From Causal Effects to Causal Mechanisms: Improving the Democratic Peace Propositions

A comparative case study of British policymaking in the British-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Falklands War

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1. Introduction

1.1 Rationale and objectives

Democratic peace theory is one of the most influential contemporary international relations theories\(^1\). Researchers have shown that democracies rarely fight each other, and this has led many high ranking policymakers to promote democratic governance as the key to world peace (Elman 1997). However, the causal explanations provided to explain this event are insufficient and possibly inaccurate.

The democratic peace research program has for the most part relied on a positivist philosophy of science. I argue that a positivist philosophy of science provides scholars with an “overly restrictive epistemology that cannot ground a causal theory” (Dessler 1991:337). Positivism imposes on researchers a causal explanation that relies heavily on causal effects (correlation) (see Johnson 2006). To improve the causal explanations that can account for the democratic peace, we need to identify and understand how the causal mechanisms that connect the independent and dependent variable operate. This thesis is an attempt to do just that.

The objective of this thesis is twofold. First, it seeks to test the causal mechanisms that are implicitly proposed by democratic peace researchers. Second, it seeks to improve the causal explanations that can account for the peaceful relations between democracies.

1.2 Literature review

By reviewing the main literature written about the explanations of the democratic peace propositions, I hope to show that these explanations are largely correlational, but also that they implicitly propose a number of causal mechanisms. I

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\(^1\) In actuality, democratic peace is not a theory but a series of empirical findings, with many different hypothesis attempting to explain the findings. I will use the terms *democratic peace theory* and *democratic peace propositions* interchangeably throughout the thesis.
will test the causal mechanisms identified through this literature review in chapters 3 and 4.

There are few, if any, general laws in the social sciences, but the fact that no war between democracies has ever taken place is, according to one analyst, as close as one gets to an empirical law in the social sciences (Levy 1989). However, after nearly thirty years of research on the democratic peace, this phenomenon still remains theoretically underspecified and primarily empirically grounded (Gates et al. 1996). The idea that democracies can create a separate zone of peace is not new. It was written extensively about by enlightenment philosophers. Kant in particular with his *Perpetual Peace* is seen as the founder of the democratic peace propositions (See Doyle 1983; see also Gates et al. 1996 and Ray 1995 for an overview of other philosophers who wrote about the impact of democracies on peace). The first modern studies of what is now known as democratic peace theory began in the 1970’s and research continues today. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, research on the democratic peace propositions was dominated by empirical studies. Researchers used statistical methods to demonstrate that there was a non-spurious relationship between pairs of democratic states and peace. In the early 1990’s researchers moved towards explaining why democracies did not fight wars against each other. The democratic peace propositions still, after several decades, lack an agreed-upon explanation but that is not for lack of trying.

This thesis is about explanation and in particular about explanation through causal mechanisms. The focus of this literature review will therefore be on the various explanations that have been presented by democratic peace researchers, rather than on the philosophical underpinnings and the many different empirical studies that have been done (for an excellent literature review on all issues regarding the democratic peace see Ray 1995). By reviewing the different explanations, I will attempt to tease out the different mechanisms that can account for the relationship between democracy and peace.

An important early attempt to systematically explain the democratic peace is Bruce Russett’s 1993 book *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Russett also co-wrote an article with Zeev Maoz entitled “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic
Peace” published in the *American Political Science Review* in the same year. The distinction between normative and structural explanations, formulated by Maoz and Russett in their writings, is still widely used today and is a distinction I will use as well. In the remainder of this section I will look at the various normative (also called cultural) and structural (also called institutional) explanations which have been proposed by researchers over the last thirty years or so.

### 1.2.1 Normative Explanations

The normative explanations are based on the idea that states behave internationally as they do domestically. As Russett (1993:31) notes, “[t]he basic norm of democratic theory is that disputes can be resolved without force through democratic processes that in some balance ensure both majority rule and minority rights”. Thus when two democracies are involved in an international dispute, both states will expect the other state to solve the dispute through peaceful means.

According to Maoz and Russett (1993), two assumptions are crucial to the normative explanation. The first is that “[s]tates, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions” (Maoz and Russett 1993:625). The second assumption “implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather then the former” (ibid). Elman (1997:11) summarizes the normative model well: “Political ideology solves the problem of how to distinguish potential adversaries from allies: liberal states, with domestic structures that encourage the peaceful resolution of domestic conflict are treated with respect and consideration; nonliberal states, which have domestic structures of violence and oppression, are approached with suspicion”.

It has been a challenge for quantitatively oriented democratic peace researchers to test the normative explanation. Maoz and Russett (1993) argued that the amount of political violence within a state is a good measure for democratic norms. They predicted that dyads where both states scored high on democratic norms, i.e., low amounts of political violence, would covary with low amounts of military disputes. There are however serious problems with such an approach. As George and
Bennett (2005:43) note, “[c]learly, these proxy measures are problematic, as authoritarian and totalitarian states that persist for decades may minimize the use of domestic violence by monopolizing the instruments of force and creating powerful police and intelligence institution that deter domestic violence and political opposition”. However, while acknowledging that there are difficulties with the measurement of democratic norms, Russett (1993) argues that the available evidence shows that the normative explanation is superior to the structural model.

Dixon (1994) concurs with Russett that the normative model provides a better explanation for the democratic peace. However, Dixon (1994:15) argues that the “diversity of democratic norms, values, and institutions, highlights the need to focus as narrowly as possible on those features of democratic systems that are both universally shared and causally relevant to foreign conflict behavior”. To Dixon (ibid) it is too vague to focus on “a broadly conceived liberal ideology or a democratic political (or civic) culture”. The essential democratic norm, Dixon (ibid:16) argues, is the norm of “bounded competition”. “Modern democratic societies foster the internalization of norms for regulating and reconciling competing interests and values in public affairs in ways that are neither violent or coercive” (ibid). Just as Maoz and Russett (1993) argue, the key is that democracies externalize this norm when dealing with another democracy. Dixon (1994:17) notes that “[t]hese norms are externalized to foreign affairs only if the practices underlying them are sufficiently robust to foster mutual expectations of congruent behavior beyond borders”. Consequently when a dispute occurs between two highly democratic opponents we should expect both parties to be constrained from using violence, no matter the severity of the dispute.

Dixon (1994) faces the same problem as Maoz and Russett (1993); how can we measure democratic norms? Dixon (1994:21) acknowledges the problem and notes: “While I cannot directly measure democratic norms of bounded competition, I can gauge the competitiveness of national political institutions using the 11-point democracy scale predefined in the Polity II data collection”. Dixon (1994) concedes that using the Polity II dataset is not without problems, as part of the dataset deals more with constraints than with competitiveness which is especially problematic as
institutional constraints is an important alternative explanation to the normative model (see Ray 1995:35).

Maoz and Russett (1993), Russett (1993) and Dixon (1994) all test their hypothesis by using different forms of statistical analysis. By using statistical methods, they are unable to test for the actual mechanism at work. However, without explicitly stating it they identify the basic normative mechanism, namely *norm externalization*.

The normative explanation has been criticized by many researchers, both opponents and supporters of the democratic peace propositions. Some researchers have even called it a caricature more than an accurate description (Reiter and Stam 2002). Several objections are usually raised. First of all, the normative explanation “leads us to expect that democracies neither seek war nor threaten to use force against each other” (Elman 1997:476), in fact Doyle (1983:213), an ardent supporter of the democratic peace proposition, argues that “[m]utual respect for liberal principles becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory”. Doyle (ibid) further point out that “[i]ndeed, threats of war has also been regarded as illegitimate”. However, this is in fact not an accurate description of reality. As Elman (1997) points out, democracies have threatened and prepared for war against each other numerous times.

Another common criticism against the normative explanation is the fact that democracies have fought many imperial wars. Both Reiter and Stam (2002) and Rosato (2003) find the imperial wars particularly damaging to the normative explanation. Reiter and Stam (2002: 151) notes, “[democracies] that initiate such [imperial] wars offer particularly compelling evidence against the normative explanation” (see also Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992 and Gates et al. 1996).

Finally, several analysts argue that covert action by democratic states against other democratic states is particularly damaging to the normative model. Elman (1997:14) argues that “if shared cultural norms preclude war, why would democratic states fight each other in ways short of open warfare?”(see also Reiter and Stam 2002:160 and James and Mitchell 1995).
1.2.2 Structural Explanations

Russett (1993) and Maoz and Russett (1993) provided one of the first attempts to systematically explain the correlational finding between democracy and peace. A competing explanation to the normative model, referred to above, is the structural model. Maoz and Russett argue that the structural explanation rests upon two assumptions. The first assumption is that political leaders must mobilize domestic support for their policies and “such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action” (Maoz and Russett 1993:626). The second assumption is that such mobilization of support can be shortcut in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies (ibid). With these two assumptions in mind, Maoz and Russett (1993) argue that democratic leaders take far longer to mobilize their states for war. Thus when two democratic states are caught in a potentially violent dispute, diplomats normally have enough time to find non-military solutions before war breaks out. The second assumption is essential to explain why democracies fight wars against nondemocratic states. In such conflicts both states “are driven by the lack of structural constraints on the mobilization and escalation process of the latter [state]” (ibid:626). Thus when democracies are in disputes or conflicts with non-democracies they are able to circumvent the need for political support.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) offer a game theoretical approach to the structural explanation. Using formal modeling, they argue that “if nation A is a dove and nation B is a dove and each knows the other to be dovish, then negotiation and the status quo are the only possible equilibrium outcomes of the game” (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992:156-157). If this is to explain why democracies don’t fight war against each other, we must either assume that or explain why democracies are doves. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) argue that democracies are doves because of the large expected political costs democratically elected political leaders face when it comes to committing a country to war. They write that: “[l]eaders in republican states, on average, expect to incur higher political costs for using force than do their counterparts in nondemocratic states and so are more reluctant than nondemocratic leaders to do so” (ibid:148; see also Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson
The reason for this higher expected political cost arises from a similar logic as that of Maoz and Russett’s (1993) first assumption, namely that democratic institutions make it “easy for domestic political opposition to mobilize, including mobilization to oppose the use of force” (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992:148). Such mobilized oppositions create significant constraints on democratic political leaders. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), makes one crucial assumption, namely that “it is common knowledge whether a state is a liberal democracy” (ibid:156), and thus they conclude that “leaders averse to using force who confront rivals also believed to be averse to using force (with sufficient confidence) do not use force” (ibid:155). Finally, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) agree with Maoz and Russett (1993) that a democracy will use force to avoid exploitation by an opponent who does not face similar constraints.

In the institutional explanation described above, it is not necessary to assume that a majority of the public are pacifists. As Ray (1995:183) notes, “groups within the population that do not necessarily constitute a majority are free to organize, protest, and speak out against bellicose policies in a way that would not be possible in more autocratic regimes”. This is important because it allows researchers to move away from the faulty assumption that a majority of public opinion in a democracy is always pacifist.

The key causal mechanisms that account for the structural model are group constraint and public constraint (Rosato 2003). Democratic institutions are designed to compel political leaders to answer to both general public opinion and to different interest groups. According to the model, leaders must secure broad support for their international policies in order not to lose support in the next election. Group and public constraint also help explain why democratic states are seen as slow to use force.

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2 I rely on Rosato in teasing out the causal mechanisms proposed by democratic peace researchers. Rosato goes on to test each of the mechanisms he identifies and argues that none of the mechanisms work as predicted. I do not examine Rosato’s test methodology and do not rely on his findings. I use his work only to assist in identifying causal mechanisms. Rosato’s article was subject to much criticism, (see Forum 2005) but none of the authors argued that the mechanisms Rosato identified were wrong. The critiques focused on whether Rosato tested the dyadic or monadic democratic peace propositions, whether Rosato misunderstood the probabilistic nature of the propositions, whether there were problems with selection bias in Rosato’s test samples and finally whether it is appropriate to test each mechanism individually.
force and often lack opportunity for a surprise attack. Rosato (2003) designates slow to use force and lack of opportunity for a surprise attack as separate mechanisms, but they are clearly effects of the constraint mechanisms. Because democratic leaders need to convince the general public, interest groups, and the legislature, mobilizing the military and preparing for war is a tedious and long process.

The structural explanation has received fewer challenges than the normative one. However, as with the normative explanation, there are some analysts who argue that the structural explanation fails to explain why democratic states have fought wars against non-democratic states. Elman (1997:13) writes that “the shortcomings of institutional-structural arguments are that they cannot account for a democratic public’s willingness to fight wars against nondemocracies”. Gates et al. (1996) agrees with this and argue that “structural theories cannot unaided explain why the democratic citizens’ adversity to war only applies to war with other democracies” (1996:4).

James Fearon (1994) provides yet another structural explanation. Fearon also uses a game theoretical approach, but his focus is on how audience costs “enable leaders to learn an adversary’s true preferences concerning settlement versus war and thus whether and when attack is rational” (1994:577). Fearon’s argument is in line with Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), in that democratic leaders face higher audience costs than autocratic leaders do. This, according to Fearon (1994:577), “suggests that democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly than authoritarian states can, perhaps ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states”.

Eyerman and Hart (1996:602) provide an excellent summary of the explanatory path: “[Fearon’s] work suggests that leaders are constrained by their domestic populations and thus by the structural characteristics of their regimes, and these characteristics give democracies the ability to communicate effectively”. Eyerman and Hart’s (1996) study is an attempt to empirically validate Fearon’s hypothesis, and they suggest that an important effect of the audience cost proposition is that disputes between democracies should experience fewer phases than disputes between other types of regimes. They test this proposition and find that it is true.
Fearon (1994) and Eyerman and Hart’s (1996) work offer a causal mechanism I call the signaling mechanism (see also Rosato 2003). Their argument is that the leaders of a democratic country are accountable to the public and to elite interest groups (constraint mechanisms), and thus democratic states will only escalate a crisis or commit the country to war “if they place a high value on the outcome of those conflicts” (Rosato 2003:587). Therefore, “in democratic crises, then both states will have good information about the resolve of the other party, and will therefore be able to reach a negotiated solution rather than incur the risk and cost associated with the use of force” (ibid).

As with the other explanations, the signaling proposition has also faced challenges. The most severe one has come from Finel and Lord (1999) who argue that the problem with both Fearon (1994) and Eyerman and Hart’s (1996) work is that they make the faulty assumption that all available information is processed correctly. They note that “[t]he distinction between information availability and assessment is crucial for discussing transparency in a useful way and it is important not to conflate the two” (Eyerman and Hart 1996:317). Rosato (2003:598) echoes this view and writes that “[t]ransparency may contribute little to peace because a lot of information is not always good information”. The criticism against the signaling explanation can also be said to be methodological. The empirical tests done on Fearon’s hypothesis are done using statistical analysis (see Eyerman and Hart 1996 and Fearon 1994b). By using a dataset it is impossible to control for the quality of assessment of the information that is available to states. Neither article tests whether there is more accurate information available from democracies; they just assume that it is. They then go on to argue that because of the amounts of information available in disputes between democracies, disputes between democracies should have fewer phases than other disputes between mixed or autocratic dyads. They do find correlational evidence for their hypothesis.

1.2.3 Conclusion

By reviewing parts of the democratic peace literature, I have identified four fundamental causal mechanisms implicitly proposed by democratic peace
researchers. The four mechanisms are: 1) norm externalization 2) public constraint 3) group constraint 4) signaling. I will test these mechanisms by subjecting them to a comparative case study in chapters three and four.

1.3 Research Questions and Approach

To test the mechanisms identified above, I will subject them to a comparative case study. The two cases are the British-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Falklands War. However, because of space limitations I will only examine British policy-making in the two conflicts. I will utilize Alexander George’s method of structured, focused comparison, in which the same research questions are asked in two relevant comparable cases. Based on the casual mechanism identified above, the research questions are:

1) Did British policy makers externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution?
2) Was there public opposition to the use of force, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers?
3) Was there opposition to the use of force by interest groups, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers?
4) Did British policymakers receive good and reliable information regarding the opponent’s intentions and resolve, and did they act appropriately upon the information they received?

1.4 Main Findings

I show that only one of the mechanisms proposed above operated as predicted in both cases. In both conflicts, the norm externalization mechanism operated as expected. In the Cod Wars, British policymakers externalized their democratic norms of conflict resolution and in the Falklands War, they did not. Evidence from the Falklands War case convincingly shows that Argentine regime type clearly influenced British decision-makers in their refusal to externalize their norms of democratic conflict resolution. In both conflicts, British norm externalization or lack
thereof was based on a logic of appropriateness and not on a consequentialist logic. However, a brief analysis of Icelandic conduct during the Cod Wars indicates that democratic states in disputes with other democratic states only externalize their norms when the interests at stake are limited.

