ADMINISTRATIVE INTEGRATION
ACROSS
LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE

Integration through Participation in EU Committees

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Preface
The current study raises two main questions: (i) How well integrated are the national central administrations of European nation-states and the administrative apparatus of the European Union (EU)? And, (ii) how should we account for processes whereby national systems and the EU administrative apparatus become increasingly intertwined, intermeshed, and interlinked?

Processes of administrative integration across levels of governance are suggested as one important indicator of European integration. European integration is not only about the functional spill-over processes at the EU level, nor has it only to do with grand bargains amongst the EU member-states. European integration also has to do with the vertical blurring of governance levels in Europe. How distinct are the decision-making processes of the EU machinery and the decision-making processes of the various European nation-states? In the current study, administrative integration is seen as synonymous with the general blurring of governance levels.

The current study goes largely beyond the neo-functionalist versus intergovernmentalist distinction. The base-line explanatory framework underpinning the current study is institutional. Administrative integration reflects, arguably, the organizational structures embedding national civil servants. Most national government officials have several simultaneous organizational affiliations. However, some of these affiliations are primary to these officials, others are considered more secondary. In the current study, national governmental structures are considered primary to national civil servants, providing cognitive schemes, guidelines for assessing appropriate behaviour, codes of conduct, as well as cues for action. These primary institutional affiliations affect not only the calculation of strategic rationality of the actors, but also contribute to constituting the very identities and role perceptions of the actors.

EU institutions are considered the secondary institutional affiliations to those national civil servants studied here. The research focus is directed towards the EU committees located at the very intersection of the EU bureaucracy and the central administrative apparatus of European nation-states. Arguably, national civil servants participating on EU committees may supplement pre-existing identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct with new ones, or
they may change the very mix between different behavioural patterns and role conceptions. Furthermore, those national officials attending EU committees with high frequency and for protracted periods of time might arguably construct new supranational senses of belonging and role perceptions. As such, administrative integration is phrased: “integration through participation in EU committees”.

The current study grapples with questions raised by neo-functionalists in the 1950s and 60s, and by intergovernmentalists in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Amongst those questions raised by these theoretical approaches, two central questions stand out. Do national officials participating in EU decision-making processes evoke supranational role conceptions? Second, are national decision-making processes becoming less tightly co-ordinated, ultimately blurring the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy? Both these questions are at the forefront of the current study. The central question posed is: Do national civil servants attending EU committees evoke supranational allegiances and do they have co-ordinated mandates and instructions when attending these EU committees? Administrative integration reflects processes whereby national officials evoke supranational role perceptions and processes whereby the co-ordination and gate-keeping roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are considered less important.

The current study reflects a research endeavour that has lasted for about three years. I can still remember the moment when the research idea was born. A colleague (Morten Egeberg) and I were visiting The European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in the fall of 1997. More or less coincidentally we got to know Guenther Schaefer at EIPA, one of the leading scholars on comitology. After five minutes of talking we had developed a joint research project, of which this dissertation is one spin-off. Prior to our visit at EIPA, Morten and I had been interested in processes of Europeanization of national government institutions and decision-making processes. At that time, Guenther Schaefer held a course in “comitology” at EIPA for national civil servants. We soon reached the consensus that EU committees could be an adequate testing-ground for hypotheses on Europeanization of national central administrations. Also, EU committees could be seen as the very institution through which administrative integration across levels of governance occurred. Hence, the idea was born.

Several of the empirical observations presented in the current study have been presented at national, Nordic and international workshops in political science. A draft version of Chapter 1
was presented at an ARENA seminar April 4, 2000. Two of the current chapters have been published in slightly different versions elsewhere: Chapter 5 has been published as ‘Multiple Institutional Embeddedness in Europe: The Case of Danish, Norwegian and Swedish government officials’, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 2000, Vol. 23, No. 4: 311-342. This article builds on the same empirical data as the current study. A slightly different version of Chapter 6 has been co-published with Frode Veggeland as ‘Access, voice and loyalty. The representation of national civil servants in EU Committees’, ARENA working paper, 2000 No. 8.

Without the encouragement, help, criticism, support and friendship of many people, this dissertation would never have been initiated, much less completed. Foremost, I would like to thank Tom Christensen and Morten Egeberg for recruiting me to academia. Without their encouragement for continued studies I would probably never have started an academic career. Second, I would like to give my gratitude to Morten Egeberg for being my tutor all the way from the beginning to the end of this research endeavour. For me, he represents an ideal scholar: Never satisfied with established truths, always in the search for new fields of empirical studies, constantly trying to suggest new ways of approaching the study of public administration and European integration. Moreover, he has become a good friend throughout these years. Second, I would like to thank Johan P. Olsen, Ragnar Lie, Kristin Eikeland Johansen and the ARENA programme (The Norwegian Research Council) for hiring me and for giving me all the scholarly and financial support needed for completing this study. ARENA has also given me ample possibilities for developing my research ideas in a multidisciplinary milieu. I would therefor like to thank all researchers at ARENA today, and all those who have been at ARENA in the past.

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List of Abbreviations

COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives
Coreper I Deputy ambassador level
Coreper II Ambassador level
DG Directorate General (of the European Commission)
EEC European Economic Community
EEA European Economic Area
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EU European Union
ECs Commission expert committees
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SEA The Single European Act
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
WPs Council working parties
**Chapter 1**

**Introduction**

**Seizing a Middle Ground between Intergovernmentalism and Neo-Functionalism**

Hence a form of government has been found which is neither precisely national nor federal; …and the new word to express this new thing does not yet exist (Tocqueville 1969).

**Introduction¹**

As one cornerstone of European integration, administrative integration denotes how national bureaucracies and the EU administrative apparatus increasingly intermesh, interact and ultimately integrate. The overall rationale of this study is to reveal the basic features of this phenomenon and to account theoretically and empirically for administrative integration across the EU – nation-state intersection. In the current Chapter the basic research questions are laid out and the theoretical toolbox is sketched briefly. Finally, the research design applied to illuminate administrative integration empirically is introduced.

Processes of European integration have attracted major scholarly attention from several disciplines in the post World War II period. Different theoretical schemes have been
suggested in order to understand the ups and downs of the integration process. One important theoretical cleavage has formed between the neo-functionalist account and the intergovernmentalist notion (Haas 1958; Moravcsik 1993 and 1998). This theoretical cleavage is still vital in current literature on European integration (e.g. Branch and Øhrgaard 1999; Cram 1997; Jensen 2000; Jordan et al. 1999; Lewis 2000; Niemann 1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Shore 2000). However, owing to an assumed lack of validity as regards the basic social mechanisms advocated by these two theoretical accounts, an ‘institutionalist turn’ has emerged in more recent literature on European integration (e.g. Andersen 2000; Armstrong 1998; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Olsen 1998 and 2000a). European studies have developed from analysing EU institutions towards a studying the EU through institutional lenses. The current study aims at seizing a middle ground between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism by outlining an institutional account of administrative integration.

Towards a two-dimensional model of administrative integration

The study of European integration may be divided into three basic scholarly traditions, depending on their research foci. First, early neo-functional accounts emphasised European integration as the horizontal integration in width and depth at the EU level of governance (e.g. Haas 1958). Empirical indicators of integration in width were, amongst others, the numbers of issue areas covered by the Community (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Indicative of integration in depth was, for example, the usage of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. According to neo-functionalists, European integration resembles a steadily increasing spill-over process across policy sectors as well as loyalty transfers from purely national institutions towards supranational institutions (Haas 1958; Saeter 1998). Consequently, neo-functionalism emphasises the vertical integration of national and EU administrative institutions, decision processes and elite identities. However, neo-functionalism tends to explain vertical integration with reference to dynamics mostly at the EU level.

Second, intergovernmental accounts of European integration have mainly studied this phenomenon as the horizontal co-operation between sovereign nation-states. Applying a two-level game approach, the EU integration process is perceived as no more than the aggregate effect of bilateral negotiations amongst the EU member states (e.g. Milward 1992; Moravcsik
Parallel to neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism also pays attention to administrative integration across levels of governance. However, the explanation of integration is directed mostly towards national level dynamics. Hence, both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism apply single-level causal models of administrative integration. Both the neo-functional and the intergovernmental perspectives are spelled out in greater detail below.

A third and more recent analytical take on European integration views this phenomenon as resulting from the vertical linkages between the EU level and the national level of governance. European integration is seen as generally resulting from a blurring of these levels (e.g. Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Bulmer 1997; Christensen 1981; Coparaso, Cowles and Risse 2000; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Lewis 2000; Rometsch and Wessels 1996). “[T]he European Union has passed the boundary from horizontal cross-border co-operation to vertical policy-making in a dynamic multi-level system” (Larsson and Maurer 2000: 76; Marks et al. 1996). The analytical shift from focusing on horizontal linkages amongst the sub-components of integration towards focusing on vertical linkages across levels of governance also have accompanied an ‘institutionalist turn’ in the study of European integration (Andersen 2000; Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Olsen 2001). Even more, this shift has accompanied an emphasis on administrative integration as reflecting institutional dynamics both at the EU level and at the national level of governance. Hence, a two-level or multilevel casual model has been introduced to render administrative integration intelligible. In addition, this theoretical turn has blurred the lines between studies of European integration and studies of Europeanization of the nation-state. This two-level model of administrative integration is spelled out in greater detail below and in Chapter 2.

The neo-functional approach, the intergovernmental perspective and the two-dimensional focus on administrative integration may be visualised as follows:
In the current study, administrative integration is perceived synonymously with processes of Europeanization of domestic government institutions and national civil servants. Focusing on the vertical relationships between the EU level and the national level of governance, both neo-functional accounts and intergovernmental approaches are important theoretical starting-points for the study of administrative integration across levels of governance. The neo-functional perspective perceives these levels as interwoven in fundamental ways, the intergovernmental account pictures these levels largely as separate governance systems. Moreover, neo-functionalism basically pictures the integration process as being strongly affected by the institutional arrangements at the EU level. The way the European Union is formally organized is seen as having fundamental impact upon the integration process. Conversely, intergovernmentalists view European integration largely as the aggregate effect of domestic politics and policies. It is the large member states who fundamentally influence the path, scope and depth of the integration process. Henceforth, these two approaches apply single-level causal models to the analysis of administrative integration.

Moreover, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism pose different scenarios with regard to processes of Europeanization of domestic institutions, actors and decision processes. Neo-functionalists stress the way the EU institutions mould domestic institutions and alter
domestic civil servants’ interests, loyalties and modes of acting. Intergovernmentalists emphasize that national civil servants who participate on EU institutions are national representatives and delegates, and that national decision-making processes are tightly coordinated - especially by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While neo-functionalism pictures a process of ‘Europeanization’ of domestic institutions, actors and decision processes, intergovernmentalism upholds a scenario of increased ‘domestication’ of domestic institutions, actors and decision processes despite their exposure towards European dynamics. The neo-functionalist notion underscores the autonomy of EU institutions, let alone the sectoral integration and fusion of the domestic government institutions and EU institutions. Intergovernmentalist perspectives, by contrast, picture the stronghold of the nation-state. Intergovernmentalism basically argues that domestic governance institutions and EU institutions are separate levels of governance: They are different arenas for combat and compromise for rational actors. Neo-functionalism, on the contrary, argues that these levels of governance are intermeshed in fundamental ways.

Hence, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism represents one central theoretical cleavage in the study of European integration, Europeanization and administrative integration. This cleavage, however, may be seen as two-dimensional: The first dimension regards a national-supranational spectrum, that focuses on the degree to which the EU system of governance has any independent impact upon decision processes, identities and role conceptions amongst its organizational members. Do national dynamics prevail, or are decision processes basically reflecting new supranational dynamics (e.g. Haas 1958)? The second dimension regards a sectoral-territorial spectrum. This focuses on the content of the identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct evoked: Does a territorial logic dominate, or is it transcended by mere sectoral dynamics (e.g. Lindberg 1963)? This two-dimensional model of administrative integration may be visualised as follows:
According to figure 1.2, intergovernmental dynamics might be transcended along two paths: First, intergovernmentalism may be transcended under conditions whereby supranational dynamics exceed national ones (Lewis 2000). Second, intergovernmentalism may be transcended in situations whereby sectoral dynamics precede territorial ones, emphasising how the territorial nation-state logic is transcended by mere sectoral and technocratic dynamics (Radaelli 1999). It is important for the current study that administrative integration across levels of governance is seen as synonymous with processes whereby intergovernmentalism is transcended along the two dimensions suggested in figure 1.2 (cf. also Chapter 2). The current study aims at uncovering scope conditions under which each of the two dimensions presented above are likely to go to their extreme endpoints.

To measure administrative integration, this study focuses on three dependent variables: the institutional identifications, role conceptions and co-ordination behaviour evoked by domestic governmental officials who participate on EU committees. Studying national civil servants attending EU committees enables us to study administrative integration across the national – EU intersection. Following the two dimensions presented in figure 1.2, the central question posed in this study is two-dimensional. First, I ask whether, and to what extent, domestic governmental officials participating on EU committees enact new supranational identities and role perceptions. This question relates to the national-supranational dimension of
administrative integration. Second, this study asks to what extent domestic officials attending EU committees on non-permanent basis evoke sectoral or inter-sectoral/territorial role perceptions and modes of acting. This question relates to the sectoral-territorial dimension outlined above. Both these dimensions have to do with processes whereby intergovernmentalism may be transcended. The first dimension by adding new supranational role and identity perceptions to pre-established national role perceptions, and the second as a result of enacting sectoral based identities, role conceptions and modes of acting. Thus, both the national and the territorial principle of the nation-state order may be partially transcended. Under both these conditions administrative integration is fostered.

The independent variables suggested in this study are of an organizational character. The main hypothesis advanced is that the identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour evoked by government officials are fundamentally moulded by their organizational affiliations. Past organization theory, however, has mainly ignored situations whereby individuals simultaneously have multiple institutional affiliations. This study analyses civil servants having (at least) dual institutional affiliations - one domestic and one European. Their national institutional affiliations are at the level of ministries and agencies. Their EU affiliations are the different EU committees. Moreover, the EU committees are located at the intersection of the national bureaucracy and the EU decision-making apparatus (Christiansen and Kirchner 2000: 5; Schaefer 2000). EU committees are institutional arrangements that may warrant administrative integration because they are embedded both at the national and the EU level of governance. EU committees represent the very “transmission belt” through which administrative integration come about (Christiansen and Kirchner 2000: 22). Hence, EU committees “are the manifestation of growing Europeanization of national administrations” (Larsson and Maurer 2000: 86). Is it likely that domestic civil servants evoke new supranational and ‘European’ role perceptions when they attend EU committees on non-permanent basis? Put more precisely, under what conditions are the identifications and role conceptions evoked by national officials likely to take on supranational characteristics, and under what conditions is it more likely that this kind of supra-nationalism is curbed? In addition to the national-supranational dimension, this study analyses the extent to which the role and identity perceptions and the codes of conduct evoked by these civil servants are basically sectoral or territorial in character. Administrative integration is perceived as
processes whereby the identities, role perceptions and modes of decision behaviour evoked take on sectoral and supranational characteristics.

Important to this study is to specify various scope conditions under which domestic civil servants (having dual institutional affiliations) evoke supranational role and identity perceptions, and under what conditions this process is hampered. One vital endeavour is to identify various conditions under which the representational roles and patterns of behaviour are likely to follow sectoral or territorial patterns.

This introductory Chapter aims at tracing the general theoretical arguments in brief. The next section opens up the theoretical schism that has developed within the study of European integration. The second section aims at bridging the gap between these two theoretical poles by introducing organization theory arguments. The organization theory arguments suggest conditions under which intergovernmental dynamics are transcended, ultimately contributing to administrative integration. Finally, the last section of this Chapter explores the research design underpinning the current study and presents an overview of the coming chapters.

The intergovernmentalist - neo-functionalist controversy

Intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism represent “unifying theoretical story lines” as far as European integration is concerned (Andersen 2000: 18). Intergovernmentalism was basically presented as a response to the neo-functionalist account. This response was partially triggered by the ‘Euro-sclerosis’ of the 1980s and partly by scholarly criticism of neo-functionalism (Rosamond 2000). Despite neo-functionalism being developed years before the intergovernmentalist reaction within the study of European integration, we start by mapping the latter perspective. 3 We move from a scenario advocating the rescue of the nation-state as seen from the intergovernmentalist perspective towards greater emphasis on sui generis processes of administrative integration and engrenage, and the partial transformation of loyalties, interests and action - as seen from the neo-functionalist perspective (Haas 1958: 16).

An intergovernmental account.

Within this study intergovernmentalism is treated as a general theory of European integration although Moravcsik explicitly limits the validity of the perspective to intergovernmental conferences within the EU (IGCs) (Moravcsik 1991, 1993 and 1998). Hence, this study
applies intergovernmentalism to underscore a more basic argument about administrative integration (Armstrong 1998: 90). One principal argument is that European integration fundamentally reflects domestic policies and politics. European institutions and decision processes are seen as aggregate effects of ‘national interests’ pursued by different member states - especially by the large and most powerful member states. Hence, the EU is seen as a traditional international organization - or more correctly, as an intergovernmental organization - where the basic logic is national and territorial (Brekinridge 1997). The EU is seen as an arena where national actors pursue their basic national interests in combat and compromise with other national actors. “European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests…” (Moravcsik 1998: 3).

Hence, intergovernmentalism draws on a rational choice perspective, which emphasises decision-processes as products of exogenously defined preferences and strategies (Chong 1996; March and Olsen 1995). Decisions and organizational structures resemble ‘negotiated orders’. Institutional arrangements are seen as arenas for giving and taking between rational actors. Preferences and identities are seen to be highly static. According to a rational choice institutionalist perspective, civil servants that change institutional affiliations “usually change their strategy, but not their preferences” (Rothstein 1996: 147). Institutional variables are perceived as intervening variables at best and not as independent variables (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001). Put more starkly, Pfeffer (1997: 49) argues that the rationalist perspective “either ignores organizations and institutions almost completely or treats them as a residual category…”. Organizations constrain the set of potential strategies available to the actors. “Institutions are conceived as an opportunity structure that constrains and enables the behaviour of self-interested actors. Institutions limit the range of strategic options that are available to actors…” (Knill and Lenschaw 2001: 9-10).

Intergovernmentalist accounts markedly reflect this rational choice institutionalist approach by picturing decision processes directed towards the EU as two-level games where ‘national interests’ are moulded domestically and then negotiated at different arenas within the Union (Checkel 1998; Moravcsik 1998; Putnam 1988). “States first define preferences […] then they debate, bargain, or fight to particular agreements” (Moravcsik 1997: 544). Consistent with the above arguments, domestic officials attending EU committees are not assumed to be
affected as regards their identities and role perceptions. Quite the contrary, EU committees are seen as arenas for articulating and aggregating exogenously and nationally defined preferences (Polsby 1975). Committees are perceived of as meeting points where national actors give-and-take - *do et des* (Sartori 1987: 214). Preferences, identities and representational roles are seen as constructed prior to attending the EU committees. Hence, a rational perspective leaves no room for outlining any hypotheses regarding changes in officials’ identities, role perceptions and preferences are concerned. Participating within two-level games, however, may change the strategies of the participants. That is, their initial strategies might alter due to negotiations and compromises during committee meetings. However, their initial and basic preferences (ends) are not altered, only the strategies (means) pursued to fulfil them.

According to an intergovernmental perspective, the most important institution at the EU level is the Council of the European Union, where cabinet members meet. However, this intergovernmental arena does not leave any significant or any independent imprints on the decision processes and the decision outcomes at the EU level, let alone at the domestic level. EU institutions are largely perceived as arrangements for reducing transaction costs amongst the member states, being largely principals in the hands of the national agents (Moravcsik 1997). Applying a two-level game approach, the European integration process results from the pooling of sovereignty by rational actors pursuing their basic national interests. Consequently, the intergovernmentalist account pictures the stronghold of the nation-state order, increased national identification and sense of belonging amongst its inhabitants, and ultimately, increased national differentiation amongst the sub-components of the Union (Milward 1992).

Moreover, intergovernmentalists argue that decision-makers participating within EU institutions in general - and within the Council of Ministers in particular - tend to be loyal to the domestic institutions of which they are employed. More generally, domestic civil servants tend to represent their domestic government when bargaining within different Union bodies. The role conception evoked is that of a ‘domestic government representative’, seeing themselves as delegates for their domestic government to the EU. Hence, domestic representatives are seen as Trojan horses penetrating the EU system of governance (cf. Chapter 6). In addition to identifications and role perceptions largely being moulded in the domestic arena, decision processes at the domestic scene are seen as inter-sectorally tightly co-ordinated (cf. Chapter 5): The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Ministers’ Office
have their primary responsibility in co-ordinating national ‘positions’, thus contributing to strengthening the unitary character of the nation-state. EU politics and policies are perceived of as an extension of national foreign politics and policies. This is reflected in the way delegates perceive their basic roles and the way they perceive their co-ordination behaviour.

As seen from this perspective, the domestic level of governance and the EU level of governance are largely separate. Perhaps more correctly, the EU level is not seen as a governance system in its own right and, hence, not as a distinct level of governance as such. Hence, the primacy of the nation-state is advocated, emphasising the single-level character of the nation-state – EU spectrum. On this basis, Moravcsik risks overlook processes of deep administrative integration across levels of governance. As seen in the next section, the study of administrative integration across levels of governance has occupied neo-functionalists to a greater extent. Moreover, arguing that different theories have different domains of empirical application it may well be claimed that intergovernmental approaches are best suited for analysing grand intergovernmental bargains (Peterson 1995). Henceforth, the study of day-to-day administrative integration amongst individual civil servants might arguably be more adequately accounted for by applying a neo-functionalist approach.

A neo-functional account.
The neo-functionalist perspective, as advocated by Ernst Haas (1958) and his students, ascribes the EU institutions a more prominent and independent role in the integration process. According to neo-functionalists, European integration resembles a steadily increasing spill-over process across policy sectors, as well as loyalty transfers from purely national institutions towards supranational institutions. Within the current study, the political spill-over hypothesis of Haas (1958) is at the forefront of the argument. “The idea is that … elites will undergo a learning process, developing the perceptions that their interests are better served by seeking supranational rather than national solutions” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991: 5). Central to Haas, civil servants participating on EU institutions are likely to change their basic interests, loyalties and ways of acting (Haas 1958: 16). Having accompanied and observed domestic civil servants repeatedly interacting within the EU institutions, Haas argued that the ‘inner selves’ of the officials become fundamentally affected. One general insight gained from the neo-functionalist perspective is that EU institutions have independent impacts upon the identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour enacted by civil servants attending EU
institutions. Hence, officials participating on EU committees may tend to enact new supranational identities and role conceptions. They will ‘go native’, to utilize an anthropological phrase, supplementing their ‘domestic’ identities and roles perceptions. What Haas did not adequately account for was how this change process came about (Pentland 1973), and how this process is partially conditioned by institutional dynamics at the domestic level of governance. A two-level organization theory approach, however, is presented in the next section of this Chapter.

As seen from a neo-functional perspective, the EU level of governance and the domestic level of governance are related in fundamental ways, as shown by Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (1995), Wessels (1998), and Joerges and Vos (1999). For the founding fathers of the EU, “it was deemed essential to create an independent, career civil service whose primary loyalties and allegiances would be to the European Union rather than to its members’ countries of origin” (Shore 2000: 139). Amongst neo-functionalists, domestic civil servants were expected to replace pre-established domestic allegiances with new European identifications when participating on EU institutions and committees. “Monnet argued for a small groups of highly-skilled dedicated people independent from national governments, prepared to take decisions in a collegiate fashion, and loyal to the European spirit” (Radaelli 1999: 33). Hence, intergovernmental dynamics are transcended subsequent to new supranational identities and role conceptions being evoked. Second, neo-functionalism transcends intergovernmentalism by stressing the sectoral character of these roles and identifications. Building on functionalism, neo-functionalism moved from “considerations of the flag, of territory and national prestige to questions of welfare and cooperation” (Taylor 1975: xxiv-xxv, quoted in Lewis 1999b: 4). Hence, the logic of territoriality is partially bypassed as a central cue for decision-making behaviour. Consequently, the co-ordination of EU affairs in the domestic arena is perceived as being less centrally controlled from the Foreign Ministry and Prime Ministers Office (Lindberg 1963: 79-80). This is seen as a result “of the incipient breakdown of the differentiation between foreign affairs and domestic affairs” (Lindberg 1963: 80; Trondal and Veggeland 1999). A great amount of behavioural discretion is available for domestic civil servants participating on EU committees. Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the domestic political-administrative leadership will increasingly loose control of these officials. Civil servants attending EU committees will not act solely as national representatives, but increasingly as independent sectoral representatives and trustees,
and increasingly as supranational actors pursuing supranational roles and enacting supranational identifications (cf. Chapter 6). The domestic principals, thus, may lose control of the agents as they turn into regular participants on EU committees (Neyer 1999).

The neo-functional perspective offers a fundamentally different view on processes of administrative integration across levels of governance compared to the intergovernmentalist account. The descriptions and explanations of, and the prospects for, administrative integration are perceived as different. However, whereas intergovernmentalists tend to overlook the integrative and transformative dynamics of EU institutions, neo-functionalists tend to undervalue the role of domestic politics and institutions. Neo-functionalists tended to have a rather static view on European nation-states. Hence, neo-functionalist accounts did not emphasise substantial effects of institutional differences among European states. As mentioned above, both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism tend to apply a single-causal explanation of administrative integration across level of governance. Therefore, a middle ground between these two approaches to the study of administrative integration is needed to highlight the multi-level and multi-causal character of this phenomenon.

One important task for this study is to outline scope conditions suggesting ‘situations’ under which the neo-functional scenario and the intergovernmental scenario are most likely to materialize. To this end, organization theory arguments are applied emphasising how the relative primacy of different role and identity perceptions and patterns of acting, partially reflects the way political and administrative life is formally organized at both the EU level of governance and at the national level of governance. Moreover, the relative primacy of different institutional dynamics arguably reflects the way these levels are formally linked. By way of specifying the organizational structures embedding government officials at both levels of governance, this study aims at specifying the conditions under which particular identities, role perceptions and co-ordination behaviour are likely to be evoked by these structures. Hence, this study aims at seizing a middle ground between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism by way of introducing organization theory. A more thorough discussion of these arguments is provided in the next section and in Chapter 2.
Bridging the intergovernmentalist - neo-functionalist divide by introducing arguments from organization theory

Due to both a widening and deepening of the European integration process in the 1980s and 1990s and a general institutionalist turn in the study of public bureaucracies and organizations in the 1980s and 1990s, the study of European integration has experienced an ‘institutionalist turn’ (e.g. Andersen 2000; Armstrong 1998; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Bulmer 1993 and 1997; Cram 1997; Egeberg 1999b; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hix 1998; Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Olsen 1998 and 2000; Tallberg 2000). This growing influence of organization theory is also due to an assumed lack of validity regarding the basic mechanisms advocated by the intergovernmental account and by the neo-functional perspective and to a lack of fit between empirical observations and theoretical predictions (Caporaso 1998: 349; Lodge 1978; Olsen 2001; Pentland 1973; Sandholtz 1996). Even more, the growing tendency of applying institutional approaches to the study of European integration and processes of Europeanization may be due to an effort at transcending the *sui generis* treatment of these processes (Andersen 2000: 2; Caporaso 1999; Wallace 2000).

As such, this influence has directed the attention of students of European integration increasingly towards formal organization structures as explanatory variables. The study of European integration has developed from a study of EU institutions towards a study of the EU through institutional lenses. Going beyond the question of whether or not national bureaucracies become increasingly ‘Europeanized’, this study aims at outlining scope conditions for deciding how and when such processes are likely to take place. According to Börzel and Risse (2000: 4) “the issue is no longer whether Europe matters, but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point in time”. As such, the value added of seizing a middle ground between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism has to do with the possibility of combining insights from both these approaches, ultimately outlining scope conditions rendering administrative integration intelligible as a two-level phenomenon. Moreover, going beyond the neo-functionalist versus intergovernmentalist distinction also implies applying a more middle-range approach (cf. Chapter 3).

The ‘institutionalist turn’ in the study of European integration has revealed that integration is indeed a multi-level phenomenon. It has become important to render understandable how
identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct of national civil servants are affected simultaneously by EU level institutions and by different national institutions. The neo-functional school emphasised the emergence of supranational loyalties and the fragmentation and the hollowing out of the nation-state bureaucracy – as shown by Dehouse (1997), Kassim and Wright (1991), Siedentopf and Ziller (1988), and Wessels and Rometsch (1996). The intergovernmental perspective pictures the rescue of national bureaucracies and national identities, as revealed by Mörth and Jacobsson (1998), Milward (1992), and Moravcsik (1993). An organization theory approach to the study of administrative integration argues that both these scenarios are partially correct (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Administrative integration oscillates between neo-functionalist processes and intergovernmental dynamics. Our task is to determine the institutional scope conditions under which each is most likely to materialize. As will be accounted for theoretically and demonstrated empirically throughout the current study, processes of administrative integration are driven by organizational structures having sectoral and supranational characteristics.

When studying the actual decision behaviour and identities evoked by government officials, the formal organization of the bureaucracy is shown empirically to be important (Dearborn and Simon 1958; Egeberg 1999a; Egeberg and Sætren 1999; Lægreid and Olsen 1984). Hammond (1989) has also revealed logically that the formal build-up of the central governmental apparatus accompanies particular decision-making behaviour amongst organizational members. Organizational structures may be seen as mobilizing particular modes of behaviour, identities and role conceptions. Particular models of man and particular models of society embedding social interaction may be moulded by particular principles of organization. “[R]esearch has yet to discover a work setting which leaves people unmarked by their participation” (van Maanen and Schein 1979: 210, quoted in Scully 2001: 3). As such, the ‘institutionalist turn’ in the study of European integration draws heavily on old neo-functionalist insights. “For example, neo-functionalism emphasized such things as actor socialization, behavioural norms, the internalization of rules, and the development of multiple, overlapping identities” (Lewis 1999b: 36). This study argues basically that we have to unpack the organizational structures of the EU system in order to determine which identity, role and mode of action being evoked by domestic officials attending EU committees. Additionally, we have to carve up the bureaucratic machinery of the nation-state in order to unravel the dual
institutional affiliations embedding these domestic government officials, ultimately determining the relative primacy of different institutional dynamics penetrating them.

A substantial body of literature conceives of the EU system as a novel and partially ‘mysterious’ polity, not resembling anything seen before, I argue that the EU system to a great extent reflects the structures of nation-state polities (Olsen 2001: 3). This stands in contrast to arguments stressing that “[t]he European Community is a political entity that does not fit into any accepted category of government” (Sbragia 1993: 24 – author’s emphasis). My argument does not ignore idiosyncrasies of the EU system, which contains supranational, multinational, multi-linguistic and multilevel characteristics. The basic arguments laid out here, however, stress organizational similarities between the EU polity and other polities. Due to the EU being described as unique, novel and ‘mysterious’ (Bartolini 1997) and faced with an assumed lack of appropriate concepts and categories for understanding this polity (Coombes 1970: 101; Jachtenfuchs 1997: 40), one vital step in this enquiry must be to divide this polity into empirically meaningful and theoretical enlightening categories.

I argue that the EU system of governance, in general, and the web of EU committees and working parties, in particular, are organized according to two basic and general principles in administrative life. Parallel to the sectoral and spatial institutional build-up of the domestic political-administrative apparatus (sector ministries and agencies versus Foreign Ministries), the EU Commission and the preparatory expert committees underlying it arguably exhibit sectoral and functional principles. The Council of the European Union and the web of working parties organized under it exhibit spatial and territorial based principles of organization (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Reflecting these organizational principles, I claim that the EU Commission is more likely to generate sectoral role perceptions and modes of acting amongst its participants. On the other hand, the Council of the European Union is more likely to activate territorial and inter-sectoral role perceptions and cross-sectoral modes of acting amongst its participants. Hence, national civil servants that are solely affiliated to Commission expert committees are likely to evoke sectoral identifications, role conceptions and codes of conduct. Conversely, territorial allegiances and role conceptions are likely to be enacted more strongly amongst civil servants solely attending Council working parties. Finally, domestic civil servants participating on both Commission expert committees and Council working parties are likely to be influenced by a mix of sectoral and territorial
dynamics. Thus, the sectoral and territorial principles of organization underpinning the EU Commission and the Council of Ministers may account for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration presented in figure 1.2.

Moreover, several conflicting principles are often built into organizational structures. Within the EU Commission a geographical principle runs parallel with the sectoral principle and within the Council the sectoral principle of organization is present, supplementing the area principle. What is important, however, is that these additional, and partially contending principles of organizations, are being biased and skewed by the dominant principle of organization (Gulick 1937). Hence, certain institutional dynamics are likely to precede other dynamics. Simply stated, I argue that the uppermost principle of organization of the EU Commission and the Council is sector and territory, respectively (Egeberg and Trondal 1999) (cf. Chapter 2).

The overall rationale for being preoccupied with these organizing principles is the idea that different principles tend to activate different conflicts, identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour (Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990; March 1994). Due to the EU Commission and the Council comprising “a variety of contradictory organization logics” (Christiansen 1997: 87), identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct are assumed to be affected differently within these organizational settings. National civil servants attending EU committees are likely to be affected by the uppermost principles present within each committee (Herrmann and Brewer 2000). Hence, national government officials participating on Commission expert committees are likely to evoke intra-sectoral identifications, role conceptions and modes of co-ordination: He or she will conceive of him- or herself as representing his or her ‘own’ policy sector, his or her professional expertise, and tend to co-ordinate within, rather than across, issue areas. “Coalitions including administrative officials (at the EU and national levels) … can be seen as the modern version of the system of engrenage built into the original model of the Community by Jean Monnet” (Radaelli 1999: 40 – original emphasis). As such, the territorial principle of the nation-state order is partially transcended by sectoral dynamics. Conversely, government officials attending Council working parties are arguably more likely to evoke inter-sectoral and territorial identifications and senses of belonging towards the central government as a whole. Furthermore, co-ordination processes are likely to be inter-sectoral in nature, ascribing vital importance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence,
sectoral logics are more likely to be enacted amongst government officials participating on Commission expert committees, while territorial logics are more likely to accompany participation on Council working parties. Officials participating on both these EU committees are likely to evoke a mixture of both these logics. These arguments are laid out more thoroughly in Chapter 2.

Consequently, intergovernmental dynamics may be transcended more fully within Commission expert committees than within Council working parties. Moreover, the Commission expert committees might foster a two-dimensional mode of transcendence. First, conceiving of EU institutions and EU committees as supranational and over-national entities, the nation-state order can be transcended due to new supranational identities and role conceptions being evoked by the EU committee participants and due to the enactment of highly sectoralized identities and role perceptions. Council working parties, on the other hand, are more likely to contribute to a one-dimensional transcendence. While new supranational identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct might be adopted amongst the participants, these features are likely to retain their basic territorial characteristics. Figure 1.3 presents two partially different modes by which intergovernmentalism can be transcended:

Figure 1.3 A two-dimensional model of transcendence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Supranational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No transcendence</td>
<td>One-dimensional transcendence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-dimensional transcendence</td>
<td>Two-dimensional transcendence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown by figure 1.3, intergovernmentalism may be transcended one-dimensionally along each axis. First, evoking sectoral modes of identifying, perceiving ones’ roles and acting need not solely reflect neo-functional dynamics at the EU level. They may have national origins from within sectoral ministries and agencies. Furthermore, inter-sectoral and territorial modes of acting and identifying need not solely reflect domestic impact. They may have supranational origins, mainly from within the Council of Ministers. A two-dimensional transcendence of intergovernmentalism, however, requires that supranational role and identity perceptions are evoked in tandem with highly sectoral roles and modes of action.

In order to seize a middle ground between neo-functional accounts and intergovernmental approaches to the study of administrative integration, we need to trace how administrative life is formally organized at both levels of governance as well as how each level of governance is formally linked together (cf. Chapter 2). The decision behaviour, role conceptions and sense of belonging evoked by domestic civil servants attending EU committees may partially reflect their domestic institutional affiliations and partially their EU affiliations. As regards the relative impact of these levels of governance, I argue in Chapter 2 that the length and intensity to which officials attend EU committees may increase the likelihood for transcending intergovernmentalism along the national-supranational axis. However, whether this transcendence is one-dimensional or two-dimensional is determined by the organizational structures embedding each civil servant. Are they sectoral or territorial in character? In the current study, intergovernmentalism is arguably transcended two-dimensionally if the civil servants are embedded in EU committees and domestic government institutions specialized according to a sectoral principle, and if the civil servants are senior EU committee participants.

With respect to the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration, the re-socializing potential of EU committees is likely to be conditioned by the seniority of the committee participants. Foremost, I argue in the next Chapter that officials who are senior participants on EU committees are more likely to be re-socialized than officials who are newcomers (Beyers 1998b; Hooghe 1999a). Officials who generally participate intensively on EU committees are likely to become re-socialized, that is, to add new supranational identities and role conceptions to pre-existing ones (Lindberg 1963: 287). Hence, individual seniority at the EU level may plausibly impinge upon the extent to which the participants will enact
supranational role and identity perceptions. In addition, institutional seniority is argued to matter. Civil servants from countries that were amongst the founding fathers of the Union are more likely to evoke supranational allegiances than civil servants from new member states. Furthermore, within each nation-state, different government institutions have participated at the EU level for different periods of time. Officials employed in ministries and agencies which have been affiliated to the EU for protracted periods of time are likely to evoke supranational role and identity perceptions more strongly than officials employed in institutions that are more new-comers at the EU arena.

Consequently, individual and institutional seniority at the EU level may affect processes of administrative integration. National role and identity perceptions are likely to be largely sustained amongst officials that are new-comers at the EU arena, whilst a partially new set of supranational identifications and role concepts are more likely to be enacted amongst more senior EU participants. Hence, both the length and the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees many account for the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration.

Domestic government officials are only part-time participants at the EU level of governance. Thus, they are likely to be only partially re-socialized at this level. Their primary institutional affiliations are domestic - within the ministry or agency in which they are employed. Considering the sectoral-territorial dimension, I hypothesise that officials employed within domestic agencies are more likely to evoke intra-sectoral roles, identities and modes of co-ordination than officials employed within domestic ministries. Officials at the ministry level are thus more likely to evoke more encompassing territorial and inter-sectoral roles, whilst officials at the agency level are more likely to enact more narrow intra-sectoral expert roles. Moreover, inter-sectoral roles are more likely to be enacted amongst officials employed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than amongst officials employed within sector ministries and agencies. Finally, contrary to Haas (1958), the enactment of supranational roles is likely to supplement pre-established role perceptions, not replace them.

By way of summarizing the core arguments presented above, this study tests the following causal model:
These causal relationships are basically those that are tested in the current study. Empirically testable hypotheses are derived from the above model in Chapter 2. In the following endnote the independent and dependent variables in figure 4.1 are operationalized:

Domestic government officials who participate on EU committees are part of two institutional systems simultaneously. The goal of this enquiry is to analyse to what extent and how the institutional scope conditions presented in figure 1.4 affects administrative integration. Consistent with figure 1.3, intergovernmentalism is transcended along two dimensions if supranational identities and roles are evoked, and if sectoral roles, identities and modes of action are enacted amongst domestic civil servants attending EU committees. A middle ground between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism is seized by way of introducing organization theory perspectives to the study of administrative integration. Intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism represent extreme scenarios of administrative integration; organization theory may identify institutional scope conditions under which each is more likely to materialize. A more thorough discussion of the independent and dependent variables, including their mutual relationships, is provided in Chapter 2.
The research design

There are basically two different modes of conducting social enquiry. The first mode is where the empirical phenomena are at the centre of the analysis and the purpose is to account for this in great detail (Pfeffer 1997: 197). The second mode is directed towards constructing theories and hypotheses, where the theoretical argument is at the centre of the analysis, and empirical data is applied in order to elucidate this argument (Elster 1989). The empirical field is utilized as a laboratory for testing hypotheses and illuminating general arguments (Haas 1958; Olsen 2001). Empirical observations are applied for the sake of the argument, not vice versa. This study is more in the spirit of the second than the first research mode. The overall aim of the current study is to outline a theoretical argument accounting for processes of administrative integration across levels of governance. The overall research endeavour is geared towards identifying scope conditions indicating when intergovernmental dynamics are likely to be transcended. Empirical observations are gathered to illuminate the validity of the theoretically suggested scope conditions.

To this end, this study focuses on domestic government officials attending EU committees: Commission expert committees and Council working parties. As will be argued for more thoroughly in Chapters 2 and 3, these committees are expected to affect identities, role conceptions and modes of acting differently. Second, this study compares domestic government officials from three Nation-States: Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The rationale for comparing these three Nation-States is due to their different forms and length of affiliations to the European Union (EU). Denmark became full-fledged member of the EEC in 1973 and Sweden became member of the EU in 1995. Norway has been affiliated to the Union through the EEA agreement since 1994. However, our study does not analyse the impact of national forms of affiliation to the EU. Rather, this study analyses the effects stemming from individual forms of affiliation towards different EU committees.

Our study is at the individual level, not at the aggregate national level. Hence, we want to study the impact generated by individual affiliations towards different EU committees as regards the identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct evoked by each individual. Danish and Swedish officials have access to Commission expert committees and to Council working parties, Norwegian officials are only allowed to participate in the preparatory stages of the decision-making processes within the Commission expert committees. Moreover,
Danish officials have been formally affiliated to these EU committees since 1973. Most of their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts entered these committees in the middle of the 1990s. Hence, this study focuses on the effects of individual affiliations to different EU committees, as well as the effects of seniority and intensity of participation on these committees.

This study analyses the impact stemming from the various domestic institutional affiliations embedding these participants with regard to their identities and role conceptions. EU committee participants are heavily pre-socialized and pre-packed from within domestic government institutions prior to entering EU committees. This study focuses on government officials employed at the agency level and at the ministry level. In the Scandinavian countries ministries and agencies are vertically specialized – that is, agencies are formally separated from cabinet level departments. Thus, agencies are organized at a lower hierarchical level and agency personnel are expected to act more intra-sectorally and politically neutral than are personnel at the ministry level. Moreover, our study includes officials having different positions within the vertical ranks of these ministries and agencies. Are officials employed within ministries - and in top rank positions - more likely to evoke inter-sectoral modes of identifying, perceiving ones’ roles and acting than officials employed in medium or lower rank positions within domestic agencies? Additionally, this study covers officials at the permanent representations to the EU of these countries. Permanent representations embody territorial principles of organization more fully than do domestic sector ministries and agencies. The permanent representations are substituted for the Foreign Ministry in this study mostly due to the assumed intensity to which officials at the permanent representation interact with various EU committees. The permanent representatives are also preferred to officials at the MFA due to the lack of MFA officials participating on EU committees (especially in the Norwegian case). We ask whether the identities, role conceptions and modes of acting evoked by permanent representatives differ significantly from those evoked by officials employed within sector ministries and agencies. Comparing officials at the Brussels-based permanent representations and officials in the ministries and agencies ‘back home’ enables us to determine the relative effect stemming from the sheer intensity of involvement in EU committees (cf. Chapter 4).
One rationale for using Denmark, Norway and Sweden as comparable cases has also to do with the domestic government institutions being almost identically constructed within these countries. As such, only minor variations in our empirical observations are likely to stem from different state traditions. The institutional build-up of the central administrations of these three Nation-States, however, is not entirely identical. The greatest potential difference between these bureaucracies lies in staff size and formal autonomy of the agencies. Both Danish and Swedish agencies are larger than most Norwegian agencies. Conversely, the ministry level in Norway is relatively larger in staff-size than in Denmark and Sweden. Hence, the autonomy and strength of the agency level is potentially greater in Denmark and Sweden than in Norway. Moreover, the agency level in Sweden has additional autonomy compared to their Danish and Norwegian counterparts. Despite these differences, however, “[s]ince the Nordic countries are more or less similar in a great many respect they stand out as good examples of comparable cases that fit, very neatly, central requirements of the most similar system design” (Anckar 1993: 119). It is important to underscore, however, that our study does not compare across countries. This study analyses only basic theoretical relationships between organizational structures and behavioural consequences of individual civil servants.

Third, this study includes civil servants from two different policy sectors - the environment sector and the field of occupational health and safety. Three basic rationales are advocated in favour of this empirical limitation. First, both these sectors concern environmental issues – more broadly in the environmental sector and more narrowly within the field of occupational health and safety. Second, common for both these policy sectors, the SEA opened up for qualified majority voting on a great many dossiers (European Commission 95/0155 (CNS); European Commission 1993; Kronsell 1999: 194; Springer 1992: 101-102). Virtually all directives enacted within these two policy areas have been subject to qualified majority voting since the passage of the SEA (European Commission 1993; Jacobsson 1992: 15; Volker 1993: 122). Hence, our empirical observations cannot be traced back to different voting procedures. Third, while the environment sector is heavily integrated into the EU apparatus, institutionally and legally, the occupational health and safety sector is less so. This difference is important because it maximises the possibility of studying officials with various levels of experience from EU committees. Officials in the environmental sector are more likely to have attended EU committees more intensively than officials in the field of occupational health and safety.
Environmental policy was introduced to EU legislation in 1972 and the occupational health and safety sector was legally integrated into the Treaty in the SEA of 1987 (Moe 1995: 35). However, the SEA also contributed to legal recognition of environmental legislation by the EC (Sherrington 2000: 113). Environmental policy has risen from silence to salience between 1972 and 2000. Approximately 90 per cent of all environmental legal acts within the national legal systems are of EU origin. There are approximately 100 preparatory expert committees under the auspices of the EU Commission within this policy field and two Council working parties exist (Demmke 1998: 14-15; The European Union Encyclopedia and Directory 1996: 178). The environmental field is the third largest policy sector within the EU as measured by the number of directives implemented: 135 out of 1300 directives implemented up to 31 December 1996 regarded environmental issues (Kronsell 1999: 191-192; Tallberg 1999: 73). Nearly one-third of the questions discussed within the European Parliament relate to environmental issues (Kronsell 1999: 192). However, the political salience of environmental policy has, in general, declined in the 1990s (Sbragia 2000). Within the occupational health and safety sector, in contrast, not only does the EU produce less legal acts but also fewer expert committees exist. The European Union Encyclopedia and Directory (1996: 238-239) counts six Commission expert committees within this policy field. Moreover, no Council working parties exist that are solely responsible for occupational health and safety issues (The European Union Encyclopedia and Directory 1996: 178). Still, an increased level of EU activity has been witnessed in the 1990s, firstly, by enacting social policy initiatives of its own and secondly, by “striking down features of national systems that are deemed incompatible with the development of the single marked” (Leibfried and Pierson 2000: 284). As such, the political salience of the field of occupational health and safety has increased in the 1990s.

Henceforth, these two policy sectors are integrated to a different extent into the EU machinery - both legally and institutionally. However, the overall rationale for studying officials affiliated to these two policy sectors is not due to the potential impact of policy sector as regards the dynamics discussed above. Rather, the environment sector and the occupational health and safety sector are selected due to both sectors dealing with fairly similar issues – environmental issues. Selecting these issue areas enables us to control for possible impact or noise stemming from policy sector affiliations. The reason for selecting two policy sectors instead of only one, which might have reduced the above control-problem more fully, has to do with (i) studying officials with different degrees of experience from EU committees, as
well as (ii) increasing the N underpinning the study. Simply by studying two policy sectors contributes to an increase in the N (cf. Chapter 3).

Moreover, what rationale can be given for studying the effects of organizational structures on the enactment of identifications, role conceptions and modes of behaviour in a multi-level frame, and not in a purely domestic context? The overall theoretical rationale for applying a multi-level frame has to do with the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration presented in figure 1.2. This study aim at seizing a middle ground between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism by specifying the institutional conditions under which supranational role and identity perceptions are attended to. Hence, as regards the two dimensions addressed in figure 1.2, only the national-supranational dimension is *prima facie* multi-level in character. The sectoral-territorial dimension is more general in character. As such, I argue in Chapter 7 that the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration is more easily generalisable to other societal contexts than the argument on the national-supranational nexus of administrative integration. However, a multi-level framing of this study is warranted to account for the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration.

One additional rationale behind studying the suggested theoretical propositions (cf. Chapter 2) in a multi-level context is methodological. Our research units are chosen in an attempt to falsify the assumed relationships between our independent and dependent variables (Popper 1963: 36). Allow me briefly to elaborate on this: The empirical frame of reference for this study is domestic government officials having their primary institutional affiliations at the domestic level. The secondary institutional affiliations of these officials are the EU expert committees and working parties on which they participate. Generally, we would expect the relationship between “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Allison 1969) to be weaker within collegial arrangements - such as the EU expert committees and working parties - than within hierarchical arrangements, especially when affiliations to these committees are considered secondary of nature (cf. Chapter 2). The robustness of the relationships between our independent and dependent variables are assumed further weakened due to the institutional embeddedness of these actors being multinational and multi-linguistic at the EU level. Hence, one rationale for choosing EU committees and working parties as a frame for enquiry rests upon the following methodological consideration: The study of organizational
identities, role perceptions and decision processes are of general interest in political-administrative life. The relationships between these dependent variables and our two basic independent variables (i) formal organizational structures, and (ii) the length and intensity to which civil servants attend EU committees), however, are studied under less favourable conditions in the current enquiry. If significant correlations (in a statistical sense) are indeed uncovered between these variables, these correlations might be deemed relatively robust. The baseline logic behind this methodological argument is addressed more thoroughly in Chapter 3.

*   *   *

The empirical data applied to illustrate our general arguments are of several kinds. As will be revealed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, survey data and interview data are used in order to test our theoretical arguments. Three empirical studies have been conducted within Danish, Norwegian and Swedish ministries and agencies. One survey study and one interview study were conducted amongst civil servants from domestic ministries and agencies within the environmental sector and the occupational health and safety sector. Additionally, one survey was conducted amongst officials at the permanent representations to the EU of these three states. This second study covers officials working within several different policy fields. A more thorough description and discussion of the empirical data is provided in Chapter 3. The following ministries and agencies are included in this study:

**Denmark**: The Department of Environment and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Forest and Nature Agency, the Department of Labour, the National Labour Market Authority, and the Danish permanent representation to the European Union.

**Norway**: The Ministry of Environment, the Norwegian Pollution Agency, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, the Directorate for Labour Inspection, and the Norwegian permanent representation to the European Union.

**Sweden**: The Ministry of Environment, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication\(^{13}\), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Swedish permanent representation to the European Union.
Overview of the study

Chapter 1 has introduced the general topic of this study, and outlined the arguments in brief. Chapter 2 allows us to trace these arguments in greater detail. Chapter 2 elaborates on the dependent and the independent variables of the study, and outlines plausible causal relationships between them. Further, Chapter 2 also present hypotheses to be tested empirically. Next, Chapter 3 introduces the empirical data underpinning this study. Chapter 3 addresses the data being applied to illustrate the theoretical arguments addressed. Further, Chapter 3 discusses some meta-theoretical problems that relate to the notion of theoretical refutation, causality and the comparative method. Chapter 4 describes the primary and secondary institutional affiliations embedding the civil servants studied. More precisely, Chapter 4 reveals the domestic institutional affiliations of these officials - their hierarchical positions, their seniority, etc. This Chapter also presents the length and intensity to which national civil servants participate on Commission expert committees and Council working parties.

Next, Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the extent to which participation on EU committees contributes to administrative integration. Thus, these Chapters reveal the extent to which a weak or a strong mode of administrative integration is emerging across levels of governance as a result of cross-level participation in Europe. A strong mode of administrative integration is represented by the evocation of sectoral role and identity perceptions amongst the committee participants and the enactment of sectoral co-ordination behaviour (Chapters 5 and 6). Furthermore, a strong mode of administrative integration implies the additional construction of supranational role and identity conceptions (Chapter 6). Furthermore, Chapter 5 and 6 study the causal impact of (i) different EU committee affiliations embedding national civil servants (Commission expert committees versus Council working parties), (ii) the length and intensity of participation on such committees, and (iii) various primary institutional affiliations at the domestic level.

Finally, Chapter 7 draws these analyses to a conclusion. A summary of the most important and theoretically illuminating propositions and empirical observations are provided in Chapter 7. This Chapter also addresses the strengths and limits of the analyses by making comparisons to existing empirical literature on the field and by revisiting the theoretical arguments and the
methodological choices suggested in this study. Based on this revision, suggestions for further research on administrative integration are considered.
Notes

1 The author would like to thank Jan Beyers, Jeffrey T. Checkel, Morten Egeberg and Jeffrey Lewis for valuable comments and criticisms on an earlier version of this Chapter.

2 Thanks to John Erik Fossum at the ARENA programme for this point.

3 The general realist perspective within the study of international relations was outlined years before the neo-functional perspective was addressed (Morgenthau 1973).

4 The current presentation of neo-functionalism draws largely from Haas’ 1958 book. The transfer of loyalties as a cornerstone of European integration was underscored in this seminal work. His book from 1964 (‘Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization’) is of less importance to our argument. The 1964 book is more general in character covering global integration, focuses less on loyalty transformations, and less on the transcendence of the territorial principle of the nation-state order.

5 Wodak (2000: 22) shows that the self-perceptions of Commission officials apparently reflect the supranational character of the institution. Most Commission officials conceive of themselves as ‘European’. However, the second most important identity of these officials is ‘national’.

6 The notion of social interaction is implicit within this argument. While recent social constructivist work pays attention towards social interaction (e.g. Checkel 1999 and 2000; Risse 2000), organization theory pays more explicit attention towards the organizational structures embedding social interaction (March and Olsen 1989; Egeberg 1999a).

7 The mix of neo-functional and intergovernmental dynamics is likely to be more complex in real life situations than seen from the pure neo-functional and intergovernmental perspectives. Hence, the theoretical arguments suggested in this study are *ceteris paribus* in character.
Figure 1.5 Operational measures of the independent and dependent variables in Figure 1.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational principles:</strong></td>
<td>Co-ordination behaviour:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A sector principle versus a principle of territoriality.</td>
<td>- Doing clearances with other central administrative institutions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional affiliations:</strong></td>
<td>- Receiving clearances from the Foreign Ministry,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Domestic ministries and agencies,</td>
<td>- Doing informal clearances,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Permanent representations to the EU,</td>
<td>- Doing formal clearances,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commission expert committees,</td>
<td>- Outlining problem notes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Council working parties,</td>
<td>- Outlining frame notes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Formal rank positions,</td>
<td>- Outlining instructions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Educational backgrounds.</td>
<td>- “Do these documents govern your positions?”,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length of attendance on EU committees:</strong></td>
<td>- “I have clear instructions as to what positions to follow”,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Number of years of attendance.</td>
<td>- “I have a great amount of freedom when participating on EU committees”,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intensity of attendance on EU committees:</strong></td>
<td>- Officials’ emphasis on professional considerations,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The number of EU committees attended,</td>
<td>- Officials’ emphasis on ‘national interests’,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The number of formal meetings attended,</td>
<td>- Officials’ contacts with various domestic government institutions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The number of informal meetings attended,</td>
<td>- Importance attached to various domestic government institutions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The proportion of time devoted participating on EU committees,</td>
<td>- Heeding signals from various domestic government institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Giving oral presentations during committee meetings.</td>
<td>Role and identity perceptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Feeling allegiance towards various domestic government institutions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Feeling allegiance towards various EU institutions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Heeding signals from various domestic government institutions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Assigning weight to various considerations,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Officials’ perceptions of the role of colleagues from other countries,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Officials’ perceptions of Commission officials’ independence of particular national interests,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The emergence of an ‘esprit de corps’ in the EU committees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As regards the ministries and agencies included in this study (see below), the ministry level and the agency level in Norway are of the same size (as regards staff). In Sweden and Denmark, the agency levels are 57 per cent and 58 per cent larger with respect to staff size than the ministry level, respectively. The following figures give the precise number of employees in the ministries and agencies covered by this study:

- **Denmark**: The Department of Environment and Energy (150 employees), the Environmental Protection Agency (460 employees), the National Forest and Nature Agency (330 employees), the Department of Labour (150 employees), and finally the National Labour Market Authority (285 employees).

- **Norway**: The Ministry of Environment (250 employees), the Norwegian Pollution Agency (300 employees), the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (265 employees), and finally the Directorate for Labour Inspection (170 employees).

- **Sweden**: The Ministry of Environment (160 employees), the Environmental Protection Agency (500 employees), the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication (293 employees), and finally the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (300 employees).

741 pieces of legislation has been completed in the environment sector between 1958 and 1992 (Fligstein and McNichol 1998: 79).

A total of 416 pieces of legislation was completed in this policy sector between 1958 and 1992 (Fligstein and McNichol 1998: 79).

Still, other policy sectors could also have been selected for this study on the premise of level of EU involvement into the respective policy areas: For example, the competition sector is heavily integrated into the EU machinery, whereas foreign policy is, at present, only modestly integrated into the EU *aquis*. Still, the environment sector and the occupational health and safety sector are selected for this study also on the premises of compatibility with regard to domestic government institutions, and to the broader issue area underpinning both these sectors – environmental policy.

