direct causes of conflict. Huntington does not present any comprehensive logical deduction of how these factors separately cause conflict, nor does he present substantive empirical evidence for this view. Moreover, there is no waterproof argument as to why these three factors combined constitute civilizations, nor is there any rationale for when a civilizational border follows an ethnic border as opposed to a religious or linguistic border. Why, for example, is there no civilizational division of Protestants and Catholics in Europe, while there is a division of Muslims and "Africans" through the African continent? Huntington does provide some answers, but there does seem to be some lack of consistency for drawing the civilizational borders. I will not go further into this criticism than to say that when testing Huntington's theory one must be aware of these problems. On the basis of the results in this analysis one may review the theory and consider corrections. It is through testing a theory and revising it that it develops to describe reality more precisely.

2.2.2 Is Huntington a Primordialist?

During the Cold War, many political scientists were led to believe that cultural factors, like religion and ethnicity, are traditional (as opposed to modern) features of a society. These features would become less significant through modernization (Gurr 1994). This view is also evident in the theories of globalization. Now that we are so inter-connected through technology, the differences will decrease. Sworn idealists even stress that the decline of states as the most important international actors is a step in the direction of a "global village" or even the "perpetual peace" thesis of Immanuel Kant (1795), suggesting a world government. The conflicts during the early 1990s, however,

restored meaning to the concept "ethnic cleansing", e.g. in Bosnia 1992-95, and it became quite common to say that cultural differences are the primary cause of conflicts.

Furthermore, why and how culture matters for conflict, became part of the academic discussion again. We may speak of a *primordial* "school", which considers religion and ethnicity as deeply-rooted cultural, psychological, and affective attachment to historical and ancestral ties (Connor 1994; Geertz 1963; Isaacs 1975; Smith 1986). Cultural division is seen as a "natural" feature, the same way that cultural differences are viewed "naturally" to be linked with conflict. As Isaacs (1975: 38) puts it:

> Basic group identity consists of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others from the moment of birth by chance of the family into which he is born.

The primordialists view cultural matters, or cultural differences, as given, non-changeable features that constitute a primary source of conflict. It is fair to say that Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis falls into this category of arguments. It is the same theoretical point that Huntington makes, except that he tries to push it a bit further and makes this type of argument very explicit by dividing the whole world into cultural entities – civilizations. He maps out where cultural groups are located and predicts armed conflict along their fault lines. Huntington also describes the "psychological" process of identity at the individual level as an important premise. On the other hand, he does not argue that cultural structures are static. Whereas the primordialist view stresses the immutable character of cultural traits, Huntington asserts that culture and civilizations change, as do identities. Nevertheless, the change of identity is a very slow process, according to Huntington. Some civilizations live for a thousand years. In that sense, it may seem fair to place Huntington in the primordialist school after all. This point remains to be clarified by Huntington.

2.2.3 Instrumentalists vs Primordialists

A common criticism of the primordialists is their assumption of fixed identities and their failure to account for variations in the level of conflict with time and place. Primordialists fail to explain the fact that new and transformed identities emerge. Furthermore, they fail to explain the absence of conflicts in many areas that are characterized by different cultural groups living side by side in harmony. There are many examples of ethnic or religious communities within a political system being divided politically, but still sorting things out peacefully, such as in the Netherlands and Switzerland.

The *instrumentalist* perspective claims to take these variations into account. They perceive religion and ethnicity as tools; they can be used by individuals, groups, or, most commonly, elites in order to obtain access to social, political, and material resources (Brass 1985; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Rothchild 1986; Steinberg 1981). Culture is a tool for politicians to recruit people to achieve a political advantage. In this view, it is not cultural dissimilarity itself that causes conflict, it is rather that an elite figure, or group, sees a window of opportunity that he/they can realize by mobilizing a certain cultural group. One example may be Slobodan Milošević seizing power in Yugoslavia late 1980s and beginning of 1990s. Also economic interests may drive elite figures to use this "tool". (Especially in many developing countries, there are both economic and political gains of seizing political power). Equally, the elites may use this tool defensively, to thwart the ambitions of others or cling to beneficial positions, or offensively, to achieve certain political or economic advantages.

Much of the theoretical criticism against Huntington can be classified as instrumental arguments, e.g. the changing nature of civilizations (Kirkpatrick 1993). Identities are not fixed, they constantly evolve, allegedly. Furthermore, cultural dissimilarities can also be "constructed" in a certain way, or "activated". They are not *per se* a cause of conflict.

2.2.4 The Constructivists – Towards a Synthesis?

The criticism faced by instrumentalists concerns a theoretical assumption inherent in their argument. If elites are able to "construct" a cultural identity from virtually nothing, this implies that individuals can choose freely what cultural group they want to belong to. This is not logical since most people are raised with a certain religious belief. Very few people change their religious identity, and the ethnicity is virtually impossible to change. In general, people do not choose which cultural group to belong to. Therefore, cultural identities cannot be entirely "constructed" (at least not over a short period of time), they may, however, matter more in some places and situations than others. Another criticism against the instrumentalists, and also against Huntington, is that macro political and economic factors are not included as explanatory factors. Are not causes of conflict more intricate than just cultural dissimilarities, one way or the other? Senghaas (1998), for example, claims that economic deprivation is the real cause of conflict.

This leads to the *constructivist* perspective (not to be confused with the constructivist school of International Relations, although related), which claims that cultural dissimilarity is not necessarily fraught with conflict, but it *can* be, given certain societal conditions. Culture may change and evolve over time, but only within the framework of the society. In this approach, culture is seen neither as immutable nor as completely open, but rather as constructed from the interaction of dense webs of social interaction (Anderson 1983; Brubacker 1995; Dominguez 1989; Young 1993). Constructivists claim that if society is in a certain political and/or economic (crisis) state, cultural dissimilarities may be "activated" as a conflict factor. Whereas when political and economic relations are harmonic, the chances of a cultural conflict are very small. This theory may be applied in explaining many cases, such as why cultural differences are a cause of armed conflict in some areas of the world (say in Rwanda), whereas on the American border towards Mexico the ethnic, religious and linguistic differences between the Latin American, American and other cultures have not

erupted in armed conflict. Ethnic hatred might well erupt in the US if Arizona and New Mexico were to experience the catastrophic economic conditions and lack of political control prevailing in Rwanda. The comparison perhaps seems far-fetched, but these are questions one needs to address; why do we find cultural conflict, and indeed genocide, in a society at a given point in time, whereas peace prevails in another society with strong cultural dissimilarities. This is the kind of question to which the constructivist perspective tries to build an answer. For the purpose of explaining variations of cultural conflict, occurrence by time and location, it is probably more beneficial to combine these views into a single theory. Academically, this perspective seems to be gaining some consensus (Brubacker 1995; Gurr 1994), although there are still many unsettled questions.

After this presentation of a theoretical setting to Huntington's theory, I will now turn to some of the criticism that Huntington has faced, based on empirical testing. In the next section, I will focus on attempts to assess the general validity of Huntington's thesis based upon systematic and quantitative empirical studies.

2.3 Attempts to Test Huntington's Thesis Empirically

As I have reviewed above, many scholars have contributed to the theoretical debate on cultural dissimilarity as a determinant of conflict. There is, however, little systematic empirical research conducted to test such theories as Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" theory. Certainly, many interesting case studies have the civilizational theory as one contesting approach to a conflict or a country and show how other models relatively fit that particular case better or worse. For my purpose, these are interesting findings, but I choose to concentrate on quantitative, generalizing research. This is due to a case study's

unsuitability as a basis for dismissing Huntington's general theory; the pitfall of a biased selection of cases may be best avoided by including a large number of units in the analysis. Relatively few scholars have attempted in a systematic way to test quantitatively the validity of the (rather explicit) propositions Huntington sets out. One reason for this is probably the fact that his theory concerns the post-Cold War era, which is still in the making, and hence there is a lack of available data. I will present here some attempts that have been made to test Huntington thus far.

During the past five to ten years, fruitful efforts have been made to test theories of International Relations and causes of conflict through the use of datasets containing information on armed conflicts and states. Russett, Oneal & Cox (2000) present a quite recent test of the civilizational theory: "We assess the degree to which propositions from Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* can account for the incidence of militarized interstate disputes between countries during the period 1950-92" (Russet et al. 2000), and further: "Pairs of states split across civilizational boundaries are no more likely to become engaged in disputes than are other states *ceteris paribus*. Even disputes between the West and the rest of the world, or with Islam, were no more common than those between or within most other groups. Among Huntington's eight civilizations, interstate conflict was significantly less likely only within the West; dyads in other civilizations were as likely to fight as were states split across civilizations, realist and liberal influences are held constant." They conclude: "We can be grateful that Huntington challenged us to consider the role that civilizations might play in international relations, but there is little evidence that they define the fault lines along which international conflict is apt to occur."

Although Russett et al. (2000) use Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) (high number of units), and they categorized the countries into civilizations by Huntington's own map, the analysis does not take into account the fact that the theory is a prediction for the post-Cold War era. Nor does the

analysis account for causes of civil wars and their relationship with interstate wars. Nor do Russett et al. (2000) provide for the fact that the unit *country-years* reflects state borders and thus not necessarily reflects cultural (civilizational) borderlines, which are often located within states. I will readdress this point in Chapter 3. Another interesting result of their analysis is that even when only controlled for contiguity, the civilizational variable is not significant. This study was heavily criticized by Huntington (2000) on methodological grounds (see the beginning of Chapter 3 for some of this criticism).

Other studies conclude slightly differently. Henderson (1997, 1998) also uses Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) as his dependent variable, but in addition to religion, he takes into account ethnic and linguistic dissimilarities. The results indicate that religious differences do increase the propensity for such disputes (MIDs), whereas ethnic and linguistic dissimilarities have no significance or negative effect. Since Huntington relies on religion as his prime cultural factor, this study provides some support for the civilizations theory. However, the study also shows that these religious-based clashes are not a distinct phenomenon for the post-Cold War era. One should keep in mind that the basis for generalizing about the post-Cold War era in these studies is only the period 1989-92. Henderson & Tucker (2001) use the dependent variable interstate war (Correlates of War data, COW) in a more direct test of Huntington's propositions. They find no support for Huntington for any periods 1816-1945, 1946-88 and 1989-92. In all these studies each state is categorized by its civilizational "membership" and the extent of conflict between states belonging to the same civilization is compared statistically with the extent of conflict between states belonging to different civilizations. Huntington (2000) criticized this approach[5] on the grounds that finding the relative frequency of inter- and intra-civilizational disputes is not a logical derivation of the theoretical claim in his book. Besides, he pointed out, civil wars are left out of

the analysis despite the fact that the vast majority of wars are civil wars, especially in the post-Cold War era. Lastly, Huntington remarked that 1989-92 is not a representative time span for the post-Cold War era.

Recent studies have been concerned with testing more specific propositions of Huntington, especially the clash of the Western and Muslim civilizations and "Islam's bloody borders".[6] At least for more recent times, using the Minorities at Risk dataset, Fox (2001) finds some support for Huntington's claims regarding Islam. Shannon (2001) finds no support for them in her study. Shannon replicates the work of Russett et al. (2000), but she focuses on the West and Islam. She uses the same dependent variable (MID) and the same independent variables, with one important exception. Instead of categorizing states into civilizations by Huntington's map, explores different variables for categorizing e.g. a "Muslim country". Shannon tries different thresholds for what percentage of a population needs to belong to a certain religion, in order for the population's country to be categorized by that religion. Although this study is more refined in this respect, also Shannon makes the very questionable generalization for the post-Cold War era from data for the period 1989-92. In several ways, these studies do not represent a correct derivation of Huntington's propositions. I will return to this matter in Chapter 3, but I will briefly mention here a few deficiencies of this earlier research. First, more years of the post-Cold War era must be included in order to generalize about it. Second, civil wars must be included in the analysis, since they account for the majority of conflicts and are part of the central argument of Huntington. Third, we need a more sophisticated "civilizational variable" and method to measure whether conflicts are "civilizational" or caused by other factors.

[5] Huntington (2000) criticizes Russett et al. (2000), but the criticism applies equally for Henderson & Tucker (2001) since the methodology is so similar.
[6] Another recent study by Norris & Inglehart (2002) applies the world value data in order to assess Huntington's propositions. This is a very interesting and different approach, where they find some support for Huntington.

2.4 Hypotheses

Earlier in this chapter, I have discussed the premises and basic assumptions of the civilizations theory. I then presented the theoretical criticism against Huntington concerning cultural differences as a cause of conflict. Next, I reviewed some recent attempts to test the theory empirically . In this section, I aim to make transparent the derivation of verifiable hypotheses concerning armed conflict from theoretical statements. The hypotheses will be the basis for my quantitative analysis (Chapter 4).

2.4.1 Conflicts Along the Fault Lines of Civilizations

One of Huntington's central theoretical claims is that conflicts will occur along the fault lines of civilizations. Empirically, this implies that conflicts will be located geographically close to the borderlines that separate civilizations. Huntington explains the dynamics that cause such civilizational conflicts in the fault line areas. One of the terms he uses is "fault line wars", which are the conflicts at a local or micro level that have grown violent. As opposed to this, he uses the term "core state wars". Core state wars are wars between major states of different civilizations that might lead to World Wars. However, the core state wars are often escalations of fault line wars (Huntington 1996: 207-208). Since there are very few, if any, core state wars so far in the post-Cold War era, I choose to concentrate primarily on the fault line wars. In addition, if there were any core state wars, they would have their origin in a fault line war.

How should one interpret the proposition that the post-Cold War conflicts will occur along the fault lines of civilizations? "Fault lines" can be interpreted literally as the geographical border where one civilization ends and another starts, or more generally as a border area or a division between two or more cultures. In any case, we are talking in general about local conflicts or wars. We have no reason to assume that these wars occur exactly at the borderlines of civilizations, but there should at least be a higher density of

conflict close to civilizational borders than further away. If Huntington is correct in his contention that civilizational borderlines are significant in explaining patterns of conflict, it must follow that the closer a location is to the civilizational border, the higher is the frequency of conflicts. This will be evident empirically if the conflicts do occur along the fault lines of civilizations, as Huntington asserts. Hence, my first hypothesis:

H1: Conflicts more frequently occur along the fault lines of civilizations.

Huntington's theory concerns primarily the post-Cold War era, a point that Huntington (2000) very strongly emphasizes in his reply to Russett et al. (2000). Therefore, it is crucial to test whether there is any evidence of such a change when we move from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. This is one of the most crucial tests since it deals with the very foundation of the theory. Huntington claims that the basis for a clash of civilizations is people's increased need for identity, caused by the collapse of the Cold War's bi-polarity. Hence, a second expectation derived from the theory is that the above-mentioned relationship posited in H1 is significantly more evident in the period 1990-2000 than in the Cold War era (represented by the decade 1979-89). This accounts for ten years during Cold War compared with ten years after the Cold War, which should be a good basis for investigating a change in the pattern of conflict.

H2: The conflicts of 1990-2000 are generally more closely located to the civilizational borders than the conflicts of 1979-89.

Huntington makes several propositions about the nature of fault line wars (Huntington 1996: 252-253). He claims that fault line wars "tend to be vicious and bloody, since fundamental issues of identity are at stake", and makes reference to conflict areas from the early 1990s that have large death tolls, such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Sudan, Tajikistan, Croatia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tibet, and East Timor. This type of conflict (civilizational conflict,

i.e. fault line war) tends to be territorial: "Fault line conflicts sometimes are struggles for control over people. More frequently the issue is control over territory". Granted that the conflicts of the post-Cold War era occur along the fault lines of civilizations, i.e. we find support for H1 and H2, one may also expect that for 1990-2000, the closer a conflict is located to a civilizational border, the more likely it is "bloody and over territory". What Huntington treats in one paragraph of his book is in fact two different propositions that need to be tested separately. The next two hypotheses express these expectations:

H3: The closer a conflict is located to a civilizational border, the more likely the conflict has a high number of battle deaths.

H4: The closer a conflict is located to a civilizational border, the more likely the conflict is over territory.

As mentioned, the theory holds that fault line wars are local conflicts, or wars at a micro level. However, they may "occur between states, between nongovernmental groups, and between states and nongovernmental groups" (Huntington 1996: 252). Moreover, they may escalate into major wars between several states. In light of these statements, it is fruitful to inquire into whether the theory applies mainly to civil wars, as opposed to interstate wars and internationalized civil wars. The latter type may be fought on several different locations, not necessarily following the "fault lines", even though they may be escalations of fault line wars. Also, it is interesting to see if there is any difference between these types of conflicts since they have thus far very often been studied separately in the study of causes of armed conflict. One may expect that:

H5: Intrastate wars are generally closer located to the civilizational borders than interstate and internationalized intrastate wars.

2.4.2 The Clashes

All clashes of civilizations are not alike in their propensity to cause war, according to Huntington. Although Huntington claims that most conflicts will arise along the fault lines of civilizations (H1 and H2) in the post-Cold War era, he distinguishes the fault lines by saying: "Some intercivilizational relations are more conflict-prone than others" (Huntington 1996: 185). For instance, Huntington claims that the West will, to a relatively large extent, be exposed to conflict, since this civilization has been losing relative power since the 1920s and simultaneously has been trying to impose its values on other civilizations. This may lead to a "West versus the rest" scenario.

> At the micro level, the most violent fault lines are between Islam and its Orthodox, Hindu, African and Western Christian neighbors. At the macro level, the dominant division is between "The West and the rest", with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and Asian societies on the one hand, and the West on the other. The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness (Huntington 1996: 183).

The clash between the Western and Muslim civilizations will be severe. Huntington devotes a whole section on this specific clash (Huntington 1996: 209-218). Among the civilizations Huntington expects to have particularly peaceful border, he mentions the Buddhist civilization. This is due to the fact that the Buddhist civilization diverges into two forms and has a weaker identity and cohesion compared to other civilizations. It is also very uncertain, following Huntington's argument, whether the Sinic civilization will align with the Muslim civilization in a future international dispute against the West. Not all of these ideas can easily be reformulated as testable propositions. But some are clearer than others and give rise to the following general hypothesis (H6), with four sub-hypotheses (H6 A-D):

H6: Certain civilizations and certain pairs of civilizations are more conflict-prone than others.

H6A: The Western civilization is more than averagely exposed to conflict.

H6B: The Muslim civilization is more than averagely exposed to conflict.

H6C: The Buddhist civilization is less than averagely exposed to conflict.

H6D: The Western and Muslim civilizations are particularly prone to fight each other.

3 Method and Data

The aim of this chapter is to make as transparent as possible the process by which variables are generated and subjected to statistical analysis, as tests of the hypotheses set forth in Chapter 2. This transparency will allow other scholars to replicate the research and fill in the holes that invariably remain. Measuring variables is by nature a rough and imperfect procedure; in this regard I have encountered problems, argued for the way I have chosen to deal with them, and pointed out remaining shortcomings.

I will start this chapter with a very brief presentation of my quantitative research design, as a response to problems related to previous attempts to test Huntington's theory. Next, I will present the data used in the analysis and some relevant variables from the dataset (3.1 and 3.2). I further explain how I have combined data to generate a "civilizational" variable – the central variable of the analysis (3.3). Last, I discuss the problems I have encountered, and the solutions, in light of reliability and validity (3.4 and 3.5).

In Chapter 2, I presented various attempts to test Huntington's propositions concerning the civilizational concept. These attempts used the "Correlates of War" (COW) datasets, where the units are "country-years" or "dyad-years" (respectively called monadic and dyadic forms of analysis). In these studies, the units of analysis are all combinations of states, or pairs of states, for all years. The dependent variable, "conflict", is measured either as Militarised Interstate Disputes (MIDs), or by a threshold of 1000 battle deaths, COW data for civil wars. The independent variables are various measurable features of a country: its level of democracy, GNP per capita, level of "open economy" (trade), etc., and control variables such as whether the state has recently been at war, and whether a pair of states are neighbors or not (contiguity). This approach has been very fruitful in testing IR theory and represents a systematic way in which

to generalize about causes of conflict. I will argue, however, that the same approach is less appropriate to testing the propositions of Huntington. Some of this criticism has already been put forward by Huntington (2000) himself.

First, Huntington's theory concerns the post-Cold War era, and an analysis of conflicts that account for the period 1945-92, which is essentially the Cold War era, can neither prove nor disprove Huntington's central argument. An analysis should endeavor to include as many post-Cold War years as possible, and there should be a sufficiently high number of units representing each era from which one wishes to generalize. Second, if we are to examine Huntington's propositions about the nature of conflicts in the "new era", his claim that interstate, intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts are all somehow interrelated, should be reflected in the design of the analysis. It is therefore inadequate to focus merely on interstate conflicts. Third, the idea of applying country-years as units in an analysis concerning religious, ethnic and linguistic differences (cultural differences) – which know no state borders – is questionable. Country-years are well suited for categorizing countries and generating variables that easily follow the administrative system of state borders, but in regards to civilizational borders it is rather problematic.

Two solutions to this problem have been tried thus far: a) to use Huntington's map (see Chapter 2) to categorize countries into civilizations, and b) to categorize countries into civilizations by cultural composition, such as the percentage of the population belonging to a certain religious community, or the country's majority ethnic group (see Shannon 2001). Both these approaches are problematic. The first does not take account of the fact that civilizational borders often cross through countries. In India, for example, the mix of Hindus and Muslims throughout the country makes it very problematic to classify even parts of India as belonging to one civilization or the other. Approach b) neglects Huntington's map, and one will have to decide on some kind of percentage measure for which countries are mixed, which are not, and between which groups. Moreover, it is not a test of Huntington's theory to measure whether "Muslim countries" fight "Hindu countries" significantly more than

they fight their own "Muslim countries". Huntington's argument is rather that the areas along the fault lines of civilizations, i.e. where the major cultures meet, or clash, are more prone to conflict than other areas. If this proposition gains empirical support, it is an indication that cultural dissimilarity is a stronger determinant of the pattern of conflict, than assumed in the studies reviewed in Chapter 2. This is not the proposition that has been tested by researchers thus far. In this chapter, I present a method to test some of Huntington's propositions. I believe that this method addresses the shortcomings of the previous attempts to test Huntington.