None of the other mechanisms operated as predicted. The intense pressure from interest groups within the fishing industry to dispatch the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters is especially damaging to the group constraint mechanism. The fact the British public was ambivalent to the Cod Wars is less damaging to the public constraint mechanism, as the Cod War was only one international incident at a time when other important international incidents were happening as well. The examination of both cases is clearly damaging to the signaling mechanism. More than anything, it shows that information per se is not sufficient to diffuse conflicts. Policymakers are prone to misperceive and misjudge the information they receive. The Falklands War case also indicates that it is a mistake to assume that non-democracies are incapable of clearly signaling their resolve.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into four parts after this chapter. In chapter 2, I briefly present positivism and scientific realism and discuss the different causal explanations they provide researchers with. The purpose is to provide the readers with one possible meta-theoretical foundation for an improved causal explanation. The remainder of chapter 2 is used to present and justify the methodological underpinnings of this thesis. In chapter 3 and 4, I conduct the two case-studies. In chapter 3, I analyze the three Cod Wars that took place between Britain and Iceland in the period between 1958 and 1975, and, in chapter 4, I analyze the Falklands War between Britain and Argentina in 1982. In chapter 5, I draw conclusions based on the comparison of British policy-making in the two disputes. I also discuss some implications and propose future avenues for research and inquiry that have emerged from this study.
2. Theoretical Framework and Methodological Underpinnings

2.1 Introduction

This chapter has two main functions. First, I intend to clarify the philosophical grounding of this thesis. I will do so by arguing that positivism, which is the philosophy of choice for most democratic peace researchers, imposes on researchers a causal explanation that relies heavily on causal effects (correlation) (see Johnson 2006). I will then argue that a scientific realist philosophy of social science, which focuses on causal mechanisms, offers a better causal explanation than positivism does. It is important to note that this thesis is very much in the empiricist tradition, but contains an emphasis on causal mechanisms in order to improve the causal explanation of the democratic peace theory.

Second, I will detail the methodological underpinnings of this study, which is a qualitative comparative case study. I will define and justify my research design, the method of analysis and data collection. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the general limitations and parameters of the study.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

A philosophy of science is a metaphysical statement that “claims to grasp the nature of scientific practice” (Wight 2002:41). It includes claims regarding ontology (nature of existence), epistemology (how we come to know, or what constitutes valid knowledge), and finally about methods (the practice researchers follow in order to formulate knowledge). These meta-theoretical underpinnings are often neglected or taken for granted by many international relations researchers. However, as I will show in this section, they should not be neglected, as it has important consequences for the theories one develops (see Lane 1996:375).

The democratic peace research program has for the most part relied on a positivist philosophy of science. I argue that a positivist philosophy of science
provides scholars with an “overly restrictive epistemology that cannot ground a causal theory” (Dessler 1991:337). In order to build a strong causal theory, a philosophy of science that offers scholars a less restrictive epistemology is needed.

Scientific realism is a philosophy of science that presents various ontological claims and a flexible epistemology. For the purpose of this research study, one of the most important aspects of scientific realism is that it assigns causal mechanisms ontological status. Consequently a scientific realist causal explanation is based on mechanisms and processes, while a positivist causal explanation is based on correlation.

This section will proceed by showing how the ontological and epistemological claims provided by positivism equip scholars with a causal explanation relying on correlation only. I will then demonstrate that the ontological and epistemological claims provided by scientific realism allow researchers to utilize a different and superior causal explanation based on mechanisms.

2.2.1 Positivism

One would think that presenting the core elements of positivism, as a philosophy of social science, would be an unnecessary exercise, as it has been the dominant philosophy of social science in the field of international relations the last three to four decades. However, to understand the basic causal explanation utilized by democratic peace researchers and its limitations, such an exercise is clearly necessary. This section will describe the ontological, epistemological and methodological claims delineated by positivism.

In social science, positivism was first developed by Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century “as a science of society, based on the methods of the natural sciences” (Smith 1996:14, emphasis original). However, contemporary positivism used today by social scientists was developed in the middle of the twentieth century and according to Steve Smith (1996:15) its four main features can be summarized as follows:

First, logicism, the view that objective of confirmation scientific theory should conform to the canons of deductive logic; second, empirical verificationism, the idea that only
statements that are either empirically verifiable or falsifiable (synthetic) or true by definition (analytic) are scientific; third, theory and observation distinction, the view that there is a strict separation between observation and theory, with observations being seen as theoretically neutral; finally, the Humean theory of causation, the idea that establishing a causal relationship is a matter of discovering the invariant temporal relationship between events.

In addition to the main features listed above, Carl Hempel’s theory of explanation is another important aspect of positivism. Hempel’s account of what constitutes an explanation focused on general laws and is called the deductive-nomological model. Here Hempel argued that explanations should be derived by deduction “whereby (1) a general law is postulated, (2) antecedent conditions are specified, and (3) the explanation of the observed event [is] deduced from (1) and (2)” (Smith 1996:15).

In positivism, epistemology is the most important, and both ontology and methodology are dependent on the empiricist epistemology (Smith 1996:17; see also Dessler 1989; Wendt 1987 and 1999; and Patomaki and Wight 2000, for more on how positivism places epistemology prior to ontology). This means that the nature of existence (ontology) is based on what can be empirically observed (epistemology), and therefore by default, equips positivism with a material ontology. The consequence, according to Smith is that “[i]n international relations, such a view means that it is simply not possible to speak of unobservables such as the structure of the international system” (Smith 1996:15).

By combining the main features of positivism, it is possible to delineate the specific causal explanation it proscribes.

2.2.1.1 Causal Effects

A positivist account of causation is a Humean account, one of covariation. Establishing covariation or correlation is all that is required to prove causation. The

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3 Steve Smith argues that the focus on empirical validation or falsification has forced positivist scholars “[to adopt] an empiricist epistemology” (Smith 1996:16).
positivist model of explanation thus shows that an event “follows regularly from conditions of a specified kind” (Dessler 2003:387). Or as Daniel Little (1991:19) writes, “the Humean notion of causal relations consists only in patterns of regular association between variables, classes of event and the like”. King, Keohane and Verba (1994:82), call associations between events causal effects, and argue that causal effects are the key to any scientific explanation. They define causal effects as “the difference between the systematic component of observation made when the explanatory variable takes one value and the systematic component of comparable observations when the explanatory variable takes on another value” (King et al. 1994:82). This Humean view of causation thus concludes that two events or variables “are causally related if and only if there is a regularity conjoining these events or variables” (Little 1991:19).

Positivist researchers using Hempel’s deductive-nomological method deductively theorize as to why events potentially covary and then test these theoretical hypotheses indirectly “by deriving observation sentences from them and evaluating these predictive consequences” (Little 1998:163 fn 6). A positivist causal explanation is thus an explanation based on theorized causal claims, verified or falsified by assessing covariation of variables.

Even though the positivist causal explanation has received much criticism, it has been the dominant form of explanation in international relations since the 1970’s. Specifically, it has dominated research on the democratic peace.

2.2.2 Scientific Realism

Just as positivism originally was a philosophy of the natural sciences so to was scientific realism. One of the first philosophers employing scientific realism in the social sciences was Roy Bhaskar (1978 and 1979). However, it would take nearly a decade before scientific realism got any attention by international relations scholars.

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4 The limitations of this thesis do not allow for a more thorough examination of the specific criticisms raised against the positivist causal explanation. For a more on this subject see Little (1991 and 1998); Dessler (1991) George and Bennett (2005) and Johnson (2006).
The first influential article to advocate for a scientific realist approach in international relations was Alexander Wendt’s 1987 essay “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”. The next significant contribution (in addition to several more articles by Wendt) was Davis Dessler’s 1989 article “What’s at stake in the agent-structure debate?” Dessler’s 1991 “Beyond Correlations: Toward a Causal Theory of War” also received considerable attention. By discussing scientific realist ontological and epistemological claims, I will show that combining the two results in a specific causal explanation that is different from the positivist causal argument.

The first important aspect of scientific realism that differs from positivism is that it places ontology before epistemology. Scientific realism places the nature of existence prior to how we come to know about it, rather than the other way around. As Wendt (1987:352) writes, “[positivism] in effect subordinate[s] ontology to epistemology—what exists is a function of what can be known experimentally”.

The other significant differences are the actual ontological claims made by scientific realists. Where positivism has a very clear material ontology, scientific realism makes several ontological claims. The ontological basis for scientific realism is both material and social, but it also claims that the mechanisms that connect the entities have ontological status. Ontology “consists not only of certain designated kinds of things [material], but also of connections or relations between them” (Dessler 1991:445). These structures/connections (or as many now call them, causal mechanisms) are often unobservable, and “in contrast to empiricism, scientific realism can, in principle, call an ontology ‘scientific’ even if it includes unobservable generative structures” (Wendt 1987:350).

As mentioned above, scientific realists place ontology prior to epistemology. How we come to know depends on what exists. Scientific realist epistemological claims must therefore support their social, material, and mechanism based ontology. With this in mind, it should be clear that scientific realists argue for a much less restrictive epistemology than positivists do. Where positivists argue for a strong empiricist epistemology, scientific realists argue “for epistemological opportunism” (Wight 2002:16; see also Patomaki and Wight 2000:227).
If epistemology is how we come to know, then methodology is the practice researchers follow in order to come to know. Most scientific realist argues for a mix of mostly qualitative methods such as case studies, comparative case studies and, especially, process tracing techniques. However, to understand the meaning and social construction of action, it can also be appropriate to utilize interpretive methods such as discourse analysis and the like.

Scientific realism is not problem-free. There are for example numerous different types of scientific realism (Chernoff 2002). However, my purpose in presenting a brief account of scientific realism is to note for the reader one possible meta-theoretical foundation for an improved causal explanation. A causal explanation that relies on the identification of causal mechanisms and not on correlations (see Little 1998 and Johnson 2006).

2.2.2.1 Causal Mechanisms

With ontological status given to causal mechanisms, it should come as no surprise that scientific realist causal explanations derive their explanatory power through causal mechanisms. Scholars arguing in favor of a mechanism account argue that it is not enough to hypothesize about potential mechanisms and then try to validate them through correlational studies using “as if” assumptions. Instead they argue that a “commitment to explanation via mechanisms differs from more general ‘as if’ assumptions in that it pushes inquiry to the outer boundaries of what is observable and urges us to expand those boundaries rather than stop with demonstrably false ‘as if’ assumptions at higher levels of analysis” (George and Bennett 2005:143).

I define causal mechanisms as George and Bennett (2005:137) do, “as ultimately unobservable physical, social or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities”. A causal mechanism then

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refers to the process leading to an outcome, or as Daniel Little (1991:15) writes, a causal mechanism “refers to a series of events connecting two variables to each other”.

Thus a scientific realist causal explanation places its focus on the causal mechanisms connecting two events. Little (1998:164) argues that “to identify a causal relation between two kinds of events or conditions, we need to identify the typical causal mechanism through which the first kind brings about the second kind”. Dessler (1991) echoes Little, and argues that a scientific realist “causal explanation shows the generative connection between cause and effect by appealing to a knowledge of the real structures that produce the observed phenomenon, and it is this generative connection that gives the notion of cause meaning beyond that of simple regularity” (Dessler 1991:345; see also Patomaki and Wight 2000:229; Lane 1996:371-373 and Elster 1989:3).

However, focusing on causal mechanisms does not render correlation useless. Scientific realists see both explanatory modes as complementary, not mutually exclusive (Dessler 1991). George and Bennett (2005) would likely not call themselves scientific realists, but they nonetheless rely on insights from scientific realism when they argue for a causal explanation containing both causal mechanisms and causal effects.

If David Dessler (1991) could argue that the lack of a causal theory of war was due to the overly restrictive epistemology of positivism, the same should apply to the democratic peace proposition. Scientific realism is a philosophy of science that allows researchers more epistemological flexibility and this flexibility makes it possible to advance the democratic peace propositions into more coherent causal theory. In the next section, I will describe and justify my research design and the methodological underpinnings of this research project.

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6 It is for example difficult to imagine a democratic peace research program without the many excellent correlational studies that exists.
2.3 Methodology

In this part I will define and justify the use of a comparative case study, I will justify my case selection and discuss issues and limitations surrounding my case selection. I will then detail the main factors of the method of structured focused comparison and the method of process tracing and finally, I will discuss some issues surrounding the data collection for this project.

2.3.1 Case Studies

I have argued above that a positivist causal explanation is mainly a correlational explanation. Thus most of the democratic peace research is based on a correlational explanation. I have also shown in the literature review that there is little consensus on which explanation about the democratic peace—the normative or the structural—is the better one. Several researchers have pointed this out and called for case studies to both test and improve the causal explanations of the democratic peace. Owen (1994:91) notes that the correlational studies have yielded no clear winner, and that detailed case studies are necessary to better understand the processes that explain why democracies don’t fight wars against one another. Elman (1997:33) agrees with this and argues that “[i]f we want to move beyond correlation to causation, we need to reveal the decision making processes of aggressive and pacific states” (see also Layne 1997:63; Ray 1995:42; Eyerman and Hart 1997:597-598; and Gates et al 1996:7).

According to Yin (1994:13) “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context”. George and Bennett (2005:75-76) note that there are six different types of case studies (see also Eckstein 1975). Of these six types especially two are important for my research objective. My comparative historical case study lies somewhere between, or can be seen as a mix of, the heuristic case study—which “inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths”—and a theory testing study—which “assess the validity and the scope conditions of single or competing theories” (ibid.).
I have argued that a scientific realist causal explanation is an explanation which is based on causal mechanisms. George and Bennett (2005:19-21) argue that one of the strengths of case studies is its ability to allow a researcher to explore causal mechanisms. Thus, a case study approach is the best possible method to achieve my research objective, which is to test the hypothesized causal mechanisms proposed by democratic peace researchers and if necessary propose new ones. In the next section I will discuss the most pertinent issues regarding the selection of my cases.

2.3.2 Case Selection

Case selection is commonly referred to as one of the most difficult issues regarding case study research. The most common criticism is that of selection bias, i.e. that the results of a study are biased, one way or the other, based on the selection of cases. This common critique is most often a concern for statistical researchers, who argue that the main problem is when cases are selected based on the outcome of the dependent variable (see King et al. 1994 and Geddes 1990). However a common reply to this by case study researchers is that they often study processes and not outcomes, or as Brady and Collier (2004) notes “selection bias is not a problem—because within-case analysis does not involve intuitive regression” (Brady and Collier 2004:95, see also Finel and Lord 1999). In terms of this study that is certainly true. The focus of this study is not on the outcome of the cases, but on the policy processes that led to those outcomes.

George and Bennett (2005) point to two key criteria when selecting which cases to examine, the first of which is relevance to the research objective of the study, and the second is that cases should “be selected to provide the kind of control and variance required by the research objective” (George and Bennett 2005:83). I have selected two cases for examination in this project, the first being the disputes between Great Britain and Iceland regarding fishing rights in the waters around Iceland, the so called “Cod Wars” between 1958 and 1975, and the second being the Falklands war
between Great Britain and Argentina in 1982\(^7\). I will limit my analysis to British behavior and policymakers.

The selection of these cases provides variation in both the independent and the dependent variable. Democratic peace theory states that a war between two democratic states have not and will not occur, but that mixed dyads—a democratic and a nondemocratic state—might fight and have fought wars. The independent variable is thus the combined regime type, democratic-democratic regimes or democratic-nondemocratic regimes. The cases clearly vary on the independent variable, as both Iceland and Great Britain are democracies and Argentina is a non-democracy\(^8\). The dependent variable in the democratic peace theory is war or not war, and in the cases selected in this study one dispute ended in war while the other dispute ended in a negotiated settlement.

One benefit of the cases selected here is that there is little room for definitional arguments. There is widespread agreement that one dyad is a democratic dyad and the other a mixed dyad and there is also widespread agreement that one case was a war and the other not. Another benefit is the fact that both cases are relatively contemporary and that they occurred only a few years apart. In a case study on the Falklands War, Freedman (1997:236) argues that “because the case is comparatively recent, the characteristics of the democratic state might be considered to have a more general application in a manner consistent with the [democratic peace] theory’s predictions”.

The cases selected represents a most-likely case—if the causal mechanisms hypothesized by democratic peace researchers are in fact the right ones there should be an obvious difference in the two cases examined, as the mechanisms that account for the democratic peace phenomenon should be present in the Cod War case and not in the Falklands War case.

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\(^7\) The area of dispute in the Falklands War was the Falkland Islands. However, these are called the Malvinas in Argentina. For simplicity I will call the war the Falklands War and not the Falkland/Malvinas War.