This ministry is a new construction. 1 January 1999 witnessed a merger between the old Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Communication, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of Interior.
CHAPTER 2

TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT ON PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

You are what you know (CNN 2000)

Introduction

Owing to accelerating ‘Globalization’ and ‘Europeanization’ two scenarios have been put forth in current literature analyzing the fate of the nation-state. One intergovernmental scenario pictures the stronghold of the nation-state, increased national identification, senses of belonging, and, ultimately, increased national differentiation and sectoral integration at the nation-state level. Second, one neo-functional scenario pictures the erosion and the hollowing out of the nation-state, national identities, senses of belonging, and, ultimately, tendencies towards sectoral differentiation at the nation-state level. While the first scenario highlights the impermeability of the nation-states’ borderlines, the second focuses on the permeable and perforated nature of the borders (Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 1999: 29; Offe 1998: 4). This Chapter argues that both of these scenarios may be partially correct, reflecting different ways of organizing political and administrative life. Intergovernmentalism may arguably be transcended more fully if institutions (at the domestic level and at the EU level) are specialized according to sector, if domestic civil servants participate intensively and for protracted periods of time within EU committees, and if institutional compatibility across the
national and the EU level is present. Under these conditions a two-dimensional transcendence of intergovernmentalism is likely to come about, contributing to administrative integration across levels of governance.

This Chapter specifies scope conditions, under which intergovernmental dynamics are most likely to materialize, and scope conditions under which neo-functional dynamics are more likely to emerge. Organization theory is introduced in order to reveal how intergovernmental dynamics and neo-functional dynamics reflects organizational structures at different levels of governance. Hence, the relative primacy of different institutional dynamics reflects how different organizations (at the domestic and EU level) are formally organized and how these organizations are formally linked together. Thus, treating the intergovernmental perspective as our null-hypothesis, this study identifies conditions under which this perspective is transcended. The overall rationale for studying conditions whereby intergovernmentalism is transcended relates to our endeavour towards identifying conditions under which administrative integration is likely to emerge. As the next section reveals, the transcendence of intergovernmental dynamics is seen as synonymous with processes of administrative integration. Hence, “the issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point in time” (Börzel and Risse 2000: 4).

Organizations are constantly evolving and changing (March and Olsen 1989). Several studies describe the EU system of governance as an unfinished polity, as a system in flux being largely ‘under construction’ (Bulmer 1993: 36; Hooghe 1997: 105; Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith 1999; Visser 1999: 2). Olsen (2000b) pictures the EU as an unsettled political unity. I argue, however, that important stabilizing organizational principles are present within the EU system, just as within domestic governance institutions (Andersen 2000; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Olsen 2001). Wallace (2000: 531-532) pictures the EU system and the nation-state as “stabile provisorium” (original emphasis) by focusing on organizational structures as stabilising mechanisms in organizational life the current analysis is not based on organizational categories provided by the vast majority of contemporary EU integration literature. The organizational arguments and dimensions addressed in this study are more general, applicable to any polity across time and space. Assuming that “the EU system of governance has some unique properties, [whilst] also [sharing] important features with other

One reason for being preoccupied with organizational structures is that they may affect conflicts and identities, roles and modes of behaviour amongst the organizational members (Gulick 1937; Hammond 1986; March and Olsen 1989; March and Simon 1958; Rokkan 1970). The basic principles underpinning organizational structures are assumed to mobilise certain identities, senses of belonging and codes of conduct amongst the organizational members.

Empirical research shows that organizational variables explain decision behaviour, role perceptions and identity formation more fully than do demographic variables (Christensen and Egeberg 1997; Egeberg 1994; 1999a; 1999b; Egeberg and Sætren 1999; Meier and Nigro 1976; Searing 1991: 1251-1252; Wallin et al. 1999: 158; Zuna 1998). Further, one reason for focusing on principles of organization is the assumption that they have policy implications. A choice of principle is a choice of policy because principles of organization are not neutral to policy outcomes (Hammond 1986). An additional rationale for focusing on principles of organization is the possibility of deriving relatively precise empirical propositions from these (Gulick 1937).

Approaching the dependent variables underpinning this study, I argue that processes of administrative integration across levels of governance may be measured by (i) the decision behaviour, (ii) the role perceptions, and (iii) the institutional identities evoked by domestic officials who attend EU committees. The EU system may be utilized as a laboratory for studying more general theoretical ideas on decision-making processes and for studying the conditions under which partially new sets of supranational identities and role perceptions are constructed within penetrated polities such as the EU (Haas 1958; Rosenau 1969).

As seen in Chapter 1, intergovernmentalism may be transcended along two dimensions. Following this two-dimensional path, two major questions are addressed throughout this study. First, under what organizational conditions is it likely that domestic government officials who attend EU committees evoke supranational roles and identities, and under what institutional conditions are pre-established national identities and role perceptions sustained at
the EU level? In other words, what are the conditions under which domestic civil servants “go native” (Christoph 1993: 532), and under what conditions can we observe “a socialization into a community with common problem definitions and relatively shared approaches to dealing with them” (Joerges and Neyer 1997: 619)? Under what organizational conditions can we expect to observe shifts in civil servants loyalties, expectations and political activities (Haas 1958: 16), and under what conditions are national allegiances and role conceptions likely to be sustained at the EU level of governance (Moravcsik 1993 and 1998)? As to account for the enactment of supranational role and identity perceptions, the current study emphasis the length and intensity to which domestic officials participate on EU committees. Second, this study asks under what organizational conditions roles, identities and modes of acting are moulded along sectoral or territorial lines. Approaching these two questions from an organization theory perspective, this study emphasises the significance of organizational borders and the consequences emanating from redrawing these borders. How may certain principles of organization within domestic institutions and within EU institutions contribute to the enactment of certain role and identity conceptions, and codes of conduct amongst the organizational participants? In sum, intergovernmentalism is assumed fully transcended in situations whereby supranational identity and role perceptions are constructed and in situations whereby the character of the evoked co-ordination behaviour is largely sectoral.

The unit of analysis in this study consists of domestic civil servants participating on expert committees under the EU Commission and working parties under the auspices of the Council of the European Union. The comitology committees are excluded from this analysis mostly due to methodological considerations.³ This choice of research units is based on two rationales: First, officials are the individuals who develop feelings of belonging, who are exposed to role expectations and who ultimately act. Second, many domestic officials are exposed to impulses from different social and societal contexts - they are ‘full-timers’ within domestic government institutions while at the same time being ‘part-timers’ within EU institutions, attending Commission expert committees and Council working parties.⁴ Their primary institutional affiliations are the domestic machinery of governance. The committees at the EU level are only secondary and supplementary institutional affiliations to these domestic officials (Egeberg 1999b).
The first section of this Chapter outlines one organizational theory argument on the significance of organizational structures with regard to the enactment of identities, role perceptions and modes of acting. According to a cognitive organization theory perspective, intergovernmentalism may be transcended if domestic officials attend EU committees intensively and for protracted periods of time, and if they are affiliated towards government institutions organized according to a sectoral principle. These two requirements are arguably fulfilled if government officials participate intensively and for protracted periods of time within Commission expert committees, especially if these officials are employed in domestic sector ministries or agencies. Intergovernmentalism is less likely to be transcended amongst officials at the permanent representations to the EU devoting little time and energy towards participating on Council working parties. This section provides micro-foundations rendering these assumptions intelligible. Additionally, some empirically testable hypotheses are outlined on the basis of this theoretical endeavour. These hypotheses derive from the causal model presented in Chapter 1 (figure 1.4). Section two discusses the dependent variables underpinning this study.

Towards an organization theory argument

Organizational dynamics in general, and processes of administrative integration in particular, can be analysed against the background of a variety of theoretical tool-kits (Checkel 2001; Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001; Cram 1997; Moravcsik 1998; Olsen 1998). The purpose of this Chapter is principally to shed light on some selected dynamics of particular relevance to the topic of this study. According to Chapter 1, intergovernmentalism may be transcended along two axes: a sectoral-territorial axis and a national-supranational axis. When explaining this dual process of transcendence, however, the same major social mechanisms are at work. These mechanisms will be addressed in this section by the use of organization theory arguments.

New-institutional perspectives in organizational analyses present a multitude of foci, interpretations and levels of analysis (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; March and Olsen 1989 and 1995; Peters 1999; Scott 1987). One common denominator integrating this plurality is the emphasis attached to contextualized, endogenous decision behaviour, identity and senses of belonging. People are perceived of as *homo politicus* as much as *homo economicus*. Attention is directed towards the way different institutional contexts mould behaviour, identities and
roles differently. Institutions not only constrain these elements, they also contribute to the initial construction of them (Checkel 1998). Organization theory perspectives aim at understanding two interrelated questions. The first is to what extent do organizational contexts mould decision behaviour, role conceptions and identities (e.g. Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Bulmer 1997; Knill and Lenschaw 1998; Puchala 1999; Sandholtz 1996)? Second, organization theory seeks to render intelligible how different organizational contexts affect identities, role conceptions and modes of acting differently (e.g. Egeberg 1999a; Gulick 1937). Organizational members are perceived of as collections of identities, roles and modes of behaviour. They are multiple selves (Elster 1986). The argument addressed here claims that different organizational contexts may contribute to activate some roles, identities and codes of conduct while de-activating others. This study focuses on domestic government officials having at least two different institutional affiliations – one domestic and one European. The main argument outlined below renders plausible that when national government officials ‘go to Brussels’, they tend to change identities, role perceptions and modes of acting in certain directions under certain institutional conditions. However, I also argue in this Chapter that, at the end of the day, the EU committee affiliations embedding these officials are only secondary to their national institutional affiliations.

It is possible to systematise organization theory perspectives on the basis of different concepts and along different dimensions (e.g. March and Olsen 1989; Peters 1999; Scott 1987). This Chapter outlines a theoretical middle ground between neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches by outlining a cognitive perspective on organizations. This perspective suggests that administrative integration is a multi-level phenomenon and is affected by institutional structures at both the nation-state level and at the EU level. More precisely, a cognitive perspective emphasises that identities, role conceptions and preferences are endogenous and thus possible to construct and reconstruct. A cognitive organizational perspective stresses how exposure towards particular institutional structures may contribute to the enactment of particular identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct. As shown in the next section, Council working parties tend to activate territorial and inter-sectoral behavioural responses amongst the participants whilst Commission expert committees are more likely to activate intra-sectoral behaviour. Furthermore, a cognitive perspective opens possibilities for individual roles and identities to oscillate along the national-supranational spectrum. Both the national-supranational and the sectoral-territorial dimensions are taken into consideration by
stressing how the domestic and the EU levels of governance are formally linked together and by emphasising the intensity and length of these linkages.

**A cognitive perspective: EU committees as agents of transformation.**

The cognitive perspective on organizations was developed within social psychology and introduced to organizational theory largely by Simon (1957), March and Simon (1958), and by Cyert and March (1963). Information-based and knowledge-based models in the explanation of political dynamics are thus not new. Hence, the current interest in the cognitive dimension of politics has been characterised as more of a rediscovery than of absolute novelty (Radaelli 1999a: 757).

According to a cognitive perspective, organizations are seen as mechanisms of simplification with respect to information processing. The underlying assumption is that of bounded rationality (Simon 1957). The possibility for individuals to attend everything simultaneously is impossible. Hence, attention is seen as a scarce resource. To be able to move beyond individual bounded rationality, a cognitive perspective sees organizational structures as mechanisms for coupling and de-coupling actors, problems, solutions and consequences. Organizational borders are seen as buffers to attention, thereby biasing the information exposed to each decision-maker (March and Olsen 1995; Scharpf 1977; Tenbrunsel et al. 1996). For organizational designers, one way of reducing information-overload is to carve up the organization horizontally and vertically thus creating buffers against particular actors, certain information, certain considerations, and certain stimuli (Gulick 1937; Schattschneider 1960). “Cognitive structures simplify when there is too much, and they thus allow the perceiver to reduce an enormously complex environment to a manageable number of meaningful categories” (Markus and Zajonc 1984: 143). Within a cognitive notion, organizational structures are seen as cognitive buffers to attention and information. “Because of the limits of human intellective capacities in comparison with the complexities of the problems that individuals and organizations face, rational behaviour calls for simplified models that capture the main features of a problem without capturing all its complexities” (March and Simon 1981: 148). Organizational structures render it possible to decompose complex tasks into sub-tasks that can be carried out within relatively independent units of governance. Organizational structures thus contribute to the development of ‘cognitive short cuts’ for individual decision-makers (Johnson 1987: 45). These shortcuts contribute to the
creation of cognitive categories and simplified representations of world phenomena to the individuals (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000: 117). As a result, these phenomena are taken for granted as “the way we do these things” (Scott 1995: 44). Organizational boundaries thus affect identities, role perceptions and modes of behaviour because these properties simplify cognitive search processes and reduce cognitive uncertainty (Castano 2000: 11; Johnson 1987; March 1994; Stryker 1980). In this light, organising political-administrative life represents a mobilisation of bias (Schattschneider 1960). Cognitive scripts provide “guidelines for sense-making and choosing meaningful action” (Scott 1995: 44). Hence, “identity formation has a strong cognitive component” (Olsen 2001: 19).

At least two pivotal arguments may be outlined on the basis of a cognitive perspective as regards the institutional embeddedness of identities, role perceptions and decision behaviour. First, these features of the self might be moulded and re-moulded on the basis of organizing and reorganizing organizational boundaries (March and Olsen 1989; Nkomo and Cox jr. 1996). Reorganizing government institutions may alter the flow of information within them, ultimately changing the flow of information exposed to each decision-maker (Scharpf 1977). Stated otherwise, certain stimuli tend to produce certain responses. Having internalized a multitude of codes of conduct, certain stimuli - like organizational structures – make it likely that the actors evoke or activate only a limited proportion of this repertoire of responses (Sevon 1996). Consequently, reorganizing the set of stimuli being exposed to the actor, the responses to them are likely to alter in systematic manners. Consistent with an instrumentalist notion, organizational designers may design and redesign organizational boundaries for instrumental reasons, e.g. strengthening or weakening the likelihood that government officials evoke particular identities and roles. Secondly, roles and identities may alter when individuals physically move from one organization to another (Roos and Starke 1981: 299). If organizational members change organizational affiliations overnight, a cognitive perspective assumes that the identities, role conceptions and modes of acting may change “overnight”. Hence, when organizational members change organizational affiliations they tend to choose new ways of acting because they are systematically exposed to new sets of information.

Domestic civil servants attending EU committees have multi-level institutional affiliations. These officials are employed within domestic ministries and agencies and at the same time participate within EU committees. Further, these officials have professional affiliations
towards different disciplines. Hence, decision-makers in current European central administrations are exposed to multiple, partially contending, sets of information, premises, considerations and stimuli. When confronted with many different stimuli, officials may have the capacity to choose which to attend and which to ignore on the basis of their organizational affiliations (March and Olsen 1989; Ritzer 1996: 334). Viewed from a cognitive organization theory perspective, however, one important research task has to do with identifying particular organizational structures activating particular role perceptions, identities, and decision behaviours. Studying government officials who are members of government institutions at different levels of governance, organizational linkages between government institutions represent one vital scope condition that affects the enactment of particular role and identity conceptions. The current study pays attention to the formal linkages existing between organizations and to the intensity and length of such linkages. “We [may] imagine a world consisting of a set of parts. At the least, [administrative] integration is caused by some measure of the density, intensity and character of the relations among the elements of that set” (March 1999: 134). Henceforth, administrative integration “is a process where the cognitive dimension of political life matters” (Radaelli 2000: 27).

The following sections identify conditions under which (i) supranational identities, roles and codes of conduct develop as government officials attend EU committees and (ii) identifying the conditions under which these features of the self are likely to take on sectoral and territorial characteristics. Whereas the first question addresses the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration, the second question regards the sectoral-territorial dimension. In the following section, the second dimension is discussed first.

**Accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension: On principles of organization.**

When characterising the EU as a polity in its own right, most recent scholarly contributions have highlighted the *sui generis* “uniqueness of the EU as a system” (Saeter 1998: 65; cf. Caporaso 1999; Wallace 2000: 9). Contrary to such assumptions, one may argue that the EU system of governance, in general, and the web of EU committees and working parties, in particular, is organized according to two basic and general principles in administrative life. Parallel to the sectoral and spatial institutional build-up of the domestic political-administrative apparatus (sector ministries and agencies versus Foreign Ministries), the EU Commission and the preparatory expert committees underlying it may be seen as exhibiting
sectoral and functional principles. Conversely, the Council of the European Union and the web of working parties organized under it may be seen as exhibiting spatial and territorial principles of organization (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Notwithstanding several contending organizing principles co-existing within the Commission and the Council of Ministers, I argue that the uppermost principles are sector and territory, respectively. Participating within institutions organized by sector, the organizational members are systematically exposed to sectoral information and stimuli. Sectoral organizational principles bias and skew identities, role perceptions and modes of acting in sectoral directions. The area principle, on the other hand, are arguably more likely to activate more inter-sectoral decision behaviour, role perceptions and identifications. The following paragraphs elaborate on these propositions.

A large body of literature conceives of the EU system as a novel and partially ‘mysterious’ polity. I argue that the EU system to a great extent reflects the structures of nation-state polities (Olsen 2001: 3), and reason against arguments stressing that “[t]he European Community is a political entity that does not fit into any accepted category of government” (Sbragia 1993: 24 – author’s emphasis). My argument does not ignore idiosyncrasies of the EU system being supranational, multi-national, multi-linguistic and multi-level (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). The basic argument laid out here, however, stresses organizational similarities of the EU polity and other polities. Still, due to this polity being described as unique, novel and ‘mysterious’ (Bartolini 1997), and faced with an assumed lack of appropriate concepts and categories for the understanding of this polity (Coombes 1970: 101; Jachtenfuchs 1997: 40), one vital step in this enquiry must be to carve this polity into empirically meaningful and theoretical fruitful categories.9

Central to any conceptualization of governance systems is that it has to identify dimensions offering theoretical utility. Moreover, the dimensions have to be precise, rendering each category mutually exclusive. Finally, the dimensions suggested should be universally applicable across time and space, rendering it possible to undertake comparative research across time and space.10 According to these criteria, the majority of current conceptionalizations of the EU system exhibit weaknesses. Being aware of this, Philippe Schmitter (1996) sees governance systems as divided along two basic organizational constituencies: one territorial and one functional.11 As argued in this Chapter, the EU governance system may also be seen as being organized along these two constituencies. The
sectoral and territorial principle of organization introduced by organizational theory supports the enactment of sectoral and territorial identities, role conceptions and modes of acting. Moreover, these principles are not *sui generis* to the EU system. They represent general principles of political-administrative life. As shown in the following, these organizational principles offer theoretical and empirical insights regarding the processes of administrative integration across levels of governance. Henceforth, going beyond the *sui generis* view of the EU, “[w]e … understand the unfamiliar with the help of familiar conceptual lenses” (Jönsson et al. 1998: 320).

Organizational structures can be drawn along various lines (Bartolini 1997): Luther Gulick (1937) outlines four basic principles of organization: on the basis of purpose or sector, on process, on geography, and finally on clientele. The reason for Gulick’s preoccupation with these principles is the fundamental assumption related to formal structures as political instruments. Different principles of organization evoke different conflicts, identities, role perceptions, and patterns of behaviour. Organizing according to the principle of purpose, sectoral considerations, identities, role perceptions and decision processes are processed and evoked, contributing to sectoral differentiation and geographical integration. The opposite is assumed to be the case when organizing according to the principle of area (Gulick 1937).

March and Olsen (1978) add a fifth principle to the four discussed by Gulick, the time dimension. Almost every organization and every decision process is organized in sequence, where different problems, solutions and actors are attended to at different phases. A sixth principle of organization is that of space or physical location (Egeberg 1994; March 1994). This list of principles, however, is suggestive, not exhaustive. The central point emphasised in the current study is that the EU Commission and the Council of the European Union exhibits “a variety of contradictory organizational logics” (Christiansen 1997: 87) and that the sectoral and territorial principles may account for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration presented in figure 1.2 (cf. Chapter 1).

Generally, when organizing according to the principle of purpose, sectoral based identities, role perceptions and modes of behaviour will be attended to systematically (Gulick 1937; Hammond 1986). This organizational model at the nation-state level will strengthen identities, role conceptions and decision-making behaviour related to sector and function. This
An organizational model applied to the EU system of governance makes understandable the transcendence of national role perceptions (Herrmann and Brewer 2000). The civil servants may tend to evoke roles as independent experts or as sectoral representatives. Co-ordination processes are likely to be intra-sectoral, resulting in poor inter-sectoral co-ordination. “If all [ministerial] departments are set up on the basis of purpose, then the task of the chief executive in the field of co-ordination will be to see that the major purposes are not in conflict and that the various processes which are used are consistent” (Gulick 1937: 33). As seen from figure 2.1, the sectoral principle contributes to sectoral fragmentation and variation (e.g. between the environmental sector and the educational sector) and, ultimately, territorial integration and standardization (within i.e. State A).

Figure 2.1 Specialization according to the principle of purpose

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- State A</td>
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<td>- State B</td>
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Organizing horizontally according to the principle of area, however, allows for inter-sectoral modes of behaviour to emerge, bridging the gap between sectors through inter-sectoral co-ordination efforts. As seen from figure 2.2, the area principle of organization is likely to have an interlocking dynamic across sectoral cleavages that contributes to inter-sectoral integration and geographical variation. This organizational model at the nation-state level may strengthen identities and role perceptions related to territory. Civil servants are likely to evoke overarching role and identity perceptions like that of ‘national representatives’ and national delegates. Similarly, the co-ordination behaviour evoked by these officials is likely to have a strong territorial component cutting across different sub-sectors.

Figure 2.2 Specialization according to the principle of area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State A</th>
<th>State B</th>
<th>State C</th>
<th>State D</th>
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<td>- Education</td>
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A parallel argument may be applied to an analysis of the EU system of governance (Egeberg 2001; Egeberg and Trondal 1997 and 1999). Organizing the EU system according to the principle of purpose, as observed within the EU Commission (Egeberg and Trondal 1997b), may systematically activate sectorally biased behavioural dynamics (Bellier 1997; Benz and Eberlein 1999: 342; Egeberg 1996 and 1999b; Hooghe 1997; Michelmann 1978; Middlemas 1995: 242-265). Sectorally defined modes of identifying, perceiving ones’ roles, and acting does not necessarily imply that these properties are especially focused towards sector A or sector B, but that they are more generally oriented towards sectoral idiosyncrasies, variation and differentiation. Swedish government officials report that national interests and conflicts only rarely dominate the inner life of the Commission (SOU 1996:6: 47). Different dynamics, however, might dominate at different hierarchical levels within the Commission structure due to different principles of organization existing at different hierarchical levels (cf. Egeberg 1996). Landfried (1997) shows empirically that even amongst Commissioners a sectoral logic is prevalent. This may owe to the fact that the demographic profiles of current Commissioners weaken the impact of their nationalities (MacMullen 1997).\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, Wodak (2000: 18) shows that Commission officials at the unit level have mainly a sectoral oriented approach when assessing the role of the Commission. However, McDonald (1997: 60-61) observes conflicting identifications amongst Commission officials. These oscillate between an ‘esprit européen’ and national identifications. Notwithstanding being largely functionally organized, the organizational structure of the Commission contains several, partially contending principles of organization.

The basic organizational structures of the Commission have reminded the same since its foundation (Metcalfe 2000: 822). For the first time, however, the Prodi administration has initiated a major organizational overhaul of the Commission. The recent administrative reforms pursued by the Prodi administration have strengthened the sector-characteristics of the Commission even further. Officials are increasingly supposed to be recruited on the basis of merit, the Cabinet system is downsized and made more multinational, Director-Generals should not be of the same nationality as ‘their’ Commissioner, the President of the Commission has gained increased authority to compose and reshuffle the Commission team, all Commissioners (besides Prodi) have moved out of the Breydel building to the site of the Commission service they head, thus strengthening mutual relationships between the political and the administrative level of each policy sectors of the Commission (European Commission
Physical proximity between organizational units tends to accompany a co-evolvement of identities in these units (Egeberg and Sætren 1999). The physical reorganization of the Commission seems to contribute to less co-ordination between various DGs. Moreover, according to European Voice (2001:6: 12), tendencies towards ‘cabinet government’ in the Commission has accompanied increased supranational identities amongst the Commissioners. Adding to the sectoralized organizational characteristics of the Commission, the administrative culture, the co-ordination patterns and identities of Commission officials are shown to be highly sectoralized (Cini 1996 and 1997; Egeberg 1996; McDonald 1997). This principle of organization also underpins expert committees organized under the auspices of the Commission (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Still, the territorial principle may loom larger at the level of the expert committees than at the level of the services (Schaefer et al. 2000). This is due to the domestic representation within the expert committees, which is primarily composed of part-time participants.

The Council of the European Union has been called the “transnational embodiment of the state” (Lewis 1999a: 7). Organizing according to an area principle, as we observe in the Council (Egeberg and Trondal 1997b), means that a territorial logic is likely to dominate patterns of behaviour, identifications and senses of belonging (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 343; Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Kerremans 1996; Sherrington 2000: 164). Area based behaviours do not necessarily imply being especially focused towards area A or area B, but being more generally oriented towards geographical idiosyncrasies, variation and differentiation. Changes in the Council’s voting procedures towards greater use of qualified majority voting (QMV) might have strengthened area logics within the Council even further (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 49). Not having the exit option of the veto might increase the volume of negotiation and compromise between different member states, thereby enhancing territorial and nation-state dynamics within the Council structure (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Schout 1999: 3). Earlier, when unanimity was a more widespread voting rule in the Council, the need for negotiations and exchanges between different state representatives was weaker. The SEA formally codified the actual use of QMV in the 1980s (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 50). The possible areas where QMV can be used have been expanded through the Maastricht and the Amsterdam treaties on, for example, environmental issues and on social policy measures. Still, consensus is the prevailing norm of taking decisions both at the minister and at the working party level and the “recourse to explicit veto has declined”
As regards contending organizational principles underpinning the Council, the element of sector specialization is most prevalent at the working party level. Even at this level it is expected that domestic officials act as government representatives and not solely as independent experts (Beyers 1998a and 1998b).

On the basis of the arguments presented so far, hypotheses can be proposed for empirical testing. Hypotheses numbers 1 and 2, outlined below, are directed towards Danish and Swedish officials due to their formal participatory rights within Council working parties:

**H1**: The spatial principle of organization within the Council working parties strengthens the sense of belonging towards the nation-state and towards the domestic central administration as a whole.

**H2**: Participation on Council working parties fosters role perceptions as ‘national representatives’ and decision processes geared towards inter-sectoral co-ordination through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Therefore, Council working parties are likely to foster territorial and inter-sectoral identifications, role perceptions and patterns of co-ordination amongst the participants. Hypotheses numbers 3 and 4 are addressed to officials from all three Scandinavian countries:

**H3**: Under the sectoral principle of organization, participation on Commission expert committees fosters and strengthens the sense of belonging towards sector administrations and to task roles.

**H4**: Participation on Commission expert committees accompanies role perceptions as sector representatives and independent experts, and decision behaviour geared towards *intra*-sectoral co-ordination.

Hence, intra-sectoral logics are likely to be evoked by domestic government officials attending Commission expert committees (H3 and H4) while inter-sectoral dynamics are more likely to accompany participation on Council working parties (H1 and H2). *Ceteris paribus,*
Intergovernmentalism is likely to be transcended more fully within the Commission expert committees than within the Council working parties. This results from the sectoral dynamics stemming from the sectoral principle of organization underpinning the EU Commission.

However, when participating at the EU level, it is observed that domestic officials frequently take part in both Commission expert committees and Council working parties (Edwards and Spence 1994; Hayes-Renschaw 1997; Institut für Europäische Politik 1987). The potential for transferring role conceptions and identities across the Commission-Council intersection may be strengthened by such dual participation. The potential for enacting both sectoral and territorial identities, role conceptions and modes of acting is assumed strengthened by such cross-institutional participation at the EU level. This is relevant only for Danish and Swedish government officials, not for their Norwegian colleagues. This potential might partially be curbed by the mismatch in organizational principles between the two institutions and by the separation in time and space of these institutions. These Union bodies are organized according to conflicting principles, are physically located at different points in Brussels whilst also being activated at different phases within the decision-making cycles of the Union. These factors increase the likelihood that officials are able to separate the role and identity perceptions that are enacted within the Commission expert committees and the Council working parties.

Organizing a system of governance according to more than one principle means that several conflicting considerations might be attended to simultaneously. This contributes to a multi-faceted system of governance comprising multiple identities, role perceptions and codes of conduct (Gulick 1937: 34; March 1994; March and Olsen 1995). Partially conflicting principles of organization are frequently built into each organizational structure, for example in the German federal system (Egeberg 2001). Due to domestic representation, a geographical principle parallels the sectoral principle within the Commission expert committees. Correspondingly, a sectoral principle supplements the area principle within the Council working parties due to these groups being specialized by sector (cf. Beyers 1998a; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Lewis 1998). However, despite these conflicting organizational principles, the sectoral and territorial principles of organization may be seen as uppermost within the Commission and the Council, respectively. Hence, sectoral dynamics are likely to take primacy over territorial dynamics amongst officials attending Commission expert committees. The inverse pattern occurs amongst those officials attending Council working parties.
Danish and Swedish officials have full participatory rights in the Council of the European Union. This can be considered the forum for ‘national interests’ of the member states (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 211). Norwegian officials, on the other hand, do not have access to the Council. Hence, Danish and Swedish civil servants are likely to be exposed to area based impulses and stimuli at the EU level to a larger extent than their Norwegian counterparts. Danish and Swedish government officials are likely to be reminded of their roles as ‘national representatives’ more systematically, frequently and extensively than their Norwegian colleagues. Norwegian officials solely attending Commission expert committees are expected to be affected more strongly by sectoral impulses than by territorial stimuli.

Moreover, co-ordination within and between government institutions may be either written, oral, or both. Non-mandatory and oral modes of co-ordination are more likely to be enacted when only few actors are involved in the decision-making process, if the actors share some fairly general interests, problems or world-views. This scenario is likely within the Commission expert committees. Co-ordination through written mandates and instructions is more likely under conditions whereby many actors are involved, more conflicting interests are to be accommodated, and more problems and world-views have to be taken into consideration simultaneously. “It is commonly hypothesized that increases in either organizational size or complexity or both will lead to increased use of written rules…” (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000: 62). This scenario is more likely within the Council working parties. The usage of written mandates is more likely within institutions organized according to a geographical principle, which activates national considerations and conflicts amongst the delegates. National conflicts, considerations and cleavages might activate written co-ordination procedures in an effort at binding the national delegates. The usage of non-written mandates is more likely within institutions organized according to a sectoral principle which downplays national conflicts by activating sectoral interests amongst the trustees (cf. also Chapter 6). Thus, the use of written instructions as co-ordination tool-kit is more likely to accompany committee meetings within Council working parties than within Commission expert committees.

When studying government officials, who have multiple institutional affiliations at different levels of governance, one has to heed how these levels relate to one another in institutional
terms. We need to trace how administrative life is formally organized at different levels of governance and how these levels are formally linked together. The behavioural dynamics evoked by domestic government officials may be affected by EU committees conditional upon: (i) the degree of compatibility in organizational structures across levels of governance and (ii) the length and intensity by which officials participate on EU committees. Accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration, the effects of particular organizational principles is strengthened by organizational compatibility (cf. i). Second, accounting for the national-supranational spectrum of administrative integration, supranational role and identity conceptions are affected by the length and intensity to which national civil servants attend EU committees (cf. ii).

**Accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension: On organizational compatibility.**

“[I]n a multi-level, multi-structured and multi-centered polity with partly autonomous sub-systems, a key to understand [administrative integration] may be to study how institutions relate, balance, collide and penetrate each other” (Olsen 2001: 18). The impact stemming from organizational principles existing at different levels of governance may be conditioned by the degree of institutional compatibility across these levels of governance (Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Knill and Lenschaw 1998a; March and Olsen 1995). By compatibility I mean that different organizations are organized according to the same basic constitutive principles – e.g. purpose or area. Thus, the notion of organizational compatibility is more narrowly defined than the concept of institutional compatibility (Knill and Lenschaw 1998b).

From social psychology we have learned that “[a]n event, a concept, an object, or a behavior that ‘fits’ a particular internal structure [is] more likely to be attended to and processed than one that did not” (Markus and Zajonc 1985: 143). Generally, if two organizations have compatible structures, individuals with dual organizational affiliations are likely to evoke the same identity and role in both organizations. “People are most likely to integrate [pre-existing] roles with their social conceptions of themselves, … when … new roles are compatible with these conceptions…” (Searing 1994: 400). Moreover, these identities, roles and modes of behaviour may even be strengthened as a result of having multiple compatible institutional affiliations. “Sectoralization both of the Commission and various national governments [may
be] mutually reinforcing” (Derlien 1999: 9). On the other hand, if these institutions have incompatible structures, the result may be unclear as to which behaviour is being evoked by the actors. However, in cases of incompatibility, pre-established role conceptions, identities and modes of acting are likely to be challenged and modified by the ‘new’ organizational affiliation. For example, the likelihood of evoking the role as ‘independent expert’ may be weakened if government officials are employed within domestic agencies and attend Council working parties fairly frequently. Conversely, the enactment of an ‘independent expert’ role may be strengthened if one is employed at the agency level and attends Commission expert committees fairly often.

In general, both Commission expert committees and domestic sector ministries and agencies can be seen as being organized along the same sectoral lines. Similarly, Council working parties, domestic Foreign Ministries and permanent representations to the EU may be seen as organized according to an area principle (Trondal 1999b). Thus, the identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour chosen by government officials employed within sectoral ministries and agencies are likely to be strengthened by the institutional dynamics of the Commission expert committees more than by the dynamics of the Council working parties. The inverse relationship is likely amongst officials employed at the permanent representations. This owes to the fact that permanent representations are formally organized under the auspices of the MFA, thus embodying territorial principles of organization. Compatibility in principles of organization may strengthen processes whereby pre-existing identities and roles are sustained and strengthened as organizational members cross organizational boundaries.

When identifying institutional compatibility across levels of governance, one has to take into account the domestic institutional affiliations embedding civil servants. “[N]ational governments … provide much of the operating life-blood of the EU” (Wallace 2000a: 27-28). Past research has revealed that the following national institutional structures are important for the construction of institutional identities, role conceptions and decision behaviour: the vertical ministry-agency spectrum; the formal hierarchical rank position of the officials; and the horizontal departmentalization between sector ministries and agencies on the one hand, and the Foreign Ministries, including their underlying embassies and permanent representations, on the other. Finally, the educational background of civil servants is shown to
be important in this respect (e.g. Dearborn and Simon 1958; Egeberg 1994; 1999a; Lægreid and Olsen 1984; Meier and Nigro 1976; Zuna 1998).

This study directs attention towards the horizontal distinction between sector ministries and agencies, on the one hand, and permanent representations to the EU on the other hand. Additionally, two vertical distinctions within the domestic governance apparatus are emphasised. First, we distinguish between the ministry level and the agency level. Second, we distinguish between different hierarchical levels within each ministry and agency. Agencies are generally organized at a lower hierarchical level than the ministries. Owing to the vertically specialized ministry-agency structure in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, I argue that officials employed at the agency level, in medium or lower rank positions, are expected to identify with functional expert roles and act in accordance with their task roles. Those employed at the ministry level, in top rank positions, are expected to enact cross-sectoral and more encompassing role and identity perceptions to a greater extent (Egeberg and Sætren 1999; Jacobsen 1960). “[I]ncumbents of leading positions are expected to identify primarily with the organization as a whole, department heads with their department, and simple members with their task role” (Mayntz 1999: 83). Moreover, owing to the fact that permanent representations are formally organized under the auspices of the MFA, thus embodying territorial principles of organization, permanent representatives are likely to evoke more encompassing and cross-sectoral behaviours than are officials employed in national sector ministries and agencies.16

Hypotheses numbers 5 to 7 relate to the primary institutional affiliations embedding domestic governmental officials.

**H5**: The potential for enacting sectoral based identities, role conceptions and modes of acting will be stronger amongst committee participants employed in medium or lower rank positions in domestic agencies than amongst those employed in top rank positions in domestic ministries.

**H6**: The potential for enacting inter-sectoral and more encompassing identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct will be stronger amongst committee participants employed
in top rank positions at the permanent representation to the EU than amongst those employed in medium or lower rank positions in domestic ministries and agencies.

“The members of national delegations in Brussels are situated at the intersection of two systems of political decision” (Pendergast 1976: 671). Moreover, having the Council of the European Union, especially the COREPER I and II and the Council working parties, as its principal responsibility officials at the permanent representation to the EU are more exposed to the organizational principles underpinning Council working parties than to the organizing principles of the Commission expert committees. Due to the EEA agreement, officials at the Norwegian permanent mission to the EU are formally excluded from participating within the Council working parties. The formal links to the Commission and its expert committees, however, persist. Hence, the Norwegian permanent representatives are likely to enact sectoral considerations and identifications more strongly than are their Danish and Swedish counterparts. Officials at the Danish and Swedish permanent representations are more likely to enact both territorial and sectoral allegiances due to their dual affiliations to both the Council working parties and Commission expert committees. Still, owing to the fact that the uppermost organizational principle of the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish permanent representations is area, the role perceptions as national representatives is likely to take primacy over sectoral role orientations. This renders it likely that officials at all Scandinavian permanent representations evoke behavioural dynamics that are biased towards the territorial end of the sectoral-territorial spectrum.

Moreover, “although the governments are free to organize their Permanent Representations as they choose, the Representations display similarities” in terms of organizational structures and staff structure (de Zwaan 1995: 20). Within the permanent representations of the three Scandinavian countries two different institutional realms exist - one diplomatic, territorial realm and one sectoral realm. On average, these realms are represented in a ratio of approximately 40:60 (de Zwaan 1995: 22; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 220). Reflecting the organizational build-up of the national administrations, these two realms are largely a replication of the horizontal distinction between sector ministries and Foreign Ministries at the domestic level. At the permanent representations, however, the diplomatic realm consists mostly of officials from domestic Foreign Ministries while officials in the sectoral realms are mostly delegates from domestic sector ministries and agencies. Officials in
the diplomatic realms tend to concentrate on salient political issues like institutional questions, external relations, and financial matters (handled in COREPER II), whereas sector specialists use more of their working time on various technical dossiers, like agriculture, transport, environment, etc (handled in COREPER I) (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 224; Westlake 1995). Hence, officials in the diplomatic realms tend to work on issue areas cutting across various policy sectors. Officials in the different sectoral realms tend to work on more narrow intra-sectoral issue areas.

Due to institutional compatibility, the potential for being affected by sectoral principles of organization underpinning the Commission expert committees may be stronger amongst officials within the sectoral realms than amongst officials within the diplomatic realms of the permanent mission. Conversely, the potential for being affected by the territorial principle of organization that is the basis for the Council working parties may be strongest amongst permanent representatives at the diplomatic realms. By and large, however, the role as ‘independent sectoral expert’ is likely to be evoked more strongly amongst officials within the sectoral realms of the permanent representations, whilst the role as ‘government representative’ is more likely to be enacted amongst officials in the diplomatic realms. These differences partially reflect institutional compatibility between different parts of the permanent representations and different EU committees. However, these differences are foremost likely to reflect the different organizational principles existing within different institutional realms at the permanent representations.17

**H7:** The likelihood for the enactment of sectoral logics is stronger amongst officials within the sectoral realms at the permanent representations than amongst officials within the diplomatic realms of this institution.

* * *

Officials attending EU committees are only part-time participants at the EU level. Their primary institutional affiliations are at the national level of governance. The institutional identities, role conceptions and patterns of acting evoked by them are thus likely to reflect the principles of organization at the national level more strongly than the organizational principles underpinning the EU committees. However, institutional compatibility across levels of
governance might provide an extra stimulus towards evoking pre-established role and identity perceptions and patterns of conduct amongst the EU committee participants. Institutional incompatibility or mismatch, however, may contribute to challenging pre-existing roles and identities. The next section introduces one additional challenge to pre-established role and identity perceptions of EU committee participants.

**Accounting for the sectoral-territorial spectrum and the national-supranational dimension: On length and intensity in cross-level participation.**

When “members of one polity serve as participants in the political processes of another” (Rosenau 1969: 46), as is the case when domestic officials participate on Commission expert committees and Council working parties, the length and intensity of participation on EU committees may impinge upon the extent to which supranational identities and role perceptions are evoked by the participants (Trondal 1998). “[T]he relative intensity of transnational activity … broadly determines variations [in supra-nationalism]” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998: 4). I argue that in addition to studying the kinds of linkages that exist at the intersection of the EU and the nation-state, the number of such linkages make a difference (Krasner 1988: 75). Apart from being formal members of EU committees, protracted and intensive interaction and participation within these committees is hypothesized to affect the enactment of identities and role conceptions amongst the committee members (Checkel 1999: 11). Haas (1958) assumed that participants become ‘locked in’ and socialized by the sheer intensity of interaction. “The interactive character of decision making extends over time so that the development of beliefs, rules, and expectations in one organization is intertwined with their development in others” (March 1999a: 29). According to Deutsch, “common identities are the product of intensive transactions and communications” (Rosamond 2000: 46).

This general argument rests upon socialization theory, which emphasise a positive relationship between the intensity of participating within a collective group and the extent to which members of this group take the world for granted (Meyer and Rowan 1991), become victims of ‘group think’ (Janis 1982; t’Hart et al. 1997), or develop particular ‘community methods’ (Lewis 2000; Smith 1998: 309). Socialization is seen as a dynamic process, “in which the actor shapes and adapts the information to his or her own needs” (Ritzer 1996: 348). Socialization is the process whereby the actors come to identify with their governmental roles. As such, socialization processes are uni-directional in the sense that the ‘socializor’ educates,
indoctrinates, teaches or diffuses his norms or ideas to the ‘socializee’. The potential for socialization to occur is positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction amongst the organizational members (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 150; Kerr 1973; Pendergast 1976; Smith 1992: 58).\textsuperscript{18} Protracted and intensive exposure towards certain information increases the likelihood for the enactment of particular identifications and role conceptions. “Many roles are learned through playing the roles…” (Stryker 1980: 63). The length and intensity to which national civil servants attend EU committees may affect the extent to which the participants are affected by the organizational principles underpinning these committees. In current neo-functionalist analyses, the construction of supranational allegiances are perceived as being “a function of the \textit{duration} of the socialization impact” (Niemann 1998: 437 - emphasis added; McDonald 1997: 51). “[S]ectors in which cross-border interaction are relatively more intense will move relatively faster and further towards supranational policy-making” (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1999: 152). 

Two claims are made concerning the outcome of socialization processes. First, the increased likelihood for identifications to develop towards EU institutions results from “daily reinforcement” and intensive exposure to new stimuli and information at the EU level (Kerr 1973; Lodge 1978: 241). One consequence of interacting frequently within Commission expert committees and Council working parties, domestic civil servants are likely to take on supranational identifications. That is, they identify with EU level institutions within which they are participating. Supranational identifications, thus, imply identifications with EU level institutions.\textsuperscript{19} Intensive participation within EU committees increases the likelihood for identities and role perceptions to reflect the supranational institutional characteristics of these committees. However, while Haas (1958) argued that supranational loyalties were likely to replace pre-existing national identifications, the current study maintains that supranational identifications supplement pre-established national and sectoral allegiances. Hence, a multi-faceted and multi-layered conception of identity and role underlies this study (cf. below). Still, the length and intensity of national officials’ exposure to EU committees might have an independent causal impact on the enactment of supranational role perceptions. Hence, this notion of socialization seeks to account for the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration.
The second argument on socialization suggests that the intensity and length of participation on EU committees strengthen the effects of the organizational principles underpinning these committees. Thus, Council working parties are likely to activate co-ordination behaviour that is territorial in character, while Commission expert committees are more likely to cultivate sectoral elements of the co-ordination behaviour enacted (cf. above). Intensive and sustained participation on these committees is likely to strengthen the territorial and sectoral patterns of co-ordination. This notion of socialization thus aims at accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration.

Commission expert committees and Council working parties are largely collegial arrangements of a non-permanent nature. They are composed largely of ‘part-timers’ whose primary institutional affiliations lie elsewhere. The socialization potential is assumed to be, and is also empirically shown to be, weaker within non-permanent collegial organizations than within permanent hierarchical organizations. This is empirically revealed within the European Parliament (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Katz 1997; Scully 1999), within the American Congress (Fenno 1962), and within EU committees (Egeberg 1999b; Lewis 1999a and 2000; Schaefer et al. 2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000). Collegial organizations are composed of members having their main organizational affinities in other organizations. The members are thus pre-socialized and “pre-packed” before attending the collegium. The socialization potential of the collegium, however, is strengthened if the committee participants attend often, if he or she is a senior participant, if the same participants meet regularly, or if each colleague generally devotes a major amount of time participating within the collegial setting (Checkel 1999: 10; Dierickx and Beyers 1999; Lewis 2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000).

Empirical evidence indicates that sustained and intensive participation within collegial arrangements generally affects the role perceptions, senses of belonging and patterns of behaviour evoked by the colleagues (e.g. Fenno 1962). Thus, in addition to being affected by the organizational principles of the EU committees, senior EU committee participants are likely to evoke supranational allegiances (Beyers 1998a). Hence, the length and intensity of participation is assumed to blur the organizational borders between the collegium and the ‘core-organization’. In this study, this scenario denotes blurring the borders between the EU level and the domestic central administrative branches.
Following from this, the intensity and length of cross-level participation may account for the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration. The length and intensity of cross-level participation conditions the likelihood that pre-established role and identity perceptions are sustained at the EU level. If domestic civil servants attend Commission expert committees and Council working parties relatively frequently, it is more likely that these officials start identifying with EU institutions, in general, and with the committees more particularly (Ekengreen 1996; Haas 1958).

As far as the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration is concerned, intensive and sustained participation on EU committees render it more likely that the evoked co-ordination behaviour reflects the principles of organization underpinning these committees. Considering Denmark, Norway and Sweden, civil servants from these countries participate on Commission expert committees, thus becoming affected by sectoral impulses. Danish and Swedish civil servants are hypothesized, in addition, to be affected by area based impulses from within the Council working parties. The exposure to these impulses is strengthened if the committee participants attend the committees often, if he or she is a senior participant, if the same participants meet regularly, or if each organizational member generally devotes a major amount of time participating within the collegial setting. The following hypotheses are proposed:

**H8**: These is a positive correlation between the length and intensity of participation within EU committees and the extent to which the participants become affected by the uppermost principle of organization present within these committees.

**H9**: Lengthy and intensive participation on EU committees contributes to the enactment of supranational allegiances.

Hence, the intensity variable relates both to the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration (H8) as well as to the national-supranational axis (H9).

The general idea behind these two propositions rests on the assumption that the potential for being affected by particular institutional dynamics relates to the duration of exposure to certain organizational structures (Checkel 1999: 10; Risse and Sikkink 1999). The potential
for being socialised and re-socialised increases with protracted memberships within organizations (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and the potential for co-operation - in large - is positively related to the duration of interaction amongst the actors (Axelrod 1990).

**The independent variables brought together.**

A multitude of cognitive borderlines is present between the EU system and the domestic civil service system. Some are based on different principles of organization, like sector and territoriality, other are based on the length and intensity to which national civil servants attend each level of governance. Some borderlines are compatible and some are not. There are also differences between various nation-states and between different policy sectors as to the degree of compatibility between national government institutions and different EU institutions. Some bureaucracies and sectors are more Euro-compatible than others with respect to the organizational principles underpinning each bureaucracy and each policy sector. Consequently, the existence of multiple institutional borders between the EU level and the domestic level implies that the potential repertoire of identities, role conceptions and modes of acting is large. Hence, “it is not one single form but rather a balanced mixture of different modes of governance which helps to manage the tensions produced by the multi-level framework” of the EU (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 343 - original emphasis).

Contending and partially conflicting principles of organization tend to coexist within the EU committees. Within the Commission expert committees a geographical principle runs parallel with the sectoral principle and within Council working parties a sectoral principle of organization exists and supplements the area principle. Hence, one has to replace the dichotomy between compatibility versus non-compatibility with a continuum in order to grasp the complexity of the reality. Analytically, however, it is important to understand how partially contending principles of organizations are likely to be skewed and biased by the uppermost principle of organization of each EU committee (Egeberg and Trondal 1997b; Gulick 1937). Hence, elements of geographical specialization within the Commission expert committees are likely to be biased by the dominant sectoral principle underpinning the EU Commission. Correspondingly, elements of sectoral specialization within the Council working parties are likely to be biased by the dominant spatial principle of organization within the Council of Ministers. Yet, due to the presence of partially contending principles of organization within these committees, contradictory empirical observations should be
expected. However, it is important to uphold the distinctions between the organizational principles advocated in this Chapter. The main effect of one principle of organization might not be totally drowned by other partially contending principles of organization. Outlining the theoretical arguments and the hypotheses merely as *ceteris paribus* clauses, empirical nuances and richness are sacrificed for analytical simplicity and parsimony.

Further, in EU member states like Denmark and Sweden, the impact of sectoral principles that dominate the Commission expert committees are likely to be moderated by the effects from area principles that exist within the Council working parties. This is due to the fact that domestic civil servants often attend both Commission expert committees and Council working parties (Edwards and Spence 1994; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Institut für Europäische Politik 1987). Moreover, the intensity dimension conditions the effects of all these organizing principles. The impact stemming from sectoral principles of organization diminishes if the participants seldom join the expert committees. Overall, institutional seniority at the EU level also conditions the relationships discussed above. Professional affiliations of government officials add to the potential modifications of the impact of the organizing principles underpinning the EU committees and working parties. For example, the impact of the territorial principle underpinning the Council working parties may be modified if the participants are educated in physics, biology or engineering, etc (cf. Chapter 5). Finally, the enactment of role and identity perceptions and modes of behaviour are likely to be fundamentally affected by the domestic government apparatus embedding these officials. The EU committees on which these officials participate are only secondary affiliations as compared to the primary affiliations towards the national ministries, agencies and permanent missions.

Due to the sheer number of organizational borders revealed between the Scandinavian Nation-States and the EU committees, one danger for the officials is to mix different responses to different stimuli. This is especially the case if different stimuli are difficult to separate from each other. “[A]lternative identities can compete for relevance, even in a given context” (Sen 1999: 15). It may be ambiguous as to precisely which identity and role to evoke in certain situations because the principles underlying organizations are conceived as ambiguous. Civil servants may evoke different identities on the basis of one singular organizational principle (March 1994; Simon 1957). Moreover, domestic governmental officials arriving at the
committee room for the first time may not immediately construct ‘new’ supranational identities or role conceptions. The new situation to which they are exposed might be perceived of as novel, unfamiliar and ambiguous to them, thus making it difficult to determine which identity or role to evoke. The new situation and the appropriate response to it may seem ambiguous to the actor (March 1994: 137). Several factors contribute to making the committee context unfamiliar and ambiguous. It is a multi-national and multi-linguistic context and consists of different national traditions and cultures as regards appropriate administrative behaviour. The institutional setting is physically distant from the home country and meeting rooms are considerably larger than what is customary.

Ambiguity regarding which identities and roles to evoke in particular situations easily activates a logic of recency whereby identities and roles that have been evoked recently are likely to be evoked again. One implication of the logic of recency is that pre-existing national allegiances are sustained at the EU level (March 1994: 70). In March’s words: “An individual who has been negotiating a tough contract as an antagonistic lawyer carries that identity over to the role of diner in a restaurant or driver on a highway” (March 1994: 70). In the EU context, national officials who have just arrived at the committee room are likely to evoke well-known identities and roles of a domestic origin. When the situation, and the response to it, are perceived as ambiguous or novel, the committee participant is likely to evoke old responses and solutions to new situations (March and Olsen 1989; 1995). However, consistent with the logic of recency, if committee members attend EU committees often, is a senior participant, meet regularly with the same participants, and generally devotes a major amount of time and energy participating within the EU committees, new supranational role and identity perceptions are likely to be enacted.

Having outlined the theoretical perspective aimed at accounting for administrative integration across levels of governance, the final section of this Chapter reviews the dependent variables applied to measure this phenomenon.
How to measure administrative integration: Conceptions of decision behaviour and role and identity perceptions

Processes of administrative integration across levels of governance may be measured through various empirical proxies (cf. Chapter 4). Relevant questions are what is the appropriate level of analysis and which variables are capable of empirically uncovering administrative integration? Three general measures are suggested as yardsticks in the current study:

- The decision behaviour of individual officials,
- The role perceptions of individual officials,
- The institutional identities of individual officials.

The current study analyses administrative integration through three dependent variables: the role conceptions, the identities, and the modes of behaviour evoked by individual EU committee participants. While identities and roles may vary along both the national-supranational axis and the sectoral-territorial axis of figure 1.2 (cf. Chapter 1), decision behaviour is likely to vary solely along the sectoral-territorial dimension. On this basis, administrative integration might stem from two major sources:

- Participation on EU committees may result in the enactment of sectoral modes of decision behaviour, roles and identities. However, these variables do not necessarily take on supranational characteristics.
- Participation on EU committees may result in the enactment of supranational identities and roles. An example is that of officials identifying strongly with the Council working parties they attend. Thus, identities are attached towards EU level institutions.

Administrative integration is moderate in each of the above cases where intergovernmentalism is transcended along only one dimension. A stronger mode of administrative integration requires that intergovernmental dynamics be transcended along both the sector-territorial dimension and along the national-supranational dimension. Contrary to the strong and the moderate mode of administrative integration, a weak mode of administrative integration is treated as our null-hypothesis and covers situations whereby intergovernmental dynamics prevail along both axes.
Owing to the fact that our three parameters of administrative integration are largely ignored within the study of administrative integration (Trondal 1999b), the following paragraphs aim at discussing these variables in greater detail. Each variable is presented successively, followed by a discussion of how each variable is likely to be affected by processes of ‘cross-level participation’ towards EU committees.

Actual decision behaviour is studied solely in relation to the sectoral-territorial dimension addressed above. In the current study, it is difficult to assume distinct supranational modes of acting. Decision behaviour relates to what officials actually do and how they do it. Decision behaviour may be seen as processes where premises are supplied and chosen (Simon 1957). Decision behaviour relates to which actors, problems, alternatives and solutions are brought together and which are held separate. Decision behaviour also has to do with who has contact with whom, when and how do they have contact, which considerations are attached importance by officials when making decisions, what signals are assigned weight amongst government officials in the course of taking decisions, and which officials are paying attention to which problems, solutions and consequences.

One way of studying decision behaviour within domestic government institutions is to focus on co-ordination behaviour. The general rationale for studying co-ordination processes relates to the question of policy coherence. A general political-administrative goal is to prevent policy fragmentation and to foster policy connectedness. Moreover, shown below, co-ordination behaviour is indicative of administrative integration. Co-ordination “has become a much more central concern for policy-makers as they need to operate in multiple arenas (often simultaneously) … “ (Hocking 1999: 10). However, definitions and perceptions of co-ordination vary between different authors. Metcalfe (1994) proposes a cumulative Guttman scale for measuring increased information sharing and increased level of agreement on politics and policies among different actors. Metcalfe (1994) proposes a cumulative Guttman scale for measuring increased information sharing and increased level of agreement on politics and policies among different actors. Co-ordination may involve exchange of information, avoidance of divergences, search for agreements, arbitration, the setting of priorities, and the formation of strategies (Metcalfe 1994). Co-ordination may also involve bargaining and arguing amongst different actors (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). Boston (1992, 89) includes acts like “the avoidance, or at least minimization, of duplication and overlap; the avoidance of policy inconsistencies; the quest for coherence and cohesion and an agreed ordering of
priorities; the minimization of conflict…; and the promotion of a comprehensive or ‘whole government’ perspective against … sectoral perspectives”.

As these definitions reveal, most accounts of co-ordination largely ignore the intra-sectoral dimension of co-ordination. They solely pay attention to cross-sectoral co-ordination processes (Schout 1999: 4). This study focuses on both intra-sectoral co-ordination and inter-sectoral co-ordination. Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination denote processes of horizontal co-ordination between governmental organizations and between different policy sectors. The Foreign Ministry represents the ultimate cross-sectoral co-ordinating ministry (Hocking 1999). Conversely, intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination denote horizontal and vertical co-ordination processes within governmental organizations and within policy sectors.

As indicated above, the co-ordination variable relates solely to the second dimension of our two-dimensional model. Co-ordination may take on either intra-sectoral or inter-sectoral/territorial characteristics. Intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination represent a more adequate measure of administrative integration than inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination. As elaborate on below, intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination weakens the boundary-maintaining role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus blurring the boundaries between the EU level and the national level of governance.

Grouping actors, problems, solutions and consequences into different organizational units encourages co-ordination within units, not between them (Mintzberg 1979: 107). Intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination relate to processes whereby each policy sector is linked closer together with respect to actors, problems, solutions and modes of thinking. Intra-sectoral co-ordination at the domestic level of governance is generally assumed to increase as one moves down the formal hierarchy and as one moves from the ministry level towards the agency level. Conversely, inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination are basically inter-organizational in nature. Inter-sectoral co-ordination denotes co-ordination processes between different ministries and between different agencies. This mode strengthens the role of ministries with a horizontal co-ordination obligation within the governmental apparatus, e.g. the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. The portfolio of these ministries crosscut the sectoral principles underpinning sector ministries and agencies. Moreover, inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination are generally assumed to increase as one moves up the formal hierarchy and as one moves from the agency level to the ministry level. Further, inter-sectoral
modes of co-ordination are assumed to be stronger at the permanent representations to the EU than within sector ministries and agencies in the ‘home administration’. This study considers day to day co-ordination behaviour. One may expect the volume of co-ordination to be lower in periods of day-to-day piecemeal changes compared to situations of crisis management (Walzenback 1999). During periods of stability, co-ordination is routinized and contributes to a generally low level of systematic attention devoted towards co-ordination amongst the decision-makers.

