The Europeanisation of National Welfare Debates

A study of the French and Swedish debates

Marte Haabeth Grindaker

Master thesis, Departement of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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Drawing on the theory of Risse and Van de Steeg (2003) and Koopmans (2004), this thesis finds some few indications of Europeanisation occurring in the welfare debates in Sweden from 1995 to 2005 and in France from 2000 to 2005. The most contentious issues within the welfare debates proved to be more Europeanised than the general debate. Signs that a Western European community of communication emerged were found in the discussion on the EU Constitutional Treaty and the French referendum that took place within the welfare debate. Moreover, based on Bartolini (2005) and on the assumption that European integration changes the welfare debates, this thesis also provides data confirming the hypothesis that a new cleavage line emerged in the welfare debates in the period of study. The cleavage is based on a European dimension that became politicised into the three groups of Welfare-Europeans, Welfare-Nationalists and Neoliberal Europeans.
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1. Introduction

Welfare politics has been controversial ever since the first welfare arrangements were implemented in the nineteenth century. From the 1990’s and up until today, a new element has gotten a more important role in European welfare debates, namely the impact of European integration on national welfare arrangements. When asked in which areas the European Union should act, European citizens frequently cite employment and social policy as top priority fields of action, and these fields gained importance from 1995 to 2005 (Eurobarometer 1995:33, 54; 2000:68; 2005:99). This thesis examines how European integration affects the Swedish and French national debates on welfare.

In democracies, public debate is seen as an essential instrument to deliberate, to search for the best solution, and to develop democratic citizens, but also to crystallise attitudes, form the knowledge and check the power of the governors. With the premise that public debate is important for opinion formation and democracy, changes in national public debates could have important consequences for national and European democracy.¹

The last fifty years, power on numerous of policy-fields has been moved to the European level of governance. It is likely that the transfer of power has an impact on the public debate in the member states, as politics shaped on the European level become increasingly relevant nationally. One possible impact would be Europeanisation; the debates becoming more similar amongst the members states – the same topics being on the agenda at the same time; more of the same European actors and a more similar framing of the issues debated. Changes in the power

¹ This thesis builds on a deliberative understanding of democracy.
structure brought by European integration might be reflected in the public debate; altering the importance given to different actors, types of issues and actions in the media.

The member states have been reluctant to transfer power to the EU in areas typically represented by the welfare state. Welfare benefits like social and health care, education and pensions remain national. EU legislation on this field is limited to minimum standards, like maternity leave and efforts to reduce unemployment. Despite the low degree of EU-politics on this field, there has been a decrease in the member states ability to shield their citizens through methods of protectionism. For instance, free circulation of persons and goods has made it impossible to have import monopolies, or to reserve jobs for the nationals of one country. The two countries chosen for this study have different welfare models, and are differing in their perceptions of the EU. Yet, European integration has been accused of threatening the national welfare model in both countries (Stevens 2003:258,267; Partiprogram 2004:8).

Because of the liberalising impact of the EU on national politics, I argue that the welfare debate is a particularly interesting case when it comes to national debates undergoing Europeanisation. Welfare is a highly important issue in both Sweden and France. Despite the lack of formal power on the European level, European integration seems to become an increasingly central factor of the national welfare debates. It is my impression that the presence of the EU in the welfare debates makes European integration a more contentious issue; crystallised into a perception of the EU as a restraint or a possibility.

Through a comparative case-analysis, this thesis aims at describing the possible changes that have occurred in the Swedish welfare debate over a period of ten years
and in the French debate over five years. How has European integration influenced the welfare debates in Sweden and France from 1995 to 2005? Are the debates becoming ‘more European’ or more similar to one another, as far as issues, actors, events, justifications and attitudes to welfare and European integration are concerned? My research questions are:

- **To what extent can we find that Europeanisation is occurring in the Swedish and French welfare debates?**

- **Is there a new cleavage emerging within the welfare debates, that polarises the perception of the EU as either a restraint or an opportunity?**

Generally speaking, decisions on economic politics are now to a large extent taken at the European level, whereas the location of responsibility is ambiguous or shared between the European and the national level in many areas, such as for instance immigration. On topics such as taxes and welfare, decisions are made nationally. However, a common European public sphere where the political debates on the future of Europe or the common economic policy can be discussed seems to be lacking. One might of course discuss these matters within the national public spheres, and debates on EU issues are indeed taking place nationally. Still, this does neither guarantee that the frames of reference are the same, nor that there is a sufficient feeling of community to ensure that people from other countries are perceived as legitimate parties of the discussion on equal terms as one’s compatriots. If debates on EU-issues take place only nationally, this prevents that the group deliberating would include everyone possibly affected by the decision. Consequently, it becomes unlikely that all

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2 Only articles containing references to both welfare and European integration are included in the data material of this thesis. It is thus the European dimension of the welfare debates that is investigated. This part of the debate is referred to as the welfare debates throughout the thesis unless something else is mentioned.
parties’ concerns are taken into consideration, and weakens the legitimacy of political decisions.

1.1 Europeanisation of the national public spheres

This thesis builds on Thomas Risse and Marianne Van de Steeg’s (2003) notion of the public sphere as an abstract phenomenon; a socially constructed space where actors deliberate publicly on issues concerning the general society. Further, the thesis employs Risse and Van de Steeg (2003) and Ruud Koopmans’ (2004) perception on how national public spheres are being Europeanised through increasing power transfers to the European level. The increased power of the Union creates a higher degree of controversy and politicisation of European issues, something which is manifested in growing contention on these issues.

By including Risse and Van de Steeg’s (2003:21) conceptualisation of the ideal typical European public sphere, I hope to be able to identify to which degree the two debates are becoming more similar when it comes to the meaning structures, opinions and patterns of interpretation. Risse and Van de Steeg’s conceptualisation sets up a qualitative and normative standard for a European public sphere, which implies that Europeanisation is occurring when the debates are becoming increasingly alike. To get a broader and more tangible picture of Europeanisation, another more concretised conceptualisation is included; that of Koopmans (2004:6) which describes the mechanisms in the process of Europeanisation.

1.2 From tacit support to legitimacy deficit – Legitimating the European Union

Until the beginning of the 1990’s, European integration was legitimised by indirect legitimacy; i.e. by the mandate the political leaders obtained through national elections – as is the norm for intergovernmental organisations in general. Moreover,
integration was perceived as advantageous and as promoting prosperity for one’s national community by a large majority in most of the member states. (Scharpf 1997:21) Thus, the Union had what Fritz W. Scharpf (1999:6) calls \emph{output-oriented legitimacy}, which is based on ‘government for the people’ as opposed to \emph{input-oriented legitimacy}, that represents ‘government by the people’. According to Andreas Føllesdal (2004:28), the question of legitimacy centres on “whether citizens have trust in the future compliance of other citizens and authorities with institutions they believe to be normatively deserving of obedience”.

European integration became a more contentious issue with the proposals for the Maastricht Treaty, which was rejected in the Danish referendum in 1992; whereas the French referendum the same year barely gave a yes-majority – much to the surprise of many EU-officials and national politicians (Føllesdal 2004). As European integration increasingly affects the daily life of ordinary Europeans, it has become politicised and controversial in several member states – as in the two countries investigated in this thesis. Hence, input-oriented legitimacy becomes necessary for further integration (Scharpf 1999:6; Koopmans 2004:3).

If a citizen is discontented by something in society, according to Albert O. Hirschman (1970) there are two main options through which he can act and/or communicate disapproval; \emph{exit} and \emph{voice}. \emph{Exit} implies that the individual leaves the organisation, whereas \emph{voice} is “the act of complaining or of organizing to complain or to protest, with the intent of achieving directly a recuperation of the quality that has been impaired” (Ibid.1991:174-175). In order for input-oriented legitimacy to be obtainable, one needs channels of communication through which the citizens can express their opinions. Following Hirschman’s terms, discontent is communicated through \emph{channels of voice}; such as elections, membership in political parties, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or interest organisations, and through actions in
the public sphere. When the possibilities of voice are weakened, discontent will be showed in a different matter, through exit or silence. (Ibid. 1970)

1.3 Legitimating welfare arrangements

In most European countries welfare services take up between one third and one fourth of the General Domestic Product – mostly financed by taxes paid by the national citizens (OECD 2006). The legitimacy of national welfare services is built on the solidarity of the national community and on the trust that the same solidarity would include me if I were in need of support (Halvorsen 2002:1).

In the national public debate, the form of welfare arrangements is discussed continuously and through this discussion, political welfare decisions do – at least ideally – obtain legitimacy. One does not find much debate over which geographical groups within the national community that should be included in the arrangements. It is hard to imagine that someone in the Swedish debate would suggest (and be taken seriously) that inhabitants of Värmlands län 3 should be excluded from the welfare arrangements provided by the Swedish state. Yet, it seems to be more legitimate to argue against the inclusion of members of other nations into the national welfare community (Castles and Miller 2003:102-103).

Malfunctioning welfare systems experience a decrease of legitimacy (Halvorsen 2002:2). Several European welfare states are in serious need of reforms. This is also the case for France and to some extent for Sweden, having large deficits, generous services, and a declining working population. Some of these problems are claimed to be caused by globalisation and European integration; e.g. delocalisation of jobs, less state control with monetary politics and the lacking possibility of using protectionist measures vis-à-vis other European countries. Negative integration used to be the

3 A region in Western Sweden
norm of the European cooperation, that is the elimination of obstacles to economic exchange (Young 2005:101). The calls for positive integration – replacing national rules with common European ones (Ibid:102) – are however becoming more frequent in the field of social policy, including redistribution and welfare, as shown by the case of the Directive on Services.

In a polity based on output-oriented legitimacy, welfare services would typically be provided as an initiative from the rulers, like in the article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, in which the six original states agree to “ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle of equal remuneration for equal work as between men and women workers” (Treaty Establishing the European Community 1957). In a political entity based on input-oriented legitimacy, welfare arrangements would be advocated by interest groups, like trade unions or political parties fighting for certain welfare arrangements. This could be said to have been the case in the controversy over the EU Directive on Services in the Internal Market proposed by the Commission in January 2004 to liberalise and thus increase the trading of services. The directive was met with criticism and opposition in many countries, especially in France, Germany and Sweden. After public debates, political pressure and several manifestations organised by European and national trade unions, quite some of the most controversial elements were removed before the final directive was adopted in November 2006 (Le Monde 2006).

1.4 The lack of boundaries as a threat to the welfare state

Stefano Bartolini (2005:369) sees the current EU legitimacy deficit as grounded in the differentiation and lowering of the boundaries constructed by the nation states. The economic, politico-administrative and cultural boundaries are getting increasingly separated. This weakens the political entity’s possibility to enforce
sanctions upon individuals or groups not obeying to their rule. Further, the feeling of a common identity and solidarity that enabled the development of the welfare state (Rokkan 1987) might become harder to invoke (Bartolini 2005:386). With European integration, the elevated state boundaries that made exit to another system difficult and costly are disappearing. Bartolini (Ibid:411) thus argues that the EU has broken “the triangle of identity, social sharing, and legitimated decision-making”, which he sees as the historical achievement of the nation-state. In his view, the EU is too open, lacking the political foundations and the prerequisites to create new coinciding boundaries and a new form of closure at the European level (Ibid:375).

The most important consequence of this process in the context of this thesis is that the public sphere is no longer always at the same level as where decisions are made:

The ‘interests’ and, more broadly, the ‘social practices’ to which politics refer are no longer easily confineable to any one space and therefore it becomes increasingly difficult to define membership groups for political deliberation. It is equally difficult to build a community of this size with a significant degree of shared values, and, therefore, a substantive base for common deliberation and the sharing of social risks becomes less likely too.

(Bartolini 2005:375)

The discontented citizen that earlier would have voiced his opinions through the national channels of voice, will no longer always have a public sphere in which to deliberate and express discontent. According to Bartolini (Ibid:408-412), European politics and policies based on economic, political and social rights could be created at the European level also without an ethno-linguistic demos – but not without a reconstruction of boundaries. The lack of coherence between identities, interests, social practices and institutions makes political reconstruction difficult, something which he sees resulting in the emergence of serious conflicts.

The study of two welfare debates in countries with large national welfare budgets becomes highly interesting in this context. European integration is changing the economic and politico-administrative boundaries of the welfare state. It is also changing the debates in the public sphere on some topics (Koopmans 2004). Is
European integration changing the welfare debates as well? Can a possible Europeanisation be seen as manifesting itself as a new cleavage in the welfare debate? Through a potential Europeanisation, is the national feeling of community and solidarity changing into also including other Europeans? Or does it rather create national mobilisation against possible threats to the national welfare system?

1.5 Outline of the thesis

The theoretical foundations of this thesis will be further accounted for in Chapter two, where two hypotheses are presented and operationalised. Chapter three shows and discusses the methodological background to answer my research questions. Part of the methodological toolkit used in this thesis is the code-book, which is to be found as an appendix. Chapter four provide answers to whether or not Europeanisation has taken place in the welfare debates in the period by a quantitative content analysis of the data material, whereas Chapter five takes a closer, qualitative look at Europeanisation for the most controversial issues within the welfare debates. The sixth chapter analyses a potential new cleavage emerging in the welfare debates. Chapter seven sums up the findings and provides short discussions of the theoretical implications of the findings and the relevance of the study.
2. Theoretical framework

As the EU becomes an increasingly important factor in national politics and debates, I expect that European integration will become a more contentious issue per se – as well as a controversial element in many areas of debates, including welfare. My presumption is that this development is leading to an increase in the relevance of European issues, actors and perceptions for welfare nationally. This is further expected to result in a Europeanisation of the national public spheres, and in the emergence of a European conflict dimension nationally. My aim is to see how the welfare debates as part of the public spheres changes with a possible Europeanisation; and if one can find evidence of the European dimension as a new cleavage in the welfare debates. Chapter two outlines the theoretical framework for this thesis, which constitutes the theoretical background for the two hypotheses presented in 2.3 and 2.4. The chapter provides conceptualisations and operationalisations of Europeanisation and describes the theoretical basis for how European integration might be presumed to affect debate and contention in the national public spheres.

2.1 The public sphere

The public debate takes place in the public sphere – “the intermediary realm of communication on relevant issues, where the positive or negative reactions created by the different opinions decide the assessment of their importance”4 (Habermas 1999:74). A democratic polity needs “[a]n interface between state and society”, and to obtain this, it is considered crucial to have “[a]n open, pluralist, and critical public discourse rooted in independent media” (Risse and Van de Steeg 2003:1).

4 My translation
Accordingly, if one sees the EU as “an emerging democratic polity beyond the nation-state”, it becomes necessary to address the issue of a European public sphere (Risse and Van de Steeg 2003:1). A common public sphere is often listed as imperative for the development of a more democratic European Union (Eriksen 2004; Koopmans and Pfetsch 2003). Debates in the public sphere lead to opinion formation and the creation and fortification of a common identity strong enough to foster a sense of solidarity among the members of the group, necessary to enable redistribution and sacrifices for the sake of the collective good. (Eriksen 2004:1-2)

2.1.1 The legitimating role of the public sphere

In a democracy, representatives are chosen through popular elections to govern the polity. As long as they govern by law and have the support of the population, their rule is considered legitimate. However, people in positions of power continuously need to search for popular approval to be regarded as legitimate during their mandate. Hence, they actively participate in the public debate where they get input through meeting opinions and claims from other actors. The possibility for everyone to participate in the debate contributes to giving the decisions deduced from the public debate legitimacy (Habermas 1999:75).

