Foreign Policy in God’s name

Evangelical influence on U.S. policy towards Sudan

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# Table of Contents

Table of Contents........................................................................................................ 3  
Acknowledgements..................................................................................................... 5  

## 1 Introduction and background.............................................................................. 6  
  1.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 6  
  1.2 Religion and politics in the United States........................................................ 8  
  1.3 The rise, fall and revival of the evangelicals ................................................... 9  
  1.4 Religious conservatives expand their agenda ................................................ 12  
  1.5 Saving Sudan.................................................................................................. 16  

## 2 Theory .................................................................................................................. 18  
  2.1 Theories on American interest groups ........................................................... 18  
  2.2 Theories on foreign policy interest groups .................................................... 20  

## 3 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 23  
  3.1 Operationalization: U.S. policy towards Sudan............................................. 23  
  3.2 Research design, validity and reliability........................................................ 24  
  3.3 On the use of sources ..................................................................................... 27  

## 4 Analysis ................................................................................................................ 28  
  4.1 Background: U.S. policy in Sudan before 2001 ............................................ 28  
  4.2 Description: The religious conservatives awaken ......................................... 30  
  4.3 First aspect: U.S. policy attention ................................................................. 38  
    4.3.1 Suddenly, Sudan ..................................................................................... 38  
    4.3.2 Primary explanation: Evangelical pressure .......................................... 41  
    4.3.3 Alternative explanations................................................................. 47  
      4.3.3.1 Explanation 1: Afro-American lobbying ........................................ 48  
      4.3.3.2 Explanation 2: Human rights group lobbying................................ 50  
      4.3.3.3 Explanation 3: Result of personal convictions................................ 54  
      4.3.3.4 Explanation 4: National interest.................................................. 57  
  4.4 Second aspect: U.S. policy substance............................................................ 61  
    4.4.1 Executive policies............................................................................... 61  
    4.4.2 Legislative policies.............................................................................. 65
5 **Conclusion** ........................................................................................................... 68

5.1 Attention, not substance .................................................................................. 68
5.2 Theoretical conclusions..................................................................................... 68
5.3 The future of evangelical foreign policy......................................................... 71

Litterature.................................................................................................................. 76
Appendix................................................................................................................... 87
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1 Introduction and background

1.1 Introduction

“Evangelical Christians in America face a historic opportunity. We make up fully one quarter of all voters in the most powerful nation in history. Never before has God given American evangelicals such an awesome opportunity to shape public policy in ways that could contribute to the well-being of the entire world. Disengagement is not an option. We must seek God’s face for biblical faithfulness and abundant wisdom to rise to this unique challenge.”


Americans have always been a religious people and religion has always been a major force in United States (U.S.) politics. Still, under President George W. Bush religion seems to occupy a more central place in the public space than ever before. Bush’s presidency has been called the most openly religious in U.S. history (Smith 2006:365). And the so-called Christian Right is fuelling the domestic political debate on issues like abortion, same-sex marriage and stem-cell research.

Since the mid 1990s, religious issues have become increasingly visible in the foreign policy field as well. Faith-based lobbyists lead by evangelical Christians claim they are the main reason why legislation on religious freedom has been passed in Congress; why President Bush has increased his aid budget to Africa with 67 percent; and why the United States continue to be Israel’s strongest ally, to mention just a few examples.¹ According to U.S. foreign policy scholar Walter Russell Mead, “the resent surge in the number and the power of evangelicals is recasting the country’s political scene – with dramatic implications for foreign policy” (Mead 2006).² Mead’s cover story “God’s Country?” in Foreign Affairs is the latest in a growing line of scholarly

¹ All examples will be discussed in chapter 1.4.
² The quote is taken from the summary of Mead’s article on Foreign Affair’s web page: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85504/walter-russell-mead/god-s-country.html
work recognizing the influence of religious conservatives in the making of U.S. foreign policy and the fact that this influence stretches beyond abortion and Israel (Abrams 2001, Hertzke 2004, Martin 1999, Thomas 2005). Although Mead’s claim is at least partially a prediction of evangelical influence in the years to come, he also refers to several cases where evangelicals are said to have altered U.S. policy priorities already. Among these is the peace treaty that ended 23 years of civil war between north and south in Sudan in 2005. “Thanks to evangelical pressure, (…) the [United States] has led the fight to end Sudan’s wars,” Mead (2006:38) claims.

Are Mead’s claims true? Has the recasting of the religious landscape in the U.S. altered the country’s foreign policy? And is this evident in U.S. policy towards Sudan? These are my research questions. Several studies and press reports have emphasized the deep involvement in the peace process in Sudan by the Bush administration as an example of the influence of religious conservative lobby groups on the administration's policies (Africa Confidential 2001, Bumiller 2003, Connell 2001, Danforth 2006, Hertzke 2004, Mead 2006, Woodward 2006). But none of these have studied the campaign and the policy process in detail. The aim of my detailed case study of evangelical influence on U.S. Sudan policy is 1) to shed light on how these religiously conservative groups worked to influence policy in this particular case; 2) to use the case study to make generalizations on evangelical influence on U.S. foreign policy in general; and 3) to peek into the 'black box' of foreign policy to discuss to which degree domestic politics influence foreign policy. But first; a brief background on the role of religion in American politics, the rise and recent revival of the evangelical movement

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4 I have not come over any such studies, anyway. The only exception is political scientist at Oklahoma University Allen D. Hertzke's *Freeing God's Children*. The problem with Hertzke's book is however that he openly admits being a sympathetic insider to the movement, and he does not provide a balanced judgment of the actual policy impact of the Sudan campaign.
and how this movement has become an influential foreign policy pressure group in recent decades.

1.2 Religion and politics in the United States

The United States is by far the most religious of the world’s developed nations. Surveys show 95 percent of all Americans say they believe in God. Around 70 percent are members of a church or a synagogue, and around 40 percent attend religious services every week – all numbers far beyond most Western European nation (Haynes 1998). Christianity is by far the largest and most influential religion, and Protestantism is the majority faith within Christianity.

The United States was born of religious zeal, and religion has influenced politics heavily ever since the first Puritan refugees landed on American shores in the 1600s. The religious revival movement of the 1730s and 40s (the Great Awakening) inspired the break from England a few years later. Religion was central in the battle over slavery in the 1850s: Supporters of the slave system used the Christian faith to pacify their slaves, but Christianity also became a vehicle for blacks to organize themselves politically and served as motivation for the abolitionists. And since the 1960s, religiously motivated battles over issues such as abortion have dominated public debate.

There are many more such examples. Major studies on the relationship between religion and politics in American history seem to agree on one thing: Religion shapes American culture, including its political culture in profound ways (Fowler and Hertzke 1995, Noll 1990/1992, Ribuffo 2001). The religious heritage from the Puritans and evangelicals helps explain the particular American idea of being an exceptional – chosen – people with a mission to lead the world, whether it be by spreading their values or acting as a moral example (from the ‘city upon a hill’ as the puritan leader John Whinthrop famously formulated it). And it helps explain why all American
presidents from George Washington to George W. Bush have invoked religious rhetoric heavily in their speeches (Judis 2005, Smith 2001).

Religion provides moral “road maps” to leaders (Amstutz 2001:177), guides them in the ethical aspects of decisions, and colors the way they view reality. So there seems to be little doubt that religion has an indirect impact on politics through the realm of ideas. It is more difficult to prove whether religion or religious groups influences politics more directly, when religious communities act as foreign policy pressure groups. This has happened several times throughout U.S. history, although religious historian Leo P. Ribuffo contends that “no major diplomatic decision has turned on religious issues alone” (Ribuffo 2001:21). One possible exception is the Israel lobby. Ribuffo (ibid:15) notes the quick recognition of Israel by the U.S. in 1948 as “a victory for one of the great grassroots lobbying efforts in American history”. And, according to a now (in)famous article by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2006) on the Israel lobby, “the thrust of US policy in [the Middle East] derives almost entirely from domestic politics, and especially the activities of the ‘Israel lobby’”. This lobby consists not only of the Jewish community, but also “includes prominent Christian evangelicals” (ibid.). The political influence of evangelicals is the subject of this study.

1.3 The rise, fall and revival of the evangelicals

Evangelicalism is a branch of Protestantism that believes in a literal interpretation of the Bible; stresses the importance of converting as an adult (to ‘accept Christ’ and be ‘born again’); and practices aggressive evangelizing in order to convert non-believers (Fowler and Hertzke 1995:14). The Evangelical movement first came into being through preachers such as Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley and George Whitefield in the early eighteenth century, and quickly became the dominant strain of Protestantism in the Puritan New England, where its emphasis on simple biblical preaching in a
fervent style seemed to have had especially fertile ground. It remained the dominant religious force in the U.S. until the beginning of the twentieth century (around 1870-1920), when broad societal changes (rise of Darwinism, general modernization and urbanization) led to a spiritual crisis and a split between religious modernizers and conservatives. The modernizers were willing to modify evangelical doctrines to remain credible in a modern age. The conservatives wanted to keep their literal belief in the doctrines of the Bible. By the 1920s, after the famous Scopes-trial, many of these conservatives had taken the name fundamentalists and largely withdrawn from public and political life. Another branch of conservatives chose to stay within the mainline denominations. These were called “neo-evangelicals” and later just evangelicals. Today, the term “evangelical” is used on any Christian conservative enough to affirm the basic beliefs of the old nineteenth-century evangelicalism (Marsden 1991:4). This includes fundamentalists, who may be considered a militant subgroup of evangelicals – or as the fundamentalist preacher Jerry Falwell likes to put it: “A fundamentalist is an evangelical who is angry about something” (ibid:1).

Evangelicals by and large disappeared from the radar screen from the 1920s and their sudden re-emergence as a social and political force in the 1970s surprised most observers. Today, evangelicals constitute the most numerous and salient religious subgroup in the United States. While the number of Christians has grown considerably along with the population growth since the 1960s, membership in mainline, liberal denominations has dropped sharply: from 29 to 22 million between 1960 and 2003 (Mead 2006:36). The drop in market share is even more dramatic: In 1960, 25 percent of all members of religious groups belonged to one of the seven leading Protestant denominations; by 2003, this had dropped to 15 percent (ibid). At the same time, the numbers of members in the main evangelical denominations has exploded. The largest,

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5 This brief historical overview is based on Marsden (1991), Fowler and Hertzke (1995) and Noll (1992).
6 John T. Scopes was a young high-school teacher in Tennessee, who was brought to trial by the state for breaking the antievolution law by teaching Darwinism in school. The case got enormous attention in the press, and the state ultimately lost.
the Southern Baptist Convention, has gained more members than the main liberal
denominations have lost combined. Furthermore, the number of evangelicals or born-
agains within the mainline denominations has increased. Today, a majority of
Protestants in the States define themselves as evangelicals and they constitute around
one quarter of the total population in the country – around 75 million people.⁷

What explains this sudden and dramatic change in the religious landscape? On the
surface, the rise of religious fundamentalism as a political force is a counter-
revolution. Just as the first rise of fundamentalism was a reaction to the secularization
of society in the late 1800s, the revival of the religious right in the 1960s started as a
direct response to events such as the Civil rights movement, the rise of liberal
counterculture (above all visible in the protests against the Vietnam War) and the 1973
Supreme Court decision on abortion. Conservative churches promised certainty in
times of uncertainty; clear, biblical answers to complex societal problems (Marsden
1991:105). But to understand the rise of the Christian Right, one also has to take into
account predisposing circumstances in American religion, such as its so-called this-
wordly orientation (what you do in life matters, as opposed to fatalism), its emphasis
on values and morality and its massive institutional recourses. Conservative church
leaders capitalized on this in the late 1960s, having built a strong organizational
network over the past decades, centred around conservative radio networks, TV-
stations, bible groups, think tanks and leadership networks (Wuthnow 1989).

It is important to note that the rise of the Christian Right has not only been an
Protestant evangelical revival. It is also a movement from the liberal to the more
conservative strains of all denominations. The main religious cleavage in American
religion is today no longer between Protestants and Catholics, but between liberals and

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⁷ Estimate made by Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2005). But because evangelicals are found in all
denominations and have a low degree of institutional identity, the estimates vary from 40 to 100 millions,
depending on how the question is framed in surveys, and by which definition is used. Most estimates are in the
upper range of this spectrum though.
conservatives within all denominations. Likewise, a person’s political behavior is not predicted by his denomination, but by whether he is a religious modernist or a traditionalist (Green 2004). Several different terms are used to describe the conservative branches of all beliefs. In this thesis, I will stay away from the terms Christian Right and religious right from now on; since these political terms do not fit all the groups I study: There are religious conservatives on the left of American politics too; Jim Wallis (2006) is a prominent example. And several of the evangelical campaigners on foreign policy label themselves centrists, and not members of the Christian Right (Cizik 2007). What these political liberals and conservatives have in common however, is a conservative religious belief. Therefore, terms like religious conservatives and conservative Christians will be used alternately to describe the faith-based activists I study. These terms cover evangelical Christians as well as conservative Catholics and Jews within the coalition. Still, the revival of conservative Protestants (evangelicals) is the main focus of this thesis, and I will also use the term evangelical when I describe evangelicals specifically.

1.4 Religious conservatives expand their agenda

The impact of the shift towards more religious beliefs is not hard to find in domestic politics in the United States: Political and judicial battles over issues like abortion, gay rights and stem-cell research has been a dominant part of the political landscape since the 1970s. A plethora books analyze these “Culture wars”. Far less attention has been given to the Christian conservative influence on foreign policy. One reason might be the impact of political realism: The belief that foreign policy to a larger degree than

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8 The phrase was made famous by James Davison Hunter’s book Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America in 1991. For a good discussion on this topic written by two Englishmen outside the struggle, see Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2004).

9 Whereas the studies on the Christian Right can be counted in the hundreds, I have only come over one monograph (Hertzke 2004) and one collection of essays (Abrams 2001) entirely devoted to religious conservative’s foreign policy agendas (not including the several books on the Christian Right and Israel, the impact of George W. Bush’s personal beliefs and a number of shorter articles).
domestic policy is viewed as an area of strategic calculation and national interests. Another may be the impact of so-called secularization theory: The belief that religion’s impact on public life diminishes as modernization moves forward. However, over the past few years religion seems to have been ‘rediscovered’ as part of the foreign policy calculus (Abrams 2001, Berger 1999, Hehir et.al. 2004, Thomas 2005).

This thesis rests on the assumptions that domestic politics does affect foreign policy; and that religious groups are part of this political debate. A look at the foreign policy debate in the United States since the 1980s clearly shows that Christian groups have been very visible. Their achievements may be divided into four main areas:

1. Expansion of the domestic agenda. Since the 1980s, religious conservatives have taken the battle over abortion, abstention, gay rights and other so-called moral issues to the international arena. Conservative Christians campaigned heavily before president Reagan launched his “Mexico City”-policy, which decreed that no overseas agency that promotes abortion could receive federal assistance from the U.S..\(^{10}\) The UN has been a favorite whipping boy, widely considered a corrupt cradle of secular ideas – even Anti-Christ in Christian conservative circles.\(^{11}\) But the campaign against UN programs and conventions has also meant working within the system of Anti-Christ, and may have contributed to making the UN more legitimate for many conservatives (Butler 2003).