The arguments advocated above stress how modes of domestic co-ordination are likely to reflect different organizational principles embedded within different EU committees. As regards administrative integration, this study aims at revealing whether domestic government officials evoke different modes of co-ordination as a result of participating within different committees at the EU level. I have argued that administrative integration is promoted more strongly if domestic government officials participate in Commission expert committees than if they participate in Council working parties. Moreover, I have claimed that administrative integration is likely to be stronger when intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination are activated. Inter-sectoral, or territorial, modes of co-ordination, largely controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), are likely to construct administrative ‘filters’ or buffers between governance levels. Conversely, intra-sectoral co-ordination processes are likely to impair the co-ordination role of the MFA to a great extent, rendering the domestic level of governance vulnerable to sectoral penetration and influence from the EU level. Hence, administrative integration is fostered by the general lack of inter-sectoral co-ordination from the MFA.

Finally, my definition of co-ordination is two-dimensional with regard to the applied techniques. Co-ordination may be either (i) pro-active, geared towards drawing up written and clear-cut mandates and instructions, or (ii) re-active and oral, not geared towards outlining any clear-cut, written instructions. Whereas the first technique tends to foster formally binding and clear mandates, the second technique tends to produce more unclear mandates. Processes producing imperative mandates are based upon notions of institutions as coupled and sectorally co-ordinated systems of governance. The notion of unclear mandates rests upon notions of institutions as uncoupled, segmented and inter-sectorally fragmented government systems (Olsen 1988: 162-170). A more thorough theoretical elaboration on different co-ordination techniques is provided in Chapter 5.
The second and third dependent variables measuring administrative integration are the *role and identity perceptions* evoked by EU committee participants. These variables are almost completely lacking in contemporary studies of administrative integration (Trondal 1999b; Trondal and Veggeland 2000). The question posed here is two-fold. First, do government officials evoke sectoral or territorial roles and identities when participating on EU committees? I argue that administrative integration is fostered if these roles and identities are sectoral in nature – thus largely transcending territorial senses of belonging. Sectoral identities and roles are seen as reflecting institutional dynamics existing within Commission expert committees and sector ministries and agencies at the national level. Second, is administrative integration fostered more fully if government officials enact supranational roles and identities? Identities and roles are defined solely in institutional terms within this study. Supranational identities and role perceptions thus resemble identifications with EU level institutions – e.g. towards particular EU committees attended or towards the EU more generally. All EU institutions are conceived of as supranational entities. Therefore, a strong mode of administrative integration requires the enactment of supranational identities and role perceptions as well as the evocation of sectoral allegiances.

In this section, roles and identities are discussed in parallel because these properties of the self are perceived of as a continuum. Having an identity is a result of internalizing the values and goals prescribed by the role (Barnett 1993: 274). Moreover, by ‘role’ we usually mean a set of expectations (norms or rules) that more or less specify the desired behaviour of the actor (March and Olsen 1989). Roles prescribe how one should act while identities, in addition, prescribe who one should be. “To the extent that organization members identify with their organization, they are willing to act spontaneously in its interest, without being told exactly what to do” (Mayntz 1999: 83). Identification does not require that deviant desires or behavioural preferences be absent, only that internal (rather than external) sanctioning mechanisms are sufficiently effective to prevent deviant preferences from being brought into action. Hence, “the adoption of roles is central to the development of social identities” (Pratt 1998: 196). According to social identity theory, the adoption and enactment of roles are necessary means for producing identification (Pratt 1998; Stryker 1980). Identities are more difficult to distinguish from the self than roles, and therefore also more difficult to alter in different situations. Identification with roles, however, need not come about because “it is relatively easy to set aside the reality of the secondary internalizations” (Berger and Luckman
1966: 162). The enactment of roles as ‘independent experts’ or ‘government representatives’ by EU committee participants need not accompany identifications with these roles (cf. Chapter 6).

The notion of role rests on an analogy of the theatre where the actor is expected to perform according to a particular script (Stryker and Statham 1985: 330). Consistent with a cognitive perspective, “[the theatre] consists of socially constructed players endowed with different capacities for action and parts to play” (Scott 1995: 42). Similarly, the current study analyses civil servants as actors at two different theatres: domestic and European. These officials are perceived as multiple selves (Elster 1986), having multiple roles and identities (Barnett 1993). The question thus becomes which script (identity and role) should they enact in which play? Additionally, is each official able to determine which roles to enact in different plays? Neither roles nor identities are seen as easily shifting and changing when actors move from one play to another. Roles and identities are fairly stable features of the self, being relatively robust characteristics of the actor (Heidar 1997: 93; March and Olsen 1989). Consistent with a multiple concept of roles and identities, actors may shift the attention towards different roles and identities when changing play, albeit not always constructing qualitatively new roles and identities for each new situation or play. Contrary to Haas (1958), the enactment of supranational allegiances is likely to supplement pre-established national identities, not replace them. Different plays often have points of resemblance triggering actors to evoke similar role and identity perceptions. In the study of multilevel governance in the EU, national ministries and agencies may have several institutional matches with different EU institutions. This contributes to strengthening pre-existing role and identity perceptions evoked at the national level of governance when entering EU committees (cf. above).

Why is it important to study identities and roles? First, they provide cognitive, moral and normative systems of orientation and self-reference. This study emphasises identity and role concepts as perceived by the officials themselves. We study role and identity perceptions of civil servants as they “exist in the minds of [civil servants]” (Saalfeld and Müller 1997: 9). Second, they provide the actor with a shared system of meaning. Third, they may influence the framing of action. “What [people] do and how they do it depends upon how they see themselves and their world, and this in turn depends upon the concepts through which they see” (Pitkin 1972: 1). If officials enact more encompassing role conceptions the likelihood for
cross-sectoral co-ordination behaviour may be enhanced. “One could argue … that the more officials identify themselves with more overarching entities, the more co-ordination will take place in a system” (Egeberg and Sætren 1999: 94). Hence, identity and role perceptions provide “conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action” (March and Olsen 1995: 30).

Within this study, representational roles may be of three different kinds: the role as ‘government representative’, the role as ‘independent expert’, and finally the role as ‘supranational agent’. We ask whether officials attending Commission expert committees and Council working parties conceive themselves as being representatives of the nation-state as a whole (‘government representative’), as representatives of their ‘own’ policy sector, ministry and/or agency (‘independent expert’), or rather as representatives of the EU, EU institutions and/or EU policies (‘supranational agent’). As regards identity conceptions, this study asks to what extent participation on Commission expert committees and Council working parties strengthen the sense of belonging towards the nation-state as a whole, towards the domestic governmental apparatus as a whole, towards the EU committees they attend in particular, or towards the EU more generally. The notion of identities and roles as complementary is important to this study. Consistent with the notion of the individual as a ‘multiple self’, individuals are seen as capable of evoking several, partially contending roles and identities simultaneously (March 1994) or sequentially (Andeweg 1997: 126; Cyert and March 1992). Due to being exposed to conflicting role and identity expectations at two levels of governance, government officials may take on a partially conflicting set of roles and identities, e.g. evoking the role as a ‘government representative’ together with the role as an ‘independent expert’. The roles and identities considered here are of institutional character. Identities are seen as the feeling of belonging towards different branches of the domestic governmental apparatus as well as senses of belonging towards different parts of the EU system. A strong mode of administrative integration arguably requires roles and identities to include both supranational and sectoral elements.
Conclusion

Ideas advanced by neo-functionalists in the 1950s and 60s (Puchala 1999) are the basing of our study. This study offers an organization theory perspective on penetrative processes and pays attention to more general mechanisms in organizational life that affect officials’ identities, role perceptions and patterns of acting. Penetrative processes embrace situations where officials are “members of one policy [and] serve as participants in the political processes of another” (Rosenau 1969: 46). I argue in this study that the mechanisms that integrate bureaucracies across levels of governance are of three kinds. These are, the basic organizational principles underpinning domestic government institutions and EU committees; the primary and secondary institutional affiliations embedding civil servants; and the length and intensity by which national officials participate on EU committees (cf. figure 1.4 in Chapter 1).

Directing our attention towards principles of organization that link particular nation-states and particular EU institutions together, this study goes beyond the membership versus non-membership distinction (Bernitz and Bernitz 1996; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Stubb 1996). Norwegian government officials may be as integrated into the EU as Danish and Swedish officials as far as sectoral affiliations towards the Commission expert committees are concerned. Moreover, Norwegian civil servants do not have access opportunities to either the Council of Ministers or to the Council working parties in particular (cf. Chapter 4). Hence, along the sectoral-territorial axis, Norwegian government officials are most likely to locate themselves close to the sectoral end of the spectrum. Danish and Swedish officials are more likely to position themselves somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. This argument holds true for domestic government officials employed within sectoral ministries and agencies as well as for officials at the permanent representations to the EU. Hence, along the sectoral-territorial axis most Norwegian officials are likely to transcend intergovernmentalism more fully than are most Danish and Swedish counterparts.

Along the national-supranational axis, however, an opposite conclusion is more likely. Generally, arguing that supranationalism stems from the length and intensity of exposure towards EU institutions and assuming a priori that Danish and Swedish officials attend EU committees more intensively than their Norwegian colleagues (cf. Chapter 4), supranational
identities and role perceptions are more likely to be evoked amongst the former than the latter. Put more generally, officials devoting much time and energy towards attending EU committees are likely to enact supranational role and identity perceptions. Officials at the permanent representations to the EU are expected to attend EU committees fairly intensively, and might thus be expected to take on supranational allegiances fairly strongly (cf. Chapter 4 and 6). The current study highlights the importance of institutional affiliations embedding individual civil servants to explain administrative integration. Norwegian, Danish and Swedish officials attending the same EU committees and having similar institutional affiliations at home are likely to enact similar role and identity perceptions.

A cognitive organization theory perspective enables us to determine the relative primacy of different institutional dynamics affecting organizational members, thus seizing a middle ground between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. A cognitive perspective reveals the multi-level character of the EU system and the multi-level character of processes of administrative integration. When comparing Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials, administrative integration is likely to vary along the two dimensions presented. Norwegian civil servants are likely to enact sectoral identities, role conceptions and patterns of conduct, albeit evoking supranational identities and role perceptions less frequently. This is not because they are Norwegian officials but because they participate solely in the “Commission pillar”. These hypotheses derive from Norwegian civil servants participating within Commission expert committees with medium intensity and for only shorter periods of time. Danish and Swedish officials, on the other hand, are more likely to construct partially new sets of supranational identities and role conceptions when attending different EU committees. Again, this is not because they are Danish and Swedish officials, but because of the seniority of each civil servant within various EU committees. Most Danish officials have participated within EU committees for considerable longer time than their Swedish colleagues (cf. Chapter 4). Thus, supranational allegiances are more likely to develop amongst Danish committee participants than amongst their Swedish counterparts.

The civil servants considered in this study have their primary institutional affiliations at the domestic level. As “travelling national civil servants” (Nedergaard 1994: 26) they are only part-time participants within EU committees. The enactment of institutional identities, role conceptions and decision behaviours are likely to be most strongly affected by the
organizational principles of the domestic bureaucracies. However, intensive and sustained participation on EU committees may increase the likelihood for the enactment of qualitative new supranational allegiances.

The next Chapter introduces the empirical data applied to illuminate the theoretical arguments put forward in this Chapter. The next Chapter also provides methodological and meta-methodological discussions regarding to how to test these theoretical arguments empirically.
Notes

1 An earlier draft version of this Chapter was presented at the ARENA Annual Conference, 5-6 November 1998. The author is indebted to the participants at this conference. Additionally, the author would like to thank Jan Beyers, Ingunn M. Bjørndal, Tom Christensen, Morten Egeberg, Thomas Hammond, James G. March and Adriaan Schout for valuable comments.

2 Within current literature on processes of Europeanization of domestic central administrations, two additional empirical proxies have been emphasised: (i) impacts on formal institutional arrangements (e.g. Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001; Page and Wouters 1995), and (ii) impacts on the policy output or policy outcome within different policy sectors (e.g. Claes and Tranøy 1999; Steunenberg and Dimitrova 1999).

3 Empirical studies show that officials participating on both Commission expert committees and comitology committees have difficulties in telling these committees apart as regards their formal status (Institut für Europäische Politik 1987: 81; Van Schendelen 1996). “This mixture of working group and comitology committee sometimes makes it very difficult for national civil servants to know when they have to act as representative of a Member-State within a Comitology committee and when as an independent national expert” (Demmke 1998: 17). Excluding the comitology committees from the analysis helps to reduce the likelihood of mixing different committees, albeit not completely excluding this possibility. Further, why concentrate this analysis on Commission expert committees instead of the comitology committees? The overall reason for this is the institutional context in which the Commission expert committees are embedded. These committees have a clear institutional connection to the EU Commission while the comitology committees have a more ambiguous institutional position at the intersection of the EU Commission and the Council of Ministers. The Council working parties, on the other hand, are institutionally located solely within the Council of the European Union. One argument against excluding the comitology committees from the study is the potential ‘importance’ of these committees due to the internal market legislation being implemented in the years to come (van Schendelen 1998). On the other hand, studies indicate that the relative ‘power’ of the comitology committees is limited in the legislative processes of the EU. Between 1987 and 1996 initial propositions from the EU Commission were altered and corrected by comitology committees in only 1 per cent of the cases (Van der Knaap 1996: 103-104). If administrative and legal corrections tell us anything about the relative influence of different institutions, and if we leave out anticipated reaction from consideration, these figures indicate a low degree of influence of the comitology system.

4 The distinction between ‘full-timers’ and ‘part-timers’ is not only a question of the time and energy devoted by officials towards different organizational contexts. In addition, this distinction is based upon formal institutional characteristics. In that respect, domestic officials should be conceived of as ‘full-timers’ within their domestic ministries or agencies and only as ‘part-timers’ at the EU-level of governance due to their formal status as employees within national ministries and agencies.
The propositions outlined in this Chapter are *ceteris paribus* in character. Several intervening variables may potentially disturb the suggested relationships. For example, officials who have negative experiences from participating on EU committees may be more reluctant Europeans than officials who have had positive experiences (Haas 1964; Saeter 1998: 23). Moreover, officials who attend EU committees fairly often need not be re-socialized. As a consequence of protracted participation on EU committees, officials may become experts at organizational hypocrisy, that is, de-coupling talk and action (Brunsson 1989). Domestic government officials may, for instance, pursue other interests within EU committees than originally intended by the domestic government. As such, this may involve a principal-agent problem (cf. Chapter 7).

One might argue that social constructivist accounts should be consulted in order to understand how organization members come to construct ‘new’ identities and role conceptions. One main difficulty in applying the social constructivist notion is the problem of operationalizing and measuring the mutual constitutive dynamic between structures and actors. This problem is highlighted within empirical work by social constructivists (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Herman 1996; Kier 1996; Price 1995; Risse and Sikkink 1999). A second problem exhibited by social constructivism is the lack of operationalizable concepts of organizational structures (Trondal 2001 – cf. Chapter 7).

This way of understanding organizations is also widespread within the new-institutionalism dealing with institutionalised environments (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Institutionalized elements in the environment develop a rule-like status contributing to cognitive mapping of the environments.

The role of agency, however, is not ruled out of the model. Which identity, role or mode of acting that is evoked is ultimately a matter of choice, however, largely biased by cognitive limitations and mental maps. Hence, rational and strategic choices are largely conditional upon the institutional contexts providing cues for selecting certain identities, roles or modes of acting above others (Sen 1999). Agency is seen as contextualized and embedded within organizational structures.

Current conceptualizations of the EU system are of a rather pragmatic nature, based on categories largely emanating from within the international relations school (Sandholtz 1996). Conceptualizations of the Union emphasize the “EU’s institutional set-up as differing markedly from member state polities” (Kohler-Koch 1998: 3), and that policies within the EU are more like those found *between* nation-states than those found *within* them (Hooghe and Marks 1997 – original emphasis). As I see it, one main problem attached to conceptualizations of the EU, as addressed within more recent EU literature, is the difficulty of deriving precise and theoretically illuminating hypotheses from the dimensions addressed. The EU system has been described as a fourth branch or level of governance (Majone 1993; Egeberg 1980). Likewise, the EU has been seen as a functional, statist and pluralist system of governance (Kohler-Koch 1998), and as a network mode of governance (Börzel 1998; Kohler-Koch 1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Peterson 1995). Moreover, the EU has been viewed as a multi level, multi-tiered, and multi-layered system of governance (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1995; Marks et al. 1996), as an international regime (Breckinridge 1997), and as an imagined and epistemic community (Anderson 1991;
Efforts have also been devoted towards conceptualizing different forms of affiliation to the EU: Nation-states have been conceived of as integrated and affiliated to the Union on the basis of time (multi-speed Europe), on the basis of space (variable geometry), and on the basis of sector (Europe a la carte) (Stubb 1996). Nation-states’ forms of affiliation to the Union are also perceived as organized according to the principle of purpose and/or according to the principle of area, ‘full’ membership comprising both principles (Egeberg and Trondal 1997b).

This is not an argument about the generalizability of theories. To make universal conceptualizations does not automatically imply a plea for ‘covering law’ theories. Rather, this argument makes no connection at all between the empirical conceptualizations of the reality and the theories applied for understanding and interpreting this reality (cf. Chapter 3).

Along these constituencies, Schmitter (1996) sees four ideal types of polities: Condominio, Consortio, Confederatio, and Federatio.

Organizational categories addressed by the old institutionalist school (e.g. Weber and Gulick) are applied to this study. This owes basically to the fact that measurable dimensions and variables are available within the old institutionalism to a greater extent than in most new-institutionalist approaches.

The examples given in figures 2.1 and 2.2 are only suggestive and illustrative.

According to MacMullan (1998), Commissioners are males, middle aged, and university educated in law or economics. Their political affiliations have largely been centrist. They also have a parliamentary or ministerial political career prior to entering the Commission.

Despite having gained increased influence on selecting the Commission team, Spence (2000) argues that the system of national pressures for particular Commissioners have remained unchanged. “Prodi is said to have wished for candidates with economic and business experience, only to be faced with several candidates with purely political backgrounds” (Spence 2000: 7).

In real life situations the distinction between the ministry level and the agency level may differ from nation-state to nation-state. In all three countries being part of this study, the agencies are formally organized outside the ministries. However, the formal autonomy of the agency level is somewhat greater in Sweden than in Denmark and Norway (Lindbom 1997; Lægreid and Pedersen 1999; Petersson 1998). The autonomy of Swedish agencies is also revealed empirically (e.g. Jacobsson 1984; Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). This autonomy is partially due to the collegial system of governance in Sweden and partially due to the relative greater staff size of the Swedish agency level as compared to the ministry level. Thus, separating the role as political loyal and professional neutral might be somewhat easier to do amongst Swedish officials than amongst Danish and Norwegian civil servants. Hence, the impact stemming form differences in staff size adds to the impact fuelled by the
administrative autonomy of the Swedish agencies. Additionally, most Swedish agencies are physically located more distantly from the ministries than their Danish and Norwegian counterparts. Notwithstanding these differences, the institutional build-up of the domestic government apparatus in these three countries is fairly similar.

Considering the ministries and agencies included in the current study, both Swedish and Danish agencies are larger in staff size than their Norwegian counterparts (cf. Chapter 1). However, the physical proximity between the ministries and the agencies are not significant, all being located within the capitals of their respective countries.

Furthermore, one might argue that the sheer number of different government officials representing one nation-state within one singular EU committee might impinge upon the roles and identities being enacted by each participant. This is especially the case in committees that are organized according to conflicting organizational principles, thus providing conflicting role expectations. Both Commission expert committees and Council working parties are organized according to (at least) two general principles: the principle of purpose and the principle of area. One can assume that the likelihood for enacting several different roles is negatively related to the number of committee members representing each nation-state. Here is one illustration. In situations whereby two officials (e.g. one from the ministry level and one from the agency level) represent one nation-state within one Council working party, each official is likely to evoke only one set of roles and identities. In this scenario, civil servants from the ministry level are likely to evoke roles as ‘government representatives’, while civil servants from the agency level are likely to evoke roles as ‘independent experts’. Conversely, if only one civil servant from one domestic ministry attend Council working parties, the likelihood increases that this official will evoke a dual set of roles: that of ‘government representative’ and that of ‘independent expert’.

Contrary to the socialization thesis, one might assume that protracted exposure to certain institutions may teach actors how to de-couple talk and action - thus keeping the role and identity perceptions of the actors largely unchanged and unaffected by ways of presenting oneself (March 1984). In the current study however, no efforts are made to study the relationships between talk and action. Role and identity perceptions are studied separately from co-ordination behaviour. Still, it might be questioned whether the role and identity perceptions evoked by officials are myths or reality to them (Brunsson 1989). No solid theoretical solution to this puzzle has yet been forwarded. When are processes of socialization and re-socialization occuring, and when do individuals ‘talk to talk’ (cf. Chapter 7)?

The sheer size of societal communities, organizations and collegial arrangements might impinge upon the construction of identities, role perceptions and codes of conduct. This dimension may also condition the impact of the intensity dimension. Commission expert committees normally convene from 20 to over 40 people. The Council working parties total somewhat the same amount of people. Consequently, the potential for intimacy and for close bargaining and arguing is provided by the size of these committees and groups. This intimacy may provide for an ’esprit de corps’ to emerge amongst the participants. However, the committees in this study are of approximately the same size. Hence, no hypotheses as regard variance in our dependent variables are possible to
outline on the basis of the size variable. Furthermore, the effect of physical location of government institutions is assumed to impact on the behaviour enacted by the government officials. Until 2000, the Commission was physically located at about 60 different places around Brussels and was physically separated from the conference centre (Centra Broscette) where most of the expert committees meet. The contrary is the case for the Council of Ministers, physically located within the Justus Lipsius building at Rue de la Loi 175. In addition, the working parties arrange their meetings within the Justus Lipsius building. Ceteris paribus, the competing sectoral organizational principle within the Council working parties may loom larger than the competing territorial organizational principle underpinning the Commission expert committees. This owes largely to the degree of physical proximity between the core-organization and its sub-committees.

20 Another argument on temporality emphasises the impact stemming from the births of organizations. Consistent with Stinchcombe’s birth-mark model (1965), one may argue that processes whereby identities, roles and modes of behaviour are constructed reflect the period of entrance to the EU; thus reflecting the birth of the formal affiliation between the Union and each nation-state. After entering EU committees, individual identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct are only subject to incremental change processes. This argument is not advocated in the current study.

21 Hammond (1990) has replied to Simon’s critique by underlining that principles of organizations are not neutral to policy outcomes. The point advanced by Gulick (1937) is that if the political leadership want to pursue a specific goal, they should organize according to particular principles in order to reach this goal. Every choice of principle is ultimately a choice of policy.

22 This logic is most likely to be activated amongst officials who are newcomers within EU committees. On the other hand, committee participants who attend the committees often, who are senior participants, who regularly meet the same committee participants, and who generally devote a major amount of time participating within the collegial setting are more likely to evoke ‘new’ supranational identities and role conceptions. The new decision situation at the EU level becomes internalized by the agent, strengthening the likelihood that he or she will evoke identities and role conceptions on the basis of this new situation. What is appropriate to do, and which role and identity is appropriate to enact at the EU level become less ambiguous as this level become internalized as part of cognitive maps of the officials.

23 This choice may be supported empirically by Wodak (2000). She shows that the articulation of, for example, supranational identities was couched in terms of organizational roles (Wodak 2000: 42).

24 Jon Elster (1998) argues that roles often come in pairs, that one role implies the existence of an opposite number. Similarly, the conception of self is often paired with the conception of an ‘essential other’ or a ‘generalized other’ (Galatzer-Levy and Cohler 1993; Ritzer 1996: 343-344). Our conceptualization of role and identity, however, does not ascribe this distinction vital importance. The central point made in previous sections
is that “[a] sense of belonging appears to be closely interrelated with membership in a political community” (Aggestam 1998: 7).
CHAPTER 3

TOWARDS THEORETICAL ROBUSTNESS

Introduction

Neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists disagree along, at a minimum, two dimensions: (i) a national-supranational dimension, and (ii) a sectoral-territorial axis. The first dimension regards the extent to which EU institutions contribute to construct new supranational preferences, identities and role conceptions amongst its full-time and part-time participants. The second dimension regards whether identities, role perceptions and modes of acting are basically sectoral or territorial in character. I have argued in prior Chapters that a strong mode of administrative integration is synonymous with the construction of supranational conceptions of identity and role perceptions, and that these features are basically sectoral in character. In the current Chapter some methodological questions are addressed. One central theme is how to test the theoretically derived hypotheses empirically and how to determine their theoretical robustness. To this end, this Chapter elaborates on the notion of causality, correlation, refutation, and comparative design.

The notions of statistical correlation and causality are often mixed in social science research. The first is taken as an indication of the second. The current Chapter argues that correlation is solely an empirical phenomenon, whereas causality is basically an analytical construct. I also argue that correlation and causality are elements of a tool-kit in the search for robust scientific explanations. The notions of correlation and causality are means towards determining the
relative validity of theoretical arguments. I also argue that the notion of falsification of theoretical arguments is the main purpose of scientific research and the main procedure to determine theoretical validity and robustness. However, whereas much contemporary social science rests, implicitly or explicitly, on the notion of verification, I argue that the notion of falsification seems more promising (Popper 1963). This is especially so within studies aiming at constructing and testing theories. Within such studies, the notion of falsification is necessary in order to identify borders of validity (read: scope condition) for the theories addressed.

According to an extreme notion of falsification, one singular observation that go counter to the theoretical assumptions is sufficient to warrant refutation of the argument as a whole (Popper 1963). A more pragmatic version of the notion of falsification argues that the overall rationale is to determine the limits of theoretical arguments – to identify the scope conditions under which these arguments may be valid (Lakatos 1981). Hence, empirical observations that go counter to expected patterns help to determine the conditions under which the theoretical argument may be valid. The current Chapter assumes, parallel to Elster (1989) and Lakatos (1981), that only partial refutations are possible due to an epistemological lack of general laws within social life. Hence, aiming at identifying the relative validity of theories, empirical observations that contradict expected patterns do not render the whole theory refuted; they only identify particular scope conditions under which the theory may be valid.

The next section elaborates on the Popperian notion of falsification. The second section touches upon the notion of correlation and causality. This section argues that in order to determine the relative validity of the cognitive organization theory perspective presented in Chapter 2 it is important to outline mutually exclusive dimensions within this perspective. On the basis of these dimensions one can derive mutually exclusive and empirically testable propositions. Chapter 2 has forwarded hypotheses that are, tentatively, exclusive to the cognitive perspective. The current Chapter juxtaposes methodological arguments for maximizing mutual exclusivity with regard to these empirical hypotheses.

A cognitive organizational theory perspective stresses how the organizational arrangements underpinning the EU committee system and national government institutions may foster particular modes of administrative integration across levels of governance. From the cognitive perspective it is argued that the formal institutional build-up of domestic government
institutions and EU committees, as well as the way domestic and EU level institutions are linked together, may affect processes of administrative integration in particular ways. On the contrary, we suggest a rational choice institutionalist approach as our null-hypothesis, emphasising that organizational structures at the EU level of governance do not profoundly affect processes of administrative integration. One vital endeavour of this study is to determine the conditions, under which intergovernmental dynamics is transcended, thus establishing scope conditions under which the cognitive approach to administrative integration merits validity.

When testing the empirical validity of the cognitive perspective, a comparative design is applied. This method is utilized in order to maximize the likelihood of refuting this perspective. In order to test the relative validity of this theory, empirical studies are conducted under less favourable conditions – that is, conditions under which the likelihood of falsifying the cognitive perspective is maximized. To this end, administrative integration is studied within collegial arrangements (committees) at the EU level of governance. I do not study permanent participants at the EU level of governance, only part-time participants that have permanent positions and their primary career opportunities within domestic ministries and agencies.

The next section elaborates on the notions of falsification and verification. The succeeding two sections elaborate on the notion of correlation, causality and the comparative research design.

On refutation and falsification

There exist, basically, two different modes of conducting social enquiry. One mode is where the empirical phenomena are at the centre of the analysis and the purpose is to account for this. According to Elster (1989: 7), a genuine explanation accounts for what happened, as it happened. The second mode is directed towards constructing theories and hypotheses. In this mode the theoretical argument is at the forefront of the analysis and empirical data is collected in an effort to elucidate this argument. Hence, the empirical field is utilized as a laboratory for testing hypotheses and illuminating general arguments. Empirical observations are applied for the sake of the argument, not vice versa. The current study of administrative integration lays more in the second than in the first category. The overall aim of this study is to outline a
theoretical argument for how to account for administrative integration across levels of governance. “[The researcher’s] job… is primarily to invent theories, and only secondarily to test them” (Stinchcombe 1968: 3). When studying administrative integration across the national – EU intersection, the overall research question is how to account for these processes theoretically and how to measure them empirically. This Chapter deals exclusively with the latter question.

Contemporary studies of European integration and processes of Europeanization of domestic institutions and policy processes exhibit an apparent methodological bias towards verifying theoretical arguments. Efforts towards confronting theories of European integration with empirical data are often geared towards systematically selecting empirical observations likely to support (read: verify) the theoretical arguments – not genuinely testing the relative validity of them (read: falsify). Andrew Moravcsik is currently the most prominent advocate for the intergovernmentalist account. His theoretical argument is that national interests pursued by domestic rational actors basically determine the European integration process – its pace, scope, depth and content (Moravcsik 1998). When studying these arguments empirically, Moravcsik consults data that are most likely to verify his arguments, that is, studying intergovernmental bargains amongst EU member states (IGCs). Thus, “[t]he research results are quite predictable when one looks to intergovernmental bargains for evidence of intergovernmental bargaining” (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998: 12). This is also evident in his synthesising presentation The Choice for Europe (1998) where “the selection of cases makes it easier to confirm the intergovernmentalist story…” (Caporaso 1999: 162-163). Moreover, it has been advocated that “the generality of confirmed hypothesis [within The Choice for Europe] is in part brought by the exclusion of ‘deviant’ cases” (Scharpf 1999: 167). He studies intergovernmental bargains relating to amendments and revisions of the EU treaties throughout the history of European integration (Moravcsik 1991 and 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolasidis 1999).

Similarly, neo-functionalists systematically select data most likely to confirm their theoretical propositions. Neo-functionalism pictures the integration process as being strongly affected by the institutional arrangements at the EU level of governance. The impact, fuelled by national interests and institutions, is filtered through institutional structures at the EU level of governance. As one example, Niemann (1998) studies how loyalties and interests amongst
domestic government officials are moulded within EU committees and also processes whereby domestic decision processes and decision processes at the EU level become increasingly intermeshed. Similarly, Haas (1992) confirms this argument about ‘epistemic communities’ by studying the development of shared sets of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise (Haas 1992: 35).

One trivial question becomes relevant: how many observations are necessary in order to verify theoretical arguments? In order to escape an infinite regress, the notion of falsification seems more promising as a ground for testing theories than the notion of verification. “[T]he basic logical process of science is the elimination of alternative theories” (Stinchcombe 1968: 22). The idea of refutation derives from the logical impossibility of verifying general arguments on the basis of verifying singular arguments (Hovi and Rasch 1996: 25-26). Moreover, the idea of falsification is often paired with the notion of covering law theories (Hempel 1965). Covering law theories emphasise that theoretical arguments have to rest upon general laws. On this basis, Popper (1963: 36) argues, that “[i]f observations show that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted. The theory is incompatible with certain possible results of observations…” (original emphasis). If social life is influenced by general laws\(^2\), then it follows that one singular empirical observation that goes against this law simply refutes the theory as a whole (Salmon 1998: 162). Moreover, theories that have survived several attempts at falsification are shown to be robust. Still, they are not verified (Stinchcombe 1968: 19). “[T]he growth of knowledge proceeds from old problems to new problems, by means of conjectures and refutations” (Popper 1972: 258).

Contrary to Popper, Elster (1989) argues that general laws are difficult to detect within social life (even though they may exist). Hence, the notion of covering law applies poorly to social sciences in general. Social life, in contrast to physical life, embodies wilful human beings. As Searl (1991) emphasises, the vital factor distinguishing social life from physical life is intentionality. I do not argue that social actors are perfect rational actors, only that certain elements of intentionality in social life imply that covering law hypotheses have severe difficulties within the social sciences. Elster (1989) argues that social dynamics stem from social mechanisms more than from general laws. Whereas general laws make statements claiming general and universal validity regarding the relationships between (at least) two
variables, social mechanisms claim only conditional validity as regards linkages between certain variables. Social mechanisms claim validity only under certain conditions (Skog 1998: 25). “Thus, explaining by mechanisms replaces the idea of “if A, then always B” with “if A, then sometimes B”” (Hovi 2000: 3). Thus, if empirical observations go counter to theoretical expectations, the theory is refuted only under certain conditions. Hence, only partial generalizations are possible within social enquiry. Ultimately, only partial refutations are possible when testing generalizations based upon social mechanisms.

Social mechanisms can be understood as those sets “of stable elements that provide a plausible account of how I and O are linked to one another” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998: 7 - original emphasis). Social mechanisms are not only those social ‘cogs and wheels’ that bring this relationship into existence (Elster 1989) but also the “logics by which social scientists render understandable the reality they depict” (Hernes 1998: 74). Thus, social mechanisms help to may make explanations more complete “by providing insight into how exactly each pair of variables in the model is causally connected” (Hovi 2000: 14). The concept of social mechanism is often paired with the principle of methodological individualism - that is, that the “elementary ‘causal agents’ are always individual actors…” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998: 11). One basic problem exhibited by this methodology, however, is that mechanisms transcending the logic of consequentiality “must either be ignored…, or they must be endogenized” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998: 12; March and Olsen 1995). Hence, theories must be parsimonious. The concept of social mechanism implies that social life is affected by a multitude of different forces: rational choice, emotions, satisficing, logics of appropriateness, temporality, etc. Cognitive theory largely emphasises an idea of methodological individualism, albeit applying a bounded logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen 1989; March and Simon 1958).

Middle-range theories are basically ‘mechanism-driven’ - the central question having to do with which basic elements link different social phenomena together. Compared to covering law theories, middle-range theories have a more limited scope of validity. Hence, falsifying such theories is more likely to result in partial falsification than falsifying covering law theories. Central to any middle-range theory is detecting scope conditions, specifying ‘switching points’ for when certain social dynamics are likely to materialize than others (Checkel 1999: 2). Unpacking social mechanisms may help us understand social dynamics.
more broadly, in addition to uncovering their conditional validity (Gilje and Grim 1993: 81; Trondal 2001).

Up to this point, it seems that both the notion of verification and falsification is partially rejected. Still, based upon the concept of social mechanisms (Elster 1989; Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998), a weak notion of falsification seems to be compatible with a plea for critical testing of theories within the social sciences (Mjøset 2001).

How do we falsify?
One vital endeavour when seeking to falsify theories is to derive mutually exclusive hypotheses. On the basis of these hypotheses, mutually exclusive observations may be detected. “Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is” (Popper 1963: 36). “[A] theory to be useful must be specific enough that it might be disapproved” (Stinchcombe 1968: 5). Hence, when observing one event, some theories are supported and others are refuted (read: partially refuted).3

In order to illuminate implications accompanying the notion of falsification, we contrast it again with the idea of verification. As argued above, studies of European integration rest on the concept of verification. Consequently, when conducting empirical research, the search for mutually exclusive theories, hypotheses and observations is largely neglected. The importance of ascribing different values to the same independent variables is often ignored, thus committing serious methodological errors. The analytical scope of the vast majority of studies of Europeanization has to do with measuring the impact of EU membership on institutional configurations and changes in the policy output of domestic policy processes (e.g. Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Sandholtz 1996). The majority of these studies limit their empirical focus to EU member states (e.g. Mény, Muller and Quermonne 1996; Rometsch and Wessels 1996). In order to measure the impact of EU membership, however, it is crucial to ascribe the independent variable at least two values, membership and non-membership. Comparative studies covering nation-states with different forms of affiliation to the EU are currently lacking.4 By ignoring this category of nation-states, the independent variable takes on only one value, essentially becoming a constant. The explanatory potential of the analyses becomes
markedly weakened. Hence, without having an explicit concept of falsification the explanatory potential of the models is severely hampered.

In order to clearly illuminating the research design accompanying the premises underpinning the Popperian perspective, we briefly address again the research units that are part of the current study. In the following, I first discuss how to select research units in order to maximize the likelihood of refutation. Second, I discuss briefly how to select research units to maximize the likelihood of identifying mutually exclusive empirical observations.

On the question of refutation, the theoretical argument advocated within this study emphasises how administrative integration generally is affected by the way that political-administrative life is formally organized. The enactment of decision behaviour, identities and role conceptions amongst individual decision-makers is affected by the organizational structures in which they are embedded. This proposition derives from a cognitive organization theory perspective. Thus, in order to test the robustness of the assumed relationship between our independent variable (organizational structures) and the empirical proxies (identities, role conceptions and modes of acting) the relationships between these variables are studied under less favourable conditions. Hence, research units were chosen that are less likely to confirm our hypothesis about significant co-variation between the independent and the dependent variables.

First, government officials participating within committees are chosen. This selection is based upon empirical observations indicating that co-ordination practises, identities and role perceptions are affected less by interim collegial arrangements than by permanent hierarchical organizations (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Fenno 1962; Katz 1997). Generally, committee members are only ‘part-time’ participants as contrasted to permanent officials within hierarchical organizations. The likelihood that ‘part-time’ participants are significantly affected by their temporal and secondary committee affiliation is modest compared to the potential impact of more permanent and primary organizational affiliations. In order to maximize the likelihood of refuting our hypotheses, government officials participating within committees and working groups in the administrative apparatus of the European Union make up the sample. At this level of governance a multitude of intervening variables makes it less likely that government officials are affected by the EU committees regarding their identities, role conceptions and modes of acting. The EU is, amongst other things, a multinational,
multicultural, multi-linguistic and multi-level system of governance (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). However, the primary institutional affiliations embedding domestic government officials that participate on EU committees are national. The EU affiliation is only of secondary importance to these officials. Hence, this selection of research units maximizes the likelihood that our hypotheses about co-variation between our independent and dependent variables are refuted. Conversely, if the hypotheses are confirmed by empirical observations, the robustness of the hypotheses – and the validity of the theoretical argument – is strengthened. Thus, the overall rationale behind this endeavour is to produce robust theories. The approach applied to achieve this end is the method of falsification.

In addition, our theoretical argument stresses that different organizational principles tend to accompany different co-ordination behaviour, role and identity perceptions. That is, particular values on the dependent variables are assumed to correlate systematically with particular values on the independent variable. Identities, role conceptions and modes of acting are assumed to be affected differently within different organizational contexts. Hence, one important research task is systematically selecting research units (government officials) having different institutional affiliations - both at the EU level and at the domestic level of governance. In order to maximize the mutual exclusivity of our empirical observations, mutual exclusivity must also be maximized with regard to the institutional affiliations embedding our research units. The goal is to make “a set of observations which will decide between two alternative theories…” (Stinchcombe 1968: 25). Accordingly, one endeavour relates to dividing organization structures into theoretical meaningful and empirical exclusive categories (cf. Chapter 2). Hence, subsequent to such conceptualizations, the likelihood that only certain empirical observations may correspond to certain theoretical arguments is maximised. Thus only certain observations are likely to confirm or falsify our hypotheses. Assuming that the cognitive perspective on administrative integration is correct, only certain values on our dependent variables are allowed to co-vary systematically with particular values on the independent variables (cf. Chapter 2).

Certain theoretical propositions are likely to be valid only under certain institutional conditions. Some important conditions are clarified in Chapter 2 by conceptualizing organizational structures embedding social action and by identifying what kind of empirical observations are compatible with certain organizational structures. On this basis, partial refutations are possible because mutually exclusive independent variables are constructed.
Moreover, due to possible refutations being partial, empirical observations going counter to certain hypotheses help to determine the conditions under which these hypotheses may in fact be valid, as well as determining the conditions under which these hypotheses are false. According to Lakatos (1970: 92), “intellectual honesty consists…in specifying the conditions under which one is willing to give up one’s position”.

On correlation and causality
The notion of refutation and verification is based on correlation and causality as elements of the explanatory tool-kits. Because the question of causality and correlation has been discussed from many different angles and at different times in the history of science, I leave this philosophical heritage behind.

The general argument advanced here emphasises causality as impossible to observe empirically. The only observable elements in a chain of events are correlations – that is, proximity in time and space between two (or more) events. Correlation may be defined as “[t]he extent to which two or more things are related (“co-related”) to one another” (Vogt 1999: 58). Correlation is present if one observes variations in the dependent variable associated with variations in the independent variables. Several scientific methods are available within the social sciences to determine the presence of correlation. In order to unravel and measure the existence of correlation between the independent and the dependent variables within our study of administrative integration (between organizational structure on the one hand, and identities, role conceptions and patterns of co-ordination behaviour on the other), two different techniques are utilized. First, survey techniques are applied in order to uncover statistical correlations. Survey data are adequate when aiming at testing fairly general theoretical arguments. In-depth analyses are less possible to conduct on the basis of survey data than on the basis of qualitative interview data. However, in-depth analysis is not necessary for testing theories. “Any effort to illuminate general patterns in complex events must sacrifice some richness of detail” (Moravcsik 1999: 169). However, interviews add a depth dimension to the cross-tabulations and regressions made. For the purpose of maximizing the likelihood of falsifying theoretical arguments, survey data may be seen as one important source for detecting correlations. Interviews provide only supplementary data to this end (cf. below).
The question of causality, however, is not settled on the discovery of statistical correlation. Causation includes co-variation as well as non-spuriousness (Asher 1976: 11-12). However, causation has more to it. A cause might be defined as “a[n event, such as a change in one variable, that produces another event, such as a change in a second variable” (Vogt 1999: 35). Causal explanations always comprise a time dimension, or a time sequence. Further, causality is an analytical abstraction, not an empirical observable phenomenon. Even if the time sequence is clear, what we observe is correlation not causation. Hence, the question of causality rests solely on theoretical arguments. What being actually observed is always correlations between events. The ‘cogs and wheels’ linking different events together are solely analytical constructs, and are unobservable. The main danger in “confusing statistical correlation with genuine causation is the danger of confusing symptoms with causes” (Salmon 1998: 45). Likewise, social mechanisms are unobservable analytical constructs (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998: 13).

Generally, model simplification has to rest on theoretical grounds (Asher 1976: 12). The elimination of irrelevant variables has to reflect theoretical argumentation. As mentioned above, several social mechanisms may link events together, i.e. emotions, rationality, cognition. These mechanisms are solely theoretical constructs. Different theories emphasise different social mechanisms. Hence, when aiming at maximizing the likelihood for refutation, one should apply theories that pay attention to quite different social mechanisms. Moreover, these theories should be parsimonious with respect to the number of social mechanisms. Within the study of administrative integration, two major mechanisms have attracted attention: rationality and cognition. These mechanisms, however, do not fulfil the criteria of mutually exclusiveness. Both rational and cognitive mechanisms rely on a logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen 1989), strategic and embedded, respectively. However, within the study of administrative integration these mechanisms generate different hypotheses regarding patterns of co-ordination behaviour, identity and role perceptions, and thus foster different empirical expectations and propositions. As regards the resocializing potential of EU committees, and thus the potential for administrative integration to emerge, a cognitive perspective may cause it to be revealed. A rational perspective, on the other hand, argues that national interests and domestic decision processes hamper processes of administrative integration. On this premise, cognitive mechanisms are selected as explanatory ‘cogs and wheels’ for this study (cf. Chapter 2).
Several other social mechanisms are potential candidates for inclusion into a study of administrative integration – i.e. the logic of appropriateness (cf. also Chapter 7). This perspective, as outlined by March and Olsen (1989 and 1995), is excluded from this study due to the difficulty in developing exclusive and testable hypotheses from it (Peters 1999: 39). When conducting empirical research on the premises of refutation, several plausible social mechanisms are often difficult to include due to methodological problems of this kind. Despite the fact that different institutional approaches often risk being non-falsifiable, the potential for refutation is severely hampered within the institutional perspective presented by March and Olsen (Peters 1999: 150). This problem is due largely to the inclusive and comprehensive understanding of organizational structures as offered by March and Olsen (1989 and 1995). Within the logic of appropriateness, organizational structures are seen as formal, cognitive, normative, demographic, temporal and symbolic arrangements (March and Olsen 1989).\(^5\) Based on this broad concept of institutions, it becomes difficult to identify hypotheses that are exclusive for this theoretical perspective, let alone revealing social dynamics not covered by this approach. Compared to the rational and the cognitive perspectives, the possibility for ‘pattern-matching’ may be difficult within the logic of appropriateness – that is, to compare empirically based patterns with predicted ones (Yin 1984: 109). This difficulty partially reflects the fact that rationalists expect no profound effects due to organizational structures, cognitivists expect important effects immediately, and that institutionalists expect effects over time through learning and socialization. Hence, one can assume that it is easier to establish empirical validation of the two former perspectives than of the latter approach. The logic of appropriateness includes several possible theoretical scenarios thus reducing the explanatory potential of each scenario. To give one example, the logic of appropriateness seeks to account for institutional inertia and evolutionary change on the one hand and punctuated equilibrium and abrupt change patterns on the other (March and Olsen 1989; cf. Krasner 1988: 77; Olsen 2001: 16). To site Popper: “The more a theory forbids, the better it is” (Popper 1963: 36).

Moreover, fruitful theories, in addition to being mutually exclusive, valid and parsimonious, should be conclusive. That is, that “the core concepts of the model can be translated into operational terms” (Skjærseth 1998: 99-100). It is always difficult to determine the relative conclusiveness of different theories. The rational and the cognitive perspectives, however, seem to be more conclusive than the logic of appropriateness. Indicative of this is the relative lack of genuine empirical testing (read: attempts of disapproval) of this perspective. Efforts
Consistent with the above arguments, when maximising the refutability of theoretical arguments, model simplifications should principally rest upon theoretical reasoning. Still, when determining the relative validity of different theories, empirical enquiries may also be designed in ways rendering causality more easily detectable. The researcher may intentionally design the time sequence of the variables. Similarly, the proximity in time and space of these variables may be systematically structured. Efforts devoted towards designing social enquiries rest upon an assumption that “persistent statistical correlation[s] … [are] strongly indicative of a causal relation of some sort” (Salmon 1998: 48). Different methods are available within social sciences to this end. The best method is experimental design. Due to difficulties in utilizing this design in the study of administrative integration another design is applied: the comparative method.

Towards a comparative design

“Comparison … is the very essence of the scientific method” (Almond 1966: 878). This might be done across time, across space, or both. The overall rationale behind the comparative method is to detect co-variation by way of systematically controlling for the effects of additional variables. The current study analyses the extent to which the impact stemming from (i) committee affiliation at the EU level and from (ii) different domestic institutional affiliations are robust under different conditions. That is, to what extent the proposed relationships between institutional affiliations on the one hand, and identities, role perceptions and patterns of co-ordination, on the other, are valid irrespective of the different forms of affiliation towards the EU characterising the three Scandinavian countries. As seen in Chapter 1, the general hypothesis to be tested is whether similar institutional affiliations amongst national civil servants accompany similar role perceptions, institutional identities and modes of acting. This study represents no country-by-country comparison.

Two different comparative designs are discussed in the literature. The most similar design, and the most different method (Collier 1991; Lijphart 1971 and 1975; Smelser 1973). For
both methods, a “small N, many variables” problem is common to both. I shall discuss four partial solutions to this problem. These are (i) studying sufficiently equal cases, (ii) studying key variables, (iii) applying general dimensions for classifying the independent variables, and finally, (iv) maximizing the number of empirical observations (Collier 1991; Kjeldstadli 1988; Lijphart 1971). The first three suggestions relate to the “many variables problem” and the fourth solution focuses on the “small N problem”. As will be seen, all these solutions relate to our prior discussion on refutation and causality.

1) Within the study of administrative integration, I study political-administrative systems being as equal as possible (Smelser 1973). Ideally, the only difference between our cases relates to our independent variables. Hence, the most similar design relies upon systematic selection of cases in order to isolate the effects stemming from the independent variables.6 In our case, data have been systematically selected from three comparable countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden. “Since the Nordic countries are more or less similar in a great many respect, they stand out as good examples of comparable cases that fit, very neatly, central requirements of the most similar system design” (Anckar 1993: 118). Given this, and owing to the fact that “[t]he behavior of individuals within the civil service is partially determined, or at least influenced by…society and by their personal and professional links with other social institutions”, the noise fostered by irrelevant variables are minimized when applying the Scandinavian countries as comparative cases (Peters 1996: 21). Still, the Nordic countries are not perfectly comparable cases, partly due to differences in administrative systems (Lægreid and Pedersen 1999: 22; cf. endnote 16 in Chapter 2). However, possible noise stemming from different irrelevant variables is minimized by way of choosing ‘sufficient’ comparable cases: “The ideal is to watch for …differences or similarities by keeping certain factors constant. Differences are thus explained by other differences, and similarities by other similarities” (Allardt 1990: 184). Hence, in order to reduce the “many variables problem”, ‘sufficient’ comparable cases are chosen to this study.

However, the Scandinavian countries differ as to their form of affiliation towards the EU. This study examines the robustness of the cognitive organization theory approach by testing the proposed hypotheses in countries having different forms of affiliation with the EU. The overall rationale behind this comparative endeavour is to show that “membership
in the European Union is not necessarily the most appropriate dividing line”, analytically speaking (Usher 1998: 184). The individual affiliations of each civil servant towards different EU institutions, in general, and towards different EU committees, in particular, are suggested as one key explanatory variable for administrative integration across levels of governance.

2) Consistent with Lijphart (1971), the current study relies upon a few key explanatory variables: (i) different committee affiliations at the EU level, (ii) different length and intensity of participation on these committees, and (iii) different domestic institutional affiliations. Hence, in order to reduce the “many variables” puzzle, our theoretical model contains only a few variables rather than a long “shopping list” of possible explanatory variables. Hence, rather than accounting for what happened as it happened (Elster 1989: 7), this study stresses some key variables conceived as vital for understanding administrative integration.

3) Consistent with the second solution, the third solution to the “many variables” puzzle also relates to the parsimoniousness of the empirical model. In order to be able to compare key variables across different political-administrative systems, we have to rely upon general dimensions on these variables. Whereas Popper (1963) argues that these dimensions have to be mutually exclusive, Smelser (1973), in addition, calls for universal dimensions. He argues that the more universal and general these dimensions are, the better they are for comparative research. In our study of administrative integration, several comparative dimensions of organizational structures are identified. Applying fairly general and basic dimensions in order to characterize and classify organizational structures, one can conduct comparative analysis along these dimensions across time and space. Consistent with Gulick (1937), March and Olsen (1978) and Egeberg (1994), organizational structures may be seen as specialized according to the principles of purpose, process, area, clientele, time and physical location (cf. Chapter 2). Being universal dimensions, they warrant comparison between nearly every political-administrative system across time and space. As revealed in Chapter 2, the principle of sector and territoriality is of particular importance to this study.

4) The fourth solution regards the “small N” problem. Comparative designs often have been paired with small sample size studies. Within this study, the number of empirical
observations is, as a matter of fact, larger than the number of variables (cf. the next section). This solution also follows the logic of partial refutation suggested by Lakatos (1981). We maximize the number of observations in order to escape the “tendency to reject a hypothesis on the basis of a single deviant case” (Lijphart 1971: 686). When maximizing N, a single deviant finding has less impact on the results. Hence, only partial refutations are likely when a large N is available to the analyst.

Data and sampling procedures
This study is based upon two primary empirical sources. The first source is drawn from two different policy sectors whilst the second source is cross-sectoral. These empirical data are described and discussed successively in the following.

The first source was two sector-specific studies conducted from summer 1998 until spring 1999 within the environment and the occupational health and safety sectors. These studies cover domestic government officials employed within ministries and agencies in the three Scandinavian countries that have experience from Commission expert committees and/or within Council working parties. The collected data was partially based on structured questionnaires and partially on semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 1 and 2). 203 questionnaires were distributed to these officials and 160 were answered. The overall response rate was 79 per cent. The individual response rates were 100 per cent in Norway, 73 per cent in Sweden, and 73 per cent in Denmark:

Table 3.1 Response rate amongst ‘national’ civil servants attending EU committees (absolute numbers and %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of questionnaires distributed</th>
<th>Number of questionnaires answered</th>
<th>Response rate in per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>79 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The high response rate in Norway is due to close and personal follow-up of each respondent by the author. The response rate in Denmark and Sweden, however, is also fairly high and results largely from this author repeatedly requesting replies on the questionnaires. These data are analysed by using the SPSS 9.0 for Windows. Additionally, 47 face-to-face interviews have been conducted amongst a systematic selection of officials from the above sample: 25 in Norway, 11 in Denmark, and finally 11 in Sweden. Of these interviews, 12 were conducted at the ministry level and 35 were conducted at the agency level. The interviews were based on a partially structured interview guide providing general and more specific topics for discussion. Those officials selected for interviews were drawn from the above survey sample (cf. Appendix 2).

The survey and the interviews are based upon a systematic sample of officials. Prior to selecting these samples, the author carried out in-depth research in the two policy sectors in order to locate officials having experience from Commission expert committees and/or Council working parties. Next, the author called each potential respondent and asked if he or she was willing to answer a structured questionnaire. 203 officials gave a positive response to my call. Then, questionnaires were sent to these officials by post. 160 officials actually answered the questionnaires. Based upon these answers, a sub-sample was drawn for face-to-face qualitative interviews. The goal was to trace some issues raised in the questionnaire, thereby obtaining more in-depth knowledge on the casual relationships studied.

The reasons for selecting officials from two policy sectors (the environment sector and the occupational health and safety sector) and for selecting officials from Denmark, Norway and Sweden have been accounted for above. At this point it is important to highlight one overall purpose when designing the layout of the questionnaires. In order to maximize the likelihood of officials assigning identical scores on questions relating to Commission expert committees and Council working parties, the officials were asked to give answers to several questions and simultaneously indicate potential differences between these committees in relation to each question (cf. Appendix 1). As discussed in Chapter 2, different committees at the EU level of governance may affect the participants differently. Hence, one should expect different scores to be assigned to different classes of committees. When, however, maximizing the likelihood that similar scores be assigned to different EU committees by designing the questionnaire in particular ways, the robustness of our theory is given a ‘critical test’ (Popper 1963). The
rationale for this follows the logic of refutation where the likelihood for refuting the cognitive organization theory perspective is maximized.

Past studies have shown that the validity and reliability of statistical data on self-conceptions is lower than data on facts (Jacobsen 1999). Our study is largely based on self-conceptions regarding the co-ordination behaviour and the role and identity perceptions evoked by national civil servants. In order to increase the validity and reliability of our study, the respondents were asked to give answers to several questions measuring the same underlying dimension. For example, in measuring modes of policy co-ordination through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, several questions were presented to the officials (cf. Appendix 1). Thus, different variables are utilized in an effort at reducing problems of intra-personal inconsistency (Jacobsen 1999). The overall rationale for using several different operational measures for co-ordination behaviour and role and identity perceptions is also to detect particular empirical patterns (Yin 1993). If several dependent variables coincide empirically with predicted patterns, the test is shown to be fairly robust. One disadvantage of using several questions for measuring the same underlying dimension is that the size of the questionnaire increases (cf. Appendix 1).

A second survey was conducted from fall 1998 to spring 1999 at the permanent representations to the EU of the three countries. The procedure for selecting this sample was identical to the procedure applied towards officials in the ‘home administration’. Moreover, the visual design of the questionnaire was nearly identical to the nationally distributed ones. In contrast to the domestic study some additional questions were added while other questions were subtracted (cf. Appendix 3). To maximize the number of observations this study covered officials from several policy sectors.
Table 3.2 Response rate amongst officials at the permanent representations to the EU attending EU committees (absolute numbers and %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of questionnaires distributed</th>
<th>Number of questionnaires answered</th>
<th>Response rate in per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>55 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The response rate in this study was considerably lower than in the corresponding national survey. This may partially be due to the general high workload at the permanent representations during the research period. A high workload amongst the Swedish and Danish permanent representatives stemmed from the introduction of the Euro, the process of enlargement to the East, the reassignment of the EU Commission, etc. However, we have no indications that only officials with a low workload answered the questionnaires and therefore no reason to believe that our sample contains the ‘less important’ officials. The low response rate amongst Norwegian permanent representatives owes mostly to their general lack of experience in participating on EU committees. They are formally excluded from participating on Council working parties and the COREPER. Norwegian government officials at the permanent representations to not participate as intensively within Commission expert committees as do officials from domestic sector ministries and agencies (cf. Chapter 4). Moreover, because the permanent representations are divided into one diplomatic realm and one sectoral realm, questionnaires were distributed to officials in both realms. 20 per cent of the returned questionnaires came from the diplomatic realm, whereas 80 per cent came from sector representatives. This sectoral bias in the data parallels the sectoral bias in the data on the ‘domestic’ civil servants: 28 per cent of the questionnaires were received from the ministry level, while 72 per cent of the answers came from agency personnel.

The sample of respondents and informants represented in these two studies are not representative in any meaningful sense. In both studies the samples were systematically selected and such data samples do not warrant empirical generalizations. Still, analytical and
theoretical generalizations are possible owing to the general nature of our theoretical arguments (Yin 1993). We use empirical proxies that reflect more general phenomena.

Certain biases are likely to accompany systematic samples. Still, not all biases are equally problematic. The biases discussed below are unproblematic. Our analytical task requires us to select a sample of respondents that reflect the “average” committee participant in Europe. It is less important to get a sample that mirrors the average domestic civil servant of each nation-state. However, our samples may include the following empirical biases. First, the research has been conducted within “small” nation-states. “One bias that may accompany this selection is that those originating from smaller member states have been shown to express somewhat more supranational attitudes than their colleagues from larger countries” (Egeberg 1999b: 464; Beyers 1998a). Second, officials in medium or lower rank positions dominate the samples compared to officials in top rank positions. In the ‘home administrations’, answers were received from director generals and deputy director generals (3 per cent), from heads and deputy heads of unit/division (25 per cent), and finally from heads of section, senior advisors and advisors (72 per cent). In the survey covering officials at the permanent representations to the EU, 25 per cent of the answers came from heads and deputy heads of unit/division, while 75 per cent of the answers come from head of section, senior advisors and advisors (cf. Chapter 4).