Being one of the most accessible channels for ordinary people and the civil society, the lack of a public sphere would constrain the inhabitants’ possibilities of voice, leading to low popular support; that is low legitimacy (Føllesdal 2004:19-20; Fossum and Trenz 2005:29). A weak public sphere will constrain the regime’s actors and institutions’ possibility to respond to popular pressure.

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5 The question of whether it is at all possible to have deliberative debates and a common public sphere without a common language, culture and common media have been raised by several authors (Schlesinger 1995 and
The EU has several representative input-structures channelling voice; e.g. European Parliament elections, national governments in the Council, and hearings where NGOs and interest groups are included. Since the controversy of the Treaty of Maastricht, the European institutions, EU and national politicians have tried to increase the legitimacy of the Union to secure support for current and future policies (Føllesdal 2004:5). Yet, the French and Dutch refusal of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 – as well as the Danish and Swedish rejection to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2000 and 2003, respectively – showed that European integration has become deeply politicised and that popular support is no longer to be taken for granted.

The absence of common European media used by the general European public, does however make it unrealistic to expect that these ‘crucial functions’ are being fulfilled at the European level\(^6\) – at least for the time being. Hence, if one is to look for enhanced contention on European issues, it seems most fruitful to look to the national media. My expectation is that the increased contention around European themes is reflected in the media, by more attention given to European actors, events and issues.

2.1.2 The role of the media in the public sphere

This thesis focuses on the part of the public sphere manifested in the media. Because of its role as an arena for the public debate, the media is an imperative part of the public sphere - often being the place where contention is expressed and develops (Van de Steeg 2002:503). The media can be perceived as “the general amplifier of

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\(^6\) Some efforts on creating newspapers and TV-channels with a European perspective and a European audience have been made, like Euronews, EU observer and The European voice. Due to linguistic barriers and to the limited interest of European news, these do however mainly reach an elite audience. (Schlesinger 2003:17-18)
“voice” (Fossum and Trenz 2005:21): Events and opinions are broadcasted to a larger amount of people than those originally present when the event took place, or the opinion was stated. The whole political entity might experience, observe and/or discuss reports given by the media simultaneously. This contributes to identity formation and community feeling in the group to which the event is broadcasted and that feels concerned by it – being local, national or supranational. (Smith 1998:139) Deciding which actors, events and opinions to be given attention, the media holds a crucial role in creating and preventing political support (Føllesdal 2004:18).

2.2 Europeanisation of the national public spheres

2.2.1 Conceptualising Europeanised public spheres

By evaluating and developing Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, Erik O. Eriksen (2004) finds that a general public sphere is currently absent at the European level. In the debate on whether a common European public sphere is necessary to build democracy on the European level, it has been argued that post-national democracy will probably not be a mere copy of the nation-state democracies (Eriksen and Fossum 2002). The transfer of political power to the European level might lead to the emergence of a common European public sphere, but it might also be more fragmented; common European spheres around different policy-areas – what Eriksen (2004:16) calls ‘transnational segmented publics’. The democratic function of the public sphere might also be fulfilled by a Europeanisation of the national public spheres, if they discuss European themes simultaneously, in a manner including the citizens of other EU states as legitimate parts of the discussion and with similar frames of reference (Eder, Kantner and Trenz 2000 in Koopmans 2004). Koopmans (2004:6) argues that the intergovernmental features of the EU make it more likely that a potential European public sphere will emerge by Europeanisation of the
national public spheres rather than by the creation of one supranational European public sphere. On this background this thesis focuses on the national public spheres.

According to Risse and van de Steeg (2003:2), a European public sphere is constructed through social and discursive practices and thus creating “a common horizon of reference and, at the same time, a transnational community of communication over issues that concern “us as Europeans” rather than British, French, German or Dutch”. This happens as a result of “interconnectedness and mutual exchanges between the national public spheres (Ibid.). In this thesis I employ Risse and van de Steeg’s conceptualisation of an ideal typical European public sphere. Such a sphere, extending beyond the national spheres is to be found

- if and when the same (European) themes are controversially debated at the same time at similar levels of attention across national public spheres and media;
- if and when similar frames of reference, meaning structures, and patterns of interpretation are used across national public spheres and media;
- if and when a transnational community of communication emerges in which speakers and listeners recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse that frames the particular issues as common European problems.

(Risse and Van de Steeg 2003:22)

For a European public sphere to be found, all of these criteria should be met. However, if all of them are not present, but there is a shift in the direction of some or all the criteria, one might speak of a stronger or weaker process of Europeanisation of the national public spheres.

2.2.2 How are national public spheres being Europeanised?

Since the public sphere is an arena for deliberation and claims-making, it seems likely that a transfer of power to new institutions at a new level will imply a similar shift in the debate. As put by Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001:7);
if Europe is becoming a polity, we hypothesize, sooner or later ordinary citizens will turn their claims and their forms of contentious politics beyond their borders and towards this new level of governance. We think contentious politics is one way they will do this – with profound consequences for the Europe of elites.

Koopmans (2004:21), who leans on the theoretical perspective of political opportunity structure, expects that “political communication and mobilisation react to shifts in competencies” from national to European level. Thus, Europeanisation is most likely to occur in policy fields with a large degree of power transference (Ibid.). These expectations were confirmed by Koopmans’ (Ibid.) study of Europeanisation. Generally, those issues in which the policy field had been subject to a strong degree of integration – e.g. monetary politics – exposed a much stronger scale of Europeanisation than issues still being under national power. It is worth noticing that the two fields that showed the least tendencies of Europeanisation were areas often defined under welfare; namely education and pensions, showing respectively decreasing, and low and stable Europeanisation. (Ibid.)

Risse and Van de Steeg (2003:15,22) see debate and controversy as being constitutive for a democratic polity. Contestation on European issues will lead to social mobilisation and truly public debates on the EU, creating political communities. (Ibid; Imig and Tarrow 2001) As an illustration of the importance of the controversy of an issue, Risse and Van de Steeg (2003) found evidence of an emerging European public sphere in the case of the Austrian election in 2000, when the extreme-right party Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) became part of the government. The ‘Haider-debate’ was discussed with the same frames of reference, at

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7 All issues and all countries seen together, he found a modest increase of vertical Europeanisation from 1990 to 2002; in the form of increasing “communicative linkages between national and European level” Koopmans (2004:6; 22-23). The horizontal Europeanisation – communicative linkages between different member states – remained stable in the same period (Ibid.).
the same time and at the same level of importance in five EU-countries. Yet, this does not seem to be a one-sided development: in the Spanish and German debates over the corruption scandal in the Commission, Hans-Jörg Trenz (2000) found that national rather than common frames of reference were prevailing.

The politicisation of EU issues might consequently transfer the ‘EU of the European elite’ into the ‘EU of the European people(s)’ in a similar process as that of state and nation building in Europe: Conflicts and claims-making were parts of this process and increased public participation (See for instance Rokkan 1987). If Risse and Van de Steeg’s theory is to be confirmed, I should find indications of increasing Europeanisation of the national debates whenever welfare and integration are contentious issues.

2.3 Why would there be a Europeanisation of the welfare-debates?

The first hypothesis of this thesis is that I expect to find indications that Europeanisation is taking place in the welfare debates in the chosen period of study.

Given that the strongest indications of Europeanisation previously have been found in areas where the political power lies on the European level, why would I then expect a Europeanisation of the welfare debates? Firstly, I expect that the shift of political power to the European level will influence more debates in the national public sphere than merely the ones where politics have been Europeanised. When European integration is highly visible and much discussed in one area, it will seem more relevant within other areas as well; including the welfare debates.

Secondly, as argued in 2.2.2, the more politicised and controversial an issue is made in a European context, the more it will be discussed in the public sphere. The national controversy of welfare politics and the fact that European integration seems to be highly controversial in the area of health and social policy make an investigation of
welfare debates especially interesting. If growing contention in the debate leads to a more similar debate, where welfare is discussed within similar frames of reference and where other Europeans are legitimate opinion-holders and actors, the debates are being Europeanised.

Europeanisation is operationalised according to Risse and Van de Steeg’s three criteria listed in 2.2.1. Firstly, indications that the same themes are discussed simultaneously and at similar levels of attention in the national public spheres and media are found if the same issues appear simultaneously and with the same frequency. Secondly, I will search for similar frames of reference, meaning structures and patterns of interpretation. This is discovered if the justifications given for the claims made in the articles are similar in both countries, and if there is equality in the perceptions of welfare and European integration advocated in the articles. Risse and van de Steeg’s (2003:22) last condition is that a “transnational community of communication emerges in which speakers and listeners recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse that frames the particular issues as common European problems”. Indications of this are uncovered if the articles show that the same agenda-setting actors and events appear simultaneously in the debate, and if one sees that other Europeans are being increasingly included as legitimate participants in the two debates.

Risse and Van de Steeg’s conceptualisation takes the form of ‘standards’ that would indicate the presence of a European public sphere. As we have seen, their conceptualisation will to a large extent be measured by the convergence of the two debates. Therefore, it seems to be less fruitful in evaluating possible differences in the potential development of Europeanisation in the two countries. On this background, Koopmans’ (2004) conceptualisation with a closer focus on the process of Europeanisation is included. Because the public sphere is a relative phenomenon Koopmans (Ibid:7) suggests that “the spatial reach and boundaries of public
communication can be determined by investigating patterns of *communicative flows* and assessing the *relative density of public communication* within and between different political spaces". Accordingly, a Europeanised public sphere exists to the extent that a substantial – and over time increasing – part of public contestation neither stays confined to the own national political space (the European public sphere’s inner boundary), nor extends beyond Europe without referring to it (the outer boundary of the European public sphere). Coverage of other member states’ internal and foreign affairs constitutes a borderline case and can only be interpreted as a form of Europeanisation if such coverage is over-represented (and over time increasingly so) compared to the coverage of the internal and foreign affairs of non-EU countries.

(Koopmans 2004:10)

To be able to differentiate between different forms of European public spheres, Koopmans (2004:6) divides his notion into three different types: *Supranational*, *vertical* and *horizontal* Europeanisation. A supranational sphere could develop through considerable interaction around European issues among European-level institutions and collective actors, and ideally this would happen along with the development of European-wide mass media. Vertical Europeanisation is composed of “communicative linkages between the national and the European level” (Ibid.). This form of Europeanisation could either happen through national actors addressing or making claims to the European level; *bottom-up*, or through European actors intervening in politics and debates on the national level; *top-down*. Communicative linkages between different member states create strong or weak horizontal Europeanisation. The weak form exists when national media cover debates and contention from another EU country, but without any linkage between the countries in the claims-making. The strong form exists when actors or policies from another country are explicitly addressed or referred to in the debate. (Ibid.)

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8 Original italics.
2.4 Three scenarios on the future political structure of the EU

Bartolini (2005:386-405) sees three possible scenarios for the future political structuring of the EU: The ‘persistence of a predominant territorial structuring’; ‘isomorphic political structuring’; and the ‘structuring of a new cleavage line’. These scenarios are relevant in explaining the process of Europeanisation and the conflicts arising around European integration. This thesis’ second hypothesis claims that a new cleavage is emerging in the welfare debate, polarising the perception of the EU into that of a threat or an opportunity.

Bartolini’s (2005) scenario of the ‘persistence of a predominant territorial structuring’ draws a picture of a Union with a geographically based structure. According to this scenario, the territorial structure is likely to evolve into being based on sub- and cross-state regions as well as on the nation-states. With territory as the only representative principle of structuring, Bartolini (Ibid:390-391) warns that the continuous opening of the domestic markets might release older latent cultural and identity-conflicts in questions of distribution and redistribution of burdens and resources. This scenario might serve as a null-hypothesis to explain the potential absence of Europeanisation in the welfare debates.

As Europeanisation influences the development in different countries, parallel structures emerge. The ‘isomorphic political structuring’ scenario predicts the forming of a political structure coupling the territorial structuring with “a cross-border coordination among national, social political, and corporate actors with similar interests/values” (Ibid 2005:392). As Europeanisation progresses, the cross-border coalition will grow stronger and hence become more visible in national debates. In the area of welfare politics, this coalition would be present by European-level NGOs, like the European Trade Union Confederation and the European Social Forum. The
presence of such actors in the debate, will take a vertical form with European-level actors intervening increasingly in the national debates.

Bartolini’s third scenario; ‘the structuring of a new cleavage line’ implies that European integration could become a new cleavage with an important impact on national politics. This cleavage would be based on the social polarisation that, according to Bartolini (2005:394-395), will happen as a consequence of the conflict between “the costs and advantages of exit versus those of renewed closure” created by the integration process. Through European integration, resourceful groups might increase their rights and possibilities by being able to make claims on new and additional arenas. Additionally, since the lowered boundaries facilitate exit from the national welfare system, it makes exit a realistic threat that the national governors would want to hinder. Bartolini expects groups with lesser education, low salaries and unstable work to have limited possibilities of occupational mobility, and thus of exit. These groups will be “less well equipped to deal with the socio-cultural aspects of the opening of the boundaries, may be more affected by the retrenchment of the welfare state, more directly threatened by immigration and by new industrializing competitors” (Ibid:399).

The traditional left-right alignment would not be able to integrate this cleavage of ‘social polarisation’, and it might therefore be politically organised by new agencies. Bartolini (Ibid:395) outlines several possible conflicts that might be part of this cleavage. The most relevant in the context of this thesis are the ones generated by options of boundary transcendence versus boundary control, which are economic openness, immigration, multiculturalism and national welfare autonomy – as we will see in figure 2.1. The potential new cleavage is organised by two dimensions, one describing the desired level of control on exit/entry, and the other explaining which political goal the actors wish to pursue through more or less integration (Ibid:397).

My supposition is that the lowering of boundaries on one field will affect the politics on others: It might be hard to preserve generous welfare arrangements nationally,
when significant power on areas like economy and immigration has been moved to the European level. As put by Bartolini (2005:368), “the national, democratic and welfare features of the states are predicated upon their continued control over redistributive capacities, cultural symbols and political authority.” European integration represents a direct challenge to this control (Ibid.), and could therefore be taken as a serious threat to the national welfare states. The undefined and unpredictable character of the future of the Union might create anxiety and confusion over integration amongst some groups (Føllesdal 2004:20), whereas it might be perceived as an opportunity to define new politics by others (Bartolini 2005:395). Because of the third scenario’s focus on the possible consequences of the lowering of boundaries, it seems particularly suited to explain the contention that might arise around welfare issues nationally as a result of the possible Europeanisation.

