United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security:

How does women’s groups and activist in Uganda engage in the implementation of UN SCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security?

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ABSTRACT

Women play various roles in conflicts and the resolution of conflicts. However, these various roles have not been reflected in mainstream approaches to peace and conflict, where women have been regarded as victims of war only. This view of women’s roles in peace and conflict has lately been contested by both academics and activists throughout the world. One result of this is that in 2000 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (SCR 1325). This resolution urges all UN member countries to include women in all efforts for the maintenance of peace and security and to increase women’s role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.

The resolution is special in a UN –context. Both because it was the first time the Security Council adopted a resolution on gender, and because large networks of NGOs and lobby activists have been active in putting the issue on the agenda and in serving as watchdogs on its implementation.

In this thesis I will analyse how women at the organisational level work to add a gender perspective, as well as to be included in decisions regarding conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Uganda. I will use SCR 1325 as a framework of reference. It is currently a civil-war in Northern-Uganda, and women suffer enormously from gender-based violence and lack of power to make decisions regarding their own lives. Therefore, the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda is of great importance.

My aim is to explore further which strategies Ugandan non-governmental actors apply when engaging in the implementation of SCR 1325. I will suggest that what is needed if SCR 1325 is to be realised is combined efforts by, and recognition of, a broad spectre of different official and unofficial implementation agents.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First, I would like to thank my supervisor Torunn Lise Tryggestad at PRIO for her great commitment and bright comments. I truly appreciate her patience and dedication to this field of research.

I would also like to thank all my informants both in Norway and Uganda. I would especially like to mention Bergdis Joelsdottir. I have received great logistical help from employees at Makerere University in Kampala and the University of Bergen.

Further, my field study in Uganda would not have been possible without the scholarship for non-European studies granted to me by the department of Political Science at the University of Oslo.

I also received help and support from the staff at CARE Norge in Oslo.

I thank my wonderful son, parents and siblings for faith and support. Great appreciation must also be given to my friends, especially Alf Marius Opsahl.

Finally, I thank everyone who has contributed to the realisation of this project.
DEDICATION

To my fantastic son and little friend Leon
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own research work, except for the acknowledged literature, which is cited. I have not submitted this research work in whole or in part for the award of a degree or diploma in any other institution.

Siv Mjaalnd
### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AU</th>
<th>African Union</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAW</td>
<td>United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVAW</td>
<td>Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOU</td>
<td>Government of Uganda Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRW</td>
<td>International Center for Research on Women</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>International Implementation Force</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>The Lord Resistance Army (Rebel group in Uganda)</td>
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<td>NCW</td>
<td>Uganda Council of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NWGWPS</td>
<td>NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBPU</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (of DPKO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEAP</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication Action Plan</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHRC</td>
<td>Uganda Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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<td>WHR</td>
<td>Women’s Human Rights</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE FIELD

1.0 INTRODUCTION
Changes within the geopolitical post-Cold War landscape have affected the ways armed conflicts manifest and develop. The state’s traditional monopoly on legitimate organised violence is erupting and civil wars are to a large extent replacing inter-state wars. Further, a characteristic feature of contemporary wars is that civilians are increasingly the targets of the warring parties (Bellamy et al., 2004: 3, 6-7). Civilians are targeted by both rebel groups and sometimes even by governmental forces. This is, among others, due to the outburst in so-called “ethnic” warfare, and the common understanding that attacking of civilians is one of the toughest ways of hitting the enemy. Furthermore the indirect human costs of war; being forced to flee from their homes, losses in income and decrease in living foundations and conditions are among the consequences of war suffered by civilians.¹

As a response to the shifting patterns of armed conflict, there has been a changing climate of opinion among policy-makers. Increasingly, emphasis has been put on the need for the international community to embrace principles of human rights, diversity, good governance and participation when responding to situations of insecurity and violent conflict. The evolving policy and conceptual discourse related to peace and security has materialised in a shift of focus from national security to human security, a shift to a more dynamic and broader approach to resolution of conflicts and an increased acceptance of women’s rights within the global policy-making framework (Tickner, 1992, Steans, 1998, Anderlini et.al., 2006, Karamé and Prestegard, 2005).

The United Nations (UN) captured this new mood early on (Baranyi, 1998: 3). The former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stressed the need to address the roots of conflict, and also emphasised the need for governments to cooperate with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in promoting peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Further, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1995 concluded that, because of the link which is seen between gendered inequality and violence, inequality between men and women is an impediment to sustainable peace (Caprioli, 2004: 414).