\(^8\) According to Doyle (1983) Iceland and Great Britain are both classified as democracies, and Argentina is not.
Finally, this is a most-similar design. A most-similar design according to George and Bennett (2005:81) is a design where the cases “are comparable in all respects except for the independent variable, whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes on the dependent variable”. If we use Mill’s terminology, this design is based on a method of difference. Ragin (1987) calls it Mill’s indirect method of difference. My cases are similar in many aspects, but differ on the most important independent variable, and it is at the outset speculated that the variation on the independent variable is what accounts for the different outcome on the dependent variable (Ragin 1987:38-40).

2.3.3 Structured Focused Comparison

To compare and examine the two cases, I will utilize the method of structured focused comparison. The method is structured because “the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible” (George and Bennett 2005:68). To analyze the cases, I ask a set of four questions in each case. The questions are derived from the literature review where I teased out the mechanisms that are supposed to account for the democratic peace:

1) Did British policy makers externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution?
2) Was there public opposition to the use of force, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers?
3) Was there opposition to the use of force by interest groups, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers?
4) Did British policymakers receive good and reliable information regarding the opponent’s intentions and resolve, and did they act appropriately upon the information they received?

The method is focused “in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined” (ibid). This study is focused in that it deals only with how the opponent’s regime type influenced British policymaking. Finally, George and
Bennett argue that it is important that both cases are instances of the same phenomenon. In this study both cases are instances of international crisis management.

To answer these questions, it is necessary to operationalize the mechanisms I intend to test. I will identify norm externalization by assessing whether policymakers are advocating and utilizing international channels of democratic conflict resolution mechanisms. That is, do policymakers advocate the use of negotiations, third-party mediation, and possibly refer the dispute to international courts, tribunals and or international organizations.

To establish whether there was public and interest group opposition to the use of force, I will first assess whether such opposition existed. I will do so by reviewing both primary and secondary sources, analyze potential opinion polls and news accounts. To evaluate whether policymakers were constrained by the potential opposition I examine statements, speeches and writings of key policymakers and assess whether they indicate any level of constraint. Another key indication of constraint will be the actual policies advocated by policymakers, and whether they conform to the will of potential pressure groups and public opinion.

I will assess the signaling mechanism by first establishing the opponent’s (Iceland and Argentina) level of resolve. This will be done through an examination of available historical sources. I will then assess whether the opponents sent reliable signals of their resolve, by examining the information relayed to the British through various channels, such as news media and diplomatic channels.

2.3.4 Process-Tracing

The appropriate method for identifying causal mechanisms is process-tracing. According to George and Bennett (2005:6) process tracing “attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case”. Checkel (2005:2) agrees with this view and argues that “to invoke process is synonymous with an
understanding of theories as based on causal mechanisms. To study such
mechanisms, we must employ a method of process tracing”.

As stated above, the purpose of this study is a mix between testing the
democratic peace propositions and improving the causal explanations for the
democratic peace phenomenon. George and Bennett (2005) argue that process tracing
is the best method for this purpose. They note that case studies employing process
tracing can improve democratic peace theory by “identifying one or more causal
processes that explain how the fact that two states that are both democratic enables
them to avoid war-threatening disputes or to solve disputes without engaging in war
or threats of it” (George and Bennett 2005:209).

For the purpose of this research project, I will employ process tracing as the
main tool when answering the questions in my comparative study. The causal
mechanisms identified in the literature review guided those questions, but by utilizing
process tracing I will also be able to see if other more important intervening variables
and causal mechanisms played a role in the different decisions made by British
policymakers in the different cases.

2.3.5 Data Collection

This thesis is based on library research. The data collected is historical data
collected from secondary and original sources available at the University of Oslo
library and cooperating institutions. In the early stages of the study, I approached the
data collection process by gathering easily accessible academic literature on the two
cases. As the thesis evolved, I gathered more relevant literature on the cases as well
as on the most important policymakers in each case. This second stage of collection
included data from news sources such as Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, which
proved to be an invaluable source for the analysis of the Cod War.

2.3.6 Data Analysis

After the initial “soaking and poking” (George and Bennett 2005) stage, in
which I immersed myself in the case and its context, I completed a structured coding
of the data I collected. I did so by first creating four broad categories which matched
the four causal mechanisms I identified through a review of the democratic peace literature. After organizing the data into these four categories, I created more refined categories which matched the operationalization of each mechanism. Finally I used the data in each category to analyze the effect or lack thereof of each mechanism.

2.3.7 Limitations

One key limitation when using secondary historical accounts is the potential bias an author might have had in his or her analysis of the case. In that regard, George and Bennett (2005:95) advice researchers to “forgo the temptation to rely on a single seemingly authoritative study of the case at hand by a historian” (see also Elman and Elman 2001: 59-60 and Lustick 1996). I have followed their advice to the best of my ability, and have examined several sources whenever possible. Whenever historians have offered different interpretations of the data, I have made the reader aware of the disagreements and considered it myself before I have drawn any conclusions.

Another important limitation with case-studies is the danger of attaching “particular significance to an item that supports, [the researchers] pre-existing or favored interpretations and, conversely, to downplay the significance of an item that challenges it” (George and Bennett 2005:99). As most researchers I had certain preconceived ideas regarding the democratic peace. I have tried, to the best of my ability, to put these ideas aside when analyzing the data. I have also considered the nature of “who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances” (ibid:100, emphasis in original).

External validity refers to the degree to which the findings of the study can be applied or generalized to other cases. The results of case studies are not meant to be statistically generalized in the way that, for instance, the results of an experimental study are. Case studies instead rely on analytical generalization, wherein the researcher is “striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory” (Yin, 1994, p. 36) rather than to generalize the results to a population. In this thesis, the goal is to both test the causal mechanisms and if possible to improve the explanatory path of the democratic peace thesis. As such it conforms to what George and Bennett (2005) calls theory development.
3. **CASE 1: The Cod Wars between Britain and Iceland**

3.1 **Introduction**

This is the first of two cases in which I intend to explore British decision making processes in international disputes. This first case is an exploration of British policy responses to the Icelandic unilateral extension of its fishing limits⁹. Three different times between 1958 and 1976, Iceland unilaterally extended its fishing limits, and each time Britain dispatched the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters. The British response was serious, and small military confrontations occurred in each of the three Cod Wars.

In May 1958, the Icelandic cabinet reached an agreement on a regulation that would extend the Icelandic fishing limits from four to twelve miles. On 1 September 1958, the new regulation took effect and the Icelandic Coast Guard immediately began to enforce the new limit. After several incidents between British fishing vessels and the Icelandic Coast Guard, the British government dispatched the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters. This marked the beginning of the first Cod War. After about two and half years, the two governments reached an agreement which heavily favored Iceland.

1 September 1972, Iceland extended their fishing limits to 50 miles. As in the first war, the Icelandic Coast Guard enforced the new limit, and several incidents between British fishing vessels and Icelandic Coast Guard vessels occurred. British fishermen once again called on the Royal Navy for protection, but British policymakers were reluctant to send the navy once again. However, after several months of further incidents in Icelandic waters and intense lobbying by the British fishermen for protection, the British government finally dispatched the Royal Navy to

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⁹ Fishing limits refers to the waters in which only Icelandic fishermen can fish.
Icelandic waters on 19 May 1973. The two states reached a settlement in mid-October, but not until Britain gave up most of its demands.

After Iceland extended its fishing limits to 200 miles in November 1975, the third and final Cod War began. As with the two other Cod Wars, a settlement that heavily favored Iceland was reached. All three Cod Wars proceeded in a very similar manner, and all three disputes were settled before serious military clashes occurred.

As described in chapter 2, this study is a structured focused comparison in which I will answer a set of four questions: 1) Did British policy makers externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution? 2) Was there public opposition to the use of force, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers? 3) Was there opposition to the use of force by interest groups, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers? 4) Did British policymakers receive good and reliable information regarding the opponent’s intentions and resolve, and did they act appropriately upon the information they received?

Before I move on to answer these questions, it is important to note that I plan to answer each question by looking at all three disputes simultaneously. That is, when I answer the first question I will do so by referring to each dispute. I will then summarize the general response and process, based on the findings in the three disputes. I believe this is the most appropriate, because even though the disputes were handled by three “sets” of policymakers, the disputes, processes and outcomes were, as the analysis will show, extraordinarily similar.

3.2 Question 1: Did British policy makers externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution?

The key normative mechanism proposed by democratic researchers is that of norm externalization. This means that when a democratic state deals with another democracy, “the political leadership externalizes the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions” (Maoz and Russett 1993:625, see section 1.2.1). The domestic norms that characterize the democratic political processes and institutions are, for example, a belief in the rule of law and the court system to resolve disputes between groups with
competing interests. Another function of democratic norms is that groups with competing interests are willing to reach a compromise and an agreement, through negotiations, reciprocal attitudes, and or third party mediation. Most importantly these norms of conflict resolution are inherently peaceful, and violence is not used to settle conflicts at the domestic level.

If policymakers in an international dispute with another democracy externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution, then we should expect to see policymakers go to great lengths to solve the dispute through mediation, negotiations, and potentially international courts. At no point should we experience the use of violence and elimination of the opposing party as a means to solve the dispute. With this in mind, it is possible to answer the first question.

In the first Cod War, which took place between 1958 and 1961, the results are somewhat mixed. British policymakers were surprised by the Icelandic announcement and did not accept the unilateral extension of the fishing limits. According to Johannesson (2004:558) the British Prime Minister was “influenced by legal principle, or the assumption that international law could not be changed unilaterally”. This belief in legal principles was displayed in the first official protest from Britain to Iceland in response to the extension. In the protest the British questioned the legality of a unilateral extension, as well as the legality of prohibiting anyone from fishing on what Britain regarded as the “high seas”. In the protest the British wrote that Iceland “could not and would not in law in any way restrict the rights of other nations in areas which have long been regarded as part of the High Seas” (quoted in Jonsson 1982:85). The belief in legal principle was at the forefront of British reactions, especially during the two final Cod Wars. However, during the first dispute there are indications that policymakers were using legal principles more to bolster their case than to commit to them as a normative principle. In discussions between British officials during the first Cod War on whether they should refer the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), they decided that referral to the ICJ was too risky (Johannesson 2004:558). Thus, the British argued strongly against the legality of both the 12-mile limit and the unilateral action by Iceland, but they were not willing to let the ICJ be the final arbiter in the dispute.
Britain pursued a settlement through negotiations throughout the entire dispute. In their first letter of protest (referred to above) Britain argued for a negotiated bilateral agreement, and indicated that they would be willing to accept an agreement favorable to Iceland. In a statement, following a cabinet meeting shortly after the Icelandic announcement, Prime Minister Macmillan maintained that Britain saw bilateral negotiations as the principal means to solve the conflict, but he added that “in default of an agreement or modus vivendi, they must preserve the rights of British fishing vessels on the High Seas” (Keesing’s 1958:16479). When the dispute was finally settled after more than three years of negotiations, threats and clashes, it was done so through a settlement which heavily favored Iceland.

In a speech in the House of Commons on 28 February 1961, Prime Minister Edward Heath stated that it was “right to reach this agreement”. He continued to say that “we recognize the immense importance of the fishing industry to Iceland, and Iceland as an ally in NATO is a country with whom we wish to resume friendly relations” (Keesing’s 1960:17314). Thus in the end British policymakers seemed to understand that Iceland’s reliance on the fishing industry was much greater than the Britain’s reliance on the fishing industry. Britain therefore practically gave up everything they had been fighting for during the previous three years. An important aspect of the final agreement signed in 1961, which would be utilized by Britain in the following conflicts was a clause that allowed either party to refer a future similar case to the ICJ.

During the second Cod War in 1972-1973, the British were relatively influenced by legalist thinking and appeared to externalize other norms of domestic conflict resolution as well. Soon after Iceland extended its fishing limits from 12 to 50 miles, the British referred the case to the ICJ, as was stipulated in the 1961 agreement. The British delegate to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed meeting, John Simpson, said in a statement on 6 August 1971 that “should the proposed extension be put into effect, it will have no basis in international law” (Keesing’s 1972:25234). He added that it would also be contradictory to the 1961 agreement, “which had been registered with the United Nations” (ibid). In an aide-memoire sent to Iceland on September 27 1971, Britain expressed its willingness to
“enter into further exploratory discussions with Iceland on the problems of the fisheries in general, including the conservation subject” (Keesing’s 1972:25235).

The British commitment to the ICJ was not without problems. British commitment to the ICJ during the second Cod War prolonged the conflict and created a situation where the British were precluded from negotiating a favorable settlement which both states could approve. Lady Tweedsmuir (Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), one of the negotiators in the dispute, said it best: “We cannot and will not accept any extension of the present limit, not even 25 or 20 miles as such a compromise would prejudice Britain’s case at the International Court” (Keesing’s 1973:25869). The British confidence and belief in the ICJ was confirmed when the ICJ ruled in favor of the British. However, Icelandic policymakers did not recognize the court’s jurisdiction and consequently not the various rulings against Iceland. In the end, British reliance on the ICJ seemed only to have prolonged the conflict even though it increased British legitimacy.

British policymakers also acknowledged the utility of third party mediators. In the summer of 1973, the British Foreign Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in a session in the House of Commons, announced that the British was willing to let Dr. Luns, the Secretary General of NATO, function as an intermediary in the dispute (Keesing’s 1973:26031). Britain also welcomed the offer by the Norwegian Government of good offices in the summer of 1973 (ibid). In September of 1973, the British Ambassador to Iceland sent a note to the Icelandic Foreign Minster “proposing that an international commission should be set up to inquire into any further allegations of ramming” (ibid: 26237). Iceland rejected all offers involving third parties and all court orders by the ICJ.

In short, British policymakers externalized norms of domestic conflict resolution during the second Cod War. They referred the second dispute to the ICJ, they continuously argued for a negotiated settlement, and they approved and encouraged the use of third party mediators. However, Icelandic policymakers did not

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10 Both British and Icelandic sailors at times rammed their vessels into each other, often causing great harm to the boats in question and sometimes personal injuries as well.
externalize their norms of democratic conflict resolution. Even thought they had agreed in 1961 that both parties could refer a potential future extension of the fishery limits to the ICJ, Iceland never acknowledged the Court’s jurisdiction. They also refused to use Dr. Luns as a mediator, rejected the Norwegian offer of good offices in the summer of 1973, and did not agree to the British proposal of establishing an international investigative commission.

The third and final Cod War was a much shorter affair than the two prior ones, but once again Britain relied on the ICJ rulings for legitimacy reasons. In a speech to the House of Commons on 25 October 1975, the Mister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth office stated that “Great Britain is attempting to establish, re-establish and confirm rights granted and conformed under international legal conditions” (Keesing’s 1976:27512). The British problem was not with the legal conditions of the dispute, as the ICJ had confirmed in 1974 that they had jurisdiction in the case and they had ruled that a unilateral extension above 12 miles was unlawful. The British problem was that Iceland did not recognize the rulings, and as such, they had very little effect on the outcome of the conflict.

Knowing that Iceland disregarded the ICJ rulings, British policymakers attempted to reach an agreement through negotiations. During the NATO meeting on 11 December 1975, the Icelandic and British Foreign Ministers met, and the British Foreign Minister, James Callaghan, offered to enter into negotiations at any place, at any level and at any time. The British also suggested mediation by a third party (Keesing’s 1976:27513). Whether the British offer was sincere is, however, questionable, as the offer demanded that Iceland stop all harassment of British fishing vessels, a precondition the British most likely knew that Iceland would not accept. Iceland once again rejected all British offers.

The third Cod War was shorter than the two prior ones, but events unfolded in roughly the same way as earlier. Britain offered negotiations and argued strongly on the legal basis of their demands. The British was also willing to accept mediation by a third party, and as such they did externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution in their disputes with Iceland. Iceland, on the other hand, did not.
The above analysis shows that the British externalized their democratic norms of conflict resolution. However, the brief analysis of Icelandic behavior shows that they did not externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution. These results might indicate that democratic states in conflicts with other democratic states will only externalize norms of domestic conflict resolution when the interests at stake are limited. Icelandic policymakers, interest groups, and the general public all viewed the extensions of the fishery limits as critical to the survival of the Icelandic nation, and they were willing to go to great lengths to protect them.

3.3 Question 2: Were there public opposition to the use of force, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers?

