The Madurese ulama as patrons

A case study of power relations in an Indonesian community

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Foreword

First of all I am very grateful to my supervisor Olle Törnquist. Without his support and continual guidance my dissertation would not have been completed. The guidance of the SUM-affiliated people has also been of uttermost importance. Moreover, thanks to funding, I got the chance to experience the Indonesian culture myself during field research. I am very grateful for that assistance.

Some individuals should be mentioned: Yono Angin from Madura is now a long time friend of mine who assisted me during my field research. Our mutual friends Holis and Mirna were also very helpful when I was collecting data. The academics connected with UGM's Isipol department helped me to get focused. The Research Institute of Madura in the town of Jember was most hospitable, letting me visit on very short notice. The students in Yogya (Yono's place) gave me valuable feedback, as did the people of Sumenep, Pamekasan, Surabaya and Jember. My fellow students in 'Støttegruppen', Berit Røysland, and specifically Hanne Sofie Løkkevik of the University of Oslo, Institute of Political Science, have been of great help. Thanks, all of you.

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Map of Indonesia and Madura*

Madura is barley home of its own people. Of an estimated 10 million Madurese, 6 million permanently live on the neighboring islands, especially on Java. During Suharto's 'transmigrasi' policy, West Kalimantan was one of the main destinations of the Madurese that were foreced to relocate. Madura is a part of the East Java province.

* Edited map. Source: Nelles map Verlag.

Words and abbreviations

Dhukon:	Healer
Juragan:	Trader
Khadam:	Islamic clerk
Kyai:	Islamic high-level teacher.
Langgar:	Islamic neighborhood school
LKiS:	Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (Non Governmental Organization seated in Yogyakarta)
Lurah:	Descendant of a kyai
Madrasah:	Qur'anic school
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU):	Islamic organization
Pesantren:	Short for Pondok pesantren (se below)
Pondok:	Dormitory, (short form of pondok pesantren) Islamic educational center
Pondok pesantren:	Islamic educational center
Santri:	Student of Islam
Syeh:	Leader of tarekat
Tarekat:	Islamic mystical brotherhoods
UGM:	Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
Ulama:	Islamic teachers (pl)
Ummat:	Disciples/followers/people
Ustadz:	Islamic clerk

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction. Approaching the Madurese ulama

1: Photo 1.1 Madurese ummat.

Noor and Arie are standing on the white line that separates traffic. They are standing in the middle of the road collecting money while cars speed by in both directions. The boys are students of kyai Ramdem, their religious leader, and receive instructions on Islamic virtues from him. The money the boys receive will be given to kyai Ramdem. He needs the money to finance his religious teaching. In their daily work Noor and Arie are motivated by their close social attachment to their religious leader. Standing in the middle of a heavily trafficked road, their reach out their hands to the passing cars. Homemade banners stretched over the road inform drivers of the purpose of the toll-road. The children and other followers of kyai Ramdem send regards to the drivers for not running over them on the road. They also thank those who support kyai Ramdem with a few Rupiah.[1]

This narrative is based on the experiences of many Madurese children and adults. Apparently they volunteer for such communal work to please their religious leaders. Throughout history, the Islamic Madurese people have been known for their strong

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[1] This toll-road activity is seen both on Madura and in the Madurese-dominated Jember on Java. Mr. Widodo, a scholar at the research institute of Jember University, Office for Madura studies, says the practice is unworthy (2000 [interview]).

attachment to their religious leaders. The Madurese are the third largest ethnic group in Indonesia, and they are presumed to be pure and traditional Muslims, a bit isolated from the other Indonesians.[2]

1.2 Theme and aim

The group of Islamic religious leaders, the 'ulama', have a strong hold on the Madurese Muslims. Collectively seen, the ulama are in possession of great power. Are we quite aware of the extent of their power? How may we reveal their nature as power-holders? The attachment between the religious leaders and the Madurese people could be characterized as a relationship of patrons and clients.[3] The theory of patron-client relations seems like a useful tool in an attempt to reveal the strong hold of the ulama. Hence, the theme of my dissertation is *the Madurese ulama as patrons*. My aim is to *reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations*. My analysis is structured by three general questions:

Firstly, I will look into the dominant social structures that make patronage possible. A personal relationship between two people, the relationship between a patron and a client is my point of departure. Moreover, I will investigate the personal relation, or dyad, within larger social relations. I will look at patron-client relations within larger social relationships as: patron-client clusters, patron-client pyramids and patron-client networks. In chapter three I will explain the difference between these intertwined social relations. In short, in order to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations, I firstly ask: *to what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize intertwined social relations to further patron-client relations?*

Secondly, after analyzing dyads, clusters, pyramids and networks, I will turn to politics. I will look at ulama's involvement in organizations. I also include some

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[2] Huub de Jonge (1995: 8) points out that such a stereotype impression of the Madurese is common. 'Stereotype' means "a relatively stable opinion of a generalizing and evaluative nature". Also Touwen-Bouwsma (1992) describes the Madurese in stereotyped terms. For a comparable article on the characteristics of the Javanese, see Mulder (1994). For details about geographical and topographical facts about Madura, see Niehof (1986: 121).
[3] In her interpretation of Mansurnoor (1990), Ina Slamet-Velsink states that the power of the religious leaders "[…] is founded on patronage […]"(1994:51-2).

reflections on ulama's political involvement in relation to democracy. My personal reflections on democracy are based on the foregoing analysis of the Madurese ulama as patrons, and are of secondary importance. In short, in this paragraph of my dissertation I ask: *To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize organizational involvement to further patron-client relations?*

Thirdly, and at last, I will look at ulama's involvement in business. I ask: *To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize economic involvement to further patron-client relations?*

The three general questions mentioned above structure my analysis. The order in which these three questions are asked is not randomly chosen. I choose to treat 'patronage as intertwined social relations' firstly, because it focuses on the societal relations which are the basis of my two other questions. However, when analyzing the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations, it is hard to decide which of these three questions is most important.

1.3 Methodology. Defining and limiting

At the outset, I have to emphasize that the three general questions guiding my dissertation pave the way for a broad scientific analysis. I confront the difficulties of a broad analysis on the *one* hand by utilizing multiple sources of empirical information, and on the *other* hand by submitting references for further reading on relevant topics, in footnotes. Moreover, a study of the Madurese ulama as patrons may reveal features common to all Indonesian ulama.[4] However, in the chapter of methodology I moderate any attempt at induction; from one case study to general knowledge.

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[4] See van Dijk (1995: 6).

1.3.1 A case study

In a broad analysis of the Madurese ulama as patrons I consider quite different social phenomena. The different phenomena I consider range from popular superstition, to economical dependency-relations. It is a challenge to limit patronage as a social phenomenon to related social constructs. Even more challenging, though, is the possibility that patronage may be a phenomenon that the Madurese themselves do not recognize: Patronage may be a sensitive theme to the Madurese, and people may be unwilling to accept that they are either 'patrons' or 'clients'. It is easy to see why someone would be reluctant to admit being a client. Being a client implies being subordinated to the more powerful patron. So admit that you are a subordinate may also mean that you are inferior in social status and power. In short, admitting that you are a subordinate may be the same as admitting that you lack social status. The problems of researching a sensitive societal phenomenon have clearly influenced my choice of research methods.

During my field research, I met with students or educated people, and others. I also interviewed a lot of santris. Madura consist of four regencies: Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan[5] and Sumenep. I conducted my field research in the latter two. I also interviewed Madurese in the Javanese cities of Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Jember.[6] The latter two cities are famous for their large number of Madurese citizens, and lie within the 'tapal leuda' (horseshoe) which is formed by the very Eastern tip of Madura, to Surabaya and to the town of Situbondo on the northwestern tip of Java. This horseshoe area is also nicknamed 'the fanatic-Islam area'.[7]

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[5] Pamekasan is the largest town on Madura. In Pamekasan we see growing urbanism, and a lot of trade activity heavily influenced by the Chinese.

[6] These latter two cities are located on Java. Some 60% of the Jember-people are of Madurese origin. Also here, the ulama are powerful.

[7] Agus and his wife both of whom are affiliated to the NGO Jaringan Kerja Tungku Indonesia, situated in Yogyakarta (2000 [interview]).

1.3.2 Definitions and limitations

Patronage: The following definition is the framework within which patronage will be understood in my dissertation: 1. Patronage concerns reciprocal exchange of goods and services between two parties. 2. The relation between the two parties is of some duration. 3. The two parties have unequal social status, there is an asymmetry in their societal power in the field of their relationship.[8] In chapter three, the theoretical foundation for my dissertation, I summarize the most common theoretical approaches to patronage. The theories of James C. Scott (1972a) and Karl D. Jackson (1974) will form the structure of my discussion.

Ulama and kyai: The way I use the terms ulama and kyai, is based on common Javanese and Madurese perceptions. I asked several of my informants for a definition. The general answer I got was that ulama means 'persons closer to God'. Others emphasized the literal meaning 'people that have the knowledge'.[9] The term ulama is used in the plural only, referring to a group. Hence, I will specify when I speak of one individual ulama.[10] The religious leader, called kyai[11], has a central and dominant position in the Madurese societal structure. The kyai is a social term, a term given by the people.[12] I experienced, though, that kyai is commonly used as the 'title' of a single ulama.[13] The kyai is a higher ulama. He is attached to a pondok pesantren (see below) and is commonly termed 'pondok ulama'. The following quote of Buchori (2000) illustrates a common Indonesian view of a kyai:

> "The image I had was that kyais were very serious all the time. They seldom laughed heartily and might smile infrequently. They always spoke in earnest. But kyais are also rich people with fertile land, tended by the disciples. They use not to mingle with the intellectuals and people of the state apparatus. In the 1970s the kyais became more open minded towards the 'modern' non-kyai community. Such 'modernization' must have been painful. Also the pesantrens [their religious centers] changed, with santris [pupils] studying also in the Western World. Kyais abusing the trust of their ummat [disciples] are withering". (Buchori is a son of a kyai himself, and writer of The Jakarta Post).

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[8] The definition is largely influenced by Saller (1982) and Gellner (1977).

[9] Grammatically, 'ulama' has the same root as 'Ilmu' (knowledge) in Arabic, Gaffar told me (2000 [Interview]). Gaffar is himself a lorah (son of a kyai).

[10] See for instance (Mansurnoor 1990: XV) for a discussion on the Arabic form ālim (singular) and ulamā.

[11] In this dissertation the Indonesian terms are transformed to English grammar so the plural form will be indicated with an additional 's'. For example: Kyai - kyais. Other terms synonymous to kyai may be 'rijal' and 'wali', in pl. 'aulia'(see also the web-dictionary: http://answering-islam.org.uk/Index/Hughes/a.htm).

[12] Gaffar (2000 [interview]).

[13] Many Indonesians see kyai and ulama as synonyms. And at times I myself will also use ulama and kyai synonymously.

We see that the kyai is one possible Islamic figure that may be termed ulama. In the analysis in chapter four I mention several other kinds of ulama, as the 'imam' (mosque ulama) and 'mak kaeh' (village ulama).

The *pondok pesantren*, short: 'pondok' or 'pesantren' is an Islamic boarding school headed by one or more kyais. In my dissertation I generally use the short term 'pesantren'. The pesantren's students are called *santris*. They live on the pesantren's campus during their education. Already from the beginning of their education the santris learn how to socialize correctly with and respect their kyais and ulama.

1.4 The structure of my dissertation

In *chapter two*, the chapter on methodology, I consider the problems of a case study. Through an examination of different theories of patronage, *chapter three* provides the theoretical foundation of my thesis. In this chapter the three general questions that structure my analysis will be thoroughly discussed. *Chapter four* will be the first part of my analysis, discussing 'patronage as intertwined social relations'. Primarily previous empirical research, but also my own field research, is the basis of the data used in the analysis. *Chapter five* is the second part of my analysis, focusing on 'patronage in politics and business'. My thesis will be brought to a close in *chapter six*, by answering the three general questions asked in chapter three. At the very end of chapter six, I connect 'the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations', to democratization of Indonesia.

Chapter 2

2.1 Methodology. Research on patron-client relations

Patron-client relations is a social phenomenon that could be difficult to understand.[14] Few people admit openly that they are patrons or clients. If you regard yourself as a client, a subordinate, you admit low social status, and risk 'losing face'. My choice of research methods is clearly influenced by the fact that patron-client relations is a sensitive phenomenon. Given the fact that I conducted field research for only a short period of time, I am quite satisfied with the response and information that I got. The universities and religious centers, and also people in general, showed me hospitality and overwhelming curiosity and response. I must mention that my minor pilot study on Madura in 1998 paved much of the way for my field research in 2000.

2.2 Case study

When I entered the field, my first problem was how to look for patron-client relations. What situations, and what behavior and statements could reveal patron-client relations? –Is it possible to observe patron-client relations? Three features of a case study helped me to search for the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. The case study research method[15] which guides me emphasizes that: 1. The phenomenon in focus (here: patron-client relations) should be studied broadly and not narrowly; 2. The phenomenon in focus should cover contextual conditions and not just the actual phenomenon of study; 3. A case study relies on multiple and not singular sources of evidence. In accordance with

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[14] Silverman (1977) comments on the importance of both context and biased subjective comprehensions in his "Patronage as Myth".

[15] 'Case study' is derived from the Latin 'casus' and underscores the importance of one singular phenomenon (Andersen 1997: 8). For more reading on this theme, see for instance Hammersley M. and Roger Gomm's comparison of case study with experimental-and survey-approaches (2000:4).

Andersen's ideal (1990a: 161) I have attempted to analyze patron-client relations as a particular social phenomenon, with all its decisive features, on its own terms. I am aware, though, of the problem of perceiving patron-client relations as a social phenomenon on its own terms, since I am not a native Madurese myself.

The chapter of theoretical foundation (next chapter) illustrates that the indicators of patron-client relations are numerous related to the data-sources that I have had access to. Patron-client relations could include a lot of factors, and I have had limited time and resources to investigate them. On the other hand, I have tried to achieve valid and reliable data by employing multiple sources of empirical information. During my collection of data, I have employed several data collection methods. In this respect, *triangulation of research methods* should be mentioned. If the existence of patron-client relations is confirmed by two or several different reliable data sources, it is more likely to be true. We are talking of converging evidence (Yin 1993:69). Quite early in the research process I realized that research on an ambiguous concept such as patron-client relations needs to be supported by several sources of empirical data. Therefore, I structured my analysis according to three research methods. *Firstly*, I employed documents and previous empirical research. However, my personal experience of patron-client relations should be the best way to grasp it. Hence, after I had studied documents from former empirical research on Madura, I realized that I had to conduct my own field research to come to terms with patron-client relations. When I was in the field, I utilized primarily the research methods 'participant observation' and interviews. Thus, the *second* research method that I have employed is known as 'observation'. In the field I tried to observe the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations.

Thirdly, I conducted interviews. An evident advantage of triangulation of research methods is that every method that I used in collecting my data has revealed slightly different details of patron-client relations. My own findings will obviously differ from previous studies. My interviews were different from previous research and the questions that I asked during my interviews were new, too. I realize that each of the research methods I utilized imposed my subjective perspectives on patron-client

relations, though. My own perspectives have been created by my own theoretical assumptions and my personal background.[16]

Yin (1993; 1994:1-4) focuses on three sub-categories of the case study. *Firstly* there is the 'exploratory case study', in which field research and data collection are defining the questions of an forthcoming study. I consider the trip I had to Madura in 1998 as an exploratory case study, or 'pilot study'. Prior to this first meeting with the Madurese, I only had vague concepts of patron-client relations, though. Hence, my observations from 1998 were unsystematic. The second time I met with the Madurese, in 2000, I was colored by theoretical assumptions. I looked for a specific phenomenon, patron-client relations. I was conscious not to let the impressions from my 1998-trip color my field research too much. Moreover, I attempted not to let my theoretical studies of the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations reduce my ability to grasp *real* patron-client relations. This proved difficult.

Secondly, a case study that presents a complete description of a phenomenon within its context is termed 'descriptive'. My case study of the Madurese ulama is descriptive since I focus on intertwined social relations, organizational involvement and economic involvement. By focusing on these three categories of patron-client relations, my aim is to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. My case study does not intend to develop any new theories concerning political or societal phenomena. I focus on description.[17]

Thirdly, a case study could be an 'explanatory case study'. This third category presents data bearing on causality, and explains which causes that produce which effects. I find it hard to reveal causality when I analyze patron-client relations, and I launch only 'general questions' in my dissertation (Yin 1993: 5-22).[18]

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[16] See Berg (1998:4) for details.

[17] See Paragraph 2.6, in which I return to a brief discussion on generalizing. For more reading on this theme, see for instance Eckstein (2000) who writes on 'theory building'.

[18] Moreover, the three sub-categories of case study may be either single or multiple, wherein multiple refers to two or more cases within the same study, Yin (1993: 5-22) states. In the following chapters of analysis, the reader will see to what extent my empirical analysis can be characterized as a 'critical case analysis': The chapter of theory will to some extent show us that the patron-client relations of the Madurese ulama represent atypical or extreme settings that may limit the applicability of general hypotheses. See Miller's (1983:26) dictionary of social science methods.

2.3 Research method 1. Documents and previous empirical research

My interest in Madurese society was ignited by my first trip in 1998. Relatively little research has been conducted on the Madurese people. And only a little research is available in English. Moreover, the latest research on Madura which is available in English was published by Husson (1997). Mansurnoor's (1990) "Islam in an Indonesian World. Ulama of Madura" is the single most important empirical source utilized in my dissertation. Mansurnoor is from East-Java. He has been affiliated with Gadjah Mada University Press in Yogyakarta, and he has conducted extensive field research on Madura. Huub de Jonge is the most famous foreign researcher on Madura. He is also famous on Java for 'inventing' the stereotype impression of the Madurese (de Jonge 1995). de Jonge has been most kind to e-mail me some comments on my own research. Moreover, I should mention the great work of Kees van Dijk, Huub de Jonge and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (eds.) (1995) "Across Madura Strait. The Dynamics of an Insular Society". Several scientific disciplines have contributed to this great work. At the University of Jember, I came across official Indonesian statistics which cover all aspects of Madurese society. This could be a good source for further research.

2.3.1 Analysis of data collected through previous research

Mansurnoor's work (1990) represents a scientific ideal regarding both reliability and validity. He bases his work on modern literature, classical texts and field research from February 1984 to March 1985 in the Pamekasan area. The documentation on which he bases his arguments is extensive. Moreover, Mansurnoor has a qualified background, with for instance a doctorate in Arabic Literature. However, Mansurnoor does not conduct a thorough analysis of patron-client relations. Thus, his research is not directly suited to helping me reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations.

The other scholars, whose empirical research I use in my analysis, are Dutch and thus foreign to the Madurese. In paragraph 2.4 I return to a discussion on the methodological problems of observations. de Jonge (1986) has conducted extensive

field research of business on East Madura, and Touwen-Bouwsma (1995) bases her work on colonial archives in both the Hague and Jakarta, as well as on extensive field research in Sampang regency (West Madura) in the 1970s and '80s. The former empirical research on which I base this dissertation covers the whole of Madura, both East, Central and West.

Most of the empirical facts which I comment on are not produced by my own field research. Most empirical facts in my dissertation are the discoveries of the researchers mentioned above. In general, it is difficult to reproduce the data generated from previous empirical research. It is almost impossible to control inter-subjectivity, or the generality, of data generated by other researchers. Hence, when I utilize former empirical research, I have had few options but to trust its validity and reliability. This could be a methodological problem.

2.4 Research method 2. Observation

By observing, I wanted the resulting data to be qualitative (as opposed to statistical), primary (as opposed to former research), and non-stimulated (as opposed to influenced by my own presence). Since I had these ambitions, the research method of 'observation' was an excellent way to collect data (Andersen 1990b: 141). In the field I conducted primarily open, and to a minor extent hidden observation. How could it be possible at all for a tall, pale, young man of North European descent to conduct hidden observations on Madura? Since the native Madurese could not avoid spotting me, my observation was primarily open.[19] Yet, only those directly involved with me and my research were aware of my purposes. Moreover, crowded as it is on Madura, I did not attract attention all the time. Thus, at times when the Madurese did not know of my intentions and presence I had opportunities to conduct hidden observations. In general, though, I had few opportunities to become 'invisible', or to conduct hidden observations of the Madurese.

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[19] See Berg (1998: 133) for a discussion on 'becoming invisible' during field research.

How did I access the field to begin with? When I visited Madura in 1998, I made several acquaintances and friends. Since my return to Norway my Madurese friends have written to me and sent e-mails with (subjective) information on a variety of issues. Hence, when I returned to Indonesia in 2000, I had a network of friends who also acted as 'door-openers' to the field. My most important door-openers I refer to as *key informants*. Key informants are also refereed to as 'guides'. Hence, door-openers, key informants, and guides are indigenous persons. They are members of the social group and the societal setting which is the focus of study. In general terms, these people must be convinced that the researcher (in this case me) is who he claims to be and that the study is worthwhile. *Mr. Yono Angin* is an indigenous Madurese from Pamekasan who is also a good friend of mine. We have known each other for four years. When required during my field research, Yono (2000 [key informant]) could reassure others that I, as a researcher, was safe to have around. He could confirm the purpose of my presence. Yono introduced me to a friend of his, *Holis*, who is also from Pamekasan. Holis is at present a student in Bandung (on Java), and he is a lorah, a son of an Islamic religious leader. Together, Yono and Holis introduced me to a number of their own friends. Thus, my network of acquaintances expanded, and a growing number of Madurese could guarantee the legitimacy and safety of my research. The process of accumulating informants is often referred to as snowballing (Berg 1998:132). My snowballing eased my access to the field.

The way I tried observing 'the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations' was unstructured, in contrast to structured observation. My observations were unstructured since I could not set up, or structure patron-client relations. A specific situation in which patron-client relations is evident, could not be created by me. How could I observe, or reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations, at all? During my encounters with kyais (patrons) and santris (clients) at the twelve pesantren that I visited, I saw several indications of how patron-client relations were furthered. For instance, I saw common people bow and kiss the hand of ulama (as signs of respect and subordination). During meals, the head of the pesantren were always the first to enter the dining-room. Moreover, the discussions that I observed were hierarchically

structured; the kyai was always the first one to speak. In other cases, when a kyai entered a room, he always received full attention, and the other people present became silent. The santris seemed quite conscious of the asymmetry in social status between themselves and the kyai. They demonstrated clear signs of subordination. Yet I also have to mention that the kyais never seemed despotic in any way. Rather, they seemed to reciprocate the santris' respectful and polite behavior by a benevolent leadership. Thus, their services were reciprocal.

Observations may be both quantitative and qualitative. Grasping the social context of patron-client relations is difficult if not conducting a qualitative observation (Andersen 1990b: 149-150). To produce qualitative data, I tried to dive into the larger societal context. However, my personal observations of 'the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations' were limited by the time and money that I had at my disposal.

2.4.1 Methodological problems. observation

My perception of patron-client relations on Madura will never equal those of the indigenous people. My field research in 2000 was limited to two months. This was too little time to see the whole spectrum of patron-client relations subject to the Madurese ulama. Moreover, I only learned a few Madurese words, so I could hardly become an integrated part of Madurese society. Even though my own legitimacy and safety were secured through the process of snowballing (see above), it was difficult to observe factual patron-client relations. It is possible that patrons and clients were even hiding their relationship on purpose. During my presence patrons and clients may have deliberately changed their natural behavior. In general, one of the biggest problems when observing a different culture, is the risk of influencing what you want to observe (Berg 1989: 133). Specifically when I visited pesantrens, my presence probably affected natural behavior. Occasionally I traveled together with ulama and junior ulama. On these trips my presence probably changed people's behavior. When people get unexpected visits from ulama, they would normally act according to their subordinate social status, and show their ulama respect. But when I came along with the ulama, there is a great chance that people's curiosity towards me overshadowed

their normal respect of ulama. I was aware of the impact of my presence, yet I still chose to travel with ulama since they could bring me to villages in the jungle of Madura. The advantage to me was visits in remote villages that I could never have found on my own.

Another point regarding methodological problems of observation is that I was unable to become a part of any patron-client relation. The few indications of patron-client relations I witnessed came from a distance, and I probably did not get a total understanding of the context. Thus, I had only a *selective perception*. Even if I had got a chance to go under the surface of patron-client relations, I would need a lot of time and socialization to grasp properly the concept of 'going native' (Andersen 1990b: 150-51). I have to emphasize that my direct and indirect observation of social behavior is far from comprehensive. This is also an obvious reason why I employ documents of previous research, and the research methods of interview in addition to observation; I base my scientific research on triangulation of research methods.

Since I discuss methodological problems of observation in this paragraph, I have to make a short comment on my field notes: What is the best way to take notes of the observations you do? Berg (1998:145-6) mentions six points crucial to the quality of field notes:

1. It is important to establish a regular time and place for writing up notes. During the first part of my field research I lived together with some Madurese youngsters. I attempted to 'go native' to learn about their behavior. When I lived with them, I had no trouble writing up my observations. Yet, the need to be alone grew quite quickly. To clear my mind, and to be able to reflect on new impressions I chose to sleep at nearby hostels away from the boys. However, during the daytime I was as close as possible to them.

2. The field notes should include the date, time and location of the observations.

3. The researcher should duplicate the notes for safety reasons. The towns of Pamekasan, Sumenep and Jember all have copy-centers, and several times I mailed my notes back home to Norway so as not to lose important information during my travels. In the bigger cities of Surabaya and

Yogyakarta, I also typed up field notes in computers as I went through my e-mail.