One example of the change in approaches to peace and security is the UN Security Council’s adoption of resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security (hereafter SCR 1325) on the 31st of October 2000. This resolution urges all UN member countries to include women in all efforts for the maintenance of peace and security and to increase women’s role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution (Olsson and Tryggestad, 2001: 1). Indeed, SCR 1325 is groundbreaking as this was the first time the Security Council adopted a resolution on gender when dealing with international approaches to peace and security. With this resolution women’s agenda was formally lifted up and included in the mainstream work of the UN and consequently possibly also in the member countries of the UN. SCR 1325 builds on other international conventions women’s rights and provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for both the individual member states and the United Nations system. A common mistake in different bodies concerned with the roles of women in conflict and conflict resolution has long been to view them as merely victims only (Mazuarana et al., 2005: 2, Turshen, 1998). However, the one-dimensional understanding of women’s roles in conflict and their potential roles in conflict resolution is challenged by initiatives such as SCR 1325 (Väyrynen, 2004a).

The current Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, has called on all UN member states, entities of the UN, NGOs and civil society to enhance coordination to facilitate the implementation of SCR 1325 at all levels in developing partnership with key actors at the regional level and with women’s groups and networks at the local level. The importance of local women’s organisations when dealing with the resolution of

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conflict, and the need to improve these actors’ increased access to decision making is also underlined in Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf’s report *Women War Peace* (2002). Thus, not only does the adoption of the resolution acknowledge the importance of applying a gender perspective on peace and conflict, it also endorses the inclusion of the civil society in peace processes. Indeed, SCR 1325 has been special in a UN context because large networks of NGOs and lobby activists have been active in putting the issue on the agenda and in serving as watchdogs on its implementation.\(^5\)

However, almost six years after the adoption, the implementation of SCR 1325 is by several national and international NGOs\(^6\) reported to move slowly. In a shadow report made by the NGO Working Groups On Women, Peace and Security (NGOWGWPS)\(^7\) it is stated that there is a lack of awareness of SCR 1325, a lack of recognition of NGO initiatives on SCR 1325, and very few national, regional and international mechanisms for the systematic implementation of SCR 1325.\(^8\) Some argue that the terror-attacks in New York September 11\(^{th}\) 2001 ultimately lead to a shift away from the human-security focus that was emerging towards a more hard-lined, zero-tolerance approach to conflicts (Bellamy et. al, 2004: 270).

Further, one must take into account the size of the UN system, and the time-lag that follow many of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council. Also, traditionally few policy proposals concerning the improvement of women’s roles in the international sphere have ever been implemented (Whitworth, 1997). The full implementation of the resolution is thus expected to take time.\(^9\) Still, judging from

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\(^5\) Among those who have emphasised this are Karamè (2001), Kabeer (2003), Sylvester (2002). Further, the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan made the same point in his speech on the fifth anniversary of SCR 1325, 31\(^{st}\) October 2005 available on: [www.un.org/apps/sg/sgtats.asp?nid=133](http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgtats.asp?nid=133)


\(^7\) Shadow report on Women, Peace and Security by NGOWGWPS (03.04.2006) [online] URL: [www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/FourYearsOnOct04.pdf](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/FourYearsOnOct04.pdf)

\(^8\) Norway is one of few countries who have made an action plan for the implementation of SCR 1325.

\(^9\) The time-lag following the adoption of international conventions or Resolutions is mentioned both in the Secretary-Generals’ report evaluating the progress of SCR1325 four years after on [www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/sgreponwps04.pdf](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/sgreponwps04.pdf) and in the shadow report launched by NGO Working Groups On Women, Peace and Security the same year on [www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/FourYearsOnOct04.pdf](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/FourYearsOnOct04.pdf)
statistics publicised by the UN, there has been some progress with the work on the resolution since its adoption.\textsuperscript{10} However, advocates of women’s rights claim that both national and international approaches to gender in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is characterised by ad-hoc processes and lacks comprehensiveness.\textsuperscript{11}

Article 25 in the UN charter states that; “The members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present charter”\textsuperscript{12}. Thus, being a member of the UN, Uganda has committed herself to implement SCR 1325. There has been continued armed conflict in Uganda for more than twenty years, and issues of conflict resolution and peacebuilding are of great concern. The humanitarian and economic losses due to violent confrontations between rebel groups and the government army are severe (CSOPNU, 2006). The now stalled peace process was lead by a woman, Betty Bigombe, but apart from that there has been few women participating in the official processes for conflict resolution (ibid.). However, several Ugandan women’s NGOs and activists work for an increased participation of women and an added gender perspective on the process for resolving the conflict. An official UN report show that both national and local women’s organisations in Uganda use SCR 1325 as an advocacy and training tool.\textsuperscript{13}

