KOSOVO-KOSOVA

A discourse analysis of the Albanian political thought during the period 1990-1999

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Reflecting on the other MA essays
Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts became a major topic of scientific debate after the events in Yugoslavia etc. The ethnic tide peaked in 2000, at least here, at the Institute of political science, University of Oslo. The majority of the essays on Yugoslavia consist of rational choice/game theory inspired investigations. The authors justify the use of this approach with the complicated nature of the conflicts and the need to simplify their studies. Second, they defend the use of formal, consistent, and precise models with the necessity for rigorous reasoning and the aspiration to generalise the conclusions. The students repeat a line borrowed from Hovi & Rasch (1996: 3) “Simple models shall lead the way to more complicated explanatory and predictive models”.

These essays can be criticised in a number of points. Empirically, the students use no primary Albanian and Serbian sources. To quote Foucault (2001: 276), “About them it could be said, rather, that they are eaters of history as others have prepared it. They consume it pre-processed”. Even secondary sources, mainly foreign journalists, had few contacts between ‘the natives’, and failed to grasp the complexity of the conflict and appreciate the presence of ‘the others’ in the Albanian political discourse.

The empirical shortcomings serve only to reinforce the theoretical weaknesses. First, it is impossible to judge the relevance of ‘variables’ that are omitted from the analysis in order to build a simplified model. Second, the students try to discover the preferences through media descriptions of historical events and to assign these preferences to the actors. They simply neglect or are unable to study how the actors themselves constructed and understood their own preferences, their justification of these preferences and the underlying cultural codes. On the contrary, we should study the political decisions along the same lines that the actors followed during the process of decision-making. Third, the students never discuss the persistence of the analysed variables/preferences and their corresponding effects on the future human behaviour.
Forth, the students speak in terms of universal/superior rationality as the antipode of Balkan nonsense. Neither the actors nor the students possess such universal rationality. Consequently, we need another research design that allows us to reveal, criticise, and contest the perception of the world through the investigation of the actors’ own meaning-construction.

1.2 The object of the essay

The theme of this essay is the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs about the political status of Kosovo. However, the theme represents only the framework of the essay. The formulation of the research object helps us to focus the research. (Taylor 2001a) The formulation of the object is based on the theoretical assumption that “When persons engage in conduct, that conduct takes on a meaning or meanings as a result of the interpretations that are available in the language from which the interpreters select. When we therefore, review the sets of constructs relating to conduct that exists in a language, we are viewing not only the horizons of possible speech but also the horizons of possible actions. The possibilities of action, then, exits, in the language of a culture, and the actions that actually emerge are presented as a result of the controlling interpretations, those with general legitimacy”. (Shapiro quoted in Neumann 2001: 38)

The point made by the discourse analysts is that the meaning construction allows people to come to shared understandings as the basis of identity and collective action. Therefore, in order to understand the done and the possible, the alliances, solidarity, mobilisation and a host of other movement processes, it is fundamental to study the meaning that the actors constructed to guide, organise and give legitimacy to their actions. Even violence, let alone normal political actions (Mathisen 1997: 4), is conceived, defined, organised and executed inside these possible meanings.

Therefore, the object of the essay is to study the Albanian side/role in the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs by analysing the political discourse (meaning making) of the Albanian elite in Kosovo. Foucault (1991: 385) defined this strategy as, “I have never tried to analyze anything whatsoever from the point of view of politics, but always to ask politics what it had to say about the problems with
which it was confronted. I question it about the positions it takes and the reasons it gives for this”. Explicitly, the object of the thesis is to deconstruct the Albanian meaning-construction in order to reveal how different Albanian elite groups, in their challenge to the official Serb discourse, constructed competing realities concerning:

- The definition of the conflict and its causes
- The definition of the solution
- The definition of the means to achieve the political solutions and their legitimacy

However, Foucault did not reduce his research strategy to ask politics what it had to say about the problems. Because, discourse is both a system of possibilities that gives us the means to mobilise and organise in collective action, and simultaneously a system of limitations that prevents us from producing certain representations and consequently, participating in certain types of collective action. Discourses decide what it is norm and what it is not producing power outcomes or effects. Discourses define and establish the ‘truth’ at particular moments and invalidate (or try to do so) other representations. Further, discourses not only establish truth, but they have also material effects. Therefore, the goal of discourse analysis is not only to reveal the meaning, but also its power (or political) effects in the human activity. Foucault (2001: 230) declared that this was the essence of his method: “To put the matter clearly: my problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth”.

### 1.3 Do we need another essay about Kosovo/Yugoslavia?

The essay is part of my MA degree. Why should you read it? First, the Kosovo crisis had a deep impact in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. *Milošević gave the fatal blow to the idea of Yugoslavism with the coerced abrogation of the autonomy of Kosovo.* (Cvić 1995; Biberaj 1993; Simić 1998)

Second, the observers considered Kosovo as the most possible place to erupt in armed violence. However, the Albanian armed resistance began only after 1997. (Biberaj 1993; Cvić 1995; Malcolm 1998; Simić 1998; Vickers 1998) It is interesting to understand the processes that inhibited the explosion for almost 7 years.
Third, the diversity of the Albanian political thought remained unrecognised. The foreign actors failed to perceive the presence of the others and to some, the first actions of the KLA and the popular support for them, came as a surprise. The essay shall help to document how the actors formed the conflict, its solution, and their strategies. These elements of meaning are significant and persistent.

Forth, the studies about the conflict in Yugoslavia should not be concentrated only on one or two political leaders, but include the intellectuals also. The intellectuals formed the conceptual terrain and even became political leaders.  

Fifth, the conflict remains frozen and unresolved. The longer it takes to decide, the fewer the options are going to be. The description and the comparison of the Albanian discourses can reveal the possibilities that lay ahead.

1.4 The structure of the essay
The essay is built according to the traditional University of Oslo model. It consists of two main parts. Part 1 establishes the theoretical underpinnings of the essay. Chapter 1 represents the object of the paper. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the problems related to methodology and method. These two chapters define the discourse analysis as research tool and the method used in this essay focusing on the subjects and the use of discursive materials. Chapter 4 gives a brief description of the events preceding the abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo.

Part 2 contains the chapters 5, 6 and 7 that explain in detail the political ideas of the main Albanian political groups. The representation of their ideas is structured so it facilitates the comparison between groups. Chapter 8 summarises and compares the ideas emphasising the common points as well as distinctions between political groups.
2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Methodology: A general view
The research design depends on the methodological assumptions concerning the understanding of the social world and the nature of the human knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to begin by clarifying the methodological foundations of the essay. (Agger 1991; Giddens 1982; Bevir 1999a; Neumann & Sand 2000; Utaker 2000; Billing 2001; Mehan 2001; Wetherell 2001b; Mathisen 1997; Mjøset 1991) We should discern between methodology and method. Morrow & Brown (1994: 36) define methodology as “… an overall strategy of constructing specific types of knowledge … justified by a variety of metatheoretical assumptions. Methodology is thus inevitably prescriptive because it attempts to legitimate the use of particular methods in ways that are consistent with the development of the specific theory in question”.

A separate branch of science, metatheory (theory about theory) studies the methodological assumptions and the implications of the research conclusions. Metatheory consist of four pillars: ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Two pillars, ontology and epistemology, are of a special importance to discourse analysis. Ontology is the study of the nature of being, i.e. what the world consists of. Epistemology is the theory of the status of knowledge, the critical study of knowledge validity, methods, and scope, i.e. epistemology tells us how to study the world. Epistemology defines criteria that determine if knowledge is scientific. Morrow & Brown (1996: 54) write, “… ontologies are linked closely to epistemologies because it is necessary to have a conception of the nature of social reality before one proposes to justify a scientific analysis of it”. Different sets of metatheoretical assumptions envisage different statuses to social research. (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 1999; Neumann 2001; Taylor 2001a)

Method, on the other side, refers to the specific techniques of scientific research such as observation, interviews, questionnaires, etc. All the MA essays written at the Institute of political science, University of Oslo, have a compulsory chapter about the
research method. One definition is always present: “Method is a line of action, an instrument to resolve problems and to arrive at new knowledge. Any instrument that serves this purpose is part of the arsenal of methods.” (Hellevik 1991: 14)

There is nothing wrong with this definition per se. The problem consists on the tacit acceptance of the objectivist/positivist methodological assumptions that follows. Ontologically, they represent the empirical facts as independent of our conscience. Epistemologically, they aim to establish causal relationships between objective social facts, and generalise the conclusions in the form of all-embracing and invariant laws. They cheer the impartial, dogma and value free researcher that studies the phenomena from outside any social/cultural milieu. Even if the students admit a certain personal belonging, they claim to treat the case from an absolute ethical position.

A critical stance to positivism is de rigueur because social life differs from nature and social sciences differ methodologically from natural sciences. First, social facts do not simply live up to the X-file logo ‘the truth is out there’. “Social facts are particularly difficult (some say obdurate or stubborn) because they cannot be taken for granted.” (Morrow & Brown 1996: 44) Our experiences are not phenomenologically pure, products of pure experience and reason, but mediated through abstract models. (Potter & Wetherell 1987; Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; McNay 1994; Bevir 1999a; Neumann & Sand 2000; Utaker 2000; Røssaaq 2000; Billing 2001; Mehan 2001; Smart 2002) Even if we reduce our understanding of reality to pure perception, we still need models to organise extensive empirical materials. Perceiving disconnected facts does not constitute knowledge. (Mathisen 1997; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 1999) Kuhn (quoted in Neumann 2001: 31) wrote, “... something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself”. Therefore, we conceive, arrange, and interpret social data according to distinct theoretical models. Morrow & Brown (1994: 44) emphasise that, “Generally nobody even bothers to collect or produce data until a theory renders them of sufficient interest”.

Second, Giddens (1982: 13) writes, “... we cannot treat human activities as though they were determined by causes in the same way as natural events are. We have to grasp what I would call the double involvement of individuals and institutions: we create society at the same time as we are created by it”. We do not simply respond
instinctively to the outside world. “Human beings are something substantially different from the rats of behaviourists”. (Mjøset 1991: 175) We contemplate and possess the ability to predict the result of our actions and adjust our behaviour accordingly. (Mathisen 1997; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips 1999; Neumann 2001)

Third, the status of the observer/researcher as objective and socially/politically unbiased is highly doubtful. (Agger 1991; Foucault 2001; Neumann 2001; Taylor 2001) The relationship between the researcher and his/her world is reflexive. The observer remains part of a distinctive social environment, possessing distinctive models to collect and interpret social facts. Rather than constructing a new objective model, the researcher adds a new model to actors’ own models.

We should criticise also the other extreme. Subjectivists reject the direct perception of the outside reality. Ontologically, they reject the comprehension of the true reality because we mediate it through our subjective models. Solipsism, the extreme variant of subjectivism, denies any possibility to perceive the world outside our conscience. Epistemologically, the source of our knowledge is not reality, but our intellectual models.

The set of the ontological/epistemological assumptions shapes our ambitions (limits) regarding the scientific research and social action. According to positivists, the goal of science is to discover general invariable laws that decide the future. These social laws restrain the human behaviour and allow no room for human intentions. (Taylor 2001a) Subjectivists search for explanations that capture specific peculiarities of the cases. For the extreme subjectivists, there are no two comparable cases. Hence, ontologically, they reject the idea of general models and the search for ideographic explanations. Epistemologically, the subjectivists fell in voluntarism claiming that the actors steer their actions according to their intentions un-checked by any objective determinants. (Morrow & Brown 1996)

2.2 Discourse- a definition
Positivism and subjectivism represent the two extremes of the possible combination sets of ontological/epistemological assumptions. Between them lie a number of post-structuralist/postmodernist methodological approaches that “… try to mediate be-
between naturalistic and humanistic perspectives”. (Morrow & Brown 1996: 6) *The discourse analysis* is one of these approaches. It is an important research strategy, although we are far from experiencing a Foucauldian revolution in political sciences. (Brass 2000) First, the understanding of contemporary societies as mediated through discourse has emphasised the importance of discourse and triggered the formulation of several discursive strategies. Second, the data used in social studies are typically discursive. Third, poststructuralism and postmodernism have emphasised the epistemological implications regarding the formation of human knowledge. (Foucault 2001; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Hook 2001; Wetherell et al 2001b; Neumann 2001)

It is crucial to begin by clarifying the notion discourse. (Alvesson & Karreman 2000; Taylor 2001a) Etymologically, the term ‘discourse’ comes from Medieval Latin ‘discursus’ and means ‘running about’, or ‘to run, to enter, to and fro’. (Chia 2000, www.Dictionary.com) English vocabularies define discourse as 1. Conversation; 2. A formal treatment of a subject in speech or writing; 3. To speak or write (about) at length. (Neumann 2001) In general, the notion discourse “… means passages of connected writing or speech”. (Hall 2001a: 72)

Discourse analysts (Taylor 2001b: 317) define *discourse* as “… historically variable ways of specifying knowledges and truths, whereby knowledges are socially constructed and produced by effects of power and spoken of in terms of truth”. Discourse includes meaning-phenomena, such as attitudes, values, beliefs, and ideas that shape reality. Discourse analysts do not treat concrete written or oral language-use as a source of information about a concrete conflict, but rather as a resource to study meaning, i.e. how individuals speak about the conflict and why they do so. (McNay 1994; Briggs 1996; Foucault 2001; Neumann 2001; Wetherell 2001a; Wodak 2002; Sunderland & Litosseliti 2002)

Foucault (quoted in Sunderland & Litosseliti 2002: 13) wrote that discourses are “… practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak”. Foucault emphasised that discourse is not simple language, but *the constituting process of reality* that invent (in a perpetuum semiosis to use the term of C.S. Peirce) social institutions, modes of thought and subjectivity. Discourse shapes even something as tangible as nourishment. What we eat depends on taboos rather than on objective nutritious val-

Foucault avoided abstract questions about the existence of things. Instead, he asked how our concepts about things function and shape our society. (Rabinow 1991; Neumann 2002) Foucault conceived discourse as encompassing reality (objectivity) and argued that things have no own, innate meaning. They take a specific meaning only as object of discourse, and cannot exist outside it. Meaning/knowledge is a product of discourse and not contained in the things themselves. (Hall 2001a; Wetherell 2001c)

Therefore, competing groups refer to the same event, but describe it differently according to their own discursive models. (Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; Jacobs 1996; Kane 2000; Mehan 2001) Laclau & Mouffe (quoted in Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 3) explain, “An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to though, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence”.

Discourse is a system of possibilities. Henriques et al (quoted in Kendall & Wickham 1999: 41) write, “In practice discourses delimit what can be said, while providing the spaces- the concepts, metaphors, models, analogies, for making new statements within any specific discourse”. Discourse does not place individuals in one distinctive position (Utaker 2000), but “Rather it … provides an array of ‘subject positions’ which individuals may occupy.” (McNay 1994: 68)

Meanings as products of discourses are relational, indexical, and dialogic. (Potter & Wetherell 1987; Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; Utaker 2000; Billing 2001; Wetherell 2001a; Hall 2001b; Sunderland & Litosseliti 2002; Neumann 2002) Carabine (2001: 273) writes, “… discourse interacts with, and is mediated by, other discourses to produce new, different, and forceful ways of presenting the issue”. First, we formulate new statements by choosing/combining/juxtaposing diverse pre-existing statements,
especially the dominant ones, to construct true subjects, to produce power and effects. Second, the meaning conveyed by discursive statements depends on the discursive context within which we use the statements. Different discursive context allocate different meanings to the same statement. Third, we ‘discover’ the ‘true’ nature of things by engaging in dialogue with each other. Bakhtin (Hall 2001b: 329) pointed out that meaning does not belong to one speaker, but it is a collective product of dialogue between many speakers. “‘Le Penseur’ may be alone with his thoughts but those thoughts bear the marks of social contexts and historical struggles over meaning.” (Wetherell 2001b: 187)

The argumentative and rhetorical character of discourse enables us to defend our views, persuade the others, and challenge rival representations. Political struggle is a struggle of discourses. (McNay 1994) Therefore, the discourse is functional. We can find acts of opposition/challenge in every historic period as a response to dilemmas. The ultimate effect of opposition is the adoption of new truths (values, beliefs, etc). (Foucault 1991, 2001; Digeser 1992; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Bevir 1999a, 1999b; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Neumann 2001; Carabine 2001, Wetherell 2001a)

Normalisation makes statements to seem uniform, necessary, and logical. (Heradstveit & Bjørgo 1992; Sand 2000) However, meaning/knowledge is contingent, and historically situated. “Things meant something and were ‘true’, he [Foucault] argued, only within a specific historical context. Foucault did not believe that the same phenomena would be found across different historical periods. He thought that, in each period, discourse produced forms of knowledge, objects, subjects and practices of knowledge, which differed radically from period to period, with no necessary continuity between them.” (Hall 2001a: 74) Hence, Foucault did not speak of universals, absolute truths, but of discursive formations, (compounds of statements) that sustains regimes of truth. (Rabinow 1991) Foucault (2001: 131) summarised, “Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth- that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”.
2.3 The role of the subject

Foucault placed discourse at the centre and argued that discourse constructs reality including subjects. However, in his latest writings, Foucault revised his ideas regarding the status of subject (Hall 2001a) and even declared, “… it is not power, but the subject, that is the general theme of my research”. (Foucault 2001: 327) He opposed both the traditional idea of an autonomous and rational actor that acts under self-imposed and self-created commands and the Marxist understanding that the economic, social and political conditions of existence are merely imprinted on the definitively given individual. (Foucault 1991, 2001; Rose 1999; Bergström & Borèus 2000, Utaker 2000; Hall 2001a; Smart 2002)

Foucault conceived the subjects as incapable of “… having meaningful experiences, reasoning, forming beliefs, and acting outside of a particular social context”. (Bevir 1999a: 354) However, Bevir (1999a) argues that Foucault’s rejection of autonomy did not entail the rejection of agency. Foucault imagined subjects as creative beings, who exercise their creativity inside a distinct social context comprised of several discursive options. These options allow us to question our present position. Otherwise, we cannot explain how “Different people adopt different beliefs and perform different actions against the background of the same social structure, so there must be at least an undecided space in front of the same social structures where the individuals decide what beliefs to hold and what actions to perform”. (Bevir 1999b: 68)

Foucault demanded even more from every individual. First, philosophically, Foucault described liberty as the process of the constant challenge to discursive norms, i.e. rather than finding our position, we should create a new one (desidentification). (Foucault 1991, 2001; McNay 1994; Bevir 1999b) Foucault (quoted in Rabinow 1991: 22) wrote, “Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. … We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries”.

Second, at the individual level, Foucault followed Nietzsche and distinguished between morality and ethics. Morality contributes premises of our behaviour, a heteronomous code to which we should obey out of fear or guilt. However, we could and should reflect about these premises, judge the possibilities, experiment and test the
culturally given codes and finally, develop our own ethical position. (Foucault 1991, 2001; Rose 1999; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Bevir 1999b) Foucault (1991: 351) wrote, “From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art.”

Third, regarding the political and civil rights and freedoms, Foucault argued that, the individuals could exercise and guarantee their liberty only through their own actions. Foucault (1991: 245) wrote, “The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because ‘liberty’ is what must be exercised”.

Discourse analysts discuss in length the impact of individuals in the production of meaning. Foucault emphasised that meaning making is collective: everyone participates in its production process. However, Foucault confirmed the inequality of authors. The discourses written by certain authors “… must be received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status”. (Foucault 1991: 107) These statements have a stronger echo and can even transcend the general social frames of meanings. First, inequality is the result of actor's formal role/position in a particular field of discourse. (Foucault 1991) Second, it is a function of author’s ability to formulate his representation (and consequently to establish himself as a founder of discursivity). (Rabinow 1991) Third, inequality is a consequence of author’s position or symbolic capital in society. (Sand 2000; Taylor 2001a) Therefore, certain individuals have a larger audience and can participate in discourses outside of their formal education/expertise/occupation. (McNay 1994; Neumann 2001)

2.4 Discourse, power and knowledge
Foucault conceded that the weak point of his discourse theory was “… its failure to incorporate a theory of power into the analysis of discourse”. (McNay 1994: 85) Therefore, in his latest writings, Foucault (2001) rebuilt the concept of power (and its social effects) and coupled it to the concept of knowledge/truth. (Bevir 1999b; Rose 1999; Brass 2000; Wandel 2001; Smart 2002)
Foucault (1991: 61) defined power “... as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance whose function is repression”. First, Foucault rejected that power is an institution or an innate (physical) strength possessed by a ruling class, a bureaucratic network, or STATE. Power is rather an immanent strategic human relation, which runs through the entire social body. Power, as Foucault understood it, “… refers to all endeavours to shape, guide, direct the conduct of other, whether these be the crew of a ship, the members of a household, the employees of a boss, the children of a family or the inhabitants of a territory. And it also embraces the ways in which one might be urged and educated to bridle one’s own passions, to control one’s own instincts, to govern oneself”. (Rose 1999: 3) Power does not operate from the top to the bottom, but it circulates between subjects. It has no meaning to say that someone posses power, because power is not possessed, but practised and exercised (Foucault 1991, 2001, 2002; Digeser 1992; Blain 1994; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Bergström & Boréus 2000, Neumann & Sand 2000; Neumann 2002; Gordon 2001; Hall 2001b)

Second, Foucault rejected that the essence of power is domination of one over another. Foucault (2001: 120) wrote, “But it seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power”. The essence of power was not its repressive, but rather its productive aspect. Power is an asset, which produces new discourses, new truths, new subjects, new practices, and new institutions. (Hall 2001a, 2001b; Gordon 2001; Neumann 2002; Foucault 2002) “What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weight on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.... It is not simply eye and ear: it makes people act and speak” (Foucault 2001: 120, 172)

Third, discourse contains power because it establishes knowledge. Carabine (2001: 274) writes that knowledge is a product of discourse that specifies “... what is morally, socially and legally un/acceptable at any given moment in a culture”. Discourse establishes norms/categories, i.e. normal, moral, practical, and legal, etc. Discursive norms serve both as measures, and as goals, which everyone should aim to achieve. Further, discourse ascertains which concrete behaviours fall inside or outside the es-
established categories, and accords to them distinct moral values. We compare all human behaviours, including ours, to these discursively modelled social norms. (Rose 1999; Mehan 2001) Finally, yet importantly, knowledge serves as base for the organisation and activity of a whole net of institutions that use knowledge to educate, regulate, control, and punish the deviant. (McNay 1994; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Neumann & Sand 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Neumann 2001; Smart 2002) Foucault defined the abovementioned process as normalisation. “Normalization is a means through which power is deployed. It is a dynamic of knowledge, practiced and learned, dispersed around various centres of practice and expertise.” (Carabine 2001: 278) The unattainable goal of normalisation is homogeneity and conformity. (Foucault 1991, 2001; Rabinow 1991; Utaker 2000; Hodge & Kress 2001)

Forth, Foucault (2001) argued that knowledge and power reside in a circular relation. (Bevir 1999b; Miller & Rose 2001; Gordon 2001) Foucault (1991: 175) wrote, “… power and knowledge directly imply one another; … there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”. Power and knowledge are inextricably enmeshed because they focus on the same human beings and their behaviour. (Brass 2000; Hall 2001a) Further, as Rose (1999: 7) points out, “To rule properly, it is necessary to rule in a light of a knowledge of the particular and specific characteristics that are taken to be immanent to that over which rule is to be exercised”. However, Foucault never intended to equate power with knowledge. Power and knowledge generate each other, but they are not the same. (Digeser 1992; Gordon 2001)

Fifth, Foucault (quoted in McNay 1994: 89) argued that history evolves through a constant struggle between different power blocks, trying to impose their knowledge. “Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.” According to Foucault, we struggle constantly aiming to alter power relations. Therefore, all power relations are inherently unstable and reversible. There are no permanent victories, but a permanent strife. (Mehan 2001; Rabinow 1991; Blain 1994; McNay 1994; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Brass 2000; Howarth & Stavrakakis
2.5 Discourse analysis as a methodological tool

Discourse analysis serves as a common designation for an array of research strategies that make use of different types of data. (Bergström & Boréus 2000; Hook 2001; Taylor 2001a) Therefore, the discursive approaches vary in important ways. (Potter & Wetherel 1987; Potter 1997; Fairclough 1995, 2000; Keenoy et al. 1997; Hammer-sley 1997; Wetherell et al 2001b; Wodak 2002) Certain discourse researchers define discourse analysis as the study of language in use, reducing discursive practices to textuality. They concentrate their research on the study of metaphors, sentence construction, etc. (Fairclough 1995, 2000; Chiapello & Fairclough 2002; Wodak 2002; Wetherell et al 2001a) These authors overestimate linguistic and representational powers of language. (McNay 1994)

Wetherell et al (2001b: 3) define Foucauldian discourse analysis as the study of meaning making as revealed through discourse, i.e. how the knowledge is produced and revealed through discourse. First, Foucault emphasised the unity of language and action as sources of meaning. According to Foucault (1991: 334), meaning “… is not, then to be sought only in theoretical formulations such as those of philosophy or science; it can and must be analyzed in every manner of speaking, doing, or behaving in which the individual appears and acts as subject of learning, as ethical or juridical subject, as subject conscious of himself and others”.