4. Field notes should include details of the physical appearance of inhabitants.

   Already during my 'pilot study' of 1998, I noted small things such as scratching, staring, dress code and differences between the sexes.

5. Other factors that should be commented upon when taking field notes are the duration of excursions and sequences of activities.

   I was conscious to take notes chronologically. However, my concept of time is quite different to that of the Madurese. Hence, I tried not to be too preoccupied with time, and instead adjust to the local rhythm of life.

6. Also personal opinions, prejudices and personal feelings about specific situations are legitimate notes.

   In this regard, from my personal field notes, I quote:

   > I'm tired of my field research. The superstition, the empty-eye staring, and the continuously non-substantial "Hello", or "Hello Mister", or other impulsive English utterances. It takes a great deal of effort ignoring all the cries for attention. I myself feel like a cage-pet, which is released, and experiencing nature for the very first time; I hear so many new sounds. There is an overwhelming amount of different impressions to absorb. And then the heat and the notoriously delayed transportation. "Jam karet" they say, as an excuse: "Always late"! (personal field notes: 27 September 2000)

2.4.2 Analysis of data collected through observation

Above, I stated that I made a qualitative observation. On its own terms, I tried to analyze 'the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations' and most of its decisive features. Speaking generally, when you observe, you have to be open to new impressions. New impressions produce new knowledge. One should interpret continuously, and base further inquiries on the interpretations. It was somewhat frustrating that I repeatedly had to discard my own expectations and prejudices. I experienced that both cause and effect of the subjects in focus got blurred. Besides personal frustration, the problem of cumulative knowledge is for others to control and re-interpret my work. In this regard, two requirements should be met by a researcher: Personal reflection through time, and personal intuition. It would be difficult to repeat the process of subjectively accumulating knowledge to myself,

and even more so to others. So it is quite difficult to control the reliability of a process such as this.

Another factor that may reduce the quality of my data is that I may have been biased in my observations, and that I may have constructed a pattern in the data that does not exists objectively (Andersen 1990a:161-3).[20] I was looking for patron-client relations as prescribed by patronage-theorists. There is a danger in collecting data on such a basis. It may "result in the collection of data about concepts that are essentially irrelevant to the culture and its polity", Jackson (1974: 3) states.

Even if patron-client relations exist, their meaning will probably differ from person to person. When the understanding of a social phenomenon is highly subjective in this way, we talk of a phenomenon that is constructed by 'multiple realities'. The meaning of patron-client relations differs from person to person and from culture to culture. *Ethnography* deals with understanding another way of life, as seen from the natives' point of view.[21] Traditional ethnographic research states that an investigator can not maintain an objective distance from the subject of his study. Ethnography abandons the positivist ideal of value neutrality, and claims research is seldom really value neutral. The crucial point of ethnographic research is that it places the researcher in the midst of the phenomenon of study. From such a position the researcher can examine various aspects of the phenomenon as perceived by the participants (Berg 1998:120-21).[22] To follow all procedures of ethnographic observation would take a lot of effort, and would exceed the limits of my own field research. The data which I possibly miss, since I do not employ thorough ethnographic research, I have tried to fill in by using documents and previous empirical research, and by conducting interviews.

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[20] Berg (1198: 128) discusses the impact of 'subjective motivational factors'.
[21] See Yin (1993: 60) and Berg (1998: 120-).
[22] For further discussion of ethnographic field strategies, see Berg (1998: 120).

2.5 Research method 3. Interview

Both during my interviews with common people, and during my interviews with santris at pesantrens (see paragraph 2.5.3 below), I applied a qualitative scientific interview. The interviews provided me with information about my respondents' world view (Kvale 1990:216-18). In general, I attempted to grasp my respondents' individual interpretations of patron-client relations. I was aware, though, that I risked influencing my interviewees.

Methodically seen, the qualitative scientific interview is semi-structured (ibid.:219).[23] In accordance with an interview type of this kind, my interview-guide had just a few exact questions. I focused on specific themes (intertwined social relations, organizational involvement and economic involvement). My interviews were recorded, written and printed out. Hence, the mini disc-recordings and transcripts are the source of my data-interpretation.

Kvale (1990: 219-224) sees the qualitative interview as characterized by twelve factors. Based on my own experiences, I will briefly comment his respective points:

1. The qualitative interview is directed at the *world view* of the interviewee. I have to make clear that my interviewees are categorized in two different groups. The first group, 'educated people', are students and scholars directly connected to higher religious and secular education. The second group, 'others', are those I met by chance. I interviewed people of different social background intentionally. Thus I was certain that my population consisted of different kinds of people and not only one specific class or one sub-group of society. I interviewed seventeen people (N) of the former group, and twenty-one (N) of the latter (see the appendix for details). In addition I also interviewed a lot of 'santris' (students of Islam). This group of interviewees will be treated separately, though.

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[23] Other researchers use different terms, as 'semistandardized', positioned between 'standardized' and 'unstandardized' (see Berg 1998: 61).

2. The qualitative interview means to investigate the phenomenon being researched upon, as *comprehended* in the respective world view of the interviewees.

   In an attempt to reveal 'multiple realities' (see above), I tried to understand people's view on the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. The educated people to a large extent began to talk instantly of patron-client relations, since many of them were familiar with the term. The other group to a larger degree needed an explanation of the meaning of patron-client relations. I often needed to discuss and illustrate to make the latter group talk. When I used the Indonesian terms 'bapak' (father) 'anak buah' (children), they understood more easily what I was looking for.[24]

3. An interview should be *qualitative*, in the meaning that patron-client relations are described subjectively by the interviewee.

   The replies from the educated people are quite coordinated. This may be a result of their background as educated people. We may discuss whether 'mutual background' results in an equal point of view. The individual responses of the other group are less coordinated, when asked about the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations.

4. The interview should be *descriptive* and as little pre-interpreted as possible.

   The interviewee should describe accurately his feelings and behavior. It is not the interviewee's interpretations or explanations, but rather his descriptions, that we want to reveal.

   Primarily I asked my interviewees *what* were the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama could further patron-client relations. Yet, I was also interested in my interviewees' interpretations of *why* ulama further patron-client relations. All the while, I was aware of the distinction between description and interpretation.

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[24] Silverman asks: "On what grounds do we identify patterns in our data and call them 'patron-client relations?" (1977:7). He is concerned of the different underlying understandings of the phenomenon, and whether a patron-client relation is just a creation of our own theoretical assumptions, or a myth. He states we have to conduct both an 'etic' (articulary behavior as detected by an observer) and an 'emic' (phonetic distinctions significant to the indigenous) study of patron-client relations.

5. The interview should reveal subjective descriptions of *specific situations and relations* characteristic to the phenomenon of study.

   Hence, I was looking for *personal descriptions* on the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. In several instances in the following chapters of analysis, I quote such subjective descriptions.

6. The qualitative interview should result in *unimpeded* descriptions of relevant factors.

   In some instances during my interviews I had to use illustrations to explain what I meant by 'the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations'. My illustrations influenced the replies of my interviewees, hence, I may sometimes have lead my interviewees, and broken the rule of unconstrained replies.

7. The interview should be specifically *focused* on 'the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations'. Thus, I should not be constrained by pre-formulated questions. Neither should my interviews be too open, though.

   The questions I asked in order to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations focused on intertwined social relations, organizational involvement and economic involvement. Thus, I circled around the theme. Yet, I realize that some of my questions may have been too open in character.

8. The interview should *reveal the latent meanings* in the statements made by my interviewees, and I should be aware of unclear replies.[25]

   As my understanding of Indonesian and Madurese language is limited, this requirement was difficult to fulfill. To a large extent I had to rely on my translators' interpretations. In the qualitative interview the goal is not to reveal unison or 'objective' truths. Hence, I was aware of, and looking for possible contradicting replies. Different point of views could actually mirror reality.

9. The qualitative interview should focus on *ambiguous statements*.

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[25] See also Silverman (1977) who underscores that the difficult task of the researcher is to discover implicit meanings.

Several times I experienced that my interviewees almost changed their views during the interview. When an interviewee was free to reason, factors that were not evident at the beginning appeared at the end of the interview. The disadvantage of such a method is that the possibility of other researchers to reproduce my findings will be very difficult, hence, the scientific principle of intra-subjectivity could be forsaken.

10. During the interview I should be *sensitive* to my interaction with the interviewee.

   My sensitivity to, and understanding of my interviewees differ from that of other interviewers. Thus, my findings contribute to an in-depth understanding of patron-client relations subject to Madurese ulama. But still we realize the possible lack of intra-subjectivity.

11. The interview should be an *interaction* between the interviewee and myself. Relevant data could be produced in this way. During my field research, I as a researcher may have become the instrument of scientific research.

   Especially among the university-affiliated people, I repeatedly felt that their intellectual curiosity produced new information because of my way of guiding the interview. I was conscious to use both feeling and understanding during such interaction.

12. The qualitative interview is also a *constructive experience.*

   I could feel the positive response from my interviewees as they sometimes lost their perception of place and time when we talked about the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations.

2.5.1 Methodological problems. Interview[26]

To what extent the scientific prerequisites of reliability and validity are met by conducting interviews are hardly decided. In reference to the science of psychology, Kvale (1990: 215) says that there is a contradiction between the widespread use of interviews and its lacking approval as a scientific tool. Kvale (ibid.) wants to see an

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[26] This paragraph is inspired by Løkkevik (2001: 30).

evaluation of the interview, an evaluation in which traditional scientific principles should reveal how valid and reliable the interview is. I will not continue Kvale's philosophizing on this theme. I just want the reader to be aware of possible criticism towards the interview as a research method.

During my interviews I tried to grasp the world view of my interviewees in order to grasp their subjective comprehension. I did not in any way hide that I was looking for latent meanings in their statements. The interaction between the interviewee and myself was often constructive. I tried to be aware of most of Kvale's (1990) twelve points (see above). I have to admit, though, that the sequence of my questions could have been different. The sequence of questions asked during an interview may significantly influence the results, Berg (1998: 70) stresses. Berg also emphasizes that the questions should be pre-tested in a pilot study. Unfortunately, I did not conduct a pre-test of questions, but the formulation and sequence of my questions have evolved during a long period. Since I have been in touch with Madurese since 1998, my questions have been shaped slowly.

Although I have tried to meet the twelve points of Kvale (ibid.), there are two points that I want to comment on when discussing methodological problems of interviews. *Firstly*, an obvious disadvantage in my interviews is my lacking familiarity of both Indonesian and Madurese language. I was dependent on translators. Thus, I had to interpret both my interviewees and my translators. On the other hand, since I conducted a 'pilot study' in 1998, and since I have been in continuous contact with several Indonesians and Madurese, I had a fundament to notice latent meanings. *Secondly*, I used a mini disc player for my recordings.[27] The use of mini disc influenced my interaction with my interviewees. Both the educated and the others were quite astonished by the technology I brought along.[28] A clear advantage of recording, instead of writing up notes, was that I could concentrate on both the conversation and body language of my interviewees. Moreover, to taking notes the traditional way, on a sheet of paper, also influenced the behavior of

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[27] Recording digitally has clear advantages compared to the tape-recorder, specifically during the phase of analysis. You may create your own tracks between which you may jump; you may shuffle tracks independently of chronology; you may create digital titles to recognize separate tracks, and even fractions of a second of an interview may be marked.

interviewees: Some of my interviewees watched with suspicion when I noted their names.

2.5.2 Analysis of data collected through interview

The aim of qualitative scientific interviews was to describe, understand and 'reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations', as perceived by my interviewees. In accordance with Kvale (1990), I discuss the process of description and interpretation below. To analyze data collected through interviews, the ideal is to go through the following five points:

1. What happened when I mentioned 'patron-client relations', was that the interviewee reflected spontaneously on his *own concepts*. Actually, as he paid attention to his personal thoughts, I intended to establish an atmosphere of mutual respect with my interviewee.

2. I let my interviewee reason freely to reveal subjective connotations, Hence, I experienced that the interviewee deduced (for himself) quite new patterns, and that he saw patron-client relations in *new perspectives*.[29]

3. At this stage (after going through the first two points), I interacted, and tried to summarize and make *conclusions*. I tried to exclude everything but the concrete thoughts of my interviewee. It was not easy to extract the essence of an interviewee's reasoning, though. Several times it was difficult to confirm a point of view. I often met a phenomenon known on East Java: 'Fear of losing face through direct confrontations'. To some of my interviewees it was difficult to give a straight answer without fear of losing face.

4. When I ended the interview, the phase of *interpreting* was in my own hands. I relied primarily on the direct and explicit statements of my interviewees. Thereafter, I interpreted the hidden and latent messages of the replies. This was difficult, considering my limited knowledge of language, and limited

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[28] I am not going to discuss the ethics of using technical equipment. For a discussion on ethics and its relation to social research, see May (2001: 59) who discusses values and ethics in the research process.

[29] Waterbury (1977:332) reminds us that it is too easy for social scientists to forget "that the categorization of human activities are only abstract constructs, and that the actors themselves seldom categorize their own actions".

experience with the cultural codes. Moreover, my interpretation of the interviewees was colored by assumptions based on theories of patron-client relations.

5. After I had conducted a number of interviews, I felt that my respondents started to repeat what others had stated before them. I saw a pattern in the replies, and felt that I had revealed the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. In my last interviews I confronted some of my former interviewees with a summary of my discoveries. I *re-interviewed* several scholars that I had met in Yogyakarta in the beginning of my field research, to verify my findings.

The two respective groups of interviewees (educated people and others) were quite united in their opinions on the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. The groups supplemented each other, yet the former group had more abstract thoughts. The replies both within each group of respondents and between them are converging, and thus suggest a pattern in my findings.

2.5.3 Interviewing santris

In my triangulation of research methods I have employed former empirical research and the techniques of observation and interviews. Moreover, to increase the reliability of my field research, I considered adding quantitative research methods. I thought of conducting a survey.[30] I realized though, that to conduct a survey, I would need more time and resources than those I had at my disposal. Even a small survey would be too demanding. Yet, I believe that a questionnaire would be a valuable contribution to triangulation of research methods.

Although I abandoned the idea of a questionnaire and a survey, I nevertheless interviewed a large number of santris (Islamic students). In addition to the two groups of 'educated people', and 'others', I treat 'santris' as a separate group of interviewees because the interviews with them were conducted differently than the interviews with

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[30] Surveys and quantitative records may supplement a case study, Yin (1993: xi) states.

the other two groups.[31] On 25 September 2000 I talked to ten (N) santris at pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin (Islamic boarding school) in the regency of Sumenep. A week later, I talked to thirty-three (N) santris at pesantren Assalafiyah in the regency of Pamekasan. Why did I choose to interview santris? I wanted to cover *contextual conditions* crucial to my case study, and my choice of pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin and pesantren Assalafiyah is legitimized by the scientific research method called *stratified random sampling*. In short, this method states that by focusing on the characteristics of a representative group of society, we may say something about the characteristics of society at large. The society at large, or the universe, is the Madurese Muslims. I chose to look specifically at santris as they are particularly important to the patron-client relations subject to Madurese ulama. The santris are taken to be a representative subgroup, or stratum, of the Madurese society. Among all the Madurese santris, I chose my respondents randomly from two of the twelve pesantrens that I visited. My choice fell on santris at pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin and pesantren Assalafiyah.[32]

   Although I was surrounded by a lot of santris during my visits at the pesantrens, I did not conduct a group interview. In group interviews, we should be able to explore group norms. The participants in my interviews commented and discussed their opinions and answers, but since I guided the discussions, my method does not qualify as a typical group interview (May 2001: 125). I did neither focus on group norms; I was more interested in individual replies. Even though I aimed at individual responses to my questions, the santris were not isolated from each other. The santris discussed the questions with each other before they replied to me. Moreover, I did not conduct a structured interview of the santris. "The theory behind it [structured interview] is that each person is asked the same question in the same way so that any differences between answers are held to be real ones and not the result of the interview situation itself" (ibid. 2001:121). I did ask santris approximately the same questions, but the responses I got were most likely influenced by the interview

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[31] See the appendix for some of my original questions to the santris, in Indonesian language.
[32] All my respondents are from East Madura, their age is between 14 and 25, and all of them are boys.

situation. Several times during my interviews at the pesantrens, I had no control of how many santris who watched and commented my presence.

My interviews at the pesantrens could qualify as semi-structured interviews (see above). Before the interviews began, I had specified a few questions (see the appendix for examples), but I focused primarily on specific themes. In the replies that I got, I searched for latent meanings. I seek qualitative information by clarifying the replies. When I started to interpret the replies, I went beyond the standardization of structured interviews. On the other hand, since I had specified my questions before the interviews began, I nevertheless achieved structure for comparability between my responses. An unstructured interview would not provide such a structure for comparability. I had a specific focus (namely the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations) for my interviews of santris. Given the conditions at the pesantrens, semi-structured interviews were useful (May 2001:123).

2.6 Qualified Generalizing

In social sciences it is commonly held that the only instance in which we may *explain* a certain social phenomenon is when we are able to identify universal laws. Explaining a social phenomenon can also be done otherwise, Andersen states. It is not only the traditional positivist approach of building hypothesis, making deductions and employing statistical data that can explain a social phenomenon (1997: 15).[33] Generalizing from a case to a universe is possible also in the social sciences, but we may generalize validly only to certain clusters of phenomena, given the right conditions. Since generalization in social sciences could be limited to certain phenomena, we do not necessarily look for universal laws. In the social sciences, positivist-philosophy is no longer as strong as it has been (ibid.:15-17). Andersen argues in favor of breaking down the harsh division between case studies oriented at unique phenomena and studies aiming at generalizing. He states that to consciously

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[33] Andersen (1997) provides an overview of literature on case studies and generalizing.

utilize theoretical models and to select samples could enable 'qualified generalization' (ibid.: 16).

Could my case study of 'the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations' be generalized to all Madurese Muslims, or all Indonesian Muslims? To enable such qualified generalization, my case study has to be valid science. Three requirements have to be met (ibid.:132-3): *Firstly*, my observations and data must be factual. *Secondly*, I must separate systematic and non-systematic variation in my observations. In other words: In what way are my observations representative? If I meet these two requirements, my case study may more validly be connected to a defined 'theoretical universe'. My dissertation's aim is to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. East Java could be a part of a theoretical universe to which my findings could be connected. Many societal structures and power relations are similar to those of the Madurese.[34] We recall, though, that the strait of Madura divides Madura geographically from Java. Only ferries connect the two islands. Being a separate island, Madura is in many ways a unique case, thus we should be careful in generalizing from Madurese characteristics to any theoretical universe.

The *third* condition that qualifies generalization is whether it is possible to generalize from my factual observations to theoretical incidents. Moreover, if my observations reveal new phenomena, phenomena which theories of patron-client relations must take into consideration, I have succeeded in induction. Since I am primarily conducting a descriptive and not explanatory case study (see Kvale's (1990) point 4, in paragraph 2.5), I have no direct intention of supplementing theories of patronage through the method of induction. Hence, in contrast to the two former points of Andersen (1997: 133), I do not intend to meet this third requirement of qualified generalization.[35] I believe that my observations are factual, and as stated above, I do see a pattern in the data produced during my field research.

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[34] Parts of Borneo (Kalimantan), other Indonesian isles, and even Islamic parts of the Sulu island chain, which links the main Southern Philippine island of Mindanao with Northern Borneo, could be included in an extended universe (see Lande 1973: 109).

[35] Andersen (1997: 132) states that "in contrast to an explorative study, there are several classical case studies which emphasize deduction. These studies are based on existing theories and knowledge at a certain field. Existing theories and knowledge provide limitations to the case study" [my translation].

Chapter 3

3.1 Theoretical foundation. Patron-client relations

This chapter has two aims. *Firstly* I approach the theories of patron-client relations. I summarize what different humanist and social sciences have focused on when treating such relations. The sciences of history, anthropology, sociology and political science are included.[36] I also summarize how different theoretical schools approach patron-client relations.[37]

I focus specifically on two theoretical contributions to patronage in this chapter. From his field research on Java, Karl D. Jackson (1974) has systemized his discoveries according to theories of patronage. James C. Scott has written an excellent essay on patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia (1972a). He has arrived at his theoretical perspectives after studying a wide range of empirical examples from the region.[38] Based on previous empirical research on Madura, it seems that the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations are by utilizing intertwined social relations, and by utilizing organizational and economic involvement. Most notably, the research of Iik Arifin Mansurnoor (1990) suggests this. Hence, the *second* aim of this chapter is threefold: In order to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations, I consider how theories of patronage treat: 1. Intertwined social relations, 2. Organizational involvement, and 3. Economic involvement. Each of these three parts will ask one general question. The resulting three general

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[36] I am influenced by two international and inter-disciplinary seminars on patronage: *Firstly* Gellner and Waterbury's contribution (1977), which is based on a conference in 1974: 28 experts, 'Mediterraneanists', from 12 countries attended. *Secondly* the contribution of Wallace-Hadrill (1989), which is a joint effort of the Classics Departments of two British universities: A series of seminars was held during 1984-6.

[37] I use 'patron-client relations' and the short form 'patronage' synonymously in my dissertation. (See the definition of patronage below.)

[38] Carl H. Lande is, according to Scott (1972b: 5), the first scholar to apply the patron-client model to Southeast Asian studies. For an overview of previous case studies in which theories of patronage are employed, see Lande (1973: 105, fn.7).

questions will structure my subsequent empirical analysis. In chapter four and five, I analyze the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations.

Although terms such as friendship, kinship-relations, communalism, class, and bossism are related terms, the mainstream humanist and social sciences agree that patronage is a specific phenomenon.[39] The definition of patronage that I utilize in the proceeding discussion consists of three core elements: *1. Patronage concerns reciprocal exchange of goods and services between two parties. 2. The relation between the parties is of some duration. 3. The parties have unequal social status, there is an asymmetry in their societal power in the field of their relationship.*[40]

3.2 Approaching patron-client relations

3.2.1 The sciences

Many scholars discussing the concept of patronage have taken an historical approach. They find that the key elements of a patron-client relationship in the ancient Roman world were a *patronus* (patron) in possession of *beneficium* (a given resource).[41] The term patronus is traditionally associated with 'father'. To the extent in which the *clientes* (clients) had access to his beneficium, patronage based on gratitude evolved. Like friendship, patronage-relations were personal, private and informal between two people. The patronage-relation was originally not regulated by public law (Meyer 1995). Extending the dyadic two-person relationship, there were also systems of patron-client relations. A client may himself be the patron of others, or he may have had more than one patron. In this way patron-client dyads may be the fundament of huge networks of people. Generally seen, when *history* treats theories of patronage, emphasis is placed on the persisting bonds of clients and patrons,

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[39] See Wallace-Hadrill (1989: 7) who makes us aware of the blurred distinctions between the content of different such social relations.

[40] As already noted, the definition is largely influenced by Saller (1982) and Gellner (1977). I choose this definition as it is quite uncontroversial. According to the literature I have studied, it seems that only reciprocity, asymmetry and duration are universal elements of 'patronage'.

[41] Most of the contributors to Wallace-Hadrill (1989) mention ancient Roman terms as these.

lasting for many generations, bonds that are identical to the ties of kinsmen (see Wallace-Hadrill 1989).

The 1940s saw the beginning of in-depth studies of patronage. The point of departure was the study of interpersonal relations and the internal power relations in social groups. *Sociology and anthropology* concentrated research on social order based on trust (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984). Anthropologists focused on primordial contexts, emotional affinity, societal participation in the realm of spiritual values, ritual kinship and institutionalized friendship in tribal and rural communities.[42] In their discourse on patronage, sociologists focused on voluntary instrumental construction of solidarity and trust, and on more formalized settings such as bureaucracies. Resulting from the evolving theories, patronage theorists also started analyzing polity. But not until the early 1960s, did *political scientists* get involved in studies of patronage. Gradually political institutions in more developed countries also got attention.

3.2.2 The theoretical schools

Within the different humanist and social sciences, different theories of patronage evolved. In their synopsis of the most common of these schools of thought, Johnson and Dandekker (1989: 219) focus on two opposing approaches: *Firstly* some scholars described patronage as a phenomenon only applicable to certain societies; "particularly those characterized by the break-up of kinship and tradition, or those in early modernization. In these societies, there is a lack of political integration and social conciliation, caused by weak market forces and an ineffective central government". The focal point in this view is that the state is in a transitional phase. During the transition, patronage replaces kinship-ties to smooth the progress of new economical and political relations. This first category of Johnson and Dandekker is the *modernization theory*. This view somewhat contradicts that of historians', who focuses on enduring bonds of clients and patrons (as mentioned above). Generally

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[42] The needs and mechanisms of boundary maintaining (between groups) used to be the focus of functionalist anthropology and the structural-functional part of sociology (Bogdanor 1993: 245-6).

seen, the modernization-theorists of the social sciences state that traditional societies are destined to social differentialization and rationalization of the culture. For instance Max Weber underscores the ways in which formalized bureaucracy replaces primordial bonds.[43] The perspectives of the modernization theory relevant to patronage imply that when the transitional phase is finished, patronage will disappear. Thus, patronage in modern developed societies and bureaucracies is hardly explainable by the means of the modernization theory.