For the dependent variable, I use the PRIO/Uppsala dataset. This dataset has a more inclusive definition of conflict than the previously used datasets, which will be discussed below. In addition, it contains more recent data, which provides a better basis for generalizing about the post-Cold War era, and for detecting possible changes from one era to the other. Furthermore, I will use "conflicts", as opposed to country-years, as units in the analysis. The units include all types of conflicts in the dataset: interstate, intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts. It thus provides a fairer and more including approach to testing the propositions/hypotheses. By using conflicts as units, I also avoid having to categorize every country into one civilization, which is extremely problematic. With this approach, I examine general features of conflicts, such as their location. More specifically, I generate a "civilizational variable" by ranking each conflict by its distance to the nearest civilizational border. As a reference, I also rank cities with more than one million inhabitants by their distance to the nearest civilizational border. I test: to what extent do the conflicts of the post-Cold War era occur geographically along the fault lines of civilizations? Furthermore, is civilizational conflict a feature merely of the post-Cold War era? Are civilizational conflicts generally over territory, and do they involve significantly high numbers of battle-related deaths? Which civilizational borders are most prone to conflict? This chapter

will explain in detail this applied method and the generating of data, and then discuss problems of validity and reliability.

3.1 The PRIO/Uppsala Dataset

The PRIO/Uppsala dataset is a newly released dataset showing armed conflict 1946-2001 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The definition of (armed) conflict in this dataset is: "A contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between the two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties at least one is the government." (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619). A conflict may be "interstate" (between two or more states), "internationalized internal" (between the government of a state and internal opposition with intervention of other states), or "internal" (between a government of a state and internal opposition groups without outside intervention) (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619). The threshold is the same for all conflicts. This is a more reasonable threshold (with regards to number of battle deaths) than either the COW project's war data (1000), or the MID data (where the threshold is simply a threat to use force, not necessarily involving a single battle-related death). Because of the lower threshold, the PRIO/Uppsala dataset includes a larger number of conflicts than the COW dataset on war. It excludes disputes with no, or only a very few, battle-related deaths[7]. The Uppsala University Conflict Data Project has collected data on low-level conflict, internal and external, from the end of the Cold War. The dataset has been extended back from the end of the Cold War to the end of World War II. The dataset has been generated in two steps: First, a candidate list was generated on the basis of 13 existing datasets. Second, the candidate conflicts were checked systematically on the basis of the Uppsala coding criteria. In sum, the PRIO/Uppsala dataset includes more conflicts from recent times and at the same time includes all relevant types of conflicts for my analysis for the period

1946-2001. The 2001 data were released quite recently, and my analysis is limited to the period 1979-2000.

Although the work of generating the dataset has been conducted with great care, there are some problems concerning the categorization of conflicts. First, there is the problem of deciding whether the fighting of a conflict-year in the later years is a continuation of the conflict in the first year, or a new conflict. The guidelines used by the creators of the dataset are somewhat unclear. A second point is that even with this low threshold, a user will find important conflicts missing because they fail to reach the 25 battle-related deaths limit. For example, both in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland there is not registered "conflict" in the database for the period 1990-2000 since the number of battle-related deaths in those conflicts did not exceed 25 in a single year in that period.

3.1.1 The Variables in the Dataset

The conflicts in the PRIO/Uppsala dataset are classified by whether they concern government or territory. A "government" conflict concerns the type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition. A "territory" conflict concerns "a change from one state to another in the control of territory in the case of interstate conflict or demands of secession or autonomy in the case of intrastate conflict" (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619-620). This dichotomous variable is labeled "Incompatibility" and responds directly to my Hypothesis 4.

A variable that responds to H3 (the proposition that civilizational conflicts are "bloodier") is the one labeled "Intensity". "Intensity" has three levels: 1. "Minor" involves at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict. 2. "Intermediate" involves at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an

[7] For a more detailed discussion see the presentation in Journal of Peace Research 5/2002, also with further reference to the dataset codebook. The codebook is also available at www.pcr.uu.se.

accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year of the conflict. 3. "War" involves at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619). In practice, and especially for the 1979-2000 period, there is no difference between category 1 and 2. They are, in fact, not properly scaled, since there is hardly any substantial difference between these two categories. Therefore I choose to dichotomize the variable and merge category 1 and 2 into "0", and the remaining "1". This variable will account for how violent a conflict is, especially since Huntington explicitly mentions that "bloody" translates to the number of battle-related deaths (Huntington 1996: 252-253).

As I have explained earlier, this analysis includes all the conflicts in the dataset. Therefore, it is interesting to see if there is any difference when distinguishing between types of conflicts (H5). Since internationalized internal conflicts according to Huntington are civil wars that have "spilled over", the same way he regards interstate wars to be spill-overs, I choose to merge the two categories into one "international conflicts", as opposed to "internal conflicts", which makes this variable a dichotomy that is labeled "Type".

3.2 Geographical Data

I use two types of geographical data for generating a "civilizational variable". One is the location of conflicts, which Halvard Buhaug has added to the PRIO/Uppsala dataset (Rød, Gleditsch & Buhaug 2001; Buhaug & Gates 2002). This contains information on the location (longitude, latitude) and geographical extent of each conflict (radius) in the dataset. The conflict locations can be viewed on Map 2 in section 3.3.1. The second set of data is simply a file with the location of cities with more than one million inhabitants (see Appendix 1).

The data for the location of the conflicts have been incorporated into the PRIO/Uppsala database (Gleditsch et al. 2002). For any given conflict, Buhaug et al. outlined a "conflict area", i.e. where the armed conflict took place, in an Eckert VI projection of the world. Based on the most distant points of this area, Buhaug defined a circular conflict zone. (This approximation is, of course, not a perfect description of the size or shape of the conflict area). The center of the circle is the center of the conflict. This is used to define the "location of the conflict". The same simplification is made when developing the "ViewConflict" program from the same set of data (see Rød et al. 2001). The conflict location of an interstate conflict is registered on the border of the two warring countries, hence not necessarily exactly where the fighting took place. A radius variable has only been generated for internal conflicts.

Given the definition of conflict in the PRIO/Uppsala dataset, the number of "observations" in this dataset is higher than the actual number of conflicts (See Codebook Sections 3 and 4.1-3). Several observations of "armed conflict" that are related, constitute one conflict. The geographical data, which is the basis for my analysis, counts every observation as one conflict. Hence, there are 536 observations, or conflicts, in the period 1946-2000, and 295 in the period of analysis, 1979-2000. What is the difference between applying "observations" or "conflicts"? When the PRIO/Uppsala dataset was generated, every observation received an ID. Later, it received a Conflict ID for every conflict involving several observations. For example, the conflicts in Tibet in 1950, 1956 and 1959 all have the same Conflict ID, but different IDs as separate observations. This means that for every year that is coded from "peace" to "conflict" or from "conflict" to "peace" (an "observation") in a certain area of the world, this is registered as a "conflict" with a co-ordinate for the location. In sum, the geographical data contains many more (about twice as many) units (locations of conflicts) than the PRIO/Uppsala final set. However, the two sets of data correspond perfectly, since they are merely more aggregated (conflicts) and less aggregated (observations) data. In the analysis of this thesis, I have

chosen to apply the same set of units as in the geographical data – which means observations.

However, I will conduct the same analysis with the other set of units for conflicts as well. Since the results are the same, I will subsequently report only findings from the first set and refer to Appendix 6; for the results from the alternative set of units. Although it does not seem to matter which type of conflict unit I choose, I find the geographical data units more appropriate in a quantitative analysis since they contain more information. Second, with as many as 295 units, split up between during- and post-Cold War, it is more justifiable to run comparisons of means when both variables are strongly skewed (Skog 1998: 167-170). Therefore, I will use "observations" in my analysis, and I will use the term "conflicts" for these observations.

The second type of geographical data is the location of cities with more than 1 million inhabitants in relation to civilizational borders (see Appendix 1). The purpose of this variable is to create a control variable when testing H1: the significance of civilizational borders to the location of conflicts. If it turns out that the frequency of conflicts increases closer to the civilizational borders, there is still no reference to determine if this is a distinct phenomenon. A (statistical) test of whether this is a distinct empirical pattern would be to see how *random* locations would be distributed in relation to civilizational borders, in comparison with how the *actual* locations of conflicts are spread in relation to civilizational borders. This is a basic statistical principle often performed as a t-test of means between the random and actual distribution. This leads to the question: how could one generate a random set of locations that could hypothetically be locations of conflicts? There are two limitations: None of the conflicts are located (at least not their center) at sea, which rules out more than 70% of the world surface, and there are no conflicts where no, or very few, people live.

The best solution would be to generate random geographical points in populated areas of a certain density level and higher. Since this would be too

time consuming and geographically challenging, I have chosen what seems to be one out of very few alternatives, which is to select all cities with more than one million inhabitants. I was able to get hold of a GIS file (ESRI) with the location of all (250) cities with more than one million inhabitants. This will serve as a set of random locations of conflict. Therefore, when I apply the civilizational variable to conflict locations, I conduct the exact same operations with this "random set" in order to compare whether the *actual distribution of conflicts* is significantly closer located to civilizational borders than the *random distribution of "conflicts" (cities)* (H1). This means I do not only measure the extent to which conflicts are distributed closely along the civilizational borders, I also test statistically whether random (populated) locations in the world are distinguishably closer located to civilizational borderlines compared to conflicts. Distances to cities are an important indicator as a control and a reference for the distance between conflicts and borders[8].

If cities are to express fictitious conflict points, as a reference to actual conflict locations, in relation to civilizational borders, this presupposes that the locations of cities are not correlated with civilizational borderlines. However, there are arguments that such correlations exist. On the one hand, one may argue that cities with more than one million inhabitants are systematically located farther from civilizational borderlines. One argument in this direction may be that while many cities are located along the coastal areas, civilizational borderlines are, to a large extent, stretched out across continents. It is also conceivable that people wish to live in culturally homogenous areas, i.e. away from civilizational borderlines. On the other hand, one may argue that there are factors affecting cities to be located close to civilizational borderlines. One argument is that many great cities have developed from the inter-civilizational trade. Istanbul, Sarajevo, and Alexandria are some examples. These factors are important to be aware of, especially if the result shows marginal difference.

[8] Also, the control of cities provides a certain control of "no conflict" as opposed to "conflict", which was the initial reason for the country-year analysis approach.

3.3 Combining the Data in GIS – how the "Civilizational Variable" is Generated

I have now presented the data I use to generate a civilizational variable. These are the next steps I have taken: First, from Map 1 (Chapter 2) I identified where one civilization meets another – the civilizational borders. I coded each border by which civilizations meet, or "clash". Next, I drew these borderlines on to a world map (Eckert VI projection of the world) where also all conflict locations are marked as points (see Map 2, below). Next, I ran an operation in the GIS program where every conflict was measured automatically by the distance to its *nearest* civilizational borderline. Hence, I ended up with a new variable where every conflict is ranked by its distance to the nearest civilizational border, measured in meters. I also coded for each conflict which borderline it aligns to as the closest. This civilizational variable I labeled "Distance" and I added it to the original dataset (see Appendix 2, which contains the whole dataset used for the analysis). This provides interesting opportunities for running correlations with other variables already in the dataset.

In the following, I will explain which problems I encountered when projecting the civilizational borders, and how I dealt with those problems. I then comment on the process of identifying which civilizational border is closest to each conflict, and measuring the distance. The matrix that was eventually produced is displayed in Appendix 2. Furthermore, I suggest some of its utilities. The exact same procedure was conducted with the measuring of location of cities in relation to civilizational borders, and I will therefore not comment more on that. The statistical tests will be further commented in (3.4).

3.3.1 Drawing Civilizational Borders

The programs used are ArcView (ESRI) for display and presentation and Arc/Info for calculations (ESRI). Both programs are software in the category Geographical Information Systems (GIS). The objective is to measure distances from locations (points of conflicts and cities) to the nearest

civilizational border. Since the conflicts are already in the program, the task is to draw civilizational borders. The only source used for drawing the borders is Huntington's map (see Map 1, Chapter 2) (Huntington 1996: 26-27). Huntington's map simply displays the various civilizations in the world. I want to draw the lines where one civilization ends and another starts – their borderlines. There are some problems attached to this. First, the lines on the map are, according to Huntington, only the broader cultural borderlines, and they are not very accurate (Some places it is quite difficult to see exactly where the lines are drawn). However, this is Huntington's most explicit and concrete exposure of his theory. Although the theory suggests that there are many finer cultural borders on a micro-level, the borders on the map are the ones that, allegedly, have an influence on war and peace. Therefore, it is appropriate to use these borders as a basis for testing his theory concerning patterns of conflict.

The second problem faced is that of reaching some kind of standard as to when the division between two civilizations by a long distance of sea (e.g. the Atlantic) should constitute a civilizational border. My solution is to use the threshold of Correlates of War project (Singer & Small 1994) when distinguishing whether two states are neighbors (the contiguity variable): less than 150 English miles (approximately 241 km). This means, for example, that there is a civilizational border across the Gibraltar strait, but not between Japan and Russia. A third problem is that the whole of India, and only India, is hatched on Huntington's map, indicating that it is mixed between one or more civilizations. The solution that is most fair to testing the theory is to define this whole area as a clash of civilizations where every conflict will have 0 meters distance to its nearest civilizational border. This method constitutes a problem since one area is treated differently from other areas, however, the potential negative effects are outweighed by the fact that there are relatively many cities in India that have one million inhabitants or more. Furthermore, the use of this method is justified by the lack of better alternatives. A fourth and final problem was the difficulty of drawing the borderlines accurately. In some (very few)

places there is a 20-30 km gap between where the line ought to be drawn, as opposed to where it is actually drawn. This discrepancy is randomly distributed and is relatively minor (30 km, the maximum margin of error, is 4,6% of the average distance between a conflict and the closest civilizational borderline of 295 conflicts 1979-2000).



Map 2: Civilizational borders and conflicts 1979-2000. (Imported from Arc View, Eckert VI projection)

3.3.2 Distances to Civilizational Borders

In Map 2, the locations (points) are conflicts 1979-2000 from the PRIO dataset, which are also the units in my analysis. The aim is, as already explained, to generate a variable by which these units are scaled by their distance to the nearest civilizational border. This means that, for all conflicts, I identify the closest point on the civilizational border and then measure the distance between the two points. This measurement is possible to do automatically in the program ArcInfo when the civilizational borders have been drawn in ArcView. The distance from each of the conflict locations to its closest borderline is measured by the program, displayed in ArcView, and made ready to export to Excel and other statistics programs (Stata and SPSS in my case).

The next stage is to identify the closest civilizational border from each conflict. The purpose of gathering this information is to compare the amount of conflict relatively along the various borders. The idea is to measure the total distance to all borders and thereafter divide the distance to each civilizational border by the total distance. This proportion multiplied with the total number of conflicts provides an "even" measure, i.e. the number of conflicts "attached/related" to a certain civilizational border provided that the conflicts were spread out evenly. In other words, this "even" measure expresses the expected number of conflicts along a certain civilizational border provided that civilizational issues did not affect the distribution of conflict. Therefore, it is interesting to compare with the actual distribution. The process of adding up distances is straightforward in the GIS software. All the lines drawn have been automatically coded (1-43). Each of these lines responds to a civilizational border, which is also coded (1-16). The final result is reached by summing up the number of conflicts of all lines belonging to each civilizational border. This information provides a good descriptive test of H6A-D. See Appendix 3 to review the information I have added.

3.3.3 Projection versus Reality

The earth has an approximately ellipsoidal shape. The world map used is a representation of the earth projected on the plane with the Eckert VI projection. We can imagine going from the globe to a sheet. This causes errors to occur in the distances in the plane compared to the distances on the earth itself. Errors in distance, direction, area and shape will vary according to which projection one chooses. Hence, a decision must be made on whether to change the projection and, alternatively, conduct distance measurements without a projection, i.e. using geographical co-ordinates (latitudes and longitudes), as opposed to plane co-ordinates.

Distances will never be 100% accurate when measured in a plane. Distances from one geographical co-ordinate to another, with a known datum (a datum contains information about the shape of the earth) can be easily measured. Finding a distance to a line, however, is more problematic. For that reason, and because the geographical data available was already plotted in a projection, using a projection was the most convenient solution. A different question is whether I should use a different projection than Eckert VI. There are world projections with smaller errors in distance, but accordingly greater errors in shape, etc. However, the fact that the data was already in this projection, and that a transfer to another projection could cause errors in the dataset, made the choice easy. Another argument for choosing Eckert VI is that this makes it easier to present the results and to replicate the analysis.

Eckert VI is a pseudocylindrical, equal-area projection, where all parallels are straight lines and all meridians are equally spaced sinusoidal curves, except the central meridian (Greenwich), which is a straight line (ESRI manual on map projections. 1994 ESRI: Appendix 36). Equal-area means that the various land areas are displayed with correct area-size relative to each other. This implies that shape, distance and directions will be inaccurate. Here, I will only comment on the inaccuracy in distance. For distance, the scale is distorted N-S

29% along the Equator relative to the E-W dimension. This distortion decreases to zero at 49° 16' N and S at the central meridian. The scale is correct only along these parallels. This means that some conflicts are in fact further located from a civilizational border than what is shown in the projection. If we look at a conflict *close to the equator*, which has its closest point on the civilizational border in the E-W direction, the distance will be distorted in the following way:



Provided that B is the closest point on the civilizational border to conflict point A, and BC is in the E-W direction located along the equator, the distance BC will in reality be 29% longer than in the projection. By measuring the ABC angle, or simply applying Pythagoras' theorem, one can with this information easily find the distortion, and hence the real distance between B and conflict point A. This kind of distortion occurs, however, only to a very limited extent in this analysis. A reason for this is that most civilizational borders are drawn in the same direction – east-west. More importantly, the same distortion will happen equally in the *random* sample of cities and it will therefore have little influence on the results.

3.4 Reliability

Validity and reliability may be seen as criteria for judging the quality of the study (Yin 1990: 40). Both terms refer to methodological aspects of interpreting the result, as opposed to substantial aspects (Hellevik 1991: 306-308). If there is a high degree of reliability and validity in the analysis, the results may be interpreted strictly substantially. Reliability is concerned with the accuracy of measurement (Hellevik 1991: 306-307). It is a measure for the

degree of reproductivity of the study and the results. In this section, I will briefly sum up the most important issues regarding reliability that may in some way affect the results. The aim is to make these concerns explicit in order to assess whether they are problematic with regard to the analysis.

Although I have pointed out many measurements that are not 100% accurate, these are not systematic errors that are expected to affect the results. What could affect the result is the way borders are drawn between neighboring civilizations divided by sea. It would, for example, probably affect the result if no border was drawn across the Gibraltar strait. There are conceivable alternatives to using a threshold of 150 miles. This threshold has, however, previously been used for similar purposes. There is a guidance, made explicit, which makes it possible for other researchers to replicate and assess whether a change of threshold affects the result of the analysis. A different reliability issue of concern may be the distortion of distances in this kind of projection. For the most part, however, this is not a concern, since the distances only to a small extent are in the east-west direction. Furthermore, for this concern, and other concerns regarding measurement in the projection, it is important to ask whether it affects any of the tests in the analysis. Since all tests are made on the basis of measurement in the same projection (distances from the cities, the random set, is generated the exact same way in the same projection), the concerns do not constitute reliability problems.

With regards to the dataset, the reliability concerns are few and minor. The most problematic point is, perhaps, how the start time and end time of the conflicts have been generated. This is often hard to tell, since conflicts tend to persist in some form or another. Are there several conflicts in, for instance, Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, or is it just the same conflict re-emerging some years later? It is also a concern that no clear guidelines seem to exist, by which to judge in these matters. This does not concern my analysis to a large extent. Because I have relatively many units, unsystematic misjudging will not disturb the discovery of the main tendencies in the material. However, I have not ruled out effectively the possibility of a standard error in the material

attached to the time-element of the PRIO/Uppsala definition. There may be a systematic error of not including conflicts of 20 battle-related deaths in December one year, and another 20 January the following year, whereas 25 battle-related deaths one year is included as a conflict.

3.5 Validity

In general terms, validity may be defined as the relevance of the data for the problem one studies (Hellevik 1991: 159). I have already discussed issues concerning validity in this chapter, and for that reason, this paragraph only makes reference to what has already been stated. Validity can be broken down to four parts (Skog 1998: 85-86). The first two points are internal and external validity. The former refers to the causal interpretation of the data, and the latter refers to the generalizing on the grounds of the analyzed data (Skog 1998: 86-90). I will treat them simultaneously as I present the research design. The analysis has a relatively large N, which means that the number of units is relatively high (295). The data contains systematically gathered properties of the units (conflicts): their location in relation to civilizational borders, intensity (number of battle-related deaths), and other characteristics of the units. I make two generalizations: I postulate that the nature of conflicts in the periods 1979-89 and 1990-2000 are representative of the conflicts in the Cold War era the post-Cold War era, respectively.