Figure 2.1 illustrates how I expect the debate to become polarised into perceiving the EU as a restraint or an opportunity for welfare politics. The hypothesis is confirmed if an increasing number of articles express an attitude to both European integration and welfare, and if a growing share of articles portrays the EU as a restraint or an opportunity.
Figure 2.1  *European integration as a new cleavage in the welfare debates*9

MORE GENEROUS WELFARE ARRANGEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare-Nationalists</th>
<th>Welfare-Europeans</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less integration to defend the national welfare state.</td>
<td>More integration to defend/ create welfare at the European level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration perceived as a threat.</td>
<td>Integration perceived as an opportunity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INDEPENDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neoliberal Nationalists</th>
<th>Neoliberal Europeans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less integration to escape European impositions on national welfare politics.</td>
<td>More integration to limit the national welfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration perceived as a threat.</td>
<td>Integration perceived as an opportunity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LESS GENEROUS WELFARE ARRANGEMENTS

Transferred to the area of welfare politics, I expect Bartolini’s cleavage to be expressed along two dimensions; less generous welfare arrangements versus more and independence versus integration. The *Welfare-Nationalists* conceive of European integration as a threat or a restraint, and wish to maintain a high degree of independence to protect generous national welfare arrangements. A likely example of this would be actors on the political left in France that campaigned against the Constitutional Treaty with maintaining the French welfare system as one of the main arguments. The *Welfare-Europeans* are also adherents of a high degree of welfare. Still, in contrast to the Welfare-Nationalists, this group sees European integration as an

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9 Developed from figure 7.2 "European integration and partisan issue dimensions" (Bartolini 2005:397).
opportunity or even the solution to defend national welfare arrangements and to expand them to other member states through making welfare part of the integration process. In my opinion, examples of such attitudes would for instance be found in parts of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. The Neoliberal Europeans also defend increased integration on the welfare area, but directly opposed to the Welfare-Europeanists, they see integration as an opportunity to limit the national welfare through liberalisation. I assume that adherents of this view would be found on the liberal right in both countries, especially amongst the Swedish conservatives in Moderaterna. The Neoliberal Nationalists would wish to maintain a low degree of welfare nationally, and conceives of the EU as threatening their country’s self-determination on this area. There might not be many proponents of this view in France and Sweden, being among the economically most generous welfare states in Europe. Adherents of this perception are in my view more likely to be found elsewhere, for instance within the British Conservative Party.

If it is possible to detect a Europeanisation of the welfare debates, it might indicate that the Europeans are starting to share a common public sphere for political debate on welfare. This would be a precondition for a democratic handling of welfare issues on a European level. If a cleavage – built on the perception of European integration as a restraint, versus that of an opportunity for welfare – is found to be present in the welfare debates, this might create new political groups and alliances and a higher level of conflict around the future of welfare arrangements. Such a development could further lead towards the marginalisation of some groups to the benefit of others.
3. Research strategy and methodological approach

Case-analyses build their data collection and analysis on existing theory (Yin 2003:14). My focus on welfare debates was decisive for the choice of methodology and cases. What seemed to be extensive debates on welfare issues in France and Sweden, in which the EU often was on the agenda, made these two debates of particularly interesting. A comparative case-study seemed as the most fruitful approach in order to investigate the debates, because of the phenomenon’s ongoing development and the two countries differences on other factors likely to have an impact on the debates. Yet it is important to note that this thesis has a descriptive focus. My aim is to detect the degree of Europeanisation within one part of the public sphere as it is shown by the two cases: the French and Swedish national welfare debates. I want to see if the results found by an investigation of the degree of Europeanisation and the perception of the EU’s role in the two welfare debates are in line with the theoretical assumptions and earlier empirical findings mentioned in chapter two. The aspiration is to contribute to the cumulative research on this field by testing theory on two new cases. This focus makes the thesis fit into Svein Andersen’s (1997:73, 127-128) theory-developing case-study; which has an analytical approach, and uses empirical cases to reformulate or confirm existing theory.

This chapter gives an account of and discusses the research design, methodology and data material used to answer my research question. The chapter also discusses the impact of these choices on the inferences to be made from my findings.
3.1 Comparative case-studies

Comparative case-studies are frequently used in political science to highlight similarities and differences between cases. The findings are usually considered stronger when multiple cases are used instead of a single case (Yin 2003:46). In this thesis, I follow Robert K. Yin (2003:1) and Andersen (1997:15) who see case-studies as a quasi-experimental research strategy. The strategy is well suited to study relatively recent processes and phenomena in a real-life context with few units and many variables (Ibid.).

The concept of Europeanisation implies that the same development is taking place (or will take place) in all EU countries. To test if this is really the case, one should investigate two different cases that are dissimilar on some important variables. This means that my study is not a general test of the theory, but a strategic test; investigating if the theory can explain the development of two different cases. Hence, a similar test on other cases might give a different conclusion. The case-study is furthermore exploratory, due to the lack of existing data on the Europeanisation concerning this field of the public debate, and due to the impossibility of controlling all the possible intervening factors.

3.1.1 The choice of cases

Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990:26-27) sorts welfare states into a typology of welfare state regimes. He argues that the variations in the welfare states cluster around three regime types; the liberal, the corporatist and the social democratic regimes. Although no country fully complies with the models, the Swedish and the French models are respectively categorised into the social democratic and the corporatist regime.
The two chosen cases also have important dissimilarities when it comes to their relation to the European Union. France was amongst the original members of 1951, and has been able to exercise great influence over the Union (Gaillard 2004). Still one of the more important members, the French position as a leading power in the Union has been weakened with the many adherent countries and France’s declining economic results. Some – like Frank Belfrage, the Swedish ambassador in France – have argued that this has lead to an increasing euro-scepticism amongst French citizens (SNS 2005). After a divisive referendum, Sweden entered the EU in 1995. Debate on European issues is still to some extent a matter of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to Swedish membership, and the Swedes are still divided in the issue on whether EU membership is a good thing for their country\(^\text{10}\) (Eurobarometer 2006:11). Being a smaller and traditionally less influential country than France, Sweden’s approach to membership has been one of cooperation and alliance building with other member states, with a special focus on setting single issues of great importance to Swedish interest on the agenda (Persson:2005).

There are also several points of resemblance between the two countries. The large expenses of the welfare state make it vulnerable to criticism during periods of economical recession or a tightened economical position. In France and Sweden, this has been an important element of the debate during the last decade. Both states have a big\(^\text{11}\) welfare budget in order to cover for services supplied by the state (Therborn 1995:97). In both countries, the strong state and the somewhat generous public welfare seem to be deeply rooted in the national political culture (Goldmann 2000; Stevens 2003:267-268). Both have had a fairly protected working life, well organised trade unions and for some time relatively high unemployment. In both countries, Globalisation – or Europeanisation – has been blamed for the increasingly

\(^{10}\) An overview of the public opinion on the Swedish and French EU-membership from 1995 to 2005 is to be found in table A.1 in the appendix.

\(^{11}\) Defined as more than 1/3 of a country’s GDP. (Therborn 1995:97)
competitive working life and has been put forward as a reason for the attempts to reduce welfare goods or workers rights. (Stevens 2003:258,267; Partiprogram 2004:8)

3.1.2 The choice of years

1995 was Sweden’s first year as a member of the European Union, after the 1994 referenda resulting in a yes-majority of 52%. The 1995 debate was still closely linked to the experiences and the divisions from the referendum debate. Moreover, a special election was held to provide Swedish Members of the European Parliament, something which naturally was an important event in the political debate. When it comes to European policy-development on the welfare area, this was a quiet year. Still, there was an important debate on the EMU, and whether or not the EU should take actions against unemployment. (Europa 2006a)

The year 2000 saw the opening of the negotiations with some of the forthcoming member states who joined the Union in 2004. To raise general employment was central to the EU throughout the year. A special European Council was held that decided on a new strategy “to strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion” (Europa 2006b). At the European council in December, political agreement on the Treaty of Nice was reached, and the Social Agenda was approved. The agenda proposed “a series of actions with a view to improving the European social model. This model is designed to promote full employment, economic dynamism and greater social cohesion and fairness in the European Union” (Ibid.). Moreover, the EMU was debated throughout 2000, especially before and after the Danish referendum and choice not to adhere. France held the presidency the second term of the year.

2005 saw an extensive and heated debate in France and the Netherlands leading up to the referendum on the European Union’s Constitutional Treaty. The adherence of the
new Central-European democracies in 2004 had lead to debate on the future of the Union; including the impact the new countries would have on the economy and welfare arrangements in the older member states. Elements from this debate were still clearly present in the debate in 2005. Social political issues were high on the agenda during the debate: 46% of the citizens voting against the Constitutional Treaty named that the Treaty would further aggravate unemployment in France as one of the reasons for their rejection (TNS-Sofres 2005).

### 3.2 Data material

Other studies in this field have most often used quality newspapers to look for a possible Europeanisation of the public spheres (See for instance Trenz, Conrad and Rosén 2007; Koopmans 2004; Risse and Van de Steeg 2003; Van de Steeg 2002; Trenz 2000). Quality newspapers’ reports are balanced and objective, the newspapers have a high degree of news content, and their readers are often highly educated and from the middle/upper class (Fradgley and Niebauer 1995). The use of only quality newspapers implies narrowing down the possibility of measuring the public sphere, since the public sphere includes all public actions, also those not reported by the media. Besides, other media might report from the public sphere differently. Observing through newspapers might exclude information by reporting only parts of the reality. (Yin 2003:86-87).

Seen that quality newspapers often are the main media forum of political debate, and seen their role as the prime media agenda setter, these newspapers are conceived of as representative of the political public sphere. My assessment is thus that important actions taking place in the public sphere will be reported in the quality newspapers, and more recurrently discussed there than in other newspapers. What more, the availability and ease of analysing newspapers is an advantage compared to other media. Hence, if Europeanisation is taking place, the most probable place to find and measure it would be in quality newspapers.
It is important to bear in mind that the quality newspapers’ ability to reflect the public sphere is not equivalent with it representing the general public opinion. The voices heard in the public sphere in general, and maybe the quality newspapers in particular, are often the voices of the educated elite (McNair 2000:172; Street 2001:260). Yet, this might be a more accurate description of the French quality newspapers than of the more egalitarian news culture to be found in the Scandinavian countries. (Trenz, Conrad and Rosén 2007:12)

3.2.1 The choice of newspapers

To get a balanced and diversified picture of the debates, two newspapers were chosen for each country. The French newspaper *Le Figaro* has been used in similar investigations (see for instance Trenz 2005; Koopmans 2004), and is placed as a centre-right newspaper with a positive attitude to European integration (Statham 2006:17). To contribute to more comparable findings with regard to the research on Europeanisation of the public spheres, I originally wanted to use *Le Monde*, which has been used in similar studies because of its importance to the French public debate. However, the restricted availability of the newspaper’s archives, and the extensive economic costs of accessing the archives made this impossible. In stead, *La Libération* was chosen as my second French source. *La Libération* is situated more to the left than *Le Monde*, but it is an important newspaper in France, with extensive public debate. Studying the welfare debate, the choice of *La Libération* might be an advantage, seen that welfare has traditionally been given more attention by the political left than the right. The use of *La Libération* could give a broader spectre of opinions and a more extensive sample of articles. Unfortunately, none of these newspapers had available electronic archives from as early as 1995, so for France, only the years 2000 and 2005 are examined.
The Swedish newspaper chosen are the centre-left or liberal Svenska Dagbladet and the centre-right Dagens Nyheter – the country’s two main quality newspapers.\textsuperscript{12} Even if Dagens Nyheter is a centre-right newspaper, I think that it is fair to say that it is situated more to the left than Le Figaro in its political standpoints, due to Sweden’s historical and political background. However, the main point of using two different newspapers from each country is to get a more diversified and accurate reflection of the debate. The difference in the newspapers political affiliations between the two countries is therefore not that important. All four newspapers cover the whole country and are sources with credibility and influence on the national debate.

3.2.2 The selection of articles

The main interest of my paper is to see whether Europeanisation occurred in the Swedish and French welfare debates from 1995/2000 to 2005 and if a new cleavage is emerging in the field of welfare politics. It is important to note that I am investigating the role played by European integration in the two welfare debates, not the welfare debates per se. On this basis, only articles including both references to the EU and welfare were part of my selection. Because of this, I am not able to say anything about a possible change in the relative number of articles mentioning the EU in the welfare debates as a whole. What is more, the part of the welfare debate referring to the EU is not necessarily representative of the rest of the welfare debate, or the national debates. Moreover, one cannot be certain that a development in the same direction for both Sweden and France is actually a sign of Europeanisation. In order to say something about a common European development within the public debates, several more countries should be included as such. From this study one cannot exclude that France and Sweden might be moving in a different direction than the rest of Europe.

\textsuperscript{12} These newspapers were also used in a similar study on the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty (Trenz, Conrad and Rosén:2007)
To be sure that the articles sampled would give as much information about the debate as possible, the most relevant of the articles obtained through general searches in the electronic newspaper archives were chosen through three stages of sampling. The sampling criteria were not designed to ensure a representative selection, but to make sure that the articles gave the best possible reflection of the debate itself.

After a search in the newspaper archives – using the criteria “välfärd* AND (EU OR euro*)” in Swedish and “politique social” AND (EU OR euro) in French – the sampling was first done in two sequences according to formal criteria of selection in letters to the editor, commentaries, chronicles and editorials. These kinds of opinion-stating articles were chosen to simplify the selection, and on the assumption that these articles would be the more likely to display attitudes and opinions.

Each article was seen as a sampling unit to be coded separately. The number of relevant articles after the first and second sampling was too extensive for all to be included in the final analysis for the Swedish newspapers and *La Libération* in 2005. Hence, twenty articles were chosen from the sample for each newspaper a year through a qualitative selection.\(^{13}\) For *La Libération* in 2000 and *Le Figaro* both years; all articles that fulfilled the formal criteria of the first and second sample were included. Yet, these articles where not sufficient to obtain the wanted sample of twenty articles. For 2000, the French sample consists of only nine articles from *Le Figaro* and eleven from *La Libération*. For 2005, the material includes twenty articles from *La Libération* and fifteen from *Le Figaro*. In total, 176 articles were coded. The reasons for, and the limitations caused by the low number of articles are discussed under 3.4.

\(^{13}\) The details of the sampling and coding of the articles are to be found in code-book, enclosed in the appendix.
3.3 Text analysis

The use of newspaper articles as data material makes text analysis a useful methodological approach. For the main part of the analysis, content analysis was chosen, whereas ideological content analysis was used to supplement the quantitative data obtained by the content analysis.

3.3.1 Content analysis

Content analysis is understood as a systematic and structural approach to describe and analyse the content of texts (developed from Bergström and Boréus 2000:45). Content analysis' main strength is that it gives an overview over a larger material; creating a foundation for comparison (Ibid:85). During the coding, it is of great importance that the sampling units are assessed in a consequent manner to ensure that any variation detected is due to real variations in the material, not in the judgement made by the coder (Bergström and Boréus’ 2000:51). Ten articles were coded by two separate persons to ensure that the procedure were reliable, after which a few adjustments were made to improve the scheme. To avoid a change in my assessment of the different variables during the coding of the material, I followed Bergström and Boréus’ (Ibid:53) recommendation and coded only ten articles from the same newspaper per year before changing to another newspaper or year.

Bergström and Boréus (2000:50-51) recommend the development of a coding scheme, including a coding instruction for the analysis of a larger quantity of data. Developing a codebook makes it necessary to define the recording units and the variables of the study. A codebook was developed with based on the codebook from the DFG-Projekt “Transnationale Kommunikation in Europa” (Eder et. al 2002).

The coding and further analysis was done using SPSS, a computer software for statistical analysis. In addition to some general variables, like newspaper, year, i.e., the following elements were coded:
• **Agenda-setting in the media:**
  This is understood as the event/action or actor to which the article mainly refers. What triggered the article – which action, actor or event gave this article news value? Both agenda-setting action/event and the agenda-setting actor were coded.

• **Main and related issue:**
  The issue of an article contains causal clarifying and/or interpretations. The *main issue* is the subject topic; the one most extensively treated in the article. Articles may often contain other issues related to the main issue as well; *related issues*. The second most important issue in the article is coded as related issue. For each article, one main and one related issue were coded separately, based on their policy area and the level of the issue (e.g. sub-national, national, European).