To what extent is there a correlation between patronage and the societal developmental-level? Asking this question takes us to the *second* approach summarized by Johnson and Dandekker. The core element of this approach is that patronage may be portrayed as a universal phenomenon: We find patronage in all periods of history and in all cultures and societies. Patronage is not only found in transitional societies as claimed by the modernization theory. The reasoning of this second approach is a reaction to the modernization-theory (Johnson and Dandekker 1989: 219). Roniger adds (1994: 3) that this reaction led to a "[…] less generalized and more *contextual* approach to the complex connections between patronage, political clientelism and development". The reaction or shift occurred in the 1970s and '80s.[44] There are different explanations as to why this theoretical shift occurred. The new studies on patronage in the 1970s and '80s focused on the *one* hand on the presence of patronage and clientelism in modern societies (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984:3,303). On the *other* hand, as scholars continued their research on developing countries, political participation and clientelism became the central theme. Not tradition.[45] Contrary to the predictions of the modernization-theory, the existence of patronage was, in the 1970s and '80s, found both in developing countries *and* in modern societies. From the new research on patronage, it became evident that

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[43] The modernization-theory is inspired of Karl Marx (economically driven history), Max Weber (structures and values) and Talcott Parsons (structures and functions). Those well-known theorists have employed dichotomies between traditional and modern societies, and taken modernization for granted (Törnquist 1998a). A more recent influential modernization-theorist is Huntington. The discussion of 'social differentiation' was the fundament of Talcott Parsons, and later on the modernization theory. Empirically seen, for instance Bowen (1997) handles patronage in a modernization-theory perspective in his case study of the Gayo society on Sumatra.

[44] Johnson and Dandeker (1989:220) refer to "Marc Bloch who regarded patronage as a universal phenomenon; universal across time, across culture, across class". For a critical view on the modernization theory (in general, independent of patronage-theories), see Törnquist (1998a). See also Roniger (1994b) and Eisenstadt & Roniger (1984). Further reading: Gellner (1977).

patronage and bureaucracy should not be seen as mutually exclusive (Wallace-Hadrill 1989: 7). Moreover, research on both developing and developed countries revealed, contrary to the assumptions of the modernization-theory, that there is no significant correlation or causality between patronage and the societal developmental-level, the geographical area or the transitional phase of a country.

3.3 Characters of patron-client relations

What has been said about patronage specifically in an Indonesian context? I find the research of Jackson (1974) quite applicable in the Madurese context. From his research on patronage in urban Bandung on Java, Jackson (ibid.) creates the three theoretical concepts of *traditional authority*, *patronage* and *reward-deprivation*. These are distinct characteristics of power relations.

Firstly, by 'traditional authority' he refers to an enduring relationship between two people, an 'influencer' and an 'influencee'. The influencer has achieved his superior status through the exercise of person-centered power, accumulated through the past and present role as a provider, protector, educator, and as a value-source. He is superior to those who have an established dependency relationship to him. The influencee behaves as the influencer tells him to, without any thinking or consideration. The influencer does not have to persuade the influencee. Traditional authority also implies that leadership is not an achieved status based on merit, but rather based on inherited status (ibid.: 3-7). The relationship is based on a diffuse long-standing, affect laden, binding and mutual obligation. The societal conditions fostering traditional authority are times of gross income inequality, restricted social mobility, government paralysis or bankruptcy, declining respect for law and order, and even civil war. In periods of social chaos, traditional authority thrives. The traditional authority bonds establish the continuation of the individual's position in a closed community of the past, but may also exist in a more open community of the present. It is important to notice that Jackson's traditional authority is not limited to a

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[45] For more reading on this theme, see Scott (1972a) who focuses on the distribution of tangible benefits as a result of competitive elections. I return to the usage of 'clientelism' in part 2.4 below.

specific period of time. He sees such bonds as also operative in, for instance, present day bureaucracies. It seems as if traditional authority may be found in all settings, independent of time and social institutions. This point seems to support a contextual approach to patronage as discussed above.

There are scholars who state that both the patron and the client may enter and exit power relationships as they wish.[46] Jackson's traditional authority does not mention voluntarism. Quite the contrary. Jackson's first category of power relations has inborn and primordial characteristics. Discussing the existence of voluntarism in traditional authority, we may ask whether optional and voluntary entrance into, and exit from relations is legitimate: An inborn society with all its traditional bonds may impose sanctions[47] upon you if your loyalty fails. There may be little accept for leaving your inborn traditional authority relations. Bonds, relations and roles that are established through affective, spiritual and unspoken dimensions, resemble the somewhat controversial concept of 'primordial relations'.[48] There are several significant examples of how primordial kinship ties and personal bonds may be decisive factors in ulama-patronage on Madura. The ways in which the kyais and ulama establish, legitimize and strengthen their position, have some evident primordial features (Mansurnoor 1995). The ulama must demonstrate their piety, knowledge and commitment. van Bruinessen (1995: 109) who focuses on the 'tarekats' (Islamic mystical brotherhoods) confirms these characteristics.

Jackson's *second* category of power relations (ibid.), which he terms 'patronage', is more attuned to the material aspect of life. In Jackson's words, patronage is not short-lived to the extent that reward deprivation (his third category) is, and it is less binding or affect-laden than traditional authority. In power relations of traditional authority, Jackson talks of an influencer and influencee. In patronage-relations, he talks of a leader or patron on the one hand and a client on the other. But neither in the case of

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[46] See Eisenstadt & Roniger (1984: 48-49, 221).
[47] By sanction I refer to informal social control as admonishment or deprivation.
[48] 'Primordialism' in this context refers to how kinship, territory, religion and innate or ethnical characteristics influence personal behavior. The term is by some scholars looked upon with utmost skepticism because it may imply normative elements. If primordial is defined as 'pre-modern', there may be clear indications of a modernizationist approach, which is criticized above. The view of an extreme primordial perspective claims ethnical group-formation to be constituted 'by nature', thus objective and an unchangeable social category (Gaasholt 1999).

traditional authority nor of patronage do we talk of contractual, formalized bindings. In patronage-relations, instrumental bonds are more influential than affective ones. The client's personal perception of his self-interests has a more decisive role in deciding whether to accept the commands of the patron. The way an influencee instantly accepts the commands of an influencer in traditional authority, is contrasted with how the client calculates gains in a patronage-relation (ibid:10-12).

The duration of patronage-relations are shorter than that of the relations of traditional authority, as patron-client relations is more opportunistic. The position of a patron is more attuned to contemporary challenges and merits. Only to a small degree is the leading role based on an inherited status. In contrast to traditional authority, patronage is a volatile relationship in which clients switch patrons, and patrons abandon clients according to changing circumstances and opportunities. Material assets and liabilities are more important in a patronage relationship than in traditional authority-relations.

Based on his analysis of migration and urbanization on Java, Jackson (ibid.) finds patronage as a particularly attractive intermediate relationship for those who have abandoned traditional authority but as yet show no sign of entering horizontal interest-groups based on homogeneity of economic and social interests. Patronage marks a definite movement in the direction of more opportunistic, instrumental,[49] and short-term power relations. But patronage relations also maintain a vertical, leader-led format familiar in a traditional society. Jackson (ibid.) finds patronage characteristic of fluctuating city-life, and traditional authority to be characteristic of village-life.[50] In Indonesia, both traditional authority and patronage are termed 'bapak-anak buah'- relationship (Jackson 1974: 13-14).

Traditional authority and patronage as a concept of power differ from Jackson's *third* category of power relations: 'reward-deprivation'. In this type of power, the followers of a power-holder calculate personal gains. Contracts regulating services

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[49] Several scholars note the division between 'primordial' and 'instrumental'. See Bijlmer and Reurink (1986), and Weingrod (1977). In an instrumental setting, Saller on his side (1982: vii) terms it 'municipal' (as opposed to personal) patronage. Primordialism and instrumentalism are categories related to the discussion of ethnic phenomena. See for instance McKay (1982:396). An extreme instrumental perspective states that ethnical groups may be functionally equivalent to interest-organizations (Gaasholt 1999).

[50] Scott (1972a: 106) complements Jackson here, focusing on commercialization of the economy and colonial bureaucracy.

and compensation are involved. Jackson talks of an explicit, impersonal, and completely opportunistic interaction. On the basis of benefit, the follower considers whether or not to support his superior in for instance political matters.

2: Illustration 3.1 Three categories of power relations (Jackson 1974).

    I find Jackson's limitation of 'patronage' towards 'traditional authority' and 'reward-deprivation' quite illuminating. Hence, when my analysis tries to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patronage, I often refer to Jackson (1974). Yet, there are three possible objections to his theory. *Firstly*, In Jackson's terms, patronage does not have all the primordial features of traditional authority-relations. On the other hand, patronage does not have the impersonal or formalized qualities of reward-deprivation. A question to be asked is whether Jackson's three concepts of power relations are too exclusive categories, and whether his definitions exclude important phenomena? Although Jackson explains the concept of patronage by limiting it (to traditional authority and reward-deprivation), the respective terms of traditional authority and reward-deprivation may be too rigid in themselves. Jackson's categories do have an analytical value though, as we may classify each individual patron-client relation along the ratio ranging from traditional authority to reward-deprivation. *Secondly*, Jackson claims that 'patronage' is primarily instrumental, responsive to changing situations, and attuned to material facets of life. I have to stress that a relationship between a superior and subordinate may have both primordial and instrumental features, independent of the context. Typically modern patronage as found in bureaucracies may also be of both a primordial and

instrumental kind.[51] *Thirdly*, Jackson states that patronage is an attractive stopover for those influencees or clients who are becoming urbanized. To the extent that Jackson (ibid.) finds patronage to be a concept of relatively short-lived power relations, I cannot agree with him.[52] At this point he may seem somewhat influenced by modernization-theory. Hence, along with the contextualists (see above), I will argue that patronage may be found in all kinds of relationships, in societies on all levels of development.

Jackson (1974) focuses on three different characteristics of power relations. His theoretical contribution is helpful when limiting patronage to other power relations. What Jackson is lacks, though, is a thorough description of the patron's and the client's source of power. What exactly is the resource base of a patron and a client? Clear indications of power would help reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. At this point, Scott (1972a) should be mentioned. He has written extensively on patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. Scott aims at demonstrating the applicability of patron-client models to political action. Still, he realizes that the patron-client model may also be applicable to more general anthropological studies of human relations (1972a: 91). In my own analysis, I apply Scott's models to general human relations, politics and business in which the Madurese ulama are the patrons. Below, I refer to the elements of Scott's model (ibid.) specifically relevant to the Madurese context.

Scott focuses on the *resource base of a patron*. The strength of a patron is based on three non-exclusive factors: 1. The patron's knowledge and skills (for instance as a religious teacher). 2. His direct control of personal real property (for instance control of scarce land). 3. His indirect control of the property or authority of others (as communal land or public office-based property). The resources of the patron, may be multiple combinations of the three categories.

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[51] For instance Eisenstadt & Roniger emphasize a possible combination of traditional and instrumental features (1984: 48-49, 221). In my own analysis (see chapter four and five) I return to how primordial sentiments may be used instrumentally.
[52] Actually most scholars state that 'duration' (long standing) is a universal element of patronage. By stressing duration, patronage is distinguished from a random commercial transaction in the marketplace. See Waterbury (1977: 330-1) who discusses the factor of durability quite extensively. See also Wallace-Hadrill (1989:7, 244).

Not only the patron is in possession of resources though. According to Scott (ibid.: 97-98, 109) the *client's resource base* may reduce the impact of the patron's power. He finds four factors that are decisive in determining the client's power vis-à-vis the patron's: 1.The client may himself possess highly valued services; 2. He may choose his adherence from different patrons; 3. He may himself have some coercive force; or 4. He may manage without a patron (ibid.: 93-4). The resource base of the patron and the client, are helpful points of reference in a discussion of patron-client relations. Hence, I refer to Scott (1972a) several times in my analysis when looking at the client's power vis-à-vis the patron's.

Party	Resource base

3: Illustration 3.2 The resource base of patrons and clients (Scott 1972a).

Scott (1972a: 98-9) continues by claiming that the variation in a client's assistance to a patron may distinguish one patron-client dyad from another. He points to three factors that may distinguish one patron-client dyads from another: 1. The extent in which clients actually do provide labor services or economical support (for instance as an employee). 2. The provision of military duties. 3. The extent of political assistance (as campaigning). The extent in which the clients provide or refuse to provide the patron with these services (labor/economically, militarily and politically) distinguishes patron-client dyads. He implies that the more the clients refuse to provide their patron with services, the stronger is the resource-base of the clients. On the other hand, if a patron is able to force his clients to provide him with services, the stronger is his resource-base.[53]

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[53] Scott (ibid.) continues by stating that "Just as a patron-client dyad can be distinguished by the main resource base of clientage so can a patron-client cluster be categorized by the modal pattern of client services for the cluster or pyramid as a whole". I return to 'clusters' and 'pyramids' below.

Scott's discussion of the resource base of patrons and clients may be related to a discussion on the *asymmetrical* element of patron-client relations. In general, patronage-theorists make clear that the asymmetry of power in patronage-relations indicates that the patron is the more powerful party. The asymmetry in patronage-relations may seem frozen and static. On the other hand, some theorists ask whether a client's power may approach the power of a patron. May the asymmetry in power of their relationship be equalized? Some claim that the client may become the superior in a patron-client relationship. The significance client's power is illustrated by for instance that he provides the information which enables a patron to appreciate a given situation.[54] In instances in which the patron and the client are close in power, it may be difficult to make use of 'asymmetry' as a universal element of patronage (Waterbury 1977: 330). In such instances, the term 'companionship' may be a more suitable term than patronage-relations. Despite possible attacks on 'asymmetry of power' as a universal element in the definition of patronage, in the successive discussion, I regard the patron as more powerful than the client.

3.4 Intertwined social relations and patron-client relations

Studying patronage, scholars have always focused on the relationship between two individuals, a *dyadic* personal relationship of loyalty between the patron and the client.[55] There may be a vague distinction between patronage and friendship in this respect: In the first place friendship is a free association between equals. But in one case of economic inequality friendship may become the foundation of patronage.[56] Opposed to normal friendship, the two participants in a patronage-dyad have unequal social status, the distance in their social relation is wider, and finally, the relationship between them is asymmetrical.

Scott (1972a: 96-7) talks of complicated intertwined social relations. He shows us how systems of patronage relations may evolve: *Firstly*, he talks of a patron's

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[54] See Pitt-Rivers (1954: 207), and Brandvik Mæhle (1995).
[55] For a summary of anthropological descriptions of 'the dyadic group', see Lande (1973: 104).
[56] For more reading on this theme, see Pitt-Rivers (1954:140).

immediate following, those clients who are directly tied to the patron. Scott terms such first order relations a 'patron-client cluster'. The cluster is organized around categorical ties, both traditional (as ethnicity, religion or caste), and modern (as occupation or class). The people are not necessarily close kin. *Secondly*, a single patron may extend his first-order following. If so, we talk of a 'patron-client pyramid'. This is a vertical extension downward of the patron-client cluster. *Thirdly*, by talking of 'patron-client networks', Scott (1972a: 96) is referring to the whole pattern of patron-client relations. He refers primarily to the *vertical* linkages between the patron and all his different clients. Also included in the patron-client network however, are alliances between patrons. Since patrons often are equal in societal power, patron-patron relations are *horizontal* in character.[57] In short, when talking of patron-client networks, he refers to all the intertwined links of a patron in a given community. Illustration 3.3 below sketches out Scott's three distinct structures:[58]

4: Illustration 3.3 Patron-client clusters, pyramids and networks (Scott 1972a).

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[57] Scott continues by stating: "Such alliances often form the basis of factional systems in local politics" (1972a: 66).
[58] I was fortunate to get Scott's own comments on this illustration. He stated that: "[...] the 'ideal typical' patron client pyramid is one in which there are no horizontal ties between clients. *But* in the real world there are almost always *some* horizontal ties (e.g. kin, community, occupation, etc). Thus 'real world' alloys rather than pure forms will affect the actual operation of such ties and the logic that drives them" (e-mail correspondence: 12 March 2002). Hence, I will underscore that my model is quite theoretical. Lande (1973: 105) says dyads are usually linked to other dyads in larger structures. In a society these links subsequently constitute its dyadic *network*. As we saw above, also some of those who research the ancient Roman world admit that a client may be a patron to others, hence, systems of patronage are created. Such systems may be extensive. Mayer (1995: 27) points out the blurred difference between patronage and systems of friendship, 'amicitia' in his studies of a Spanish village.

Moreover, 'patron' and 'client' may serve as terms defining two different groups, organizations or institutions.[59] The term 'client' may actually refer to a group of clients. The same goes for the patron. For instance (parts of) state-bureaucracy may be termed a 'patron', and its employees may be termed clients. My working definition of patronage has accounted for such an extended understanding of patrons and clients, and does not specify that patronage only concerns two individuals.

There are two shortcomings in handling 'patron' and 'client' as aggregates or groups. *Firstly*, it may be difficult to distinguish aggregates of clients from interest groups.[60] Moreover, when handling the patron and the client as groups, we may ask what separates theories of patronage from theories on interest groups, or *class-theories*. Scott (1972a: 97) claims the difference is the structural focus: Theories of patronage focus on vertical structures, while class-theories focus on horizontal structures. Individual dyadic bonds to the patron are stressed as the main point dividing a patron-client cluster from a class.[61] By contrast, the members of a class are likely to have horizontal links uniting them (in a categorical group), independent of their leader.[62] Moreover, Scott (1972a: 104) also limits patron-client structures and class to 'communalism'. Communalism refers to social relations based on vertical cleavages, not horizontal ones as for class. In communalism we may, however, see brotherhood-affections between the community-members that resemble class-loyalty. If ethnicity or religion form particularly strong loyalties that exclude members of other communities, we talk of communalism. However, communalism consists of patronage-relations: By dealing with the outside world, the leader of the respective community may himself become a client to regional or national leaders.[63]

The *second* shortcoming connected with handling patron and client as aggregates or groups, is of a more statistical or mathematical nature: When we treat aggregates, we cannot easily say anything about individual qualities.[64] For instance if we see the

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[59] For more reading on this theme, see for instance Waterbury (1977: 335), and Gellner (1977:1).

[60] See Waterbury (1977: 335)

[61] Lande (1973: 104-5) complements Scott (1970b) on this point by stating: "The ease with which dyads cut across occupational and class lines make them of particular importance to political scientists […]".

[62] Also Waterbury (1977) notes the terminological division between class which concerns horizontal solidarity, and patronage, which concerns vertical relations.

[63] I will not continue a discussion of communalism. My point is, though, that we should be aware of communalism-theory, which is placed between class-theory and patronage-theory.

[64] See Waterbury (1977: 335).

client as an aggregate or group, we cannot say anything about an individual client's resource base without run a risk of an ecological fallacy. There are several interesting, but complex sociological explanations on this theme.[65]

van Bruinessen (1995: 113) looks at the intertwined social relations of Madurese 'kyais' (Islamic high-level teachers) that evolved as early as the 17th and 18th century. Later on, in the 19th century, the kyais evolved into a caste-like grouping, bound together by links of common descent and marriage. Although the Madura-expert Mansurnoor implies (1995: 41-5) the significance of single dyadic patronage-relations, he also focuses on the intertwined social relations controlled by 'ulama' (Islamic teachers). He states that horizontal and vertical networks foster patron-client relations. Mansurnoor (ibid.) and other Madura-researchers emphasize the 'pesantren' (Islamic educational center) to be the main basis of ulama-follower relations. Hence, former research on Madura implies that when looking for the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patronage, we cannot be limited to only two individuals, a dyad. A larger group of people may be involved. Hence, the first general question of my dissertation is: *to what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize intertwined social relations to further patron-client relations?*

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[65] See Eisenstadt & Roniger (1984) and Johnson and Dandekker (1989).

3.5 Organizational involvement and patron-client relations

When determining the extent in which the Madurese ulama utilize organizational involvement to further patron-client relations, an important question is whether or not the phenomenon of patronage may be found in such formal institutions as the state bureaucracy or organizations. We have already seen the *in*formality of patronage as intertwined social relations. But does patronage only concern an informal sphere? Quite frankly, the answer is no. Meyer (1995:26) who has treated the Latin world, reminds us that *formal* political verdicts giving patrons certain formalized obligations were already passed in the 5th century.[66] But we do not have to look to the ancient Latin world to find patronage in a highly structured and formal setting. During the bureaucratic oligarchy of Indonesia's former president Suharto, political forces clearly allowed state managers to patronize for instance the business sector. And formally elected and appointed state managers sought their political constituencies within various elements of the state itself.[67]

Often diffuse on the distinction, scholars tend to use the term *clientelism* to describe an institutionalized and formalized type of patronage.[68] In the clientelist-view, political institutions perpetuate a system of clientelism, and political parties try to gain control of the political allocation of resources. It is important to be aware of the following contradiction: On the *one* hand, the manager of a formal institution should be elected or appointed according to his merits. According to the Weberian ideal way of organizing formal institutions, the manager's role should be regulated according to the standard operating procedures and rules of his institution. On the *other* hand, the manager may act as a patron. He may utilize patron-client relations or clientelism to run his institution. By utilizing clientelism, he does not follow the

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[66] Saller (1982:vii) comments on a similar factor by distinguishing between freeborn men and freedmen, the latter being subject to legal regulations.

[67] See also Shin (1989: vii-viii). Several other researchers also note patronage in formal settings as bureaucracies (Gellner 1977). Eisenstadt & Roniger (1984: 48-49, 221) point out that localized informal and personal patronage may be linked to a wider institutional framework as in polity and political parties. Moreover, the state may depend on patronage for its functioning, Wallace-Hadrill (1989: 5) states. See also Pitt-Rivers (1954: 155), and Waterbury (1977:335-6) who discuss the possibility of characterizing the state and administrative apparatus as patrons. Waterbury (ibid.) talks of 'political kinship'. He also limits this phenomenon to cronyism (links between co-equals).

[68] Lande (1973:105) suggests the term 'personal following' as a general label for most vertical webs of a political nature. A specific subtype of this general concept is patron-client systems.

Weberian ideal of standard operating procedures (see Scott 1972a: 92). Hence, when managers act as patrons, formal standards may be replaced by friendship as a criterion for public power.[69]

Empirically seen, the introduction of modern state bureaucracy may well represent the beginning of a 'modern societal context' that widens both the patron's and the client's resource base. Scott (1972a: 102) underscores that due to the introduction of modern state bureaucracy, party-connections, development programs, nationalized enterprises and bureaucratic power became important. Madura saw the introduction of modern state bureaucracy in the latter part of the 19th century. By the turn of the century, domestic resentment towards the colonizers grew, and the ulama of Madura to a large extent entered politics and the state bureaucracy. They began representing political independence from the colonizers (Mansurnoor 1990: 30-38). Opposition to the Dutch may be counted as an apparent change in the ulama's role.[70] Traditionally, the ulama primarily had religious and primordial functions. But at the turn of the 19th century the ulama also became a political force. The power that the ulama already exercised through their intertwined social relations (as discussed above) was gradually extended. Ulama also started exercising power through formalized ulama-associations, organizations and the state-apparatus. The growing involvement in official and political matters may have had a negative effect on the ulama's overall power, however. A lot of researchers, among them Schiller (1996: 224-5), focus on how Indonesian ulama actually lost supporters and patron-power by entering politics.[71]

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[69] Jackson (1974:9) states that "[…] personal [patronage] relationships tend to supercede institutional arrangements". The loyalty in a patronage-relationship flows to persons rather than offices or institutions. Weingrod (1977:42) on his side, points out that although it might seem as if patrons and political parties represent their own interests by ignoring the formalized operating procedures of the bureaucracy, clientelism does not necessarily produce interest groups.

[70] Also Antlöv & Cederroth (1994: 10-11) claim the ulama gradually got an additional function [a political one], extending the primordial one.

[71] See also Hefner (2000: 121, 168).

We realize that the organizational involvement of the Madurese ulama may be two faceted. On the *one* hand, their resource base may have increased as they became attached to political office and state projects (Scott 1972a). On the *other* hand, ulama going political may have lost supporters (Schiller 1996). I return to this contradiction in chapter five. Based on the foregoing deliberation, the second general question of my dissertation is: *To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize organizational involvement to further patron-client relations?*

3.6 Economic involvement and patron-client relations

Talking of patronage as power relations, we may refer to control over resources.[72] This leads us to the scholars with an evident *economic* approach to the theories of patronage. Suharto's New Order régime was deeply involved in Indonesian economy. Indonesian politicians are known for their involvement in business. There is a clear overlap between politics and business in Indonesia. Some of the motives behind organizational involvement of the Madurese ulama has been, and still is, to get indirect access to economical resources. Indirect access to resources through the political control of tax, toll and public duties seems to be a goal.

Some scholars discussing theories of patronage state that a patron may monopolize crucial access to the means of production, markets and power centers in the society (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984: 48-49, 221). Patronage may become exploitative. Situations may open for a cementing of patron-client relations or even an economically oriented dependency-relation.[73] It is worth noting that voluntarism and reciprocity as universal elements of patronage are not very compatible with exploitation. Hence, if patronage develops towards exploitation, there are better terms than 'patronage' to describe such power relations.[74] One such term is *bossism*. None

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[72] See for instance Weingrod (1977) and Scott (1972a).

[73] After research on a Spanish village, Pitt-Rivers (1954: 204) states: "[Patronage] covers a wide range of relationships. From noble protection of dependents, […] to the scurrilous coercion […]". For more on exploitation, see Millet (1989: 3, 16); Silverman (1977:10). Garnsey and Woolf (1989: 158) focus on the difference between dependency and clientage. The *lack of* free entrance into, and exit out of relations are the main differences to patronage. Hence the same could be said, comparing patronage to master and slave, or lord and serf.