2. New emphasis on foreign aid. Religious conservatives have not only contributed to withholding of aid, but also to an increase of U.S. aid to poor countries. Under George W. Bush, foreign aid to Africa has risen by 67 percent, including 15 billion dollars in new spending to combat HIV/aids (Mead 2006). This is widely attributed to

\(^{10}\) This policy was lifted under President Clinton, but reinstated again under President Bush (Lobe 2002).

\(^{11}\) In the fiction novel series "Left Behind", which has sold 63 million copies since the 1970s, the Secretary General of the United Nations is depicted as Anti-Christ.
campaigning from evangelical lobby groups, and especially their connections with Michael Gerson, himself an evangelical, who was called the social conscience of the White House as policy adviser and speechwriter for President Bush (Economist 2005).

3. Strong support for Israel. Numerically, the so-called Israel lobby is not predominantly Israeli or Jewish. It is evangelical Christian. Evangelicals’ literal understanding of Biblical doctrine makes them Israel’s staunchest supporters in the United States. The widespread Christian view is that Christians, not Jews represent the new and true children of Israel. A majority of evangelicals base their belief on prophecies in the Old Testament saying God has given Israel (including the West Bank) to the Jews that the Jews will have to occupy the holy land before Christ can return. They also believe the majority of Jews will turn to Christ just before he returns, which reduces the need for conversion to build an alliance between the two groups. The exact impact of the evangelical groups on the Israel lobby, and the lobby’s impact on U.S. foreign policy is hard to measure. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) nonetheless contend the lobby is the main reason why the United States is Israel’s staunchest supporter.

4. Campaign against religious persecution. The latest development within faith-based activism in the United States has been a steady campaign to fight persecution of Christian minorities in far corners of the world. In the mid-90s, a Congressional lobby campaign was developed by a number of highly engaged and well-connected individuals in Washington DC think-tanks and within the political wings of evangelical denominations. Their campaigning and alliances with central lawmakers

\[12\text{ There are three million Jews in the United States, and 75 million evangelicals.}\]
\[13\text{ In a Pew survey from 2003, 62 percent of the evangelicals say “Israel fulfils biblical prophecy about second coming”, compared to 36 percent in the population as a whole. 72 percent say God gave land of Israel to the Jews, compared to 44 percent of all those surveyed (Pew 2005).}\]
\[14\text{ The anatomy of this campaign is described in detail in chapter 4.2.}\]
on Capitol Hill seem to have contributed considerably to the signing of five Congressional acts:

i) The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 made promotion of religious freedom abroad an explicit foreign policy goal for the United States, as one of only two countries in the world.\(^{15}\) It established an office within the State Department, an ambassador-at-large and an independent commission, all designated to advise the government on how countries perform on religious freedom. Countries given poor grades can face economic sanctions at the will of the president.

ii) The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 was also motivated by stories of how Christian women were enslaved and became victims of sex trade in Muslim countries (Hertzke 2004:315-335). It gave the president new measures to sanction countries who do not fight trafficking. New legislation signed by President Bush in January 2006 will provide an estimated 360 million dollars to fight human trafficking (McMahon 2006).\(^{16}\)

iii) The Sudan Peace Act of 2002 was aimed at pressuring the Muslim regime in Khartoum by opening up for direct aid to Christian rebels in the South for the first time, and by establishing benchmarks for conduct by Khartoum in the ongoing peace negotiations. The benchmarks were accompanied by threats of direct sanctions.

iv) The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 required president Bush to appoint a special envoy for human rights in North Korea and says human rights in the country shall be a “key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea and other concerned parties in Northeast Asia”. Korea has been a major area for

\(^{15}\) The Vatican city-state is the other one (Pew 2006).

\(^{16}\) These efforts have been noted by the Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang as well (Skartveit 2007).
evangelization for more than a century, and American missionaries estimate 100,000 Christians are in North Korean jails, persecuted because of their faith (Becker 2003).

v) **The Advance Democracy Act** of 2005 states that “to promote freedom and democracy in foreign countries [shall be] a fundamental component of United States foreign policy”. It aims at establishing a new Office of Democratic Movements and Transitions in the State department and requires the department to issue an annual democracy report. It was introduced by the same group of evangelical politicians and pressure groups who initiated the previous four laws (Feffer 2005).

### 1.5 Saving Sudan

Together, these achievements may seem to add up to a considerable evangelical influence on U.S. foreign policy in recent years. However, there are two major problems with making such a conclusion based on such a brief review. First, as mentioned in the introduction, no detailed, in-depth case studies have been made to investigate and weigh claims of evangelical influence against other explanations for U.S. policy. Secondly, these points do not necessarily add up to major changes in the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. has always been Israel’s strongest supporter, since long before the evangelical revival. The launch of a new 15 billion dollar aid program does not mean that the promised increases actually are implemented in the end. The fact that the U.S. now has a law on religious persecution does not mean that the U.S. aggressively pursues a policy against religious persecution around the world. And the fact that human rights according to Congress are supposed to be central in U.S. policy towards North Korea does not mean that it is. In fact, the religious lobby groups themselves have made several complaints that the laws they have campaigned for have yet to make any considerable impact (Horowitz 2007, Fikes 2005, Pew Forum 2006b).

It might be the case that influence from the new conservative Christians has altered U.S. foreign policy. But this case might also be overstated by putting too much
emphasis on symbolic policies and Congressional decisions, and too little emphasis on implementation and the relative importance of the policies. With these objections in mind, I have chosen U.S. policy towards Sudan under President George W. Bush as a case study to assess evangelical (in coalition with other religious conservatives) influence on U.S. foreign policy. The reason is first of all that this is an area where there has been a marked shift in policy from the Clinton-administration’s hands-off approach to the active engagement of President Bush. Mead and other observers claim this was largely due to the lobby campaign from conservative Christians with almost unlimited access to Bush’s White House. Secondly, there were opposing lobby interests at play in the case of Sudan: The oil and business lobbies favored a different approach than the Christian conservatives. Thirdly, national security interests became an increasingly important part of U.S. policy considerations also in Sudan after September 11, 2001, and the national security interest was not the same as the conservative Christian interest.

I will lay out this argument in greater detail in my analysis, but in short it goes like this: By the end of 2000, Sudan was not a country where one would expect the United States to invest much political capital. And if the U.S. was to intervene, both economic and security interests indicated a policy in favor of the regime in Khartoum, and not a confrontational line favoring the Christians in the south as the religious conservatives propagated.

A case study may disclose that other interest groups and/or interests are just as plausible explanations for U.S. policy towards Sudan as conservative Christian pressure. But if it seems likely that the United States involved heavily in Sudan because of evangelical pressure, and that the actual policy towards Sudan corresponded to the policy input of the evangelicals and not to those of other vital interests, this strengthens Walter Russell Mead’s claims about a “recasting” of foreign policy. We may in fact be witnessing an example of what Mead (2005) calls a “Wilsonian revival” in U.S. foreign policy.
2 Theory

2.1 Theories on American interest groups

A study of the influence of lobby groups rests on a basic premise that people organize into groups to promote their interests. “The causes of faction are sown in the nature of man,” James Madison (1981:16) wrote in *The Federalist Papers*. His definition of faction still serves as a definition of an interest or pressure group: “By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (ibid). In this study, evangelical groups are treated as a faction by Madison’s definition. They are united by a common impulse to protect fellow Christians from persecution. Whether they are adversed to the rights of other Americans is perhaps debatable, but they are certainly adversed to the Islamist regime in Sudan.

Madison’s writing is an early example of the discussion of the role of interest groups in politics. Arthur Bentley’s *The Process of Government* (1908, quoted in Loomis and Cigler 2002) and David Truman’s *The Governmental Process* (1951, quoted ibid) are probably the classic theories of interest groups in American politics.17 Building on Bentley’s ideas, Truman described American politics as a pluralist system where interest groups compete to such a degree that no single set of interests get to dominate. Theodore Lowi (1979) criticized this classic theory of interest group pluralism through his theory of interest group liberalism, in which he contended that interest groups are so successful in achieving their goals that government agencies can considered captive to organized interests, a tendency Lowi described as clientelism.

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17 Bentley is reprinted in abridged form in Richardson (ed.) 1993:19-22. The discussion of Truman’s work is based on Loomis and Cigler 2002:4-6.
As Truman had done, Lowi based his theory on a general assumption that whenever people have common interests, it is rational for them organize to achieve their goals. This was challenged by economist Mancur Olson in his *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965/1993). Olson based his analysis on the model of the rational economic man, and contended it would not always be rational for individual beings to invest time and money in participation in an interest group, when they could get the same benefits by staying outside. Olson has been criticized for emphasizing the material costs and benefits of group membership too heavily. Later works have emphasized so-called *solidary* benefits (fun, camaraderie, prestige) and *expressive* benefits (advancing a particular cause or ideology) of joining an interest group (Loomis and Cigler 2002:9-10).

What these classic studies on interest groups have in common is their preoccupation with economic and domestic policy-oriented interest groups. A central premise is that people form groups to pursue their personal interests. Mancur Olson noted that his theory “can be extended to cover communal, religious and philanthropic organizations, but the theory is not particularly useful in studying such groups” (Olson 1993:25).

Furthermore, the classic theories are mostly concerned with describing the proliferation of interest groups, not their influence. This might be due to the fact that determining actual influence is, as one lobbyist has noted, “like finding a black cat in the coal bin at midnight” (quoted in Loomis and Cigler 2002:28). Loomis and Cigler list several examples of works that attempt to determine the influence of interest groups. Some give broad, societal overviews of how the structure of interest groups shapes the political system (like the classic studies of Rokkan and Olsen has done for Norway). And some try to explain specific patterns of influence at the level of individual lobbying efforts. “[B]ut even here the best work relies heavily on nuance and individualistic explanations,” Loomis and Cigler conclude (ibid.:26).
2.2 Theories on foreign policy interest groups

The fact that classic interest group theories are preoccupied with the proliferation of economic and domestic interest groups make them ill suited for this thesis. But the theoretical body of interest group influence on foreign policy is much less developed. One reason is probably that the tradition Walter Russell Mead (2002:35-55) calls “continental realism” is so strong in political science. “On foreign policy the entire country is supposed to speak with a single voice. Policy is supposed to reflect a national interest that has its roots in moral principles,” Eric M. Uslaner states in his essay “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy” (2002:356). This may be a common perception. But a central premise of this thesis is nevertheless that states cannot be considered ‘black boxes’ as foreign policy-makers. Domestic politics matters; and interest groups matter in the decision-making process.

The theoretical tradition called liberalism, liberal institutionalism and/or liberal utilitarianism in foreign policy theory argues that domestic politics matters. So does Walter Russell Mead. In his work Special Providence (2002), he describes four schools of thoughts in American society which all have shaped foreign policy thinking throughout U.S. history: Hamiltonianism, Wilsonianism, Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism. For Mead, the increased foreign policy activism of religious conservatives has meant a revival of what he calls the Wilsonian school, named after President Woodrow Wilson. Wilsonians share the belief that America has a moral and practical duty to spread its values through the world. Mead (2002:132-174) puts special emphasis on missionaries as bearers of this tradition.

The goal of this thesis is to provide an analysis of one specific interest group's possible influence. This will certainly mean relying heavily on nuance, as it is difficult to prove influence directly and as relatively little is written on the subject. But there are theoretical attempts to build on. Several scholars have noted the influence of ethnic lobby groups on U.S. foreign policy. I have already discussed the Israel lobby briefly in chapter one. The Greek, Cuban, Taipei-Chinese and East European lobbies are other examples on groups which have had their impact on foreign policy decisions as well.
One famous example is Vice President Nelson Rockefeller’s quote from a hearing on the conflict in the Middle East and the crisis between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus. In both instances, “it is foreign lobbies that are guiding U.S. policy,” Rockefeller contended (quoted in Howe and Trott 1977:4).

Concluding a collection of essays on *Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy*, Mohammed E. Ahrari (1987:155-158) suggests three conditions for ethnic group success in foreign policy which he calls “determinants of their influence or power quotient” (ibid.:155). Although only the first criterion is directly applicable to ethnic American groups, at least two of Ahrari’s generalizations may be used as a framework in a discussion of religious groups and foreign policy as well: 18

1. The group must press for a policy in line with U.S. strategic interests.
2. The group must be assimilated into U.S. society, yet retain enough identification with the “old country” so that this foreign policy issue motivates people to take some political action.

In the essay “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy”, Eric M. Uslaner (2002:358) refers to Ahrari, and adds three further criteria he believes groups need to fulfill in order to be influential:

3. The policies that are advocated ought to be backed by the larger public.
4. The groups must have enough members to wield political influence. Here, one may include other resources as well: A skilful staff, active members and strategically placed allies.
5. The groups must be perceived as pursuing a legitimate interest.

These are five general indicators of a lobby groups’ chances of influence on a foreign policy issue. Since most studies of ethnic lobbies deal with lobbying in Congress, one

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18 I skip his third criterion, that a group should have a high degree of homogeneity, since he labels this a minor determinant (Ahrari 1987:157).
may include a few further determinants of influence on Congress. Out of Crabb et.al.’s *Congress and the Foreign Policy Process* (2000:137-155) one can extract the following four criteria:

(6) Pressure directly from a representatives' constituency gives a representative incentives to act.

(7) Personal access to decision makers may secure direct action, as representatives act as individual “entrepreneurs” and not party representatives.

(8) Success is more likely if there is no competition from other groups or groups with conflicting views on issue.

(9) An ability to build broad and unlikely coalitions, so-called “strange bedfellows”, gives higher potential of a breakthrough in Congress.

Since most of these latter criteria are directed at influence on Congress, and Congress' influence on foreign policy making often is minimal\(^{19}\), one may add one last criterion for success:

(10) The ability to lobby the executive directly is a measure of an interest group’s influence.

This adds up to a list of ten indicators of an interest group's influence on foreign policy making. Many of these are common-sense assumptions, but most of them are also tested on studies of ethnic lobbies. As an example, Uslaner cites the pro-Israel lobby as the most prominent example of a group that has satisfied most of the first seven criteria and therefore has been very influential for many years.\(^ {20}\) The pro-Arab lobby, on the other hand, does not meet any of the seven criteria and remains a weak force in American foreign policy making (Urselaner ibid:358-364).

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\(^{19}\) Crabb et.al. (ibid:138) claim Congress’ influence is minimal. Ripley and Lindsay (1993) claimed Congress was resurging in foreign policy matters in the early 90s. Nowadays, talk of the ‘imperial presidency’ is in fashion again (Wolfensberger 2002).

\(^{20}\) He claims, however, that some conditions have not been met in recent years and that the Israel lobby is not the same dominant force as it used to be. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) seem not to share this view.
Even though they were developed in studies of ethnic lobbies, all of these indicators are applicable to a study of religious groups (apart from one criterion: number two, retaining ties with “old country”). I will use the indicators throughout the analysis to connect my study to earlier studies on lobby influence on foreign policy. If the faith-based groups analyzed in this thesis meet all or most of the criteria, it tells that these groups share the same characteristics that have proven successful for ethnic lobby groups. This would be an indication that faith-based groups are likely to have some influence on U.S. foreign policy (although one should be careful making too broad generalizations, a point I will return to in the concluding chapter).