With relatively few variables and large N, the analysis suits *explanation.* It is my aim to contribute to the debate on what the causes of conflict are on the background of seeing location of conflicts in relation to causes of conflict. Nevertheless, the more specific objective and project of this thesis is to test certain propositions of Huntington's theory, from which I have deduced hypotheses in Chapter 2. These hypotheses are logical derivations from theoretical statements. They are deduced "empirical statements". "After this

logical deduction of empirical statements from the theory, one can make the observations called for in the empirical statements to see whether or not they are true" (Stinchcombe 1968: 15-17). One central derivation is that the conflicts of the post-Cold War era occur along the fault lines of civilizations. I have formulated H1 to test this theoretical statement empirically. I make observations of the locations of conflicts for the period I wish to generalize about, and measure their location in relation to the fault lines of civilizations. If H1 corresponds with reality, Huntington's theory gains more credibility. If not, Huntington's proposition is false. Furthermore, there are logical expectations deduced from the theory about how the "civilizational variable" will correlate with other relevant variables. This is provided that I have made correct measurements, deductions and statistical tests; hence, the results from the test can be interpreted substantially rather than methodologically. This type of research design is a quite standardized and recognized research method.

A third approach to validity is the validity of conclusions. This is a matter of applying appropriate statistical tests and design, so that the results will correctly mirror the data. The statistical tests of this analysis will consist of descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between the civilizational variable and other relevant variables. Examples of descriptive statistics are the average distance between civilizational borders and conflicts, when controlling for post- and Cold War period, or cities. As means of comparison, I apply the Student's t-tests of averages to see if they are significantly different. This kind of test is problematic if the variable is strongly skewed, which the civilizational variable is. Provided that the number of units exceeds 100, however, it is still plausible to apply this kind of test, according to Skog (1998: 166-170). Both for H1 and H6A-D I apply descriptive statistics to some extent. The underlying principle for these tests is to compare the *actual* distribution with a *random* distribution in order to judge if they are significantly different. A difference implies the existence of a distinct empirical phenomenon. This is, for example, the case when comparing random (even) distribution of conflicts along

civilizational borders, with the actual distribution of conflicts controlled for civilizational borders (H6A-D).

In this context, I will briefly return to the issue of internal validity, i.e. the causal relations. It is obvious that the civilizational variable comes first in time of the relevant variables. E.g. the fact that a conflict is located in an area where different civilizations meet, may affect the length of the conflict or how "bloody" it will be. However, it is not logical that the duration of a conflict determines the location of the conflict in relation to the civilizational border. Although there may be a relatively strong correlation between the civilizational variable and another relevant variable to the theory, it does not necessarily predict or explain an empirical relationship. The relationship may be a spurious effect, meaning that the variation in the dependent variable may be caused by a different independent variable than the one used. For example, the areas through which the civilizational borders are drawn may be densely populated and this factor determines a relatively high death rate. It is common to use control variables in order to rule out this possibility. In my case, the only variables available are the existing ones in the dataset and additional variables must be generated. I have already generated one, and generating more geographically based variables would be too time-consuming. This is probably the most severe limitation of my analysis – the lack of control variables. This will be further discussed at the end of Chapter 4, and I will suggest remedies to this problem through including relevant control variables in a qualitative approach in Chapter 5. One solution to the lack of variables is to reduce the number of units to a few (comparative study) or one (case-study). I have in the introduction suggested conducting a case study in order to investigate the micro-foundations of a general relationship that may be revealed in the initial quantitative analysis. Such combinations of quantitative and qualitative research may complement each other with great advantage, and compensate some for the lack of control variables by providing more understanding of the results and the interplay of various factors (Madsen 1979; Collier 1993: 105-110; King et al. 1994: 3-33).

A fourth, and final, aspect of validity is construct validity, which may be defined as the extent to which the chosen operationalization corresponds with the theoretical concepts (Hellevik 1999: 17; Skog 1998: 87-92. Even though it is problematic to simply translate the concept of civilization to "cultural factors" such as linguistic, ethnic, and, especially, religious differences, I leave it to Huntington to defend this. My objective is to test his theory, and then, on the basis of the results, I can criticize the logical arguments of his theory. For the sake of the analysis, I take for granted that his theory is correct and test the logical implication of the theory empirically. As regards construct validity in general, I have already discussed the process of operationalization throughout Chapters 2 and 3. Nevertheless, I think it is timely ask what the civilizational variable expresses. The theoretical point of departure is Huntington's claim that the conflicts of the post-Cold War era will mainly occur along the fault lines of civilizations. One solution to measure this phenomenon would be to see how many conflicts are located within a certain buffer zone along the borderlines. This solution is in essence to create a categorical variable. But then again, how wide should this buffer zone be across the different parts of the world? How many layers (categories) should one make and what distance between the layers should define the categories? The better solution is to use a continuous (scale) variable measured in meters. Although this solution does not entirely match the fact that borders are in many cases buffer zones, it provides more information and solves having to "guess" which lines should have a wider or narrower buffer zone. But what does such a variable express? Is a conflict more *civilizational* the closer it is located to a civilizational border? This question is important to answer in regard to the bivariate correlations where the civilizational variable is one of the two. Since the variable is measured in meters at the interval level, the answer must be yes: it is a ranking of how civilizational a conflict is. This is obviously not a perfect measurement of "how civilizational" a conflict is. Take a conflict that is located in India. Since India is mixed, and thus hatched, it would mean that the conflict has the value 0

meters distance from the nearest civilizational border. This should then be the most civilizational conflict of all. One problem is that all conflicts in India have this value, so there is no way of scaling them. Second, this specific conflict may strictly concern resource shortages, even though it is located in an area marked as “clash of civilizations”. It is, in other words, not a perfect scale. Even so, it is a very good approximation to testing the validity of Huntington’s argument. The relatively large number of units outweighs the problems with the scale of the variable. With as many units as 295, it will be quite evident, statistically speaking, whether the conflicts of the various periods are centered along the fault lines of civilizations or if they are randomly spread in relation to these borderlines. If there is such a pattern and relationship that Huntington proposes, it will be identified with this type of analysis (this also concerns conclusion validity).

4 Analysis

4.1 The Significance of Civilizational Borders to the Pattern of Conflict

H1: Conflicts more frequently occur along the fault lines of civilizations.

This relationship seems evident in a visual presentation when testing for the period 1979-2000, like below on Map 3. The civilizational borders are drawn on a display of conflict locations 1979-2000[9]. Map 3 shows that conflicts are visually, to a large extent, located along the fault lines of civilizations. Judging from this visualization, one would expect support for H1, although there apparently are great variations, i.e. different parts of the borders are unequally exposed to conflicts. For example, it may seem that the theory is less suitable for explaining conflicts on the American continent than in the rest of the world. Another apparent feature of this map is the absence of conflicts in Northern China and further north, despite the existence of civilizational borderlines also in this area.

[9] See Appendix 4 for a visual comparison of the conflict locations 1979-89 and 1990-2000. The zone, marked grey, is 650 km around the borders (650 km is the average distance from a conflict to the nearest border)



Map 3: Conflicts 1979-2000. Civilizational borderlines are red. Conflicts 1979-89 are green, and conflicts 1990-2000 are blue. All conflicts in India are coded value 0.

The seemingly close distribution of conflicts along the borderlines is also evident in the measured variable "Distance". An indication of possible support for H1 is that the variable "Distance" (distance from each conflict to the nearest civilizational border) is strongly skewed. A normal distribution plot shows that the frequency of conflicts is highest between 0 and 300 km, still high between 300 and 800 km, and for distances above 800 km the frequency is considerably lower, even though conflicts occasionally occur at quite long distances (2500 km) (see Appendix 5). The probability plot and the quantile plot also indicate that the distribution is strongly skewed (see also Appendix 5). This observation is a prerequisite for further support for H1. However, no "reference" is provided for assessing whether the frequency of conflicts close to civilizational borderlines is higher than the frequency of an alternative empirical phenomenon or landmark. An appropriate test is to compare the *actual* distribution of conflicts in relation to civilizational borders, with a *random* distribution of "potential conflict points". That is the purpose of the variable "Cities" (distances from all 250 cities with more than one million inhabitants,

to their nearest civilizational border – see Chapter 3). Below is a t-test comparison of the average distances of the variables[10].

Table 1: Average distances to civilizational borderlines, and t-tests of whether conflicts are located significantly closer than cities, to civilizational borders.

	Mean distance (km)	Difference in mean distance (km) (cities-conflicts)	T-test of means* significance probability
Conflicts 1979-89	734	387	0.000
Conflicts 1990-2000	544	573	0.000
Cities	1117	-	-

* One-tailed test. P-value for two-sample t-test of averages.

The first column of Table 1 contains the average distances from conflicts (split up in two eras), and cities, to civilizational borders[11]. The average distances have great variations. The second column displays the difference in mean distance (from column 1). Each number in this column is the result of subtracting the conflicts' mean distance (for each period) from the cities' mean distance. Column three displays the result from a statistical test: what is the likelihood (p-value) that the differences of means (in column two: cities - conflicts) reflect a significant change? I.e. what is the possibility that cities and conflicts are located at about the same distance from civilizational borders? The result in column three shows that, with 99% statistical confidence, cities are located farther from civilizational borders than conflicts. This is evident for both periods, and thus, for the whole period 1979-2000.

The "Cities"-variable is a reference and a sort of control variable expressing the assumption that conflict is more likely in areas with a relatively high population density. In Chapter 3, I pointed out that there are arguments both for cities being systematically farther away from, and being closer to, civilizational borders. This means that the cities' locations are far from a

[10] The purpose of a Student's t-test in this case is to determine by what likelihood the average distances are significantly different from each other. The basic model is to calculate the critical t-value by the following formula: t = (m1 – m2) / (St.dev. (m1 – m2)), where m1 is the average distance from one population, and m2 from the other population.

perfect measure of random points in populated areas. It is, however, the best approximation available at this stage. If cities are, for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 3, systematically located farther away from civilizational borders, this constitutes a problem for the confidence in the results in Table 1. In regards to the interpretation of the result, this may imply that the size of the difference of the mean distances may be imprecise. This is probably the major point of contention against the robustness of the result. Nevertheless, since the difference is so substantial (34% minimum difference), it is not that likely that such an inaccuracy affects the significance of the results. Hence, the conclusion remains: conflicts are located significantly closer to civilizational borders than random locations in populated areas. This means that I find support for H1.

As already commented on, the result in Table 1 clearly shows that conflicts are located closely along the civilizational borders. How should this result be interpreted? First of all, the result indicates that cultural boundaries do affect the location of conflicts. Where cultures meet, there is a higher propensity for conflict. This suggests that previous research testing this theory has somehow underestimated the significance of a civilizational variable (see 4.1.1). If we are to apply Huntington's explanation of this result, it is a support for the claim that difference in cultural identity is among the primary causes of armed conflict. However, I cannot judge from this analysis whether it truly is a "primary" cause of armed conflict. For such an assessment I would have to add more relevant control variables to the analysis. I will discuss this further in the context of results from similar attempts to test the general validity of Huntington's theory.

[11] For results using the alternative set of units for the test in Table 1, see Appendix 6 and discussion in Chapter 3.

4.1.1 Comparing the Results

The results in Table 1 are derived from a new methodological approach compared to previous attempts to test Huntington's theory. The result that civilizational borders constitute a significant determinant of armed conflict 1979-2000 seems clear. The analysis does not, however, include relevant control variables in a multivariate analysis, like Russett et al. (2000) and Henderson & Tucker (2001) do. (See presentation of this research in Chapters 2 and 3). Nevertheless, the result is comparable to bivariate correlations. A control variable inherent in my analysis is the "contiguity" variable, the same as used by Russett et al. (2000). I do not allow for civilizational borders to exceed more than 150 miles of sea. With this same approach, it is interesting to review the result Russet et al. (2000) reach when measuring the propensity for civilizations "ceteris paribus" to fight each other (MIDs) when controlling for contiguity (period 1950-92). Russett et al. (2000: 594, Table 1) find a positive, but not significant, correlation between mixed civilizations and the propensity for militarized interstate disputes. However, contiguity is strongly correlated with the dependent variable. They also demonstrate the non-significance of the civilizational variable when expanding the analysis to include control variables expressing "realist" and "liberal" assumptions.

Henderson & Tucker (2001) have a very similar analysis. However, they do not include their control variables one by one. Instead, they show that their civilizational variable (also pairs of mixed civilizations) alone is negatively, and significantly, correlated with the propensity for war, i.e. the opposite of what Huntington claims (Henderson & Tucker 2001: 329, Table 1). Their contiguity variable (distance) is measured slightly differently, but they do not include it as a control variable when measuring the effect from their "civilizational variable". On this background, their result (an opposite civilizational effect) is not surprising at all. The contiguity variable is known to correlate strongly with the propensity for war in dyadic analyses. Without this control variable, the analysis is not much worth. It simply shows that, on

average, two states from different civilizations are distantly located from one another (e.g. Senegal and China) and will, thus, not likely be at war. Whereas two states from the same civilization (e.g. Iran and Iraq, and other Muslim states) are more prone to be at war with each other since they, on average, are located relatively close to each other. This kind of test does neither prove, nor disprove, Huntington's argument. It is simply irrelevant to this theory[12].

Since the initial tests of Henderson & Tucker (2001), as argued, make little sense without including the contiguity variable, I choose to compare my findings with the results of Russett et al. (2000). They have, correctly, added the contiguity variable when analyzing the effect from their civilizational variable. Also, they show the effect when adding one control variable at a time. What do their result express (as opposed to my results)? They find for the period 1950-92, when controlling only for contiguity, that states of different civilizations have a higher propensity for militarized interstate disputes; however, this correlation is not significant by far. The non-significance of this relationship, however, even Huntington would most likely acknowledge. For this indicator to be significant, we would have to experience major civilizational alliances and wars on the international arena (which Huntington regards as the extreme consequence of his theory). For testing this specific part of Huntington's theory, the indicator of Russett et al. (2000) is appropriate.

What Russett et al. (2000) do not measure is Huntington's claim that conflicts will have a more evident cultural dimension in the new era. In order to measure the relevance of this dimension, one ought to concentrate on whether such interstate disputes occur along cultural cleavages, either at an abstract level, or physically along the civilizational borderlines. This challenge could be met by measuring how many miles of a country's border follow a civilizational border, or whether a country is divided by a civilizational border (however, this is quite problematic to measure, see 6.2). Another weakness of the Russett et al. (2000) research design is the single focus on interstate war. This should be

[12] The "distance" variable is absent from the dataset of Henderson & Tucker (2001) at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/~rtucker/data/clash/. This makes it hard for me to replicate their work,

addressed by expanding the analysis to include all sorts of armed conflicts, not only the small proportion of conflicts that are interstate militarized disputes. Huntington stresses the fact that the majority of civilizational conflicts are fault line wars at a micro level, most commonly civil wars (Huntington 1996: 252-254). Last, as Russett et al. (2000) also are aware of, they do not have sufficient recent data to generalize about the post-Cold War era.

In effect, the deficiencies commented on above justify my methodological approach. I include all types of conflict, I include recent data from the post-Cold War era, and I look at the actual locations of conflicts in relation to civilizational borders – a more appropriate, direct, and more accurate measure to testing Huntington's overall claim. As control variables, I include a demographic measure (the cities-variable), and a contiguity variable, similar to the one Russett et al. (2000) use, is inherent in the measurement of civilizational borderlines. Hence, the results of Russett et al. (2000) and Henderson & Tucker (2001) must be interpreted on this background. If they had applied a more appropriate method for testing Huntington's propositions, they would probably also have gotten results similar to mine. However, since the approach I am using has not been tried out before, there are no measured control variables available that suit this kind of analysis. I have demonstrated the relevance of a civilizational variable to the pattern of conflict, but this relationship has yet to be subjected to multivariate analysis with additional relevant control variables. It is natural to measure control variables that express the same features as the control variables used by Russett et al. (2000) and Henderson & Tucker (2001), e.g. the level of democracy, and socio-economic conditions. Such an analysis will reveal the actual relevance of a civilizational factor in relation to other factors that are known to correlate with conflict. Since it is too time-consuming to generate control variables for the analysis in this thesis, I will compensate by looking at the relevance of control variables in the case study in Chapter 5.

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including the "distance" variable that they themselves fail to include, although it is appropriate to do so.

4.2 Is the Civilizational Theory more Applicable to the Post-Cold War Era?

H2: The conflicts of 1990-2000 are generally located closer to the civilizational borders than the conflicts of 1979-89.

As reviewed earlier, researchers have in different ways attempted to test this hypothesis, with varying results. This is a crucial point of Huntington's argument since he emphasizes so much that there is a distinction during- and post-Cold War. The best way to test this hypothesis in my analysis is simply to make a Student's t-test of means for the two periods and see if they are significantly different with 99% and 95% confidence.

Table 2: Average distances to civilizational borderlines, and t-tests of whether conflicts 1990-2000 are located significantly closer to civilizational borders than conflicts 1979-89.

	Mean distance (km)	**Difference in mean distance (km)**	**T-test of means* Significance probability**
Conflicts 1979-89	734	-	-
Conflicts 1990-2000	544	190	0.014

* One-tailed test. P-value for two-sample t-test of averages.

The above test is significant at the 1%-level (99% confidence) and the direction is clear; the conflicts are, on average, located closer to borderlines in the post-Cold War era. There may, of course, be variations within the two decades. For example, many of the conflicts that are very closely located to civilizational borderlines represent the dissolving of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the beginning of the last decade. Still the average distance varies 26% between the two periods (190 km difference out of 734 km during the Cold War).

However, one should be aware of one specific potential source of error in this kind of test. It is possible that the result reflects that civilizational conflicts have persisted through both eras, whereas the ideological East-West conflicts have disappeared after the Cold War. Hence, there is a possibility that the above results merely reflect that there are relatively fewer ideological conflicts, as the proportion of civilizational conflicts has either decreased or remained the same. If so, the results in Table 2 are not a support of Huntington.

In order to control for this uncertainty, I present in Table 3 the frequencies of conflict by which era they belong to and whether they are "civilizational conflicts" (distance to civilizational border less than 650 km), or "not civilizational conflicts" (vice versa). 650 km is the average distance between conflicts and civilizational borderlines 1979-2000.

Table 3: Frequencies of conflicts 1979-2000.

	Not civilizational	Civilizational
1979-89	46	72
1990-2000	64	113

Whereas the number of non-civilizational conflicts has increased by 18 in absolute figures, civilizational conflicts have increased by 41. This is a clear indication that the number of civilizational conflicts increases relatively to other types of conflict when entering the post-Cold War era. Also, if one views the frequencies as percentages of the sum of conflicts for each era, one will find that the change to the post-Cold War era constitutes a 4 % decrease in the proportion of non-civilizational conflicts, and a 4% increase in the proportion of civilizational conflicts. This result is not significant. However, it illustrates that the result in Table 2 is robust, at least for the cases tested. Hence, with the reservation that the cases are not representative for all conflicts 1979-2000, I find support for H2.

How should one interpret and explain this result? Granted that the civilizational fault lines actually express cultural boundaries as they are intended to do, and that the result does not have other methodological explanations, it is reasonable to assume that conflicts in the 1990s are generally more linked to cultural differences than before. There are many explanations for a possible shift towards conflicts being more culturally dependent after the Cold War. It is,

however, most natural to apply Huntington's explanation, since the hypothesis, which has been strengthened, is derived from the civilizational theory.

Huntington's explanation of the empirical findings would be that cultural difference in identity is the primary cause of armed conflict in the post-Cold War era, and perhaps a secondary factor during the Cold War period. The underlying rationale for this assessment is that at the individual level there has been a change in identity following the end of the Cold War. People ask themselves *who* they are. Civilization is an expression of the broadest cultural affinity, which, following the end of the Cold War, has an increased impact on shaping world politics, determining war and peace. For Eastern and Central Europe the civilizational concept may be quite applicable. When the Soviet Union dissolved it was like removing a "lid" under which different ethnic groups were forced to live under one system, often without any representation for their interests. When this lid was removed, the various groups claimed their historical "rights" over territory and rights to political representation[13]. Without the sudden collapse of the East-West bi-polarity structure, events would probably have been very different.

In the following, I will concentrate on the period 1990-2000, representing the post-Cold War era, since this is the era for which Huntington expects his theory to be valid.

4.3 Fault Line Wars – Bloodier and over Territory?

H3: The closer a conflict is located to a civilizational border, the more likely the conflict has a high number of battle deaths.

H4: The closer a conflict is located to a civilizational border, the more likely the conflict is over territory.

[13] See the "Pressure Cooker" conceptualization by Mearsheimer (1990).

Variables (see Chapter 3):

"Distance" – The civilizational variable explained above and in Chapter 3 (distance to nearest civilizational border)

"Incompatibility" – shows whether conflict is over government "2" (recoded 1) or territory "1" (recoded 0)

"Intensity" – 1: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year, but fewer than 1000 during the course of the conflict. 2: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1000, but fewer than 1000 per year. 3: At least 1000 battle-related deaths per year. The intensity variable is recoded 1&2=0 and 3=1.

The "Distance" variable is the one I have generated, and it is commented on in the two tests above. The variable is measured at the ratio scale level in meters as a continuous variable. It expresses how "civilizational" a conflict is. A low value means it is closely located to a civilizational border, and vice versa. This test simply uses some other variables already existing in the dataset that express certain properties of the conflicts that one expects to find, or not to find, for civilizational conflicts. However, both the "Intensity" and "Incompatibility" variables are recoded as dichotomies. When measuring the correlation between a dichotomous variable and a variable at scale-level I can choose either to dichotomize the scale-variable and lose a lot of valuable information or I can run the test (Pearson's r)[14] and accept that the result is not 100% accurate. I choose the latter.