• **Justification:**
  In the article, the actor will most often give a justification of why he is stating an opinion or making a claim. By the justification, the actor wishes to tell the audience *why* this is important. The justifications can be value-, identity-, rights- or interest-based. Several justifications might be used in the same articles.

• **Attitudes towards the generosity of the welfare arrangements and to European integration:**
  According to Bartolini’s (2005) theory on the emergence of a new cleavage line on the field of welfare, I expected to find a normative assessment of how generous the welfare arrangements should be, and if more or less integration is wanted. By welfare I understand solutions or politics aimed at securing people rights to benefits on areas like health and social insurance. Welfare used as an economic term; meaning progress and prosperity, was coded as not mentioned. Articles advocating either deeper or wider integration (or both), were coded as
‘more integration’. If it is argued in favour of one kind of integration and against another, the article is coded as ‘not identifiable’. If the theme of the article is one particular kind of integration (like the EMU), the article is coded by the position taken to more or less integration on this specific issue.

- **Perceptions of the EU:**
  Based on Bartolini (Ibid.), the articles were coded based on their view on European integration; as a restraint or an opportunity. All statements indicating that the actors perceives of the EU as a restraint or an opportunity were coded, including those where the reference was not specifically for the welfare area.

### 3.3.2 Ideological analysis

Bergström and Boréus (2000:154-163) list several methods of procedure to investigate ideas and opinions in a debate. The one chosen for the qualitative analysis in this thesis focuses on the actors’ perspective to investigate which ideas and perceptions that are present and that prevail in a debate. The focus of this analysis is on the actors’ perceptions of welfare as a national versus a European level issue, of European integration and of the EU as a restraint or a possibility in the context of welfare.

### 3.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the methodology

#### 3.4.1 Validity

The validity of a research describes if the data is relevant for the research question (Hellevik 1999:457). External validity establishes “the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized” (Yin 2003:34). Case-studies should be generalised analytically, that is generalising the results of a study to broader theory (Ibid:37).

The low number of relevant articles in France, especially in 2000, and the limited amount of articles in general, makes it important to notice that a change of percentage
from one year or country to another might only be a matter of one or a few articles. Hence, to be able to deduct any trustworthy results, the data material must show clear changes. Based on such a small selection of articles, one should be cautious when generalising from the findings. What is more, the fact that the Swedish data are sampled from three different years will probably give a more accurate picture of the development than the French data. Two sample years give no indications of whether or not the changes observed represent a continuous evolvement over time.

Further, when the two debates show similar traits without there being signs of changes in the discussions in the period, it should not be taken on the account of Europeanisation without any reservation. Common features might just as well be explained by historical or cultural similarities in the public debates or politics in two European countries. Indications of Europeanisation should thus mainly be claimed on indicators that evolve over time.

This thesis builds on theoretical criteria that have already been employed on the “Haider-debate” by Risse and Van de Steeg (2003). The debate analysed in this thesis is of another policy field, a longer period and two countries not included in Risse and Van de Steeg’s study. Although the operationalisations are different, this thesis can to some extent be seen as a replication of their study on the case of welfare debates. When all reservations are included, my claim is that it is possible to generalise analytically from this thesis.

Choosing the words by which the newspaper articles were to be selected, presented me with some problems in finding those that would give an as accurate picture of the debates as possible. The original choice was ‘welfare’ something which seems to have been a good option for the Swedish debate. However, searching for welfare in

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14 ‘välfärd’
the French news archives gave considerably fewer hits than in Sweden, and, more importantly, the articles found were more often referring to the social model or debates in other countries, rather than the French debate.

It seems to me as if the word ‘welfare’ in French gives negative connotations and that it is therefore little used in the French debate. When talking about what Swedes most likely would perceive as welfare issues, it seems that French actors use the terms ‘social state’ or ‘social policy’. I found that the Swedish reality to be quite the opposite. Welfare is a word with so many positive connotations, and so deeply linked to the national identity that it is used very frequently, also when there is no immediate link to welfare issues. A number of other French words were tested, and finally the term ‘politique sociale’ was chosen, as it seemed to best reflect the debate on welfare issues. This is not an accurate translation, and there are clearly different nuances connoted to these two different terms. Hence it limits the construct validity of the thesis and the possibility to compare the two cases. However, the possibility of having approximately equivalent debates in both countries seemed more important than to investigate the meaning of the word welfare in French and Swedish.

The coding of the articles showed some limitations of looking at the welfare debate in France. It seems to me that discussions on welfare arrangements more often than in Sweden take place in more specified subfields of welfare – discussing health care, social benefits and child care as single issues – rather than as part of the general discussion on welfare. This might be the cause of the low number of relevant articles found in the French debate. If this is the case, the validity of my inferences is considerably weakened.

15 ‘providence’
16 ‘état social’
17 ‘politique sociale’
3.4.2 Reliability

It is a scientific aim to have reliable data – that is, the data must be trustworthy. Moreover, to make sure that it is possible to repeat and verify the research, the methods and criteria should be well accounted for. The reliability is increased by the fact that a codebook with detailed instructions is provided, and by the double-coding of a small part of the material.

The fact that a maximum of forty articles are analysed per year, and that it might take only a few coincidental changes to create a shift in percentage, limits the reliability of the findings. One should be particularly aware of this when it comes to the French articles in 2000. The reliability might have been further enhanced by the use of additional sources, as pointed out by Yin (2003:34), but this would have been too time-consuming.

Another limitation of the inferences of this thesis would be that the two debates examined are in languages other than my mother-tongue. In text analysis, it is important to have a good understanding of the languages in the texts, but also of the cultural and societal context in which these texts are situated. If not, there is a risk of missing significant conventions and codes in the language (Neumann 2001:50-51). Although having good knowledge of the French and Swedish society, politics, culture and language, it is not unlikely that there were connotations and references that escaped my attention. On the other hand, having some distance to the case under analysis might be an advantage, as one might be able to see things more clearly than what is possible within one’s own culture.

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18 ‘social politics’ or ‘social policy’
4. Is Europeanisation occurring in the welfare debates?

In this chapter, the findings of my study are compared to the first hypothesis deduced from the theory in Chapter two; that Europeanisation is taking place in the welfare debates within the period of study. In accordance with Risse and Van de Steeg’s (2003:22) concept of a European public sphere, the hypothesis was operationalised into three criteria that would indicate Europeanisation. The findings are analysed by these criteria. When these terms can constructively explain the ongoing development, Koopmans’ (2004:6) classification of supranational, vertical and horizontal Europeanisation is employed to indicate how the process of Europeanisation potentially occurs. The general findings are described and discussed in this chapter. In Chapter five, the criteria are employed more qualitatively in a closer examination of the most important discussions within the welfare debates.

One should note the limitations of the data in this study, mentioned in chapter three. The relatively low number of articles for each country a year makes it important to be careful in the interpretation and the further generalisation of the results.

4.1 Same themes at similar levels of attention

Risse and Van de Steeg’s first criterion is that the same themes should be controversially debated simultaneously at similar levels of attention across national public spheres and media. This is confirmed if the data material shows that the same issues are discussed at the same time, with the same frequency. In order for

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19 Another such indication would be that the events setting the agenda for the debates are similar in the two countries. The coding scheme developed for this thesis proved to be unfruitful in responding to which events being agenda-setting in the two debates. Agenda-setting events are thus mentioned for some single issues, but no statistics have been made on this variable.
Europeanisation to be taking place, the issues discussed in the two national debates should be approaching each other over time.

Table 4.1 shows which issues that appear in the two welfare debates in the period under examination. All articles in the sampled material make references to welfare and the EU, but these two subjects are not necessarily the main or related issue of the article.\textsuperscript{20} An issue might have a high frequency on main issue without having a high frequency on related issue.\textsuperscript{21} The ‘total’ category describes the percentage this issue obtained when main and related issue is seen as a whole. The most important issues would thus be those for which the ‘total’ frequency is high.

Being natural parts of most European national debates, it is to be expected that the issues listed in table 4.1 are discussed in the same year in both countries without it being a sign of Europeanisation. Table 4.1 is further used as an indication of which issues that are most debated and that seem to have a significant similar or dissimilar development. How, when and why these issues were debated is further investigated in Chapter five.

\textsuperscript{20} To simplify the reading, some categories have been combined. As an example, the issue of welfare contains the articles coded as “welfare between the EU and the nation state; division of roles and power”; “welfare” (politics, arrangements, reforms, models, social policy, etc); “workers’ rights”; “pensions/retirement”; and “consumer rights”.

\textsuperscript{21} An overview of the frequency of related issues is to be found table A.1 in the appendix.
Table 4.1  Main issues and total from 1995 to 2005. Percentage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
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<td>22,5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11,3</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>16,7</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>8,6</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU as a dimension in national politics</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Resistance against European integration</td>
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<td>6,3</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>8,8</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13,8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16,3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elections/referenda</td>
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<td>8,8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>17,5</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy/economic policy</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>2,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>European integration</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>16,7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16,8</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>15,8</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party politics</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,3</td>
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<td>1,5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council meetings or IGC</td>
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<td>2,5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33,3</td>
<td>19,1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU enlargement</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>3,8</td>
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<td>4,8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>1,5</td>
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<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>2,5</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>The EU Constitution</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>57,1</td>
<td>35,7</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>EU guest workers</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>6,3</td>
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<td>Globalisation</td>
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<td>Foreign/International relations</td>
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<td>2,5</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>2,5</td>
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<td>2,9</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/not identifiable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>1,5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total (N)</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

22 Issues coded as “Specific EU-issues” are the Lisbon strategy, the Service directive and the government of Jörg Haider and the EU-sanctions.
As shown in table 4.1, there are few similarities in the frequencies by which the different issues appear in the two national debates. The only parallel between the two countries is the stable share of European integration in 2000 and 2005.

Seeing all EU issues as a whole (European integration excluded), as showed by table 4.2, it is interesting to notice that EU issues become more central in both national debates over time. This could be an indication that EU as a policy maker or as a topic of discussion is gaining importance in the national welfare debates.

Table 4.2 All EU-issues\textsuperscript{23} as main issue and as total. Percentage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All EU-issues</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main issue</td>
<td>32,5</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>52,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>38,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the information given by table 4.1 and 4.2, the tables A.3-A.5 in the appendix show which issues that are related to the main issues. The connections between the main and related issues do not show much resemblance, but the similarities are increasing from 2000 to 2005. All in all, Risse and Van de Steeg’s first criterion cannot be said to be confirmed by the general development of the

\textsuperscript{23} The category ”All EU-issues” include all articles originally coded under any of the following categories: EU as a dimension/cleavage in national politics, Resistance against European integration, EMU, Meetings in the European council /IGC, Enlargement of the Union, The nation-state’s role in the EU, The EU-Constitutional Treaty, Guest workers from the EU, National rivalries within the EU, The Lisbon strategy, The Service directive, The European regions, The government of Jörg Haider and the EU-sanctions.
welfare debates. On this basis, welfare seems to be a field where the issues debated are raised and discussed nationally.

4.2 Similar frames of reference, meaning structures and patterns of interpretation

To find that there is a process towards that “similar frames of reference, meaning structures, and patterns of interpretation are used across national public spheres and media” (Risse and Van de Steeg 2003:22), one would see a convergence in the justifications used in the articles’ argumentation. Moreover, the number of actors in the two debates arguing for more or less generous welfare arrangements and European integration should become more parallel. The two national perceptions of the EU as a restraint or an opportunity would also be approaching each other.

4.2.1 Justifications

The justifications used by an actor to strengthen his/her argument can tell us something about what kind of appeals – or justifications - that is important in order to convince people within the field of discussion. If the justifications are converging in the two national debates, this could be a sign of more similar frames of reference and patterns of interpretation. Table 4.3 describes the development in the use of four categories of justifications in the period of study.
As one can see in table 4.3, value-justifications are often employed in articles in the welfare debate in both countries, and the use increases throughout the period (1995-2005 and 2000-2005). Arguments referring to democracy are the most recurrent, but also references to solidarity, liberalism and peace are often present. In a chronicle on EU enlargement, the Swedish Foreign Minister justifies enlargement by peace and solidarity:

> The unification of Europe gives great opportunities to extend the peace project, weave together economies, countries and peoples. With this insight, Sweden has been amongst the leading proponents of the enlargement, ever since the start of our membership in the Union. To unify East and West is our most important aim.

(Lindh 2000)

Justifications based on identity, seem to be moderately important in the two debates during the period of study. It does however show a diverging development; while it becomes more central in the Swedish debate, its significance decreases in France. The rights-based justifications are generally the least present in the debates. This group of

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24 All citations quoted from the newspaper articles are my own translations.
justifications does however experience a strong growth in both countries during the period. Some of this development might be explained by the importance of the Constitutional Treaty as an agenda-setter in both debates. The format of a Constitution implies that much of its content often will be in the form of the rights – something which could be expected to be reflected in the debate.

Justifications appealing to interest are generally used very frequently. This quote from an article on the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice is a typical example:

Nice confirmed that as soon as there are important economical and political conflicts of interest between states, everything is blocked. […] Only the citizens’ and the societies’ effort to construct a general interest could legitimise a European power.

(Herzog 2000)

The use of interest-based justifications shows a small increase in Sweden from 1995 to 2005, whereas it becomes less important in France.

4.2.2 Similarities in attitudes on welfare arrangements and European integration

In order to get more information on the meaning structures in the welfare debates, it is interesting to look at how the attitudes towards European integration and welfare politics are evolving in the two countries. My claim is that similar frames of reference and patterns of interpretations can be found in evaluating the perception of EU as a restraint or an opportunity in the welfare debates. Only the changes in a converging or diverging direction are analysed in this part to answer the first hypothesis. The attitudes towards the generosity of welfare arrangements and towards European integration are analysed and discussed in Chapter six. Firstly, we take a look at the development of the attitudes to European integration amongst the actors’ participating in the welfare debate in table 4.4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Year and country</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less integration</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,5</td>
<td>17,5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More integration</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>72,5</td>
<td>47,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not identifiable</td>
<td></td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4  Attitudes towards European integration in the welfare debates. 
Percentage.

The number of articles not expressing any identifiable view on European integration has decreased considerably in the period in both countries. Table 4.4 illustrates that the attitude towards European integration within the Swedish welfare debate has changed radically within the period: from 40% advocating more integration in 1995, to 80% of the articles expressing a wish for more integration in 2005. This wish is expressed both from actors from the Socialist and Social Democratic parties;

We need the EU to defend democracy in the age of globalisation.
(Bengtsson et al. 2005)

and by right-side actors, like the editorial of the centre-right newspaper:
The service sector contributes to nearly 70 percent of the European economy. Preparing Swedish service enterprises to enter the European market is obviously of Swedish interest. (Svenska Dagbladet 2005)

The development in the French welfare debate went in the opposite direction: from no articles expressing a wish for less integration in 2000, to 43% doing so in 2005. An example of this can be found in this quote on the Directive on Services:

Let’s not be fooled. The Bolkestein directive was attempted passed in this manner, and it will be attempted passed again in another manner. Except if the French clearly express that they do not want the European construction to loose its equilibrium due to the directive. (Berès 2005)

What about the attitudes towards the generosity of welfare arrangements? The actors’ attitudes towards this issue are described in table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Opinions on the generosity of welfare arrangements. Percentage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less generous welfare</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>14,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More generous or stable welfare</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>33,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrangements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not identifiable</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>52,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A common trend is that the number of articles not expressing any identifiable opinion on the matter is reduced over time. With this exception, the Swedish debate does not
demonstrate any clear tendency on this variable. There is, however, a considerable change in the French debate; into a large majority being in favour of more generous or stable welfare arrangements in 2005, here exemplified by Henri Weber:

A great European mobilisation is necessary to obtain the withdrawal of the Bolkestein and Palacio directives. It is needed to repeal the opting out, taking the safety and health of the workers into consideration in the organisation of working hours […]

(Weber 2005)

In order to say something about how the European Union is conceived of in the area of welfare debate, data on the perception of the EU was gathered. These are shown in table 4.6.