3 Methodology

3.1 Operationalization: U.S. policy towards Sudan

How does one define U.S. policy towards Sudan? To answer this, one first needs to determine who conducts U.S. foreign policy. According to the U.S. Constitution, foreign policy is primarily the president’s domain. He is the chief diplomat who, together with his cabinet, conducts foreign policy on a day-to-day basis. He makes diplomatic appointments, negotiates treaties and sets policies through speeches and directives. Therefore, the policies of the president and his administration are the primary objects of this investigation. Congress also has a formal role in foreign policy making, through oversight, budgets and approval of appointments and treaties. In the case of evangelical influence, the role of Congress is interesting, since congressional legislation has been one of the evangelicals’ main areas as pressure group. Therefore, I will return to a discussion of which influence congressional law making has over presidential decision-making in the foreign policy field in my case analysis.

Concerning the content of foreign policy, my research question addresses two different aspects. First of all, Mead and others claim the evangelicals’ main contribution has been to raise and alter the attention of the foreign policy makers. Therefore, I will measure attention. I will do this through an analysis of the level of rhetoric: How often
is Sudan mentioned in speeches, statements and policy documents from the administration? And more importantly: In which speeches and documents, and by who is Sudan mentioned? But foreign policy is more than attention: Mentioning the misery in Sudan now and then does not necessarily mean Sudan is a high foreign policy priority. Therefore, the second aspect is a measure of policy substance. Is it true, as Mead claims, that the U.S. “led the fight to end Sudan’s wars” (Mead 2006:38)? And if so, what kind of political investments did this leadership demand? I will measure this by looking at what specific measures the Bush administration utilized towards Sudan, compared to the Clinton administration; and by discussing the level and intensity of the involvement.

3.2 Research design, validity and reliability

In the case study of U.S. Sudan policy, I am especially interested in one independent variable: Influence from religiously conservative (and especially evangelical) interest groups. I will take a twofold approach to this independent variable: First, I will describe the coalition of evangelical Christians and other religious groups and how they work as foreign policy actors. Secondly, I will try to determine to which degree they influence policy in the case of Sudan.

It is necessary to describe how religious conservatives act in foreign policy matters to be able to discuss whether they influence policy, especially since these groups have not been widely studied. As mentioned earlier, the fact that this is a largely untold story is one of the reasons I have chosen to address the question of evangelical influence through a case study instead of a general survey of different policy areas. This way, I hope to avoid repeating the often-superficial claims journals and news stories make about evangelical influence. A thorough case study may provide knowledge of how evangelicals and other religious conservatives work. This may again be used to discuss the potential influence of these groups on other policy areas as well. And as the discussion in the theory chapter showed, hardly any theory exists which deals with this issue specifically. In this regard, the first part of my analysis
resembles what Robert K. Yin (1994:29) calls an “exploratory” case study – a study that explores a subject where the existing knowledge base is poor.

Even though this thesis has elements of exploration, its main aim is explanation. My primary interest is to determine whether evangelical pressure groups are a significant independent variable influencing U.S. foreign policy in the case of Sudan. How does one then measure influence? It is hard. “One lesson of these pages is that it may be futile to search for direct cause-and-effect relationships between religion and foreign policy”, Elliot Abrams concludes the introduction to one of the few studies on the issue, *The Influence of Faith. Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy* (2001). One reason it is hard in the case of Sudan, is that there are no registries over lobby contact and furthermore, that the presidential minutes of 2001-2005 are secret for many years to come. It is difficult to know who spoke to whom when; and most studies on religion and foreign policy have concentrated on the more indirect influence of ideas.21 Another reason is that since one has no control over the environment, one cannot find direct cause-and-effect relationships of the kind one finds in an experiment in a case study. But that does not mean one cannot discuss causality in case studies. Quite the opposite: According to Robert K. Yin (1994:6), case study is in fact the best suited research strategy when one investigates questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ on "contemporary events where one has no control over behavior events oneself”. The key is to let a case study undergo the same tests as other types of research to secure the quality of the research design. The tests may be described as construct, internal and external validity; plus a test of reliability (ibid:33).

Securing construct validity means making sure one measures what one wants to measure in the correct way. To meet this challenge, Yin (ibid:91) suggests using multiple sources of evidence as one principle. In my study, I have tried to achieve this triangulation by relying both on official documents (Congressional hearings, press

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21 See further discussion in chapter 4.3.3.3.
statements, briefings); secondary sources like newspaper and magazine articles; and personal interviews with relevant actors. I also interviewed actors both within different segments of the religiously conservative landscape, as well as secular observers of Sudan and religious conservatives to check and contrast the data I collected. Another principle is to “maintain a chain of evidence” that makes it possible for an external observer to trace the researcher’s argument (ibid:98). In this case, I have tried to achieve this chain by including numerous citations of and references to the statements that constitute the basis of my investigation. Furthermore, all interviews were made on the record and with a tape recorder, which makes it possible to check them. These precautions also address the question of reliability: demonstrating that a different researcher could collect the same data with the same result.

Internal validity – establishing causal relationships within the study – is a particularly important concept in a study that strives at making claims on causality. How can I be sure that it was in fact conservative Christian lobbyists that prodded the Bush administration into intervening in Sudan, and not some other group or force? Yin (ibid:35) suggests two tactics that are directly relevant to this study. First, one may apply the logic of pattern-matching of independent variables to discuss rival explanations. I have done this in the sense that I develop and discuss five different explanations for Bush’s Sudan policy: Evangelical pressure; lobbying from secular human rights groups; lobbying from Afro-American groups; personal convictions; and strategic interests. But these are not all mutually exclusive, which they have to be in order to predict different patterns (ibid:108). They may in fact all contribute to explaining the same outcome to varying degrees, and Yin’s second tactic therefore seems like a more appropriate description of this thesis: Explanation building. I try to explain Bush’s Sudan policy by “stipulating a set of causal links about it” (ibid:110). This means making initial theoretical statements I may compare the empirical data to. I have developed ten determinants of a lobby group’s potential power to serve this purpose. Furthermore, I discuss other plausible (rival) explanations for Bush’s Sudan policy and compare them to my initial explanation.
The third test, external validity, deals with the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized. In a case study, generalization is not statistical but analytic – one may generalize from a case to a theoretical universe (ibid:30). The universe I can generalize to may be defined as “evangelical influence on U.S. foreign policy in general”. As previously mentioned, Sudan is chosen as a case because there has been a marked changed in policy on this area, a change that is widely attributed to evangelical pressure. Sudan may be what Harry Eckstein calls a “most likely case” (quoted in Andersen 1997:86): If evangelical pressure is not a likely explanation for policy change in this case, it seems less likely that evangelical pressure explains U.S. policies towards countries like China, North Korea or Israel, where evangelical influence also has been predicted, but the initial argument does not seem as strong. But in order to strengthen the external validity of this case study, a replication of its logic to other cases is necessary. Some suggestion will be made in the concluding chapter.

3.3 On the use of sources

Since the presidential records of the Bush administration are not yet disclosed, I have had to rely on open sources. The following provide the main sources: Existing research, although limited, has provided material for literature review. So have news stories. I have done systematic searches of news archives of the newspapers New York Times and Washington Post for Sudan-stories, as well as searches in the religious press, like the evangelical magazine Christianity Today. I have particularly looked for op-ed pieces by and interviews with religious leaders as well as their policy statements to get an impression of these groups' activities and views. The archives on the web pages of the various campaign organizations also provided material, as did transcripts of testimonies at congressional hearings. Presidential speeches and hearing transcripts from press conferences and congressional hearings provided the material for the

22 Op-ed is an abbreviation for opposite editorial (the column traditionally placed on the opposite page of the editorial in the newspaper), and is a signed editorial representing the opinion of an individual contributor not necessarily affiliated with the newspaper.
analysis of the Bush-administrations views. Finally, I conducted first-hand interviews with participants of the lobbying campaign, observers of the campaign and Sudan analysts in Washington D.C. As mentioned, all the interviews were made on the record (all statements are openly attributed to the interviewees). They were semi-structured, thematic interviews and each lasted between 45 and 120 minutes. I sent out request to around 20 people whose names I had come over in my research. I aimed at talking to both participants in the faith-based lobby movement, Sudan lobbyists not affiliated to these groups, and analysts who could comment on the issue without being direct participants. In the end, I got eight interviews in Washington DC, and one more was conducted in Oslo a few weeks later. All categories were represented (five religious conservatives, three activists who were not religious conservatives, and one analyst). A complete list of the names and titles of the interviewees is included in the appendix.

4 Analysis

4.1 Background: U.S. policy in Sudan before 2001

When the warring factions in northern and southern Sudan signed a peace treaty in January 2005, they ended a 21 years long civil war which had claimed an estimated two million lives (Martin 2002). This latest of several civil wars erupted when the national government in the north in 1983 revoked the autonomy that had been granted to the south for 11 years. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) took to arms against the north under its armed faction SPLA, lead by John Garang. Muslims opposed to Khartoum, organized as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), later joined these rebels.

Although most commonly portrayed as a conflict between Muslim oppressors in north and Christian and animist rebels fighting for autonomy in south, the roots of the conflict are more complex. In The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Douglas C. Johnson (2003) argues that Sudan’s recurring civil wars are a product of at least ten historical factors. Among them are the exploitive relationship between the central government in Khartoum (north) and the peripheries (south); the introduction of
militant Islam to the Muslim north that sharpened this divide; the postcolonial legacy and Sudan’s position in the power play of the cold war.

U.S. policy towards Sudan up until 2001 is commonly interpreted as a reaction to this latter factor: Sudan’s position in the cold war struggle determined the U.S. geopolitical interest in the country (Connell 2001, Hentz 2004:27-29, Woodward 2006:17-37). When Sudan went pro-Soviet Nasserite in 1969, the U.S. put the country on their enemy list. When neighbouring Ethiopia went pro-Soviet in 1977, the U.S. started supporting Sudan again – during the 1980s, Sudan was the sixth largest recipient of U.S. military aid. But when Islamist NIF (National Islamic Front) seized power in 1989, the U.S. stopped all bilateral aid immediately. As Osama bin Laden moved to Sudan, and the regime in Khartoum supported Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991, U.S. increased its effort to isolate the country. The Clinton administration labelled Sudan a “rogue state”, prohibited U.S. investment and increased anti-Sudan moves in the UN. In 1998, the U.S. bombed a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum as a reprisal for Sudan’s suspected harbouring of those responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. And Secretary of State Madeleine Albright promised U.S. military aid to SPLM.

None of this did much to stop the civil war that raged between north and south all along. And up until 2001, the U.S. did not show great interest in brokering a peace agreement between north and south. A peace process had been underway for some years under the seven-country regional development organization Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But by 2000 this process was largely stalled. In 1999, Madeleine Albright told a group of religiously conservative Sudan activists that the U.S. would not charge Sudan with genocide, as the activists wanted. Such a designation would require serious action from the government. But the human rights situation in Sudan was “not marketable to the American people”, Albright said (Hertzke 2004:275). Two years later, the U.S. was deeply involved as the main negotiator in peace talks between north and south Sudan. What had happened? The possible answers will be discussed in the following analysis. First through a
description of the coalition of religious conservative who had got engaged in Sudan in the late 90s, then by discussing different explanations for U.S. policy attention and substance towards Sudan.

4.2 Description: The religious conservatives awaken

There have been Christians in today’s Sudan far longer than there have been Christians in the United States. The first Christian missionaries arrived in Sudan from the Middle East in the 6th century. 1300 years later, the first American missionaries arrived to convert Muslims, traditional believers and believers in traditional Sudanese Christianity to the new gospel (Johnson 2003:14). The historical roots of the U.S. Christian involvement in Sudan lie in this missionary movement.

Walter Russell Mead (2002:139) calls the story of American missionary activity the “lost history” of American foreign policy. “It has played a much larger role in the relationship of the United States to the world (…) than is generally recognized”.23 Along with the great revivals of Christianity in the United States, American missionaries have spread around the world with increasing pace. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were around 5,000 American protestant missionaries around the world (ibid:142). The vast majority was in Asia, especially in China and Korea. Protestantism was introduced in Korea by American missionaries in 1899, and a few years later, Korea was considered such a fertile ground for missionaries that Pyongyang, now capital of communist North Korea, was widely known as “Asia's little Jerusalem” (Marquand 2003). Today, around 30 percent of the population in South Korea is Christian (19 percent protestant).

23 Madeleine Albright (2006:26) makes a similar point in The Mighty and the Almighty. This point may be valid for Norway as well. Mead’s emphasis on missionary activity as a foreign policy driver bears resemblance to Olav Riste’s (2001) description of the “missionary impulse” as one of the main pillars of Norwegian foreign policy history". 
Today, there might be as many as 100,000 Americans serving religious missions abroad (Mead 2002:142). And the power shift from traditional, mainline Christianity to the more conservative evangelical branches has been just as evident in the missionary field as in the religious landscape in the U.S.. While eight out of ten protestant missionaries came from the mainline denominations at the end of the First World War, those same churches provided less than one out of ten missionaries by 1996 (Pierson 2001:160). The influence of the Catholic Church has also declined considerably. Today, the Southern Baptist Convention alone fields the same amount of missionaries as the entire Catholic Church in the United States, and as all mainline U.S. denominations combined (Hertzke 2004:20).

This long history of missionary activity, combined with the dramatic transformation of the missionary field, helps explaining why religious conservatives became increasingly aware of the persecution of Christians in Sudan in the mid-nineties, and decided to launch a campaign for Christians in Sudan, North Korea and China. The goal of this campaign was (and still is) to be Freeing God’s Children, as Allen D. Hertzke (2004) has called his insider’s account of the religious conservatives’ campaign. Hertzke notes four underlying conditions paving the way for this movement: (1) The spread of evangelical Christianity had shifted the Christian population toward the global south. Whereas 80 percent of the world’s Christian population lived in Europe and North America in 1900, this had declined to 40 percent by 2000. (2) The communications revolution had lead this new Christian population and their often difficult conditions much closer to fellow Christians in the States through the news network of the missionaries.24 (3) Furthermore, the fall of the iron curtain had opened up new areas for evangelization. (4) And finally, the revival of the religious conservatives and their

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24 Several places missionaries provide the main source for international news (Green 2007). As Peggy L. Shriver (2006:52), former assistant general secretary of the National Council of Churches of Christ writes: “Combing 30 years of North Carolina’s Gastonia Gazette, 1940-70, (…) I was struck with how parochial the newspaper was. Almost the only international news appeared in the Gazette’s religion page, usually reporting missionary accounts.”
An organizational network in the United States had created a forceful movement able to engage for their persecuted brothers and sisters worldwide.