It is notable at the outset to point out that the importance of the fishing industry in Great Britain at the time of these disputes was relatively modest. According to one analyst, the fishing industry as a whole accounted for less than one percent of GDP, and the long-distance fishing industry was of course even less than that (Habeeb 1986:101). However, the long-distance fishing industry was of great importance to the ports in the area of Humberside, such as Hull and Grimsby. The fishing industry accounted for a great number of jobs in these cities, and thus these cities were the ones that were impacted the most by the Icelandic extensions of the fishery limit.

The evidence about how public opinion impacted British policymakers during the Cod Wars is at best mixed. According to Hart (1976:56), “the British public was ambivalent about the Cod War”. There was some sympathy for the Icelandic people and there was some sympathy for British reactions to the Icelandic harassment of British trawlers. In essence, “the Cod War was not seen as crucial to the continued existence of the nation, as it was seen in Iceland, nor was there widespread awareness of linkages between issues of the dispute and the issues of unemployment and

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11 The long-distance fishing industry refers to the fishing that takes place outside of British territorial waters.
consumer prices” (Hart 1976:56-57). Hart (1976) also points out that government officials even disagreed on how British public opinion saw the case.

Even though British opinion seems to have been fairly ambivalent about the Cod Wars, there is evidence that a number of policymakers were constrained from using too much force against Iceland. Habeeb’s (1986) analysis of the first Cod War shows that early on, the British felt that it would be impossible to win without the use of effective naval action. But, at the same time, British policymakers recognized that there were significant constraints on the use of force. “It was felt that world public opinion, or even British public opinion, would not countenance violent action” (Habeeb 1986:104).

The idea or fear of losing world public opinion clearly constrained British policymakers more than British public opinion did. According to Hart (1976:35), the British government was reluctant to send in the Royal Navy because they feared that “a display of military muscle by a large country like Britain against a small country like Iceland would not help to win domestic or international support”. Habeeb (1986:118) reports that increased attention from the international press (mostly in favor of Iceland) during the second Cod War “was causing immense discomfort in London”. The international public opinion became even more of a constraint on British policymakers after the first navy vessels were sent into Icelandic waters in the second Cod War. Ingimundarson (2003:112) writes that “public opinion in Western countries no doubt was more supportive of the Icelandic cause after the British sent warships to Iceland. While the frigates exercised extreme caution, there was no escape from the fact that a great power was flexing its military muscle against a small ‘unarmed nation’”.

During the much shorter third Cod War, Iceland, according to Jonsson (1982:179), gradually gained “the upper hand in the publicity campaign on the conflict in the world media”. The most apparent proof of this was Foreign Minister Anthony Crosland’s speech in the House of Commons on 7 June 1976. In his speech, which was a defense of the agreement with Iceland which ended the third Cod War, he stated that the only alternative to the agreement was “to continue to pursue the
Cod War, with the certainty of dangerous escalation...[and] with international and especially NATO opinion moving sharply against us” (Keesing’s 1976:27825)\(^{12}\).

British policymakers were not significantly constrained by a pacific domestic public opinion, which was mainly ambivalent to the Cod Wars. Thus the first institutional mechanism, \textit{public constraint}, cannot account for the peaceful outcome of the British-Icelandic Cod Wars. There is, however, some evidence that world public opinion constrained British policymakers, at least more so than domestic public opinion did. There are several reasons for this. First of all, as was pointed out above, few people, other than those directly affected, appreciated the linkages between the Cod Wars, unemployment and potentially rising prices. Another reason for the lack of domestic public attention was the fact that other, more important, things filled the daily headlines in Britain during the Cod Wars. Britain had, just two years prior to the first Cod War, participated in the highly publicized Suez War, and the conflict was still an important foreign policy issue when the first Cod War took place. During the second and third Cod War, Britain’s membership in the EU (then the EEC) was the most important foreign policy issue, and thus the Cod Wars were largely ignored by the general public in Britain.

Even though I do not intend to analyze Icelandic decision making processes in this thesis, it is worth while to briefly discuss Icelandic conditions as well. The Icelandic public was in no way ambivalent about the Cod Wars. During all three conflicts, Icelandic public opinion often compelled Icelandic policymakers into a more confrontational approach. There were several instances of demonstrations, and at times the demonstrations almost turned violent against British and NATO interests. Thus public opinion in Iceland operated in the opposite direction of what democratic peace researchers have proposed. As with the normative mechanism, this seems to be explained by the magnitude of the interests at stake.

\(^{12}\) Mitchell (1976) provides an excellent analysis on how both governments utilized the press to strengthen its own position in the negotiation.
3.4 Question 3: Was there significant opposition to the use of force by major interest groups, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers?

The democratic peace thesis stipulates that major interest groups will oppose governmental use of force towards another democracy. This opposition forces key decision makers to either reconsider their strategy, in fear of potentially losing their power base, and thus risk loosing the next election or the government is forced to spend a significant amount of time and resources to convince the opposition that their course of action is the right one, thus allowing diplomats time to reach a negotiated settlement before the use of force takes place. The evidence in favor of the interest group constraint mechanism in the Cod War case is none-existent. Rather, as will be shown below, significant pressure from important interests groups were the main reason why the British government decided to send the Royal Navy into Icelandic waters during all three disputes.

Because several other international crisis and events were happening around the time of the different fishery disputes with Iceland, the fishery industry and their interest groups had what seems to have been close to a monopoly on informing and pressuring British policymakers during the disputes with Iceland. From an early stage of each dispute, these groups called on the British government to send in the Royal Navy to protect British trawlers. Even though there were international constraints on the British government, the trawler owners had great success in their lobbying efforts. The fishery disputes in essence became Cod Wars because of the influence of important interest groups rather than those interest groups defusing the conflicts.

Beginning in the first Cod War, British groups lobbied the government for Royal Navy protection. Habeeb (1986:103) writes that:

The British Trawlers Owners Federation, as well as labor union locals in Humberside port cities, were fiercely committed to preserving their fishing rights in Icelandic waters. These groups lobbied the government to provide Royal Navy protection when Iceland began its tactic of harassment.

Habeeb points to another important aspect as well when he argues that “commitment in Britain, outside of these groups, was limited” (Habeeb 1986:103).
There is no doubt that the lobbying efforts by British fishermen were successful. At an early stage in the dispute the British Ambassador to Iceland, Sir. Andrew Gilchrest, expressed to the British Government that a mild form of naval action would be highly inefficient and would only postpone defeat (ibid:105). However, the British fishermen lobbied intensely and called for “naval actions, landing bans and other hard line responses” (ibid). In the end, the fishermen were successful and the British government ignored Ambassador Gilchrest’s advice and “fell in line with the trawlermen” (ibid).

Several analysts share the opinion, that pressure from the fishing industry significantly contributed to the British government’s decision to dispatch the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters during the first Cod War. Jonsson (1982:94) writes that an important reason for the decision to send the navy “was the powerful political lobby at work in London, constantly demanding protection for the British trawlers in Icelandic waters”. Johannesson (2004) also supports the notion that the fishing industry was successful in its lobbying efforts. Johannesson (2004:570) argues that “the origins of the ‘cod war’ underline the importance of pressure groups and party politics in foreign policy decision-making” [sic]. Johannesson’s (2004) argument is not that pressure groups helped avert an escalation of the dispute, as democratic peace researchers have proposed, but rather that escalation was unlikely without the lobbying efforts by British fishermen.

It is also necessary to show that policymakers actually did act or at the very least were influenced by the lobbying efforts during the first Cod War. One such example can be found in the 18 June 1958, statement by John Hare, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, who in the House of Commons referred to a meeting he had with the British Trawler Owners’ Federation and argued that the effect of the Icelandic decision would be “very serious, with heavy losses in the catches and economic dislocation of the distant water fleet” (Keesing’s 1958:16478). This was even before the Icelandic policy had taken effect and no Icelandic enforcement had yet taken place. Even Prime Minister Macmillan was clearly influenced by the early lobbying efforts and in May 1958, he maintained that if Britain gave in, “our fishing industry will be ruined” (quoted in Johannesson 2004:555).
During the second Cod War, the situation was very similar to the first war. Intense lobbying efforts by the British fishing industry clearly led British policymakers to dispatch the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters to protect the trawlers. There are numerous statements and reports that shed excellent light on the lobbyists influence on British policymakers and their decision to dispatch the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters.

The British fishermen were quite belligerent. Soon after Iceland announced its intentions of extending the fishing limits from twelve to fifty miles, Mr. Austen Laing (Director General of the British Trawlers’ Federation) said in a statement that, “the British fishing industry—owners and men—were prepared for a second and fiercer ‘cod war’ if Iceland went ahead with her plans” (Keesing’s 1972:25236) [sic]. Laing also argued that “the closure to Britain of the Icelandic grounds could cause economic distress among the 100,000 British workers who depends directly and indirectly on the fishing industry—particular in Fleetwood, Grimsby and Hull” (ibid). These kinds of statements did not go unnoticed. Members of Parliament, especially those from the potentially affected areas, were concerned and pressured government officials to use the Royal Navy. An excellent example of this occurred during a session in the House of Commons on 12 June 1972, almost three months before the Icelandic regulation was to take effect, where James Johnson (MP for Kingston-upon-Hull West) asked Anthony Royle (Under-Secretary of State) “to bear in mind that all sections of our fishing industry…want the minister to say two things—that we do not accept the domestic jurisdiction of Iceland up to the 50-mile limit, and that we must have our men and boats looked after in the event of anything happening after September 1, 1972” (Keesing’s 1973:25869). To this Royle replied, as the government had done at several occasions, that naval protection was not out of the question (ibid).

The British fishing industry continued its lobbying efforts for naval protection during the summer of 1972, and on 30 July, The British Deep-Sea Fishing Industry Committee—representing the British Trawlers’ Federation, the Scottish Trawler Owners’ Association, the Trawler Skippers, Guilds of several ports and the Transport and General Workers’ Union—announced after a meeting in Hull its unanimous
decision that “fishing should continue at the present level after Sept 1, whatever action the Icelandic Government might take” (Keesing’s 1973:25869). They also said that they would continue discussions with the British government and would “stress that every effort must be made to safeguard the well-being of the crews in the threatened waters, including naval protection against interference with our lawful business on the high seas” (ibid). During several more sessions in both the House of Commons and House of Lords during the fall of 1972, Members of Parliament spoke up against the Icelandic extension of the fishing limits. Each time key members of the administration made it clear that sending in the Royal Navy was a likely scenario (Keesing’s 1973:25872).

Iceland was not deterred by British discussions about the dispatching the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters, and negotiations between the two states were unsuccessful. On September 1, 1972 Iceland began policing its new 50-mile fishery limit. The tactics were the same as during the first conflict. However, Iceland had developed a new trawl-cutter weapon which significantly increased the cost of fishing for the British fleet. During the first few weeks, the Icelandic Coast Guard successfully cut several British trawl wires. Icelandic harassment led the British fishing industry to intensify their lobbying efforts for naval protection. On October 23, 1973 the trawling industry’s joint action committee called on the British government “for an immediate Navy presence among the trawling fleet of Iceland” (ibid). Members of Parliament, especially those from the Humberside port cities, also continued to pressure the government to send in the Royal Navy. Mr. Anthony Crosland, (Labour member from Grimsby and future Foreign Secretary) was one of the most vocal supporters of the fishing industry. He continuously pushed the government for navy involvement (ibid:25874).

However, as described above, the international pressure to settle the conflict peacefully severely constrained the British government’s options. As a temporary solution the government therefore rented several, privately owned and operated, ocean going tug boats and sent them to protect the British trawlers. According to Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home, this was done after consultations with the fishing industry (ibid:25872).
The tug boat solution did little to reduce Icelandic harassment. During the spring of 1973, the Icelandic Coast Guard carried on with its harassment and continued to cut trawl wires. The British fishing industry persistently called for naval protection, but the British government was reluctant. On 16 May 1973, the trawler skippers sent an ultimatum to the British government: send the navy or we leave. During a full cabinet meeting on 17 May at 10 Downing Street, the Government decided to send in the Navy the following day (Keesing’s 1973:26029). Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home explained the decision on May 21, in a speech in the House of Commons. “After consultations with the industry the Government concluded that it was no longer possible for the British vessels to fish in safety without protection. Naval vessels were therefore ordered into the area on May 19” (ibid.). Prime Minister Edward Heath acknowledges the importance of the fishing industry’s lobbying efforts in his memoirs, writing that he, “with the full agreement of the British deep-water fishing industry, ordered the Royal Navy to protect our trawlers in their traditional fishing grounds in the high seas” (Heath 1998:490). In reality, it was probably Heath who agreed with the fishing industry and not vice versa.

During the shorter third and final Cod War, the same pattern occurred again. Intense pressure from the fishing industry, threats of leaving Icelandic waters and pressure from local MP’s, led the government to send the Royal Navy into Icelandic waters. The main difference between the second and the third conflict was the speed with which this happened. As Britain and Iceland had signed a two year agreement, which ended the second Cod War, the new 200-mile limit did not take effect for British vessels until 14 November 1975. The Icelandic Coast Guard did as they had in the two prior disputes; they started policing the new limit on the day it went into effect. British trawlers did as they had done; they continued fishing as if nothing had changed. As during the other disputes the Icelandic Coast Guard was very successful in harassing the British fishing vessels, and several trawl wires were cut only a few days after the new limit had gone into effect.

Less than a week after the new limit had gone into effect, Roy Hattersley (Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) stated that “the British...
Government were ready to provide the trawlers with whatever support and protection they need” (Keesing’s 1976:27512). However, this time the government was not in total agreement. A day after Roy Hattersley statement the Secretary of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Frederick Peart), pointed to the unsuccessful interventions of the past and stated in “response to requests from the fishing industry to take sterner measures to protect trawlers, that sending the Royal Navy would only aggravate the situation” (ibid). Nonetheless, after threats from British trawler skippers, on November 23, 1975, that they would leave Icelandic waters unless the government assured them Royal Navy protection by noon on the 24th, the government dispatched several navy vessels the following day (ibid). According to Mr. Hattersley, the government did so because they had been “convinced by the trawler owners, skippers and crews on three points. These were (i) that Icelandic gunboats were more able to harass trawlers now than in 1972-1973 ; (ii) that there was a real danger to the welfare and safety of trawlermen ; and (iii) that trawlers could not make commercially viable catches while harassment went on” (ibid).

The events of the three Cod Wars do not confirm the group constraint mechanism. As the above analysis shows, key interest groups did play an important, if not critical, role in all three Cod Wars. The British fishing industry significantly influenced British policymakers to dispatch the Royal Navy to Icelandic water, thus escalating the fishery disputes into what has become know as the British-Icelandic Cod Wars. The only interest groups that became involved in the fishery dispute were different groups from the fishing industry, and they collectively supported and lobbied for the use of the Royal Navy. This influenced especially parliamentary members from the districts that were most impacted by the Icelandic regulations. According to one analyst, “the parliamentary seats on Humberside, particularly Grimsby and Hull, were marginal seats, which could easily float from Labour to the Conservatives and vice versa. This is probably one of the main reasons why the British Government yielded to pressure from the fishing industry and sent British warships to Icelandic waters” (Jonsson 1982:95).

According to Doyle (1983), an important part of the democratic peace explanation can be traced to the fact that many liberal states are economically
interdependent. This economic interdependence “creates interest groups that are opposed to war because it imposes cost by disrupting trade and investment” (Rosato 2003:587). In the Cod Wars the British fishing industry argued in favor of the use of military force because they feared for their livelihood. In other words, economics played an important role in the government’s decision to use force, but it worked in the opposite way of what Doyle (1983) and other analysts have proposed (see also Russett and Oneal 2001).

3.5 Question 4: Did British policymakers receive good and reliable information regarding the opponent’s intentions and resolve and did they act appropriately upon the information they received?

The final mechanism extrapolated from the democratic peace literature, is the signaling or information mechanism. Fearon (1994:577) argues that “democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly than authoritarian states can, perhaps ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states”. Thus, the fourth question is whether British policymakers, given Iceland’s status as a democracy received good and reliable information regarding its intentions and resolve.

The general conclusion regarding the signaling mechanism is that the results are at best mixed. The British, especially in the first two disputes, clearly did not understand how unified Iceland was in the decision to extend the fishing limits and in policing the new limit vigorously. The most severe mistake the British made was to view Icelandic behavior as controlled by a relatively small communist party, who wanted to leave NATO and oust the Americans from Iceland. As will be shown, this belief led the British to think that an escalation would persuade the Icelanders to retreat. Another difficulty for the signaling mechanism is, as will be shown, that the British on several occasions were led to believe that Iceland would take extreme measures to stop the British fishermen. This belief came from faulty reports from both Icelandic and British newspapers, and had the unfortunate effect of rousing the British fishermen. Combined, this does not bode well for the signaling mechanism. British policymakers made decisions based on faulty information, and escalated the
conflict in the belief that it would lead to an Icelandic retreat. The result was the opposite; it unified the Icelandic people even more and could have had severe consequences. In the end it was private negotiations and British retreat that ended all three conflicts.