Previous studies show that decision behaviour enacted by officials at medium or lower rank positions is sectorally oriented. Similarly, officials in medium or lower rank positions evoke role conceptions that are more sectorally oriented than those enacted by colleagues in top rank positions (Christensen and Egeberg 1997; Zuna 1998). Hence, our data exhibit sectoral biases stemming from the hierarchical positions of the officials. Finally, systematic biases relating to the ministry-agency spectrum are apparent within the data set. Based on a systematic selection of officials along this axis, answers were received from officials from sector ministries (28 per cent) and from vertically subordinated agencies (72 per cent). Similarly, amongst officials that were interviewed face-to-face, 74 per cent were employed at the agency level, while 26 per cent were employed at the ministry level, thus corresponding to the survey sample. Similarly, at the permanent representations to the EU, 20 per cent of the returned questionnaires came from officials at the diplomatic realm, whilst 80 per cent came from sector representatives. Moreover, biases in the two data sets also relate to the educational backgrounds of the officials: 73 per cent of the officials employed within domestic ministries and agencies and
who participate on EU committees are educated in technical disciplines. Officials at the permanent representations are educated in law and economy to a greater extent - 49 and 32 per cent, respectively (cf. Chapter 4). These biases may accompany tendencies towards expressing more sectoral identities, role conceptions and co-ordination behaviour.

The questionnaires utilized in these two studies were written in Norwegian (cf. Appendix 1 and 3). Despite certain biases that might accompany the use of Norwegian as regards officials’ understanding of the questions, no systematic errors have been registered to support such concerns. Similarly, during the interviews the questions were posed in Norwegian and the answers were given in the officials’ native language (cf. Appendix 2). No major misunderstandings were registered during the interviews.

Conclusion

Comparative designs generally are applied in order to make correlation easily detectable. The ultimate goal is to better identify causality between certain variables by carefully designing the study. Despite efforts towards detecting causality on empirical grounds, however, the concepts of causality and social mechanisms are solely theoretical constructs.

Moreover, causality and correlation are elements from a tool-kit in the search for robust theories. To this end, the notion of refutation is taken to be adequate. Moreover, parallel to Elster (1989) and Lakatos (1981), only partial refutations are assumed possible due to an epistemological lack of general laws within social life. Middle-range theories call for identifying the relative validity of theories. Hence, empirical observations that counter expected patterns do not refute the whole theory but only identify scope conditions under which the theory may be valid, as well as the conditions under which it may prove false.

A cognitive organization theory perspective stresses how organizational arrangements underpinning EU institutions and committees foster particular modes of administrative integration across levels of governance. Moreover, we argue that the formal institutional build-up of domestic bureaucratic institutions and the way the domestic institutions and the EU institutions are linked together affect processes of administrative integration in particular ways. Our null-hypothesis states that organizational structures at different levels of governance do not significantly affect processes of administrative integration. In order to test
the relative validity of the cognitive approach, two surveys and one interview study have been conducted under less favourable conditions, that is, conditions under which the likelihood of falsifying the cognitive approach is maximized. To this end, administrative integration is studied within collegial arrangements (committees) at the EU level of governance. Permanent participants at the EU level of governance are not studied; only part-time participants having their primary institutional affiliations within domestic ministries, agencies and permanent representations to the EU.

Empirical observations serve as the basis for providing opportunities for refuting middle-range theories. The cognitive perspective on administrative integration is taken as a ‘critical test’ within this study on the basis of survey data and supplemented by interview data. Two major sources of empirical data are provided: (i) statistical and interview data on committee participants from the three Scandinavian countries, working within the environment sector and the field of occupational health and safety; (ii) statistical data on officials at the permanent representations to the EU of these states, working within different policy sectors.

Due to the fact that our sample is systematic, no empirical generalizations are warranted. Particularly those empirical descriptions that are provided in Chapter 4 may reflect the sample more than the theoretical universe. Hence, our observations in Chapter 4 are not representative for all those participating on EU committees. However, when analysing more general theoretical relationships between various independent and dependent variables in Chapters 5 and 6, sampling biases are less problematic.

In the following Chapters the data presented above are studied using univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses. In Chapter 4 univariate and bivariate techniques are mostly used to reveal patterns of cross-level participation in Europe amongst domestic government officials. Chapter 4 reveals the formal institutional affiliations embedding the government officials, the intensity to which these officials attend EU committees, their educational backgrounds, etc. Next, Chapters 5 and 6 analyses how such cross-level participation affects modes of policy co-ordinating amongst the participants (Chapter 5), and the enactment of particular role and identity perceptions (Chapter 6).
Notes

1 The author is indebted to Jeffrey Lewis and Robert Zuna for valuable comments to an earlier draft version of this Chapter.

2 General laws are conceived as similar to covering law hypotheses (Hempel 1965). A covering law hypothesis can be understood as a special case of a probability law where the likelihood of its validity is equal to one (p = 1).

3 Considering situations whereby theories are refuted, Popper’s assumption rests on a premise of reliability. That is, no errors are involved in the research process as such, nor that the empirical observations can be derived from the research design more generally. Hence, any element of systematic or random errors must be eliminated in order to render refutation possible (Gilje and Grimen 1993: 76). Empirical observations must be traceable back to the independent variables of the study, not to any random or systematic error (Hovi and Rasch 1996: 27).

4 One exception to this trend is the anthology edited by Hanf and Soetendorp (1998) comparing Norway, Switzerland and eight EU member states.

5 While formal structures are seen as formal rules in the rational perspective, the cognitive perspective perceives formal structures as buffers to attention and information.

6 Hence, statistical generalizations to a theoretical universe are impossible when systematic samples are applied. Statistical significance tells us nothing about this universe, only, at best that the theoretical relationships studied are relatively robust ones.

7 What dimensions is most suitable for comparative research? Structures, actors, decision processes and policy outputs have been suggested in the literature. Still, other candidates have been put forward within comparative policy and comparative administration literature. At this stage, I want to argue in favour of using organizational structures as the comparative dimension instead of policy content/policy output. This is mostly due to the lack of adequate conceptual schemes for identifying dimensions that are mutual exclusive and robust as far as policy content is concerned (Peters 1996: 29). Sufficiently universal and basic dimensions are indeed available as regards organizational structures (e.g. Gulick 1937).

8 Thanks to Svein S. Andersen at the ARENA programme for this point.
CHAPTER 4

INTEGRATION THROUGH PARTICIPATION?

CROSS-LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE

Introduction

One vital driving force lurking behind processes of administrative integration is cross-level participation amongst national civil servants (Schaefer 2000: 22). One prerequisite for shifts to occur in role and identity perceptions and modes of acting amongst government officials is that they actually come together and interact mutually. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 have provided theoretical and methodological frames for this study, the current Chapter places the study of administrative integration into empirical frames. This Chapter provides an overview of patterns of cross-level participation amongst Scandinavian government officials. The questions raised are which EU committees these officials attend, how frequently do they meet, how long have they participated, in which domestic government institutions they are employed? Since role and identity perceptions and modes of policy co-ordination reflect multiple institutional affiliations at both the EU level and the national level of governance, the current Chapter describes these affiliations. Before doing so, however, the first section elaborates on how to perceive administrative integration more generally. Section one follows up one central theme discussed in Chapter 1 and provides a more thorough discussion of the notion of administrative integration. Next, section two provides a short overview on past and
contemporary studies of EU committees, thus, providing a bibliographical framing of our study. Finally, sections three and four describe patterns of cross-level participation amongst those Danish, Norwegian and Swedish civil servants studied here.

Bureaucratic integration

Administrative integration, as seen here, is a relatively embryonic field of study. Still, “[t]his notion of ‘bureaucratic interpenetration’, and the image it evokes of individuals becoming snared in the EU’s expanding webs and networks, is crucial for understanding the way European integration is conceptualised by EU elites” (Shore 2000: 147). This phenomenon might be understood as a process and not a fixed state of affairs. The mutual relationships between administrative systems constitute ever-changing phenomena in political-administrative life. Just like single organizations are in constant states of flux’, the relationships between organizations are constantly evolving. Moreover, administrative integration is relational - covering the relationships, interdependencies and interconnections between different administrative systems and between the members of these systems (Spinelli 1966). Furthermore, administrative integration is seen as a continuum, ranging from weak to strong modes of integration (Trondal 1999b). As discussed more thoroughly below, weak administrative integration requires that actual contacts occur between at least two administrative systems. A stronger notion of integration requires, in addition, that these contacts mutually affect the systems and the individual members within them (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). Hence, integration is seen as an outcome more than a process. Finally, administrative integration is not uni-dimensional (e.g. Hix 1999). It might be seen as a two-dimensional phenomenon, covering a sectoral-territorial dimension and a national-supranational dimension (cf. Chapters 1 and 2).

Several suggestions as to how to view administrative integration have been addressed in the literature (cf. Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 1999: 75). In an abstract vein, March (1999b: 134) conceives of administrative integration as gauged at measuring the “density, intensity and character of the relations amongst the elements of [different administrative systems]”. Moreover, “‘integration’ signifies some measure of the density, intensity and character of the relations among the constitutive elements of a system” (Olsen 2001: 4). Somewhat more concrete, Scheinman (1966: 751) sees administrative integration as the “intermingling of
national and international bureaucrats in various working groups and committees in the policy-making context of the EEC” (cf. Cassese 1987; Pag 1987). Similarly, Majone (1996) “refers to the idea of *copinage technocratique* to denote the interaction between Brussels officials, experts from industry, and national civil servants” (quoted from Radaelli 1999a: 759 – original emphasis). Similarly, Rosenau (1969: 46) defines administrative integration as penetrative processes whereby “members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another”. Common to all these conceptualizations is an emphasis on the mutual relationships and cross-level participation between governance systems and the members of these systems. As such, the above conceptions of administrative integration represent weak definitions of this phenomenon, emphasising that different administrative systems actually come into mutually contact of some sort.

Approaching a stronger conception of administrative integration, Barnett (1993: 276) asks, “[w]hat happens when state actors are embedded in two different institutions … that call for different roles and behaviour?” Similarly, Olsen (1998a: 2) asks, “[w]hat happens to organized political units when they become part of a larger unit?” In a more assertive vein, Eriksen and Fossum (2000: 16) argue that “integration, in the true meaning of the term, depends on the alteration, not the aggregation of, preferences”. European integration in general and administrative integration more particularly, thus denotes processes whereby organizational dynamics and behavioural logics are transformed amongst European institutions and decision-makers. While the above paragraph defines administrative integration in a weak sense, Barnett and Olsen apply a stronger definition of this phenomenon by emphasising how the systems are mutually affected by increased contact. Moreover, whilst Olsen operates at the system level of analysis, Rosenau and Barnett apply the individual government official as the unit of analysis (cf. also Shore 2000). Finally, parallel to Olsen (1998a) and Eriksen and Fossum (2000), the current study views administrative integration as having to do with the vertical relationships across levels of governance (cf. figure 1.1 in Chapter 1).

This study applies both a weak and a strong definition of administrative integration. Weak administrative integration covers actual contact patterns between administrative systems as measured by the cross-level participation conducted by the individual members of these systems. Cross-level participation denotes national civil servants participating on EU
committees. This pattern of integration is revealed empirically in the current Chapter. As seen above, however, a stronger definition of administrative integration emphasises how such cross-level participation affects the systems (mutually) and the individual members within them. This concept of integration is traced in Chapters 5 and 6.

The individual is the unit of analysis in this study. Individual civil servants are those who travel to Brussels in order to participate in meetings and groups. Obviously, several government officials formally and actually do represent their ministry, agency or nation-state when participating at these meetings (cf. Chapter 6; see also Egeberg 1999b; Schaefer et al 2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000). However, we analyse the representatives themselves, not whom they represent as it is the individual officials who act and who ultimately foster processes of administrative integration across levels of governance (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). The third and fourth levels of governance become increasingly integrated through patterns of participation cutting across these levels, thus contributing to (mutual) inter-penetration of these levels (Rosenau 1969). Such patterns of cross-level participation are formally institutionalized within the EU committees. Consistent with the arguments presented in Chapter 2, EU committees can be seen as transformative meeting places for actors, problems, solutions, identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct and are thus adequate arenas for studying administrative integration (Haiback 2000; Lewis 2000; Schaefer 2000; Trondal 1999b; Van Schendelen and Pedler 1998). “In qualitative terms, committees provide the foundation for ‘bureaucratic’ integration theories that emphasise the emergence of a European bureaucratic elite or envisage the ‘fusion’ of national and European state bureaucracies” (Gehring 1999: 195).

From the late 1960s onwards, a growing literature on administrative integration emerged in the wake of accelerating processes of European integration. Studies of public administrations discovered how domestic administrative systems became increasingly embedded within international political orders. Consequently, the multi-level character of domestic administrative systems attracted increased scholarly attention. Early scholarly contributions on administrative integration revealed how the domestic-international distinction became blurred due to the intermingling of national and international bureaucrats (Cassese 1987; Christensen 1981; Egeberg 1980; Feld and Wildgen 1975; Hopkins 1976; Kerr 1973; Mørch 1976; Pag 1987; Pendergast 1976; Scheinman 1966: 751; Scheinman and Feld 1972). Highlighting
‘bureaucratic inter-penetration’ across levels of governance, this literature emphasised that the “description of the Community as ‘above’, ‘alongside’ or ‘outside’ the member states were useless oversimplifications” (Pag 1987: 446; Rosenau 1969; Scheinman 1966). The national level and the Community level were described as mutually interwoven and intermixed in fundamental ways (Demmke 1998: 15). This body of literature addressed to what extent national government officials become regular participants at the EU level of governance (Rosenau 1969). Only scarce attention was devoted to studying how such cross-level participation affected the ‘inner selves’ of the participants as such, let alone their actual decision-making behaviour (cf. Chapters 5 and 6) (see however Feld and Wildgen 1975; Kerr 1973; Pendergast 1976; Scheinman and Feld 1972). As such, the weak notion of administrative integration underpinned these studies.

Despite this growing scholarly interest for administrative integration across levels of governance, little light has been shed on the dual character of the European Union bureaucracy, which consists partially of permanent officials and partially of officials who are temporary participants in the committee system of the Union (Buitendikj and Van Schendelen 1995: 43; Cini 1996). “Research on committees and comitology has long been a neglected issue in European integration studies” (Neyer 1998: 148). The 1990s has witnessed a significant increase in the scholarly attention devoted towards EU committees, in particular, and administrative integration, in general (Beyers 1998a and 1998b; Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Christiansen and Kirchner 2000; Egeberg 1999b; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; European Parliament 1998: 5; Joerges and Vos 1999; Lewis 2000; Pedler and Schaefer 1996; Schaefer 2000; Schaefer et al. 2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000; Van Schendelen 1998; Vos 1999).

According to Coombes (1970: 243), “since about 1963 the Commission’s own work has become dominated by … various intermediary committees of national representatives”. Different measures have been applied to studying the extent to which bureaucratic integration actually occurs through these committees. One such measure has been the number of EU committees and agencies existing at the EU level (e.g. Institut für Europäische Politik 1987; Kreher 1997; Pedler and Schaefer 1996). Other empirical proxies applied in the study of administrative integration have been the number of travels to Brussels conducted by domestic officials (Christensen 1981; Demmke 1998; Van Schendelen 1996), the number of domestic government officials attending committees at the EU level (Hopkins 1976; Mørch 1976;
Scheinman 1966), the number of days in session pursued by these committees (Wessels 1998), etc. The EU bureaucracy is made up of permanent Eurocrats together with “travelling national civil servants” (Nedergaard 1995: 26). Indicative of the “factual enormity of the committee phenomenon” (Weiler 1999: 340 – original emphasis), Van Schendelen (1996) estimates that about 50 000 domestic officials are temporarily engaged in the administrative work of the Union per year.² Bach (1992: 24) estimates that national bureaucrats make 360 000 officials journeys to Brussels every year due to activities in the Union. Furthermore, the Commission organized about 5 500 committee meetings in 1989 requiring approximately 64 000 person-days (Buitendijk and van Schendelen 1995). In the Council, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997: 70) estimate that 3000 to 4000 officials from the national capitals attend meetings every day and that approximately 2000 days are spent in committee meetings each year (cf. Westlake 1995: 62). The committee members within these EU committees are regular participants who meet each other relatively frequently (Institut für Europäische Politik 1987). Moreover, several of these officials participate both in Commission expert committees and in Council working parties (Schaefer 1996). Hence, “Brussels is truly an over-crowded policy arena” (Wright 1996: 152).

Despite difficulties in estimating the exact number of EU committees (Falke 1996; Van der Knaap 1996; Wessels 1998: 218-219), “[for the 1990 budget year the Commission mentions a total of 994 committees with financial authority to meet” (Buitendijk and Van Schendelen 1995: 40). Schaefer (2000: 11) assumes that “there are probably 700 to 800 [Commission expert] committees”. However, despite the great number of committees existing at the EU level, “a complete and reliable survey of the committee - and expert - or working group system as well as an in-depth analysis of its performance in practise is still missing” (Institut für Europäische Politic 1989: 14; cf. also Butt-Philip 1991; Cassese and Della Cananea 1991). However, theoretically informed and empirically illuminating studies of how such cross-level participation influence the participants themselves are generally lacking (e.g. Joerges and Everson 2000). This study, in particular Chapters 4, 5 and 6, seeks to reduce this lack of research.
The parallel European administration: Past and contemporary studies

One way of classifying the EU committee system is to divide it into (i) preparatory expert committees under the EU Commission, (ii) Council working parties, and (iii) comitology committees (Schaefer 1996 and 2000). These committees deal with policy areas falling under the first pillar of the Community. The comitology committees are excluded from this analysis mostly due to methodological considerations (cf. endnote 3 in Chapter 2). The preparatory Commission expert committees consist mainly of domestic government officials, in addition to representatives from the relevant DG in the Commission (the chair of the committees). Representatives from the industry, universities, and from interest organizations also frequently attend these committees. The main function of these committees is to “assist the Commission in drafting proposals for legislation in the Commission” (Schaefer 1996: 19). Domestic government officials attending Commission expert committees are formally regarded by the EU Commission as independent experts, not constrained by clear-cut mandates, obligations or particular governmental loyalties. The Council working parties, on the other hand, consist mainly of domestic government officials, representatives from the permanent representation in Brussels, representatives from the Presidency (the chair of the working parties), and representatives from the Commission. The main function of these committees is to “prepare decisions of COREPER and the Ministers on the basis of Commission proposals” (Schaefer 1996: 19). Within these committees domestic government officials are expected to act like national delegates with written and binding instructions, and with clear governmental loyalties. Most Commission expert committees and Council working parties convene between 20 and 40 participants.

Past and contemporary literature on EU committees and working parties is mainly directed towards studying the comitology system. This body of literature pays only secondary attention to the Council working parties and the preparatory Commission expert committees. In the following, a fourfold classification scheme of this literature is suggested. A major part of the scholarly literature on EU committees is (i) oriented towards the historical development of the committee system, with particular emphasis attached to internal reforms of this system (Ballmann 1996; Bradley 1997; Bücker et al. 1996; Demmke et al. 1996; Egan and Wolf 1998; Haibach 2000b; Vos 1997); (ii) is formal-legalistic, focusing on legal typologies of these bodies (Bertram 1967; Bücker et al. 1996; Dogan 1997; Haibach 1997; Hankin 1997; Joerges 1997; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Schindler 1971; Vos 1999); (iii) emphasises the
number of committees, the number and types of participants and meetings, the size of these committees (Ballmann 1996; Cassese and Della Cananea 1991; EURO-CIDCE 1996; Falke 1996; Institut für Europäische Politik 1989; Lindberg 1963; Mørch 1976; Pag 1987; Schaefer 1996; Van der Knaap 1996; Vos 1999; Wessels 1990 and 1998); and finally, (iv) theory oriented studies, trying to understand this phenomenon more broadly (Bücker et al. 1996; Egan and Wolf 1998; Egeberg 2001; Eriksen 1998; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Lindberg 1963; Neyer 1999b; Trondal 1999b; Wessels 1998). Amongst those scholarly contributions written in the 1960s and 1970s - and to some extent in the 1980s - the legal and historical approaches tend to dominate the analyses.

Recent scholarly contributions on EU committees are generally more theoretically oriented but only very few studies are empirically rich (cf. also Chapter 7). Amongst the more recent studies on EU committees that have an empirical orientation a few endeavour to measure and assess the transformative dynamics fostered by this committee system (e.g. Van Schendelen 1998). Two pioneer empirical contributions were Scheinman and Feld (1972), and Feld and Wildgen (1975). One basic insight gained from their research is that political attitudes and orientations amongst domestic government officials become moulded when participating on EU committees. On the other hand, Kerr (1973) and Pendergast (1976) observed the pivotal role played by domestic institutions in moulding the attitudes and role perceptions of domestic civil servants. Hence, these early empirical studies indicated that administrative integration reflects the impact of both EU committees and domestic government institutions. Still, one fundamental weakness exhibited by these contributions concerns the lack of distinction between different types of EU committees. This has led to sweeping generalisations and general assertions such as “the dichotomy of national governments and Community institutions dissolves and is replaced by a dense system of interacting national and European groups as well as sub-units of formal actors both from the member states and the Union” (Ballmann 1996: 4).

In addition to these early empirical studies of EU committees, a study from The Institute für Europäische Politik (1987) discloses the number of EU committees and the intensity of networking that occurs within them. Possible effects from such cross-level participation with respect to the participants’ identities, role conceptions and modes of acting, however, are rarely analysed. A defining characteristic of this body of literature is the tendency to neglect
the re-socializing potential of the EU committees. The majority of past literature on EU committees has been concerned with measuring the actual volume of cross-level participation as such.

Generally, the majority of those attending Commission expert committees and comitology committees are private sector representatives (Institut für Europäische Politik 1987). Government officials do not attend these committees to the same degree. Most of those attending Council working parties, however, are government officials. Reporting on government officials, Wessels (1990: 235) observes that “[t]echnical and ‘internal’ affairs ministries are considerably involved [in EU committees]”. As shown below, this is more so in the Commission expert committees than in the Council working parties. Still, contacts with EU bodies, including committees, “is a normal, although not dominant, part of day-to-day activities of national civil servants” (Wessels 1990: 235).

The next two sections of this Chapter analyses cross-level participation amongst domestic government officials from the three Scandinavian countries. Cross-level participation signifies that government officials have institutional affiliations at (at least) two levels of governance. The first section considers various primary institutional affiliations embedding these officials whilst the second section provides data on different secondary EU affiliations that embed them. Together, these primary and secondary institutional affiliations are applied as independent variables in Chapters 5 and 6. The following operational measures are proposed as empirical proxies of these institutional affiliations:

**Primary institutional affiliations:**
- Whether officials are employed at the ministry level or at the agency level.
- Whether officials at the permanent representations to the EU are employed within the diplomatic realm or within different sectoral realms.
- The formal rank positions of these officials.
- The seniority within current position, current institution, and in the domestic central administration as a whole.
- Age.
- Professional backgrounds.
Secondary institutional affiliations:
- Whether domestic officials attend Commission expert committees and/or Council working parties.
- The proportion of time devoted to participate on these.
- For how many years have these officials attended EU committees?
- The number of committees attended.
- The number of committee meetings attended.
- The duration of committee meetings.
- Whether, or not, these officials give oral presentations during committee meetings.
- Are these officials routinely invited to attend these committees?
- Informal contacts with fellow committee members outside formal committee meetings.

Multiple institutional affiliations amongst Scandinavian civil servants
As regards the degree of cross-level participation between the EU system and the domestic government apparatus, several variables might measure it. For example, Christensen (1981) studied the travel patterns amongst Danish government officials going to Brussels and Wessels (1990) studied the amount of participation in EU committees amongst German civil servants. Other variables can be added to such a list: the frequency of participation on EU committee meetings, the number of committees officials attend, the level of engagement and involvement in formal negotiations within these committees, the frequency of informal contacts prior to such meetings, the frequency of consultations after these meetings (by phone, post, e-mail, fax, etc.), etc. Most of these variables are addressed in this Chapter.

The next two sections show how Norwegian, Danish and Swedish government officials are involved in cross-level participation. The first section shows the primary institutional affiliations embedding these officials. That is, whether they are employed at the ministry level or at the agency level, their formal rank position in the domestic civil service, etc. The second section focuses on their committee affiliations at the EU level. This section is divided into two distinct parts. In one part different measures are applied to account for different committee affiliations at the EU level. In the second part various operational measures are applied to analyse the length and intensity of these affiliations.
Primary institutional affiliations

Primary institutional affiliations are of a permanent nature and secondary institutional affiliations are only temporary. Table 4.1 presents the ministry-agency affiliation embedding domestic civil servants and the diplomatic-sectoral affiliation of officials at the permanent representations to the EU.

Table 4.1 Percentage of domestic officials and permanent representatives attending EU committees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional affiliations:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector ministries.........</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agencies..................</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic realms.........</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral realms...........</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N..........................</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen from table 4.1, domestic agency personnel participate more frequently in EU committees than do ministry personnel. Moreover, at the permanent representations officials employed in different sectoral realms attend EU committees more frequently than do officials in the diplomatic realm. The proportion of officials within Norwegian ministries and agencies who are involved in EU related dossiers has increased considerably in the 1990s (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a). From being an exclusive group of “Eurocrats” under the EEA negotiations (Christensen 1996; Kux and Sverdrup 1997), almost 50 per cent of the officials are currently engaged into EU related work in one way or another (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Trondal 1999a: 54-57). Similarly, the proportion of Swedish officials engaged in EU related work has increased significantly in the 1990s, especially after 1995 (Larsen, Lægreid and Wik 1999: 57; Statskontoret 1996:7 and 2000:20; Sundström 1999).

Processes of administrative integration are reflected in the organizational arrangements that exist within national ministries and agencies. One general tendency is apparent regarding how EU dossiers are organized into existing government institutions in different EU member states. EU related dossiers are largely integrated into pre-existing sector departments and units.
at the ministry level and at the agency level. Only seldom are special co-ordinating units constructed solely responsible for EU issues. It is striking, on the one hand, to observe the establishment of separate, specialized EU co-ordination units within ministries and agencies in relatively new member states and, on the other hand, to observe the withering away and the dissolution of these units in ‘older’ member states (Bulmer and Burch 1999). So, EU dossiers are organized into pre-existing institutional arrangements to a larger extent in old member states than in new member states and in applicant states (e.g. Ågh 1999: 843). Similarly, tendencies towards sectoral integration of EU dossiers at the domestic level are observed to a greater extent in policy sectors having old traditions of handling EU affairs than in sectors being relative new at the EU arena (Trondal 1999c; Statskontoret 1996: 68 and 2000:20A: 30-31).

In the Norwegian government apparatus EU dossiers tend to be organized into pre-established divisions and units (integrated institutional solutions) (Larsen et al. 1999: 138). Specialized institutional arrangements are chosen less frequently within the Norwegian ministries and agencies. In comparing the institutional arrangements over time in Norwegian ministries, an overall pattern of institutional stability is revealed, interrupted only by a marked increase in the number of integrated solutions in the middle of the 1990s. This period is distinguished by the presence and salience of ‘the EU question’ as to whether or not Norway should become a full member of the EU (Narud and Strøm 2000). During the so-called ‘interim period’ approximately 16 per cent of all units or sections at the ministry level were characterised as having EU dossiers added to pre-existing divisions or units (Trondal 1996). Similarly, the present situation is characterised by integrated solutions. Integrated organizational solutions also dominate the Danish and Swedish government apparatus at present (e.g. Sjölund 1994: 386; Statskontoret 2000:20A: 30-31).

Table 4.2 shows the percentage of officials in our sample with different rank positions in the ministries, agencies and at the permanent representations to the EU.³
Table 4.2 Distribution of officials’ ranks (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranks</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director general, deputy director general</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head/deputy of unit/division\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of section, senior advisor, advisor\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} e.g. assistant director general, principal officer.
\textsuperscript{b} e.g. advisor, executive officer, senior executive officer.

The observations in table 4.2 contradict Simon’s (1957: 294) general assertion that “as the higher levels are approached in administrative organizations, the administrator’s “internal” tasks […] decrease in importance relative to his “external” tasks […]”. The typical EU committee participant is employed at the agency level and in middle or lower rank positions. The same is true at the permanent representations the typical EU committee participant is employed in lower rank positions. Hence, the number of external contacts towards EU committees increase as one moves down the formal hierarchy within national governmental institutions. Trondal (1998: 286) shows that this tendency is significant at the ministry level and at the agency level within the Norwegian government apparatus (cf. Bulmer and Burch 1999: 21 and 29). The rank positions of the officials may be indicative of the highly technical nature\textsuperscript{4} of most dossiers handled by most EU committees (Page 1997: 3). At the national level of governance, technical issues of the kind dealt with by most EU committees are normally delegated from the political level to the bureaucratic machinery. Hence, the observations shown in table 4.2 may reflect institutionalized practises at the national governance level. Moreover, officials attending ECs tend to be employed, to a larger extent, in positions earmarked for specific professional groups than are officials attending WPs (Statskonsult 1999:6: 27-28). This follows from the technical nature of the work within ECs but can also be due to the fact that agency officials educated in technical disciplines attend many ECs. To summarize, EU committee participants are recruited amongst medium and bottom rank expert officials employed in positions earmarked for specific professional groups.
Table 4.3 displays the relative seniority of officials attending EU committees. The table clearly shows that ministry and agency officials attending EU committees have a generally high level of seniority at the domestic level of governance. The mean scores for the length of service in current position is 7 years, in current institution 11 years, and in the central administration as a whole 13 years. The overall mean score of 10 years is close to the average length of service in the Norwegian ministries (11 years) (Christensen and Egeberg 1997: 97).

Hence, officials attending EU committees have generally served for quite a long time in the domestic government apparatus before attending EU committees. However, this observation does not counteract the observation made in the previous table. The rank variable correlates significantly and positively only with the length of service in the central administration as a whole ($r = .19^*$). This correlation, however, is not very strong nor do the other two variables presented in table 4.3 correlate significantly with the rank variable. Despite this, we may expect these officials to be highly pre-socialized and “pre-packed” before entering EU committees. From this follows a general resistance towards altering identity and role perceptions and modes of acting amongst these officials (cf. Chapters 5 and 6).
Table 4.3 Distribution of length of service (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of service:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In current position:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3 years</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 years</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12 years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15 years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 years, or longer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean length of service (years)............</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In current institution:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3 years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12 years</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15 years</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 years, or longer</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean length of service (years)............</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In the central administration as a whole:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3 years</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 years</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12 years</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15 years</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 years, or longer</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean length of service (years)............</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N..................................</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Officials at the permanent representations have served for considerably shorter time periods in current position and in current institutions than their domestic colleagues (cf. table 4.3). The mean scores for length of service in current position is 2 years and in current institution 3
years. They have served approximately the same number of years in the central administrative apparatus as a whole (12 years) before having acquired a position at the permanent representation, as have officials in domestic ministries and agencies (13 years). Officials at the permanent representations may also be expected fairly pre-socialized and “pre-packed” before entering EU committees. The general picture from table 4.3 indicates that recruitment to the permanent missions is not a reward only to officials with long careers in the national bureaucracy. Officials with fairly short careers in the central administrations are also given positions at the permanent representations.

Consistent with table 4.3, table 4.4 shows that officials attending EU committees are generally middle-aged:

Table 4.4 Distribution of ages (% and cumulative %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ages:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Cum. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 years</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44 years</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54 years</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 years</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years, or more</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>156 (100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen from table 4.4, officials at the permanent representations are somewhat younger than officials in the national ministries and agencies (cf. Statskonsult 1999:6: 26; Trondal 1998: 286). Moreover, age and seniority are themselves strongly inter-correlated. Thus, the officials studied tend to have served for fairly long periods of time in the domestic government apparatus (table 4.3) and to be middle-aged (table 4.4). Moreover, while officials in the national ministries and agencies have served in the national civil service for longer periods of time than their colleagues at the permanent representations (table 4.3), officials at the permanent representations are somewhat younger than officials in the national ministries and agencies (table 4.4).
Adding to past socialization experiences, the educational background of the sampled officials is assumed to affect the identities, roles and modes of action evoked by them. Table 4.5 provides an overview of the educational backgrounds represented in our samples.

Table 4.5 Distribution of professional backgrounds (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professions:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical disciplinesa</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | (100)              | (100)                     |

a) e.g. physics, biology, engineering, chemistry.

Within the domestic administrations, table 4.5 shows that committee participants are mostly educated in technical disciplines. At the permanent representations, lawyers are represented more extensively. What plausible reasons can be suggested for this difference? First, the high proportion of experts at the national level might reflect the fact that most officials come from the agency level (72 per cent) and are employed in medium and lower rank positions (72 per cent). Professional expertise might be deemed vital for being appointed to an executive position in the first place and for performing adequately as a participant in Commission expert committees. At the permanent representations, officials are employed primarily in sectoral realms (78 per cent) and in medium rank positions (75 per cent). From these figures it does not follow that most of the permanent representatives are lawyers. Still, law might be considered an adequate expertise needed to perform adequately as a permanent representative and as a participant in Council working parties. Assuming that the EU system in general, and the Council of Ministers in particular, is a regulatory system par excellence (Majone 1996), one would expect lawyers to be recruited extensively to Council working parties. As seen in table 4.6 (below), officials at the permanent representations are more frequent attendants at the law-making machinery of the Council working parties. This pattern is reversed for Commission expert committees (cf. table 4.6 below). The work is of more technical nature in the Commission expert committees than in the Council working parties (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). This might explain why the proportion of technical experts is larger amongst those attending
EU committees from the domestic ministries and agencies than amongst the permanent representatives. However, the domination of technical experts from national ministries and agencies might also reflect the two issue areas covered in this study - the environment sector and the field of occupational health and safety. These sectors require highly specialized skills (Flynn 2000: 86-90; Vos 1999).

* * *

To sum up the observations so far, the committee participants from the ‘home administrations’ are mostly employed at the agency level, in middle or lower rank positions, and are trained in technical disciplines. As such, these officials are expected to evoke sectoral role and identity perceptions, and modes of acting (cf. Chapter 5 and 6). Furthermore, these officials are middle-aged, having served in the domestic government apparatus for relatively long periods of time. Being highly “pre-packed” before travelling to Brussels for committee meetings, one can assume that ministry and agency personnel only marginally enact supranational allegiances (cf. Chapter 6). Officials at the permanent representations are mostly employed in the sectoral realms of this institution, in medium or lower rank positions, and are trained in law. These officials are likely to evoke a mixture of sectoral and inter-sectoral roles, identities and modes of acting (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). Moreover, the permanent representatives are also middle-aged officials, albeit somewhat younger than their colleagues in the domestic administrative institutions. However, they have served for shorter periods of time in current position and in current institution than their domestic counterparts. Still, permanent representatives have served for relative long periods of time in the central administration as a whole prior to entering the permanent representation. Most of them also return to the domestic government apparatus after finishing their stay in Brussels. As such, one might expect both types of officials to be reluctant to changing pre-established role and identity perceptions in the direction of the supranational end of the national-supranational spectrum of figure 1.2 (cf. Chapters 1 and 6).

However, the secondary institutional affiliations considered in the current study may increase the likelihood for changes to occur in these variables and especially to increase the likelihood that supranational role and identity perceptions are attended to by EU committee participants. Administrative integration across levels of governance is arguably affected by (i) forms of
affiliation towards different EU committees, and (ii) the length and intensity of participation on these committees.

Secondary institutional affiliations
In this section, attention is first attached towards (i) the EU committees to which domestic civil servants attend and then towards (ii) the intensity and length to which national officials participate on these committees.

**Participation on EU committees.**
The officials were asked to report whether or not they have attended ECs and/or WPs recently, or in the past. The following table presents the proportion of officials in our sample that has attended EU committees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission expert committees…</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council working parties………</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N……………………..</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6 shows an inverse relationship between the percentage of officials from the ‘home administration’ and officials at the permanent representations. Officials within the ‘domestic administration’ participate more on ECs and officials at the permanent representations attend WPs more often. This may, however, partly reflect the fact that Norwegian officials solely attend ECs (cf. table 4.7 below). The difference between domestic officials and permanent representatives may also explain why committee participants in the domestic administrations are mainly trained in technical disciplines whilst officials at the permanent representations are mainly educated in law (cf. table 4.5).

Distributed by country, the following table compares Norwegian, Swedish and Danish government officials’ participation on ECs and WPs.
As shown in table 4.7, with the exception of officials at the permanent representation, Norwegian officials attend solely ECs. The fact that some Norwegian permanent representatives have attended WPs may reflect the fact that they attended WPs during the so-called ‘interim period’ of 1994 (Trondal 1996). During this period Norway was negotiating for full EU membership status and the government officials were allowed to attend EU committees, including WPs, albeit without formal voting rights. Table 4.7 also reveals that Swedish and Danish domestic administration officials attend ECs relatively more frequently than do their colleagues at the permanent representations. Consistent with the general pattern shown in table 4.6, WP participants are mostly recruited amongst permanent representatives.

Table 4.8 reveals the amount of time officials devotes to participation on Commission expert committees and Council working parties. Increased time of involvement in EU committees is assumed to increase the exposure to new information from these committees, thus fostering changes in the roles, identities and modes of acting amongst the participants.

As seen from the above table permanent representatives tend to devote more time to participation on EU committees than their colleagues do from the capitals. Moreover, officials
from the domestic administrations have an equal distribution of time devoted to attending ECs and WPs. Officials at the permanent representations, however, use considerably more time within WPs than within ECs. Moreover, going beyond table 4.8, 31 per cent of the Swedish and the Norwegian officials who are employed in the domestic administrations report that they devote a large proportion of time to EC participation. (This value scale corresponds to the dichotomised five-point scale of table 4.8.) 41 per cent of the Danish officials report devoting the same amount of time to ECs. Finally, comparing Swedish and Danish officials attending WPs, 33 per cent of the Swedish officials and 38 per cent of the Danish civil servants report that they devote a large proportion of time to participating on WPs. Thus, Danish officials seem to devote more time to participating on EU committees than the Swedish officials. Norwegian civil servants take third place by attending solely ECs.

In Chapter 2 we suggested that officials at the agency level attend ECs more frequently than officials at the ministry level, reflecting the highly sectoralized and technical character of these committees. The following table confirms this proposition. However, some significant deviations from the patterns are also seen.

### Table 4.9 Percentage of officials from different institutional realms who attended Commission expert committees and Council working parties during the last year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sector ministries</td>
<td>Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECs....................</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPs....................</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N..............</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to table 4.9, EC participants are recruited from both ministry personnel and agency personnel (cf. Jacobsson and Sundström 1999a: 13 and 1999b; Larsen, Lægreid and Wik 1999: 68; SOU 1996:60: 36; Statskonsult 1999:6: 24; Statskontoret 1996:7: 133; Trondal 1999b and 1998). In absolute numbers, however, agency officials attend ECs more extensively than ministry personnel. WP participants are mostly recruited from ministry personnel (cf. SOU 1996:6: 35). Similarly, at the permanent representations, most EC participants are
employed in sectoral realms. Moreover, WP participants are most frequently recruited from officials employed in the sectoral realms of the permanent representations. Most of the officials at the diplomatic realm attend Council working parties. Hence, EC and WP participants at the permanent representations are recruited from different institutional realms. However, similar to table 4.8, permanent representatives participate mostly on Council working parties while officials from domestic ministries and agencies mostly attend Commission expert committees.

The relatively high proportion of officials from domestic ministries and agencies attending ECs compared to attending WPs might reflect the fact that Norwegian officials solely attend ECs. The following table makes an analysis similar to table 4.9 but distributed by country. The permanent representatives are excluded from this table due to the fact that Norwegian permanent representatives seldom join EU committees and due to low sample size.

Table 4.10 Percentage of officials from national sector ministries and agencies having attended Commission expert committees and Council working parties during the last year, by country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sector ministries</th>
<th>agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECs........</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPs........</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N........</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.10 reveals that officials from different countries attend different EU committees. As expected, most of the Norwegian officials in the sample have attended ECs during the last year. However, amongst the Swedish civil servants, ministry officials have attended more WPs than ECs and most of the Swedish agency officials have attended ECs. Danish civil servants, however, have attended more ECs than WPs during the last year. One caveat is warranted. The sample size underpinning table 4.10 is fairly low in each column so conclusions should be drawn with caution. The value added by analysing table 4.10 compared to solely analysing table 4.9 has to do with revealing cross-country differences with respect to the intensity to which national officials participate on various EU committees.
Finally, table 4.11 investigates the extent to which particular educational backgrounds are systematically related to the propensity to attend certain EU committees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.11 Percentage of officials with different educational backgrounds attending Commission expert committees and Council working parties.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>domestic officials</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical disciplines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most significantly, table 4.11 shows that national ministry and agency officials attending EU committees are mostly technical experts, regardless of the type of EU committees they attend. Similarly, officials at the permanent representation attending EU committees are mostly lawyers, regardless of the type of EU committees attended. As such, contrary to our expectations outlined in Chapter 2, the figures presented in table 4.11 display no significant correlation between educational background and recruitment to particular EU committees. When compared to table 4.9, it seems that the ministry-agency variable is more significant in explaining the propensity for officials to attend either ECs or WPs than the educational variable. However, domestic officials who are technical experts are represented to a larger extent within ECs than within WPs. Moreover, domestic officials trained as lawyers attend WPs to a greater extent than ECs. These observations support the propositions suggested in Chapter 2. Amongst permanent representatives no significant co-variation is found between educational background and the type of EU committees attended. Hence, table 4.11 provided mixed support to the propositions suggested in Chapter 2.

* * *
To sum up the observations made so far, one overall picture can be identified. The typical EC participant is employed both at the agency level and at the ministry level, has a position which is earmarked for particular professional groups, and is employed in a middle or lower rank position. EC participants are mostly educated in technical disciplines. WP participants, on the other hand, are typically employed at the permanent representation to the EU, in different sectoral realms, in medium or lower rank positions, and are educated in law. However, a large proportion of WP participants is also recruited from national ministries and agencies. The role perceptions and patterns of co-ordination behaviour evoked by officials attending EU committees may be expected to reflect various national institutional affiliations. The ministry-agency variable might be particularly useful in accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). In order to account for the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration the final section of this Chapter considers the length and intensity to which national officials attend EU committees.

Length and intensity of cross-level participation.
The co-ordination behaviour, as well as the role and identity perceptions, evoked by national civil servants are likely to stem partly from the kind of institutional links existing across levels of governance and partly by the intensity and length of such linkages. “The frequency of communication among individuals is a key variable to students of socialization” (Pendergast 1976: 674). Table 4.12 gives an overview of central contact patterns with different EU institutions chosen by the EC participants and WP participants covered in our sample.

As seen from table 4.12 (cf. beneath), contacts outside their ‘own’ EU committee is significantly affected by the primary institutional affiliations embedding these civil servants. Officials at the ‘home administrations’ tend to have fewer contacts with other EU institutions compared to officials at the permanent representations. Officials in the ‘home administration’ tend to have contacts with DGs working within their ‘own’ policy sector – that is, with the DG for Employment and Social Affairs on health and safety issues, and with the Environment DG on environmental issues. One official claimed that “I take care of interests in the Commission daily” (Source: Danish agency official – author’s translation). Officials at the permanent representations have more frequent contacts with DGs working in other policy fields and with COREPER I and II. Contacts with the COREPER imply contacts with ‘own’ ambassador or deputy ambassador or with ambassadors or deputy ambassadors from other EU
member states. Still, as regards differences between those attending ECs and those attending WPs, EC participants at the permanent representations have considerably fewer contacts with other DGs and with the COREPER compared to permanent representatives attending WPs. Moreover, officials attending WPs have contacts with MEPs more frequently than have EC participants. Hence, table 4.12 indicates that domestic government officials attending ECs tend to have more intra-sectoral contacts with various EU level institutions while permanent representatives attending WPs tend to have more inter-sectoral contacts with EU institutions.

Table 4.12 Percentage of officials attending ECs and WPs who had the following contacts during the last year.\(^{a}\)

| Contacts with DGs working within my own policy sector\(^b\) | 22 | 33 | -- | -- |
| Contacts with other DGs | 9 | 13 | 29 | 63 |
| Contacts with participants at COREPER I and II\(^c\) | 2 | 12 | 22 | 83 |
| Contacts with MEPs | 0 | 2 | 0 | 18 |
| Contacts with officials at the European Court of Justice | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mean N | 143 | 59 | 19 | 40 |

\(^{a}\) The variables presented in this table involve officials who had these contacts fairly often, or very often. This dichotomy builds on the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).

\(^{b}\) Within the environment sector this involves contacts with the Environment Directorate General, while within the occupational health and safety sector this involves contacts with the Employment and Social Affairs Directorate General. This involves contacts with the chairperson of the relevant committee. However, because only 22 per cent of the EC participants and 33 per cent of the WP participants have contacts with their ‘own’ sector DG, these contacts are most likely to be with persons other than the chairperson.

\(^{c}\) Contacts with the COREPER imply contacts with ‘own’ ambassador or deputy ambassador or with ambassadors or deputy ambassadors from other EU member-states.
The committee participants were asked to indicate the year in which they made their first appearance in the EU committees. Since Norway and Sweden became formally affiliated to the EU in 1994 (through the EEA agreement) and Denmark having been EU member since 1973, the data set has been divided into two separate parts. One part considers officials who have participated in EU committees since before 1994, the other part comprises officials who entered EU committees for the first time after 1994. Based upon this distinction, table 4.13 reveals differences between the majority of Danish officials and Norwegian and Swedish officials.

Table 4.13 Distribution of first year of attendance (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECs</td>
<td>WPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1994 and 1998……</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1994…………………</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N…………………………</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.13 reveals that most of the officials attended EU committees for the first time after 1994. Moreover, because most of the EU committees have existed for fairly long periods of time, often more than 10 years (Institut für Europäische Politik 1987: 5), a moderate proportion of the officials also have participated for several years, that is, before 1994. Officials attending ECs or WPs report that the same officials usually meet several times in different committee meetings (Source: interview). Thus, “[c]hanges in the composition [of these committees] occur relatively infrequent” (Institut für Europäische Politik 1987: 6). The officials were presented with the following question: “Do the same officials normally attend meetings”? 89 per cent of the EC participants and 83 per cent of the WP participants from the ‘home administration’ responded “fairly often” of “very often” on this question. The corresponding responses from permanent representatives were 83 per cent from the EC participants and 95 per cent from the WP participants. These observations are confirmed in our interviews, which show that the same officials frequently attend several meetings, both within ECs and WPs. No major differences were observed between Norwegian, Swedish and Danish officials in this respect in either the interview data or the survey data. As discussed in
Chapter 6, regular meetings and interaction amongst the same people can allow an ‘esprit de corps’ to emerge in the EU committees.

Next, tables 4.14 and 4.15 give an overview of the number of committees to which these officials have attended.

**Table 4.14 Percentage of officials participating on EU committees.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of officials:</th>
<th>ECs</th>
<th>WPs</th>
<th>ECs</th>
<th>WPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 committees………..</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 committees……….</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 committees……….</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 committees…….</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49 committees…..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99 committees…….</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199 committees….</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-299 committees….</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-399 committees….</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-499 committees….</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score…………….</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N………………….</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.15 Percentage of officials participating on EU committees, by country.

A) Commission expert committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th></th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 committees…………..</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 committees………..</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 committees………..</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 committees…..</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49 committees…..</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99 committees…..</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-399 committees..</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N……………………</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B) Council working parties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th></th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 committees…………..</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 committees………..</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 committees………..</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 committees…..</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49 committees…..</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99 committees…..</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-499 committees…..</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N……………………</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)

Table 4.14 reveals that most of the officials have attended between 1 and 9 EU committees. On average, EC participants and WP participants coming from national ministries and agencies attend 3 committees. One reason why officials attend both ECs and WPs may be because they often follow EU directives from the Commission phase to the Council phase. Comparing these figures with observations made in table 4.6, we see that officials in domestic
ministries and agencies attend ECs more frequently than WPs (97 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively). However, these officials attend the same number of ECs and WPs (table 4.14). These figures thus reflect the fact that national officials attend ECs more extensively than WPs. However, the intensity of participation on these committees is equally distributed amongst the EC participants and the WP participants. On the other hand, officials at the permanent representations participate mainly on WPs (92 per cent) (cf. also table 4.6). Still, these officials tend to participate on an equal number of ECs and WPs. They mostly attend between 1 and 9 committees – both the ECs and the WPs. Moreover, some officials at the permanent representations have not attended any committees at all.

Table 4.14 shows that the majority of the permanent representatives have participated on more EU committees than have the ministry and agency personnel. The mean score amongst permanent representatives attending ECs and WPs is 17 committees. Hence, the mean score amongst permanent representatives is considerably higher than the corresponding mean score amongst the officials coming from the capitals (3 committees). These figures correspond to the data presented in table 4.8, which show that officials at the permanent representations generally devote more time and energy to participating on EU committees. These figures reveal that the permanent missions to the EU are located at the intersection of the nation-state and the EU system of governance.

Table 4.15 (A) and (B) shows that most Norwegian, Danish and Swedish domestic officials have participated between 1 and 4 committees. At the permanent representations, however, the difference between Norway and the two EU member states crystallises. While 67 per cent of the Norwegian permanent representatives have never attended ECs, most of the Swedish and Danish permanent representatives have attended between 1 to 9 ECs. More generally table 4.15 reveals that Norwegian domestic officials participate on ECs to the same extent as their Swedish and Danish colleagues. Swedish and Danish officials, however, have participated on more WPs than have their Norwegian counterparts.8

The above tables have accounted for the total number of committees to which the officials have attended across time. Tables 4.16 and 4.17 focus on more recent participation within EU committees: during the last year, and during the last month.
Table 4.16 Percentage of officials who attended EU committee meetings during the last year and the last month.

**A) Domestic officials:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last year</th>
<th>Last month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No participation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9 meetings</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 meetings</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 meetings</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 meetings</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 meetings</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 meetings or more</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B) Permanent representatives:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last year</th>
<th>Last month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No participation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9 meetings</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 meetings</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 meetings</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 meetings</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 meetings</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 meetings or more</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean score</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(100) (100) (100) (100)
Table 4.17 Percentage of officials in the domestic administrations who attended EU committee meetings during the last year, by country.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ECs</th>
<th>WPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No participation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9 meetings.</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 meetings.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 meetings.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 meetings.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 meetings.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 meetings or more</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N……………..</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)

a) This table does not involve officials at the permanent representations to the EU. Neither does it involve official’s monthly participation on EU committees. This owes to the general low N within these two distributions.

As seen from table 4.16, most EC and WP participants from the capitals seem to attend between 1 and 9 meetings per year. On average, EC participants have attended 4 meetings last year, whilst WP participants have attended 6 meetings. However, most EC participants and WP participants from the ‘domestic administrations’ have not attended meetings during the last month. The mean score amongst EC participants last month is 0 meetings, whilst the corresponding mean score for WP participants is 1 meeting. At the permanent representations, however, most officials seem fairly active during the last year and during the last month. The mean score amongst EC participants at the permanent representation is 13 meetings for the last year. The corresponding mean amongst the WP participants is 82 meetings; these participants at the permanent representations seem particularly active in attending EU committees. Moreover, officials at the permanent representations also seem somewhat more active during the last month compared to the officials from the national level. The mean score amongst EC participants is 2 meetings last month and the corresponding mean score for WP participants is 10 meetings. These figures also confirm that permanent representatives are more active with the Council working parties than with the Commission expert committees.
When comparing the overall degree of cross-level participation amongst ‘domestic representatives’ and ‘permanent representatives’, the latter are more active with the former. This observation is consistent with the observations presented in tables 4.8, 4.14 and 4.20. Finally, in table 4.17, no major differences can be observed between the Scandinavian countries as regards the sheer number of EC meetings attended during the last year. The more general pattern shown in table 4.16 is that permanent representatives attend EU committees more intensively than do the domestic officials capitals.

Next, how many days in session do these committee participants normally have?

Table 4.18 Percentage of meetings of given duration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECs</td>
<td>WPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day…………………</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 days……………</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 days or more…...</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N…………………..</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen from table 4.18 domestic officials have generally more days in session than have officials at the permanent representations. The physical proximity between the committee meeting rooms and the permanent representation buildings may partly explain this. Moreover, Norwegian officials seem to attend 1-2 days sessions to a larger extent than do Danish and Swedish officials (46 per cent, 23 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively). Norwegian officials thus seem to devote the same amount of time and energy in attending Commission expert committees as do Swedish and Danish civil servants.

Tables 4.19a and 4.19b report results on the questions: “do EU committee participants give oral presentations during committee meetings, and are they routinely invited to attend committee meetings?”
Table 4.19a Percentage of officials giving a positive answer\textsuperscript{a} to the following questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>\textit{domestic officials}</th>
<th>\textit{permanent representatives}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{ECs}</td>
<td>\textit{WPs}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Do you give oral presentations during committee meetings?” \textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Are you asked routinely to attend committee meetings?” \textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).

Table 4.19b Percentage of officials within domestic government institutions routinely invited to attend EU committees, by country\textsuperscript{a}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>\textit{Norway}</th>
<th>\textit{Sweden}</th>
<th>\textit{Denmark}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textit{ECs}</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{WPs}</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} The variables presented in this table regard officials being asked fairly often, or very often to attend these committees. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).

As shown in table 4.19a, participants within ECs and WPs are routinely invited to attend meetings. No major differences are observed between Norwegian officials and officials from Sweden and Denmark with regard to the extent to which they are routinely invited to attend EC meetings (table 4.19b). Parallel to this observation, most of the Danish and Swedish officials are also routinely invited to attend WPs. Hence, only a very small proportion of the committee participants has been subject to self-selection.

Which institutions normally invite officials to attend EU committee meetings? As seen from our data (even though they are not presented above), officials at the permanent representations tend to be invited by the Commission and the Council of Ministers to attend ECs and WPs, respectively. Amongst domestic representatives, EC participants are mostly invited directly by the Commission (87 per cent) whilst WP participants are mostly invited by one’s own
government institution at the domestic level (57 per cent). When comparing the three Scandinavian countries, no major differences emerge regarding the procedures used to select committee participants. These figures support the intergovernmental nature of the Council working parties as well as the relative transcendence of intergovernmentalism within the Commission expert committees (cf. also Chapters 5 and 6).

Regarding the extent to which officials give oral presentations during the committee meetings, table 4.19a reveals that 50 per cent of the officials give oral presentations fairly often during EC and WP meetings. Only 27 per cent of the Norwegian domestic officials attending EC committees give oral presentations fairly often or more frequently. Consistent with these figures, one Norwegian EC participant reported that, “we sit somewhat on the side-line in the EU system. We are not treated as full members of the committee” (Source: interview - author’s translation). The corresponding figures amongst Swedish and Danish officials are 61 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively. Similarly, 41 per cent of the Swedish and Danish permanent representatives give oral presentations during meetings in ECs and most of these officials give oral presentations during WP meetings (92 per cent). Assessing the degree of intensity of involvement in the EU committees, oral presentations appear to be a vital variable this respect. On this measure, Norwegian officials seem less intensively engaged in the daily work of the EU committees than their Swedish and Danish counterparts. The figures presented below also support the observation that Norwegian officials are less intensively engaged in the day-to-day activities of the EU committees (cf. table 4.21).

Table 4.20 is concerned with the informal contacts made outside formal EU committee meetings.
Table 4.20 Percentage of officials who have the following informal contacts with other committee participants outside formal committee meetings.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contacts with other committee participants:</th>
<th>ECs</th>
<th>WPs</th>
<th>ECs</th>
<th>WPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- before formal meetings ..................</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- after formal meetings ....................</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N........................................ 141  57  23  40

a) The variables presented in this table involve officials conducting informal contacts outside formal committee meetings fairly often, or very often. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale:

Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).

Table 4.20 shows that informal contacts outside the committee meetings are more frequent amongst permanent representatives than amongst domestic representatives. Moreover, such contacts are distributed equally between the “before” and “after” formal committee meetings for both the EC and WP participants. Thus, permanent representatives are involved in the informal EU committee networks more extensively than domestic officials. This may partially be explained by the fact that permanent representatives devote more time to participating in EU committees, as shown in table 4.8, compared to officials from the domestic ministries and agencies. Permanent representatives also attend both more EU committees and formal meetings than their national colleagues (cf. table 4.14 and 4.16). This helps to explain why permanent representatives have more informal contact with fellow committee participants outside the meeting rooms (table 4.20). However, committee participants coming from the domestic administrations have slightly more frequent informal contacts before formal committee meetings than after such meetings. As such, ex ante contacts are deemed more vital for these officials than ex post consultations.

When asked what kind of informal contacts were conducted by Norwegian, Swedish and Danish civil servants, the following distribution results:
Table 4.21 Percentage of officials within domestic government institutions who have the following contact patterns outside formal EU committee meetings, by country.\textsuperscript{a, b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact patterns:</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Face-to-face contacts……….</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone, e-mail, fax…….</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N…………………….</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a) The two variables presented in this table regard officials who have these contacts fairly often, or very often. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).}

\textsuperscript{b) No officials from the permanent representations answered this question. Moreover, this question did not differentiate between EC participants and WP participants.}

As seen from table 4.21, Norwegian officials have considerably fewer face-to-face contacts outside formal committee meetings than their Swedish and Danish counterparts. Also, contacts by phone, e-mail and fax amongst the committee members are less frequently used by Norwegian officials than by Swedish and Danish officials. \textit{“We often have contacts between the meetings – rather informal and personal contacts”} (Source: interview: Swedish official – author’s translation). This indicates that the Norwegian officials have fewer informal contacts outside formal committee meetings than Swedish and Danish officials. This observation is supported empirically by Larsen, Lægreid and Wik (1999: 72), and underscores the observations above (cf. table 4.15).