The initiatives by women’s organisations and activists for the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda are the topic of this thesis. I will discuss their strategies for the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda in light of theories on NGOs, implementation and feminism. Following in the next section, is an elaboration of my research question.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

In this thesis, I am analysing the roles of various women’s organisations and activists in the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda. My aim is to explore further which


\textsuperscript{11} These concerns have been expressed both orally by Jessica Nkuuhe during interviews, and Karamê during a conference arranged by the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs, 31\textsuperscript{st} October 2005, as well as in texts such as: Isis WICCE (2003), Karamê 2005, Tryggestad (2005)

\textsuperscript{12} The UN Charter (02.03.2006) [online] URL:www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html

strategies these actors apply when engaging in the implementation of SCR 1325. The resolution links women’s participation in politics in general with participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in particular. I will therefore include the overall environment for political participation of women in Uganda in my analyses of the strategies applied to increase women’s participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. To address these issues, the following research question will be posed:

**How does women’s groups and activist in Uganda engage in the implementation of UN SCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security?**

Based on the overall research question the following sub-questions will be addressed:

- What are the main features of the political and structural frameworks within which women’s organisations and activists operate in Uganda?
- What are the main features of the official and un-official work for the realisation of the content of SCR 1325 in Uganda?
- Can the women’s organisations and activists’ engagement in the implementation of SCR 1325 be understood as a feminist project?
- Can implementation strategies identified in this thesis serve as recommendations for how SCR 1325 can be implemented more generally?

### 1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

In spite of increased attention, there is still a lack of a thorough scientific approach to the implementation of SCR 1325. In Norway, research on this field is still in its infancy. Most accounts on issues of women, conflict resolution and peacebuilding are given by activists or parts of the significant lobby-segment surrounding SCR 1325. These are important contributions creating attention and political pressure for the implementation of the resolution. Still, it is necessary with a more scientific approach

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14 Different NGO reports and papers are available at [www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox). In Norway, NUPI launched a paper on SCR 1325 in Sudan (Karamè and Prestegard, 2005) and PRIO in cooperation with CARE launched a report on SCR 1325 in the Great Lakes region (Husby and Stensrud, 2005). Furthermore, on a seminar marking the fifth anniversary of the Resolution, representatives form the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs (UD) requested suggestions for adequate strategies for the implementation of SCR 1325.
to the field. A successful implementation is important on at least two levels, a rights-based and an efficiency-based. First, both nationally and internationally there are calls for attention to women’s rights, and especially so in areas of conflict where violation of these rights are increasing and often extreme (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002). Second, through this resolution it is stated that women must participate in the processes of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in order to facilitate the creation of sustainable peace. Not because women are more peaceful than men, but because they make up about half of the population in any given society. On democratic premises they should therefore be allowed to participate (Kabeer, 2003). To sum up, there is a need for scientific research on this field, and there are several reasons for engaging in a more comprehensive understanding of women’s roles in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. I therefore consider this area of research and my research question of scientific relevance.

1.3 METHODOLOGY
A methodology in social research comprises rules that specify how social investigation should be approached; the relationship between the process and the product of research (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002, Harrison, 2001). Below the methodology of my thesis will be outlined.

1.3.1 Project Design
According to Stanley and Wise (1993) research on women is placed in the midst of science, government and women’s movements. The motivation of such research is often based on a political engagement for the change of inequalities. Still, this research must remain faithful to established scientific obligations and ambitions beside the political (ibid.). I have tried to make this a guiding rule for my project.

This project has the design of a case study, focusing on a relatively small number of individuals and organisations engaged in the work with the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda. Data was collected during a field study in Kampala and areas nearby, February through March 2006. In addition, several internet pages, newspapers and
documents produced by activists of women’s rights and the Ugandan government were used as supplementary sources.