During the first Cod War the British seriously underestimated Icelandic resolve. In an early report, the British Ambassador Andrew Gilchrist reported that there were serious conflicts internally in the Icelandic Government. According to Jonsson (1982:91) he also “believed in the propaganda in the papers, particular Morgunbladid, that the opposition was, until the end of May 1958, against the extension without a negotiated settlement with NATO states”. Jonsson (ibid) argues that Gilchrest “was misreading the situation and sending misleading reports to London on this point, because after the final decision had been taken there was no question of any political party not supporting the new 12-mile limit”. To Gilchrest and the British policymakers, an Icelandic government with serious internal disagreement about the extension of the fishing limit, suggested that a firm stand in the negotiation process would be the best strategy.

One particular important aspect of Gilchrest’s impression of the situation, which persisted throughout the first and second Cod War, was the belief that the Icelandic decision was forced through the government by the People’s Alliance (a party with communist tendencies). During a meeting in the summer of 1958, Johannesson (2004:557) reports that “an angry Gilchrest asked Gudmundsson (Icelandic Prime Minister) whether Britain must now work on the assumption that the communist were running the Icelandic coalition”. There is no doubt that the Icelandic coalition was under some stress, but the decision to extend the fishing limit was not an issue where there were any doubts.

Gilchrest’s assertion that there were internal conflicts in the Icelandic coalition, and especially that the communists controlled the coalition and the fishery issue, clearly influenced British policymakers. In a private synopsis of the first Cod War, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wrote he feared “that Russia and the Communist have got a strong hold on them” (Johannesson 2004:564). Johannesson (ibid) makes the same observation as Jonsson (1982) does, that “such a
misreading of the feeling in Iceland was unfortunate and highlighted a limited and prejudiced knowledge at the highest level in London”. Johannesson (ibid; see also Jonsson 1982) argues that “the threat of force had united the Icelandic nation, from Left to Right, for the first time since the Republic’s foundation in 1944. The whole affair was not a Moscow plot”.

According to Finel and Lord (1999) transparency—a common trait many democracies shares—does not necessarily allow democratic states to signal clearly their resolve and intentions. Finel and Lord (1999:335) argue that transparency often can exacerbate a crisis. The reason being that “the media—a major facto in transmitting information made available by transparency—may have an incentive to pay more attention to belligerent statements than more subtle, conciliatory signals”. During the Cod Wars this occurred several times. In the time leading up to the first extension of the fishing limits, there were doubts about how Iceland would deal with British vessels fishing within the 12-mile limit. The Icelandic government was naturally somewhat reluctant to announce their plans. However, the British press was very interested to find out what the Icelanders would do. The day before the new 12-mile limit was to take effect (30 August, 1958), the Daily Mail quoted an Icelandic Coast Guard member saying that “we will shell any British ship that passes the 12-mile line” (Johannesson 2004:564). This naturally did not ease an already tense situation. The truth was however very different. The Icelandic Coast Guard had been instructed to “show the utmost caution at the onset when everyone is tense and the situation a powder keg” (ibid). Another example of the British press creating uncertainty about the Icelandic strategy is from a story in the Daily Express, which stated that “should a suspected poacher disobey orders to stop, a burst of gunfire would be unleashed, first across the bows and then the gunner will spray the bridge, where the skipper is likely to be standing” (quoted in Johannesson 2004:564). According to Johannesson (ibid) “the story was a total fabrication”.

The signaling mechanism did not operate as prescribed by democratic peace researchers during the second Cod War either. One reoccurring problem was, as during the first Cod War, that the British believed there were serious disagreements internally in the Icelandic coalition government. According to Hart (1976:30) the
British government received “inconsistent signals from the [Icelandic] Foreign and Fisheries ministries”. The British Foreign Ministry would communicate with the Icelandic Foreign Ministry and would receive “conciliatory messages from Einar Augustsson at the same time that the AFF Ministry received unaccommodating messages from Ludvik Josepsson. When the Foreign office and the AFF Ministry talked to each other, they wondered if they were talking about the same dispute” (ibid)\(^\text{13}\).

It was not only the bureaucracies that were confused about the Icelandic position. In line with Finel and Lord’s (1999) argument discussed above, the British press found the Icelandic position confusing. Hart (1976) explains how reporters would rather interview the Fishery Minister (the more belligerent one), than the Foreign Minister. Thus the mixed signals coming from Iceland created a confusion that “tended to muddle the issues and impede progress toward a settlement” (Hart 1976:31).

Members of Parliament and senior officials were also puzzled by the mixed signals coming from Iceland. MP’s expressed in the House of Commons that they believed the escalation of the conflict was “due to Communist pressure designed to get Iceland out of NATO” (MP Patrick Wall, quoted in Keesing’s 1973:25872). The Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home also believed that Iceland had a hidden agenda and that the situation was controlled by the Fisheries Minister Josepsson (who was also the leader of the People’s Party) (Ingimundarson 2003:104). Sir Alec Douglas-Home indicated his views to the Americans, arguing that the Icelandic government “was not only weak but it was controlled by the communists who could resign from it whenever they pleased” (Douglas-Home quoted in Ingimundarson 2003:116). The British belief that the dispute was a communist plot was incorrect. According to Ingimundarson (2003:116) the British and Douglas-Home in particular “severely underestimated public opinion in Iceland by putting the blame on the communists. The support for Iceland’s hard line on the fishery issue and for resisting

\(^{13}\) AFF is the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Food. Einar Augstsson was the Icelandic Foreign Minister and Ludvik Josepsson was the Icelandic Fisheries Minister.
British show of naval force was shared by the vast majority of Icelanders in an intensely nationalistic climate”. Even after more than a decade after the second Cod War, Prime Minister Heath, in his memoirs, blamed the dispute on what he calls the “stridently left-wing government” which focused its discontents on Britain (Heath 1998:490).

During the third Cod War the situation was somewhat different. Having been through two very similar disputes earlier, the last one only a few years previously, the British government, Members of Parliament, and the fishing industry, had no reason to doubt Icelandic resolve and intentions. Another important aspect is that the signals coming from Iceland during the third Cod War were less ambiguous. Jonsson (1982:173) for instance points out that question of Icelandic NATO membership and the future of the American base on Iceland had been asked at different levels during the two first conflicts. However, during the “last Cod War they were asked more loudly and forcefully in Iceland by all people of all political persuasions than during the previous cod wars” (ibid). There were also several large anti-NATO demonstrations and meetings, as well as members of the Icelandic Parliament tabling resolutions demanding that the U.S. base at Keflavik be closed and Iceland withdraw from NATO (ibid:173-174). Finally “several other speeches and writings could be cited to show that the bulk of the Icelandic nation, political leaders and commentators of all political shades, were having second thoughts about Iceland’s NATO membership and the value of the American defense force at Keflavik” (ibid:175). The signaling mechanism worked as expected during the third Cod War, but even though British policymakers had no doubt about Icelandic resolve and intentions, they pursued a very similar, if not identical, course as in the two prior disputes. Thus signaling did not stop the fishery dispute from escalating. Even the end result was almost identical: Britain ended up signing an agreement in which Iceland clearly received the better outcome.

An analysis of the signaling or information mechanism has shown that Iceland, a democracy, with a free press and clearly a transparent governmental system, was unable to diffuse three fishery disputes from becoming Cod Wars by clearly signaling their interests and resolve. In the two first Cod Wars, Icelandic transparency and a
free British Press exacerbated the conflicts rather than diffusing them. British policymakers did not understand the resolve of the Icelandic nation, and believed reports that there were conflicts in the Icelandic coalition government. British policymakers also believed reports that the People’s Party, a party with communist sympathies, was controlling the situation. In the Cold War setting in which these disputes took place, the fear of a communist plot led British policymakers to take sterner and more aggressive moves than what was otherwise necessary. A final important failure of the signaling mechanism was the many mistaken reports of an overly aggressive Icelandic Coast Guard in the British press. In sum, this analysis clearly shows that the signaling mechanism did not diffuse conflicts or disputes as predicted by democratic peace researchers. Rather it supports the conclusion of Finel and Lord (1999) that transparency often can exacerbate conflicts and that information in itself is not enough; correct interpretation of the information is what is important.

3.6 Conclusion

The above analysis shows that only one of the four mechanisms operated as proposed by democratic peace researchers. There is evidence that British policymakers externalized their norms of democratic conflict resolution in their dispute with Iceland. The most significant evidence for this was the strong belief British policymakers had in the International Court of Justice. The British also indicated a strong willingness to involve third parties as mediators, as well as a desire to reach a negotiated settlement that was fair for both parties.

The other three mechanisms did not operate as proposed. British public opinion was largely ambivalent and did not constrain British policymakers. However, pressure from a largely negative international press and public opinion, and the fear of damaging the British image, constrained policymakers from pursuing a more aggressive policy from the beginning of each dispute. Thus, expanding the public constraint mechanism to also consider international public opinion may help to explain the democratic peace.
The evidence shows that the group constraint mechanism operated in the opposite way of what democratic peace researchers have proposed. Without strong and belligerent interest groups from the fishing industry, it is very likely that the disputes between Iceland and Britain would have been solved without any display of military force. British policymakers were without doubt seriously influenced by the pressure put on them by the fishery industry. There was also an almost total lack of opposition from other interest groups on the British display of military power.

Icelandic transparency did not help British policymakers appreciate the overwhelming support the Icelandic government had regarding the fishery limits amongst the people, interest groups, and in the Parliament. Had Iceland unmistakably signaled its resolve and the British understood this, it is unlikely that the second and third Cod Wars would have ever happened.

The above analysis of the three Cod Wars between Britain and Iceland indicates that only one of the causal mechanisms of the democratic peace propositions work as proposed in the literature. However, to see whether British policymakers are influenced by an opponent’s regime type, it is necessary to explore another case. In the next chapter I will analyze the Falklands War between Britain and Argentina, asking the same questions as I did above. By comparing the results, we can better establish if any of the mechanisms proposed have casual relevance or whether other mechanism or processes can better account for the outcomes.
4. CASE 2: The Falklands War

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored British decision-making processes in a dispute against another democracy. In this chapter I will explore British decision-making in a dispute against a military dictatorship, and whether the fact that Argentina was ruled by a military junta played a significant role in British policy choices.

On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands and quickly overwhelmed the small garrison of British Royal Marines stationed in Port Stanley, the capital of the islands. They soon raised the Argentine flag, expelled British Governor Rex Hunt from the islands and “proclaimed the successful recovery of the islands after 150 years of British occupation” (Welch 1995:155). By and large, the invasion came as a surprise to the British government, even though relations with Argentina had drastically deteriorated since the end of February 1982. At no point did the British expect a full-scale invasion by the Argentines and they did not know about it until it had practically happened. The Thatcher government responded quickly to the invasion, and within days a Royal Navy task force was dispatched to the South Atlantic. On 1 May 1982, the British began a counter attack to regain the islands, and on 14 June the remaining Argentine forces surrendered and the British flag was once again raised in Port Stanley. In total, 655 Argentines and 255 British were killed during the war.

The goal of this thesis is to examine whether the causal mechanisms implicitly proposed by democratic peace researchers hold. As a result, this case study will consider events leading up to the war and not events of the war itself. In order to determine the impact of some of the mechanisms, it is necessary to examine events that happened more than a decade before the actual war, but most of the analysis is of events occurring in the immediate months prior to the war.
I will use the same questions to analyze this case as I did in the Cod War case. To remind the reader, the questions are: 1) Did British policy makers externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution? 2) Was there public opposition to the use of force, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers? 3) Was there opposition to the use of force by interest groups, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers? 4) Did British policymakers receive good and reliable information regarding the opponent’s intentions and resolve, and did they act appropriately upon the information they received?

It is important to note that since the dispute under examination is a dispute between a democracy and an autocracy\textsuperscript{14}, the democratic peace propositions predict different answers than they do in a dispute between two democracies. In order for the Falklands War case study to contribute to the democratic peace literature, we should expect the data to give us different answers than the Cod War case did. Since Argentina was a dictatorship, Britain should not externalize its norms of democratic conflict resolution and there should be less public and interest group opposition. However, opposition should still be present, but the Thatcher government should attempt to circumvent the need for political support (see Maoz and Russett 1993:626). Finally, British policymakers should not receive good and reliable information about Argentine interests and resolve. The following sections will establish whether the case study confirms these hypotheses.

4.2 Question 1: Did British policy makers externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution?

As discussed above, one of the key mechanisms explaining peaceful relations between democracies are shared democratic norms. However, democratic norms do not restrain a democracy is in a dispute with a non-democracy. “Because non-liberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from

\textsuperscript{14} The Argentina military junta was a military dictatorship. I will use military dictatorship, dictatorship, autocracy and non-democracy interchangeably throughout the chapter.
a presumption of amity; non-liberals suffer from a presumption of enmity” (Doyle 1986, quoted in Russett 1996:93). In the Falklands War case, we should therefore expect the British to view Argentine foreign policy behavior with skepticism, and thus they ought not to externalize their norms of democratic conflict resolution.

The Falklands War was the culmination of nearly fifteen years of disputes over the Falkland Islands between Britain and Argentina. To understand British behavior appropriately and to analyze whether they externalized their democratic norms of conflict resolution it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the negotiations in 1967. To Argentina, the issue of the Falkland Islands had long been an issue of national concern and pride, and when the first negotiations began in 1967 the goal of the Argentine government was a transfer of sovereignty from Britain to Argentina. To the British, the Falkland Islands were of limited interest and according to Foreign Secretary Carrington, maintaining “a very small colony (in terms of population) a few hundred miles offshore from the Argentine coast and several thousand from our own in the face of irreconcilable Argentine hostility made little sense to successive Governments in London” (Carrington 1998:349). When negotiations began in 1967, both Argentina and Britain believed a peaceful transfer of sovereignty was possible, but as the Falklands War showed, that was not the case.

The Falkland Island population was approximately 1800 people when the negotiations began. The British entered the negotiations with intentions of transferring sovereignty to Argentina, and believed it would be in the best interest of the islanders that negotiations took place. However, the Islanders themselves were opposed to any transfer of sovereignty and, as we will see below, they began a successful lobbying effort that culminated in a shift in British policy. During 1968, the British position changed from considering the interests of the islanders to viewing the wishes of the islanders as critical (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990:8). According to Kinney (1985:83) “[t]he wishes of the islanders (self-determination) were enshrined as the basis of British negotiation policy”.

The idea of transferring sovereignty over the islands against the wishes of the islanders was quickly seen as impossible. The fact that Argentina was a dictatorship made a transfer of sovereignty even more unlikely as long as the islanders themselves
opposed a transfer. As Michael Stewart, Labour Foreign Secretary in 1968, notes, “we were not going to hand them over to Argentina against their wishes, particularly as it was then a dictatorship. There was no getting away from this. The idea of parting with a British possession to a foreign country that they did not want to go to was bad enough in itself; that it should be a dictatorship made it worse” (Steward quoted in Charlton 1989:21). The fact that Argentina was a dictatorship clearly influenced policymakers in the beginning of the negotiations. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart believes the issue would not even have come up had Argentina been a developed democracy. In an interview with Michael Charlton (1989:8) Stewart notes, “[y]ou see, it seems to me that a country that’s become really adult, and lived in the twentieth century, would not make demands of this kind on territory. Canada does not demand that those two little islands in the river St Lawrence, which are French possession”. Thus, the Argentine regime type influenced the British negotiating position.

Early on in the negotiations the British negotiated in good faith with a belief that a transfer of sovereignty was possible, but by providing the islanders with a veto on any future decision on sovereignty, negotiations were bound to fail (see Kinney 1985 and Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990). As Dillon (1989:27) notes, future negotiations were nothing but “a series of desultory negotiation…Britain had nothing to offer Argentina by way of progress on sovereignty, and Argentina slowly came to the view that it was getting nowhere through diplomatic channels” (see also Sharp 1997:57; Charlton 1989:75). Because the islanders refused a transfer of sovereignty, negotiations became little else than a stalling tactic.

Even though Britain had little to offer Argentina by way of sovereignty, negotiations took place on a regular basis from 1967 until the end of February 1982. The last negotiations before the Argentine invasion took place in New York in February 1982. These negotiations provided no new solutions and relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly in the following month. On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. The invasion obviously led to a new phase in the dispute.
In a dispute between two democracies, democratic peace researchers have convincingly showed that the parties often utilize third party mediations, and or refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice and or the UN or other IOs (see Dixon 1994 and Ray 2003). In the dispute over the Falklands, several parties attempted to act as third party mediators. The British referred the invasion to the UN Security Council, but neither party ever referred the case to the ICJ.

The Argentine invasion changed the dynamics of the dispute and other parties became heavily involved in trying to diplomatically settle the dispute before the British attempted to counter the invasion by force. In particular, the United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig attempted to play a mediator role. Even before the Argentine invasion, British policymakers pushed for U.S. involvement. In early March 1982, amidst increasingly aggressive Argentine rhetoric, the British Foreign Secretary wrote to Secretary Haig “warning him of the changing atmosphere in Argentina and seeking his help in ensuring that the issue was settled peacefully and in accordance with the democratically expressed wishes if the inhabitants of the Islands” (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990:32). However, the British did not consider Secretary Haig a third party mediator. Prime Minister Thatcher notes in her memoirs that U.S. involvement was much appreciated, and in the weeks before the invasion she believed that “our only hope now lay with the Americans—friends and allies, and people to whom Galtieri, if he was still behaving rationally, should listen” (Thatcher 1993:179). After the invasion, the British still did not view Alexander Haig and the Americans as mediators. Thatcher (ibid:192) notes that Alexander Haig was accepted not as a mediator “but as a friend and ally, here to discuss ways in which the United States could most effectively support us in our efforts to secure Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands”. Thatcher also notes that an important reason for keeping Haig involved was to preclude others, such as the UN and Peru, from getting involved as mediators. Thatcher (ibid:188; see also 211) writes that it “certainly worked in our favor by precluding for a time even less helpful diplomatic intervention from other directions, including the UN”. The British were thus not interested in third party mediation. This is in stark contrast to the Cod War case, where Britain was in a
dispute with another democracy and clearly favored mediation by the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Luns.

Another key difference from the Cod War case was Britain’s view of the ICJ. In the Cod War case, Britain believed strongly in the ICJ, but at no point in time during the dispute with Argentina did Britain consider referring the dispute to the ICJ. Ian Sinclair (a Foreign Office senior legal advisor), in an interview with Michael Charlton (1989:4) argued that because public opinion in both Britain and Argentina was strongly polarized about the case, it was unsuitable for international judicial settlement. Such an argument never played a role in the Cod War case. It is true that British public opinion was ambivalent at best, but Icelandic public opinion was clearly very passionate, and Britain nonetheless happily referred the case to the ICJ. That they did not do so with the Falklands case is probably explained better by British belief in Argentina’s response to such an action, than the strong public feelings the case brought out in each country.

The Falklands dispute was referred to the UN at different times. First, on 16 December 1965 the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 2065, in which the General Assembly called on the parties to resolve the issue peacefully. Britain abstained from voting. The second time the dispute was referred to the UN was on 3 April 1982, one day after the Argentine invasion. Britain brought the Argentine invasion up in the UN Security Council and the council voted in favor of resolution 502 which condemned the Argentine occupation. “To Britain the vote came as a relief. Resolution 502 was taken as a clear statement of opposition to the Argentine action. It linked Argentine action to a breach of peace” (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990:139-140). However, British policymakers in general, and Prime Minister Thatcher in particular were very skeptical to the UN’s role as the dispute dragged on. Thatcher notes in her memoirs that though it was important to win support for resolution 502, “in the long run we knew that we had to try to keep our affairs out of the UN as much as possible. With the Cold War still underway, and given the anti-colonialist attitude of many nations at the UN, there was a real danger that the Security Council might attempt to force unsatisfactory terms upon us” (Thatcher 1993:182). Thus, in a dispute with a military dictatorship, which had
clearly invaded another state’s territory, Britain was at best cautious in its approach to international law as a conflict resolution mechanism. The same mechanisms they applied in the Cod War case they rather saw as inappropriate in the dispute over the Falkland Islands. The same can be said of engaging with the opponent in negotiations. Britain did seriously negotiate about the Falkland Islands in the 1960’s, but by giving the Islanders veto on any transfer of sovereignty, future negotiations were nothing but a stalling tactic. Finally, the British refused to engage with third party mediators during a critical phase of the dispute. Was this behavior, which directly contradicts their behavior in the Cod War case, influenced by the fact that Argentina was a military dictatorship? The evidence discussed above suggests that it was.

The nature of the Argentine regime influenced British policymakers from an early point in the dispute. As discussed above, the British Foreign Secretary in 1968 Michael Stewart saw it as near impossible to transfer sovereignty to a military dictatorship (Charlton 1989:21). As the dispute dragged on, the British policymakers’ focus on the Argentine regime type did not subside, and when the Conservative party and Margaret Thatcher won the general election in 1979 it became even more important.

After the final negotiations took place in New York in the last days of February 1982, relations between the two states quickly deteriorated. There was great uncertainty in London about what would happen next, but intelligence suggested that whatever Argentina did, it would stop short of a full-scale invasion. Thatcher writes that even though she didn’t expect a full-scale invasion she “knew that they were unpredictable and instable and that a dictatorship might not behave in ways we would consider rational” (Thatcher 1993:179).

The Argentines invaded the Falklands on 2 April 1982, and U.S. Secretary of State Alec Haig immediately began his shuttle diplomacy. As discussed above, Britain refused to consider Haig as a mediator and saw him only as a friend and ally.

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15 Shuttle diplomacy refers to diplomatic negotiations conducted by an official intermediary who travels frequently between the nations involved.
Margaret Thatcher told Haig that she saw any new negotiations by Argentina as a stalling tactic and that this “was an issue of dictatorship versus democracy” (ibid:198; see also Freedman 1997:261). Thatcher had no faith in further negotiations and she clearly did not trust the Argentines. She notes that “she saw no reason to give Argentina the benefit of the doubt” (ibid:197). In essence, the Argentine regime type played an important role in British policy-making at this time.

Another important aspect regarding the Argentine regime type is the historical analogy made by both Thatcher and the British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym. Both referred to Hitler and the origins of World War II. In his first speech in the House of Commons as Foreign Secretary\(^\text{16}\), Francis Pym began with the declaration that “Britain did not appease dictators” (Lebow 1985:115). Thatcher (1993:192) referred to the same historical analogy and writes that “we in Britain had experience of the danger of appeasing dictators”. The British press also pursued the same line of reasoning. An editorial in the Times declared: “We defended Poland because we had given our word and because the spread of dictatorship across Europe had to be stopped for our own sake….As in 1939, so today, the same principles apply to the Falklands Islands” (Lebow 1985:115-116).

Two final statements by Thatcher effectively convey the importance of Argentine dictatorship and its impact on the normative aspects of the British response to the Falklands dispute. Thatcher (1993:188) refers to a letter she received which reads:

> TO appease aggression and evil is to connive at a greater aggression and evil later on… If we fail to deal with Fascist Argentine, the Russians will be even more encouraged that they are already to nibble away with more and more acts of aggression in what is left of a free world.

Thatcher (ibid) writes of the letter writer: “Of course, he was entirely right”. In the end, Thatcher saw only one alternative to end the conflict. Even though many problems and uncertainties surrounded any British naval operation, Thatcher saw this

\(^{16}\) After Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, the then-Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington resigned his post.
as the only alternative. Discussing the risks involved with the naval operations she notes:

All these considerations are fair enough. But when you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking: you have to set out with an iron will to overcome them. And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen’s subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minster (ibid:181).

British policymakers did not externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution. Rather, “Britain went to war in support of the democratic principle of self-determination. An additional normative influence was a belief that international law had been violated, and that compliance with Argentine demands would therefore mean rewarding aggression” (Freedman 1997:237). The nature of the Argentine regime gave British policymakers an opportunity to mobilize public opinion in favor of military action. This stands in stark contrast to the Cod War case where it was very difficult for both policymakers and interest groups to mobilize public opinion in favor of any type of action. The most likely reason for this lack of public attention is that Iceland was a common democracy, ally and friend. Thus this case study largely supports the importance of normative factors in explaining international behavior, but “it demonstrated that the character of these norms may be complex and conditional” (Freedman 1997:238).\\n
4.3 **Question 2: Was there public opposition to the use of force, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers?**

The first of the institutional mechanisms proposed by democratic peace researchers is that of public constraint. According to Russett (1996:100-101), “the complexity of the mobilization process means that leaders will not readily embark on an effort to prepare the country for war unless they are confident they can demonstrate a favorable ratio of costs and benefits to be achieved, at acceptable risk”. This mobilization process takes time and is “immensely more public than in an

\begin{footnote}{17}Freedman’s argument here largely fits with the argument made by Risse (1995).\end{footnote}
authoritarian state” (ibid). Accordingly, in a dispute between two democracies the process take too long, and diplomats are able to find a negotiated solution before war breaks out. In a dispute or conflict between a democracy and an autocracy a “democratic state can respond to a sudden attack by using emergency powers” (ibid), and thus when democracies are in disputes or conflicts with non-democracies they are able to circumvent the need for political support (Maoz and Russett 1993:626). In the Falklands War case we should thus expect to see the Thatcher government attempt to circumvent the need for public support and use emergency powers to respond to the Argentine invasion. As we will see in the following section that is not what took place.

To be sure, there was public opposition to the use of force and there is no doubt that the Thatcher government was concerned with public opinion. Thatcher (1993:181) notes that within the government there was no doubt about sending the task force to the South Atlantic. However, she notes that a more immediate problem was “how to deal with public opinion. Support for the despatch of the task force was likely to be strong, but would it fall away as time went on?” (ibid)

A number of opinion polls were conducted throughout the duration of the conflict18. Most of these show that public support for the government was strong, but there was also opposition. Soon after the Argentine invasion, a set of MORI polls showed strong public support in favor of non-violent conflict resolution methods. 46% of respondents in one poll wanted to see the islands regained by diplomatic efforts, and there was strong support for other non-violent methods of conflict resolution. 84% supported banning Argentine imports and 82% favored freezing Argentine assets in British banks. Throughout the conflict about a quarter of those asked could be classified as more dovish than the government, favoring more efforts to be put into negotiations. In a poll conducted in the days after the British began their counter-attack, 25% of those asked believed that the government was too willing

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18 The results reported and analyzed here were conducted by Market and Opinion Research International (MORI), Gallup and National Opinion Polls (NOP) and reported on in Freedman (1988:92-104). All polls are from after the Argentine invasion. For a more extensive analysis, see Freedman (1988:92-104).
Another early poll showed that 39% were against the sinking of Argentine ships and 24% were against landing troops on the islands. After the British sank the Belgrano, 44% answered that they were against it. Throughout the conflict, there was never a majority tolerating the loss of an Islander’s life, and in the beginning a majority opposed the loss of service men’s life as well (49-44%). This later figure changed as the conflict progressed, and on the eve of the conflict 58% accepted the loss of service men’s life while 37% opposed it. As the conflict continued, this figure changed to 62% accepting the loss of life and 34% opposing the loss of life. In general there was some opposition to the use of force, and more opposition to the loss of life, but by and large a sizable majority supported the government’s policy.

As mentioned above, the invasion came as a surprise to most British people, the government included. A large majority of the people asked in the first poll after the invasion blamed the British government. 58% blamed the British government a lot, while 22% blamed the British government a little. Only 12% did not blame the government at all. Thus Thatcher was right when she assumed that the public would support the dispatch of the Royal Navy task force (see above). A poll taken on 14 April 1982 showed that 60% supported the government’s sending of the task force, while 30% were unhappy with the government’s response. The same poll showed that 83% personally cared that Britain regained the islands. This last number remained nearly constant throughout the conflict (Freedman 1988:96). In another poll a week later 68% were happy with the government’s response, and at the end of April this number had increased to 76%. Thus, even though there was a sizable minority against the use of force, a large majority supported the government’s use of force and, in hindsight, a large majority (80%) believed the sacrifice of British and Argentine lives was worth it. In essence as diplomatic efforts failed, after the invasion, the public’s willingness to use force increased (Dillon 1989:117).

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19 The Belgrano was an Argentine war ship that was sunk by British forces on 2 May 1982. A total of 321 Argentine soldiers lost their lives.
The democratic peace propositions suggest that in disputes with autocracies, democratically elected leaders “are forced to find ways to circumvent the due political process. Thus, in such a conflict, the nondemocracy imposes on the democratic political system emergency conditions enabling the government to rally support rather rapidly” (Maoz and Russett 1993:626).

However, that was not the case in the Falklands War. At no point was it necessary for the Thatcher government to circumvent the need for political support. Neither was there a need to rally domestic support in favor of the use of force. Freedman (1997:256) notes that “[f]rom the start of the conflict, polls suggested that over 80 percent of the population cared that the island should be regained…while a sizable majority supported sending the task force and the overall crisis management”. In essence, “many more opponents of government policy criticized it for being too soft than too tough” (ibid:257). Instead of circumventing the need for public support, the government had to take a strong stance against Argentine aggression. In the words of one analyst:

The most pressing concern driving the government’s policy to begin with was its own survival. The general public, the political opposition and even Thatcher’s own Conservatives were appalled at what they understood to be the circumstances of the Islands’ loss, and informed opinion was divided only over whether the government should resign immediately or only if it failed to recover them (Sharp 1997:65).

Essentially, the Thatcher government did not have to circumvent or spend much time or resources on mobilizing public opinion.

It is not only the general public that can constrain democratic leaders from using force. A democratic government often faces opposition and constraint from political opponents and other elites as well. However, the Thatcher government did not have to spend time or resources mobilizing parliamentary and political support for sending the task force or deciding to re-invade the islands. Neither did Thatcher need to circumvent the need for parliamentary and political support as proposed by the democratic peace research. The political community, both the Labour opposition and Conservative MPs, were highly critical to the loss of the Falkland Islands, and in
a highly publicized debate in the House of Commons on Saturday 3 April, one day after the Argentine invasion, “Thatcher, Nott and Carrington were charged by the Labour party as being guilty of appeasement” (Sharp 1997:253). Thus “when Thatcher announced the dispatch of the task force in the House of Commons on 3 April, only a handful of members disagreed, and while the mood of the House of Commons may have been ahead of public opinion in its bellicosity, there was little to suggest subsequently that it was at odds with it” (ibid:84). The 3 April debate showed the government that they had little to fear in terms of support for their subsequent actions. As Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1990:122) writes, “while the strength of the Opposition’s attack may have discomforted the Government to a degree it also endowed any actions they might take to recover the islands with a degree of popular support that might otherwise have been unobtainable”.

Though the Labour opposition initially agreed to dispatch the task force and thus provided the government with important support, they did hope and argue for a different outcome than the one that prevailed. According to Sharp (1997:84-85), several Labour MPs, including their leader Michael Foot, were hoping that “on the long voyage south, cooler sentiments would prevail on both sides and a compromise would be worked out”. Foot also argued in favor of more negotiations and “declared that force should only be used as a last resort, only after every possibility of a peaceful settlement had been explored and exhausted” (ibid). Throughout the conflict, Foot and others continued to call for more negotiations and UN involvement. However, “Thatcher was not troubled by anything the opposition might do. She enjoyed an unassailable majority in Parliament and Foot was the ineffective leader of a weakened party, which, in her judgment, had completely lost its grip on political and economic realities” (ibid:86). In the beginning of the conflict a bellicose Parliament, including the opposition, provided the Thatcher government with all the support necessary for future action. In any event, Thatcher did not see the limited opposition provided by a weakened Labour party as any reason to change course.

\[20\] John Nott was Defense Secretary.
Both public opinion and the opinion of MPs were clearly shaped by the nature of the Argentine regime. “British opinion at all levels saw Argentine behavior as displaying the characteristically aggressive pathology of authoritarian regimes; this behavior was contrasted with Britain’s own democratic nature” (ibid). In addition, British war aims “were…framed in terms of democratic norms: the material interests involved were negligible and were increasingly played down” (ibid).

To conclude, the above analysis shows that British public opinion and the level of constraint posed by it were qualified by a number of factors. According to Freedman (1997:256), “the British tend to see a readiness to go to war as a necessary component of a responsible foreign policy”. It is also important to note that the British military rely on volunteer professionals and not on conscription, and thus they are probably seen as willing agents of foreign policy. Finally, the first shots in the conflict were fired by Argentina, and as a consequence Britain was quite unified on the need to regain the islands (ibid).

Democratic peace researchers do not argue that democratic governments are unconstrained in a dispute against a non-democracy. Rather, they argue that an emergency situation enables democratic governments to circumvent the need for support, and that an emergency situation enables democratic governments to rally support more quickly than against another democracy. In the Falklands War case, a strong public majority demanded that the government should recover the islands, and rather than constrain and compel the government to use emergency powers, the public and MPs pushed the government to a more hard-line policy, just as we saw in the Cod War case. In other words, the public constraint mechanism did not operate as stipulated by democratic peace researchers.