* * *

One final question considers whether the different variables presented in this Chapter are strongly inter-correlated or not. Within the field of political behaviour, a number of studies have shown that different measures of intensity and length of participation are closely related. Scoring high on one dimension increases the likelihood of scoring high on other dimensions. Endnote 9 presents the inter-correlations that are significant at 95 % and 99 % levels.\textsuperscript{9} Table 4.22A shows that different measures of intensity and length of participation tend to be statistically significantly correlated. Most significantly, national ministry and agency officials that participate intensively on ECs also tend to participate intensively on WPs. Having participated within EU committees for long periods of time increases the likelihood for
intensive participation, especially with regard to informal contacts. Thus, officials participating on many formal committee meetings also tend to participate informally at the EU level (cf. Lægreid 1999). Informal contacts seem to develop during formal meetings within ECs and WPs.

As seen from the permanent representatives’ point of view, some of the same tendencies observed amongst the domestic officials are revealed in table 4.22B in Endnote 9. Similar to the domestic officials, the overall picture presented by the permanent representatives is that different measures of intensity and length of participation on EU committees tend to go together. Intensive participation on ECs is shown to correlate with intensive participation on WPs. Likewise, informal participation on these EU committees is seen to correlate positively with formal participation within the same committees. Generally, permanent representatives attend many EU committees (table 4.14), devote much time and energy towards attending these committees (table 4.8), attend many formal committee meetings (table 4.16), and have many informal contacts with other committee participants outside the committee rooms (table 4.20).

Finally, the tables presented above have utilized different empirical indicators for length and intensity of cross-level participation. One rationale behind applying different operational measures of the same theoretical variables is to detect particular empirical patterns (cf. Chapter 3). Empirically, many of the variables measuring length and intensity of cross-level participation are shown to have significant inter-correlations. More specifically, length of cross-level participation is significantly associated with intensive participation.

Conclusion
To summarise the observations, two overall empirical patterns may be identified: One relates to the EC - WP distinction and the other to the ‘home administration’ – permanent representation axis. Considering the first dimension, the typical EC participant is employed at the agency level as well as at the ministry level, has a position that is earmarked for particular professional groups, and is employed in a middle- or lower-rank position. Moreover, the EC participants studied here are mostly educated in technical disciplines, like physics, engineering, etc. WP participants, on the other hand, are typically employed at the permanent representation to the EU, in different sectoral realms, have medium or lower rank positions
and have a legal education. However, a large proportion of the WP participants is also recruited from national ministries and agencies. Due to the differences between EC and WP participants we may expect differences with respect to the evoked role and identity perceptions, and the modes of acting chosen by the EC participants compared to the WP participants (cf. Chapters 5 and 6).

As far as the differences between officials from the ‘home administration’ and officials at the permanent representations are concerned, committee participants from the ‘home administrations’ are mostly employed at the agency level, in medium or lower rank positions, and are trained in technical disciplines. As such, these officials are likely to evoke sectoral role and identity perceptions, and modes of acting (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). These officials are also middle-aged and have served in the domestic government apparatus for relatively long periods of time. Officials at the permanent representations, on the other hand, are mostly employed in sectoral realms, in medium or lower rank positions, and are trained in law. These officials are likely to evoke a mixture of sectoral and inter-sectoral roles, identities and modes of acting (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). These officials are also middle-aged, albeit being somewhat younger than their colleagues in the capitals. They have served for shorter periods of time in current position and in current institution than their domestic counterparts. They have, however, served for relatively long periods of time in the central administration as a whole before entering the permanent representations. Most of them also return to the domestic government apparatus after finishing their stay in Brussels. Consequently, one might expect officials at both the permanent representations and in the domestic administrations to be fairly reluctant and hesitant to change their pre-existing role and identity perceptions towards the supranational end of the national-supranational spectrum. Therefore, supranational roles and allegiances are likely to be evoked only marginally. Permanent representatives, however, generally participate more intensively on the EU committees than their domestic colleagues. This observation makes it more likely that supranational role and identity perceptions are evoked amongst permanent representatives than amongst ‘domestic representatives’ (cf. Chapter 6).

The most significant difference observed between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials relates to which type of EU committees they attend. Whereas Danish and Swedish government officials participate on both ECs and WPs, their Norwegian counterparts have
access only to the ECs. This difference is reflected markedly in the data presented in this Chapter. This difference has also led to major differences between officials at the permanent representations of Norway and officials at the Danish and Swedish permanent representations in terms of cross-level participation. The Norwegian permanent representatives fairly seldom attend EU committees, their Swedish and Danish counterparts are more heavily engaged in both ECs and WPs, albeit mostly in the latter. As seen from the ‘domestic administrations’ point of view, however, no major differences are observed between the three countries as regards the intensity to which officials attend ECs. Norwegian officials attend ECs to approximately the same extent as their Danish and Swedish colleagues. Still, Danish and Swedish officials have additional access to the WPs, and Danish officials have, on average, participated on EU committees for longer periods of time than have their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts. Danish and Swedish EU committee participants tend to have more intensive informal contacts outside the formal committee meetings than the Norwegian committee participants. Also, the Norwegian participants talk less during EU committee meetings than their Danish and Swedish counterparts. We expect that, supranational role and identity perceptions are likely to be evoked more markedly amongst the Danish and Swedish officials than amongst their Norwegian colleagues.
Notes

1 This section, and the following section, builds from Trondal 1999b.

2 A corresponding total of 25 561 officials have permanent positions within the different Union bodies. Of this total, 17 946 officials are employed by the Commission (70 per cent), while 2 225 officials work permanently within the Council structure (9 per cent) (Fligstein and McNichol 1998: 73).

3 The occupational titles presented in table 4.2 correspond to an official document published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999b).

4 This does not, however, imply that technical issues may not be politically salient. For example, the cumulative effect of incremental technical decisions may have large political implications.

5 Within the domestic level institutions: Pearson’s r between age and seniority in current position is r = .46**; Pearson’s r between age and seniority in current institution is r = .62**; and Pearson’s r between age and seniority in the central administration as a whole is r = .67**. Seniority in current position, in current institution and in the central administration as a whole are themselves significantly inter-correlated. At the permanent representation Pearson’s r between age and seniority in current position is r = .61**; Pearson’s r between age and seniority in current institution is r = .23; and Pearson’s r between age and seniority in the central administration as a whole is r = .63**. Also, at the permanent representations these three seniority variables are significantly intercorrelated, except for the relationship between seniority in current position and seniority in the central administration as a whole.

6 The Commission and the Commission expert committees also “make laws”, however at an earlier stage in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the Council has delegated law-making authority to the Commission on a great many policy fields. In order to monitor this delegated power the Council has required the establishment of comitology committees. These committees are not included in our study.

7 Amongst officials in the domestic administrations, contacts are most likely to be directed towards other DGs than the two sector-DGs mentioned above. For permanent representatives contacts with their ‘own’ DG may include other DGs than the DG for Employment and Social Affairs and the Environment DG. This owes to the fact that our sample of permanent representatives includes permanent representatives from several different policy areas.

8 There are one outlier in tables 4.14 and 4.15B. This respondent has participated in several hundred ECs and WPs. This is an agriculture official at the Danish permanent representation whose attendance on EU committees can be characterised as extremely intensive. This official has worked at the Danish permanent representation for 2.5 years.
Table 4.22 Inter-correlations between variables measuring length and intensity of cross-level participation (Pearson’s r), a, b

A) Domestic officials:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. number of ECs</th>
<th>2. number of WPs</th>
<th>3. time of arrival in ECs</th>
<th>4. time of arrival in WPs</th>
<th>5. number of formal meetings last year in ECs</th>
<th>6. number of formal meetings last year in WPs</th>
<th>7. oral presentations in ECs</th>
<th>8. oral presentations in WPs</th>
<th>9. routinely invited to ECs?</th>
<th>10. routinely invited to WPs?</th>
<th>11. informal meetings with EC participants</th>
<th>12. informal meetings with WP participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. number of ECs</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. number of WPs</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.95**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. time of arrival in ECs</td>
<td>.81**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. time of arrival in WPs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. number of formal meetings last year in ECs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. number of formal meetings last year in WPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. oral presentations in ECs</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. oral presentations in WPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. routinely invited to ECs?</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. routinely invited to WPs?</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. informal meetings with EC participants</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. informal meetings with WP participants</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N........ 119

*) p ≤ .05    **) p ≤ .01

a) This table presents only correlations that are significant at the 95 % or 99 % levels.
b) Some of the variables above are ‘natural’ metric variables, i.e. the number of ECs and WPs attended, the number of meetings attended, etc. Other variables in the above tables are substantially non-metric variables, i.e. whether officials are routinely invited to attend ECs, building on the following five-point scale: very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5). In an effort at utilising as much information in such variables as possible, they are treated as metric variables in the statistical analyses. The low N in the analyses also renders the analysis vulnerable for dichotomies where the univariate distributions are skewed, rendering some cells nearly empty. Thus, all the variables in the two tables above are treated as metric variables, thus, including all their original values (as shown in previous tables). A high value is given to those having participated in few committees, in few formal meetings, having
participated for few years. A high value is also given to those being routinely invited to attend meetings, those giving oral presentations often, and those attending many informal meetings.

As seen from the above table, officials attending many ECs also seem to attend many formal EC meetings (Pearson’s r = .85**), but conduct few informal meetings with colleagues from these committees (Pearson’s r = -.18*). Officials attending many ECs tend to be senior participants, thus, having attended ECs for many years (Pearson’s r = .32**). Officials attending many WPs tend to be senior participants within both ECs (Pearson’s r = .35**) and WPs (Pearson’s r = .44**). “I often follow the dossier between expert committees and working parties” (Source: Swedish official attending ECs and WPs – author’s translation). Officials attending many WPs tend to have many formal meetings in WPs (Pearson’s r = .95**). Officials attending many WPs tend to be routinely invited to attend ECs (Pearson’s r = .19*) and tend to give oral presentations in EC meetings (Pearson’s r = .24**). As regards the length of participation on EU committees, officials tend to have made their first appearance within ECs and WPs at approximately the same time (Pearson’s r = .81**). Senior EC participants give few oral presentations during EC meetings (Pearson’s r = -.17*). Officials having many formal WP meetings during the last year also have many informal contacts with other WP participants (Pearson’s r = .30**) are routinely invited to attend ECs (Pearson’s r = .19*) and give oral presentations during EC meetings (Pearson’s r = .30**). Indicating the close links that exists between participating on ECs and WPs, officials giving oral presentations in ECs also tend to give oral presentations in WPs (Pearson’s r = .47**), and have many informal EC meetings (Pearson’s r = .29*). These officials also tend to become routinely invited to attend formal EC meetings (Pearson’s r = .29**). Officials giving oral presentations during WP meetings also tend to become routinely invited to attend WP meetings (Pearson’s r = .35**) and have many informal meetings with other WP participants (Pearson’s r = .38**). Finally, officials having many informal meetings with other EC participants also tend to have informal meetings with WP participants outside the formal meetings (Pearson’s r = .50**).

**B) Permanent representatives:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. number of ECs</th>
<th>2. number of WPs</th>
<th>3. time of arrival in ECs</th>
<th>4. time of arrival in WPs</th>
<th>5. number of formal meetings last year in ECs</th>
<th>6. number of formal meetings last year in WPs</th>
<th>7. oral presentations in ECs</th>
<th>8. oral presentations in WPs</th>
<th>9. routinely invited to ECs?</th>
<th>10. routinely invited to WPs?</th>
<th>11. informal meetings with EC participants</th>
<th>12. informal meetings with WP participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>.84**</td>
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<td>.57</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td>.92**</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mean N……………………… 36

*) p ≤ .05       **) p ≤ .01
As seen from the above table, permanent representatives attending many ECs also attend many formal EC meetings (Pearson’s r = .84**). Officials attending many WPs have generally participated for long periods of time within both ECs and WPs (Pearson’s r = .57* and .70**, respectively). Senior officials within ECs also tend to be senior participants within WPs (Pearson’s r = .92**). Officials routinely invited to attend WPs also tend to have many informal contacts with other WP participants (Pearson’s r = .68**). Less easily to interpret is the negative correlation between “oral presentations during WP meetings” and “being routinely invited to attend ECs” (Pearson’s r = -.45*).
CHAPTER 5

MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS IN EUROPE

EFFECTS ON THE CO-ORDINATION BEHAVIOUR
OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Introduction

Chapter 4 revealed the “factual enormity of the committee phenomenon” (Weiler 1999: 340 – original emphasis). Past and more recent literature on EU committees have measured the degree of cross-level participation through these committees in various ways. One question less frequently addressed in this literature is how cross-level participation in Europe affects the actors themselves – their identities, role conceptions and modes of acting. The current Chapter considers this question by analysing how participation on EU committees accompanies certain co-ordination behaviour amongst the participants. The current Chapter also analyses how different primary institutional affiliations accompany particular co-ordination behaviour.

As the boundaries between the nation-state bureaucracy and the EU become increasingly blurred due to processes of cross-level participation, the boundary-maintaining role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) may be affected in particular ways. In this Chapter we ask to what extent the gate-keeping role of the MFA, the last stronghold of the nation-state, is affected by the cross-level modes of participation revealed in Chapter 4. Is the co-ordinating
role of the MFA affected differently by different EU committees – that is, by Commission expert committees and Council working parties? Additionally, we are interested in how the co-ordination role of the MFA is affected by different domestic institutional structures embedding civil servants.

Within existing research on processes of Europeanization of domestic institutions and policy processes, at least two classes of empirical observations are highlighted. First, EU membership contributes to fragmentation of domestic decision processes, promoting a general lack of coherent policy approaches towards the EU amongst different domestic government institutions (e.g. Dehousse 1997). Secondly, EU membership has been observed to foster and strengthen domestic co-ordination processes, ultimately strengthening the gate-keeping role of the Foreign Ministry (e.g. Bulmer and Burch 1998; Spence 1999: 249). “Indeed, paradoxically, both centralised co-ordination and the countervailing phenomenon of sectoral segmentation … appear to be on the increase” (Wright 1996: 155). However, theoretical explanations put forward in the literature have largely ignored this paradox (Dehousse 1997; Lindberg 1963; Moravcsik 1998; Wessels 1998). An apparent puzzle has thus arisen. While domestic co-ordination processes have been observed to oscillate along a sectoral-territorial spectrum, theories that explain these processes are largely based on uni-dimensional explanatory variables. The emphasis is directed to either inter-sectoral co-ordination dynamics (Moravcsik 1998; Hocking 1999) or to intra-sectoral processes of fragmentation (Dehousse 1997). Only occasionally do scholars pay systematic attention to different co-ordination dynamics (cf. Derlien 1999; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Metcalfe 1994; Schout 1999).

The puzzle, as outlined here, emerges prominently within studies of EU committees. The vast majority of this body of literature pictures EU committee meetings as generally business-like, depoliticized, consensual and technocratic. They emphasise ‘technocratic collusion’ at the Community level (Dehousse 1997: 48; Wessels 1998 and 1999: 265). Current studies of EU committees largely ignore the differentiated institutional character of the EU committees, and emphasise their commonality as a symptom of administrative integration and engrenage, more broadly (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 1999; Neyer 1999). Our analytical effort, outlined in Chapter 2, is focused towards emphasising that different organizational principles may affect administrative integration differently. When accounting for different co-ordination dynamics within domestic government institutions, this Chapter is concerned with the multiple institutional embeddedness of domestic civil servants. They are
employed within domestic ministries and agencies and simultaneously are part-time participants within different EU committees. This Chapter shows that government officials attending Commission expert committees (ECs) report that their co-ordination behaviour differs from those officials participating on Council working parties (WPs). Furthermore, officials employed in domestic ministries are seen to co-ordinate differently from officials employed in domestic agencies or directorates.

Generally, studies on policy co-ordination pay more attention to inter-sectoral processes than to intra-sectoral processes (Derlien 1999: 1; Hocking 1999; Schout 1999: 4). Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination denote linkage processes across policy sectors with regard to actors, problems, solutions, consequences, role conceptions and identities are concerned. In the current study, inter-sectoral co-ordination resembles horizontal inter-ministerial co-ordination behaviour. On the other hand, intra-sectoral co-ordination resembles both horizontal and vertical co-ordination within each government institution and vertical co-ordination across the ministry level and the agency level.

Furthermore, my definition of co-ordination is two-dimensional as regards the techniques applied. Co-ordination may involve (i) pro-active processes for drawing up written and clear-cut mandates and instructions, or (i) re-active and oral processes, not geared towards outlining any written instructions. The first process tends to foster formally binding mandates and the second process tends to produce more ambiguous mandates. While processes for producing imperative mandates is based upon the idea of institutions as coupled, sectorally co-ordinated systems of governance, the notion of ambiguous mandates rests upon perceiving institutions as uncoupled, segmented and inter-sectorally fragmented government systems (Olsen 1988: 162-170).

Linking this study to past and contemporary theories of European integration, I have argued in Chapter 1 that organization theory constitutes a theoretical bridge between intergovernmental perspectives and neo-functional accounts. With reference to domestic co-ordination processes, intergovernmental perspectives emphasise the primacy of inter-sectoral co-ordination processes and neo-functional accounts pay greater attention to intra-sectoral processes (e.g. Lindberg 1963; Moravcsik 1998). The cognitive organizational theory perspective outlined in Chapter 2 argues that both these scenarios may be partially correct because they reflect different organizational principles. The cognitive organization theory perspective outlined
provides microfoundations for accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration. Chapter 2 argued that the territorial logic of the nation-state, emphasised within intergovernmental accounts, can be transcended subsequent to intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination taking primacy over inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination. In practice, this may imply that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is largely by-passed as a vital co-ordinating institution at the domestic level. As the MFA loses control of EU policies and politics at the domestic level, sector ministries and agencies may be sectorally penetrated from the EU level (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Moreover, these dynamics are likely to be fuelled by the sectoral organizational principles that underpin the EU Commission and the Commission expert committees, in particular. This mode of sectoral penetration of sector ministries and agencies, however, may be filtered and modified to some extent if the MFA is perceived as a central co-ordinating body. The Council of Ministers and the Council working parties, in particular, can contribute to the empowerment of the MFA as a vital co-ordinating unit.

In this Chapter, administrative integration reflects processes whereby domestic co-ordination processes are affected significantly by the organizational principles underpinning Commission expert committees.3 Hence, consistent with prior arguments outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, intra-sectoral co-ordination processes are fairly strong indicators of administrative integration. Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination, in contrast, are indicative of intergovernmental dynamics and largely go counter to processes of administrative integration. Administrative integration thus requires the co-ordination behaviour of civil servants to be close to the sectoral end of the sectoral-territorial dimension presented in Chapter 1. This weakens the boundary-maintaining role of the MFA. Thus, “institutional fragmentation [may] … assume a positive significance for the purposes of [administrative] integration” (Cassese 1987: 19).

In the following, a short resume of the main theoretical arguments outlined in prior Chapters is provided. Next, an empirical analysis is conducted, revealing how different formal organizational arrangements, and their mutual linkages, are reflected in the way domestic civil servants conceive of their own co-ordination behaviour.
Deriving empirical propositions from theory

Two pivotal assumptions have been outlined in Chapter 2 on the basis of a cognitive organization theory perspective. First, decision behaviour may be moulded and re-moulded on the basis of organizing and reorganizing organizational boundaries (March and Olsen 1989; Nkomo and Cox jr. 1996). Reorganizing from one principle of organization to another may alter the flow of information within organizations, which ultimately changes the flow of information to each decision-maker. So, when organizational members change organizational affiliations they may tend to choose new ways of acting as a result of being exposed to new sets of information.

Civil servants from domestic ministries and agencies attending EU committees have multilevel institutional affiliations. In addition to their ministry/agency affiliation and their EU committee affiliation these officials have professional affiliations towards different disciplines. Hence, national decision-makers may be influenced by multiple and partially contending sets of information, premises and considerations. One task in Chapter 2 was to identify the conditions under which particular institutional affiliations of individual civil servants accompany particular co-ordination behaviour amongst them. Studying government officials who are members of government institutions at different levels of governance, I emphasise organizational linkages between government institutions as one vital scope condition that affects the co-ordination behaviour evoked by government officials. One central aspect of multiple institutional affiliations relates to the formal linkages between organizations and to the intensity and length of such linkages.

To summarize the main arguments of Chapter 2, the following propositions may be forwarded. Inter-sectoral co-ordination modes are most likely to be evoked amongst domestic officials who are educated in law, economy or social sciences, participate on Council working parties, who have seniority and who participate intensively on these committees, who have top-rank positions at the permanent representations to the EU, and who belong to the diplomatic realm of this institution. Conversely, intra-sectoral modes of co-ordinating are more likely to accompany domestic government officials educated in technical disciplines, who participate intensively and for long periods of time on Commission expert committees, and who are employed in medium or lower rank positions within domestic sector ministries or agencies.
Administrative integration is arguably stronger amongst officials enacting intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination than amongst officials evoking inter-sectoral co-ordination behaviour.

The empirical record: What co-ordination processes tell us about administrative integration

This section shows how different EU committee affiliations and different national institutional affiliations affect domestic modes of co-ordinating EU related dossiers. The following reveals how these officials’ co-ordination behaviour reflects the type of EU committee that is attended. The next section seeks to control statistically for the length and intensity of participation on these EU committees. The final section shows how co-ordination processes reflect various institutional affiliations at the domestic governance level. The following analysis does not determine the relative explanatory potential of each independent variable. The principal rationale is to illustrate how each variable influences particular modes of co-ordination behaviour. In the reminder of this Chapter, several different dependent variables are used to measure co-ordination behaviour. The overall rationale for using several different empirical proxies on the co-ordination variable is to detect empirical patterns. If several operational measures coincide with predicted patterns the test is shown to be robust (cf. Chapter 3).

Different EU committee affiliations: Effects on co-ordination behaviour

I have argued that the level of policy co-ordination is likely to be greater amongst civil servants attending Council working parties (WPs) compared to officials attending Commission expert committees (ECs). Moreover, I expect that officials who solely participate on ECs will co-ordinate less actively than those officials who also attend WPs. Table 5.1 provides an overview of different efforts at co-ordinating EU related dossiers, paying particularly attention to different techniques applied to this end.
Table 5.1 Percentage of officials using different co-ordinating techniques. a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination techniques:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing clearances with other central administrative institutions before attending EU committees b</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing informal clearances c</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing formal clearances</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up problem notes d</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up frame notes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up instructions</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>”Do these documents govern your positions“ e</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) In the following tables, N varies somewhat, reflecting the extent to which the respondents have answered different questions. However, by using the mean N, extreme variations in N are omitted.
b) This variable, and the following two variables, involve officials doing clearances to a fairly great, or very great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Great extent (1), fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
c) This question, and the following question, was not presented for the permanent representatives.
d) This variable, and the following two variables, regard officials who outline these documents fairly often, or very often. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
e) This variable regards officials who report that these documents govern their positions to a fairly great extent, or great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: To a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5).

Table 5.1 reveals that the use of clearances between national governmental institutions is more frequent amongst WP participants compared to officials participating on ECs. Still, the amount of inter-sectoral co-ordination is high amongst those participating on ECs. This may partially is due to the territorial organizational principle within the ECs. It may also reflect the primary institutional affiliations that embed the EU committee participants (cf. the next section). Moreover, policy sectors are frequently organized differently between the EU Commission and the domestic government institutions. Institutional misfit can lead to cross-sectoral co-ordination efforts at the domestic level, for example, between different ministries,
between different agencies or directorates, and between ministries and agencies (cf. Jacobsson and Sundström 1999b; SOU 1996:6: 51; Trondal 1996). Inter-sectoral co-ordination that reflects institutional misfit, however, need not involve the MFA. More frequently, cross-sectoral co-ordination processes that accompany institutional misfit tend to strengthen the co-ordination role of sector ministries and agencies:

“I have to work towards several DGs. This makes it difficult to find responsible institutions at the domestic level. This implies having contacts with several ministries”
(Source: Norwegian ministry official – author’s translation).

Additionally, table 5.1 reveals that the relative high frequency of cross-sectoral modes of co-ordination in ECs may also be due to the heavy use of informal clearances amongst the participants. Supporting this interpretation, table 5.1 shows that WP participants use formal co-ordination arrangements more frequently than EC participants. EC participants tend to be guided by informal clearances to the same extent as WP participants. Statskonsult (1999:6: 43) report that written frame notes are used less frequently as co-ordination tool-kits amongst Norwegian EC participants compared to officials attending comitology committees (cf. Statskonsult 2000:3: 51). In the Norwegian central administration, written problem notes and frame notes are intended to provide background information on EEA legislation in the issue area at hand, as well as reviews of existing national legislation. Additionally, these documents are to include discussions on budgetary implications, surveys on the interests of other countries, etc. (Statskonsult 1998: 190-195). As seen from our data, EC participants from all the three Scandinavian countries use informal co-ordination arrangements more frequently than do WP participants (cf. table 5.1). “We use mostly informal contacts towards [the ministry]” (Source: Norwegian agency official participating on ECs – author’s translation).

Table 5.1 also reveals that written instructions are used more frequently amongst officials attending WPs than amongst officials attending ECs. These observations are also supported in qualitative interviews. While officials negotiate under fairly clear and written instructions within WP meetings, less clear and often implicit mandates tend to accompany negotiations within EC meetings (Source: interviews).

Hence, the relative propensity to apply written problem notes, frame notes, and instructions vary between the two classes of committee participants. Still, no significant difference is
identified between the two classes of committee participants with regard to the extent to which written instructions, problem notes or frame notes affect the positions taken by the participants during EU committee meetings (table 5.1).

“I am quite self-driven on these meetings” (Source: Norwegian EC participant – author’s translation). Still, “[t]here are clear differences as regards the instructions one gets prior to the two types of committees” (Source: Swedish official participating on both ECs and WPs – author’s translation).

Following the distinction between (i) pro-active and written modes of co-ordination, and (ii) re-active and oral modes of co-ordination outlined in Chapter 2, this analysis shows that participants on WPs tend to use the former co-ordination technique while oral co-ordination modes are evoked more extensively by EC participants. Within the Swedish government apparatus, written instructions have been increasingly used after Sweden joined the EU in 1995 (Jacobsson and Sundtröm 1999b: 72). Still, even within the Norwegian central administrative apparatus formal co-ordination efforts are evident (cf. table 5.1) through the use of collegial committees constructed for handling EU related subject matters (Trondal 1998: 290). In Norway, the EEA agreement accompanied the construction of a three-layered hierarchical co-ordination apparatus (Statskonsult 1995:15). Since it is often harder to change or replace old institutions, new ones are often constructed for particular purposes (March and Olsen 1995). Past research indicates that Norwegian civil servants that participate on ECs tend to co-ordinate EU dossiers through co-ordinating committees, headed by the ministry most affected (“special committees”). These committees are specialized by sector, largely mirroring the DG structure of the EU Commission (Statskonsult 1999:6: 38 and 43; Trondal 1998: 291). Similarly, co-ordination through intra-ministerial committees is even more frequent amongst Norwegian officials. Conversely, inter-ministerial co-ordination through the “Co-ordination board”, headed by the MFA, is reported to be relatively modest amongst Norwegian officials attending ECs (Trondal 1998: 290). This committee is cross-sectoral in character and has a more overarching co-ordination rationale. Issues that are not agreed on in the lower-ranking special committees are referred to the Co-ordination Board. Finally, co-ordination through a cabinet committee composed of cabinet representatives is activated only on politically sensitive issues. So far, few directives have attracted political attention in
Norway. From this it follows that the substantial co-ordinating role of the cabinet committee has been essentially nil.\textsuperscript{4}

Despite the use of formalized co-ordination committees, most evidence shows that the substantial content of frame notes, problem notes, etc. are provided for by departments and units within each ministry and agency and to a lesser extent by these co-ordination committees (Statskonsult 1995:15 and Statskonsult 2000:3: 61; Sundström 1999: 51-52; Trondal 1998). The role of the EU co-ordination committees tends to be more symbolic and procedural than substantial, both in Norway and to some extent in Denmark (Nedergaard 1994; Sundström 1999; Trondal 1996 and 1998). Tendencies towards using domestic co-ordination committees are greater amongst the Danish WP participants than EC participants (Table 5.1; cf. Statskonsult 1995:15; Trondal 1996: 62 and 76). Sweden never established a corresponding committee structure.

When comparing officials who only participate on Commission expert committees with those who also attend Council working parties, most of the tendencies revealed in table 5.1 are repeated.\textsuperscript{5}
Table 5.2 Percentage of officials in the ‘domestic administrations’ using different co-ordinating techniques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination techniques:</th>
<th>Participate on expert committees only</th>
<th>Participate on expert committees and working parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doing clearances with other central administrative institutions before attending EU committees⁴</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing informal clearances</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing formal clearances</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up problem notes⁵</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up frame notes</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up instructions</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Do these documents govern your positions&quot;⁶</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) This variable, and the following two variables, regard officials doing clearances to a fairly great extent, or very great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Great extent (1), fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).

b) This variable, and the following two variables, regard officials outlining these documents fairly often, or very often. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).

c) This variable regards officials who report that these documents govern their positions to a fairly great extent, or very great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Great extent (1), fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).

The distinction made in table 5.2 corresponds to the distinction made between Norwegian officials (participating on Commission expert committees only) and Danish and Swedish officials (participating on both Commission expert committees and Council working parties). The only striking difference between table 5.1 and table 5.2 regards the first dependent variable. Officials who only attend ECs make inter-organizational clearances more frequently than officials also attending WPs. This difference may reflect the frequent usage of informal clearances amongst EC participants (cf. Olsen 1996: 103). The overall pattern revealed by table 5.2 indicates only marginal differences between officials solely attending ECs compared...
to those who also take part in WPs. These findings are supported by qualitative interviews. “It is important that Swedish positions [within ECs] are consistent with what being said within WPs” (Source: Swedish official attending both ECs and WPs – author’s translation). Thus, officials participating on both ECs and WPs anticipate the importance of presenting consistent positions on both committees (Spence 1997: 112-113) and are exposed to fairly similar sources of information.

Some other observations made in table 5.1 are supported in table 5.3. Officials participating on WPs see their instructions as being considerably clearer than those participating on ECs:

Table 5.3 Percentage of officials who agree on the following assertions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assertions:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“I have clear instructions as to what positions to follow during EU committee meetings”</td>
<td>27 64</td>
<td>24 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have great amount of freedom when participating on EU committees”</td>
<td>45 16</td>
<td>37 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td>139 58</td>
<td>20 37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following three-point scale: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).

Table 5.3 also shows that the amount of perceived leeway or behavioural discretion that relates to modes of proceeding, ‘positions’ to follow, roles to evoke, etc, is significantly higher amongst officials participating on ECs compared to those participating on WPs (cf. table 5.17). Norwegian officials attending ECs report having few clear guide lines from the political-administrative leadership or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cf. Statskonsult 1999:6: 45). “Lack of clarity as far as the formal role of the MFA is concerned may imply that the MFA increasingly is put on the sideline” (The Norwegian Foreign Ministry 1999a: 23 – author’s translation). However, every participant works under some kind of national mandate and instructions (cf. tables 5.1 and 5.2). As seen in the qualitative interviews, the amount of behavioural discretion available to the participants seems far more extensive within the ECs than within the WPs.
“I work under limitations set by the ministry, otherwise I have behavioural discretion”. However, “if the ministry means something else than I do, I have to take the ministry’s point of view into account” (Source: Norwegian agency official participating on ECs – author’s translation).

At the permanent representations to the EU the same tendencies are revealed regarding modes of co-ordinating. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 measure the perceived importance of their own professional expertise and the importance attached to ‘national interests’ amongst EU committee participants:

### Table 5.4 Percentage of officials emphasising professional considerations and national interests.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Domestic officials</th>
<th>Permanent Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional considerations…..</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘national interests’ of my own country…………….</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N………………………</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) This table involves officials paying fairly great, or very great emphasis towards these considerations. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very great (1), fairly great (2), both/and (3), fairly little (4), and very little (5).

### Table 5.5 Percentage of officials agreeing on the following assertions.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assertions:</th>
<th>Domestic officials</th>
<th>Permanent Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The positions I take are based on my professional expertise”……….</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I take the positions which I believe is to the interest for my country”………...</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N………………………</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following three-point scale: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).
Table 5.4 indicates that officials attending ECs report their ‘positions’ to be based on professional expertise more extensively than their colleagues participating on WPs. Table 5.5 reveals that ‘national interests’ are given greater importance amongst officials attending WPs as a catalyst for determining their ‘positions’ than are professional expertise.

“Within [EC] meetings it is often underscored that ‘this is a technical discussion’. This, in order to emphasise political considerations shall not be taken. Still, one is somewhat sensitive towards ‘Sweden’” (Source: Swedish EC participant – author’s translation). “The political aspect plays a big role [both within ECs and WPs], but loom largest in the Council... The technical aspects are more predominant within the Commission” (Source: Danish official – author’s translation).

Thus, the type of EU committees attended significantly affects the general level of inter-organizational co-ordination. As such, the level of administrative integration across levels of governance is significantly affected by the committee affiliations embedding national civil servants.

The co-ordination role of the MFA is one critical indicator of administrative integration by indicating the level of boundary-maintaining governance pursued by the nation-state towards the EU. The following two tables show the relative proportion of officials conducting inter-organizational clearances with the MFA (tables 5.6a and 5.6b), and the proportion of officials doing intra-organizational clearances with other departments within their own governmental institution (tables 5.7a and 5.7b):

**Table 5.6a Percentage of officials receiving clearances from the Foreign Ministry.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a,b
Table 5.6b Percentage of domestic officials receiving clearances from the Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{a, b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participate on expert committees only</th>
<th>Participate on expert committees and working parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes……………</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No……………</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N………………</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) These tables include officials using fairly much, or very much of their time participating on EU committees. This dichotomy combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very much, (1), fairly much (2), both/and (3), fairly little (4), very little (5).

\(b\) This variable has the two following values: Yes (1), No (2).

Table 5.7a Percentage of officials seeking clearances with other departments within their own government institution before entering EU committees.\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N………………</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7b Percentage of domestic officials seeking clearances with other departments within their own government institution before entering EU committees.\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participate on expert committees only</th>
<th>Participate on expert committees and working parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N………………</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) These tables include officials doing intra-organizational clearances fairly often, or very often. This dichotomy builds from combining values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).

The results presented in tables 5.6a and 5.6b are not completely comparable to those presented in tables 5.7a and 5.7b. Still, they reveal some interesting differences. As expected,
WP participants utilise clearances more frequently than EC participants – both intra-sectorally (table 5.7a) and inter-sectorally (table 5.6a). The co-ordination dynamics driven by WP attendance are captured in the following quotation: “I know very well the Swedish position” (Source: Swedish WP participant – author’s translation). On the other hand, those participating on ECs conduct clearances more frequently intra-sectorally than inter-sectorally. The differences between Norwegian officials and Danish and Swedish officials (tables 5.6b and 5.7b) are largely due to the latter having additional attendance on Council WPs. Still, Danish and Swedish officials who participate solely on ECs report a generally low tendency for inter-sectoral co-ordination, especially towards the MFA, compared to their national officials attending WPs (Source: interviews). VIII “I have nothing to do with the MFA at all” (Source: Swedish EC participant – author’s translation). Officials report that inter-state bargaining dominates WP meetings to a larger extent than EC meetings. This reflects the territorial principle of organization underpinning the Council of Ministers, in general and the WPs, in particular. Territorial dynamics loom larger within the WPs than within the ECs (cf. Chapter 6 – table 6.8). This difference explains the more extensive enactment of cross-sectoral co-ordination behaviour amongst officials attending WPs compared to those participating on ECs (Source: Danish official participating on both ECs and WPs). As such, the EC-WP nexus affects co-ordination behaviour amongst the participants more strongly than the EU membership and non-membership distinction.

When consulting table 5.6b, the patterns presented in table 5.6a become clearer. Only 25 per cent of those officials participating only on ECs make clearances with the MFA while 56 per cent of those who also attend WPs make such clearances (cf. table 5.6b). Finally, table 5.6a reveals that clearances with the MFA are conducted more frequently amongst officials at the permanent representations than amongst officials within the ‘home administrations’. This can be due to the fact that permanent representatives attend WPs more frequently than officials within the ‘home administration’ (cf. Chapter 4). However, it can also reflect the fact that the permanent representations embody territorial principles of organization to a greater extent than do the domestic ministries and agencies (cf. below).

These observations are further supported in table 5.8:
Table 5.8 Percentage of officials agreeing on the following assertions.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assertions:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( EC )</td>
<td>( WP )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have to co-ordinate with the MFA or with other central co-ordinating units”…………………..</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“My position has been co-ordinated with all relevant ministries”……………</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“My position has been co-ordinated with all relevant departments within my own institution” ..................</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N……………………………..</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( a \)  \( Values \ 1 \ and \ 2 \ combined \ on \ the \ following \ three-point \ scale: \ always \ (1), \ half \ of \ the \ time \ (2), \ never \ (3). \)

Table 5.8 clearly shows that participation on different EU committees tends to accompany different patterns of co-ordination amongst the participants. Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination are evoked more frequently amongst officials participating on WPs compared to those attending ECs. “All ministries get involved as dossiers are sent to the Council after having been in the Commission” (Source: Danish official – author’s translation). The first column of table 5.8 shows that the majority of EC participants co-ordinate their positions with other departments within their own institution, that is, intra-sectorally. At the other end of the intra-/inter-sectoral spectrum, they seldom co-ordinate with the MFA or with other central co-ordinating units (cf. Sundström 1999: 52-53). Moreover, cross-sectoral modes of co-ordination are pursued more extensively amongst officials at the permanent missions compared to officials within the ‘home administration’ (cf. table 5.8).

Co-ordination involves contact patterns towards other governmental institutions as well as contacts within each institution. The following table 5.9 reveals how participation on different EU committees accompanies different contact patterns amongst the participants.
Table 5.9a Percentage of officials having contacts with the following domestic government institutions.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government institutions:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The domestic Parliament</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership(^b)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-sectorally:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Foreign Ministry</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ministries</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intra-sectorally:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With domestic agencies within my own policy sector(^c)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With my own superior ministry(^d)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean N</strong></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.9b Percentage of domestic officials having contacts with the following domestic government institutions.\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government institutions:</th>
<th>Participating on expert committees only</th>
<th>Participating on expert committees and working parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The domestic Parliament……..</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership\textsuperscript{b} …….</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inter-sectorally:**

- The Foreign Ministry………. 7 20
- Other ministries……………. 25 33

**Intra-sectorally:**

- With domestic agencies
  - within my own policy sector\textsuperscript{c}. 56 79
  - With my own superior ministry\textsuperscript{d}…………………. 61 49

Mean N……………………... 50 37

\textsuperscript{a) The variables presented in these two tables include officials having contacts fairly often, or very often with the government institutions listed above. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).}

\textsuperscript{b) This regards contacts towards the political leadership in the capital.}

\textsuperscript{c) This variable regards officials employed at the ministry level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation does, however, not relate to officials at the permanent representations.}

\textsuperscript{d) This variable regards officials employed at the agency level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation does not relate to officials at the permanent representations.}

The upper halves of tables 5.9a and 5.9b consider inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination. Consistent with prior observations made in this Chapter, one of the most striking observations from tables 5.9a and 5.9b relates to the difference between the two classes of committees. Inter-sectoral contact patterns are evoked more frequently amongst officials attending WPs compared to officials on ECs. Most clearly, contacts with the MFA, being the ministry formally embodying the territorial principle of the nation-state order most strongly, is significantly stronger amongst the WP participants than amongst the EC participants. Officials participating on ECs have more frequent contacts with other sectoral ministries than with the MFA, the domestic Parliament or the national political leadership. When adding intra-sectoral contact patterns to this picture, the tendency from table 5.8 is repeated in table
5.9a. Officials participating on ECs make relatively more frequent use of contacts with other government institutions within their ‘own’ policy sector than with government institutions in other policy areas. Still, intra-sectoral contact patterns are pursued even more strongly amongst WP participants than amongst EC participants, that is, towards sectoral agencies and ministries within their ‘own’ policy area (cf. Beckman and Johansson 1999; Statskontoret 1996:7; Trondal 2000). When comparing officials, who only participate on ECs with those who also attend WPs, the same tendencies shown in table 5.9a are repeated in table 5.9b.

Together, tables 5.9a and 5.9b reveal that officials who attend ECs tend to co-ordinate within their own government institution.

“The instructions are cleared within [the agency] if it is consistent with the official policy. If one has doubts, one sends the instructions for clearance within [the ministry].” (Source: Norwegian agency official participating on ECs – author’s translation). Partially due to the technical nature of the subject matters at hand within ECs, “this [work] is a one-man-show” (Source: Danish EC participant – author’s translation). “I often write my own positions. I get more discretion as the subject matters get increasingly technical. In larger questions the positions have to be better anchored” (Source: Swedish EC participant – author’s translation).

Finally, modes of policy co-ordination can be measured by how civil servants perceive the relative importance of different government institutions. Contact patterns do not provide an adequate understanding of the perceived importance of these contacts. Table 5.10 (a and b) reveals how EU committee participants view the relative importance of different domestic government institutions.
Table 5.10a Percentage of officials assigning weight to the following government institutions when important decisions are reached.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government institutions:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The domestic Parliament</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inter-sectorally:**

**Importance to:**

|                          | 19    | 42    | --    | --    |
| The Foreign Ministry     |
| Other ministries         | 29    | 59    | 33    | 46    |

**Intra-sectorally:**

**Inputs from:**

|                          | 82    | 91    | 95    | 100   |
| My own superior ministry |       |       |       |       |
| Domestic agencies within my own policy area | 68    | 64    | 90    | 85    |

**Importance to:**

|                          | 64    | 86    | 76    | 100   |
| My own superior ministry |       |       |       |       |
| Domestic agencies within my own policy area | 70    | 60    | 63    | 60    |

**Mean N**

|                          | 80    | 38    | 19    | 33    |
Table 5.10b Percentage of domestic officials assigning weight to the following government institutions when important decisions are reached.\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government institutions</th>
<th>Participating on expert committees only</th>
<th>Participating on expert committees and working parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The domestic Parliament</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inter-sectorally:**

Importance to:
- The Foreign Ministry                        | 19                                     | 20                                                   |
- Other ministries                             | 29                                     | 29                                                   |

**Intra-sectorally:**

Inputs from:
- My own superior ministry\textsuperscript{b} | 83                                     | 80                                                   |
- Domestic agencies within my own policy area\textsuperscript{c} | 71                                     | 64                                                   |

Importance to:
- My own superior ministry\textsuperscript{b} | 73                                     | 49                                                   |
- Domestic agencies within my own policy area\textsuperscript{c} | 58                                     | 82                                                   |

Mean N                                       | 49                                     | 37                                                   |

\textsuperscript{a} The variables presented in these two tables involve officials attaching fairly much weight, or much weight to the government institutions listed above. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: much weight (1), fairly much weight (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), and very unimportant (5).

\textsuperscript{b} This variable regards officials employed at the agency level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation does, however, not relate officials at the permanent representations.

\textsuperscript{c} This variable regards officials employed at the ministry level within the domestic bureaucracy. This limitation does not relate to officials at the permanent representations.

Consistent with the figures presented in tables 5.9a and 5.9b tables 5.10a and 5.10b show that different EU committees do indeed affect the relative importance attached to different government institutions. Most significantly, this difference centres on the importance assigned to government institutions inter-sectorally. Officials attending ECs tend to assign less weight to the political leadership, to the MFA, to other ministries, and to the domestic Parliament than to officials attending WPs (cf. Sundström 1999: 42-46). Moreover, officials who only
attend ECs attach greater importance to government institutions within their ‘own’ policy sector and attach considerably less importance to institutions in other policy fields. The inverse pattern is revealed amongst officials attending WPs. Moreover, officials participating on both WPs and ECs tend to pay attention towards, i.e. their ‘own’ ministry and their ‘own’ agency (cf. table 5.10b).

The analysis tends to confirm our main hypothesis that the organizational principles underpinning EU committees affect the actors serving within them. Most importantly, however, this analysis reveals how attendance on different EU committees has different effects on co-ordination processes in domestic bureaucracies. EC participants seem to co-ordinate more strongly intra-sectorally than inter-sectorally. WP participants tend to co-ordinate more strongly inter-sectorally. One some occasions, however, the differences in co-ordination behaviour between the EC participants and the WP participants are marginal. This partially reflects the influence of contending organizational principles that underpin these committees. Additionally, it may also reflect the fact that many Danish and Swedish officials attend both ECs and WPs. However, the lack of differences between the EC participants and the WP participants as to their co-ordination behaviour may also reflect these officials having similar national institutional affiliations (cf. below).

The above analysis does not provide an understanding of the extent to which EU committees affect the participants’ co-ordination behaviour. The next section analyses the relative impact of the length and intensity of attendance on EU committees.

Length and intensity of participation on EU committees: Effects on co-ordination behaviour

“[N]egotiations [within ECs and WPs] sometimes last for years and take place among almost the same set of delegates…” (Neyer 1998: 159). As such, socialization dynamics may come into force. On average, Danish civil servants have participated for longer periods of time within EU committees than their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts (cf. Chapter 4). On this basis, the data sets have been separated into two distinct parts: The first part includes those officials who have participated since before 1994 (involving most of the Danish officials) and the second covers those officials who entered EU committees after 1994 (involving most of the Norwegian and Swedish officials). In the following analysis only those
correlations that are significant at the 95 % level and the 99 % level and those correlations exceeding .40 are presented\(^{10}\). As such, only fairly strong and robust tendencies are highlighted in the tables presented beneath.

First, table 5.11 presents significant correlations between length of participation on EU committees and modes of policy co-ordination.\(^{11}\)

### Table 5.11 Correlations between the length to which officials participate on EU committees and their co-ordination behaviour (Pearson’s r).\(^{a}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination behaviour</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing clearances with the MFA before attending EU committees(^{b})</td>
<td>- .23**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up problem notes</td>
<td>- .27*</td>
<td>- .41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up frame notes</td>
<td>- .34**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up instructions</td>
<td>- .20*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do these documents govern the positions followed in committee meetings?</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to the MFA</td>
<td>- .26*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination with all relevant departments within my own institution</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N……………………………….. 140 56 20 30

\(^{a}\) This table compares officials who entered EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded 2) and officials who have participated since before 1994 (coded 1).

\(^{b}\) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: variable 1: Yes (coded 1), No (coded 2); variable 2, 3 and 4: very often (coded 1), fairly often (coded 2), sometimes (coded 3), fairly seldom (coded 4), very seldom (coded 5); variable 5: to a very great extent (coded 1), to a fairly great extent (coded 2), both/and (coded 3), to a fairly small extent (coded 4), to a very small extent (coded 5); variable 6: very important (coded 1), fairly important (coded 2), both/and (coded 3), fairly unimportant (coded 4), very unimportant (coded 5).
As seen from table 5.11, the use of written instructions, problem notes and frame notes as coordinating tools relates negatively to the length of participation on ECs and WPs. Being a senior participant within EU committees decreases the likelihood of using binding and written mandates. Senior WP participants still report that these documents tend to govern the positions to be followed during WP meetings \((r = .26^*)\). The same tendency is seen amongst senior WP participants at the permanent representations \((r = .35^*)\). Senior EU committee participants thus seem to co-ordinate less by written procedures than do more junior participants. However, when written mandates are being drawn up, considerable weight are attached to them \((r = .26^*)\). Furthermore, EC participants who have participated for long periods of time tend to attach less importance to the MFA as a co-ordinating ministry than shorter term EC participants \((r = -.26^*)\). Contrary to this, senior EC participants seem to co-ordinate more intra-sectorally, within their ‘own’ institution \((r = .28^{**})\). Similarly, veteran officials at the permanent representations, serving on ECs utilize problem notes as co-ordination tool-kits to a lesser extent than officials who have participated for shorter periods of time \((r = -.41)\). Hence, they are more likely to ‘go native’ with respect to co-ordinating modes as they become senior participants within the EU committees. On the other hand, WP participants at the permanent representations, having participated for long periods of time on WPs, tend to utilize written instructions more extensively than permanent representatives who have attended WPs for a shorter period of time.

As expected, when exposed to different EU committees for longer periods of time, officials become increasingly affected by the uppermost organizational principles underpinning these committees. This observation is valid both amongst domestic officials and amongst permanent representatives. Hence, the length of participation on EU committees strengthens the impact of the uppermost organizing principles of the EU committees.

In additional to the effects of individual seniority, one can add the impact of the intensity of participation of domestic officials: the number of committees they attend, the number of formal and informal meetings attended, the degree of activism (oral presentations) during these meetings, etc. Generally, one can assume intensity to correlate positively with the degree to which officials are affected by the committees’ organizational principles.\(^{12}\)

Table 5.12 analyses how, and to what extent, the number of committees to which national civil servants attends accompany certain co-ordination behaviour amongst them.
Table 5.12 Correlations between the number of EU committees attended and the coordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination behaviour</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( EC )</td>
<td>( WP )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with the MFA\textsuperscript{b} ........................................</td>
<td>-31**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to the MFA..................................................</td>
<td>-37**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to the political leadership................................</td>
<td>-21*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“My position has been co-ordinated with all relevant ministries”........</td>
<td>-17*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up problem notes.........................................................</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up frame Notes............................................................</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N.........................................................................................</td>
<td>139 --</td>
<td>19 --</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( *) \text{p} \leq .05 \quad **) \text{p} \leq .01

\textit{a) This table compares officials who have participated on a maximum of 2 EU committees (coded 2) and officials who have participated on more than 2 EU committees (coded 1).}

\textit{b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1, 5 and 6: often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5); variable 2 and 3: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); variable 4: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).}

This table indicates that the impact of particular organizing principles is strengthened by the intensity of attendance. Officials in the ‘domestic administrations’ participating on many ECs seem to co-ordinate inter-sectorally less frequently than do officials participating on fewer ECs. Officials attending many ECs tend to have few contacts with the MFA (rm= -31**), attach less importance to the MFA and the political leadership (\( r = -37** \) and -21*, respectively) and finally, assert that their positions have been co-ordinated poorly with all relevant ministries (\( r = -17* \)). Similarly, officials at the permanent representations attending many ECs tend to co-ordinate intra-sectorally less strongly than do officials participating on fewer ECs (\( r = -45 \) and -41).

Furthermore, when studying the correlations between the number of formal meetings attended and the co-ordination behaviour evoked, the same tendencies revealed in table 5.12 are repeated in table 5.13:
Table 5.13 Correlations between the number of formal EU committee meetings attended and the co-ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination behaviour</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC WP</td>
<td>EC WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I take the positions I believe are to the interest for my country”(^b)</td>
<td>- .24(^**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are problem notes, frame notes and instructions governing the positions followed in committee meetings?</td>
<td>- .49(^*)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I choose the positions to follow”</td>
<td>.54(^*)</td>
<td>.45(^**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*) p \leq .05 \quad (***) p \leq .01

\(a\) This table compares officials how have attended 4 meetings, or more per year (coded 1) and officials who have attended between 0 and 3 meetings per year (coded 2).

\(b\) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1 and 3: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3); variable 2: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5).

Table 5.13 also reveals how the impact from the organizing principles are strengthened by the number of formal meetings attended by the national civil servants. Domestic EC participants who attend many EC meetings tend only marginally to “take the positions [they] believe are to the best interest for [their] country” \((r = -.24**\)). Similarly, officials at the permanent representations who attend many EC meetings report that problem notes, frame notes and instructions only marginally govern their positions \((r = -.49*)\) and that they are increasingly able to “choose the positions to follow” based on the behavioural discretion available to them \((r = .54*)\). Strongly indicative of the effect of the number of formal EU committee meetings attended, permanent representatives attending many WPs report that they are able to “choose the positions to follow” \((r = .45**\)). Hence, the dynamics result from the territorial principle of organization is partially circumvented by the effect of participation intensity on the WPs. Despite attending Council working parties and being employed at the permanent missions to the EU, officials who attend many EU committee meetings tend increasingly to choose the positions to be pursued. This observation is indicative that the intensity of attendance might have an autonomous and independent causal impact on co-ordination behaviour.
While tables 5.12 and 5.13 focused primarily on EC participants, table 5.14 considers mostly WP participants. Consequently, most of the numbers presented in the two former tables have signs opposite to those presented in table 5.14. Still, the general observations are the same: intensive participation on EU committees tends to strengthen the impact of the underlying organizational principles. Hence, when analysing the effects of the number of informal EU committee meetings to which national civil servants attend, the same tendencies as unveiled in tables 5.12 and 5.13 are repeated in table 5.14:

Table 5.14 Correlations between the number of informal meetings conducted with other EU committee participants and the co-ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination behaviour:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to my own agency(^b)</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up problem notes</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.53*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing up frame notes</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are these documents governing the positions followed in committee meetings?</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have clear instructions as to what positions to follow”</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with the political leadership....</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N…………………………………… 134 59 20 36

\(^a\) p \leq .05 \hspace{1cm} \(^b\) p \leq .01

\(a\) This table compares officials who have informal meetings with other committee participants fairly great extent, or very great extent (coded 1) and officials who have fewer informal meetings with other committee participants (coded 2). This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), somewhat (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5).

\(b\) The co-ordination variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); variable 2, 3 and 6: often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5); variable 4: to a very great extent (2), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5); variable 5: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).

Table 5.14 shows that intensive participation on Council WPs, measured by the number of informal contacts pursued with fellow committee participants outside formal committee
meetings, contributes to strengthen and support the impact of the geographical organization principle built into the WPs. The general observation made in table 5.14 is that the amount of intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral co-ordination is stronger amongst officials who have many informal meetings with fellow WP participants compared to those with fewer such contacts. As such, intensive informal contacts strengthen the effects of the particular organizational principle of the WPs. These observations indicate that officials who devote much time and energy towards EU committees are affected by the organizational principles underpinning the EU committees.

However, table 5.14 also reveals two partially deviant observations. First, officials having many informal contacts with fellow EC participants tend to co-ordinate strongly. Still, intensive informal interaction amongst EC members tends to accompany stronger intra-sectoral co-ordination patterns ($r = .19^*)$. Hence, this observation corresponds closely to the predicted pattern. Second, permanent representatives having many informal contacts with fellow EC members tend to have more extensive contacts with the national political leadership when compared to permanent representatives who have less informal networks with fellow EC members ($r = .62^{**}$). This relationship may reflect the strong element of territorial organization that underlies the permanent representations. Hence, intensive participation on EU committees may support and strengthen the impact of the primary institutional affiliations that embed the participants (cf. below).

Our analysis so far seems to confirm the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 2. The length and intensity of being exposed to certain organizational structures, even though these structures are of secondary nature and embedded within collegial arrangements at the EU level of governance, strengthens and support the effects generated by these structures. Further, this section has indicated that intensive participation on EU committees strengthens the effects from the organizational principles underpinning the primary institutional affiliations embedding the participants (cf. table 5.14). However, this section also shows that the length and intensity to which national government officials attend EU committees may have an independent impact on modes of policy co-ordination amongst these participants. Being an experienced and senior EU committee participants might outweigh some of the dynamics that result from the EU committees’ organizational principles (cf. table 5.13). Summing up the main observations provided in this section, administrative integration is promoted more
amongst officials attending many ECs and who also attend many formal and informal EU committee meetings.

The next section uncovers the extent to which the relationships presented so far are filtered and modified by the various primary institutional affiliations that embed the EU committee participants.

**Different national institutional affiliations: Effects on co-ordination behaviour**

The following section unveils how various domestic institutional affiliations affect modes of policy co-ordination. More precisely, the following section illuminates the independent (controlled) effect of domestic institutional affiliations on modes of policy co-ordination. Thus, the control variable in the following section is the EU committee affiliations embedding these officials.

Past research on decision-making behaviour amongst Norwegian civil servants reveal that the ministry-agency nexus significantly affects modes of policy co-ordination (Christensen and Egeberg 1997; Lægreid and Olsen 1984). Chapter 2 argued that cross-sectoral co-ordination modes are more likely to be evoked amongst officials at the ministry level than at the agency level. Moreover, the permanent representations, formally embassies under the auspices of the MFA, are mainly organized according to a territorial principle. As such, permanent representatives are likely to locate themselves close to the territorial end of the sectoral-territorial dimension with respect to their co-ordination behaviour. Officials within the diplomatic realms at the permanent representations, however, are more likely to enact cross-sectoral modes of co-ordination than officials within the sectoral realms. The latter are delegates from domestic sector ministries.