At that point, Sudan was already high on the religious conservatives' agenda. Since the National Islamic Front seized power in Khartoum in 1989, American missionaries had sent home news about forced Islamization, and even mass slaughter of Sudanese Christians in the south. While traditional historians and secular analysts would emphasise the complex nature of the civil war (Human Rights Watch 2003, Johnson 2003, Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001), Christian activists bluntly stated that this was “a war on religion”, as Nina Shea titled an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (1998). Neither did missionaries and their organizations back home hesitate using the word genocide to describe what was being done to their brothers and sisters
in Sudan. Some even contended that the loosely estimated two million victims of the war between north and south all were Christians that had been purposefully slaughtered, although the victims were both Muslims and believers of old faiths as well (Hertzke 2004:261).

What really prompted evangelical organizations into action in the United States was the campaign against slavery in Sudan (McDonnell 2007, Saunders 2007). Initiated by U.S. director of Christian Solidarity International (CSI) John Eibner, it spurred thousands of Christians in the States to raise money to redeem Sudanese Christians from Arab slave traders. Along with fellow evangelist Charles Jacobs, who founded the American Anti-Slavery Group in 1994, Eibner claims to have redeemed at least 80,000 slaves by buying off local slave-traders (Hertzke 2004:112). This undertaking caused controversy. Organizations such as UNICEF and Human Rights Watch (1999) criticized the practice, and in 2002 a front page article in Washington Post claimed that SPLA-commanders exploited the redeemers by stage-managing transactions, passing off free people as slaves (Vick 2002). Nevertheless, millions of dollars were raised by evangelical networks in the States, slavery in Sudan became an issue on Christian TV-networks and a high school class made national headlines by raising 50,000 dollars for slave-redemption (Sink 1998, Woodbury 1998).

Another channel of action was humanitarian relief. Several evangelical relief organizations were established in Sudan in the 1990s. The most notable was probably Franklin Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse. Son of Billy Graham, the father of modern evangelicalism in the States, and heir to his empire of ministries, Franklin Graham is also one of President Bush’s closest religious confidantes, and held the invocation on his inauguration ceremony in 2001. Graham visited Sudan several times, and wrote

25 “Much like a novice writer enchanted with exclamation points, it repeatedly uses the term “genocidal” to describe the actions of the government in Sudan”, T. Jeremy Gunn of the American Civil Liberties Union (2001) mocked the advisory Commission on International Religious Freedom’s use of the word in 1999. Nonetheless, the House of Representatives followed suit, and labelled Sudan “genocidal” later the same year (Shea 2000).
and spoke about Sudan in the press. “This carnage, the most appalling I have seen in my 25 years as an international relief worker (...) is happening in Sudan, where the Muslim government is waging a brutal war against Christians,” Graham (2000) wrote in an op-ed in *Wall Street Journal* in 2000. He concluded with the following warning: “If we turn a blind eye to the plight of the people being mistreated in Africa (...), I believe God will judge this nation. His hand of blessing could easily and quickly be removed.”

Graham was not the only top-tier evangelical leader who spoke out about Sudan in the late 1990s: Richard Land (2007), policy director of the Southern Baptist Convention (by far the nation’s largest protestant denomination) made Sudan part of his policy advocacy. Chuck Colson – once chief council for President Nixon, jailed for Watergate, born-again as an evangelical in jail and later founder of Prison Fellowship to reform U.S. jails – campaigned for Sudan through his own think-tank the Wilberforce Forum (named after the English statesman and evangelical who lead the fight to abolish slavery in the 1800s). Colson is considered one of the best-connected lobbyists among U.S. evangelicals (Cooper and Tumulty 2005). Richard Cizik is a third example. As chief lobbyist for the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), he had a power base of 30 million members (and potential voters) to use in his campaigning for Sudan (Sheler 2006:227-271). In comparison, the National Rifle Association (NRA) has around four million members. The largest nongovernmental organization in the United States, American Association of Retired People (AARP), has 35 million members. As Eric M. Uslaner (2002:358) notes, membership is an important indicator of political influence (criteria four in my theory chapter).

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26 Both Land and Cizik were interviewed personally for this thesis.
It is important to note that although their organizational basis was mainly among evangelical churches, not all faith-based activists were evangelicals. Nina Shea, according to Allen D. Hertzke (2004:274) the most central campaigner, is a Catholic. And the one Richard Land (2004) and Richard Cizik (2007) consider being the most central, Michael Horowitz, is a Jew. Horowitz, a former appointee at Reagan’s White House is now activist and analyst at the Hudson Institute where he took the initiative to what became the International Religious Freedom Act, and later spearheaded the evangelical Sudan campaign. Among his PR initiatives was hiring celebrity lawyers Ken Starr and Johnnie Cochran to defend him in court when he was arrested for protesting outside the Sudanese embassy (Raspberry 2001). Horowitz is not shy about taking credit for his role in the Sudan campaign: “Debbie and I were behind the peace deal in Sudan,” he bluntly stated in a personal interview (Horowitz 2007). Debbie is Deborah Fikes of the Midland Ministerial Alliance in Texas, who built a grass root effort for Sudan in President Bush's hometown (Neumayr 2003). Horowitz attributes his commitment to persecuted Christians to his Jewish background: “Sudan is the Hitler-regime of our time,” he says about the Islamist regime (O’Beirne 2001). Horowitz was not the only prominent Jewish American who campaigned for Christians in Sudan. Elliot Abrams, once Assistant Secretary of State under Reagan, travelled to Sudan to interview Christian refugees as chairman of the Commission on International Religious Freedom, and in an article in Weekly Standard he outlined how the Bush administration should approach the crisis (Abrams 2001b). One month after the article was printed; Abrams became one of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s deputies.29

Another important component of the Christian conservative campaign for Sudan was to be found at Capitol Hill. The Republican landslide election in 1994 had made

28 The two were the main stars of two of the most famous legal battles in U.S. history: The investigation of president Bill Clinton (Starr), and the O.J.Simpson-case (defended by Cochran).
29 He was appointed Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations at the National Security Council.
Congress considerably more religiously conservative. Many of these politicians got involved in Sudan. When a disastrous famine spread across southern Sudan in 1998, evangelical relief agencies delivered aid to prevent what they considered to be a “manufactured famine” to exterminate the Sudanese Christians (Shea 1998). One of the relief workers who went to Sudan with Samaritan’s Purse in 1998, was the physician and junior senator from Tennessee, Bill Frist, who five years later was to become Senate majority leader and one of the most powerful politicians in the United States. “The radical Islamic regime in Khartoum is unmatched in its barbarity toward the sub-Saharan or “black African” Christians of the countries south,” Frist (1998) wrote in an op-ed in Washington Post upon returning from his trip. He called for a much tougher U.S. policy towards the regime in Khartoum. Frist is the most prominent example of the Christian conservative politicians who raised the issue of Sudan in Congress from the late 90s onwards. Apart from him, Allen D. Hertzke’s (2004:appendix) list of “fervent members of Congress” includes senators Sam Brownback (Republican) and Don Nickles (R); and House representatives Chris Smith (R), Frank Wolf (R), Tony Hall (Democrat), Tom Tancredo (R), Joseph Pitts (R) and Spencer Bachus (R). Eight Republicans and one Democrat, all Christian conservatives.

By 1999, an organised “Sudan Campaign” had formed in Washington DC under Nina Shea’s direction at the Freedom House. Although largely a “grass top-movement” consisting of elite lobbyists and activists from faith-based organizations, the campaign

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30 One measure is the Christian Coalition’s scorecards. In the Congress before 1994, 30 percent of House representatives and 26 percent of the senators voted in line with their views in at least 80 percent of the votes. After 1994, the numbers were 43 and 36 percent respectively (Martin 1999).

31 Seven of the nine received a full 100 points in the Christian Coalition’s scorecard in 2004 (http://www.cc.org/2004scorecard.pdf). Frank Wolf received 84 points and Tony Hall was not in the House at the time. Pitts and Brownback also co-chaired the “Values Action Team”, a forum which coordinated strategy between lawmakers and social-conservative activists (Stone and Vaida 2004).

32 The campaign organization still existed in early 2007, but was now directed towards Darfur (www.sudancampaign.com).
also activated the grass roots of American evangelicalism. From 1996 on, “International Days of Prayer for the Persecuted Church” were organised on an annual basis by the World Evangelical Fellowship (WEF). From a core group of 7,000 churches, this day of prayer quickly grew to encompass over 100,000 U.S. churches of all denominations, where ordinary churchgoers would pray for fellow Christians in Sudan and learn about their plight from the pulpit. In a personal interview, director Faith McDonnell of the Church Alliance for a New Sudan quoted Representative Frank Wolf noting the following on this phenomenon: “There are more churches than chambers of commerce in the United States. So if you want to influence foreign policy, you have to influence the churches.”

News on Sudan also penetrated religious media. One example is the religiously based TV-series “Touched by an Angel”, which was one of CBS’ most popular shows in the 90s. It aired an entire episode dedicated to the issue of slavery in Sudan in 1999. Christian college networks and Christian rock stars also campaigned for Sudan (Lobdell 2001). In August 2001 30,000 young Christians gathered in Midland, Texas (George W. Bush’s hometown) for the festival “Rock the Desert”. The following year, 90,000 attended. There they were met by campaign material like a mock slave cell to inform about persecution of Christians in Sudan. This event spurred what was later to become the Midland Ministerial Alliance, which became a central part of the evangelical Sudan campaign at later stages (Neumayr 2003).

As the Bush administration came into office in January 2001, the issue of Christian persecution in Sudan was well established as a cause worth fighting for among evangelicals. In a survey from the Ethics and Public Policy Center (2002) more than 70 percent of the 300 pastors, advocates, radio hosts and other members of the “evangelical elites” who were asked had “heard a lot” about the situation for Christians in Sudan. More than 40 percent had contributed to an organization working

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33 Numbers are WEF’s own estimate. Taken from their webpage www.persecutedchurch.com.
for Sudan. However, the activists felt they got nowhere with the Clinton administration on the issue. According to Michael Horowitz (2007), Clinton was “awful on Sudan”. The activists were “struck by the huge disparity between the genocidal scale of atrocities being committed by the government of Sudan and the muted response of the President and Secretary of State of the United States,” Nina Shea (2000b) said in a testimony before Congress on September 28, 2000 as a representative of the International Commission on International Religious Freedom. By the end of 2000, the faith-based movement was ready to take on the new president and his administration on Sudan.

4.3 First aspect: U.S. policy attention

4.3.1 Suddenly, Sudan

The premise underlying the thesis of Walter Russell Mead and others that evangelical pressure directed President Bush’s attention towards Sudan is that president Clinton did not pay the same level of attention. Is this true? A search in the The American Presidency Project’s database with the keyword “Sudan” reveals that President Clinton did mention Sudan in 12 speeches during his last four-year term in office. 34 Thus, it is obviously not true when Nina Shea (2004) in Weekly Standard states that president Bush “became the first president to emphasize the Sudanese conflict in a public speech”. In fact, the last time Clinton mentioned Sudan in a public speech – just a few weeks before he left office, he addressed Shea and her compatriots directly: “[L]et me say especially to the students, religious communities, and human rights activists who have done so much to publicize the atrocities of Sudan, America must continue to press for an end to these egregious practices and make clear that the Sudanese Government cannot join the community of nations until fundamental changes are made on these fronts” (Clinton 2000).

34 The database is located at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and contains all public papers issued by presidents Clinton and Bush (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php).
However, apart from this speech, a closer look at the 11 others speeches shows that Clinton actually never addressed the conflict in length until this single occasion, when he was on his way out of office. On four occasions he mentioned the U.S. bombing of a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. In the other seven speeches, Sudan is only mentioned summarily in sentences like: “War still tears at the heart of Africa. Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan have not yet resolved their conflicts” (Clinton 1999). No initiatives were taken by the Clinton-administration to mediate in the conflict between north and south. Clinton did appoint a special envoy, to Sudan in 1999, former congressman Harry Johnston. But Johnston did not make any new peace initiatives. The administration’s approach was to isolate rather than engage Khartoum. And although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did meet with SPLA-commanders and promised them direct aid, no such aid materialized (Connell 2001:2). In other words, Sudan seems to have remained a “back-burner issue” to the Clinton administration, as the faith-based movement claimed.\footnote{According to the Sudan Campaign (2000), the term "back-burner" even figured in a policy paper on Sudan from the Clinton administration.} This is confirmed by observers not affiliated to the faith-based campaign movement interviewed in Washington DC. Sudan expert David Smock (2007) at the congressionally founded United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Sudan campaign manager at the International Crisis Group (ICG) Colin Thomas-Jensen (2007) both stated that there was a marked shift in policy from the Clinton to the Bush administration. Former special envoy for the UN to the horn of Africa and Norwegian ambassador Tom Vraalsen (2005:79) states the same in his exposé on the experiences from conflict resolution in Sudan: “In 2001, a fundamental change occurred in U.S. policy towards the civil war in Sudan. From a non-interventionist policy, which was mainly limited to condemning the regime in Khartoum, the United States now moved on to a policy of constructive engagement” (my translation).
When George W. Bush entered the White House, there were no indications that Sudan would become a higher priority for him than it had been for his predecessor. In fact, the general impression from Bush’s election campaign was that he did not have much of a foreign policy at all, apart from a perception that the country was better off not getting heavily involved in foreign conflicts (Melby 2004:9-16). When Bush was asked about his policy on Africa in one of the television debates, he simply answered: “We don’t have any vital interests there” (Lyman 2006:49). However, after only four months in the White House, Bush had mentioned Sudan on three different occasions. First, Sudan was mentioned in two speeches in March 2001 along with the countries China, Cuba and Iraq as countries that deny religious freedom to their citizens (Bush 2001a, b). At the same time, Secretary of State Colin Powell (2001:48), at his first hearing before the House committee on International Relations stated that “there is perhaps no greater tragedy on the face of the Earth today than the tragedy that is unfolding in the Sudan”. Powell promised the country would be a top priority for him. This prompted Washington Post into writing a story titled “Suddenly, Sudan” (Mcgrory 2001); and then, two weeks later the cover story “Christians’ Plight in Sudan Tests a Bush Stance” (Mufson 2001b), pointing to the contrast between this rhetoric and the lack of attention to foreign policy, and especially Africa, before the election.

Then, in a speech to the American Jewish Committee on May 3 – with Shimon Peres, Joschka Fisher and Vicente Fox as guests, Bush devoted three full paragraphs to the civil war in Sudan: “We must turn the eyes of the world upon the atrocities in the Sudan,” Bush stated, and announced that he had appointed USAID chief Andrew Natsios as a special humanitarian coordinator to Sudan. “Our actions begin today, and my administration will continue to speak and act for as long as the persecution and atrocities in the Sudan last,” the president concluded (Bush 2001c).

During the summer of 2001, a Sudan policy review was under way in the State Department. And by September 6, 2001, Bush’s actions had led him to appoint longtime senator and Episcopalian priest John Danforth as “Special Envoy for Peace to The Sudan”. Danforth got a considerable staff with full-time presence at the peace
negotiations in Kenya (Snyder 2004). He also got a specific mission to end the country’s civil war: “Our administration is deeply committed – is deeply committed – to bringing good folks together, from within our country and the leadership of other nations, to get this issue solved once and for all,” Bush (2001d) stated at the ceremony in the Rose Garden. What explains this sudden will to get involved in this then 18 years old and complicated civil war in a continent far away?