[74] See Eisenstadt & Roniger (1984) and Roniger (1994), and Scott's elucidation of 'balance of voluntarism and coercion' (1972a:99).

of the scholars that focus on exploitation mention bossism. In the ensuing discussion of patronage, the term bossism will be used when coercion and exploitation replace reciprocity.[75]

Antlöv & Cederroth (1994: 17) mention the general possibility that kyai-power may exploit students in the religious centers in Indonesia. Mansurnoor (1990: 323-7) for his part stresses optional and free entrance into and exit out of different economically oriented patron-client relations on Madura: Clients may desert their patron. Taking into account former research on the ulama's involvement in business on Madura, the third and last general question asked in my dissertation is: *To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize economic involvement to further patron-client relations?*

3.7 Summary

After investigating a wide specter of literature, one soon realizes the complexity of patron-client relations. The sciences of history, sociology, anthropology and political science emphasize quite different elements in their respective approaches to patronage. Throughout this discussion, we have seen how important it is to be aware of the blurred distinctions between patronage and other terms relevant to societal power relations. We have to recognize that there are different theoretical approaches to the term, and that different scholars have deviant views, emphasizing different elements of patronage. In any case, only with some minor exceptions, the elements of reciprocity, duration and asymmetry seem to be universal elements of patronage.

Jackson (1974) creates the three theoretical concepts of *traditional authority*, *patronage* and *reward-deprivation*. These are distinct characteristics of power relations. I find Jackson's limitation of 'patronage' to 'traditional authority' and

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[75] Sidel (1997) writes on bossism in Indonesia's neighboring country of the Philippines. He implies that bosses emerge and entrench themselves through electoral fraud, vote-buying and violence. He states that "[…] terms like cacique democracy, mafia democracy, feudalism warlordism and bossism [gain] considerable currency". (ibid.: 947). Sidel (1999a: 13-14) describes bosses as far less paternalistic (than patrons), rooted in society, and detrimental to capitalist development. For a discussion of bossism versus patronage, applicable to Indonesia, see for instance Sidel (1997) and Sidel (1999b). See also Jackson (1974: 10), Waterbury (1977) and Roccamora (1995). Moreover, Scott (1972a: 93,96) states that armed violence, coercion, fraud and money-politics may go along with modernization. He limits 'boss' towards 'caudillo' or 'cacique' commonly found in Latin America: They typically rely on force, and lacks the traditional legitimacy.

'reward-deprivation' quite illuminating. Hence, when my analysis tries to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations, often I refer to Jackson. What Jackson lacks, though, is a thorough description of the patron's and the client's source of power. What exactly is the resource base of a patron and a client?

Scott (1972a) focuses on the resource base of a patron and a client. He claims that the variation in a client's assistance to a patron may *distinguish* one patron-client dyad from another. He implies that the more the clients refuse to provide their patron with services, the stronger is the resource-base of the clients. On the other hand, if a patron is able to force his clients to provide him services, the stronger is his resource-base.

Studying patron-client relation, scholars have always focused on the relationship between two individuals, a *dyadic* personal relationship of loyalty between the patron and the client. Scott (ibid.) talks also of complicated intertwined social relations. He shows us how *systems* of patronage relations evolve. He talks of a patron-client cluster, pyramid and network. Scott's patron-client network refers to all the intertwined links of a patron in a given community. The aim of my dissertation is to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. The *first* general question that will structure my subsequent empirical analysis is: To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize intertwined social relations in order to further patron-client relations?

We realize the *in*formality of 'patronage as intertwined social relations'. But does patronage only concern an informal sphere? May the phenomenon of patronage also be found also in formal institutions, as in state bureaucracy or organizations? The *second* general question that will structure my subsequent empirical analysis is: To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize organizational involvement to further patron-client relations? Talking of patronage as power relations, we may refer to control of resources. This leads us to economical theories of patronage. Hence, the *third* and last general question structuring my empirical analysis is: To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize economic involvement to further patron-client relations?

Chapter 4. Analysis part *one*

4.1 Patronage through intertwined social relations

As an attempt at revealing the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations, this chapter analyzes the extent to which the ulama utilize intertwined social relations. We will see that the intertwined social relations that are subject to the ulama are almost all-encompassing within the Madurese society at large. The ulama strongly influence and rule intertwined social relations that are quite extensive. The core of ulama-patronage is the relationship of the 'kyai' and 'santri' (teacher and pupil). The center of this patron-client relation is the 'pesantren' (Islamic educational center). I treat the pesantren quite extensively, discussing its importance to the intertwined social relations subject to the ulama. The 'madrasah' (Qur'anic school) is also frequently connected to a pesantren. A discussion of the madrasah will be closely related to the focus on the pesantren. Moreover, I will look at the role of the mosque and 'langgar' (Islamic neighborhood school). The pesantren, madrasah, mosque and langgar will be treated as four distinct Islamic institutions. As components of the intertwined social relations, what is the role of these four respective Islamic institutions? Moreover, could the intertwined social relations subject to the ulama go beyond the four Institutions? I ask, too, in what ways the larger Madurese community is subject to the intertwined social relations of the ulama.

Popular Madurese beliefs focus to some extent on the sacred, supernatural abilities of the ulama. Hence, besides analyzing the four Islamic institutions, in this chapter I will also analyze the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama extend their social intertwined relations to include mystical brotherhoods, the 'tarekats'.

4.2 Background

When did Islamization[76] begin on Madura? Ancient syncretic traditions on Madura were not extinguished by the Javanese Majapahit-rule (1292-1527). The Majapahit-kingdom tried to spread Hinduism to the interior areas also on Madura, but did not totally succeed because of Madura's scattered settlement. Majapahit was replaced by another Java-based régime, the *Islamic* Mataram (1527-1743/4). The existing Hindu and Buddhist dominance on Madura was not eradicated by Muslim armies or suppressed by an all-pervading clergy, though, as it was in India in the 12th and 13th centuries. Islam did not suddenly replace Hinduism and syncretism on Madura. The 'rato' (nobility, rulers)[77] from the Majapahit era converted to Islam, as the Muslim Sultan Agung of the Mataram régime occupied the western part of Madura in 1624.[78] Islam grew slowly on Madura, and the local nobility accepted Islam at the beginning of the 16th century. Touwen-Bouwsma (1992:105-6) suggests that the political ambitions of the existing nobility were the crucial motivation behind their conversion to Islam. Mataram's occupation of West Madura persisted until 1743/4.

The Madurese people's desire for independence resulted in a neglect of the Mataram-imposed taxes and other duties. A continuing struggle for independence from centralized, external political centers seems to characterize Madurese history. Knowledge of the relationship between the existing secular nobility and the rising Islamic ulama during the reign of Mataram is inconclusive, but it is clear that the nobility introduced and popularized Islam. They also tolerated the growth of different types of educational centers. These centers were lead by Islamic functionaries. Hence, the old nobility and the emerging ulama lived together harmoniously. In such a situation, the Madurese ulama were free to develop their intertwined social relations.

In 1675, only 148 years after Mataram imposed Islam on the Madurese, the Dutch East-Indies Company (VOC) had succeeded in building alliances with the local nobility on Madura in an attempt to undermine the Islamic régime of Mataram. After

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[76] Touwen-Bouwsma (1992:102) defines 'islamization' as "a process in which new religious discourses and practices come into being, which are monopolized and elaborated by religious specialists and which progressively obtain an authoritative status in a society".

[77] The term 'rato' may also include all Madurese rulers who assumed power at this early historical point. Mansurnoor (1990: 20) presents the structure of the rato's administration and staff.

[78] Touwen-Bouwsma points out the different development on East and on West Madura. The eastern part of the Island (Sumenep) was controlled by the Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) in 1680 (1992:102).

an upsurge was suppressed in 1743, The Company exercised full leadership over all of Madura.[79] However, just as the Mataram-régime had done, the European colonizers also faced opposition and struggles for independence from the indigenous Madurese. To rule effectively, the Dutch needed the support of the most popular and influential local leaders. To a certain extent the colonizers based their rule on ulama-support. Anyhow, it is worth noting that the Dutch were not too interested in, or focused on controlling Madura. Unlike Java, Madura was even granted self-government with the supervision of a permanent representative Dutch administrator in Pamekasan and Sumenep from 1744 (Nagtengaal 1995: 52,67). Finally however, the Dutch became the supreme rulers[80], ruling three segments of the society: The old indigenous rulers, the ulama, and the people (Hefner 2000b: 32).

From the beginning of Islamization, until the 19th century, the growing ulama were submissive to two different secular régimes. The ulama were firstly subject to the existing power-holders, the ratos (nobility), thereafter the colonizers. However, during the 19th century, religious life changed its focus to the mosques. Hence, in the course of ongoing Islamization, the mosque-ulama grew more influential. Not only did Islam change character in this period, but traditional indigenous societal structures were also altered during the 19th century.[81] Moreover, as in the Philippines, Indonesian governmental and institutional structures were cemented. Madura, however, was not affected by the colonizers' administrative effort to the extent that Java was. One sign of Madurese resistance was that the princes on Madura (the local nobility) succeeded in retaining their old rule. Pamekasan, the smallest of the three principalities of contemporary Madura was not brought under direct Dutch rule until 1858. And in Sumenep and West Madura the indigenous nobility ruled until 1883 and 1885 respectively.[82] However, even though Madura was given direct rule by the

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[79] For more on history, see van Dijk, de Jonge and Touwen-Bouwsma (1995a: 1) and Nagtegaal (1995: 52).
[80] There was a British interregnum, from 1811 to 1816 led by Raffles (Hüsken 1994:120).
[81] Actually, the Dutch imposed large reforms during the 19th century. The colonizers instituted a system of 'shared property', especially on West Java, though (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1994: 122-3), and several land reforms were implemented in the last part of the 19th century. 1830 saw the 'cultuurstalsel' as a means of reorganizing agricultural production aimed at export. Through 'ethical policy', focus was also put on public health and education from the 1870s on. Attempts were made to restructure the political system. About 1885, the Dutch also attempted to regulate ulama's trips to Mecca (to become a 'haji'). This attempt increased the ulama's resentment of the colonizers. –Writing on the reforms, Kartodirdjo (1994: 23) states the reforms on *Java* […] "were doomed to fail, especially because of the strong position of the bupati (regency-head)". Traditional feudal rights were too strong.
[82] For more on relevant history, see Touwen-Bouwsma (1986).

Dutch, it experienced the erosion of indigenous authority relations (Touwen-Bouwsma 1992:109).

The nobility[83] gradually lost their privileges, and their governing apparatus was reduced. The demise of the nobility allowed the kyais (top ulama) to increase their power and further develop their intertwined social relations. Strengthened by their growing influence, the kyais began to challenge colonial power. The colonial-imposed political reforms improved the economy of the villagers, thus they got power, and to a larger degree they could afford education.[84] The Islamic ulama seized the opportunities of the improved economic situation. Thus, the ulama were indirectly helped by public politics, in their aim for establishing regular religious education (Mansurnoor 1990: 35). We may say that the resource base of the ulama was strengthened by indirect access to public office and politically controlled resources. In this respect, it seems as if the latter part of the 19th century may represent a point of departure for ulama-power, and *ulama-patronage*. Along with a general growth in wealth, the number of pesantrens increased. In this phase of the Islamization, the ulama developed an independent power-base directed against the colonizer's régime. Mansurnoor (1990, 1992) gives three distinct reasons for the ulama's growing opposition to the state-apparatus, and for the strengthening of their resource base. *Firstly* the state-apparatus never appreciated or understood the social significance of the ulama. *Secondly*, the developing intelligentsia largely ignored the ulama. For these two reasons, Mansurnoor sees the ulama and the state-apparatus as two "dealers [that] vigorously, and in different ways, sell their commodities: hope and well being" (1992: 89). However, the ulama never raised arms against any external enemy. They stuck to non-violent criticism of the colonizers. Even so, the Dutch claimed that they were rebellious, and with that as an excuse, attacked a religious compound in 1895. According to Mansurnoor , this is the *third* distinct reason for the growing popularity of the ulama.

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[83] During the political changes at that time, the term 'rato' (nobility) started implying also panembahan, sultan, bupati etc. (Mansurnoor 1995: 31).
[84] Salary was no longer given as land, but cash payment. Individual land-ownership was introduced, and the people were liberated from most compulsory official services. (Mansurnoor 1990: 33; 1995: 26-31). For an elucidation of the 'office fields' ('percaton'), see Niehof (1986).

Eventually, the ulama became symbols of independence (Mansurnoor 1990: 30-38). And from this point on, ulama's organizational and political role seems clear. Ulama were already powerful as they controlled extensive networks of intertwined relations, and now, their political involvement provided them with even more power. By becoming symbols of independence, ulama's traditional functions seem to be extended. The ulama no longer only acted as traditional religious leaders. They also became political opinion leaders. They faced new challenges to their power. The state bureaucracy indirectly challenged the ulama to respond to *real* problems such as social poverty, and not only to spiritual and religious issues. The state apparatus had money to solve such real problems, and the ulama had not. Hence, at the beginning of the 20th century, we see a reinforced ulama, whose increased power faced new challenges.

By organizing their interests, the Madurese ulama confronted these challenges. In 1912, Sarekat Islam, (SI), or the Islamic Union, was founded. This was the first modern mass organization introduced to the Madurese. Thereafter, the Madurese ulama shifted their allegiance to 'Nahdlatul Ulama' (NU)[85] which was founded in 1926. We return to the growing organizational and political involvement of the ulama in the next chapter. The ensuing analysis in this chapter focuses on the intertwined social relations subject to the Madurese ulama. I look at the extent to which the Madurese ulama utilize intertwined social relations to further patron-client relations. The intertwined social relations found at the pesantren, madrasah, tarekat, mosque and langgar get specific attention here.

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[85] Literally: "Rise of Muslim Scholars".

4.3 Ulama and the pesantren

For several weeks after Abdurrahman Wahid was ousted as president of Indonesia, the new Megawati government was not recognized by East Java kyais. Furthermore, several East Java pesantrens displayed pictures of Abdurrahman Wahid as president. Hence, it was long before the pesantrens were ready to accept the new leadership of Megawati and Hamzah Haz elected by the People's Consultative Assembly on 23 July 2001.[86] The pesantrens' lack of approval is an important point since the pesantrens represent a strong societal force in Indonesia at large.[87] Mansurnoor explicitly states that the most important aspect of the ulama's world is the pesantren (1990: XV), and several of the people I spoke to during my own field research suggested that the number of pesantrens is the single most important factor in the ulama-stronghold. The more pesantrens, the greater ulama-power.[88]

We have seen that the improved financial situation of greater layers of the Madurese population by the end of the 19th century strengthened the ulama. An increasing number of santris (Islamic students) attended the ulama's centers, and more systematic studies of Islam evolved. At the same time, the Dutch colonizers pushed the Muslims into villages, away from the central power. The ulama took advantage of the new situation, and as a reaction, during the 19th century, the pesantren spread widely on Madura. As the ulama administrated the pesantrens, the students also asked them for advice in moral and practical questions. Thus 'bapakism' evolved: Based on this tutor-role, the ulama became patrons called 'bapak' (father) and the santris became their clients, called 'anak buah' (children). As the 'father' was supposed to take care of the material, spiritual and emotional needs of the 'children', we see here a

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[86] Haz is, by the way, known as an orthodox Muslim.

[87] Sidney Jones (1991) has written an interesting paper concerning the East Javanese pesantrens. She draws examples from the Kediri regency. Be aware though, that as Jones (1991:20) uses the same cultural categories as Geertz (1960) does, she may to some extent be criticized as Geertz for: 'oversimplifying', generality, reliability and validity etc. (see paragraph 4.3.1.2).

[88] Hefner (2000) confirms the central role of the pesantren in the religious and political life of traditionalist Islam. Schiller (1996: 48) stresses the huge impact that the pesantren has on the local society of Jepara (on Java). Slamet-Velsink (1994:49) stresses the necessity of focusing on ulama-controlled education in order to understand ulama-patronage. van Bruinessen (1995:99) points to the Jombang district (East Java) as the center of traditional Islam. Several of the most famous pesantrens are situated there.

fertile ground for patron-client relations based on primordial sentiments (see also Eisenstadt & Roniger 1994: 124).

The kyai heads the pondok pesantren. That is why he is often referred to as pondok-ulama.[89] Also associated with the pesantren are the subordinate functionaries 'khadam' and 'ustadz' (both religious clerks). The 'lurah' is the descendant of the kyai. And as the lurah is a family member of a kyai, he has higher status than the khadam and ustadz.[90] Both to the santris (students) and to the religious clerks, the kyai is the sole superior within the pesantren. We see that the pesantren is structured hierarchically. Does the pesantren resemble a patron-client pyramid, in which the kyai functions as a patron? Some scholars insist that the answer has to be yes: Based on his field research on Madura, Mansurnoor states: "Sociologically, santris have become a kyai's clients since they join his pondok" (1990: 244). This is a statement that has to be explained. –What exactly decides the stronghold of a kyai, how does a kyai establish, maintain and strengthen his personal dyadic relations to his followers at the pesantren?

4.3.1 Choice, voice and counter-forces

When analyzing the stronghold of a kyai, the following three questions should be answered: 1. Are the Madurese children free to choose whether or not to attend a pesantren? 2. What is the character of a pesantren's internal policy (thoroughly regulated by orthodox Islam)? 3. What are the most dominant counter-forces to kyai-patronage?[91] The following three paragraphs correspond to the three questions just asked. As mentioned above, my own empirical findings are based on interviews with, and observation of santris at pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin in Sumenep, and at pesantren Assalafiyah in Pamekasan. As mentioned in paragraph 2.5.3, I chose to

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[89] Some of the founders of the pesantrens in the 19th century were not really ulama; they did not have a high level of Islamic knowledge. The contemporary 'ulama' sent their sons to Saudi-Arabia and Egypt for studies, and only by return the *sons* had become worthy of the term ulama (Gaffar 2000 [interview]).

[90] According to my good friend and Madurese key informant Yono, the correct spelling is:: 'Khadam', 'ustadz' (female: 'ustade', both genders: 'asadid' (in plural form)), and 'lurah'. Another term used describing ustadz is 'Syariat' (2000 [interview]).

[91] I was fortunate to interview both the scholars Lay and Pratikno (2000 [interview]), and I had long discussions with their Staff (2000 [discussions]) at Isipol at UGM. The three questions asked in this paragraph of my dissertation, is the result of my conversations at UGM.

visit the two pesantren because I wanted to cover some of the contextual conditions of patron-client relations.

4.3.1.1 Choice

   Are the Madurese children free to choose whether or not to attend the pesantren; does everybody have to attend, and are the youngsters free to choose any pesantren they wish? I term this factor: "Choice". During my field research I presupposed that the freer the children are to choose among different pesantrens, the stronger their societal power. Consequently, the freer the children, the more limitations on the power of a kyai. Even though Madurese children have the right to choose freely among different pesantrens, their choice is limited by the *expenses* involved. It is not only the attendance-fees that are the hindrance, however, as poor families may be granted free attendance. A more important factor is the cost of transportation to the pesantren. And as there is a tradition of travelling to several different pesantrens, the transportation costs become even more decisive: Usually only the rich can afford the tradition of going to different pesantren, I was told.[92] By asking santris why they were interested in studying at their respective pesantren, I got replies that underscore economic issues. To the santris of both pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin and pesantren Assalafiyah, expenses connected with education seemed to be the single most decisive factor influencing their choice. I have to comment that the replies I got at the pesantrens were often the result of intense discussions among the santris. The santris often agreed in 'one rightful' answer to my question. At crowded pesantrens it was difficult to reveal subjective, individual opinions, feelings and descriptions.

   Another element that limits the choice opportunities is the *location* in which you live. Several Madurese told me, and I witnessed myself, that the more urban the location of your home, the more pesantren there are to choose from.[93]

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[92] Gaffar (2000 [interview]); Supported by Mr. Widodo who is a scholar at the Research Institute of Jember University, Office for Madura Studies (2000 [interview]).

[93] Yet, keep in mind that even the town-centers on all of Madura may be termed rural. There is no rigorous rural-urban division on Madura (Gaffar 2000 [interview]). Contradicting such a view though is Lay, who underscored the important division between urban and rural on Madura (2000 [interview]). Moreover, the sociologist Praja whom I talked to, underscored the breaking up of kyai-patronage within Madurese ghettos. He referred to Madurese societies in bigger cities as Yogyakarta, though (2000 [interview]).

Among the santris of pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin there was a focus on altruistic values. A typical motive behind their choice of pesantren was: "If I study in this pesantren, I will be more able to do something useful for the people." The santris also often chose their pesantren because of family-tradition, or due to a desire to learn about the supernatural. In the other pesantren, Assalafiyah, the santris focused on how attendance helps them concentrate on their religious studies. When asked why he chose his pesantren, one santri answered "The pesantren is a quiet place for studies". I also got replies that emphasized 'interest in learning general (secular) subjects'. From the santri-response from the two pesantren, I got no direct indications that ulama control the choice-situation. I have to note though, that most likely my presence at the pesantrens influenced the answers and behavior of the santris. My respondents may deliberately have changed their natural opinion.

4.3.1.2 Voice

In order to answer what defines the stronghold of a kyai, a crucial theme to analyze is the character of a pesantren's internal policy: Is the pesantren's way of life completely regulated by orthodox Islam, or can a pesantren be liberal? What is the scope of student power vis-à-vis his teacher? My preliminary assumption was that the stronger the voice (power) of a santri, the stronger his resource base vis-à-vis his patron's.

In general, santris believe that the kyai is in possession of 'kesaktean' (spiritual power) and may generate 'selamat' (prosperity, welfare and blessing). The kyai is believed to be a medium between man and God. As he is such a dominant figure, what are the opportunities of a critical voice from the subordinated santris? Does the day-to-day schedule of the pesantren give any chances for independent activities? And if the santris have any spare time, what are the options to engage in activities that foster criticism against the kyai?

The kyai is ever present in the santris' lives at the pesantren, from the four AM Morning Prayer until the 'isha' (evening prayer).[94] Hence, the kyai has ample

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[94] I do not intend comparing the Madurese pesantren-life to Javanese. But Geertz (1960) who conducted his research in Modjokuto in East Java, also has interesting remarks on the internal procedures of the pesantren (ibid.: 718-80).

opportunity to establish, maintain and strengthen his patron-client relations. The classes at the pesantren are mostly taught by senior santris and lorahs (the children of the ulama). The kyai himself is more of a professional, specializing in complicated Islamic matters (Mansurnoor 1990: 250). So when we look at the pesantren as a patron-client pyramid, we easily see that there is an ulama on top who reinforces his power through assistants, and extends his patronage downwards to the santris (se illustration 3.3). This view of patronage is advocated by Scott (1972a). But what about the concrete content of the day-to-day activities? What is the content of the patron-client, or kyai-santri relations?

The santris learn mainly by memorizing, and not by understanding, a fact that defines their dependence on their kyai and pesantren. Hence, the position of the santris resembles what Jackson (1974) terms 'influencees', santris seem to lack individual contemplation.[95] Besides the Qur'an, the Madurese santris study 'Kitap Kunig' (texts interpreting Islam) in 'Kitap Salafia': Salafia is a book of morals, attitudes and guidelines that tells about 'dosa' (sin and attitude); 'Kunig' is the high level of Salafia. Santris also study 'Haram' (action), Islamic letters of great complexity.[96] Finally the santris study 'Kitab Thalimudthalin' (Arabic: 'learn how to become a student'). This text states that obeying the teacher is in itself a source of knowledge.[97] Such an educational profile is fertile ground for traditional authority-relations (see Jackson ibid.). The kyai is the tutor of the santris and their sole interpreter of the Arabic religious texts. Hence, strong patron-client dyads and clusters evolve within the pesantren. We are, however, not speaking of wholly primordial patron-client relations, in which the affective and unspoken dimensions are the only elements of the kyai's resource base. The power of the kyai is not unconditional, as his function as an interpreter of the Islamic texts does not necessarily guarantee his position. He has to adjust his concepts and relate his interpretations to the context and to contemporary society. Hence, a kyai must be able to adjust in order to remain a patron.

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[95] See also Slamet-Velsink (1994; 49-50).
[96] I refer to the Madurese understanding of these terms. In Hughes' dictionary of Islam, 'Haram' means 'prohibited'.
[97] Conversation with students of Islam at LKiS (13 September 2000); Gaffar (2000 [interview]); Ketua (2000 [interview]) who is a santri-leader in Surabaya.

In addition to his responsibilities, as education at the pesantren, the kyai mobilizes santris to communal service. The kyai's home gets special attention. As the kyai is elevated above physical work, we may talk of a division of labor within the pesantren (Mansurnoor 1990: 254). To term the communal work 'exploitation' would be an exaggeration, but the santris get assignments that they do not seem to perform too voluntarily. One example is the santris that beg for money in the middle of the road at the private toll-roads, as photo 1.1 illustrates.[98] To the extent that a santri refuses to perform the communal work that is demanded by the kyai, we may speak of client power. I asked a lot of santris whether they ever opposed the kyais in such a way. My respondents generally agreed in that there is no reason to oppose the kyai, as you agree to the internal duties of the pesantren the moment you choose to attend. If you strongly disagree with the pesantren's way of life, you are free to leave, they told me.[99] Others stressed the strong informal control of the kyais that discourage santris from resenting their leaders. The kyai provides the students with shelter, food and instruction. In this way, the kyai create a sense of indebtedness in the santris, an indebtedness that the santris try to reciprocate by being loyal. Moreover, an image of the pesantren as the personal belonging of a kyai, further strengthens this feeling of indebtedness in the santris. The impact of the kyai's direct control of personal property is, in Scott's (1972) terms, seen as an important resource base of the kyai.