4.4 Question 3: Was there opposition to the use of force by major interest groups, and if yes, did this opposition constrain British policymakers?

The democratic peace propositions stipulate that major interest groups will oppose governmental use of force towards another democracy. This opposition forces key decision-makers to either reconsider their strategy, in fear of potentially losing their power base, and thus risk losing the next election. Alternatively, the government
is forced to spend a significant amount of time and resources to convince the
opposition that their course of action is the right one, consequently allowing
diplomats time to reach a negotiated settlement before the use of force takes place.
The explanatory path of the interest group mechanism is thus similar to the public
constraint mechanism. In a dispute against a non-democracy, the argument goes, as it
does with the public constraint mechanism, that a democratic government can
circumvent the need for support by using emergency powers. In the Falklands War
case the government had broad support for their policies and thus there was no need
to circumvent the need for domestic support. And contrary to the democratic peace
propositions, the evidence shows that the Falklands lobby was essential in spoiling
any prospects for a negotiated settlement concerning sovereignty over the islands.
Thus an interest group was important, not in constraining the government, but in
reducing the government’s policy options and possibilities in reaching a negotiated
settlement with Argentina before the war broke out.

The following sections will focus on the Falkland Islands lobby’s impact on
British policymakers. This requires a look back to the beginning of the negotiations
in 1967. I will conclude the section by showing that even though there was some anti-
war groups trying to mobilize, they were largely unsuccessful in their attempts and in
the end they provided no significant opposition to the Thatcher government.

As mentioned above, the first negotiations regarding the Falkland Islands
between Argentina and Britain began in 1967. At the beginning of the negotiations,
British policymakers believed a transfer of sovereignty was in the best interest for
Britain, Argentina, and the people of the Falkland Islands. However, a shift in British
policy occurred around 1968 when the British moved from considering the interests
of the Islanders to seeing their wishes as a paramount to any deal with Argentina.
This shift would not have happened without the success of the Falklands lobby. As
Ellerby (1992:85) notes, “in the mid-1960s pragmatism would have probably led the
British government to transfer the sovereignty of the Falklands had not the Falkland
lobby arisen to counter the pressure of Argentine demands” (see also Dillon 1989:78;
The Falkland lobby was a broad alliance of people that included MPs, business interests and others who were all sympathetic to the islanders’ right to self-determination. The lobby was formed around 1968, largely as a response to the negotiations that were taking place between Argentina and Britain, and it was “formalized on 25 March 1968 by the formation in London of the so-called Falkland Islands Emergency Committee” (Ellerby 1992:88). In February 1968, before the group was formalized, they sent a letter to every MP and the national press in February of 1968. The letter read:

"ARE YOU AWARE THAT –
Negotiations are now proceeding between the British and Argentine Governments which may result at any moment in the handing-over of the Falkland Islands to the Argentine.
TAKE NOTE THAT –
The Inhabitants of the Islands have never yet been consulted regarding their future - they do NOT want to become Argentines – they are as British as you are, mostly of English and Scottish ancestry, even to the 6th generation – five out of six were born in the Islands –many elderly people have never been elsewhere – there is no racial problem – no unemployment – no poverty, AND WE ARE NOT IN DEBT (quoted in Ellerby 1992:87).

The letter was the first of many successful campaigns and it “resulted in Britain changing its negotiating position; now the ‘wishes of the islanders’ were to be critical” (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990:8). With the wishes of islanders being paramount, the Islanders were given a de facto veto in any future negotiations.

The success of the lobby made it impossible to reach a settlement in 1968. In the eyes of the Argentines, “serious discussions, addressing the sovereignty issue, only took place for two short periods during [the next] sixteen years: between 1966 and 1967, and from 1977 to 1980. For the rest of the time the Falkland Islands lobby undermined the flexibility of the Foreign office in its conduct of the negotiation” (ibid).

With the Conservatives and Thatcher winning the 1979 election, a new government was in charge of the already ongoing negotiations. As in the past, the wishes of the islanders remained paramount in any discussions regarding sovereignty.
Negotiations were not going well. Nicholas Ridley, the Minister of State at the Foreign office responsible for the South Atlantic and Americas, was put in charge of the negotiations by Thatcher and Carrington. Ridley proposed that the government should suggest a new solution—a so called lease-back option—in which sovereignty was transferred to Argentina and Britain would lease back the islands for a long period of time (Britain had agreed to this with China regarding Hong Kong). The lease-back proposal was presented to the House of Commons on 2 December 1980, and the reactions it received are famous. In the words of Ellerby (1992:98), “Ridley was savaged in the House of Commons”. Charlton (1989:74) describes the situation as an “immediate and conspicuous revolution of the Commons. The minister was blown away by the guns of the Falkland Islands Lobby”.

The lobby reorganized in the early 1970s and each of the larger parties in Britain was invited to appoint a member to serve on the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee. “MPs from the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal and Scottish Nationalist Parties… subsequently joined” (Ellerby 1992:91). The Falklands lobby’s influence on British politics was consequently “based on a large body of support in Parliament” (ibid:96). During Ridley’s presentation of the lease-back option, the lobby showed its strength. “The MPs of the Falklands Lobby demanded paramountcy for the islanders’ wishes and anticipated their rejection of leaseback” (ibid:98). The lease-back option was from that point on dead.

Ellerby (1992:100) suggests that the lobby was able to “influence Foreign Secretary Carrington’s decision in September 1981 to reject a more public and active campaign to educate islander and British public opinion”. Carrington himself goes a long way in confirming that view. Carrington (1998:354) writes that “[t]he option of seeking to negotiate while conceding nothing on sovereignty…was forced upon us by our commitment to respect the wishes of the Falklanders, as well as by British domestic hostility”. In effect he notes, “[t]he government’s critics had conspired to make diplomacy near impossible” (ibid:357).

Other high-ranking policymakers have also pointed to the impact of the Falklands lobby. John Nott, Thatcher’s Defense Secretary, notes that the lease-back proposal “was not an issue involving great national interest, but there were some very
dedicated people who made it one of the key areas of interest for them. The Falkland Islanders had many very close friends” (quoted in Charlton 1989:73). Thatcher was also reluctant to put any pressure on the islanders. The reason according to Lebow (1985:105), “may have been the strength of the Falkland lobby among Conservative Members of Parliament. This small but outspoken group of Tories portrayed the Falkland Islands as a test case of the government’s commitment to uphold traditional British freedoms”. According to Lebow (ibid):

They allied themselves with left-wing Labourites who also opposed any concessions to the junta on the grounds that it was a fascist dictatorship. Both groups are reported to have kept in close touch with the islanders and to have encouraged them to keep up their pressure on the government. The prime minister, already in trouble within her own party, and her popularity sagging in the polls, would have been reluctant to antagonize backbench opinion on this issue.

Thatcher herself does not acknowledge the lobby, but she does note the importance of the islander’s wishes. In a comment on the lease-back option she writes that “I disliked this proposal, but Nick [Ridley] and I both agreed that is should be explored, subject always to the requirement that the islanders themselves should have the final word. We could not agree to anything without their consent: their wishes must be paramount” (Thatcher 1993:175). She adds that had her cabinet approved a negotiated settlement which put the islanders right to self-determination at stake, she would have had to resign (ibid:208).

The preceding analysis shows that the islanders were in effect granted a veto on any discussions regarding sovereignty. It is important to note that sovereignty and self-determination was in essence the single issue in which the lobby focused and had any influence on (Ellerby 1992:105; see also Freeman 1997:244). In other words, the lobby did not explicitly push the government towards a war. They rather made diplomacy near impossible (Carrington 1998:357). During the Cod War we saw that the pertinent interest groups explicitly pushed the government into more aggressive policies. That was not the case in the Falklands War. However, the Falkland Islands lobby made a peaceful settlement between Argentina and Britain nearly impossible to reach.
In contrast to the Cod War case, which never evolved into a war and never experienced any pressure from peace movements, the Falklands War did not run its course without protests. Even before the Falklands crisis, a burgeoning peace movement had begun to criticize the Thatcher government’s foreign and defense policies (Lebow 1985:101). However, the different groups were never able to garner much support in the public. According to Freedman (1988:86) “the considerable amount of opposition throughout the country to the military operation, especially during the earlier stages, was never fully mobilized”. Neither did the MPs who dissented manage to lead “a national movement against the war” (ibid:85).

The main problem of the peace movement was that it consisted of several groups that opposed the war for different reasons (a short list of anti-war groups: several labor organizations, Socialist Workers Party, Communist Party, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CND] and The Ad Hoc Committee, which was initiated by the CND, but whom not all other groups agreed with). One of the key problems for the different groups was that the “war threw all those on the Left who are not pacifist into a state of some political confusion” (New Statesman 28 May 1982). Some groups believed the Islands should be recovered peacefully through negotiations, and that any future decision regarding sovereignty had to take into consideration the right to self-determination of the islanders. Others believed it was inappropriate to let 1800 Islanders decide the future fate of the Islands. In essence, the fragmented groups could not agree on a common solution and were therefore unable to mobilize a significant opposition to the war. The only thing the groups could agree on was that the Labour Party “should have opposed the sending of the task force from the beginning and should have argued in Parliament [and in other forums]… that it could devise strategies for the non-violent settlement of international disputes” (ibid).

There are very few references to the different groups opposing the wars in the literature on the Falklands War. None of the groups are mentioned in the memoirs of Thatcher or Carrington, and none of the groups are mentioned in interviews with other policymakers. If anything, the fact that they are not mentioned provide us with some circumstantial evidence that they had little impact on British policymakers.
In line with the democratic peace propositions, several interest groups did oppose the war and they were able to voice their disagreement, as would be expected in a democracy. However, they did in reality impose no serious constraints on the government.

The above analysis has shown that the interest group constraint mechanism did not operate as predicted by democratic peace researchers. Just as with the public constraint mechanism, no anti-war interest groups managed to mobilize enough support, either among MPs or the general public, to constrain the government’s policy of using force to recapture the Falkland Islands. Rather, as we saw in the Cod War case, a powerful lobby managed to dominate the political arena by “impos[ing] a veto on any attempts to hand the islands over to Argentina” (Freedman 1997:244). The Falklands lobby made it impossible to reach a diplomatic settlement.

4.5 Question 4: Did British policymakers receive good and reliable information regarding the opponent’s intentions and resolve, and did they act appropriately upon the information they received?

The final mechanism extrapolated from the democratic peace literature is the signaling mechanism. As mentioned above, Fearon (1994:577) argues that “democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly than authoritarian states can, perhaps ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states”. Thus, the fourth question is whether the British policymakers received good and reliable information regarding Argentine intentions and resolve.

The Falklands War has attracted much attention, and several books and articles have been written discussing the role of signaling and misperception (see especially Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 and Lebow 1985). The purpose of this section and this thesis in general is not to assess whether the Falklands War broke out because of poor signaling and misperceptions (Lebow 1985 argues that it did). It is rather to assess in a comparative light whether Iceland as a democracy was better able than Argentina, a military dictatorship, to signal their resolve and intentions. I will start this section by assessing whether Argentina did signal their resolve and intentions clearly. I will then assess whether British policymakers perceived and
acted appropriately on the information they received. According to the democratic peace propositions, Argentina as a dictatorship should not have properly signaled their resolve and intentions.

According to Lebow (1985:89), the Falklands War broke out “because of two serious and mutually reinforcing misjudgments: the belief in London that Argentina would not invade the Falkland Islands and the expectations in Buenos Aires that Britain would accommodate itself to a military takeover of the islands”. The fact that key personnel in London believed that Argentina would remain passive “made British policymakers unresponsive to warnings of [the] invasion” (ibid). Not only had the British broken the Argentine diplomatic code, but the Argentines “made efforts to publicize rather than conceal their military preparations in the hope that this demonstration of resolve would elicit a British concession on sovereignty that would make military action on their part unnecessary” (ibid:91).

Negotiations between the two sides progressed slowly after the collapse of the lease-back option (see above), and during 1981 “the Argentine press began to take the generals [of the military junta] to task for their failure to secure sovereignty over the Malvinas” (Welch 1995:172). In December 1981, the Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Menez “began briefing senior journalists on the government’s determination to recover the Falklands by the end of 1982, [even] discussing in some detail the military operations that might be necessary” (Welch 1995:166).

With relations between Britain and Argentine deteriorating further after negotiations failed in New York at the end of February 1982, the Argentine military junta began to brief the press in Argentina about their dissatisfaction with the lack of British concessions. The junta’s dissatisfaction and the failure of the negotiations “prompted bellicose editorial comments, which continued throughout the month [of March] and culminated in predictions of invasion” (ibid:108). Lebow (ibid) also notes that “junta members also began to dropping broad hints to diplomats in Buenos Aires that they were considering military action unless the British displayed willingness to cede sovereignty”.

Argentine press accounts are of limited signaling value unless the British read them and take them seriously. It is also difficult to assess the accuracy of the reports.
According to Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1990), most of the Argentine reports were both specific and accurate. Britain also “had little capacity for monitoring military movements within Argentina…As a result, much of the reporting from Buenos Aires…was based on the local press” (ibid:85). For example the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires “had taken to reporting articles…back to London because he felt that they attracted more attention than repeating his own concerns with regards to the developing Argentine mood” (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990:25).

Argentina, a military dictatorship, sent strong signals to the British and did not even attempt to conceal their military preparations (Lebow 1985:89). Argentine press reports became increasingly bellicose, and the military junta utilized the press to signal their discontent with the British. The British had also broken the Argentine diplomatic code. Lebow (1985:91) reports that Ted Rowlands, who handled the Falklands question in the Foreign Ministry in 1979 for the Labour government, “told the House of Commons that in terms of intelligence Argentina was an open book for the British”. In essence Argentina signaled their interest and resolve well, and at the very least better than the democratic peace propositions predict. The next question is what Britain did with the information they received.

The British did not act appropriately on the information they received. According to Lebow (1985) no one in London believed that Argentina would invade the Falkland Islands. Lebow (ibid:109) writes that “unfortunately for the junta, it was dealing with an adversary who was insensitive to so many of the political storm warnings blowing from Argentina. The generals’ strategy thus failed in the first instance because their desperation went unrecognized in London”.

However, it is not totally surprising, even with all the information available, that Britain did not act. This was after all not the first and only time bellicose signals arrived from Buenos Aires. Foreign Secretary Carrington said in a speech to the House of Lords that “[h]ad this been the first time over the past 20 years that some allusion to the use of force had been made from the Argentine side it might have struck Britain as more significant than it did” (quoted in Lebow 1985:93). Carrington also points to past Argentine aggressiveness in his memoirs where he notes that,
“[w]e had throughout the previous year had a good deal of this sort of thing [Argentine hostility] and there was no particular reason to suppose the situation might not still be contained or defused” (Carrington 1998:362).

Prime Minister Thatcher also blames past signals from Argentina for the British failure to take them more seriously in 1982. In the House of Commons on 4 April 1982, she argued that:

Several times in the past an invasion has been threatened. The only way of being sure of preventing it would have been to keep a large fleet close to the Falklands, 8,000 miles away from base. No government has ever been able to do that…because the cost would be enormous (quoted in Lebow 1985:93).

Later Thatcher wrote that:

[In] judging our response to the Junta it is important to remember how much aggressive rhetoric there had already been in the past, none of it coming to anything. Moreover, based on past experience our view was that Argentina was likely to follow a policy of progressively escalating the dispute, starting with diplomatic and economic pressure (Thatcher 1993:176).

Even with the information available, the British all along believed that if Argentina was to do something, they would do so gradually. Thus “[t]he contingency upon which the Government was focusing…was not a full-scale military occupation but the cutting off of air and sea links to the Islands” (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990:72).

British policymakers seriously misjudged Argentine intentions in the Falklands dispute. They did so even though Argentina tried its best to signal their intentions and resolve. As in the Cod War, many factors contributed to this misperception or misjudgment. According to Dillon (1989:53) some of the factors that contributed to the failure were:

the confusion and uncertainty which surrounded the development of the dispute; the preoccupation of Ministers with other more important problems; the influence of established expectations lodged deep in the intelligence advice available to Ministers; the political dilemmas caused the strength of Parliamentary and Island opposition to transfer of sovereignty; the military dilemmas involved in having to deter and opponent
from 8000 miles away without proving a preemptive
strike;...and the speed with which the Junta finally decided to
go ahead with the invasion.

The Falklands War case closely resembles the Cod War case in terms of British
judgment of the opponents resolve, intentions, and interest. Policymakers are often
unable to focus only on one issue at the time, and thus they easily misjudge the
information available to them.