4.3.2 Primary explanation: Evangelical pressure

Media and observers by and large explained Bush’s involvement in Sudan with the pressure from evangelical lobby groups. “The Bush administration, prodded in part by American Christian evangelical groups, (…) has taken an unusual interest in the Sudan civil war,” New York Times stated (Weisman 2003). “Bush officials have been lobbied heavily by fundamentalist Christian groups,” Washington Post explained (Vick 2001). “The conservative religious lobby in the U.S. (…) pressured the U.S. government to maintain a harder line on Sudan,” Human Rights Watch (2003:478) concluded in one of their analyses. There are, however, other possible explanations why Sudan suddenly caught the Bush-administration’s attention. I will turn to these soon. But first: How plausible is the established thesis that Bush’s involvement in Sudan was a result of faith-based pressure?

A first indication that faith is involved is Bush’s own rhetoric on Sudan. The first two times Bush mentioned Sudan; he did it as an example of religious persecution (whereas Clinton talked about the civil war without mentioning religion). When Bush appointed John Danforth, Bush did not mention religious persecution. He did, however, mention the slavery issue. And as he explained his motivation for intervening, he seemed to be addressing organizations like Billy Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse directly: “We’re committed to bringing stability to the Sudan, so that many loving Americans, nongovernmental organizations, will be able to perform their duties of love and compassion within that country without fear of reprisal” (Bush 2001d).
The appointments of Andrew Natsios and John Danforth as special envoys can itself be interpreted as gestures towards the faith-based movement. The appointments were made in spite of the new Secretary of State Colin Powell initial wish to scale back on the use of special envoys (Royce 2001). Natsios’ previous job was as director at WorldVision, one of the Christian relief organizations involved in the campaign. Danforth was an ordained priest, and this appointment also went down well with the evangelicals (Hertzke 2004:289). In fact, the Bush administration’s first choice as special envoy was Chester Crocker, U.S. secretary of state for African affairs in the Reagan administration. But Christian conservative coalition members claim their pressure secured that Crocker was not appointed. “We fought pretty hard against Crocker,” Faith McDonnell (2007) of the Church Alliance for a New Sudan stated in a personal interview. Crocker was one of the architects behind the “constructive engagement” policy with apartheid South Africa in the 1980s and did not have the trust of the religious conservatives. In the end, Crocker himself declined the job when he could get sufficient guarantees that religious conservatives would not interfere in his work (Inter Press Service 2000). Danforth (2006:189-190) himself was not in doubt who were the main drivers behind Bush’s Sudan policy: “[T]he energy fueling our effort in Sudan was clear to me when I saw the Christian leaders in the audience that day [when Danforth was appointed as envoy in the Rose Garden] and when I considered the religious convictions of President Bush. American Christians wanted our government to make every effort to end the world’s longest lasting civil war,” he writes in his autobiography.

Franklin Graham’s position as one of President Bush’s religious mentors points to one of the most crucial factor behind the apparent success of the faith-based campaign: Elite access. As Crabb et.al. (2000:141) notes, direct access to Representatives is

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36 Danforth is, however, a self-proclaimed religious moderate, and in 2005 he wrote a sharp critique of the Christian Right, which prompted a sharp rebuttal from Richard Land and other evangelicals who were involved in the Sudan campaign (Danforth 2005, Slevin 2006).
crucial, since the Representatives act as individual entrepreneurs in law-making (criterion seven in the theory chapter). But in foreign policy matters, the “Entrepreneur-in-Chief” is undoubtedly the president (hence criterion ten: direct access to the executive). According to the New York Times, Graham himself has said he used a breakfast with Bush one week before the election to pressure the soon to become president-elect on the need for American involvement in Sudan (Goodstein 2001). Shortly after Bush took office, a delegation of religious leaders was summoned to meet with Bush’s principal advisor Karl Rove for an hour long discussion of Sudan (Bumiller 2003). Among the leaders was Charles Colson of the Wilberforce Forum. He said to be a personal friend of President Bush, and is one of the evangelical leaders who later were to have weekly conference calls with Karl Rove and Bush’s liaison to the evangelical community Tim Goeglein to discuss policy initiatives (Stone and Vaida 2004). Another is Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention. “There's no question this is the most receptive White House to our concerns and to our perspective of any White House that I've dealt with, and I've dealt with every White House from Reagan on,” Land (2004) said in an interview. Other activists share this impression: “We tried to reach Clinton, but did not get much response. He had a firewall around him that did not let us in that much,” Faith McDonnell (2007) stated.

Having access does not mean getting everything your way. “It’s not like the Bush administration did everything evangelicals wanted, not by a long shot,” William Saunders (2007) at the Family Research Council underlined in a personal interview. He founded the organization Sudan Relief Inc. to campaign for Sudan. But Bush’s White House nevertheless seems to have been more receptive to evangelical groups than previous administrations. One reason may be that the Bush-administration was

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37 As a further illustration of close ties: Tim Goeglein was a former aide to Gary Bauer, previous leader of Family Research Council, evangelical Sudan-advocate and another participant at the weekly conference calls.

38 The views differ though: Richard Cizik (2007) of the National Association of Evangelicals said the receptiveness depends on the issue. David Kuo (2006), who served as Deputy Director of the Office of Faith-
full of evangelicals itself. According to presidential historian Garry Scott Smith (2006:366), there had never been so many conservative Christians in the White House as under George W. Bush. One of them was Michael Gerson, who was Bush’s principal speechwriter at the time he delivered the speeches were Sudan was mentioned. “During my time in the White House, the most intense and urgent evangelical activism I saw did not come on the expected values issues—though abortion and the traditional family weren't ignored—but on genocide, global AIDS and human trafficking. The most common request I received was, "We need to meet with the president on Sudan"—not on gay marriage,” Gerson (2006) writes in a commentary in Newsweek.

Elite access was also secured through the recruitment of the new administration. I have already mentioned Elliot Abrams as one Sudan-advocate who secured a post in the Bush-administration. Michael Miller is another. He also got a job in the National Security Council. Until then, he was Senator Bill Frist’s assistant, and travelled with Frist to Sudan (Mcgrory 2001). Frist himself was “Bush’s main man in the Senate and sees the president all the time,” according to Washington Post (ibid). It also seems probable that Frist and other Christian conservatives in Congress who had campaigned for deeper involvement in Sudan all had greater access to the Bush-administration than they had to the Clinton-administration.

The elite access-argument seems further strengthened when one considers the signatories of a letter sent to President Bush a few days after his inaugural, calling on him to make ending the “genocide” in Sudan a foreign policy priority, along with stopping sex trafficking and religious persecution of minorities in China (Mufson 2001a). Among the signatories were (apart from the already mentioned Elliot Abrams, Chuck Colson and the president of the National Association of Evangelicals) Paula J. Based and Community Initiatives in the Bush administration wrote a whole book lambasting what he believed was a hypocritical attitude towards evangelicals in the administration.
Dobriansky of the Council of Foreign Relations (who was nominated by Bush as Under Secretary of Democracy and Global Affairs at the State Department a few weeks later); Harvard professor Michael Novak; Marvin Olasky, the man behind the concept “compassionate conservatives”; and former CIA-director James Woolsey.

Another argument is organizational strength. Although in large part a “grass tops movement”, the faith-based lobbyists gained strength and legitimacy from their grassroots support in the evangelical community. As described in the introductory chapter, evangelicals have come to constitute a very important subgroup in American society numerically. “When you get 100,000 churches focused on this, they begin to talk to their congressmen,” Richard Land (2004) said about the Sudan campaign. One example of how this grassroots power worked is the Sudan involvement of Tom Tancredo. He came into Congress in 1999 from the district in Colorado were schoolchildren had got national attention for raising 50,000 dollars to slave-redemption in Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2003:484). And according to Crabb et.al. (2000:142), “no single factor is likely to be more crucial in determining the positions of members of the House and Senate on questions of public policy than constituency influence” (criterion six).

Just as important as numerical strength is probably the evangelicals’ organizational strength: “Religious conservatives have created the largest, best-organized grassroots social movement of the last quarter century,” Robert D. Putnam (2000:162) writes in Bowling Alone, his study on the development of civic engagement in the States since the 1960s. According to Putnam, “faith communities are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America” (ibid:66). Churches are among the arenas where most Americans meet most often, not only to pray but also to discuss and learn about social issues. And whereas overall church attendance has dropped somewhat since the peak in the early 1960s – along with overall civic engagement, evangelical activism provides one of the counter-trends of increased activism. This means the relative numerical and organizational power of evangelicals has increased considerably over the past decades. This is evident in their voting power: In 2004, self-
described born-agains constituted 40 percent of George W. Bush’s electorate. If one also includes the votes of Catholic traditionalists and Mormons, Bush received 60 percent of his vote from religious conservatives (Smith 2006:376). Finally, strengthened organizational and voting power also means strengthened lobbying power: One measurement is the polls made by National Journal on perceived lobby strength in Congress. In 2005, when representatives were asked the question “which special interest group would members of your party buck more often if the group weren’t so powerful?”, Christian conservatives were second among Republicans, only beaten by the National Rifle Association (Vaida 2005).

A final argument in the evangelical pressure-explanation is the breadth of the Sudan coalition. Although the grassroots activity was largely confined to evangelical groups, the elite coalition was much broader, encompassing Jews, Catholics and secular activists. Allen D. Hertzke calls it an “unlikely alliance for human rights.”39 Crabb et. al. (2000:144) call it “strange bedfellows” (criterion nine): “Nearly always, successful lobbying campaigns are waged by coalitions or alliances among pressure groups having common goals”. Michael Horowitz (2007) cited gaining left-right support as one of the main principles of his lobbying strategy. But the most unlikely thing about the Sudan coalition was the bridging between religious groups with centuries-long antagonisms. Historically, Protestants and Catholics have not been natural bedfellows in American politics; neither have evangelicals and Jews in modern times. The fact that the campaigns for religious freedom and Sudan seem to have contributed to a diminishment of old theological tensions may be one of the movements’ main strengths. “American evangelicals and orthodox Jews appear set to write a new and original chapter in the long and troubled story of relations between the faiths. Their

39 The subtitle of his book Freeing God’s Children.
alliance could well be deeper and more stable than many observers believe,” Walter Russell Mead predicts (2005:92).  

In the Sudan case, this new alliance is evident in the campaigning of Jews like Michael Horowitz and Elliot Abrams, which I have already described. Other examples are the involvement of Elie Wiesel, who was among the people who wrote to President Clinton about “how the genocide in Sudan haunted him” (Sudan Campaign 2000); and the long-time Sudan activism of Rabbi David Saperstein of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism (RAC). 41 Yet another is the fact that the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum made the plight of southern Sudan the first exhibit mounted by its then new-founded “Committee of Conscience”. Among the participants at a meeting on Sudan organized by the museum in February 2001 were the American Civil Liberties Union and several Catholic bishops (Mufson 2001). The U.S. Catholic Conference condemned the “cruel, fratricidal conflict in Sudan” in 2000 and sent a delegation to the country lead by cardinal Bernhard Law (United States Office of Catholic Bishops 2000).

4.3.3 Alternative explanations

Present at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in February 2001 also were representatives of the Congressional Black Caucus, the organization representing African American members of Congress. One could assume that the longest civil war in Africa would be just as big a concern for the African-American communities as for predominantly white evangelicals; and activism from African-American lobbyists is one of several alternative explanations for the Bush-administration’s involvement in

40 In a personal interview, expert on the relationship between religion and politics John C. Green at Pew Forum, however claims that “alliance is too strong a word” to describe the relationship between Jews and evangelicals. In his opinion, Israel is about the only issue that unites the two groups (Green 2007).

41 RAC is the center for social activism for more than 900 Jewish congregations representing 1,5 million American Jews (http://rac.org).
Sudan. Others include pressure from other human rights lobby groups; and the possibility that foreign policy in this case is not at all best explained as a result of domestic lobbying, but rather as a product of the president’s personal convictions, or of economic or security interests. These four possible explanations will be explored in this section.

4.3.3.1 Explanation 1: Afro-American lobbying

“The lesson should be to involve more organisations in the fight against the Sudanese genocide. Where are the organisations of Afro-Americans in this campaign? Why are they not crying out about African holocausts?” one commentator asked after having attended a press conference at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, just a few months before the large meeting where Afro-American groups were heavily represented (Afrol.com 2000). Jeff Drumtra of the U.S. Committee for Refugees had just given a speech where he attacked the media for not paying attention to the crisis in Sudan. Although there were Afro-American voices speaking up for Sudan in the United States since the early 1990s, review of academic literature, reports and articles in the press strongly suggest that the Afro-American community was not a main driver in the domestic lobby campaign for Sudan. They were however to become an important part of the campaign initiated by Christian conservatives, and may help to explain why this campaign became such a persuasive force.

Furthermore, there were few voices of Sudanese exiles in the debate on Sudan. That is, there were some, but in total the white American voices dominated. One reason may be that there is no coherent Sudanese-American society in the States. Sudanese migration into the U.S. is a relatively new phenomenon; almost all Sudanese have arrived from the late 1980s onward, and up until around 2000 the annual numbers could still be counted in the hundreds (Abusharaf 2002:6-9). Which means Mohammed Ahrari’s second criterion – that an ethnic group must retain ties to its “old country” to be motivated into action – is probably not fulfilled. This criterion in fact seems more fitting to describe the ties between missionaries in Sudan and their
“brothers and sisters” in the United States. The missionaries both had strong emotional ties to Sudan as well as a strong organizational network in the United States. One group of exiles is worth mentioning, however: The lost boys of Sudan. These were a group of around 3,600 young boys who had lived in a refugee camp in Kenya for several years after having fled the war in Sudan. In 2001 they were allowed to resettle in the States, and their stories received broad media coverage. Secretary of State Colin Powell met several of the boys personally in June 2001, as the review of Bush’s Sudan policy was underway.42 “To act you must get to know those you act on behalf of. You must have a personal stake in it. The lost boys did a lot to move people into action,” Faith McDonnell (2007) stated. She has worked with several of the lost boys.

According to Human Rights Watch (2003:486), the U.S. African community was split on the Sudan issue until Louis Farrakhan “faded out of the debate” due to illness in the late 1990s. Farrakhan, head of the organization “Nation of Islam”, was a strong defender of the Islamist government in Khartoum, and had considerable clout over the debate on the issue among Afro-American organizations.43 Allen D. Hertzke (2004:253) suggests black leaders like Jesse Jackson remained silent on Sudan for fear of offending Muslim allies. The fact that the Sudan had become a “Christian Right issue” also made it difficult for Afro-American organizations to join the campaign. African Americans are not less religious than white Americans, but there are deep historical cleavages between white and black churches. According to expert on religion and politics John Green (2007) at Pew Forum, “one of the biggest divisions in American religion is on race. Many researchers like to think of black churches as a separate religious tradition, even though the theology is the same. Many evangelicals have worked very hard to disavow racism, but the divisions are still there”.