Second, and this is the crucial point, “… meaning construction allows people to come to shared understandings (the basis of identity, ideology, frames of collective action, and specific discourse), and as shared understandings are crucial to alliances, solidarity, and mobilization, being able to explain and analyse meaning construction is fundamental to understanding political alliance and mobilization, as well as a host of other movement processes”. (Kane 2000: 313) Therefore, the goal of discourse analysis is to reveal the premises of meaning, how these premises are combined to form knowledge, to effectuate power and influence the behaviour inside the group.
Third, Foucault (1991) emphasised that the discourse analysis does not focus on the truth and its validity, but on the conditions, the discursive regime that produces and exercises the truth, the effects of the truth, and what was going to happen if we produced or exercised a different truth. (Foucault 1991, 2001; Carabine 2000; Schaanning 2000; Neumann 2002; Smart 2002) Wetherell (2001a: 16) explains, “In discourse research, decisions about the truth and falsity of descriptions are typically suspended. Discourse analysts are more interested in studying the process of construction itself, how ‘truths’ emerge, how social realities and identities are built and the consequences of these, than working out what ‘really happened’”.

Forth, Foucault (1991, 2001) rejected the assumption of a telos built into history. The events have no predetermined substance and do not represent a piece of a general design or purpose. The events that shape social history are discontinuous, divergent, and governed by chance. (McNay 1994) Therefore, Miller & Rose (2001: 364-365) write, “Rather than searching for causes and determinants, we need to try to identify the ways in which diverse arrays of events- institutional, technical, political, moral- are articulated together to provide a set of conditions which make changes of this type possible, and the heterogeneous powers and capacities which have been called into play in these new ways of thinking and acting”.

Fifth, Foucault (1991: 247, 254) wrote, “Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society … there are only reciprocal relations… What is interesting is always interconnection, not the primacy of this over that, which never has any meaning”. Hence, Foucault rejected the study of social life through causal models expressed in the form of independent and dependent variables. (Neumann 2001) The researcher should study society as a totality, analysing any particular phenomenon against the background of its wider social context. (Mathisen 1997; Bevir 1999a, 1999b; Neumann 2001; Wandel 2001)

Discourse analysts study meaning making through four research strategies. First, they search to identify the competing discursive formations of reality. In this strategy, we concentrate our research in identifying how the participants in discourse combine
the truths to built competing pictures of reality. Second, we search for the scarcity of meaning, i.e. taboos, unsaid, impossible, or unreasonable ideas. In this case, we look for missing truths, in one or some of the discursive positions. Third, different meanings (or scarcity of meaning) have histories developed through the lives of the participants in discourse. In this case, we aim to identify these histories and show how they developed (produced) different discursive positions. Forth, discourse analysts study changes in the dominance of certain discourses and the development of new discourses. Each concrete discourse analysis uses one of these techniques or a combination of them. (Foucault 1991; McNay 1994; Kendall & Wickham 1999; Hook 2001; Hollway 2001)

2.6 Metatheoretical characteristics of discourse analysis

Discourse analysts assert that knowledge obtained through discourse analysis has three metatheoretical characteristics. The first one relates to our ontological understanding of reality. There is no ONE reality. There are challenging realities built by their corresponding bodies of knowledge. (Taylor 2001a; Wetherell 2001c; Smart 2002)

Second, epistemologically, knowledge is partial, situated, and contingent i.e. it does not represent a universal knowledge, but it is specific to the place/time/situation that we study. (Agger 1991) Discourse analysis does not predict or dictate the future, but it draws our attention to the complexity of the social world, the possibilities, the incidence off the unexpected, and the contingence of the present. The mixture of factors would not necessarily be the same in another situation in the future. (Rose 1999; Taylor 2001a) Therefore, the best we can do is to predict possible (alternative) situations.

Third, knowledge is relative/reflexive, i.e. the research results depend on the researchers’ worldview and value system. Foucault (2001) stated that the belief in social research as detached, historical, truth-seeking process is unsustainable. (Hall 2001b; Taylor 2001a; Wetherell 2001c; Smart 2002) Atkinson (quoted in Taylor 2001b: 319) writes, “The notion of reflexivity recognises that texts do not simply and transparently report an independent order of reality. Rather, the texts themselves are...
implicated in the work of reality-construction”. History becomes a battle between different representations/ narratives. Therefore, for Foucault (2001), the goal of the intellectuals was not to free science from ideology, but rather to ascertain new politics of truth through the critical study of the society.

However, these qualifications do not represent signs of weaknesses, but limitations of any research programme. “Rather, all knowledge is considered to be situated, contingent and partial. Truth is unattainable because reality itself is not single or static, and reality is also inevitably influenced and altered by any processes through which a researcher attempts to investigate and represent it.” (Taylor 2001b: 319)

What is the value of discourse analysis? Why should we engage in such study? First, all instances of language-use are rhetorical. As such, to study discourse means to investigate the positions and arguments pro and against in a certain issue. No one can participate in discourse without knowing the opponent. (Taylor 2001a)

Second, the discourse analysis does more than explain the historical preconditions, which make the present appear as its does. (Foucault 1991; Neumann 2002) “The particular aim of a genealogical study is to explore how meanings and practices have operated in the past, without making predictions for the future. However, it is also clear that discourses do not just disappear or stop functioning, so ultimately the interest of such analysis is in its recognizable relevance to present-day situations and material, like contemporary policy texts.” (Taylor 2001b: 317)

2.7 Criteria for evaluation

In the positivist/post-positivist tradition, research is evaluated according to four criteria. The first criterion is construct validity- the quality of the operational measurement of the concept being studied. To achieve high construct validity, the measurement apparatus should work consistently. In this case, the researcher speaks of interreliability. The second criterion is internal validity, which refers to the accuracy of the results in the situation that we study. The third criterion, external validity, refers to the accuracy/possibility of generalising the results from the research group to the population. The forth criterion, reliability, demands that another researcher can repeat the research and arrive at the same or similar result as the original one. (Yin 1993)
However, the abovementioned criteria neither fit nor apply to discourse analysis. Seale (quoted in Taylor 2001b: 319) writes, “… conceptions of reliability and replicability … are rooted in a realist view of a single external reality knowable through language”. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a new set of criteria to evaluate the quality of discourse analysis. (Carabine 2001; Taylor 2001a)

Taylor (2001b) stipulates the quality criteria relevant to discourse analysis. First, the research should relate to previously published works, whether of theory or analysis, building on or challenging the claims of other researchers. (Brass 2000) The theoretical part of this essay rests on a thorough elaborated theory. Regarding the empirical part of the essay, the author was unable to find discursive analysis of the Albanian political discourse.

Second, the research should be coherent, i.e. it should depend for its persuasiveness on arguments rather than emotional impact. The analysis and its conclusions should be logically convincing. The analysis in this essay is made as explicit/clear as possible in order to allow the reader to evaluate the degree of coherence.

Third, the analysis must represent a systematic investigation (or rigour). We can achieve rigour by including deviant cases, finding and analysing discursive inconsistencies and diversities. Foucault (quoted in Neumann 2001: 54) advised “… to read everything, study everything”. Expanding the scope of discursive material insures us that no representation is left out. (Brass 2000) This essay includes three discursive formations (meaning entities) that act as deviant cases to each other. The ideal case-including all the discourse formations- is impossible. The strict essay-guidelines limited the investigation to the most important discursive formations and contributors inside each formation. Other strategies inspiring to achieve thoroughness include more details in the research and simultaneously aiming to make the analysis as explicit as possible. The essay uses a large number of discursive materials in order to reveal details and reduce the possibility of omitting meaning-nuances.

Forth, the quality of interpretation depends on special cultural qualifications. Discourse analysis demands from the researcher a high degree of cultural competence. First, the researcher should know the available texts and how to retrieve these. Second, the researcher must understand the cultural elements of language and be able to
spot even subtle aspects. (Taylor 2001a; Carabine 2001) The author considers himself able to understand the underlying cultural codes that serve as building bricks for the meanings formulated by Albanian political leaders.

*Fifth*, the data used in the essay should be relevant to the topic of essay. The data used in this essay contain all the necessary discursive material to achieve the goal stipulated in chapter 1. The data written by the leaders themselves is the best source to trace the political decisions, their rationalisation, their premises, and how they were connected together.

*Sixth*, the paper should be useful and relevant for those interested about the Yugoslav conflict. This attribute of the essay was discussed already in the sub-chapter 1.2.
3. METHOD

3.1 Method- the case study research design

Method refers to the specific techniques of scientific research such as observation, interviews, questionnaires, etc. Method is a necessary part of the research design. Hellevik (1994: 4) defines method as “… a line of action, an instrument to resolve problems and to arrive at new knowledge. Any instrument that serves this purpose is part of the arsenal of methods.”

Yin (1993, 1994) writes that the choice of the method depends on: 1. The type of research question we have formulated. 2. The degree of control we have over the actual behavioural events. 3. The degree of focus, the author has on contemporary as opposed to historic events. First, the essay describes (explains) a concrete example of human agency, i.e. how the political leaders constructed reality. Second, the researcher has no control over the behaviour of the subjects and cannot manipulate it as in a psychological experiment. Third, the phenomenon is a contemporary one allowing the use of a full variety of evidence (data), like interviews, observation, graphic materials, etc. The answers make it clear that the study of a contemporary political discourse is compatible with one empirical method: the case study research design. It is impossible to apply it together with experiments, surveys, histories, or analysis of archival information.

Yin (1994/2003: 13-14) defines the case study as a comprehensive research strategy that: ① Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when, ② The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident, ③ Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there may be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result, ④ relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and consequently, ⑤ benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.
The main feature of case studies is that they are holistic— they treat cases as whole entities and not as collections of parts (or collections of scores on variables). Further, case studies allow us to study the phenomenon in its context. These features represent a liability for other methodological approaches because they complicate the formulation of causal models. (Yin 1993) On the contrary, they strengthen discourse analysis as research design. Discourse analysis does not deal with limited independent/dependent variables, but with an entity of interconnected narratives and their context. Further, discourse analysis uses multiple sources from written data to symbols or behaviour. (Carabine 2001; Neumann 2001)

3.2 The case— the unit of analysis

First, the essay studies a particular dossier inside Albanian discourse. Foucault (quoted in Ho & Tsang 2000: 136) explains a dossier as “… a case, an affair, an event that provided the intersection of discourses that differed in origin, form, organization, and function. … All of them speak, or appear to be speaking, of one and the same thing; … But in their totality and their variety they form neither a composite work nor an exemplary text, but rather a strange contest, a confrontation, a power relation, a battle among discourses and through discourses”. The case is that part of the Albanian discourse that formed the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs.

Second, discourses do not act separated of each other, but they form clusters of meanings. Hall (2001a: 73) writes, “… whenever these discursive events ‘refer to the same object, share the same style and … support a strategy … a common institutional, administrative or political drift and pattern’, then they are said by Foucault to belong to the same discursive formation”. Therefore, the essay does not deal with a discursive nebula, but rather with discursive formations that competed about the dossier: the political future of Kosovo. This organisation of research facilitates the comparison of different representations.

Third, the essay does not cover every discourse, discursive formation, or individual in dossier. Instead, the essay deals with the most important discursive formations and the most important representatives inside each discursive formation. The studied dis-
cursive formations do not represent a statistical sample of discourses, but rather the most prevalent discourses (as I perceive those) between the Albanians.

Forth, the essay studies the discourse as a process because “Conflict is a process, not a state. Disputes have beginnings, middles, and, occasionally, ends, or at least resting places”. (Brenneis 1996: 43) This approach allows us to study the phenomenon as an ongoing interaction process tracing the discursive changes. (Kendall & Wickham 1999; Brass 2000; Neumann 2001; Carabine 2001; Taylor 2001a)

Fifth, the research approach adopted in this paper, studies the discourse at elite level, i.e. what the leaders said and how they made their case. A limitation of this paper is that vox populi remains unheard and unstudied. However, the research includes several discursive formations at elite level, balancing fairly well this limitation.

Sixth, the essay deals with the period 1990-1999. The time-scale for data collection includes in the corpus analysis even few discursive materials form the period 1988-1989. They serve to reveal the cognitive break from the latent phase to the open conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs.

3.3 The subjects
The essay concentrates on three discursive formations: civil disobedience formation, the democratic formation, and the radical formation. These three discursive formations give a representative picture of the dossier about the political status of Kosovo and the means to achieve it. The first discursive formation is that of the civil disobedience. The discourse material used to study this formation originates from the main leaders of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK): Ibrahim Rugova (party leader and President of Republic of Kosovo/died in 2006), Fehmi Agani, (deputy leader and chief negotiator, killed by Yugoslav police/army in 1999) and Gazmend Zajmi (party secretary, died in 1994). A few other texts, written by the other members of LDK, are used also.

Shkëlzen Maliqi, Veton Surroi, and Muhamet Kullashi represent the democratic discursive formation. They were the initiators of the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists, the first organisation outside the system of League of Communist of Yugoslavia. Latter they led the Kosovo branch of the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative
(UJDI), the Social-Democratic Party of Kosovo, and the Youth Parliament of Kosovo (latter named the Parliamentarian Party of Kosovo). Surroi retreated from politics in period 1991-1993 and worked as journalist for BBC. He participated in the Rambouillet talks as independent. Maliqi resigned from the leadership of Parliamentarian Party of Kosovo, but continued to write as commentator for many newspapers. Kullashi was highly active in the beginning, but he left Kosovo in 1992 for France.

Rexhep Qosja represents the radical option. Qosja was the director of the Albanological Institute. After 1991, Qosja led the independent intellectuals, an informal opposition group to LDK. Qosja represented the group and he produced a huge amount of discursive materials. Qosja authored a number of important articles for Zëri i Kosovës (Voice of Kosova), the newspaper of the Zurich-based Popular Movement of Kosovo. The Popular Movement of Kosovo was the force behind the Kosovo Liberation Army. In 1998, Qosja organised the Albanian Democratic Union, a loose group of intellectuals and former LDK members. He was one of the two candidates for the duty of spokesperson for Kosovo Liberation Army. Qosja participated in the talks in Rambouillet as the leader of the Albanian Democratic Union.

3.4 Collecting discursive data/materials

The discourse analysis relies on multiple sources of evidences. Foucault (1991: 76-77) wrote that discourse analysis, “… requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material”. Ho & Tsang (2000), Carabine (2001), etc, write that discourse analysis demands an inclusive approach to data collection. If we study, for example, nationalism, than we should expect to find observable data of national discourse in texts like school books, historical essays, poetry; in social practices like education, military service, religious practices; institutions like schools/ university, TV; informal institutions like informal networks of alumni, soldiers etc. (Hook 2001; Neumann 2001)

Data used in discourse analysis, includes documents, interviews, observations, and physical artefacts. With physical artefacts, we mean non-text artefacts like posters, pictures etc. In an ideal research, we should make use of all these sources of evidence. However, Foucault underlined the advantages of language (Saussure used the
notion parole, while Chomsky uses the notion performance), especially written language. First, writing is the most important technology that we use to reveal our meaning. Second, texts/writings have a fixed source and supply a broad audience with readymade meanings. (Neumann 2002) Third, the strength of documents is that they are stable, exact, unobtrusive, and provide a broad coverage of the object.

Data used in this essay consists of written documents only (interviews, articles, books, press releases, etc). This study takes a multi-perspective approach covering both documents written for the Albanian press and the foreign media. The translations from Albanian to English are of mine.

The Albanian leaders were not interviewed for three reasons. First, Zajmi and Agani, two of the main text contributors, passed away. Second, it was impossible to interview the subjects during the research period. This changed after 1999, but by then, the context had changed radically allowing a change of representations. The goal was to study how meaning evolved during the period 1990-1999 rather than after 1999. Third, many discourse analysts resists the idea of conducting interviews. They fear that the researcher’s questions can mask the real discourse. (Taylor 2001a)
4. THE ALBANIAN CONTEXT

The New York Times published in November 1990 a CIA analysis, which predicted that war was going to break out in Yugoslavia within an 18 months period. The war did break up, but not in Kosovo, Yugoslavia’s powder keg. (Neier 1994; Judah 1997; Vickers 1998; Motes 1999; Malcolm 1998) The historical events (1989-1990) produced radical changes in the Albanian leadership. New leaders addressed the national question with a new world understanding and strategy. A short retrospective journey is necessary to realise the political background of the new political leaders and groups.

4.1 The predecessors of the Albanian national movement

Three political groups dominated the Albanian political scene during the period 1945-1989. The oldest force consisted of the remnants of the pre-WWII elite: a mix of monarchical, nationalist, and anti-Communist elements. The most important fraction was the Albanian National-Democratic Organisation created during the WWII. The Organisation fought unsuccessfully the Yugoslav partisan army. After 1945, the Organisation acted in co-operation with the Albanian émigré organisations, Balli Kombëtar (National Front), Legaliteti (Legality), and the Western intelligence services. Its influence in Kosovo fizzled out due to two reasons. First, UDB-a (the Yugoslav Secret Service) arrested its main leaders in 1947. Second, the Organisation lost its Western support after the rapprochement between the West and Yugoslavia in 1948.

The second political force was the hierarchy of League of Communist of Yugoslavia (hereafter LCY). It included party officials and high civil servants, i.e. the provincial power bearing elite. Its top stratum, commonly known as ‘the clan of Gjakova’⁴, was a tight group of individuals connected by their political activity/position and through family and friendship ties. They were former members of the Communist Party of Albania, sent to Kosovo to help the organisation of the Communist resistance there. The provincial LCY leadership exercised tight control over the appoint-
ments and political decisions. As the number of civil servants and graduated professionals expanded, nepotism was enhanced with cronyism.

The Albanian Communist leaders intended to create the Republic of Kosovo, but slowly, careful not to infuriate Tito. The Albanian leadership acted through party and bureaucratic channels. The limits and the possibilities to do so were situational and poorly defined. Nevertheless, the Titists were considered a *benign* opposition. While the other Republican leaderships tried to diminish the power of the Federate, the Albanian leaders tried to cut the ties with Serbia by rallying the help of Federative institutions. The 1981 grassroots demonstrations showed that the Albanian communist leaders were loosing their control over the Albanians. The demonstrations put the Albanian leadership in an impossible position between the Albanians and the Federative institutions.

The pre-World War II Albanian intelligentsia left Kosovo or it was wiped out. Initially, the new stratum of Albanian intellectuals grew slowly. The process accelerated only after 1966 and especially after the opening in 1969 of the University of Prishtina. The Albanian intellectuals (the majority employed at the University of Prishtina) served as an appendix to the provincial LCY leadership. Their dissonance to the conditions in Kosovo followed the lines drawn by the provincial LCY leadership. They developed slowly their own Aesop-a-like language to criticise the Yugoslav system or evoke the Albanian history and nationalism. However, they never tried to turn the popular respect into political power or play any such role. Their *struggle* consisted of long deliberations in coffeehouses close to University campus.

The third political formation consisted of Marxist-Leninist cells, politically orientated towards Enver Hoxha and Albania. (Judah 2000b) Adem Demaći created the first group, the Revolutionary Movement for the Unification of the Albanians, in 1961. Demaći wrote the statute of the movement emphasising that the goal was *liberation* and *unification*. His statute served as a model for the Popular Red Front created in 1980 in Germany by the Gërvalla brothers. The third group was the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo leaded by Kadri Zeka and based in Switzerland. After 1982, the groups tried to co-operate with each other. They held a secret meeting in Istanbul in the presence of an Albanian diplomat, but failed to reach an agreement.
The radicals managed to preserve the spirit of national resistance and the idea of unification with Albania. (Demaçi 1990) The radicals blamed the colonialist/imperialist policy of the Great Powers for the annexation of Kosovo and the Serb occupation and capitalism for producing political oppression, social inequality, and economic backwardness. The prerequisites for the development of Kosovo were independence, the creation of united Albania, and Communism as leading ideology. (Vickers 1998; Judah 2000a) The Marxists were convinced that the unification with Albania was impossible. Shatri, an aide to Gërvalla brothers said, “No one thought Yugoslavia could be destroyed … it was the ‘West’s little darling’”. (Judah 2000a: 105) Therefore, all the groups opted for a more practical, short-term goal, the Albanian republic in Yugoslavia. It was the first step as the groups waited for a better time for the unification idea. (Lalaj 2000)

Regarding the means to achieve the goals, Demaçi wrote, “Our movement … shall use all the methods and means that it posses, from those political-propaganda- peaceful means to armed struggle and popular general uprising- non-peaceful means”. (Article 2) Gërvalla supported the strategy of *guerra prolongata popolare*. He foresaw three phases of resistance. The first phase consisted of increasing the ideological and political conscience of masses. During the phase two, the movement would use any peaceful means such as strikes, demonstrations, protests etc. The third phase was the armed struggle to achieve unification. (Lalaj 2000) On January 17, 1982, the Serb Secret Service assassinated the brothers Gërvalla and Kadri Zeka. The assassinations and the repression that followed the 1981 demonstrations convinced the leaders of the Movement that war was unavoidable. *It was simply a matter of time.* (Judah 200b)

In February-March 1982, the Albanian groups came to an agreement and created *The Movement for the Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia*, commonly known as the Movement. The Movement adopted the political platform of the Front of Republic of Kosovo developed by Kadri Zeka and Hydajet Hyseni. The fall of Communism revived the discussion about the ideology and the tactics of the Movement. In the Second Meeting of the Movement, the moderates left the Movement that now operated under the name *Lëvizja Popullore për Republikën e Kosovës* (Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo-LPRK). Only 2 years latter (1992), a more moder-
ate/pragmatic group of leaders replaced the radicals. The Movement operated now under the name *Popular Movement of Kosovo*, abbreviated as LPK. Without denouncing explicitly the Communist past, they tried to reform the Movement from a political/ideological sectarian group to a pro-democratic national-liberation front.