What about the resource base of the santris then? Are they merely influencees that do as they are told? There are several factors that strengthen the resource base of the santris. Some classes are dedicated to discussions, and give room for a critical voice. Yet, the classes are controlled and guided by ustadzes (religious clerks).[100] So, what is the scope of a critical santri voice? Depending on the profile of the pesantren, the number of classes dedicated to critical discussions differs. The extent to which a pesantren admits a critical santri voice depends on the character of the ulama in charge. Different ulama have different degrees of tolerance and orthodoxy. Several Indonesia-researchers have classified Muslims with reference to tolerance, orthodoxy,

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[98] Widodo (2000 [interview]).
[99] Gaffar (2000 [interview]). The phenomenon of 'gotong royong' (communal service) treated elsewhere in Indonesia-research, is also employed within the pesantren. This is quite voluntarily, kyai Hadhori of Pamekasan and his son, stated (2000 [conversation]).

etc. Geertz' book "The religion of Java" (1960) is the classical work on this subject. He classifies *Javanese* Muslims in three different 'alirans' (cultural streams) according to social, religious, political and economic features (ibid.: 4). As noted in chapter one, the Madurese ulama are stereotypically characterized as untainted Muslims. In Geertz' terms, the Madurese ulama may be characterized as 'santri' traders with a 'kolot' (traditional) culture.[101] As there are traces of ancient animist rituals on Madura, the Madurese may also be seen in Geertz' terms as 'abangan' peasants. Hence, as the Madurese Muslims could fall between Geertz' categories, and I will not utilize Geertz to any important extent (see Touwen-Bouwsma 1992, Hefner 1997a:15 and Slamet-Velsink 1994: 43).[102] Moreover, Geertz (ibid:130) further elucidates abangan, priyayi and santri Muslims as either 'modèrn' or traditional according to their connections to the 'modern world' (see Bråten 1988:10-11). I am quite aware of the general criticism of Geertz for his use of somewhat rigid categories of Muslims. Nevertheless, during my own field research, I pursued the distinction between traditional and modern Muslims. Among the Madurese themselves, I noted that it is common to evaluate the pesantrens along a spectrum ranging from traditional to modern.[103] Several of my informants agreed that:

> Madura sees divisions between traditional and modern pesantrens. –We are not referring to the difference between Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah [Islamic organizations], we are referring to the internal management of the pesantrens. The traditional pesantrens only deal with religious education, whereas the modern pesantrens teach also modern science. Moreover, a traditional pesantren has its specific material features: The teaching is conducted without chairs in the classrooms, everybody sits on the floor; while in the modern pesantren a modern system of education is adopted. The division between traditional and modern is also proven by the architecture of the buildings, and whether sarong or uniforms are worn by the santris. People refer to the traditional pesantrens as 'pesantren salah/salahfiyah'.[104]

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[100] Roy (2000 [interview]), who is a santri at pesantren Assalafiyah, Pamekasan.

[101] Besides referring to a single student, to Geertz, the term 'santri' may also refer to "a member of the [Javanese] population who takes his Islam seriously" (1960: fn. p. 178).

[102] The third category of Geertz is 'priyayi' Muslims (mystic and Hindu-inspired bureaucrats). Geertz' (1960) categories have attracted a lot of criticism. For elucidation of the criticism, see Hefner (1997a: 15,) who talks of 'oversimplifying'; or Bråten (1988:2) who critically treats the basis of Geertz' work, and looks at the generality, the reliability and at the validity of Geertz' research.

[103] Mansurnoor (1990: 390) concludes that ulama may be divided into conservative, adaptive and progressive types. In his field research in Bantur on Java, Cederroth for his part, uses different categories focusing on the *one* hand on traditionalists who are quite inward looking, and on the *other* hand on a group of Muslims eager to spread Islam (1994: 150-1).

[104] Gaffar (2000 [interview]); Kyai Rawi (2000 [interview]), who is a pesantren-head in Sumenep; Radi (2000 [interview]) who is a lecturer in political science, Jember University.

I witnessed many of these differences myself when I visited twelve pesantren during my field research. But does the distinction between traditional and modern necessarily influence the scope of a critical santri-voice and, hence, the resource base of a santri? At traditional pesantrens modern technology and science may also be taught, I was told. So we should not jump to conclusions about the relationship between traditional pesantren and possible lack of a critical santri-voice.

Of course, there is criticism of the kyai, as for instance during lunchtime at the pesantren, I was told. Although the criticism is discreet the kyai is probably aware of it, though. During the breaks between all sessions at the pesantren, the santris are free to discuss. But during the breaks rituals are also practiced under the supervision of the kyai. Hence, the spare time during which free discussions among the santris are permitted may be somewhat limited. But at their 'pondok' (dormitory) at bedtime, knowledge and ideas are spread. The resource base of the santris is also strengthened in the pesantren's pondok-committee. The committee is lead by a lorah (junior ulama) who together with senior santris, deals with emerging problems. Issues of criticism that may be discussed are for instance: too restrictive rules; too many hours dedicated to studies; or too few travel-permissions. When the santris talked of these issues, I tried to be conscious of, and sensitive to, possible latent opinions. I got few indications of that the santris tried to hide any arguments to me, though. Reasonable criticism may lead to changes, as for instance the reduction of attendance-fees. Criticism of pesantren-leaders is indirect, from the santris through the ustadz, then to the ulama. Criticism thus follows the hierarchy of a patron-client pyramid.

One way of channeling a critical voice is through demonstrations. But at the pesantren, demonstrations are considered impolite, and some of my informants claimed that a kyai is at liberty to dismiss a santri from attending his pesantren.[105] Physical ousting of santris is rare, however. The kyai may use more discrete methods to control the santris, and his closeness to Allah is often sufficient to reduce criticism.[106] To some extent, other santri-organizations were mentioned. Organizing interests as a way of raising a critical voice did not seem widespread on Madura. For

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[105] Roy (2000 [interview]) confirmed this. (See also Mansurnoor 1990: 249). The santris cannot dismiss their leaders.
[106] Tjahjono and Abdur Rozaki (2000 [interview]) who are employed by opposition press in East-Java.

instance only *one* of the many santris I met had heard of for instance the nationwide LKiS.[107]

   The santris may not openly reject any of the kyai's wishes, and they may seem to live strictly in accordance with Islamic rules. Do they, however, act differently in their spare time, when they are not monitored by the kyai? Do they then raise a critical voice? I asked the santris at pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin and pesantren Assalafiyah what they liked to do in their spare time. It seems as if such 'secular' activities as reading about modern technology and science, newspapers, magazines or comics were the santris' most popular spare time activities.[108] The santris at pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin also spent their spare time in religious studies and learning martial arts. To some extent, they focused on the supernatural. One of the santris answered: "I like to study martial arts and supernatural powers". The santris of Assalafiyah had a wider spectrum of replies. Some of them liked to write poetry, some to discuss, to practice sports, or to read the Qur'an with the kyai. One of the santris replied: "In my spare time I like to read books, and practice sports such as football". In general, when asked what criticism they had of the kyai, the santris I talked to replied reluctantly that "the old hierarchy of ulama" might be a topic. In general, the Madurese philosophy of 'bupak bakbu guru rato' that stipulates to whom one owes respect in hierarchical order (parents, ulama, state), seems effectively to eliminate the santris' criticism of the ulama.[109] It appears that for both the Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin- and Assalafiyah-santris it is not the kyai-dominated world, but rather secular interests that attract their attention. I received no direct indications that the kyai controls the voice-options of the santris.

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[107] Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (short for 'learning together', see: http://www.lkis.org/index.php). LKiS is seated in Yogyakarta. They perform a 'live Islam' as they reinterpret the religion. I was also told that the works of Abdurrahman Wahid was a prelude to the organization (Conversation at LkiS 13 September 2000.). Also Pusuat kebudanyaan Madura, Organisasi Santri Nasy'atul Muta'allilin (OSNAS) and Kaim Mutu Nahdlatul Ulama (KMNU) are organizations directed at young santris who want to discuss Islam. They are all subject to the control of ulama, hence we may question it's function as a critical voice (conversation with the santri 'Ari' at pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin (2000 [interview]). From my own field research I cannot confirm the importance of these respective organizations, however.

[108] Scott (1972a: 106) has an analysis of the 'secular trends in the nature of patron- client ties in Southeast Asia'. He analyses how traditional patronage, over time, changes toward contemporary patronage.

[109] 'The king of beggars' (2000 [interview]), who is affiliated to the Yogyakarta-seated NGO Jaringan Kerja Tungku Indonesia; Radi (2000 [interview]).

4.3.1.3 Counter-forces to pesantren-generated patron-client relations

The third question that seemed crucial to analyze when considering the most dominant ways in which the Madurese kyais further patron-client relations within the pesantren, is to what extent a pesantren is a shuttered institution; are there any counter-forces to kyai-power? In accordance with Scott (1972a: 101), I have reason to believe that *competition* between different pesantrens may represent a general source of counter-forces to the power of a kyai.[110]

In agreement with Hefner (2000b: 88) who states that students are free to travel from pesantren to pesantren, in search of specific 'ilmu', (religious knowledge), my own field research indicates that the santris have a real possibility of exiting from, and entering into different pesantrens as they wish.[111] Formally, a santri that does not find the ilmu he searches for at one pesantren is free to exit. In Scott's words (1972), the resource base of a client is empowered by such a free exit, or option of multiple adherence. In this respect, it seems as if the mobility of the Madurese santris reduces a kyai's opportunities to execute patronage-power. Moreover, in this way the view that stresses that patron-client relations are based on voluntarily relations, and that bonds of patronage are based on trust, is also strengthened, as a santri may choose what kyai and what pesantren to attend. Thus, on Madura we find many different pesantrens, with santris free to come and to leave. This mobility allows the santris to be influenced by several kyais as they move around. We may say that the Madurese pesantrens form a complex *network* within which the santris move. By moving around, the santris change their allegiances, and in this way, the patron-client network of the ulama is not cemented. During my field research, I talked to a group of UGM-scholars who, after the fall of Suharto in 1998, claim to have noticed an increasing competition among pesantrens, as well as between pesantren and tarekats (mystical brotherhoods). If there is a tendency toward more competition among different

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[110] See also paragraph 4.4.4.
[111] Geertz' (1960:178), and Jones' (1991:20) findings from East Java supports this pattern. My informant Gaffar elucidated this by stressing that pesantrens specialize in different matters. For instance kyai A may specialize in the teaching of the Qur'an, and kyai B may specialize in the Hadith (the sayings and actions of Mohammed), and another kyai may concentrate on the Shariah" (2000 [interview]). 'Kias' and 'Igema Ulama' ('the decision of the ulama', deciding rightful action) is another possible field of pesantren-specialization. Since the kyais and their pesantrens specialize in different matters, santris travel between them to learn about different issues (Kyai Rawi (2000 [interview]).

pesantren, the santris' pattern of pesantren attendance becomes more volatile.[112] Two of my informants stressed that:

> It has become more common to get travel-permits from the religious leaders, as people have become busier and travel more frequently. The 'ummat' [followers of ulama] do not look upon their ulama as determining their social life.[113]

We should keep in mind, as noted in chapter one, that an estimated 6 out of 10 million Madurese have been relocated to neighboring islands. As many Madurese travel back and forth to Indonesia's second largest city, Surabaya, just across the Madura strait.[114] Can we say that the pattern of a mobile population contrasts with the regulated internal structure of a separate pesantren?

When we enter a pesantren we see the physical buildings and the campus. On a typical campus we find a centrally placed mosque, pondoks (dormitories), and a building in which the ulama and santris eat. There are also buildings for lessons and maybe a madrasah (Islamic school). What we do not see is the *in*formal social structures and norms that regulate personal behavior. The pesantren has a hierarchy of informal relations. We have seen that these relations originate from the kyai, the patron. He is at the top of the social hierarchy at the pesantren. The respective social relations may resemble what Scott (1972a) terms a patron-client pyramid. Within a single pesantren, or patron-client pyramid, the asymmetry between the kyai's and the santris' power clearly favors the kyai. The kyai's strength is based on a hierarchy of single dyadic relationships with the attending santris. Could the basic patron-client dyads of kyai-santri get volatile, however, in as much as individual santris are free to exit the pesantren? We may say that an individual santri has some power as he is free to exit the relationship. On the other hand, if the santri then attends another pesantren, he enters another patron-client pyramid. He enrolls into a new patron-client dyad,

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[112] [Conversation] Fakultas Isipol (Department for political science, see http://www.gadjahmada.edu/my_UGM/alamat/indeks. html), UGM (18 September 2000). In any case, we should note Geertz (1960:180) who, based on his research in East Java, hints that "(...) basically the [kyais] are united", in respect to their worldview and ends.

[113] Gaffar (2000 [interview]).

[114] See for instance Spaeth (2000). de Jonge (1995:20) claims migration is one of the characteristics of the Madurese (see also Wessing (1994). Accelerated by Suharto's and New Order's enforced transmigrasi-policy, the ulama of Madura have encouraged migration to the neighboring Island of Borneo (Kalimantan). Every now and then since the 1950s we have witnessed severe ethnical clashes between the indigenous Dyaks and Malays, and the migrating Madurese on that Island of Borneo (Tapol report 2000). The chairman of Muhammadiyah, NU and even national ministers have tried to end the manslaughter. (The Jakarta Post: 23, 28 February 2001, 28 February 2001). Mansurnoor remarks "[…]the [Madurese] santris [have] realized that in the jungle [of Kalimantan] no one [of the indigenous tribes] wanted to listen to their teaching and preaching […]"(1990: 176).

with another kyai as his patron. Hence, on the *one* hand, a santri may have a strong resource base as he is free to leave one kyai. On the *other* hand, the santri will always be subject to kyai-power as long as he chooses to be a santri (student of a kyai). Based on her studies of pesantrens on East Java, Jones also sees such a pattern.[115]

4.4 The ulama, and the madrasah, mosque and langgar

4.4.1 The madrasah

Thus far, we have seen that the most important aspect of the ulama's world is the pesantren. The pesantren is the core of the ulama's intertwined social relations. We may say that the core of ulama-power is the relationship of the kyai and santri. Frequently connected to a pesantren is a madrasah (Qur'anic school). Could it be that the madrasah further extend the intertwined social relations subject to the Madurese ulama?[116]

Several Muslims on Madura who do not attend a pesantren, get their formal religious education at the madrasah instead. A lot of santris attend both the pesantren and the madrasah. The madrasah may even function as a prep school for the pesantren (Mansurnoor 1990: 274-9). The madrasah is founded by local lower ulama, possibly in cooperation with kyais. The madrasah may be situated within a pesantren's campus, or in the outside village. When a madrasah is located on a pesantren's campus, the senior santris from the pesantren often serve as teachers of the madrasah. Hence, when a madrasah is located on a pesantren's campus, both formal and social ties between the pesantren and the madrasah will be tight. Even the pesantren's lurahs (junior ulama), khadams and ustadzes (Islamic functionaries) provide religious sessions at the madrasah. We realize the closeness of a pesantren and a madrasah, if the madrasah is located on a pesantren's campus. In these instances it is easy to see that the patron-client relations subject to a kyai go beyond the

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[115] Jones states that "[we are looking at] no patron-client relationship" (1991:29). In her paper however, Jones does not discuss theories of patronage at all. And I strongly believe that Jones' empirical findings of dyadic bonds and network may also be categorized within the framework of patron-client theories.

[116] Compare to Geertz' findings in East Java (1960:187-190). Jones (1991, note 5: 38) claims that "[the] madrasah was used in the medieval Middle East to denote a school of Islamic law.[…] The model for Indonesian pesantrens was a specific madrasah: Darul Ulum, in Mecca, which served the Malay-speaking community including Indonesia".

pesantren. His patron-client ties will also include the people attached to the madrasah. In Scott' terms (1972a) we realize how the patron-client pyramid subject to a kyai also is extended downward, to include a madrasah. Just as at the pesantren, the kyai is the sole authoritative interpreter of the religious texts at the madrasah. And as at the pesantren, his knowledge is an important resource base.

There may however be some opposition between a pesantren on the one hand, and an *independent* madrasah on the other. Not always do a pesantren and a madrasah have a harmonious coexistence. The pesantren-kyai may be a rival to the madrasah-ulama (Mansurnoor 1990: 272).[117] A newly established madrasah may also be in opposition to an established mosque (ibid.: 274-9). Moreover, when the Dutch introduced secular education in Pamekasan in 1862, the madrasahs opposed the government-sponsored education. In any case, the pupils of the public secular schools continued to attend the ulama's schools too. Hence, the madrasah-ulama and the teachers at the secular schools live side by side. This pattern prevails, and a lot of pupils start the day by attending public schools, going on to Islamic madrasah-schools in the afternoon (Mansurnoor 1990: 41-2, 128).

4.4.2 The mosque

As at the madrasah, there may also be a mosque either on the pesantren's campus, or outside its confines. Mosques are often found in the middle of towns, however. Could a mosque extend the intertwined social relations subject to the Madurese ulama, just as a madrasah does?

The head of a mosque is the 'imam'. He may also be called mosque ulama. He is the symbol of village unity. An imam is supposed to have a good educational background, but not as good as a kyai's. He concentrate his instructions on adult villagers, and leads the Friday prayers held in Arabic. His most important resource base as a possible patron is his knowledge and skills. If the imam has a personal non-religious agenda, he may use his religious authority in the mosque to further his non-

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[117] Confirmed in interview with Kyai Rawi (2000 [interview]), at his house in Katchuman, Sumenep.

religious ends. For instance, as the village officials and politicians attend the Friday prayers, a bond to the imam is formed.

Mansurnoor suggests that a village with only one mosque has a low level of political play (1990:196). Hence, if a village has only one mosque, the leading imam has considerable influence. In general though, an imam's knowledge and skills are his most important resource base, in as much as he performs religious rituals in accordance with tradition. Not too much has been said about the resource base of the imam, and his power is hardly discussed by Madura-researchers. Yet, we realize that the imam do have some of the resources needed to establish patron-client relations.

4.4.3 The langgar

5: Photo 4.1 A langgar keneq (small langgar) on Madura.

Beside from the pesantren, madrasah and the mosque, a fourth important Islamic institution is the 'langgar' (Islamic neighborhood school). The langgar is found in many neighborhoods. It is a small building like the one in the photo. The 'mak kaeh' heads the langgar.[118] Seen in hierarchical order, a mak kaeh is the lowest kind of

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[118] The name 'mak kaeh' may actually be confused with 'pak kyai' or pak kiayeh that means 'father kyai' (Kyai Rawi 2000 [interview]). It is clear that the Madurese was influenced by the pre-Islamic traditions in East Asia. 'Langgar' seems to have

ulama, and may be called village ulama. Are the intertwined social relations of the Madurese ulama extended through the langgars, and do the Madurese ulama utilize the langgars to further patron-client relations?

Unlike the kyai, the mak does not inherit his position from his father, and he is not that powerful as a kyai. He is often attached closely to a kyai, as a client (Mansurnoor 1990: 336).[119] If a kyai takes on a mak kaeh as his subordinate, their relationship may resemble that of patron and client. If a langgar is subject to or attached to a pesantren, we realize that larger patron-client pyramids evolve. Another question that must be analyzed is to what extent a mak kaeh functions as a patron. To what extent is the mak kaeh's relationship to his followers characterized by a reciprocal exchange of goods and services between two parties, and how lasting is the relationship? Do the parties involved have unequal social status, and is there asymmetry of societal power in their relationship? Primarily children attend the langgar. Hence, there will probably be little exchange of concrete goods and services, unless we consider the attendance and loyalty of the children as a commodity. In any case, the villagers value the langgar highly. At the age of five or six, children of both genders are sent to the mak kaeh, to learn how to recite and practice rituals (Mansurnoor 1990: 72).[120] One of my informants told me that the langgar is also used for teaching the Qur'an.[121] The main expertise of the mak kaeh is not strictly Islamic, however. He is supposed to be familiar with the supernatural. Children who get their primary religious lessons from the mak kaeh, develop an enduring bond with him. The bonds that evolve in this way seem affectionate and unspoken, thus resembling a primordial relation. Operating on a neighborhood level, the mak kaeh has only limited wealth. In accordance with his low-level ulamaship, he receives few gifts compared to the higher ulama, and he has no political office (Mansurnoor 1990: 339-40; 1992:79). Hence, compared to higher

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its origin in India. But compared to Java, there are very limited remains of Indic traditions and monuments left on Madura (see Niehof 1986). Also Mansurnoor suggests the langgar is pre-dating the introduction of Islam. The spreading of langgars is of many Madurese taken as a evidence of their dedication to *Islam* though, as the institution now is submitted to the Muslims (1990: 193, 212).

[119] For a comparison to Javanese langgars, see Geertz (1960: 181).

[120] There is a division Pof genders in the Madurese society. *Female* ulama do exist. They restrict their public speeches only to women's gatherings, though (Mansurnoor 1990: 60). Women often found their own gatherings. For more on social divisions concerning age-cohorts and language categories, see Mansurnoor (1990).

[121] Kyai Rawi (2000 [interview]).

ulama, it may seem that the mak kaeh has a weaker resource base.[122] On the other hand, we should not underestimate the influence of the mak kaeh, as he is the first religious leader that Muslim children experience.

Normally the followers of a mak kaeh maintain their allegiance to him throughout their life. Thus, as in the case of the kyais, we see how patron-client dyads submissive to the mak kaeh may encompass large sections of the society. But just as in the patron-client relations of a kyai, the subordinates of a mak kaeh may move in and out of the relationship. We recall that the Madurese are known for their mobility, and we realize the volatility in these patron-client relations. Moreover, as the public secular education grows, Mansurnoor sees even more challenges to these patron-client relations (1990: 110). In any case, when we look at the pesantren and the langgar, we see the contours of an extensive system of intertwined social relations. The pesantren resemble what Scott (1972a) terms a patron-client pyramid. And by including madrasahs and langgars, the pesantren extends it relations. The resulting structure is an extensive patron-client pyramid headed by a kyai. The role of the mosques in this structure is more difficult to decide. We have seen that the Madurese ulama clearly utilize these patron-client pyramids to further patron-client relations.

4.4.4 The larger community

So far, we have looked at the Islamic institutions of pesantren, madrasah, mosque and langgar. Specific social relations characterize these institutions. Seen together, these four institutions resemble an extensive patron-client pyramid. In this paragraph we turn to the larger Madurese community.[123] Here we find people that are not closely attached to or submissive to the four Islamic institutions discussed so far. To what extent are those people outside the Islamic institutions submissive to the intertwined social relations of the Madurese ulama?

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[122] A mak kaeh with a large following may establish a mosque and become an imam: He may also open a madrasah. Hence, social mobility within the ulama-sphere may occur. For a mak kaeh, it takes generations to advance to the position of a kyai, especially if there is a lack of close kinship ties to more powerful ulama (Mansurnoor 1990: 237-8).
[123] Based on his research on East *Java*, Jones (1991: 27-8) states: "If the pesantren helped maintain the cohesion of the community at the local level, it was also instrumental in maintaining the cohesion of the Javanese ummat or community of believers more generally."

Mansurnoor (1995: 37) talks of an 'internal phase' and an 'external phase' through which a kyai legitimizes and secures his power in the larger community. In the former phase the kyai has to demonstrate his piety, knowledge and commitment. In the latter phase he attempts to *widen* his sphere of influence. In both phases, the kyai carefully calculates what resources that would strengthen his resource base as a power-holder.

In the *internal phase* the kyai seems particularly to focus on primordial sentiments in his attempt to legitimize and secure his position. Popular belief emphasizes the sacred, supernatural abilities of the kyai. He is supposed to be the direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammed.[124] The kyai and his descendants are thought to have innate divine and supreme learning and leadership abilities. Faith in the kyai's powers has been passed from father to son, so that even today this faith prevails and is utilized by the ulama to gain legitimacy. The kyai may claim kinship ties to the early Islamic preachers, the 'sayyids' (Arab aristocrats) or to royalty, going back to the old kingdoms (Mansurnoor 1990: 226; 1995: 40).[125] Another popular belief claims that all the Madurese ulama are descendants of four famous religious and political leaders. Some of these historical figures are known as the nine 'walis' (holy men).[126] The walis were the first to convert the Javanese to Islam in the 15th century (Touwen-Bouwsma 1992:104). This belief is widespread among the Madurese. The more widespread such faith is, the firmer is the ground on which the ulama legitimize and secure their position.

Some of the ulama's claim to royal or divine inheritance are more factual than others. Nagtengaal (1995) comments on the kyais who claim descent from noble leaders. He implies that the Madurese people who respect their ulama for such an alleged heritage may have forgotten an important factor: The ulama who were allies of the Dutch after 1744 did not strengthen or gain popular legitimacy by this alliance to a foreign government. On the contrary: The ulama that were allies of the Dutch

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[124] For more details, see Mansurnoor (1995: 34, 39), and Hefner (2000:35).
[125] The greater part of the Madurese ulama adhere to the "*ahl al- sunnah wal- jama'ah*" interpretation of Islam. This implicates their allegiance to the "*Syafi'i*" formulation ('*madzhab'*) and to the "*Asy'ari/ Maturidi*" concept. See Mansurnoor (1995: 38) for details on the Islamic terms and concepts.
[126] The wali may also be termed 'Ma'rifat'. 'Mukasafah' is another type of wali.

after 1744 were not respected by their contemporaries. Why then, should present day Madurese respect such a heritage? When present day ulama claim legitimacy because their ancestors were allies of the nobility and the Dutch, there is a misunderstanding. The ulama alliances to different state règimes have never had great legitimacy. It is rather those kyais who stayed clean of such alliances, and who represented independence at the end of the 19th century, that should be respected.[127] Some of my interviewees were inconclusive on this point, but quite often the 'blood-factor' (family-relations and heritage) was mentioned when I asked people for the reasons for the ulama's position as patrons. Other of my interviewees disregarded the blood-factor though, and stressed the growing importance of merit.[128] In general, people's belief in holy men appears to be quite a primordial element. Mansurnoor's 'internal phase of legitimizing ulama-power', seems dominated by affective, spiritual and unspoken believes. Such faith appears to be widespread in the larger Madurese community.