[14] Termed *Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient.* This is one of the most widely used correlation coefficients for two variables, and it varies between 0 and 1. I have run the tests in the programme Stata. The formula for Pearson' r is: $r = (\sum z1\ z2) / N$, using the z-score on each variable. Thus, r is the mean of the sum of the products of the two variables 1 and 2.

Table 4: Pearson's r bivariate correlations for the period 1990-2000 – significance probability (p-value) in parentheses

	Distance	Intensity	Incompatibility
Distance	1.000		
Intensity	0.031 (0.686)	1.000	
Incompatibility	0.28* (0.000)	0,045 (0.553)	1.000

* Significant at 1%-level

The variables "Distance" and "Intensity" are correlated positively, but very weakly. This means that the less civilizational a conflict is, the more likely it will have a high number of battle-related deaths – the opposite of what is expected from Huntington's argument. However, the correlation is not significant even with 95% confidence, and the variation could therefore just as well be random. Hence, there is no support for H3. This is an interesting point, since Huntington uses many examples from the 1990s to make his point that this is a general tendency (Huntington 1996: 253). However, my analysis contains all conflicts in the 1990s and shows that conflicts close to civilizational borderlines are not significantly more violent. Nor is there, however, any support for an imagined alternative hypothesis that civilizational conflicts are less violent in terms of number of battle-related deaths. There is simply no correlation between these two variables, without any control variables.

"Incompatibility" has a positive correlation with the "Distance" variable, which means that civilizational conflicts are generally over territory, as opposed to government. The correlation is significant at 99% confidence and the correlation is relatively strong. In social sciences a Pearson's r- correlation of more than 0.4 between two variables is normally considered relatively high. This correlation is almost 0.3. Hence, H4 gains support. This involves further support of the overall "civilizational theory". Huntington (1996: 252) explains this specific relationship between territory and cultural conflicts: "More frequently [for fault line conflicts] the issue is control over territory. The goal

of at least one of the participants is to conquer territory and free it of other people by expelling them, killing them, or doing both, that is, by "ethnic cleansing" […] The territory at stake often is for one or both sides a highly charged symbol of their history and identity, sacred land to which they have an inviolable right: The West Bank, Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Drina Valley, Kosovo."

4.4 Is the Civilizational Theory only Significant for Civil Wars?

H5: Intrastate wars are generally closer located to the civilizational borders than interstate and internationalized civil wars.

The variable "Type": 1 = extra-systemic conflict; does not exist in this sample, 2 = interstate conflict, 3 = intrastate conflict, and 4 = internationalized intrastate conflict (see Chapter 3). I have recoded: 4&2=0, 3=1.

The Pearson's r correlation between "Type" and "Distance" has a positive coefficient of 0.033. The variables are positively correlated, which means that intrastate wars are less civilizational (they are located further away from civilizational borders). The result, however, is not significant – hence not valid. The fact that it is not significant is interesting. For a long time, scholars have tended to study the various types of conflict separately. This result may indicate that, at least when it comes to variables expressing the meaning of cultural dissimilarity in relation to conflict, it is not so far-fetched to analyze them concurrently.

4.5 Civilizations and their Clashes

H6: Certain civilizations and certain pairs of civilizations are more conflict-prone than others.
H6A: The Western civilization is more than averagely exposed to conflict.
H6B: The Muslim civilization is more than averagely exposed to conflict.
H6C: The Buddhist civilization is less than averagely exposed to conflict.
H6D: The Western and Muslim civilizations are particularly prone to fight each other.

The technique for generating results relevant to these hypotheses is briefly described in Chapter 3. A repetition may be useful before commenting on the results. For each conflict I have information that tells which civilizational borderline is the closest. This allows me to sum up all conflicts that are related to one "clash", for each of the various borderlines. Hence, I get the number of conflicts attached to each borderline (each clash), and to each civilization. This information on the actual distribution of conflicts along each of the borderlines is interesting only when compared to a random distribution. I obtain a random distribution by dividing the length of a borderline by the total length of all borderlines. I then multiply that fraction with the total number of conflicts. More precisely, this procedure gives me a distribution as if conflicts were equally distributed along the borderlines. This expresses a situation in which there is no variance among the borderlines in propensity for conflict. The difference between this distribution and the actual distribution holds interesting results that are clearly relevant to the hypotheses above. A big difference, negative or positive, is an indication of a more or less war prone civilizational border. Values around 0 indicate average. It is important to notice that since I use observations as units for conflict, the differences will be greater than if I had applied the other set of units (see Chapter 3).

Table 5, with diagram: The actual number of conflicts along civilizational border compared with an even distribution of conflicts along civilizational borders.



	Western	Latin American	Hindu	Sinic	Muslim	African	Orthodox	Buddhist	Japanese
Difference	-5	1	1	-49	55	37	2	-28	0

Table 5 shows that there are two civilizations that stand out as having a high propensity for conflict along its borders. The first is the Muslim civilization with 55 more conflicts than one expects with an equal distribution. The second is the African civilization with 37 more conflicts. On the negative side, the Sinic civilization stands out with 49 conflicts less than expected with an equal distribution. Next is the Buddhist civilization with 28 conflicts less than expected. The rest are about as expected when equally distributed. However, it is interesting to note that the Western civilization is on the negative side with 5 conflicts less. According to Huntington the West should have a quite "bloody" border from its wars intended to impose Western values on other civilizations.

The same type of result may be displayed for the separate clashes among pairs of civilizations. This is displayed below in Table 6.

Table 6: Difference in the proportion of conflicts 1990-2000 by clashes – all pairs of civilizations

Civilizational border	Border distance / Total distance	Even distribution	Round off	Actual distribution	Difference: actual-even
Western - Latin American	0,033	5,841	6	4	-2
Latin American - Hindu	0,034	6,018	6	9	3
Sinic – Hindu	0,021	3,717	4	0	-4
Western - Sinic	0,055	9,735	10	2	-8
Muslim- African	0,187	33,099	33	70	37
Western - Muslim	0,025	4,425	4	8	4
Western - Orthodox	0,064	11,328	11	12	1
Orthodox - Muslim	0,09	15,93	16	37	21
Sinic - Orthodox	0,076	13,452	13	0	-13
Buddhist - Orthodox	0,042	7,434	7	0	-7
Sinic - Buddhist	0,17	30,09	30	10	-20
Japanese - Orthodox	0,002	0,354	0	0	0
Muslim - Sinic	0,024	4,248	4	0	-4
Buddhist - Hindu	0,017	3,009	3	0	-3
Muslim - Hindu	0,153	27,081	27	22	-5
Buddhist - Muslim	0,006	1,062	1	3	2

What Huntington depicts as the most severe clash, i.e. the one between the Western and Muslim civilizations, is in reality not severe at all. It is slightly positive with 4 conflicts above average, but is, by far, not as war prone as the borders between the Muslim and African civilizations (37) and Orthodox and Muslim civilizations (21). The least war prone borders are the Sinic-Buddhist (-20) and the Sinic-Orthodox (-13). I must therefore reject H6A, since the Western civilization is not very war prone relatively to other civilizations. H6B gains support since the Muslim civilization is by far the most war prone. The African civilization should also be included in this category, even though Huntington says very little about this civilization. H6C gains support since the Buddhist civilization is relatively "peaceful" along its borders. However, the Sinic civilization is by far the least war prone, which does not correspond with Huntington's theory. Huntington expected that the Sinic civilization would

form alliances with other civilizations against the Western civilization, and it would, thus, be relatively war prone. H6D is false. Although the Muslim and Western civilizations have a few more conflicts than expected (see Table 6), this clash is, by far, not the most severe and conflict prone among clashes of civilizations. Instead, the most conflict prone clashes are between the Muslim civilization on one hand and the African and Orthodox on the other.

4.5.1 Interpreting the Results – Islam's Bloody Borders

What can one make out of reading these results? At best, 50% of Huntington's predictions are correct, 50 % are wrong. If his theory were to be considered valid, the score would have to be much better. Hence, H6 gains no support. Huntington is right in assuming that certain civilizations are more exposed to conflict than others, but his assessment of the variation among the specific civilizations is not in accordance with the result. In this case, it is natural to look at other explanatory factors for this result than Huntington's "realpolitik among civilizations" explanation. It is clear that the propensity for conflict does change when controlling for different civilizations. What (other) factors may explain this phenomenon? There are numerous approaches to answering this question. I will at this point only suggest some angles from which to theorize about this phenomenon. First, let us assume that the civilizational borderlines do express actual cultural boundaries. Let us also assume that it is not just a failure in the analysis of inter-civilizational relations that causes the non-correspondence between theory and the results, but that other explanations must be applied in order to understand the variations. The results show, for instance, that the Muslim civilization is most prone to conflict. One explanation for this, which also Huntington has stressed in *Newsweek* (12/2001), is demographic. Areas of the world with so-called youth bulges in their population may be more prone to conflict than other areas (For a recent empirical study of this argument, see Urdal (2002)). A youth bulge is a large youth cohort (caused by a rapid decline in infant mortality about 20 years in

advance). Huntington (2001) believes that Islam's "bloody borders" can be explained partly by the huge youth bulges currently experienced in Middle Eastern countries. Zakaria (2001: 25) claims: "The Arab world has a problem with its Attas in more than one sense. Globalisation has caught it in a bad demographic moment. Arab societies are going through a massive youth bulge, with more than half of most countries' populations under the age of 25."

A different explanation points at socio-economic factors, such as economic deprivation (often measured by movement in GNP/capita) and non-democratic regimes, both correlating with a high propensity for conflict. These explanations would probably fit even better for the African civilization, although the Middle East scores low on such indicators as well. Despite the oil revenues of many Middle Eastern countries and attempts to introduce democratic reform some places, socio-economic explanations may still be fruitful for explaining the variation compared to other civilizations – perhaps more so than focusing merely on cultural factors such as religion. However, socio-economic explanations and cultural explanations cannot be seen entirely separately in this case. Perhaps religion and cultural factors affect democratization, which again affects the likelihood of conflict. Kedourie (1994) claims that the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam. The relationship between Islam and democracy turns out to be rather intricate when more relevant factors are included[15]. One aspect is that the Arab societies have not yet developed a large and influential middle class, a factor that Moore (1966) holds to be essential for the promotion of democracy. Regarding religion as an obstacle to democracy may seem politically incorrect, but it is in fact not far from the argument Rokkan (1987) made about what he called "nation building" in Western Europe. Rokkan created a model for explaining both how democracy was developed in the various Western states, and at what pace representative democracy was developed. In his model, religion is an important background variable. He distinguished between whether the population was catholic, protestant or mixed. Rokkan claimed that

this variation was essential, among other factors, in explaining constraints in developing democracy, as we know it today. Analogically, Islam, in its various forms across the Arab world, may explain why the development towards democracy has experienced so many constraints in the Middle East.

Economically speaking, some Middle Eastern countries have suffered severely from being rentier-states (see e.g. Ross 2001). Most countries with considerable oil revenues have become very dependent on their petroleum sector and have failed to distribute that wealth among all layers of the population. On the other side, there are also states in the "Muslim world" that are not that dependent on the oil sector, e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia. Some explanations of Islamic fundamentalism suggest that the underlying root causes lie in deep disparities between rich and poor within societies, buttressed by the pervasive inequalities in political power in Middle Eastern regimes (Chirot 2001). Although it may be argued that the high propensity for conflict is in part due to a low economic level and democracy deficit in this region, the question remains: What came first? Economic deprivation and political instability, or did a clash of civilizations occur prior in time causing the socio-economic problems?

Through studies of Islam, Roy (1994) provides new perspectives on religious factors as a cause of conflict. He distinguishes between, on the one hand, Islam as a world religion, and, on the other hand, "Islamism" as a combative nationalistic ideology within various states. One group is identified and labeled (radical) "neo-fundamentalists". It is this third group that, allegedly, is most combative and plays an active part in many conflicts. Neo-fundamentalists do not aim to establish an Islamic state within a certain territory, according to Roy. Unlike Islamism, they disregard the notion of a "state" as a notion imported from the enemy – the West. Their objective is rather to fight for "Ummah", an Islamic world. Therefore, the neo-fundamentalists fight for Islam in the "de-territorialized" outskirts of Islam, like Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and the Philippines. This may also be one

[15] See Esposito (1992, 1996), Midlarsky (1998), Jurgensmeyer (1993), among others.

explanation of why the Muslim civilization has relatively many conflicts going along its borders. There is an ever-stronger network of neo-fundamentalists playing an active part on the side of Muslims living in a given conflict area. In addition, these elements may play a role of polarizing and radicalizing the relationship between Muslims and other cultural groups in a potential conflict area.

4.5.2 On the Sinic and Buddhist Civilizations

On the other hand, it may be just as challenging to explain why the Sinic civilization is the most peaceful in the 1990s. Why is there a relative absence of conflicts in this area? One explanation is, naturally, that much of this area is just one country – China. Hence, it may be fruitful to apply analyses of China as a country. Although China may emerge as a civilization, there are also signals that it may not. China is still in the making politically, and the legitimacy of the current government rests on month-to-month economic performance (Thorheim 2000). If the economic development makes a downward turn, the situation and prospects of China as an emerging civilization may soon be fading. So far, China has been able to handle, or at least put a lid on, the many potential conflicts that lure in this vast country and population. The ruling government is very aware of the need to keep the economic fright-train rolling, and therefore it is not in the country's interest to get involved in armed conflict internally with the many ethnic minorities in the North and North-West, religious movements like the Falun Gong, a workers' union that is growing stronger outside government control, or, externally, over Tibet, Taiwan or the borderlines with India.

A second reason for this result is that the Sinic civilization shares borders mostly with the second most peaceful civilization – the Buddhist civilization. The Buddhist civilization, according to Huntington, does not have a strong cohesion and is divided into two separate practices of Buddhism, as explained in Chapter 2. When comparing this relatively "peaceful" part of Asia

with Africa and the Middle East, one difference is the amount of transitional regimes in the regions. Hegre et al. (2001) find that it is the not fully autocratic, yet not quite democratic, regimes that are most prone to conflict. They suggest that countries experiencing regime change/transitions are particularly exposed to conflict. This accords with the situation in large parts of Africa, both countries in the "Muslim North", and the rest of the continent. Relatively many African states have been transitional democracies during the past 10-20 years. Many of these have previously been dictatorships, and are now striving for their fragile democracy to prevail. Whereas in countries like China, Thailand, South Korea and Singapore, the main emphasis has been on economic liberalization, not so much political change.

In sum, this discussion has emphasized that, in accordance with the results of H6 A-D, other explanations than Huntington's inter-civilizational power politics analysis may be just as applicable when attempting to explain the variation in the propensity for conflict among civilizations. The results show that the actual variations are not in accordance with Huntington's predictions. There are probably two reasons for this. First, the level of the analysis is so high, that it is very difficult to point out which factors are relevant. By this I mean that the analysis is based on generating and accumulating processes from an individual level, above state level, to a "civilizational level". Phenomena on this level may have a very high number of contributing factors. It is virtually impossible, at least with certainty, to identify them, let alone to measure their relative impact. Second, Huntington does only to a very limited extent take these other explanatory factors into account. It is a weakness in Huntington's argument that he focuses solely on one factor without examining how it may inter-act with other factors in producing a certain result. This is particularly problematic when other explanatory factors are probably more applicable for this kind of analysis, as partly demonstrated in the discussion above. These other explanatory factors may very well be better suited to explain the variations among civilizations (H6 A-D). At least, it is

crucial to look at how a civilizational approach may constitute one factor in a model of several inter-acting factors.

In this chapter, I have found support for Huntington's overall claim, while I have rejected other claims (see summary of findings in Table 7 in the concluding Chapter 6). Through the discussion, I have emphasized that many other factors, along with cultural factors, determine the nature of conflict. In the next chapter, I will try to assess these factors with a qualitative approach. How may these other factors inter-act with cultural factors to cause conflict? Hence, what is the role of cultural dissimilarity as a cause of armed conflict?

5 A Qualitative Approach

The purpose of this chapter is to address some of the methodological challenges mentioned in Chapter 4, mainly the lack of control variables in the analysis. The general finding of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 is that cultural dissimilarity is significantly correlated with the pattern of conflict, when controlling for the location of cities. Further, this result is even more evident in the post-Cold War era. It is a support of Huntington's overall proposition; that in the post-Cold War era the primary cause of conflict is cultural. In order to further test the validity of this proposition, I could measure and add to the quantitative analysis relevant control variables and observe whether the result remained evident. In the discussion of the findings, I suggested several relevant control variables. However, this is too time-consuming as a project for a master thesis. An alternative approach to further testing the validity of Huntington's theory is to investigate into the micro foundations (Hovi & Rasch 1996) – an attempt to discover and explain logically the mechanisms that produce the relationship posited in the hypotheses H1 and H2[16]. The procedure for this kind of analysis is to select one, or a few, cases that follow the general tendency and inquire into the micro foundations of what causes these conflicts. This will be conducted in two stages.

In the first stage (5.1), as an introduction, I display the 10 conflict areas in the post-Cold War era that are ranked as closest to civilizational borderlines in the "distance" variable on Map 4 below. The purpose of this map is to briefly discuss some cases that follow the general tendency. Precisely because the quantitative analysis provided support for the overall claim of Huntington, it will be interesting to apply a single-case approach to the central questions:

[16] For a recent and similar approach to investigating into the micro foundations of a relationship, see Gates (2002).

Are these cases, in essence, civilizational conflicts? Are the cultural disputes the primary cause of violence in these cases? The second stage (5.2 - 5 .7) is to select one of these conflicts and go into a more profound discussion of the same questions. For this I have chosen Bosnia. However, in the discussion on the causes of war in Bosnia I will, in addition, address more specific questions: Is the cultural factor (religion, ethnicity) the primary cause of this conflict? What is the role of other causes? How do these causes inter-act, i.e. what are the *mechanisms*, at a micro level, causing armed conflict in this "main-stream" case of civilizational conflict?

5.1 The Top Ten Civilizational Conflicts

I have selected the ten conflicts that in the "distance" variable are located closest to civilizational borders for the period 1990-2000, except for India[17]. These conflicts are located almost exactly on the borderlines of the major cultures, displayed on Map 4. Interestingly, these conflicts are also examples that Huntington often uses. Among the ten, the war in Bosnia in the 1990s is probably the most common example of a civilizational conflict used by Huntington[18]. In this section, I will only briefly comment on the conflict areas of Map 4, before going into a more profound discussion of the causes of the conflict in Bosnia in section 5.2, and the rest of this chapter.

[17] Since the conflicts in India all have value 0 m, there are many conflicts in India to be included in a top 10 ranking of minimum distance. As a limitation I choose to include only the conflict in Sri Lanka from this region, although this cannot compensate for letting out conflicts in India. The idea, however, is just to point out various areas of the world as examples from the variable where there is conflict very close to the civilizational borders.

[18] (Huntington 1996: 28, 38, 64, 118, 126-27, 129, 138, 156, 176, 179, 184, 196, 212, 242, 251, 253-57, 261-64, 267, 269-72, 308).



Map 4: The 10 conflict areas 1990-2000 closest to civilizational borderlines.

One of the conflict areas displayed above is the Balkans. This is an example Huntington regularly refers to in order to show what he means by a civilizational conflict. Historically, the Balkans is an area where Europe meets the Orient and through which the great schism of 325 A.D. drew the borders between the Roman and the Orthodox churches. Already before World War II it was a war-exposed area, and some of the worst atrocities of World War II were committed in the intense fighting between the Ustasha (radical Croats) and the Chetnicks (radical Serbs). Throughout the Cold War, Yugoslavia stayed peaceful, although its people were heavily suppressed by the Tito regime. In 1991, after Slovenia had left Yugoslavia and Croatia tried to do the same, the war broke out. This war was, to a large extent, focused on winning territory to which the parties laid historical or ethnic/religious claim. In this regard, it appears evident that the conflict may be labeled "cultural", and it is justifiably coded with a low value on the distance-variable.

The 1999 war in Kosovo clearly had an ethnic dimension since the origin of the conflict was the disputes between the Kosovo-Albanians and the Kosovo-Serb minority in Kosovo, which first gained real momentum in 1989. NATO's 78-day long air campaign probably had several agendas (Thorheim 2001), but in our context, the interesting point is that the West was intervening in order to protect a Muslim population in Southern Yugoslavia from human rights abuses committed by the Serbs. According to Huntington's theory, the West went in on the wrong side. Both in Kosovo and in Bosnia, the tendency is that the Muslim population has been supported more than others by the international efforts, which are mainly controlled by Western nations.

5.1.1 Orthodox-Muslim and Hindu-Muslim Clashes

Tajikistan has experienced three changes in government and a five-year civil war since 1991, when it gained independence from the USSR. Moreover, Tajikistan has had territorial disputes with Kyrgyzstan in the Fergana Valley on the northern border. Although there is a 25% Uzbek population in Tajikistan and some Muslim militant groups are based in the country, the vast majority are Tajiks and Sunni Muslims (CIA World Fact Book, 2002), and the country may be said to have a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity compared to neighboring areas. It is fair to say that the problems in Tajikistan before the peace agreement in 1997 are not primarily of a cultural character; rather, it is criminal and political violence in a country very early in its nation-building process. Both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were annexed in the second half of the 19th century by the Russians and gained independence in 1991. While Uzbekistan is relatively homogeneous culturally and is concerned mostly with insurgency from Islamic militants based in the region, Kyrgyzstan has experienced much inter-ethnic violence. Russians make up 20% of the population and about 75% are Muslim.