### 4.2 The events that preceded the Albanian national movement

In March 1981, the students of University of Prishtina organised the first demonstration demanding better living conditions. Only days latter, the demonstrations turned political and the participants demanded the status of republic. The provincial leadership predominantly Albanian labelled the demonstrations as “counter-revolutionary” (Hasani 1981: 22) and acted to quell those by massive use of police violence followed by political trials\(^7\), ‘differentiation’\(^8\), and an even more exigent application of the criterion of ‘political-moral suitability’ introduced in 1973.

However, there was the activity of the Serbian intellectuals that culminated in the Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Sciences, which terrified the Albanian intellectuals. The Memorandum\(^9\) came along with a wave of letters, petitions, meetings and gatherings of Serbs intellectuals and/or Serbs from Kosovo. On 24 April 1987, Milošević organised the first demonstration of the Serbs in Kosovo. The police, predominantly Albanian, intervened brutally and Milošević approached to the already agitated Serbs with the phrase “No one is allowed to beat you!”\(^10\) That phrase made him the undisputed leader for almost 10 years. (Magaš 1993; Silber & Little 1995; Miller 1997; Malcolm 1998; Vickers 1998; Meier 1999; Motes 1999; Mønnesland 1999; Thomas 1999; Judah 2000a; Dragović-Soso 2002; Kostovicova 2000; Todorova 2000)

In July 1988, Milošević organised the Serbs in Kosovo and used them as shock troops in the ‘*happenings of the people*‘.\(^11\) On 19 November 1988, the Albanian leaders admitted the constitutional changes under pressure from Belgrade and continuous Serb demonstrations. Until that moment, they hoped to appease Milošević with some personal/decorative/rhetoric changes. They expected help from the Federative institutions, but these were blocked and ‘Yugoslavism’ and ‘balance of power’ had become outdated. Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia were trying to change unilaterally the organis-

The Albanian answer came too late. Only on 24 January 1989, the Albanians organised their first demonstrations. Milošević reacted immediately. On 24 February, the Serb parliament adopted the constitutional changes. Facing huge demonstrations and hunger strikes in Kosovo, Milošević forced the collective Yugoslav presidency to declare the state of emergence (27 February) and arrested Azem Vllasi12 (2 March). On 24 March 1989, the Kosovo Assembly approved the constitutional changes recognising de jure the abolition of autonomy. Only 10 MPs dared to vote against the changes. 1,500 extra officers from the All Yugoslav Special Police, 15,000 soldiers, and rumours about detention lists did the trick. Small clashes between Serb police and Albanians continued during all 1989. The detention of 237 Albanian intellectuals and the threat to detain another 300 paralysed the Albanian elite. The Albanian elite remained in limbo until the legalisation of political pluralism in Serbia. (Malcolm 1998; Silber & Little 1995; Thomas 1999; Judah 1997, 2000a; Motes 1999; Vickers 1998, 2000; Meier 1999)

4.3 A new leadership takes over
The abolition of autonomy and the political changes in Eastern Europe had a great impact on the further organisation of the Albanian movement. (Gjeloshi 1992) First, in the other Yugoslav republics, the Communist elite remained intact and leded the transition to democracy and independence. The state institutions were preserved and used to achieve independence. The Albanians leaders, on the other side, failed to resists to Milošević’s salami tactic. Milošević discredited and purged them one after the other destroying in process the institutional structures in Kosovo.

Second, the Marxists were the organisers of the demonstrations in 1989. However, they failed to keep the momentum. They were experiencing an identity crisis as the Communist regime in Albania was collapsing. The Albanians in Kosovo were disappointed with the reality of Albania. All the other Albanian political parties (as LCY in Kosovo did before it scattered) blamed the 1981 demonstrations for provoking the 1981-1989 repression. They depicted the Marxists as imprudent, tactically reckless
and hasty, and ideologically opposed by USA and Europe. Generally, the Marxists were popular and considered trustworthy as individuals, but not suitable as political leaders.

Third, the new class of leaders came out the Albanian intelligentsia. The new leaders were highly motivated and the majority of them as university lecturers enjoyed the respect of the Albanians. However, they lacked political and organisational experience. It was the first time they dared to take over a political role and stand against Milošević. Further, their political activity suffered from egotistic interdivisions.

4.4 The formation of the Albanian national movement

Two institutions played an important role in the political organisation of the Albanian elite after the abolition of autonomy. The first one was the Writers’ Association of Kosovo. The Albanian members of the Association proclaimed in April 1988 the first national programme. The second group was the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo (APHSK). The APHSK organised a number of manifestation, petitions, gathering etc. The Associations were an intermediary organisation phase until the new parties were legalised. (Maliqi 1998b; Malcolm 1998; The Kosovo Report 2000)

On December 7, 1989, members of APHSK founded the Prishtina Branch of the Union for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI). UJDI was the last effort to preserve Yugoslavia as a united and democratic country, either as a federate or as a confederate. Its initiators propagated that there were more reasons to stay together than to dismember Yugoslavia. The Union promoted a combination of sovereignty of citizens-individuals and republics and tried to find a new formula for the federation. Probably more important than their political goals there was their political strategy. The UJDI called for the solution of the problems through democratic means, bilateral and multilateral talks and not through unilateral actions. (Maliqi 1998b; Malcolm 1998)

The Democratic League of Kosova was founded on 23 December 1989 as the national party of the Albanians in Yugoslavia. As the dissolution of Yugoslavia proceeded rapidly, the LDK lost its all-Yugoslav feature and it was re-conceptualised as
the party of the Albanians in Kosovo. The Albanians in Macedonia decided to found their own political party, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP).

LDK copied the organisation of LCY. It created a number of mass organisations (youth, women etc) in order to unite all the Albanians in Kosovo. “Both DLK and PDP were based on the model of dominant national parties, like those first established in Slovenia and Croatia and later in the other parts of former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, where the “pluralist” space at the very beginning was divided on an ethnic base.” (Maliqi 1998b: 223) At the same time, the LCY disintegrated and whole LCY cells joined LDK. LDK declared that its goals were democracy, federal Yugoslavia, the rule of law and political pluralism. The main goal was certainly the problem of the status of Kosovo. In May 1990, the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo represented its Declaration, which served to legitimise the actions of LDK. The Declaration called for Kosovo as “independent and equal subject in Yugoslavia”.

The other political parties were created shortly after LDK. There were no ideological differences, but rather personal divergences between their leaders. Nevertheless, LDK was very effective in the first months of its existence and caught the main part of the Albanians. (Maliqi 1998b) Under pressure from the other political parties, LDK agreed to create the Democratic Forum of Kosovo on 1 July 1990 as a coordination instrument for the Albanian movement. On 28.08.1991, the Albanian political parties created a new council gathering all the Albanian parties in the former Yugoslavia. (Gjeloshi 1992) The Forum declared that its main goal was to establish “the sovereignty of Kosova as a constitutive entity of the Yugoslav community in equal terms with its other entities”.

The members of the Assembly of Kosova, elected in 1989, switched their loyalty from LCY to LDK. On 2 July 1990, 115 Albanian members of the parliament issued a Political Declaration, proclaiming the Republic of Kosova and its equality to all the other Yugoslav republics. The Declaration did not have the power of law and it was not legally binding. However, on 26 June 1990, the Serbian Assembly had voted already to suspend the Assembly of Kosova. On 5 July 1990, the Albanian members of the Assembly voted for the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. On 7 September 1990, they met again and approved the new constitution declaring Kosovo a republic
within the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The declaration and the respective Constitutional changes were one of many unilateral legal actions undertaken by different Yugoslav units after the Federation ceased to function. (Judah 2000a; von Kohl & Libal 1992; Maliqi 1998b; Surroi 1998a; Troebst 1998)

From 26 to 30 September 1991 the Albanians (87.01% of the voters) voted in a referendum and endorsed their constitution (99.87% pro). On 19 October 1991, the Parliament met and declared Kosova ‘a sovereign and independent state’. On 23 December 1991, the Government of Kosova applied unsuccessfully to USA and EU for recognition. The parliament of the Republic of Albania recognised the independence of Kosova; however, the Albanian government did not follow the declaration. (Troebst 1998)

In May 1992, the Albanians went to polls to elect their new parliament, the first since the declaration of independence. The new parliament had 143 seats and Democratic League of Kosova leaded by Rugova won 96 of these. Rugova became the first president of the Republic of Kosova. (Simić 1998; Troebst 1998)
5. “NO ‘SPECIAL STATUS’, NO THIRD REPUBLIC, BUT ONLY INDEPENDENCE!”

5.1 Rugova and his self-image

Mehmet Kraja, Jusuf Buxhovi, Fehmi Agani, etc were planning the foundation of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). However, they could not agree about the leader of the party and decided to co-opt someone outside their ranks. They asked first Rexhep Qosja, but he refused to lead the party. Then, they offered the job to Rugova, who had just published a ‘strong’ article in Der Spiegel. Rugova accepted immediately and since that day, he became the undisputed leader of the LDK.

Rugova grew up in an anti-Communist peasant family that had suffered a lot in the period immediately after the WWII. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 153) never forgot the Serb/Communist massacres in 1945. “The eliminations were systematic, they were liquidated, killed or imprisoned, all the important and well-known people in Kosovo. My grandfather was killed, my father was killed” (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 124). Nevertheless, Rugova attended the Prishtina branch of the University of Belgrade, and during that time, besides his studies, he edited the student newspaper and joined the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Latter he worked as a researcher at the Albanological Institute, editor of its scientific journal, and president of the Writers Association of Kosovo.

Rugova (1994b) represented himself as the successful researcher that was compelled by the political circumstances to participate in politics and lead the largest Albanian political party in Kosovo. “I entered [politics] to defend, to do something, to create the proper conditions so the nation could develop, not to do political career.” (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 206) Rugova declared that the political circumstances were the forceful constitutional changes that abrogated the autonomy of Kosovo. “On Mars 23, 1989, I reacted and said ‘I do not accept this, I cannot accept this’”. (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 124) Rugova claimed that he was sacrificing himself for the nation facing every day the peril of being killed by the Serb police. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 54) declared, “Probably, they are saving me for the end… to provoke
even more the Albanians… I have taken the danger upon myself”. To the foreign media and diplomats, Rugova repeated that he possessed a modern philosophy after one year at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales attending the lectures of Roland Barthes. Rugova claimed that his political philosophy was inspired by existentialism and reflected the best Albanian values.

5.2 The Albanians- repressed, discriminated and threatened by Milošević and Serbia

The discourse of the leaders of the LDK\textsuperscript{18} concentrated on the position of the Albanians in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. (Rugova 1989a, 1990e; Agani 1994a; Cana 1990b) The LDK leaders declared that the Albanians were experiencing an unparalleled campaign of political and judicial repression. The repression that began immediately after the 1981 demonstrations was intensified after Milošević became the leader of the League of Communists of Serbia. Rugova (1990c: 131) wrote, “The present situation in Kosovo is the outcome of nine years of repression and anti-democratic policy, which has reached its culmination in the present extremist Serbian policy that gives prominence to ‘territory, volunteers, and weapons’”.

The LDK leaders described the Albanians as socially and politically discriminated by the Serb minority, which enjoyed preferential treatment regarding employment and housing. (Rugova 1989a; Allain & Galmiche 1994, Agani 1994a) The Albanian graduates felt especially discriminated. Their Serb counterparts treated them contemptuously as quasi-intellectuals, less qualified and with dubious scientific credentials. Rugova (1989b: 192) retorted, “Of course, we do not have a tradition of a university like that of Belgrade or Zagreb, but what they [Serbs] say about its [University of Prishtina] quality is debatable”.

Further, the LDK leaders described the Albanian nation as the poorest in Yugoslavia. (Rugova 1988, 1989b, 1990c; Zajmi 1991) Agani (1994a: 86, 200) wrote, “Kosova is economically backward, socially undeveloped … with the highest unemployment level and the lowest incomes… In comparison with the other regions, living is more difficult in Kosova. …poverty and unemployment, first of all, are for the Albanians, the Muslims, and the Roma”.

However, the LDK leaders drew primarily the attention of the Albanian public to the situation created in Kosovo because of the “… hegemonistic, unitary, militaristic policy of Serbia and its leadership guided by Milosevic”. (DAPPK 1990) The LDK leaders declared that the constitutional changes and the anti-Albanian propaganda posed a great threat to the Albanians. They declared that the autonomy of Kosovo was the only institutional guarantee to their national rights. (Rugova 1989a, 1989b; Agani 1989a, 1992a, 1994a; Buxhovi 1989; Aliu 1989; Zajmi 1993a, 1993c) The LDK leaders argued that the constitutional changes and the anti-Albanian propaganda were not random actions, but they were part of a conscious anti-Albanian strategy conceived by Milošević and his aides. “The policy against the Albanians in Kosova is pursued in a conscious manner; so we are practically confronted with compulsory ghettoism”. (Rugova 1989c: 360)

The LDK leaders continually reinforced the representation of Milošević as an existential threat to the Albanian nation. (Rugova 1989a, 1989b, 1990c; Agani 1994a; Cana 1989; Buxhovi 1989) Rugova warned that Milošević was reviving Ranković and Ćubrilović, implying that Milošević had the same goal: to expulse the Albanians. Rugova (1989c: 360, 1988: 126) wrote, “This reminds me of some of Vasa Ćubrilović’s previous ideas… The anti-Albanian strategy of the Serbian bourgeoisie of the end of last century and the beginning of this century has been enriched with new elements according to the new conditions”. “When Ranković lost Tito’s support in 1966 and Ranković’s Serbian followers were removed, they threatened that one day they would return and take revenge. This is what is happening now”. (Rugova 1989a) Cana (1989: 176) argued, “Now, the battle for its [Kosovo’s] complete de-Albanianisation is beginning”. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 82-83) declared, “[we] …began to understand that behind all this [the constitutional changes] hung the threat against our very existence”.

5.3 Ethnic conflict as elite manipulation

The LDK leaders continued to pursue the official Yugoslav discourse. They rejected nationalism as ideology and denied the Serb claim that they and/or the Albanians were nationalists. Agani (1994a: 113) defined nationalism as the deification of the
nation and its national interests to the detriment of the natural rights of the other nations, and condemned it as a form of national fascism. “Today it is not difficult to show the historical inconveniences and the objective damage of any kind of nationalism, regardless of what it may look like in the present political situation”. (Agani 1994a: 84)

Rugova denied that the Albanians were nationalists or that the Albanian mobilisation was inspired by nationalism. Instead, Rugova defined the Albanian mobilisation as legitimate defence of national and democratic rights and interests threatened by Milošević. Rugova (1989b: 190, 191) wrote, “There are nationalists, but this is an illness of every nation. I would not say there is nationalism among the Albanian masses… Our need for national identity is thought of as nationalism”.

The LDK leaders admitted that many Serbs felt a strong animosity towards the Albanians. (Cana 1990c, 1990d, 1990e; Agani 1994a; Rugova 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990b; Buxhovi 1990c; LDK 1990) However, they rejected any Serb claim that the Albanians were the cause or in any way responsible for the creation of their animosity. The Albanians were innocent because they had never harmed or caused any injustice against the Serbs. Rugova rebuffed the claim that the Serbs were leaving Kosovo because of ethnic pressure as “… a myth that they [Milošević & co] invented”. (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 90) The Serbs were leaving Kosovo because they could not “bear to have Albanians, too, in leading positions”. (Rugova 1989a: 26) Agani (1994a: 199) claimed that, “The relocations have many reasons: economic, social, family relations etc”.

Agani refused to accept the idea that the national/ethnic conflicts had an ‘objective’ base. The Serb animosity was not objective, but the result of old prejudices being manipulated by the Serb communist leadership. Agani (1994a: 87) wrote, “The myth which shows the Albanians as riotous, despotic and tyrant is still preserved, indeed, much is done to give it a new strength”. The LDK leaders maintained that Milošević and the Serb elite were unable to resolve the political crisis of Communism. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 158) declared, “… everything began with the possibility to choose between Communism and democracy”. Therefore, Milošević tried to prolong his reign by inventing the ethnic conflict between the Albanians and
the Serbs and transferring the conflict to the other Republics. Agani (1999) wrote, “... specifically the unresolved question of Kosova is the main ‘legitimatization’ of this regime”.

The LDK leaders declared that Milošević manipulated the Serb public by enlisting the help of certain Serb intellectuals and the Serb media. The Serb intellectuals compiled the nationalist programme, known as the Memorandum of the Academy of Sciences of Serbia. Agani (1994a: 139) depicted the Memorandum as “The Manifest of the Serb national-chauvinistic movement, the source and the inspiration of its destructive energies, the charter that initiated the crimes and the insanity”.

Media helped Milošević to accomplish two goals. First, Milošević diverted away the attention of the Serbs from the crisis of Communism and the democratisation of Yugoslavia. Agani (1994a: 80, 90) argued, “…some problems and political relations are manipulated, some problems are exaggerated with the purpose of covering up other questions and problems, or raising non-existent problems… to express something else than the real interests of their own people”. Second, Milošević legitimised the Serb repression over the Albanians. Agani (1994a: 188, 80, 89) wrote, “…new illusions are added to the old ones… the former prejudices are fostered and revived, adding new mistakes to the old ones… In essence; it [the Serb propaganda] contains the message that the Albanians are impossible to live with”.

The LDK leaders maintained that Milošević was endangering the co-existence between the ethnic groups. Cana (1989: 180) wrote, “It is an undisputable fact that, in Kosova, the old bridges of communication are being destroyed, and the foundations of coexistence, relations of good neighbourliness, mutual respect, and aid have been undermined”. Nevertheless, Rugova (1989b: 192) called for co-existence between the Albanians and the Serbs. “We have to collaborate and live together”.

5.4 Democracy and self-determination

The LDK leaders depicted the democratisation of Yugoslavia as the only way to resolve the systemic and national crisis. Rugova (1990a, 1990e) Rugova (1989d: 116) declared his confidence, “As I said, the only future is democracy, free elections and
free economic enterprise”. Agani (1994a: 91) reinforced his idea, “… the essence of the Albanian question in Yugoslavia is democratic, and it can be settled only through consistent democratisation”. Agani (1994a: 91) was optimistic about the effects of democratisation as “… the only way to establish democracy and national peace and to settle the national conflicts and many others”.

However, the LDK leaders argued that democratisation presupposed the equality of the nations. (Zajmi 1991, 1992b; Rugova 1989b, 1990c, 1990e) Agani (1994a: 203) wrote, “Equality is the fundamental prerequisite of the consequent democratisation… There can be no equality- we mean real equality and not verbal egalitarianism- if it is not both collective and individual”. Agani (1994a) considered the liberal idea of civil liberty and equality as incomplete because the individual equality and prosperity were a function of the national equality and prosperity. Agani argued that the Albanians were going to enjoy individual equality only if the Albanian nation was going to enjoy the same political and institutional rights as the other Yugoslav nations. Agani (1994a: 203) wrote, “Actually, the individual and collective equality puts forward the main demand of the Albanians: the recognition of their subjectivity in Yugoslavia”.

Therefore, the main demand was the Republic of Kosovo as equal member of the Yugoslav federation. Without the national equality, the democratisation of Yugoslavia was going to remain incomplete. (Agani 1994a; Rugova 1989e, 1990d; Buxhovi 1990a) Rugova (1989e: 17) declared, “…Yugoslavia ought to be a democratic federation of nations and nationalities … so that Kosovo, too, should have its equal place in Federal Yugoslavia”.

5.5 The discourse of self-determination
The LDK leaders declared that their goal was the Republic of Kosovo equal to all the other Yugoslav republics. (Rugova 1989a, 1989b, 1989e, 1990b; Agani 1994a; Buxhovi 1989, 1990a, 1990b) Agani argued that the Albanians had the innate right of self-determination and the Republic of Kosovo was its expression. Agani maintained that self-determination was not a political principle, but rather an objective right that belonged to very subject (nation) that fulfilled certain conditions. “In the concrete
case, the Albanian nationality, greater in number than some other nations of Yugo-
slavia, with a territorial concentration in proportion to the size of a nation, with many
cultural and other specific features, has the right of self-determination.” (Agani
1994a: 94) Rugova supported Agani by claiming that the Albanians had the historical
right over Kosovo. “Kosova is specific because it has its own historical and active
ethnos… An Illyrian-Albanian population exited and lived on through the centuries

Further, the Republic of Kosovo was going to complete the democratisation of
Serbia and Yugoslavia. Agani (1994a) quoted Karl Marx that no nation was free if it
denied the same freedom to another. The Serbs would be free only when the Albani-
ans would enjoy the same freedom. Last, but not least, the Republic of Kosovo was
the precondition to resolve all the economic and social problems of the Albanian na-

Until January 1991, the LDK leaders were not anticipating the dissolution of
Yugoslavia and saw the future of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia. Therefore, their first
demand was “… [their] inclusion in the processes of Yugoslav development”. (Rugova 1989b: 191) The LDK leaders rejected any claim that their goal was seces-
sion from Yugoslavia. Agani (1994a: 91) wrote, “The essence … is not secession-
ism”. The first statute of LDK began with the expression “The Albanians in Yugosla-
via have expressed their free will after the World War II to live in Yugoslavia”.
Rugova (1989a, 1989e) went even a step further and denied any desire to join Alba-
nia. He rejected the Albanian unification as a Serb propaganda ploy. Rugova (1989b:
195) retorted, “Albania is the national state of the Albanians, but I was born in Kos-
ova and I consider Yugoslavia my own state. I think that this Albania is pushed too
often under our noses”.

However, this declaration of loyalty to Yugoslavia did not stop Rugova from
threatening with secession and unification. Rugova (1989a: 26) warned, “… if the
oppression continues, then the people will seek a way out… either in the direction of
Albania, or in another direction” and again (Rugova 1989b: 195), “However, if this
policy continues in Kosova, some people will perhaps seek their state in Albania and
consider it as ‘something better’”.

In January 1991, Rugova called a secret meeting of the Coordination Council of the Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia. (Surroi 1998a) The Political Declaration of this meeting was published on 12 October 1991, immediately after the Referendum of Republic of Kosova. Facing the calls of Slovenia and Croatia for independence, the leaders of the Albanian political parties formulated three different options for the resolution of the Albanian question. First, if the internal and external borders remained unchanged, than the Albanians were going to demand the status of republic for Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, the status of constitutive nation in Macedonia and self-administration in Montenegro and Serbia. The second option anticipated the change of the borders between the Republics. In this case, LDK was going to demand the creation of the Republic of the Albanians. Third, if external borders of Yugoslavia changed, then the Albanians in Yugoslavia with a plebiscite were going to decide the territorial unification with Albania. (CCAPPY 1991; Gjeloshi 1992; Allain & Galmiche 1994)

5.6 The strategy to achieve the political goal
In retrospective, the LDK leaders admitted that they had no prepared/elaborated strategy to answer to Milošević. (Zajmi 1993b) Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994) excused the tactical deficiencies with the lack of time and the rapid political development. The pace of events forced the LDK to improvise underway.