“In the early phases of the Sudan campaign black support was limited to disparate leaders”, Hertzke (2004:253) writes. Among these disparate leaders was Congressman Donald Payne (Democrat from New Jersey). He was among the activists arrested in a protest outside the Sudanese embassy in the spring of 2001 (Reynolds 2001), and he later introduced the final version of the Sudan Peace Act in Congress. In 2001, Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson, both previous presidential contenders, both made trips to Sudan. At this point, Sudan had become a hot topic among Afro-Americans as well. “This has the possibility of becoming a new South-Africa”, one staffer for a black congressman told the newsletter Africa Confidential (2001). Chuck Singleton, pastor of the largest African-American congregation in California was another leader on the issue. In 1999, he explained the lack of attention to Sudan from black leaders with the fact that they were too busy with other issues. “So to call their attention to and get them to change directions or add another agenda item is a very difficult thing to do,” Singleton said (Bearden 1999).

In early 2001, Sudan activists like Payne and Singleton did succeed in bringing elite organizations like National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Urban League, and the Congressional Black Caucus into the faith-based campaign network for Sudan. This added considerable strength to the campaign, and seems to underline religious historian Leo P. Ribuffo’s point that “religious interest groups have been most effective when they found allies outside their own communities and invoked widely shared American values” (Ribuffo 2001:21).

4.3.3.2 Explanation 2: Human rights group lobbying

Christian conservatives were by no means the first to introduce Sudan as an issue in U.S. civil society. But they seem to have been about the first to highlight the religious

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44 This again resonates with criteria three and nine: Policies ought to be backed by the larger public, and the lobbyists need to have the ability to build broad coalitions.
dimension of the civil war in Sudan. Human Rights Watch (HRW 1993) did issue a report on the Christian minority of the Copts years before Sudan entered the Christian-conservative radar screen. Since the Islamists seized power in Khartoum in 1989, HRW had issued regular reports on the civil war in Sudan. But apart from the report on the Copts, only one other underlined the religious aspects of the conflict specifically (HRW 1994). The same goes for Amnesty International. Their annual reports document massive human rights abuses, including mass killings of civilians in Southern Sudan all through the 1990s. But a review of all of their annual reports since 1995 indicates that the conflict is not framed as a religious struggle, or genocide of Christians. An electronic search through the reports shows that abbreviations of the word “Christian” is only mentioned once in eleven reports (in a description of an episode inside a Church in 2002). The word “religious” is mentioned three times, but not as a description of the conflict.45 Neither do the traditional, mainline denominations seem to have played any significant role in getting Sudan on the map of U.S. concerns. “Sudan has been a frustration. We have not put enough energy into it, and I don’t think we have been as persistent and public as the crisis demanded,” presiding bishop Mark S. Hanson of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ECLA) admitted in a personal interview.46

These arguments all support the claim of the Christian-conservative activists that an emphasis on the religious elements of the conflict was missing (Horowitz 2007, McDonnell 2007). Said William Saunders of the Family Research Council: “Very, very few knew about Sudan in the mid-90s. We were concerned that mainstream human rights groups did not pay sufficient attention because of the religious element of the conflict.”

45 Reports accessed on http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/sudan/reports.do
46 Despite the name, ECLA is not evangelical in the sense that the term is used generally, and in this thesis. ECLA is a theologically liberal denomination. In fact, Hanson told in the interview that one of his great frustrations has been that the term evangelical has been “taken away” from his church and reserved for conservatives.
The framing of the civil war in Sudan in religious terms might be one explanation why the religiously conservative campaign caught the attention of the Bush-administration. Another might be that theirs was a campaign in a more profound sense of the word than the activity of traditional groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty. Although the latter groups were concerned by abuses in Sudan as well, neither of them made Sudan a special priority over other countries with similar abuses. In fact, Human Rights Watch’s executive director Kenneth Roth had criticized the faith-based campaign against religious persecution in the 90s as “special pleading” and “an effort to privilege certain classes of victims” (Freedman 1997). This enraged campaign strategist Michael Horowitz, who tried to get Roth fired by sending letters to board members of HRW and stepping up public criticism of Roth (ibid). There were, in other words, both personal and political antagonisms making it hard for liberal and faith-based activists to cooperate on Sudan.

Reading through op-eds in major newspapers and academic literature on U.S. Sudan policy made it clear that public campaigning for Sudan in the late 90s to a large degree was done by faith-based groups, not the traditional secular human rights groups. The personal interviews confirmed this impression. David Smock at the U.S. Institute of Peace and Colin Thomas-Jensen at the International Crisis Group both worked intimately with Sudan in the late 90s for secular groups. Both named religious conservatives as the primary reason why the Bush administration got involved in Sudan. According to Thomas Jensen (2007), “Bush came under pressure from his base.” Smock (2007) calls evangelicals “Bush’s natural constituency – and he listened to them.” This might also have a structural explanation: Although rich in topical and political expertise, organizations like HRW and Amnesty do not have the same organizational grassroots strength as evangelical groups. Amnesty International USA represents 300,000 members. National Association of Evangelicals represents 30
Furthermore, while evangelicals according to Robert Putnam (2000:159) have built up some of the strongest grassroots movements in the United States over the past few decades, organizations like Amnesty have developed from grassroots organizations into “participation-by-proxy” organizations, where the connections between paid activists in Washington DC and paying members are increasingly weak.

Nevertheless, four secular initiatives for Sudan need mentioning in order to paint a complete picture of the Sudan activism in the United States around 2000-01: First, at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a “Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy” was established in July 2000 in order to “revitalize” the debate on Sudan in the U.S. and generate “pragmatic recommendations for the new administration (CSIS 2001:1). This task force was in part a reaction to the strong Sudan activism among U.S. evangelicals and others. People like Walter H. Kansteiner III, who was to become Undersecretary of State for African Affairs in the Bush-administration, and Elliott Abrams participated in the task force, and its recommendations were to be influential on the new administration.48 Secondly, similar activities had been ongoing at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) throughout the 1990s, under the auspices of Chester A. Crocker, who was President Bush’s first choice as special envoy to Sudan in 2001, but who declined the job (Woodward 2006:121). The report “A new Approach to Peace in Sudan” (USIP 1999) triggered a State Department conference where ideas for renewed engagement were discussed (Woodward 2006:120). Thirdly, there was also an established “Sudan Working Group”, which consisted of several liberal church groups and cooperated closely with Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. This group also produced several policy papers on Sudan and wrote letters to the Clinton

47 Numbers taken from the organizations’ web pages:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/activist_toolkit/startagroup/startalocalgroup.html and
http://www.nae.net/index.cfm?FUSEACTION=nae.benefits

48 The influence of these institutions will be discussed further in the analysis of U.S. policy towards Sudan.
administration. And lastly, the International Crisis Group did continuous campaigning on Sudan, particularly through its Africa expert John Prendergast, who also worked on Sudan in the State Department during the Clinton administration.

4.3.3.3 Explanation 3: Result of personal convictions

So far, the entire analysis has rested on the assumption that domestic policy concerns influence foreign policy decisions. Although not an uncommon assumption, neither is it an uncontroversial one. It is difficult to prove a causal relationship between the actions of domestic lobby groups and foreign policy decision-makers. Another question is whether these relations are best described as causal. An increasing line of scholarly works investigates foreign policy decisions in terms of so-called constitutive relations rather than causal (Ruggie 1998). Within these various social constructivist perspectives the main argument is that decisions must be considered in light of decision-makers’ identity: How they view reality. Instead of speaking of Christian-conservative lobbying, one may speak of a Christian-conservative discourse which is part of the constituting of the decision-makers’ worldview (Scholz 2005).

The vast majority of the works dealing with religion and foreign policy-making in the Bush-administration seem to be drawing on this theoretical perspective to varying degrees, even though few of the authors label themselves constructivists or discuss constructivist theory directly. Instead of discussing the causal influence on religious ideas and interest groups, their primary interest is looking at President Bush’s personal faith as an explanation for his actions (Aikman 2004, Albright 2006, Bacevich and Prodromou 2004, Goodstein 2004, Judis 2005, Mansfield 2003, Smith 2006, Suskind 2004). One example is Andrew J. Bacevich and Elizabeth H. Prodromou’s (2004) article “God is Not Neutral: Religion and Foreign Policy after 9/11”, which opens with

49 Samples of the campaigning may be found at the campaign’s news site http://sudaninfonet.tripod.com/ and at the homepage of the Episcopalian “Washington Office on Africa” web page http://www.woafcafrica.org/.
the following statement: “George W. Bush is a man of genuine religious conviction. Since September 11, 2001, his personal religiosity has had a marked effect on U.S. foreign policy.” Their conclusion is that the president’s religion informed his alliance with neoconservative thinkers and “may well ensure the dominance of neoconservative precepts in U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future” (ibid:54). Another widespread conclusion is that Bush’s personal faith infuses him with certitude, not to say stubbornness, when pursuing his personal goals. “He truly believes he’s on a mission from God. Absolute faith like that overwhelms a need for analysis”, Republican columnist Bruce Bartlett claims in Ron Suskind’s (2004:1) analysis titled “Without a Doubt”.

It is no wonder Bush’s personal faith fascinates journalists and researchers. His own speeches and remarks are full of references to the United States being “called” or given a “mission” by the “Author of Liberty” or “Maker of Heaven”. As are speeches of every American president throughout all times. Abraham Lincoln spoke of being “an humble instrument in the hands of the Almighty, and of this his almost chosen people” (Smith 2006:91); and Franklin D. Roosevelt declared during World War II that “we on our side are striving to be true to [our] divine heritage” (Judis 2005:1). This makes it difficult to make strong conclusions on the influence of Bush’s personal faith by reading his speeches. He is perhaps not as much exposing his personal faith as continuing a rhetorical tradition as old as the republic. And even if personal faith does affect Bush’s foreign policy, this faith is not an intrinsic force in Bush’s mind alone. Whether the relationship is causal or constitutive, there seems to be a strong argument that the implementation of Bush’s faith is influenced by groups with whom he shares a basic religious world-view and whom he considers to be close allies and even personal friends. “Due to personal connections he had, Bush became personally interested in the issue [of Sudan],” Faith McDonnell (2007) believes. According to campaign leader Nina Shea, the president’s wife Laura also expressed personal interest in Sudan when Shea was talking to the president about the issue at a White House event in 2002. Shea later learned that Laura Bush’s mother had attended several meetings on Sudan in her church in Midland, which was one of the most active on the issue (Neumayr 2003).
Special Envoy John Danforth has told *National Review* that “not only did the president appoint me as special envoy, he repeatedly talked to me about Sudan afterward. Every single time I went to either Sudan or Kenya for peace talks, I talked to the president in advance, either in the Oval Office or by telephone – every time. He was intimately involved in it” (Nordlinger 2005). In his autobiography, Danforth (2006:189) suggests that Bush had another motivation for engaging in Sudan: “President Bush saw the prospect of peace in Sudan as a possible model for resolving ethnic and religious conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere. As the president once said to me, “If they [the Sudanese] can figure it out, anyone can”.”

The sources of Bush’s personal convictions do not necessarily stem from pressure from religious interest groups. One might have to look wider than election benefits and strategic calculations. In constructivist language: In order to understand the relationship between identities and foreign policy, one need to look at multiple forms of texts. This may even include movies: In 2005, several media reported that one of the three movies President Bush watched during the three first month of the year was *Hotel Rwanda*, a dramatization of the genocide in Rwanda (Bumiller 2005, Nordlinger 2005). Bush saw the movie twice, and invited the hotel manager the story was based on, Paul Rusesabagina, to the White House afterwards. They talked about Darfur, and Bush said he would do anything he could to stop what he believed was a new genocide. Bush’s intervention in the (perceived) genocide in Sudan may at least partly be a result of a similar ‘never again’-instinct. The phrase ‘never again’ has strong resonance in what Samantha Power (2002:xxi) has called America’s “culture of Holocaust awareness.” But as Power’s study ““*A Problem from Hell*: America and the Age of Genocide” (ibid) shows, this culture does not seem to have spurred the United States into acting forcefully against genocide at any time in the 20th century.

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50 This is consistent with what observers call Bush's ideals of a "humble" foreign policy; ideals he brought to office, but largely disposed of after September 11, 2001 (Melby 2004).
Bush saw *Hotel Rwanda* in 2005, four years after he got involved in Sudan, and there are no indications that a book or a film prompted President Bush into becoming interested in Sudan in the first place.\(^5\) But the story illustrates how convictions may be shaped by many different impressions, be it lobbyism, family talk or watching movies.

**4.3.3.4 Explanation 4: National interest**

Classic realism, the belief that countries are driven by interest and the quest for power rather than ideals and benevolence, is according to Walter Russell Mead (2002:35-55) a foreign policy model designed to describe the European power play in the nineteenth century, and as such no fruitful starting point for a study of American foreign policy. Nevertheless, whether labeled realism or Hamiltonianism (as Mead calls it); interests matter, and in order to understand U.S. policies towards Sudan – including the decision to work for a peace agreement – one need to consider U.S. interests in Sudan. As Mohammed E. Ahrari underlines, the most important determinant of lobby influence on foreign policy, is perhaps whether the issue pushed for is in line with U.S. strategic interests or not (criterion one).

Sudan has never been a country of great national interest to the United States, neither economically, nor strategically. At the time President Bush came into office, there were however two areas where Sudan was of some economic interest to interest groups in the United States: Gum Arabic and oil. Gum Arabic is a derivative of the acacia tree, a natural substance which is required in the production of newspapers (in printers), soft drinks (like Coca Cola) and pharmaceuticals. Sudan provides 70 to 90 percent of the world’s supply; and in the 1990s, the United States imported almost all of its gum Arabic from the country (Kim 1998). When trade sanctions were imposed.

\(^5\) However, William Saunders (2007) of the Family Reseach Concil told that he first learned about the war in Sudan through a couple of TV-programs. Faith McDonnell (2007) first heard about the conflict from the journalist David Aikman (who has also written a biography on President Bush’s faith).
on Sudan in 1997, an exception was made for gum Arabic after lobbying from groups like the Newspaper Association of America (representing among others the Washington Post), the National Soft Drink Association (Coca Cola etc.), the National Food Processors Association, and the Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association (Sudan Update 1997, Washington Post 1997). These lobbies did have diverging interests to the faith-based activists. While conservative Christians wanted to isolate Khartoum (‘the Hitler regime of our time’), the gum Arabic lobby wanted a better relationship with the regime. This conflict did play a role when Congress later on discussed strengthening the sanctions against Khartoum. But it seems unlikely that the need for gum Arabic was a barrier for engaging more deeply in the peace process in Sudan. Quite the opposite: A more stable situation in Sudan was also in the interest of the soft drink and printing industry in the U.S, and the need for gum Arabic does not seem to have played any role in the discussion on whether the U.S. should engage in a peace process.