The *external phase* through which a kyai legitimizes and secures his position in the larger society, depends to a large extent on the kyai's merits and ambitions. As opposed to the internal phase, in the external phase a kyai do not legitimize and secure his resource base primarily by utilizing primordial sentiments. Rather, the resource base of a kyai is very much dependant on his own merits (Mansurnoor 1995: 37). Three crucial factors in this phase are treated here: Through knowledge, by socializing with the villagers, and by providing villagers with goods and services the ulama attempt to legitimize and secure their position.

The *first* way in which the kyais spread their influence is by proving knowledge. From my own field research I noted that the skills of the kyais were an important consideration in the santris' choice of pesantren. There is no active promotion of a pesantren as an educational center, hence a kyai's success as a leader depends on his

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[127] For more on this, see also Hefner (2000b: 32-3).
[128] Interview with research-assistant Linda (2000 [interview]), and university-scholar Cornelius Lay (2000 [interview]). Also underscored by research-assistant Gaffar (2000 [interview]). I had several discussions with these three scientists at UGM, Isipol.

reputation as a wise man.[129] We recall Scott's (1972a) statement that a patron's knowledge and skills are crucial to his resource base.

A *second* way through which the influence of the kyais may be spread in the external phase is, according to Mansurnoor (1995), by socializing with the villagers. The kyai's non-educational activities, outside the Islamic institutions, attract a lot of followers. People frequently visit the kyai for medication, for counseling and even to learn about invincibility. It is still common for Madurese to search for supernatural abilities.[130] The kyai receives both ordinary villagers and state-officials as visitors. These visits are known as 'nyabis'.[131] To a certain extent a kyai is also able to mobilize people for 'jak-ngajak' (communal work). The villagers would never think of asking the kyai himself to participate in the jak-ngajak however. It would be inappropriate for him to perform physical work (ibid.: 63-6). In such communal work, we clearly see patterns of asymmetry of power between the ulama and his followers,[132] evidence of a patron-client relationship. As a result of the kyai's interest in the world outside Islamic institutions, a large part of the community is subject to the intertwined social relations and patronage of a kyai. The nyabises are particularly central to the broader prestige of a kyai.

A *third* way through which the influence of the kyais may be spread in the external phase is according to Mansurnoor (1995) is by providing his potential followers with goods and services. The services the kyai provides the community with are for instance: weekly prayers and leadership of Islamic celebrations.[133] Moreover, the kyais and 'hajis' (Muslims that have visited Mecca) found organizations and arrange religious meetings. They may provide followers and citizens with loans, employment and education, and they build and maintain mosques and religious schools. Ulama

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[129] My Madurese translator 'Benny' emphasized this (2000 [interview]); Also interview with the local NU-head, kyai Hamid Mannam Munif, Pamekasan confirmed this view (2000 [interview]). "The Madurese are fanatic: They see the kyais as types of scientists", one of my informants stated (Soegianto (2000 [interview], who is a professor at The Research Institute of Jember University, Office for Madura Studies).

[130] For more on this theme, see Mansurnoor (1990: 329-30, 251).

[131] Moreover, '*Sulathurani*' is a type of informal meetings of different kyais in which the horizontal network of the kyais are strengthened, and the competition *between* kyais and between pesantrens are minimized (Gaffar 2000 [interview]).

[132] From his research on Jepara , Java, Schiller (1996) reveals similar *patronage- relations* with religious overtones. See also Sudarjat and Bukhori (1999). Slamet-Velsink (1994: 48) compares Madura and parts of Java on this point.

[133] From her research on East Java, Jones (1991:25-6) elucidates the importance of the pesantren in different Islamic celebrations. She also focuses on the kyai's provision of specific goods: Concerning Id ul-Adha (commemoration of the prophet Ibrahim's sacrifice of his son) she states that "[…the authority of the kyai is] implicitly defined by how far [his distribution of *food*] would reach".

organize charities and sponsor village entertainment: "The community influence of the Islamic leaders is strengthened because they frequently act as patrons for villagers seeking employment, credit or education", Schiller confirms from his research on East-Java (1996: 48).

As well as providing goods and services, the ulama to a certain extent also control information, modern technology and secular education. This control may not directly legitimize the position of ulama, but may at least secure their power-position. According to Mansurnoor, the control of information is the key explanation to the patron-and power-position of the Madurese ulama (1990: XX). As the ulama may still today have better access to information through the media, they may use frightening news such as pollution and wars to control the people's need for comfort and guidance, Mansurnoor (1990: 222) states.[134] Such an interpretation resembles what Jackson (1974) terms traditional authority relations. Even on Madura we may question to what extent the ulama are in control of modern technology, however. The construction of the railway already in 1901, the ferry-routs to neighboring islands, bridge and dam-projects, and other improved and new channels of communication have benefited, and continue to benefit the Madurese society at large. As an example, when I went to Pamekasan in September 2000, the first public Internet-café had opened just two months earlier. Mansurnoor (1990: 45) claims such developments are still under the censorship of the ulama.[135] Others believe that modern mass communication may effectively erode that resource-base of the ulama.[136] As for their control of education, the ulama have clearly demonstrated their ignorance of secular subjects. Such ignorance has, of course, influenced the santris' attitudes. One of my informants stated that:

> As interpreters of the holy book, the ulama have a hundred percent authority. But secular education challenges their overall position, as it brings modernity. Yet, there are many rural areas on Madura in which secular education is poor.[137]

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[134] To the locals, the kyais may also be seen as mediators, or cultural and political brokers (Radi 2000, who is a lecturer in political science, Jember University 2000 [interview]). See also Slamet-Velsink (1994: 40) and Antlöv & Cederroth (1994: 10-11).

[135] Some of my own informants stressed that the 'pondok ideology' (idealizing of a simple life based on real values and moral) reinforces the stronghold of the ulama (Tjahjono and Abdur Rozaki 2000 [interview]).

[136] Mansurnoor (1990) and other scholars as Antlöv & Cederroth (1994: 17) emphasize this.

[137] Lay (2000 [interview]).

Competition from public schools from late the 1970s on has influenced kyais to open general classes, though. From his own research in East Java's town of Jumbang, Gaffar underscored that the patron-client relations subject to ulama has been decreasing for the last decades, due primarily to secular education (2000 [interview]).[138] Yet, the Islamic pesantren has been strengthened in their competition with secular education in one way. To an increasing degree they are allowed to hand out graduation certificates.[139]

There is little doubt that the external phase through which a kyai legitimizes and secures his position, depends to a large extent on the kyai's merits and ambitions. By showing his knowledge, by socializing with potential followers and by providing and controlling goods and services, the Madurese kyais may be regarded as an élite who act as cultural brokers. Moreover, the ulama in general may be regarded as a caste-like grouping with a complete set of resources, roles, positions and interests.[140] Yet, we do not talk of a class structure. The intertwined social relations of the ulama are hierarchical and vertical in character, and not based on horizontal bonds as in a class-structure. Mansurnoor (1990:12, 92) underscores that the widespread influence of the ulama is more typical of 'relational circles': The relations among villagers crosscut the other societal structures. Within the Islamic institutions we saw that the top-down relations of ulama-followers clearly resemble patron-client pyramids. Through the ulama's 'internal and external phases' of legitimizing and securing their superior position, the larger Madurese community is subject to the intertwined relations of the ulama. This overall structure of intertwined relations is to a large extent instrumentally utilized by the ulama to further patron-client relations.

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[138] In contrast to many of my other interviewees, Gaffar reflected on patron-client relations quite unimpeded by my theoretical presumptions.

[139] Indah (2000 [interview]) who is a member of The Madurese Society in Jember. For a comparison to East Java, see Jones (1991:20)who states that "[the pesantrens' function as a center of formal schooling has] gradually assumed greater importance". She underscores the impact of: 1. The spread of printing facilities made religious texts more available. 2. A flow of Javanse pilgrims to Mecca, and an increasing number of ulama desirous in opening pesantren. 3. Increasing popular demand for education.

[140] A cluster of attributes supports them. And their position, unity and tradition depend on ideology, kinship and a mix of religion and politics Mansurnoor states (1990: XV). See also Touwen-Bouwsma's reference to the term 'religious régime' as a related phenomenon. She refers to an institutionalized constellation within which the relations are formalized (1992). Touwen-Bouwsma states that the 'religious régime' that developed on Madura in the 19th century was weakly institutionalized and were quite informal.

4.5 Ulama and mysticism

Above we saw that in the internal phase through which a kyai legitimizes and secures his societal power, he focuses on primordial sentiments. Popular beliefs among the people are centered to some extent on the sacred, supernatural abilities of a kyai. Do the Madurese ulama utilize mystical societies to further patron-client relations? The research of van Bruinessen may help to answer this question. He states that "[…both the leaders of] Muslim modernists and puritans are quite often opposed to mystical brotherhoods, especially to the popular devotional practices often associated with them" (1995: 109). Hence, we realize that on the *one* hand, mysticism may be popular with the community, but, on the *other* hand it may be unpopular with leading Muslims.

4.5.1 The tarekats

The tarekats (Muslim mystical brotherhoods) became popular in the late 18th century, and the most recent international tarekats came directly to Madura from Arabia in the 20th century.[141] Touwen-Bouwsma has conducted research specifically on the expansion of the tarekats. She claims that the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) disturbed the traditional legitimacy of the Madurese secular nobility in the middle of the 18th century. The nobility started to approach Islam, but developed their own religious direction. The result was a combination of an ancient Madurese religious tradition and mystical Islam (1992).[142] At the same time, there was another development that contributed to the growth of mystical Islam on Madura: The Islamic expansion into Indonesia coincided with an era of great Sufi influence in such important Muslim centers as Mecca and Medina. "Not coincidentally then, mystic literature and practices were conspicuous among the items first appropriated by

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[141] I was told that the current Madurese tarekats are parts of extensive intertwined social relations with sub-divisions on large part of the Indonesian peninsular. The tarekats are strong all over Indonesia in general (Wajidi 2000 [interview]); Gaffar (2000 [interview]). According to Mansurnoor (1990: 207-8), the most known tarekat on Madura are the Naqsybandiyah (also found in for instance Turkey (Haugom 1995:50)); and Qadiriyah or Qadiriyah wan- Naqsybandiyah. van Bruinessen (1995:92) and Kyai Rawi (2000 [interview]) add Tijaniyah and Syuriallyah. Wajidi, who is the head of LKiS, adds the orthodox tarekat Jama'ah Ahlu Tarekat Mu'tabacah. According to him, Naqsybandiyah and Tijaniyah are two tarekat theories or schools (2000 [interview]). See also Touwen-Bouwsma (1992:118). For a comparison to East Java, see Geertz (1960: 183).

[142] For an article on symbols of the Madurese, see Wessing (1994) who discusses the symbolic animist link of the forest and the tiger to man. He claims popular beliefs may link ulama with tigers.

popular Islamic culture in Southeast Asia", Hefner states (1997a: 10). The contemporary indigenous culture on Madura was quite receptive to mysticism, and the local syncretic beliefs further developed the new Islamic mysticism.[143] Still, in 2000 the fusion of Sufism and syncretism is absorbed into Islam. The mysticism seems to comprise affective and unspoken dimensions characteristic to primordialism. Despite their relatively recent introduction to Madura, the tarekats seem to be the legacy of an unquestioned old tradition. Jackson's concept 'traditional authority-relations' (1974) seems suited to describe the intertwined social relations that exist within such a tradition: We talk of diffuse long-standing, affect laden, binding tarekat-relations.

The 'syeh' or 'mursyid' is the guide and leader of the tarekat. He is usually a famous kyai, and he may be perceived as a saint. He appoints 'khadams', 'khalifahs' and 'badals' (local deputies), to help him guide his followers. Hence, as in the case of the pesantren, the tarekat has an internal hierarchical social structure. One difference however, is that the disciples of a tarekat seem more attached psychologically to their syeh, than the santris to a kyai. We should note that the members of a tarekat, and the students at a pesantren are quite different in character, though. The members of a tarekat possess a higher level of religious maturity because the tarekat-system is regarded as the highest level in the approach to Allah.[144] In this way the tarekat-disciples are more mature and self-reliant than the santris. Another difference between the tarekat and the pesantren is that the followers of a tarekat may not easily change their allegiance from one tarekat to another. To change allegiance from one tarekat to another may even be illegitimate. In contrast to this rigidity, we remember that the santris of one pesantren are quite free to travel between pesantrens in search of religious knowledge. To the degree in which mobility represents a resource base

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[143] By 'Sufism', Touwen-Bouwsma refers to a religious tradition of mystical Islam. Direct spiritual union between god and man is crucial. Sufism is organized in 'tariqa', mystical brotherhoods (1992:116-7). 'Syncretic' indicates the mixing of different cultural elements. Bråten (1988: 89) finds such a blend problematic as it may imply a theoretical bias.

[144] During my field research I was told that the tarekat system has 4 levels of knowledge: 1.'Haiat', taught by anyone, for instance by parents to children, as basic knowledge. 2. 'Syriat' taught by ustad. 3. 'Tharikat' taught by kyai. 4. 'Ma'rifat' taught by a wali. Hence, the wali is superior to the kyai (conversations at The Madurese Society in Jember: 19 October 2000). Such a possible structure needs more research though. Compare with Geertz' findings from East Java (1960:183).

for a disciple, follower or client, the follower of a tarekat has a weaker resource base than the santri.

The syeh is sometimes more important than the kyai, I was told. He gives a great deal of attention to the poor, and may in some instances be an intermediary between the poor and the government. This is different from the kyai who, by contrast, may attract santris from affluent families. Another difference between the tarekat and the pesantren is that the tarekat draws its members from local communities, while the pesantren may attract santris from a large area. In one local setting, there is usually one dominating tarekat. This is especially true in rural areas.[145] Gaffar (2000 [interview]) on the *other* hand, stated that the tarekat is neither related to a socioeconomic stratum nor to a clear rural/urban division.[146]

The tarekat is usually smaller than the pesantren, as only a few ordinary villagers are associated with it. A pesantren by contrast, may consist of from 100 to 2000 students. And, in general, fewer people belong to a tarekat-syeh than to a pesantren-kyai.[147] In any case, it is not easy to decide whether the syeh or the kyai controls the most powerful patron-client relations. The clientele and spheres of activity of the tarekat and the pesantren may on the *one* hand not always be directly comparable. In *other* instances, it may not be easy to make a distinct division between a tarekat society and a pesantren society, as there could be an overlap between the two institutions: A pesantren-kyai may be involved in mysticism. And a kyai who is involved in a tarekat could become a syeh. Moreover, tarekat practices may take place on the campus of a pesantren.[148]

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[145] Interview with Wajidi (2000 [interview]); Gaffar (2000 [interview]).
[146] Interview (19 September 2000). There is a lack of research on tarekat-stratum and tarekat-urbanism issues, though.
[147] See Touwen-Bouwsma (1992:117-8). Gaffar (2000 [interview]) and Roy (2000 [conversation]) suggest the same.
[148] From her research on East Java, Jones (1991: 24) explicitly states that the Sufi orders, or tarekat was traditionally centered at the pesantren. Among the santris at the pesantrens, late night, before bed time is the time to practice mysticism. Santris staying at one pesantren for several years may be introduced to the teaching of mystical tendencies of Islam. Tarekats may also be centered at a mosque. (Wajidi 2000 [interview]); Gaffar (2000 [interview]).

4.5.1.1 White and black magic

Besides the tarekat-syeh, several figures of a mystical, primordial nature exist among the Madurese. Even regular kyais may hand out magical amulets to special visitors. Among the Madurese kyais, mystical and magical skills are highly valued. The treatment of illness with traditional medicine has long been one of the primary sources of a strong dyadic ulama-villager relation. We can easily see how traditional authority and patronage based on mysticism grow strong.[149] Even the younger people that I spoke to during my own field research would never oppose the masters of mysticism.

Popular mystical activities are witnessed at the gathering of 'samman'-groups (see van Bruinessen 1995: 92-93). In these gatherings which are a kind of tarekat custom, artistic talent is expressed, and the participants may become ecstatic and go into a trance. The rituals are clearly influenced by Islam though, as the participants frequently shout Islamic slogans as: "Allah, Huwa, Hu" (god) and "La ilaha illa Allah" (No god but Allah). A syeh or mursyid (spiritual preceptor) leads the gathering privately at his home (Mansurnoor 1990: 189-90).

A kyai may also function as a 'dhukon' (healer). Mansurnoor defines the dhukon as a "magical practitioner or simply healer" (1990: 197). The dhukon is supposed to be able to communicate with the unseen world, and his power represents black magic. On the contrary, the genuine kyais are in possession of 'Do'a' (white magic). But to demote the un-Islamic elements of his practice, the dhukon often includes some Islamic symbols. Such practices reveal ancient syncretic traditions.[150] It is interesting to note that former president Suharto relied on (Javanese) spiritual advisers; among them, the dhukon (Hefner 2000b: 83).

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[149] For more on this theme, see Mansurnoor (1990: 189-90).

[150] According to my key informant Yono, the spelling is proper Madurese grammar. Other versions are: 'dukun', 'dhukun' and 'tukon'(2000 [interview]). See Jones (1991:23), and Hefner (1987) who elucidates Clifford Geertz' research on Java. For a description of the dhukon as a protector of the symbolically important Madurese bulls, see de Jonge (1990). See also van Bruinessen (1995: 96-8,101-8). For healing and magic, see Slamet-Velsink (1994). The 'ilmu tabib' (white powers) of the kyais and syehs are limited to syncretism and the 'ilmu klenik' (black magic) of the dhukon (Kyai Hadhori and his son Holis (2000 [conversation]). Also Cederroth (1994) treats mysticism, and describes 'kebatinan' movements that are concerned of inward life and noble character. Widodo at Jember University claims the dhukon is still the most powerful figure on Madura (2000 [interview]). See also Schiller's case study of the Jepara district on Java. The dhukon seems to compete with the patronage of the genuine Islamic ulama.

The three kyais I had thorough conversations with, dismissed the importance of the tarekats' influence. But as mysticism is also a taboo, the kyais' replies to me may be a sign of political correct-ness. My presence as a stranger, and my interaction with the kyais may have altered their real point of view, thus, complicated my attempt at revealing their world view. In general though, people gave me the impression that on Madura the power of the syeh and tarekat-associates is very strong. Among the UGM scholars I spoke to, there was a dominant view that the present time sees increasing competition among tarekats, as well as between tarekats and pesantrens. They suggested that the national political revolution of 1998 might be the reason for this.[151] In any case, we see the following pattern: A kyai controls a huge patron-client pyramid, the pesantren. His patron-client relations may be extended through the Islamic institutions of madrasah, langgar and probably through the mosque. Moreover, we have seen that the kyai, and ulama in general, further patron-client relations over the Madurese society at large in different ways. In this paragraph, we have also seen that kyais may head the mystical tarekats, and even function as dhukons. We realize that the Madurese ulama control a wide network of intertwined social relations. And to a great extent these relations concerns reciprocal exchange of goods and services between two parties. The relationship between the parties involved is of some duration, and those involved do have unequal social status. Hence, we are looking at extensive patron-client relations.

4.6 Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have considered the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. The analysis has focused on the extent to which the Madurese ulama utilize intertwined social relations to further patron-client relations. We have seen that the ulama make use of extensive intertwined social relations. To a high degree these relations are utilized to further patron-client relations. The foundation of the ulama's intertwined social relations is the patron-client dyad of a 'kyai' (Islamic teacher) and a 'santri' (student of Islam). The kyai-

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[151] Encounter with scholars at UGM (18 September 2000).

santri relation is centered at the 'pesantren' (Islamic boarding school). The Madurese people are quite free to choose what pesantren they want to attend. And within the pesantren, the santris do have some choices of raising a critical voice and to criticize their leaders. The intertwined social relations found in a pesantren clearly resemble a patron-client pyramid that the head ulama may use to further patron-client relations.

A 'madrasah' (Islamic school) may be directly subject and attached to a pesantren. There may also be an overlap in personnel between the pesantren and the madrasah. To the extent to which a madrasah is directly attached to a pesantren, the kyai has ample opportunity to extend the patron-client pyramid subject to his control. Just as the madrasah, 'langgars' (Islamic neighborhood school) may also be attached and subject to a pesantren. Probably mosques may be subject to a pesantren, in the same way. We realize that a kyai who heads a pesantren may extend his intertwined social relations to include the Islamic institutions of madrasah, mosque and langgar. These three 'lower' institutions may to some extent be in opposition to the pesantren's leader, however. We may see competition between them. Beyond the Islamic institutions of pesantren, madrasah, mosque and langgar, a kyai also attempts to subject the larger Madurese community to his intertwined social relations. In this way, we realize that the patron-client pyramid at the pesantren is extended to a patron-client pyramid that covers society at large. We see the contours of the ulama's huge societal power. Moreover, we have seen that the ulama are also in charge of the 'tarekats' (Muslim mystical brotherhoods). A fusion of Sufism and syncretism produces its own intertwined relations that, when subject to the ulama, extend the intertwined patron-client relations even further.

Chapter 5. Analysis part *two*

5.1 Patronage through ulama organizations, and business

"Ulama continue to exercise an important role in Indonesia. Who are they? How do they preserve their position in society?" Nine years after Mansurnoor (1990: XV) asked this, the most important ulama-organization, Nahdlatul Ulama backed Abdurrahman Wahid for the presidency of Indonesia. Even though Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced Abdurrahman Wahid as president in 2001, ulama are still a most important social force in Indonesia.[152]

My aim in this dissertation is to reveal the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. We have already seen that the ulama control extensive intertwined social relations. To a great degree ulama utilize such relations to further patron-client relations. In this chapter I will discuss whether the Madurese ulama have other means to further their patron-client relations. Do they also make use of organizational and economic involvement to further patron-client relations?

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[152] I was told that between Mojoagung and Jombang, in East-Java we would find the Islamic center, pesantren 'Tebuireng'. The pesantren was run by Abdurrahman Wahid's uncle, kyai Wahid, and founded by Abdurrahman Wahid's grandfather. This illustrates Abdurrahman Wahid's tight relations to the pesantrens. Moreover one of the syehs connected to Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Saihon Holil, was Madurese, which also links Gus Dur to Madura and the 'tarekats' (mystical brotherhoods) (Ketua (2000 [interview], who is a santri-leader in Surabaya); (Roy 2000 [interview]), who is a santri at pesantren Assalafiyah, Pamekasan: 7 October 2000).

5.2 Ulama and their organizations

5.2.1 Official and non-official kyais

Based on his research on Madura, Mansurnoor (1995) makes a distinction between official and unofficial 'kyais' (Islamic high-level teacher). The *official kyais* are those that are directly attached to Islamic organizations and the state sphere. They became involved in official and political matters already at an early historical period, when they were appointed as court officials during the kingdoms from 1527 on.[153] Later, from about 1743, the Dutch recruited the official kyais directly into the state sphere. Helped by their alliance with the Dutch, the official ulama manifested their position as a political élite. Scott (1972: 97) underscores that indirect control of the authority of others (as through ownership of communal land or public office-based property) is one factor crucial to a patron's resource base and political power. The empirical research of Mansurnoor (1995: 41-5) seems to confirm the existence of such a resource base. In any case, the dominating trend at the end of the 19th century was that the alliance between the ulama and the state sphere of the colonizers weakened.[154]

Unlike the official kyais whose access to the military state-apparatus helped strengthen their power, the *unofficial kyais* only had informal intertwined social relations as a resource base of patronage. We remember, though, that the intertwined social relations subject to the Madurese ulama are quite far reaching (see chapter four). The patron-client relations subject to the *un*official kyais were personal, and not political in character. During the 17th and 18th century, however the intertwined relations of the unofficial ulama were not yet properly linked to the pesantren. The ulama that stayed out of the state alliance gradually strengthened their power vis-a-vis the ulama within the state alliance, however. On present day Madura, there are instances in which the intertwined social relations subject to the unofficial ulama may

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[153] Be aware that Mansurnoor's (1995) official kyais/ulama may resemble Geertz' (1960) criticized category of 'priyayi' Muslims.