The LDK concluded that two factors were influencing the development of the Yugoslav crisis. The first factor was the intervention of the Yugoslav federative institutions, Slovenia, and Croatia. In 1968, after the first Albanian demonstrations, Tito intervened and expanded the autonomy of Kosovo. Although, disillusioned with the Federative institutions and their appeasement policy towards Milošević, the LDK leaders continued to expect for a similar solution, from above and outside Kosovo. The Federative institutions, Slovenia, and Croatia were going to resolve the conflict in the favour of the Albanians, just as Tito did in 1966-1968. (Buxhovi 1989; Zajmi 1991) Cana (1989: 181) wrote, “What is going to stop them [the Serbs] and bring them to their senses? Perhaps a new Brioni Plenum22?! But perhaps for this we have still to wait”. Cana (1990a: 49) would repeat the same idea; “The future of Kosovo
depends totally on the stand of the other peoples of Yugoslavia… It also depends on the ratio of forces in Yugoslavia… We can hope for something to be done only if the other republics oppose Serbia, if they will eventually succeed in persuading the Yugoslav presidency to set up an unbiased state commission to deal with the question of Kosovo”. Rugova (1989a) called for the help of the Federal institutions, also, “…it is the right moment for them to intervene and stop the Serbian arbitrariness”.

The second factor was the role and the strategy of the Albanian movement. The LDK leadership was split in two groups: the radicals that called for the escalation of the conflict, and the moderates that opposed any such move. The decision rested on Rugova (1989a, 1989b) and he wavered between contradictory statements. In the same interview, Rugova (1989a: 24) spoke against any armed actions: “My impression is that there are forces in Yugoslavia which desire precisely terrorist actions in Kosova. If shots are fired from amongst us, this serves as a justification to step up the repression… You can imagine who engages in such speculations”. However, to the question: “Are they [the Albanians] preparing for a civil war?” Rugova (1989a: 24, 27) answered clearly and unequivocally “People see no other way out. During the protests is always like this: if you do not get any echo, than you should shout even lauder. … If Serbia goes on suppressing our national identity, then there will be an uprising”.

In a second interview, Rugova (1989b: 193) tried to correct his previous statement (Rugova 1989a). “I said ‘insurrection’ in the meaning of an attempt to redress injustices, not in the meaning of ‘armed uprising’ as it is attributed to me by the Belgrade press now”. However, Rugova (1989b: 194) concluded the interview once more with a fierce statement, “If pressure and policies, which lead to the restriction of our rights are continued, disturbances can be expected. Only I do not know in what form. The consequences could be catastrophic”.

The detention of 245 Albanian intellectuals in March 1989 was a warning (Rugova 1989a, 1989c, 1989d) that it was more at stake than their university tenures. Rugova was convinced that his name was in a second detention list that for unknown reasons remained unused. Rugova (1989b: 187) confessed, “It is hard on me to meet people in the street and to find out that they are astonished I am still free”. The massacres
committed by the Serb police during January-February 1990 forced Rugova to decide definitely about the LDK tactic. (Rugova 1990a, 1990c) On January 31, 1990, Rugova (1990d) “… made a statement to Prishtina TV demanding the cessation of rallies so as to avoid further bloodshed”. On 30 June 1990, Rugova (Declaration of APPK 1990), in the name of the Albanian Political Parties in Kosova called again “… upon all its citizens not to respond to provocation, to avoid conflict, and at the same time to remain vigilant, observe events closely”.

Rugova declared that LDK would stand to the Serb violence through civil disobedience. Rugova provided only one practical advice to the Albanians: do not react. Agani (1994a: 95) explained the new strategy. “We think about the solution of Kosovo only as a peaceful solution. War and violence can only ‘strengthen’ the occupation, deepen the crisis, but can not resolve and overcome it”.

First, Rugova became convinced that Milošević was trying to provoke an uprising. “At present Belgrade acts according to this logic: we kill them first, then sit down and talk with the rest of them”. (Rugova 1990c: 147) Milošević was going to exploit any act of violence as an excuse to massacre and expulse as many Albanians as possible. (Buxhovi 1990b) Rugova (Impact International 1992: 10) summarised, “In fact, the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be massacred”.

Second, Rugova concluded that the Albanians could not resist against the Yugoslav police and army. Rugova (Impact International 1992: 10) justified his fear of armed actions, “We are not certain how strong the Serbian military presence in the province actually is, but we do know that it is overwhelming and that we have nothing to set against the tanks and the other modern weaponry in Serbian hands. … We would have no chance of successfully resisting the army”.

Third, the LDK leaders (Rugova 1989a) believed that any insurrection in Kosovo would help Milošević to mobilise the Serbs along the ethnic lines and away from democratisation. Buxhovi (1990c: 152) wrote, “We are convinced that the forces which are interested in the preservation of the current situation in Kosova and Yugoslavia, also, encourage the present excesses, which help them to remain in power”.
Forth, Rugova believed that Milošević would use any armed action to discredit the Albanian movement by representing it as terrorism. “And if the resistance of the Albanians against Serbian hegemony can be denounced in foreign countries as terrorism, then it can be calculated that international sympathy for our cause will soon pass.” (Rugova 1989a: 24)

Fifth, the LDK leaders believed that Milošević was a short-lived phenomenon. Agani (1994a: 90) wrote, On the contrary, we must see the crisis as something temporary that can be overcome”. Rugova (1989b: 197) shared the same idea, “I think that his [Milošević’s] policy won’t last long. He had gone far enough, and here I am referring not only to Kosova and Serbia, but also to the whole Yugoslavia”. Rugova believed that even Milošević knew that and therefore, he was looking for a quick confrontation. On the contrary, the Albanians benefited from a strategy that postponed the confrontation.

5.7 The Albanians under the Serb occupation

Rugova (1989b: 199) had declared already in 1989, that Serbia occupied Kosovo after the Balkan Wars and separated it from Albania. Against their will, the Albanians in Kosovo became part of Serbia instead of their mother-state: Albania. As the Yugoslav dissolution was speeding up, the LDK leaders developed this idea further: Kosovo was under Serb occupation. (Agani 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1998r; Rugova 1993b, 1994b; Zajmi 1993a, 1993b, 1994a; Cana 1993)

The LDK leaders argued that historically and legally speaking, Kosovo was a distinct territory inhabited by the Albanians that joined Yugoslavia after the WWII as an independent unit and not as part of Serbia. Further, the 1974 Yugoslav constitution granted to Kosovo all the prerogatives of a Republic inside the Yugoslav federation. Last, but not least, LDK leaders declared that the constitutional changes initiated by Milošević, and approved under violence, were illegal. They did not represent the will of the Albanians, but were the legal camouflage that Serbia used to occupy Kosovo. Agani (1994a: 93) wrote, “The Serb hegemonic aggression against Kosova and the Albanians was intensive since 1981, but during the period 1989-1990 it developed to
the complete and violent demolition of the political-constitutional position of Kosova and the Albanians in former Yugoslavia”.

The LDK leaders used every chance to point out the systematic violence that Milošević (and the Serbs) was exercising over the Albanians in order to preserve the occupation of Kosovo. (Agani 1993, 1994a, 1996a, 1998r; Cana 1993; Ismajli 1993; Zajmi 1993a, 1993b) Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 56, 60) declared, “We are experiencing the effects of a massive and everyday terror… Yes, as it’s often said, [Kosovo] is ‘a vast prison’ or ‘a concentration camp’”. The LDK leaders accused Milošević of committing genocide. His goal was to expulse silently and slowly the Albanians from their historical territories and change the ethnic structure of Kosovo. (Agani 1994a; Bukoshi 1998c) Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 57, 62) declared, “The key word is quiet ‘ethnic cleansing’ … people still leave because of repression”.

The LDK leaders erased any difference between Milošević, Serbia and the Serbs in Kosovo. The LDK leaders represented the Serbs in Kosovo as part of the occupying force. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 55, 107, 114) wrote, “We are totally occupied, ruled by the Serb minority and the Belgrade leaders. … 8% Serbs [in Kosovo] …have the power in their hands. … Because, they armed the Serb civilians in 1991- with every kind of weapon”.

5.8 The Republic of Kosovo

The Badinter Advisory and Arbitration Commission, the Conferences of London and Hague decided to respect the internal borders and grant the international recognition only to the republics. Privately, Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 175) called the international recognition of Macedonia ‘a catastrophe’ because it put an end at their dream of uniting all the Albanians in Yugoslavia in one republic. In the end of 1992, Rugova summoned again the Coordination Council of the Albanian Political Parties. The Council released a new declaration. “We, as Coordination Council withdrew from the third option of the unification of our nation, as it was emphasised if Yugoslavia was dissolved, because the international factors do not support the Albanian question… Our nation is unprepared for war… However, with our peaceful policy we shall arrive, understandably a little ‘slower’, to the realisation of our national de-
mands”. (Kelmendi 1998: 19) From that moment, Rugova spoke only about the question of Kosovo. Rugova justified the political changes with the need to be realistic and pragmatic. The Albanians could not challenge the decisions of the European Powers. If they pushed with the Albanian unification, they risked losing even Kosovo to Serbia. (Clark 2000)

The LDK leaders debated three possible solutions for Kosovo. The first, proposed by Drašković and later Ćosić, called for the division of Kosovo between Serbia and Albania. Agani (Schmidt 1996) interpreted it as “… a proof that the original nationalist aggression has been defeated”. The LDK leaders argued that this plan revealed that Serbia was interested on the natural resources and had no significant historical or ethnic interests in Kosovo. (Zajmi 1993c; Rugova 1993a, 1993e) Therefore, Rugova (1993f, 1995f) rejected the plan in unequivocal terms, “Our stance is clear, that it can neither be done nor accepted any division of Kosovo… It is clear that now Serbia offers the division where it shall take all the areas with natural and economic resources. This is unacceptable. …For us, as well as for the West, this is unacceptable”. Further, Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 94) declared, “This is not a solution, because almost 1 million Albanians were going to remain outside a reduced Kosovo”.

The second solution was the 1974 autonomy under international guarantee. Agani admitted that autonomy under international guarantees represented an improvement from the lawless situation. However, the LDK refused to accept autonomy as the final solution for Kosovo. Agani (Judah 2000a: 93) declared, “To tell us we have to be part of Serbia means we have to continue to suffer under Serbian occupation. This line has no perspective”. Agani (1994a: 97) argued that the autonomy-solution “… does not take into account the fact that the former autonomy of Kosova cannot be reinstated because Yugoslavia does not exist any longer”. Even more important, the former autonomy proved to be vulnerable and it failed to protect the Albanians from the Serb abuses of power. Rugova (1995b: 2) repeatedly rejected the autonomy as a solution “… because we have a very bad experience with the Yugoslav federation”. A new autonomous Kosovo, albeit under international guarantees, was going to suffer from the same deficiencies. (Rugova 1993c, 1993e, 1993f, 1994c, 1995a, 1995b; Bukoshi 1994; Agani 1994b, 1996a; Zajmi 1993a, 1993b, 1994b) Rugova (1995b: 2) wrote,
“This means that we have to find an ethnic solution, in which we should be free of fear”.

The third option was the independence of Kosovo. The LDK organised a referendum, (exactly as Slovenia and Croatia) on September 26-30, 1991. 99.87% of the voters supported the independence of Kosovo. The LDK leaders represented the Albanian demand for statehood as part of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and not secession. Agani (1998f) wrote, “In Yugoslavia, Kosovo was a constituent element, with a defined border. That Yugoslavia does not exist anymore. Moreover, as with the other states- Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Macedonia- Kosovo should have the right to decide its own status… present-day Yugoslavia is a new state, and it is not our state… In reality, this new state is Serbia”.

Rugova argued that the only right solution that could provide security for the Albanians was the independent Republic of Kosovo. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 110) kept repeating, “Today, we cannot remain alone with Serbia and we demand our independence” in every meeting with foreign diplomats. Agani (1994a: 87) wrote, “The independent Republic of Kosovo is the fundamental demand of the Albanians”. The Serbs had to understand that they could neither change the ethnic composition of Kosovo nor continue endlessly to suppress the Albanian majority. (Agani 1994b; Zajmi 1993a, 1994a; Rugova 1994b, 1994c, 1994d, 1996a, 1996b; Bukoshi 1996b)

The LDK leaders rebuffed the Serb claims over Kosovo. They repeated that the Albanians had the right to establish the Republic of Kosovo because they had the right of self-determination. The LDK leaders argued that the Albanians in Kosovo possessed both the historical right and the ethnic right over Kosovo. Historically, they were the autochthon nation in Kosovo inhabiting it since antiquity. Further, the Albanians were a sufficiently large national group that constituted the majority of the population in Kosovo. (Agani 1994a; Rugova 1993b, 1994b, 1996a, 1996b; Zajmi 1993a, 1993b, 1994a)

However, Rugova soon understood that the strongest point was that Serbia had no moral right and legitimacy to rule over Kosovo. The LDK leaders emphasised that Serbia had lost any moral right to rule over the Albanians. Milošević and Serbia were refusing to respect the national and democratic rights of the Albanians and were pur-
suing an open genocide and ethnic cleansing programme. Agani (1994a: 101) wrote, “After more than 10 years of discrimination and terror to the Albanians, in the conditions of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia cannot get support based on the principle of uti possidetis”.

Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994) proposed as a temporary step towards full independence a form of international protectorate in Kosovo. First, Rugova specified that the international protectorate (he called it a trusteeship) would calm the situation, re-build the administrative, economic, and social institutions, and give time for political talks about the future of Kosovo. Second, Rugova hoped that during the protectorate period, the Serbs were going to loose the war, Milošević was going to be removed from power and the Serbs would simply abandon Kosovo. (Rugova 1993a, 1993c, 1994a, 1994c, 1994d, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a; Agani 1994a, 1994b)

5.9 The strategy to achieve the political goals

The LDK leaders designed the civil resistance as a temporary tactic. However, once established, the strategy remained unchanged because Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 141) saw “No, no other solution” regarding the means to fight the occupation. Rugova (Kelmendi 1998: 32) emphasised, “Those that support the war, are somewhere else, in Tirana, or in Europe, but not in Kosovo… Let them come here and we shall see… We support only peaceful means”. Agani (1994a: 95) explained, “We think about the solution for Kosovo only as a peaceful solution, war and violence can only ‘reinforce’ the occupation and deepen the crisis, but cannot resolve and surpass it”.

The LDK leaders continued to believe that Milošević aimed at provoking a new confrontation and the subsequent expulsion of the Albanians. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 117) said, “They provoke us, hoping for a massacre…. We have the same fear: that our people come out of their houses and react. They [the Serbs] intend this… They do not need many soldiers- look, there are not many soldiers around Sarajevo, - and it is enough to push the buttons. With us, it is going to be even worse. Because, they intend the complete ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. It is going to be a massacre”. Agani argued that Milošević could also start an armed conflict in Kosovo
in order to manipulate the political situation in Serbia. Agani (1994a: 96) wrote, “In the case of an eventual crisis inside Serbia, the Serb regime would prefer to transfer the conflict in Kosova”.

Therefore, Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 109, 170) argued that because of the situation “The problem for us is to save the people …the goal of our policy is to avoid the tragedy”. The LDK leaders concluded that their primary duty was to control the population in order to avoid any reaction against the Serbs that could provoke ‘the confrontation’. (Rugova 1993c, 1995d, 1995e, 1996a, 1996b) Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 108) wrote, “We have to be very careful, because every move from our side is a pretext for massive imprisonment and maltreatment, especially of the intellectuals and the leaders of our movement”.

Rugova (1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) maintained that civil disobedience was the only possible form of resistance and it was proving itself as very successful. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 140) wrote, “…because of this patience we have won time. This is a more difficult road, but it is safer”. The other LDK leaders supported the same idea that their first concern was to save the Albanians. Agani (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 140) was quoted saying “The policy of Rugova saved the nation”.

Further, Rugova argued that a change of strategy was going to diminish the support from the Western powers. Rugova (Kelmendi 1998: 32) wrote, “Those that support other forms of activity aim to stop the internationalisation of the Albanian question, the support for us in the world, exactly at the moment when we have arrived at the time that Kosova is put forward as a question to be resolved, and the nation to remain under occupation”.

Rugova complemented the fear of the Serb retaliation with moral/cultural arguments. Rugova continuously tried to persuade the Western diplomats that the civil resistance was an expression of the Albanian cultural setting. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 130) declared, “The practice of non-violence in this situation corresponds to an aspect of our character, to a tradition of patience and prudence in the face of all dominations”. Rugova claimed that the Albanians had embraced the European values and their movement was modern and European. Rugova (Clark 2000: 67) declared, “We have learnt that non-violence is the modern European preference”.

The second pillar was the activity of the Serb actors. The LDK represented any contact with the Serb institutions/opposition as an act of betrayal ‘because it gave legitimacy to the occupation of Kosovo’. (QIK 1993; Rugova 1993c; Agani 1994a; Schmidt 1997) However, the main reason was that the Serb opposition was unable to depose Milošević. Further, Panić did not support the right of self-determination for the Albanians and offered to resolve the question of Kosovo through ‘self-government’ and ‘self-administration’. (Agani 1994a: 228) Agani (Judah 2000a: 79) said, “Panić is offering crumbs but it is not enough to resolve the crisis. … We cannot give total support to Panić because his position is not total support for us. The position of Panić is to reduce problems rather than resolve them”. Therefore, although under strong international pressure, the LDK refused to participate in the Serbian elections when Panić challenged Milošević for the presidency of Serbia.

The third pillar of LDK strategy was the support of the international community. The LDK leaders were convinced that USA and the European Union were going to play the decisive role in granting independence to Kosovo. Agani (1994a: 91) wrote, “In the process of Yugoslav dissolution… the international factor was and is very present, in a direct way, and in many cases also, in a decisive way… We should emphasise in this case the positive development and the democratisation of the international relations … in searching for the peaceful solution of the problems”. The confidence of the LDK leaders grew even stronger after the President Bush delivered the Christmas Warning (December 1992) to Milošević. (Danner 1999; Clark 2000; Judah 2000a)

Even as the war was raging through Bosnia, Rugova continued to hope for an international intervention in Kosovo. Rugova (Allain & Galmiche 1994: 58, 64) declared, “I bet … on my confidence on the international institutions. I still believe… I want to hope a little longer”. Rugova (1995e) was so confident that he did not hesitate to declare that he expected Kosovo to be independent and part of the European integration process by year 2000.

Rugova (1995e) believed that “… the spheres of interests in Europe… [that] existed during the Cold War” belonged to the past. The European integration was creating a new Europe based on justice and morality. Therefore, Rugova (1995a, 1995b,
1995b) believed that the USA and EU would feel morally obligated to stop the Serb violence and reward the Albanians for their civic resistance. Rugova inflated the media with the alleged support of the international community for the question of Kosovo. “Kosovo is put forward in every international organisation… Of course, we should never be satisfied, but we should not forget these successes, produce defeatism, disappointment etc.” (Rugova 1994b) “We should be satisfied that everyone is sad about our situation here and that they follow constantly the situation in Kosovo, especially the USA and I can add all the European countries.” (Rugova 1995a)

Rugova (1996a: 2) declared, “We hope as well, that the international community shall take into consideration our contribution to the peace in our region… I am convinced that we are going to be rewarded for this”. “USA have expressed respect and have supported continuously our policy of peaceful non-violence and avoidance of conflicts. This is recognition and help for our cause; this is a concrete recognition of our organisation, of our concept of state…” (Rugova 1996b)

Further, Rugova believed that the violation of the human and national rights was going to force the Europeans to conclude that any solution inside Yugoslavia was impossible. (Rugova 1993e; Zajmi 1993a; Agani 1994a) This belief was another reason that prevented the LDK from supporting Panić or the Serb opposition. McDowell (1993: 12) summarised the LDK policy, “Unless Serbia continues to be labelled as profoundly evil- and they themselves, by virtue of being anti-Serb, as the good guys- they are unlikely to achieve their goals”. The LDK arrived to the conclusion: The more the Albanians suffered under the Serb occupation, the better chance they had to get help from the Western powers. Agani (Judah 2000a: 79) formulated, “Frankly, it is better [for us] to continue with Milošević. … Milošević was very successful in destroying Yugoslavia and, in the same way, if he continues, he will destroy Serbia”.

Last, the LDK leaders listened very carefully to different Western declarations. For example, Warren Christopher (Danner 1999: 10) pointed “We [USA] fear that if the Serbian influence extends into [Kosovo and or Macedonia], it will bring into the fray other countries in the region- Albania, Greece, Turkey… So the stakes for the United States are to prevent the broadening of that conflict to bring in our NATO allies and to bring in vast sections of Europe, and perhaps, as happened before, broadening into
a world war”. Therefore, the LDK leaders maximized the danger of out-spill in order to gain support for their cause. (Agani 1994a; Rugova 1995b)

5.10 The Dayton Peace Accord and the LDK dilemma

The Dayton Peace Accord increased the expectations, although it did not mention the Albanians at all. Rugova speculated and overestimated three separate events. First, the USA and EU conditioned the outer wall of sanctions with the resolution of the question of Kosovo. The LDK leaders considered the sanctions as a victory for the Albanians, their demands and their civil disobedience tactics. Second, USA opened an information office in Prishtina. Agani represented it as an embassy in embryo, i.e. USA was treating Kosovo as a state in-making. Rugova (1996b) said, “The opening of this office creates possibilities for next step towards the resolution of the Albanian question”. Third, the LDK leadership deliberately speculated about a secret appendix to the Dayton Peace Accord regarding the status of Kosovo. (Agani 1996a, 1996b; Rugova 1996a, 1996b; Clark 2000)

It proved to be a short relief. Only three months latter, the EU announced that it was stabilising its relationships with FRY. Germany recognised the former Yugoslavia and prepared to return the Albanian refugees. Bukoshi (Judah 2000a: 125) declared, “It was a shock. We weren’t expecting it and it was a fatal mistake”. Bukoshi blamed the tactics that the LDK had pursued since 1990. “Meanwhile this non-violent attitude is viewed by Belgrade as an invitation to increase oppression and is seen by the international community as an excuse to ignore the situation”. (Kosova Communication 164) The LDK leaders understood that the civil disobedience had failed and those who fought in Bosnia, they won. Agani (Hedges 1998) summarized the Dayton Accord: “We learned that violence works. It is the only way, in this part of the world, to achieve what you want and get the attention of the international community.”

Rugova came under pressure to change the tactics. (Bukoshi 1996a) Bukoshi, the Prime Minister in exile, criticised openly Rugova “for lack of perspective”. “This year has taught us that the international community may move, may help, but it can never solve the whole issue, even less the capital issue. Everyone ought to do that himself”. (Bukoshi 1998c) Nevertheless, the LDK leaders rejected a change of the
tactics and refused to co-operate with the KLA because they did not believe that KLA could succeed in fighting the Serbs. (Agani 1998g, 1998w)

Rugova was also under strong pressure from the USA and EU to renounce independence and began talks with Milošević. Agani (Balkans Watch 1.3) explained, “These diplomats threaten us by saying ‘If you don’t do this, you will be in your own; the West will go’. However, Rugova could not renounce independence that easy because he judged the co-existence with Serbia as impossible. Agani (1999f) declared, “For the Albanians, the difficulty is to accept the integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia… We feel there is no future in Serbia and Yugoslavia”.