Table 4.6  Perception of the European Union in the welfare debates from 1995 to 2005 in Sweden and from 2000 to 2005 in France. Percentage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception and country</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraint</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>17,5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>62,5</td>
<td>52,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not identifiable</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6 shows that both debates become more polarised in the period of study concerning the perception of the EU as a restraint or an opportunity. Still, also in relation to this point, the two debates seem to be moving in opposite directions. The Swedish articles increasingly conceive of the EU as an opportunity. It is pictured as the arena for solving problems caused by globalisation and too much European liberalism, as it is argued by several left-side actors here:

Europe should agree upon a common strategy that places environmental and social
sustainability in the foreground. By social sustainability we intend full employment and an “upwards” levelling of the incomes and social situation for the peoples of Europe. In the long term, this is the only possibility to prevent social dumping.

(Bengtsson et al. 2005)

The share that conceives of the EU as an opportunity remains a stable majority in France, here exemplified by the Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and former Minister of European affairs, Alain Lamassoure:

One must be blind, illiterate or of complete dishonest intentions to pretend that this text is the triumph of ultraliberalism: on the contrary, it brings politics and the social aspect into the foreground again.

(Lamassoure 2005)

However, the percentage of French articles that conceives of the EU as a restraint shifts from none to 40%. The restraint or threat represented by the EU, and especially the European Constitutional Treaty is very often related to economic liberalism, as done here by the former MEP Charles Pasqua:

Far from protecting us, the European Union has become the facilitator for a globalisation without conscience.

(Pasqua 2005)

The general examination of Risse and Van de Steeg’s second criteria shows that the two welfare debates have become more politicised in a period of increased European integration, as predicted by Risse and Van de Steeg. Politicisation of an issue implies more controversy. According to Risse and Van de Steeg (2003:15), this should make it more important for national actors to address European integration within the area of welfare.

The use of justifications does however not show a parallel development; neither does the evolvement of the different attitudes in the debates. Yet, the division of the debates into different opinion groups on the future of welfare arrangements seems to have become more similar, as actors in the French debate start perceiving the EU as a
restraint to welfare – a position present in the Swedish debate (at least) since 1995. Still, the development of the two debates cannot be said to be moving in the same directions, disconfirming Risse and Van de Steeg’s second criteria of Europeanisation. The possible causes of polarisation and the divergent development in the two countries will be further analysed in Chapter six.

4.3 Other Europeans as legitimate participants in a common discourse on common European problems

In order to say that the two debates show signs of Europeanisation, they should also move in the direction of a “transnational community of communication […] in which speakers and listeners recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse that frames the particular issues as common European problems” (Risse and van de Steeg’s 2003:22). To find indications of such a development, the same agenda-setting actors should appear gradually more often and at the same time in the debates. EU actors or actors from other EU-states should be increasingly included as agenda-setting actors. One could also expect to find a growth in the relative number of issues being totally or partly on the European level. More European-level actors and issues would according to Koopmans indicate a top-down vertical Europeanisation. An increasing share of actors and issues from other EU states would imply horizontal Europeanisation, whereas more national actors debating EU-level issues would point to a bottom-up vertical Europeanisation. Table 4.7 indicates the participation of different types of actors in the welfare debates over time.
### Table 4.7  Agenda-setting actors, all main issues. Percentage.

The material presented in table 4.7 shows that the relative amount of national governmental actors is declining, while the number of national non-governmental actors in the Swedish debate is augmenting in the period. An article written by the MP and leader of the Socialist party Gudrun Schyman is an example of the typical actor in 1995. She demands that the government cooperate with her party to increase the grants to unemployment benefits and to call for a referendum on the EMU (Schyman 1995).
In 43% of the articles referring to the EU in the French welfare debate in 2000, the agenda was set by EU governmental actors. Typically, this would be the Council meeting or the IGC on the Treaty of Nice. Both countries experience a decrease in the number of EU governmental actors to the benefit of national actors in 2005. These actors are for instance agenda-setting when the Swedish Trade Union Confederation publishes a report (Svenska Dagbladet 2005), or when the French President calls for a referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty (Pasqua 2005). Common for both countries is that non-governmental European actors and governmental actors from other EU-states appear to be without agenda-setting power in the welfare debates throughout the period. Non-governmental actors from other EU-states are only sporadically present as agenda-setting actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level and country</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National level in the newspaper’s country of origin</td>
<td>42,5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National level in another EU-country</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National level for EU-states</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU level</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU and national level</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22,5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International level</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>14,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not identifiable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only the kind of actors, but also the level on which an issue is discussed is central to indicate in which direction the possible process of Europeanisation is moving. Table 4.8 presents data on the development within issue-level in the period.

Table 4.8   Issue-level for main issues in both countries. Percentage.
In both national debates, there is a growth in the relative amount of articles with issues that are simultaneously on national and on EU-level. A typical example is the French Socialist MEP writing on how the Directive on Services and changes in The Working Time Directive affect national policies on welfare and workers’ rights (Weber 2005).

Sweden experiences a considerable fall in issues only on the Swedish national level, whereas the number of articles with main issue on national level for EU states increases from 1995 to 2005. This indicates a horizontal Europeanisation. In France, an important augmentation occurs within issues on national level, while the number of articles on a European level drops significantly. The two debates become more similar from 2000 to 2005 concerning the share of issues on national level for EU states, on EU-level as well as on EU and national level.

Being an EU issue ‘taken down’ from the European level and debated nationally, it is interesting to see how the EU Constitutional Treaty influences the actors and issue-levels in the French debate. As seen in table A.12, 88% of the agenda-setting actors in articles with the EU Constitutional Treaty as an issue were national – although it was a European issue.
All articles included, national actors become more important in both debates. This is likely to imply that fewer actors would appear simultaneously in both debates. Neither is there an increase in the share of EU actors or actors from other EU states. The indications of some increased similarities on issue-levels in the two debates might point to a common understanding of what level the welfare debate should be led.

4.4 Differences in the Europeanisation in the French and Swedish debates

As shown in table 4.2, EU issues are significantly more prominent in the French than in the Swedish welfare debate. Further, national actors and issue-level gain importance from 2000 to 2005 in the French debate, at the same time as the significance of European issues experiences a radical growth. In 2000, France proves to have more European actors, more issues on a European level and more EU-issues in the debate than what is the situation in Sweden in 1995 and 2000. In the Swedish 2005 debate the agenda-setting actors are to a larger extent EU actors or actors from another EU state than France. Moreover, the amount of issues on EU level or on national level in EU-states is higher than what is the case in the French 2005 debate. When it comes to the share of ‘EU-issues’, as shown in table 4.2, France has the higher percentage throughout the period.

Summing up the general evidence presented for the first hypothesis; have the two welfare debates been Europeanised during the period? When it comes to the simultaneity of when and to what degree different themes are being discussed in both debates, there proved to be few similarities between the two debates except for the stable level of European integration in both countries from 2000 to 2005 and a growing importance of EU-issues. The data showed some indications of a common
development in frames of reference, meaning structures and patterns of interpretation as operationalised in Chapter two. Still the common polarisation occurring was expressed by opposite developments in the two countries. The third criteria showed little convergence of the two debates concerning the actors, but some tendencies of the two debates approaching each other when it came to issue-level.

There seems to be only weak elements of a converging development indicating Europeanisation of the welfare debate making references to the EU when operationalised according to Risse and Van de Steeg’s criteria. Employing Koopmans’ mechanisms of Europeanisation, the French debate show signs of bottom-up Europeanisation; national actors discussing European issues in both a national and a European context. The Swedish debate, on the other hand, shows a tendency of increasingly more top-down Europeanisation; European level actors participating in the national welfare debate.

Based on these results, and considering Koopmans’ and Risse and Van de Steeg’s argument of controversy and contention as the factor causing Europeanisation, the next chapter gives a closer examination of the issues that were most controversially discussed within the welfare debates in the period.
5. Europeanisation on the most controversial fields of debate

In order to obtain a more complementary picture of the welfare debates, some parts of the debates are investigated more closely in this chapter. This supplementing analysis is carried out through the use of qualitative ideological text analysis, as described in 3.3.2. The examination focuses on welfare on a national versus a European level; European integration; and the EU as a restraint or an opportunity in the context of welfare. I expect to find more indications of an emerging European public sphere following Risse and Van de Steeg’s (2003) conceptualisation in the following discussions which are considered the most controversial within the welfare debates: Welfare; European integration and Intergovernmental Conferences; resistance against European integration; and the EU Constitutional Treaty and the French referendum.

5.1 Welfare

The importance of welfare as main or related issues does not show any stable development over time in either of the countries. In the Swedish debate, welfare is related to European integration all three years. An example of how these two issues were related can be found in a chronicle written by the former Swedish MP Eva Britt Svensson, leaving the Social Democrats. She argues that the party’s eagerness to adapt to the EU’s economic politics destroys the Swedish welfare:

The convergence criteria for the common currency imply even more unemployment. Increased differences in income, decreased unemployment benefit, decreased sickness benefit and a worsened economic situation for the municipalities have followed from the EU-membership.

(Svensson 1995)
Some of the Swedish articles on welfare in 1995 have a clear national scope, with the EU only playing a minor role. Part of the debate on welfare issues indicates horizontal communication by debates referring to the importance of Swedish EU membership for the Danish welfare state (strong horizontal) and to French welfare reforms invoked partly by the Euro (weak). Still, vertical communication is most recurrent, as when the EU is presented as important in order to secure welfare and low unemployment (Linde 1995), or when the adaptation to the EU and the EMU is claimed to endanger the Swedish welfare as shown in the citation above.

In 2000, vertical communication becomes more important within articles with welfare as main issue in Sweden. The agenda-setting events are votes in the European Parliament, the upcoming Swedish Presidency and the Council of ministers meeting in April. The French welfare debate is not as intense as the Swedish this year; indeed half of the articles do not indicate any attitude towards the generosity of the welfare arrangements – something which must be said to be unexpected in a debate on welfare. Moreover, the agenda-setters in articles with welfare as main or related issue are often actors outside the EU, or national actors. Except for references to German pension reform, welfare is either discussed in a Western context – like when *Le Figaro* refers to and discusses an article in the American newspaper *The Wall Street Journal* on the differences between American and European social and economic policy and why this makes Europe less competitive than the USA (Casanova 2000) – or in a purely national one.

In 2005 the picture changes, most radically in France. The material collected in both countries this year discusses welfare as related to the EU; which role should the Union have in welfare policies, and most importantly – would the Constitutional Treaty imply an improvement or a detriment of French/Swedish and European welfare? The French referendum campaign and ultimately the rejection of the Treaty

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25 Measured by the original number of relevant articles
set the agenda for nearly all French articles this year, but also for many of the Swedish articles. The tables A.9-A.11 indicate a slightly growing share of EU actors in Sweden from 1995 to 2000 and in France from 2000 to 2005 within the articles with welfare as main or related issue; a vertical top-down Europeanisation. This might be a sign that welfare is becoming a common political issue – making EU actors more relevant as agenda-setters in the national debate.

Contrary to the general tendency described in 4.2.1 indicating a fall of interest-based justifications in France, there is a growth in the use of these justifications within articles on welfare in both debates in the period, as seen in tables A.6-A.8. Moreover, as opposed to the general picture given by table 4.3, the use of justifications based on identity increases within the articles with welfare as main or related issue from 2000 to 2005 in both countries. An example of the use of such justifications can be seen in the discussion concerning the social consequences of the proposed Directive on Services and changes in The Working Time Directive, when the MEP for the French Socialist Party portrays Europe as one community; “[t]he ideal of civilisation wanted by the Europeans”26. At the same time, he sees Europe as being divided between an Anglo-Saxon and a continental influence:

[...] dominated by the conservative liberals, the Commission follows the lead of the Anglo-Saxon countries and impairs the European ideal of a society of well-being.

(Weber 2005)

Looking only at articles with welfare as main or related issue, communication seems to become more vertical in both countries: European-level politics that could affect welfare is to a larger extent discussed nationally and national actors increasingly

26 My italics.
make demands on welfare to the European level, using parallel justifications. The EU Constitutional Treaty as a common agenda-setter seems to have made it clearer to actors in the debate that European integration could affect the national welfare arrangements. Actually, it seems as if some actors suddenly realises that integration probably had been affecting welfare as a policy field for quite some time already.

5.2 European integration and Intergovernmental conferences

In Sweden, European integration increased its presence in the welfare debate from 1995 to 2000. Council meetings and other EU state leaders, as well as national politics and national actors, often set the agenda in articles on European integration in 1995. The British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd is an example of this, when he writes a commentary in *Dagens Nyheter* on British opinion on the topics to be discussed at the upcoming Council meeting (Hurd 1995). Still, these meetings are rarely present as a main issue. European integration as an issue seems to be at the same and stable level of total attention around 15% in both countries from 2000 to 2005. In 2005, Council meetings or Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) is no longer registered as an issue in the welfare debates, as seen in table 4.1.

Meetings in the Council or IGCs are the main agenda-setting events in the articles on European integration in both debates in 2000. In the French debate, these meetings constitute an important issue in 2000, representing a total of 19% of the main and related issues in table 4.1. Table A.12 shows that EU actors are the only agenda-setting actors in these articles, all referring to the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice. The French articles on IGC or European integration seem to be what Koopmans (2004) calls supranational; the event setting the agenda is European, the actors are European trade unionists, the French presidency, or state leaders – discussing European issues like the Social Agenda, enlargement and structural reforms of the EU. Moreover, the focus in the French debate on the IGC and European integration in
2000 is on what is best for Europe as a contrast to national interests. The Swedish debate on these two issues also have European agenda-setting events, but the focus of the debate is more national; on the role of the upcoming Swedish Presidency and how Sweden influences the EU and vice versa. This makes the Swedish debate fit more into Koopmans’ vertical Europeanisation. Both debates related European integration to resistance against European integration and to EU enlargement in 2000.

The French articles on European integration and Council meetings/IGCs in 2000 hence indicated a supranational European communication, whereas the Swedish debate was to a larger extent marked by vertical communication; both bottom-up and top-down. For 2005, the issue of European integration is weaved into the debate occurring in the same period as the French vote on the EU Constitutional Treaty. It will therefore be discussed under 5.4.