Another economic interest was soon to become much more important than gum Arabic: Oil. Large quantities of oil were found in the south of Sudan in the early 1990s, and this was probably a main reason why the civil war escalated at the same time (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2001:4-5). The regime in Khartoum seized control over the oil fields and cut deals with Western and Asian firms, mainly from Australia, Malaysia, China and Canada, to extract the oil. No U.S. companies were directly involved in this new oil boom, but U.S. investors were involved in several of the companies (Washington Office on Africa 1999). As with the gum Arabic lobby, these companies lobbied for the United States to better their relationship to Khartoum. An argument could therefore be made that the United States had a strategic interest in favoring Khartoum over the South in order to gain access to the potential oil riches in Sudan, and that engaging in a peace process that could strengthen the South would risk endanger American interests (Martin 1999). This argument is, however, weakened by the fact that the oil discoveries in Sudan were small compared to other oil riches on the African continent. In 1999, Sudan’s known reserves only ranked tenth among African countries, and the reserves of 36 million
tons were dwarfed by Libya’s 3.900 and Nigeria’s 3.000 million ton.\footnote{Numbers taken from World Energy Council’s “Survey of Energy Resources 2001”: http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/publications/reports/ser/oil/oil.asp} Furthermore, an argument could also be made that in order to secure future oil revenues, it would be in the interest of both Khartoum and the United States to stabilize the situation in the oil-producing areas on the border between the north and the south in order to bring in new investments and explore new areas (Woodward 2006:119). A peace deal could be seen as being in the strategic interest of the U.S. in order to secure future oil supplies.

Economic interest in gum Arabic and oil seem to be more important in the discussion on the substance of U.S. policy towards Sudan – especially in Congress – not in the discussion on whether the Bush-administration should get involved in brokering a peace agreement in the first place. None of the persons interviewed for this thesis mentioned oil or gum Arabic as part of the initial policy rationale behind the Bush administration’s Sudan policy. The same conclusion seems fair if one looks at U.S. security interests in Sudan. These were mainly concentrated around the issue of terrorism, which seems to have been the main driver behind U.S. policy towards Sudan since the Cold War. In the 1990s, the U.S. had imposed sanctions on Sudan, barred the country from entering the UN Security Council, and even bombed Sudan as a part of its counter-terrorist policies. In general, terrorism seems to have been the guiding principle behind the strategic views on Africa of the Bush-administration as well. A policy document from the White House states, “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States — preserving human dignity — and our \textit{strategic} priority — \textit{combating global terror}.”\footnote{Quote taken from the online document ”Africa Policy” on http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa/ [accessed 29.01.2007].} Still, it is hard to find any indications in early statements from the Bush-administration that engaging in the peace process in Sudan was considered as part of a strategy against terrorism. When asked about Africa in his first hearing at the House International Relations Committee, Colin Powell (2001:30) stated
that “Africa would be a priority for President Bush and me; not necessarily a military or national security priority, but just a priority in the sense that this is a continent of 800,000,000 people who have great needs, and those needs can be satisfied in many ways by United States action and United States effort”. David Smock (2007) at the USIP made a similar point: “Counter-terrorism was not a driving force behind policies in Sudan. It is clearly very much the driving force behind recent policies in Somalia, but this was not the case for Sudan.”

Engaging more deeply in Sudan was perhaps not important to U.S. strategic interests in 2001. On the other hand it is hard to see that it should be against strategic interests to work for peace. The conclusion of the CSIS task force in February 2001 was that the approach of the Clinton administration – isolation of Khartoum combined with tough rhetoric – had made little headway in stopping Khartoum’s support of international terrorism. “If the Bush administration is to be effective in advancing U.S. interests in Sudan, it will need a significantly modified approach,” the task force recommended (CSIS 2001:5). One could therefore argue that there was little risk in engaging in peacekeeping in 2001. In *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*, Peter Woodward (2006:117) argues that changes on the ground made conditions look “ripe for resolution” as the Bush administration reviewed its policies in the summer of 2001. These conditions were first of all the military situation; the fact that neither side in the civil war seemed capable of a military victory. This was matched by a lack of political advance on either side which made the leaderships weaker both in north and south. At the same time, the repeated attempts to produce a peace settlement in the past had created some common ground from which to launch a new diplomatic offensive. Finally, the regime in Khartoum had approached Washington DC several times and offered terrorist intelligence in the final years of the Clinton administration. Although this did not change official U.S. policy towards Sudan, American agents made their first visit to Khartoum to exchange material in May 2000.

All of this meant that the climate in Washington had been changing even before the arrival of the Bush administration, and as Colin Powell ordered a review of Sudan
policy in the spring of 2001, both officials in State departments and policy advisors were positive to a deeper engagement for peace.

4.4 Second aspect: U.S. policy substance
Getting someone’s attention to an issue is just the first step on the way to influencing their position. This section examines the content of United States policies towards Sudan from the summer of 2001, when the Bush administration’s new policy was presented, up until January 2005, when a peace agreement was signed between the government in Khartoum and the southern rebels. To what degree did the Bush administration follow the policy recommendations of religious conservatives? And secondly, to what degree did Congress adopt the policy recommendations of these groups, and did the input of Congress influence the administration’s policies? Establishing such links, if there are any, does not mean proving a causal relationship between the policy inputs of pressure groups and the administrations’ policies. But if there is little or no correlation, there can hardly be any influence in terms of policy substance.

4.4.1 Executive policies
To determine what religious conservative pressure groups wanted Bush to do in Sudan is not entirely straightforward. Religious conservatives were not a monolithic group. Plenty of recommendations were made, by plenty of people. But as this analysis has tried to establish, some people were more central than others, and one gets a good idea of religious conservatives’ views by looking at the statements of some of the most central actors.

There seems to be one central theme in religious conservatives’ opinions on Sudan: Stay tough on Khartoum. “The United States needs a strong non-military policy to stop the genocide in Sudan – a policy to keep the pressure on Khartoum by publicizing Sudan’s atrocities and isolating the regime until the carnage, slavery, rape and
deliberate mass starvation stop,” the policy declaration on the Sudan Campaign’s web page reads (Sudan Campaign 2000). One may argue that isolation of Khartoum was exactly what the Clinton administration did. But according to the campaign, the failure was that Clinton implemented this policy “half-heartedly” (ibid): “U.S. foreign policy towards the government of Sudan must be pursued with unwavering firmness and promoted as a policy priority” was the central campaign message (ibid). The same message is evident when one looks at the recommendations given at a hearing on U.S. Sudan policy in Congress in the spring of 2001, called “America’s Sudan Policy: A New Direction?” This hearing is a fitting illustration of policy views, since it was held just as the Bush administration was reviewing its Sudan policy, and was the only official outlet of opinion from civil society towards the legislature. Campaigners like professor Eric Reeves, Roger Winter of the U.S. Committee for Refugees and reverend Gary Kusonoki were all active in the Sudan campaign, and they all presented the same message, with the words of Kusonoki (2001:59): “We should treat Sudan as a pariah nation, just as we treated South Africa years ago.”

To be fair, religious conservatives made more detailed and nuanced policy proposals as well. Elliot Abrams (2001b), who was to become responsible for Sudan at the National Security Council in the Bush administration, made three policy recommendations in his article “What to Do About Sudan?” in The Weekly Standard just weeks before his appointment: First of all, appoint a special envoy with full access to the president. Secondly, conduct the new diplomatic offensive through the existing Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). And thirdly, consider severe sanctions against Khartoum if the regime does not respond to the carrots of peace negotiations. These recommendations seem to have been supported by most campaigners. But the bottom line, both for Abrams and most other campaigners, seems to have been a deep distrust of the Islamist government in Khartoum. As Nina Shea (1998) stated back in the late 90s: “Negotiations with the genocidal dictatorship […] will not achieve either justice or a lasting peace.”
Yet negotiations were exactly what the Bush administration attempted. Instead of staying tough, the Bush administration decided to stay in touch with Khartoum. U.S. policy objectives were summed up in several speeches and hearing statements by Walter Kansteiner (2002a, 2002b, 2002c), Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the State Department. The objectives were threefold: First, a negotiated peace settlement between north and south. Secondly, cooperation against terrorism from the government in Khartoum. And thirdly, getting humanitarian assistance to all those in need in Sudan. This meant engaging Khartoum in talks on all three issues.

For religious conservatives, Kansteiner represented “the voice of capitulation” on Sudan (Hertzke 2004:286). Activist Eric Reeves wrote op-eds on Kansteiner’s “shallow and ineffectual” leadership in the State Department, which he called the “deepest shame for the Africa Bureau” (quoted ibid). Still, it was this “voice of capitulation” that won through in the administration, against the more hardline approach of Elliot Abrams in the National Security Council or Roger Winter and Andrew Natsios in USAID (ibid.). Special envoy John Danforth (2006:193) summarizes the contrast between the policy input of religious conservatives and the administration’s policy in clear terms in his autobiography: “My understanding of the mission President Bush gave me differed from the expectations of concerned American Christians.” Danforth describes how religious conservatives, especially in Congress, emphasized how the government in Khartoum was the oppressor and the southern Sudanese the victims. He concludes: “I did not doubt this observation, but I did not think it relevant to my mission. As I understood it, President Bush had asked me to see if America could be a peacemaker. He did not ask me to be the moral arbiter between the two sides.”

Religious conservatives got things their way on some issues: After all, they pressured hard to get a special envoy, and to get John Danforth instead of Chester Crocker. They pressured hard to get direct aid deliveries to southern Sudan without Khartoum’s restrictions (McDonnell 2007), and this became the third policy priority of the administration. And the issue of slavery, one of the initial concerns of the activists,
was made one of the four tests special envoy Danforth presented to test Khartoum’s seriousness in the negotiations: An international commission was set up to look into the allegations of slavery (Woodward 2006:122). But the administration’s overarching policy move remained offering Khartoum carrots like international recognition and an end to UN sanctions in return for peace negotiations and terror cooperation. This was against the will of most religious conservatives. When asked about this paradox in a personal interview, William Saunders at the Family Research Council simply answered: “The administration’s approach worked.” He admitted his campaign wanted the administration to be much more aggressive towards Khartoum. “But there are probably a million different ways to go about doing something. This approach worked” (Saunders 2007). Secular observer David Smock (2007) was categorical in his assessment of the religious conservatives’ policy inputs: “Evangelicals were not helpful in creating policy proposals.”

What then, explains the administration’s approach? One obvious candidate is 9/11. The terror attacks on the U.S. occurred five days after John Danforth was appointed special envoy. Khartoum was quick to offer full cooperation on terrorism in the following days, providing lists and information on terror suspects. "The attacks of 9/11 may not have changed everything, but they did scare Sudan's government into seeking improved relations with Washington. Suddenly, Bashir [the leader in Khartoum] started to be helpful on terrorism and also to negotiate productively, albeit unhurriedly, with Garang [the rebel leader]," Madeleine Albright (2006:256) states in her memoirs from the period. Albright (ibid:255) says she believes she did everything she could to end the war in Sudan. In her view, it was 9/11 - not the new administration - that changed the picture. Cooperation on terrorism was well underway with the Clinton administration before 9/11 as well (Katzman 2001:28). But the cooperation gained a much higher priority with the terror attack, both for Khartoum and Washington DC. “9/11 injected a degree of urgency into our counter-terrorism cooperation with Khartoum. (...) I can with confidence characterize their current cooperation as acceptable,” Walter Kansteiner III (2002b) told Congress in the summer of 2002.
For John Danforth (2006:194), it was a goal not to make "moral proclamations" against Khartoum. Danforth says he promised the Sudanese foreign minister “normal relations” between Sudan and the United States on behalf of President Bush personally. “I am convinced that the response of President Bush was a critical factor in persuading the government of Sudan to make the concessions that led to the peace agreement signed by the parties in January 2005,” Danforth (ibid:195) concludes. Several factors contributed to that agreement, and not all of them can be attributed to the United States. But according to several observers, the peace deal would never have been sealed if the United States had not brought such leverage to the process (Smock 2007, Thomas-Jensen 2007, Vraalsen 2005:79, Woodward 2006:132). It is also worth noting that several of the policy proposals the U.S. brought into the process were tabled in the working groups at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Most important among these was the one state-solution that was to be the central element of the agreement. “I do hope we were helpful,” David Smock (2007) said in a personal interview, and added that the negotiating parties told him that some of his institute’s ideas were generated into peace process. Michael Horowitz scornfully dismissed the work of CSIS as “appeasement” and labeled the think thank “the constructive engagement crowd” (quoted in Hertzke 2004:267). Although meant as an insult, constructive engagement with Khartoum proved to be crucial in ending the world’s longest civil war.

4.4.2 Legislative policies

Even though foreign policy is primarily a presidential prerogative, the bulk of the campaigning on Sudan was directed at Congress. “We worked very hard, and visited the Hill again and again,” Richard Cizik (2007) of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) explained when asked about describing the key to the success of the Sudan campaign. But why Capitol Hill, and not the White House? “Because unless you can put a bill on the President's desk, you're dependent on the President's whims,” Cizik answered.
As noted in chapter three, lawmaking is one of the ways Congress may influence foreign policy, and the bill Cizik is talking about on this subject matter is The Sudan Peace Act. The bill was a baby of the religious conservative campaign; in fact Michael Horowitz (2007) at Hudson claimed he drafted the entire bill himself. It was crafted as a reaction to the oil boom in Sudan in the late 1990s, which gave the regime in Khartoum new resources to wage war on the south. The idea behind the law was to put more pressure on Khartoum, and among the provisions were capital market sanctions to keep companies that invested in Sudan (like Australian Talisman Oil and Swedish Lundin Oil) out of American capital markets. The sanctions were first presented in 1999 by a coalition of religious conservatives and national security hawks who wanted to put extra pressure on Khartoum for counter-terrorism reasons (Hertzke 2004:281). Later, the semi-official Commission on International Religious Freedom and Elliot Abrams picked up on the idea, before Congressman Spencer Bachus (a Republican from Alabama) included it as the “Bachus amendment” to the proposed Sudan Peace Act in the spring of 2001. After 9/11 the amendment was fiercely contested both by the Bush administration and leading senators who wanted to better the relations to Khartoum. In the end, the administration pressed Congress to suspend the entire bill and contribute to lifting UN sanctions on Sudan as a reward for the cooperation on terrorism instead (Woodward 2006:128).

It was not until October 21, 2002 that a final Sudan Peace Act was signed into law by President Bush. This act was considerably toned down from the first draft, but still provided new means to maintain pressure on Khartoum in the ongoing peace negotiations: The President was asked to report after six months whether Khartoum negotiated in “good faith” or “unreasonably interfered with humanitarian assistance efforts” (Sudan Peace Act 2002:5). If Khartoum was found to obstruct the

54 Bills have been the religious conservatives’ main weapons on other subject matters as well, from the International Religious Freedom Act to the North Korea Human Rights Act.

55 As previous quotes suggest ("Debbie and I made peace in Sudan"), Horowitz’s claims should be treated with caution, however.
negotiations, a number of sanctions would be imposed, including denied access to World Bank and IMF loans and a UN embargo against the Sudanese government.

“I will not forget Sudan,” President Bush promised when he signed the Sudan Peace Act into law (Hertzke 2004:292). And in what Allen Hertzke (ibid) considers an acknowledgement of the power of the faith-based campaign movement, Bush added: “And if I do, I know that you will prod me.” At the same time, in the official press release issued by the White House, the president underlines that foreign policy is his domain, no matter what is stated in a bill from Congress: “The executive branch shall construe these provisions as advisory because such provisions, if construed as mandatory, would impermissibly interfere with the President's exercise of his constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs” (Bush 2002).