Under international pressure, Rugova was forced to meet Milošević in Belgrade, on May 15, 1998. De facto, Rugova renounced the independence and accepted to held talks with Milošević without the presence of international mediators. However, Rugova could not renounce independence de jure without some embellishment from the West and the support of the other Albanian leaders. (Lutovac 1997) Holbrooke organised a reception for Rugova by the US president, Clinton, on May 29, 1998. Upon his return to Kosovo, Rugova tried on two occasions, in July and August 1998, to get the support of Adem Demaçi and Rexhep Qosja. Both refused to support the renunciation of independence and denounced Rugova. Agani excused ‘the lack of unity’. “But we can’t unite for anything less than independence, without that the war will continue”. (Balkans Watch 1.3)

The LDK was under strong international pressure to begin talks with the Serb authorities. Rugova kept his silence, while Agani began to deliberate the compromise: Kosovo as the third republic of Yugoslavia. Agani (1998q) concluded, “Therefore we [should] engage for an interim settlement which would guarantee Kosova an equal status with the other units of FRY”. Agani (1998q) rejected, “… that the settlement should be sought within the framework of Serbia… there is no one in Kosova who is prepared to accept settlements, which legalize the Serbian rule in Kosova”. Agani recognised that Rugova could not renounce independence and therefore, he called for an international conference that would impose an agreement. Agani (1998m) declared, “Even the agreement on such compromise proposals is difficult, and perhaps it will need to be imposed”.
Therefore, Agani (1999e) described the Rambouillet talks as the best chance to succeed. Agani (1999d) was convinced that the Albanians had no other choice than “... to reach a compromise solution only in the way the international community projects it”. However, Agani did not consider the compromise as the final solution. It was more a postponement of the final solution and not a renouncement of the demand for independence. “After the deployment of the NATO troops in Kosova, which is a substantial component of the Agreement and a necessary prerequisite for its implementation, it is understandable that there can be no talk of Yugoslavia’s integrity and sovereignty in Kosova”. (Agani 1999e) Agani believed that after some time the Serbs were going to lose their interest on Kosovo and resign before the Albanian stamina. “Many people in Serbia today cannot understand this. But tomorrow many more will”. (Agani 1999f)

5.11 Summary
The LDK leaders began their discourse by representing the political situation. They described the Albanian nation as living under repression and discrimination. However, they concentrated themselves in depicting Milošević as an existential threat to the Albanians in Yugoslavia. They associated him with Ranković, Ćubrilović, expulsions and massacres aiming to destroy everything Albanian. The LDK leaders spoke about the final confrontation between the Albanians and the Serb leadership. Either they would succeed in creating the Republic of Kosovo or they would loose every national right and leave Kosovo forever.

The LDK leaders’ juxtaposition of the Albanians and the Serbs disputed the Serb discourse about the Albanian as malicious and a threat to the Serbs, Serbia, and even Europe. The LDK discourse represented the Albanians as innocent, discriminated, and persecuted. The Serbs, on the other side, enjoyed every national right and privilege. They had no reason to feel threatened or discriminated by the Albanians. Their animosity towards the Albanians had no ‘material base’, and it was the product of elite manipulation. Milošević could not resolve the political and economic crisis and invented the ‘the Albanian threat’ in order to divert the attention of the Serbs.
The LDK leaders challenged the Milošević discourse about the Albanians and Kosovo, but they remained well-inside the frames of the official Yugoslav (Tito) discourse of ‘brotherhood and unity’. The LDK leaders claimed that they were not nationalists, i.e. against ‘brotherhood’. They claimed that ethnic conflicts were unnatural and artificial bourgeoisie creations. Likewise, the official Yugoslav discourse treated every demand for secession as a mortal sin. The LDK leaders denied that their goal was secession and swore their loyalty to the ‘unity’ of Yugoslavia.

The LDK leaders called for the democratisation of Kosovo and Yugoslavia. However, they described the national equality as a necessary part of democracy. The LDK leaders described democracy both as a goal in itself, and as a means to realise the right of self-determination, i.e. the Republic of Kosovo. The LDK leaders emphasised that the right of self-determination was not a political principle, but a legal right. The Albanians fulfilled the criteria and therefore, they had the right to have their own Republic, equal to other Yugoslav nations. The Albanians could become equal citizens of Yugoslavia only if Kosovo was equal to the other Yugoslav units.

The most interesting point here is the strategy of the LDK. The LDK leaders debated the possible actions they could undertake to answer to the Serb violence: to escalate the situation, i.e. armed uprising, or to calm the situation, i.e. peaceful resistance. The decision was purely pragmatic. Rugova came at the conclusion that Milošević was looking for an escalation, while the Albanians were unprepared for war. The LDK leaders thought that Milošević would not last for more than a year and they could hold on a year. Therefore, Rugova called for the cessation of demonstrations and protests. The LDK leaders foresaw that the conflict was going to be resolved, as in 1968, in a party plenum pushing Milošević out of power opening the way for the democratisation of Yugoslavia and restoring the autonomy of Kosovo. After the restoration of autonomy, the LDK was going to demand via legal channels the status of republic.

The second phase begins with the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. The LDK leaders followed Slovenia and Croatia challenging both the Serb and Yugoslav discourse. The Albanians were no longer loyal citizens of Yugoslavia. They were a nation surviving under a ruthless occupation, colonisation and oppres-
sion since 1878. Simultaneously, the LDK leaders called the Serb living in Kosovo part of the occupation force. Rugova argued that the Serbs were controlling (and could control) Kosovo through open and ruthless violence denying to the Albanians every national and human right.

The LDK leaders had formulated three different goals based on three different scenarios. According to these options, if the external borders of Yugoslavia were going to change, then the Albanians in Yugoslavia were going to demand the unification with Albania. However, the external borders changed, and Rugova decided to demand only the independent Republic of Kosovo. There was another pragmatic decision camouflaged as the decision of the Coordination Council of the Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia. USA and EU had recognised Macedonia and Montenegro as independent states and they did not support a change of borders in favour of the Albanian question.

Rugova represented the independent Republic of Kosovo as the only right solution for the Albanians in Yugoslavia. The Albanians in Kosovo had the right of self-determination because they possessed both the historical and the ethnic right over Kosovo. Further, only the Republic of Kosovo could save the Albanians permanently from the Serb wrath. The LDK leaders used every instance of Serb violence against the Albanians as evidence that living with the Serbs or compromising with them was simply impossible. Rugova and his closest associates repeated in every press conference that the Western powers were showing respect for the peaceful resistance, they would reward the Albanians for their resistance and that the question of Kosovo was making progress.

The LDK leaders continued to believe that Milošević aimed at a quick and bloody victory against the Albanians. The LDK leaders decided against armed resistance in favour of peaceful resistance because they were convinced that they would suffer massive losses and could not succeed, and not because of some political or cultural aversion towards violence. Again, the LDK leaders believed that the solution of the Albanian question was going to come from a third factor, this time European Union and USA. Once, he had decided, Rugova refused to revision the LDK tactics. He labelled every opponent of his policy as irrational and even worse, a provocateur.
The third phase corresponds with the period after the Dayton agreement. It became clear that the international community, contrary to the declarations of Rugova, was not supporting the independence of Kosovo. Instead, EU and USA were putting pressure on Rugova to begin direct talks with Milošević. Rugova faced a dilemma: to renounce the referendum or to begin the armed resistance. Rugova was convinced that the Albanians could not fight against the Serbs and rejected every armed action. The massacres in Bosnia only reinforced his conviction that the armed resistance was impossible. At the same time, Rugova hesitated to renounce independence and accept some form of autonomy. For many years, Rugova had convinced the Albanians that independence was the only right solution, and that the international community was showing increasing understanding for the Republic of Kosovo. Rugova made an effort to repeat the rejection of the Albanian unification in favour of the Republic of Kosovo. He tried to diminish the damage of an agreement ‘less than independence’ with Milošević. Therefore, he tried to secure the presence of USA representatives in talks and to enlist the support of the Albanian opposition. However, both Qosja and DEMAÇI refused to support the renunciation of the 1991 Referendum.
6. THE DEMOCRATIC OPTION

6.1 The democrats and their self-image

The democrats, (Maliqi, Surroi) were heirs of the Albanian Communist elite. Maliqi’s father, a member of the old guard, was appointed Secretary of Interior of Kosovo, after the 1981 demonstrations. The father of Surroi served as Yugoslavia’s ambassador in Spain, Mexico, etc. They attended the Serb classes with Serb teachers because, as Maliqi (1998b) explained, they held a higher standard than the Albanian ones. Subsequently, they continued their studies at the University of Belgrade (Maliqi), University of Zagreb (Kullashi) and University of Mexico City (Surroi). The democrats resided in Prishtina, the provincial capital, and enjoyed a more than satisfactory life standard, a well-paid job, and comfortable housing. In general, they perceived themselves as sophisticated and modern to the newly arrived in Prishtina. Even more important, in words of Maliqi, they did not experience any form of ethnic discrimination or discomfort during their youth protected by their fathers’ political position. Maliqi (1998b) reported some trouble because of his support for the 1968 student movement in Belgrade.

The democrats considered themselves as social democrats, modernists, and Europeans. As supporters of the democratic socialism they criticised the Yugoslav system as dogmatic and bureaucratised, and sympathised with the ‘liberals’ gathered around Praxis. However, none of them engaged in any serious act of political opposition before 1989. As modernists and Europeans, they opposed, more through their life-style than through their political activity, the Albanian conservative and nationalist intelligentsia.

In 1989, the democrats tried to take the initiative from ‘the Albanian extremists’. (Maliqi 1998b: 231) Their first effort was the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists that gave birth eventually to three political parties: the Kosovo branch of the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI)\textsuperscript{23}, the Social-Democratic Party of Kosovo and the Youth Parliament of Kosovo (latter renamed the Parliamentarian Party of Kos-
Maliqi (1989b) described his participation in politics as, “I have been and I am still on the sideline and naive in politics, one who has become involved not from desire, but because a forest, a jungle, has been created around us in which, calls for unity and tribal-political line-ups are constantly heard. I have not been able to close my eyes to these things that are happening… Secretly, I want each article… to be my last political venture, but I get involved again and betray myself, because I have a terrible fear of the consequences of… the policy being pursued. I write to drive away my fear”. Their political campaign was rather short, because Kullashi immigrated to France (1990), Surroi moved to London as a journalist for BBC (1992), while Maliqi was forced to resign as chair of the Social-Democratic Party.

6.2 The crisis of real socialism and elite manipulation

The democrats maintained that Yugoslavia was not a victim of ethnic conflicts, but rather the victim of “… the systemic crisis of the real socialism”. (Surroi 1998a) Maliqi supported Surroi by declaring that ethnicity and/or Kosovo were not responsible for the Yugoslav crisis. “Kosovo may have been the catalyst of the crisis, but not its essence”. (Maliqi 1998b: 128) The democrats argued that Yugoslavia was going to be in crisis even if Kosovo was not part of Yugoslavia. (Kullashi 1989, 1990; Maliqi 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1994, 1998b; Surroi 1989a) Maliqi (Magaš 1993: 238) summarised, “We are dealing with a crisis of state socialism which has used up its historical credit. Everywhere the party-state is falling apart”. Kullashi formulated the same idea, although in a different language. “The fundamental source of the crisis of Kosovo, Serbia and Yugoslavia lies in the absolute domination of the political sphere over the other spheres of socio-economic and cultural life”. (Kullashi 1989: 63)

The democrats were careful to use the proper phraseology. (Magaš 1993; Kullashi 1990; Maliqi 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992g, 1998b; Surroi 1989a) They rejected that they were the enemy and referred to themselves as the democratic opposition. They did not identify the opposite forces in national terms as Serb, Albanian etc, but as the Kosovo nomenclature/authorities (Berisha 1990), “the rulers of Kosovo” (Maliqi 1989c), or “multi-national Kosovar bureaucracy”. (Kullashi 1989: 56)
The democrats argued that the Serb Communist elite was unable to resolve the systemic crisis of real socialism. Therefore, it tried to postpone the democratisation of Yugoslavia by manipulating the nationalist feelings of the Serbs. (Magaš 1993; Kullashi 1989, 1990; Maliqi 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1994; Surroi 1989a; Berisha 1990; Bobi 1994) Maliqi (1990b: 56) argued, “I still continue to think that the question is not in essence about an ethnic problem, but about a conflict stirred up by the leaders who, in order to maintain their power, have resorted to nationalism”.

The democrats blamed Milošević for instigating the ethnic quarrels by creating to the Serbs a sense of victimisation, insecurity, and anxiety. (Kullashi 1989; Surroi 1990b; Myrtezai et al. 1990; Maliqi 1989b, 1989d, 1989e, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1998b; Bobi 1994) They considered Milošević as an adventurous, reactionary, power-obsessed Communist (Maliqi 1994: 56), who tried to “… consolidate the bureaucratic structure of power” (Magaš 1993: 235), and used Kosovo “… as a welcomed cause to avoid the debate” about the fundamental political principles and the democratisation of Serbia and Yugoslavia. (Kullashi 1989: 53)

The democrats dismissed the Serb propaganda about “Albanianization”, “counter-revolution” or “genocide” as false. (Maliqi 1989a) “[The] relations between the Albanians and the Serbs today and in the past have been presented with a scheme… as ‘a continuity of the multiple violence in which the former are regularly presented as aggressors and the latter as victims’. … The examples from history are selected… The events, the given circumstances, the activities of personalities, groups or institutions are simplified, distorted, and sometimes even falsified”. (Kullashi 1989: 56)

The democrats declared that the Serb nationalist propaganda was inspiring increased oppression and even the expulsion of the Albanians out of Kosovo. Kullashi (1989: 61-62) argued that Milošević was a threat to every Albanian because “The application of this wartime terminology in peaceful conditions expresses the attempt to apply the same measures indiscriminately against the external enemies and against those with a different or opposed political viewpoint. Time after time the Albanians of Kosova and of all other regions in Yugoslavia are presented both as internal and external enemies. … [The] only possible and very long delayed solution, ‘as the final
solution’ of the Kosova problem, is armed repression, military administration, the expulsion from Kosova of 300-400 thousand so-called ‘hostile migrants’.

The democrats represented themselves as impartial regarding their critique of nationalist leaders. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 253) ridiculed Albanian “…village characters who have made their name by being more Albanian than the next man”. The democrats warned against the nationalists who were trying to exploit the dissatisfaction of the Albanians and to escalate the conflict. Maliqi (1989a: 41) wrote, “They [the Albanian extremists] have achieved their aim: the Albanian extremists (just as the extremists of the other side) were hoping for years for this situation to arise”.

However, the democrats made the difference between the Serb and the Albanian nationalism. The Serb nationalism was artificial and created from above, while the Albanian nationalism “… grew out of the discontent of the Albanian masses”. (Maliqi 1998b: 25) Surroi (Magaš 1993: 250-251) followed the same line and described the founding of LDK as “… not so much a party as a product of the popular response to so many years of repression”.

The democrats defended the nationalist reaction of the Albanians. Milošević scared them with the rehabilitation of Ranković and his anti-Albanian rhetoric. (Surroi 1990b, 1998a; Maliqi 1989a, 1989e, 1990b, 1994; Kullashi 1995) Maliqi (Magaš 1993: 183) excused the Albanian working class, “Milošević’s extreme Serb nationalism made them [the Albanians] react not only as workers, but as Albanians, since they were being threatened and denounced as Albanians”. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 246) shared the same idea: “The violent anti-Albanian campaign has excluded Albanians from all political life, so that national frustration takes precedence over all other concerns”.

6.3 Democracy and self-determination
The democrats declared “… first democracy, then the status of Kosovo”, i.e. the democratisation had priority to the resolution of the national question. (Maliqi 1998b: 33) First, the democrats represented the East European democratisation and the European integration as pre-determined processes. Maliqi (1989c) wrote, “The democratic trend is our predetermined fate”. The future of Yugoslavia was democracy and EU
membership. Some years latter, Maliqi (1998b: 232) remembered, “We were engaged in the democratisation of Yugoslavia, for normal development”.

Second, Kullashi (1995: 30) argued that the solution to the Yugoslav crisis was not nationalism, but a democratic and liberal society, “… where the freedom of the citizen is the prerequisite to the freedom of the nation and not vice versa”. Surroi (1990a: 25) represented such society as based on “… the sovereignty of the citizens”. Maliqi (1990b) rejected nationalism also, “The problem cannot be solved proceeding from the idea of the national state as a reality which has priority. … The way out is through democracy, a new concept of development and renunciation of nationalism”. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 251) argued likewise, “Kosovo’s problems go beyond the immediate problem of national oppression and can be tackled only on the basis of a transformation that would allow the free expression of all the different national, social and group interests throughout Yugoslavia”. The democrats expected that the democratisation was going to undermine the ethnic homogenisation. Ethnic differences would persist, but in a benign and rather controllable form. (Magaš 1993; Maliqi 1990b)

Third, Kullashi warned that the nation-state was not necessary free and democratic. Nationalism was not above-ideology, but rather an ideology in itself, which gave priority to the nation and its collective rights. Therefore, just as Marxism, nationalism, with its emphasis on the rights of the nation, could limit the rights of the individuals. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 253) agreed, “We do not wish to see a party-based monism replaced by one based on nationalism”.

Forth, the democrats considered the nationalist agenda as dangerous because “… giving priority to the status of Kosovo was essentially a war option, which could postpone democratisation in Kosovo and even in Serbia”. (Maliqi 1998b: 34) Nationalism was unproductive because it was going to give Milošević a chance to mobilise the Serbs around the nationalist platform and further away from democratisation. (Kullashi 1989, 1990, 1995; Maliqi 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1989e, 1990b, 1994, 1998b; Surroi 1989a, 1990b, 1998a; Magaš 1993)
6.4 The goal: the democratisation of Yugoslavia

The definition of the problem and their understanding of the relation democracy-nationalism determined the political goal of the democrats, formulated in “The Appeal to the democratic opinion”\textsuperscript{24}. First, the democrats declared that the only solution was the democratisation of Yugoslavia. (Kullashi 1989, Berisha 1990; Maliqi 1990b) Maliqi (1989c) wrote, “… the democratisation is the only road for the institutional establishment of a democratic order in Yugoslavia and to create the conditions for the elimination of those essential aspects of the crisis which have paralysed our system today”. Kullashi (1989: 63) called for “[The] limitation and control of the political power, the creation of premises for an effective functioning of the juridical state, for guaranteeing the independent activity of the courts, for political and cultural pluralism, for the autonomy of the society and the individual from the state”.

Second, the democrats declared that the democratisation of Yugoslavia could not happen without the democratisation of Kosovo. Surroi (1990a) declared that, “The Kosova crisis, one of the most sensitive and specific components of the Yugoslav crisis, likewise, must find its solution in the establishment of democracy”. Kullashi (1990: 366) considered the democratisation of Kosovo as “… the greatest test for Yugoslavia… for democracy or for totalitarianism, for a civilized solution of the crisis or for the continued repression”.

Third, the democrats refrained from representing any demand about the future constitutional status of Kosovo. (Kullashi 1989; Surroi 1989a, 1990a; Maliqi 1990c) Maliqi (1990b) wrote, “Even previously my opinion has been that the question of state organisation is of a second-rate importance as compared with the question of democratization”. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 253) demanded even “… a six-month armistice on the issue of Kosovo” in order to neutralise the nationalists. The rearrangement of Yugoslavia and the political status of the Albanians were to be decided after the democratic elections. Maliqi (Magaš 1993: 234) said that the Albanians “… place their hope in the process of democratisation of Yugoslavia; in that context, they will seek legal channels to achieve the return of a normal situation in Kosovo”.

Forth, the democrats did not contemplate about the dissolution of Yugoslavia and an independent Kosovo. They could not imagine the dissolution of Yugoslavia. (Kullashi 1989, 1990; Surroi 1989a, 1990a; Maliqi 1990c) Instead, the democrats spoke about the democratisation of Yugoslavia and its possible political and administrative re-arrangement. Kullashi (1990: 366) called for the “… re-construction of Yugoslavia as a federal union arranged as a representative system with the citizens as the main factor”. Surroi (Magaš 1993; Surroi 1989a, 1990a) was more concrete and proposed the organisation of Yugoslavia as a Federative state, parliamentary democracy, with a two-chamber parliament. The first chamber was to be elected through general and equal suffrage of all Yugoslav citizens, while the high chamber was to have an equal number of representatives from each unit.

6.5 The strategy of the democratic fraction
The democrats foresaw two scenarios regarding the democratisation of Yugoslavia. The first scenario was a democratic popular rebellion akin to the revolt that ousted Ceaușescu in Romania. (Surroi 1990b; Kullashi 1995) The democrats cheered the Romanian rebellion. They perceived it as bloodless and swift. However, they rejected immediately that this scenario could succeed in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 253) said, “However, despite the obvious parallels between Kosovo and Romania, we know that the situation in Yugoslavia is different; that direct confrontation will not work”. Maliqi (Magaš 1993: 237) argued, “In the Albanian masses … there is a general will to resist, but at the present there is no means of coordinating this”.

The democrats rejected any escalation of the situation. First, the moderates were influenced by the Polish and Czech experience. They considered Milošević as the last phase of the totalitarian Yugoslavia. (Maliqi 1994; Kullashi 1995) “Since their adversary had chosen a totalitarian ideology and behaviour, the Albanians were happy to rely on the East European model of democratic counter-action that proved to be very efficient in the fight against totalitarianism”. (Maliqi 1998b: 28) Therefore, the democrats thought that violence was unnecessary and even dangerous, and called for political actions. Maliqi (1994: 38) reminisced some years latter, “The wave of de-
Democratic changes … awakened the hope that the key to the solution of the problem of Kosovo and of the Albanian national question was democracy. The formula appeared to be quite simple: pluralism, market economy, free elections, multi-party parliament and democratic institutions … created space … for the declaration of free expression of the will of the Albanians and for the coming to power of the democratic majority in Kosova. There is no need to fight; it is enough to raise two fingers, the V-sign”. The democrats believed on a quick and decisive victory over the nationalists. Milošević was the last breath of the Communist oligarchy and a temporarily occurrence. (Maliqi 1994) Surroi (1989a) wrote, “I think this will not require more than a year”.