Kazakhstan[19] is marked on the map, but has not been involved in warfare against its neighbors. Apart from playing an important strategic role in the region, Kazakhstan does not play a direct part in the military clashes that involve Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Much of the fighting has taken place in the Fergana valley. This valley is the granary of this region and has repeatedly experienced ethnic cleansing. It is hard to tell what the primary causes of this regional conflict are. It has many characteristics of a civilizational conflict; the conflict in the valley was fought along ethnic lines between Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz (www.IRINnews.org 3 Oct, 2002). However, the conflict started after the collapse of the Soviet Union, perhaps as a consequence of it. The violence may have been an indirect consequence of economic deprivation. Moscow held back food supplies to this region already around 1990 and the fertile Fergana valley became increasingly important for feeding the surrounding countries' populations. Also, territorial claims over the valley may have been strategically important to profiting from oil pipelines (www.rand.org/publications 2002; www.eia.doe.gov 2002).

As reviewed above, there are often other factors than cultural that seem to play a role as well. However, it may be hard to find evidence that cultural dissimilarity is not a primary factor causing the conflicts of e.g. Southern Caucasus and Sri Lanka. Huntington argues forcefully: "In another Orthodox-Muslim fault line war, the primary participants were the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the government and people of Azerbaijan, with the former fighting for independence from the latter. […] This war was the latest episode in both the struggle going back centuries to those between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire for control of the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, and the intense antagonism between Armenians and Turks going back to the early twentieth-century massacres of the former by the latter." (Huntington 1996: 278).

[19] Although Kazakhstan is marked as a conflict area, this does not mean that Kazakhstan has been involved in warfare. It is also puzzling that Huntington has not marked this country as Muslim on his

A similar fight for independence has been taking place in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has a complex colonial history, and Ceylon, as it was called until 1972, gained independence in 1948 from British colonial rule. The tensions between the Buddhist Sinhalese majority and the Hindu Tamil separatists have erupted in violence repeatedly, reaching a climax in the mid 1980s. The number of casualties of this war is counted in thousands. Neighboring India experiences many similar ethnic conflicts, among which the best known is the current crisis in Kashmir. This area of the world is, like the Balkans and the Fergana valley, a historic meeting place of various great cultures and civilizations. In earlier times, this left them with wealth from trade (e.g. the Fergana valley used to be an important part of the Silk Road, connecting Europe with Asia), but now it seems this richness has become a burden.

5.1.2 Muslim-African Clashes

The African continent has had many, still lasting, conflicts in the 1990s (and before). Huntington recognizes that Ethiopia could potentially be classified as a civilization based on its historic heritage. Today, however, Ethiopia is not a great power in Africa. The economic "motors" and leaders in broadcasting African culture are countries like South Africa and Namibia in the South, Kenya in the East; and Nigeria, and, to some extent, Niger and Senegal in the West. Huntington draws a borderline between the "Muslim North" and the "African South" right across the African continent. Conflicts of the 1990s that are located very closely along this borderline include Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the East, Chad in the central part, and Sierra Leone in the West.

In Somalia, the Siad Barre regime was ousted in January 1991: Turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy followed for nine years. The population in Somalia is mostly Sunni Muslim, but the fighting in Somalia has generally been among clans. This is evident since the grievances that underlie the conflict extend back to the seizure of power by Siad, as an army general, in 1969.

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map, despite all its characteristics of belonging to the Muslim civilization.

Although Siad's "scientific socialism" had the aim of eradicating tribalism, he was, at the same time, creating an inner circle based on his own clan and sub-clan, while suppressing other clans, e.g. the southern Darod clan (Copson 1994: 49-53). Although it is a matter for debate whether clans may be labeled "ethnic groups", clans certainly constitute some kind of cultural identity. Thus, although the civilizational border may act as a background cause to the conflict through hindering a nation-building process, this conflict is not a typical civilizational conflict where parties belong to a Muslim and a non-Muslim faction. However, there is some cultural dimension to the conflict since it, to a large extent, revolves around clans and clan alliances.

The term "civilizational conflict" probably applies better to the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both countries are religiously and ethnically mixed. Eritrea has a long history of fighting for independence from Ethiopia, and independence was attained with a referendum in 1993. In 1998, however, a two-and-a-half-year border war with Eritrea erupted and lasted until December 2000. This war is perhaps not a clear-cut civilizational conflict, but it has many of the relevant characteristics. Essentially, the struggle is about territory and the strong cultural meaning attached to these territories. However, the strains e.g. Ethiopia are facing internally are more of an ethnic character, not so much religious (Copson 1994: 34). A conflict more directly affected by being divided among the Muslim and African civilizations, it seems, is the conflict in Chad, part of France's African holdings until 1960. About half of Chad's population is Muslim, around a quarter is Christians and the last quarter is indigenous beliefs (mostly animism). In addition, there are numerous ethnic groups in Chad. 1990 saw the end of 30 years of ethnic warfare as well as invasions from Libya. In 1998, however, a new rebellion broke out in northern Chad, which continued to escalate throughout 2000. Currently, there are peace initiatives in the country, but this peace remains very fragile.

A last example from the African continent is the West African state Sierra Leone. Since independence from British colonial rule in 1961 there have been five military coups. For the whole of the 1990s Sierra Leone has

experienced civil war. The atrocities attracted the world's attention and the peacekeeping force UNAMSIL was sent to Sierra Leone. Peace was finally restored in 2002, marked by the peaceful conduct of multi-party elections. Sierra Leone is also located on the borderline of the Muslim and African civilization. It is mixed with about 60% Muslims and 30% Christians. There are several ethnic groups in the country of which Mende, Temne and Limba are the most numerous. The ethnic differences are parallel to the North-South divide (Thorheim 2002). Interestingly, in this country, where all indicators say that this conflict should be of a civilizational character, it is not. The conflict in Sierra Leone does not involve religious divides between Muslims and Christians, nor ethnic mobilization. Instead, the conflict is centered on issues like mining resources and type of government.

Already in these introductory comments on various civilizational conflict areas there are signs that not all these conflicts are merely "civilizational" by nature. Although most of these conflicts have an essential cultural dimension, the picture often seems to be more complex. The next project will be to study more profoundly one particular case – Bosnia.

5.2 Introduction to Studying Bosnia

5.2.1 Methodology

I have chosen Bosnia for a more profound analysis, because Bosnia is a case that clearly follows the general tendency of civilizational conflict. Geographically, Bosnia is divided between three civilizations: the Orthodox, the Western and the Muslim. Hence, this conflict scores a low value on the civilizational variable in the analysis and is among the 10 conflict areas closest to civilizational borderlines. Furthermore, Huntington claims that Bosnia is a

prime example of civilizational conflict; also, the war in Bosnia did not break out until after the Cold War. Through investigating, in terms of a limited case study, the mechanisms and background variables that caused this conflict, it might become clearer *whether*, and *how*, the cultural divides in Bosnia were a factor causing the tragic war 1992-1995. In addition to being a test of the validity of the result from the quantitative analysis, this kind of case study enriches us by providing more closeness to the matter studied, and more understanding of the result and the mechanisms behind it. This is the strength of combining quantitative and qualitative research.

When conducting this "shortened" case study, it is important to have in mind the potential problems of reliability, briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. The sources of information that I refer to in this chapter are all second-hand. They are varied: from Bosnian epic literature, personal impressions, and documentation by journalists, to more academic literature. I am aware of a possible selection bias of literature. However, I also have first-hand experience of Bosnia through working in the country for a year. In addition, I speak Serbo-Croatian. This enabled me to communicate with Bosnians in ways that are not possible through an interpreter. On the other hand, although I spoke to a large number of people from all sides and specters of the community and heard their stories, my personal experience may have biased my views. However, I tend to believe that this first-hand experience is rather a "correction" to, and a way to sort, the various literature and theories. Hopefully, I can combine the models and literature into a closer description of what really caused the war in Bosnia.

5.2.2 Limitations

Before going into the discussion, I will make some comments about the difficult limitation of discussing Bosnia separately from the rest of the Balkans conflict(s). The most natural approach would be to study the causes of the conflicts in the Balkans as a whole, since the conflicts are all more or less inter-related. Without the prelude of Slovenia and Croatia claiming independence

from Yugoslavia, there is a possibility that the war in Bosnia had not taken place. However, this is highly hypothetical. Certainly, the war in Bosnia cannot be studied entirely separate from the events that occurred at the same time in the neighboring countries. In this perspective, it would be more appropriate to discuss the causes of the Balkan conflict. On the other side, the events in the Balkans constitute a very wide scope of analysis with a large amount of empirical material to select from and many various factors deciding the outcome. Therefore, one reason to focus on Bosnia is the fact that Bosnia provides a narrower scope. It is, thus, more eligible for an analysis of the micro foundations of causes of (cultural) conflict. Secondly, this limits the empirical data and factors causing the conflict. In this way, I can go to "the heart of the matter" while having to control for fewer factors. Nevertheless, the limitation of not seeing the Bosnia conflict entirely in the light of the rest of the Balkans gives a somewhat biased analysis. This point is important to be aware of, although I will, to some extent, try to include an "outside influence" factor in the case study.

5.2.3 Background

After Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia, still a one-party state, changed its political system to an annually rotating presidency. Economic and political matters were increasingly discussed along ethnic and nationalistic lines, whilst the communist party never replied with other than the old slogans of brotherhood and unity. In May 1991, a Croat was due to become the new Yugoslav president under the scheme of rotation, but Serbia refused to accept the change. This act shattered the last hopes for a solution through constitutional means. In June, both Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence. Violent clashes in Slovenia ensued, involving the JNA (Jugoslavna Narodna Armija – the Yugoslav People's Army), but soon came to an end. The war over territorial claims with newly proclaimed Croatia lasted

longer and claimed tens of thousands of lives. During 1992, the arena of open war shifted from Croatia to Bosnia, a province split along ethnic lines.

In a plebiscite early March 1992, a majority of Bosnians voted for independence, but the vote was split along ethnic lines, with most Serbs opposing such a step. Many Serbs left cities like Sarajevo, and a Bosnian Serb parliament was established. In April 1992, Bosnian Serb forces initiated a methodical effort to seize control of as much territory as possible, especially in the eastern part of Bosnia, as a step towards a possible union with Serbia. This was the period in which "ethnic cleansing" became widespread, including the extensive use of rape and the creation of concentration camps to hold Muslim men (Mønnesland 1995). After this initial Bosnian Serb "raid" for territory, the Muslims and the Bosnian Croats embarked on fighting over territories in western parts of Bosnia. This "second war" started when the Bosnian Croats shifted their alliance from the Muslims to the Bosnian Serbs. The fighting, especially in places like Mostar, is reported to have been just as horrifying as the initial Serb "ethnic raid". The persistence of these reports led to escalating commitment by the UN and numerous efforts of peace negotiations, culminating in pledges to use NATO forces as an instrument to stop the war. The war in Bosnia was fought along ethnic lines, which means that the war affected nearly every town in the country. All the greater cities, with the exception of Tuzla, experienced heavy fighting. The Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo and the Bosnian Croat siege of Mostar were especially bloody. The atrocities in Srebrenica and the ineffectiveness of UN troops attracted the world's attention and called for interventionist international action. The summer of 1995 saw the climax of the civil war in Bosnia, when the warring parties explored their options after the UN had lost all control of the events. When the Dayton Peace Accords were signed the same year, the war had claimed more than 250,000 lives out of a pre-war Bosnian population of 4.4 million, more than half of whom had become refugees. With the deployment of NATO troops in accordance with the Dayton agreement, peace was effectively restored in Bosnia.

5.3 Bosnia – A Civilizational Conflict

> Who lies in bed awake in Sarajevo and cannot sleep may hear the sounds of the Sarajevan night. Heavily and steadily the bell tolls twice in the Catholic Cathedral: It is two hours past midnight. A little more than a minute later (exactly seventy-five minutes, I counted) sounds the slightly weaker but more penetrating sound from the Orthodox Church – the tower strikes *its* two strokes past midnight. Shortly after, muffled and distant strokes are heard from the Shat-Kula of the great Beg-Mosque. It strikes eleven ghostly Turkish strokes by their eccentric way of counting time from far ends of the world! The Jews do not have their bell to toll, but God, the only, knows what time it is for them, what time by the Sefardic, and what time by the Ashkenazi calendar. Hence, also at night, when everyone sleeps, this difference, dissimilarity between people, is evident. This people who during the day work and are joyful in each other's company, grief and fast by four different calendars, yet send their wishes and prayers to the same heaven in four different church languages. This difference, sometimes visible and obvious, other times concealed and invisible, always resembles hatred and often is identical to it.
>
> Yes, Bosnia is a land of hatred. That is Bosnia. At the same time, by some strange contrast, which is in fact not so strange and may perhaps after profound analyses be easily explained, there are few countries that may be said to have so much firmness in faith, so much elevated and strong character, profound sentiment, so much loyalty and steadfast devotion, so much thirst for truth. Meanwhile, under all this rest great storms, whole hurricanes fraught with compressed hatred only waiting for the right moment to unleash. (Andrić 1981: 183-186, my translation from original writing).[20]

The above extract is taken from a short story by Ivo Andrić called "Pismo iz 1920" ("Letter of 1920"). It clearly shows that even long before the "right moment" in 1992 when the war broke out in Bosnia, people were aware that the cultural dissimilarities within this territory could easily erupt into violence between the various groups. The passage describes the cultural differences as a potential direct conflict cause. This corresponds with the primordial view, to which Huntington may be said to belong (see Chapter 2). The cultural dissimilarities, which at macro level may be called civilizations, have for a long time existed, but have become more apparent after the Cold War, when identity increasingly matters more to the individual and eventually results in armed conflict. "A dramatic rise in civilizational identities occurred in Bosnia, particularly in its Muslim communities" (Huntington 1996: 268-269). He comments further: "Once the broader Yugoslav identity collapsed […] each group increasingly identified itself with its broader cultural community and defined itself in religious terms." (Huntington 1996: 268-269). There is plenty

of evidence that can be used to support this view, not even a short background paragraph can leave out the instrumental role ethnic differences played in the conflict. The fact that the war in Bosnia was concentrated on territorial claims and involved ethnic cleansing speaks for itself. Furthermore, many war acts were purely symbolic statements in the same direction, such as the destruction of religious monuments. Bosnia is located where three civilizations meet, or clash: the Orthodox, the Western and the Muslim, represented by the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniacs, respectively.

Already in the 1980s, the Muslim population of Bosnia had become more aware of its identity. The 1990 elections showed that President Alija Izetbegović of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) had increased his popularity among the Muslim population. Izetbegović had previously served time in prison for "Muslim fundamentalism", based on his "Islamic Declaration" (Mønnesland 1995: 288). The Bosnian Serbs were originally more aware of their identity, although this feeling of identity was very much reinforced by the dissolution of Yugoslavia and by the claim that Serbs should be entitled to live in "Serb territory". The Serbs were afraid to become citizens of a Muslim state, and the Bosnian Muslims were equally afraid that they would be regarded as Serbs and lose their rights if Bosnia remained in a new Yugoslavia without Slovenia and Croatia. The last part of 1991 saw an increase of distrust and tension among the ethnic groups in Bosnia.

Based on this presentation, it seems clear that Huntington has a strong case when he declares Bosnia a civilizational conflict. The increased tension between ethnic groups could eventually not be handled peacefully, and warfare was in the end the only "exit". This mechanism is not specific to Bosnia and is described by Horowitz (1985) with the terms "Politics of Domination" and the "Struggle for Preeminence". Horowitz claims that the fear of being dominated by ethnic strangers may be a source of increased identity and mobilization of a

[20] I have not found this short story translated into English. I have cross-checked my own translation with the translation into Norwegian by Mønnesland (1995: 287).

second, different ethnic group. This, in effect, leads to mutual insecurity that may again result in incessant competition of power. This security problem has a mechanism similar to "the prisoner's dilemma" (Lake & Rothchild 1998: 7-11). Horowitz's examples span from the North Nigerians fearing domination by the Southerners, to the struggle for power between ethnic groups in Zanzibar when it became clear that colonial rule would soon come to an end. Likewise, in Sri Lanka, talks of deciding whether the country "belongs to" Sinhalese or the Tamils, equally, set off such a process.

> In Mauritania, Chad, and the Sudan, all of which lie, as Lebanon does, between two "worlds", the question was similarly put: was the state to be "Arab" or "African"? And the derivate question, of course, was who would rule it, Arabs or Africans? The imminence of independence in Uganda aroused "fears of future ill-treatment" along ethnic lines. In Kenya, it was "Kikuyu domination" that was feared; in Zambia, "Bemba domination"; and, in Mauritius, "Franco-Mauritians", Creoles and Muslims began to fear they will be overshadowed by the more populous Hindus". Everywhere the word *domination* was heard. (Horowitz 1985: 188-189).

Horowitz could easily add many examples from the 1990s conflicts, which is perhaps just what Huntington has done as a basis for his theory. This process of "fear of domination" along ethnic lines may very well be a central feature and explanatory factor for the conflict in Bosnia. Nevertheless, vital questions remain unanswered. Why did the conflict erupt at that particular time? Why did this situation in Bosnia escalate into armed warfare, whereas similar situations of conflict are resolved peacefully, even if they are situated along the fault lines of civilizations?

5.4 "The Puppet Masters" – the Instrumentalist Approach

Many have criticized Huntington's explanation of the Bosnian conflict. Mazower (2000) comments on the civilizational approach that in daily life the distinctions between Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims were less pronounced and that in fact Eurasian frictions brought in by outsiders were historically blunted or defused by just shared local practices (Mazower 2000: 64).

Mazower focuses on how harmonically the ordinary people of different ethnic groups have lived together in Bosnia for hundreds of years. Huntington's approach would be to counter this harmonic view with emphasizing the increasing need for identity after the Cold War and its consequences. However, instrumentalists would say that political leaders are the ones causing the increasing identity and friction between the ethnic groups. This contesting approach can mobilize much empirical support.

BBC correspondent John Simpson witnessed the initial stages of the conflict and comments: "The siege of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs was the worst crime that I ever witnessed, but that doesn't make the Bosnian government entirely guiltless". And he continues: "But the only side I really sympathized with in this entire miserable war was the side that was totally unrepresented by any of the politicians: the ordinary inhabitants of the city" (Simpson 2001: 88). To some degree, this corresponds with the instrumentalists' claim that political leaders may have had personal agendas that were not necessarily in the interest of the people they claimed to be representing. Were, for example, the various ethnic groups as threatened as their leaders claimed? Did the leaders really convey the true level of fear of domination within their ethnic community, or did they in fact construct some of this fear in order to promote their personal agendas, i.e. to gain political power in a purely Serb, Croat or Muslim state within Bosnia? General Kukanjac, for example, had disappointed the Bosnian Serb leaders in the initial stages of the conflict by refusing to use the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) forces under his command to partition Sarajevo. Kukanjac recalls a heated discussion on this topic with Mr. Karađić and Mr. Izetbegović: "I said to them very roughly: that they were playing with people's lives, that they should sit down and talk and that we had had enough of that nationalistic behavior. Sit down, talk, come to an agreement. If not in your interest then in the interest of the people" (Silber & Little 1996: 206).

The political leaders ordered the ethnic cleansing as part of their strategy to win territories that they claimed as historical belongings of their people.

Bosnian Serbs were ordered by their leaders to leave their homes and settle in the ethnically cleansed former Bosnian Croat or Muslim areas, like Zvornik[21]. It was a cruel fight over territory driven by leaders who did not recognize the worth of human beings of a different ethnic group, and who cared for their own people merely as instruments in their siege for territory and power. The Bosnian Croat leaders were perhaps to a greater extent than the other parties controlled by outside forces, in this case the Croat president Franjo Tuđman. Tuđman and his marionettes initially claimed to support the Bosnian Muslims. Later, however, it became evident that Tuđman had a secret agreement with Milošević to partition Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia (Mønnesland 1995). When the Bosnian Croats suddenly switched sides, fighting between the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims ensued, and became especially fierce in Mostar. Not only did political leaders allow themselves to play strategic games involving the lives of their own people, but this also demonstrates how the agendas of the political leaders in the Bosnian conflict were much driven by outside forces, primarily Croatia and Serbia, but also the greater powers like Russia, USA, European states, and groups in Iran and Saudi-Arabia. Influence of the greater powers in times of conflict is, however, often concealed and hard to document. The main point, though, is that political leaders on all sides had personal agendas that were often influenced by outside forces. These agendas may not all have been in the interest of the people, but political leaders pursued them, using "fear of domination" as a tool.

I have argued above that the instrumentalist approach does hold some truth in the Bosnian case, and this challenges Huntington and the primordialist view. To what extent can we say that the instrumental model is valid? Does the validity of one model necessarily exclude the validity of the other? As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are problems of logic in the instrumental model.

[21] During my time in Bosnia I had many talks with internally displaced people. For example, the Bosnian Serbs who had moved from Sarajevo to Zvornik during the war had been told to do so by their Bosnian Serb leaders. They were not forced to leave by Bosnian Muslim militia. On the contrary, their

First, it is quite questionable to what extent political leaders can "construct" ethnic divides and mobilize people to fight for these reasons. Logically, there must be some basis for this kind of mobilization. In Bosnia, for example, if there were no distinct cultural dissimilarities, its leaders would hardly be able to construct such differences. Second, it is probably under certain conditions, only or mostly, that political leaders can mislead or neglect the people in such a way that the instrumentalist approach holds. To sum up the discussion thus far: we cannot disregard the significance of cultural factors, such as ethnic divides, even though the instrumentalist approach does have some explanatory power for the Bosnia case. At the same time, we must study more closely *under what conditions* are political leaders given the opportunity and room to play on cultural divides? Such explanations may include the application of socio-economic background variables as explanatory factors.

5.5 Constructivists – and the Relevance of Other Variables

The constructivists, as reviewed in Chapter 2, are perhaps bridging the two perspectives discussed above, but add and integrate the relevance of political and economic background causes of armed conflict. Provided that a society is in a certain political and economic (crisis) condition, ethnic diversity may more likely be a cause of conflict.

Research on the relationship between political systems and peace starts with the observation that democratic states almost never go to war with each other, which is originally a theoretical claim of Immanuel Kant in his work "Perpetual Peace" (Kant 1795). There is a great deal of research showing that democratic states are more peaceful towards each other, but not more peaceful overall (Rummel 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995). Are democratic states more internally peaceful? Hegre et al. (2001) show that it is the states that are not

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own leaders told them that if they did not move to Zvornik, the Serbs would in the future have to live

quite democratic, yet not fully autocratic either, that have the highest propensity for internal armed conflict. They find that political transitions are hazardous[22]. This argument fits very well the outbreak of war in Bosnia. Tito ruled like a dictator in Yugoslavia, and his policies often had the aim of reducing, or even terminating, the ethnic differences, applying brutal methods. This, however, often had an opposite effect (Mønnesland 1995). Tito favored some kind of socialism distinct from the Soviet form of communism, and the constitution of 1974 laid the foundation for a more open society, including elements of federalism with much more autonomy for the regions.

Before his death in 1980, Tito, through the 1974 constitution, had given instructions about how the country should be ruled after his death. The various political institutions made up delegates from labor unions, interest groups and provincial representatives. A presidential council of nine members, one from each republic and autonomous province and one from the communist party, headed the state. The presidency rotated among these members annually. In 1981, there was an extensive discussion on political change in Yugoslavia. Everyone agreed that something ought to be done, but the disagreement within the communist party and the rigid system of presidency made it impossible to process these aspirations and steer the country in any direction. When the USSR dissolved, Yugoslavia was fraught with great tension between liberal forces that wanted to transform Yugoslavia into a democratic state, and the communists, who tried to keep the existing system and who saw the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a threat. The political system failed completely to bridge this gap in views, and to come up with a political program to transform the country (and it was not constructed to deal with such crises).

Economic conditions emerge as perhaps the most important explanatory factor of armed conflict. The key issue here is the (low) level of economic development (Hegre et al. 2001; Collier & Hoeffler 2001; Hauge & Ellingsen

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under strictly Muslim rule.

1998). This may be indicated by a low average Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, by a disproportionately large agricultural sector, or by a country's economic vulnerability to shifts in the world markets in commodities and capital (Avery & Rapkin 1986). Combinations of lack of democratic openings and poor economic conditions are identified as conditions under which there is a higher propensity for armed conflict.

I have already pointed out the great deficiencies of the Yugoslav political system, and how this, in a time of transition and change towards democracy, may have been a cause of the conflict. The political system was not able, due to its infrastructure, to deal with the great difficulties it was facing. In addition to this, the economic situation had become ever more critical since the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Although Bosnia, and Yugoslavia as a whole, had mixed production and was relatively prosperous compared to many countries of the third world, the economic decline was dramatic; in 1989 inflation had reached 2,700%, and unemployment was constantly rising. The political leadership was not able to agree on clear economic policies and reforms until 1988, when the 1974 constitution was revised in direction of a more market based economy (Mønnesland 1995: 232-234).

In addition to the great economic problems, the provinces Slovenia and Croatia had long claimed that they were economically exploited by Serbia. Whereas Serbia received much of the country's revenues, it was mainly Croatia's tourist industry and Slovenia's industry and export to Western countries that made up the revenues (Mønnesland 1995: 328-329). This may also have been an important factor that increased the significance of the ethnic divide during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, when it finally came about. This also corresponds somewhat with the "relative deprivation" theory (Gurr 1994). It is clear that as background cause the economic conditions in Yugoslavia, and hence also in Bosnia, greatly contributed to the outbreak of conflict. There is

[22] Jaggers & Gurr (1995: 477-478) mention the possibility that transition towards democracy is particularly dangerous.

also evidence that it was the combination of the socio-economic and cultural factors that made it more likely for a conflict to erupt.

If we consider the constructivist model to include all these factors, we have a model that shows how cultural differences may be a cause of conflict in a given society where economic and political conditions are those of crisis or transition and where political leaders play on ethnic strings to achieve their objectives. This would, as shown in this chapter, be a fairly good model for explaining why Bosnia collapsed into armed conflict in the beginning of the 1990s, and how ethnic differences played a vital role in causing this conflict, along with other political and economic factors. This model will, however, be criticized from two sides.

From one side, the criticism is that causes of conflict range much wider than economic, political and "cultural" factors. According to this view, other factors are just as important, such as environmental degradation as a direct cause of violent conflict (Homer-Dixon 1994). Nevertheless, contemporary views stress that few conflicts today have environmental degradation as their primary factors, such as those in Haiti and the Philippines (Smith 2000: 4-5). In recent times, the role of demography is another factor that increasingly has been viewed as a cause of conflict. A common argument is that an area, or society, with huge youth bulges is more prone to conflict. This argument has been reviewed in Chapter 4. On the far end of this criticism against the constructivist model, one may say that every conflict is unique; hence, every conflict has unique causes and combinations of factors as causes. Thus, generalizing about the causes of conflict is pointless. However, this view gives up on our endeavors to explain armed conflict as a phenomenon and, hence, gives up on the idea that we can develop analytical tools that better prepares us to understand and resolve, and eventually reduce, the extent of conflicts.

From the other side, many researchers believe that cultural dissimilarity alone is not a cause of conflict. Generally, the claim is that economic and political factors are the real causes of conflict, whereas ethnic diversity is at

best a catalyst. Smith (2000) distinguishes between background causes (economic and political) and foreground factors (ethnic diversity, among others). He does, however, emphasize that ethnic diversity may "exacerbate conflict and increase the likelihood of serious escalation, precisely because it offers fertile material for political mobilization. A prime example here is the disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s." (Smith 2000: 4). For Bosnia, it is evident that the incapability of the political system combined with the economic crisis was an essential cause of the conflict. It is also clear that the political leaders used the ethnic diversity for political mobilization. But this does not undermine the fact that the ethnic diversity was a cause along with these factors. Why was the political system so inefficient in both its actions and its composition? It was probably because Tito had strived to keep a lid on the ethnic conflict that was already in process and that had persisted since the atrocities between Chetnicks and Ustasha during World War II. Tito engineered the presidential council with the purpose of diffusing power between the various nationalistic groups and to counter domination, or fear of domination, among ethnic groups. Once the Cold War ended and the Berlin wall came down, the ethnic groups, and their leaders especially, saw their windows of opportunity. This opportunity was, of course, a result of Bosnia's socio-economic state. Nevertheless, had it not been for the ethnic composition and history of the country, the political situation had also been entirely different. On the other side, Smith clearly addresses an important case when trying to systematize what factors are triggers, catalysts, etc., in order to understand how conflict can be more effectively resolved.

Generally, there are many factors that combined explain a phenomenon in the social sciences. As it is for conflict, there are many conditions that, separately, make war more likely, but few factors can alone be said to determine war, like a general law. Benin, for example, has all the conditions that make war likely, but is still peaceful and changes government by democratic principles, even though party cleavages are strictly along ethnic lines. Or Sierra Leone, where

"all conditions" are set for an ethnic conflict, yet the armed conflict in the 1990s has not evolved along ethnic lines[23]. There are some conflicts that may seem to be caused by one factor alone. One example is the poor economic conditions in Liberia, where warlords fight over the few surpluses. When there is such scarcity of few resources (mostly diamonds), there is hardly any basis for democracy, the rule of law and stability[24]. More examples are decades of warfare in Angola and massacres in Burundi and Rwanda. It seems the economic conditions alone has much explanatory power. Still, the majority of conflicts have a complex combination as their cause, at least when it comes to explaining the events that triggered the conflict. Thus, the vital questions that remain unanswered are: How do we sort the causes of violent conflict? What may explain *when* the war broke out, as opposed to *why* the war broke out, and *what* made it so violent?

5.6 Triggers, Targets, Channels and Catalysts – Sorting the Causes of Armed Conflict

Dessler (1994) has attempted to sort the causes of armed conflict, in order to distinguish between them. First, a "trigger" of violent conflict is any event or the situation that increases the probability of conflict. Hence, to cite the trigger is to cite an event that may explain aspects of the timing of the conflict. In the case of Bosnia, one trigger would be the historical disputes between ethnic groups, which increased throughout the 1980s. Other triggers were the economic development and the political deadlock. Second, Dessler (1994) emphasizes the "target" of a conflict. These are the objectives of the social

[23] It is actually quite interesting to see how harmonically the various groups live together in Sierra Leone. As an election observer during the presidential and parliamentary election 2002 I observed several rallies. All participants stood up and all participated in first saying a Muslim prayer and thereafter a Christian prayer. Some of this I have commented in (Thorheim 2002).

[24] Liberia is today ruled by anarchy, probably worse than in Afghanistan. Even experienced aid organizations cannot operate there. There is no easy solution of imposing sanctions or just removing Charles Taylor from "power". The contemporary conditions resemble something like Hobbes' image of the "condition of Man" that evolves to a "state of warre", where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 1668: 89), and peace is hard to restore.

actors as they see it. To cite the target of a conflict is to understand what the conflict is about. In Bosnia, the aim was for each ethnic group to gain control of as much land as possible in order to create a future state for their "nationals". At least, this was the essential "target", which may explain why the war resulted in so many refugees and internally displaced persons, and why there, still today, are so many bombed-out villages. Third, "channels" are the sources and dynamics of shaping identities of the conflict's participants. Dessler (1994: 105) explains: "While triggers and targets figure in the explanation of intentional actions, […] channels figure primarily in sub-intentional explanation and supra-intentional (why actors have the beliefs and desires they do, […] and why individual actions have the collective or aggregative effects they do)." The notion of channels is associated with the constructivist explanation of the conflict. It focuses on how leaders take advantage of the fear-of-domination mechanism to mobilize a group. The effects at the individual level are aggregated and lead to a strong group identity – "them" and "us". As discussed earlier, there must be some kind of basis for such a construction of stronger group identity, which can be a line of political, social, economic, and/or cultural structures. Interestingly, the ethnic propaganda from the Croats often characterized the Serbs as dumb farmers who did nothing but drink all day, thus looting the goods generated from the prosperous Croat economy (from the Croat tourism and off-shore industries)[25]. This is an example of reinforcing ethnic cleavages with economic/political cleavages in order to strengthen identities. Fourth, a "catalyst" is any factor that controls the rate of intensity and duration of a conflict, once initiated. According to Smith (2000) (see above), the ethnic diversity is a typical catalyst. Also, Ted Gurr has observed: "cultural identities – those based on common descent, experience, language, and belief – tend to be stronger and more enduring than most civic and associational identities" (Gurr 2000: 66).

My analysis shows, however, among the conflicts 1979-2000, no significant correlation between a conflict's proximity to a civilizational border

[25] See Mønnesland 1995: 328-329, or the newspapers like Vjesnik from the early 1990s.

and the number of battle-related deaths. The argument may still be plausible, but there are so many other factors that may play a greater role. One example is the tactical side of military campaigns (e.g. Kosovo 1999). For Bosnia, I think one may easier cite the catalysts by looking at the "target" of the conflict. Since the war was fought over borders, where the frontlines were constantly shifting, it was hard to reach a point where all three parties were satisfied with status quo. Also, the military tactics may, to some extent, explain the high number of battle-related deaths. Although government soldiers raping and burning houses is one of the gravest human rights abuses known to man, it is still a rational tactic when the only goal is to gain control over as much territory as possible in a short time, no matter what the consequences are. These were the tactics by people like the psychologist and politician Radovan Karađić. To sum up, the perspective of Dessler (1994) does provide at least some kind of tool to sort, or to separate, the various aspects of what are the causes of armed conflicts. It is hard to say whether this exact classification is the most fruitful imaginable, but it does structure various arguments effectively.

5.7 An Attempt to Answer the Initial Questions

Initially in this chapter, I put forward the question of whether the case of Bosnia is a civilizational conflict. The answer is that even though Bosnia is Huntington's prime example of civilizational conflict, this conflict, as many others, can be seen from different angles and fit different types of explanations. Nevertheless, we can say that cultural differences constitute a vital part of the conflict – and of explaining it. The next question raised was in what way did cultural differences contribute to the conflict in Bosnia? Through the discussion, it became clear that the political leaders did play on those strings, perhaps not always in the interest of the people they represented. The leaders followed their political agendas, which were to some degree driven by outside political forces. Nevertheless, had it not been for the economic state Bosnia

was in, and the political state within Bosnia and outside (the dissolution of the east-west bi-polarity structure and Yugoslavia), the chances of such an ethnic conflict might have been significantly reduced. The discussion gives us an idea that it is probably a combination of these factors that is the cause of armed conflict, although it is not inevitable that, given these conditions, armed conflict will erupt. There is probably some mechanism, involving various factors, that increases the likelihood of conflict. In the case of Bosnia, the ethnic and religious dissimilarity may be said to have been at least among the few primary factors.

A final question is, do the findings of this discussion support Huntington's theory? One should be very careful in generalizing from one case to "all conflicts" or "Huntington is right or wrong". Nevertheless, on the background of the results in the previous chapter and this discussion, it is evident that cultural dissimilarity and conflict are related; it is also the case for Bosnia. Huntington does not provide a well-founded theoretical basis for positing this kind of empirical relationship. The theory focuses almost exclusively on cultural differences (although it is not entirely a mono-causal explanation), and in doing so, loses the perspective of the interaction of factors that together constitute causes of conflict, as touched upon in the case of Bosnia. The war in Bosnia was ethnically based, but Huntington fails to answer why and how it became an ethnic conflict, what triggered it, and why it erupted at that particular time. A more structured argument, and explanation, may be found in applying the notion of triggers, targets, channels, and catalysts in order to sort the various causes of armed conflict. This thesis shows that Huntington's overall claim gains some empirical support, yet the theoretical basis for this claim demands a much stronger foundation than what Huntington provides. The natural extension of the research in this thesis is to further inquire into the micro foundations of the finding that cultural dissimilarity is correlated with conflict. This requires further quantitative and qualitative research. The Dessler (1994) approach may be one direction in which to guide the theoretical debate.

6 Conclusion

In this thesis I have attempted to assess the validity of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis concerning the causes and nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War era. In order to do so, I have presented the theory and derived empirical statements from it in forms of hypotheses. Next, I have drawn up the civilizational borderline and measured for each conflict its distance to the nearest line. This, along with other information in the PRIO/Uppsala dataset, has enabled me to test such propositions as: Do the conflicts occur along the fault lines of civilizations? Is this relationship more evident in the post-Cold War era? Are fault line (civilizational) conflicts generally more "bloody" and generally fought over territory, etc.? In addition to this, I have measured the amount of conflict along each of the nine civilizational borders, which set the grounds for assessing the validity of Huntington's claims of which civilizations are more, and which are less, exposed to conflict. In the extension of testing these specific claims of the theory, I have aspired to assess *how* cultural difference may be a cause of conflict – how does cultural dissimilarity, along with several other factors, interact in generating this phenomenon? A case study of the causes of conflict in Bosnia provided the basis for understanding more of this process.

6.1 Findings

The quantitative analysis provided the following results:

Table 7: Results from the quantitative analysis (Chapter 4)

No. of Hypothesis		Support	No support
H1	Conflicts more frequently occur along the fault lines of civilizations	X	
H2	The conflicts of 1990-2000 are generally located closer to the civilizational borders than the conflicts of 1979-89.	X	
H3	The closer a conflict is located to a civilizational border, the more likely the conflict has a high number of battle deaths.		X
H4	The closer a conflict is located to a civilizational border, the more likely the conflict is over territory.	X	
H5	Intrastate wars are generally closer located to the civilizational borders than interstate and internationalized civil wars.		X
H6	Certain civilizations and certain pairs of civilizations are more conflict-prone than others.		X
H6A	The Western civilization is more than averagely exposed to conflict.		X
H6B	The Muslim civilization is more than averagely exposed to conflict.	X	
H6C	The Buddhist civilization is less than averagely exposed to conflict.	X	
H6D	The Western and Muslim civilizations are particularly prone to fight each other.		X

Through the discussion of the results, I pointed out that the support for H1 and H2 should be interpreted in the way that there is a relationship between conflict and difference of cultural identity. This is even more evident after the Cold War. This means that Huntington's premise that cultural identity is ever more

important at the individual level, and consequently affects the pattern of armed conflict, may describe some features of reality. However, it is important to keep in mind that socio-economic background variables, or type of political regime, which are known to correlate with conflict, are not controlled for. H4 gained support and is an expression for cultural conflict often being fought over territorial claims, whereas Huntington is wrong about cultural conflicts being more violent (H3). The result of H5 may give an indication that, methodologically, different types of conflict should perhaps not be studied separately; perhaps they are to some extent the same phenomenon. The discussion of H6 A-D holds that even though there may be some evidence supporting Huntington's overall claim (H1 & H2), his analysis of inter-civilizational mechanisms holds very little correspondence to reality. On the contrary, I detected many other relevant factors that may explain the variation of exposition of conflict across civilizations just as well, or even better. I also pointed out that an analysis of inter-civilizational relations involves so many possible background variables that it is virtually impossible to say anything certain about this.

As a natural extension of the results from the quantitative analysis, I first reviewed the ten conflicts closest to civilizational borderlines as an introduction to looking at the cases qualitatively. Next, I selected a case, the war in Bosnia 1992-95, which follows the general tendency. I attempted to assess the mechanisms that caused the conflict. I found that even though this conflict was fought along ethnic lines, and that ethnic-religious dissimilarity and hatred is one of the causes of this conflict, the picture seems to be much more complex. First, there are indications that the political leaders, on all sides, played on ethnic strings in order to mobilize "their people" and to fight "the others". At the same time, it is questionable whether the objectives for which the people were mobilized were actually in their own interest. Political leaders may have made use of the psychology of "fear of domination" in order to gain support. This does not, however, prove that potential ethnic tension did not exist before

the war. Rather, it urges us to identify what conditions give room for elites to play on ethnic strings in a society. Much evidence points at the economic and political crisis in which Bosnia, and its surroundings, found itself. The transition to a new political system and the ineffectiveness in handling the economic crisis may have swept the grounds for interest-driven politicians to stir up ethnic tension. Lastly, I found it rather fruitful to distinguish between the various types of causes of conflict, as suggested by Dessler (1994) (triggers, targets, channels and catalysts).

A conclusion of my findings may be formulated, very simplified, this way: Through the quantitative analysis I discovered that cultural dissimilarity does play a vital role to the pattern of conflict. This supports the overall claim of Huntington, and challenges previous attempts to test the civilizations thesis. Through the qualitative discussion of Bosnia, however, I confirmed how difficult it is to tell *how* cultural dissimilarity plays a role as a cause of conflict. I identified other important explanatory factors, and how these may interact with cultural factors to cause armed conflict. Thus, future studies of Huntington's theory should take these aspects into account.

6.2 Suggestions for Further Research

There are some interesting methodological aspects of this thesis that it may be fruitful to follow up on, and the appendixes contain all information necessary in order to replicate this work. One may want to link the information in the appendixes to the current PRIO/Uppsala dataset, which is updated annually. The statistical database, along with the detailed list of definitions from the Uppsala Conflict Data project, is available at www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/. For further research, I would first like to point out the possibility to replicate the work with the Correlates of War (COW) data, or other data. The COW data have a different criterion for conflict, which might affect the result, and they contain additional variables that are relevant control variables for a second

analysis of this kind. One option is to run tests on: Are cultural factors correlated with the duration of conflicts?[26] Second, I have used geographical data in the analysis. I have combined the location of conflicts with the location of cultural borders in GIS software. This is probably only a start for research with this approach: Further research may map out where conflicts are located in relation to the locations of natural resources, mountains, climate zones, demographic features, and developed/developing areas. However, for this type of method to develop further, one needs to reach a more appropriate reference for a random distribution of locations, than what the "Cities" variable represents (see discussion in 4.1). This could be developed most effectively in co-operation with geographers. The geographical approach represents a de-aggregation of countries, which may become an important feature of future conflict research.

Third, I use conflicts as units, as opposed to country-years. This approach, combined with geographical data, seems far more appropriate for testing the significance of cultural factors. Hence, variables expressing economic level, level of democracy and other socio-economic indicators should be measured geographically in order to fit this type of units. These measured variables should be included as control variables in a multivariate analysis. Although case studies can, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, shed light on the role of the various factors that increase the likelihood of conflict, they cannot compensate entirely for a quantitative multivariate analysis. However, with conflicts as units, further multivariate analysis requires innovative measuring of variables based on geographical information, using GIS software.

A different approach for a quantitative multivariate analysis is to replicate the work of Russett et al. (2000), and add a variable measuring the proximity of a country to the nearest civilizational borderline (as suggested in 4.1.1). However, there are several problems attached to generating this variable, at least as a continuous variable. One could perhaps code countries that are divided by a civilizational borderline as the closest, i.e. code them with

[26] See the recent work of Walter (2002) for a similar type of analysis.

a low score on the proximity variable. Second closest would be those countries that share borders with a different civilization. However, for this second category one ought to control for how long this shared border is in relation to the country size and where the majority of the population lives. A third category should contain countries that are not located along civilizational borderlines. These countries ought to be ranked by the distance to their nearest borderline. This is problematic since it requires projecting a point that represents the location of a whole country. This kind of proximity variable could at least be some approximation that would be interesting to apply when replicating Russett et al. (2000), but also for a monadic analysis.

Theoretically, I have tried to link the results from the quantitative analysis to relevant theories on cultural causes of conflict, through the case of Bosnia. As pointed out earlier, a much more comprehensive case study is needed in order to find out more about the mechanisms on the individual-, group-, and macro level that lead to war. If we are to believe that the support of Huntington's overall claim in this thesis is due to cultural dissimilarity being a primary cause of conflict, we need to look at the process at the individual level. When does an individual change preferences to using violent means to fight "the others", i.e. under what conditions do identity differences become lethal? I think the categorization of causes of conflict, as done by Dessler (1994), is one direction in which to proceed. It is this kind of "mapping" of the factors and their roles that can eventually produce a more comprehensive picture of the root causes of armed conflicts and the complex mechanism that triggers them.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: All (250) cities with more than one million inhabitants

The "Distance" variable measures the distance, in meters, between a city with more than one million inhabitants and the nearest civilizational borderline.

NAME	COUNTRY	POPULATION	CAPITAL	DISTANCE
Tokyo	Japan	23620000	Y	1463853,400
New York	US	16472000	N	3271394,800
Seoul	Korea Rep	15850000	Y	587788,310
Sao Paulo	Brazil	15175000	N	3349081,200
Osaka	Japan	15040000	N	1446289,200
Mexico City	Mexico	14100000	Y	930636,500
Moscow	Russia	13100000	Y	631963,250
London	UK	11100000	Y	1421305,400
Calcutta	India	11100000	N	61867,801
Buenos Aires	Argentina	10750000	Y	4539857,500
Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	10150000	N	3331101,500
Bombay	India	9950000	N	666780,120
Paris	France	9775000	Y	1124001,100
Los Angeles	US	9763600	N	176910,520
Shanghai	China	9300000	N	1037375,100
Cairo	Egypt	9300000	Y	1366473,900
Jakarta	Indonesia	8600000	Y	1567464,900
Chicago	US	7717100	N	2465100,800
Delhi	India	7200000	N	257057,090
Beijing	China	6450000	Y	803307,120
Bangkok	Thailand	6450000	Y	595942,250
Tehran	Iran	6400000	Y	628001,310
Taipei	Taiwan	6130000	Y	556281,810
Saint Petersburg	Russia	5825000	N	147924,550
Istanbul	Turkey	5750000	N	10328,118
Manila	Philippines	5474000	Y	2240,442
Hong Kong	UK	5395997	Y	20532,230
Karachi	Pakistan	5300000	N	201495,770
Philadelphia	US	5208600	N	3105261,000
Berlin	Germany	5061248	Y	710539,810
Tianjin	China	4880000	N	804173,440
Nagoya	Japan	4800000	N	1419087,100
Detroit	US	4691900	N	2831048,500
Madrid	Spain	4650000	Y	546967,810
Madras	India	4475000	N	538735,620
Lima	Peru	4344000	Y	2342383,000
Bogota	Colombia	4260000	Y	1295761,200

NAME	COUNTRY	POPULATION	CAPITAL	DISTANCE
Santiago	Chile	4100000	Y	4330123,000
San Francisco	US	4053800	N	623028,560
Barcelona	Spain	4040000	N	885151,620
Boston	US	3971700	N	3653206,800
Essen	Germany	3867000	N	995792,940
Baghdad	Iraq	3841268	Y	659930,380
Shenyang	China	3840000	N	447020,120
Pusan	Korea Rep	3800000	N	1029325,600
Lagos	Nigeria	3800000	Y	404473,880
Milano	Italy	3750000	N	524408,190
Johannesburg	South Africa	3650000	N	2084392,600
Caracas	Venezuela	3600000	Y	699308,250
Wuhan	China	3490000	N	1095106,100
Dhaka	Bangladesh	3430312	Y	85896,922
Toronto	Canada	3427168	N	3230013,500
Sydney	Australia	3364858	N	3177353,000
Alexandria	Egypt	3350000	N	1212748,200
Washington D.C.	US	3221400	Y	2870554,200
Roma	Italy	3175000	Y	378643,530
Ho Chi Minh City	Vietnam	3100000	N	40951,496
Guangzhou	China	3050000	N	108117,610
Athinai	Greece	3027331	Y	340538,030
Lahore	Pakistan	3025000	N	31159,811
Singapore	Singapore	3025000	N	605838,310
Kinshasa	Zaire	3000000	Y	1806821,400
Yokohama	Japan	2992926	N	1493556,900
Bangalore	India	2950000	N	505233,250
Belo Horizonte	Brazil	2950000	N	2959992,800
Montreal	Canada	2921357	N	3816272,800
Kiev	Ukraine	2900000	Y	439492,750
Napoli	Italy	2875000	N	347200,310
Melbourne	Australia	2832893	N	3968178,000
Miami	US	2827300	N	1518971,500
Rangoon	Burma	2800000	Y	608553,380
Manchester	UK	2775000	N	1656815,800
Houston	US	2755100	N	507055,280
Hyderabad	India	2750000	N	78822,547
Dallas	US	2727300	N	713680,750
Birmingham	UK	2675000	N	1578003,500
Harbin	China	2670000	N	249304,810
Recife	Brazil	2625000	N	2180440,200
Porto Alegre	Brazil	2600000	N	4079509,500
Budapest	Hungary	2565000	Y	178917,390
Algiers	Algeria	2547983	Y	669546,120
Casablanca	Morocco	2475000	N	320064,410
Chongqing	China	2450000	N	604239,500
Ankara	Turkey	2400000	Y	348181,750
Ahmadabad	India	2400000	N	242905,330

NAME	COUNTRY	POPULATION	CAPITAL	DISTANCE
Bruxelles	Belgium	2385000	Y	1109260,200
Guadalajara	Mexico	2325000	N	1012789,200
Toshkent	Uzbekistan	2325000	Y	1912,289
Warsaw	Poland	2323000	Y	168626,610
Nanjing	China	2290000	N	1166796,400
Bucuresti	Romania	2250000	Y	455323,470
Lisboa	Portugal	2250000	Y	410841,500
Hamburg	Germany	2225000	N	936749,690
Pittsburgh	US	2218800	N	2821524,000
Cleveland	US	2218400	N	2803279,200
Taegu	Korea Rep	2206000	N	899712,120
St. Louis	US	2203000	N	1886023,600
Donets'k	Ukraine	2200000	N	903255,620
Havana	Cuba	2125000	Y	1245848,000
San Diego	US	2098500	N	28365,869
Medellin	Colombia	2095000	N	1418692,400
Seattle	US	2077100	N	1878341,900
Xian	China	2050000	N	802413,060
Colombo	Sri Lanka	2050000	Y	177413,910
Salvador	Brazil	2050000	N	2361282,000
Surabaja	Indonesia	2027913	N	1927850,100
Nizhniy Novgorod	Russia	2025000	N	1030209,000
Baku	Azerbaijan	2020000	Y	196782,140
Monterrey	Mexico	2015000	N	192024,800
Minneapolis	US	2012400	N	2544082,000
Atlanta	US	1962500	N	1790975,900
Baltimore	US	1960400	N	2939728,800
Munchen	Germany	1955000	N	500593,410
Abidjan	Ivory Coast	1950000	Y	477406,220
Kharkov	Ukraine	1940000	N	863892,120
Sapporo	Japan	1900000	N	355498,120
Vienna	Austria	1875000	Y	343645,780
Kanpur	India	1875000	N	195760,690
El-Giza	Egypt	1870508	N	1307681,600
Amsterdam	Netherlands	1860000	Y	1189752,500
Frankfurt am Main	Germany	1855000	N	817188,880
Damascus	Syria	1850000	Y	893991,940
Kao-Hsiung	Taiwan	1845000	N	526456,000
Fortaleza	Brazil	1825000	N	1564273,400
Chengdu	China	1810000	N	451857,970
Glasgow	UK	1800000	N	1909375,200
Bandung	Indonesia	1800000	N	1663629,400
Cape Town	South Africa	1790000	N	3379796,000
San Juan	Puerto Rico	1775260	Y	1314924,800
Pune	India	1775000	N	568695,560
Koln	Germany	1760000	N	973088,940
Fukuoka	Japan	1750000	N	1376939,500
Changchung	China	1740000	N	372122,340

NAME	COUNTRY	POPULATION	CAPITAL	DISTANCE
Curitiba	Brazil	1700000	N	3526844,200
Kobenhavn	Denmark	1685000	Y	808746,120
Dalian	China	1680000	N	533997,620
Beirut	Lebanon	1675000	Y	900120,750
Tel Aviv-Yafo	Israel	1670000	Y	1105390,500
Taiyuan	China	1660000	N	831072,060
Minsk	Byelarus	1650000	Y	115045,720
Yekaterinburg	Russia	1620000	N	1308947,600
Inch`on	Korea Rep	1604000	N	576992,380
Novosibirsk	Russia	1600000	N	952267,060
Pyongyang	Korea D P Rp	1600000	Y	387189,690
Dnepropetrovsk	Ukraine	1600000	N	856126,120
Hiroshima	Japan	1575000	N	1334670,100
Brasilia	Brazil	1567709	Y	2335457,000
Torino	Italy	1550000	N	636500,500
Durban	South Africa	1550000	N	2403207,200
Izmir	Turkey	1550000	N	302069,220
Montevideo	Uruguay	1550000	Y	4608984,500
Leeds	UK	1540000	N	1633202,200
Kita Kyushu	Japan	1525000	N	1346273,000
Liverpool	UK	1525000	N	1682692,400
Samara	Russia	1505000	N	1225469,400
Hanoi	Vietnam	1500000	Y	104114,100
Adis Abeba	Ethiopia	1500000	Y	393145,590
Buffalo	US	1483000	N	3172836,000
Phoenix	US	1482400	N	263076,590
Cincinnati	US	1480100	N	2351504,500
Kyoto	Japan	1479218	N	1398078,400
Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia	1475000	Y	304131,030
Mashhad	Iran	1463508	N	685821,750
T'Bilisi	Georgia	1460000	Y	75297,680
Jinan	China	1460000	N	858243,120
Luanda	Angola	1459900	Y	2288051,000
Stockholm	Sweden	1449972	Y	616963,560
Dakar	Senegal	1428084	Y	738633,440
Kobe	Japan	1410834	N	1430524,600
Denver	US	1405300	N	1213437,100
Beograd	Serbia	1400000	Y	76153,867
Guatemala	Guatemala	1400000	Y	1403907,000
Cali	Colombia	1400000	N	1564306,800
Chittagong	Bangladesh	1391877	N	64417,941
Vancouver	Canada	1380729	N	2079263,500
Al Kuwayt	Kuwait	1375000	Y	1247850,600
Milwaukee	US	1374700	N	2601949,000
Medan	Indonesia	1373747	N	337328,560
Volgograd	Russia	1360000	N	829580,750
Quezon City	Philippines	1326035	N	2141,174
Chelyabinsk	Russia	1325000	N	1097679,100

NAME	COUNTRY	POPULATION	CAPITAL	DISTANCE
Praha	Czech Repub	1325000	Y	583832,940
Yerevan	Armenia	1315000	Y	26645,490
Santo Domingo	Dominican Rp	1313172	Y	1477810,400
Nagpur	India	1302066	N	521224,500
Anshan	China	1300000	N	451895,690
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	1300000	Y	235266,250
Jiddah	Saudi Arabia	1300000	N	853999,060
Nairobi	Kenya	1286200	Y	75708,648
Kunming	China	1280000	N	287653,120
Lyon	France	1275000	N	855728,310
Kansas City	US	1272400	N	1661240,100
Fushun	China	1270000	N	418561,340
Valencia	Spain	1270000	N	570099,310
Lanzhou	China	1270000	N	400774,560
Hangzhou	China	1270000	N	915426,560
Qingdao	China	1270000	N	760699,620
Guayaquil	Ecuador	1255000	N	2067751,900
Amman	Jordan	1250000	Y	1061046,400
Accra	Ghana	1250000	Y	543720,250
Ar Riyad	Saudi Arabia	1250000	Y	1340034,000
Portland	US	1227200	N	1605978,600
Tunis	Tunisia	1225000	Y	862927,380
Marseille	France	1225000	N	822573,940
Porto	Portugal	1225000	N	643188,190
Aleppo	Syria	1216000	N	630761,000
Sofiya	Bulgaria	1205000	Y	203870,250
Belem	Brazil	1200000	N	631442,310
Almaty	Kazakhstan	1190000	Y	37078,086
Shijiazhuang	China	1190000	N	930119,250
Changsha	China	1190000	N	816099,310
Odessa	Ukraine	1185000	N	598708,380
New Orleans	US	1185000	N	984197,380
Kabul	Afghanistan	1179000	Y	415732,940
Omsk	Russia	1175000	N	1156321,600
Jilin	China	1170000	N	279585,780
Zhengzhou	China	1170000	N	1112135,900
Rostov-na-Donu	Russia	1165000	N	752373,620
Perm'	Russia	1160000	N	1546864,100
Qiqihar	China	1150000	N	249579,480
Brisbane	Australia	1149401	N	2268576,200
Ibadan	Nigeria	1144000	N	288741,590
Kazan'	Russia	1140000	N	1400425,200
Dublin	Ireland	1140000	Y	1885763,000
Barranquilla	Colombia	1140000	N	1395197,800
Baotou	China	1120000	N	285607,560
Rotterdam	Netherlands	1110000	N	1178158,800
Faisalabad	Pakistan	1104209	N	129291,230
Ufa	Russia	1100000	N	1190628,100

NAME	COUNTRY	POPULATION	CAPITAL	DISTANCE
Antwerpen	Belgium	1100000	N	1130781,400
Kawasaki	Japan	1088624	N	1488138,500
Cordoba	Argentina	1070000	N	4063477,500
Maputo	Mozambique	1069727	Y	1878693,200
Santos	Brazil	1065000	N	3404006,000
Lodz	Poland	1061000	N	274529,940
Tangshan	China	1060000	N	744937,120
Lucknow	India	1060000	N	136872,750
Puebla de Zaragoza	Mexico	1055000	N	942483,620
Quito	Ecuador	1050000	Y	1888872,600
Rosario	Argentina	1045000	N	4293136,500
Urumqi	China	1040000	N	228872,120
El Paso	US	1037700	N	7541,610
Nanchang	China	1030000	N	765632,120
Douala	Cameroon	1029731	N	710506,810
Jaipur	India	1025000	N	391526,280
Patna	India	1025000	N	124044,700
Semarang	Indonesia	1024940	N	1783418,400
Lille	France	1020000	N	1174325,600
Guiyang	China	1010000	N	525062,000
Riga	Latvia	1005000	Y	226052,660

Appendix 2: Conflicts 1979-2000 with the generated ”distance” variable, in addition to variables from the PRIO/Uppsala dataset

The columns are: The ID of the conflict observation, the year the conflict began and ended, the variables from the analysis – incompatibility, type, and intensity. Latitude and longitude. The variable “distance” is the distance from the nearest civilizational. The “lines” are lines I have drawn and coded, where each code corresponds to a civilizational border between two civilizations.

ID	Begin	End	Inco	Intens	Type	Lati	Longit	Radius	Lines	Distance
33	1979	1988	1	3	2	35,000	67,000	500	16	577063,250
34	1992	1992	2	1	3	35,000	5,000	350	10	1336031,100
35	1993	2000	2	3	3	35,000	5,000	350	10	1336031,100
37	1992	1992	1	1	3	-5,000	12,000	100	7	1868222,100
38	1994	1994	1	1	3	-5,000	12,000	100	7	1868222,100
39	1996	1997	1	1	3	-5,000	12,000	100	7	1868222,100
40	1990	1994	2	3	3	-12,000	18,000	500	7	1860878,400
41	1995	1995	2	2	3	-11,000	16,000	600	7	2049170,900
42	2000	2000	2	3	3	-10,000	16,000	500	7	2045074,500
42	1998	1999	2	3	3	-11,000	16,000	600	7	2049170,900
45	1982	1982	1	3	2	-52,000	-60,000	300	34	6647032,000
51	1992	1994	1	3	4	39,500	46,500	100	12	13367,163
52	1993	1993	2	1	3	40,350	48,000	200	12	104830,090
53	1995	1995	2	1	3	40,380	49,510	50	12	171039,280
55	1987	1992	1	2	3	22,330	92,000	100	18	53439,219
60	1993	1995	1	1	3	44,810	15,850	50	9	12664,426
61	1993	1993	1	3	4	44,000	17,500	200	9	41489,379
62	1994	1994	1	2	4	44,000	17,500	200	9	41489,379
63	1992	1993	1	3	4	44,000	17,500	200	9	41489,379
64	1994	1995	1	2	4	44,000	17,500	200	9	41489,379
65	1987	1987	2	1	3	12,370	-1,520	50	7	183001,390
66	1985	1985	1	1	2	12,350	-4,500	300	7	244660,140
69	1990	1992	2	1	3	-3,000	30,000	100	7	654146,250
70	1995	1996	2	1	3	-3,000	30,000	100	7	654146,250
71	1997	1997	2	2	3	-3,000	30,000	100	7	654146,250
72	1998	1998	2	3	3	-3,000	30,000	100	7	654146,250
73	1999	1999	2	2	3	-3,000	30,000	100	7	654146,250
76	1979	1988	2	2	3	13,000	103,000	200	27	379671,440
78	1989	1989	2	3	3	13,000	103,000	200	27	379671,440
79	1990	1998	2	2	3	13,000	103,000	200	27	379671,440
84	1984	1984	2	1	3	3,870	11,520	50	7	748204,690
85	1996	1996	1	1	2	5,000	9,000	150	7	600032,060
86	1991	1994	2	1	3	11,000	17,000	400	7	209304,670
87	1997	2000	2	1	3	15,000	19,000	700	7	291640,340
88	1989	1989	2	2	3	13,000	21,000	350	7	38815,422

ID	Begin	End	Inco	Intens	Type	Lati	Longit	Radius	Lines	Distance
89	1990	1990	2	3	3	13,000	21,000	350	7	38815,422
91	1987	1987	1	3	2	21,000	18,000	300	7	1042941,000
92	1983	1983	1	1	2	13,500	13,350	50	7	188335,020
106	1983	1984	1	2	2	23,000	105,000	200	27	204872,170
107	1986	1988	1	2	2	23,000	105,000	200	27	204872,170
110	1989	1990	2	3	3	4,500	-74,000	600	34	1291114,100
111	1991	1991	2	2	3	4,500	-74,000	600	34	1291114,100
112	1992	1993	2	3	3	4,500	-74,000	600	34	1291114,100
113	1994	1997	2	2	3	4,500	-74,000	600	34	1291114,100
114	1998	2000	2	3	3	4,500	-74,000	600	34	1291114,100
115	1997	1997	1	1	3	-12,250	44,420	50	7	421493,310
116	1989	1989	2	1	3	-11,680	43,270	50	7	295518,840
123	1996	1996	2	1	4	-2,500	23,000	1000	7	1339895,200
124	1997	1997	2	3	4	-2,500	23,000	1000	7	1339895,200
125	1997	1997	2	3	4	-3,000	14,000	200	7	1620807,200
126	1998	1999	2	3	3	-3,000	14,000	200	7	1620807,200
127	1998	1999	2	3	4	-2,500	23,000	1000	7	1339895,200
129	1992	1993	1	2	4	44,000	16,000	100	9	33776,727
130	1995	1995	1	2	4	44,000	16,000	100	9	33776,727
136	1991	1994	2	1	3	12,500	43,000	50	7	47673,086
138	1995	1995	1	1	2	3,500	-78,500	50	34	1753648,200
139	1992	1998	2	1	3	28,000	32,000	400	12	1607390,600
141	1979	1980	2	1	3	13,500	-89,000	100	1	1556013,900
142	1981	1990	2	3	3	13,500	-89,000	100	1	1556013,900
144	1991	1991	2	2	3	13,500	-89,000	100	1	1556013,900
147	1979	1979	2	1	3	1,500	10,000	100	7	1043812,700
148	1998	2000	1	3	2	15,000	39,000	300	7	50460,633
149	1989	1991	1	1	3	12,500	42,500	100	7	8235,121
150	1996	1996	1	1	3	12,500	42,500	100	7	8235,121
155	1996	1996	1	1	3	7,500	45,000	300	7	126568,150
156	1998	2000	1	1	3	7,500	45,000	300	7	126568,150
157	1999	2000	1	1	3	8,000	39,000	500	7	462176,220
158	1996	1997	1	1	3	7,500	44,000	400	7	163147,200
159	1999	1999	1	1	3	7,500	44,000	400	7	163147,200
166	1983	1983	1	1	2	7,500	45,000	300	7	126568,150
167	1987	1987	1	1	2	7,500	45,000	300	7	126568,150
172	1981	1981	2	1	3	13,450	-16,580	50	7	614899,620
173	1992	1992	1	1	3	43,000	40,500	50	12	232028,700
174	1993	1993	1	3	3	43,000	41,000	100	12	209729,780
175	1994	1994	1	1	3	43,000	41,000	100	12	209729,780
176	1992	1992	1	1	3	42,330	44,000	50	12	100052,540
177	1991	1992	2	1	3	42,000	43,000	150	12	49453,156
178	1993	1993	2	1	3	42,000	43,000	150	12	49453,156
180	1981	1981	2	1	3	5,550	-0,220	50	7	545357,190
182	1983	1983	2	1	2	12,250	-61,750	50	34	498855,410
189	1988	1991	2	2	3	16,000	-90,000	200	1	1243730,900