5.3 Resistance against European integration

In 1995, resistance against European integration is discussed in a national context in Sweden; it is Swedish EU scepticism that is on the agenda, like after the Swedish supplementary elections to the European Parliament. In the year 2000, the issue is at the same level in both debates around 9%, as seen in table 4.1. Still, the agenda-setting events for this issue are not the same in the two different debates. The Swedish debate obtains a more European focus on this issue as compared to 1995, when Swedish EU scepticism is seen as a part of a spreading European EU-scepticism. This issue thus becomes more horizontal; in the strong form. In the French 2000 debate, resistance against European integration is seen as linked to national resistance against globalisation; national communication – and to lacking social policy on EU-level with Euro-protests as the agenda-setting event; indicating supranational communication.
Being similar in 2000, table 4.1 shows that the importance of resistance against European integration increases to a total of 20% for main and related issue in Sweden, whereas it decreases to only 3% in France in 2005. The issue comes up in the Swedish debate in discussions on welfare and economy/economic politics, but most importantly in relation to EU issues; European integration, enlargement, guest workers from the EU and on the French referendum. In contrast to the increasing importance of identity-based justifications when all Swedish articles are seen as a whole, identity-based justifications are less used over time in articles on EU resistance. On the other hand, the rights-based justifications become more important in Sweden within this issue.

Resistance against further integration is often mentioned and discussed in my data on the French 2005 debate. However, it is seldom amongst the two most important issues in the articles, and therefore not registered to be of any significance. The agenda set by the French referendum seems to open discussions on both French, Swedish, as well as on general European EU scepticism – and it is discussed as a European issue rather than as a national one. The use of value-based justifications does, contrary to the general development become less important in articles on EU-resistance in both debates. In 2005, articles in both debates explain EU-resistance and the French No by the lack of social policies and too much liberalism on the EU-level:

New common rules for labour and welfare are a premise to retrieve the citizens’ confidence in politics – both nationally and on EU-level.

(Lindberg and Kempe 2005)

The main reason that convinced many French employees into voting no is obvious. It was the fear of workers from the new member-states, and the idea that competition with great numbers of Polish plumbers and delocalisations to Romania would lead to an irreparable deterioration of salaries and working conditions in France.

(Piketty 2005)
In Sweden, resistance against European integration shifts from a national context in 1995 to a more strongly horizontal Europeanisation in 2000. The French articles on this issue do not point in any clear direction, and the two countries do not have any agenda-setting actors in common. Still, in the context of the French constitutional debate, there is a tendency to perceive of resistance or scepticism against the EU as a common European problem. Moreover, one of the main reasons given for this resistance in both countries is that the EU market liberalism influences and impairs welfare arrangements and employment.

5.4 The EU Constitutional Treaty and the French referendum

The EU Constitutional Treaty was, naturally, an issue registered for the first time in 2005. Not surprisingly, table 4.1 indicated that it was a more important topic in the welfare debate in France – with a total of 36% – than in Sweden; 6%. According to some, the French debate was perhaps the first “truly democratic national debate on a European issue” (Ricard-Nihoul 2005:3). Some of the coverage of the Treaty and the French referendum seems to be included in the issue of elections/referenda, which obtains a total of 23% in the French and 9% in the Swedish debate. One might have expected a higher Swedish level; after all, the Constitutional Treaty was going to concern the Swedes and possibly their welfare arrangement as EU-members. Still, the French referendum set the agenda and was discussed within Swedish articles on welfare, European integration and resistance against European integration as well.
both countries, the single most discussed question within the 2005 welfare debate is the future of national welfare arrangements if the Treaty is adopted.27

EU guest workers were present as an issue in the Swedish debate in 2005 with a total of 6%. The agenda-setting events are Latvian or Polish craftsmen working at lower wages and without the same social rights as Swedish workers, as well as the French ‘fear’ of the Polish plumber. Due to the controversy on ‘social dumping’, rights-based justifications proved to be more employed than for other issues. EU guest workers are barely registered as an issue in the French debate, probably because they are mentioned in articles in the context of the Constitutional Treaty or the referendum and not as a single issue. Still, I expected guest workers to be more present in the welfare debate than what it appears to be here, seen as the stories about East-European guest workers threatening the French welfare were considered being one of the reasons for the rejection of the Treaty (Piketty 2005). After all, France was the country where the Polish plumber became an expression.

There is a shift in both debates on the issue of European integration in 2005; with a radical decrease in the number of European actors to the benefit of national actors. This shift is clearest in the French debate, where the President of Attac France could be said to represent the typical agenda-setting actor (Haigneré 2005). In line with the general French development, the number of articles on European integration that employ interest-based justifications decline. One might have expected that with national debates on EU-issues, such as the Constitutional Treaty, there would be a growth of references to “us French” versus “the others”. However, the French actors

27 Although there are many references to the French debate and the French vote in the Swedish debate, there are only a few references to the parallel debate and vote in the Netherlands. This is probably due to the fact that welfare issues were never a central part of the Dutch debate. The main Dutch reasons for rejecting the Constitutional Treaty were that it would be a deterioration as compared to the current situation; the EU giving the Netherlands more disadvantages than advantages; that the Treaty was not good enough; the behaviour of the proponents and because of opposition to Turkish membership and/or the 2004 enlargement (de Hond 2005).
mainly refer to European rather than to French interests. This is also reflected by the fact that justifications based on identity are less present for the Constitutional Treaty and elections/referenda than on other issues. It may seem as if the controversy over the Constitutional Treaty changed the use of the justifications in the French welfare debate. The arguments used to convince the voters appear to have been based more on values – like democracy, solidarity and liberalism – and which rights that would be part of the Treaty rather than on what would be in the interest of particular identity-based groups.

As opposed to the French debate, identity was an important element in the Swedish coverage of the French Referendum and the Constitutional Treaty in general, as exemplified here by a Swedish journalist:

[I]n Poland, at first, one got appalled that their craftsmen had trashed the European Constitution. Later, one became flattered. If 150 polish plumbers (they were not more numerous) could create panic in a country, which by the way was lacking almost 6000 plombiers [sic], Polish plumbing must be something special. The state tourist agency created a web-page where an attractive craftsman […] reassured the French that he intends to remain in Poland, where they, on the other hand, are welcome in great numbers. And a liberating laughter went over Europe. (The Britons laughed the most, having for a long time tried to hit the French self-centredness below the belt, without really succeeding.)

(Zaremba 2005)

Although being an EU-related issue, the discussion on guest workers from the EU only have national agenda-setting actors in Sweden. The same tendency is to be observed when it comes to the Constitutional Treaty in both debates; the Swedish having only national agenda-setting actors and the French having only a low

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28 As in the use of rhetoric in general, actors arguing that something would be of European interest does not exclude that they use it as an argument to obtain something of French interest. Still, the mere fact that the European community of interest is the one referred to is an indication of what is considered to be a legitimate argument in the context of the EU Constitutional Treaty.
percentage of EU-governmental actors. This parallel development is in line with the polarisation of attitudes seen in 4.2.2 and seems to indicate that European integration is being politicised in the national welfare debates. European integration gets increasingly intertwined in national politics and debates in general, as in this case of welfare.

Still, the debate caused by the proposed Constitutional Treaty and the French referendum have numerous points of resemblance in France and Sweden. Somewhat simplified, one might say that the EU is conceived as a community, and the French No are a manifestation of a common negative feeling on European integration and of the EU’s malfunction. The rejection of the Treaty, as well as the causes for the rejection, is described as a common problem to which the solution lies within the EU itself. None of the sampled articles argue that Sweden or France should withdraw from the Union, rather one argues for reforms; making the EU more governable, more transparent, more democratic and more important to European citizens – often by an expansion of the social dimension of the Union. Even in the French debate, the actors argue on the basis of what they see as in the interest of the EU, not – as one might have expected – based on national interests.

However, there is cross-national disagreement concerning Europe that is portrayed in the proposed solutions, and which role the Union should play in the welfare area. To one group – often actors from the Swedish Socialist Party or the French “Non de Gauche”, it seems as if many of the problems are caused by the Central-European countries accession in 2004. This made it harder to reach common decisions in the EU; leaving France and Sweden with less power; creating social dumping and ultimately threatening national welfare arrangements (Haigneré 2005). For instance, it is argued that citizens would never had voted in favour of a Swedish membership if they had “understood the threat against our welfare” (Tham 2005). Holders of this perception call for more EU-regulations on social policy and workers’ rights, common minimum wages, they oppose the Directive on Services, and, in France in
particular, they reject the Constitutional Treaty. The other group argues that the European solidarity must be extended to the Central-European countries as well; that also the former EU15 stand to profit from the enlargement; that the proposed Treaty is a progress to the European social dimension and that the fear of delocalisation and guest workers is exaggerated and uncalled for. These are especially to be found amongst the Swedish Social Democrats, or amongst the French actors advocating the approval of the Treaty (Persson et al 2005; Piketty 2005).

In the case of the debate caused by the EU Constitutional Treaty and the French referendum, the same European themes are controversially discussed simultaneously and cross-nationally – although not at similar levels of attention. To a large extent, the articles included in the Constitutional debate show that “similar frames of reference, meaning structures, and patterns of interpretation are used across national public spheres and media;” and there are signs of a transnational community of communication in which other Europeans are considered to be legitimate parts of the “common discourse that frames the particular issues as common European problems.” (Risse and Van de Steeg 2003:22) Hence, the part of the welfare debate for which the agenda was set by the EU Constitutional Treaty show clear indications of being Europeanised.

5.5 Elements of Europeanisation on controversial issues within the welfare debates

While the indications of Europeanisation as conceptualised by Risse and Van de Steeg must be said to be weak for the welfare debates as examined in this thesis, there are signs of more Europeanisation when looking into the issues of welfare, European integration and the EU Constitutional Treaty. My impression is that these issues are the most controversially discussed in the debates, something which confirms Risse
and Van de Steeg’s (2003:15) argument that Europeanisation of the national public spheres will take place as a result of growing contestation of European affairs.

In 2005 the EU Constitutional Treaty caused an important discussion within the welfare debate. For this discussion, there are indications that the same issues were debated simultaneously, with the same arguments and frames of reference including other nationals as legitimate actors in the debate on common European problems. According to Risse and Van de Steeg’s standard of a European public sphere, such a sphere did emerge in the welfare debate. The referendum created a particular setting and debate, and one should as such be careful as to generalise from the French debate in 2005 to a universal development of Europeanisation. On the other hand, it might give a picture of what occurs when EU-issues becomes truly nationalised.\textsuperscript{29} The high degree of contention in this debate confirms that communities of communication will emerge as a result of increased controversy.

It seems, however, that the European community of reference in the debate that occurred around the Constitutional Treaty were often is restrained to the fifteen old member-states. Therefore, it may be more accurate to speak of a Western European community of communication. When looking at the analysis and findings in this chapter, one should however bear in mind that only the most controversial areas were analysed qualitatively. As a consequence, the findings in this chapter should not be regarded as other than indications of a possible development towards Europeanisation for the most contentiously debated issues.

We have seen that within both welfare debates, the issues of welfare, European integration, resistance against European integration and the EU Constitutional Treaty and the French referendum are contentious issues. The next chapter looks at how this

\textsuperscript{29} In this context it might have been of interest to look at the debate Swedish in 2003, the year of the EMU-vote.
contention is manifested nationally, by looking at the polarisation of attitudes and at the division of the welfare debates into different groups.
6. The emergence of a new cleavage line in the welfare debates

The second hypothesis raised in Chapter two is that a new cleavage is emerging in the field of welfare politics. The cleavage creates a polarisation in the perception of the European Union, making the public look increasingly at the EU as a restraint or an opportunity. This chapter seeks the answer to this hypothesis. To confirm it, there should be a growth in the amount of articles expressing an attitude to both European integration and welfare. Moreover, an increasing number of articles should portray the EU as a restraint or a possibility.

6.1 The polarisation of the welfare debates

As shown in tables 4.4 and 4.5, the two debates became more polarised in the period of study both when it came to European integration and the generosity of welfare arrangements. However, this polarisation proved to give diverging results for the two national debates: In France, the group expressing a wish for less integration increased drastically, whereas the participants in the Swedish debate became considerably more positive to European integration. The French debate was by far more positive towards stable or more generous welfare arrangements in 2005 than in 2000, while the Swedish opinion experienced an increase in the number of adherents to less generous welfare arrangements as compared to 2000. Table 4.6 indicated that, during the period, a growing number of articles showed a perception of the EU as a restraint in France, and as an opportunity in Sweden.

A model of how the potential conflict line would manifest itself in the welfare debate was indicated by figure 2.1 in the second chapter. According to this model, opinion would be divided into four different groups: Welfare-Nationalists advocating more welfare and less European integration; Welfare-Europeans favouring more welfare
and more integration; *Neoliberal Europeans* encouraging lower welfare and more integration; and *Neoliberal Nationalists* wanting a low degree of welfare and less integration.

Table 6.1  *The relationship between opinions on European integration and welfare arrangements. Percentage.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude to welfare arrangements</th>
<th>Attitude to European integration, Year and country</th>
<th>EUROPEAN INTEGRATION</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More/ stable</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not identifiable</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in table 6.1 indicate an increase of Welfare-Europeanists and especially of Welfare-Nationalists in France from 2000 to 2005. The augmented number of Welfare-Nationalists builds on a shift in the debate in the direction of portraying the ‘neoliberalist Constitutional Treaty/EU’ as endangering French welfare solutions:

The real question posed by this referendum (…) is yes or no to European neoliberalism.

(Nikonoff 2005)

The European Union is thus deeply marked by the seal of neoliberalism. The well-known consequences of this are: reduced public services, inter-state competition forcing states to social and fiscal dumping, delocalisations, aggravated precarity and a monetarian policy
making employment a simple adjustable variable, etc. (Coupe et al. 2005a)

A politicisation of the European dimension of the welfare debates has clearly taken place in the period. In Sweden, it seems to have happened between 1995 and 2000, whereas it can be detected by my data material to have occurred in France between 2000 and 2005. The number of actors perceiving the EU as an opportunity and the relative amount of Welfare-Europeans and Neoliberal Europeans are relatively stable from 2000 to 2005 in the French debate. However, a new position emerges in the French debate. The number of actors advocating less integration goes from zero in 2000 to 43% in 2005, the share looking at the EU as a restraint goes from none to 40%, and from no Welfare-Nationalists in 2000, 34% could be said to belong to this group in 2005.

The Welfare-Nationalists have existed as a group in the Swedish debate throughout the period studied in this thesis, but is barely present in 2005. The number of actors perceiving the EU as a restraint and the amount that advocates less European integration has also diminished. On the contrary, the share of Neoliberal Europeanists in Sweden grows considerably from 1995 to 2005, exemplified by the editorial in Svenska Dagbladet (2005):

The Swedish Social Democrats has – in alliance with all sorts of protectionists – worked against the proposal of a free market of services, the so called Service Directive. No, the Government does not want to acknowledge that it opposes competition, but in practice, the objections against the proposal lead to limitations of the right to sell services across the boarders. Nothing that might dare the trade unions or the collective agreement is accepted.

The number of Swedish Welfare-Europeans increases clearly from 1995 to 2000:

We suggest that the Lisbon Agenda is converted into a concrete and focused five year welfare action plan – Developing Europe – including specific decisions to be made and measures to be adopted on both EU and national level, like the 1992 plan for the common
The debate on EU guest workers and the increasing use of identity-justifications within articles on welfare and European integration taken into account, I would have expected a higher share of Welfare-Nationalists in Sweden in 2005. However, the development indicated in table 6.1 is in line with the tendencies showed in the previous chapter. The Swedish debate became increasingly top-down Europeanised and positive to European integration, and consequently it might not be remarkable that the two growing groups are the Welfare- and the Neoliberal Europeanists.