Though this thesis is about British policymakers and this particular section
about Argentina’s ability to signal, it is worthwhile to briefly explore whether Britain,
as a democracy, managed to send clear signals as the democratic peace proposition
predicts. The short answer is that Britain did not signal its resolve and intentions
particularly well. However, analysts differ in their interpretation of British signaling.
One group of scholars led by Lebow (1985:110) argues that “The principal reason
why Galtieri [Argentina’s President] may have discounted the possibility of a strong
British reaction was London’s obvious failure to communicate resolve”. According to
the Times correspondent in Buenos Aires “many Argentine officials had actually
formed the impression that the British failure to respond to Argentine provocations
could only be attributed to their desire to be rid of the Falkland problem once and for
all by means of an invasion” (Tony Emerson quoted in Lebow 1985:111). Thus the
argument is that the British failed to signal resolve, and consequently Argentine
leaders believed an invasion would not be met with much objection from Britain.

Another group of scholars argue that the Argentine government had an
alarmist perception of a British imminent threat. The British tried to strengthen their
military presence in the South Atlantic, and therefore Argentina had to act quickly
before the British could stop an invasion (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990
and Freedman 1997). Most of this intelligence came from inaccurate and speculative
press accounts in Britain which the Argentine ambassador sent back to Argentina,
and which the junta used to develop a threat assessment (ibid).

Whichever account is more accurate, it clearly indicates, as the Cod War case
did, that democracies do not always accurately signal their resolve and intentions.
Transparency, as Finel and Lord (1999) argue, can often exacerbate conflicts and
information in itself is not enough; correct interpretation of the information is what is important.

The above analysis has shown that Argentina, a military dictatorship, in contrast to what the democratic peace propositions predict, signaled its resolve, intentions and interests reasonably well. The problem was that British policymakers were insensitive to the signals they received. The conclusion that emerges from this case study is that the “fault lines often lies with the recipients as much as the senders of the signals of war” (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990:xxxiv).

4.6 Conclusion

Of the four causal mechanisms analyzed in this case study, only the first one, norm externalization, operated as predicted by the democratic peace propositions. The democratic peace propositions predict that democratic officials will not externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution in a dispute with a non-democracy. The above analysis shows that British policymakers were skeptical to the Argentine military junta. They lacked trust and did not seriously seek a negotiated settlement that would satisfy both parties. Neither did British policymakers seek a judicial settlement or call for third party mediation. The key reason for this was Argentine regime type.

None of the other mechanisms operated as predicted. Little public opposition existed in Britain, no interest group managed to seriously constrain the government, and Argentina signaled its resolve and intentions much better than predicted by the democratic peace propositions.

The results of the Falkland War case study are similar to the preceding Cod War case study. A full comparison and a summary of what conclusions we can draw based on this comparative study will be done in the concluding chapter.
5. Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the thesis by giving a brief summary of the main points of the study. First, I will briefly summarize the findings from the individual case studies. I will then compare the findings and draw some conclusions from the comparison of the causal mechanisms that have been tested. I will then discuss some of the wider implications of my findings. Finally, I will discuss some of the difficulties encountered and suggest some possible avenues for future research.

5.2 Summary of findings

The point of departure for this thesis is that the democratic peace propositions lack a convincing causal explanation. In the first chapter, I reviewed the different explanations that have been proposed to explain the empirical finding that democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other. Through the literature review, I identified four causal mechanisms that have been implicitly discussed in the literature. Those four mechanisms are: norm externalization, public constraint, group constraint and signaling.

In the second chapter, I provided the readers with a meta-theoretical foundation for a causal explanation based on causal mechanisms, instead of a causal explanation relying on causal effects (correlation). I also discussed the methodological underpinnings of the study in the second chapter.

The third and fourth chapter contain the main focus of this thesis. In chapter 3, I test the mechanisms identified in chapter 1 by examining British policymaking in the British-Icelandic Cod Wars. In chapter 4, I test the same mechanisms by examining British policymaking in the Falklands War. The following sections will briefly discuss the individual findings from each case, before I draw the more important comparative conclusions.
5.2.1 British-Icelandic Cod Wars

The British-Icelandic Cod Wars were three disputes between two democracies that became militarized, but which all ended peacefully through negotiated settlements.

Of the four mechanisms I tested, only one—norm externalization—operated as predicted by democratic peace researchers. The most significant evidence in favour of the norm externalization mechanism was British policy-makers belief in the ICJ, third-party mediation and negotiations as the primary conflict resolution mechanism.

The other three mechanisms did not operate as predicted. British public opinion was largely ambivalent to the Cod Wars, and did not constrain British policy-makers. No interest groups constrained the government either. Rather, strong interest groups from the fishing industry compelled the government to send warships into Icelandic waters. Thus, the interest group mechanism operated in the opposite direction of what democratic peace researchers have predicted. Finally, the signaling mechanism did not operate as predicted either. The examination of the Cod Wars showed that transparency, a feature democratic states share, can exacerbate conflicts rather than diffuse them. Information in itself is not enough; correct interpretation of the information is what is important.

The examination of the Cod Wars suggests that international pressure might constrain a government more than domestic pressure from the general public and interest groups. British policy-makers were clearly constrained by international pressure during the Cod Wars.

5.2.2 Falklands War

The Falklands War was a war between Britain, a democracy, and Argentina, a military dictatorship. Thus, the democratic peace literature provides us with different predictions as to how the mechanisms should operate. Of the four mechanisms I tested, only one operated as expected, namely norm externalization.

Democratic peace researchers predict that Britain—in a conflict with a dictatorship—should not externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution.
The evidence shows that the Argentine regime type clearly influenced British policymakers not to externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution.

None of the other mechanisms I evaluated operated as predicted. Little public opposition existed in Britain, no interest group managed to constrain the government seriously, and Argentina signaled its resolve and intentions better than predicted by the democratic peace propositions.

5.2.3 Comparing the Findings

This thesis is a comparative case study, in which I utilized the method of structured focused comparison. Thus, each case study referred to above, is part of a larger picture. The goal of a comparative study is to draw conclusions based on the comparison of cases.

In order to confirm or validate the operation of the causal mechanisms proposed by democratic researchers, the two cases should have shown the mechanisms operating in different ways. In the dispute between Britain and Iceland, British policy-makers should have externalized their democratic norms of conflict resolution. They should have been constrained by both the public and by interest groups, and they should have received strong signals from Iceland regarding Icelandic resolve. In the dispute between Britain and Argentina, British policy-makers should not have externalized their democratic norms of conflict resolution. They should have been less constrained by both the public and interest groups, and policy-makers should have attempted to circumvent the need for broad public support for their policies. Finally, British policy-makers should have received poor signals from Argentina regarding Argentine resolve.

As shown above, only one of the mechanisms operated as predicted in both cases. In both conflicts, the norm externalization mechanism operated as expected. In the Cod Wars, British policymakers externalized their democratic norms of conflict resolution and in the Falklands War they did not. Evidence from the Falklands War case convincingly shows that Argentine regime type clearly influenced British decision-makers in their refusal to externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution. In both conflicts, British norm externalization was based on a logic of
appropriateness. In other words, norm externalization was a function of what was morally right (or wrong), and not a result of a cost benefit analysis of what would lead to the best outcome.

None of the other mechanisms operated as predicted. The intense pressure from interest groups within the fishing industry to dispatch the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters is especially damaging to the group constraint mechanism. An important finding which I discussed briefly in the Cod War case is the idea proposed by Doyle (1983) and Russett and Oneal (2003) that economic interdependence and increased trade, increases opposition to war by interest groups fearing for their economic interests. In the Cod War case, I showed how interest groups favored the use of force rather than opposing it. They did so because of they feared for their economic well-being. In the Falklands War case, the early lobbying efforts were spearheaded by the Falkland Islands Company, which owned about 40 percent of the land and had a virtual monopoly in shipping, banking and retailing (Ellerby 1992:104). Though they did not advocate for the use of force, they argued in favour of the islands remaining British, as that was the only way the company could continue to operate. This finding indicates that it is inaccurate to assume that economic interdependence is only a force for peace.

The fact the British public was ambivalent to the Cod Wars is less damaging to the public constraint mechanism, as the Cod War was only one international incident at a time when other important international incidents were happening as well.

The examination of both cases is clearly damaging to the signaling mechanism. More than anything, it shows that information per se is not sufficient to diffuse conflicts. Policy-makers are prone to misperceive and misjudge the information they receive. The Falklands War case also indicates that it is a mistake to assume that non-democracies are incapable of clearly signaling its resolve.

According to George and Bennett (2005:25-27) one of the positive features of case studies is their ability to help identify scope conditions. This entails identifying under which terms and conditions a specific variable or mechanism postulated by a theory is likely to operate. I concluded above that based on the examination of British policymaking, only the norm externalization mechanism operated as predicted.
However, a brief analysis of Icelandic behavior showed that they did not externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution. These results might indicate that democratic states in conflicts with other democratic states will only externalize norms of domestic conflict resolution when the interests at stake are limited. The Icelandic population viewed the interests at stake as life-threatening, and during all three conflicts Icelandic public opinion compelled Icelandic policymakers into a more confrontational approach. There were several instances of demonstrations, and at times the demonstrations almost turned violent against British and NATO interests. Thus public opinion in Iceland operated in the opposite direction of what democratic peace researchers have proposed. As with the normative mechanism, this seems to be explained by the magnitude of the interests at stake. Consequently, two of the four mechanisms examined seem to operate as predicted by democratic peace theory only when the interests at stake in a dispute between to democracies are seen as limited by both parties.

5.3 Implications

This study has implications, regarding the explanations for the democratic peace as well as for future research on the democratic peace.

5.3.1 Implications for Democratic Peace Theory

The most obvious implication is the failure of the structural mechanisms proposed by democratic peace researchers. This study indicates that the normative mechanism provides the explanatory power to the democratic peace propositions. However, policymakers do not operate in a static vacuum. The Cod War case indicates that even though British policy-makers externalized their democratic norms of conflict resolution, they nonetheless, after pressure from interest groups, dispatched the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters. Thus, democratically elected decision-makers are exposed to pressure from different groups and it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess which group or groups that will be able to capture the attention of policy-makers. In the two case studies above, pacifist interest groups lost out to other groups that made peaceful settlements more difficult.
Another implication of this study is the fact that British policymakers faced almost no opposition to the use of force in the Falklands War. This could indicate that democratic peace researchers are wrong in assuming that opposition will force elected officials to circumvent the need for support. It seems likely that the nature of a non-democratic regime increases the willingness amongst the general public to use force. In other words, neither the public, nor policy-makers externalize their democratic norms of conflict resolution in disputes against non-democracies.

5.3.2 Implications for Future Research

If, as this study indicates, norm externalization is the key causal mechanism that helps explain the democratic peace, then more research is needed to understand how and through what processes people externalize their norms. Rosato’s (2003) reading of the democratic peace literature leads him to argue that people externalize their norms through a process of trust and respect for fellow democracies. However, assessing whether democratically elected officials trust and respect each other across boarders is difficult. Operationalizing trust and respect as causal mechanisms is difficult. One way to do this is to utilize the burgeoning literature on trust and social psychology.

Mercer (2005:95) suggests “that trust is an emotional belief”, and that emotional beliefs “are generalizations about internal, enduring properties of an object that involve certainty beyond evidence”. In other words, trust is an internal attribute that someone attributes to someone else. The consequence of this view of trust according to Mercer (ibid) is that we “give the benefit of the doubt to people [we] trust, and [we] doubt anything beneficial done by people we distrust”. A passage in Margaret Thatcher’s memoirs might indicate that this can be a fruitful way to see trust. Discussing her lack of faith in the Argentine military junta, Thatcher (1993:197) writes, “I saw no reason to give Argentina the benefit of the doubt”.

By seeing trust in terms of dispositional attributes, we move into the realm of social identity theory. Hermann and Kegley (1995:517) have proposed that “leaders and publics identify countries that classify themselves as democracies as part of their in-group and, therefore, as worthy of protection and support rather than competition
and conflict. Conversely, it is those governments that are not democratic that cannot be trusted and with whom it is unwise to negotiate to resolve conflict”. The main point is that we need to improve our understanding on how democracies externalize their norms when dealing with each other. Considering trust as an important concept is one possible avenue for future research.

The Cod War case identified international public opinion as a constraining factor on British policy-making. In an ever more interdependent world it seems natural that international pressure might constrain democratic governments from pursuing aggressive policies against other democracies. However, to understand through what mechanisms international pressure can constrain democratic decision-makers we need more research. The democratic peace research program could benefit by looking at the research done on transnational advocacy networks and human rights socialization. Risse et al. (1999) developed what they called the “spiral model”, where they show how a repressive state, through international and transnational pressure incorporates international human rights and thereby becomes less repressive. Their model utilizes insights from both rationalist and constructivist perspectives, and could potentially be extended to help explain how international or perhaps transnational pressure can constrain democratically elected leaders from going to war against another democracy.

Another important implication coming out of this study is the importance of understanding how interest groups are able to capture the state. In both case studies anti-war groups failed to constrain policymakers. However, that is not always the case. Understanding how and under what conditions interest groups are able to capture the state might lead to a better understanding of how, if at all, governments are constrained by domestic forces.

5.3.3 Meta-Theoretical Implications

I began this thesis by arguing that the causal explanations provided to account for the peaceful relations between democratic states are mostly correlational and thus underdeveloped. I then argued that a move away from a positivist philosophy of social science and towards a scientific realist philosophy of social science would
allow researchers to utilize an improved causal explanation based on casual mechanisms rather than causal effects (correlation).

The plea for researchers to explore mechanisms in the social sciences has been widespread during the last two decades and it has come from a wide range of scholars. Elster (1989 and 1998) and Little (1991 and 1998) are two rationalists pleading for using mechanisms. Constructivists such as Checkel (2005 and 2005b) have also called for a better understanding of mechanisms, and other scholars such as George and Bennett (2005) have done the same\textsuperscript{21}. The one thing these scholars have in common is that they to various degrees have called for an increased emphasis on causal mechanisms as a foundation for causal explanations. There has however, been little guidance on how scholars should do so methodologically\textsuperscript{22}.

Scientific realism’s added value is that it potentially provides researchers with a meta-theoretical foundation that makes it possible to cross epistemological boundaries. Scientific realism has a less restrictive epistemology than positivism does (see Dessler 1991 and Wight 2002)\textsuperscript{23}. Thus, it opens up an opportunity to use empiricist methods such as process tracing, and at the same time, it also provides an opening for the potential use of interpretive methods such a discourse analysis and the like. Risse (1995:511), discussing the normative explanation for the democratic peace, suggests that “an explanation focusing on norms, identity and perceptions…must involve discourse analysis, since words matter as much as deeds in such an account”. A scientific realist epistemology would offer a meta-theoretical foundation for such an analysis, while positivism would not.

An interpretive epistemology also allows scholars to “explore the role of language in mediating and constructing a social reality” (Checkel 2006:5). Relying on a more interpretive epistemology we can ask how possible questions, rather than

\textsuperscript{21} For an excellent essay review the literature on mechanisms see Hovi (2004)

\textsuperscript{22} Checkel (2005) and George and Bennett (2005) are the first to suggest process-tracing as the appropriate empiricist method.

\textsuperscript{23} Scientific realism is one alternative. Chernoff (2002 and 2005) argues that a version of conventionalism is a better alternative. Johnson (2006) suggests pragmatism as another alternative to positivism.
why questions (ibid). This can potentially open up an entire new understanding of the
democratic peace thesis. Is it at all possible for democracies to go to war against each
other, or is the political order amongst democracies constituted by a specific
democratic social reality? Scientific realism seems to be “ideally placed both to give
process tracing conceptual grounding and – equally important – [to] create an
epistemological platform broad enough to” (Checkel 2006:14) allow researchers to
explore a more constructivist research agenda to analyse the peaceful relations
between democracies.

5.4 Conclusion

The amount of research done on the democratic peace propositions is immense
and in many ways cumulative (see Ray 2003 and Chernoff 2004). George and
Bennett (2005:37) point to the democratic peace research program as one where a
diverse group of scholars have used a diverse set of methods to achieve “a
progressively better understanding of when and how democracies use force, and the
differences between their behavior and that of other types of regimes”. Nonetheless,
there is a deficit in the democratic peace research program when it comes to case
studies and especially comparative case studies24. There is a similar deficit when it
comes to studies that attempt to assess the different causal mechanisms that can
account for the democratic peace. This study is an attempt and a beginning to rectify
those deficits.

References