[154] See Mansurnoor (1995: 41-5). Jones (1991: 22) states that the antipathy to the bureaucracy may be traced to the political alliance of Mataram kingdom and the Dutch, who tried regulating the north-coast Javanese trade. Such regulations were already strongly opposed by kyais in the latter part of the 17th century. See also (Hefner 2000b: 32-3).

be considered as *parallels to the state organization* (Mansurnoor 1990: 202). The unofficial ulama compete with the state apparatus for legitimacy and influence. On Madura, there is a well known saying: 'bupak bakbu guru rato' (Parents, ulama, state) which implies that in hierarchical order that the unofficial, independent ulama are more important than the state-apparatus.[155]

5.2.2 From patron-client clusters to ulama organizations

The analysis in chapter four, of the extent to which the Madurese ulama utilized intertwined social relations to further patron-client relations, focused on informal dyadic relations, patron-client clusters and patron-client pyramids. In the subsequent discussion, I will look beyond patron-client dyads, clusters and pyramids. As I discuss ulama in official and political matters, I will look at ulama *organizations*. In Scott's terms (1972a), an ulama organization may resemble the social structures of a patron-client *network*. Illustration 3.1, reminds us, that the horizontal social relations between different patrons characterize a patron-client network. A patron-client dyad, cluster and pyramid differ from a patron-client network in that a patron-client network includes horizontal *bonds between different patrons*. When an individual ulama joins an ulama organization, he establishes social relations to his equals, and not to subordinates as in patron-client dyads, clusters or pyramids. He is no longer the sole authority and superior in the relationship. He joins other ulama whose power may be equal to his own. An individual ulama that goes official, may even become subordinate and inferior in power to more prominent ulama in that same organization.[156]

Official ulama who cultivate their own personal ends and careers within Islamic organizations may not necessarily widen their own power or patronage. On the

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[155] Tjahjono and Abdur Rozaki who are employed by the opposition press in East-Java (2000 [interview]); Soegianto (2000 [interview]) who is a professor at The Research Institute of Jember University, Office for Madura Studies (21 October 2000); Radi (2000 [interview]) who is a lecturer in political science, Jember University. Based on his research on Java; Jackson (1974: 9-10) also touches on this phenomenon. The predictability of traditional authority- relations "[...] tends to supercede institutional arrangements", he states. Also researching on Java, Jones (1991:24) who not explicitly divides between official and unofficial ulama, states "[…the kyais were] clearly outside [the state]".

[156] Slamet-Velsink (1994:49) points out that super-local organizational relations closely connect the Madurese to the Javanese. The Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is significant in this respect.

contrary, they may weaken their own resource base as a patron. The two-edged consequence of pursuing personal ambitions in ulama organizations may actually be the loss of personal power. An individual ulama that joins an ulama organization may loose his initial, tight and primordial connections to his local community in which he is a power-holder. In other words, when an individual ulama looks beyond patron-client dyads, clusters and pyramids in his local community, and turns instead to super-local ulama-networks, he may endanger his power. When ignoring his core resource base in such a way, his influence may weaken. Hence, if an individual ulama is not careful in his pursuit of personal ambitions, he may actually loose influence. The Madurese 'santris' (students) call official ulama who systematically use organizations in an attempt to gain a stronger personal resource base symptomatically: "Tigers kept in the zoo" (Mansurnoor 1990: 280, 319).

   A natural question to ask, is whether ulama-organizations resemble a class structure. We may reflect on this question by wondering: What are the chances that strong individual ulama may unite in a political class? Is the personal power of an individual ulama compatible with the broader *collective* interests of a class? Within the ulama organizations, horizontal bonds of brotherhood develop between the ulama. Moreover, as many ulama have attended the same pesantren in their youth, informal santri-spirit may link ulama together even more strongly.[157] But it is their shared *religion* that forms the strongest loyalties. Rather than class-structures, it is the ulama's mutual religion that excludes members of other communities. Could we then say that the ulama's organizational interests resemble communalism and not class structure? Communalism focuses, on the *one* hand, on the vertical relations (superior-inferior), typical to patronage. And on the *other* hand it focuses on brotherhood-affection between members, characteristic of class-loyalty. The limits of this dissertation do not allow me to pursue a discussion on communalism any further. What is important, though, is that we may rightfully question whether the ulama compose a class; and whether the organizations treated below represent class-interests.

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[157] For more reading on this theme, see Niehof (1986:124).

5.2.3 The main ulama organizations

We recall that the intertwined social relations of the ulama are far-reaching in the Madurese society at large, and the intertwined social relations of the ulama to a large extent channel ulama-power. Ulama organizations are ulama collectives, and we may say that ulama organizations unite patrons. Ulama organizations are the collectives of power-holders, we could say. By summarizing the most dominant ulama organizations below, we will see that the official Madurese ulama have ample opportunities to organize.

Sarekat Islam, (SI), founded in 1912, was the first modern mass organization of the Madurese ulama. SI's main target was the Dutch monopoly of the salt-industry on Madura. SI is characterized as a reformist organization. Despite some protest to the reformist-line, the contemporary profile of SI and its followers did not differ much from the conservative organization of NU (see below). SI's most powerful base was in the town of Pamekasan. Most Madurese ulama joined SI during its campaign in the 1910s. Later the majority turned to NU (Mansurnoor 1990).

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was founded in 1926 by Hasam Ashalih, grandfather of former president Abdurrahman Wahid, together with traditionalist Muslim scholars. Today NU has some 40 million members in Indonesia, or about 19% of the total population. Quite obviously, to implement public policy the national government has to cooperate with NU. NU managed to attract a large following on Madura in the 1930s; especially in Pamekasan (Mansurnoor 1990: 45). The ulama's way of life, more than their ideology, has always defined NU's guidelines. Researching Islamic organizations, Schiller (1996: 270) states that "NU provides an example of independent community achievement and leadership". Others compare NU to a big pesantren.[158] This is an interesting comparison, especially in regard to the central position of the pesantren, as analyzed in chapter four. NU was an important player in Sukarno's government,[159] and the Ministry of Religion was a resource base for ulama-power from the early 1950s until 1971 (Hefner 2000b: 86, 93). In the 1971 general

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[158] Among others, Mansurnoor (1990: 123) and Ari, a santri at pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin, stated that Abdurrahman Wahid says the same (2000 [interview]).

[159] Feillard (1997: 130) analyzes NU's relations with the state. He claims that the Sunni (Islamic) tradition of NU has helped to legitimize both the Sukarno and the Suharto régimes.

election on Madura, NU got 67% support, and Golkar only got 26%. This outcome is interesting, as it implies that the Suharto-controlled Golkar-party on Madura was relatively weak. Since the fusion of NU and PPP[160] in 1973, PPP has been the strongest rival to Golkar on Madura (Schiller 1996: 204-5). As ulama have dominated NU, the fusion with PPP meant that the ulama also began to dominate the NU-PPP coalition.

T*he National Awakening Party* (PKB) of Abdurrahman Wahid is currently the dominant political party on Madura, and as PKB includes higher ulama, it is secured the support of the pesantrens.[161] PKB recently (September 2000) received a lot of attention during "the Sampang incident": The elected regent Fadhilah Budiono (representing PPP, and supported by TNI[162]) was harshly criticized by PKB. PKB supporters obstructed attempts to inaugurate the elected regent and tensions simmered. Angry mobs set the Sampang Council Office on fire as they claimed that the elected regent Fadhilah was involved in the swindle of rice-aid to Kalimantan-refugees. The head of PKB's East Java division, Choirul Anam, later hailed the return of peace in the town (The Jakarta Post 5, 7, 8, 13, 23 September 2000). After the minister of Home Affairs became involved, a stand-in for the elected regent was appointed.

Since the Madurese ulama identify themselves with NU, other religious movements such as *Muhammadiyah* (the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia) and *The National Mandate Party* (PAN) only play small roles (Touwen-Bouwsma 1992:100).[163] Moreover, reports of the Madurese ulama's current involvement with *the military* (TNI) are inconclusive. There is a lack of research on this theme, and even when explicitly asked, few of my own respondents had any information about ulama-military relations.[164] I was told, though, that a faster way for

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[160] United Development Party.

[161] Conversation at LKiS (13 September 2000).

[162] The military's party.

[163] Muhammadiyah's explicit goal is to purify religious practices and the belief system of the holy Qur'an and other Islamic texts. Most of the followers of Myhammadiyah have higher education and live in urban areas. They are not numerous in the villages (Mansurnoor 1990: 120). In the 1970's a similar organization Gerakan Salman rejected the conservative and elitist elements that were prevalent among the ulama. They emphasized Muslim morality and devotion, and spread their ideas on public campuses (Hefner 2000b: 123).

[164] NU has been involved with the armed forces however. Banser is the paramilitary group attached to NU. It is equivalent to PNI's Banra (Mansurnoor 1990: 158). In general, literature on Madura does not focus to any significant extent on the role

the military leaders to gain popular support and legitimacy was through the support of ulama. The people more readily respect the command of the military leaders if they are attached to the ulama.[165] The replacement of the Dutch by the Japanese from 1940 to 1945 gave the Madurese opportunities for military training and social mobility.[166] As the Dutch began to re-occupy Madura on 4 August (completed on 13 November) in 1947, the ulama of Madura requested for a 'jihad' (holy war) against the Dutch. The jihad lasted for four months. During this resistance, the kyais and pesantrens provided important support to the Madurese military forces.[167] This incidence is but one example of ulama- military alliance.

Regarding the different ulama organizations sketched out above, it must be underscored that the Madurese ulama are religiously quite homogenous:

> The different Islamic organizations and parties on Madura are like brother and sister-organizations. In one mosque, especially at the Friday-prayer, there may be many flags seen, belonging to different organizations. Anyway, everyone prays together.[168]

5.2.4 Furthering patron-client relations through involvement in ulama organizations?

The Madurese ulama have the opportunity to join in several different organizations. An overview of the different Islamic ulama organizations, as mentioned above, help us realize that there are several organizations through which the Madurese ulama may unite in pursuit of a public career and power. One question to be answered is whether the official ulama utilize these organizations to further patron-client relations? We recall Nagtegaal (1995) who questioned whether turning to official and political matters is a factor crucial to ulama-power.

During Suharto's heyday in the 1980s, higher state-officials actively tried to recruit ulama into government positions, and the government sponsored many of the Islamic

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of different military groupings. See Touwen-Bouwsma (1995: 73-4) for a short discussion on different military groupings. See also Slamet-Velsink (1994: 45).

[165] Interview at UGM, Isipol (13.9.01); Gaffar (2000 [interview]) who is a research-assistant at UGM, Isipol; Interview with Widodo who is a scholar at the Research Institute of Jember University, Office for Madura Studies (2000 [interview]).

[166] Historically, the Madurese have had no respect for the national military. I was told that the Madurese 'cakra' (soldier) has been in opposition to all external régimes (Radi 2000 [interview]).

[167] Encouraged and controlled by the Dutch, a plebiscite was held on 23 January 1948, confirming the issue of *Madura as an independent state*. Touwen-Bouwsma (1995:72) claims the whole Madurese quest for independence "[…] was based on Dutch fiction rather than on the free will of the Madurese people". She terms Madura a '*Negara sandiwara*' (a puppet state). Anyway, as the Dutch returned full sovereignty to the Indonesian government in the following year, the plebiscite became irrelevant (Mansurnoor 1990: 46-8). Madura surrendered its independence on 9 March 1950.

[168] Widodo (2000 [interview]).

associations. Golkar (the government's party) was famous for its 'money politics' which implied among other things, the sponsoring and construction of mosques.[169] But in many instances such 'trade' (or 'corruption') has proved inefficient. By openly supporting the bureaucrats' party Golkar, popularity could decrease for ulama.[170] Moreover, I was told that the 'syehs' (tarekat-heads) lost followers, as a result of their alliances with the state apparatus.[171] We realize that involvement in official matters and politics, may not profit the resource-base of an ulama. Ulama may loose supporters and subordinates, by entering into public matters and politics.[172] Such a conclusion conflicts with Scott (1972a) who sees indirect control of public office as a resource for a patron.

Are the hazards of turning to official and political matters greater than the gains? And if so, do the hazards frighten the ulama and keep them from entering the official and political arena? Does this then, result in a decreasing number of ulama going official? Current development does not support such a theory. After the fall of Suharto's dictatorship in 1998, and during the on-going democratization of Indonesia, Madura has witnessed a growing trend among the ulama to run for political office.[173] To an increasing degree Madura sees Islamic leaders embrace official and political matters. I found an example of this in the pesantren Nurul Islam, where Mr. Ramdann who is a kyai and a syeh, is also the politically elected regency head of Sumenep. It seems common to combine a religious and political leadership. One of my informants explained the growing number of official kyais by pointing out that there is a new and more educated generation growing up. These up-coming ulama do not see the hazards of turning to official and political matters.[174] Since the democratic election in 1999, the general trend has been for ulama to increase their political power. I was told that in the future, the ulama of Madura will become a very powerful political group and

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[169] 'The king of beggars' (2000 [interview]), who is affiliated to the Yogyakarta-seated NGO Jaringan Kerja Tungku Indonesia (13 September 2000).

[170] Research from Java also confirms this. See for instance Hefner (1987: 546).

[171] Roy (2000 [interview]). Wajidi who is the head of LKiS supported this view (2000 [interview]). van Bruinessen also confirms this (1995). Antlöv & Cederroth (1994: 9) talk of the formalized pressure on the ulama, as they were incorporated Majelis Ulama, subordinated to the Offices of Religious Affairs. Individual mosques were also subordinated to the state apparatus through a mosque congregation board controlled by the state.

[172] For a general discussion on this phenomenon, see (Schiller 1996: 224-5), and Maurer who talks of 'dual functions', and Cederroth (1994: 160) who talks of similar dilemmas of dual loyalty to the local administrators. He states that the two different roles are internally exclusive (1994: 102).

[173] Tjahjono and Abdur Rozaki (2000 [interview]).

base. In short, the ulama seem eager to enter the political sphere. But the Madurese ulama also seem to be strengthening their power in another field: The Asian financial crisis that accelerated in 1997 has increased the number of the informal 'nyabis' (ulama's consulting-service). From the discussion in paragraph 4.4.4, we remember that the phenomenon of nyabis is crucial to the ulama's external phase of widening their influence. To an increasing degree the higher ulama receive both common villagers and state officials as visitors, as these followers believe that ulama know everything and have all the answers, also about official and political matters.[175] Hence, in addition to utilizing intertwined social relations to further patron-client relations, we see a tendency for the Madurese ulama to utilize organizational involvement to further their societal power.

   As democratization of Indonesia moves on, and more and more ulama get involved in official and political matters, what will happen to their over-all influence on Madurese society? The economic turmoil in and after 1997, the fall of Suharto in 1998, and the on-going democratization of Indonesia appear to reinforce and widen the resource base of the Madurese ulama. Hence, a question to be asked is whether the ulama utilize the growing resource base to further their patronage. We have seen that if the ulama enter the sphere of official and political matters too passionately, their original followers may slip away.

   Now, let us turn to the followers, the clients. What impact have recent political developments in Indonesia had on the client's resource base, and the client's power vis-à-vis the ulama? To my knowledge, no analysis of democratization's impact on Madurese clients has appeared thus far. Mansurnoor's (1990) earlier empirical research on Madura may shed some light on the impact of the on-going democratization, however. He focuses on the Madurese people's active and passive stand in politics, in general. *Firstly*, he states, that in as much as virtually everyone on Madura is closely attached to the ulama, the ulama's opinion will usually be respected by their followers. The ulama utilize their intertwined relations, thereby consciously benefiting from the power that the extensive pesantren-pyramids provide. One

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[174] Radi (2000 [interview]).

[175] Kyai Hadhori (2000 [interview]), of Pamekasan; Widodo (2000 [interview]); Soegianto (2000 [interview]).

criticism should be noted, however. In chapter four we saw that students and followers of the ulama may change their allegiances, as they are free to travel from pesantren to pesantren in search of religious knowledge. In Scott's (1972a) terms, such mobility leads to multiple adherence; followers will often have several ulama whom they should respect. Hence, the patron-client relations of ulama and followers are not cemented, but flexible. Possible monopoly and total dominance over patron-client structures by a single ulama-patron seem unlikely. Thus, it is difficult for the ulama to secure or fix political support. Supporting the view of a pluralistic political culture, Robert Hefner (2000b: 7) stresses that the politics of the Indonesian Muslims are plural. One of my own prominent interviewees also confirmed such a plurality.[176]

Secondly, Mansurnoor's (1990) research on the impact of politics underscores the followers' general ignorance of politics on Madura. In general, the Madurese are indifferent to politics. To them, the political parties and organizations appear as symbols that merely confirm traditional bonds. Elections are considered rites of democracy, and are termed 'pesta demokrasi'. Hence, contradicting the first point, to some extent, the voter's role is somewhat fixed, and followers merely do their duty by voting for their ulama (Mansurnoor 1990: 100, 119). We see the resemblance to what Jackson (1974) terms 'traditional authority relations'. When asked about the extent of 'sowara se dioceng' (fixed votes) the replies I got were inconclusive. Due to lack of education the villagers elect whichever candidate(s) the higher ulama want them to. Lacking education, people, or clients, also lack active reflection, I was told.[177] This is a stereotype characteristic, however. Given that the Madurese know little of politics, one must wonder whether democratization will influence the clients' resource base? Will democratization strengthen the resource base of clients if they are ignorant of political options? We realize that the ulama seem to seize the new options of power introduced by democratization. Their followers have traditionally had little or no interest in politics, and probably have some serious barriers to overcome before they will be able to understand and make use of their democratic options. Compared to their ulama, the clients will probably be less confident, and unaware of the new

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[176] Lay who is a university-scholar, at UGM, Isipol (2000 [interview]).
[177] Key informant Holis who is the son of a kyai (2000 [conversation]); Supported by Widodo (2000 [interview]).

options of power that democratization brings about. In the last paragraph (6.2.2) of my dissertation, I will return to some general reflections on ulama's patronage in relation to democracy.[178]

5.3 Ulama and their economic involvement

So far, in my analysis of the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations, I have focused on intertwined social relations, and official and political matters. The third and last general question that structures my analysis of the Madurese ulama as patrons, is: To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize economic involvement to further patron-client relations?

Madurese traders were probably introduced to Islam on their trips through the Strait of Malacca, along the eastern coast of Sumatra. Such trade-encounters existed long before more systematic Islamization, which occurred from the second half of the 16th century on. We recall Touwen-Bouwsma (1992:103, 105) stressing that the Islamization of West Madura was not carried out by traders, but by wandering preachers who were under the protection of the local nobility (ratos of the Mataram régime).

Success in business and trade is much admired by the Madurese people. But a kyai's close connection to religion does not allow him to be a full time businessman. In the Madurese ulama's ideology, affluence is admired. But ulama try to avoid social and religious criticism by keeping a low profile (Mansurnoor 1990: 333).[179] The position of an individual ulama as a leader and patron requires large sums of money, and the money is derived from his followers in several ways. Ulamaship is made possible by ulama-follower dyads based on economic relations. Ulama may receive money and land as donations from faithful followers, and a large part of the kyais' funds comes from the somewhat primordial phenomenon 'salam tempel', or 'zakat',

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[178] Mansurnoor (1990:100, 119)) focuses on the Madurese ummat's active or passive stand in politics, but says little of the impact of increased ulama-activity in politics.

[179] See Jones (1991: 22) who underscores similar values, incorporated into the pesantren-ethics on East-Java. For a contrast, see Raillon (1994:182) who focuses on how the New Order-regulations of Suharto fostered relations between Muslims and big business.

money given to the ulama for counseling and social calls (see the 'external phase of their legitimization in paragraph 4.4.4). Villagers may believe that they will have better luck as a result of such donations, since the ulama are thought to be closer to god (Mansurnoor 1990: 222-3; 1995: 34). Such practices make us realize the strong bonds that connect the ulama and the villagers. Moreover, the ulama not only receive –they give. They lend money to villagers for such rituals as weddings and funerals. This may be seen as an attempt to reciprocate the devotion of their followers.[180]

To finance pesantrens, madrasahs, mosques and langgars, personal gifts from followers are often insufficient. The ulama need income from employees and workers who run businesses, and who manage the agriculture and tobacco-trade. Higher ulama have easy access to cheap santri-labor (Mansurnoor 1990: 255-6), and on East Java, santris hire themselves out as agricultural laborers.[181] During my field research I saw few indications that ulama-santri relations were exploitative, however.[182] It seemed rather as if the santris represented a labor service that the ulama valued highly. Moreover, we remember that the santris, and the Madurese people in general, travel a lot. To the extent in which laborers are free to travel, they may avoid ulama exploitation, thereby strengthening their resource base as clients. The mobility of the laborers limits the power of the ulama.[183]

We recall that patron-client relations that evolve in the pesantrens allow optional entrance and exit. Thus the power-base of the clients is strengthened since they thereby attain multiple religious adherence. Slamet-Velsink (1994: 49) who bases much of her information on the earlier work of Mansurnoor, implies, though, that there is a "silent pact" among the kyais not to recruit santris from another pesantren. Such a pact among the ulama may be viewed as a zero-sum game, in which 'theft' of santris will be retaliated by the suffering pesantren. The pact may restrict the mobility of the santris, as their ulama have agreed on which santri belongs to which ulama. To

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[180] Based on East Javanese findings, Jones (1991) briefly touches this theme, relating it directly to one of the pesantren's functions.
[181] For details, see Jones (1991).
[182] See Antlöv & Cederroth (1994: 17).
[183] In the U.S. there are instances of migrant workers who have a sorry time of it and are very poorly paid. If the ulama do not as yet exploit the workers it may be because they haven't realized that they can. Let us hope the they don not find out (commented by my very good and most helpful friend, the author Mary Lee Nielson).

the extent that the mobility of a santri is regulated by such a silent pact, the santri's resource base as a client will be limited. We may ask in what ways a silent pact of non-competition influences the labor-market. –Could a religious pact also affect the labor market?

My good friend Yono (2000 [key informant]) from Pamekasan, said –as did most of my informants- that the ulama and kyais do not have to be involved in commerce since they are funded by gifts from their supporters.[184] Contradicting such a view, many kyais in Pamekasan are active entrepreneurs. They possess farm land and taxis, they are involved in the tobacco- trade, and they serve as employers (Mansurnoor 1990: 222). An informant of mine from Madura added:

> As farmers and owners of a 'tanean' or 'perdikan' (land), at least some of the ulama may be described as landlords. They grow tobacco, and rice in the rainy season. But their main influence is in religious questions, of course".[185]

de Jonge (1986:39) describes the *tobacco trade* extensively. This is the largest Madurese industry as tobacco production is well suited to Madura's dry soil.[186] The tobacco-trade is structured hierarchically, and reveals asymmetrical and many-stranded relationships that resemble a patron-client cluster. As a result of their wealth, the most successful 'juragans' (traders) may undertake a pilgrimage to Mecca. In this way, their relation to Islam is made clear; they become 'hajis'. The juragans, as the most important players in trade, attain great socio-economic status. As a result of their affluence and their position as haji, juragans easily attract a following. As proof of their wealth they fund places of worship and prayer, such as mosques. We realize that there is an overlap between business and religion, between juragans and ulama.[187] de Jonge underlines the self-interest of businessmen: "In fact, the élite

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[184] Supported by Gaffar (2000 [interview]); Interview with a local NU-leader, kyai Hamid Mannam Munif (2000 [interview]). In the Islamic way of doing business, there should be no conflicts. The ulama make investments, but do *no direct business*. (Interviews at UGM (19 September 2000); Moreover, being conservative in general, the ulama of Madura still question the modern banking system. There is a discussion of 'sharia' (laws regulating 'no bad competition'), and 'achlack' (moral). Based on this, there is a discussion of whether interest rates are 'riba' (exploitation). Kyais with a modern education try to find a middle way and refuse the idea of exploitation. I was told that the prophet Muhammed himself was a businessman (Mahmad (2000 [conversation]).

[185] Conversation with 'Aziz 1', who is a santri at pesantren Al- Usymuni, Sumenep (2000 [conversation]).

[186] Several of my informants underscored that growing tobacco is an effective way to get rich on Madura.

[187] I was fortunate to correspond with Mr. de Jonge by e-mail. He confirmed this structure (6 March 2002). At the University of Jember an extensive collection of statistics is available for further research. Look for "Jember Dalam Angka 1986 and 1998". In these statistics, the number of mosques may serve as an indicator of the strength of Islamic institutions. As well as tobacco, some kyais are also involved in the production of salt. The leader of the national salt-consortium is a kyai, I was told; The kyais seldom show up at the factories, though. They are more like middlemen, as their main interest is teaching. (Interview with a salt-production co-worker: 28 September 2000); Kyai Munif (2000 [interview]).

increases its hold on the local population through [such] social investments" (1986: 37-8). The juragans seem to have knowledge and skills, as well as personal real property. Hence, they have a strong resource base which allows them to become patrons.

Do the hajis and ulama involved in trade have any control over the property or the authority of others, as for example, public office-based property? Not a lot has been said on this topic. The power of the traders, however, is in many instances greater than that of the government. Moreover, Indonesia's different historical régimes have shown Madura little interest, and Madurese traders have become important informal leaders. The ulama that are involved in trade have traditionally remained financially independent of the state-apparatus (Mansurnoor 1992:71). Madurese traders have derived their income primarily from land, gifts and donations, and not from political office. de Jonge (1986: 26) elucidates this point, though, claiming that commercialization on Madura was a direct consequence of government initiated plans.[188] It seems then, that ulama involved in trade do have some control of public office-based property. In Scott's view (1972a), such control is crucial to the resource base of the patron.

There are actually several examples of politically initiated development programs[189] that eventually submit to the control of ulama. The Madurese ulama seem skeptical to any governmental interference, and are eager to be in charge of the implementation of public policy. The plan to build a bridge between Java and Madura was initiated by the state because it was considered necessary to the development of the Surabaya Metropolitan Area. As a result, Bangkalan on Madura has attracted huge investments (Kuntowijoyo 1995: 195). But the decade long bridge-plan has failed. The official reason for this is that state-funds never came through (Time, 21-28 August 2000). The unofficial reason, several of my informants stated, is that the ulama claimed that the people are not ready. Thus, we realize that the stronghold of

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[188] de Jonge continues by stating: In an atmosphere of indifference, "[…] local entrepreneurs and traders indepedently of government-interference set up economic contacts with the outside world" (1986: 26).
[189] As a result of the introduction of development programs ulama may fear for their position and thus feel forced to return to the strictly religious sphere (see Antlöv & Cederroth 1994:17).

conservative ulama may have overrun political initiative. [190] Another interesting example of ulama influence is 'the Nipah Dam Incident': On 15 September 1993, the military commander in Sampang called a meeting where it was decided to remove people suspected of initiating demonstrations against the dam project. The usual lines of command were altered, and the military was employed instead of the police. Ten days later, protesting farmers in Sampang were shot at. The protesters were trying to protect their land from expropriation for the government-initiated dam project. Some 500 farmers shouting "Nyo'on odik!" (Give us life!) were led by 'ustadz', (senior Islamic students), and mobilized by ulama. The kyais involved decided what their followers' 'rightful cause' was. Kyais in the towns of Pamekasan and Sumenep who were activated later, questioned the actions of Sampang's local-government and the use of military force. An investigation of the shootings resulted in the replacement of military personnel. The reprimand of military officers was quite unusual, as we recall that Suharto's militant NO-regime at that time had firm political control.[191]

The influence of the ulama seems clear. Both the bridge-and the dam incidents demonstrate confrontations between the ulama and the government (Sudarjat & Bukhori 1999). The local ulama resisted political efforts, and there is still no dam in Sampang.[192]

The ulama's control of development programs is evident. They legitimize their control of development programs by claiming to protect the people. We know, though, that, as development programs aim at economic and social development, a lot of money is involved. By controlling the implementation of development programs, the ulama also control great amounts of money. Mansurnoor (1992) impressively discusses the importance of kyai-support in village development and in government planned rural development programs. As witnessed in both the bridge- and the Nipah dam incident, kyais may jeopardize development programs if their support is withheld The ulama's control of development programs strengthens their indirect

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[190] Such a view was confirmed during a conversation with kyai Munif and Radi (2000 [conversation]).
[191] The floating mass policy, and the illegalizing of political parties at the sub-district and village-level, was meant to pacify the people. Golkar's position after the 1992 election was approximately of 70,5% at the national level (Sudarjat and Bukhori 1999:6).
[192] Stressed by my informants Tjahjono and Rozaki (2000 [interview]).

control of public office and property. Such control is crucial to a patron's resource base.

Ulama's skepticism to government-imposed development programs is still obvious on Madura. On the other hand, such programs are badly needed to accelerate economic development on the Island. Hence, it was with utmost interest that I joined members of the NGO "Jaringan Kerja Tungku Indonesia" on one of it's fieldtrips to pesantrens on Madura. The goal of this NGO is to introduce the rural pesantren to 'simple technology' that could improve health and hygiene. The NGO works symbiotically with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and pesantrens, to implement a 'clean water project'.[193] In the aftermath, I realize that both public politicians and NGO-workers probably have no option but to cooperate with ulama to implement development programs.

Possibly contesting ulama's economic power is the Madurese-*Chinese*. The Chinese compose some 15% of the population in Sumenep, and are in charge of approximately 80% of the commerce. They are the wealthiest inhabitants and speak the best English. Their numerous satellite-dishes are proof of their affluence. In addition to the obvious ethnical disparity, an economic division is also apparent between them and the Madurese. The Chinese seem to have limited relations to ulama's patron-client network. And possibly the other way around. To what extent do the ulama interact with the Chinese? During a visit to a private school in Sumenep, I noticed that the Chinese children seemed to stick together separated from the Madurese. According to one of my informants, Ipunk, only the naughty 'pribumi' (native) children play with the Chinese children.[194] Their way of life and the fact that they attend church, not the mosque, are other factors that strengthen the impression that the Chinese live separately from the Madurese ulama. I must make clear, however, that my observations of the Madurese-Chinese are only preliminary impressions.

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[193] Interview at the NGO's base in Yogyakarta (13 September 2000); 'The king of beggars' (2000 [interview]), later the same day.
[194] Ipunk is a private teacher, and was my guide and translator in Sumenep (2000 [conversation]).

5.4 Concluding remarks

In this second part of my analysis I have looked for ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. I have discussed the extent to which the Madurese ulama utilize organizational and economic involvement to further patron-client relations. We have seen that the ulama have ample opportunity to organize. There are several ulama organizations which the ulama may join. Moreover, the Madurese ulama are extensively involved in business. To a large degree both the ulama membership in organizations and their involvement in business are utilized to further their patron-client relations.

A distinction between unofficial and official ulama may be made. The former concentrate on religious work. The latter are involved in *official and political matters*. It is the ulama who join ulama organizations that have been the focus in this chapter. From chapter four, we recall that I analyzed patron-client dyads, patron-client clusters and patron-client pyramids. In this chapter I have analyzed patron-client networks. It is interesting to note that the ulama organizations resemble patron-client networks. When looking at ulama organizations, we should be aware of the horizontal bonds that bind the different ulama together. When an individual ulama enters an ulama organization, he enters a relationship of equals. He is no longer the sole authority and superior in the relationship. An individual ulama that joins an ulama organization may loose his initial, tight and primordial connections to his local community. It is the superior-inferior relations in the local community that are the core resource base of patron-client relations. In other words, when an individual ulama looks beyond patron-client dyads, clusters and pyramids, and turns to ulama networks, he may run the danger of ignoring the foundation of his power-position, the local community. Moreover, ulama-state relations may weaken the power of the ulama specifically. History has shown that by openly supporting the bureaucrats' party Golkar, the ulama's popularity could decline. Hence, we realize that being an official ulama, involved in official matters and politics, may not be profitable to his resource-base as a patron. Ulama may loose supporters and subordinates, by entering public affairs and politics. On the other hand, we should recall that ulama organizations may be regarded as a collective of power-holders. Ulama organizations unite patrons. But are

losses from turning to official and political matters greater than the possible gains? At present, there is a growing trend among the ulama on Madura to run for political office.

What impact have recent political developments in Indonesia had on the client's resource base, and the client's power vis-a-vis the ulama? We realize that the ulama seem to seize the new options of power brought by democratization. On the other hand, their followers have traditionally had little interest in politics. Probably the followers will have serious barriers to overcome before they are able to grasp the new options which democracy brings. Compared to their ulama, the clients will probably be less confident or conscious of the new options that democratization offer.

To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize *economic involvement* to further patron-client relations? A large amount of the kyais' funds is made up of the money received by the ulama as gifts. These gifts demonstrate the strong bonds between the ulama and the villagers. Moreover, not only do ulama receive –they give. They lend money to villagers for different rituals. This may be seen as an attempt at reciprocating the devotion of their followers. Besides receiving gifts, higher ulama have easy access to cheap santri-labor. Yet, to the extent in which laborers are free to travel, they may avoid ulama exploitation, thereby strengthening their resource base as clients. The mobility of the laborers limits the power of the ulama.

Examples from the tobacco industry on Madura reveal an overlap between business and religion, between traders and ulama. And the power of the traders is in many instances greater than that of the government's. Traders have also become important informal leaders. It also seems that ulama involved in trade have some control of public office-based property. Actually, the ulama seem eager to be in charge of implementing public policy. The ulama's control of development programs is quite evident. They legitimize their control of the programs by claiming to protect the people. We know, though, that as development programs aim toward economic and social development, a lot of money is involved. In general we realize that the ulama's economic involvement may further patron-client relations.

Chapter 6

6.1 The Madurese ulama as patrons. Conclusions

We have seen that the group of Islamic religious leaders, the ulama, have a strong hold on the Madurese. Collectively seen, the ulama are in possession of great power. In this dissertation I have asked whether we are aware of the extent of their power. I have revealed the nature of the ulama as power-holders. The Madurese ulama may be described as patrons. Theories of patron-client relations have helped me to describe the nature of the ulama's power. I have analyzed the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations.

The three general questions guiding my analysis are based on the theories of Scott (1972a) and Jackson (1974). Their contributions have been particularly suitable in approaching the Madurese ulama. Based on previous empirical research on Madura and strengthened by my own field research, it seems that the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations are by utilizing:
1. Intertwined social relations; 2. Organizational involvement; 3. Economic involvement. Below, I return to these three points in separate paragraphs.

6.1.1 Patronage through intertwined relations

The first of the three general questions I ask is: to what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize intertwined social relations to further patron-client relations? In order to answer this question, I have analyzed the dominant social structures that make patron-client relations possible. A personal relationship between two people, or the relationship between a patron and a client has been my point of departure. Thereafter, I have investigated the personal relation, or dyad, within larger social relations. I looked at patron-client relations within: patron-client clusters, patron-client pyramids and patron-client networks.

The fundament of ulama's intertwined social relations is the patron-client dyad of a 'kyai' (top ulama, Islamic high-level teacher) and a 'santri' (student of Islam). The center of this kyai-santri relation is the 'pesantren' (Islamic boarding school, educational center). We have seen that, in general, the Madurese people are free to choose which pesantren they want to attend. Hence, the ulama do not determine people's choices. Moreover, within the pesantren, it is possible for the santris to rise a critical voice against their kyai. Hence, the power of santris are strengthened by their free 'choice' and 'voice'. The characteristics of the intertwined social relations found within a pesantren resemble a patron-client pyramid to a large extent, though. Such a patron-client pyramid may be utilized by the kyai to strengthen his power and domination over the santris.

A 'madrasah' (Islamic school) may be directly subject to a pesantren. There may also be an overlap in personnel between the pesantren and the madrasah. To the extent in which a madrasah is directly attached to a pesantren, the kyai has ample opportunity to extend his patron-client pyramid. Just as the madrasah, the 'langgars' (Islamic neighborhood schools) may be attached and subject to a pesantren. Mosques may probably be subject to a pesantren in the same way. We realize that a kyai who heads a pesantren may extend his intertwined social relations to include large segments of society. Besides controlling a pesantren, a kyai may also indirectly control the Islamic institutions of madrasah, mosque and langgar. Moreover, beyond the Islamic institutions of pesantren, madrasah, mosque and langgar, kyais also attempt to subject the larger Madurese community to their intertwined social relations. Thus, we realize that the patron-client relations subject to op ulama are expanded to a patron-client pyramid that covers society at large. We realize the contours of the ulama's extensive societal power. Furthermore, we have seen that the ulama are also in charge of the 'tarekats' (Muslim mystical brotherhoods). A fusion of Sufism and syncretism produces its own intertwined social relations. The tarekats extend the intertwined social patron-client relations subject to the ulama even further.

6.1.2 Patronage through ulama organizations

The second of the three general questions that guide my analysis is: To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize organizational involvement to further patron-client relations? I have looked at ulama's involvement in organizations, and I included some personal reflections on ulama's involvement in official and political matters.

We have seen that the ulama have ample opportunity to organize. There are several ulama organizations which the ulama may join. A distinction between unofficial and official ulama has been made. The former group concentrates its work on religious matters. The latter group is involved in official and political matters. It is this latter group that has been my focus when analyzing 'patronage through ulama organizations' (in chapter five). It is interesting to note that ulama organizations resemble patron-client *networks*. Hence, we look beyond the patron-client dyads, clusters and pyramids that were the main focus of 'patronage through intertwined relations' (in chapter four).

When looking at ulama organizations, we must be aware of the horizontal bonds that bind the ulama together. An individual ulama that joins an ulama organization may loose his initial, tight and primordial connections to his local community. It is his superior position in his local community that is the core of his societal power. In other words, when an individual ulama turns to ulama organizations, he may run the danger of cutting his ties to the fundament of his power-position, the local community. Hence, we realize that being an official ulama, involved in official matters and politics may not be profitable to his resource-base as a patron. Ulama may loose supporters and subordinates by entering official and political affairs. On the other hand, we have to recall that an ulama organization may be regarded as a collective of power-holders. Ulama organizations unite patrons, and the social and political power of these organizations should in no way be underestimated.

At present, Madura sees a growing trend among the ulama to run for political office. What impact has the late political developments of Indonesia had on the people's resource base, and the clients' power vis-a-vis the patrons'? We realize that the ulama seem to seize the new means of power brought on by democratization. On the *other* hand, the people have traditionally had little interest in politics. Probably

the people will have some serious barriers to overcome before they too are able to seize the new options offered by democratization. Compared to their ulama, the clients will probably be less confident and less conscious of the new options that democratization offers. See paragraph 6.2.2 below for more reflections on ulama's patronage and democracy.

6.1.3 Patronage through economic involvement

The third and last of the general questions that guide my dissertation is: To what extent do the Madurese ulama utilize economic involvement to further patron-client relations? A large part of the kyais' wealth comes from gifts. This is in many ways a primordial phenomenon. In such practices, we realize the strength of the bonds connecting the ulama and the villagers. Yet, the ulama both receive and provide services. They lend money to villagers for different rituals. Another source of economic involvement is the higher ulama's access to cheap santri labor. But, to the extent that the laborers are free to travel, they may avoid ulama-exploitation. Their mobility strengthens their resource base as clients or laborers. The mobility of the laborers limits the power of the ulama.

Just as the ulama may be seen as a social structure that contests the political sphere, the power of the traders may also be greater than the government's. Moreover, examples from the tobacco industry on Madura reveal an overlap between business and religion, between traders and ulama. Ulama involved in business also have some control of public office-based property. Actually, the ulama seem eager to be in charge of the implementing public policy. Several examples of ulama controlled development programs prove this. The fact that ulama control public programs and money surely strengthens their power.

6.2 Synopsis, and reflections on democracy

6.2.1 The actual power of the Madurese ulama

We realize that the Madurese ulama are in possession of great power. My dissertation has shown specifically that through informal intertwined social relations and through organizational and economic involvement, the ulama can be described as patrons. Regarding ulama-power in the realm of intertwined social relations, pesantrens are fruitful grounds for patron-client pyramids to grow. The patron-client relations evolving in this sphere may to a certain extent contest the power of the state-sphere. Regarding ulama-power in the realm of organizational involvement, we have seen that ulama organizations resemble patron-client networks. And at present, Madura sees a growing trend among the ulama to enter ulama organizations as the first step toward running for political office. We have to recall that ulama organizations unite power holders or patrons. Regarding ulama-power in the realm of economic involvement, we should be aware of a possible overlap between business and religion, between traders and ulama. And the power of the trading ulama may also be greater than that of the government.

Ulama's intertwined social relations; involvement in official and political affairs; and involvement in business are the most dominant ways in which the Madurese ulama further patron-client relations. Patron-client relations or patronage on the *one* hand concerns reciprocal exchange of goods and services between two parties. On the *other* hand, patronage also concerns unequal social status. There is an asymmetry in societal power. In patron-client relations the two parties involved do not have equal societal power. The patron is the superior and the client is the inferior. Patronage is about real societal differences. And the patterns of patronage seem to encompass most of Islamic Madura.

6.2.2 Reflections on democracy

With respect to the superiority of the Madurese ulama, I would like to quote Azra (2000: 1): "Because of their majority, the position of the ulama is very important. If they practice good conduct, then many of Indonesia's problems can be solved."[195] It would be no exaggeration to state that four years after the ousting of dictator Suharto, Indonesia still has a lot of problems, and has not yet consolidated its *democracy*.[196] Could the power of the ulama be a problem for Indonesia's ongoing democratization? Are patterns of ulama-patronage compatible with democracy?

My analysis of the Madurese ulama, has shown that by utilizing intertwined social relations, organizational involvement and economic involvement, the ulama further patron-client relations. Specifically *asymmetry in power* is a feature of patron-client relations that could be incompatible with democracy. Reflections on Madura and democracy should take into consideration the power relations revealed in my foregoing analysis of the Madurese ulama as patrons.

The *intertwined social relations* discussed in chapter four include patron-client dyads, clusters and pyramids. These social constructs are informal in character.[197] Does the character of the informal patron-client relations from Madura pose any possible threat to democratization? In general, the Madurese are free to travel, they are free to choose what Islamic institution to belong to, and even the internal policy of different Islamic institutions may be quite liberal. The Madurese seem to have free choices and voices.

There are informal patron-client relations that resemble traditional authority relations, though. When patronage takes this form, the influencee behaves as the influencer tells him to, without any thought or consideration. The influencer does not have to persuade the influencee. Social relations characterized by traditional authority may preserve asymmetry in societal power, and deprive individuals of choice and voice. A free choice and voice are important to democracy. Within pesantrens,

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[195] Azra is a reporter for The Jakarta Post. The Quotation is somewhat rephrased.

[196] My intention is not to delve into the huge normative debate on democratization. My reflections in this paragraph are personal, without any references. The arguments are influenced by the ideologies of liberal welfare states, and by theoreticians as John Rawls. One clear indicator of Indonesia's uncompleted democratization (probably *no* country has ever completed democratization, though), is the ongoing debate on Islam's position in the 1945 constitution (see for instance Siboro 2002).

[197] By informal I refer to personal and private, as noted by several patronage theorists.

langgars and tarekats, we may find traces of traditional authority relations. Moreover, within the Madurese community in general, the ulama to a certain extent also control information, modern technology and secular education. Such control may secure ulama's power vis-à-vis the community's, and limit people's free choice and voice.

From the analysis in chapter five, we recall that ulama have ample opportunity to organize in the sphere of *official and political matters*. Ulama organizations resemble patron-client networks that go beyond informal organizing. Ulama may loose supporters and subordinates by entering into public affairs and politics, though. Yet, after the fall of Suharto's dictatorship in 1998 and during the ongoing democratization of Indonesia, Madura has witnessed a trend among the ulama to run for political office. It seems more common to combine religious and political leadership. The Asian economic turmoil after 1997, the fall of Suharto in 1998, and the on-going democratization of Indonesia seem to have reinforced and widened the resource base of the Madurese ulama.

What impact have the late political developments of Indonesia had on the client's resource base, and the client's power vis-à-vis the ulama? Possible monopoly and total dominance over patron-client structures by a single ulama-patron seems unlikely, as the people are free to travel. Mobility leads to multiple adherences, and people become attached to several ulama to whom they show respect. In this regard, also Madura is a plural society. On the *other* hand, political parties and organizations may appear as simple symbols that primarily confirm traditional bonds. Political elections may be considered as rites of democracy. When the people merely fulfill their duty by voting for their own ulama, we recognize patterns of traditional authority relations which are undemocratic.[198]

Regarding the ulama's *economic involvement*, there are few indications of exploitative and undemocratic ulama-santri relations. To the extent that laborers are free to travel and thus avoid ulama-exploitation, they strengthen their resource base as clients. The mobility of the laborers limits the power of the ulama. We may ask in what ways a silent pact of non-competition among individual ulama may influence

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[198] In these reflections on democracy, 'traditional authority relations' are understood as defined by Jackson (1974) in Illustration 3.1. Compare to the discussion of 'controversial concepts' in chapter three.

the labor-market. May a religious pact also affect the labor market? To the extent that the mobility of the people is regulated by such a silent pact, people's freedom will be limited.

Appendix

Interviewees

In the list below, I include the background of my interviewees, and the date of the interviews.

Group 1. Educated people

Angin, Yono (1998-2002): UGM-student, Pamekasan, affiliated to the NGO Jaringan Kerja Tungku Indonesia, Yogyakarta/Madura, key informant.

Didik (2000): The Research Institute of Jember University, Office for Madura Studies, 20 October 2000.

Gaffar (2000): UGM-scholar, Isipol, Madurese lorah, Yogyakarta, 12,19 September 2000.

Holis (2000): Lorah, Bandung-student, Pamekasan, key informant.

Hudayana, Bambang (2000): Dr. of Anthropology, Yogyakarta, 18 September 2000.

Indah (2000): Student at Jember University, Jember, 19 October 2000.

Lay, Cornelius (2000): UGM-scholar, Isipol, Yogyakarta, 11-12 September 2000.

Mahiili, Linda (2000): UGM-scholar, Isipol, Madurese, Yogyakarta, 12 September 2000

Pak Kianto (2000): The Research Institute of Jember University, Office for Madura Studies, writer of an Islamic dictionary, 20 October 2000.

Poki (2000): UGM-graduate, Isipol, Yogyakarta, 18 September 2000.

Praja (2000): Dr. of Sociology, Yogyakarta, 18 September 2000.

Pratikno (2000): UGM-scholar, Isipol, Yogyakarta, 11 October 2000.

Radi, Umaidi (2000): Lecturer in political science, Jember University, 22 October 2000.

Soegianto (2000): Professor at the Research Institute of Jember University, Office for Madura Studies, 22 October 2000.

Taufik, Mahmad (2000): Leader of local Madurese society, student at Jember University, Jember, several times in October 2000.

Wawan (2000): UGM-student, Pamekasan, Yogyakarta, 10 September 2000 and several other times.

Widodo (2000): Scholar at the Research Institute of Jember University, Office for Madura Studies, 20 October 2000.

Group 2. Others

Agus (2000): Magelam/Yogyakarta, Dr., 9 September 2000, and several other times.

Amril and wife (2000): PAN-members, conference in Sumenep, Madurese, 24 September 2000.

Ari (2000): Madrasah-teacher at pesantren Nasy'atul Mufa'allimin, Sumenep, 25 September 2000.

Aziz 1 (2000): Santri at pesantren Al- Usymuni, Sumenep, 22 September 2000.

Aziz 2 (2000): Lorah, candidate for klebun, Sumenep, 27 September 2000.

Benny (2000): Bank clerk, translator, Sumenep, 26 September 2000, and several other times.

Dauri (2000): Madurese, Sumenep, 22 September 2000.

Female friend of Ipunk (2000): Board-member of salt factory, Kalianget, 28 September 2000.

Hadi and wife (2000): Friends of Ipunk, Kalianget, 28 September 2000.

Ipunk (2000): Private teacher, translator, Sumenep, 26 September 2000.

Ketua (2000): Santri-leader, Surabaya, 4 October 2000.

Kyai Hadhori (2000): Haji, Pamekasan, 6 October 2000.

Kyai Hamid Mannam Munif (2000): Head of local NU-branch in Pamekasan (town), 7 October 2000.

Kyai Rawi (2000): head of Pondok, Sumenep, 27 September 2000.

Roy (2000): Santri at pesantren Assalafiyah, Pamekasan, 7 October 2000.

Rozaki, Abdur (2000): East Javanese, opposition press journalist, Yogyakarta, 11 September 2000.

Staff at LKiS (2000): Yogyakarta, 13 September 2000.

Tami (2000): Yogyakarta, NGO-worker, 00.09.09. and several other times.

'The King of Beggars', (2000): Affiliated to the NGO Jaringan Kerja Tungku Indonesia, Yogyakarta, 13 September 2000.

Tjahjono (2000): East Javanese, opposition press journalist, Yogyakarta, 11 September 2000.

Wajidi, Farid (2000): Head of LKiS, Yogyakarta, 15 September 2000.

Questions to, and replies from santris

To approach santris, I began interviews by asking some general questions. Below I give examples of three questions that I asked frequently during my visits at the pesantrens (Islamic boarding-schools). I include the most common replies and themes that were discussed.

1.Why are you interested in studying in this Pondok Pesantren/Tarekat (PP/T)?
a. Because it is the tradition of my family.
b. Because most people in my neighborhood choose the same.
c. Because I feel a strong attachment to the PP/T (institution).
d. Because; before I started in this PP/T the leader of my PP/T was my employer.
e. Because it's not too expensive to get Islamic education in this PP/T.
f. Other reason.

In Indonesian:
1. Mengapa anda tertarik belajar di Pondok Pesantren (PP)/Tarekat ini?
a. Karena sudah menjadi tradisi keluarga saya
b. Karena lingkungan di sekitar saya memilih PP/Tarekat
c. Karena saya merasa dekat dan yakin dengan PP/Tarekat
d. Karena sebelum saya belajar di (PP/Tarekat) pimpinan dari PP/Tarekat tersebut adalah pimpinan juga di tempat saya bekerja
e. Karena (PP/Tarekat) adalah tempat belajar yang tidak terlalu mahal untuk memperoleh pendidikan agama Islam
f. Alasan lain.

2.How many hours a day (Saturday - Thursday) in average, do you have 'free time' (neither education nor duties)?

In Indonesian:
2. Berapakah rata-rata "waktu jam bebas" (tidak ada pelajaran atau tidak ada kewajiban khusus) selama hari Sabtu sampai Kamis [rata-rata= jumlah jam bebas dalam sehari dari hari sabtu sampai kamis (dijumlahkan) dan kemudian dibagi 6]?

3.During your 'free time' what do you like to do?
a. Playing football, or doing other sport- activities.
b. Read about technology, science, newspapers, magazines or comics.
c. Discuss European or Chinese philosophy.
d. Discuss modernization and positive/negative sides of globalization and global/local environmental pollution.
e. Sharing experiences with students from other PPs/ Ts.
f. Sharing experiences and information with people/ citizens outside the PP/ T institution.
g. Sleep or take a rest.
h. Cleaning my own room.
i. Cleaning the mosque, boardinghouse, library etc.
j. Other activity.

In Indonesian:
3. Selama "jam bebas", anda paling suka melakukan apa?
a. Bermain sepak bola atau melakukan olaharga yang lain
b. Membaca buku ("science and technology"/koran/majalah/komik)
c. Diskusi filsafat (filsafat Barat/ filsafat Cina)
d. (Silahkan pilih, boleh lebih dari satu) Diskusi tentang modernisasi atau berdiskusi tentang dampak positif-negatif globalisasi atau berdiskusi tentang dampak dari pencemaran tingkungan baik yang terjadi di tingkat lokal/global
e. Berbagi pengalaman dengan pelajar/santri dari PP/Tarekat yang berbeda
f. Berbagi pengalaman dan informasi dengan masyarakat umum
g. Tidur atau bersitirahat
h. Membersihkan kamar
i. Membersihkan masjid/asrama/perpustakaan, dll-nya
j. Aktifitas lainnya.

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