Second, the democrats feared the Serb army and police. (Kullashi 1995; Surroi 1989a, 1990a, 1990b; Shala 1990; Berisha 1990; Maliqi 1989d, 1989e, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1994; Clark 2000) Maliqi (1998b: 232) remembered, “Kullashi, as the President of the SDP, had a heated debate at one joint meeting with Agani, claiming that if one accepts the path of escalation, that means opting for war. Agani was trying to neutralize that stand, saying that there is actually no danger of war”. Maliqi (1998b: 234) wrote that the democrats knew how superior Yugoslavia/Serbia was militarily. Maliqi accepted that the military weakness was decisive as the Albanians opted for the civic resistance. “Especially with Albania in a state of collapse, Kosova Albanians thought themselves much too weak to start a war venture.” (Maliqi 1998b: 170)

Third, the democrats believed that Milošević was trying to provoke the Albanians because he was looking for a military confrontation. (Surroi 1989a, 1990a, 1990b; Maliqi 1994, 1998b; Kullashi 1995) Maliqi (1994: 35) wrote, “The massacres without any reason … the massive intoxication … the night encirclements and armed attacks … are reasonably judged as attempts to induce a massive Albanian uprising, which could be used latter as casus belli and a reason for the bombardment of Albanian settlements and massive reprisals to provoke an Albanian exodus”. Surroi (Magaš 1993: 246-247) saw also a pattern of provocation, “… a conscious policy of trying to provoke a national uprising… The Kosovo Party committee had sent a warning to the hospitals, even before the demonstrations began, that they should prepare themselves for a lot of casualties”.
Surroi (Magaš 1993: 246) labelled the organisers of the Albanian demonstrations as provocateurs working for Milošević. “There is evidence for this— that initially spontaneous [Albanian] demonstrations were in fact fanned by provocateurs”. Milošević would use their actions as an excuse “… to correct’ the ethnic structure in favour of Serbs”. (Magaš 1993: 237) The democrats argued that the only right action was to avoid the Serb ploy and to do the opposite. (Maliqi 1989a, 1994, 1998b; Surroi 1990b) Hence, Maliqi (1998b: 32) argued, “So the Albanian movement was obliged to take on an essentially fire-fighting role.” Therefore, “The non-violence strategy was imposed somehow by itself as a better answer, more pragmatic and efficient to the Serb aggressive plans.” (Maliqi 1994: 37)

Forth, the Serb propaganda accused the Albanians as being terrorists, separatists, Moslem fundamentalists, etc. Maliqi argued that the Albanians had to demonstrate to the international community that they were the opposite: European, democratic, modern, peaceful etc. (Maliqi 1994, 1998b) Maliqi (1998b: 103) wrote, “… the Albanians, through their strategy of non-violence, rounded off their understanding and perception of themselves as of good guys, i.e. benevolent, peaceful, and democratic people as opposed to Serbs who were bad guys, i.e. belligerent and non-democratic people”.

Fifth, this strategy enjoyed the support of the EU and USA. Maliqi and others had a number of meetings with foreign diplomats, notably the US ambassador in Belgrade, Zimmerman. Zimmerman made it clear to Maliqi (1998b: 238) the Albanians should “… hold that course [civic resistance], not embark on an adventure, not to misunderstand some statements made by President Bush, or later, Clinton that America would intervene in the case of war. ‘That does not mean that you should start the war’”.

The democrats realised that their direct influence in the masses was limited. (Maliqi 1989a, 1992e; Surroi 1990b) Therefore, they tried to do it indirectly by persuading the confused leadership of LDK which, “… it seemed, did not know what it wanted”. (Maliqi 1998b: 231) Maliqi (1992g) was very proud that they convinced Rugova (February 2, 1990) to stop the demonstrations and generally not to fall victim of Milošević’s provocations.
The democrats advocated the second scenario: the ousting of Milošević and the democratisation from above. The democrats believed that, “… there are other internal and external factors as well, that can reverse the situation and create the conditions for the application of the political means”. (Maliqi 1994: 70) The internal forces were the Federative institutions and the democratic forces in Yugoslavia. Surroi (1990a: 84) wrote, “It seems to me that only the Federation can bring pluralism”. Maliqi emphasised the role of the democratic forces in Yugoslavia. “… the Serbian working class may appear momentarily blinded by the nationalist project, its future lies in cooperation with the working class in other parts of the country”. (Magaš 1993: 238)

The democrats prescribed a minimal role to the Albanian opposition. They called for the interruption of the demonstrations and strikes in order to prevent the first scenario, and advocated the use of discussions, collective complaints, and publications. As a model to the other parties, the moderates organised the signing of the petition “For Democracy-against Violence”26. (Surroi 1989a, 1990b; Berisha 1990; Maliqi 1989d, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1994, 1998b; Clark 2000) Surroi (1990a) summarised, “We shall organise discussions on relevant social themes… we should send collective complaints to the highest organs in Kosovo… we shall soon produce our own publications”.

6.6 The conflict after the dissolution of Yugoslavia

By the summer of 1990, the democrats began to doubt the future of Yugoslavia as a united and democratic country. (Maliqi 1990h) Maliqi (1998b: 122) wrote, “…the process of consolidation of democratic institutions will be particularly complex in federal states like the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which have already faced strong national, indeed nationalist, conflicts and separatist movements. Indeed, when these countries are concerned, we cannot be sure whether they will survive the process of democratisation as integral states or break up in smaller units”.

Nevertheless, the dissolution of Yugoslavia came as a surprise to the democrats. The democrats admitted that they failed to appreciate the ability of Milošević to play the nationalist card. Maliqi (1998b: 128) wrote, “I failed to predict one thing: the break up of Yugoslavia”. The dissolution of Yugoslavia forced the democrats to ac-
knowledge that their programme of ‘democratic Yugoslavia’ had failed. Maliqi (1998b: 233) wrote, “We became losers, since our entire platform broke into pieces”.

The democrats argued that the dissolution was caused primarily by the activity of the nationalistic leaders. The democrats criticised the Western scholars for using mono-causal ‘objective’ explanations for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, like historical animosities and absences, democratic immaturity, patriarchal values, or ethnocentrism. (Maliqi 1993b, 1993n; Bobi 1994; Kullashi 1995)

Maliqi represented the new situation after the dissolution of Yugoslavia as apartheid and segregation. Maliqi (1994: 33, 34; 1998b: 24) blamed Milošević for creating “… a system, which has all the qualities of national apartheid and segregation… a relationship of open hate … in which one side stops at nothing, committing the most brutal violations of human rights and civil liberties”. The democrats argued that the goal of Milošević was not the annexation of Kosovo, but rather the creation of ‘the Great Serbia’ through expansion and ethnic cleansing. (Maliqi 1998b; Bobi 1994) Maliqi (1998b: 98–99) wrote, “Militarization of the Kosovo question is the doing of the present Serbian regime which does not even attempt to conceal that its ultimate aim is not only annexation, but also change in the ethnic structure of Kosovo”. The democrats joined the other Albanian leaders and called Milošević an existential threat to the Albanians. (Maliqi 1998b; Kullashi 1995) Maliqi (1998b: 53) wrote, “Today, to be Albanian is to be in jeopardy: it is clearly our survival that is at stake”. Maliqi (1998b: 22) described the new political situation as “The division between Serbs and Albanians became total and confrontation became a way of life”.

Maliqi (1994: 158) explained that the Albanians were forced to abandon the democratic project because “… the reality of the horrible national oppression forced us to put in the first place the Albanian national question, supporting completely the national liberation movement, its program for the independence of Kosovo from Serbia and the realisation of the right of self-determination of the citizens in Kosovo”.

6.7 The goal of the Albanian movement
Maliqi underlined he was pragmatic regarding the concrete political solution and open to debate different solutions regarding the relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
(Maliqi 1994, 1998b) The first option was the division of Kosovo and the exchange of territories and populations between Kosovo and Serbia. Maliqi (1998b) supported at first this idea, which according to him represented a clean and definitive break between the Albanians and the Serbs. Maliqi abandoned this option after a meeting with Sali Berisha, the then president of Albania. Maliqi was not convinced by Berisha that the division of Kosovo would lead to war. Nevertheless, Maliqi (1994: 117) rejected this option as “diabolical” because the Serb proposals demanded almost 40% of the territory of Kosovo, including the richest regions of Kosovo. Maliqi feared that a divided Kosovo would remain a feeble state.

The second option was the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. Maliqi argued that self-determination, i.e. independence, was the only right option to resolve the crisis. (Maliqi 1992d, 1994) Maliqi considered any connection with Serbia or the re-creation of Yugoslavia as impossible. Maliqi (1998b: 41) wrote, “Serious Albanian-Serb talks could be conducted in the first instance only on the issue of self-determination for Kosova, on how to give Kosova independence, and only secondarily on the economic, political and other ties Kosova might have with Serbia.”

Maliqi justified the demand for the independence of Kosovo with a number of arguments. First, the co-existence with the Serbs was impossible because of their violence and refusal to accept the Albanians as equal. The majority of the Albanians had no positive experience as part of Serbia. Therefore, the Serbs had lost any right to govern the Albanians and Kosovo. Second, Maliqi argued that as any other colonial nation, the Albanians had the right to liberate itself politically. Third, the Albanians were not a minority, but a nation and as such, they had the right of self-determination. Maliqi did not debate the accuracy of the Serb historical right over Kosovo. He simply ignored it as irrelevant. (Kullashi 1995; Maliqi 1998b)

Maliqi tried to elude the question about a future unification with Albania if the independence of Kosovo was recognised. “If the Albanians shall be unified or the solution shall be the independence of Kosovo, this has little importance”. (Maliqi 1994: 183) Until 1992, Maliqi rejected any such possibility because of the Communist rule in Albania. (Maliqi 1994) However, in 1995, after a direct question, Maliqi (1998b: 229) answered, “Whenever I was asked about my personal opinion, I would say that
the best solution would be the unification with Albania, and I will say that in every occasion. ... I believe that the Albanians of Kosova would opt for the unification with Albania in a referendum, if they could freely express their will”. Maliqi (1998b) explained that he had rejected previously the idea of unification because of two reasons. First, Maliqi admitted that under the influence of the Serb propaganda, he had considered the unification as chauvinistic. Second, Maliqi rejected the unification because he feared that such a radical change of the balance of power could decrease the support of the European powers for the Albanians. However, by 1995, Maliqi concluded that unification was ‘natural’ and not chauvinistic.

By the middle of 1993, Maliqi called for a debate about the goal and strategy of the Albanian movement. Maliqi emphasised that debate was not betrayal, but a legitimate and necessary part of a national-democratic movement. Maliqi (1994: 133) wrote, “We must open a continuous debate about this crucial matter about what is real and achievable at this moment and what should be postponed for latter”. Maliqi distanced himself from the other Albanian leaders who were failing to be realistic. The Albanian movement had to formulate a goal, which was achievable, and stop dreaming. “I am not one of those who project their wishes into some political concepts, wishes that are perhaps illusory. I have always tried to be a realist”. (Maliqi 1998b: 229)

Maliqi declared that the solution of the question of Kosovo depended on the actions of three factors: the Serbs, Albanians, and the West. Maliqi (1998b: 38) dismissed any help from the Serb opposition because “As far as Kosova is concerned, there is unfortunately, still no Serb opposition”. No Serb political parties, able to depose Milošević, recognised the right of self-determination to the Albanians in Kosovo. Maliqi (1998b: 123) wrote, “The majority of the opposition parties … are no less nationalistic than the ruling party”. Surroi (1998a: 161) supported the same idea, “The main message which the ethnic Serbian politicians have projected until now is that Kosova is part of the territory of Serbia and will continue to be so”.

The second factor was the activity of the Albanian movement. (Maliqi 1994, 1998b) Maliqi was proud of the civic resistance that he considered both wise and productive. Maliqi praised the civic resistance for saving the Albanians from the Serbs
massacres and increasing the international support for the question of Kosovo. “In reality, we are not mute. On the contrary, we have never been so clear and laud in expressing our goals and demands.” (Maliqi 1994: 66) The international community was showing more interests for the fate of the Albanians and Serbia was coming weakened from every “victory”. (Maliqi 1994: 150) However, Maliqi simultaneously admitted that albeit increasing international support, the civic resistance was not going to produce the independence of Kosovo. Maliqi (1994: 138) wrote, “The Serb forces cannot be thrown out of Kosovo through press conferences”.

The third factor was the intervention of USA and EU. Maliqi believed that the European powers would play the decisive role in the solution of the Kosovo question. Maliqi (1998b: 75) was convinced that “Europe holds the keys to Kosova’s destiny… the EU considers it natural to assume the role of main arbiter”. However, Maliqi feared the egoism of different European states. Maliqi (1994: 28) regretted that the New World Order did not materialise as promised. “Yet no such order has been constructed, involving rules, relations of forces, and procedures based on documents of international law.” Europe continued to act according to the principles of the old order: UK and France intended to control the German expansion rather than build a common foreign policy. Their foreign policy was built around old geo-strategic models. (Maliqi 1998p) “The French and the Brit ish still seem to believe in the old formula of stability in the Balkans based on a powerful regional position of Belgrade and a kind of a political and military hegemony of the Serbs.” (Maliqi 1998b: 166)

Maliqi dismissed any hope that the European powers were going to support the independence of Kosovo. Maliqi (1994: 45) explained that Europe was biased towards the right of self-determination because it “… has to conceal its past and even its criminal present”. The most influential European countries deliberated that if they recognised the right of self-determination to Kosovo, then they had to do the same with Corsicans, Catalans, etc. (Maliqi 1994, 1998b) They downgraded the question of Kosovo to an internal problem of Yugoslavia and advised its solution inside the scope of human rights. (Maliqi 1993b, 1994, 1998b)

Therefore, the Albanians had two choices: to continue to remain in limbo, or to refrain from independence and aim at a compromise with Serbia. Maliqi opted for the
second solution. Maliqi (Clark 2000: 88) proposed to follow the international advice and to participate in the Serb elections with “… a list of independent citizen candidates… [who would] go to the Serbian parliament with the programme for Kosovo independence”. Maliqi (1994: 160) recognised that participation in the elections was a heavy burden for the Albanians, “First to liberate our enemies, in order to be liberated ourselves”. However, “… from the pragmatic point of view, participation in the Serbian elections might offer some advantages- it could be developed as a logical extension of the non-violence resistance strategy”. (Maliqi 1998b: 38) Further, if the Albanians boycotted the elections than Milošević should get 20% of the votes before the elections even began. (Maliqi 1998b)

Maliqi’s call for debate was met with a harsh condemnation as political capitulation and act of treachery. Maliqi (1998b: 230, 248) was labelled “Titoist”, “Serbian agent”, “Belgrade’s extended hand”, “Yugo-nostalgic”, etc. Maliqi expected a certain resistance to his declarations, but not a chorus of condemnation. Maliqi resigned from the duty of the chair of Social-Democratic Party, apologised, and swore his loyalty to independence and non-cooperation. Maliqi (1998b: 38) admitted that he was wrong. The participation in Serbian elections “… would represent a recognition of the Serbia fait accompli in Kosova, a denial of the right of self-determination, and a suicidal act in the face of the Serbian policy of assimilation and colonization”.

6.8 The Dayton peace talks and the radicalisation of the Albanian movement

The despair of the democrats during the Srebrenica massacres changed to optimism and euphoria during the Dayton talks. Maliqi declared, “… there are indicators that Kosova and Macedonia will come on the agenda immediately after the Dayton talks are over, so that time bombs are preventively dismantled”. (Maliqi 1998b: 136)

The mode turned sour as the German foreign minister visited Belgrade and the European Union removed some of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, Germany declared that it intended to return the Albanian refugees. (Maliqi 1998b; Surroi 1998b) Maliqi (1998b: 150) wrote, “The international community’s hesitation in dealing with the Kosova issue has deeply disappointed Kosova Albani-
ans. Its promises that Kosova will be a priority concern of preventive diplomacy now strike them as if they have always been and still are hollow words. … The contradictory policy that the West pursues in relation to Belgrade is not encouraging”. The democrats complained that the international disengagement had disappointed the Albanians. Maliqi (1998b: 153) admitted, “The recent developments have dispelled Albanian illusions that the resolution for Kosova would arrive from abroad”.

The democrats complained that USA and EU were not paying attention to the fate of the Albanians because there was no fighting in Kosovo. (Maliqi 1998j; Surroi 1998c) Maliqi (1998b: 141) wrote, “The most cynical ones [foreign diplomats] among them even say ‘It is necessary to wage war for what you demand’. In other words, they believe that the Serbs in Bosnia have won the right to have their own republic by war, while the Albanians who have not waged war can count only on a somewhat lower degree of autonomy”. Maliqi argued that with its policy, the West was sending all the wrong signals and helping the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). “The Dayton agreement was a regional watershed, enshrining the ethnic principle within Bosnian politics and suggesting that violence could succeed in winning international support”. (Maliqi 1998b: 190)

Maliqi considered the KLA as the Albanian answer to the lessons of the Dayton agreement and the lack of international intervention. Maliqi (1998d, 1998e) was biased regarding the activity of the KLA. He did not challenge the goal, or the morality of the actions of the KLA, but rather its effectiveness. Maliqi (1998b: 185) wrote, “Guerrilla actions have been mounted against the Serbian police but the KLA does not seem to represent a crucial factor that could substantially change the balance of power”. On the other side, the KLA could draw the attention of the international community. However, the democrats feared that, as in Bosnia, the international help would arrive too late to save the Albanians. The Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia terrified the democrats and they thought that KLA was providing Milošević with an excellent opportunity in Kosovo. (Maliqi 1998d, 1998e, 1998f, 1998g, 1998h, 1998j, 1998o, 1998q, 1998r; Surroi 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Shala 1998a) “The spectre is of Milosevic provoking a widespread Albanian uprising, and then war, to justify ethnic cleansing.” (Maliqi 1998b: 191)
Therefore, fearing a massacre of Bosnia proportions, the democrats concentrated their efforts in two directions. First, Maliqi attacked openly the policy followed by Rugova. “During the last years in Kosova, we, consequently, had politics that was blinded by its own naivety and futility, with a continuous tendency toward atrophy, by a created illusion that the solution will come by itself, on one side, and on the other yet another comparable unrealistic politics, blinded by its aggressiveness in relation to the prevailing atrophy, as well as by its position of ignorance toward the world.” (Maliqi 1998s)

The democrats believed that the renunciation of the act of independence by Rugova was going to increase the chances of the Western intervention in Kosovo. Rugova, “… the leader of Kosova Albanians is aware that for the time being the option of independent Kosova had failed to win the support of the international community, even of Americans, and that a compromise should be sought for coexistence with the Serbs, no matter how impossible it may seem from the present vantage point”. (Maliqi 1998b: 154) The democrats were confident that Rugova knew he had to renounce the act of independence and accept the position of the international community. Maliqi (1998b: 153) wrote, “[Rugova]… has finally realised that it was impossible to seek solution outside that framework, but he still lacks the courage to face the Albanian public with it”.

Maliqi (1998b: 186) foresaw one solution: “The most rational and least painful would be the application of a partial, rather than a conclusive solution. This would be based on the division of power, a kind of extension of the current state of dual power and parallel life, but under agreed conditions”. The democrats recognised the resistance between the Albanians for any solution less than independence. However, they were confident that, “…when the time comes, it will be possible to win people around, ‘if Rugova says, every day, “This is what we must do”’”. (Judah 1998: 38)

The second direction was to call upon the USA and EU to intervene and unblock the political situation. (Maliqi 1998b, 1998e, 1998k, 1998m, 1998n; Shala 1998e, 1998g, 1998h; Surroi 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999a, 1999b) “The fate of our sovereignty is obviously determined by the hope on the support of our foreign friends, first of all the United States.” (Maliqi 1998m) The democrats argued that neither
Milošević nor Rugova could find a compromise on their own. Surroi (1999a) called for, “an imposition of an accord”. The USA and EU had to impose an agreement exactly as in Bosnia. Shala (Kovacic 1997) said, “It is the international community which must slap the deal down at the table like in Dayton”. Maliqi arrived at the same conclusion. “Once the interim agreement is signed, even though there will be shared dissatisfaction, it is assumed that the presence of the international factor would be sufficient for the quick implementation of the solution.” (Maliqi 1998u)

6.9 Summary
The democrats believed that Yugoslavia was experiencing the systemic crisis of Communism. It was a conflict between the dogmatic (real) socialism and the democratic socialism. Therefore, their solution was the democratisation of Yugoslavia through democratic means. The democrats believed that democratisation was a necessary process and that a democratic society could resolve all the other problems, including the national question.

The democrats denied that there was an ethnic conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians. Milošević and the Serb Communist leadership manipulated the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs. Milošević was facing increasing demands for the democratisation of Serbia and he used Kosovo to divert the anger/disappointment of the working class to nationalism. The Albanians were not guilty because they were not the cause of the Serb nationalism. On the contrary, the Albanian nationalist mobilisation was a direct consequence of the Serb nationalism and aggressive policies initiated by Milošević. The Albanians were trying to defend their political and social rights and even their existence.

The democrats proposed the civic resistance as the only possible way to resist to Milošević and achieve the democratisation of Yugoslavia. The democrats proposed this strategy for three main reasons. First, they intended to democratise Yugoslavia through democratic means, like in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The democrats believed that these means were going to work in Yugoslavia also. Second, the democrats perceived the Serb massacres as an attempt to provoke an Albanian armed response. The democrats believed that Milošević was looking for an opportunity to re-
solve the Albanian question swiftly through massacres and expulsions. Therefore, the democrats perceived as their duty to formulate a new strategy of resistance to evade the war and save the nation. Third, the international community was supporting this strategy. The Albanian civic resistance was intended to buy time until the Yugoslav democratic forces and the international community removed Milošević from power.

The democrats accepted that the dissolution of Yugoslavia caught them by surprise. The democrats argued that the main culprit for the dissolution of Yugoslavia was Milošević. His attempts to centralise Yugoslavia produced the Slovenian and Croat secessionism. His following efforts to create the Great Serbia through the re-drawing of the borders and ethnic cleansing plunged the entire country into a horrible ethnic war. The democrats depicted the relationship between the Serbs and the Albanians as apartheid, open hate, and violence. The Albanian demand for independence was right and justified because the Albanians in Kosovo had the right of self-determination.

The democrats considered unnecessary the formulation of a new strategy after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The democrats considered the wars in Croatia and Bosnia as evidence that their predictions were right. Serbia was militarily strong and Milošević was willing to commit atrocities to create the Great Serbia. The democrats believed that the solution could only come through the actions of a third party: the help and the support of the USA and EU.

The democrats argued that the Albanian political parties had to take into account the intentions of the Western powers. The Albanians had to settle for less than independence, not because their demand was false, but because they could not achieve it. The democrats believed that neither the Albanian resistance nor the unyielding demand for independence could influence the Western powers to change their stance towards the independence of Kosovo. On the contrary, if the Albanians renounced the act of independence and settled in principle for autonomy inside Serbia/Yugoslavia, than the international could act more decisively in their support. Maliqi tried to debated about the goal of the Albanian movement, only to be surprised at the harsh condemnation that he received by LDK.
The democrats explained the Albanian armed resistance as the logical conclusion of the Dayton agreement, the removal of external wall of sanctions against Serbia, and the lack of a strong involvement by the EU and USA. However, the democrats did not support the actions of KLA because they were giving to Milošević the casus belli to unleash all his military power against the Albanians. The democrats feared the huge losses Milošević would inflict upon the Albanians if the Western help would take time to materialise like in Bosnia. The democrats were not prepared to accept these losses and thought that victory would meaningless if paid with the blood of Albanian civilians.
7. REXHEP QOSJA, HIS POLITICAL IDEAS

7.1 Qosja and his self-image
Qosja (1996) was born in an all-Albanian village annexed by Montenegro in 1880, after fierce battles between the volunteers of the Albanian League of Prizreni and the Montenegrin army. Qosja (1996: 450) confessed that his strongest impression from his childhood related to the interaction between the Albanians and the Serbs: a young man who ended up mentally ill because of Serb torture. Qosja, according to his own statements, neither had nor tried to get any Montenegrin or Serb friend. After he graduated from the University of Prishtina, Qosja joined the Albanological Institute. Qosja (1990: 181) perceived his research as a major contribution to both science and patriotism, because “… the Albanian literature of the National Renaissance was not only literature, but our national ideology as well”.