I used a qualitative research method based on interviews, observation and analyses of documents and reports. It is generally accepted that qualitative research allows for greater expression and insight, aiming at achieving depth rather than breadth (Letherby, 2003). In my research I wanted to learn about the reality as it is experienced by my informants, and according to Thagaard (1998: 16), the qualitative method allows for this. This approach, however, means that the number of informants is relatively low, and that the project necessarily will be affected by subjective influence by both the researcher and the researched. Also, qualitative methods offer limited means of generalization (Letherby, 2003). Further, there is a weakness in this method regarding interpretation as different researchers may interpret the same response to a question differently (ibid.). Even so, some researchers uphold that it is not possible to produce knowledge free of the researcher’s values (Harrison, 2001). There is always a subjective aspect of asking questions, which is the essence of research (Thagaard, 1998: 17). I recognise the subjective relation between researcher and informants in qualitative method, but with openness regarding methodological weaknesses, I believe my choice of method is defendable. I have prioritized the opportunity qualitative methods give to approach the ‘why’ and ‘how’ in addition to the ‘what’.

1.3.2 Feminist Methodology
The identification of what is “feminist” depends on socially constituted, and so variable, norms, concepts and experiences; a feminist project is never an open or shut case (Letherby, 2003: 4). Feminist projects however have in common a dependence on a normative framework that interrelates ‘injustice’, a politics for ‘women’, ethical practices that eschew the ‘unjust’ exercise of power, and theory that conceptualizes gendered power within this normative framework (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002: 147). Feminist research includes both academic and political concerns, and recognises that women’s personal experiences are inextricably linked to these concerns (Letherby, 2003). In this thesis I use feminist theory, and aim at producing knowledge that can be
useful for the transformation of gendered injustice and subordination. I therefore consider it rightful to label this research project ‘feminist’.

I have made a deliberate choice to write in the first person in sections where I include myself as researcher. Different researchers argue that the use of ‘I’ is both academically and politically necessary when presenting research, even though challenging a long-standing academic tradition (Letherby, 2003, Humm, 1989). The use of ‘I’ is meant to fill the gap between the author of the text, and the text itself, and showing openly with whom the responsibility for the text lies. While this abstracts some of the distance and objectivity often linked to the usage of third person in academic writing, it adds subjectivity and involvement (Letherby, 2003:8-9). And, hopefully makes the research process open and my own statements easily traced.

1.3.3 The Interview and Observations
In collection of data from the field, I have used interviews. Additional sources of information have been analysis of existing data, which will be explained in more depth in the next paragraph. An interview is an encounter between a researcher and a respondent, where the respondent’s answers provide the raw data (Harrison, 2001). My interviews have had an open semi-structured form. I used an interview-guide (see appendix 1) and added, subtracted and revised the questions in the guide along the process of interviewing. The semi-structure allows for clarification and elaboration of answers, while aiming at keeping the focus of the interviews at a certain level of structure to avoid the total free flow often seen in the unstructured interview form (Harrison, 2001). While trying not to be rigid in sticking to my original ideas about the outcome of my research, I did not want to loose them completely, and thus the semi-structure form turned out to be useful.

1.3.4 Informants
As Thagaard states (1998: 54), a common method in research based on interviews is to establish contact with central persons who can facilitate the researcher in gaining contact with more informants. This method is called the snowball method, and I applied it asking both Norwegian and Ugandan contacts to identify what they believed
to be 'relevant informants' for my research project. The snowball method led to some dead ends, but by and large I managed to get in contact with several relevant groups and individuals who were willing to be my informants.

According to Harrison (2001) qualitative researchers may find that they need to engage in handling sources of bias in order to assure diversity in their research. Bias is when one seeks out information to confirm political or personal predilections. To totally rid oneself of personal bias is extremely difficult if not impossible (Kull, 2003). Although bias is sometimes considered a drawback with qualitative methods, there are techniques that can be applied to eliminate some subjectivity. In looking for a variety of relevant informants, one can use cross-referencing to account for bias and subjectivity (Harrison, 2001). When people with diverse backgrounds in different situations express the same values, one can be surer of the broader holding of the information (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 74). To apply this technique, I interviewed different actors who related to my field of research in different ways. The aim of this technique is to maintain balance, a range in point of views and diversity (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 65-74). My informants were state employees, university employees, professional activists, voluntary activists and journalists. I am of the opinion that these informants gave me different insights to my field of interest and thus helped me to revisit and correct my understanding of the mechanisms at work regarding struggles for strengthening women’s position in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Uganda.

The following criteria’s identified my interviewees:

- **The state employee**: These where state employed persons working with the issues of women’s rights, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

- **Academics**: Persons with relevant university background working with gender issues in peace and conflict in Uganda.