So, did the law influence U.S. policy on Sudan? As noted in the theory chapter, it is questionable how much influence Congress has on foreign policy in general. Congress’ “impact on the actual diplomatic behaviour of the United States is often minimal”, Crabb et.al. (2000:138) claim. In this case, it is hard to conclude decisively on the impact. President Bush did report to Congress on the negotiations in April 2003 as the law required. He certified that Khartoum did in fact negotiate “in good faith”, even though their forces continued to attack civilians in spite of a signed cease-fire (Reeves 2003). This provoked massive outcry from religious conservatives, but the administration did not change their assessment no matter how fierce the protests were (Hertzke 2004:295-296). Still. Allen Hertzke claims that the “fierce lobbying by Sudan coalition members” with the Sudan Peace Act as main weapon was vital in keeping the pressure on Khartoum in the final phases of the peace negotiations. Other analysts support this view (Smock 2007, Woodward 2006:130). “Bush was pursuing a constructive engagement where Clinton had been containing and isolating. Bush’s contention was: If you put enough incentives on the table, Khartoum would turn. Congress used the Sudan Peace Act as a stick to compensate for Bush's carrots, and probably the combination of the two was decisive,” Colin Thomas-Jensen (2007) concluded.
5 Conclusion

5.1 Attention, not substance

“You never know if you influence someone, or if he just agrees with you,” Richard Land (2007) of the Southern Baptist Convention replied when asked about evangelical influence on President Bush’s policy towards Sudan. Though measuring influence has its intrinsic difficulties, some scholars do not shy away from making clear-cut conclusions: “The faith-based movement has bent the arc of Sudanese history,” Allen Hertzke (2004:299) emphatically claims in his account on the religious conservative campaigning for persecuted Christians in Sudan. My analysis suggests that his claim is somewhat hyperbolic. Had the Bush administration followed the advices of the faith-based movement on how to conduct peace negotiations in Sudan (stay tough on Khartoum), there may never have been a peace agreement. On the other hand, if the well-connected faith-based movement had not provided such consistent lobbying, the Bush administration would probably not have been heavily involved in peace making in Sudan in the first place. Even though personal convictions probably played an important role, there seem to be a strong case for religiously conservative influence as the primary explanation for the Bush administration’s policy attention. The case is weaker in terms of policy substance, even though the Sudan Peace Act may have been an important component in the U.S. efforts for peace. Thus, Walter Russell Mead is probably right when he claims that “thanks to evangelical pressure, (…) the [United States] has led the fight to end Sudan’s wars,” (Mead 2006:38). Evangelical pressure explains why the United States got involved in Sudan, but it does not explain why the administration fought the way it did once involved.

5.2 Theoretical conclusions

Looking at the indicators developed in the theory chapter, the shape of Christian-conservative meddling in foreign affairs seems to be largely consistent with influential involvement by ethnic lobbies in the past. Of the ten determinants of a lobby group’s
power quotient presented earlier, most are met by this campaign: The group retained strong ties to the country lobbied for through missionary groups and Sudanese exiles (criterion 2). The campaign for Sudan was backed by a (if not the) larger public through evangelical constituencies (3), and as Walter Russell Mead (2005:91) notes, “the projection of religious faith and values onto the arena of foreign policy has tremendous appeal and resonance for tens of millions of Americans”. Furthermore, the campaign had plenty of members and other resources (4); and the plight of Sudanese Christians was widely considered a legitimate interest (5), even though secular human rights groups did accuse the faith-based groups of ‘special-pleading’ for Christians.

Concerning pressure directed at Congress, we have seen examples of direct constituency pressure in the case of the state of Colorado (6); the importance of personal access to decision makers through the work of e.g. Bill Frist (7); and an ability to take ‘strange bedfellows’ into the coalition in the case of Jewish and Catholic groups, plus African Americans (9). Crabb et.al.’s criterion concerning lack of competition from groups with conflicting views is not entirely met (8): There was a potentially conflicting interest in the case of oil, and there was an active lobby on gum Arabic. The gum Arabic lobby’s significance seemed to have faded in importance, however, and it is far from obvious that oil interests served as a barrier to involvement in the peace process. Finally, although we have seen plenty of examples of direct lobbying towards the executive through the personal contacts with President Bush, the bulk of lobbying seems to have been directed towards the legislature. Therefore, the last criterion (10) is only partially met.

“Wilsonian revival” is the term Walter Russell Mead (2005:88) uses to describe the increasing influence of evangelicals on foreign affairs issues. Inspired by President Woodrow Wilson, Mead labels ‘Wilsonian’ the idea that there is a vital linkage between American security and the pursuit of American values of freedom abroad. Judging from the description of the faith-based campaign for Sudan presented here, religious conservatives share this idealistic agenda. As Mead (ibid) notes, there is one major difference, however: Whereas the traditional Wilsonians addressed the questions
of values primarily in secular terms like freedom and human rights, the ‘born again Wilsonians’ have an explicitly religious agenda of religious freedom and religious rights.

Although Wilsonian revival may be a fitting description of the Christian-conservative lobby movement, U.S. policy substance in this case has looked more like Hamiltonianism. As mentioned in the theory chapter, Hamiltonian (named after Alexander Hamilton) is the term Mead uses to describe the traditional realist camp in American foreign policy thinking. And traditional realist interests like cooperation on national security seem to have been just as important as a Wilsonian will to transform or even dispose of an authoritarian regime in the case of Sudan. Or, put differently: The peace process in Sudan is a case where Hamiltonian (realist) and Wilsonian (idealistic) interests merged. As a representative of the Bush administration, counterterrorism coordinator Karl Wycoff, put it before the House International Relations Committee in 2004: “[A] successful conclusion to the Sudanese peace process will help make the region more stable and less vulnerable to terrorists and their facilitators” (Wycoff 2004). Before 9/11, Sudan was not very important in terms of national security. After 9/11, Mohammed Ahrari’s first and most important power determinant was fulfilled (1): The lobby campaign pressed for a policy – a peace deal in Sudan – in line with U.S. strategic interests – counterterrorism. A brief look at two other cases suggests that evangelical lobby success is less likely when this decisive criterion is not met.

Apart from Sudan, the Christian-conservative campaign has been most concerned about persecuted Christians in North Korea and China. Modeled after the ‘Helsinki Process’ in which human rights were used as leverage for regime change in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, the North Korea Human Rights Act (NKHRA) was initiated by religious conservatives and passed by Congress in 2004. Its first paragraph stated that “it is the sense of Congress that the human rights of North Koreans should remain a key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea, and other concerned parties in Northeast Asia” (NKHRA 2004:4). But when the United States,
North Korea and the other parties in the six-party talks signed a “denuclearization action plan” in February 2007, human rights were not mentioned at all in the official State Department (2007) release. “The State Department is out there to give Kim Jung Il ‘peace in our time’. Human rights are not on the table at all, and Helsinki is anathema to the State Department,” Michael Horowitz (2007), the author of the bill, gloomily commented in a personal interview a few days before the action plan was signed.

In the case of North Korea, denuclearization seems to have trumped human rights so far. In the case of China, economic interests seem to have been the strongest. In 2000, religious conservatives campaigned hard to prevent the Clinton administration from granting China permanent normal trading relations because of China’s persecution of Christians and other religious minorities. The campaign did not succeed, and China got their trading relations. Religious conservatives did celebrate it as a major victory when President Bush demanded to give an uncensored speech on religious freedom on his state visit to China in 2002 (Hertzke 2004:311). But apart from such largely symbolic gestures, conservative Christians have not had much success altering U.S. relations with China. In fact, when asked why his people had such success swaying Bush on Sudan, Richard Land (2007) of the Southern Baptist Convention simply answered: “Because Khartoum is not Beijing.” Then, he elaborated: “We can't intervene everywhere. But we have to intervene where we can make a difference.”

5.3 The future of evangelical foreign policy

U.S. policies towards North Korea and China are obvious cases for further research to test Walter Russell Mead’s (2006) claim that “the resent surge in the number and the power of evangelicals is recasting the country’s political scene – with dramatic implications for foreign policy”. The case of Sudan indicates that there is some truth to his claim, although the revival of the Wilsonian camp may be more a supplement than a replacement of the Hamiltonian impulses in U.S. foreign policy. What about the
future? Can Mead’s thesis, if not a description of the present situation, serve as a prediction of future power?

The evangelical moment may already be over in U.S. foreign policy. A first indication is that religious conservatives think so themselves. In the interview in February 2007, Michael Horowitz expressed concern over what he had seen in the evangelical community the last year or two. Mainly because of lack of recognition of their efforts in the national press, he said, there had been “a decline in priority and attention given to foreign policy issues. Some Christians are reverting back to the default options of abortion and gay marriage. Others are going into the politically correct issue of global warming,” Horowitz (2007) claimed. In a roundtable on Mead’s Foreign Affairs essay in the journal Faith & International Affairs, managing editor of the leading evangelical leading newspaper Christianity Today Mark Galli, expressed similar concerns. He claimed that evangelicals are only interested in “specific problems that affect specific people in specific ways” (Galli 2006:54). Therefore, Galli predicted that evangelicals will become less interested in foreign policy when they discover how complex it is. According to Galli, Mead is too generous in his description of the role of evangelicals: “Both our history and our DNA suggest that these optimistic assessments will not bear up. (…) We will continue to have flashes of international genius – like abolition and religious freedom – but in all, our unique contribution to the world lies elsewhere” (ibid:55).

A second argument against future evangelical influence on foreign policy is demographic. Although still the most religious among the world's industrialized countries, even Americans are becoming less religious. Overall religious participation has declined significantly since the peak in the 1960s (Putnam 2000:70-72). And though this general decline has affected traditional denominations the hardest, evangelical churches are affected too: “Evangelicals fear the loss of their teenagers” the headline of a New York Times article read in October 2006 (Goodstein 2006). It cited statistics predicting that only 4 percent of teenagers today will be ‘Bible-believing adults’ later in life, a sharp decline from 35 percent in the baby-boomer
generation and 65 percent of the World War II generation. The statistics had prompted
the National Association of Evangelicals into adopting a resolution deploiring “the
epidemic of young people leaving the evangelical church” (ibid).

Finally, although considered to have some influence on the Reagan administration, the
current influence of evangelicals seems closely connected to Bush's personal faith and
the composition and electoral basis of the Bush administration (Smith 2006). Their
influence on future administrations is uncertain. Although some republicans claim the
Grand Old Party has become God’s Own Party (Hedges 2006, Phillips 2006), the
frontrunner in the upcoming presidential election (as of April 2007), Rudy Giuliani,
has few if any ties to the evangelical community. David Smock (2007) of the U.S.
Institute of Peace contended that evangelicals were not a strong force in the 2006
midterm elections, that a possible Democrat administration will feel “much less
beholden” to them, and finally that evangelicals “will have much less influence on
future administrations.”

Nevertheless, it would be premature to write off evangelical influence on U.S. foreign
policy altogether. The Christian Right has been written off before, when the Moral
Majority dissolved in the late-80s or when the Christian Coalition’s influence waned in
the mid-90s. Richard Cizik of the National Association of Evangelicals did not share
Michael Horowitz’s or Mark Galli’s gloomy predictions of evangelical foreign policy
activism. “What we are witnessing, is the rise of a new, centrist evangelicalism. An
activist and internationalist foreign policy that cares about pursuing a role that is not
arrogant,” Cizik said (2007). Cizik is one of the evangelicals pushing what Michael
Horowitc called “the politically correct” issue of climate change hardest within the
evangelical community, and predicted that evangelicals will play a pivotal role in
turning official U.S. climate policies in the future.56 Policy analyst John Green at Pew

56 Among Cizik’s achievements is the ”Evangelical Climate Initiative”, signed by around 80 evangelical leaders
in January 2006 (available at: http://www.customsandclimate.org/). On the other hand, around 25 leading
Forum agreed with Cizik’s thesis of a more centrist evangelicalism, and predicted that the next generation of evangelicals will be more diverse in their policy opinions than today’s Christian Right. He also stated “foreign policy concerns are here to stay for evangelicals” (Green 2007).

One should probably be more nuanced when interpreting the second argument against an evangelical foreign policy future as well. Although belief patterns may be changing, the picture is not entirely clear. “Young people have always been less engaged. They tend to return to church when they grow older, marry and settle down. And this return is higher among evangelicals than mainstream Christians,” John Green (ibid.) pointed out. And a 2006 survey from Pew Forum indicates that Americans in general remain more supportive of religion’s role in public life today than they did in the 1960s (Pew Forum 2006a:1).

Finally, although future presidential administration may not be as receptive to evangelicals as the Bush administration has been, it would also be premature to write off evangelicals' role in electoral politics. Exit polls from the 2006 elections show that so-called ‘value issues’ were considered among the most important for voters in these elections as well, as they were in 2004 (CNN 2006). And the religious divide between Republican and Democratic voters, the so-called “God Gap”, persisted: White evangelicals and those who attend church frequently continued to support Republicans by large margins and remained the party’s most loyal voters (Pew Forum 2006c). This means a future Republican president will have to take evangelicals into account. And should a Democrat reach the White House in 2008 or later, the self-proclaimed evangelical center is ready to influence them. Richard Cizik (2007) told how he had approached both presidential frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama almost a year before the Democratic primaries to discuss religious persecution and other foreign evangelical leaders in March 2007 called for Cizik to resign for being to activist on climate change issues (Banks 2007).
policy issues with them. Although their future influence might be uncertain, it seems certain that evangelicals have come to stay as a source of influence on the foreign policy of the United States.
Litterature


Hanson, Mark S. (2007). *Personal interview with author.* March 16.


O’Beirne, Kate (2001). “A Faraway Country … about which we know a lot - 17 years of civil war in Sudan.” *National Review* March 05.


Appendix

List of names, titles and categories of people interviewed in Washington DC February 5 - February 8, 2007 (all interviewees are also referred to as sources in the literature list):

Cizik, Richard. Vice President for Governmental Affairs of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). (Religious conservative.)

Green, John C. Senior fellow in religion and American politics at the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. Director of the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics and Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron. (Analyst.)

Horowitz, Michael. Senior fellow and Director of Hudson Institute’s Project for Civil Justice Reform and Project for International Religious Liberty. (Religious conservative.)


McDonnell, Faith. Director of the Church Alliance for a New Sudan (CANS) at the Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD). (Religious conservative.)

Saunders, William. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Human Life and Bioethics at the Family Research Council (FRC). Founder of Sudan Relief and Rescue, Inc. (Religious conservative.)

Smock, David. Vice President at the Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution and Associate Vice President for the Religion and Peacemaking Program at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). (Activist not affiliated to religious conservatives.)

Thomas-Jensen, Colin. Africa advocacy and research manager at International Crisis Group (ICC). (Activist not affiliated to religious conservatives.)

Interviewed in Oslo on March 16, 2007:

Hanson, Mark S. Presiding Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ECLA). (Activist not affiliated to religious conservatives.)