ID	Begin	End	Inco	Intens	Type	Lati	Longit	Radius	Lines	Distance
190	1992	1992	2	3	3	16,000	-90,000	200	1	1243730,900
191	1993	1995	2	2	3	16,000	-90,000	200	1	1243730,900
193	1998	1998	2	3	3	11,850	-15,580	50	7	417919,280
194	1999	1999	2	2	3	11,850	-15,580	50	7	417919,280
195	1991	1991	2	1	3	19,000	-73,000	150	34	1686452,100
214	1993	1993	1	2	3	31,000	76,000	150	17	110028,670
215	1983	1986	1	1	3	31,000	76,000	150	17	110028,670
216	1987	1987	1	2	3	31,000	76,000	150	17	110028,670
217	1988	1992	1	3	3	31,000	76,000	150	17	110028,670
225	1984	1984	1	2	2	34,000	76,000	200	15	1,000
226	1987	1987	1	2	2	34,000	76,000	200	15	1,000
227	1989	1990	1	2	2	34,000	76,000	200	15	1,000
228	1992	1992	1	2	2	34,000	76,000	200	15	1,000
229	2000	2000	1	2	2	34,000	76,000	200	15	1,000
230	1999	1999	1	3	2	34,000	76,000	200	15	1,000
231	1989	1989	1	1	3	4,000	97,000	200	28	424455,970
232	1990	1990	1	3	3	4,000	97,000	200	28	424455,970
233	1991	1991	1	2	3	4,000	97,000	200	28	424455,970
234	1999	2000	1	2	3	4,000	97,000	200	28	424455,970
235	1989	1989	1	2	3	-9,000	126,000	100	29	1464050,100
236	1992	1992	1	2	3	-9,000	126,000	100	29	1464050,100
237	1997	1998	1	2	3	-9,000	126,000	100	29	1464050,100
239	1979	1988	1	2	3	-9,000	126,000	100	29	1464050,100
248	1979	1980	1	1	3	31,000	49,000	150	12	1057014,100
250	1990	1990	1	2	3	37,000	46,000	300	12	219410,530
251	1993	1993	1	2	3	37,000	46,000	300	12	219410,530
253	1979	1980	1	3	3	37,000	46,000	300	12	219410,530
254	1981	1981	1	2	3	37,000	46,000	300	12	219410,530
255	1982	1982	1	3	3	37,000	46,000	300	12	219410,530
256	1983	1988	1	2	3	37,000	46,000	300	12	219410,530
258	1979	1980	2	1	3	34,000	46,000	200	12	592318,190
259	1981	1982	2	3	3	34,000	46,000	200	12	592318,190
260	1986	1988	2	2	3	34,000	46,000	200	12	592318,190
261	1991	1993	2	2	3	34,000	46,000	200	12	592318,190
263	1980	1988	1	3	2	33,000	46,000	450	12	717642,310
264	1989	1990	1	2	3	36,000	44,000	200	12	354562,120
265	1991	1991	1	3	3	36,000	44,000	200	12	354562,120
266	1992	1993	1	2	3	36,000	44,000	200	12	354562,120
276	1988	1988	1	3	3	36,000	44,000	200	12	354562,120
280	1991	1991	2	3	3	31,000	46,000	250	12	969110,310
281	1992	1996	2	2	3	31,000	46,000	250	12	969110,310
282	1982	1984	2	1	3	31,000	46,000	250	12	969110,310
283	1987	1987	2	1	3	31,000	46,000	250	12	969110,310
284	1990	1990	1	2	2	30,000	47,000	150	12	1117741,800
285	1991	1991	1	3	2	31,000	46,000	350	12	969110,310
300	1982	1982	2	1	3	-1,280	36,820	50	7	69115,117

ID	Begin	End	Inco	Intens	Type	Lati	Longit	Radius	Lines	Distance
301	1989	1990	2	2	3	20,000	103,000	300	27	88503,070
302	1986	1988	1	1	2	17,500	101,000	100	27	306629,500
306	1989	1990	2	3	4	33,500	35,500	50	12	931861,620
310	1980	1982	2	3	4	33,500	35,500	50	12	931861,620
311	1983	1988	2	2	4	33,500	35,500	50	12	931861,620
312	1998	1998	2	1	3	-29,470	27,480	50	7	2487681,200
313	1980	1980	2	1	3	6,320	-10,800	50	7	204771,420
314	1989	1989	2	1	4	6,000	-10,000	250	7	171239,200
315	1990	1990	2	3	4	6,000	-10,000	250	7	171239,200
316	1991	1991	2	2	4	6,000	-10,000	250	7	171239,200
317	1992	1992	2	3	4	6,000	-10,000	250	7	171239,200
318	1993	1995	2	2	4	6,000	-10,000	250	7	171239,200
319	1996	1996	2	1	3	6,000	-10,000	250	7	171239,200
324	1981	1981	2	2	3	4,500	102,000	200	28	137775,640
326	1994	1994	1	1	3	19,000	-1,000	500	7	1006035,100
327	1990	1990	1	1	3	19,000	-1,000	500	7	1006035,100
328	1989	1990	1	1	2	16,000	-14,000	250	7	774206,310
329	1994	1994	2	1	3	17,000	-93,000	150	1	1101595,100
330	1992	1992	1	1	3	47,000	29,500	50	9	490290,000
332	1980	1980	1	3	3	25,000	-14,000	400	7	1879074,100
333	1981	1989	1	2	3	26,000	-11,000	200	7	1955236,500
336	1981	1992	2	3	3	-20,000	35,000	700	7	1070951,600
351	1997	2000	2	1	3	29,000	82,000	200	18	71699,977
353	1981	1982	2	1	3	13,000	-85,000	250	1	1709378,900
354	1983	1988	2	3	3	13,000	-85,000	250	1	1709378,900
355	1989	1989	2	2	3	13,000	-85,000	250	1	1709378,900
357	1994	1994	1	1	3	19,000	9,000	400	7	991588,690
358	1990	1992	1	1	3	19,000	9,000	400	7	991588,690
359	1997	1997	1	1	3	19,000	9,000	400	7	991588,690
360	1997	1997	1	1	3	18,000	13,000	500	7	703006,690
361	1996	1996	1	1	3	18,000	13,000	500	7	703006,690
369	1995	1996	2	1	3	24,870	67,030	50	17	203543,700
370	1989	1989	2	1	3	8,970	-79,520	50	34	1803921,000
371	1989	1989	2	1	2	9,000	-79,500	100	34	1802332,900
372	1989	1990	1	1	3	-6,000	155,000	100	29	1349218,600
373	1992	1996	1	1	3	-6,000	155,000	100	29	1349218,600
374	1989	1989	2	1	3	-25,270	-57,670	50	34	3357724,800
378	1988	1992	2	3	3	-12,000	-74,000	700	34	2155839,500
379	1993	1999	2	2	3	-12,000	-74,000	700	34	2155839,500
380	1980	1980	2	1	3	-12,000	-74,000	700	34	2155839,500
381	1981	1985	2	3	3	-12,000	-74,000	700	34	2155839,500
382	1986	1987	2	2	3	-12,000	-74,000	700	34	2155839,500
384	1994	1999	1	2	3	7,000	122,000	500	30	140098,770
388	1979	1980	1	2	3	7,000	122,000	500	30	140098,770
389	1981	1981	1	3	3	7,000	122,000	500	30	140098,770
390	1982	1988	1	2	3	7,000	122,000	500	30	140098,770

ID	Begin	End	Inco	Intens	Type	Lati	Longit	Radius	Lines	Distance
393	1981	1981	2	2	3	12,000	123,000	700	33	63007,602
394	1982	1986	2	3	3	12,000	123,000	700	33	63007,602
395	1987	1988	2	2	3	12,000	123,000	500	33	63007,602
396	1989	1992	2	3	3	12,000	123,000	500	33	63007,602
397	1993	1994	2	2	3	12,000	123,000	500	33	63007,602
398	1999	2000	2	2	3	12,000	123,000	500	33	63007,602
401	1989	1989	2	1	3	46,000	25,000	300	9	270980,590
402	1994	1994	1	1	3	43,250	45,500	100	12	218741,170
403	1995	1996	1	3	3	43,250	45,500	100	12	218741,170
404	1999	2000	1	3	3	43,250	45,500	100	12	218741,170
405	1999	1999	1	1	3	43,000	47,000	250	12	131393,920
406	1993	1993	2	1	3	55,130	38,840	50	9	734532,380
407	1990	1990	2	1	3	-1,300	30,000	50	7	669182,810
408	1991	1992	2	3	3	5,000	30,000	50	7	757815,380
409	1993	1994	2	2	3	-2,000	30,000	100	7	655499,500
410	1998	1998	2	3	3	-2,000	30,000	100	7	655499,500
411	1999	2000	2	2	3	-2,000	30,000	100	7	655499,500
412	1979	1979	2	1	3	21,450	39,820	50	7	834892,380
413	1990	1990	1	1	3	12,500	-15,000	150	7	426872,810
414	1992	1993	1	1	3	12,500	-15,000	150	7	426872,810
415	1995	1995	1	1	3	12,500	-15,000	150	7	426872,810
416	1997	2000	1	2	3	12,500	-15,000	150	7	426872,810
417	1991	1993	2	1	3	8,000	-12,000	150	7	142319,880
418	1994	1997	2	2	3	8,000	-12,000	150	7	142319,880
419	1998	1999	2	3	3	8,000	-12,000	150	7	142319,880
421	1989	1992	2	3	3	5,000	45,000	800	7	22271,379
422	1993	1996	2	2	3	5,000	45,000	800	7	22271,379
423	1981	1986	2	1	3	10,000	46,000	300	7	192632,160
424	1987	1988	2	2	3	10,000	46,000	300	7	192632,160
426	1979	1979	1	2	3	-20,000	18,000	600	7	2170131,800
427	1980	1983	1	3	3	-20,000	18,000	600	7	2170131,800
428	1984	1985	1	2	3	-20,000	18,000	600	7	2170131,800
429	1986	1988	1	3	3	-20,000	18,000	600	7	2170131,800
430	1981	1988	2	1	3	-30,000	26,000	800	7	2612437,800
431	1989	1993	2	3	3	-30,000	26,000	800	7	2612437,800
433	1990	1990	1	1	3	40,500	47,500	250	12	83727,445
434	1990	1991	1	1	3	39,920	46,750	50	12	33815,684
435	1991	1992	1	1	3	43,000	-2,500	100	9	1432833,100
436	1980	1981	1	1	3	43,000	-2,500	100	9	1432833,100
437	1987	1987	1	1	3	43,000	-2,500	100	9	1432833,100
438	1983	1984	1	1	3	8,500	80,500	150	19	128059,950
439	1985	1988	1	2	3	8,500	80,500	150	19	128059,950
440	1989	1993	1	3	3	8,500	80,500	150	19	128059,950
441	1994	1994	1	2	3	8,500	80,500	150	19	128059,950
442	1995	2000	1	3	3	8,500	80,500	150	19	128059,950
443	1989	1989	2	3	3	7,000	80,500	100	19	241536,330

ID	Begin	End	Inco	Intens	Type	Lati	Longit	Radius	Lines	Distance
444	1990	1990	2	2	3	7,000	80,500	100	19	241536,330
447	1983	1992	1	3	3	9,000	30,000	600	7	253554,110
449	1993	1994	1	2	3	9,000	30,000	600	7	253554,110
450	1995	2000	1	3	3	9,000	30,000	600	7	253554,110
453	1986	1988	2	1	3	4,000	-55,000	200	3	5451,719
455	1979	1981	2	1	3	35,000	37,000	200	12	732595,310
456	1982	1982	2	3	3	35,000	37,000	200	12	732595,310
457	1998	1998	2	1	3	39,000	70,000	150	13	263403,880
458	1993	1993	2	3	3	38,000	69,000	100	13	346982,880
458	1992	1992	2	3	3	38,000	69,000	100	13	346982,880
459	1994	1994	2	2	3	38,000	69,000	100	13	346982,880
459	1995	1996	2	2	3	38,000	69,000	100	13	346982,880
462	1991	1991	2	1	3	6,130	1,220	50	7	443067,660
463	1986	1986	2	1	3	6,130	1,220	50	7	443067,660
464	1990	1990	2	1	3	10,650	-61,520	50	34	314703,910
465	1980	1980	2	1	3	34,500	9,000	50	10	1068003,900
468	1992	1997	1	3	3	37,500	43,000	200	12	280221,250
469	1998	2000	1	2	3	37,500	43,000	200	12	280221,250
470	1984	1986	1	1	3	37,500	42,500	200	12	294027,590
471	1987	1991	1	2	3	37,500	43,000	200	12	280221,250
472	1991	1992	2	1	3	39,000	32,000	400	11	360607,690
473	1989	1989	2	3	3	2,000	32,500	150	7	650635,000
474	1990	1990	2	2	3	2,000	32,500	150	7	650635,000
475	1991	1991	2	3	3	2,000	32,500	150	7	650635,000
476	1994	1995	2	1	3	3,000	32,500	150	7	720690,880
477	1996	2000	2	2	3	3,000	32,500	150	7	720690,880
481	1981	1988	2	3	3	1,500	32,500	300	7	615856,880
484	1979	1979	2	3	4	0,000	32,000	150	7	553790,690
488	1998	1998	1	2	3	54,670	-6,000	50	9	1936809,100
491	1992	1992	2	1	3	10,000	-69,500	300	34	903714,000
493	1994	1994	1	3	3	14,000	44,000	200	7	219222,110
494	1980	1982	2	1	3	16,000	44,000	200	7	362044,000
502	1986	1986	2	3	3	12,770	45,010	50	7	237073,520
503	1991	1991	1	3	3	44,500	15,500	300	9	41581,711
504	1999	1999	1	3	4	42,500	21,000	100	10	42665,320
505	1991	1991	1	1	3	46,000	15,000	100	9	129429,200
1106	1979	1979	1	3	2	23,000	105,000	200	27	204872,170
1107	1980	1981	1	2	2	23,000	105,000	200	27	204872,170
1180	1989	1989	2	1	3	6,000	-1,000	150	7	491415,590
6001	2000	2000	1	3	3	7,000	122,000	500	30	140098,770
6002	2000	2000	2	2	3	-3,000	30,000	100	7	654146,250
6003	2000	2000	2	2	3	8,000	-12,000	150	7	142319,880
6004	2000	2000	2	1	3	41,000	69,500	50	13	32799,742
7002	1991	1992	1	1	3	19,000	94,000	300	18	434183,750
7003	1994	1994	1	1	3	19,000	94,000	300	18	434183,750
7007	1990	1990	1	1	3	16,000	97,000	200	27	668706,440

ID	Begin	End	Inco	Intens	Type	Lati	Longit	Radius	Lines	Distance
7011	1994	1994	1	3	3	22,000	98,000	300	27	116268,180
7012	1995	1995	1	2	3	22,000	98,000	300	27	116268,180
7017	1992	1992	1	1	3	19,500	97,000	100	27	335966,620
7018	1996	1996	1	1	3	19,500	97,000	100	27	335966,620
7021	1992	1992	1	3	3	17,000	97,000	200	27	570860,560
7022	1993	1995	1	2	3	17,000	97,000	200	27	570860,560
7023	1997	2000	1	2	3	17,000	97,000	200	27	570860,560
7027	1979	1988	2	2	3	20,000	95,000	500	18	365077,620
7034	1989	1994	2	1	3	17,000	79,000	300	19	867500,880
7035	1996	2000	2	1	3	17,000	79,000	300	19	867500,880
7040	1989	1997	1	1	3	25,500	94,000	150	18	83824,883
7041	1982	1989	1	1	3	24,500	94,000	150	18	56286,684
7042	1991	1994	1	1	3	24,500	94,000	150	18	56286,684
7043	1997	2000	1	1	3	24,500	94,000	150	18	56286,684
7045	1993	1993	1	1	3	24,000	92,000	100	18	29827,531
7046	1995	2000	1	1	3	24,000	92,000	100	18	29827,531
7048	1989	1990	1	1	3	26,000	93,000	150	18	113596,960
7049	1991	1991	1	3	3	26,000	93,000	150	18	113596,960
7050	1992	2000	1	2	3	26,000	93,000	150	18	113596,960
7051	1993	1993	1	1	3	23,000	85,000	100	18	298986,280
7060	1989	1989	1	1	3	33,000	77,000	250	14	701,084
7061	1990	1993	1	3	3	33,000	77,000	250	14	701,084
7062	1994	1998	1	2	3	33,000	77,000	250	14	701,084
7063	1999	2000	1	3	3	33,000	77,000	250	14	701,084
7064	1997	1999	1	2	3	22,000	98,000	300	27	116268,180
7068	2000	2000	2	2	3	35,500	52,000	100	13	690203,620
7069	2000	2000	2	1	3	7,500	-10,500	100	7	68091,219
7070	1998	1998	1	3	3	42,500	21,000	100	10	42665,320
127001	2000	2000	2	3	4	-2,500	23,000	1000	7	1339895,200
170002	1979	1983	1	2	3	7,500	45,000	300	7	126568,150

Appendix 3: The geographical locations of all cities with more than one million inhabitants

The dots are cities, and the red lines are civilizational borderlines.



All 250 cities with more than one million inhabitants and civilizational borderlines.

Appendix 4: Visual comparison of location of conflicts in relation to civilizational borders 1990-2000 and 1979-89:

1990-2000:



Conflicts 1990-2000 and civilizational borders with a buffer zone.

1979-89:



Conflicts 1979-1989 and civilizational borders with a buffer zone.

Appendix 5

Appendix 6: Conflict ID data with comparisons of means:

	Average	Difference of means	T-test of means*
Conflicts 1979-89	742 (734)	375	0.000
Conflicts 1990-2000	529 (544)	588	0.000
Cities	1117	-	-

In parentheses are the average distances from the units used in the analysis. This shows that the average distances remain almost the same no matter what set of units applied. The conflict ID is identical with the Conflict ID in the PRIO/Uppsala dataset.

Conf_id	Distance	Begin
11	219410,531	1979
12	1057014,125	1979
13	592318,188	1979
26	834892,375	1979
27	732595,312	1979
37	577063,250	1979
47	204872,172	1979
55	1464050,125	1979
64	140098,766	1979
77	379671,438	1979
105	2170131,750	1979
113	553790,688	1979
124	1556013,875	1979
815	1043812,688	1979
905	0,000	1979
6	862000,688	1980
16	717642,312	1980
24	931861,625	1980
29	362044,000	1980
98	1540418,000	1980
111	1068003,875	1980
131	2155839,500	1980
58	137775,641	1981
63	63007,602	1981
88	614899,625	1981
89	545357,188	1981
100	1070951,625	1981
104	192632,156	1981
106	2612437,750	1981
129	1709378,875	1981
14	969110,312	1982

Conf_id	Distance	Begin
93	69115,117	1982
117	6647032,000	1982
49	0,000	1983
66	21574,709	1983
80	188335,016	1983
87	126568,148	1983
108	253554,109	1983
126	498855,406	1983
28	294027,594	1984
51	0,000	1984
902	748204,688	1984
74	244660,141	1985
34	237073,516	1986
109	443067,656	1986
133	5451,719	1986
809	306629,500	1986
38	53439,219	1987
73	183001,391	1987
79	1042941,000	1987
15	354562,125	1988
127	1243730,875	1988
67	192063,766	1989
78	38815,422	1989
94	171239,203	1989
120	1291114,125	1989
130	3357724,750	1989
511	270980,594	1989
542	424455,969	1989
553	1349218,625	1989
564	295518,844	1989
571	8235,121	1989

Conf_id	Distance	Begin
579	774206,312	1989
598	1803921,000	1989
599	1802332,875	1989
808	88503,070	1989
908	0,000	1989
1909	0,000	1989
5909	0,000	1989
913	0,000	1989
72	1860878,375	1990
75	654146,250	1990
515	83727,445	1990
516	33815,684	1990
524	1117741,750	1990
578	1006035,125	1990
581	991588,688	1990
583	669182,812	1990
584	426872,812	1990
602	314703,906	1990
2904	116268,180	1990
507	49453,156	1991
518	41581,711	1991
519	129429,195	1991
528	360607,688	1991
567	47673,086	1991
585	142319,875	1991
595	1686452,125	1991
1904	551400,000	1991
2909	0,000	1991
135	903714,000	1992
501	13367,163	1992
503	41489,379	1992
506	33776,727	1992
508	100052,539	1992
509	232028,703	1992
510	490290,000	1992
521	1607390,625	1992
558	346982,875	1992
559	845690,625	1992
561	1868222,125	1992
5904	335966,625	1992
6904	570860,562	1992
502	104830,086	1993
504	41489,379	1993
505	12664,426	1993
512	734532,375	1993
3909	0,000	1993
6909	0,000	1993
513	218741,172	1994
529	219222,109	1994
596	1101595,125	1994

Conf_id	Distance	Begin
3904	116268,180	1994
552	203543,703	1995
592	1753648,250	1995
3909	0,000	1995
83	1339895,250	1996
86	126568,148	1996
563	600032,062	1996
572	163147,203	1996
582	703006,688	1996
59	71699,977	1997
565	421493,312	1997
566	1620807,250	1997
3904	68091,219	1997
7	1936809,125	1998
568	50460,633	1998
575	417919,281	1998
576	2487681,250	1998
514	131393,922	1999
520	42665,320	1999
574	462176,219	1999