Qosja (1990: 25) declared that he got involved in politics because of his loyalty and responsibility to the nation “… as a reaction: to the unjust and anti-historical policy of Yugoslavia, of course, dictated by Serbia”. Qosja rejected the notion ‘the father of the nation’ or any resemblance to Dobrica Ćosić, the leading Serb nationalist ideologue. However, Qosja emphasised that he was the first Albanian intellectual to call for the republic of Kosovo, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the unification with Albania.

Qosja (1990, 1994) declared that he disliked politics: dirty and dishonest; and that he was suspicious of the politicians: egoistic and short-sighted. Therefore, Qosja refused to lead the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and preferred to continue his activity as an independent intellectual. Qosja assigned to himself this role: the protector of the nation, above the political parties, incorruptible and unselfish. Qosja (1992: 13) had a Plato-a-like understanding of the role of the intellectuals. “The intellectuals constitute that social stratum thatformulates the democratic and national demands, while the youth is, primarily, the force that strives to realise those”. Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) envisaged that, his role was to contemplate, formulate ideas, and estab-
lish goals. His only concrete action was the organisation of the Democratic Union of Kosovo in June 1998 as a political alternative to Rugova. Qosja (1992) believed that ‘the soldiers’ were going to organise themselves and resist to the Serb aggression.

7.2 The victimisation of the Albanians by Serbia

Qosja (1992: 81) emphasised the necessity to analyse the historical past. “It is well-known that we can judge reasonably the prospect for the future only based on the facts and knowledge of the past”. Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) depicted the Albanian history as an antithesis: the Albanian nation, although innocent, was the most suffered and victimised nation in Europe. The Albanian nation was innocent because, “… [It] has never enslaved someone else, occupied, or harmed another nation”. (Qosja 1990: 176) Nevertheless, the Albanians were victims, because “The European and Balkan historical-political circumstances have caused great historical, national, political, and social injustices to the Albanians as a nation … the only nation in Balkan, and probably the only nation in Europe, which the historical injustice has condemned to live divided in five states.” (Qosja 1990: 210)

Three factors caused the victimisation of the Albanians. The first one was the Ottoman occupation and Islamisation. Qosja (1992: 7, 9) regretted that “Although, geographically part of Europe, historically it [the Albanian nation] was for a long time part of Asia … The Ottoman Empire built a wall between the Albanians and Europe, first of all with Islam as its state ideology, but not only that.”

Second, Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) condemned the European Great Powers, which pursued an egoistic, dishonest, and unjust policy because of geo-political considerations. Qosja (1996: 218) quoted Metternich30: “Europe does not need freedom, but peace”. Qosja (1992: 16, 28) claimed that the imperialistic European powers were guilty because they “… actively participated in the most significant national drama in their continent- the division of the Albanian territories … using the rights and the fate of small nations like banknotes”.

Third, (and the main cause) the Albanians were victims of the colonial, chauvinistic, and expansionist policy of Serbia. Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) repeated that the Serb bourgeoisie fabricated the historical right over Kosovo out of some medieval
legends to justify the occupation and the subsequent colonisation of Kosovo. The myth of Kosovo inspired a constant colonial and racist policy towards the Albanians: a catalogue of massacres, oppression, exploitation, and expulsions.

Qosja (1990: 11) maintained that the Albanians were still victims of Serbia because of their unequal political status as “the forbidden nation”. “Indeed, the Albanian nation … has not experienced yet the real liberty”. (Qosja 1990: 98) Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) explained that the Albanians remained the poorest, most neglected, and undeveloped nation in Yugoslavia, although they lived in one of its richest areas. Qosja (1990: 360) denounced the Serb intimidation and persecution of the Albanians as an effort to prolong the unequal political situation and the exploitation of Kosovo. “The police are the symbol of the reality in Kosovo. Serbia-it is the Police for the Albanians. The police, the Serb police are the destiny of the Albanians. Cursed fate!” Qosja (1990: 367) declared, “The Serb policy towards the Albanians, incessant since 1912, is the policy of repression, which without reluctance uses state force and violence against them”.

Qosja (1990, 1992) believed that the election of Milošević as chair of the League of Communists of Serbia, and the policy that he was pursuing, represented an existential threat against every Albanian and the Albanian nation. The abolishment of the autonomy was the prologue of the final solution of the Albanian question. Qosja (1990: 231, 254) wrote, “Now, for the third time during the twentieth century, we are in the historic situation in which our fate and future shall be decided… The Albanians, today, are afraid for their fate, for the fate of their families, for their employment, for their dignity, for their safety, for their liberty and future… our life, as it is shown during the last days, is completely worthless to the police and army”.

7.3 Ethnic conflict as elite manipulation
Qosja denied that there was a conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs. Qosja (1990) maintained that the ethnic conflicts were not objective, genuine, or predetermined, but rather artificial events constructed by the bourgeoisie. Peaceful ethnic coexistence was possible, based on equality, mutual respect, and human understanding. Qosja (1990: 290) wrote, “Divisions, rifts are abnormal conditions in the life of na-
tions and peoples. Only peace and solidarity are the natural state of humanity— the natural state in the life of nations”.

Qosja (1990: 341) did not blame the Serbs because “… the nation cannot be equated with its ruling stratum”. Instead, Qosja accused Milošević for inventing the conflict to prolong his own rule, to the detriment of both the Albanians and the Serbs. Qosja (1990: 290-291) declared, “I do not think there is a rift between the nations in Kosovo. I think there is a rift between the nations and the power-holders … The rulers try to break the equality of the nations, because in this manner they succeed to prolong their rule. This is the political logic pursued by the present Serb leadership”. Milošević, the Serb nationalist intelligentsia, and the Serb media colluded to manipulate the latent distrust and prejudices of the Serbs to hate and aggressiveness against the Albanians and away from the democratisation. Qosja concentrated his efforts in contesting the Serb nationalist intelligentsia. The Serb intellectuals compiled the new nationalist and anti-democratic programme, “a new mythology about Kosovo, but this time, a mythology, in which, the villains, instead of the Turks, were the Albanians”. (Qosja 1990: 12) Qosja (1990: 210) regretted that Milošević succeeded in turning Serbia into “… a society in which the nationalist explosions act as a substitute for democracy”.

Qosja (1990, 1992) maintained that the Albanians were innocent because they did nothing to provoke or aggravate the conflict. The root of the conflict was not the demand for the Republic of Kosovo, because this demand was ‘natural’ and ‘just’. “It is not necessary to remember you how natural, just and moral are the endeavours of every nation to establish the right of self-determination- because only in that way, it can exercise its own freedom; to have its own state- because only in this way, it can protect its own destiny; to live in democracy- because only in this way, it can fully develop its own creativity.” (Qosja 1990: 178) Qosja dismissed any claim that the Republic of Kosovo would impair the national or religious rights of the Serb in Kosovo or in Serbia. The status of Republic was going to guarantee equal national rights to both the Albanians and the Serbs.
7.4 Social progress, self-determination and democracy

Qosja (1990, 1992) depicted the social progress as a necessary, logical, natural movement towards more freedom and equality, individual freedom (democracy) and collective freedom (self-determination). Qosja (1990: 262) wrote, “… humanity is moving increasingly more secure towards increasingly broader rights and liberties for the individual and the nations, towards the true equality between the nations”. However, self-determination had priority over democracy because the collective rights constituted the base for the individual rights. Qosja (1990: 291) explained, “Democracy implies freedom and equality of nations and individuals. Without equality of nations in multinational communities, there can be no equality of citizens”. Qosja (1990: 157) argued explicitly that the Albanians as individuals could become equal citizens only if the Albanian nation was politically equal to the other Yugoslav nations. Qosja was clear: first, the national emancipation, i.e. the Republic of Kosovo and latter the democratisation of Kosovo and Yugoslavia.

Qosja claimed that the Albanians were progressive and bound to win because they were demanding more equality and freedom. The Serb leadership was anti-democratic and regressive because it was trying to stop the social progress through violence. Qosja (1990: 231) declared, “We should not get desperate. The history does not develop in a straight line”. However, Qosja declared that the annulment of autonomy of Kosovo was a pause to gather forces and move to a higher social understanding or level.

Marxist determinism influenced likewise the understanding of the Serb violence and its consequences. Qosja (1990: 284) wrote, “…through violence, one question cannot be resolved and has never been resolved: the national question. Violence can only postpone for a certain time the right solution of the national question”. Milošević was only a brief setback and unable to change the predestined course of social progress. Qosja (1990: 242) expressed his confidence, “The crisis is going to pass, the violence is going to come to its end, and the hate is going to pass. The leaders of national and religious intolerance (Milošević and his team) are going to pass and new forces shall emerge necessarily- the forces of civil and democratic tolerance”.

7.5 The republic of Kosovo vs. the Albanian unification

Qosja did not blame the Serbs as a nation, but rather the Serb elite for creating the conflict in order to postpone the democratisation of Yugoslavia. However, the goal of the Albanian movement, as Qosja envisaged it, was not the deposing of Milošević and the democratisation of Serbia/Yugoslavia, but the Republic of Kosovo inside Yugoslavia. First, Qosja (1990, 1992, 1994) argued that the Republic of Kosovo was a rightful demand that did not depend on the regime form in Serbia, but on certain objective qualities of the concerned national group (i.e. the Albanians). The Albanians were a nation and possessed the right of self-determination because they fulfilled all the conditions: distinct national identity, territory, population, and political will. Qosja (1990: 269-270) wrote, “The Albanians in Yugoslavia … even because of their number compared to the other nations in Yugoslavia, or as the majority in Kosovo, or because of their spiritual and cultural development and the level of development of their national conscience, are objectively a nation: that lives together, in a compact territory, as its most ancient autochthon nation”.

Second, Qosja (1990, 1992) implied that even a democratic Serbia was going to remain an ethnocracy and treat the Albanians as second rank citizens. Qosja (1990: 159) argued that autonomy had proven to be unstable and reversible like “… a very sensible plant that the winds from Belgrade can toss in the ground”. Only the Republic of Kosovo, equal to the other Yugoslav units, could guarantee the equality and eliminate the vulnerability to the Serb political mood. Qosja (1990: 370) ridiculed any Albanian “… who instead of the Republic of Kosovo chooses autonomy, [he] reminds us of an abnormal human who, instead of a large and strong castle, in which he was going to be the landlord, would choose to live in a rotten hut, from which he can be thrown out at any time”.

Simultaneously, Qosja (1990, 1992) aired the idea of the national unification of all the Albanians in one national state: the ideal solution and his personal lifelong dream. Qosja (1992: 98) wrote that, “… the unification of the Albanian nation is the holy ideal of the Albanian nation. Such will is a natural right”. Qosja (1990, 1992) felt so strong that he debated unification, although he considered it impossible. First, Qosja implied that the unification was not desirable for as long as Albania remained a
Communist dictatorship. Second, Qosja could not conceive the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Qosja considered a regime change in Albania as imminent while the dissolution of Yugoslavia remained unthinkable. Therefore, Qosja consoled himself with the idea of the unified Albanian nation inside the EEC. “The Albanians are right to hope that their question can be resolved entirely and not partly, once and for all and not temporarily, in the united Europe of the free nations, because in the Europe of nations, they as a divided nation would realise unification”. (Qosja 1992: 25)

7.6 The strategy of the Albanian movement

Qosja (1990, 1992) argued that two forces were going to produce the desired political results. The first and the decisive force was the Albanian peaceful, but active resistance: demonstrations, strikes, etc. Qosja challenged directly the policy advocated by Rugova and Maliqi. Qosja (1990: 379) wrote, “No! I don’t think that through Ghandi-a-like passive resistance it can be done a lot to weaken the reign of the Serb violence in Kosovo”. Qosja contested the idea of Maliqi and Rugova that Serbia was going to use any act of resistance as an excuse for new massacres. Qosja (1992) was convinced that the level of violence did not depend on the level of the Albanian resistance, but rather it depended on the goal of Serbia: the expulsion of the Albanians from Kosovo.

However, Qosja (1990: 368) excluded any armed action against the Serb rule. “In peace, nevertheless, and only in peace, we should search the resolution of the question of Kosovo and the Albanian question”. Qosja argued that the goal of the Albanians was to live in peace with their neighbours, while violence was going to bring pain and sufferings to all the nations in Kosovo. “I stand for the peaceful solution of the question of Kosovo because I am conscious that force and violence cause pain and misfortune to all people- guilty and innocent as well.” (Qosja 1990: 373)

Qosja argued that Milošević was not going to relinquish willingly his control over Kosovo. Qosja (1990: 209) wrote, “History does not record any ruling stratum that has refrained willingly from power, which has refrained willingly from its own interests, therefore, we cannot expect that the ruling stratum in Yugoslavia was going to be an exception”. Therefore, Qosja (1990, 1992) recommended the active resistance
albeit he acknowledged that his strategy was painful and risky. Qosja had an especially national-romantic idea about the effect of violence: violence produces pain, but pain strengthens the nation. Qosja (1990: 263, 318) wrote, “Fortunately, because of these pains, no nation has disappeared. On the contrary, the nations are hardened in pain, both spiritually and morally. … The violence hurts the nations temporarily, but in their historical development, it strengthens their vitality”. Qosja could not even imagine a painless victory. “Because [the nations] do not achieve their freedom, walking through flowers, but only through prolonged ordeals and pains”. (Qosja 1990: 337)

The second factor was the intervention of the international community. Qosja’s language revealed his belief on the new nature of the international relations: a paradigm change had happened in the world. “In the world, in the meantime, today is under articulation a new political philosophy that encourages inter-relations, agreements, equality of nations, which upholds freedoms, rights and their sovereignty”. (Qosja 1990: 231) Qosja used the notion ‘the Great Powers’ when he referred to the role of the Western powers as they divided the Albanian territories between their Balkan clients. Qosja (1992: 28) accused the imperialistic Europe for “… using the rights and the fate of small nations instead of banknotes”. In contrast, Qosja used the notion ‘the international community’ to refer to the role of EU and USA in resolving the Albanian question in 1989-1991. The new world, as Qosja understood it, was the political and ideological antithesis of the old imperialistic Europe. “Although in the minds of many, the name of Europe is associated with the Great Powers… Europe of after the World War II is neither politically, legally, nor morally, the Europe of before World War II. … Europe… is looking upon us and is protecting us.” (Qosja 1992: 19, 21)

Qosja (1990, 1992, 1996) believed that the new Europe was going to help actively the Albanians to achieve their self-determination. First, Qosja was convinced that the new Europe recognised its old mistakes and felt morally obliged to help the Albanian democratic movement. “Europe that draw the political map of the Balkan, creating the Albanian question, as the tragic question of the Balkan is now, historically and morally obliged to help for the just resolution of this question. And not only Europe,
but even the USA, that now is the symbol of democracy and universal justice.” (Qosja 1990: 391) Second, Qosja (1990, 1992) assumed that the European Community intended to expand and include the Balkan states as well. Therefore, Qosja expected that EEC was going to intervene actively in the democratisation of Yugoslavia.

7.7 The Yugoslav dissolution: occupation vs. liberation

Qosja (1992, 1994, 1996) declared that the dissolution of Yugoslavia represented a complete new situation that demanded a new language and a new understanding. Qosja (1996: 46, 1994:249) claimed that Yugoslavia was “a mistake of history” and “a creature against the nature”. It was not created by the free will of its comprising nations, but because of imperialistic interests of France and England.

Qosja described the dissolution of Yugoslavia not as an accident, but rather as the unavoidable and necessary result of the historical progress. Qosja (1994: 249, 246, 311) summarised that, “Yugoslavia was a creature ‘against the nature’… The dissolution of Yugoslavia is the product … of the liberation efforts of its comprising nations”, because “It [Yugoslavia] did not represent the right solution of the national question of its comprising nations”. However, the cause of the ethnic violence was not the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but rather the policy of Milošević. Qosja (1996: 153) declared, “I am convinced that the main reason for the war in the former Yugoslavia is the policy of Slobodan Milošević”.

The conflict was no longer between the Serb elite and the nations. Already on July 5th, 1990 Qosja (1990: 364) had ‘mentioned’, “At the present, the Albanian rule over Kosovo, inexistent as it was, is even officially declared inexistent! Kosovo is under Serb occupation!” In January-February 1991, Qosja (1992: 83) wrote an article titled “The Albanians in Yugoslavia- an occupied nation” that became the pivot of his political narrative. The conflict was between the occupier colonial Serbia and the occupied Kosovo. Qosja (FISH 1995) wrote, “The Serb interest in Kosovo is simply colonialist and hegemonic, while the Albanian interest is ethnic and existential”.

Qosja (1992: 124) described the occupation, as “… the most tragic condition that a nation can experience; the freedom and the independence are the highest ideal that a
nation can aim to achieve”. Qosja (1994) argued that the final goal of Serbia was not
to control Kosovo, but to expulse all the Albanians from their land. “The chauvinistic
occupying Serb regime does not know where to stop: because hate is its only senti-
ment; because terror is its method; because our disappearance from our land is its
ultimate goal!” (Qosja 1992: 140)

Qosja erased slowly the distinction between Milošević/Serbia and the Serbs living
in Kosovo. “Even the Serbs and the Montenegrins in Kosova, are armed by Serbia up
to their teeth”. (Qosja 1996: 95) The Serbs were no longer ‘the manipulated’, but the
colonial masters and their duty was to impose Serbia’s domination over Kosovo and
oppress the Albanians. Qosja (1996: 368, 95) wrote, “Around 2 million Albanians are
completely ruled, exploited and oppressed by some 150000 Serbs and Montene-
grins… armed by Serbia up to their teeth”. Kosovo was a colony of Serbia where
“One ethnic minority- the Serb minority rules, exploits, and persecute the majority-
the Albanian majority”. (Qosja 1996: 375)

7.8 The Albanian unification
Qosja had no doubt about the future of the Albanians in the Great Serbia and com-
pared it to the period before the WWII. The Albanians “… were going to submit to
recurring expulsions, but this time this process will be concluded”. (Qosja 1992: 144)
However, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not only a huge setback, but also a
unique opportunity for the resolution of the Albanian question. “The dissolution of
Yugoslavia has opened the historically unstoppable process … of the creation of the
new national states”. (Qosja 1994: 251) Qosja (1994: 251) argued that the Albanians
had to make the maximum efforts to exploit this chance, because “Now, or probably
never ever!”

Qosja (1992, 1994, 1996) excluded any ties between Kosovo and Serbia/Yugoslavia. “Yugoslavia as a federation is a closed chapter.” (Magnussen
1998:6) Qosja declared that the only right and long-term solution was the national
state that respected the ethnic geographical boundaries. Qosja discerned between the
Albanian question and the question of Kosovo. “The Albanian question cannot be
reduced to the question of Kosovo, even though Kosovo is its most important element
... Any comprehensive solution to the Albanian question must take the problem of all these Albanians into account” (Qosja 1995b: 494-495)

However, Qosja was forced to retreat from the idea of unifying all the territories with an Albanian majority and instead to concentrate on the unification of Albania and Kosovo. First, the international community granted recognition to Macedonia and Montenegro. Second, the Albanian political parties in these two republics declined to support his idea. Qosja (1992, 1994) was especially disappointed with the Albanians leaders in Macedonia that opted for a solution inside Macedonia and did not mention the idea of unification.

Therefore, Qosja downgraded his demand and called for the unification of Albania and Kosovo. “The unification of the Albanians- this is the future necessary to come.” (Qosja 1992: 85) Qosja argued that unification was a necessary and unstoppable process. Qosja (1992: back-cover note) claimed “And, the day of the destruction of that wall [the border that divided the Albanians] would come as a necessity of history. And, the day of Albanian unification would come as a necessity of justice”.

Qosja (1994, 1996) claimed that the Albanian case was unique. Qosja argued that the Albanians in Kosovo were not a minority, but the only divided nation. Qosja (FISH 1995) wrote, “The Albanians have been referred to as a minority, although constituting half of the entire [Albanian] nation... The Albanian question cannot be treated as a minority question in the Serbian-Montenegrin Federation either, since Albanians are more numerous than Montenegrins that constitute only 5% of this federation, and yet have their own republic, whereas Albanians constitute 16.6% in the federation or 1/3 of the population of multinational Serbia”.

Therefore, the Albanian question demanded a unique solution: the unification of Kosovo and Albania. First, Qosja (1992, 1994, 1996) argued that the Albanians possessed the ‘will’ to live in their unified state. Qosja described ‘the will of the nation’ to create his own national state as innate, legitimate, progressive, and as obvious as it needed no explanation. “The Albanian nation has one ideal: the national unification.” (Qosja 1996: 8) Qosja declared that the German unification was the best evidence to the existence and the force of ‘the will of the nations’. Second, Qosja (1992) maintained that the Albanians in Kosovo were autochthones and the majority in Kosovo.
As such, they had a special connection to Kosovo and the special right to decide about its political status. Third, because of its violent past, “Serbia has lost every moral and political right to govern Kosovo or to have any institutional connection with”. (Qosja 1999: 111)

7.9 The strategy of the Albanian movement

Qosja argued that three factors were determining the solution of the Albanian question. “The Albanians … are the main factor that shall decide the way to resolve it [the Albanian national question]; Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, as republics in which the Albanians are oppressed and exploited, are the second factor interested about the Albanian question, but interested to preserve status quo, … the European and world political factor is the third factor”. (Qosja 1992: 89)

The first factor was the role of Milošević and the Serb opposition. Qosja regretted that Milošević had already succeeded in scaring Rugova and achieved his goal. Qosja (1994, 1996, 1997a, 1999) had no doubt that ‘the Serb invaders’ were not going to leave Kosovo out of their free will. Qosja dismissed that the Serb opposition could improve the position of the Albanians or grant them independence, because “All the Serb political parties defend the concept of the Great Serbia.” (Qosja 1994: 274)

Qosja condemned as treason any attempt to co-operate with Serbia, or the Serb political parties and even worse to participate in the Serb parliamentary elections. Qosja argued that the participation in the elections was the recognition of the occupation. “None has the mandate to decide for the Albanians to continue their life under the Serb occupation.” (Qosja 1996: 220)

The international community was the second force that influenced the resolution of the Albanian question. Qosja appreciated its role in defending the Albanians. “Without the continuing interest of the all-European institutions for us, the horrible situation of the Albanian nation in Yugoslavia, even unprecedented as it is in peace time, was going to be even worse”. (Qosja 1992: 20-21) However, Qosja (1994: 260) regretted the fact that the Western powers “… did not support [the Albanian] demand for independence … [and advised that the Albanians] must accept Serbia”.
Simultaneously, Qosja returned to the traditional distrust and scepticism towards the European powers. Qosja ceased using the term New World Order and instead warned the Albanians not to take for granted the European support for the Albanian question. Qosja (1992: 26, 29) wrote, “We should not forget, in the meantime, that the hopes of small nations, quite often during their history have ended up in desperation … we should not exclude every possibility for disappointment in the new European order. … I am afraid that even in future, the expressions: poor small man, poor small nation, poor small culture, are going to be proved true”.