The increased polarisation of the debates is manifested in the development of a more similar welfare political landscape; where the expected three of the four groups sketched out in figure 2.1 are represented in both 2005 debates. Both debates also experience that welfare appears to be changing into an issue more often discussed at European level and with European actors whereas European integration and specific EU-issues seem to become more nationalised within the welfare debates. The use of justifications based on interest and identity is growing among the articles with welfare as main or related issue. These tendencies confirm the development of a welfare-political landscape in line with the model in figure 2.1. The increased use of identity- and interest-justifications in welfare articles shown in tables A.6-A.8 confirms the growth of Welfare-Nationalists in France; emphasising national self-interest in welfare politics. However, this interpretation does not correspond to the Swedish decrease of Welfare-Nationalists.

With the data on attitudes to welfare, European integration and the perception of the EU, the second hypothesis can be confirmed. There is a new European cleavage line
emerging in the welfare debates. This can be seen in the polarisation of the debates, and it is also expressed in the perceptions of the EU.

6.2 Contestation as a pre-condition for Europeanisation - but do the debates reflect public opinion?

Following Risse and Van de Steeg (2003:15), contestation is a pre-condition for developing a European public sphere: “The more contentious European policies and politics become and the more social mobilization occurs on European issues, the more we should observe truly European public debates.” The polarisation of the two welfare debates concerning the attitude to European integration and the perception of the EU could in this perspective be seen as an indication of Europeanisation, although not a parallel development. Furthermore, there is a higher number of French articles expressing a detectable opinion on both the generosity of welfare arrangements, European integration and the EU as a restraint or a possibility – something which is in line with the degree of contestation in 2005.

The constitutional debate of 2005 was truly a European issue, with a great potential to create controversy throughout Europe. There is, as we have seen, much evidence for the contention it aroused in France. As noted, the issues of the EU Constitutional debate and the referendum are significantly present in the Swedish debate. The number of articles without any detectable opinion on the issues of integration and the perception of the EU could have been expected to drop further down from 2000, seen that the debate was controversial also in Sweden. Instead, we see from tables 4.4 and 4.6 that these numbers remain stable from 2000 to 2005, indicating that the 2005 welfare debate was less controversial than the one in France.

Still, one should remember that European integration is – or was at least until 2005 – a more controversial and politicised subject in Sweden than in France. Ever since Sweden entered the EU, two of the country’s established parties; the Green and the
Socialist party have argued that Sweden should leave the Union (Grön ideologi 2005:7; Partiprogram 2004:8). Data collected by Eurobarometer (See table A.1) shows that the EU membership lack strong popular support in the Swedish population, something also demonstrated by the rejection of the EMU in the 2003 referendum. On this background, it is quite unexpected that 80% of the articles in the Swedish welfare debate should advocate more integration. It is possible that this reflects a more positive public attitude to European integration within the area of welfare. On the other hand this divergence might explained by the public debate’s tendency to be more of an elite discussion, rather than it representing public opinion. (McNair 2000:172; Street 2001:260). If this is the explanation, it seems as if the Swedish actors participating in the welfare debate are becoming increasingly more elitist since their view is moving away from the popular attitude to integration – contradicting the common perception of the Scandinavian media debates being more egalitarian than others (as seen in Trenz, Conrad and Rosén 2007:12).

In France, the increased amount of articles showing a wish for less European integration in 2005 is somewhat more in line with the popular opinion shown in table A.1, indicating a shift in the attitudes towards European integration. The ‘new’ attitudes represented by the Welfare-Nationalists found in my data are contrasting to the previous situation. The EuroPub-project found that although almost half of the claims made to the EU on seven different issue-fields in the French debate in 2000 were made as criticism, the French actors in the debates were largely in favour of European integration (Guiraudon 2002:20).

Virginie Guiraudon (Ibid:21) gives an interesting explanation of the dissonance between the amounts of criticism directed to EU-institutions and the common understanding of European integration as something positive. It is interpreted as a sign that the actors recognise the EU as a powerful arena and an organ to which criticism should be raised when needed. The criticism does not question whether or
not European integration is beneficial for France. However, this dissonance was not understandable for the people not participating as actors in the French public sphere, and might partly explain why the attitude in the public debate is more positive than that found in representative polls. (Ibid:21)

If this explanation is correct, what happened in the 2005 debate might have been that the dominating picture of the benefits of further European integration was broken in the public debate. The increase of non-governmental national actors as agenda-setters in the debate might have contributed to this shift. Moreover, the result of the referendum as well as the more negative attitude towards European integration in the French population, might be said to show that the ambiguous message expressed for years – picturing European integration as something positive, while simultaneously blaming and criticising European institutions – was communicatively problematic, leading to a negative perception of more integration.

6.3 What are the consequences of European integration?

Since some elements of Europeanisation can be said to have occurred in both debates, Bartolini’s first scenario on the ‘persistence of a predominant territorial structuring’ – presented in 2.4 – can be rejected for these cases. The scenario of ‘isomorphic political structuring’ predicts the emergence of parallel structures in the EU-countries. Europe will get a political structure combining the territorial structure with European coordination of national, social and corporate actors. The two debates investigated do in my opinion not give sufficiently indications of parallel developments and parallel structures, few parallel European-level actors are for instance present in the debates. The scenario that most successfully describes the development seen in the two debates is ‘the structuring of a new cleavage line’. What future consequences does this indicate?
If we follow the scenario drawn out by Bartolini (2005), European integration will benefit resourceful groups at the cost of low-educated, low-income groups with unstable jobs. It is thus interesting to note that the typical French No-voter in the 2005 referendum was a blue-collar worker without higher education. The person would be in the age of 18-29, have an income of less than 3000 Euro a year and be living in the rural areas of France. (Ricard-Nihoul:2005)

According to Bartolini’s third scenario, the resourceful will be able to extend their use of voice to including European arenas, but also to exit from the nation-state if they are unsatisfied with what it offers. This might erode the solidarity on which most European welfare states are built. (Bartolini 2005:399) The less resourceful groups are not likely to increase their use of voice, but they will neither have the possibility of exit. With less tax-money and less use of the nationally provided welfare arrangements due to the exit of large numbers of people, there will be ‘less welfare’ for the less resourceful groups. The future conflicts of interests will thus not be between the states, but between different social groups within and across the states.

If one is to continue the path drawn out by Bartolini, this gloomy future scenario is likely to reinforce the new cleavage line manifested in this chapter. More European integration will appear to be in the interest of some groups of society, while in the disfavour of others. Provided that this becomes an important issue, it will be incorporated into national politics – either absorbed by the existing parties adapting to the new situation or, if they fail to do that, by new parties or other organised forms. If this evolvement occurs, the less resourceful groups might still not feel that their interests are properly defended by the political establishment. For marginalised groups, the only seemingly available alternatives of actions might be silence or violent/illegitimate opposition – unless their social security becomes re-established by the nation-state, the region or the European Union itself. Still, one might see the No-vote strongly expressed by exactly these less resourceful groups in their
participation in the French 2005 referendum as an indication that these groups are using the channel of voice provided by elections or referenda.

Based on the shift in attitudes to the generosity of welfare arrangements, European integration and the perception of the EU registered in the two welfare debates; this chapter showed evidence of a new conflict dimension emerging in the welfare debates. Concurrently, ‘the structuring of a new cleavage line’ seems to be the scenario supported by the data material, something which might imply a restructuring of the national and European political landscape.
7. Concluding remarks

Drawing on the theory of Risse and Van de Steeg (2003) and Bartolini (2005), this thesis has investigated the hypothesis that Europeanisation occurred in the welfare debates in Sweden and France; from 1995 to 2005 and 2000 to 2005, respectively. Moreover, under the assumption that European integration changes the welfare debates, the thesis also examined the hypothesis that a new conflict line, based on a European dimension, is emerging in the welfare debates. This chapter resumes the main findings of the thesis, gives an account of their theoretical assessments and discusses the study’s relevance.

7.1 Main findings

By studying the debates as reflected in two quality newspapers for each case, the examined data material showed only some indications of the debates undergoing Europeanisation – that is approaching the criteria for an ideal typical European public sphere set out by Risse and Van de Steeg (2003), as referred in part 2.2.1.

A closer examination of the most contentious issues did however point at elements of Europeanisation in both welfare debates in discussions of issues where the EU played a controversial role. Employing Koopmans’ (2004) different mechanisms of Europeanisation as a tool to better understand the process investigated, these most controversial issues demonstrated indications that the elements of Europeanisation found to be occurring were taking different forms in the two debates: In Sweden *top-down Europeanisation* is shown by an increasing share of European issues, actors and issue-levels. In France, *bottom-up* Europeanisation is expressed by the nationalisation of EU-issues and subsequently a nationalisation of actors and issue-levels. In the debate set of by the French referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty, there were
signs of a Western European community of communication according to Risse and Van de Steeg’s criteria.

Both debates saw a clear polarisation in the attitudes towards generosity of welfare arrangements, towards European integration and in the perceptions of the EU as a restraint or as an opportunity in the examined period. Yet, the polarisation was manifested very differently in the two debates. Sweden saw a radical increase of actors in favour of more integration, and the number of actors perceiving the EU as an opportunity rather than a restraint doubled from 1995 to 2005.

This thesis found that a major shift occurred in the French welfare debate from 2000 to 2005. In the context of the referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty, the future of different welfare arrangements and workers rights were discussed in an intense and heated debate as many actors was critical to the (lacking) social dimension of the Treaty. From 2000 to 2005, a new position emerged in the French debate: from none actors advocating less integration in 2000 to 43% doing so in 2005; from one third wanting more generous welfare arrangements in 2000 to 71% in 2005; and from no actors perceiving the EU as a restraint to 40% doing so in 2005.

Based on these findings, there is evidence indicating that the second hypothesis is confirmed: a dimension of European integration has emerged and become politicised in the national welfare debates in the period of study. In line with my expectations, I found the groups Welfare-Europeans, Welfare-Nationalists and Neoliberal Europeans to be present in both debates in 2005, whereas the Neoliberal Nationalists proved to be absent.

7.2 The findings’ theoretical implications

According to Risse and Van de Steeg (2003:3), it is contention over common issues that will create a European public sphere, increased media attention on the EU being “a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of a European public sphere”. In this
sense, the controversy seen in the French debate concerning the Constitutional Treaty can be understood as a step in the direction of increased national politicisation of European issues and hence on the route to a more popular involvement on the future of the European Union. This interpretation is in my view also supported by the nationalisation of actors and issue-levels when European issues are discussed in the welfare debate. It is however difficult to assess whether this growing popular interest and participation will mean increased national focus on European issues as participants in a European community, or if it will mean a re-nationalisation of attitudes and a wish for less European integration.

The fact that the same Constitutional debate was found to a large extent in the Swedish debate, and the manner in which the problems of European integration were addressed as common problems could point in the direction of a more European focus in national debates. Simultaneously, the major French shift in attitudes might indicate a movement in the direction of a national opinion being more sceptical to further European integration. The Constitutional Treaty marked the entire French debate in 2005 and it was the most agenda-setting event in the Swedish debate as well. It is likely that the Europeanised community of communication found in this debate would be weaker or disappear when the issue was no longer of relevance. Yet, the situation described in 2005 shows that common European debates can Europeanise parts of the public sphere when the actors sees a controversial event or issue to be a common European problem or choice. In line with Risse and Van de Steeg’s (2003) argument that contestation on European issues pulls Europeans together in a European public sphere; actors from the left wing trade union Union syndicale Solidaires argue that:
The no-victory creates new opportunities. By blocking a process presented as irreversible by its promoters, it enforces a public debate all over Europe on the aims and organisation of the Union. By permitting the future of Europe to be discussed within a plurality of choices, the French no helps to create a European public space and to reinforce the Union’s identity. This result gives new responsibilities to those who defend the idea of “another Europe”, a Europe of rights and of solidarity amongst the peoples.

(Coupe et al 2005b)

In his study, Koopmans (2004) showed that Europeanisation is most likely to occur in policy fields with a large degree of power transference. The findings of this study show some indications that Europeanisation could take place also in areas where little power has been transferred to the EU. Koopmans (Ibid.) did also demonstrate that Europeanisation of the public spheres leads to better access for state and executive actors, at the expense of the access for actors from civil society, interest groups, NGOs and the local level. These results are to a certain extent contradicted by the findings in the Swedish debate on welfare, where increased top-down Europeanisation is concurrent with a growing share of national non-governmental actors setting the agenda.

Of Bartolini’s three future scenarios on European development, ‘the structuring of a new cleavage line’ found support in my data. If the structuring of a new cleavage line is indeed what is happening, it would be interesting to look at how different social groups are positioned on the two dimensions. It would be of interest to see if Bartolini’s presumptions on the increasing division between resourceful and less resourceful groups can be confirmed and to what extent the different groups voice their opinions and participate in the ideally open public sphere.
7.3 The relevance of this study

There are some weaknesses to be noted concerning the relevance of this study’s findings. Firstly, as discussed in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the limited number of articles for the French debates, as well as the fact that these articles might not have captured the ongoing welfare debate in 2000, reduced both the validity and the reliability of the French 2000 data. Moreover, the fact that my quantitative content analysis in Chapter four gave only few indications of Europeanisation, whereas the more qualitative analysis of the most controversial debates presented in Chapter five showed clearer signs of Europeanisation could be interpreted in the direction of a malfunctioning operationalisation of Risse and Van de Steeg’s criteria of an ideal typical European public sphere.

Still, I would argue that my findings of increasing Europeanisation for controversial issues could be generalised into a further strengthening of Risse and Van de Steeg (2003) and Koopmans’ (2004) argument that European communities of communication emerge from contentious debates on common issues. My empirical findings support Bartolini’s (2005) third scenario and indicates that the European dimension appears as a cleavage line in the welfare debate. This could in my opinion also be assumed to be a general development also relevant in other EU-countries, and within other fields of debate; like economic openness, immigration and multiculturalism as suggested by Bartolini (Ibid:395). Although the countries have different welfare models, history and relation to European integration, one should not exclude that some of the findings of increasing similarities in the debates and in the polarised opinion of the EU are dependent on the fact that the two countries in this study both have a tradition for and an opinion in favour of generous welfare arrangements.
The European states face many parallel problems when it comes to maintaining their welfare arrangements. Ironically, one of these problems seems to be the restructuring of political and economical boundaries that happens as a result of European integration. If a common understanding arises in Europe, that the current situation for the European welfare states is unsustainable in the long run, two solutions immediately comes to mind: re-nationalising the power and structures needed to preserve the welfare models built on internal solidarity and redistribution; or lifting the welfare arrangements to a harmonised European level. Interestingly, these alternatives are often mentioned in the debates investigated in this thesis, and in a more ‘black or white’-manner that what I expected. The French actors refuting the EU Constitutional Treaty argue that the EU needs more common social policy. So do the Swedish Social Democrats, governing throughout the whole period of study: The Swedish welfare state should be exported to the EU, creating common standards on social policy and workers’ rights. Debating welfare in a European as well as a national context might very well be the beginning of the search for common solutions. Yet, seen the level of controversy of this issue – and the picture of ‘us West Europeans versus them, the East Europeans’ it might also be the beginning of a new problematic policy field of the European cooperation where one could experience national mobilisations against possible threats to the national welfare state.

Still, common European public debates on welfare would be a precondition for a democratic handling of welfare issues on a European level. The new cleavage found in the two welfare debates points to a higher level of conflict around the future of welfare arrangements; possibly marginalising some groups to the benefit of others. When European integration changes the preconditions on which the national welfare models were built, national consensus on which welfare solutions to be chosen might erode. This opens up for a new battlefield for redefining the borders of the welfare state.
Literature


Berès, Pervenche (2005) ‘Bolkestein plane sur l’UE; Véritable obstacle à la construction d’une Europe sociale, la directive n’a pas été écartée.’ *La Libération* 11.05.


Lamassoure, Alain (2005). ‘L’Union dont la France a besoin’, *Le Figaro* 01.03.


Lindberg, Anders and Anders Kempe (2005). ‘Ett svenskt samhällskontrakt’, *Svenska Dagbladet* 04.08


Nikonoff, Jacques (2005). ‘Cette Constitution, non merci; Il faut voter contre le néolibéralisme à l'européenne et le recul organisé de la démocratie’, *La Libération* 23.03.


Appendix 1 Code-book

This thesis investigates if a Europeanisation of the welfare debate occurred in France from 2000 to 2005 and Sweden from 1995 to 2005. More information on the research design and the methodological assessments made for this thesis is to be found in Chapter three. This code-book is meant to give a detailed account on how the data was coded. 30 In the selection of newspaper articles that were used as data-material, three samplings were made after the initial searches for articles containing references to both welfare and EU.

1) First sampling

Only opinion-stating articles are included, that is editorials, letters to the editor, chronicles or commentaries.

2) Second sampling

The second sampling select the relevant articles based on formal criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal criteria of inclusion</th>
<th>Formal criteria of exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naming of EU policy-making in the past or the present in a welfare-political and decision-making context:</td>
<td>All apolitical articles on the EU and/or welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EU-issues, -actors, -policy fields, -politicians, -laws, -regulations or;</td>
<td>• Articles not containing EU-references</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EU political institutions, or;</td>
<td>• Articles not containing welfare-references</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Brussels as the EU-headquarter And</td>
<td>• Article not including other references to welfare than when referring to the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 This code-book is developed based on the code-book of the DFG-project: “Transnationale Kommunikation in Europa”
### Third sample

Of the remaining articles, twenty articles are chosen from each newspaper a year. The criteria of this selection were, in order of importance:

1) The heading; is welfare and/or EU in the by line?
2) By line; is welfare and/or EU in the by line?
3) The importance of the EU and welfare references in the article: the more important, the more relevant.
4) The length of the article: the longer, the more relevant.

The codes given to the newspapers appear as the first digit in the codes given to the articles. The articles are coded chronologically.

### Variables

*Variable 2 Newspaper*
1. **Svenska Dagbladet**
2. **Dagens Nyheter**
3. **Le Figaro**
4. **La Libération**

**Variable 3  Year**
1. 1995
2. 2000
3. 2005

**Variable 4  Month**
1-12

**Variable 5  Day**
1-31

**Variable 6  Type of article**
1. Editorial
2. Letter to the editor/ Chronicle:  (Argumentative articles printed in the newspaper, written by actors not belonging to the newspaper. Contains claims-making or normative judgements)
3. Commentary:  (Argumentative and interpretive articles authored either by newspaper actors or by actors not belonging to the newspapers)
4. News article
5. Unidentifiable
Agenda-setting in the media

I understand agenda-setting in the media as the event, action or actor to which the article mainly refers. This is often found by looking for the cause of the article.

Variable 7  Agenda-setting action/ event

What is the action or event that triggered the article – which action or event gave this article news value?

1  Institutional and administrative actions

   Actions by state institutions, both new and recurring activities like political decisions, juridical actions, state-political meetings and directly democratic actions like elections, and institutional actions by economic actors.

2  Verbal actions

   Including written and oral expressions of opinion and statements that are not accompanied by any further activities, like statements, press conferences, press relases, interviews, official speeches, position-taking by economic actors, open letters, publications, grafitti, etc.

3  Campaigning actions

   Campaigning actions draws the attention towards a theme, without the use of disturbing actions. This includes information meetings, leaflets, posters, petitions etc.

4  Disruptive protest actions

   Disruptive actions lead to a disturbing of ‘every-day life’. These might be actions leading to physical confrontations with the political opponents. Examples of disruptive protest actions are public meetings, marches, demonstrations (legal and illegal), boycotts, strike, political suicides, hunger strike, blockades, occupations, disturbances of other actions, threat of use of force, symbolic force like a burning of flags or dolls, damages, force against things or persons.

5  No action or event indicated

99  Not identifiable

Variable 8  Agenda-setting actor
### National and/or sub-national state actors
1. National and/or sub-national government actors in the newspaper’s country of origin
2. National and/or sub-national parliamentary actors in the newspaper’s country of origin
3. National and/or sub-national jurisprudence in the newspaper’s country of origin
4. National and/or sub-national government actors outside the newspaper’s country of origin
5. National and/or sub-national parliamentary actors outside the newspaper’s country of origin
6. National and/or sub-national jurisprudence outside the newspaper’s country of origin

### EU-actors
7. The Council
8. The European Commission actors
9. The European Parliament actors
10. The European Central Bank
11. European Economic and Social Committee
12. Other EU-institutions
13. The EU as a whole
14. Other EU-states as a whole

### Non-state actors
15. Political parties, in the newspaper’s country of origin
16. Interest groups, in the newspaper’s country of origin
17. Trade unions, in the newspaper’s country of origin
18. NGOs, in the newspaper’s country of origin
| 19 | Economic actors, in the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 20 | Religious actors, in the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 21 | Media/Journalists, in the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 22 | The public/ the people, in the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 23 | Other non-state actors; Individuals, research institutes, criminals, etc, in the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 24 | Political parties, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 25 | Interest groups, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 26 | Trade unions, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 27 | NGOs, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 28 | Economic actors, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 29 | Religious actors, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 30 | Media/Journalists, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 31 | The public/ the people, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 32 | Other non-state actors; Individuals, research institutes, criminals, etc, outside the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 33 | Actors from a non-EU-country |
| 34 | The public/ the people, in the newspaper’s country of origin |
| 35 | The EU Presidency |
| 36 | European interest organisations, NGOs or trade unions |
| 99 | Not identifiable |

**Political party**

For politicians, in local, regional, central or European level government, parliament or opposition, their party affiliation is coded.

**Variable 9 Political party**

1. Miljöpartiet de gröna (mp)
2. Vänsterpartiet (v)
Socialdemokraterna (s)
Centerpartiet (c)
Kristdemokraterna (kd)
Folkpartiet liberalerna (fp)
Moderata samlingspartiet (m)

Les Verts
Lutte ouvrière
Parti communiste français
Parti Socialiste
L’Union pour la Démocratie Française
L'Union pour un movement populaire
Front National

Issues
The issue of an article contains causal clarifying and/or interpretations. Coded as ‘Issue’ is the topic most extensively treated in the article. The issue most often emerge in the title, in the first sentence and/or paragraph (short article) or within the first 150 words (long article). The issue is coded both by the political area in 10A and by level in 10B.

Variable 10A         Main issue
1 Welfare between the EU and the nation state; division of roles and power
2 EU as a dimension/cleavage in national politics
3 Resilience against European integration
4 Economic problems
5 EMU
<table>
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<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Welfare (politics, arrangements, reforms, models, social policy)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Elections and/or referendums</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Employment</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Economic policy / economy</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>European integration (Historical development, discussions on the future of the union; like institutional arrangements, voting procedures, “what kind of Europe do we want?”)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Party politics (References to some or all political parties’ positions on different topics, alliances, strategic choices, etc)</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Taxes</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Meetings in the European council / IGC</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Military policy</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Workers’ rights</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Enlargement of the Union</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>The nation-state’s role in the EU</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>The EU-Constitutional Treaty</td>
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<td>Industrial policy</td>
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<td>Cultural policy</td>
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<td>Guest workers from the EU</td>
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<td>National rivalries within the EU</td>
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<td>Globalisation</td>
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<td>The Lisbon strategy</td>
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<td>The Directive on Services</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Trade</td>
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<td>Development in poorer countries</td>
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<td>The European regions</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Pensions / retirements</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>The government of Jörg Haider and the EU-sanctions</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>International justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
33  International / foreign policy  
34  Democracy  
35  Competition policy  
36  Consumer rights  
44  Other  
99  Not identifiable

**Variable 10B  Issue-level**

1  Sub-national level in the newspaper’s country of origin  
2  Sub-national level in a EU-country different from the newspaper’s country of origin  
3  National level in the newspaper’s country of origin  
4  National level in a EU-country different from the newspaper’s country of origin  
5  National level for EU member-states  
6  European level  
7  European and national level  
8  International level  
9  National/sub-national level in a non EU-country  
44  Other  
99  Not identifiable

**Related issue**

Articles may often contain more than one issue; related issues. The second most prominent related issues are coded with this variable. The issues are coded both by political area in 11A and by level in 11B.
**Variable 11A  Related issue**

1. Welfare between the EU and the nation state; division of roles and power
2. EU as a dimension/cleavage in national politics
3. Resilience against European integration
4. Economic problems
5. EMU
6. Welfare (politics, arrangements, reforms, models, social policy)
7. Elections and/or referendums
8. Employment
9. Economic policy / economy
10. European integration (Historical development, discussions on the future of the union; like institutional arrangements, voting procedures, “what kind of Europe do we want?”)
11. Party politics (References to some or all political parties’ positions on different topics, alliances, strategic choices, etc)
12. Taxes
13. Meetings in the European council /IGC
14. Military policy
15. Workers’ rights
16. Enlargement of the Union
17. Immigration
18. The nation-state’s role in the EU
19. The EU- Constitutional Treaty
20. Industrial policy
21. Cultural policy
22. Guest workers from the EU
23. National rivalries within the EU
24. Globalisation
25. The Lisbon strategy
26. The Directive on Services
Variable 11B  Issue-level

1. Sub-national level in the newspaper’s country of origin
2. Sub-national level in a EU-country outside the newspaper’s country of origin
3. National level in the newspaper’s country of origin
4. National level in a EU-country outside the newspaper’s country of origin
5. National level for EU member-states
6. European level
7. European and national level
8. International level
9. National/sub-national level in a non EU-country
44. Other
99. Not identifiable
Justifications
The actor will most often give a reason of why he/she is stating an opinion or making
a claim. The justification is often to be found as arguments supporting the original
message of the article. Several justifications might be used in the same articles, so
each kind of justification is coded into a dummy-variable.

Variable 12 Contextualised value-based justifications
A value-based justification is used when the arguments refer to ideology or values.
This might be references to solidarity, democracy, freedom, etc.

1 Yes
2 No

Variable 13 Identity-based justifications
When the arguments refer to collective identity of a group, the thesis is given an
identity-based justification. The group is often mentioned in contrast to another
group. The groups referred to might be geographically, ethnically or socially defined.

1 Yes
2 No

Variable 14 Rights-based justifications
The justification is coded as rights-based when the arguments contain references to
political or juridical rights. Examples of this include EU-law, Human Rights and
national rights, such as the right to social security benefits.

1 Yes
2 No
Variable 15  Interest-based justifications
An interest-based justification is present when the arguments are instrumental and rational; that is when it refers to the interests of actor(s). These justifications are typically referred to as “the interest of the Swedish government,” “in the interest of the European parliament people” or as “the interests of the French trade unions”.

1  Yes
2  No

The EU and welfare
The writer’s perception, if any, on the generosity of welfare solutions and on European integration is coded in the variables 16 and 17, respectively. By welfare, I understand solutions or politics aimed at securing people’s rights to benefits in fields as health and social insurance. Welfare understood in economic terms; like progress and prosperity, is coded as not mentioned.

Articles advocating either deeper or wider integration (or both) are coded as more integration. If it is argued for one kind of integration and against another, the article is coded as “not identifiable”. If the theme of the article is one particular kind of integration (like the EMU), the article is coded by the position taken to more or less integration on this specific issue.

Variable 16  Welfare solutions
0  Not mentioned
1  Differentiated, earnings based, particularistic welfare solutions / opposing the existing solutions
2  Generous and inclusive/universal welfare solutions / defending the existing solutions.
Variable 17  European integration

0  Not mentioned
1  Less integration
2  More integration
3  Not identifiable

Variable 18  Perception of the EU

0  Not mentioned
1  The EU conceived of as a restraint
2  The EU conceived of as an opportunity
3  Not identifiable
### Appendix 2 Tables

**Table A.1 Opinion polls on the attitudes to European integration**. Percentage.

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<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
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Table A.2  Main and related issues from 1995 to 2005. Percentage.

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^32 Issues coded as "Specific EU-issues" are the Lisbon strategy, the Service directive and the government of Jörg Haider and the EU-sanctions.
Table A.3  Main and related issues in Sweden 1995. Percentage.

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<th>Welfare</th>
<th>EU as a dimension in national politics</th>
<th>Resistance against European integration</th>
<th>EMU</th>
<th>Elections/ referenda</th>
<th>Economy/ economic policy</th>
<th>European integration</th>
<th>Party politics</th>
<th>Council meetings or IGC</th>
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Table A.4  Main and related issues in Sweden and France 2000. Percentage.

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<th>Elections/ referenda</th>
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<th>Council meetings or IGCs</th>
<th>EU Enlargement</th>
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<td>100 (4)</td>
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### Table A.5 Main and related issues in Sweden and France 2005. Percentage.

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<th>Elections/ referenda</th>
<th>Economy/ Economic policy</th>
<th>European integration</th>
<th>EU enlargement</th>
<th>The EU Constitutional Treaty</th>
<th>EU guest workers</th>
<th>Specific EU-issues</th>
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Table A.6  Justifications for the most important issues and EU-specific issues in Sweden 1995. Percentage.

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<th>Elections/ referenda</th>
<th>European integration</th>
<th>EMU</th>
<th>Council meetings/ IGC</th>
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Table A.7  Justifications for the most important issues (main and total) in Sweden and France 2000-2005.

Percentage.

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<td>Elections/ referenda</td>
<td>European integration</td>
</tr>
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<td>Main</td>
<td>Total</td>
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Table A.8  Justifications for EU-issues (main and total) in Sweden and France 2000-2005. Percentage.

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<td>France</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15,4</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>France</td>
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Table A.9  Agenda-setting actors for the most important issues (main and total) and the EMU in Sweden 1995.

Percentage.

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<th>European integration</th>
<th>EMU</th>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>Main</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>66,7</td>
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<tr>
<td>National non-governmental actors</td>
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<td>22,2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Governmental actors from other EU-states</td>
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<td></td>
<td>14,7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-governmental actors from other EU-states</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non EU-states/ International actors</td>
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Table 4.10  Agenda-setting actors for the most important issues (main and total) in Sweden 2000-2005.  

Percentage.

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<th>2005</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Elections/ referenda</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
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<td>33,3</td>
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<tr>
<td>National non-governmental actors</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU governmental actors</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental actors from other EU-states</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Table A.11  Agenda-setting actors for the most important issues (main and total) in France 2000-2005.

Percentage.

<table>
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<th>2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Elections/ referenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>EU governmental actors</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non EU-states/ International actors</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total % (N)</td>
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Table A.12  Agenda-setting actors for some specific EU-issues for France and Sweden 2000 and 2005.

Percentage.

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<td>Sweden Council meetings/ IGC</td>
<td>France EMU</td>
<td>France Council meetings/ IGC</td>
</tr>
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<td>Main</td>
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