Consistent with the above propositions, table 5.15 reveals that cross-sectoral modes of co-ordination, especially through the political leadership and the MFA\(^{13}\), are conducted more extensively by officials at the ministry level than by agency personnel. Officials at the agency level, on the other hand, pay considerably more attention to professional considerations, that is, take positions on the basis of their own professional expertise, than do ministry level officials. The same tendencies are revealed amongst the permanent representatives. Those employed in the diplomatic realm have more frequent contacts with the MFA than officials in
the sectoral realms. Henceforth, table 5.15 indicates how cross-sectoral modes of co-
ordination are strengthened as one moves from the agency level towards the ministry level
and as one moves from the sectoral realms towards the diplomatic realm at the permanent
missions. Table 5.15 also shows that these effects are present under different conditions, that
is, when controlling for the EU committee affiliations embedding these officials. The signs of
the correlations presented in table 5.15 are the same across the EC-WP nexus. This
observation reflects the pivotal and independent role played by the domestic institutional
affiliations in affecting modes of policy co-ordination. 14 Consistent with these observations,
officials within the diplomatic realm at the permanent representations evoke cross-sectoral
modes of co-ordination more frequently than do their colleagues within the sectoral realms.
This effect is also shown to be robust when controlling for the EC-WP committee affiliations
embedding the permanent representatives.
Table 5.15 Correlations between primary institutional affiliations and the co-ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination behaviour:</th>
<th>\textit{domestic officials}</th>
<th>\textit{permanent representatives}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{EC}</td>
<td>\textit{WP}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with the political leadership</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with the MFA</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to the political leadership</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to my own agency</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals from the political leadership</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heeding professional considerations</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have to co-ordinate with the MFA, or with other central administrative institutions”</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“My position has been co-ordinated with all relevant ministries”</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I often choose the positions to follow in committee meetings”</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The positions I follow is based on my professional expertise”</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>-.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) p \leq .05  **) p \leq .01

\textit{a}) This table compares officials within the domestic bureaucracy who are employed at the \textit{ministry level} (coded 1) and officials at the \textit{agency level} (coded 2). At the permanent representations to the EU this table compares officials from the \textit{diplomatic realms} (coded 1) and officials employed within different \textit{sectoral realms} (coded 2).

\textit{b}) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1 and 2: often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5); variable 3, 4, 5 and 6: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); variable 7, 8, 9 and 10: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).
As one example, when controlling for the EU committee affiliation, the impact of domestic institutional affiliation is significantly negative depending on whether positions are “based on professional expertise”. One Norwegian agency official reports that,

“I get no clear positions telling me what to say within the group” (author’s translation). Similarly, one Swedish agency officials argues that “[i]t is difficult to know what is the Swedish point of view” (author’s translation).

Still, no domestic officials participate on EU committees without mandates of some sort. However, the amount of behavioural discretion available to the officials is reported to be more substantial amongst officials at the agency level compared to officials at the ministry level (Source: Interview). Moreover, at the agency level the amount of behavioural discretion is greater amongst the Swedish officials than amongst the Danish and Norwegian civil servants: 52 per cent of Danish and 47 per cent of Norwegian agency officials report fairly great amount of rule following in their daily business, the corresponding number in Sweden is 32 per cent (cf. Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). Despite these differences table 5.15 reveals that particular national institutional affiliations accompany certain co-ordination behaviour amongst Norwegian, Danish and Swedish EU committee participants. This statistical relationship is shown to be robust when controlling for the various EU committees attended by these officials. The fact that the signs of the relationships in table 5.15 are the same amongst EC participants and WP participants partially reflects the strong impact of national institutional variables (cf. the multiple regression analyses reported in endnote 18 of this Chapter).

The values presented in table 5.15 indicate that some of the observations presented in the first part of this Chapter, which reveal how different committees at the EU level affect co-ordination behaviour, may be spurious. However, it is not possible to test for spuriousness in the current analysis because in the questionnaire the committee affiliation variable is merged with each dependent variable presented in table 5.15 (cf. Appendix 1 and 3). 15

Table 5.16 reveals the effects generated by the formal rank positions of the EU committee participants:
Table 5.16 Correlations between rank positions within domestic government institutions and the co-ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r). a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination behaviour:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to the interest of my own country b</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have clear instructions as to what positions to follow”</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I often choose what positions to follow”</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have great amount of freedom when participating on EU committees”</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with the MFA</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N………………………………... 139 -- 20 --

*) p ≤ .05  **) p ≤ .01

a) This table compares officials in top rank positions (coded 1) (director general, deputy director general, head/deputy of unit/division) and officials in medium rank positions (coded 2) (head of section, senior advisor, advisor).
b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); Variable 2, 3 and 4: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3); variable 5: often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5).

As seen from table 5.16, officials in top rank positions tend to carry out cross-sectoral modes of co-ordination more than officials in medium or lower rank positions, independent of their diverse EU committee affiliations. However, table 5.16 does not adequately control for the committee types that embed the civil servants. This is due to the lack of significant correlations between rank positions and co-ordination behaviour amongst the WP participants. What table 5.16 does reveal is that officials in top rank positions who attend ECs seem to attach greater importance to the interest of their own country than do officials in medium or lower rank positions (r = .26**). Similarly, officials in top rank positions report receiving clearer instructions as to what positions to follow during EU committee meetings than officials in medium or lower rank positions (r = .19*). Officials in medium rank positions attending ECs often choose what positions to follow during the committee meetings (r = -
.21*) and have greater leeway when participating (r = -.27**). The inverse pattern is revealed amongst officials in top rank positions attending ECs.

Finally, government officials are highly pre-socialized and “pre-packed” before entering formal positions within national ministries and agencies. Prior professional training may continue to affect modes of behaviour after officials are assigned formal positions within highly formalized organizations like domestic ministries and agencies. Table 5.17 takes into consideration prior professional training amongst civil servants. Relating to the sectoral-territorial dimension of co-ordination, law, economy and the social sciences are seen as representing cross-sectoral disciplines and technical disciplines are associated with more sectoral professions: As such, officials educated in law, economy and social sciences are expected to co-ordinate more strongly across policy sectors than officials educated in technical disciplines.
Table 5.17 Correlations between formal education and the co-ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-ordination behaviour:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with the political leadership b</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.38*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with the MFA</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heeding signals from the political leadership</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heeding professional considerations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to the MFA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have to co-ordinate with the MFA, or with other central administrative institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) p ≤ .05  **) p ≤ .01

a) This variable compares officials educated in law, social sciences and economy (coded 1) and officials educated in technical disciplines (coded 2).

b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: variable 1 and 2: often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5); variable 3, 4 and 5: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); variable 6: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).

Table 5.17 shows that educational background and professional affiliations do impact on modes of policy co-ordination. Lawyers, economists and social scientists tend to co-ordinate cross-sectorally more frequently than officials educated in various technical disciplines, regardless of the EU committees attended. Conversely, technicians co-ordinate intra-sectorally to a larger extent than lawyers, economists and social scientists. For example, lawyers, economists and social scientists at the permanent representations tend to co-ordinate cross-sectorally (paying attention to signals from the political leadership), whereas technicians at the permanent representations co-ordinate more intra-sectoral, regardless of the EU committees attended. Thus, modes of policy co-ordination tend to correlate with educational backgrounds as much as with committee affiliations.

*  *  *
Since we are left with some statistically significant bivariate relationships between some independent variables and some dependent variables, multiple OLS regression analyses are provided. I have shown above that it is not possible to uncover the relative explanatory potential of the EU committee affiliation variable. The following paragraphs study the relative explanatory potential of (i) the intensity and length of participation within EU committees, and (ii) different primary institutional affiliations. This analysis, however, concentrates on the data from the ‘domestic officials’. No regression analysis has been conducted on the data from the ‘Permanent representation’ data due to low N (cf. the above tables). The multiple regression analyses are presented in the following endnote:

Firstly, the multiple regression analyses presented in tables 5.18 and 5.21 unveil that the intensity of attending EU committees have a significant and independent impact on the co-ordination behaviour evoked by the participants. Hence, the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees seems to have a stronger impact on the co-ordination behaviour evoked by the participants than the sheer length of participation. Attending many EU committees and informal meetings is a stronger predictor of the co-ordination behaviour evoked by the participants than the length of attendance. Officials participating intensively on EU committees tend to co-ordinate less than officials participating less intensively. Still, the relative explanatory potential of the EC-WP variable is not identified on the basis of these figures. Tables 5.22 to 5.27 in endnote 18, studying the relative explanatory potential of different primary institutional affiliations, the ministry-agency variable turns out most important. Officials at the ministry level tend to co-ordinate more strongly cross-sectorally than officials at the agency level.

Conclusion
Studies of public administration increasingly try to understand how multi-level institutional structures affect decision processes at each level. This study suggests ways of conducting such studies. Our initial arguments emphasise that primary institutional affiliations may provide vital cues for decision behaviour within government organizations. However, this Chapter also identifies conditions under which secondary institutional affiliations towards Commission expert committees and Council working parties affect the co-ordination behaviour enacted by the participants. Under conditions of intensive and protracted cross-level participation, domestic co-ordination processes may reflect the EU committee
affiliations embedding national civil servants. I have argued that different organizational principles – domestically as well as within various EU committees – are likely to affect modes of co-ordination.

The empirical analysis presented in this Chapter supports these arguments. With respect to the principles of organization, inter-sectoral modes of policy co-ordination tend to be evoke more extensively amongst officials participating on Council WPs than amongst those attending Commission ECs. Moreover, as regards techniques applied to co-ordinating EU dossiers, written instructions are reported more frequently amongst WP participants than amongst EC participants. Among the latter, anticipated reaction and unwritten ‘positions’ are more common. Moreover, the effects from the different organizational principles are strengthened subsequent to officials attending these committees with a high level of intensity. Hence, officials attending ECs fairly intensively are shown to co-ordinate less strongly than officials participating fairly intensively on WPs. Assuming that the general lack of policy co-ordination within national central administrations propels administrative integration, administrative integration is fostered most extensively amongst officials who are intensive attendants to Commission expert committees, especially if the participants attend many committees and a great deal of formal and informal committee meetings. This Chapter has revealed that the intensity to which national civil servants attend EU committees has an independent causal impact on their co-ordination behaviour. The multiple regression analyses also show that the intensity dimension has stronger explanatory power than the length dimension for the evoked co-ordination behaviour.

Notwithstanding these observations, this study also indicates the pivotal role played by domestic institutions in affecting the co-ordination behaviour of national civil servants. When controlling for different EU committee affiliations, the current study reveals that domestic institutional affiliations have independent causal impact on the co-ordination behaviour evoked by national officials. Moreover, the regression analyses indicate that the relative explanatory power of the intensity and length variable is generally lower than that of domestic institutional affiliations. Thus, despite providing clear indications of the re-socializing potential of EU committees (cf. Chapter 6), this analysis also shows that the ministry versus agency distinction is important when accounting for the co-ordination behaviour of EU committee participants.
Henceforth, administrative integration, as measured by the co-ordination behaviour evoked by national civil servants attending EU committees, seems strongly affected (i) by the organizational principles of EU committees and domestic government institutions, and (ii) by the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees. When comparing Norwegian, Swedish and Danish civil servants, Norwegian officials attend solely Commission expert committees organized according to a sectoral principle. Moreover, Norwegian officials participate fairly intensively on these committees. Hence, administrative integration is shown to be fairly strong amongst Norwegian government officials. This is due to the weaker level of cross-sectoral co-ordination behaviour evoked by the Norwegian EC participants. The EEA agreement may, thus, provide for fairly strong administrative integration across levels of governance. Danish and Swedish officials, in contrast, have dual institutional affiliations towards both ECs and WPs. Moreover, Danish and Swedish government officials generally attend EU committees more intensively than do their Norwegian colleagues. (cf. Chapter 4). Officials at the Danish and Swedish permanent representations interact fairly intensively towards the WPs (cf. Chapter 4). Having demonstrated that intensity of participation on EU committees has an independent causal impact on modes of policy co-ordination, administrative integration is fostered amongst Danish and Swedish officials attending EU committees. However, administrative integration is less strong amongst those Danish and Swedish officials attending WPs fairly intensively. Finally, the current analysis also reveals that various domestic institutional affiliations have significant and independent impact on the co-ordination behaviour evoked by EU committee participants.

The next Chapter moves towards measuring administrative integration through the identities and role perceptions evoked by the EU committee participants. The next Chapter also studies the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration together with the sectoral-territorial dimension.
Notes

1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 12th NOPSA Conference, Uppsala, August 19-21, 1999. The author is indebted to Shrin Ahlbäck, Svein Andersen, Jan Beyers, Simon Bulmer, Jeffrey T. Checkel, Morten Egeberg, Bengt Jacobsson, Ann-Cathrine Jungar, Tobias Krantz, Per Legreid, Göran Sundström and Frode Veggeland for valuable comments. Also thanks to Knut A. Christophersen for technical assistance.

2 Hocking (1999) argues, however, that the notion of the gate-keeping role of the MFA must be understood ideal-typically. The MFA has never had omnipotence as far as governance of the domestic-international interface is concerned. “Rather [the MFA has] been more usually engaged in bureaucratic bargaining processes with other government agencies intent on carving out for themselves a role in various areas of international policymaking” (Hocking 1999: 3). As such, “gate-keeping’ continues to be what it has frequently been, namely a shared activity, on occasions involving conflicts with other key government departments” (Hocking 1999: 14).

3 The current chapter analyses how different organizational principles, as embedded within the EU Commission and the Council of Ministers, affects modes of co-ordination. The modus operandi of the Commission and the Council is different. They are located at different phases of the decision-making cycles of the EU machinery. Still, the current chapter does not make any efforts at theorizing decision-phases. Organizational principles are put to the fore in this study partly because organizational principles are under-researched in general, and partially because one can derive testable hypotheses from the notion of organizational principles more easily than from the notion of decision-phases.

4 A similar observation is made in Germany where the co-ordination role of the MFA is seen as synonymous with that of “a postman” (Derlien 1999: 5).

5 Due to small N and to few officials participating solely on Commission expert committees it is not possible to make this distinction in the data from the permanent representations. This argument is valid for all tables presented within this chapter. Moreover, tables making the distinction between officials solely attending ECs and officials attending both ECs and WPs are presented only when the latter distinction accompanies observations that deviate significantly from the ‘original’ table. This argument is valid also for chapter 6.

6 Still, 38 (53 per cent) of the Swedish officials and 6 (14 per cent) of the Danish officials participate solely on ECs. Hence, the distinction made in table 5.2 does not correspond perfectly to the distinction between different countries. Moreover, 32 (44 per cent) of the Swedish officials and 35 (80 per cent) of the Danish officials participate on both ECs and WPs. Finally, only 2 (3 per cent) of the Swedish officials and 1 (3 per cent) of the Danish officials participate solely on WPs. To sum up, amongst the Danish and Swedish officials 38 per cent (44) participate solely on ECs, 58 per cent (67) participate on ECs and WPs, while 3 per cent (3) participate solely on WPs (cf. also Chapter 4).

7 40 per cent of the officials solely participating on Commission expert committees report their decision behaviour to be governed by rules and practises to a fairly great extent, or more. On the other hand, 52 per cent
of those officials participating on both ECs and WPs report their decision behaviour to be governed by rules and practices to a fairly great extent, or more.

8 Time pressure is reported as one additional hindrance for co-ordination (cf. Hayes-Renschaw and Wallace 1997: 237). Still, time pressure is reported to be more extensive in the Swedish than in the Norwegian central administration (source: interviews; cf. Larsen et al. 1999: 123; SOU 1996:6: 65; Sundström 1999: 41). “[T]here is usually only a week or two between the mailing of the agenda and the plenary meetings” (Van Kippersluis 1998: 56). This observation is only partially supported by Schaefer et al. (2000: 6): According to Schaefer et al. (2000), the availability of documentation for committee meetings is mostly a day or two before in the Council working parties. However, most of those officials attending Commission expert committees report that they receive documentation a week before the meetings. Consequently, the potential for making co-ordinated preparations before committee meetings should be better amongst those officials attending the Council working parties. Thus, the time pressure on Norwegian officials attending Commission expert committees should be greater than the corresponding time pressure on Swedish and Danish officials attending Council working parties. Moreover, the technical complexity of many EU directives – especially within the environmental field – adds to these co-ordination problems (Jordan et al. 1999; Sundström 1999: 42). Technical complexity is also a major hindrance for the politicisation of EU questions. Within the Norwegian Parliament only a few MPs are able to derive political implications from the vast majority of EU directives (Nordby and Veggeland 1999).

Finally, additional explanations of the co-ordination behaviour evoked by EU committee participants is the increased number of issue areas dealt with at the EU level, the political salience of different issue areas for the national political leadership, the six-month long Presidency of the EU, and the co-ordination needed during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) (Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000: 4-5).

9 In our sample from the ‘home administration’, 51 per cent of the Danish officials entered ECs before 1990, whereas only 5 per cent of the Norwegian officials and 2 per cent of the Swedish officials entered them before 1990. Regarding participation on WPs, all of the Swedish officials entered these committees for the first time after 1994 (when Sweden became affiliated to the EEA agreement), while most of the Danish officials entered long before 1994 (cf. Chapter 4).

10 Most of the variables presented in tables 5.11 to 5.19 are not ‘natural’ metric variables. Most of them may substantially be viewed as non-metric variables, i.e. the variable ‘co-ordination with all relevant departments within their own institution’ has the following values: always (1), half of the time (2), seldom (3). Other variables have five values, i.e. the importance attached to the MFA, having the following values: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5). In an effort at utilising as much information as possible contained in such variables, they are treated as metric variables in the statistical analyses. Moreover, the low N renders the analysis vulnerable for dichotomies where the univariate distributions are skewed, rendering some cells close to empty. This problem is reduced when using the original value-scale on the variables. Moreover, an ad-hoc procedure has been applied in the current analysis. Correlations exceeding
.40, but which is not significant, are presented in the tables. Correlations exceeding .40 are strong, but might be insignificant due to low N.

11 Owing to systematic selection of data, significance tests do not reveal any information about any theoretical universe. On the contrary, however, significance may tell us something about the robustness of the relationships tested (cf. Chapter 3). Moreover, owing to the low N, and aiming at studying only fairly robust relationships, Pearson’s r not being significant at the 95% or the 99% levels, or Pearson’s being lower than .40 are not shown in the tables. On this basis, the likelihood for random errors is reduced.

12 Those officials participating on many EU committees also seem to take part in many formal meetings (Pearson’s r = .23**, N = 159). Moreover, those attending many committees are also generally senior participants (Pearson’s r = .34**, N = 159) (cf. Chapter 4).

13 Pearson’s r = .32**, N = 148 amongst the domestic ministry and agency officials.

14 The fact that EC and WP participants enact fairly similar co-ordination behaviour may also reflect the dual role expectations presented to these officials. Owing to contending principles of organization present within both ECs and WPs, officials at the ministry level are expected to act like ‘government officials’ and ‘expert representatives’ within both ECs and WPs (cf. Chapter 6).

15 A test of the independent explanatory status of EU committee affiliation would require cross-tabulations, at least controlling for the ministry-agency affiliation. This test is not done here because it would render only a few units in some of the cells (especially amongst ministry officials – cf. Chapter 3 on the number of officials underpinning this study).

16 The general role orientation of lawyers, economists and social scientists are likely to be more cross-sectoral (generalists) whereas the general orientation of officials educated in various technical disciplines is likely to be more intra-sectoral (specialists). However, linking law, economy and social sciences into the same variable gives one major problem. While the law education and various economy educations are professional in character, which may instil strong professional allegiances in the officials, most social science disciplines are cross-disciplinary. Thus, the level of professional allegiance may differ between these disciplines (Zuna 1999).

17 Diagnostics of collinearity between the independent variables analysed in tables 5.18 to 5.28 unveil no indications of multicollinearity. Thus, the independent variables seem to have independent causal impact on the dependent variables.
Multiple regression analyses:

Table 5.18 Factors related to the importance attached to the MFA: EC participants (Pearson’s r and beta).\textsuperscript{a,b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of participation</td>
<td>-.26*</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of committees attended</td>
<td>-.38**</td>
<td>-.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a)} p \leq .05 \quad \textsuperscript{b)} p \leq .01

Adjusted $R^2 = .16$ ($R^2 = .17$)

a) Due to low N in some analyses, we use the adjusted $R^2$ in some tables in order to correct for possible skewness in the data.

b) The dependent variable has the following values: very important (coded 1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).

c) Independent variable 1 has the following values: entered EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded 2), entered EU committees before 1994 (coded 1). Independent variable 2 has the following values: having participated on a maximum of 2 EU committees (coded 2), having participated on more than 2 EU committees (coded 1).

Table 5.19 Factors related to what extent frame notes, problem notes and instructions govern the positions followed during EU committee meetings: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of participation</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of informal meetings attended</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a)} p \leq .05 \quad \textsuperscript{b)} p \leq .01

Adjusted $R^2 = .15$ ($R^2 = .18$)

a) The dependent variable has the following values: to a very great extent (coded 1), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5).

b) Independent variable 1: cf. the value labels in table 5.18. Independent variable 2: having informal meetings with fellow committee participants fairly often, or more, (coded 1), fewer informal meetings (2).
Table 5.20 Factors related to contacts with the MFA: EC participants (Pearson’s r and beta).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of committees attended</td>
<td>-.31**</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ministry/agency affiliations</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational background</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) p ≤ .05    **) p ≤ .01
R² = .06

a) The dependent variable has the following values: very often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5).

b) Independent variable 1 has the following values: cf. table 5.18. Independent variable 2 has the following values: ministry level (1), agency level (2). Independent variable 3 has the following value: law, social science, and economy (1), technical disciplines (2).

Table 5.21 Factors related to the importance attached to the political leadership: EC participants (Pearson’s r and beta).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers of committees attended</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ministry/agency affiliation</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) p ≤ .05    **) p ≤ .01
R² = .15

a) The dependent variable has the following values: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).

b) Independent variable 1 has the following values: cf. table 5.18. Independent variable 2 has the following values: cf. table 5.20.

Table 5.22 Factors related to contacts with the MFA: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ministry/agency affiliation</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational background</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) p ≤ .05    **) p ≤ .01
Adjusted R² = .32 (R² = .39)

a) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.

b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.
Table 5.23 Factors related to contacts with the political leadership: EC participants (Pearson’s r and beta). a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ministry/agency affiliation b</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational background</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N………………………………………………... 82

*) p ≤ .05     **) p ≤ .01
Adjusted R² = .12 (R² = .15)

a) The dependent variable has the following values: often (coded 1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5).

b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.

Table 5.24 Factors related to contacts with the political leadership: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta). a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ministry/agency affiliation b</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational background</td>
<td>.38*</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N………………………………………………... 38

*) p ≤ .05     **) p ≤ .01
Adjusted R² = .30 (R² = .34)

a) Value labels: cf. table 5.23.

b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.

Table 5.25 Factors related to the following assertion: “I often choose what positions to follow”: EC participants (Pearson’s r and beta). a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ministry/agency affiliation b</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal rank</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N………………………………………………... 132

*) p ≤ .05     **) p ≤ .01

R² = .12

a) The dependent variable has the following values: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).

b) Independent variable 1 has the following values: cf. table 5.20. Independent variable 2 has the following values: top rank positions (1), medium or lower rank positions (2).
Table 5.26 Factors related to signals from the political leadership: EC participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ministry/agency affiliation</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational background</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) p ≤ .05      **) p ≤ .01

R² = .11

a) The dependent variable has the following values: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).

b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.

Table 5.27 Factors related to the following assertion: “I have to co-ordinate with the MFA, or with other central administrative institutions”: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ministry/agency affiliation</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational background</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) p ≤ .05      **) p ≤ .01

Adjusted R² = .17 (R² = .22)

a) The dependent variable has the following values: often (coded 1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5).

b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.
CHAPTER 6

ACCESS, VOICE AND LOYALTY

REPRESENTATIONAL ROLES AMONGST NATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS ATTENDING EU COMMITTEES

Introduction

The role of EU committees in the EU decision-making process has been subject to increased academic interest during the last years, partly due to the important role of committees in the operation of the single European market (Chapter 4; cf. Joerges and Vos 1999; Van Schendelen 1998). Chapter 4 has shown that a large number of representatives from national government administrations participate on EU committee and become "fused" in important decision-making and decision-shaping processes at the European level. National civil servants have gained better access to the EU institutions and play important roles as both voices of national views in the EU and as voices of narrow special interests (Rometch and Wessels 1996; Trondal and Veggeland 2000). Previous studies have also indicated that participation on EU committees creates a potential for affecting the roles and loyalties of the participants (Christoph 1993; Egeberg 1999b; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Kerremans 1996; Schaefer et al. 2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000).

These observations lead to one question that have attracted less scholarly attention. When attending EU committees, what kind of representative roles do the participants evoke? In
other words, do national civil servants, when attending EU committees, consider themselves mainly as national government representatives, as independent experts, or merely as supranational agents? Do they represent their national governments, particular professional interests or supranational EU interests when attending EU committee meetings? The current study thus confronts one classical problem in public administration that of the inherent conflict built into the domestic government apparatus between political loyalty to the political leadership and professional autonomy (Christensen 1991; Jacobsen 1960 and 1966). However, the EU level adds a new dimension to this classical conflict: supranational allegiances. According to intergovernmental perspectives, the EU is an arena for bargaining between national government representatives. According to this view the possibility for role conflicts to emerge is not acknowledged, or at least not taken into serious consideration. Implicit in the intergovernmental perspective is a notion of ‘imperative representation’ (see below) where the civil servants are expected to behave solely as national representatives. However, as asserted by neo-functionalists, civil servants may over time shift loyalties from a national to a supranational level; thus approaching the idea of liberal representation (Egeberg 1999b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Additionally, because national officials are primarily employed in sectoral ministries and agencies at the national level and participate on highly specialised expert committees and networks at the EU level (cf. Chapter 4), they may put more weight on professional autonomy than on political loyalties.

I have argued in Chapter 2 that a cognitive organization theory perspective may occupy a middle ground between the intergovernmental and the neo-functional notion of European integration. Moreover, a cognitive organization theory perspective is warranted in order to pay adequate attention to the potential conflicts between political loyalty, professional autonomy, and supranational allegiances. Implicit in the cognitive approach to administrative integration is a notion of ‘ambiguous representation’ (see below), where the civil servants act upon multiple roles and allegiances. The ambiguity lies in the fact that it is not always clear to whom the representative is responsible. Which of the role conceptions most strongly evoked—the government representative role, the independent expert role or the supranational agent role - depend on the institutional affiliations that embed the civil servants. A cognitive perspective on administrative integration presupposes that the civil servants' main loyalty will remain at the national level as long as their primary institutional affiliations are to national government institutions. However, a situation of ambiguous representation questions the possibility of maintaining strict national control over the committee participants.
As such, the mix of different role and identity perceptions evoked by EU committee participants may reflect the particular institutional affiliations embedding the civil servants. In the following, an elaboration of the notion of representation is provided. Next, three models of representation are suggested: imperative representation, liberal representation, and ambiguous representation. Finally, this Chapter applies empirical data on Danish, Norwegian and Swedish government officials attending Commission expert committees and Council working parties in order to test the merit of the cognitive perspective on administrative integration.

The concept of representation
The concept of representation is poorly understood and has meant different things to those who have studied it (Pitkin 1972). At the etymological level, representation means, “making present again” (Pitkin 1972: 8). Thus, representation means “the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact” (Pitkin 1972: 8-9 - original emphasis). “The term ‘representation’ directs attention first of all, to the attitudes, expectations and behaviours of the represented” (Eulau et al. 1959: 743). As such, representation depends, amongst other things, on how it is conceived by the representative and by the represented. One vital question is how people come to perceive this conception. Suggestively, the role and identity perceptions evoked by national civil servants are vital in determining their representational status. The representative status is measured not so much by procedures for selecting the representatives, their demographic characteristics, or by the output of action pursued by the representatives, as by the role and identity perceptions evoked by them (Lægreid and Olsen 1978: 16-17). An individual is representative in a symbolic sense ‘by what he is or how he is regarded’ (Pitkin 1972: 113).

Representation always involves a relationship between the representative(s) and those represented; “[t]he relationship between the representative and the represented is at the core of representational theory” (Eulau 1959: 743). Theories of representation have been mainly occupied with the relationship between the electorate and the elected politicians. This study emphasises the relationships between individual civil servants and bureaucratic institutions at the national and at the EU level of governance. This relationship may be based on trust or enmity, on formal or informal rules, on shared notions of representative quality or on contending notions of true representation. More importantly for our study, the symbolic relationship between representatives and their constituents may vary between two extremes.
At one extreme, representation means evoking role and identity conceptions that are closely and solely knit to constituents (an imperative notion of representation). On the other extreme, representation means having the free will to evoke roles and identities that deviate from this constituency (a liberal notion of representation). Between these extremes, representation means having multiple role and identity conceptions, thus highlighting a notion of role conflict (an ambiguous notion of representation). Hence, the ambiguous nature of representation represents a middle ground between the imperative and the liberal notion of representation. A more thorough elaboration of these three models of representation is provided in the next section.

Role and identity perceptions are important to study because they have “a significant influence on human behaviour” (Sen 1998: 5). Studying roles and identities as the actors themselves conceive of them, “we will be in the best possible position to explain the behaviour” of these actors (Searing 1994: 14; cf. Eulau 1959: 746; Wish 1980: 535). A further rationale for studying the symbolic aspects of representation is the lack of such research in general, and especially the lack of such research in studies of EU committees. “Over forty years after the European project began, it is striking how little we know about its socialization and identity-shaping effects on national agents” (Checkel 1999: 545; cf. also Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001; Szakolczai 1998: 1). Finally, studying EU committees can also show how multiple institutional affiliations trigger role conflicts and identity conflicts amongst the domestic government officials attending these committees.

Deriving empirical propositions from theory: Three models of representation
Three different models of representation are outlined in this section. However, these models have different analytical statuses in this Chapter. The notions of imperative representation and liberal representation are outlined in an effort to present three different representational roles: a ‘government representative’ role, an ‘independent expert’ role, and finally a ‘supranational agent’ role. The idea of ambiguous representation is used primarily to show how the potential mix of these three representational roles may shift under different institutional conditions.

An imperative notion of representation.
At one extreme, the idea of imperative representation maintains that “true representation occurs only when the representative acts on explicit instructions from [their] constituents”
(Pitkin 1972: 146). From a symbolic viewpoint, true representation occurs only when representatives evoke roles that are tightly knit to their constituents. Defenders of this concept tend to view representatives as uni-dimensional servants and delegates with respect to institutional affiliations and allegiances (Olsen 1988: 162). “[T]he possibility of conflict in role orientations is clearly envisaged and resolved in favour of subordinating one’s independence to what is considered a superior authority” (Eulau 1959: 750).

As seen from an imperative perspective, domestic civil servants evoke solely the role as a ‘government representative’ when attending EU committees. As such, role conceptions are seen as rigidly fixed and stable, impossible to mould or remould during EU committee meetings. EU committees are viewed as intergovernmental arenas for a “give and take” between sovereign nation-states mediated through their delegates. Thus, participation within EU committees has no significant impact on the role and identity perceptions evoked by the delegates (cf. Chapter 1). If the representative, however, does evoke roles and identities that deviate significantly from the ‘government representative’ role, the representative may be recalled, either permanently or temporarily (Christophersen 1986). The delegates, thus, have clear incentives not to deviate from the ‘government representation’ role when attending EU committees.

A liberal notion of representation.

At the other extreme lies the idea of “complete independence” of the representative (Pitkin 1972: 146). True representation emerges only when the representative has the leeway to evoke role and identity perceptions which may deviate from the ‘government representative’ role. Representational roles must “not be bound by instructions, from whatever source, but must be guided by what Burke called ‘his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience’” (Eulau 1959: 744). Defenders of this representation concept tend to view political questions as difficult and complex and beyond the capacities of ordinary individuals. Representatives are seen as experts with a great deal of behavioural discretion at their disposal, resembling Plato’s ‘wise men’ pursuing “superior understanding of the subject and the procedures of decision-making” (Rometsch and Wessels 1997: 216). Decisions are reached by trustees on the basis of ‘the best arguments’ (Olsson 1993). The liberal concept of representation builds on a deliberative perspective where free individuals act to reach the

The liberal representation concept signifies that weak links may exist between representatives and those they represent. To give one example, frequent interaction with representatives from other EU member states during EU committee meetings may increase the likelihood that the representatives ‘go native’. Frequent participation on committees may also affect the role and identity perceptions evoked by the participants (Joerges and Neyer 1997). Being supranational institutions, frequent interaction on Commission expert committees and Council working parties may influence national civil servants to evoke supranational role and identity perceptions. A supranational role involves conceiving of one self as an ‘EU participant’ or, more accurately, as an ‘EU committee participant’ (cf. Chapter 2). These role and identity perceptions are likely to be moulded differently within Commission expert committees and Council working parties. Commission expert committees, organized according to a sectoral principle, deal with highly complex and technical dossiers and involve domestic civil servants with high technical expertise (cf. Chapters 2 and 4). Hence, officials attending these committees are likely to enact the role of an ‘independent expert’. Council working parties, which are organized according to a geographical organization principle, deal with more politicised issues and recruit civil servants with educational backgrounds mainly from law (cf. Chapters 2 and 4). These officials are likely to evoke the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than the ‘independent expert’ role.

Hence, EU committees may be seen as transformative entities that contribute to the enactment of supranational role and identity perceptions amongst the participants. Even more, intensive and protracted participation on EU committees can increase the likelihood that supranational role and identity perceptions are enacted amongst the participants. In the current study, the liberal representation model involves two role perceptions that transcend the ‘government representative’ role: (i) the ‘independent expert’ role, and (ii) the ‘supranational agent’ role. Moreover, parallel to figure 1.2 in Chapter 1, the ‘independent expert’ role transcends intergovernmentalism along a sectoral-territorial dimension; the ‘supranational agent’ role transcends intergovernmentalism along a national-supranational axis. Intensive and sustained participation on Commission expert committees increases the likelihood that the participants evoke the two latter role perceptions. Intensive and sustained participation on Council working parties is more likely to mobilise supranational and government representative roles.
amongst the participants. The liberal representation concept highlights a delegation problem (Kiewiet og McCubbins 1991; Pollack 1997), along both the sectoral-territorial axis and the national-supranational axis. The crucial point of this problem is the degree to which civil servants (agents) act on role and identity perceptions of their own choosing rather than on those of the government (principals). This problem can occur in those instances where committee participants develop loyalties that are in conflict with their role as national government representatives. The delegation problem and the problem of representation, therefore, are different sides of the same coin (Mayntz 1999).

An ambiguous notion of representation.
A middle ground between the imperative and the liberal models of representation is seized by the notion of ambiguous representation (Olsen 1988). Whereas the basis for representation is fairly clear and uncontested in the two former models, representative quality has no clear basis in this third model. Rather, the representative is seen as having multiple obligations, institutional affiliations and allegiances. The uni-dimensional model of representation is superseded by a concept of multiple representation, which also introduces role conflict as a constitutive aspect of self (Barnett 1993: 276; Elster 1986; Jacobsen 1960; Lægreid and Olsen 1978; March and Olsen 1989; Stryker and Statham 1985: 336).³ The idea of role conflict introduced by ambiguous representation might be visualised as follows:
Figure 6.1 A geometrical triangle of representation.

![Geometrical Triangle Diagram]

Key:
NS: the national – supranational dimension of administrative integration
ST: the sectoral – territorial dimension of administrative integration

Ambiguous representation introduces organizational variables as scope conditions that affect the relative validity of the two extreme representation modes presented above. As such, institutional factors give momentum to the model presented in figure 6.1. The possible mix of role perceptions evoked by an official will be different under different ‘institutional conditions’ (cf. Eulau 1959: 750). Representatives are embedded within formal organizations that focus only on selected aspects of the reality (Olsen 1988: 167-168; Schattschneider 1960). Representatives also have multiple memberships and true representation is a function of the mix of different role and identity perceptions stemming from these memberships. The representative quality is a result of the interplay and conflict between various representational roles (March and Olsen 1989; Olsen 1988: 169). In being exposed to contending role expectations from different institutions, representatives may take on a partially conflicting set of roles. The notion of representative ambiguity therefore views government systems as fragmented and with multiple representative channels (Rokkan 1966). It becomes increasingly
difficult to determine who the representatives actually are and who they represent (Olsen 1988: 170).

Identifying the institutional contexts in which the representative(s) are embedded can reduce representative ambiguity (Aggestam 1998: 7). In the following, some scope conditions, or independent variables are suggested as "switching points" between the roles shown in figure 6.1. The role perceptions evoked by EU committee participants are likely to be affected by the EU committees on which they attend and by the domestic government institutions in which they have permanent positions. Committee members can be seen as wearing a modern Janus face (Lewis 1998: 483). When domestic government officials participate on EU committees, “they must understand the perceptions and preferences of their interaction partners as well as those of their own organization …” (Mayntz 1999: 84). Generally, we expect that intensive and sustained participation on EU committees is likely to accompany the enactment of supranational role perceptions by the participants. Moreover, assuming that Commission expert committees are largely sectoral in character, officials that frequently attend Commission expert committees are likely to evoke supranational roles that are largely sectoralized in character. Hence, officials devoting a great deal of time and energy attending Commission expert committees are likely to evoke roles as ‘independent experts’ and as ‘supranational agents’ more extensively than roles as ‘government representatives’ (Egeberg 1999b; Trondal and Veggeland 2000; Veggeland 2000). As such, the likelihood of enacting role perceptions that are tightly linked to their own domestic government institution is weakened. Officials frequently attending Council working parties are more likely to evoke a mixture of ‘supranational agent’ roles and ‘government representative’ roles.

The concept of ambiguous representation implies that the roles evoked by civil servants are affected most strongly by their primary institutional affiliations. From a cognitive organization theory perspective, the primary institutional affiliations embedding civil servants affect their role and identity perceptions more extensively than their EU committee affiliations (Egeberg 1999b; Herrmann and Brewer 2000: 13; Trondal 2000). Moreover, domestic civil servants have many different institutional affiliations at the domestic arena. These affiliations include: employment at the permanent representations or in the national bureaucracy, employment at the ministry or agency, employment at the sectoral or the diplomatic realms of the permanent missions, employment in medium or top rank positions, they are senior officials or have served for only shorter periods of time within the domestic
central administration, they have different degrees of behavioural discretion at their disposal, etc. Generally, most of these primary institutional factors are likely to influence processes through which the representatives enact supranational role perceptions (Mayntz 1999: 84-85). However, these primary institutional affiliations are likely to have different impacts on the ‘independent expert’ role and the ‘government representative’ role. As will be empirically illustrated in the next section, sectoral role perceptions are likely to be evoked more extensively by domestic officials at the agency level than amongst officials at the permanent representations, and more by officials in medium or lower rank positions than by officials in top rank positions.

A cognitive organization theory perspective introduces “switching points” in the role conflict model presented in figure 6.1. However, the scope conditions suggested above are not exhaustive, only suggestive. The central idea is that multiple institutional affiliations may affect the relative strength of the representational roles enacted. This has the effect of making representation largely ambiguous to the representative. In the next section we study empirically the extent to which access to EU committees affects the loyalties of the participants (read: their role and identity perceptions). Two main hypotheses are tested. The first is that intensive and protracted participation on Commission expert committees and Council working parties (read: access and voice) results in loyalty shifts and loyalty transfers amongst the participants (read: the enactment of ‘supranational agent’ roles). The second is that the mix of intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral role and identity perceptions (‘independent expert’ roles and ‘government representative’ roles) is affected in particular ways by different EU committees and by different domestic institutional affiliations. Thus, both the national-supranational dimension and the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration are accounted for in the current Chapter. The ambiguous representation model is empirically illustrated in the following sections.

The empirical record: Representational roles amongst Scandinavian EU committee participants

In the following section, two main questions are considered. Does attendance on different EU committees and being from different domestic administrative institutions accompany particular representational roles amongst national civil servants? This question mainly relates to the sectoral–territorial dimension of administrative integration. Independent expert roles
represent the sectoral end of this spectrum whilst the government representative role represents the opposite end of this axis. The second question is how the intensity and length of participation on EU committees affect the national-supranational role dimension. Having assumed in Chapter 2 that the length and intensity to which civil servants attend EU committees influence supranational role perceptions, the second section is devoted to the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration.

The first section, however, illustrates how participation on different EU committees can cause different role and identity perceptions amongst the delegates. In the following, different operational measures are used to illuminate different representational roles. Similar to Chapter 5, different dependent variables are applied in the current Chapter to detect certain empirical patterns (Yin 1993).

**Accounting for the sectoral-territorial role dimension.**

*Effects of EU committee affiliations.*

Suggestively, the ‘government representative’ role is attended to more extensively by WP participants than by EC participants. Table 6.1 applies different operational measures to show the ‘government representative’ role.
Table 6.1 Percentage of officials evoking a ‘government representative’ role. a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘government representative’ role:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards my own government.</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heeding signals from the political leadership…..</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heeding the interests of my own country……….</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards the MFA b……………….</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N…………………………………………..</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Variables 1 and 4 presented in this table involve officials feeling allegiances to a fairly great extent, or very great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly small extent (4), very small extent (5). Variables 2 and 3 presented in this table involve officials attaching fairly great, or very great emphasis towards certain considerations or interests. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).

b) This question was not presented to officials from the domestic bureaucracies.

The most general observation made in this table is that the majority of national civil servants attending EU committees tend to evoke the ‘government representative’ role. The percentage of EC participants who evoke a ‘government representative’ role is lower compared to the WP participants on all the dependent variables presented in table 6.1. This pattern holds for both officials in the ‘domestic administrations’ and the permanent representations. Officials attending ECs pay considerably less attention to signals from the political leadership nationally (62 per cent and 59 per cent amongst ‘domestic officials’ and permanent representatives, respectively) than do officials attending WPs (95 per cent and 97 per cent amongst ‘domestic officials’ and permanent representatives, respectively). This difference reflects the fact that officials attending ECs receive fewer instructions from the political and administrative leadership than do WP participants (cf. Chapter 5). However, signals coming from the political leadership may be highly sectoralized. This variable is thus less indicative of the ‘government representative’ role than the other variables presented in table 6.1.

Going beyond table 6.1, comparing domestic officials solely attending ECs and domestic officials attending both ECs and WPs, the latter tend to evoke the ‘government representative’ roles more markedly than the former category of officials. Together with table 6.1, these
figures indicate that officials attending Council working parties tend to enact more cross-sectoral role and identity perceptions than those who attend Commission expert committees.

Despite some minor differences are observed between EC and WP participants, a second general observation that can be made in table 6.1 is that all officials attending different EU committees tend to enact a ‘government representative’ role. In this respect, no major differences are seen between officials attending different EU committees. This observation is also supported in the interviews: One Norwegian ministry official reports that:

“I represent Norway. I pay attention to the interests of the ministry as a whole” (author’s translation). Similarly, another Norwegian agency official reports that, “[w]hen the policy is decided, one is committed to this” (author’s translation). A third Norwegian agency official claims that, “I represent Norway and the central administration, not my self or my professional expertise” (author’s translation). Swedish civil servants make the same observation: “I feel strongest allegiance to Sweden, but develop a certain amount of loyalty to the committee. Still, this loyalty never exceeds the loyalty to the [agency]” (Source: Swedish agency official – author’s translation). Similarly, one Danish ministry official reports that, “I represent [the ministry] and Denmark. I do not represent independent expertise” (author’s translation).

Moreover, the interviews indicated elements of role complementarity as much as role conflict. Evoking a ‘government representative’ role may not necessarily conflict with developing ‘independent expert’ roles and ‘supranational agent’ roles. Having multiple institutional affiliations, these officials turn into ‘multiple selves’ (Elster 1986). One Swedish ministry officials reports that he feels a strong sense of ‘esprit de corps’ in the EU committees and, at the same time, he feels strong allegiances to his own government and his own ministry. Similarly, one Danish ministry official reports that “I have a strongest national identity, but this [identification] should be in accordance with the principles of the [EU] Treaty” (author’s translation). Despite evoking a mixture of different role perceptions the above observations indicate that the sectoral-territorial dimension and the national-supranational dimension indeed are separate dimensions with respect to administrative integration. However, the officials seem to pay sequential or situational attention towards different representational
roles, thus being able to evoke a role repertoire based on partially contending institutional allegiances and conflicting expectations.

The next table applies different operational measures illuminating the extent to which EC participants evoke the independent expert role more strongly than do WP participants.

Table 6.2 Percentage of officials evoking an ‘independent expert’ role.\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘independent expert’ role:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards my own profession.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards my own policy sector</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I heed professional considerations…………………...</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N……………………………………….</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Variables 1 and 2 presented in this table involve officials feeling allegiances to a fairly great extent, or very great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly small extent (4), very small extent (5). Variable 3 presented in this table involves officials attaching fairly great, or very great emphasis towards professional considerations. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).

Compared to table 6.1, table 6.2 shows that national civil servants who attend EU committees tend to evoke ‘independent expert’ roles to a considerably lesser extent than the ‘government representative’ role. Hence, officials tend to locate themselves at the territorial end of the sectoral-territorial spectrum with regard to representational roles. Still, similar to table 6.1, table 6.2 also reveals expected differences between EC and WP participants. Consistent with the propositions outlined in Chapter 2, EC participants tend to enact independent expert roles more strongly than WP participants. This difference is shown both amongst ‘domestic officials’ and permanent representatives. For example, permanent representatives attending ECs tend to feel allegiance towards their own policy sector more strongly than permanent representatives attending WPs (75 per cent and 61 per cent, respectively). One Norwegian agency official attending ECs reports that,
“in the group you sit as an individual” (author’s translation). Another Norwegian agency official attending ECs claims that, “the allegiances go to the profession, not to the government” (author’s translation). Indicating the differences between ECs and WPs, one Swedish agency official reports that, “I do not represent Sweden. I represent independent expertise. When the dossiers are sent [from the ECs to the WPs], however, Sweden as a nation becomes more important [as a reference point for identification]” (author’s translation). As such, “the technical [aspects] are most predominant in the [expert] committees” (Source: Danish agency official – author’s translation).

Similarly, domestic officials attending ECs tend to heed professional considerations more markedly than do domestic officials attending WPs (88 per cent and 75 per cent, respectively). Moreover, extending table 6.2 when comparing domestic officials solely attending ECs and officials attending both ECs and WPs, the former category tend to evoke ‘independent expert’ roles more strongly than the latter (95 per cent and 78 per cent, respectively).

As expected, officials attending Commission expert committees tend to enact more intra-sectoral role and identity perceptions whilst those attending Council working parties tend to evoke more encompassing role perceptions. The differences between these participants, however, are not large as far as the enactment of ‘independent expert’ roles are concerned. Hence, similar to the observations made in table 6.1, officials attending both ECs and WPs tend to evoke a mixture of ‘government representative’ roles and ‘independent expert’ roles. This observation might reflect the fact that these two role perceptions are more complementary than conflicting. One Norwegian agency official reports that:

“I am more government representative than independent expert. In Norway, however, there are no conflicts between these roles in my policy sector. National interests coincide to some extent with the expertise” (author’s translation).

This observation might reflect the fact that sectoral and territorial organizational principles are built into the EU committees. However, as will be accounted for more thoroughly below, role enactment also reflects particular national institutional affiliations embedding these committee
participants. Thus, the perceived complementarity between different roles may reflect the sheer multitude of institutional affiliations and allegiances that embed these officials.

In addition to indicating their self-perceptions, the respondents were also asked to indicate how they perceive and assess the roles of their fellow colleagues within the EU committees. In addition to being self-conscious regarding their own representational roles, officials may also have strong opinions on how their colleagues perform and act in the EU committees (Giddens 1989: 700; Ritzer 1996: 342). Do they perceive of other colleagues merely as ‘independent experts’ or largely as ‘government representatives’, or do they view them as having more mixed roles?

Table 6.3 Percentage of civil servants perceiving colleagues from other countries as mainly ‘independent experts’ or ‘government representative’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colleagues roles:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly ‘independent experts’………………..</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed roles…………………………………</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly ‘government representatives’……….</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N……………………………………………….</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3 shows that officials’ perceptions of other colleagues are significantly affected by their committee affiliation. EC participants tend to view other colleagues as more ‘independent experts’ than ‘government representatives’. Still, the majority of EC participants tend to view other colleagues as having a mixed role orientation. On the other hand, officials attending WPs tend to view other colleagues as merely ‘government representatives’. These observations are significant amongst both ‘domestic officials’ and permanent representatives. Hence, table 6.3 largely confirms the observations made in tables 6.1 and 6.2 and indicates the transformative effects of EU committees embedding national civil servants. However, the fact that different EU committees activate different role perceptions can also reflect the fact that different organizational principles evoke different parts of complex selves (Elster 1986; March 1994).
Effects of primary institutional embeddedness.

Despite participating intensively and for protracted periods of time within EU committees, the primary institutional affiliations of civil servants are national. Most of their time and energy are used in the national ministry, agency or permanent mission to the EU. Their career possibilities depend heavily on their national performance. As such, their EU committee affiliations are secondary to their national institutional affiliations. Hence, the representational roles evoked are likely to reflect strongly their national institutional affiliations. The following section highlights the independent effects of various domestic institutional affiliations. Thus, the control variable in the following section is committee affiliations at the EU level. The representational roles enacted are likely to vary according to different primary institutional affiliations.

Reflecting the spatial organizational principle underpinning the permanent representations to the EU, permanent representatives are likely to evoke ‘government representative’ roles more strongly than officials employed in sector ministries and agencies. Moreover, reflecting the stronger element of the spatial organizational principle at the ministry level than at the agency level, officials at the ministry level are likely to evoke more encompassing representative roles than do officials at the agency level. Likewise, officials in top rank positions are more likely to enact ‘government representative’ roles than officials in medium or lower rank positions.

First, table 6.4 shows how primary institutional affiliations embedding ‘domestic’ civil servants and permanent representatives affect their enactment of ‘government representative’ roles and ‘independent expert’ roles. The institutional affiliations considered in this table are the ministry/agency affiliation and the diplomatic/sectoral affiliation at the permanent missions.
Table 6.4 Correlations between primary institutional affiliations and the representational roles evoked (Pearson’s r)\textsuperscript{a,b}.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representational roles:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The ‘government representative’ role:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards my own government</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heeding signals from the political leadership</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The ‘independent expert’ role:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards my own profession.</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to professional considerations</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N ..................................................................</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 
* ) p ≤ .05 \quad **) p ≤ .01

\textsuperscript{a)} This table compares officials within the domestic bureaucracy who are employed at the ministry level (coded 1) and at the agency level (coded 2). At the permanent representations to the EU this table compares officials from the diplomatic realms (coded 1) and officials within different sectoral realms (coded 2).

\textsuperscript{b)} All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: variable 1 and 3: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5); variable 2 and 4: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).

Table 6.4 largely confirms that officials at the ministry level tend to evoke the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than officials at the agency level. Ministry officials tend to feel allegiance to the national government (r = .20*) and heed signals from the political leadership (r = 30** amongst EC participants and r = .29* amongst WP participants) more strongly than agency personnel. On the other hand, agency personnel tend to evoke the ‘independent expert’ role fairly strongly. They tend to feel allegiances towards their own profession more strongly than do ministry personnel (r = -.20*), and they to pay attention to professional considerations more strongly than do ministry officials (r = -.24** amongst EC participants and r = -.31* amongst WP participants). No significant correlations were found amongst the permanent representatives.

Table 6.5 shows how the formal rank positions within domestic ministries, agencies and permanent representations accompany certain role perceptions amongst the participants.
Table 6.5 Correlations between rank positions within domestic government institutions and the representational roles evoked (Pearson’s r)\(^a,b\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representational roles:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>domestic officials</td>
<td>permanent representatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘government representative’ role:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heeding the interests of my own country…….</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N……………………………………….………</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) p ≤ .05  ***) p ≤ .01

\(a\)  This table compares officials in top rank positions (coded 1) (director generals, deputy director generals, head/deputy of unit/division) and officials in medium rank positions (coded 2) (head of section, senior advisor, advisor, executive officer).

\(b\)  The dependent variable in this table has the original values: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).

Only one variable had a significant correlation with the rank variable. As expected officials in top rank positions tend to evoke the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than officials in medium rank positions. That even top rank officials attending ECs tend to report that they ‘heed the interests of [their] own country’ indicates the strong impact of primary institutional affiliations.

Accounting for the national-supranational role dimension.

The final role perception considered in this study is the ‘supranational agent’ role. This role has to do with the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration presented in figure 1.2 (cf. Chapter 1) and in figure 6.1. Assuming that EU institutions and EU committees are supranational institutions, attendance at EU committees may cause the enactment of ‘supranational agent’ roles.
Table 6.6 Percentage of officials evoking a ‘supranational agent’ role.\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘supranational agent’ role:</th>
<th>\textit{domestic officials}</th>
<th>\textit{permanent representatives}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{EC}</td>
<td>\textit{WP}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“An ‘esprit de corps’ emerges over time in the EU committee”</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards the ECs attended…</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards the WPs attended…</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards the European Union</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}) Variable 1 involves officials agreeing fairly much, or agreeing very much towards this assertion. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: agreeing very much (1), agreeing fairly much (2), both/and (3), agreeing fairly little (4), agreeing very little (5). Variables 2, 3 and 4 presented in this table involve officials feeling allegiances to a fairly strong extent, or very strong extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly small extent (4), very small extent (5).

Compared to tables 6.1 and 6.2, the proportion of officials that evoke a ‘supranational role’ and identity perception is lower than that enacting a ‘government representative’ role and an ‘independent expert’ role. Arguing that the EU committee affiliations embedding national civil servants are secondary to their national institutional affiliations, we proposed in Chapter 2 that national officials attending EU committees would enact the ‘supranational agent’ role perception with less strength than the ‘government representative’ role. Tables 6.1 and 6.6 largely confirm this proposition. Therefore, when attending EU committees supranational allegiances tend to be more weakly enacted than pre-existing role perceptions.

“It is hard to change ways of acting and thinking” (Source: Swedish agency official – author’s translation). “I have not developed any sense of belonging to the EU. I have a realistic view on the EU, as a partner to which no emotional connections are established. Still, I have close relationships to individuals in the group” (Source: Danish agency official – author’s translation).

Moreover, as seen from table 6.6, it is difficult to detect clear correlations between EU committee affiliations and the extent to which supranational role and identity perceptions are evoked. This may reflect the fact that the national-supranational dimension is affected less by
the committee affiliations of the officials and more by the length and intensity to which the officials attend these committees (cf. the next sub-section).

A significant difference is seen between officials from the domestic administrations and those at the permanent representations. As seen from table 6.6, officials at the permanent representations evoke supranational role perceptions more strongly than do officials in the domestic ministries and agencies. This may reflect the fact that officials at the permanent representations tend to participate more intensively on the EU committees (cf. Chapter 4). The tendency amongst permanent representatives to enact allegiances towards the supranational level is clearly shown in the first variable of table 6.6. Permanent representatives tend to experience the emergence of an ‘esprit de corps’ within the committees to a considerably larger extent than do domestic officials. This may reflect the sheer intensity to which permanent representatives attend EU committees (cf. Chapter 4 and the next sub-section of this Chapter). However, amongst those domestic officials who interact frequently with their fellow committee colleagues, supranational role perceptions are enacted:

“I feel a certain sense of belonging to the group, or to individuals of the group, especially to Nordic colleagues whom we meet occasionally in other contexts”

(Source: Norwegian agency official – author’s translation).

Finally, to indicate the tendency for evoking supranational allegiances, the respondents were asked to indicate to what extent Commission officials are perceived as being independent of particular national interests.
Table 6.7 Percentage of civil servants perceiving Commission officials as mainly independent or mainly dependent of particular national interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly independent</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed role</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly dependent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table illustrates the supranational component of the EU Commission as perceived by the national officials attending EU committees. Viewing the Commission as largely independent of particular national interests may be interpreted as reflecting supranational allegiances. No major differences are observed between EC and WP participants in this respect. Similar to table 6.6, the only significant difference is unveiled between permanent representatives and national officials. While 15 per cent of the latter tend to perceive the EU Commission as mainly dependent on particular national interests, none of the permanent representatives share this view. Hence, supranational identifications are enacted more vigorously amongst permanent representatives than amongst ‘national’ civil servants.

*   *   *

To summarize the above observations, national government officials tend to enact the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than the ‘independent expert’ role when attending EU committee. These two roles are evoked even more extensively than the ‘supranational agent’ role. Still, significant differences have been shown between officials having different institutional affiliations. EC participants tend to evoke the ‘independent expert’ role more strongly than the ‘government representative’ role, whilst the reverse is observed amongst WP participants. Hence, the committee affiliations embedding these officials partially account for the sectoral-territorial role conflict. Consequently, the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 have been largely confirmed in the above analysis, thus indicating that different committee affiliations at the EU level accompany different role and
identity perceptions amongst the participants. The spatial principle of organization underpinning the WPs tends to accompany cross-sectoral role and identity perceptions amongst the participants, the sectoral organization principle built into the ECs is reflected only in the enactment of intra-sectoral roles and identifications amongst the delegates.

As far as the national-supranational dimension is concerned, no major differences have been observed between EC and WP participants with respect to enactment of the ‘supranational agent’ role. On the national-supranational dimension, however, major statistical variations have been found between permanent representatives and ‘national’ officials. This is partially due to the permanent representatives attending EU committees more intensively than ‘national’ officials. The former tends to evoke supranational role and identity perceptions more strongly than the latter. However, no robust test was conducted in the above analysis regarding effects from the intensity and length of participating on EU committees. However, no definite conclusion can be drawn at this stage on the causes of supranational role and identity perceptions. Therefore, in the following section the length and intensity of participation on EU committees are suggested as one vital institutional condition for the emergence of supranational allegiances.

The length and intensity of participation on EU committees: Effects on supranational allegiances.

One central theoretical proposition presented in Chapter 2 has to do with the national-supranational dimension. Intensive and protracted participation on EU committees strengthens the likelihood that supranational role perceptions are evoked amongst the participants, regardless of the underlying organizational principles. Assuming that EU institutions, in general, and Commission expert committees and Council working parties, in particular, are supranational institutions, intensive exposure to these bodies are likely to result in the enactment of supranational role and identity perceptions amongst the participants. Hence, dynamics of re-socialization at the EU level are assumed to be activated by prolonged exposure to supranational institutions.

Similar to our analyses in Chapter 5, the analyses conducted beneath apply several different operational measures of the underlying theoretical dimension. In the following analyses the dependent variables shift between tables. This is due to the fact that only those empirical proxies, amongst several potential, that correlate significantly with the independent variables
are presented. This procedure reduces the size of the tables and helps to focus our attention only on the most revealing observations.

Table 6.8 shows how the length of attendance on EU committees is conducive to supranational allegiances.

**Table 6.8 Correlations between length of participation on EU committees and the enactment of supranational roles (Pearson’s r).**\(^{a,b}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘supranational agent’ role:</th>
<th>( \text{domestic officials} )</th>
<th>( \text{permanent} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“An ‘esprit de corps’ emerges over time in the EU committee”</td>
<td>( EC )</td>
<td>( WP )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) \( p \leq .05 \) \hspace{1cm} **) \( p \leq .01 \)

\( a \) This table compares officials who entered EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded 2) and officials who have participated since before 1994 (coded 1).

\( b \) The dependent variable in this table has its original values: agreeing very much (1), agreeing fairly much (2), both/and (3), agreeing fairly little (4), agreeing very little (5).

As seen in the above table, WP participants who have participated for relatively long periods of time tend to experience the emergence of an ‘esprit de corps’ in the committee to a lesser extent than officials than are new-comers to these committees. This rather contra-intuitive observation can be explained by the fact that the WPs’ geographical principle of organization weakens tendencies for the development of a ‘club-feeling’ amongst the delegates. The notions of national conflicts and compromises tend to overshadow tendencies to transcend this organizational logic within the WPs.

However, table 6.8 will not be given any thorough examination here. There are one fundamental rationale for this. The OLS regression analysis presented in table 6.11 (cf. below) reveals that the bivariate correlation presented in table 6.8 is not significant. Table 6.11 shows that the number of informal EU committee meetings conducted during the last year is a more adequate explanation of processes of re-socialization to supranational identifications than the length of participants’ attendance at these EU committees. The
intensity variable indicates the level of more recent involvement and interaction with fellow committee participants. The ‘length of participation’ within EU committees (table 6.8) only measures at what time the officials made their first appearance in the EU committees, not how intensively these officials have interacted within these committees ever since.

Table 6.9 reveals how the number of committees attended by national civil servants and permanent representatives affects the enactment of supranational allegiances.

Table 6.9 Correlations between the number of committees attended and the enactment of supranational roles (Pearson’s r).\textsuperscript{a, b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘supranational agent’ role:</th>
<th>domestic officials</th>
<th>permanent representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling allegiance towards the European Union</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean N.......................................................</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\*p \leq .05 \quad \*\*p \leq .01

\textit{a) This table compares officials who have participated on a maximum of 2 committees (coded 2) and officials who have participated on more than 2 EU committees (coded 1).}

\textit{b) The dependent variable in this table has its original values: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly little extent (4), to a very little extent (5).}

In conjunction with the re-socialization thesis outlined in Chapter 2, EC participants who attend many committees tend to feel allegiance towards the EU as a whole more strongly than EC participants attending fewer committees. Supporting the hypothesis on the re-socializing power of EU committees, one Norwegian agency official attending ECs reports that,

"it is important to participate on several meetings in order to learn the history of the group" (author’s translation).

Finally, table 6.10 shows how the ‘supranational agent’ role evoked by EU committee participants reflects the number of informal meetings with fellow committee participants outside the committee rooms.\textsuperscript{7}
Table 6.10 Correlations between the number of informal meetings attended and the enactment of supranational roles (Pearson’s r).\textsuperscript{a,b}

| The ‘supranational agent’ role: | \textit{domestic officials} & \textit{permanent representatives} |
|------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Feeling allegiance towards the EU committees attended | \begin{tabular}{lcc}
EC & WP & \\
.11 & -.05 & \\
.52* & .39*
\end{tabular} | \begin{tabular}{lcc}
EC & WP & \\
.23** & .43** & \\
.29 & .35*
\end{tabular} |
| “An ‘esprit de corps’ emerges over time in the committee” | \begin{tabular}{lcc}
.23** & .43** & \\
.29 & .35*
\end{tabular} | \begin{tabular}{lcc}
.23** & .43** & \\
.29 & .35*
\end{tabular} |
| Mean N | 114 & 44 & 22 & 36 |

\textsuperscript{a}) This table compares officials who have informal meetings with other committee participants \textit{to a fairly great extent, or to a very great extent} (coded 1) and officials who have fewer informal meetings with fellow committee participants (coded 2). This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5).

\textsuperscript{b}) The dependent variables in this table have their original values: variable 1: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5); variable 2: agreeing very much (1), agreeing fairly much (2), both/and (3), agreeing fairly little (4), agreeing very little (5).

Table 6.10 provides evidence of a re-socializing dynamic. Officials who have a great deal of informal contacts with fellow EU committee participants tend to evoke supranational allegiances more strongly than officials with fewer informal contacts at the EU level. Permanent representatives who have a great deal of informal contact with other committee participants tend to feel stronger allegiance towards those committees that they attend than permanent representatives who have fewer informal contacts (\(r = .52^*\) amongst the EC participants and \(r = .39^*\) amongst the WP participants). Hence, “\textit{a feeling of participation in the EU - as an organization - develops}” (Source: Swedish agency official – author’s translation). Similarly, officials having frequent informal contacts with other committee participants tend to report that an ‘esprit de corps’ emerges in the committees more strongly than amongst officials having fewer informal contacts (\(r = .23^{**}\) and \( .43^{**}\) amongst ‘domestic’ officials attending ECs and WPs, respectively. \(r = .35^*\) amongst permanent representatives attending WPs). This observation might reflect the fact that most Commission expert committees and Council working parties convene between 20 and 40 officials and that the same officials meet each other fairly regularly (cf. Chapter 4). Consequently, the potential
for intimacy and for friendship to develop is driven by the size of these committees. This intimacy provides for an *esprit de corps* to emerge amongst the participants, especially if they interact fairly intensively (cf. Lewis 2000). Finally, ‘domestic’ government officials having frequent informal interaction with other WP colleagues tend to view the EU Commission as being mainly independent of particular national interests (this figure is not presented in table 6.10). The above observations are significant irrespective of the EU committees attended and whether they are permanent representatives or ‘domestic’ officials. These correlations seem to be robust since they receive empirical support under different institutional conditions. Moreover, the above observations are also supported empirically in the interviews amongst ‘national’ civil servants:

“We talk together at the pub in the evenings. Then we get good contact. The same individuals arrive at several meetings. We call each other and send e-mails to each other. An *esprit de corps* emerges in the group” (Source: Norwegian agency official – author’s translation). “We have regular e-mail contacts. An enormous feeling of collegiality emerges amongst the Nordic colleagues. A strong sense of allegiance develops in the groups when you have participated for 5 years. It becomes your baby. It becomes so collegial” (Source: Norwegian agency official – author’s translation). “The dinners in the evenings are important arenas for talk. We spend a lot of time together” (Source: Norwegian agency official – author’s translation). The same official reports that, “I travel from Norway as an ‘ambassador’ for Norway, only to return as a representative for the EU Commission. I often feel stronger allegiance to my Swedish colleague than to my Norwegian colleagues” (author’s translation). “We have frequent contacts between the meetings, rather informal personal contacts. This result in a certain allegiance to the committee and to the individuals who attend” (Source: Swedish agency official – author’s translation).

The enactment of the ‘supranational agent’ role thus reflects the intensity of informal interaction amongst the committee participants. As indicated above, one obvious factor behind these correlations is the size of the committees. The limited number of officials attending EU committees accompanies intensive personal connections and even friendships. “The size of the groups has impact. One learns to know the other participants in small groups” (Source: Swedish ministry official – author’s translation).
To summarize the main observations in this sub-section, the intensity of participation by national civil servants on EU committees has an independent casual impact on the propensity to which the participants enact supranational roles. As such, a positive relationship is demonstrated between the intensity of participation and the enactment of supranational allegiances. Additionally, having a great number of informal contacts with fellow committee participants tends to accompany the enactment of supranational role and identity perceptions. Combining this conclusion with insights gained in previous sections of this Chapter, intergovernmental dynamics are transcended more fully by officials attending ECs and by officials who generally attend these committees intensively.

The socializing power of EU committees partially re-socializes the participants to developing a supranational sense of identification. Yet, how can we be certain that supranational loyalties stem from socialization dynamics and not out of self-selection of civil servants with pre-established supranational loyalties? Our data reveal that the majority of the sampled EU committee participants are selected by others to attend EU committees (cf. table 4.19a and 4.19b). Only a minority of committee participants has been subject to self-selection. However, one could assume that officials with pre-established supranational loyalties are over-represented in the national civil service at large. However, studying officials employed within administrative institutions that have few specialised EU units, it is likely that recruitment are based on merit rather than on particular institutional allegiances (cf. Chapter 4). Therefore, supranational allegiances can hardly be seen to reflect processes of self-selection to the EU committees. Rather, supranational role perceptions are likely to reflect the intensity to which national civil servants attend EU committees (cf. tables 6.11 and 6.12 below).

Moreover, one explanation could be that the enactment of ‘supranational agent’ roles partially reflects re-socialization processes at the EU level and partially reflects the lack of clear and mandatory instructions from the national political-administrative leadership (cf. Chapter 5). However, national co-ordination is mostly concentrated on governing the actual decision-making behaviour of the EU committee participants (Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000; Metcalfe 1994). For instance, Norwegian officials who attend Commission expert committees are intended to draw up instructions considering the following aspects: background and status on the particular dossier, existing national regulations, Norwegian interests on the subject
matter, the present bargaining situation and finally, administrative, economic, budgetary and juridical consequences (The Prime Minister’s Office 1997). Beyond this, national instructions have seldom the intention of entrusting the participants with particular loyalties, identities or allegiances.

* * *

Moreover, since we are left with some statistically significant bivariate relationships amongst some independent and dependent variables, multivariate OLS regression analyses are warranted in an effort at unveiling spuriousness. Before deciding on which independent variables and which dependent variables to include into a multiple OLS regression analysis, however, the level of multicollinearity between the independent variables has to be decided. Diagnostics of collinearity between the independent variables analysed below unveil no indications of multicollinearity. Thus, the independent variables seem to have independent causal impact on the dependent variables. This analysis, however, concentrates on the data from the ‘domestic officials’. No regression analysis has been conducted on the data from the ‘Permanent representation’ data due to low N (cf. the above tables). W analyse the relative explanatory power of (i) the length to which national officials participate on EU committees, and (ii) the number of informal meetings conducted outside the formal committee meetings. Hence, the multiple OLS regression analyses conducted below relate solely to the national-supranational role dimension. The regression analyses are presented in the following endnote:  

Tables 6.11 and 6.12 in endnote 8 indicate that the intensity to which national civil servants participate on EU committees affects their enactment of supranational role and identity perceptions. Officials with a great deal of informal contacts with fellow committee participants tend to assert that an ‘esprit de corps’ emerges in the committees and view Commission officials as independent of particular national interests. Conversely, the length of participation on EU committees is shown to have no independent explanatory power as far as the representational roles are concerned.
Conclusion

An inherent conflict between that of being a ‘government representative’ and that of an ‘independent expert’ is built into the role as a civil servant. When Norway joined the EEA agreement in 1994 and when Sweden joined the EU in 1995, following Denmark as a full-fledged EU member, a second conflict dimension became vital for the role and identity perceptions of the civil servants – a national-supranational dimension. Intergovernmental perspectives and neo-functional accounts on European integration have long emphasised a more uni-dimensional conception of representative quality, emphasising an imperative model of representation and a liberal model of representation, respectively. However, a cognitive organization theory perspective is introduced in this study in order to account for the representative ambiguity that results from the multiple institutional affiliations, obligations and allegiances embedding national civil servants attending EU committees.

Empirically, the current Chapter shows that the sectoral-territorial role dimension predominates amongst national civil servants attending EU committees. Most national government officials evoke a ‘government representative’ role and an ‘independent expert’ role when attending EU committees, but they tend to pay most attention to the former role perception. Moreover, some statistical variation is revealed in the data: officials attending Council working parties tend to enact the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than those attending Commission expert committees. This variation, however, is only marginal. When the respondents were asked to assess the roles of their fellow committee colleagues, a significant difference is observed between respondents attending ECs and those attending WPs.

The current Chapter has revealed that various primary institutional affiliations account more adequately for the sectoral-territorial role dimension than does the EC-WP distinction. As such, top rank ministry personnel tend to enact the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than the ‘independent expert’ role. An inverse empirical pattern is demonstrated amongst middle or lower rank agency personnel. As such, the above analysis highlights the pivotal role played by domestic government institutions with respect to the representational roles of national civil servants. Moreover, different institutional affiliations nationally tend to accompany different role and identity perceptions amongst the officials.
The ‘supranational agent’ role is evoked less strongly than the ‘government representative’ and the ‘independent expert’ roles. The national-supranational role dimension is thus evoked less extensively than the sectoral-territorial role dimension. Still, permanent representatives tend to evoke the ‘supranational agent’ role more strongly than ‘domestic’ officials. This difference is shown to reflect the intensity to which permanent representatives participate on EU committees.

Mirroring the mixed set of roles and identifications evoked by these officials, the current Chapter underscores the ambiguity that underpin the representational roles enacted by domestic government officials attending EU committees. These officials have several institutional affiliations and different cues for action and role enactment. The classical conflict in public administrations between political loyalty and professional autonomy is reflected in this study, albeit adding a new supranational dimension to it. The representative quality is shown not to be a fixed property, as asserted by the concept of imperative and liberal representation, but rather is a dynamic and flexible feature. The representative quality of committee participants at the EU level is ambiguous, which reflects the multiple institutional affiliations embedding them.
Notes

1 The conceptual frames applied in this Chapter build largely from Trondal and Veggeland (2000). An earlier version of this Chapter was presented at a research seminar at ARENA April 4, 2000. The author would like to thank all the participants who attended this seminar for stimulating comments. The author is also indebted to Jeff T. Checkel, Morten Egeberg, Johan P. Olsen and Frode Veggeland for valuable comments on an older version of this Chapter. The title of this chapter is inspired by Albert O. Hirschman’s seminal work ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States’ (1970). Whereas loyalty represents an intervening variable in Hirschman’s analysis, this variable is a dependent variable in the current Chapter.

2 At least four concepts of representative quality may be identified in the literature. First, representation as “acting for” (Pitkin 1972: 112). This notion of representation claims that “true representation entails responsiveness to the represented, attention to his wishes or needs” (Pitkin 1972: 113). Representation entails acting in accordance with the wishes and interests of those they represent. Second, demographic representation “depends on the representative’s characteristics, or what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing something” (Pitkin 1972: 61 - original emphasis). Third, formalistic representation “defines representation in terms of a transaction [i.e. election] that takes place at the outset, before the actual representing begins” (Pitkin 1972: 39). Fourth, symbolic representation means representation “by what he is or how he is regarded” (Pitkin 1972: 113). The loyalties and identities enacted by the representatives determine whom they represent (cf. Birch 1971: 15; Olsen 1988: 157-158).

3 When actors try to cope with role and identity conflicts, existing roles and identities may be “strengthened, combined with other identities and roles, modified or dropped” (Christensen and Røvik 1999: 168). Complementary strategies for coping with role conflicts are (i) to live with them and to cultivate the differences (Jacobsen 1960; Smith 1992); (ii) to de-couple conflicting roles or role elements (DiMaggio and Powell 1991); (iii) to attach sequential attention towards contending role and identity perceptions (Simon 1957); and finally (iv) institutional compartmentalization between different roles and identities (March and Olsen 1989 and 1995; Stryker and Statham 1985: 337). “[W]ork on role conflict generally takes for granted that conflicting expectations must somewhat be resolved” (Stryker and Statham 1985: 337). As seen above, however, this need not be the case. Coping with role conflicts is not synonymous with resolving those conflicts.

4 This model is ideal typical. The role perceptions presented are to be seen as mutually exclusive, analytically speaking.

5 In the Scandinavian countries agencies are formally separated from cabinet level departments. Thus, agencies are organized at a lower hierarchical level and agency personnel are expected to evoke more intra-sectoral role perceptions and identifications than personnel at the ministry level.
This question can also be interpreted as a factual question. In the current study, however, civil servants’ perceptions of Commission officials’ independence of particular national interests are seen as reflecting supranational allegiances.

The effects stemming from the number of formal meetings within EU committees did not turn out to correlate significantly with any of the dependent variables studied here. Therefore, this variable is excluded from the analysis.

Multiple regression analyses:

Table 6.11 Factors related to the following assertion: “An ‘esprit de corps’ emerges over time in EU committees”: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).\(^{a,b}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of participation(^c)</td>
<td>-.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of informal meetings attended</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N……………………………………………………… 57

*) p ≤ .05  **) p ≤ .01

Adjusted R\(^2\) = .30 (R\(^2\) = .34)

\(\text{a)}\) The dependent variable has the following values: agreeing very much (1), agreeing fairly much (2), both/and (3), agreeing fairly little (4), agreeing very little (5)

\(\text{b)}\) Due to low N in this table, we use the adjusted R\(^2\) in order to correct for possible skewness in the data.

\(\text{c)}\) Independent variable 1: entered EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded 2), having participated since before 1994 (coded 1). Independent variable 2: having informal meetings with fellow committee participants fairly often, or more (coded 1), having fewer informal meetings (coded 2).

Table 6.12 Factors relating to civil servants’ perception of Commission officials’ independence of particular national interests: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of participation(^b)</td>
<td>-.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of informal meetings attended</td>
<td>.32*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean N……………………………………………………… 56

*) p ≤ .05  **) p ≤ .01

Adjusted R\(^2\) = .07 (R\(^2\) = .10)

\(\text{a)}\) The dependent variable has the following values: very independent (1), fairly independent (2), mixed roles (3), fairly dependent (4), very dependent (5).

\(\text{b)}\) Value labels: cf. table 6.11.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE INTEGRATION RECONSIDERED

Introduction

Building on theoretical arguments and the empirical observations provided in this study, the current Chapter draws these to some firm and some tentative conclusions. The following points are recapitulated in the current Chapter. The first section summarizes the major empirical observations. These include the degree of cross-level participation conducted by national civil servants towards EU committees (Chapter 4), the co-ordination behaviour evoked by EU committee participants (Chapter 5), and finally the role and identity perceptions enacted by these participants (Chapter 6). The next section compares these empirical observations with pervious empirical findings and more recent scholarly contributions. The third section assesses the theoretical approach to administrative integration outlined in Chapter 2. The fourth section evaluates the data and the methodology used to throw light on the theoretical propositions. The final section suggests prospects for future research on administrative integration in particular and European integration more generally. What guidelines can the current study provide for future research on processes of European integration, on administrative integration, and on dynamics of Europeanization of domestic institutions and policy processes?
Summary of the empirical observations

On cross-level participation.

As seen in Chapter 4, the typical EC participant is employed at the agency level as well as at the ministry level and occupies a middle or lower rank position. Moreover, the EC participants studied here are mostly educated in technical disciplines, like physics, engineering, etc. WP participants, on the other hand, are mostly employed at the permanent representations to the EU are placed in different sectoral realms of this institution, have middle or lower rank positions and are educated in law. However, a large proportion of the WP participants is also recruited from national ministries and agencies.

Second, Chapter 4 revealed differences between officials at the ‘home administration’ and officials at the permanent representations. Committee participants from the ‘home administrations’ are mostly employed in medium or lower rank positions at the agency level, and are trained in technical disciplines. Furthermore, these officials are middle-aged and have served in the domestic government apparatus for relatively long periods of time. Officials at the permanent representations, on the other hand, are mostly employed in medium or lower rank positions in sectoral realms, and are trained in law. These officials are also middle-aged, albeit being somewhat younger than their colleagues in the capitals. They have served for shorter periods of time in current position and in current institution than have their fellow colleagues in the ‘domestic administration’, although they have served for relatively longer periods of time in the national bureaucracy before entering the permanent representations. Most of them also return to the domestic government apparatus after finishing their stay in Brussels. Moreover, permanent representatives generally participate more intensively on EU committees than their national colleagues.

The most significant difference observed between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials relates to which type of EU committees they attend. While Danish and Swedish government officials are allowed to participate on both ECs and WPs, their Norwegian counterparts have access only to the ECs. This difference has also led to major differences between officials at the permanent representations of Norway and officials at the permanent representations of Denmark and Sweden in terms of cross-level participation. Norwegian permanent representatives seldom attend EU committees: Their Swedish and Danish counterparts are more heavily engaged in the day-to-day work of both ECs and WPs. As seen from the
‘domestic administrations’ point of view, however, only marginal differences are observed between the three Scandinavian countries as regards the number of ECs attended. Most of the Norwegian officials studied here attend ECs to approximately the same extent as their Danish and Swedish colleagues. Still, Danish and Swedish officials have additional access to the WPs and Danish officials have, on average, participated on EU committees for longer periods of time than have their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts. Additionally, Danish and Swedish EU committee participants tend to have more intensive informal contacts outside the formal committee meetings than their Norwegian counterparts. The Norwegian participants talk less during EU committee meetings compared to their Danish and Swedish colleagues.

To conclude the observations on cross-level participation, the major differences between Norwegian, Swedish and Danish civil servants relate to the types of EU committees they attend. Moreover, Danish and Swedish permanent representatives participate more intensively on EU committees than the Norwegian permanent representatives. The Danish, Norwegian and Swedish EU committee participants have fairly similar national institutional affiliations. Assuming that administrative integration ultimately reflects the primary institutional affiliations embedding these officials, only marginal differences are expected between the Scandinavian officials as to the degree of administrative integration across levels of governance.

**On co-ordination behaviour.**

Chapter 2 has emphasised that the primary institutional affiliations embedding individual decision-makers provide vital cues for affecting their decision behaviour. However, Chapter 5 also identifies conditions under which secondary institutional affiliations with Commission expert committees and Council working parties may affect the co-ordination behaviour enacted by national government officials. Under conditions of intensive and protracted cross-level participation, domestic co-ordination processes may reflect the EU committee affiliations embedding national civil servants. Moreover, I have argued that different organizational principles – domestically as well as within various EU committees – are likely to affect modes of co-ordination in particular ways.

The empirical analysis of Chapter 5 supports these arguments to a considerable degree. As far as the principles of organization are concerned, inter-sectoral modes of policy co-ordination tend to be evoked more strongly amongst officials participating on Council working parties
than amongst officials attending Commission expert committees. Moreover, as regards techniques applied for co-ordination, written instructions are reported more frequently amongst WP participants than amongst EC participants. Amongst the latter, anticipated reaction and unwritten ‘positions’ are more common. Moreover, the effects stemming from the different organizational principles underpinning ECs and WPs are strengthened subsequent to officials attending these committees with a high level of intensity. Hence, officials attending ECs extensively tend to co-ordinate their positions less strongly than officials with intensive participating on WPs. Assuming that a general lack of policy co-ordination within national central administrations generates administrative integration, integration is fostered most extensively amongst officials who intensively attend Commission expert committees. Hence, intergovernmentalism is transcended more fully amongst EC participants than amongst WP participants, especially if the participants attend many committees and if they attend a great deal of formal and informal committee meetings. Some empirical observations presented in Chapter 5 indicate that the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees has an independent causal impact on the co-ordination behaviour pursued by the actors. The multiple OLS regression analyses show that the intensity dimension has a stronger explanatory power than the length dimension.

Notwithstanding these observations, this study also indicates the pivotal role played by domestic institutions in affecting the co-ordination behaviour of national civil servants. When controlling for their different EU committee affiliations, the current study shows that the domestic institutional affiliations embedding the EU committee participants have independent causal impact on their co-ordination behaviour. Moreover, the multiple OLS regression analyses indicate that the relative explanatory value of the intensity and length to which national officials participate on EU committees is generally lower than the causal weight of domestic institutional affiliations. Thus, despite providing clear indications of the re-socializing potential of EU committees (cf. Chapter 6), the current study also shows how the ministry versus agency distinction accounts for the co-ordination behaviour of EU committee participants.

Therefore, administrative integration, as measured by the co-ordination behaviour evoked by national civil servants attending EU committees, seems strongly affected (i) by the organizational principles underpinning EU committees and the domestic government institutions and (ii) by the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees.
Comparing Norwegian, Swedish and Danish civil servants, the former solely attends Commission expert committees organized according to a sectoral principle. Moreover, Norwegian officials participate fairly intensively on these committees, as measured by the number of committees and meetings attended. Hence, administrative integration is shown to be fairly strong amongst Norwegian government officials. This is due to the weaker level of cross-sectoral co-ordination behaviour evoked by the Norwegian EC participants. The EEA agreement may provide for strong administrative integration across levels of governance. Danish and Swedish officials, in contrast, have dual institutional affiliations to both ECs and WPs. Moreover, Danish and Swedish government officials generally attend EU committees more intensively than do their Norwegian colleagues. (cf. Chapter 4). Officials at the Danish and Swedish permanent representations interact intensively towards the WPs (cf. Chapter 4). Chapter 5 demonstrates that the length and intensity to which national officials attend various EU committees have a significant and sometimes independent effect on their co-ordination behaviour. For example, permanent representatives who attend many formal meetings within Council working parties tend to “choose the ‘positions’ to follow” (cf. table 5.13). The effects likely to stem from the territorial principle of organization are partially circumvented by the effect of the intensity of participation on the WPs. Also, the sheer intensity to which civil servants attend EU committees is shown to have a stronger independent causal impact on their co-ordination behaviour than the length of attendance.

Having demonstrated that intensity of participation on EU committees has an independent causal impact on modes of policy co-ordination, administrative integration is strongly fostered amongst Danish and Swedish officials attending EU committees. However, administrative integration is less strong amongst those Danish and Swedish civil servants that attend WPs fairly intensively. Finally, the current analysis also reveals that various domestic institutional affiliations have significant and independent impact upon domestic co-ordination behaviour. Hence, administrative integration, measured by co-ordination behaviour is affected differently by the various institutions embedding them.

**On representational roles.**

Chapter 6 shows that the sectoral-territorial role dimension predominates amongst national civil servants attending EU committees. Most national government officials evoke a ‘government representative’ role and an ‘independent expert’ role when attending EU committees However, they pay most attention to the ‘government representative’ role.
Moreover, officials attending WPs tend to enact the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than do the EC participants. This difference, however, is only marginal. However, when the respondents were asked to assess the roles of their fellow committee colleagues, a significant difference is observed between respondents attending ECs and those participating on WPs.

Additionally, this study has revealed that various primary institutional affiliations more adequately accounts for the sectoral-territorial role dimension than does the EC-WP distinction. As such, ministry personnel in top rank positions tend to enact the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than the ‘independent expert’ role. Hence, Chapter 6 highlights the pivotal role played by domestic government institutions in affecting the representational roles of national civil servants. Moreover, different national institutional affiliations tend to accompany different role and identity perceptions amongst the officials.

Chapter 6 also reveals that national civil servants attending EU committees tend to enact the ‘supranational agent’ role less strongly than both the ‘government representative’ role and the ‘independent expert’ role. The national-supranational role dimension is evoked less extensively than the sectoral-territorial role dimension. Permanent representatives tend to evoke the ‘supranational agent’ role more strongly than do ‘domestic’ officials. This difference reflects the relatively high participation intensity on EU committees amongst the permanent representatives.

Mirroring the mixed set of roles and identifications evoked by these officials, this study shows the ambiguity that underpins the representational roles enacted by domestic government officials attending EU committees. These officials have several institutional affiliations and different cues for action and role enactment. The classical conflict in public administrations between political loyalty and professional autonomy is thus reflected, although adding a new supranational dimension to it. The representative quality is not a fixed property, as asserted by the notion of imperative and liberal representation, but rather a dynamic and flexible feature.
**Administrative integration reconsidered.**

Studying administrative integration through empirical proxies shows that “membership in the European Union is not necessarily the most appropriate dividing line” (Usher 1998: 184). As the EU becomes increasingly differentiated, allowing for various levels of ‘enhanced cooperation’ and different forms of affiliation, the membership versus non-membership dichotomy becomes a less adequate explanation of administrative integration (cf. European Voice 2000, No. 13). This study reveals that national government officials attending Commission expert committees evoke approximately the same set of representative roles and co-ordination behaviour. Moreover, civil servants attending Council working parties tend to evoke fairly similar role perceptions and modes of co-ordinating their positions. Hence, similar institutional affiliations towards EU level institutions are a more significant explanatory variable than the membership versus non-membership dichotomy. We will return to this puzzle in the third section of this Chapter. Hence, representative quality and behavioural patterns are not fixed properties, as asserted by neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist accounts, but rather a dynamic and flexible feature as asserted by the cognitive approach (Beyers 1998a; Checkel 1999; Kerremans 1996; Lewis 2000; Trondal 2001).

We have observed the development of new supranational loyalties that may undermine the trust between the political leadership and civil servants. The formative and transformative effect of EU committees as regards the loyalties of national officials represents a delegation problem. Of course, the representatives must have some professional autonomy in order to make use of their special expertise and to learn from colleagues in the committees. Nevertheless, shifts of loyalties represent a challenge to the ability of national governments to assure that national representatives attending EU committees act in accordance with the interests of their government. However, the salience of this challenge is partially conditioned by the various national institutional affiliations that embed EU committee participants. As seen from the current study, administrative integration across levels of governance reflects the dual institutional affiliations that embed civil servants at both the EU level and the national level.
The empirical observations compared
In the following section the empirical observations summarised in the previous section are compared with empirical observations made from past and more recent scholarly contributions. The major body of literature on EU committees is of recent origin, reflecting the lack of systematic scholarly attention to this phenomenon in the past (Haibach 2000a: 38). Most of the literature surveyed in this section deals with the relationships between EU committees and the Scandinavian countries. However, comparisons outside Scandinavia are also provided.

On cross-level participation.
Within Norwegian ministries and agencies the proportion of officials involved in EU related dossiers has increased considerably in the 1990s (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a). From being an exclusive group of “Eurocrats” under the EEA negotiations (Christensen 1996; Kux and Sverdrup 1997), almost 50 per cent of the officials are currently engaged in EU related work in some way or another (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Trondal 1999a: 54-57). Similarly, the proportion of Swedish officials engaged in EU related work has increased significantly in the 1990s (Larsen et al. 1999: 57; Lægreid 2000; Olsson 1993: 340; SOU 1996:6: 33; Statskontoret 1996:7; Sundström 1999). Similarly, every government official in the Swedish central administration is increasingly affected by EU dossiers on a daily basis (Statskontoret 2000:20: 45). No corresponding upsurge in the volume of EU related work has been documented in the Danish central administration in the 1990s. The increased workload in the Swedish bureaucracy it not paralleled in the Norwegian central administration (Jacobsson and Sundström 1999b: 17).

almost no relations with national political elites” (Beyers 2000: 9). Hence, “[t]he interlocking of the European and the national is accompanied by a sharp disjuncture between policy making and politics” (Laffan 1997: 24). Hence, national politicians seem non-privileged in the cross-level networks in Europe in that they mostly react to the moves of national civil servants. Our study shows that officials attending Council working parties have far better contacts with the national political-administrative leadership than those participating on Commission expert committees.

Moreover, paralleling the observations made in Chapter 4, the number of external contacts with EU committees increases as one moves downwards the formal hierarchy within governmental institutions. Trondal (1998: 286) shows that this tendency is significant at the ministry level as well as at the agency level within the Norwegian government apparatus (cf. Bulmer and Burch 1999: 21 and 29). Similarly, Falkner et al. (1999: 502) show that Austrian officials in medium rank positions attend EU committees more frequently than officials in top rank positions. These observations may partly reflect the fact that officials from small European states attend EU committees more extensively than officials from larger European countries (Schaefer et al. 2000: 8). Schaefer et al. (2000) show that this observations is valid for officials attending Commission expert committees, Council working parties and comitology committees. Parallel to our observations, EC participants tend to be employed in positions earmarked for particular professional groups (Statskonsult 1999: 6: 28).

One of the most significant difference between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials relate to which class of EU committees they attend. While Danish and Swedish government officials are allowed to participate on ECs and WPs, their Norwegian counterparts have solely access to the ECs. However, some Norwegian officials attend ECs to the approximately same extent as their Danish and Swedish colleagues. This last observation goes largely counter to past research indicating that Norwegian government officials generally have to take initiatives themselves in order to get access to meetings within the Commission expert committees (Trondal 1999a: 56). The current study shows that Norwegian officials have almost equal access to the Commission expert committees as their Danish and Swedish counterparts. However, the Norwegian officials studied here have considerably fewer face-to-face contacts outside formal committee meetings than their Swedish and Danish counterparts. The Norwegian officials also make fewer oral statements during EC meetings than the Danish and Swedish officials. These observations are supported empirically by Larsen et al. (1999: 72).
Lægreid (2000: 12) observes that “Norway is the only country where formal meetings [within the Commission] are more frequent than informal meetings”. Similarly, Middelthon (2000) shows that while the Swedish Occupational Safety and Health Administration strengthened the level of participation on Commission expert committees after Sweden became EU member in 1995, The Norwegian Directorate for Labour Inspection experienced hard times in this respect. Similarly, Jacobsson and Sundström (2000: 99) show that Norwegian ministries and agencies have fewer contacts with Commission expert committees than their Swedish counterparts. As such, Norwegian officials seem to attend Commission expert committees somewhat less intensively than their Danish and Swedish colleagues (Jacobsson and Sundström 1999b).

When comparing the observations from the scholarly literature with the empirical observations provided in Chapter 4, a reasonable degree of fit is discerned.

**On co-ordination behaviour.**

Parallel to the empirical observations summarised in the first section of this Chapter, research shows that domestic co-ordination processes are at least two-dimensional in character: intra- and inter-sectoral (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Harmsen 1999; Metcalfe 1994; Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Trondal 1998). Some scholars observe policy fragmentation, sectorization, bureaucratization and deparlamentarization of domestic EU policy processes (Burnham and Maor 1994; Cassese 1987; Dehousse 1997; Dimitrakopoulos 1995; Hopkins 1976; Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000; Siedentopf and Ziller 1998; Spence 1995), others report cross-sectoral co-ordination processes and political-administrative steering as the central mode characterising EU policy making at the domestic level of governance (Bulmer and Burch 1998; Hocking 1999; Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Walzenback 1999). Comparing the three Scandinavian countries, intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination are observed in the Norwegian central administration after Norway joined the EEA agreement in 1994, with a subsequent impairment of the co-ordination role of the MFA on EU related dossiers (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a and 1999; Lægreid 2000; Trondal 1996, 1998; 1999a and 1999d; Trondal and Veggeland 1999). The weak co-ordination role of the Norwegian MFA has “contribute[d] to a segmented state becoming increasingly segmented…” (Sverdrup 2000: 76). Within the Danish and Swedish central administrations, on the other hand, co-ordination processes after EU membership have tended to oscillate between intra- and inter-sectoral modes (Beckman and Johansson 1999; Dosenrode 1993;
Ekengren and Sundelius 1998; Grønnegård Christensen et al. 1994; Jacobsson 1999; Nedergaard 1994; Pederson 2000; SOU 1996:6; Statskontoret 1996:7; Trondal 1996). Moreover, the co-ordinating role of the MFA seems somewhat greater in Denmark and Sweden – and also in Finland – than in Norway (Lægreid 2000; Raunio and Wiberg 1999; Ruin 1999; Sidenius 1997). Recently, the co-ordination role of the Prime Minister’s Office has increased to the disadvantage of the MFA, in Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Dosenrode 2000: 390; Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000; Sverdrup 2000).

Parallel to our observations, Larsen et al. (1999: 151) and Lægreid (1999: 25) find that within the Norwegian central administration intra-sectoral policy co-ordination is more widespread than inter-sectoral co-ordination, due to Norwegian government officials being affiliated solely to the Commission ECs. As mentioned above, inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination are reported to be more widespread in the Danish and the Swedish central administrative services (Lægreid 1999; Nedergaard 1994; SOU 1996:6; Statskontoret 1996:7 and 2000:20). For example, Olsen (1996: 105) observes that the Danish Department of Labour has daily contacts with the MFA on EU related dossiers. Similarly, Jacobsson and Sundström (2000: 98) show that the majority of the EU related issues within the Swedish central administrations are co-ordinated. Contrary to this observation, Larsen et al. (1999: 22) and Trondal (1996, 1998 and 1999a) observe that the EEA agreement, and participation on ECs, tend to accompany increased intra-sectoral co-ordination behaviour amongst Norwegian civil servants. Similarly, Statskonsult (1999:6: 44) observes that most of the Norwegian EC participants receive few instructions from the political-administrative leadership. Larsen et al. (1999: 52) reveal a declining co-ordinating role of the Norwegian MFA on EU related issues. This may partly reflect weak links existing between the Norwegian MFA and various Commission expert committees (Larsen et al. 1999: 67; Trondal 1996, 1998 and 1999a; Trondal and Veggeland 1999). Still, Pedersen (2000: 223) observes that Danish government officials attending Commission expert committees mostly work only under instructions from their home sector ministry. Thus, attendance on Commission ECs seems to accompany a weakened co-ordinating role of the MFA.

Some scholarly contributions underscore that Europeanization of domestic administrative systems reflects the membership versus non-membership distinction. Lægreid (1999: 20-21) observes that inter-sectoral contact patterns and co-ordination efforts are more widespread within the Danish and the Swedish government apparatus than within the Norwegian
bureaucracy, subsequent to their different forms of affiliation with the EU. Similarly, in contrast to Norwegian government officials, Swedish officials have fairly frequent contacts with the political leadership in their EU related work (Jacobsson 2000: 20; Sundström 1999: 39). Tendencies towards increased ministerial control and supervision vis-à-vis the agency level is also observed within the Swedish environment sector (Kronsell 1999: 205) as well as within the Swedish central government apparatus at large (Riksrevisionsverket 1996:50; Statskontoret 1996:7: 118). “[T]he EU-membership has contributed to increased regulation of the activity of the agencies” (Riksrevisjonsverket 1996:50: 349 – author’s translation; Statskontoret 2000:20 and 2000:20B). However, Statskontoret (2000:20B: 25) also observes that ministerial steering of the Swedish agencies is stronger towards the Council working parties than towards the Commission expert committees. Furthermore, increased inter-sectoral co-ordination between different ministries was also accompanied on January 1 1997 by a re-organising of the Swedish ministries into one single Authority (Regeringskansliet). The fall of 1998 also witnessed the merger of four separate ministries (the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Communication, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of interior) into one Ministry for Industry, Employment and Communications. Furthermore, the Swedish MFA has organized its departments according to a desk system. In sum, Swedish EU membership has accompanied increased co-ordination activities in the central administration, thus supporting the empirical observations of Chapter 5. Few similar trends are observed in the Norwegian central administration in the aftermath of the EEA affiliation in 1994.²

However, paralleling our observations that the individual institutional affiliations that embed civil servants are important explanatory variables for their co-ordination activities, Statskontoret (1996:7: 120) reports that a majority of the Swedish agencies do not get clear mandates from the ministries or the political leadership. Moreover, within the Danish and the Swedish government apparatus, co-ordination processes relating to EU issues increase as one move from the agency level to the ministry level (Jacobsson and Sundström 1999a: 12 and 2000: 98; Pedersen 2000: 228). Similarly, Swedish ministry officials assign more weight to the political leadership on EU related issues than do Swedish agency personnel (Sundström 1999: 47). Moreover, within the Norwegian government apparatus, contacts with the cabinet level on EU related issues decrease significantly as one moves from the ministry level to the agency level (Larsen et al. 1999: 118). Similarly, Larsen et al. (1999: 39-40) report that in the Norwegian central administration, frame notes used for the purpose of co-ordinating EU
dossiers are drawn up more frequently at the ministry level than at the agency level. Further, Larsen et al. (1999) and Statskonsult (1999:6: 38) observe that the sectorally organized ‘special committees’ in the Norwegian central administration have gained a pivotal role in coordinating EU/EEA related issues. Where 42 per cent of all ministry departments have participated on the cross-sectorally organized ‘Co-ordination board’ during the last year, 75 per cent have participated on the intra-sectorally organized ‘special committees’ (Larsen et al. 1999: 139-142). Similar to our observations in Chapter 5, this indicates that co-ordination processes towards the Commission expert committees are more intra- than inter-sectoral. Also, the Swedish central administration has witnessed an increased use of written instructions as co-ordination tool-kits from 1995 to 2000, supplemented by informal co-ordinating arrangements (Jacobsson 2000: 14; Statskontoret 2000:20). Consistent with our observations, Statskontoret (1996:7: 121 and 2000:20: 65) also shows that co-ordination through written instructions is most common amongst WP participants, whilst more informal and oral co-ordination techniques tend to accompany EC attendance.

A comparative study of the experiences of member state officials in EU committees largely supports the main conclusions of our study. Participants on Commission expert committees are more weakly co-ordinated than officials participating on Council working parties (Schaefer et al. 2000). Hence, the major empirical observations presented in Chapter 5 are supported within the existing literature.

Finally, Chapter 5 shows that officials attending ECs report their ‘positions’ to be based on professional expertise more extensively than do their colleagues participating on WPs. The same pattern is revealed within the area of food politics in Norway (Veggeland 2000) and in the transport sector within several other EU member states (Egeberg 1999b). Hence, observing that officials from different countries attending ECs tend to evoke fairly similar co-ordination behaviour, this study shows that committee affiliations may explain administrative integration more fully than the membership versus non-membership dichotomy. However, non-membership in the EU excludes WP participation. As such, the EU membership versus non-membership distinction determines the possibility of attending WPs. In this respect, EU membership “matters” as far as administrative integration is concerned. Still, this argument is modified by the fact that officials from both EU member-states and from EEA states have equal access to the Commission expert committees.
On representational roles.

Many scholars have asserted that participants on EU institutions are re-socialized as far as their role and identity perceptions are concerned (e.g. Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Hayes-Renschaw and Wallace 1997: 235; Joerges 1999: 320; Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 1999: 87; Scully 2001; Weiler 1999: 342; Wessels 1999: 266). However, few empirical observations are at present available that helps to confirm or reject this hypothesis. A frequent assertion in the literature is that an ‘esprit de corps’ emerges within EU committees (Laffan 1998 and 2000; Pag 1987; Wessels 1991), and this is especially the case if the participants interact fairly frequently and intensively (e.g. Eriksen 2000: 61; cf. Haas 1958; Lewis 1999a). Contrary to this, Wessels (1998: 227) argues that no loyalty transfers have taken place at the supranational level.

Provoked by such assertions, scholars have now begun investigating empirically Haas’ (1958) loyalty transfer hypothesis. Lewis (1999: 19) shows empirically that a “club-like” atmosphere or a “family-club” identity emerges amongst COREPER members. For example, Lewis (2000) shows how a ‘community method’ emerges around consensus norms within the COREPER. According to Lewis (2000), intensive interaction amongst the permanent representatives instils several community norms in the officials. These include diffuse reciprocity, thick trust, mutual responsiveness, consensus-reflexes and a culture of compromise (cf. Flynn 2000; Verdun 2000). On this basis, Lewis (1999: 17) argues that “COREPER is a mechanism where member-states endogenize new ways of articulating, defending, and representing their ‘self interests’”. Similarly, Hayes-Renschaw and Wallace (1997: 236) observe that intensive interaction amongst national officials within the ECOFIN “encourages the emergence of stable and predictable relationships among the participants, solidifies shared norms and intensifies interdependence among the participants”. Similarly, Shore (2000) observes that, even amongst new recruits, Commission officials are socialized into supranational allegiances. Furthermore, Shore (2000: 152) observes the enactment of an ‘esprit de corps’ and supranational allegiances amongst temporary national experts seconded to the Commission on fixed-term contracts. Finally, Shore (2000) observes that Commission officials experience ‘cognitive shifts’ that are fairly enduring and penetrative.

However, paralleling our observations that emerging supranational allegiances are indeed secondary to national identifications, Lewis (2000: 274) argues that “[d]etailed investigation of the EU permanent representatives has also shown the socialization to the Brussels political
game does not lead to the whole scale redefinition of national identities and interests. There is no evidence of a transfer of loyalties or the emergence of a ‘European’ identity, although there is an identifiable secondary allegiance among the permanent representatives to the collective arena” (cf. Daemen and van Schendelen 1998: 138). Similarly, Scully (2001) and Franklin and Scarrow (1999) find little evidence indicating that MEPs ‘go native’ and develop strong and lasting European loyalties. MEPs have their primary institutional affiliations in national parties. However, their institutional allegiances are seriously challenged by intensive and sustained participation with fellow MEPs.

Scholars have recently begun analysing how EU committees affect the identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour evoked by the committee participants. Jan Beyers and Guido Dierickx analyse how participation on Council working parties impacts the communication networks and attitudes of the participants (Beyers 1998a and 1998b; Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Dierickx and Beyers 1999). They basically show that communication networks within Council working parties are largely influenced by the nationality of the officials (Beyers and Dierickx 1997), but that intensive participation within these committees enhance processes whereby these communication networks are affected by their ‘European exposure’ (Dierickx and Beyers 1999). Moreover, Jan Beyers and Bart Kerremans (1996) demonstrate the centrality of the Foreign Ministry with respect to contact patterns within the Council working parties. Consistent with this pattern, participants on Council working parties also tend to ascribe the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a vital role in the domestic co-ordination of EU-related dossiers (Beyers and Kerremans 1996). Finally, Beyers (1998b) shows that the attitudes towards European integration amongst these participants reflect prior national socialization experiences (their primary institutional affiliations) and the period of entrance to the Union. These studies, thus, reveal the re-socializing role played by EU committees. These studies, however, also clarity the pivotal role of domestic government institutions in moulding the role perceptions and institutional allegiances of the participants.

Morten Egeberg (1999b) adds the Commission expert committees to this picture and also includes the Council working parties. Consistent with one of our main conclusions, he shows that officials who attend Commission expert committees evoke other role and identity perceptions than officials attending Council working parties. Officials attending Commission expert committees tend to evoke intra-sectoral identifications and roles more frequently than do officials participating on Council working parties. Moreover, officials attending both
Commission expert committees and Council working parties tend to evoke multiple sets of roles and identities. However, the enactment of supranational allegiances is shown to be only secondary and complementary to pre-established allegiances. Thus, consistent with the observations of Chapter 6 and parallel to observations made by researchers at the University of Leuven (Beyers, Dierickx and Kerremans), Egeberg underscores the pivotal role played by various domestic level primary institutional affiliations in affecting the enactment of representational roles. Schaefer et al. (2000) and Statskontorets (2000:20: 83) largely confirm these observations. Similarly, Veggeland (2000) shows how Norwegian government officials tend to evoke multiple role conceptions, both expert roles and national representative roles. Hence, he indicates that conflicting organizational principles are built into the EU committee system, accompanying conflicting role perceptions amongst the committee participants. Statskontorets (2000:20B) also highlights the role conflicts between professional considerations and political loyalty amongst national civil servants attending EU committees.

However, similar to our observations, contemporary literature has indicated that supranational allegiances and national identities need not conflict. Rather, supranational allegiances may be a supplement to pre-established identities and role perceptions, not a replacement. In the words of Castano (2000: 20), “the more people identify with their nation, the more they feel European”. This assertion is empirically supported by Herrmann and Brewer (2000: 12) and by Licata (2000). Similarly, Wallace (1999: 529) observes that “[o]utside experts … see themselves as players on both national and European stages …”. Hence, “[a]lmost all actors in the EU policy process have multiple identities, and many play multiple roles” (Wallace 2000: 529). National officials attending EU committees may thus evoke different role perceptions sequentially, conditional upon their different institutional affiliations at different points in time (cf. Sevôn 1996). Hence, different organization principles underpinning different EU committees may evoke different parts of complex selves.

Supporting these observations, Trondal and Veggeland (2000) show that national civil servants with similar institutional affiliations at the national level and at the EU level tend to evoke similar role perceptions. Trondal and Veggeland (2000) also show, similar to the observations made in Chapter 6, that officials who participate frequently with fellow committee participants tend to evoke supranational role perceptions. This study also highlights the fact that national civil servants attending Commission expert committees tend foremost to evoke a ‘government representative’ role. The second most important role

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perception unveiled in the Trondal and Veggeland study is the ‘independent expert’ role. The ‘supranational agent’ role is deemed less important. This study also emphasizes the primacy of national institutional affiliation in affecting the role and identity perceptions amongst the EU committee participants.

* * *

Inspired by Haas’ pioneering work on supra-nationalism and European integration, recent empirical studies have indicated how EU committees affect administrative integration across the EU – nation-state intersection. However, as with the observations presented in Chapter 6, the pivotal role of national government institutions is also underscored by contemporary scholarly contributions as one vital driving force of administrative integration. The current section has, foremost, provided empirical support to the main empirical observations on administrative integration made throughout this study. The next section reconsiders the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2.

The theoretical account reconsidered

“[I]t has been suggested that, as relatively autonomous and independent units become integrated into a larger unit of organized activity, the internal dynamics of the original group tend to change” (Brunsson and Olsen 1998: 31). The current study has revealed that cross-level participation in Europe partially blurs the borderlines between EU committees and the national government apparatus. To account for the enactment of supranational allegiances and the evocation of particular patterns of co-ordination behaviour, two theoretical arguments have been derived from a cognitive organization theory perspective. The first argument on organizational specialization accounts for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration. The second argument seeks to clarify the national-supranational spectrum of administrative integration.

In accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration, the first argument emphasises how particular models of horizontal specialization of government institutions accompanies particular co-ordination behaviour and institutional allegiances amongst the civil servants. Organizations that are specialized according to a sectoral principle activate co-ordination behaviour and role and identity perceptions that are largely sectoral in
character. Organizations that specialize according to a territorial principle, on the other hand, activate more cross-sectoral patterns of co-ordination as well as more encompassing institutional allegiances.

The empirical evidence juxtaposed in Chapters 5 and 6 largely support this argument. Officials attending Commission expert committees, and officials employed at the agency level in medium or lower rank positions specially earmarked for particular professional groups tend to evoke both intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination and an ‘independent expert’ role fairly extensively. Officials attending Council working parties on the other hand, and employed within top-rank positions in the diplomatic realms at the permanent missions to the EU are more geared towards evoking inter-sectoral patterns of co-ordination and a ‘government representative’ role. As such, the argument on organizational specialization receives strong empirical support in the current study.

Countervailing observations, however, are also found in the current study. Most clearly, all officials attending EU committees, both Commission expert committees and Council working parties, seem to evoke a ‘government representative’ role. This observation partially reflects the element of territoriosity that is organized into all EU committees, although most strongly in the Council working parties. However, this observation may primarily also the primary institutional affiliations embedding these officials. The fact that no major differences are detected between officials attending ECs and officials attending WPs may reflect the secondary nature of the EU committees in affecting administrative integration. However, major differences have been observed between WP participants and EC participants with respect to their assessments of fellow committee colleagues. In addition to being self-conscious with respect to their own representative roles, officials may also have strong opinions on how their colleagues perform and act in the EU committees. Officials attending WPs tend to perceive other colleagues as mainly ‘government representatives’, whilst those attending ECs tend to see fellow colleagues as having more mixed roles. Hence, the representative roles correspond to the organizational principles underpinning the Council working parties and the Commission expert committees.

National institutional affiliations are primary to these officials who devote most of their time and energy towards these institutions. The officials studied are more exposed towards the organizing principles underpinning national administrative bodies than towards the organizing
principles built into the EU committees. Hence, officials employed at the agency level are shown to evoke intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination and an ‘independent expert’ role more strongly than officials employed at the permanent representations to the EU. The current study thus supports the general argument on organizational specialization and the argument on primary and secondary institutional affiliations. Further, supporting the argument that primary institutional affiliations have a stronger impact on role enactment than secondary institutional affiliations, Chapter 6 showed that the ‘supranational agent’ role is evoked less strongly by EU committee participants than the ‘government representative’ role. National institutional allegiances are thus largely sustained when national civil servants attend EU committees, albeit most strongly amongst those entering the Council working parties. However, additional supranational allegiances seem to supplement these pre-established representational roles.

Finally, the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration was seen in Chapter 2 as reflecting the length and intensity of cross-level participation. The officials studied are full-time participants within the national administrative system and only part-time participants of the EU committees. Consequently, national institutional allegiances exceed supranational ones. However, officials intensively attending EU committees evoke supranational role and identity perceptions more strongly than officials attending these committees with only minor intensity. This is especially clear amongst the permanent representatives. Moreover, the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees seems to affect both the co-ordination behaviour and the representational roles of these participants more strongly than the length of attendance. Attending many EU committees and many informal meetings is a stronger predictor of the co-ordination behaviour and the representational roles of the participants than the length of attendance.

By and large, the current study provides ample evidence supporting the explanatory power of the following three independent variables: (i) the horizontal specialization of government institutions, (ii) the primary and secondary institutional affiliations embedding government officials, and finally of (iii) the intensity of cross-level participation amongst these officials. As such, the current study claims that the individual institutional affiliations embedding each government official are one important explanation of administrative integration. This conclusion largely supports a cognitive perspective on administrative integration across levels of governance.
According to standard views on administrative integration, governance levels are blurred and increasingly symbiotic (e.g. Lewis 1999a: 10; Maurer, Mittag and Wessels 2000; Pag 1987; Wessels 1998). The current study shows that the cognitive boundaries between the EU level and the national level of governance have become only partially blurred. As seen from our study, national officials attending EU committees do not necessarily mix and amalgamate pre-established role perceptions with new supranational ones. Rather, these officials are able to attend to several partially contending role perceptions and shift between these in different situations (cf. Andeweg 1997). Rather than blurring different levels of governance, this study shows that officials develop a mixed repertoire of roles for different organizational contexts (Eulau et al. 1959: 750). However, the shifts between different roles may be moderate; most civil servants attend to the ‘government representative’ role and the ‘independent expert’ role. Still, the relative primacy of these roles varies in different organizational contexts. Rather than administrative *engrenage* and perfectly integrated system levels, a picture of partial administrative integration across levels of governance emerges from this study. The EU committees and national bureaucracies thus resemble “loosely coupled rather than coherent, hierarchical and tightly coupled” systems (Brunsson and Olsen 1998: 17).

However, this study has also shown that the Commission expert committees foster administrative integration to a stronger degree than the Council working parties. This is especially the case along the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration. Hence, different parts of the EU system are integrated more strongly with the national government systems than other parts. However, considering the EU system as a multi-functional and multi-faceted polity, differentiated administrative integration across different sub-systems of the EU might be functional for integration at the system level. The role of the Commission is to cultivate non-territorial interests and concerns. The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, should pay particular attention to territorial needs and preferences. Hence, different EU institutions should function according to different logics of governance in order to secure European integration at large. According to a pendulum thesis, a strong emphasis on supranational governance at one point in time, as shown in particular by the Delors’ administration, easily triggers contra-measures along the intergovernmental path. Put generally, system maintenance requires the joint existence of conflicting and non-compatible governance logics and organizing principles. Hence, overall system integrative is generated by sub-system differences (Christiansen 1987; Jacobsen 1960; March and Olsen 1995). Thus, European integration can gain from institutionalized sub-systemic variations. While neo-
functional perspectives and intergovernmental accounts of European integration largely neglect this argument, the cognitive institutional perspective sheds light on the multi-faceted character of administrative integration.

**Supplementary theoretical approaches.**
Empirical support for the cognitive organization theory perspective on administrative integration does not render supplementary theoretical approaches useless. Administrative integration might also be explained by different independent variables. The current study has emphasised organizational affiliations, primary and secondary, organizational specialization, as well as the length and intensity to which civil servants attend EU committees as major explanatory variables. Amongst the number of theoretical approaches currently available, some particular supplementary theoretical approaches to the study of administrative integration are briefly touched upon in the following. This highlights the fact that the cognitive organization theory approach is not the only justifiable approach (cf. Wallace 2000b: 69-70).

**Cultural institutional perspectives.**
Cultural perspectives pay attention to how co-ordination patterns and the enactment of institutional role and identity perceptions reflect pre-established administrative cultures, codes of conduct and non-codified norms. Cultural perspectives view organizations as institutions, “infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (Selznick 1957: 17 – original emphasis). Processes of administrative integration across levels of governance are expected to be filtered through pre-existing institutional identities and cultures in the national administrations (Røvik 1998; Sverdrup 2000; Trondal 1999a and 1999c). “The longer a rule has existed, the more it becomes linked to the values of organizational stakeholders” (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000: 72-73). According to a cultural perspective, actors become norm- and rule-driven. Actors are less driven by anticipation of future consequences and more by matching identities to situations (March and Olsen 1989). Similar to a cultural perspective, the cognitive organization theory perspective takes into account the pre-packed nature of government agents. When entering EU committees these officials retain their national institutional affiliations, act upon them and evoke role perceptions that deviate only marginally from past role perceptions. Institutional filtering processes have considered by way of reflecting on how primary institutional affiliations at the national governance level contribute to sustaining pre-established behavioural patterns and institutional allegiances.
Hence, administrative integration is seen to reflect national administrative structures, especially those that are specialized according to a sectoral principle (Gulick 1937; Harmsen 1999; Knill and Lenschaw 1998a and 1998b; March and Olsen 1995).

Insufficient attention has been paid to processes of historical path-dependency and incremental change. Process studies through time have been sacrificed for a variance study in time (Roness 2000). Cultural perspectives are particular appropriate for process tracing and studying change processes across time (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). They are also useful tools when combined with longitudinal data, juxtaposed dynamic models and dynamic data. The current study combines a static model with static data and focuses not on change patterns but on how established institutions mould the actors in particular ways. Time series data are not used nor have any process tracing been conducted. A “one-shot” picture has been taken of processes of administrative integration across levels of governance.

Social constructivist approaches.
As in the variety of institutional perspectives in organizational theory, “one can find almost as many constructivisms as there are constructivists” (Lewis 1999b: 34). Still, different approaches to social construction share at least some basic characteristics and research foci. The different social mechanisms addressed within social constructivist accounts are largely identical, or at least strikingly similar to those posed by different organization theory perspectives (Trondal 2001). However, where social constructivist approaches emphasise the interactive processes that constantly occur within formal organizations, organization theory perspectives pay particular attention to the structural/organizational arrangements within which social interaction occurs. In order to make a distinction between social constructivism and general organization theory perspectives, one can argue that organization theory studies how different social contexts contribute to the enactment of certain elements within a fixed repertoire of identities, roles and codes of conduct. Social constructivists, in contrast, study the initial construction and formation of identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct, thus rendering central features of the self as variables. Put differently, while social constructivism seeks to understand how, for example, roles and identities are constructed, organization theory focuses on understanding how pre-existing identities and roles are activated and deactivated in particular organizational contexts. Organization theory pictures agents as having a particular and fixed set of responses to be enacted in particular institutional
contexts, whereas social constructivism analyses how different elements within this repertoire initially came about (Trondal 2001).

However, the social constructivist versus institutionalist divide is not distinct or clear-cut (Trondal 2001). To take only one example, most cognitive theory scholars agree that organizations contribute in constructing actors’ mindsets, cognitive schemes and, ultimately, their role perceptions and patterns of behaviour. Hence, organization theory may account for the initial construction of role perceptions. The current study has emphasised that national civil servants may construct supranational allegiances subsequent to becoming re-socialized within the EU committees.

When compared to social constructivist accounts, organization theory perspectives are relatively static on the conception of agency. Agents are largely seen as being “structurally determined”. Critics of institutional perspectives have “seen the individual as helpless in the face of structural arrangements” (Stryker and Statham 1985: 338). Hence, a cognitive perspective on organizational dynamics “risks explanatory determinism, ignoring possibly independent influence of actors and their strategic interaction…” (Knill and Lenschaw 2001: 8). Social constructivism is more open for agency dynamics. “Some recent theorizing and research on the multiplicity of roles and on role conflict has begun to recognize that the individual is not completely helpless and passive in the face of structural constraints” (Stryker and Statham 1985: 339). Further, agency is institutionally constituted and not randomly distributed. But, social constructivists have yet to suggest a theory of action. Additionally, most institutionalist accounts are more implicit than social constructivists on the notion of social interaction. While most institutionaslists pay attention to the institutional apparatus as such, social constructivists pay more explicit attention to the social interaction, deliberation, bargaining, and persuasion that take place within such institutions (e.g. Checkel 1999; Jetschke 2000; Lewis 2000; Risse 2000). For example, Joerges and Neyer (1997) study processes of argumentation and deliberation that occur within EU institutions and EU committees. Social constructivists, however, pay only marginal attention to the particular organizational contexts embedding social interaction (see beneath).

As scholarly disciplines, social constructivism is embryonic compared to organization theory. Social constructivism, as developed within the study of international relations, has been mainly devoted to meta-analyses. Organization theory is more middle-range in character and
analyses the ‘cogs and wheels’ that bring social elements into correlation. Reflecting this meta-theoretical heritage, the institutional concepts addressed by most social constructivists are criticized as being too vague; they “point to a ‘system’ out there” without unpacking central characteristics of this system (Pasic 1996: 88). It is therefore difficult to deduce precise implications with respect to determining the concrete construction of roles and identities on the basis of the institutional concepts addressed by most social constructivists. This criticism reflects a more general tendency amongst several social constructivist scholars to ignore operationalizing and conceptionalizing the social contexts within which actors operate (Inayatullah and Blaney 1996; Pasic 1996). This lacuna has contributed to a general deficiency of, and a “striking unwillingness” by, social constructivists to set forth distinctive and empirically testable hypotheses (Checkel 1999c; Moravcsik 1999: 678). Consequently, social constructivism has not enabled empirical research on administrative integration, not the least because of their lack of operational dimensions (Trondal 2001).

Myth perspectives.

Social constructivism and institutionalism focus on processes of re-socialisation as reflecting intensive exposure towards certain stimuli. Myth perspectives, however, focus on two different aspects of organizational dynamism: organizational hypocrisy and environmental adaptation. First, a myth perspective pays attention to situations whereby incompatible and conflicting expectations concerning appropriate role enactment and appropriate modes of behaviour lead civil servants to de-couple these properties from the modes of presenting them. If participation on committees and working parties under the EU Commission and the Council facilitates exposure to conflicting expectations, civil servants might evoke role perceptions that deviate significantly from ways of presenting themselves. For example, EU committee participants may be inclined to adopt ‘Euro-talk’ picturing oneself as ‘Europeanized’, i.e. using ‘Euro-jargon’, whilst at the same time acting in accordance with national expectations and obligations. Combining pre-established national modes of acting and feeling and applying standardized and ‘Europeanized’ language, civil servants may be able to satisfy inconsistent expectations and demands. ‘Euro-talk’ might thus reflect “the norms geared exclusively for talk” more than the norms of action and practice (Brunsson 1998: 267).

Where social constructivists argue that intensive interaction on EU committees drives processes of re-socialization towards supranational allegiances, myth perspectives argue that intensive interaction on EU committees may actually teach the participants to be cynical about
ways of presenting themselves to their wider environment. “The more experience, the greater the competence” (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000: 75). The role and identity perceptions evoked may function as myth, signal and ceremony for the committee participants towards the environment (Brunsson 1989; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; March 1984). Processes of identity and role formation can be geared more towards organizational hypocrisy than to organizational change (Brunsson 1989). As such, administrative integration represents more of a signal and symbol than a reality. The notion of de-coupling talk and action is not accounted for in the current study, nor is it fully tested empirically in current literature (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000: 60; Røvik 1992: 274).

Second, and linked to the idea of organizational hypocrisy, myth perspectives may account for variation in processes of administrative integration. Administrative integration can vary across policy sectors as well as across nation-states due to policy sectors and different nation-states being exposed to different institutional environments (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Røvik 1998). Organizations come to view different aspects of their environments as “rule-like”, having a “taken-for-granted” status (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). “The symbolic significance of any activity depends on the social norms within which it is undertaken” (Feldman and March 1982: 184). However, institutionalised environments are fragmented with different sets of institutionalised standards available for adoption to different parts of each organization. To be sure, organizational fragmentation, sectoral variation and national differentiation may reflect the adoption of different institutional standards by different parts of the organization (Røvik 1998). Consistent with the cognitive organization theory perspective, this notion of the myth perspective views actors as bounded rational actors. Dynamics of imitation are triggered by uncertainty amongst the actors. One solution to uncertainty is to “imitate organizations which are perceived to be more legitimate or more successful” (Radaelli 1999: 45). Adaptation to the institutionalised environments follows a process of unconscious imitation. Put generally, “[r]itual acknowledgement of managerial importance and appropriateness is part of a social ceremony by which social life is made meaningful and acceptable…” (March 1984: 31).

A rational choice version of the myth approach highlights sectoral divergence and national variation that results from different actors and nation-states strategically adapting to different institutional environments (Brunsson 1989; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Røvik 1998). According to this approach, organizations are mostly geared for survival. Organizational
survival and viability is secured through processes whereby environmental actors view the organization as legitimate and effective. Viewing organizational actors as rational, they may strategically download different institutional standards to satisfy environmental expectations and demands. Organizational fragmentation can thus reflect strategic adaptation to fragmented institutional environments (Sevòn 1996). Administrative integration mirrors processes whereby individual civil servants adapt, more or less consciously, to the requirements, expectations and demands set by the EU committees. Owing to the level of uncertainty in EU policy-making, as well as the level of uncertainty facing national civil servants attending EU committees, processes of mimetic adaptation are likely to occur.

Environmental adaptation might also be called uni-lateral administrative integration, differing from bi- or multi-lateral administrative integration (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a). Uni-lateral administrative integration is a century-old mode of international standardization based on imitation and copying across time and space (Rose 1993). Bi- and multi-lateral administrative integration are more recent phenomena that reflect administrative adaptation through intergovernmental and supranational organizations. The current study views administrative integration as reflecting the multi-lateral adaptation of the decision-making behaviour and institutional allegiances of EU committee participants. However, processes of uni-lateral administrative integration have been observed recently in the Norwegian government system as well as in other EU member states (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000: 241-242; Sollien 1995; Sverdrup 2000). Similarly, adaptation to European integration in non-EU member countries, like Norway, Switzerland, and Poland indicates that administrative integration has more to it than merely multi-lateral adaptation (Biernat 1997; Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Kux and Sverdrup 1997). While this study perceives administrative integration as reflecting ‘integration through participation’ on EU committees, the Europeanization of the Swiss central administration has been described as a process of “integration without participation” (Sverdrup 2000: 121). As such, administrative integration may reflect processes of uni-lateral adaptation. This notion of the myth perspective supplements the ideas of organizational hypocrisy where administrative integration is a symbol and signal to the institutional environments more than a description of the actual integration of national government institutions and EU level institutions. However, uni-lateral adaptation to environmental requirements can also have instrumental effects beyond simple signals and symbols. In the end, organizational hypocrisy need not last forever as the symbols
might affect the cognition of the actors, and ultimately the actual working of the organization (March 1984).

**Additional independent variables.**
The current study has focused primarily on the primary and secondary institutional affiliations that embed individual civil servants to explain why certain co-ordination behaviour and representational roles are attended to. However, where you stand depends not only on where you sit, or where you come from, but also to a degree on where you are going (cf. Allison 1969). In addition to being pre-socialized before attending EU committees, and re-socialized in the course of the meetings, officials might also be pre-socialized towards future institutional affiliations. The most likely agent of this latter pre-socialization mode is the national administrations. Acting on the shadow of the future, the career possibilities as well as the rewards and punishments for the committee members are largely national. When attending EU committees the participants are thus likely to anticipate future career possibilities at the national level of governance.

A second variable not emphasised in the current study is how positive and negative experiences from the EU committees may affect the role perceptions of the participants. Past experiences might be analysed from an experiential learning perspective. “[E]xperiential learning offers a form of backward-looking wisdom” (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000: 114). If a ministry officer spends a lot of time on EU committees, he or she may either become increasingly fed up with it or, conversely, it can lead to an increased supranational attitude. The enactment of supranational allegiances is less likely if the officials have negative experiences from the committee meetings. For example, the meetings might be perceived as dull and boring, highly technical, time consuming, less productive than anticipated, preoccupied with formalism, poorly managed on behalf of the chair, etc. Such experiences could reduce the likelihood for the construction of supranational role and identity perceptions amongst the participants.

Not every potential explanatory variable has been attended to in this study. Rather, our theoretical model contains only a few independent variables rather than a long “shopping list” of possible explanatory variables. Hence, rather than accounting for what happened as it happened (Elster 1989: 7) this study has stressed some key variables as suggested by our theoretical perspective which are seen as vital for understanding administrative integration.
The data and methodology revisited

Three methodological concerns are discussed below: the robustness of the empirical test of the cognitive approach to administrative integration, the fruitfulness of the empirical proxies, and finally, the generalisability of the empirical observations and the theoretical inferences drawn from them.

First, regarding the question of robustness, this study has been carried out under less than favourable conditions where the proposed relationships between our variables were less likely to occur. Collegial arrangements are less likely to affect behavioural dynamics than hierarchical organizations. This is especially so if the collegium is perceived as a secondary institutional affiliation. As such, the proposed relationships between our independent and dependent variables were taken to a “critical test” in the EU committees. One overall goal when designing the questionnaires was to maximize the likelihood of falsifying our theoretical arguments. One way of doing this was to increase the likelihood for officials assigning identical scores on questions relating to Commission expert committees and Council working parties. The officials were asked to give answers to several questions, simultaneously indicating if there were any differences between these committees in relation to the each question. As discussed in Chapter 2, different committees at the EU level may affect the participants differently. Hence, one should expect different scores to be assigned to different classes of committees within the questionnaire. However, when maximizing the likelihood for refuting this theoretical argument by way of designing the questionnaire in particular ways, the robustness of our theory was taken to a ‘critical test’.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have presented evidence indicating that most of the predicted empirical patterns indeed materialise under these unfavourable conditions. As such, the empirical observations indicate that the theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter 2 are fairly robust.

Second, other empirical proxies can measure administrative integration than the ones applied in our study (cf. Chapter 4). The current study builds on how the civil servants perceive their own co-ordination behaviour and their own role and identity perceptions. One vital argument in favour on relying on the self-perceptions of the officials is that these perceptions are likely to affect their actual decision behaviour. Assuming that civil servants are bounded rational
actors, the stories they tell through interviews and questionnaires are likely to reflect not only their actual patterns of acting but also the taken-for-granted nature of these patterns.

Different yardsticks and different methods can also measure administrative integration. For example, co-ordination processes could be measured more directly by studying the actual co-ordination behaviour of civil servants, studying the minutes from the co-ordination meetings, studying the content of the frame notes and the instructions, etc. Policy co-ordination could also be studied through direct observation. This last procedure, however, might potentially affect the actual co-ordination practises of the actors. Administrative integration could also be measured through processes whereby national administrative structures are re-shuffled and reshaped through processes of legal adaptation to EU standards (laws, regulations, agreements, conventions, directives and standards), through cultural changes in the national institutions, through convergence or divergence in the policy outputs and policy outcomes within various policy sector, through changes in the financial and budgetary allocations nationally, through changes in the composition of personnel of national ministries and agencies, etc. The list of potential dependent variables in the study of administrative integration seems endless. When choosing among these, some indicators may prove more adequate than others. Similar to Radaelli (2000), this study attempts to draw a demarcation line between what is administrative integration and what is not. One major reason for focusing on co-ordination behaviour and role and identity perceptions in the current study is that they measure administrative integration fairly well (cf. Chapter 2). Additionally, these variables are applied because of the general lack of such variables in existing literature (cf. Chapter 4). Past and recent literature on processes of Europeanization of national administrations focus mostly on (i) changes in the organizational structures of national central administrations, including changes in the demographic composition and the temporal orders of these systems (e.g. Auer, Demmke and Polet 1996; Dehousse 1997; Ekengren 1996; Metcalfe 1994; Page and Wouters 1995), and (ii) changes in the policy output (e.g. Aspinwall 1996; Dong-Huyen et al. 1993; Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Claes and Tranøy 1999). Fewer empirical studies analyse how European integration and the EU polity affects actual decision processes within national administrative systems and the way representational roles of the decision-makers are moulded.

The next question is whether the empirical findings reported in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are generalizable beyond the Scandinavian countries, or even beyond the case of EU committees?
The samples of respondents and informants in this study were systematically selected and thus not representative in any meaningful sense. Systematic data samples do not warrant empirical generalizations. However, our observations on the Scandinavian sample are supported empirically by studies outside these countries (cf. above). Analytical and theoretical generalizations are possible due to the general nature of our theoretical arguments (Yin 1993). Furthermore, the current study applies empirical proxies that more or less reflect general phenomena in organizational life.

As far as generalizability is concerned, the majority of the theoretical arguments forwarded in Chapter 2 are sufficiently general so as to warrant generalizations across time and space. As such, the relationships between the independent and the dependent variables may apply also to non-Scandinavian countries. It is, however, questionable to what extent the theoretical arguments on supra-nationalism can be generalized beyond the EU context, let alone, beyond the EU committee setting. First, few other international organizations have supranational characteristics to the same extent as the EU institutions. Worth mentioning, however, international organizations like the WTO have indeed supranational characteristics. Hence, the empirical observations on supranational allegiances might to some extent be generalized outside EU institutions. Moreover, the arguments on cross-level participation require that this participation is routinized to a certain degree, for example within committees. Few other government institutions have institutionalised cross-border or cross-level interaction to the same magnitude as the EU (Rosamond 2000: 121). Consequently, the empirical observations presented in this study, particularly on supra-nationalism, is limited to the study of administrative integration at the intersection of the EU system and the nation-state. The arguments on organizational specialization and on primary and secondary institutional affiliations, however, are more general and merit generalization beyond the EU system (cf. Egeberg 1999a; Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990). The concept of organizational specialization and institutional affiliations claims no validity with respect to levels of governance.

Finally, are the empirical data applied in this study suitable for illustrating the theoretical arguments that are advanced? Ideally, dynamic theoretical models should be tested against dynamic data and vice versa. The theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter 2 are two-dimensional as far as the level of dynamism in the arguments is concerned. First, along the sector-territorial dimension of administrative integration the cognitive organization theory perspective is geared towards understanding how pre-established identities and roles are
activated and deactivated within particular EU committees. As such, this approach views agents as having a particular and fixed set of responses to be enacted in particular institutional contexts. A ‘one shot picture’ is taken of the role and identity perceptions evoked by national civil servants attending EU committees, representing a static model. Hence, the static nature of the model is paralleled by static data. Second, considering the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration, the cognitive approach emphasises a re-socializing dynamic. Arguably, re-socialization towards supranational allegiances may stem from intensive and sustained participation on EU committees. This dynamism, however, is not perfectly represented by any genuine dynamic data. The only element of dynamism in the data relates to questions of how long the officials have participated on the committees, when they first arrived, how many meetings they have attended during the last year and the last month, etc. Inter-correlating these independent variables with different empirical proxies on role and identity perceptions thus provide a dynamic element in the analysis. However, time series and iterated interviews could have increased the dynamic element in the data, thus giving a better fit between the dynamic elements in our arguments on the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration. As such, along the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration this lack of dynamic data may be a problem since we try to hit a moving target with a ‘one-shot picture’.

Prospects for future research on administrative integration

EU “committees function as hybrids between EU governance and the organizations represented” (Van Schendelen and Pedler 1998: 288). Administrative integration, as defined in Chapter 4, is relational covering the relationships and interdependencies between different administrative systems and between the members of these systems. Administrative integration requires that actual contacts occur between (at least) two administrative systems (cf. Chapter 4). A stronger notion of integration requires, in addition, that these contacts affect the systems (mutually) and the individual members within them (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). As such, administrative integration should be seen as processes whereby the borderlines between (at least) two administrative systems become increasingly blurred. The empirical analyses conducted in this study, however, provide evidence only of partial blurring of the borderlines between the EU system and the national administrative apparatus. Due to the fact that national and sectoral allegiances exceed supranational ones amongst most national EU committee participants, administrative integration is shown to be only partially two-dimensional.
However, under certain institutional conditions we have observed the emergence of a two-dimensional mode of administrative integration. This occurs under conditions of intensive cross-level participation amongst the EU committee participants and under conditions whereby these officials are embedded in government institutions that are largely organized according to a sectoral principle. Hence, the current study agrees only partially with Wolfgang Wessels’ (1998) assumption of a ‘fusion’ of national administrations and EU institutions. Rather, the EU and the national central administration are imperfectly integrated orders.

However, the current study has limited the analysis of administrative integration to only one side of the coin, namely how it is seen by the national civil servants. Because of this, a study of full-time EU bureaucrats should supplement the picture provided by this study, thus contributing to a more complete picture of the relational character of administrative integration. Are Commission officials who frequently interact with national civil servants becoming increasingly supranational with regard their role and identity perceptions (cf. Cini 1996, Hooghe 1999a; Landfried 1997; McDonald 1997; Wodak 2000)? This is, amongst others, an important question to be answered in future research.

Second, additional empirical sources and foci should supplement the empirical focus of the current study of administrative integration. This study provides only a general picture of administrative integration across level of governance; in-depth case studies within different policy sectors could provide increased knowledge on the micro-foundations affecting this phenomenon (Scharpf 2000: 766). Case studies make it possible to test theoretical arguments under conditions where possible noise from various independent variables is controlled. Moreover, the possibilities for more inductive research facilitated by the case study approach might potentially uncover relationships that were not recognized beforehand. Thus, the general picture of administrative integration revealed in the current study could be confirmed and enriched.

Finally, a more complete picture of administrative integration across governance levels should include analyses of other EU institutions than the Commission expert committees and the Council working parties. As mentioned above, future studies of administrative integration should explain the behavioural patterns and the representative roles of permanent Commission officials as well as the auxiliary agents of the EU Commission. A fuller picture of administrative integration should also include additional empirical proxies than the ones used
here (cf. the previous section). Further, the study of integration across levels of governance should go beyond the administrative sphere. Consequentially, future research on political-administrative integration in Europe should focus on permanent EU Commission officials and Commissioners (cf. Cini 1996; Hooghe 1999a; Nugent 1997; Wodak 2000), on the semi-autonomous agencies under the auspices of the Commission (cf. Covassi 1997; Kreher 1997), the Council structure, including the level of COREPER (cf. de Zwaan 1995; Hayes-Renschaw and Wallace 1997; Lewis 2000; Pendergast 1976), the EU Parliament, the MEPs and the impact of participation on different Parliamentary committees (cf. Frankline and Scarrow 1999; Katz 1997; Kerr 1973; Scully 1999 and 2001), the comitology committees organized at the intersection of the Commission and the Council (e.g. Schaefer et al. 2000; Wessels 1998), and the re-socializing dynamics of the European Court of Justice (cf. Joerges 1997). Finally, a more adequate portrait of administrative integration should also take into consideration integration through more informal networks, epistemic communities, and advocacy coalitions (e.g. Börzel 1998; Haas 1992; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Sabatier 1998).

The current study of administrative integration does not raise all the relevant questions, neither does it provide all possible answers. Still, it has shed light on the partial blurring of the borderlines between national administrative systems and the EU government apparatus. Subsequent to intensive and protracted cross-level interaction and due to sectoral specialization of government institutions, administrative integration is shown to be emerging across levels of governance. Hence, this study has moved beyond the neo-functional versus intergovernmental controversy by stressing that administrative integration is indeed a two-dimensional phenomenon.
Notes

1 The author would like to thank Jan Beyers and Morgen Egeberg for valuable comments on various versions of this Chapter.

2 However, the desk system has also been introduced to the Norwegian MFA.

3 Meta-analysis, however, is a recent characteristic of social constructivist literature. More contemporary studies apply middle-range accounts to a greater extent (Checkel 1999; Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001). Hence, the distinction between meta-analysis and middle-range analysis does not fit perfectly to more recent social constructivist and organization theory research.

4 Thanks to Johan P. Olsen for this point.
References


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til Rådets avgørelse om vedtakelse af et program omfattende ikke-lovgivningsmæssige foranstaltninger til forbedring af sikkerhed og sundheden på arbejdspladsen. Brussels


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Appendix

Appendix 1: Letter and questionnaire to national officials from Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

*Kjære tjenestemann/-kvinne.*

Som en del av forskningsprogrammet ARENA (Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation State) foretar jeg en undersøkelse av erfaringene til nasjonale tjenestemenn i sentraladministrasjonene i Danmark, Norge og Sverige fra deres deltagelse i ekspertkomiteer og arbeidsgrupper under EU-kommisjonen og Unionsrådet/Ministerrådet. For å få et best mulig bilde av erfaringene fra slik deltagelse, er det ønskelig at du har anledning til å fylle ut vedlagte spørreskjema.

Intervjuene vil gjennomføres slik at hver enkelt fyller ut et standardisert spørreskjema på egenhånd. Selve utfyllingen vil ta omlag 30 minutter. Dernest ber jeg deg om å returnere skjemaet i utfylt stand så snart som mulig i den frankerte konvolutten som medfølger, eller sender den pr. fax (se nummer nedenfor). Hver informant vil være garantert full anonymitet (Datatilsynet).

En liten veiledning i utfyllingen av skjemaet:

Vennlig hilsen

Jarle Trondal
Stipendiat (doktorgradsstudent)
Fax: + 47 22 85 44 11
tlf: + 47 22 85 51 66
e-mail: jarle.trondal@stv.uio.no

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Sentralforvaltningen i Danmark, Norge og Sverige: Erfaringer fra tjenestemenn som deltar i ekspertkomiteer og areidsgrupper i EU.

Jarle Trondal
Universitetet i Oslo,           Spørreskjema i
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Postboks 1097 Blindern,        ARENA-programmet
0317 Oslo.                    Norges forskningsråd
Tlf: +47 22 85 51 66
Fax: +47 22 85 44 11

1. Land:____________________.

2. Hvilken instans er du ansatt i?
   ________________________________________________________.

3. Hvilket politikk-/saksområde arbeider du på?
   ________________________________________________________.

4. Hva er ditt nåværende stillingsnivå?
   ________________________________________________________.

5. Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i:

   År

   • nåværende stilling? [ ]
   • nåværende instans? [ ]
   • sentralforvaltningen samlet
6. Har du arbeidet i EU-kommisjonen som:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ja</th>
<th>Nei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- praktikant
- offentlig tjenestemann
- nasjonal ekspert

Så følger noen spørsmål angående din deltakelse overfor Den Europeiske Union.

7. I hvilken grad berører EU og/eller EØS-avtalen ditt saksområde?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meget</th>
<th>Meget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stor grad</td>
<td>liten grad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 2 3 4 5

8. Omtrent hvor stor andel av den samlede arbeidstiden din går med til:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meget</th>
<th>Meget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stor andel</td>
<td>liten andel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- EU-/EØS-arbeid generelt 1 2 3 4 5
- Deltakelse i ekspert-komiteer under EU-kommisjonen 1 2 3 4 5
- Deltakelse i arbeids-grupper under Unionsrådet 1 2 3 4 5
- Deltakelse i komitologi-komiteer (komiteer for kontroll av EU-kommisjonens utøvelse av delegert myndighet 1 2 3 4 5

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9a. I forbindelse med din deltagelse i forberedende ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis EU-kommisjonen og Unionsrådet, hvor ofte har du hatt kontakt med de følgende instansene i løpet av det siste året:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Meget ofte</th>
<th>Av og til</th>
<th>Meget sjelden/aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ekspertkomiteer**

- Med the environmental DG under EU-kommisjonen
  - 1 2 3 4 5

- Med andre Generaldirektorater under EU-kommisjonen
  - 1 2 3 4 5

- Med ekspertkomiteer under EU-kommisjonen som jeg ikke deltar i selv
  - 1 2 3 4 5

- Med Unionsrådet
  - 1 2 3 4 5

- Med COREPER
  - 1 2 3 4 5

- Med arbeidsgrupper under Rådet som jeg ikke deltar i selv
  - 1 2 3 4 5

**Rådsarbeidsgrupper**

- Med Europa-parlamentet
  - 1 2 3 4 5

- Med Europa-domstolen
  - 1 2 3 4 5
• Med EØS- og EFTA-organer 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

• Med kolleger fra andre medlemsland som ikke deltar i den komite/gruppe som jeg deltar i 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

• Med kolleger fra andre medlemsland som deltar i den komite/arbeids-gruppe jeg deltar i 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

9b. Med hvilke av de nevnte instansene eller gruppene har du oftest kontakt?
______________________________________________________. 

10a. Hvor mange komiteer og rådsarbeidsgrupper har du deltatt i?

Antall

• forberedende ekspertkomiteer
• rådsarbeidsgrupper

10b. Når omtrent ble du første gang involvert i slik deltakelse?

• Forberedende ekspertkomiteer: ________________________.
• Rådsarbeidsgrupper: ________________________________.
10c. Kan du angi navn på de ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper du har deltatt i?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ekspertkomiteer</th>
<th>Rådsarbeidsgrupper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10d. Hvor mange møter har du deltatt i?

- siste år
- siste måned

10e. Omtrent hvor lenge varer møtene gjennomsnittlig?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Møtelengde</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Holder du innlegg på møtene i ekspertkomiteen(e)/arbeidsgruppen(e)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meget ofte</th>
<th>Meget sjelden/aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper

10d. Hvor mange møter har du deltatt i?

10e. Omtrent hvor lenge varer møtene gjennomsnittlig?

11. Holder du innlegg på møtene i ekspertkomiteen(e)/arbeidsgruppen(e)?
12. Får du rutinemessig innkalling til møter i disse komiteene/gruppene, eller må du selv ta initiativ til deltakelse?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blir innkalt</th>
<th>eget initiativ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Forberedende ekspertkomiteer</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rådsarbeidsgrupper</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12b. Dersom svart 1, 2 eller 3 ovenfor, fra hvilken instans får du vanligvis innkalling?

• Forberedende ekspertkomiteer:
  ______________________________________________________.

• Rådsarbeidsgrupper:
  ______________________________________________________.

13a. Er det omtrent de samme personene som deltar i komiteen(e)/gruppen(e) fra møte til møte?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I stor grad</th>
<th>Sjelden/aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Forberedende ekspertkomiteer</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rådsarbeidsgrupper</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13b. Hvis svart 1, 2 eller 3 ovenfor, omtrent hvor lang fartstid har disse personene i komiteen/gruppen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vet</th>
<th>Antall år</th>
<th>Antall måneder</th>
<th>ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Forberedende ekspertkomiteer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rådsarbeidsgrupper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. Har du kontakt med noen av de øvrige komite-/arbeidsgruppe-deltakerne ut over den kontakt dere har gjennom de formelle komite-møtene?

   I stor grad    sjelden/ aldri

- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer  1  2  3  4  5
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper         1  2  3  4  5

15. **Konsulterer** du enkelte av de øvrige deltakerne i ekspertkomiteen(e)/gruppen(e) forut for og/eller i etterkant av møter?

   Meget ofte     Meget sjelden/ aldri

Forberedende ekspertkomiteer:

- I forkant av møter  1  2  3  4  5
- I etterkant av møter 1  2  3  4  5

Rådsarbeidsgrupper:

- I forkant av møter  1  2  3  4  5
- I etterkant av møter 1  2  3  4  5

16. Kan du angi omtrent **hvor lenge** disse komiteene/gruppene har eksistert?

   Antall år    Vet ikke

- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer  
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper  

308
17. Hvilken **form for kontakt** benytter du forut for og i etterkant av slike møter, og hvor hyppig forekommer denne type kontakt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meget hyppig</th>
<th>sjelden/ aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Møter ansikt-til-ansikt</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• kontakter pr. telefon, fax og/eller e-mail</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• andre kontaktformer</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. I hvilken grad føler du **tilhørighet til og ansvar overfor de følgende enheter når du deltar i ekspertkomite(er) og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis Kommisjonen og Rådet?**

| Nøkkel: I meget stor grad både og liten grad Ikke relevant |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 9 |

| | Ekspertkomiteer | Arbeidsgrupper |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | i Rådet |
| • Egen avdeling | 1 2 3 4 5 9 | 1 2 3 4 5 9 |
| • Eget departement/direktorat (centrale embetsverket) o.l. som helhet | 1 2 3 4 5 9 | 1 2 3 4 5 9 |
| • Egen regjering | 1 2 3 4 5 9 | 1 2 3 4 5 9 |
| • Egen profesjon/ utdannelsesbakgrunn | 1 2 3 4 5 9 | 1 2 3 4 5 9 |
• Komite(er) som jeg deltar i under EU-Kommisjonen 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
• Arbeidsgrupp(er) som jeg deltar i under Rådet 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
• Den Europeisk Union 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
• Egen policy-sektor 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
• Annen (spesifiser) 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

19. Hvilken vekt vil du tillegge innspill fra de følgende enheter når du deltar i ekspertkomite(er) og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis Kommisjonen og Rådet?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Meget stor betydning</th>
<th>Meget liten betydning</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ekspertkomiteer</th>
<th>Arbeidsgrupper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egen avdeling</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eget departement</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eget direktorat</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utenriksdepartement</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parlamentet nasjonalt</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasjonale interesse-grupper/bedrifter</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommisjonens representanter</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Representanter fra ett
  eller flere andre medlemsland
• Enkeltpersoner som jeg har blitt kjent med gjennom komiteen(e)/arbeidsgruppene
• Euro-grupper/-bedrifter
• Formannskapet
• Rådssekretariatet
• Europaparlamentet

20. I hvilken grad mener du at tjenestemenn fra andre land opptrer som "eksperter" eller som "regjerings-representanter"?

"eksperter" "regjeringsrepr."

• I forberedende ekspertkomiteer 1 2 3 4 5
• I Rådsarbeidsgrupper 1 2 3 4 5

21. I hvilken grad mener du Kommisjonens representanter opptrer uavhengig av nasjonale særinteresser?

"Uavhengig" "Avhengig"

• I forberedende ekspertkomiteer 1 2 3 4 5
• I Rådsarbeidsgrupper 1 2 3 4 5
22. Nedenfor er listet endel påstander. I hvilken grad er du enig eller uenig i disse påstandene?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Helt enig</th>
<th>både og</th>
<th>Helt uenig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ekspert-komiteer | Råds-arbeidsgrupper

- "Kommisjonen tar medlemslandenes syn seriøst" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- "Kommisjonen tar EØS-landets Norges syn seriøst" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- "Kommisjonen hører mer på representanter fra store medlemsland" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- "Deltakelse i ekspert-komite(er)/arbeidsgrupper er viktig for å sikre faglig riktige vedtak" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- "Deltakelse i ekspert-komite(er)/arbeidsgrupper er viktig fordi jeg kan fremme våre nasjonale interesser" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Deretter følger noen spørsmål om dine kontakter og arbeid i sentralforvaltningen nasjonalt.

23a. Foretar du **forhåndsklareringer** med andre sentraladministrative instanser forut for møter i:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stor grad</td>
<td>aldri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- ekspertkomiteen(e) 1 2 3 4 5
- Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e) 1 2 3 4 5

23b. Inkluderer dette klareringer med Utenriks-departementet?

Ja  
Nei  

23c. Foretar du **forhåndsklareringer** med andre avdelinger innad i egen instans forut for møter i:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stor grad</td>
<td>aldri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- ekspertkomiteen(e) 1 2 3 4 5
- Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e) 1 2 3 4 5
23d. Hvilke metoder benyttes for slike forhåndsklaringer?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stor grad</td>
<td></td>
<td>aldri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ekspertkomiteen(e)

- Uformelle kontakter
  (telefon, e-mail o.l) 1 2 3 4 5
- Formelle møter gjennom koordineringsstrukturen 1 2 3 4 5
  for EU-/EØS-saker
- Annet 1 2 3 4 5
  Spesifiser____________________________________________.

Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)

- Uformelle kontakter
  (telefon, e-mail o.l) 1 2 3 4 5
- Formelle møter gjennom koordineringsstrukturen 1 2 3 4 5
  for EU-/EØS-saker
- Annet 1 2 3 4 5
  Spesifiser____________________________________________.

24a. Utarbeides noen av de følgende dokumentene i ditt arbeid overfor ekspertkomiteen(e):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ofte</td>
<td>aldri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- problemnotater 1 2 3 4 5
- rammenotater 1 2 3 4 5
- instrukser 1 2 3 4 5
24b. Utarbeides noen av de følgende dokumentene i ditt arbeid overfor rådsarbeidsgruppen(e):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
<th>Ofte</th>
<th>aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>problemnotater</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rammenotater</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instrukser</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24c. Føler du at disse dokumentene er styrende for de standpunkter du tar i:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>Ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stor grad</td>
<td>liten grad</td>
<td>relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ekspertkomiteen(e)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Så følger noen spørsmål om dine kontakter og vektlegger i utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver nasjonalt.

25. Hvor ofte vil du anslå, i forbindelse med din deltakelse i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, at du har hatt kontakt med de instanser/grupperinger som er listet nedenfor i løpet av det siste året?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Meget ofte</th>
<th>Av og til</th>
<th>Meget sjelden/aldri</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ekspertkomiteer Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet

- Kontakt med politisk ledelse
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Kontakt med eget direktorat (centrale embetsverket) o.l.
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Kontakt med eget overordnet departement
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Kontakt med andre direktorater (centrale embetsverket) o.l.
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Kontakt med andre departementer
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Kontakt med Utenriks-departementet
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Kontakt med Statsministerens kontor
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
• Kontakt med andre avdelinger innad i egen instans

• Kontakt med interesse-organisasjoner

• Kontakt med Parlamentet nasjonalt

• Kontakt med massemedia

26. Kan du anslå, i forbindelse med din deltagelse i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, hvor viktige følgende instanser eller grupperinger er når sentrale beslutninger treffes innenfor ditt saksområde?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Meget</th>
<th>Meget</th>
<th>Ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>viktig</td>
<td>både og uvesentlig relevant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>3 4 5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ekspertkomiteer</th>
<th>Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>politisk ledelse</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eget departement</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eget direktorat (centrale embetsverket)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>andre departementer</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>andre direktorater (centrale embetsverket) o.l.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interesse-organisasjoner</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27. Hvilken vekt vil du, i forbindelse med din deltakelse i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, tillegge hvert av de følgende hensyn ved utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver? (Kategoriene er ikke gjensidig utelukkende.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Meget både og uvesentlig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ekspertkomiteer Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet**

- **signaler fra politisk ledelse**
  - 1 2 3 4 5
- **faglig/profesjonelle hensyn**
  - 1 2 3 4 5
- **signaler fra bruker-grupper, klienter, særlig berørte parter**
  - 1 2 3 4 5
- **Hensynet til eget lands interesser**
  - 1 2 3 4 5
- **Hensynet til andre medlemsland i EU**
  - 1 2 3 4 5
- **Signalen fra EU-kommisjonen, dets ekspertkomiteer**
  - 1 2 3 4 5
• Signaler fra Unionsrådet,
  COREPER, dets
  arbeidsgrupper 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
• Signaler fra massemedia 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5


| Nøkkel: | Alltid eller halvparten av sjelden eller stort sett tilfellene aldri |
|--------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
|        | 1 2 3                       | 1 2 3                    |

Ekspert- | Rådsarbeids- komiteer grupper

• "Deltakelse i komiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper er nyttig for meg når diskusjoner om min regjerings holdninger til en sak har startet"

• "Jeg må koordinere med Utenriksdepartementet eller andre sentrale koordinerende organer"

• "Min "posisjon" har blitt koordinert med alle relevante departementer"

• "Min "posisjon" har blitt koordinert med alle relevante avdelinger i min egen instans"
• "Jeg har klare instruksjoner om hvilken "posisjon" jeg skal innta"

• "Jeg velger ofte selv hvilke "posisjoner" jeg skal innta"

• "Jeg tar de "posisjoner" jeg tror er i beste interesse for mitt land"

• "Jeg tar de "posisjoner" jeg tror er best på grunnlag av min profesjonelle ekspertise"

• "Jeg tar de "posisjoner" jeg tror er til beste for medlemslandene som gruppe"

• "Jeg prøver å få relevante interessegrupper involvert i koordineringen av min "posisjon"

• "Jeg tar også kontakt og prøver å få "posisjonen" til det nasjonale Parlamentets relevante komiteer"

• "Jeg har store "frihetsgrader" når jeg deltar i ekspert-komiteene/arbeidsgruppene"
Til slutt følger noen generelle konkluderende spørsmål.

29. Vennligst ta stilling til følgende påstand: "Det utvikles en spesiell "esprit de corps" (korpsånd) over tid i":

Helt enig     Helt uenig

- De forberednede ekspertkomiteer: 1 2 3 4 5
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper: 1 2 3 4 5

30. Mener du at samarbeidet innenfor EU/EF generelt har vært fordelaktig eller ufordelaktig på ditt saksområde?

"fordelaktig" "ufordelaktig"
1 2 3 4 5

31. Er du tilhenger av å styrke samarbeidet innenfor EU/EF ytterligere?

- Innenfor eget saksområde: JA NEI
- Styrke EU-/EF-samarbeidet generelt: JA NEI

32. Når du for første gang ble involvert i EU-/EF-relatert arbeid, var du hovedsakelig positiv eller negativ til EU-samarbeidet?

"positiv" "negativ"
1 2 3 4 5
33. Siden den gang, har du endret din holdning på dette området?

1. Har blitt mer positiv til EU-samarbeidet
2. Ingen holdningsendring
3. Har blitt mer negativ til EU-samarbeidet

34. Hvilken utdanning har du?

______________________________________________________.

35. Alder: Hva er din alder?

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Under 25 år</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45-49 år</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25-29 år</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50-54 år</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>30-34 år</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55-59 år</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>35-39 år</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60-64 år</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>40-44 år</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>65 år og mer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. Finnes det klare regler eller veletablert praksis innad i din institusjon med hensyn til utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver?

1. Meget klare regler/praksis
2. Nokså klare regler/praksis
3. Både og
4. Må selv utøve nokså stort skjønn
5. Må selv utøve meget stort skjønn

Tusen takk for samarbeidet
Appendix 2: Interview guide to national officials from Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

- **Hvor mye** er du involvert i deltagelse i ekspertkomiteer og arbeidsgrupper?
- Finnes **dokumentasjon/rapporter/notater** som sier noe oppsummerende om EU-arbeidet i din instans?
- Hva vil du karakterisere som **hovedforskjellen** mellom rådsarbeidsgruppene og ekspertkomiteene?
- **Endrer du ofte standpunkter** når du deltar i møter?
- Utvikles det noen **esprit de corps** i komiteen, tilhørighet til komiteen…?
- Hvilke **tilhørigheter** er sterkest når du deltar i rådsgruppene og i ekspertkomiteene?
  - overfor egen instans
  - til eget land
  - overfor komiteen som jeg deltar i
  - til EU som helhet
  - til sentraladministrative organer nasjonalt innenfor egen sektor
  - til innenfor andre sektorer
  - til Utenriksdepartementet

- Finnes det **normer for sømmelig** adferd i gruppen du deltar i?
hvilke **kontakter** har du mest hyppig i forbindelse med deltakelsen i rådgruppene og ekspertkomiteene?
kontakter innad i komiteen
med øvrige EU-organ
med sentraladministrative organer “hjemme” innenfor egen sektor
“ på andre sektorer
med Utenriksdepartementet

**Hvem representerer du** primært i komiteen/gruppen?
landet du kommer fra
instansen du jobber i
uavhengig fagekpertise

- Føler du at **hvem du representerer har endret seg** noe over tid - ettersom du har deltatt i slike komiteer?

- Hvordan **koordineres** de posisjoner du fremfører i komiteene / gruppene?
  Klarert med UD, politisk ledelse, andre departementer, andre direktorater?
Kjære tjenestemann/-kvinne.

Som en del av forskningsprogrammet ARENA (Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation State) foretar jeg en undersøkelse av erfaringene til nasjonale tjenestemenn ved de permanente delegasjoner/representasjoner til den Europeiske Union fra deres deltagelse i ekspertkomiteer og arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis EU-kommisjonen og Unionsrådet/Ministerrådet. Undersøkelsen omfatter Danmark, Norge og Sverige. For å få et best mulig bilde av erfaringene fra slik deltagelse, er det ønskelig at du har anledning til å fylle ut vedlagte spørreskjema.

Intervjuene vil gjennomføres slik at hver enkelt fyller ut et standardisert spørreskjema på egenhånd. Selve utfyllingen vil ta omlag 30 minutter. Deres ber jeg deg om å returnere skjemaet i utfylt stand så snart som mulig i den frankerte konvolutten som medfølger, eller sender den pr. fax (se nummer nedenfor). Hver informant vil være garantert full anonymitet (Datatilsynets konsesjon).

En liten veiledning i utfyllingen av skjemaet:

Vennlig hilsen

Jarle Trondal
Stipendiat (doktorgradsstudent)
Fax: +47 22 85 44 11
tlf: +47 22 85 51 66
e-mail: jarle.trondal@stv.uio.no
**DE DANSE, NORSKE OG SVENSK EU-DELEGASJONER: ERFARINGER FRA TJENESTEMENN SOM DELTAR I EKSPERTKOMITEER OG AREIDSGRUPPER I EU.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jarle Trondal</th>
<th>Spørreskjema i EU-delegasjoner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universitetet i Oslo,</td>
<td>ARENA-programmet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutt for statsvitenskap,</td>
<td>Norges forskningsråd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postboks 1097 Blindern,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0317 Oslo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlf: +47 22 85 51 66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax: +47 22 85 44 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Land:**____________________.

2. **Hvilket politikk-/saksområde arbeider du på?**
   
   __________________________________________________________________________.

3. **Hva er din nåværende stilling?**
   
   __________________________________________________________________________.

4. **Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i:**
   
   År
   
   - nåværende stilling?  
   - nåværende instans?  
   - sentralforvaltningen
                             samlet

5. **Har du arbeidet i EU-kommisjonen som:**
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ja</th>
<th>Nei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>praktikant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offentlig tjenestemann</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nasjonal ekspert</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Så følger noen spørsmål angående din deltakelse overfor Den Europeiske Union.

6. Omtrent hvor stor andel av den samlede arbeidstiden din går med til:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meget stor andel</th>
<th>Meget liten andel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deltakelse i ekspert-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>komiteer under EU-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kommisjonen</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deltakelse i arbeids-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grupper under Unionsrådet</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

327
7a. I forbindelse med din deltakelse i forberedende ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis EU-kommisjonen og Unionsrådet, hvor ofte har du hatt kontakt med de følgende instansene i løpet av det siste året:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Meget ofte</th>
<th>Av og til</th>
<th>Meget sjelden/aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ekspertkomiteer**
- Med ulike Generaldirektorater under EU-kommisjonen: 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- Med deltakere i ekspertkomiteer under EU-kommisjonen som jeg ikke deltar i selv: 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- Med andre landsdeltakere i COREPER I eller II: 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- Med deltakere i arbeidsgrupper under Rådet som jeg ikke deltar i selv: 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- Med Europa-parlamentet: 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- Med Europa-domstolen: 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- Med EØS- og EFTA-organer: 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
7b. Med hvilke av de nevnte instansene eller gruppene har du oftest kontakt?
______________________________________________________.

8a. Hvor mange komiteer og rådsarbeidsgrupper har du deltatt i?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- forberedende ekspertkomiteer [ ]
- rådsarbeidsgrupper [ ]

8b. Når omtrent ble du første gang involvert i slik deltakelse?
- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer: ________________________.
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper: _________________________________.

Ekspert-komiteer  Råds-arbeidsgrupper

- Med kolleger fra andre medlemsland som ikke deltar i den komite/ 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
  gruppe som jeg deltar i
- Med kolleger fra andre medlemsland som deltar i den komite/arbeids-gruppe jeg deltar i 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
8c. Hvor mange møter har du deltatt i?

- ekspertkomiteer
  - siste år
  - siste måned
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper

8d. Omtrent hvor lenge varer møtene gjennomsnittlig?

- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper

9. Holder du innlegg på møtene i ekspertkomiteen(e)/arbeidsgruppen(e)?

- Meget ofte
- Meget sjelden/aldri

10. Får du rutinemessig innkallelse til møter i disse komiteene/gruppene, eller må du selv ta initiativ til deltakelse?

- Blir innkalt
- eget initiativ

330
10b. Dersom svart 1, 2 eller 3 ovenfor, fra hvilken instans får du vanligvis innkallelse?

- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer:
  
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper:
  

11a. Er det omtrent de samme personene som deltar i komiteen(e)/gruppen(e) fra møte til møte?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I stor grad</th>
<th>Sjelden/aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper

11b. Hvis svart 1, 2 eller 3 ovenfor, omtrent hvor lenge har disse personene deltatt i komiteen/gruppen?

- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper

12. Kan du angi omtrent hvor lenge disse komiteene/gruppene har eksistert i gjennomsnitt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antall år</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Forberedende ekspertkomiteer
- Rådsarbeidsgrupper
13. Har du kontakt med noen av de øvrige komite-/arbeidsgruppe-deltakerne ut over den kontakt dere har gjennom de formelle komite-møtene?

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{I stor grad} & \text{sjelden/} & \text{aldri} \\
\hline
\text{Forberedende ekspertkomiteer} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\text{Rådsarbeidsgrupper} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\end{array}
\]

14. **Konsulterer** du enkelte av de øvrige deltakerne i ekspertkomiteen(e)/gruppen(e) forut for og/eller i etterkant av møter?

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Meget ofte} & \text{Meget sjelden/} & \text{aldri} \\
\hline
\text{Forberedende ekspertkomiteer:} & & & & & \\
\text{I forkant av møter} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\text{I etterkant av møter} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\text{Rådsarbeidsgrupper:} & & & & & \\
\text{I forkant av møter} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\text{I etterkant av møter} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\end{array}
\]

15. Hvilken **form for kontakt** benytter du forut for og i etterkant av slike møter, og hvor hyppig forekommer denne type kontakt?

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Meget hyppig} & \text{sjelden/} & \text{aldri} \\
\hline
\text{Møter ansikt-til-ansikt} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\text{kontakter pr. telefon, fax og/eller e-mail} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\end{array}
\]
16. I hvilken grad føler du tilhørigheten til og ansvar overfor de følgende enheter når du deltar i ekspertkomite(er) og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis Kommisjonen og Rådet?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ekspertkomiteer</th>
<th>Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-delegasjonen</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eget fagdepartement/direktorat (centrale embetsverk) o.l.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utenriksdepartementet</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egen regjering</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egen profesjon/utdannelsesbakgrunn</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komite(er) som jeg deltar i under EU-Kommisjonen</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeidsgrupp(er) som jeg deltar i under Rådet</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Den Europeisk Union</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eget saksområde/sektor</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nøkkel: I meget stor grad både og liten grad relevant

1 2 3 4 5 9
17. Hvilken vekt vil du tillegge innspill/uttalelser fra de følgende enheter når du deltar i ekspertkomite(er) og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis Kommisjonen og Rådet?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Meget stor betydning</th>
<th>Meget liten betydning</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ekspertkomiteer**  
Arbeidsgrupper  
i Rådet

- Eget fagdepartement  
nasjonalt  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Eget direktorat o.l.  
nasjonalt  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Utenriksdepartement  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Parlamentet nasjonalt  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Nasjonale interessegrupper/bedrifter  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Kommisjonens representanter  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Representanter fra ett eller flere andre medlemsland  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Enkeltpersoner som jeg har blitt kjent med gjennom komiteen(e)/arbeidsgruppene  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

- Interessegrupper/bedrifter på europeisk nivå  
    1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
18. I hvilken grad mener du at tjenestemenn fra andre land opptrer som "eksperter" eller som "regjeringsrepresentanter"?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ekspertkomiteer</th>
<th>Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Formannskapet</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rådssekretariatet</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Europaparlamentet</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. I hvilken grad mener du Kommisjonens representanter opptrer uavhengig av nasjonale særinteresser?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ekspertkomiteer</th>
<th>Arbeidsgrupper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • I forberedende  
ekspertkomiteer | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| • I Rådsarbeidsgrupper | 1 2 3 4 5 5 |
20. Nedenfor er listet endel påstander. I hvilken grad er du enig eller uenig i disse påstandene?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Helt enig</th>
<th>både og</th>
<th>Helt uenig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ekspert- | Råds- |
| komiteer | arbeidsgrupper |

- "Kommisjonen tar medlems-landenes syn seriøst" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- "Kommisjonen tar EØS-landets Norges syn seriøst" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- "Kommisjonen hører mer på representanter fra store medlemsland" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- "Deltakelse i ekspert-komite(er)/arbeidsgrupper er viktig for å sikre faglig riktige vedtak" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- "Deltakelse i ekspert-komite(er)/arbeidsgrupper er viktig fordi jeg kan fremme våre nasjonale interesser" 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Deretter følger noen spørsmål om dine kontakter og arbeid i EU-delegasjonen.

21a. Foretar du forhåndsklareringer med andre sentraladministrative instanser forut for møter i:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stor grad</td>
<td>aldri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Ekspertkomiteen(e) 1 2 3 4 5
- Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e) 1 2 3 4 5

21b. Inkluderer dette klareringer med Utenriksdepartementet?

Ja [ ]
Nei [ ]

21c. Foretar du forhåndsklareringer med andre lands faste EU-delegasjoner/representasjoner forut for møter i:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stor grad</td>
<td>aldri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- ekspertkomiteen(e) 1 2 3 4 5
- Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e) 1 2 3 4 5

22a. Utarbeides noen av de følgende dokumentene i ditt arbeid overfor ekspertkomiteen(e):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ofte</th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- problemnotater 1 2 3 4 5
- rammenotater 1 2 3 4 5
- instrukser 1 2 3 4 5
22b. Utarbeides noen av de følgende dokumentene i ditt arbeid overfor rådsarbeidsgruppen(e):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sjelden/</th>
<th>Ofte</th>
<th>aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>problemnotater</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rammenotater</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instrukser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>problemnotater</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rammenotater</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instrukser</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22c. Føler du at disse dokumentene er styrende for de standpunkter du tar i:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>I meget</th>
<th>Ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stor grad</td>
<td>liten grad</td>
<td>relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ekspertkomiteen(e)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Så følger noen spørsmål om dine kontakter og vektlegginger i utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver.

23. Hvor ofte vil du anslå, i forbindelse med din deltakelse i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, at du har hatt kontakt med de instanser/grupperinger som er listet nedenfor i løpet av det siste året?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Meget ofte</th>
<th>Meget av og til</th>
<th>Ikke sjelden/aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ekspertkomiteer Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet**

- Kontakt med politisk ledelse  
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- kontakt med eget direktorat nasjonalt (centrale embetsverk)  
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- Kontakt med eget fag-departement nasjonalt  
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- kontakt med andre direktorater nasjonalt (centrale embetsverk)  
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- Kontakt med andre fag-departementer nasjonalt  
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- kontakt med Utenriks-departementet  
  1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
Ekspertkomiteer Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet

- Kontakt med Statsministerens kontor 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- Kontakt med interesseorganisasjoner 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- Kontakt med Parlamentet nasjonalt 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- Kontakt med massemedia 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

24. Kan du anslå, i forbindelse med din deltakelse i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, hvor viktige følgende instanser eller grupperinger er når sentrale beslutninger treffes innenfor ditt saksområde?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel: Meget</th>
<th>Meget</th>
<th>Ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>viktig</td>
<td>både og</td>
<td>uvesentlig relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3 4 5 9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ekspertkomiteer Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet

- eget departement nasjonalt 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- eget direktorat nasjonalt (centrale embetsverk) 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- andre departementer nasjonalt 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
25. Hvilken vekt vil du, i forbindelse med din deltagelse i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, tillegge hvert av de følgende hensyn ved utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel: Meget viktig</th>
<th>Meget både og uvesentlig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ekspertkomiteer Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet

- andre direktorater nasjonalt (centrale embetsverk) 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- Parlamentet nasjonalt 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9
- Massemedia 1 2 3 4 5 9 1 2 3 4 5 9

Ekspertkomiteer Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet

- signaler fra politisk ledelse 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- faglig/profesjonelle hensyn 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- Signaler fra bruker-grupper, klienter, særlig berørte parter 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
- Hensynet til eget lands interesser 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Ekspertkomiteer Arbeidsgrupper i Rådet
• Hensynet til andre medlemsland i EU
  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

• Drøfting i ekspertkomiteer som jeg selv deltar i
  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

• Drøfting i arbeidsgrupper som jeg selv deltar i
  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

• Omtale i/innspill fra massemedia
  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nøkkel:</th>
<th>Alltid eller</th>
<th>halvparten av</th>
<th>sjelden eller</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stort sett</td>
<td>tilfellene</td>
<td>aldri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ekspert-komiteer</th>
<th>Rådsarbeids-grupper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- "Jeg må koordinere med Utenriksdepartementet eller andre sentrale koordinerende organer"
  
  1 2 3 1 2 3

- "Min "posisjon" har blitt koordinert med alle relevante departementer nasjonalt"
  
  1 2 3 1 2 3

- "Jeg har klare instruksjoner om hvilken "posisjon" jeg skal innta"
  
  1 2 3 1 2 3

- "Jeg velger ofte selv hvilke "posisjoner" jeg skal innta"
  
  1 2 3 1 2 3

- "Jeg tar de "posisjoner" jeg tror er i beste interesse for mitt land"
  
  1 2 3 1 2 3

- "Jeg tar de "posisjoner" jeg tror er best på grunnlag av min profesjonelle ekspertise"
Ekspert-  
Rådsarbeids-  
komiteer  
grupper

- "Jeg tar de "posisjoner" 
jeg tror er til beste  
for medlemslandene som 1 2 3 1 2 3  
gruppe"
- "Jeg har store "frihetsgrader" 
når jeg deltar i ekspert- 1 2 3 1 2 3  
komiteene/arbeidsgruppene"

Til slutt følger noen generelle konkluderende spørsmål.

27. Vennligst ta stilling til følgende påstand: "Det  
utvikles en spesiell "esprit de corps" (korpsånd) over tid i":

Helt enig  
Helt uenig

De forberednede  
ekspertkomiteer  1 2 3 4 5  
Rådsarbeidsgrupper  1 2 3 4 5

28. Mener du at samarbeidet innenfor EU/EF generelt har  
vært fordelaktig eller ufordelaktig på ditt saksområde?

"fordelaktig"  "ufordelaktig"
1 2 3 4 5
29. Er du tilhenger av å styrke samarbeidet innenfor EU/EF ytterligere?

- Innenfor eget saksområde: JA NEI
- Styrke EU-/EF-samarbeidet generelt: JA NEI

30. Når du for første gang ble involvert i EU-/EF-relatert arbeid, var du hovedsakelig positiv eller negativ til EU-samarbeidet?

"positiv" "negativ"
1 2 3 4 5

31. Siden den gang, har du endret din holdning på dette området?

1. □ Har blitt mer positiv til EU-samarbeidet
2. □ Ingen holdningsendring
3. □ Har blitt mer negativ til EU-samarbeidet

32. Hvilken utdanning har du?

______________________________________________________

33. Alder: Hva er din alder?

1 □ Under 25 år 6 □ 45-49 år
2 □ 25-29 år 7 □ 50-54 år
3 □ 30-34 år 8 □ 55-59 år
4 □ 35-39 år 9 □ 60-64 år
5 □ 40-44 år 10 □ 65 år og mer
34. Finnes det klare **regler** eller **veletablert praksis** innad i din institusjon med hensyn til utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver?

1    Meget klare regler/praksis
2    Nokså klare regler/praksis
3    Både og
4    Må selv utøve nokså stort skjønn
5    Må selv utøve meget stort skjønn

Tusen takk for samarbeidet