Qosja (1992: 89) believed that the international community “… shall play a very important role in the resolution of the Albanian question, but this role shall depend mostly from the Albanian factor. The more vigorous, decisive, and stronger is the Albanian factor, the more powerful the role of the European and international factor shall be, and vice versa.” Qosja (1996: 366) argued that the Albanians, through their active resistance had to convince the international community that “… the Albanians shall never be calm and the Balkans never shall be pacified without the right solution of the question… of the Albanian nation”.

The most important factor to resolve the Albanian question was the activity of the Albanians in Kosovo. Qosja (1994, 1995e, 1996) continued to define the Albanian strategy as a challenge to Rugova and his “… disreputable and submissive political course towards Serbia, a course of nothing more than words”. (Qosja 1995b) Qosja (FISH 1996) argued that instead of intensifying the resistance, “… this diplomacy has only calmed down an entire historical national movement at the end of this century”. Qosja (1996: 151) argued that the effect of the LDK resistance was “… very pale because it is disobedience sitting down”. Qosja (1996: 416) argued that LDK pursued this policy not because it was smarter, but because LDK had turned into “A new political caste … that does not accept the idea of sacrifice”. Its goal was not to protect the nation from the Serb wrath, but rather to protect its own position and privileges.

Qosja argued that Rugova was relying only on the help of the EU and USA to achieve independence. Rugova was “… spreading illusions that USA and the EU states are going to bring us freedom and independence … in our imagination they are become that over-natural creature”. (Qosja 1992: 129) Qosja demanded from Rugova
to face the truth: the international community was not supporting the independence of Kosovo. Rugova had to tell the truth to the Albanians, because “For a number of reasons, it is always better to tell to the nation only the truth, independently of how much we like it or not”. (Qosja 1992: 130)

Rugova was proud that LDK, with its policy, had preserved the nation and peace. Qosja (1996: 64) dismissed this idea, because “For the occupied, peace is not the most important value”. Qosja (1992: 130) declared that the most important value was freedom and the Albanians had to win their own freedom with their “… efforts, sweat, and sacrifices”. Qosja argued that to achieve independence “We must exploit all the ways of civil disobedience, as means of active resistance”. Qosja (1995b, 1995c, 1996) claimed that the core of Ghandi peaceful resistance was the organised and active resistance: strikes, demonstrations and generally active resistance. Qosja (1996: 42) realised that the active resistance was dangerous and painful, but “The road to unification is the road of pain”.

Slowly, Qosja began to contemplate the idea of the armed resistance. Qosja (1996: 280) asked, “Can we continue endlessly with our peaceful resistance?” The answer was “The nations that cannot achieve their human, political and national rights … through peaceful, democratic means… are forced to wage war. War, hence, becomes a necessary evil; the nations that want to become master of their fate cannot escape from this evil.” (Qosja 1996: 280) Qosja (1996: 219) considered war as something horrible for the individuals and the nation, but moral, because if all the other forms of resistance fail than “the war remains a lawful means”. Qosja argued that to succeed in war, the Albanians had to be careful. “But for the war, we should be well prepared and we need foreign states to support us”. (Qosja 1996: 416)

7.10 The post-Dayton strategy
The first half of 1996 was characterised by mass euphoria about the Dayton agreement and the opening of the US Information Centre in Prishtina. However, as the outer wall of sanctions was crumbling and the European leaders were putting pressure on Rugova to start talks with Milošević, Qosja (1997a: 207) announced, “The time of deception is slowly coming to its end!” The events were proving that “The
question of Kosovo has entered a new phase, and in this phase, it is confirmed that the policy pursued by the LDK leadership has suffered a total failure”. (Qosja 1998a)

Qosja (Lutovac 1996: 20) described the period after the Dayton accord as “… the end of illusion that the international community will honour the requests of the Albanians for independence or unification with Albania”. Qosja (1997b) complained, “How can we be satisfied with their stance for as long as they do not promise Kosovo more than autonomy?” Qosja (1996, 1997a) explained the reluctance of the international community to help the Albanians with the failed civil disobedience. The Albanians had to learn from Croatia and Bosnia. They rebelled, fought for their national rights and compelled with their resistance the international community to intervene.

Qosja described the present situation as the direct consequence of the policy pursued by Rugova and LDK. Qosja (1997a: 33) declared, “In no case, I was going to defend this policy… first of all because its result until today is: the acceptance in practice of the oppression and exploitation of the Albanian nation”. Qosja (1998a) argued, “LDK is paralysed and dead” because Rugova “… has excluded completely the idea of sacrifice”. (Qosja 1997a: 470)

Qosja (1997c, 1998a) warned that the most courageous people (i.e. former political prisoners) had already left LDK and the remaining leaders (Qosja hinted at Agani) were engaged in talks with the Serb representatives in New York and Belgrade. Qosja (1997a: 37) labelled these talks as a new effort to achieve a new “brotherhood and unity”. Qosja (1998b: 6) declared that any effort to accept less than independence was an act of betrayal, because “It was against the will of the nation expressed in the referendum”.

Qosja argued that it was the time for the Albanians to decide about their strategy and consequently their future. “We are at the crossroad: where should we go?” (Qosja 1997a: 208) Qosja was confident that the Albanians were not going to accept any compromise Rugova- Milošević. Qosja (1997a: 38) asked, “Is the nation going to accept this? The historical lesson is: No!” Qosja implied that another form of resistance was needed to achieve the independence of Kosovo. Qosja (1997a: 35) repeated: “It is necessary to revive our national all-popular resistance”. There was little doubt what Qosja included in the notion “revival of the popular resistance” because
the Kosovo Liberation Army was already active. Qosja described the KLA as a continuation of the Albanian tradition of fighting for freedom. “The Albanian people have often had to defend themselves from the Serbs. It is not the first time that the Albanian blood is shed in Drenica.” (Magnussen 1998: 6)

However, Qosja (1998c, 1998d, 1998e) was aware that KLA could not liberate Kosovo. Qosja argued that the goal of the armed resistance was not to force the Serb forces out of Kosovo, but rather to force “… a certain form of international armed intervention, and the deployment of an international protection force, as a precondition for preventing further escalation of the war, for finding a political solution of the Kosovo issue”. (Qosja 1998e) Qosja expected that the international community was going to act as it did in Bosnia: immediate ceasefire, the retreat of the Serb forces and the creation of an international protectorate over Kosovo. Qosja believed that during this phase the Serbs and the Albanians would engage in talks about the future of Kosovo. Qosja (1998d) argued that, “The New Democratic League of Kosovo is for the peaceful solution of the question of Kosovo, after the Serb police and army forces leave the province and the participation of the international mediators is secured.”

Quite differently, from Agani and Surroi that called upon the USA and EU to impose a solution, Qosja advocated an active role during the talks at Rambouillet. The maximum demand for Qosja (1999: 131, 198) was a referendum about the political future of Kosovo after 3 to 5 years. “Together with the dislocation of a NATO force in Kosova, we consider as strategic the question of a referendum…. The question of the referendum is for us the most important, decisive question in the International Conference for Kosova.” However, Qosja was not sure if the Albanians could extract such promise in Rambouillet. Therefore, in case that the USA and EU threatened to stop the talks, Qosja was prepared to accept only the retreat of the Serb police and army forces and the international protectorate over Kosovo. The Albanians were going to be safe from their Serb occupiers, the connections with Serbia were going to weaken gradually and the Albanians could find another solution.
7.11 Summary

Qosja rejected the idea that there was an ethnic conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs. The ethnic conflicts were not natural, inherent or predetermined, but rather created by the ruling class, i.e. the bourgeoisie. Milošević and the Serb Communist elite were guilty for creating a conflict in order to prolong their own rule and postpone the democratisation of Serbia/Yugoslavia. Qosja declared that Milošević represented an existential threat to the Albanians, because his final goal was the expulsion of the Albanians. In general, the Albanians were victims of Serbia, which denied to them the status of republic inside Yugoslavia. The political inequality was the root of all the economic and social problems experienced by the Albanians in Kosovo.

Qosja declared that the Albanians had never harmed Serbia and the Serbs and therefore, they bore no responsibility for the conflict. Qosja argued that the Albanians were a nation and they had the right to demand their own republic. The demand for the Republic of Kosovo neither created nor aggravated the conflict, because just and fair demands do not create conflicts. The Republic of Kosovo was going to mend the old imperialistic injustice, mitigate the Albanian fear of Milošević, improve the social and economic status of the Albanians, and create the right conditions for the democratisation of Yugoslavia.

Qosja debated the unification as the only right solution, although the goal was the Republic of Kosovo. Qosja declared that the unification was his long-term goal. Qosja was optimist that the democratic Albania and Yugoslavia were going to be part of the European Union, effectually uniting the Albanians in one state. Qosja neither debated nor demanded the dissolution of Yugoslavia. As any other Albanian leader, Qosja believed that Milošević, a Communist turned nationalist, was a temporary phenomenon. Milošević was going to give up under the internal and external pressure. Milošević’s demise was going to open the way for the institutional re-organisation of Yugoslavia, i.e. the Republic of Kosovo and the democratisation of Yugoslavia.

As Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia, Qosja was quick to follow representing similar demands. Qosja considered the dissolution of Yugoslavia as natural, predetermined and inescapable. Qosja argued that Kosovo was under Serb occupation. Qosja demanded the unification of all the territories with an
Albanian majority (Albania + Albanians in Yugoslavia) in one state. Qosja argued that this was the best solution because the innate volition of each state is to create its own national state. Qosja declared unification was going to resolve any ethnic conflict and allow the national states to concentrate on their domestic problems, i.e. economic development. However, because he got no support for his idea by the Albanian political leaders in Macedonia and Montenegro, Qosja modified his idea and demanded the unification of Albania and Kosovo.

In the beginning, Qosja rejected the war or any armed action against Serb army and police. Simultaneously, Qosja called for an active resistance against Milošević and Serbia: demonstrations, strikes etc. Qosja believed that every victory had its own cost and every cost was acceptable to win the right of self-determination. Qosja criticised the sense of euphoria shown by many Albanian leaders. Qosja agreed that a new set of principles was organising the international relations. He believed that the Great Powers had taken a new stance toward the Albanian question as part of the Yugoslav crisis.

Qosja demanded from the Albanian political parties to co-ordinate their activities with those of the international community. He demanded a more active strategy in order to stimulate the international attention and intervention. Qosja declared that the goal of the Albanian political parties was to convince the international community that the only solution was the self-determination of all the Albanians in Yugoslavia. Qosja expected help from the international community, but the Albanians had to take the first step. Therefore, he demanded a more active stand in the form of strikes, demonstrations etc.

However, he concluded that the civil disobedience was not going to produce results. Qosja declared that the armed rebellion remained as the last alternative to win independence. Qosja warned that the Albanians had to find the right moment and to be well prepared. Qosja was the only Albanian leader to defend the armed action and the human cost of it. Qosja despised LDK and its satellites, because they had changed the soul of the Albanians. LDK had turned the Albanians into subservient creatures. Qosja pictured the opposite Albanian: proud, courageous, and self-sacrificing.
Qosja explained Dayton agreement as a clear proof that only one who dares wins. The agreement rewarded those who participated in the war and left out the Albanians. The international community praised the Albanians for their civil disobedience, but offered them nothing in return. Therefore, Qosja called again for an armed resurrection. He was well aware that the Albanians could not win the war. However, exactly as in Bosnia, the Serb counter-insurgency tactics were going to force the international community to interfere actively in conflict. Qosja saw Rambouillet as the coronation of his political activity.
8. THE POWER/KNOWLEDGE EFFECTS

As pointed previously, discourse contains power because it produces knowledge, i.e. it decides what the norm is and what it is not. However, as Neumann (2001) shows discourses produce different power effects that influence our life at various degrees. Neumann (2001: 173) argues that, “The political is the battle about differences that make a difference”. Therefore, in this chapter, I shall not deal with every knowledge of the discourse (every representations that constituted a piece of knowledge), but with the most important ones that produced political effects in the life of the Albanians in Kosovo during the period 1990-1999.

I would like to begin by pointing out that building and maintaining a discursive norm is an arduous discursive work that involves the repetition of the representations, and the invention and the use of different institutions and practices. However, if properly constructed and maintained, the discursive norms enjoy a certain degree of inertia that prevents the creation of new discursive norms. The Yugoslav discourse created two such norms that influenced the discourse of the Albanian discursive formations. The first norm defined nationalism as a danger and anti-revolutionary activity. All the Albanian leaders began their discourse by following this norm. They denied that they were nationalist or guided in their activity by nationalism. Instead, they spoke about defending natural national interest. The second discursive norm labelled the Albanian demand for the Republic of Kosovo as irredentism and as the first step towards the unification with Albania as chauvinism. Therefore, Rugova began his involvement in politics declaring his loyalty to Yugoslavia and denying that his goal was the independent Republic of Kosovo and even worse, the unification with Albania. Maliqi called the unification with Albania as natural, as late as 1995, long after Yugoslavia had dissolved.

Similarly, the Albanian civil disobedience formation, as the main/dominant discursive formation, produced its own knowledges that were represented as truth. The first of such discursive norms established a system of differentiation between the Albanians and Milošević/the Serb Communist leadership. The system of differentiation es-
established two categories of ethical subjects. Milošević was the power-obsessed Communist leader that was facing increasing demands to relinquish power and allow the democratisation of Yugoslavia. Instead, he was trying to prolong his own rule by inventing an ethnic conflict. Milošević depicted the Albanians as a threat and a foreign element inside Serbia and Kosovo as integral part of Serbia. On the other side, the Albanian discourse created the other, the good Albanian as victim of Milošević trying to defend his national rights. The Albanian discourse identified Milošević as an existential threat to every Albanian because his goal was the destruction of the Albanian nation. The Albanian discourse represented mobilisation and resistance as a necessary (normal) behaviour towards Milošević and Serbia excluding any possibility for agreement. All the Albanians had to participate in this final confrontation where the future of the Albanian nation was going to be decided.

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the system of differentiation was slightly changed. It was a conflict between the occupier and the occupied. The system of differentiation expanded to include not only the Serb leaders, but also the Serbs in general and the Serbs living in Kosovo especially. They were depicted as ‘armed’ and ‘part of the occupation force’ that were helping the Serb police and the army to suppress any act of opposition.

The second discursive norm related to the goal of the Albanian movement in Kosovo. The leadership of all the Albanian political parties in Yugoslavia foresaw three possible scenarios with three corresponding solution the Albanian question. However, although, the external borders of Yugoslavia changed, the Albanian political parties decided to change their goal. They decided to demand the Republic of Kosovo as their main demand instead of demanding the unification of all the Albanian territories in one state. It was not a simple change of goal because it admitted that the Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro were going to remain part of these two states and not join the independent Republic of Kosovo or the unified Albanian state. How did Rugova manage to change the goal of the Albanian movement without fearing and experiencing any normalisation effects that would undermine his position as leader? First, there was almost no resistance to this change. All the Albanian parties shared the same idea. The international community recognised Macedonia and Mon-
tenegro and the change of their borders was impossible. Second, the change of the goal was approved by what was perceived as the proper authority, the Coordination Council of the Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia that included the Albanian political parties in Macedonia and Montenegro. Third, a massive discursive work paved the way for this political decision. From that moment and on, Rugova would repeat in every occasion that the only right solution for the Albanians was the independent Republic of Kosovo.

The parliamentary and presidential elections in Kosovo that resulted in a massive victory for the LDK and Rugova served to give legitimacy to his programme and his role as the president of Kosovo. Although, he did not have the monopoly of violence, Rugova enjoyed the complete respect of the Albanians as a moral figure. As the Albanian shadow institutions were taking shape, Rugova declared that the Republic of Kosovo existed and that it needed only the international recognition. Therefore, Rugova called for a policy of non-cooperation with the Serb institutions.

The third discursive norm was that the independence of Kosovo was going to be achieved by a combination of civil resistance and international intervention. There was much debate between the LDK leaders as what was the best means to resist to the Serb occupation. However, once Rugova decided, the civil resistance became the norm. The main argument for this decision was the belief that Milošević was trying to provoke the Albanians in order use massive military power to accomplish the expulsion of the Albanians.

Rugova argued that the duty of the LDK was to control the reactions of the Albanians that faced massive abuse at the hands of the Serb police and army. The advice that Rugova gave to the Albanians was: Do not react. First, the LDK leaders succeeded in stopping the wave of strikes/demonstrations that had engulfed Kosovo in 1990-1991. Second, after each police action, groups of LDK leaders and human right organisations would visit the place and try to stop any retaliatory action from the Albanians. LDK was so effective that there were no demonstrations between 1992 and 1996.

Rugova assured the Albanians that the USA and EU were going to intervene on behalf of the Albanians. USA and EU would feel morally obligated to stop the Serb
violence and reward the Albanians for their civic resistance. Rugova inflated the media with the alleged support of the international community for the question of Kosovo. He repeated that the support of the USA and EU for the independence of Kosovo was increasing and it was only a matter of time.

The first challenge to the discursive norms established by the LDK leaders came from Maliqi. He proposed the participation of the Albanians in the Serb national elections. Maliqi argued that the participation of the Albanians in the Serb parliamentary elections could secure the victory of Panic and change the balance of power in Serbia. The proposal was met with massive condemnation by the LDK controlled media. The participation in the Serb elections was considered as giving legitimacy to the Serb institutions and consequently an unacceptable behaviour. Maliqi withdrew his proposal, apologised, and even resigned from his position as the leader of the Social-Democratic Party of Kosovo. Effectively, Maliqi was removed from the discursive arena as unacceptable and even untrustworthy.

The second challenge against the LDK produced norms came after the Dayton agreement. Both the former leaders of the democratic formation and Qosja as representative of the radical option challenged the policy followed by Rugova as it became clear that the international community was not supporting the independence of Kosovo. Maliqi and Surroi made it clear that the independence of Kosovo did not have the support of the international community. They accused Rugova for following a policy blinded by its own naivety and futility. They demanded from Rugova to change the final goal of the Albanian movement and to engage in talks with Milošević.

Qosja challenged Rugova from another point. The Republic of Kosovo was the right solution and the goal that the Albanians had to achieve. However, the policy of civil resistance had failed and it was time to review it and move to another form of resistance. Qosja referred to the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. Qosja claimed that the highest value was not peace and survival, but freedom and therefore, any active resistance, including the armed insurrection was not only proper, but also morally right. Qosja argued that for as long as the Albanians wanted to live in freedom, the armed resistance as unavoidable.
Rugova was the prime constructor of these discursive norms. However, even he could not change or abandon those that easily. The discourse has a normalising effect even on the subject that creates it. Rugova faced the dilemma between less than independence or war. Rugova opted for the first alternative and tried to enlist the support of Qosja and Demaci. Both refused to support him. By that time, the students were demonstrating in the streets of Prishtina and the KLA had engaged the Serb army and police. The Serb special police answered with its ill-famed counter-insurgency operations. Then NATO came!
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11. ENDNOTES


2 A very interesting contribution to understand the role of the Serb intellectuals in the Yugoslav conflict is Dragović-Soso (2002).

3 "The Thinker" (French: "Le Penseur") is one of Auguste Rodin's famous bronze sculptures. It depicts a man in sober meditation battling with a powerful internal struggle. It is sometimes used to represent philosophy.

4 Gjakova is a town in the eastern part of Kosovo, close to the Albanian border. The majority of the high Communist cadres came from this area.

5 "The first and last goal of our movement is to secure the right of self-determination including secession for the areas inhabited by a majority of Albanians… which means that the first and the last goal of our movement is the liberation of Albanian areas annexed by Yugoslavia and the unification of these regions with their mother, Albania". (Article 1 of the Statute)

6 Latter in the 90’s, some of the group members blamed the Albanian interference for the failure to co-ordinate. However, they cannot give a reason why the Albanian intelligence service sabotaged the meeting. The Albanian side blames the parochial interests of group leaders and the personal failure of the Albanian mediator.

7 Truth be told, political trials were organised concurrently in the other Republics also. The most known ones were those of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Gojko Djogo in Serbia. The Yugoslav leadership felt that even political repression had to be divided somehow equally. However, the trials in Croatia and Serbia were different, because they were selective (in Kosovo, there were condemned 245 people during the period May-September 1981), aimed at the members of intelligentsia, the sentences were shorter and usually pardoned after a short time.

8 Differentiation was described as distancing from irredentism and nationalism. Many Albanian students were expelled from University of Pristina; many Albanians were dismissed or expelled from LCY.

9 The Memorandum was never finished. The Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts appointed in June 1985, a committee comprised of 16 members under the leadership of Antonije Isaković to draft the Memorandum. However, only few of its members participated actively during the drafting process. Dobrica Ćosić was not part of the committee, but he knew what was going on. Serb daily Večernje novosti (Evening news) published
on September 24th, 1986 excerpts from the unfinished document. We can only speculate as who leaked the document and why.

10 In Serbian (here in Latin alphabet) “Niko ne sme da vas bije, vas niko ne sme da bije” has the tone of a paternal prohibition and assurance. (Pavković 2000:220, note 22)

11 For the origin of this term see Dragosović-Saso (2002) note 1, p. 1

12 Azem Vllasi, previously the leader of the Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, was at that time provincial leader of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia.

13 Its organisers conceived the Association as an ideological heir of the Yugoslav Association for Philosophy and Sociology and as part of the ‘new left’.

14 Hereunder called LDK.


17 The Yugoslav partisan forces killed his grandfather Rrustë Rugova and father Ukë Rugova on January 10th, 1945. Ibrahim Rugova was born on December 2nd, 1944, in Cerrcë, municipality of Istog, Kosovo.

18 The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was founded on 23.12.1989.

19 Minister of the interior and head of the military intelligence ("OZNA") and political police ("UDBA") from 1945 until 1966. Ranković was ill famous between the Albanians for organising the Action for the gathering of weapons in 1955. However, according to the documents, Ranković had visited Kosovo only four times during the period 1945-1966. (See note 8, also)

20 As a member of the Academy of Science of Serbia, he was one of the developers of the ill-famous plan on expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans.

21 The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was a draft document produced by a committee of the Serbian Academy from 1985 to 1986. In September 1986, the draft was released to the public. Among many in Yugoslavia, including Serbia, it was deemed as an expression of Serbian nationalism.

22 Brioni Plenum was a meeting of the CC of LCY on July 1st, 1966. Tito condemned Ranković for his “etatis-tistic-bureaucratic conceptions and the negative activities of the secret police in Kosovo etc.

23 Among the founders of UJDI in January 1989 in Zagreb were, from Kosovo, Muhamedin Kullashi and Shkëlzen Maliqi.

24 The Appeal was written by Maliqi et al. and signed on January 23rd, 1990, by Veton Surroi, as leader of Pristina branch of UJDI, Idriz Ajeti as leader of The Council for the Protection of Human rights and Liberties, and Isuf Berisha as leader of the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo.
The petition was signed by 400,000 Albanians.

Qosja was born in 1936 in Vuthaj, district of Plava and Gucia. The district is today part of Montenegro.

Qosja completed his post-graduate studies at University of Belgrade in 1971.

Qosja emphasised that he wrote 18 books during the period 1967-1990, and another 6 during the period 1990-1999.

The Austrian Foreign Minister.

On July 5th, 1990, the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Serbia interrupted the session of the Parliament of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo.