The Stability of Political Regimes

- Assessing the Importance of Ethnic Groups’ Access to Power

Kathrine Holden

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### Contents

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ................................................................................................................. 2

**CONTENTS** .......................................................................................................................................... 3

1. **INTRODUCTION** ...................................................................................................................... 4

2. **REVIEWING LITERATURE** .................................................................................................. 8  
   2.1 ASSESSING REGIME STABILITY .............................................................................................. 8  
   2.2 MAPPING ETHNICITY .................................................................................................................. 16  
   2.3 THE STEPS FORWARD .............................................................................................................. 22

3. **ETHNIC EXCLUSION IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT** ................................................................. 24  
   3.1 ETHNICITY AND REGIME STABILITY ......................................................................................... 24  
   3.2 DEMOCRACY AND EXCLUSION ................................................................................................. 31  
   3.3 AUTOCRACY AND EXCLUSION ................................................................................................. 39  
   3.4 INCONSISTENT REGIMES AND EXCLUSION ............................................................................ 45  
   3.5 ARRIVING AT HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................. 49

4. **THE EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THEORY** ........................................................................ 52  
   4.1 THE RESEARCH APPROACH ...................................................................................................... 52  
   4.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................................................... 54  
   4.3 THE LOGIC OF SURVIVAL ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 59  
   4.4 THE DATA ................................................................................................................................... 61

5. **THE RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS** ......................................................................... 76  
   5.1 ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND REGIME STABILITY ........................................................................ 76  
   5.2 ETHNO-POLITICAL EXCLUSION IN DIFFERENT POLITICAL Contexts .................................. 82  
   5.3 ADDITIONAL MEANS OF INCLUSION – OR EXCLUSION .......................................................... 88  
   5.4 ROBUSTNESS OF FINDINGS .................................................................................................... 97  
   5.5 DISCUSSION OF MAIN FINDINGS – AND CHALLENGES ......................................................... 99

6. **CONCLUSION** ........................................................................................................................... 104

**REFERENCES** ...................................................................................................................................... 107
1. Introduction

“The potency of ethnicity is palpable, but not easily explained”. (Wilmsen, 1996:viii)

Ethnically diverse societies are often portrayed as inherently unstable. Presumably, the instability is due to lack of cooperation and trust among groups of different ethnic origins (Fearon & Laitin, 1996:717). These micro-level mechanisms are expected to lead to poor economic performance, higher risk of violence, and ethnic outbidding (Collier, 2001:1), ultimately threatening the stability of political regimes. Regime stability here refers to the duration of institutional structures. This argument has important consequences for multiethnic societies since stability is a necessity for regimes to function (Aristoteles, 1946; Eckstein, 1971). In reality, however, inter-ethnic peace and stability is both possible and probable (Collier, 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 1996). There are numerous examples of countries which have remained remarkably stable despite ethnic diversity and incidents of ethnic antagonism. India is one prime example (Ahuja & Varshney, 2005), while others include Malaysia (Snyder, 2000:280-287) and Western European countries such as Switzerland and Belgium (Horowitz, 1994:37). There are, however, also examples of the opposite, where ethnic divisions have threatened the stability of the regime, such as Fiji (Lal, 2002) and Ethiopia (Tronvoll, 2000). Thus, there must be other mechanisms working at the level of ethnic groups that can explain both regime instability, and the lack thereof.

The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on how the existence of multiple ethnic groups within state borders may be associated with regime instability. Although diverse ethnic affiliations create potential for divisions and tensions, ethnic diversity in itself is not sufficient to threaten the stability of a regime. My argument is that political institutions do matter, both in shaping the salience of ethnic identities, and in creating incentives and constraints for a possible ethnic mobilization. In this regard, access to political power is intrinsically important: exclusion of ethnic groups from the executive may create frustration (Ellingsen, 2000:232) and give a powerful
motive for change of the current political reality. The importance of ethno-political exclusion was first assessed by Cederman and Girardin (2005) in relation to civil war onset, and refers to exclusion of ethnic group(s) from the executive.

The present situation in Iraq illustrates my point. Since the former regime led by Sadaam Hussein was overthrown by American and British troops in March 2003, the subsequent efforts to establish a new democratically elected government have been flawed with much violence and ethnic antagonism. The insurgencies have mainly been led by the Sunni minority, and in the beginning were directed at the foreign troops, but soon primarily targeted the Shi’i majority, their cities, and religious sites (Muir, 2006). An important reason for this change has been Sunni fear of marginalization in the political arena in relation to the Shi’i majority (Hultgren, 2005). This has led the newly elected Prime Minister designate from the Shi’i majority, Nuri al-Maliki, to pronounce that he will focus on inclusion of the Sunnis in his government (The Hill, 2006).

This decision to form a broad coalition to accommodate an ethnic minority reveals a concern that the price of exclusion might be higher than the alternatives, which ultimately may be a regime change (Human Development Report 2000). My approach is to examine whether this concern is indeed well-founded. I will use statistical modeling to provide more systematic evidence on whether ethno-political exclusion is followed by regime instability. Through comparing many cases, the critical issue to be addressed in this study is the following: “Are regimes which exclude ethnic groups from political power more prone to regime instability?”

The importance of excluding ethnic groups from power, however, may in turn be dependent on how the regime types: democracy, autocracy, and inconsistent regimes, shape the motives and opportunities for action. Returning to the example of Iraq prior to the invasion, the small Sunni minority had forcefully controlled political power in the autocracy since the 1960s (Wimmer, 2002:179-180). The few attempts at opposition by the two other ethnic groups in the country, the Kurds and the Shi’is, were effectively silenced (Gurr, 2000) and did not seriously challenge the stability of
the regime. This illustrates that the impact of excluding ethnic groups on regime stability may be relevant only under certain political circumstances. Hence, the second issue to be addressed in this study: “Is the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability contingent on the regime type?”

By addressing these issues I move beyond mere ethnic diversity as an explanatory factor for regime stability, so commonly applied in quantitative research. Instead, I explicitly assess the importance of political institutions combined with the ethnic composition of a country in explaining the occurrence of regime stability. I expand with own data collection, the measure of ethno-political exclusion (Cederman & Girardin, 2005) which captures a potential motive for action and thus better accords with theory on when ethnic groups may mobilize. Furthermore, I examine more systematically how political institutions shape the chances of mobilization, given a motive based on ethno-political exclusion. Through this, I advance scholarly knowledge on how, and under which conditions, the existence of diverse ethnic groups may threaten the stability of a regime.

I find that ethnic diversity by itself does not have an impact on regime stability, regardless of regime type. Ethnic exclusion from political power, however, strongly increases the hazard of regime instability in democracies. This finding remains strong throughout the analysis and gives support to arguments from both relative deprivation and rational action theory. In autocracies and inconsistent regimes, though, the exclusion of ethnic groups does not seem to have a consistent effect on their stability. Additional institutional elements that are expected to impact the notion of ethno-political exclusion in regimes with at least some democratic traits include: decentralization, legal protection, and a proportional representation system. These elements do not reduce the hazard of instability with higher levels of ethno-political exclusion in democratic regimes. A system of decentralization when ethno-political exclusion is high in inconsistent regimes, on the other hand, significantly reduces the hazard of regime change, implying that this measure may compensate for lack of access to the executive in this type of regime.
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the two different strands of research on civil unrest to which this study relates: the conditions for regime stability, and the role of ethnic groups in conflict. In Chapter 3 the analytical framework for the subsequent analysis is developed, discussing how ethno-political exclusion, and not sheer ethnic diversity, may threaten the stability of a regime. The impact of ethno-political exclusion is subsequently discussed in three regime types; democracy, autocracy, and inconsistent regimes, given arguments from the (relative) frustration and rational action perspectives. The chapter is concluded by summarizing the general arguments into eight testable hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the research design, the logic of survival analysis, the data, and the operationalization of the variables. In Chapter 5, the results of the survival analysis are reported and the robustness of the model is examined. I also discuss potential measurement validity problems. Chapter 6 concludes this study by summarizing the results and highlights my contribution to the understanding of why multiethnic regimes differ in terms of stability.
2. Reviewing Literature

“Standing on the shoulder of giants” (Newton, 1676)

Despite cultural differences and diverse preferences, the majority of human beings wish to live a life in peace and stability. The preconditions for a situation of peace and stability are highly contested though, and constitute an essential question in social science. Extensive research has been conducted to reveal the patterns of war, peace and stability. Hence, reviewing the state of (perceived) knowledge is a suitable starting point for the subsequent analysis. This study relates primarily to two different strands of research on civil unrest. First, this thesis is a further investigation of the conditions for regime stability. Second, the study draws on the extensive body of literature on the role of ethnicity in conflict. In the following chapter I first categorize regime types, define the concept of regime stability and instability, and give a brief outline of the theoretical and empirical approaches to studying regime changes. I then turn to the role of ethnicity, and give an account of how groups may be identified in terms of ethnic boundaries. Subsequently, I discuss how ethnic groups may be mobilized for change of status quo, given three preconditions for mobilization: identity, frustration, and opportunity. Next, I review different statistical measures commonly applied when assessing the role of ethnicity, and argue that all but one, the ethno-political exclusion measure, diverge from the theoretical understanding of ethnic groups. The knowledge on regime stability and ethnic groups in relation to conflict are sought combined in the last section, being the bridge for my own analytical framework in Chapter 3.

2.1 Assessing Regime Stability

A regime is a political system that lays down procedures and rules for decision-making. The systemic mechanisms determines “who has political rights, how they can be exercised, and with what effects for the control over the state” (Przeworski et al., 2000:18). In other words, a regime is a way of organizing political power. The
organizing of power takes place at every level of the international system. Here the focus is confined to political regimes demarcated by state borders. Regime and political regime will be used interchangeably throughout the study to refer to this concept.

2.1.1 Categorizing Regimes

There exist probably as many ways of organizing political power as there are territorial areas confined by state borders. Nonetheless, there are similarities amongst the different systems. The current categorization of different political regimes originally derives from the thinkers of Antiquity. Aristotle (1946:III,1279b) organized the different ways of governing as a continuum between the rule of the few to the rule of the many. This simple understanding will be adopted in this study. The typology relates purely to the actual characteristics of the political system, not to its performance – a highly debated limitation.

A political system characterized by the rule of the many is understood as a democracy. Democracy literally means the ‘rule of the people’. There is however a conceptual disarray in the actual interpretation and application of the term. Whilst the ‘minimalist’ school purely emphasizes the instrumental aspects of democracy as a method (e.g. Schumpeter, 1962:269-283), the ‘maximalist’ school turns its focus to the normative implications and performance of a democratic system (e.g. Beetham, 1994:25-41). The difference between the two strands is clearly elucidated by Kaldor and Vejoda (1997:62):

“Formal democracy is a set of rules, procedures and institutions [...] substantive democracy [is] a process that has to [be] continually reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in such a way as to maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions which affect society”.

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1 In reality, Aristotle developed six categories of regime type according to two criteria: i) the number of people who govern, and ii) the purpose of the regime.
Although an important issue by itself, a more thorough discussion of what democracy essentially is, both normatively and empirically, is beyond the focus of this study. I have adopted a minimalist understanding of regimes for strategic reasons. Following a slightly modified version of Gurr (1974:1483) applied by Gates et al. (2005:1), I define democracy as a political system that devolves power along three institutional dimensions; the recruitment of the executive is open, the power of the executive is constrained, and there are regular constitutional opportunities for participation permitting the largest possible part of the population to vote.

Conversely, autocracies are characterized by the rule of the few. In such a system “only the preferences of part of society are taken into account” (Boix, 2003:10). I define autocracy as a political regime that concentrates power along the three dimensions. The most important feature, according to Gandhi and Przeworski (2006:1) is that the political leader(s) “cannot be removed from office by means of the people’s vote”. In addition to the restricted recruitment of the executive, the power of the executive is not constrained, and larger parts of the population do not participate through elective channels (Gurr, 1974:1483). As with democracy, the choice has been to apply a simple, formalistic definition for advantages to which I will return.

The categorization of democratic and autocratic regimes captures an underlying concept of more or less concentration of political power along three dimensions. This forms the basis of a gradual determination of every regime being more or less democratic (Dahl, 1986:63) or more or less autocratic. Although understanding democracy and autocracy as representing two extremes on a continuum is not unproblematic (see Næss, 1968:93 for a critique), it intuitively captures important differences between the systems. Each extreme or ideal type holds institutions that are ‘consistent’ in the sense that they either concentrate or devolve power on all three dimensions. The consistent regimes, be they autocratic or democratic, are characterized as regimes which contain “institutions that are mutually reinforcing” (Gates et al., 2005:3).
Following this logic, there will inevitably be many political regimes falling in-between the ideal types. These hybrid regimes typically combine autocratic and democratic features along the different institutional dimensions. They are commonly referred to as ‘semi-democratic’ or ‘inconsistent regimes’ (see Levitsky & Way, 2003 for discussion). I will refer to political regimes that are in-between the ideal types as inconsistent, following Gates et al. (2005), since they posit a mixture of concentration and devolution of power. Incorporating the conception of consistency-inconsistency allows me to better separate between regime types and prevents me from collapsing everything into simply a dual categorization. It allows for nuances within an otherwise strict and limited framework.

A three-fold categorization of all regimes is a simplification of reality. However, there are three advantages of adopting such a ‘minimalist’ classification. First, the categorization is based on simple and observable facts. Second, although a definition based on institutional characteristics does not capture the entire notion of differences between regimes, it captures what is necessary. Even Beetham (1999:4-5), a proponent of the substantive democracy strand, acknowledges that “democratic principles [...] require practical institutional form for their realization”. The last advantage of applying a minimalist definition is that I can study the performance of a regime separately. The outcome of the formal structures, such as for example the treatment and inclusion of different ethnic groups, is thus distinguished as an outcome and not as defining traits. Although ‘rule by the few’ more likely excludes diverse ethnic groups from power, it is theoretically possible that ‘the few’ consists of one person from each ethnic group in the regime. Conversely, ‘rule by the many’ may correspond to ‘many’ from the same ethnic group, excluding all ethnic groups not composing part of the majority. Since democracy does “not always deliver on expectations about egalitarian justice and fairness [...]”, it is important to detach democracy from these expectations” (Shapiro & Hacker-Cordón, 1999:12). Hence, given these considerations I apply a formalistic, three-fold categorization between democracy, autocracy and inconsistent regimes. In Chapter 4 more precise operationalizations will follow.
2.1.2 Conceptualizing Regime Stability and Change

The necessity of regime stability is a recurring issue in social science (Aristoteles, 1946; Eckstein, 1971). However, understanding of this phenomenon differs substantially. Hurwitz (1973:449-463) reviews the conceptual diversity in research on political stability, from absence of civil conflict and consistence of societal traits, to longevity of political structures. Although highly interlinked, I see the longevity of political structures as the core element of the concept. Hence, a political regime, be it autocratic, democratic or inconsistent, is considered stable if the main institutional features endure over time. Again, the main institutional features refer to the three dimensions identified in the previous section: how the executive is recruited, how the executive is constrained, and last, but not least, how citizens are allowed to participate in politics.

On the contrary, a political regime is considered unstable if the main institutional features are relatively short in duration. Frequent changes in how a regime organizes political power obstruct the consolidation and stability of the system. Hence, to identify the duration of political regimes, it is necessary to identify when regime changes in institutional features occur. In this regard, it is crucial to draw a line between minor regime changes, which are a natural consequence of a regime’s adaptability, and larger regime changes, which destabilize a political system (Gurr, 1974:1484). Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between regime changes as smaller parts of a larger process of transition (Pridham, 1995:xii). This gives an indication on the time perspective. Lastly, it is important to keep in mind the direction of the regime change.

A regime change is here defined as a change in the rules and the procedures of the political regime such that it alters its defining character. Recalling that a regime’s defining character is based on the three institutional dimensions of power; there must be a major change in the degree of openness in the recruitment of the executive, the constraints on its power, and/or the level of participation in politics among citizens. This definition corresponds to a view on regime changes as signs of instability, and
not mere adjustments. Furthermore, given this definition, a regime change is equivalent to transition. This implies that each regime can only experience one regime change – a transition to a new regime. The advantage of such an approach, in comparison to the alternative of identifying regime changes as parts of the transition process, is that the completion of change is determined and does not need any references to the complicated notion of consolidation. Furthermore, this approach avoids understanding regime changes as a unidirectional process towards democratization. Since regime changes can go in multiple directions, and the importance of regime changes for this study is solely the frequency of it, I see this approach as the most feasible. A more thorough operationalization of regime change will be given in Chapter 4.

2.1.3 Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives on Regime Change

There have been many attempts at identifying why regimes differ in terms of stability. Before reviewing the literature on the possible causes of regime stability and instability, it is important to highlight that regime changes can take various forms. They can be a result of revolution and revolt or a consequence of reforms and negotiation. The initiative for change can come from the people, external forces, the political elite, or prosperous groups that do not contain official political power (see Stepan, 1999 for a review). Despite diverse paths of regime change, a common denominator for most cases is that at least some groups in society must be mobilized and demand changes of status quo. Whether these groups include political leaders, poor farmers, or ethnic groups, regime changes do not occur by accident. The potential for mobilization is further dependent on a groups’ identity, motive, and opportunities for action (Ellingsen, 2000:229), which in turn are shaped by contextual features. Most large comparative studies have focused exclusively on the contextual conditions that are conducive for regime stability. In the following section, I will thus assess four broad structural factors that have been identified by previous research as important determinants of regime change.
The most extensive focus on regime stability has been on the importance of economic conditions. Initial work on regime change in the 1950’s interpreted the phenomenon in a ‘modernization’ perspective; where political systems deterministically would undertake gradual regime change(s) from authoritarianism to democracy as they develop economically (e.g. Lipset, 1959). Later important works in the economic arena have revealed that higher levels of economic development and economic growth are associated with regime survival. The challenge here has been to identify the reciprocal relationship between economic performance and regime stability. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) convincingly show how higher income per capita preserves democracy, not necessarily causes it. They also find support for economic growth’s decisive role in determining regime survival. This may indicate that at higher levels of economic development and growth, groups in the society do not contain any motive for mobilizing for changes of status quo.

In contrast to the theory of political modernization, certain researchers have highlighted that there are diverse paths of regime changes and stability dependent on social or cultural compositions. Moore (1966) was the first to break with a uniform development perspective (Østerud, 1999:62). He stressed the importance of the balance and interaction between different class constellations as key factors in shaping the occurrence and direction of regime changes. Hence, he explicitly assessed the potential of mobilizing groups for regime change based on their identity and group affiliation. Later important works in the ‘sociological approach’ have concentrated on factors such as cultural homogeneity and ethnic competition in explaining the great variation in regime type and stability. (Dahl, 1971:111) found partial support for the argument that democracy, what he preferred to call polyarchy, is less feasible in multiethnic societies. A consequence of this argument is that multiethnic democracies are unstable due to the opportunities for ethnic outbidding. However, as Dahl also recognizes, his study has many shortcomings since it does not control for the effect of economic development and the age of the regime (see Przeworski & al., 1996:21 for a critique). Newer statistical research with measures of
cultural heterogeneity in relation to regime stability has not found any consistent support for this argument (e.g. Gasiorowski, 1995).

The ‘new institutionalist’ approach was a consequence of a general critique among political scientists towards the omission of political structures, reducing regime change to a simple reflection of social and economic processes. This temporal omission was repaired by increasing focus on the effect of institutional features on regime stability, in combination with social factors and rational choice theory (Apter, 1998). A consequence of the ‘new institutionalism’ approach was that mobilization did not only depend on identity and motive, but rather the political opportunities or lack thereof. Important work in this school has commonly compared democracy and autocracy in terms of regime stability (e.g. Przeworski et al., 2000), or concentrated more on specific democratic features such as differences in electoral system, constitutional restrictions, and measures of decentralization (see Przeworski & al., 1996:43-46 for a critique). The most important work for this thesis is a study by Gates et al. (2005), which reveals that the patterns of stability depend on the consistency of the political structures, not the political structures per se. Their theoretical foundation resembles that of earlier publications by (Eckstein, 1973) and (Gurr, 1974). They find that regimes that are consistent in either devolving or concentrating power, exemplified by ideal democratic and autocratic systems, are relatively stable. Conversely, inconsistent regimes, which are systems that combine autocratic and democratic features, are highly unstable (Gates et al., 2005:21).

In the realm of growing interconnectedness between societies, the focus on the international diffusion of ideas and their impact on regime stability and change have been increasing. In this regard Huntington’s (1991) study on the ‘third wave of democratization’ directed a new path. He argued that the empirical identification of three democratic waves, and their reversals, indicated that the causes of regime changes were shared and thus global (or at least regional). Huntington’s ignorance of domestic-bound causes have been thoroughly criticized (e.g. Przeworski et al., 2000:45), and later studies in this approach has slightly modified the argument (e.g.
Grugel, 2002:8-9). Despite its flaws, the study inspired extensive research on the possibilities of external causes for regime change (e.g., Pevehouse, 2002). Gleditsch (2002:192-193) has found evidence that the political neighborhood strongly influences the stability of political systems. He demonstrated that regime changes tend to render political systems more similar to neighboring countries. This corresponds to a view that the motive and opportunities for mobilization are improved with external inspiration and encouragement.

In terms of the notion of the preconditions for mobilization, the four structural approaches emphasize different contexts, which may influence group identity, motive, and opportunities. This study intends to have an integral approach to the four perspectives reviewed, since I do not believe regime stability to be explained by one cause, but rather the interaction between many. Hence, each perspective will serve as the theoretical basis for the choice of control variables in chapter 4. The core assumption of this thesis, however, is that institutions do matter in shaping groups’ identity, motive, and opportunity. In accordance with Przeworski (1995:43), I believe that “stability is not just a matter of economic, social or cultural conditions because specific institutional arrangements differ in their ability to process conflicts”. Yet, I do not intend to go into the same pitfall as many inquiries based on a neo-institutional approach and omit the fact that societies differ (Boix, 2003:15). I believe that diverse societal conditions, such as ethnic diversity, are to be reflected in the performance of political institutions. The role of ethnic groups will be assessed in the following section.

2.2 Mapping Ethnicity

Demarcating borders is not only an aspect of the relationship between states, but does also take place at the individual level among people. To “belong, to identify and hence to exclude” is according to Gellner (1964:149) a human necessity. Thus, identifying ‘me’, ‘us’ and ‘the others’ is an important aspect of human life and creates a base of belongingness. However, the phenomenon is equivocal in the sense
that it can also act as a catalyst for negative behavior towards ‘the others’. When this happens, the identity may play a role in relation to antagonism, conflict, and ultimately regime instability. Each individual has commonly several overlapping identities (Barth, 1969:22-25), and ethnicity is one such base for demarcating between individuals. In the following sections, I discuss how ethnic groups may be identified and made relevant in relation to changes of status quo.

2.2.1 Ethnicity as Given, Created or Shaped?

Understanding the nature of ethnicity is intrinsically complicated and how ethnic groups may be identified has long been disputed. Theoretically there has been a division primarily between the ‘primordialist’ and the ‘constructivist’ approach, although many criticize this dichotomy (e.g. Comaroff, 1996:164). The primordialist approach understands ethnic identities as fairly settled and unchangeable. The assumption is that inherent characteristics, such as language, religion, descent and other cultural traits, create bonds between individuals with similar traits, and demarcate the boundaries towards ‘the others’. Thus, ethnic identity is biologically given and fixed, and ethnic groups may be identified according to objectively, observable traits (Comaroff, 1996).

The primordialist view has been strongly criticized for presenting a static and naturalistic view of ethnicity (Eller & Coughlan, 1993). At its most extreme, primordialism stratifies humans into species and thus “wanders into the zoological gardens of socio-biology” (Østby, 2003:25). Empirical difficulties in defining ethnic groups and the apparent multi-layers of identity have to a large degree undermined the assumption of identity as primordial (see Fearon, 2003 for thorough discussion).

The constructivist approach is a broad assertion of different theoretical perspectives: realist, instrumentalist², and contextualists, which have in common an understanding

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² Some scholars distinguish a third perspective of ethnic origin, institutionalism, which sees identity as a consequence of utility. This, however, I do not see as significantly different from the constructivist approach (Comaroff, 1996:164).
of collective identities as social constructions (Comaroff, 1996). Barth (1969) was one of the first to break with the earlier static approach and emphasized the understanding of ethnicity as relational. Instead of taking ethnicity as given, the constructivist camp concentrates their focus on the role of elites, state institutions, and conflicts in shaping a collective identity. Hence, ethnic identity is not necessarily durable, but rather has the possibility to change depending on contextual matters. Heilser (1990:45) promptly stated; “ethnic identity tends to be a partial, part-time aspect of people’s self-concepts”.

However, reducing ethnic identities to pure constructions undermine the reality of individual actors. Individuals are not simply passive receivers of an identity, which is the impression the constructivist approach gives. As Laitin (1998:248) accentuates “ethnic entrepreneurs cannot create ethnic solidarities from nothing”. To succeed, the identification base has to be relevant for real people. The identity must thus be founded on considerations of relative likeness and difference among the compliers (Horowitz, 1985:70).

The two theoretical approaches to ethnic identity are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Instead they stress two important aspects in the process of identifying an ethnic group (Hylland Eriksen, 1991:264). First, an ethnic identity has to appeal and be relevant to the people who share them. This implies an identification of similarities and differences of characteristics, whether biologically bound in terms of for example skin color, or not. Secondly, the importance of the identity is defined and influenced by the social and political context. Hylland Eriksen (1993:57) sums this up well by stating that “ethnic identities are neither prescribed nor achieved: they are both”. The inherent duality in the concept of ethnic identity is acknowledged in this study. In accordance with the first aspect, potential ethnic groups are here primarily distinguished by religion, provided that they posit self-consciousness as a group and that membership in the group has a strong descent basis, a definition adopted from Fearon (2003:202). Considering the second aspect, the relevance of ethnic groups, as
defined here, depends in particular on the political context. This will further be elaborated in the next section.

2.2.2 Ethnic Groups and Mobilization

For a regime change to occur, it is most likely that at least some groups and preferences in society must be mobilized, as discussed earlier. Given certain conditions, ethnic groups may serve as an important basis for mobilization against status quo. Three preconditions for a group to mobilize have been identified by the literature on civil unrest: a common identity, frustration, and opportunity (Ellingsen, 2000:229). I will now assess each precondition separately, in relation to ethnic groups.

Commitment to mobilization cannot be constructed out of nothing. The need for a unifying structure, based on certain characteristics, is of high importance (Tilly, 1978). The identity serves to demarcate borders between the ones to potentially mobilize and ‘the others’, and provides for greater intra-group coherence. Ethnic identity in this sense is relatively more important than many other forms of demarcation, since the characteristics are more durable. It is not possible to convert one’s ethnic identity in the same way, as it is possible, at least in principle, to change its geographical belongingness or class situation (Horowitz, 1985:6-13). Threat from the ‘outside’ can further accelerate and delineate identity differentiation. When ethnicity is an important determinant of people’s economic, social and political status, it is more likely to be highly salient (Ellingsen, 2000:234; Gurr, 2000:67). The salience of ethnic identity thus operates in a reciprocal relationship with the context, as discussed in the previous section.

Mobilization must serve a purpose. It must be a response to certain conditions that make people react and cohere. A motive for mobilization can be based on frustration. Recent studies have focused on inequality as the main element of frustration (Stewart, 2002; Østby, 2003). Following the logic of frustration theory, distribution of benefits, which follows ethnic divisions, makes people react and organize for change “against
the source of discrimination” (Ellingsen, 2000:234). Political institutions are central determinants of the distribution of benefits (Stewart, 2000:6), and thus access to political power captures an important aspect of equality, or conversely inequality, between ethnic groups. Ethnic exclusion from political power is here defined as a situation where the ethnic group is not represented in any of the main positions in the executive with regular intervals, following Cederman and Girardin (2005:7). It is often a ‘relative’ sense of frustration, rather than an absolute, that has been observed as the underlying determinant of mobilization (Davies, 1962). The gap between expectations and the actual situation may be what causes frustration (Ellingsen, 2000:230). As a consequence of the ‘relative’ notion, ethnic groups, which are excluded from the executive, may have a greater incentive to mobilize for change of status quo if they expect to be included, in accordance with relative deprivation theory.

Last, but not least, scholars of rational action theory argue that the conditions must be favorable for excluded ethnic groups to mobilize. According to this approach a common identity and frustration may alone be insufficient in determining mobilization (Gurr, 1970:112). If the individuals are rational actors they will consider their opportunities to mobilize due to frustration. Muller and Weede (1990:625) argue that opportunities are a function of the resources available and the responses of the political system. Attributes of the political system thus give an indication about some of the opportunities rational actors will consider, given a motive for mobilization. There are clearly other opportunities that are relevant, such as group characteristics and international trends. This study will, however, primarily assess opportunities in terms of what Gurr (2000:79-81) refers to as external opportunities given by the rules and procedures of the domestic political system. Other internal opportunities in terms of the size of the ethnic group will be defined as capacities assessed indirectly through the operationalization of ethnic exclusion. Hence, following the logic of rational action theory, ethnic groups will calculate their probabilities of success through mobilization, given their motive and political context. I will return to the
notion of ethnic group’s frustration and opportunity in relation to regime stability in Chapter 3.

2.2.3 Empirical Studies on the Role of Ethnicity

The role of ethnic groups as a potential basis for mobilization against status quo has been assessed in numerous studies. In particular, the many ethnic conflicts and disputes, which accompanied regime changes from the late 1970s to the 1990s, boosted research on the phenomenon. However, there exists a discrepancy between the theoretical understanding of ethnic identity, its potential role in mobilization, and how statistical studies have assessed the challenges of ethnic diversity. This discrepancy may partly explain why ethnic antagonism in numerous case studies have been distinguished as an important explanatory factor in regime change (e.g. Bertrand, 2004), while most statistical studies have yet to identify any strong association between these phenomena (e.g. Gasiorowski, 1995:889-892; Przeworski et al., 2000:124-126). In the following section, I give a short review on the different statistical measures of the role of ethnicity. They have primarily been employed on studies investigating the outbreak of civil conflict, and to lesser degree on regime stability since there have not been many studies on the association between ethnic diversity and regime stability. However, since I am here chiefly interested in the actual statistical measure, and how it captures ethnic groups as potential bases for mobilization, I disregard the differences in use.

The most commonly applied measure of the role of ethnicity in relation to changes of status quo is the ethnic fractionalization index. This measure captures the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in a country, identifying the ethnic belonging of each individual. Applying this measure, numerous researchers have drawn the conclusion that ethnic diversity does not play any significant role in explaining the onset of civil wars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003), or regime change (Gasiorowski, 1995; Przeworski et al., 2000). Other measures of ethnic diversity have been developed, to better account for the relative size of the ethnic groups. Employing a
measure of ethnic polarization, Reynal-Querol (2002) found support that higher level of ethnic polarization does indeed heighten the risk of civil war incidence. Two other measures on ethnic dominance and ethnic cleavage\(^3\), developed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), was confirmed to be unrelated to the onset of civil war. These examples of statistical measures on ethnic diversity only differ in how they weigh the relative size of ethnic groups. They do not take into account whether the ethnic groups are relevant, and neglect the necessity of a motive for ethnic groups to mobilize.

In order to capture this inconsistency between theory and quantitative studies, Cederman and Girardin (2005) have developed their own measure of ethno-political exclusion. This measure goes beyond the mere ethnic composition of a society and incorporates a contextual aspect of ethnic identity: both the relative size of each ethnic group, and whether they have a motive for action based on exclusion from power. They found that the higher levels of ethno-political exclusion, the greater risk of civil war. This measure of ethnic exclusion is at the centre of the analysis in this study, and will be further described in Chapter 4.

### 2.3 The Steps Forward

Through reviewing existing knowledge on the reasons for regime instability and the nature of ethnicity, I have paved the way for my own inquiry. First, I have come to acknowledge the importance of institutions for the stability of political systems. Regime change is a result of the mobilization of at least some parts of the population. Political institutions shape the opportunities, and the incentives, for such a mobilization. Second, I acknowledge that political structures do not operate in a social vacuum. Ethnic group(s) serve as a potential identity base for mobilization, which could subsequently threaten the stability of a regime. Yet, this mobilization depends not only on the mere existence of ethnic groups, but also on frustration based

\(^{3}\) The measure was named ‘cleavage’ by Nordås (2004:45).
on ethnic demarcation. One powerful source of frustration is exclusion from political power based on an ethnic identity, which could in turn threaten the regime’s stability. Most likely, however, the excluded ethnic groups will act as rational actors and consider their opportunities of success through a mobilization, given their motive. These theoretically founded assumptions will be the point of departure for the subsequent development of the analytical framework.
3. Ethnic Exclusion in a Political Context

“In ethnic politics, inclusion may affect the distribution of important material and nonmaterial goods, including the prestige of the various ethnic groups and the identity of the state as belonging more to one group than another” (Horowitz, 1994:35)

Regulation of the diversity and divergent opinions that inevitably exists in a collective is necessary for a political regime to function. A regime’s rules and practices determine individuals’ and groups’ access to power and regulate who is to be included or excluded. In every existing political regime there are groups experiencing the privileges of being included and others the penalties of being excluded (Horowitz, 1994:35), although the extent varies. Under certain circumstances exclusion could threaten the stability and practices of the regime itself. In this chapter I develop an analytical framework for the analysis of regime stability based on the review of theory in Chapter 2. I first discuss how ethnic diversity could affect regime stability, not through the mere existence of different ethnic groups, but rather through ethnic exclusion from political power. The expected effects on regime stability are then illustrated in a model. Subsequently, I develop the argument further and discuss how exclusion of ethnic groups from power affects regime stability differently depending on the political context. More specifically, I discuss the effect of ethnic exclusion on regime duration in democracy, autocracy, and inconsistent regimes separately, in light of arguments from (relative) frustration and rational action theory. In the end, I summarize the general arguments into testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis.

3.1 Ethnicity and Regime Stability

Political stability is the aim of all regimes (Muller & Weede, 1990:624), and how this may be affected by ethnic diversity is of intrinsic interest to policy makers. In the following part, I first examine why ethnic diversity is not relevant in determining regime stability. Subsequently, I argue that a situation of ethno-political exclusion
better accord with the theoretical understandings of ethnic groups and mobilization. I then illustrate the general arguments on what affects regime stability in a model.

### 3.1.1 Ethnic Diversity and Regime Stability

Multiethnic societies are often regarded as inherently unstable. Allegedly, diverse ethnic groups are less likely to cooperate for the best solutions (Easterly & Levine, 1997). Lack of cooperation is based on two micro level assumptions; ethnic groups do not see it as advantageous to cooperate or they do simply not trust each other (Fearon & Laitin, 1996:717). Regardless of behavioral mechanisms, the non-cooperative environment is expected to pose a threat to the political system’s performance (Collier, 2001:1). Manifestation of dissatisfaction with status quo, due to dysfunctional politics and constant ethnic disagreement, may quickly lead to regime changes and instability. Since every policy outcome is seen as a result of ethnic outbidding, the more ethnic groups in a society, the worse the performance and thus the chances of regime stability.

However, the argument that the more ethnic diverse a society, the greater chances of regime instability, is neither adequately grounded in the theoretical understanding of ethnic identity, nor considers the preconditions for mobilization. The argument entails an understanding of ethnic boundaries as fixed. Moreover, it presupposes that ethnic divisions in heterogeneous societies are the inevitable cleavages at which social and political behavior revolves and mobilizes. I will argue, referring both to theory and empirical examples, that both these assumptions are poorly founded.

First and foremost, ethnic identities cannot be seen as static and primordial. Each individual contains multiple identities, which could all be seen as ‘ethnic’, and possibly cross-cutting (Barth, 1969:22-25). A Sudanese man, for example, may simultaneously identify with his Arabic language-group, Darfur territory, nomadic tribe, and Islamic religious belief. These identities are partly overlapping, but rarely completely. There is no obvious explanation why one of these bases of ethnic identity is intrinsically more important than another (Gurr, 2000:67). Their importance is
determined by the appeal to the individual in question (Horowitz, 1985) in turn subject to contextual circumstances. The crosscutting identities complicate the rationale for cooperation or lack thereof. The fact that an individual has several identities diffuses the logic at the aggregate level for cooperation and trust between ethnic groups. This makes the environment for cooperation in multiethnic societies more dynamic than what many scholars presume, and the expected threat of multiethnicity to a regime’s stability diminishes.

Posner (2005) has illustrated empirically the dynamic character of ethnic identities through an extensive case study of Zambia. Based on interviews and questionnaires he reveals how cooperation and relevance of ethnic identities in Zambia varied due to changes in the electoral system. Whereas the roughly seventy different tribal identities appeared the most important to the voters when Zambia posited a multi-party rule from independence to 1972 and 1991 until today, the four larger linguistic groups became the ethnic dimension most relevant under a one-party rule in the period 1973 to 1991 (Posner, 2005:18). Institutional features facilitated different ethnic constellations and cooperation. This empirical example accentuates the importance of taking seriously the dynamic character of ethnic identities as they partly reflect the political context.

Secondly, a cleavage is not based on the mere existence of differences, but on mobilization due to such differences. Mobilization presupposes more than just a common identity among the mobilized. It is thus problematic to equate multiethnic regimes with the existence of mobilized ethnic cleavages, which in turn is believed to endanger a regime’s stability. According to theories on mobilization, a common identity is one important, but insufficient, condition for a group to mobilize (Gurr, 1970:112). In order to function as a demarcating identity basis for mobilization, there must be a motive dependent on the common identity. Without such an objective, which can serve as an incentive for individual engagement, mobilization along ethnic lines is unlikely (Gurr, 2000:69-71). Hence, the existence of ethnic diversity does not pose a threat to a regime’s stability and cooperative environment per se, but depends
on whether there are incentives for mobilization and delineation. Given that, there is not likely to be a consistent relationship between ethnic diversity and regime instability.

The inconsistent relationship between ethnic diversity and the existence of an ethnic cleavage is supported by case studies of multiethnic countries. Sri Lanka, with long-driven civil strife between the governing Sinhalese and the Tamil minority, is one example of a society where ethnicity constitutes the major cleavage. Tambiah (1991) remarks that the ethnic antagonism between the two groups has dismantled the democracy and created an unstable regime. Yet other countries have remained remarkably stable despite great ethnic diversity. Switzerland for example, has not undergone any greater regime changes since after the Second World War, although the political system is organized around linguistic divisions (Lijphart, 1999:34). Hence, ethnic diversity alone does not explain the occurrence of regime instability. Any theory that fails to consider ethnicity’s contextual character will miss important dynamics (Przeworski & al., 1996:21) that are necessary if to explain the role of ethnic groups in relation to regime stability.

### 3.1.2 Ethno-Political Exclusion and Regime Instability

An important catalyst for mobilization and awareness of a collective identity below the national level is in relations of inequality. Discriminatory policies and inequality “gives people powerful incentives for action” (Gurr, 2000:71). According to Comaroff (1996:166) are “ethnic identities […] always caught up in equations of power at once material, political, symbolic”. The centre for the equation of power has traditionally been the state. Concern for future prospects mobilizes ethnic groups to compete for ownership of the state and thereby securing other resources (Cederman & Girardin, 2005:5). Holding political power has widespread advantages (Przeworski & al., 1996:40). Hence, access to political power, here understood as access to the executive, is intrinsically important.
Exclusion from political power may increase the salience of the ethnic consciousness and give ethnic groups a powerful incentive for mobilization against the power-holders. As Ellingsen (2000:232) notes, “through monopolizing key positions within the government, the army, and so forth, the dominant group may create ethnic hostility”. A mobilization due to frustration could in turn threaten the very foundation of the regime. The mobilized group may, either through the use of coercion or negotiation, enforce political changes. The ethnic group in power could respond by accepting, denying, or counter-mobilizing against the claims made by the mobilized group, which could quickly involve regime changes. A regime’s stability thus relies on the dyadic relationship between the ethnic group(s) excluded from political power and the dominant group(s) at the centre.

Clearly, ethnic exclusion may occur not only in relation to the executive power. The frustration caused by exclusion from the executive could be aggravated if accompanied with ethnic monopolization of other branches of political power, such as in the bureaucracy and the military (Adekanye, 1997:99). Furthermore, access to non-political arenas of power may be of importance, in particular the economic arena (Stewart, 2000:5-6). The focus in this study, however, will be on access to the executive power, because of the central importance of this arena for the power-relations in other fields.

Having ascertained the importance of frustration based on ethno-political exclusion for a regime’s stability, the capacity for regime change also depends on the dyadic relationship of strength between the excluded and the power holders. This does to a large extent relate to the relative size of the excluded groups in comparison to the ones holding power. Posner (2005:7) accentuates that the relative size of the ethnic group is vital since it “determine[s] whether or not [it] will serve as [a] useful base of self-identification and political mobilization”. Furthermore, whether there is more than one ethnic group excluded from the executive could disperse the power of the excluded since they would most likely not cooperate (Cederman & Girardin, 2005:6). The relative size and number of excluded ethnic groups are incorporated in the
measure of ethno-political exclusion, as will be clarified when presenting the operationalization of ethno-political exclusion in Chapter 4. Thus, I will argue that exclusion of ethnic groups from the executive could lead an ethnic group to mobilize, which in turn may increase the likelihood of regime instability.

Turning to the real world there are numerous examples of negative consequences of excluding ethnic groups from political power. In Burundi the traditional power holders, the Tutsi minority, was expelled from office in 1993 as a result of a democratic election, which was part of a larger reform process. This provoked military coups and other counterinsurgencies by the excluded Tutsi’s against the new power-holders, the dominant Hutus, nullifying Burundi’s democratic gains (Dravis, 2000:188-189). Statistically, Cederman and Girardin (2005) have found that exclusion of ethnic groups from power does in fact increase the likelihood of civil war onset.

3.1.3 The Model of Effects between Ethnicity and Regime Stability

The theoretical discussion and empirical examples in the previous sections make it plausible to expect that ethno-political exclusion, rather than ethnic diversity, may lead to regime instability. Whilst ethnic diversity only affects the notion of identity, ethno-political exclusion also captures the aspect of frustration, giving ethnic groups’ an incentive for mobilization. Figure 3.1 illustrates the general argument, and is not a strict causal model.

As illustrated in the model, ethno-political exclusion is a possible consequence of features of the political regime if the system is composed of diverse ethnic groups. Besides the direct effects between ethno-political exclusion and two of the preconditions for mobilization; identity and frustration, there is a dependent aspect of ethno-political exclusion. The importance of ethno-political exclusion for the sense of frustration and the opportunities for mobilization are highly dependent on the regime type. For that reason I will in the continuation discuss the impact of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability in each regime type separately. In the subsequent
analysis, the three preconditions for mobilization; identity, frustration, and opportunity, will not be measured directly, and one may argue that they are indeed unmeasurable. Instead, I will measure whether these assumptions regarding individual- and group-behavior are consistent with macro-level results on the risk of regime instability.

![Figure 3.1: The Model of Expected Effects on Regime Stability](image)

The model demonstrates that I understand a situation of ethno-political exclusion as a consequence of the regime type. It seems appropriate, however, to ask whether regimes are, or should be, defined on the basis of exclusion or inclusion of ethnic groups? This relates to the ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ discussion of how regime types should be identified, as discussed in Chapter 2. With the minimalist approach applied here, regimes are defined according to their structural features, not according to the outcome. However, the likelihood of autocracies being more exclusive in ethno-political terms is greater than in democracies since power is concentrated in the first and dispersed in the latter. Even so, a democratic government may exclude all
ethnic groups but one, if this group contained majority. Furthermore, if ethno-
political inclusion were to be the prime-defining feature of democracies, then systems
of representative democracy would be defined as less democratic than systems with
versions of more direct democracy. To claim that Switzerland is more democratic
than other democracies I do not find reasonable. Accordingly, I understand ethnic
exclusion to be a result of regime type and not vice versa. I now turn to how
exclusion of ethnic groups works differently depending on regime types.

3.2 Democracy and Exclusion

Democracies are the most stable type of political regimes according to Gates et al.
(2005). Social conditions could however influence this general picture. In the
forthcoming section, I discuss how common ethno-political exclusion is in
democracies, and what impact this might have.

3.2.1 Ethnic Exclusion in Democracies

By nature, democracy is believed to be more inclusive, both formally and informally,
than other regime types. One defining formal character of a democratic system is that
all citizens are allowed to vote in regular, contested elections to choose the ones to
govern (Przeworski et al., 2000:15). The elections determine who’s ‘in’ and who’s
‘out’ for the subsequent period. By itself, this does not constitute a threat to a
democracy’s stability since the ‘losers’ know that there are prospects of change.
Gates et al. (2005:6) contend that “the expected gains from the next election exceed
the expected gains from subverting the regime”. So, even though the ones that are
‘out’ may feel frustrated with the current government, the sense of injustice is not a
prevailing incentive for mobilization. According to Przeworski (1991:30-31),
“democracy will evoke generalized compliance […] when all the relevant political
forces have some specific minimum probability of doing well under the particular
system of institutions”.
However, democracy is indeed about both inclusion and exclusion of power, and in certain circumstances there are narrow prospects of change of this situation (Horowitz, 1994:35). First, if there are social factors that demarcate between the ones to be included and the ones to be excluded from the executive, this could aggravate the sense of frustration. In multiethnic societies political parties and coalitions can be based on ethnic divisions. In such societies, “ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded” (Horowitz, 1994:35). A second and related factor is whether the exclusion is consistent over time. The continuity of the exclusion confirms that the division between the excluded and the included are grounded in cleavages difficult to alter. This is often the case with ethnic groups since switching membership is not just based on opinion or belief, but rather physical traits and family background (Horowitz, 1985:6-13). This can produce a feeling of permanent exclusion from executive based on ethnic belongings, which in turn is conducive to mobilization against the source of inequality (Horowitz, 1994:35-36).

3.2.2 Impact of Ethnic Exclusion in Democracies

An enduring exclusion of ethnic groups from the executive may affect the stability of a democratic system. On the one hand, ethno-political exclusion could seriously threaten the democratic stability. This is likely to be more serious in democracies than in non-democracies. There are two arguments for this. First, the frustration due to exclusion may be greater than in other regime types since the expectation of inclusion is high in democracies, as posited by relative deprivation theory (Davies, 1962). Secondly, a frustrated group may have better opportunities to mobilize in democracies than in non-democracies. This makes mobilization of an excluded group more likely, in accordance with rational action theory (Tilly, 1978). On the other hand, exclusion of ethnic groups may not constitute an immediate threat to the stability of a democratic regime, because of the ways the system responds to frustration. In contrast to autocracies, democratic systems possess accommodative means, which may incorporate ethnic groups although they are not represented in the
executive. The existence (or possibility of application) of such accommodating means in democracies may secure the stability of the system in comparison to other regimes. This argument may be interpreted in both a relative deprivation and rational action perspective (Muller & Weede, 1990).

**Instability Due to Relative Deprivation**

All citizens of democratic regimes expect to influence, with regular intervals, on the composition of the executive power through their vote. When they experience that their vote never reaches as far as to the executive due to ethnic divisions, this could lead to severe frustration among the excluded. Relatively speaking, this frustration may be more severe than in systems where the citizens do not expect to influence on the composition of the executive. Such a situation of relative deprivation may undermine the compliance in the democratic system, and function as an incentive to mobilize for change of status quo. Gurr (1970:596) summarizes the logic well;

> “The greater the deprivation an individual perceives relative to his expectations, the greater his discontent, the more widespread and intense is discontent among members of a society, the more likely and severe is civil strife”.

Following this reasoning, exclusion of ethnic groups from power in democratic regimes could seriously threaten the stability of the system. A mobilization of the excluded ethnic group could enforce political changes in terms of concession or oppression by the power-holders or through mere occupation of the power by the excluded. Thus, it is plausible to expect that ethno-political exclusion threatens the stability more in democratic regimes than in non-democracies.

A compelling empirical example on how ethno-political exclusion may lead to regime change in a democratic system is Fiji. In the period 1972 to 1987, Fiji had a multiparty system that followed ethnic divisions. The largest ethnic group comprised of Fijians, and their respective party the Alliance, traditionally controlled the government. However, in 1987 the National Federation Party-Fiji Labor Party coalition won the election (Lal, 2002). This coalition was mainly supported by the
Indo-Fijian community, and the subsequent formation of government excluded representatives of Fijian heritage. This created widespread frustration among the Fijians, according to Lal (2002:273-275), because the Fijians placed so much weight on political ascendancy. The frustration resulted in a military overthrow of the democratically elected government the same year. The example illustrates how exclusion of ethnic groups from power in democratic regimes may destabilize the political system due to the widespread expectation that they actually will be included.

**Instability Due to Opportunities**

In a democracy the environment for mobilization is favorable. The openness of the system encourages political activity (Auvinen, 1997:180), in principle irrespective of motive. Different opinions and frustrations are supposed to be heard through people-led mobilization and in turn ‘processed’ and resolved through the system. However, all dissatisfaction will most likely not be expressed through political structures (Auvinen, 1997:180). ‘Uncontrolled’ mobilization outside the democratic channels may undermine the existent structures and subsequently lead to regime changes.

To ensure a democratic system, civil liberties such as freedom of speech and association are essential. The possibility to freely organize and voice their frustration facilitates the mobilization of an excluded ethnic group in important ways. First, to enable mobilization due to ethno-political exclusion, group-members must be aware of the situation. In democracies, communication of (alleged) injustice is relatively easily transmitted to those concerned through the media. Second, the democratic system encourages group interests to be organized to better channel (and thus control) their demands. Hence, Mousseau (2001:551) contends, “democratic systems increase the availability of political resources for the organization of group demands, facilitating their mobilization”. Given that individuals are rational actors, they will consider these favorable opportunities for action.

In addition to the availability of organizational resources, some researchers suggest that the democratic discourse itself can nurture existing ethnic frontiers (Adekanye,
Melson and Wolpe (1970) argue that in multiethnic societies the democratic system encourages mobilization along ethnic lines because the political elites rely on support from the masses. Hence, appealing to communal loyalties is an opportunity to assure support. Mill (1958:230) argued in a similar vein that democracy is nearly impossible in multiethnic regimes due to the lack of a communal sense:

“Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist”

Thus, a democratic system could reinforce political competition and mobilization along ethnic lines, enforcing the consistency of ethnic exclusion. Trust in the democratic system may evaporate, and the excluded ethnic group will more likely express political protest, both violent and non-violent (Ellingsen & Gleditsch, 1997:70). In this manner exclusion of ethnic groups may “strain, contort, and often transform democratic institutions” (Horowitz, 1985:682). Hence, the probability of instability due to consistent ethno-political exclusion should be higher in democratic systems since the opportunities and organizational resources are easily available.

The First Republic of Nigeria, which was a democratic regime established after independence in 1960, only lasted six years. The system contained an ethnic federal structure, which secured political autonomy for three of the largest ethnic groups in the country. The geographical and demographical preponderant Hausa-Fulani group from the northern region, however, primarily dominated the central government (Suberu & Diamond, 2002). According to Suberu and Diamond (2002:402), this system organized after ethnic lines, combined with the “abuse of the liberal political game by competing sectional political coalitions”, constitute the reason for the culmination of conflict and subsequent military coup in 1966. This illustrates that ‘liberal opportunities’ may facilitate ethnic antagonism based on ethno-political exclusion, and increase the risk for regime change.
Stability Due to Alternative Opportunities

In reality, nearly all voters are excluded from the executive in democratic regimes, since their elected representatives could never fully represent them in all aspects (Horowitz, 1985:294). Exclusion due to ethnicity is no different in this regard. However, to counterbalance this deficiency of the representative democracy, there are alternative channels where citizens can continually influence and direct the decisions of the power holders. This can “furnish losers with instruments to counteract power as natural monopoly” (Przeworski & al., 1996:40).

In general, democratic regimes and democratically elected leaders are more attentive to claims and conflicting views made by different groups in the societies, than non-democratic regimes. Ideally, the democratic system serves as a method for regulating and managing conflicting interests between groups (Auvinen, 1997:180), and forms of interest representation take place at diverse arenas of the political decision-making process through informal channels. Gurr (1974:1496) argues that since democratic leaders are presumably more responsive than their autocratic counterparts, and there are channels to voice frustration, the democratic system is more adaptable, so that abrupt changes are less susceptible than in other regimes. The compromise-oriented system in democracies may inhibit challenges towards status quo (Ellingsen, 2000:236).

In addition to the informal channels, democracies contain ample resources to formally accommodate frustration pursued within the democratic system. Likewise, existing features of democracies could affect the notion of exclusion and inclusion beyond the central executive power. In contrast to autocratic regimes, the political power in democracies is by definition more dispersed. Hence, access to power in democratic regimes is not solely determined by access to the executive. There are other arenas where interests can be presented and/or protected, which in turn may compensate for the negative impact of exclusion from the executive. There are mainly three arenas where the interests of ethnic groups can be accommodated aside from the executive power. These accommodations are minor and do not affect the general structure of
the political regime as defined here. Furthermore, they only refer to arenas where excluded ethnic groups potentially may have better access or protection, without determining whether they actually do.

First, decentralization of power, in the sense that common policy-making is diffused to lower levels (Elazar, 1994:xv), allows ethnic groups to have access to decision-making on sub-national levels. Certain forms of decentralization are especially targeted towards accommodating ethnic groups, whilst other arrangements only indirectly allow for ethnic influence to other political arenas. In order for decentralization measures to compensate for the sense of frustration due to exclusion, the regional entities must contain authority independent of the executive. Decentralization arrangements may, however, work counterproductive and facilitate mobilization in certain circumstances due to the demarcated basis for power (Hale, 2004). Nevertheless, the impact of decentralization is in general expected to counterbalance the negative effect of ethno-political exclusion on democratic stability.

A second arena that may counteract the sense of frustration due to ethno-political exclusion is the judiciary. Lack of access to the executive can be counterbalanced by protection from the legal system. Kymlicka (1995), among others, argue that to avoid disadvantaging ethnic minorities implies special judicial protection in terms of minority rights. However, legal recognition of diversity may also be oppressive (Ghai, 2002:143-144). A minimum requisite for the judicial branch to compensate for ethno-political exclusion is to protect ethnic groups on equal terms as the rest of the population. Thus, equal legal protection is expected to limit the negative effect of ethno-political exclusion on a democracy’s stability.

The last arena is the legislative power. In a democratic system is the legislature supposed to control the effect of the executive. Access to the legislature depends on the electoral formula. A system of proportional representation better ensures smaller groups and parties’ access to the legislature (Reynolds, 1999:92). Hence, scholars of consociational theories suggest that such electoral systems are more likely to
accommodate ethnic minorities, than a non-proportional system (Norris, 2002:207). Thus, proportional representation in the legislature is expected to reduce the negative effect of ethno-political exclusion on democracies’ stability. These three additional arenas of accommodation are by definition expected to be nonexistent or irrelevant in systems where the executive is not elected.

In sum, frustration and discontent in democracies may not require drastic political changes (Ellingsen, 2000:236) as a result of the informal and formal inclusion of ethnic groups outside the executive core. Hence, democratic regimes may remain more stable than autocratic regimes, despite ethno-political exclusion. Three features of the democratic system, decentralization of power, equal legal protection, and a proportional representation system, may further enhance the conflict-resolving features and ensure democratic stability.

After the fall of Franco in 1975 and the subsequent establishment of a democratic regime, Spain has avoided large regime changes despite long-driven tensions between the different regions, chiefly following ethnic divisions. One reason for this is the fine balanced relationship between the central executive dominated by ‘Castillanos’ and the regional levels, with increased self-government and autonomy as important accommodating features towards the ethnic minorities (Heidar & Berntzen, 1998:290-292). Recently, the Spanish Parliament voted in favor of a reform of the autonomy status of Cataluña, the region with the second biggest ethnic group in the country (Risi, 2006). The reform, if accepted by the citizens of Cataluña the 18th of June 2006, will lead to further secured autonomy status for the region with widespread power on matters such as language (Quevedo, 2006). Analysts have argued that this is the reason why the former separatist movement from the Basque region, ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), in March 2006 announced that it will lay down its weapons and start to negotiate with the government (Risi, 2006). The regional tensions in Spain exemplifies that there under a democratic domain are numerous resources available to ensure the stability of the democratic system, although the ethnic groups are in general excluded from the executive power.
3.3 Autocracy and Exclusion

Autocracies are less stable than democracies, but far more stable than their inconsistent counterparts (Gates et al., 2005). The ethnic composition, however, may modify this picture. Subsequently, I discuss ethno-political exclusion in autocracies and how it may influence autocratic stability.

3.3.1 Ethnic Exclusion in Autocracies

As opposed to democracies, in authoritarian regimes only the preferences of part of the society are considered in the decision-making process (Boix, 2003:10). The political power is concentrated in the hands of a few and they typically do not allow any genuine contestation for political power (Østerud, 1999:133). The monopolization of the political channel excludes large parts of the population and suppresses potential challengers. The actual executive power in autocracies is commonly limited to a family or kin or other groups based on strong internal loyalty due to ideological or religious affiliations. This nature of power in autocracies set firm lines between the ones who are included and the ones who are excluded.

Because of the characteristics of the system it is likely that the political core in autocracies all belong to the same ethnic group. Although this is not necessarily the case when it comes to autocracies founded on an ideological basis, examples such as the former Soviet Empire and today’s Myanmar illustrate that ethnic domination of the executive does indeed happen. Given the fact that autocracies endure (Przeworski et al., 2000), and that political leaders in autocracies are relatively rarely replaced, ethno-political exclusion typically carry on until a regime change take place. Hence, long-lasting ethno-political exclusion is probably more common in autocracies than in democracies.
3.3.2 Impact of Ethno-political Exclusion in Autocracies

The impact of ethno-political exclusion on the stability of autocratic regimes is theoretically ambivalent. On one side, ethnic exclusion could severely endanger the stability of the autocratic system, in comparison to democracies. In autocracies the excluded ethnic group experiences a situation of double frustration: general frustration due to the suppression of all citizens and targeted frustration since the state appears to belong more to one group than another. On the other side, and perhaps more probable, ethno-political exclusion may not have any consistent impact on the stability of an autocratic system. One reason for this is that ethno-political exclusion does not differ from other types of exclusion in such systems. Another and complementary reason is that, although the ethnic group experience frustration due to exclusion, it is not rational to mobilize since repressive measures limit the opportunities to do so.

Instability Due to Frustration

In autocracies, political discrimination is by nature high. According to proponents of frustration theory, this gives people a reason to mobilize against the source of inequity (Gurr, 1974). This might explain why Gates et al. (2005) found that autocracies experience more regime changes than democratic regimes. In situations where a group experiences exclusion from political power due to ethnic identity this could give yet another incentive for mobilization against the system. The feeling of exclusion may be perceived as more absolute for the ethnic group than other parts of the population. Moreover, access to the executive power in autocracies is of intrinsic importance, simply because this political core controls most areas of the society. Whilst power is more clearly divided in democratic regimes and exclusion from one arena may have narrow consequences for the others, these arenas are tighter interlinked in autocracies and access to the executive more likely determines the access also to the other domains. Thus, ethno-political exclusion could have a severe negative impact on the stability of autocratic regimes since the sense of frustration may be reinforced; giving the ethnic groups a stronger motive to mobilize.
In addition, turning to the other side of the dispute, autocratic political leaders are presumably quite different from their democratic counterparts. Their power does not rely as directly on the acceptance of the people. By definition, autocratic leaders are less responsive to opinions and demands made by the citizens. There is no reason to believe that demands made by an ethnic group are different in this regard. Mobilization by an excluded ethnic group would most likely be met with repression. Gurr (2000:127) claims that when ethnic groups challenge the existing system of power this almost always brings forth provocative responses. To ensure their personal positions, these leaders may further concentrate power and limit the space of the civil society to hinder the ethnic group’s possibility to mobilize. Regime changes to further secure the power in the hand of the current authorities may threaten the stability of the current system.

Repressive methods to silence the opposition may be successful in the short run and thus restabilize and reinforce the autocratic system. This tactic could, on the other hand, be counterproductive. Gurr (2000:71) notes that “the use of force against people who think it is unjust may inspire fear and caution in the short run but at the same time provokes resentment and enduring incentives to resist and retaliate”. In the long run the autocratic leader’s repressive methods may increase the antipathy towards the system and further boost the effort to change it. An ethnic identity in this regard facilitates collective action (Tilly, 1978). Since the ethnic identity relates to the daily interaction with family and kin, these potential mobilization bases are not so easily controlled as other forms of organization in autocratic systems. Thus, the ethnic identity makes mobilization against the power holders possible. Exclusion of ethnic groups from power then may facilitate a mobilization for change and destabilize the autocratic regime.

The case of Ethiopia illustrates the argument. For centuries a relatively small ethnic group, the Amhara, controlled the political power. The autocratic regime increasingly centralized the political system to ensure their own position, and applied force to counterweight the centrifugal forces that threatened the stability of the regime.
The ethnically based resistance movements, the most important being the two supported by respectively the Tigray and Oromo community, became political and military allies against the amharized dominating centre (Tronvoll, 2000:14-15). The resistance intensified towards the end of the 1980s, and in May 1991 the autocratic leader escaped to a neighboring country and the military regime subsequently surrendered (Tronvoll, 2000:14-15). The anecdote actualizes how exclusion and repression of ethnic groups could, in the short run stabilize the autocratic regime, but in the long run be followed by regime changes.

**Stability Due to lack of Relative Deprivation**

Exclusion from executive power may be one powerful incentive for mobilization of the befallen group. In autocracies, however, political exclusion strikes all individuals and groups outside the tight core of power holders and this situation typically endures over time. Thus, being excluded from political power in autocracies is an inherent part of the system and exclusion based on ethnicity is no different. Citizens of autocratic regimes do not expect to take part in the final decision-making. This is reserved people who by religious, family or ideological reasons are given power. To question whether some groups are excluded would be to question the total system of power. In this vein, excluded ethnic groups do not have a greater incentive to change the political structures than the rest of the population. Although the general level of frustration might be high in autocracies, the relative deprivation of excluded ethnic groups is somewhat lower.

This lack of a more specific incentive and mobilization base may secure the foundation and the power structures of the regime. Gates et al. (2005:5) contend that “exclusion stabilizes the [autocratic] system”. The excluded ethnic groups do not posit a power base from where to raise their demands, thus they do not constitute a specific threat to the autocratic system. In other words, ethno-political exclusion does not endanger the stability of an autocratic system more than the general level of frustration does.
In Saudi Arabia the royal family al-Sauds controls all aspects of the society. The royalties are Sunni Arabs, an ethnic group who compose of 66 % of the Saudi Arabian population (Fearon, 2003). Their authority has long been questioned by mainly two fractions of the society; the reformist arguing for a more liberal and open society; and the traditionalist demanding greater incorporation of Islamic religious laws (Owen, 2004:98). Except for relatively negligible clashes between the Shi’is and the Sunni rulers in the Eastern provinces in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution (Owen, 2004:170), the Shi’ite community and other ethnic groups have been remarkably absent from the national arena. Although the non-Sunnis experience severe discrimination at multiple levels, ethnicity does not serve as a basis for mobilization. If active, they are rather incorporated into the fraction demanding a more democratic society, as is partly the case with the Shi’ite minority, and do not serve as an independent mobilization base (Owen, 2004:170). This exemplifies that lack of relative grievance in autocratic regimes makes the demarcating process, necessary for a useful ethnic power base for mobilization, less effective.

**Stability Due to Lack of Opportunities**

A mobilization targeting the political authorities depends not only on frustration, but also on the availability of opportunities. Individuals are expected to be rational actors calculating their chances of the prospects of reaching their goal through a mobilization. Ethnic groups in autocracies may have very grim prospects of achieving their goal, which could in turn scare them from trying in the first place. Considering the prospects of success, mobilization in an autocracy may not be rational. Since the system’s regular response to dissident behavior is the use of force and coercion, a rational calculation of the possibilities may hinder the efforts to organize the frustrated group. The prospects for gains are minimal in comparison to the costs (Gates et al., 2005:4-5). Autocracies “command the resources and coercive force necessary to control” (Gurr, 1974:1496). The threat of force thus represses a possible ethno-political mobilization and the regime remains stable.
In addition, regardless of the prospects of success, the opportunity to organize any excluded group may be grim. Ironically, the more repressive the regime and by that the greater the frustration, the less space and possibilities there are for mobilization (Ellingsen, 2000:235). Firstly, the awareness of the situation of exclusion is probably limited since channels of communication are controlled. The possibility of transmitting information is important to raise awareness among the excluded. Secondly, it is commonly not allowed to organize and disagree with the power-holders, endangering a mobilization from the beginning. In autocracies, “little room is left for individuals or groups to engage in dissident behavior” (Mousseau, 2001:550). This makes a mobilization due to ethno-political exclusion less likely.

Moreover, the ethnic group’s status as excluded from political power, and thus most likely other arenas of power, may affect the opportunities that the group has to mobilize in general (Østby, 2003:4). Lack of human resources in terms of organizational experience, and economic finances, might make a mobilization of the excluded impossible. Hence, exclusion of ethnic groups from power in autocratic regimes should not lead to instability, since the opportunities for dissident behavior is so grim.

A return to the example of Saudi Arabia may illustrate this point. The few attempts by the Shi’i minority in 1979-80 at striking the Sunni authorities, inspired and directly assisted by the Iranian revolution, were slight. The efforts of resistance were quickly contained and dispersed by the authorities (Owen, 2004:170). Even today, no organized form of dissidence is allowed, effectively reducing the Shi’ite community’s opportunities for organization and information. Although local elections were held for the first time last spring, parties and other remedies facilitating the organization of different views and demands was still effectively restricted (Human Rights Reports 2005). It is thus useless to talk about any forms of organized resistance in Saudi Arabia, necessary for a mobilization of an ethnic group. Instead, individuals gathered in rather idle coalitions or fractions to voice their opposition (Owen, 2004). The difficulties in organizing any dissidence shed light on why mobilization of excluded
ethnic groups in autocracies is so difficult, making stability more likely in autocratic than in democratic regimes.

3.4 Inconsistent Regimes and Exclusion

Inconsistent regimes are by far the most unstable type of regime. Gates et al. (2005:22) found that in general democracies endure 3.6 times longer and autocracies 1.9 times longer than inconsistent regimes, controlling for other factors. In this section, I consider the extensiveness of ethno-political exclusion in inconsistent regimes, before discussing the impact of exclusion on the stability of inconsistent regimes.

3.4.1 Ethnic Exclusion in Inconsistent Regimes

Inconsistent regimes constitute a category even more diverse than autocracies and democracies. They are regimes characterized by holding both autocratic and democratic institutional features (Gates et al., 2005:1). Thus, whether they exclude or include ethnic groups in the executive cannot be traced back to a simple pattern of concentration or devolution of power. These regimes have a varying degree of inclusion and exclusion depending on the political dimensions of interest. To determine the extension of ethno-political exclusion in inconsistent regimes theoretically is thus complex.

Inconsistent regimes generally have less dispersed political power than democracies. Furthermore, Snyder (2000:28) contends that the treatment of minorities is commonly very bad in what he calls ‘semi-democratic’ regimes, in comparison to democratic regimes. Given that, it is plausible to expect that exclusion of ethnic groups from power is more likely in inconsistent regimes than in democracies. Comparing the level of ethno-political exclusion in inconsistent regimes to autocratic ones, however, is more complicated. Although inconsistent regimes generally allow for more contestation of power than autocratic regimes (Gates et al., 2005), the openness of the
executive is more likely the last barricade before a complete transition to a democracy. Hence, it is plausible to expect that the difference between autocratic and inconsistent regimes in ethno-political exclusion is not that great.

### 3.4.2 Impact of Ethno-political Exclusion in Inconsistent Regimes

Inconsistent regimes resemble autocratic regimes in certain aspects and democratic regimes in others. This is reflected in the subsequent discussion of how ethno-political exclusion may affect inconsistent regimes’ stability. First and foremost, ethno-political exclusion is expected to nurture the sense of frustration towards the power holders in inconsistent regimes, which subsequently may endanger its stability since ethnic groups have better potential to mobilize given their identity. This resembles the argument made in relation to autocratic regimes and will not be discussed further in this section. Secondly, regarding the notion of relative deprivation, it is by definition difficult to determine the general level of inclusion and exclusion in inconsistent regimes. More knowledge about this is necessary to be able to compare and theoretically identify the expectations excluded ethnic groups potentially may have in such regimes. Thus, the concept is not seen as relevant for this discussion. A third aspect, how alternative means of accommodation may counterbalance the negative impact of ethno-political exclusion in inconsistent regimes, resembles an argument made in relation to democratic regimes. These additional arenas of power: decentralization, equal legal protection, and a proportional representation system, may give excluded ethnic groups access to power outside the executive, which in turn may reduce the risk of instability in inconsistent regimes. Since this has been discussed earlier, the arguments will not be repeated in this section.

However, what make inconsistent regimes differ from the consistent autocratic and democratic regimes, and which may subsequently endanger its stability, are the ambiguous opportunities groups have for mobilization. In inconsistent regimes there are some organizational opportunities for mobilization, but at the same time the
authorities typically do not possess resources to accommodate the befallen group. Hence, ethno-political exclusion may more severely endanger the stability of inconsistent regimes than the consistent ones, as will be discussed below.

**Instability Due to Opportunities**

Excluded ethnic groups in inconsistent regimes have substantially better access to organizational resources than what is available in autocratic regimes. Inconsistent regimes come in diverse forms, but at least some features do resemble a democratic system (Gates et al., 2005:9). Most likely, there are more possibilities to voice frustration due to ethno-political exclusion in inconsistent regimes than in autocratic ones. Communication through media not fully controlled by the power holders, facilitate a mobilization of the befallen group. Moreover, there are probably better opportunities to assemble and organize excluded ethnic groups, because inconsistent regimes leave the windows (partly) open for engagement. Access to some arenas of power, from where to develop and expand, further facilitates the mobilization. Gates et al. (2005:7) states that “authority is not sufficiently diffuse to ensure that the democratic process is not subverted or challenged”. Thus, the possibility to organize and voice ones’ frustration leaves ethnic groups with better opportunities to mobilize in inconsistent regimes than in autocratic ones.

The cost of mobilization is also a function of how the system responds to organized groups demanding political changes. In other words, to which extent the system is willing or able to reply with repressive or accommodating means towards a mobilized ethnic group. Leaders of inconsistent regimes are expected to be less responsive than the political leaders in democratic regimes since their authority is not based on a fully institutionalized election system. Muller and Weede (1990:627) state that peaceful opposition is typically ineffective in semi-repressive systems. Furthermore, the power holders “usually lack the resources or institutional means to make and guarantee the kinds of accommodation that typify the established democracies” (Gurr, 2000:87). Since democratic values and institutions are not fully established, inconsistent
regimes are less likely capable of accommodating excluded ethnic groups (Mousseau, 2001:552).

On the contrary, autocratic leaders typically do not accommodate deprived groups. Instead, their strategy is to repress and enforce silence. To accomplish this it is necessary with clear lines of authority and power beyond words. This is not the case in inconsistent regimes where the authority structures are ambiguous. Authority is not sufficiently concentrated to strike down a prospective mobilization by discontented citizens (Gates et al., 2005:7). Hence, given these considerations, inconsistent regimes will most likely experience more instability due to ethno-political exclusion than other, more consistent regimes.

A well-known example of a successful mobilization in an inconsistent regime due to ethno-political exclusion is South Africa. Under apartheid, the executive was controlled by the white minority which was elected through an intricate system ensuring white supremacy (Library of Congress, 2005). Although the black majority was denied access to the executive, they were granted limited self-government for their ‘homelands’ and contained to a certain degree access to political resources (Library of Congress, 2005). This facilitated the network building of the excluded black majority, although organizations such as African National Congress (ANC) were still banned. Availability of organizational resources, in addition to the reluctance of the political leaders to use violence, probably due to international pressure, forced the government to ultimately make concessions towards the black community. In April 1994, the first non-racial elections were held, and the change to a democratic regime was a reality. This example illustrates that the partial openness of an inconsistent regime makes exclusion of ethnic groups from power difficult to sustain in the long run.
3.5 Arriving at Hypotheses

To sum up the previous discussion on how ethnic diversity affect regime stability depending on certain preconditions, I repeat the main arguments and develop a set of hypotheses that serve as the point of departure for the empirical analysis. Regarding the role of ethnicity, I anticipate that it is not the mere differences, but rather frustration based on such differences that could lead to a mobilization threatening the stability of the regime. In line with frustration theorists, I understand mobilization not solely as a function of group identity, but also as dependent on a sense of frustration among the group members. This frustration should commonly relate to access to the highest political authority, since I understand this as the centre of power with implications for other arenas of daily life. Furthermore, the power of the excluded, in terms of number of groups and relative size, in comparison to the dominant group(s) is of importance. Therefore, I deduce that:

**H1:** There is no systematic relationship between the degree of ethnic diversity and regime stability

**H2:** The greater the degree of ethno-political exclusion, the greater hazard of regime instability

Mobilization may also be a function of the rational calculation by the possible participants. In line with rational action theorists, I presume that excluded ethnic groups consider their context and opportunities to successfully achieve their aim, when mobilizing. The opportunities for mobilization are in turn dependent on the political regime. These presumptions suggest a general hypothesis that:

**H3:** The effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability depends on regime type

More particularly, ethno-political exclusion is expected to have very different effects depending on the regime type. On the one hand, ethno-political exclusion is anticipated to be of greater threat to democratic stability, than autocratic. This is in line with both a rational action and a frustration framework. In a democracy the sense
of relative deprivation due to ethno-political exclusion is higher than in more autocratic regimes, since there is generally higher expectation of participation. Furthermore, if excluded, the ethnic group has more resources available for mobilization in democracies than in autocracies. On the other hand, it may be argued that ethno-political exclusion is a greater threat to an autocratic regimes’ stability than a democratic one. This follows the argument of frustration theory. The exclusion from power in autocratic regimes is enforced when this also follows ethnic lines. This is aggravated by the fact that political power in autocracies largely determines access to other arenas of power as well. Moreover, democracies’ responsive and reconciliatory character makes minor accommodative changes more likely, and prevents larger regime changes. This discussion suggests that there are two contradictory outcomes. Ethno-political exclusion could have more impact on regime instability in democratic than in autocratic systems, or vice versa. This contradiction generates one hypothesis:

**H4: Ethno-political exclusion increases the hazard of regime instability more in democracies than in autocracies**

Democratic and autocratic regimes either devolve or concentrate power. Inconsistent regimes do both. These combinations of regime traits, where excluded groups are partially allowed to organize, and yet met with somewhat repressive means, leave the arena open for confrontations. In line with a rational action perspective, this suggests that:

**H5: Ethno-political exclusion increases the hazard of regime instability more in inconsistent regimes than in consistent ones**

Democratic and inconsistent regimes may have additional means of accommodation that could influence the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime instability. Decentralization of power allows ethnic groups to have access to arenas of political power below the national level. This could counterbalance the presumed negative effect of ethno-political exclusion. Similarly, equal legal protection of all citizens
may reduce the negative effect of ethno-political exclusion. Lastly, access to the legislative, best assured through a proportional representation system, could influence the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability. These factors are not expected to have any consistent impact in regimes where the executive is not elected since the alternative arenas may not exist or be of less relevance. Hence, I therefore anticipate:

**H6a:** The existence of a system of decentralization when ethno-political exclusion is high reduces the hazard of regime instability in democracies

**H6b:** The existence of a system of decentralization when ethno-political exclusion is high reduces the hazard of regime instability in inconsistent regimes

**H7a:** The existence of equal legal protection when ethno-political exclusion is high reduces the hazard of regime instability in democracies

**H7b:** The existence of equal legal protection when ethno-political exclusion is high reduces the hazard of regime instability in inconsistent regimes

**H8a:** The existence of a proportional representation system when ethno-political exclusion is high reduces the hazard of regime instability in democracies

**H8b:** The existence of a proportional representation system when ethno-political exclusion is high reduces the hazard of regime instability in inconsistent regimes

Given this analytical framework, and hypotheses to be investigated, the challenge is now how to assess this empirically. In the next chapter I discuss the method and operationalization of the relevant concepts, and in the subsequent chapter test whether the hypotheses do correspond with the empirical reality.
4. The Empirical Assessment of Theory

“Err we must; the question is which way” (Przeworski et al., 2000:23)

The purpose of research is to improve our understanding. Researchers use different methods and work at different levels of abstraction in order to better perceive how different phenomena act and relate to each other. Historically there has been much rhetoric and “nonsense fight over scientific method” (Prothro, 1956:565). As many others I understand quantitative and qualitative approaches in social science to be complementary rather than competing (Grønmo, 1996:75). King et al. (1994:3) argue that the difference between quantitative and qualitative research relates purely to style, not to their value. The focus should therefore not be on methodological wedges, but rather on the phenomenon at interest. However, in the real world, time and space limit the methodological opportunities of every research project. Within this framework I have made my choices, as discussed in this chapter. In the following, I first sketch out some preliminary fundamental approaches to research. Then I discuss my choice of research design - statistical modeling and survival analysis. Subsequently, I give an outline of the logic of survival analysis. In the end I present the data and discuss the operationalization of each variable in terms of reliability and measurement validity. More particularly, I point to the data’s consequences for the analysis and the inferences to be made.

4.1 The Research Approach

The phenomenon ‘regime stability’ and how it is affected by ethnic political arrangements is the focus of this inquiry. There are clearly different manners of shedding light on the matter, and I recognize the advantages of different methodological approaches and combinations thereof. The essential question is epistemological: “how to proceed if one wants to form an opinion with prospects to be true?” (Malnes, 2002:12, author’s own translation).
At the very beginning of this thesis I made some implicit choices with subsequent methodological consequences. The research questions reveal my assumption that the survival or demise of political regimes can be partly traced back to structural features. By these assumptions, I simply ignore the fact that regimes are social constructions made up of individuals not subordinated the political structures. Rather there exists a reciprocal relationship between individuals, political collectives, and the social context (March & Olsen, 1984). This reciprocal relationship is difficult to catch with the macro-perspective on regimes. Nevertheless, even though a structural study like this cannot test directly what enforces regime changes, since these are actions made by individuals; it can reveal whether hypotheses are consistent with stated ideas about individual and group behavior. The advantage of such a macro-level analysis is that “it enables one to take the role of the state into account explicitly” (Muller & Weede, 1990:625). This I see as necessary since individual action does not occur in a vacuum and is clearly constrained, but not determined, by formal properties.

Besides the influence of structural features, I expect that individual action is rational. Individuals will select the strategy that maximizes their chances of achieving their objective. The strategies available are in turn shaped by political institutions, and other structural characteristics such as ethnic divisions, through systems of rules and inducements to behavior (Peters, 2001:19). This applies even when the political systems are not fully institutionalized (Gjerde, 2005:3). The assumption that individuals are rational actors has been much criticized, however. Andersen (Andersen, 1988) claims that reducing actors to rational agents is like placing the whole problem in a parenthesis. I will argue that there are two compelling reasons for applying a rational choice approach in this study. First, the approach explicitly combines the importance of individuals’ objectives, with the feasible alternatives they contain within a structural context (Geddes, 2003:177). Second, although the principle of parsimony should be applied with care (e.g. Friedrich, 1982; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994:20), it has been particularly pertinent at the individual level of this study due to the macro perspective. Given these arguments, I see it as
appropriate to apply a rational action approach for pragmatic reasons, not for dogmatic ones.

In addition to the implicit choices, the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3, serves as the starting point for this study. A deductive approach may easily be criticized for solely reflecting the researcher’s purpose. Every research project, however, must necessarily start with some latent models of interpretation, explicitly expressed or not (Andersen, 2003:30). Although deductive at start, the theory is subjected to extensive testing before considered knowledge (Bryman, 2004:7). Lather (1986:267) accentuates that

"Data must be allowed to generate propositions in a dialectical manner that permits use of a priori theoretical frameworks, but which keeps a particular framework from becoming the container into which the data must be poured”.

The intention is thus to allow the theoretical premises to structure the empirical findings, not to guide the results. Hence, the definition of truth and the inferences made in this thesis is entirely based on whether it corresponds with the (historical) reality in a Popperian manner (Popper, 1963:36). The limitation of this approach is primarily that other theoretical interpretations are not up for discussion. However, I will argue that such an approach is much more fruitful than the alternatives. Competing theoretical premises I leave for future research. Given these a priori premises, the time is set for an account of the method applied to reveal whether reality actually corresponds to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3.

4.2 The Research Design

There are numerous methodological techniques that could improve our understanding of the relationship between ethnic diversity and regime stability. However, for the purpose of this thesis I take a realistic stand based on certain considerations regarding the phenomenon at interest. Firstly, I wish to investigate whether ethnic political arrangements affect the duration of political regimes. This inevitably implies a
historical perspective considering changes over time. Secondly, I seek to identify effects that are common across cases, implying that the main goal is generalization. Given these concerns, I have chosen to apply a statistical method called survival analysis that allows both these considerations to be taken seriously. This is in accordance with a previous study by Gates et al. (2005). The choice to apply survival analysis generates two questions to be elaborated upon: “why statistical modeling” and “how come survival analysis is then the most appropriate”?

### 4.2.1 Why Statistical Modelling?

Given the purpose of this inquiry, to reveal whether there are patterns of regime stability, to compare different cases over time seem most feasible. There are mainly two methods of explicit comparison, the comparative case-study and the statistical method. Whereas a statistical approach typically compares a large number of cases, a comparative case-study will commonly concentrate on a few. Both methods hold their obvious advantages and disadvantages.

The statistical model’s greatest advantage is its potential for generalization. Due to a reliance on large number of cases, the statistical method better facilitates generalization from sample to universe. The more regimes that behave according to the general theoretical propositions, the better the foundation is for drawing general inferences. Although the comparative case study contains the possibility of making inferences regarding a greater population through analytical matching and case-selection, this is best done with a well-founded theory (Andersen, 2003:30-31). A study relying on very few cases will inevitably have a more “restricted spatio-temporal domain of validity” (Austvoll, 2005:44) than one with more cases under investigation or over a greater time-span.

Furthermore, the use of statistical methods better enables the researcher to reject rival explanations and the large number of cases “reduces the potential severity of causal overdetermination“ (Frendreis, 1983:259). The statistical method has the merit of assessing different causal explanations through statistical control. Although this
ability to control for alternative explanations is limited by the theoretical starting point and data availability, it gives systematic information on the relative effects actually included. This stands in stark contrast to comparative case-studies where the effects could be observed and somehow analytically handled, but by no means controlled for in the same manner. The comparative method has a limited capacity for sorting out rival explanations (Collier, 1993:91). In this inquiry, rival explanations are intrinsically important and statistical techniques allow us to better approach these challenges.

A final advantage of statistical modeling is according to Frendreis (1983:259-260) sociological, rather than technical. Whereas deviant cases in the comparative method tend to debilitate the hypotheses, the same cases are turned into unexplained variance in the statistical method (Frendreis, 1983:259-260). Unexplained variance merely points to the fact that there are causes who are concealed and/or specific in time or space not controlled for, and it does not invalidate the general argument as long as the effects remain significant.

Despite the decision to comply with a statistical approach based on its advantages in relation to this inquiry’s purpose, there are clearly pitfalls to be aware of. It should be kept in mind that a statistical approach may only give an overview of the phenomena of interest rather than deep insight (Grønmo, 1996:93). Applying statistical modeling effectively limits the range of aspects that can be studied in relation to regime stability. In an ideal world, all relevant effects could be incorporated into a statistical analysis, but in reality this is not feasible. Possible effects, questions and categories are excluded since the researchers’ \textit{a priori} knowledge is constrained, the effects are not relevant in all cases and/or data availability is limited (Grønmo, 1996:83). However, since the intention of this study is to give an overview on how ethnic diversity may affect regime instability, this loss seems tolerable. Furthermore, the dynamic relationship between variables is sought acknowledged through the application of interaction variables and other effects based on an extensive review of
earlier work. Although this could compensate for the danger of oversimplification, nuances will nonetheless be lost.

The most common criticism of statistical inference and perhaps the most dangerous pitfall is the confusion of correlation with causation. Detection of correlation is the essential mechanism for explanations in the statistical method. Yet, correlation is not the same as causation. Nor can it be. Uncertainty about causal inferences made with statistical methods will never be eliminated (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994:76). Thus, making causal inferences on the basis of correlation could justly be criticized. However, the problem with drawing causal inferences is not just limited to research using statistical methods, but every causal processes not directly observed through experiments. Although a significant statistical correlation does not comply with Hume’s strict criteria for causality, it does predict a probable one (Skog, 2004:24-28). Thus the intention with this thesis is not to confirm absolute causal laws, but rather attempt to draw inferences about probable causality based on a careful scientific design and theoretical considerations.

Application of statistical modeling clearly poses many challenges. So do all methods. Although statistical modeling may partly undermine the importance of both context and individuals, and fail to ascertain causal relationships, I see it as the best choice given my research question.

4.2.2 Why Survival Analysis?

Time-series data present special challenges for the use of statistical modeling (Skog, 2004:81-86). In order to study what affects the duration of political regimes I use survival analysis. The design is a replication of an inquiry conducted by Gates et al. (2005). Using survival analysis, I examine the influence of ethno-political exclusion on the duration of regimes with the same general institutional features. The appeal of survival analysis is precisely that it reveals regularities in covariates relative to time (Yamaguchi, 1991). Although traditional models could to a certain degree analyze duration, they do in general have an inherent problem in handling longitudinal
processes (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004:183). The advantages of survival analysis in handling duration, or conversely, the disadvantages of other models, constitute the reasons for my choice of analysis.

Researchers have often applied a binary dependent variable when analyzing duration data, using ordinary logit or probit models. This is possible to do if the regime duration is divided into shorter time-periods such as for example years, and the dependent variable reports whether there have been a regime change in that period or not. The problem, however, is the assumption that the annual observations are independent of each other (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998:1260). Clearly, the probability of a regime change depends on how long the regime has subsisted (Gates et al., 2005:15). Since the observations of yearly segments of regime duration are temporally dependent this could disturb the results “with overly optimistic inferences” (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998:1261). Although the time-dependence could be controlled for by applying and comparing dummy variables denoting time (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998), this would make the analysis overly complex.

Another problem with the traditional models in relation to duration data is how they handle the notion of time beyond the temporal domain of the sample. This inquiry covers the years 1945-2000. The simplest solution would be to expect that the phenomenon of interest comes into existence at the start of the data collection and terminates with the end of it. This would not likely conform to reality. Not all sample regimes arose in or after 1945 or ended before or in 2000. As a consequence, such a “production” of data could distort the results and subsequent inferences made based on traditional models. Observations not registered during their whole period in the condition of interest are referred to as censored data (Lawless, 1982:31-44). Indeed, censored data could be handled in both linear and logistic regression models with newer statistical techniques (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004:2). Yet, survival analysis is superior when it comes to explicitly incorporating the notion of censoring in the mechanisms of the model.
This brief review has revealed how specific challenges presented by time-series data, such as censored data and non-normality, make traditional models problematic in the study of regime duration. Given the fact that survival analysis is particularly suited for handling censored observations and time-dependent effects and variables (Bienen & van de Walle, 1992:689), the choice has been made to apply this model. Survival analysis, in short, “tak[es] time seriously” (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998:1).

4.3 The Logic of Survival Analysis

Survival analysis is used to examine when changes happen. The backdrop for the following examination is Box-Steffensmeier and Jones’ (2004:7-15) thorough account of the logic of survival analysis. The units, in this case the political regimes, are observed from when they enter the analysis. This is determined either by the start date of the data set, which in this case is 1945, or at the time-of-origin of the regime. When they enter, the regimes are in the ‘state’ of existence. They are observed over time and are continually ‘at risk’ of experiencing a change in the political structures characterizing the regime. After the regime change, also called ‘failure’, the units are no longer observed – they are in a ‘state’ of non-existence. The new regime that arises from the change is then observed as ‘at risk’ until it eventually also experience a regime change, or the observation period ends.

The relative entry time is the same for every regime since it is the first year of their existence after 1945. If a regime undergoes a regime change, the new regime’s entry time will thus also be its first year of existence after 1945. This natural baseline provides a starting point from which to compare the units (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004:8). The time from the unit enter the analysis until they experience a regime change is the ‘survival time’ (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004:9). A regime’s survival time is thus measured by how long a political regime endures with the same political structures starting with the entry time. Hypothetically, if the study continued indefinitely all regimes would experience a regime change (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004:13). In contrast to the regimes that survive, the share of
the regimes that have experienced a regime change or a ‘failure’ is all the time increasing.

The notion of both failure and survival is combined to measure the hazard function of failure for any unit. This function indicates the ‘hazard rate’ or the probability that a unit will experience a transition at time \( t \) given that the unit has survived until then. The specific hazard rate for each unit may be compared to the baseline. The ‘hazard ratio’ of two hazards can be written as:

\[
hr(x) = \frac{h_i(t)}{h_0(t)} = \exp(B'(x_i - x_j))
\]

Where \( h_i(t) \) is the hazard rate for a unit with a specific characteristic, and \( h_0(t) \) is the baseline hazard function. The hazard ratio can vary between zero, which denotes no risk, to infinity signifying certain failure. As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004:15) point out, “‘failure’ is conditional on ‘survival’: the event is conditional on its history”. This ability to take time seriously was one of the main arguments for applying survival analysis instead of other traditional models. To further control for dependency between regime changes within the same state, the regimes are in the analysis clustered by country.

The statistical processing of censored cases is another important advantage of survival analysis as earlier mentioned. In contrast to traditional models, survival analysis takes account of information from both censored and uncensored regimes. Units that exit the analysis before a transition has occurred are referred to as being right censored. Hence for our case this would be regimes that experience a regime change after 2000, or which have still not experienced one. In survival analysis the uncensored cases contribute information about the failure time since the regime

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4 The literature also refer to interval and left censored, and right, left and interval truncated data (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004:29-36), but since they are not relevant for this inquiry I do not discuss their application any further.
change actually take place, while right censored cases only contribute to the notion of survival (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004:17-19).

The hazard rate may take a variety of functional forms. The shape of the hazard function is important when deciding which survival model to apply. Whilst various parametric models require the analyst to make assumption regarding the shape of the cumulative hazard rate, semi-parametric models leave this unspecified (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004:2-6). Gates et al. (2005:15-16) convincingly argue that regime changes first will happen to a large proportion of regimes four to five years after their creation, and that the rate then steadily will decrease. They therefore chose to apply a log-logistic model that captures such a distribution.

However, I find it more appropriate to apply a semi-parametric model. Since the intention of this study, as stated earlier, is to let the data determine the results, I would like to avoid depending on a priori theoretical assumptions. The semi-parametric Cox regression model therefore seems most appropriate. The essential logic of Cox regression is that the hazard of political change for a regime can be “factorized into a parametric function of (time-dependent) variables and a non-parametric function of time itself (the baseline hazard)” (Raknerud & Hegre, 1997:389). Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004:93) argue that as long as the baseline hazard is not of central interest, there are not many persuasive arguments why the Cox-model should not be applied.

4.4 The Data

Andersen (2003:29, author’s own translation) accentuates that ”data will always be socially constructed”, confirming how important it is to elaborate on my choice of data acquisition. The point of departure for this inquiry is the dataset developed by Gates et al. (2005). Their units of analysis are all regimes with more than 500 000 inhabitants from the year 1800 to 2000. Recall that regimes are here understood as political systems demarcated by states borders, which lay down procedures and rules
for decision-making. The dependent variable is the time a regime endures with the same general institutions before it experiences a regime change, which subsequently alters the regime’s defining features and marks the end of the regime. To this dataset I have added an indicator on ethnic exclusion and additional measures on access to political power, as well as data on ethnic diversity, population size, and colonial history. Due to data availability for these measures, I have limited the time-span to the period 1945-2000 as I will discuss below. This is also the reason why countries in Africa South of Sahara are excluded. In the following, I present the dependent variable, the regime variables, the ethnicity variables, the additional access variables, and lastly, other covariates.

4.4.1 The Dependent Variable: The Stability of Political Regimes

The dependent variable is conceptually speaking how long a regime survives. This implies that there are two operational challenges; firstly, to distinguish between different regimes; and secondly, to determine when a regime experiences a regime change and thus ends.

Determining the political status of a regime is challenging since one has to collapse complex phenomena into relatively simple categories as discussed in Chapter 2. Following Gates et al. (2005), I employ a minimalist view of regime typology and define them according to three structural dimensions. The first dimension concerns how the executive is recruited. This is measured using three indicators from the Polity data set on competitiveness, openness and regulation of executive recruitment (Marshall & Keith, 2002:19-21). The second dimension captures whether there are any constraints on the executive based on a single indicator from the Polity data (Marshall & Keith, 2002:23-24). The last dimension measures the extent of political participation in the system. This dimension is based on data from Vanhanen (2000) on the interaction between two indicators on participation and competition and has been modified by Gates et al. (2005). Each of the dimensions varies between zero and one, where zero characterizes the most concentration of power whereas one typifies
the greatest devolution of power. If a system contains zero on all three dimensions, it will be classified as an ideal autocratic regime. Conversely, a regime is classified as an ideal democracy if it holds a one on every dimension.

Evidently, what constitutes a regime change is critically dependent upon definitions of what constitutes a regime. As discussed in Chapter 2, the challenge is to distinguish between minor regime changes which are just a sign of a dynamic political structure, versus major changes which are equivalent to a transition and symbolizes the end of the regime. The decisive criterion is that the regime change alters the regime’s character in terms of procedures and rules either by truly devolving or concentrating the power at the national level. Accordingly, Gates et al. (2005:14) define a regime change as ”any change in indicators that results in either: 1) a movement from one category to another in the executive [recruitment] dimension (…), 2) a change of at least two units in the executive constraints dimension, or 3) a 100% increase or 50% decrease in the participation dimension”. In addition, establishment and dissolution of states are also coded as a regime change. The coded regime changes demarcate the start and the end of each regime. The time between regime changes is thus the dependent variable in this analysis.

The reliability of the data, which entails the notion of whether the data is measured properly, is expected to be high since both Vanhanen’s and Polity’s dataset are commonly acknowledged and applied.

4.4.2 Regime Types

Drawing on their three-dimensional framework for determining a regime’s political status, Gates et al. (2005) develop measures for categorizing all political systems. I am interested in the differences between democracy, autocracy and inconsistent regimes when it comes to how they lay the ground for the notion of frustration and opportunities. Whilst autocratic systems concentrate power, democratic regimes devolve power. Inconsistent regimes devolve power on some dimensions and yet concentrate power on others. I employ the categorization of Gates et al. (2005) of the
three regime types. They combine the three dimensions to form a cube from where are regimes can be identified\(^5\). Based on whether the political regimes are closest to the ideal democratic and autocratic corner of the three-dimensional cube, the regimes are categorized as either democratic or autocratic. The regimes are coded as inconsistent if they are not in the immediate regions around the democratic or autocratic corners. This three-fold categorization generates two dummies. One dummy denoting whether the regime is democratic and the other dummy indicate whether the regime is autocratic. The baseline is inconsistent regimes.

### 4.4.3 Ethnic Heterogeneity

The understanding of ethnic identity is controversial, and even more so the attempts at operationalizing ethnic groups. The starting point for measuring ethnic identity in this study is the list of ethnic groups developed by Fearon (2003). Building on former important works, Fearon’s intention was to both take into account objective ethnic features such as religion and the relevance for the people in question in registering ethnic groups within countries. I have chosen to use primarily two different measures of ethnicity presented below; the ethnic fractionalization index and the ethno-political exclusion measure. Three alternative measures of ethnic diversity will be outlined in the end, measures which will solely be applied in the analysis to illustrate the diversity in operationalizing ethnic groups in relation to civil unrest.

**Ethnic Fractionalization**

The most common operationalization of ethnic diversity in econometric models is a measure of ethnic fractionalization (ELF). The ELF index is defined as the probability that two randomly selected individuals within a country will be from different ethnic groups:

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\(^5\) Readers are referred to the paper by Gates et al. (2005) for a more thorough explanation and illustration.
\[ F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2 \]

Where \( p_i \) is the proportion of the population belonging to group \( i \). I will apply the widely used version of the index developed by Fearon and Laitin (2003) with Fearon’s (2003) list on ethnic groups as the basis. The index is higher when there are many groups in a country, particularly if they are of some size. Conversely, the index is lower when there is one large and dominant ethnic group. The variable is centered.

Fearon and Laitin’s dataset do not take into account changes in ethnic fractionalization over time, except for the creation of new states, which has been accounted for. The index is therefore insensitive to, for example demographic changes. Changes in ethnic composition due to demography should be relatively small, however, and not significantly affect the proportional differences between groups within countries in recent time. Due to the lack of time-series data on ethnicity, I limit the sample from 1945 until 2000, since it is less probable that there have been great changes in the ethnic composition of countries since the Second World War.

**Ethno-Political Exclusion**

I have argued that it is not the mere existence of ethnic fractionalization, but rather ethno-political exclusion that can threaten the stability of a regime due to the notion of frustration. Cederman and Girardin (2005) have developed a measure to account for exclusion of ethnic groups from the executive based on Fearon’s (2003) list. The measure is valuable because it measures exclusion from governmental power, giving marginalized ethnic groups a potential motive to destabilize a regime. Furthermore, the measure incorporates each excluded ethnic group’s capacities to mobilize in terms of relative size compared to the ethnic group in power.

The logic of the measure rests on two premises; i) that conflict of interests may erupt between the ethnic group(s) controlling the centre and peripheral groups, and ii) that the peripheral groups do not interact with each other (Cederman & Girardin, 2005:).
This leaves us with a star-like configuration with a central ethnic group in power (EGIP) contested by peripheral marginalized ethnic groups (MEG), excluded from the executive. The argument that the centre controls all communication and interaction resembles Galtung’s (1971) center-periphery theory.

Thus, ethnic antagonism and frustration within a country is expected to be determined by the dyadic relationship between the ethnic group in power and each excluded ethnic group. The possibility for each excluded group to mobilize against the ethnic group controlling the executive is expected to depend on the relative size of each group. Given these assumptions, an indicator on the probability of ethnic conflict over power based on a star-like ethnic configuration, $N^*$, can be computed applying the following formula:

$$N^*(r, k) = 1 - \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \left\{ \frac{p_i}{r} \right\}^{1+k} \frac{1}{1 + \left( \frac{p_i}{r} \right)^{-k}}$$

Where $p_0$ is the proportion of the ethnic group(s) in power and $p_i$ is the proportion of each excluded ethnic group. The $r$ parameter is a threshold value set at 0.5, and $k$ is a slope parameter set at 5. $N^*$ is higher when a relatively small ethnic group controls power, with relatively large groups excluded from the executive, ready to challenge the power-base. The measure is centered since it will be investigated in interaction with other variables.

$N^*$ has its disadvantages. Firstly, the measure is severely limited in spatial extent. At the time of writing, EGIP, was only coded for Europe, Asia, and North Africa. Since my intention is to make inferences regarding the general effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability this poses a problem. Thus, I have expanded the sample to also include all countries in America, Sudan, and Oceania except for Papa New.

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6 The reason why Sudan is coded is that it is by many seen as belonging to the Arabic countries of Northern Africa, and not to the African countries south of Sahara. The power holders of Sudan made the country a member of the Arab League.
Guinea. My main sources were the *Human Rights Reports* from the US State Departments, the *Library of Congress*, and the *CIA Factbook*. In some cases I also used the countries’ official web side. In addition I was allowed access to a dataset by Heger and Salehyan (2005), which contained a variable coding the ethnic identity of the leaders who served during the period of armed conflict. This was used to control the reliability of the coding based on the other sources.

Sub-Saharan Africa was left out due to time constraints. Given that these countries commonly consist of many ethnic groups and relatively often experience regime changes, they should ideally have been included in the analysis, to better ground any attempts at generalization. However, there are still many units in the analysis, varying in both space and time, indicating that the external validity should not be severely impaired. Furthermore, brief reviews and case-studies of Sub-Saharan regimes (e.g. Suberu & Diamond, 2002) seem to indicate that ethnic exclusion is intrinsically important for their instability, which may imply that broadening the sample would only generate stronger support for the importance of ethno-political exclusion.

The second disadvantage with N* is that it is not accurately captured over time, but rather denotes a ‘general’ value. In contrast to the measure of ethnic fractionalization, exclusion from power is not merely a demographic feature, but a political one. N* takes into account whether the ethnic group has access to the executive or not, and politics is not as static as demographic processes. Exclusion of ethnic groups, however, may be more consistent in reality than anticipated. A closer review suggests that the same ethnic group(s) have been in power for the entire sample period in a majority of the regimes. The small number of regimes where changes have occurred in the ethnic identity of EGIP, should not seriously affect my results. First and foremost, these changes have been fairly recently, many happening after 2000. An

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7 Papa New Guinea was left out since Fearon’s (2003) list does not contain information on the numbers and relative size of ethnic groups in that country.
example is Evo Morales who was the first person of indigenous origin to have access to the Presidency in Bolivia, but that was after the election in December 2005 (Beck, 2006). Secondly, even though some persons with a background from excluded ethnic groups recently have been included in the government, they are very often not in the main positions of power and thus still defined as excluded in accordance with the definition outlined in Chapter 2. However, in cases of more uncertainty and where changes in level of ethno-political exclusion were detected, this was reported as noted below.

There were many challenges in coding the ethnic groups in power, as recognized by Cederman and Girardin (2005:7-8). A general challenge in Latin-America was to determine the status of ‘mestizo’ since this group has both indigenous and white ancestors. In Bolivia the term is no longer used to refer to purely racial characteristics, but rather socio-cultural consequences (Library of Congress, 2005). Amerindians become ‘mestizo’ when they abandon their native customs, learn to speak Spanish and acquire a skill or trade. Hence, I decided to code ‘mestizo’ as ethnic group in power in all countries in Latin-America, since it is in most cases impossible to distinguish between them and the ‘white’. A ‘pure’ indigenous by Latin-American standard is more likely differentiated in terms of status and access to power. This example illustrates the challenges in the coding process. With other cases of more uncertainty, in time and/or status, these were coded as -1, following Cederman and Girardin (2005), whilst ethnic groups in power are coded 1 and the excluded ethnic groups coded 0. This allows me to run the analysis twice, with the ambiguous cases reported as included or excluded. In the subsequent analysis I include the ambiguous cases as ethnic groups in power, but when I assess the robustness of the findings I control how it influences the results if I do the opposite.

Hence, employing the N* poses many challenges. It reduces the sample by excluding the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, and there are some uncertainties in the coding process when it comes to variation over time. However, the gains from assessing the potential motives for mobilization outweigh the constraints associated with N*.
**Alternative Measures of Ethnic Diversity**

I apply three alternative measures of ethnic diversity, which vary in how they picture the importance of the relative size of the different ethnic groups. None of these measures capture the ethnic identity in relation to the source of frustration, such as is the case with ethno-political exclusion. *Ethnic dominance* is simply a measure of the proportion of the population that belongs to the largest ethnic group. The larger the ethnic group, the less their control is disputed, and the less instability will follow, is the general argument. The data is gathered from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and the variable is centered. *Ethnic cleavage* is also based on a measure by Fearon and Laitin (2003). This measure is a dummy, indicating whether the biggest group constitutes 49% of the population or more and the second largest group exceeds 7%. The assumption is that the existence of an ethnic cleavage heightens the probability of regime instability. *Ethnic polarization* is a measure which increases when there are few, equally large, groups in the country. The highest level of ethnic polarization is a situation where the regime contains two ethnic groups which each consist of approximately 50% of the population. The measure applied here is developed by Reynal-Querol (2002) and the assumption is that the higher degree of ethnic polarization, the more likely is regime instability. The variable is centered.

### 4.4.4 Additional Means of Inclusion – or Exclusion

I argue that there are primarily three other arenas of power in more democratic regimes, which could compensate for the lack of access by ethnic groups to the executive. Subsequently, I present the operationalization of these three arenas.

**Decentralization**

The question of decentralization is in distinguishing between regional bodies which serve as a mere extension of the executive, and regional bodies which serve as an alternative base of power, where the last is the prime interest of this study. The problem is that a federal state can in some respects be more centralized than a non-federal state with extensive decentralization features such as for example Norway.
Furthermore, the level of decentralization does not only vary between countries, but also within countries (Solnick, 2002:172), which further complicates the matter. Regardless, I have employed a simple dummy variable denoting whether there is a geographical diffusion in decision-making authority or not. There are two reasons for why I chose to do this. First, I am primarily interested in capturing whether there actually are arenas of common-policy making below the executive level where alternative interest representation can occur. Second, the data-availability for the time-span under investigation and the large sample limits the applicability of alternative measures.

The data on decentralization is primarily gathered from the Polity III dataset (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995). The variable “centralization of state authority” captures whether the geographic concentration of decision-making authority is unitary, intermediate, or federal. The dataset contains information for the period 1800-1994. For the last six years I complemented this data by controlling for changes with a variable on decentralization from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). This dataset contains information on political systems from 1975 until 2000, and there were one dummy that were used to complement the original dataset; whether sub-national governments have extensive taxing, spending, or regulatory authority. It is not unproblematic to combine variables from different datasets since they do not capture exactly the same. However, since the decentralization measure is a dummy, this facilitated the process. The operationalization generated a dummy denoting whether the regime contain a decentralized system of power or not. Both datasets are recognized and I expect that data is fairly reliable.

**Legal Protection**

Legal protection of excluded ethnic groups should ideally capture special majority rights and protection in the Constitution. However, I was only able to find one study that had recorded constitutional provisions concerning the rights of minorities for a large number of countries, but it was from 1978 and only reported frequencies of constitutional minority protection (van Maarseveen & ven der Tang, 1978). Hence, I
was left with my second-best alternative, to measure whether the ethnic groups at least possess the same legal protection as the rest of the population. The measure on legal protection did originally go from zero, signifying no differential in legal protection, to two, denoting significant differential in legal protection. The intermediate category one, was labelled indeterminate differential. I reversed and centered the variable. Higher levels thus signify equal legal protection, and lower levels unequal.

The variable is gathered from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (2005). There are, however, some problems with using a variable from the MAR dataset for this study. Most importantly, the units of the dataset have originally been identified as ‘minorities at risk’ according to two general criteria (Davenport, 2003), and the value on legal protection corresponded to each group. Although these measures have been aggregated to accord for the mean level of legal protection in each country, the measure still poses a sample selection problem.

Applying this measure, I do not catch the level of legal protection in every regime, but rather to which extent minorities ‘at risk’ within the country, has the same legal protection as other citizens. Most likely, these groups ‘at risk’ do not correspond perfectly to the ethnic groups identified as excluded from power in this study. Furthermore, there may be countries not containing any minorities ‘at risk’, even though exclusion of ethnic groups from power does occur. To be recognized as a minority ‘at risk’ attention needs to be drawn to your case, which often occur in situations of conflict and regime instability. Hence, coding on the legal protection measure may correspond to when a regime is more unstable, and reversed, missing values on legal protection may correspond to regimes which are stable.

Although recognizing the problem, I will argue that in practice, the measure does actually capture the level of legal protection in most cases. The MAR dataset has continually been expanding in time and space since it origins and now contains information on 285 ethnic groups (Davenport, 2003:6). That corresponds to most regimes in the sample applied here. The majority of the regimes with missing values
on the legal protection measure either did not contain any ethnic groups, or these
groups were not excluded from power. Hence, in most cases with higher values of
\(N^*\), the level of legal protection for at least some groups in the regime was coded.
Since I am primarily interested in whether the effect of high \(N^*\) on regime stability
may be reduced by equal legal protection, this may still be revealed despite other
limitations. Furthermore, the fact that the measure of legal protection is coded at the
level of ethnic groups, may improve the value of this variable in comparison to the
other arenas of accommodation. Decentralization for example, is purely a structural
variable, and does not favour excluded ethnic groups if the regions do not differ in
ethnic composition from the national level. The fact that perhaps only the legal
protection of one out of many excluded ethnic groups, is coded, is more likely not a
problem since it probably captures the ‘worst of’.

The data on legal protection is only coded at five year intervals between 1945 and
1985. Hence, I have interpolated the measure in the period before 1985, whilst from
1985 until 2000 the measure is coded for every year. The variation in the five year
intervals should be moderate enough to allow for this.

Electoral System
The type of electoral system is presumably the most straight-forward to
operationalize of the three alternative arenas of power. The problem relates to
systems which employ a mixture of electoral systems. I will argue, however, that as
long as at least parts of the legislature is elected by proportional representation, that
allows excluded groups of some size to have access to an alternative arena of political
power. Hence, I employ a dummy where one denotes a system where at least parts of
the representatives elected by popular vote are elected through a system of
proportional representation. Conversely, zero indicates that the regime does not
contain a proportional representation system.

The dummy is adopted from the Database of Political Institutions from the World
Bank (Beck et al., 2001). The disadvantage with this dataset, however, is that it only
contains information on electoral systems from 1975 until 2000. I could not find other complementary data sources and there was no time for individual coding. Although the sample will be very small given the limitations in time, I still find it fruitful to employ this measure to test the last hypothesis.

4.4.5 The Control Variables

The prime relationship of concern in this thesis, the association between regime type, and different measures of ethnic diversity, are clearly not the only factors relevant when studying the conditions for regime stability. Previous research has identified several important factors, as discussed in Chapter 2. Hence, to better grasp the true effect of my explanatory variables I have included the control variables presented below. Most of the control variables were included in the study by Gates et al. (2005), but have also been found to be important by for example Przeworski et al. (2000).

Economic Development
One of the most investigated and robust findings in the literature on regime stability is the association between level of economic development and regime stability (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Economic development is measured as the natural log of GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars. It is lagged with one year prior to the regime change to ensure the direction of causality is correct. The variable is adopted from Gates et al. (2005:19-20), which have standardized data from the World Bank (2000), Penn World Tables (Summers & Heston, 1991) and Maddison (1995).

Economic Growth
Economic growth rates are often found to affect the risk of anti-regime activities (Londregan & Poole, 1990). It is measured as the difference in the natural log of GDP per capita in five year intervals, divided by five. The intervals are counted from one to six years before the actual year, to lag the variable to further ensure that the sequence is in order. It is multiplied by 100 to obtain a measure which is
approximately the standard growth rates in percentages (Przeworski et al., 2000). The data is adopted from Gates et al. (2005:19).

**Political Neighbourhood**

Regimes are more likely to remain stable when surrounded by similar political systems (Gleditsch, 2002:192-193). To control for the political neighborhood, I employ a measure denoting the ‘political distance’ from the regime in question to all its neighboring regimes. Neighboring regimes are countries that either share common borders, or which have less than 150 nautical miles between them. Regimes without political neighbors as defined, is assigned the average ‘political distance’ from that regime to all other regimes in the world. The variable is normalized to range from zero being completely similar to its neighbors in terms of political institutions, to one being completely different. The variable is adopted from Gates et al. (2005:19).

**Newly Independent States**

Time is important for regime stability and newly established political institutions will more likely experience more changes and structural adjustments than institutions in older countries (Hegre et al., 2001). To measure the effect of new states, I employ a dummy labeled one if the regime was the first after independence, and zero if not. The measure is adopted from Gates et al.’s (2005:20).

**Colonial Past**

Former colonial powers have often been accused of favouring certain ethnic groups, leaving the regime unstable due to ethnic favouritism (Horowitz, 1985:66-67). Since a colonial past both can affect the degree of ethno-political exclusion and regimes stability, I add this variable to the dataset by Gates et al. (2005). The colonial past variable is a dummy, where one denotes if the regime is a former colony, and zero if not. The data was gathered from the Correlates of War project on Colonial/Dependency Contiguity, v2 (2005a) and subsequently modified by Strand (Strand, 2006).
**Population Size**

With larger populations, the executive power may have greater difficulties in controlling their citizens. Furthermore, excluded ethnic groups may have more individuals to mobilize due to frustration (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). To control for this, I include a variable on population size to the dataset. I take the natural log of the measure to ensure that extreme outliers do not manipulate the actual effect. The data is taken from the Correlates of War project on National Material Capabilities, v3.02 (Singer, 1987).
5. The Results and their Implications

“A country like Switzerland is the former Yugoslavia’s equal in every way in linguistic and cultural diversity, and has yet managed to avoid a pervasive politicization of ethnicity” (Wimmer, 2002:86)

Exclusion from power due to ethnic divisions has clearly played a role in regime changes in Nigeria (Suberu & Diamond, 2002). In stark contrast stands a multiethnic regime such as India which has remained remarkably stable since its independence (Ahuja & Varshney, 2005). The purpose of this thesis is to move beyond single cases and reveal whether there are patterns of stability in multiethnic regimes. In this chapter I present the results of the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 3 and discuss the implications. First, I investigate the association between different measures of ethnic diversity and regime stability. I test whether ethno-political exclusion, and not sheer ethnic heterogeneity, may increase the hazard of regime change, as anticipated in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Subsequently, I examine Hypotheses 3 to 5; whether exclusion of ethnic groups from political power affects the risk of regime change differently depending on regime type. Following that, I divide the sample into three subsets to more thoroughly investigate the contingent effect of ethno-political exclusion on the stability of democratic and inconsistent regimes given specific regime features, as expressed in Hypotheses 6 to 8. In the end, I test the robustness of the model before I conclude the chapter by summarizing the main results, and discuss the limitations of this study.

5.1 Ethnic Diversity and Regime Stability

To examine what affects a regime’s stability I apply Cox regression. The estimates are in hazard ratios. Whereas hazard ratios below one denotes less risk of regime change with higher values on the independent variable, ratios above one identify higher risks of regime change with higher values on the independent variable. The significance level has the same interpretation as in regular regressions. Hypotheses 1
and 2 relate to how different measures of ethnic diversity are associated with regime stability. Although I am primarily interested in the measures of ethnic fractionalization and ethno-political exclusion, I also test for three alternative indicators on ethnic diversity. The correlations between the five different measures are displayed in Table 5.1 below. It shows that ethno-political exclusion is quite different from the measure of ethnic fractionalization; they only correlate by .22.

Table 5.1: Correlations between the Different Measures of Ethnic Diversity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization (ELF)</th>
<th>Ethno-Political Exclusion (N*)</th>
<th>Ethnic Dominance</th>
<th>Ethnic Cleavage</th>
<th>Ethnic Polarization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization (ELF)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Political Exclusion (N*)</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Dominance</td>
<td>-0.685</td>
<td>-0.485</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Cleavage</td>
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<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.207</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Polarization</td>
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<td>-0.758</td>
<td>0.517</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the forthcoming models are solely based on the measure of ethnic fractionalization and/or ethno-political exclusion since that is where my theoretical argument rests. The models have, however, been estimated also with the alternative measures of ethnic diversity, and the results are reported in footnotes. The reason for this is a wish to both show how much impact the concept and operationalization of ethnic groups’ role in conflict have on the hazard of regime change, but at the same time keep the presentation as simple as possible.

Regime stability or instability can clearly not be solely explained by the ethnic composition of the regime. In fact, it might not have an effect at all. To account for other possible causes, all relevant factors have to be included in the same multivariate Cox regression. Hence, Table 5.2 concerns the multivariate regressions with regime
stability as the dependent variable. To get an impression of how the different control variables affect regime stability, without the variables of interest for the hypotheses, the first model only includes these covariates. Model 1 thus serves as a control model. In addition to the variables applied by Gates et al. (2005) in their study of regime stability, I have added variables on the population size and a dummy on whether the regime has a colonial past.

Table 5.2: Ethnic Diversity and Hazard of Regime Change, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization (ELF)</td>
<td>0.895 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.908 (0.39)</td>
<td>0.908 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Political Exclusion (N*)</td>
<td>0.908 (0.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.188*** (8.97)</td>
<td>0.186*** (9.02)</td>
<td>0.184*** (8.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>0.614*** (4.03)</td>
<td>0.609*** (4.08)</td>
<td>0.608*** (4.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.877*** (2.59)</td>
<td>0.878** (2.48)</td>
<td>0.880** (2.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.984* (1.93)</td>
<td>0.983** (2.02)</td>
<td>0.983** (2.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Neighborhood</td>
<td>3.889*** (4.59)</td>
<td>3.863*** (4.55)</td>
<td>3.836*** (4.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>0.585** (2.39)</td>
<td>0.603** (2.22)</td>
<td>0.605** (2.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Past</td>
<td>4.188** (2.01)</td>
<td>4.144** (2.00)</td>
<td>4.117** (2.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>0.983 (0.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Subjects: 446 445 445  
Number of Failures: 337 337 337  
Log Pseudo-Likelihood: -1673.306 -1673.017 -1672.969

Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

Considering Model 1, most of the results for the control variables are in accordance with previous findings. In the multivariate regression both the democracy and the autocracy variables are significant at less than 1% level. The baseline is the inconsistent category, which has a significantly greater hazard of regime change than both democratic and autocratic regimes. The control model further confirms that the economic variables are significant. Both higher economic development and economic
growth effectively reduce the risk of regime change, although economic growth is only significant at a 10% level. The political neighborhood variable also has the proposed effect on regime stability. The more politically different a regime is from its neighbors, the greater hazard of regime change. Besides, being a former colony significantly increases the risk of regime instability. In fact, a regime has a four time greater danger of experiencing a regime change, if the territory was once controlled by colonial powers.

The variable measuring whether the regime is the first after independence is significant, but does not, however, have the expected direction. Rather than to increase the hazard of regime change, new states have a lower hazard of failure. However, the effect is in accordance with previous results by Gates et al. (2005:28). They found that autocracies survive longer if established just after independence, whereas autocratic institutions established after other regime types are more unstable, thus affecting the results. The last control variable, the natural log of the population size, is not significant. The population size variable may be non-significant since the sample already is limited to regimes with more than 500,000 inhabitants. Since the measure remained non-significant when including the other variables of interest, I have dropped it from the subsequent models.

With the control model as a starting point, I turn to Hypotheses 1 and 2. I suggested that it is not the mere ethnic differences, but rather frustration due to such differences, that should threaten the stability of a regime. Thus, I first test Hypothesis 1, which states that there should be no systematic relationship between the degree of ethnic diversity in a regime and its stability. I test the effect of ethnic diversity by applying a measure of ethnic fractionalization in the Cox regression controlling for other factors. Model 2 confirms that ethnic fractionalization is non-significant, indicating that the hazard of regime change, as defined here, is no higher in more ethnically
fractionalized countries controlling for other factors\(^8\). As for the control variables, they all have roughly the same effects as in the control model, and they are all significant at a .05 level or better. Since there is not support for the alternative hypothesis of an effect of ethnic diversity on regime stability, **Hypothesis 1** cannot be rejected; I find no systematic relationship between ethnic diversity and a regime’s stability.

As argued earlier, if people are denied access to power based on their ethnic identity, this could lead to frustration and give an incentive for mobilization towards the power holders. In accordance with frustration theory, I hypothesized that higher levels of ethno-political exclusion give a motive for change of status quo, and thus should be associated with regime instability. This expectation is expressed in Hypothesis 2.

However, ethno-political exclusion is also partly an outcome of regime type as illustrated in the model of expected effects in Chapter 3. Or, given a more ‘maximalist’ view on how regimes should be defined, ethno-political exclusion should be a function of the regime type (Beetham, 1994:25-41). This relates to the theoretical discussion outlined in Chapter 2 on whether regimes should be defined according to institutional features, or rather normative implications and performance. Given my ‘minimalist’ definition of regime type, I argued that exclusion and inclusion of different ethnic groups is a possible outcome in a system that either concentrates or devolves power, but that it is not a necessary one. Thus, there should not necessarily be a complete correlation between level of ethno-political exclusion and regime type. Table 5.3 confirms that even though ethno-political exclusion is less common in democracies than in other regime types, ethnic exclusion also happens in democratic regimes. Otherwise, if exclusion was solely a function of regime type, the mean level of N* in democracies would be zero.

\(^8\) I tested the alternative measures of ethnic diversity with the same control variables. Even so, the conclusion remains the same. Neither variables of ethnic dominance, ethnic polarization, nor ethnic cleavage were close to a satisfactory level of significance. Moreover, they did not affect the other results.
Table 5.3: Mean Level of Ethno-Political Exclusion by Regime Type, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Mean Level of Ethno-Political Exclusion (N*)</th>
<th>S.d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent Regimes</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracies</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracies</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, having established that ethno-political exclusion may have an independent effect even when controlled for regime type, I assess Hypothesis 2 by including a measure of ethno-political exclusion to the earlier model. The results are shown in Model 3 in Table 5.2. I keep the ethnic fractionalization index to control for the effect of ethnic diversity. The result reveals that the hazard ratio of ethno-political exclusion is not significant. The control variables all hold roughly the same effects as in previous models. Given these results, I cannot reject the alternative hypothesis that there is no effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability. Hence, **Hypothesis 2** is not supported; higher levels of ethno-political exclusion are not associated with higher levels of regime instability when controlled for other factors.

The fact that Hypothesis 2 is not supported demands more discussion. More particularly, the fact that the effects of *both* the ELF and the N* on regime stability were non-significant contradicts previous expectations. The measure of ethno-political exclusion was expected to capture the motive behind a mobilization, in contrast to just the potential based on an ethnic identity as with the ELF index. Due to this discrepancy between theory and results, the most obvious, and easiest, solution would be to reject the theoretical foundation. The analytical framework could be disputed at several levels – the importance of ethnic identity, the understanding of mobilization, and the dynamics of regime stability are just some examples. Furthermore, the measure of ethno-political exclusion could be criticized at a methodological level due to lack of time varying data as discussed in Chapter 4.

However, due to theoretical, empirical, and methodological reasons the importance of frustration due to ethno-political exclusion should yet not be underestimated. It could
be the case that the importance of exclusion of ethnic groups is different depending on the political system. To put it bluntly, exclusion of ethnic groups may be irrelevant in some political systems where most citizens are excluded. If the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability depends on the values of another variable, this will not be revealed in simple multivariate regressions. The complex relationship between ethno-political exclusion, regime type and regime stability, demands a more intricate analysis.

5.2 Ethno-Political Exclusion in Different Political Contexts

Ethnicity cannot be understood outside its context. Neither can the notion of exclusion. A guiding assumption for this inquiry is that political structures, in combination with the ethnic configuration of a regime, may explain regime stability and instability, since they lay the ground for feelings of frustration and calculations of opportunities. The question of whether political access for ethnic groups, in conjunction with regime type, affects the duration of political systems is reflected in Hypotheses 3 to 5.

To be able to check whether exclusion of ethnic groups affects regime stability differently depending on political structures, interaction terms between the measure of ethno-political exclusion and the respective regime types, are included in the multivariate regression. The interaction term, if significant, can be understood as the effect of one factor on a dependent variable with the level of another factor held constant. In other words, ethno-political exclusion will only in certain circumstances have an impact on regime stability, in other situations less or none at all. All the relevant interaction variables, which were not dummies, were centered by subtracting out their means before I calculated the interaction term. This was done to reduce multicollinearity (Gasiorowski, 1995:887). Table 5.4 shows the model where the interaction terms between N* and regime dummies, denoting whether the regime is democratic or autocratic, are included.
### Table 5.4: Ethnic Diversity, Regime Type, and Hazard of Regime Change, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Political Exclusion</td>
<td>0.656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N*)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ELF)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.199***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8.82)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>0.599***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.07)</td>
<td>(3.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N* x Democracy</td>
<td>57.796***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N* x Autocracy</td>
<td>1.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF x Democracy</td>
<td>2.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF x Autocracy</td>
<td>1.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.895**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.06)</td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.984**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.98)</td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Neighborhood</td>
<td>3.889***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.41)</td>
<td>(4.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>0.592**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.34)</td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Past</td>
<td>4.902**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.21)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Subjects</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Failures</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudo-Likelihood</td>
<td>-1668.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1672.068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

Reviewing the results in Table 5.4, a more diversified pattern appears than with the former models. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the model increases. When comparing the log pseudo-likelihood in Model 3 with the log pseudo-likelihood in Model 4, the explanatory power of the model increases with 4.85. This indicates that Model 4 explains more of the variance. The models are the same except for the inclusion of the interaction terms in the latter, which implies that the interaction terms are causing the increase in the log pseudo-likelihood. Whilst the interaction term between the democracy dummy and the N* is above one and highly significant at .01 level, the interaction between autocracy and N* is non-significant. In Model 5 I
repeat the operation, but replace the measure of ethno-political exclusion with the ethnic fractionalization index to test the strength of the findings. The results show that replacing ethno-political exclusion with the ELF-index diminishes the relevance of the interaction term. Thus, higher levels of ethnic fractionalization do not increase the risk of regime change in neither democracies, nor autocracies, nor inconsistent regimes\(^9\). This confirms that ethno-political exclusion does capture aspects in relation to regime stability which the ELF index does not\(^{10}\).

Before turning to a closer investigation of the interaction effects in Model 4, a brief review of the other variables is appropriate. The pattern is very much the same as in the earlier models. Both ethno-political exclusion and ethnic fractionalization remain non-significant. The independent effects of both autocracy and democracy on the probability of survival are still strong despite the inclusion of interaction effects. All the control variables remain significant with approximately the same hazards of regime change.

Based on the information in Model 4 I first consider Hypothesis 3, whether the impact of exclusion of ethnic groups on regime stability in general depends on the political institutions. This can be ascertained if any of the interaction terms between ethno-political exclusion and regime types are significant, or if \(N^*\) has an independent effect given the baseline. Since Model 4 confirms that the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime instability does indeed depend on whether the regime is democratic or not, Hypothesis 3 receives strong support. The main finding conforms to the expectation that the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability depends on regime type, ceteris paribus.

\(^9\) The model was also tested with interaction terms between the three alternative measures of ethnic diversity and dummies on democracy and autocracy. The interaction terms between democracy and both ethnic dominance and ethnic polarization contained significant effects at approximately the same significance level as \(N^*\). The effects of the interaction terms between ethnic cleavage and the two regime dummies were not significant, however.

\(^{10}\) I included all the variables and interaction terms applied in model 6 and 7 in one model. There were no noteworthy changes in the effects, or in the significance levels.
In Hypotheses 4 and 5 I explicitly anticipate how ethno-political exclusion affects a regime’s stability depending on whether the system is autocratic-democratic, or inconsistent-consistent. With Hypothesis 4 I suggest that the existence of ethno-political exclusion increases the hazard of regime change more in democracies than in autocracies. This hypothesis could be defended from two perspectives; there are more opportunities to mobilize in democratic regimes and the frustration due to exclusion is relatively speaking higher in such regimes than in more autocratic ones. There exists however well-founded counterarguments to this proposition outlined in Chapter 3. It might be that the negative effect of ethno-political exclusion is higher in autocracies than in democracies since the sense of frustration is more absolute. These possible outcomes generate one hypothesis to be tested.

The interaction terms in Model 4 indicate that exclusion of ethnic groups does have an impact on the stability of democratic regimes, but that it does not in autocracies, given the model’s specifications. In other words, the level of ethno-political exclusion is very important for democratic stability, but it is not decisive for an autocracy’s stability. The independent effect of the $N^*$, measures the impact of ethno-political exclusion in inconsistent regimes.

The interaction effects demand a more comprehensive investigation. Their interpretation can be understood more clearly by calculating the hazard of regime change relative to the baseline where the centered $N^*$ equals zero and there is no democracy;

\[
\text{HazardRatio} = e^{\left( \ln(0.56)N^* + \ln(0.199)\text{Democracy} + \ln(57.796)N^* \times \text{Democracy} + \text{rest} \right)}
\]

\[
\text{HazardRatio} = e^{\left( \ln(0.56) + \ln(57.796)\text{Democracy} \right)N^* + \ln(0.199)\text{Democracy} + \text{rest} }}
\]

This second equation illustrates that an increase in the democracy variable from zero to one substantially influences the effect of $N^*$ on the hazard of regime failure. Given that the dummy for democracy is one, the effect of a one unit increase in ethno-political exclusion on regime stability is in reality;

\[
\text{HazardRatio} / (\text{Democracy} = 1) = e^{\left( \ln(0.56) + \ln(57.796) \right)N^* + \ln(0.199)}
\]
This means that an increase with one unit increases the probability of regime change roughly 7.5 times in democratic regimes. Table 5.5 illustrates how democratic regimes become increasingly more unstable with higher levels of ethno-political exclusion in comparison to the two other regime types.

Table 5.5: Estimated Hazard Ratios for the Different Regime Types Given Different Levels of the Centered Ethno-Political Exclusion, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Inconsistent</th>
<th>Autocracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowest level of Ethno-Political Exclusion (N* = -.078)</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>.606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean level of Ethno-Political Exclusion in Democracies (N* = -.057)</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>1.024</td>
<td>.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean level of Ethno-Political Exclusion in all Regimes (N* = 0)</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest level of Ethno-Political Exclusion in Democracies (N* = .337)</td>
<td>.677</td>
<td>.868</td>
<td>.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest level of Ethno-Political Exclusion in all Regimes (N* = .909)</td>
<td>5.420*</td>
<td>.682</td>
<td>.527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The hazard ratios are for the respective regime types when all the other variables are kept at zero. * = A value of ethno-political exclusion no democracy contains.

Even though the hazard ratio is still below one with all relevant values of ethno-political exclusion in democratic regimes, implying that it consequently has a lower risk for regime change than inconsistent regimes, the difference is continually decreasing. In fact, democracies with a mean level of ethno-political exclusion among democracies, compared to the democracies with the highest measured level of N*, have more than 4 times the risk of experiencing a regime change all other things being equal. In contrast, the hazard ratio for regime change is slightly decreasing in
autocratic regimes with higher levels of ethno-political exclusion, although this tendency is not significant. The fact that ethno-political exclusion only appears to be relevant in explaining regime instability in democracies, and not in autocracies, is consistent with arguments from both a rational actor perspective and a relative deprivation approach. In democratic regimes, the citizens do have ample resources available for mobilization. Furthermore, the sense of frustration due to exclusion may relatively speaking be greater, since the citizens in general expect to be included. Hence, given the operationalizations applied, **Hypothesis 4** receives strong support: ethno-political exclusion increases the hazard of regime instability more in democracies than in autocracies.

Hypothesis 5 relates to whether ethno-political exclusion in inconsistent regimes increases the hazard of regime instability, in comparison to consistent ones. This is based on an expectation that combinations of autocratic and democratic institutional features leave the arena partly open for confrontation between ethnic groups and disputes over power, facilitating a mobilization due to frustration. To assess Hypothesis 5, I return to Table 5.4 and 5.5, recalling that in these models did the inconsistent regimes constitute the baseline. In Model 4 the independent effect of N* is not significant. The effect’s lack of significance imply that whether ethnic groups are included or excluded from power in inconsistent regimes does not have an effect on its risk of regime change relative to autocracies.

In Table 5.5 the exact hazard of regime change for inconsistent regimes is calculated for certain values of ethno-political exclusion. The pattern revealed is quite opposite from what was expected based on the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3. Whilst higher levels of ethno-political exclusion are followed by greater hazard of regime change in democracy, the direction is the opposite in inconsistent and autocratic regimes, although with high levels of uncertainty. In an inconsistent regime, the hazard of regime change is reduced by nearly 35% going from the highest level of ethno-political exclusion to the lowest level. The fact that the hazard ratios of regime change are below one for inconsistent regimes when N* is above the mean, indicate
that inconsistent regimes actually survive longer if they exclude larger part of the population from power. The same is also true in autocracies, although these are indications from the data not supported at a satisfactorily significance level.

Yet, the indications and the significant interaction term between democracy and $N^*$ give a sufficient foundation for assessing Hypothesis 5. Given this inquiry’s limitation, ethnic exclusion from power does not increase the hazard of instability in inconsistent regimes. On the contrary, there are some findings which indicate that exclusion of ethnic groups in inconsistent regimes actually secure its stability, though this is uncertain. Within the limitations of this thesis, Hypothesis 5 is not supported. Ethno-political exclusion does not seem to increase the risk of regime instability more in inconsistent regimes than in consistent ones.

5.3 Additional Means of Inclusion – or Exclusion

In this section I investigate in greater detail additional elements that may affect the notion of exclusion and inclusion outside the central power. The argument is that access to political power is not solely determined by access to the executive. In particular in regimes with at least some democratic traits, the power is more dispersed. Hence, in such regimes, the effect of ethnic exclusion from the executive may be compensated by the existence of other features which could protect the interests of the excluded ethnic group(s) vis-à-vis the central government. These additional arenas; decentralization, equal legal protection, and a proportional representation system, are hypothesized to be relevant in regimes with at least some democratic traits, as reflected in Hypotheses 6 to 8. Hence, I have tested the hypotheses separately in three sub-sets of the sample divided by whether the regime is democratic, inconsistent, or autocratic. The autocratic sub-sample serves as a control model, where the three additional arenas are expected to be non-existent or not of high relevance. I have also tested the models in this section replacing $N^*$ with the three alternative variables of ethnicity and ethnic fractionalization. For simplicity, all these results will only be reported in footnotes.
Hypotheses 6a and 6b relate to the arena of power below the executive, which is assessed in Table 5.6. Decentralization, through federal or autonomous arrangements, may allow ethnic groups to have access to power on sub-national levels. There are however counterarguments, as pointed out in Chapter 3. Regions and autonomies may also serve as a base from where to mobilize for independence, evidently threatening the stability of the system. Hence, Hypotheses 6a and 6b simply states that the existence of a system of decentralization of power, when ethno-political exclusion is high, reduces the risk of regime instability in respectively democracies and inconsistent regimes.

Table 5.6: Decentralization, Ethno-Political Exclusion, and Hazard of Regime Change by Subsets of Democratic, Inconsistent, and Autocratic Regimes, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 6 Democracies</th>
<th>Model 7 Inconsistent</th>
<th>Model 8 Autocracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Political Exclusión (N*)</td>
<td>59.683** (2.24)</td>
<td>0.932 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.624 (0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization (ELF)</td>
<td>0.332 (1.12)</td>
<td>0.852 (0.39)</td>
<td>0.785 (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>1.081 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.475** (2.19)</td>
<td>0.952 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N* x Decentralization</td>
<td>0.501 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.000** (2.54)</td>
<td>0.620 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.635*** (2.67)</td>
<td>0.918 (0.96)</td>
<td>1.033 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.997 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.992 (0.56)</td>
<td>0.974** (2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Neighborhood</td>
<td>4.695** (2.36)</td>
<td>5.832** (2.48)</td>
<td>4.046*** (2.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>0.522 (1.17)</td>
<td>0.621 (1.36)</td>
<td>0.349** (2.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Past</td>
<td>8.947** (2.37)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Subjects</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Failures</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

The hypotheses are assessed through incorporating a dummy variable denoting whether or not the regime decentralizes power, and an interaction term between the decentralization dummy and N* in Model 6 and 7 as displayed in Table 5.6. The control variables are the same as in earlier models.
Model 6 shows the results for the subset of democratic regimes, and neither the dummy accounting for whether the system is decentralized, nor this dummy in interaction with N*, are significant. This indicates that whether a democracy has a decentralized system of decision-making does not have an impact on the regime’s hazard of instability, regardless of higher levels of ethno-political exclusion\(^\text{11}\). Table 5.7 illustrates the difference in hazard of regime change in decentralized and centralized democratic and inconsistent regimes with levels of N* above the mean.

### 5.7: Estimated Hazard Ratios for Democratic and Inconsistent Regimes with High Levels of Ethno-Political Exclusion, Given by Centralized or Decentralized Systems of Decision-Making, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Inconsistent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System of Decision-making</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em><em>Mean Level of Ethno-Political Exclusion (N</em>=0)</em>*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em><em>Highest level of Ethno-Political Exclusion in Democracies (N</em>=.337)</em>*</td>
<td>3.967</td>
<td>3.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em><em>Highest level of Ethno-Political Exclusion in all Regimes (N</em>=.909)</em>*</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>41.138*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The hazard ratios are for the respective regime types, when all other variables are kept at zero.

\(\ast\) = A value of ethno-political exclusion no democracy contains.

Comparing the differences within democratic regimes between systems of centralization and decentralization reveals minor differences. Particularly when considering that the highest level of N* in democracies is revealed in the second row. Hence, decentralization does not seem to influence democracies’ stability given this study’ limitations. However, the lack of significant results may partly be explained by

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\(^{11}\) The interaction terms between decentralization and respectively ethnic fractionalization and ethnic cleavage were significant at a .05 level in the subset consisting of democratic regimes. The existence of a system of decentralization when the level of ethnic fractionalization is high in democracies reduces the risk of regime change. In regimes with an ethnic cleavage, a system of decentralization increases the likelihood of regime change. The interaction between the other ethnicity variables and the decentralization dummy were not significant, in neither this subset, nor in the other subsets.
the relatively low numbers of only 35 regime changes in democracies in the period 1945-2000.

In inconsistent regimes, measures of decentralization do have a significant impact on the hazard of regime change, both independently and in interaction with ethno-political exclusion as displayed in Model 7 in Table 5.6. The hazard below one implies that a system of decentralization reduces the risk of regime change in inconsistent regimes. Furthermore, the effect of N* is contingent on whether the regime contains measures of decentralization. Since the independent effect of N* is not significant, differences in N* in inconsistent regimes with a centralized system of power does not affect the hazard of regime stability. However, when comparing the differences in effects in Table 5.7 between centralized and decentralized systems in inconsistent regimes, given certain levels on N*, the differences become apparent. The existence of a system of decentralization when ethno-political exclusion is high reduces the hazard of instability in inconsistent regimes.

The control group of autocracies as displayed in Model 9 in Table 5.6 simply confirms the expectation that decentralization of power is not of relevance in this subset of regimes. Considering the control variables across the three models, many are no longer significant. This is due to the small sample in each subset and many variables. Aside from the political neighborhood variable, none of the measures remain significant across the three subsets. Economic development appears to be the most decisive for democracies’ stability, whilst economic growth is important for autocracies’ stability. The lack of significant control variables in the subset of inconsistent regimes may indicate that this is a quite diverse group of regimes. The variable denoting whether the regime contains a colonial past is dropped by default in the subsets of inconsistent and autocratic regimes, due to collinearity.

Based on the findings in Table 5.6 and 5.7 then, Hypothesis 6a is not supported. Given this inquiry’s limitations I find no support that having a system of decentralization when ethno-political exclusion is high, reduces the hazard of regime change in democracies. The significant interaction term in the subset of inconsistent
regimes, however, give support to Hypothesis 6b; a system of decentralization in inconsistent regimes when ethno-political exclusion is high, reduces the hazard of regime instability.

Hypotheses 7a and 7b concern the judiciary arena of power. Lack of access to the executive can be counterbalanced by protection from the judiciary, and vice versa, if the system contains at least some democratic features. Hypothesis 7a and 7b thus states that equal legal protection when the level of ethno-political exclusion is high, reduces the hazard of regime instability in respectively democratic and inconsistent regimes. To check this, interaction terms between legal protection and N* is included in the models in Table 5.8.

Model 9 captures the hazard of regime change in the subset of democratic regimes and shows that the interaction term between legal protection and N* is significant\textsuperscript{12}. In fact, the interaction term is significant in both the subset of democracies and autocracies as displayed in Model 11. Of particular interest, the hazard ratios changes the direction across the subsets. The effect of the interaction term in inconsistent regimes is, however, not significant as model 10 confirms\textsuperscript{13}.

\textsuperscript{12} None of the alternative measures of ethnic diversity were significant in interaction with legal protection in the subset of democratic or inconsistent regimes.

\textsuperscript{13} I also ran the models with the inclusion of the decentralization variable and its subsequent interaction term from the previous models. Since this does not affect my inferences I do not display the results.
Table 5.8: Legal Protection, Ethno-Political Exclusion, and Hazard of Regime Change by Subsets of Democratic, Inconsistent, and Autocratic regimes, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracies</td>
<td>Inconsistent</td>
<td>Autocracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Political Exclusion</td>
<td>254.687***</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N*)</td>
<td>(4.35)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.209*</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>0.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ELF)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Protection</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td>1.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N* x Legal Protection</td>
<td>32.991***</td>
<td>1.729</td>
<td>0.219**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.61)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(2.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.536***</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td>1.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.32)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>0.974**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Neighborhood</td>
<td>1.943</td>
<td>5.791**</td>
<td>2.299*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(2.52)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>0.187*</td>
<td>0.822</td>
<td>0.367**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.65)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Past</td>
<td>16.155*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Subjects</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Failures</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudo-Likelihood</td>
<td>-116.320</td>
<td>-551.845</td>
<td>-452.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

These findings contradict two previous expectations. First, the level of legal protection was not expected to have an impact on the effect of N* in more autocratic regimes. The significant interaction terms indicate that it does. Second, the effect of equal legal protection does not reduce the negative impact of high ethno-political exclusion in regimes with more democratic traits. Rather the contrary, complete equal protection combined with ethno-political exclusion actually heightens the risk of regime instability in democratic regimes. Even more puzzling, equal legal protection in autocratic regimes, reduces the negative effect of N*. The interpretation of the significant interaction terms may be understood more clearly by calculating the hazard ratios for certain values of ethno-political exclusion, in systems with the most unequal and the most equal legal protection respectively, as done in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Estimated Hazard Ratios for Democratic and Inconsistent Regimes with High Levels of Ethno-Political Exclusion, Given by Centralized or Decentralized Systems of Decision-Making, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th></th>
<th>Autocracy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Protection</td>
<td>(-1.144)</td>
<td>(.856)</td>
<td>(-1.144)</td>
<td>(.856)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Level of Ethno-Political Exclusion (N*=0)</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>.939</td>
<td>1.049</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest level of Ethno-Political Exclusion in Democracies (N*=.337)</td>
<td>1.677</td>
<td>17.766</td>
<td>1.699</td>
<td>.682</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest level of Ethno-Political Exclusion in all Regimes (N*=.909)</td>
<td>4.047*</td>
<td>2340.305*</td>
<td>4.653</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The hazard ratios are for the respective regime types when all other variables are kept at zero. * = A value of ethno-political exclusion no democracy contains.

Comparing the differences in the estimated hazard ratios between democratic systems with unequal and equal legal protection, given certain values on N*, confirms that the hazard of regime change increases the more equal the legal protection in democracies. In autocratic regimes the tendency is the opposite, the hazards decreases when going from an autocratic system with the most unequal legal protection to systems with the most equal. The fact that equal legal protection increases the hazard of regime change in democracies with high levels of ethno-political exclusion, may imply that protection from the judicial system give excluded ethnic groups better opportunities to mobilize. Conversely, in autocratic regimes, equal legal protection may give excluded ethnic groups less reason to mobilize for change. This may partly explain why Przeworski et al. (2000:49-51) found that autocracies which promulgate law are more stable than autocratic systems without any proclaimed rules.

Turning to the control variables in the three models in Table 5.8, the effects are roughly the same as in the models in Table 5.6. The most noteworthy differences are in the subset of democracies, were the political neighborhood variable is no longer significant when controlling for the level of legal protection of minorities.
Furthermore, the ethnic fractionalization contains a significant effect for the first time. However, the effect is only barely significant at a 10% level and the hazard is below one, indicating that higher levels of fractionalization slightly seem to reduce the hazard of regime change, other things being equal. The negative effect of $N^*$ is even stronger than in previous models. This is most likely due to characteristics of the legal protection variable, since now the $N^*$ measures ethno-political exclusion given a mean level of unequal legal protection for ‘minorities at risk’, as discussed in Chapter 4. Based on the highly significant effect of the interaction term in democratic regimes, but not in the proposed direction, and the non significant interaction effect in inconsistent regimes, neither Hypothesis 7a, nor Hypothesis 7b receives support given the limitations of this study. The existence of equal legal protection in democratic and inconsistent regimes when ethno-political exclusion is high does not reduce the hazard of regime change.

The last Hypotheses, 8a and 8b consider the legislative arena, and thus state that a proportional representation system, when ethno-political exclusion is high, reduces the hazard of regime change in democratic and inconsistent regimes respectively. The logic behind these hypotheses is that in regimes with some democratic traits do the legislative contain power independently of the executive. A proportional representation system better allows ethnic groups to get their ‘men’ inside, in comparison to first-past-the-post systems of election. I assess these hypotheses in Table 5.10 by including interaction terms between the variables on proportional representation and ethno-political exclusion. However, due to the lack of data on the election system, the sample is reduced to 1975 to 2000. Considering that I have also divided into subsets, since these are effects believed to only be relevant in more democratic regimes, the samples are very small and the correspondingly number of regime changes very low. This renders the analysis more vulnerable to the impact of outliers.
Table 5.10: Proportional Representation, Ethno-Political Exclusion, and Hazard of Regime change by Subsets of Democratic, Inconsistent, and Autocratic Regimes, 1975-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 12 Democracy</th>
<th>Model 13 Inconsistent</th>
<th>Model 14 Autocracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Political Exclusion (N*)</td>
<td>158.975** (2.16)</td>
<td>0.609 (0.56)</td>
<td>2.505 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization (ELF)</td>
<td>0.169 (1.56)</td>
<td>0.586 (0.73)</td>
<td>0.571 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional Representation (PR)</td>
<td>0.654 (0.65)</td>
<td>1.099 (0.35)</td>
<td>1.361 (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N* x PR</td>
<td>0.231 (0.68)</td>
<td>0.347 (0.55)</td>
<td>0.517 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.444*** (3.37)</td>
<td>0.972 (0.25)</td>
<td>1.027 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>1.004 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.983 (0.69)</td>
<td>0.920** (1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Neighborhood</td>
<td>0.883 (0.12)</td>
<td>3.660* (1.70)</td>
<td>0.731 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>1.393 (0.37)</td>
<td>0.815 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.379 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Past</td>
<td>4.137 (1.06)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Subjects 75 97 40
Number of Failures 19 66 26
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -53.146 -229.777 -52.625

Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

The effect of proportional representation independently, or in interaction with N*, is not significant in any of the three subsets of regime types corresponding to Model 12 to 14. In fact, across the three models there are very few significant effects. The tenuous results are due to the very small samples as the basis for inferences. Particularly in democratic regimes the basis for generalization is narrow, with only 19 registered regime changes. Although the effect of the interaction term in Model 12 and 13 are in the expected direction, there is too much uncertainty regarding the results to be able to draw further conclusions. As for now, a PR-system in inconsistent and democratic regimes when ethno-political exclusion is high does not seem to reduce the hazard of regime change.

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14 When replacing N* with the alternative measures of ethnic diversity, none of the interaction terms contained a significant effect at a .05 level.
The impact of the small sample is also reflected in the control variables, very few remaining significant. The fact that the measure of ethno-political exclusion remain significant in democratic regimes throughout all models, give an indication on the high importance of this variable in explaining democratic instability. Considering the hypotheses, there are not sufficiently consistent results to support Hypothesis 8a and/or Hypothesis 8b, given this study’s limitation. Whether a democratic or inconsistent regime contains a proportional representation system when the level of ethno-political exclusion is high does not reduce the hazard of regime instability.

5.4 Robustness of Findings

The value of the inferences made is dependent on specifications regarding the method and data applied. Accordingly, in this section I briefly consider the sensitivity of the findings. First, I turn to the robustness of the model’s specifications, investigating whether the Cox regression is an appropriate method. I first consider the assumption of proportional hazards. Even though the shape of the hazard is unspecified in a Cox-regression, all the covariates are expected to proportionally contain the same hazard ratio, which might not be according to the data. I test whether the effect of the covariates are independent of duration, by interacting each with time through an operation in Stata (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004:176). None of the interaction terms are significant, implying that my assumption regarding the time-independency of the proportional hazards is correct. I also control the result by a test of Schoenfeld’s residuals (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004:178-181), which confirmed that the residuals were indeed not a function of time. I proceed with the link test, which indicates whether the model is incorrectly specified so that transforming variables will increase the explanatory power of the model (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004:175-176). The hypothetical test variable is not significant at 10% level.

Subsequently, it is appropriate to assess the overall goodness of fit of Model 4, which has been central in determining whether hypotheses can be rejected or supported. To
evaluate the overall model fit, using Cox-Snell residuals is appropriate (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004:190-193). If the model has been fit to the data, the cumulative hazard of the Cox-Snell residuals should be a straight 45° line. I find that the model fits the data reasonably well. Although there is some variability about the 45 grades line, particularly as time passes, this is as expected due to the reduced sample because of prior regime changes and right censoring (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez, 2004:191).

Turning to the value of the data, I assess the challenge of extreme outliers, since they could disproportionally influence on the estimated parameters. Through investigating Martingale’s residuals, I identify Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon for some autocratic years as outliers on the level of ethno-political exclusion. I do a simple test and completely remove these countries step by step, and when both Iraq and Jordan are deleted from the analysis, the interaction term between autocracy and N* becomes significant at a .05 level and the hazard ratio jumps to approximately 6. This illustrates that the inferences regarding the importance of ethno-political exclusion in autocratic regimes are relatively sensitive. Hence, exclusion of ethnic groups does increase the likelihood of instability in autocratic regimes, when Iraq and Jordan are excluded from the sample. I do the same with outliers on the interaction between democracy and N*. I identify in order of relevance, Fiji, Peru, and Sudan at times when they were categorized as democratic. I repeat the step-test, and the interaction term remains significant at a .05 level. This confirms the importance of ethno-political exclusion in explaining democratic instability.

As discussed in Chapter 4, to measure the exclusion of ethnic groups from power has been a challenge and in some cases the coding was rather uncertain and/or dependent on time. In the analysis, these uncertain groups were included as ethnic groups in power, to underestimate, rather than overestimate, the risk of regime change. However, I also ran all models with an alternative measure of N*, where these groups are reported as excluded from power. Fourteen changes in N* was made, but they did not, however, change the main effects, nor their significance level, in any of the
models reported above. Given the doubts regarding the lack of accurate time-variant data on ethno-political exclusion, this seems to partly confirm that these changes will not significantly influence the findings. Hence, this may indicate that the N* as operationalized, capture the general picture, if not the full.

For all the models, I have reported the results for three alternative measures of ethnic diversity in footnotes to illustrate how different notions of ethnic diversity may influence the results. Particularly the ethnic domination and the ethnic polarization measures were significant when the ethnic fractionalization measure was not. They very often corresponded to the N* measure in impact of effect, although in different direction with ethnic dominance as anticipated. Theoretically, I would disqualify such measures which purely rely on the ethnic composition in the country. However, it may be that these measures better captures situations where higher levels of ethnic exclusion from power may occur, in comparison to the simple ethnic enumeration as with the ethnic fractionalization index. Furthermore, they more accurately consider groups capacity for mobilization in terms of relative size. Even so, I will and have argued that the N* is a more appropriate measure since it explicitly captures the motive for action and situations where the ethnic identity becomes delineated, in addition to considerations on the internal opportunities for each group.

Reviewing the robustness of the findings, I comply with the request from King et al. (1994:31-32) to explicitly assess the uncertainty of my results due to method and data. Certainty is, however, unattainable, but replicability is not. Hence, the data will be available for replication on this internet page (PRIO 2006).

5.5 Discussion of Main Findings – and Challenges

So, has this study revealed any patterns of stability in multiethnic countries? Or, are the single case studies outlined in Chapter 3 simply examples of conditions specific in time and space? In this section I first briefly review the results and discuss the
inferences with some optimism. I then turn to the limitations of this study, or what I prefer to call areas for improvements.

5.5.1 What are the Findings?

The analysis tested the conditions for regime stability. The results confirmed that ethnic fractionalization does not have a systematic effect on regime stability. This was as expected since this measure only captures the notion of ethnic identity, an insufficient precondition for mobilization. My theoretical argument was that ethno-political exclusion could better capture the motive for mobilization, and thus should be associated with regime instability. However, the macro-results are not consistent with this reasoning, since ethno-political exclusion when controlled for other variables did not have an independent effect on the hazard of regime instability.

Since the opportunities for mobilization and the notion of frustration due to exclusion are quite different depending on political structures, I argued that the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability may in fact be contingent on regime type. The results confirmed that this was indeed the case. More particularly, findings revealed that exclusion of ethnic groups from democratic regimes drastically increases the regime’s risk of instability. Neither in inconsistent regimes nor in autocratic regimes is the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability significant. However, tenuous findings seem to indicate that ethno-political exclusion might secure the stability of inconsistent regimes, although this claim is not supported at a satisfactorily level of significance. I controlled for these findings by replacing N* with ethnic fractionalization. None of these interaction terms was significant. The results confirm that N* does capture aspects in relation to regime instability not identified when relying on measures of ethnic fractionalization.

The fact that ethno-political exclusion heightens the risk of regime change in democratic regimes and not in non-democracies is consistent with certain expectations regarding group behavior. First, it is consistent with relative deprivation theory which states that it is the gap between actual situation and expected situation
which makes people mobilize for change. This might explain why ethno-political exclusion does not seem to be relevant in autocratic regimes, since the citizens do not expect to be included. Secondly, the finding that ethno-political exclusion heightens democratic instability is consistent with a rational action approach, where ethnic groups will consider their opportunities when mobilizing. In democratic regimes organizational resources are much more available than in non-democracies.

Since access to political power in democracies and inconsistent regimes is not restricted to the executive, I tested whether additional arenas of power could reduce the hazard of regime change when ethno-political exclusion was high. However, neither decentralization of power, equal legal protection, nor a proportional representation system for election, compensate for the negative effect of $N^*$ on the stability of democratic regimes. This may indicate that the access to the executive is seen as so important for ethnic groups that access to other arenas cannot compensate for this frustration. In inconsistent regimes, however, the existence of decentralization measures when ethno-political exclusion was high did reduce the hazard of regime change. Proportional representation and the level of legal protection did not have a significant impact on the stability of inconsistent regimes either. The lack of sound conclusions when it comes to the last hypotheses might be partly due to small samples.

This pattern of instability in democratic regimes, where exclusion of ethnic groups drastically increases the risk of regime change, reflects a view that exclusion of ethnic groups is an outcome of regime type, and thus not a defining trait. This was a necessary assumption, and a well-founded one, for the purpose of this study. Yet, there are sound arguments that the causal direction could be turned the other way around. In other words, whether the regime exclude or include different ethnic groups in power should indeed be seen as defining whether a regime is democratic or not. This is in line with a more ‘maximalist’ view on regime categorization, emphasizing the substantial traits of democracy and not solely the sheer formal structures. Perhaps Gates et al.’s (2005) three-dimensional model of political systems could be expanded
to a four-dimensional index incorporating the treatment of (ethnic) groups? The current operationalization on regime type only incorporates individuals’ access to the executive and individuals’ level of participation, in addition to constraints on the executive, and disregards the importance of the group dimension. Here there may be room for improvements.

5.5.2 What are the Areas for Improvement?

When it comes to the limitations of this study, I primarily identify three areas for improvement. The first relates to the measure of ethno-political exclusion. The conclusions are based on a sample without regimes from Sub-Saharan Africa. Even though I have argued that this should not necessarily impair the external validity, it clearly would improve the basis for inferences if these regimes were included. Furthermore, the difficulties in determining the ethnic groups in power, and particularly over time, should generate further attempts at improving the quality of N*. A first challenge would thus be to improve and expand in time and space the coding on ethno-political exclusion.

A second challenge relates to the understanding of exclusion. This inquiry has primarily assessed political exclusion in terms of access to the executive. Power is, however, not limited to the political arena, as discussed, but not pursued any further in this study. Although three additional means of inclusion were controlled for in relation to the last hypotheses, they did not explicitly relate to the access of ethnic groups. An improvement of this study would thus be to move beyond the executive and asses the importance of exclusion from other arenas. Important areas in this regard may be the military and the bureaucracy, in addition to for example decentralization measures especially targeted at ethnic groups. Ethnic groups’ access to higher positions in enterprises would also be interesting to pursue further.

A last challenge would be to more seriously assess the diversity and direction of regime changes. By diversity I refer to how the regime changes take place, through popular uprising or elite decisions. I have relied on a simple assumption that any
regime change would inevitably be a result of mobilization of at least some parts of the population and that this was a function of three preconditions: identity, frustration and opportunity. For elite driven regime changes this might not be the case. And for regime changes imposed from the ‘outside’, such as in Iraq, this is clearly not the case. A fuller understanding of the diverse mechanisms involved in regime changes would improve our minor attempts at understanding.
6. Conclusion

This study has come to an end. The purpose was to shed some light on the role of ethnicity in relation to regime stability. It started with a citation from Wilmsen (1996:viii): “the potency of ethnicity is palpable, but not easily explained”. Although not ‘easy to explain’, the analysis has illuminated that there are indeed certain patterns of instability in multiethnic regimes, supported by findings to which I will return.

The point of departure for this investigation was a discrepancy between the theoretical understanding of ethnic groups and their potential for mobilization, and the empirical assessment of this relationship in quantitative research. I argued that due to this discrepancy, most statistical studies fail to ascertain why some ethnically diverse regimes are stable and others are not. There are numerous empirical examples of both countries which have remained remarkably stable despite ethnic diversity and others where ethnic divisions have endangered the stability of the regime. Hence, it was time to assess why this is so.

I have argued that political institutions do matter for the relationship between ethnicity and regime stability - both when it comes to the salience of ethnic identity, and in creating motives and opportunities for ethnic groups to mobilize. In this regard, I saw exclusion from the political power as an important determinant of ethnic frustration, inspired by Cederman and Girardin (2005). Furthermore, I argued that the effect of ethno-political exclusion in turn depend on the regime type. Given these considerations, I posed two questions: “Are regimes which exclude ethnic groups from political power more prone to regime instability?” and “Is the effect of ethno-political exclusion on regime stability contingent on the regime type?”

Building on theoretical arguments regarding the dynamic character of ethnic identity and the three preconditions for mobilization, I developed an analytical framework to discuss how ethnic diversity could affect regime stability. This framework generated
eight hypotheses to be tested. They were tested using survival analysis, where the dependent variable was the duration of political regimes. I tested the hypotheses for all regimes with more than 500,000 inhabitants, except for Sub-Saharan Africa and Papua New Guinea in the period 1945-2000.

The results confirm that ethnic fractionalization by itself does not explain regime stability. This finding is consistent throughout the analysis, also when controlling for interaction with regime type. The result corresponds to the argument that ethnic identity is not a sufficient condition for mobilization. Moreover, by enumerating ethnic groups, the dynamic character of an ethnic identity is disregarded. From this I conclude that ethnic differences are insufficient for explaining regime instability.

By itself, exclusion of ethnic groups from political power does not affect regime stability, when controlling for factors such as regime type. I argued, however, that neither ethnicity nor the notion of exclusion can be understood outside its political context. The results of the analysis confirmed that the effect of ethno-political exclusion does indeed depend on regime type. More particularly, ethno-political exclusion severely increases the hazard of regime change in democratic regimes, whilst there are no significant effects in autocratic and inconsistent regimes. The fact that ethno-political exclusion increases the hazard of regime instability in democracies is consistent with certain arguments regarding group behavior. Firstly, the frustration due to ethno-political exclusion may be relatively higher in democracies than in more autocratic regimes, since ethnic groups in democracies in general expect to be included. Secondly, there are more opportunities for mobilization due to ethno-political exclusion in democracies than there are in autocracies. If excluded ethnic groups are rational actors they will more likely consider these chances for a successful mobilization.

Moreover, I argued that additional means of accommodation of ethnic groups may compensate for the effect of ethno-political exclusion on the stability of democratic and inconsistent regimes. The results do not support this argument, however, when it comes to democratic regimes. The findings indicate, though, that means of
decentralization reduce the hazard of regime change in inconsistent regimes with high levels of ethno-political exclusion. These conclusions are based on fairly small samples, however.

Alternative estimations of the models show that the findings in general are robust to alterations in both the model specifications and the data. However, the absence of an effect of ethno-political exclusion on the stability of autocratic regimes is sensitive to outliers. When two countries are removed from the analysis, the hazard of regime change is significantly increases with exclusion. This illustrates that some of the inferences in this study may be sensitive to design choices – a problem that probably relates to every research project. Hence, as for all studies, there are important improvements that could be made. In particular data on ethno-political exclusion should be expanded in time, space, and accuracy. Another area of improvement is to move beyond the executive and investigate more thoroughly other aspects of exclusion at the dyadic level. A last challenge would be to more seriously account for the diversity and direction of regime changes.

With this study, I have demonstrated that an analysis that fails to consider the dynamic and contextual character of ethnicity may be ‘at risk’ of missing important nuances among multiethnic regimes. Furthermore, the results of the study have important implications for democratic leaders. Inclusion of diverse ethnic groups in political power is not only morally sound and perhaps a ‘democratic value’, but has also been shown to be a good strategic choice given the aim of regime stability. Any consideration of the motive behind the Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s decision to include both the Sunni and the Kurd minority in his government is at best only well-founded guessing. However, the results from this study indicate that his choice is rational when considering the experiences of other democratic regimes.
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