- **Women’s organisations representatives**: Women active in organisations aiming at changing or influencing political organs which played crucial roles in conflict resolution and peacebuilding organisation in Uganda. Both women well
established locally, nationally and regionally, as well as small-scale organised women were of interest. As all persons in this category were to some degree professionally engaged in the organisation, I labelled these informants *professional activists.*

- **Activists:** People active in the Ugandan public and political life who did not belong to neither of the above mentioned groups, but who could give me an “outsiders” view of the impact and participation of women in Ugandan politics and civil society. Examples of such were journalists from TV and newspapers, students and other socially engaged people. As these people engaged in the field on an ad-hoc, non-professional basis I labelled these informants *voluntary activists.*

1.3.5 *Analyses of existing data*

In case studies, where the aim is to gain holistic knowledge on a case, a combination of methods is usually applied (Thagaard, 1998: 77). As supplementary sources to the interviews, I have analysed already existing data such as official documents, reports and the media, which I collected both in Norway and Uganda. The analyses of existing data have served as a starting point for the creation of the questions in my interview-guide and as a foundation for the understanding of the contexts my informants related and referred to. In addition, the existing data have been used to support or question the data collected in my interviews. Finally, I had the opportunity to view several documentary films produced by the different organisations as a part of their documentation of women’s experiences and activities during conflict. These films served both as sources of information and examples of the women’s groups strategies for implementation of SCR 1325.

1.3.6 *Access to the field*

During my field study in Uganda, I made a deliberate choice not to visit areas in the North where there is an ongoing civil war. There where two main reasons for this. First, I could not find resources to support security measures which would be needed for such a visit. Second, even though it would be of great interest to visit women who are struggling for influence on the conflict resolution process in these areas of Uganda,
the people I met in and around Kampala could also give me relevant information regarding these issues. Many of them worked with women in the war-struck areas in the North, whereas their struggle to influence national politics was mainly conducted in the capital city, Kampala.

Further, due to national elections during my stay, some of my contacts both in Norway and in Uganda expressed concerns that I might not be able to get hold of the same amount and type of information as I would under more normal circumstances. They were worried that people would be afraid to talk to me on political matters due to fright of state reprimands. It is impossible for me to say if this is what happened or not. However, most of my contacts where very politically active, and had spoken their opinions in public even though these opinions where not popular with the Ugandan authorities. Also, judging from official debates and the writing in Ugandan newspapers, there is space to express ones political opinion in the Ugandan public sphere, even though in opposition to the countries leaders.¹⁵ My belief is therefore that the elections did not disturb my research to a large extent.

1.3.6 Ethical considerations
Ethical considerations have been an important part of this research project. There are several differences between me, the researcher, and my informants in Uganda. First, we come from different countries in different parts of the world. I have grown up, and been socialized under other conditions than my informants have. Cultural, linguistic and economic differences were severe with some of my informants, while they seemed smaller with others. Further, all my informants in Uganda were black, whereas I am of white complexion. Some argue that this gives us different ways of experiencing and explaining the world, others argue that this is of less significance (Narayan, 1997, Okin, 1999). In Black feminism for one, there has been put much emphasis on the examination of the boundaries of sisterhood with white feminists in order to deal fully with the contradictions inherent in gender, race and class within the context of racist societies (Humm, 1989). I believe it is important in a research process to be aware of

¹⁵ This statement is based on readings of newspapers, both in archives and during my stay, participation in political meetings and women’s organisations campaigns for the realisation of women’s rights during my stay in Uganda. An opinion also confirmed by several of my informants.
the possibility of differences in experiences due to distinctions in class, race and culture in addition to the contextual differences of geography and political environment.

Most of my informants were women, whereas a few were men. I did not experience negative attitudes towards me as a female researcher from neither. Quite on the contrary, my informants where polite and showed a friendly attitude. The presence of my son in many of the interviews led to some distraction, but mostly of humorous character. In fact, I often felt that bringing my son gave the interviews an informal and friendly character. Almost all my informants had been living for a long time with a close experience of war. This was a severe difference between us. My initial academic and distanced approach to armed conflict was challenged by their first-hand and personal experiences with what the features and consequences of war are. I listened to many emotional narratives, which in turn also affected emotions such as compassion and horror with me. Thagaard (1998: 86) discusses the importance of maintaining a balance between empathy and critical evaluation of the information the interviews provide. I have tried to be open regarding this, and to keep an emotional distance when analysing the raw data, in order to avoid applying personal reactions to the analyses.

Informed consent is essential in order to respect the informants control over information on themselves which they share with others (Thagaard, 1998: 22). However, what lays in the term “informed consent” is a subjective judgement by the researcher. I aimed at informed consent with my informants by always make clear the intentions with my project, the limited outreach my final report believably would have, and my role as merely a student of their work. Further, I took an effort to repeat my understanding of the information I had received at the end of each interview, to make sure that I had not misunderstood what they were saying.

I have tried, during the process, to be clear about the goal of my study, which was to gain accounts of meaning, experiences and understandings from my informants which were relevant for my research question. This may, off course, have led me to, either
loose important information or angles which I considered irrelevant, or to look for connections and relevance where there may not have been any. Rubin and Rubin (1995: 45) claims that the researcher must try to maintain flexible in order to accommodate the questioning to what one is learning and to what the interviewees knew in order to keep the results fresh and interesting. I have tried to do this, but, as mentioned earlier, research is a subjective and interpretative process, and some bias have most likely, either subtle or more obvious, marked this research project as well.

Finally, the securing of the anonymity of my informants is an important part of protecting the privacy of the people I have interviewed. Especially difficult is anonymity when one is presenting different representatives from the same network, which is the case in this thesis. To meet this problem, I applied two methods suggested in Thagaard (1998: 201-202). First, I have not used any names on my informants. Second, I have not presented my informants and the data they provided one by one, but rather used topical approaches, sorting the information on themes, rather than persons. Therefore, several opinions from different persons are presented under each section, and the separation of the informants is made more difficult to the reader, even though clear to me. However, with the acceptance of my informants, I have made it clear from what network or organisation an argument or statement origins. This is because the strategies applied by the different organisations or activists were sometimes differing in both content and form. Further, the organisations and networks all had an officially stated policy which they argued for. I therefore consider the links I make between these organisations and networks, and different arguments and strategies as less personal and of a more official character than e.g. the accounts of the university employees. Thus, in order to maintain clarity and continuity in the different informants reasoning for their specific strategies and methods of work, I have named their groups. Actually, all my organisation/network informants were interested in creating attention to their organisations, as future funding and social and political strength often depended on public awareness of their work.
1.3.7 Key concepts
Concepts applied in this thesis are not without complexity, and the following definitions are given in order to maintain some level of conceptual clarity. As I am doing analyses on a UN Security Council resolution, I will to a large extent use official UN definitions on terms relevant to the content of SCR 1325. Further elaboration of the concepts will be introduced in chapter three and four where the literature review and contextual framework will be outlined.

Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding
The processes of official conflict resolution is understood as all national, regional and international measures taken to initiate peace in an armed conflict. Un-official initiatives by the civil society, organisations and the likes can also catalyze the resolution of conflicts. Further, official peacebuilding in this thesis includes negotiations, the building of institutions of government and law and other official procedures of recapturing a nation after war. As women are mostly represented in more unofficial processes, I have chosen to include this in my conceptualisation of peacebuilding. Unofficial peacebuilding includes grassroots activities for rebuilding the society after war, and the empowerment of people who have suffered physical and/or psychological losses during the period of war (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002).

Gender
The nature of “gender” is of political significance, as the understanding of the concept underpins political strategies (Squires, 1999). According to much feminist usage of the term, ‘gender’ refers to a set of culturally shaped and defined characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity. In this view, biology may constrain behaviour, but it should not be used “naturally” or “deterministically” to justify practices, institutions or choices that could be other than they are (Letherby, 2003, Squires, 1999). According to Whitworth (1997), experiences and concerns of men and women during and after armed conflicts are shaped by their gendered social roles. The use of monolithic terms

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such as “women’s experiences”, then, does not account for the diversity among women (ibid.). However, as we shall see in the theoretical framework, the problem with essentialism versus political mobilisation for the realisation of women’s rights is not easily solved. Väyrynen (2004a) claims that in the UN context, gender has consequently equalled women. This is, as explained above, not compatible with a feminist understanding of the term.

*Gender Equality*

Gender equality refers to the demand for equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of men and women anchored in the idea of justice and the fight against injustice and discrimination (Lehn et. al., 2003). The demand for equality between men and women presupposes the existence of inequality, and that this inequality can and should be changed (ibid.). Gender Equality is a goal that has been accepted, at least rhetorically, by numerous governments, including the Ugandan, and international organisations and is enshrined in international agreements and commitments.18

*Gender Balance and Mainstreaming- strategies for gender equality*

The two principal strategies within the UN to achieve gender equality are gender balance and gender mainstreaming (Pietilä, 2002). These strategies are also in principal adopted by the Ugandan government (Matembe, 2002). Gender balance is in essence about the democratization of participation (Skjeie and Teigen, 2003: 217). The concept refers to the degree to which women and men participate within the full range of activities associated with the United Nations. The UN has committed itself to a goal of full gender balance, though still far away from reaching this goal. The UNs engagement in peacekeeping is illustrative, where women’s participation remains low. In September 2005, 10 out of 18 UN peacekeeping and political missions had a dedicated full-time gender adviser. This is a considerable progress since the adoption of SCR 1325. At the same time, women made up only about one percent of all UN military personnel.19 Women are present in large number in the area of non-professional or civilian positions, but rarely at the highest levels within missions

Gender mainstreaming\footnote{For UN’s official definition of gender mainstreaming in its full length, see ECOSOC’s agreed conclusions 1997/2, UN Doc. A/52/3/Rev.1.} is the second strategy within the UN to achieve gender equality. It entails bringing the perceptions, experiences knowledge, and interests of women as well as men to bear on all policy making, planning and decision making. In situations of conflict and post-conflict, gender mainstreaming means to understand and take into account the differences in people’s experiences due to gender as well as other factors, in the responses to armed conflict. The forums in which women participate should then be acknowledged, and where possible, supported along with the forums in which men participate (Raven-Roberts, 2005: 43-45). Gender balance and gender mainstreaming are related, but two different strategies for gender equality. The presence of more equal numbers of women is no guarantee that gender mainstreaming will be conducted (ibid.). As mentioned in the introduction, SCR 1325 is an example of gender mainstreaming in the UN. The resolution also holds incentives for gender balance in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

\textit{Discourse, ideology, hegemony and patriarchy}

There are concepts often used in feminist theory and debates which also needs to be specified. First, \textit{discourses} are in this context understood as systems of representation which contribute to the construction of social identities, relations and systems of knowledge and meaning (Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999). \textit{Ideology} is understood as construction of meaning which contributes to production, reproduction and transformation of dominating relations. Ideology becomes common sense and works as a normative base to discourse. Also, ideological discourses are those who contribute to transformation or maintenance of dominating relations (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002). In addition, \textit{hegemony} is the process by which general consent is actively sought for the interpretation of the ruling class. Dominant ideology becomes invisible
because it is translated into common sense, appearing as the natural, un-political state of things accepted by each and everyone (Van Zoonen, 1994). Further, hegemony is, according to Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) a dynamic concept and is shaped and re-shaped by the power-holders in a society. Finally, the concept patriarchy is understood as a system of male authority which discriminates against women through social, political and economic institutions. This system is hierarchic and builds on gender superiority to men as a group (Høglund, 2001: 7-19).

Selection of words can frame that which is represented in a more or less negative way. According to Richardson (2004), choices of words become ideological when used in nomination and characterization of social actors. The positive or negative connotations to some words can affect the general impression of the thesis. Words, such as “race”, “Third World”, “black woman” and “ethnicity”, are not unproblematic to use as they in certain contexts have been argued to be part of suppressing power-language (ibid.). In lack of good alternatives I will still use these words throughout the thesis. However, I will try doing so sensitively, and wish to emphasis that the use is not meant to contribute to generalization or further stereotyping of groups.

1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This paper is limited to highlight activities of women’s organisations and activists in and around Kampala. Further, I have tried to analyse these activities from a feminist perspective. There were several organisations working directly with women and conflict in northern parts of Uganda. As for their work, I have only second hand information from my informants who cooperated with them.

I was in contact with bodies subsumed under the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development in Uganda, but did not meet with representatives from the Ministry directly. In spite of numerous attempts, it was impossible to arrange a meeting during my stay in Kampala due to lack of response from relevant persons. I did correspond with the Ministry by e-mail, and thus got information on the official government stand on the topics of my research. I also got hand on official documents and statements on the SCR 1325 through newspaper archives and my other informants.
However, I do not consider this data sufficient to base any large part of my analysis on. Therefore, I will only discuss the governments’ strategies for the implementation of SCR 1325 in relation to my informants’ accounts.

The written documents on women’s participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Uganda were scarce both at official and organisational levels. The level of professionalism is also varying. This may have limited my analyses. Resources such as gender sensitive statistics where practically non-existing. This is not a problem only in Uganda, the DPKO and other UN bodies also possess a limited amount of gender sensitive statistics in areas of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Also, the content of SCR 1325 is wide, unspecific and suggestive rather than concrete. The language used is of a vague character urging and calling on all member countries to include women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Thus, any explicit report on the extent to which SCR 1325 is made difficult both because necessary data for doing such an analyses are scarce, and because the content of the resolution is of such a character that it is difficult to judge when it is completely implemented. Therefore, the aim of my study is neither to conduct a quality-measurement of the methods applied for implementation, nor an account of the impact of these methods. Rather, my project has been to find out if my informants engage in the implementation of SCR 1325, and how they do it.

Finally, my field work has concerned Uganda, and generalisations are probably not possible without further research. Also, I will not in this paper distinguish between men and boys, and women and girls, but subsume boys and girls in the categories of “men” and “women”. This is because my focus and contacts have mainly been men and women, and in the cases girls or boys were included as variables by my informants, this was not emphasised. There are important differences in experiences and needs related to age, as well as gender, but I will not discuss them here.

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1.5 THESIS OUTLINE IN CHAPTERS
The thesis begins with an introduction to the field of study and methodology. In chapter two, the literature I consider relevant for my thesis is outlined. In chapter three, the context of my analyses is presented, both in terms of UN framework and specific features of Ugandan politics in relation to gender and women’s participation. Following, in chapter four, is the analyses of the data I collected during my field work. The thesis is ended with a concluding chapter, summing up the main points made in the analyses and presenting concluding remarks. This chapter is ended with some general suggestions for implementation of SCR 1325 based on the work of women’s organisations and activists in Uganda.

1.6 SUMMARY
In the first chapter, an introduction to the field of this thesis to was given. The background for the adoption of SCR 1325, and different views on the progress with the implementation of the resolution was briefly outlined. In addition, I introduced the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda as the case study of this thesis. Then, my research question was elaborated, and I argued for the relevance of my thesis. Following was a section on methodology. The chapter was ended with a clarification of relevant concepts, a presentation of the scope of the thesis and an outline of the thesis in chapters. Following in chapter two is an introduction to the theoretical framework of the thesis.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION
According to Harrison (2001), empirical findings are of lesser value if not related to a theoretical framework. In this chapter, a literature review will be outlined. First, theoretical approaches to women’s organisations and civil society in developing countries will be introduced. Next, I will present theories of implementation. My empirical findings will also be discussed in the theoretical framework of feminist approaches to political participation and International Relations. The choice of multiple feminist approaches rests on the assumption that feminist politics must recognise different strategies to challenge forms of gender inequality and build upon
the many sites of feminist struggle (Letherby, 2003, Beneria, 2003). Finally, the chapter is ended with a discussion on feminist approaches to security and power.

2.1 SOCIAL ACTIVISTS AND NGO’S

Women in developing countries scores lower than men in most conventional measures of development and general participation in the society (UNRISD, 2005). The interest in altering this has led to the creation of several women’s organisations throughout the world. Even though diverse in goals and interests, in common for most of the women’s movements is the dissatisfaction with the lack of improvement of women’s position and a struggle for the realisation of women’s rights (Haynes, 1997: 122).

The concept ‘social activists’ will in this thesis include networks, organisations and individuals aiming at change in political institutions and social structures by non-violent action (Riano, 1994). Further, the NGOs which I have included in my analyses can all be characterised as non-profit, non-violent, organised group of people who are not seeking government office (Willetts, 1996: 5). I have chosen this definition because my research lies within a UN framework, and the definition is compatible with the demands the UN sets for the NGOs with whom they will cooperate (ibid.). NGOs traditionally engage in agenda-setting, policy-making and implementation of policy, with varying balance between the three types of activities. NGOs concerned with women’s rights and operating within the UN framework has traditionally engaged in agenda-setting (Willetts, 1996: 11). However, their role in the implementation of a Security Council resolution is what will be discussed in this thesis.

The definitions of NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are sometimes overlapping (Riano, 1994). I have chosen to work only with the concept of NGO in order to avoid confusion. Some of the NGOs I have worked with were sometimes labelled CSOs and other NGOs. However, as they all match the UN definition of an NGO, I have chosen to call them that.

Riano (1994) argues that women’s initiatives and actions for conflict resolution and peacebuilding often take place outside formal processes. She further claims that the
placement of these initiatives outside the official procedures makes them easier to overlook both nationally and internationally. There is a tendency in politics to define women’s initiatives as interesting, but ignorable. Further, it is suggested that women’s organisations are most effective when they operate far from the centres of power (ibid.). However, several examples show that women protest against these attitudes and demand their right to participate at higher and more formal levels of action.\textsuperscript{22} The civil society sets the stage where these demands are articulated. At the very centre of the following discussions is the consideration of the informal, civil level of action as a condition and foundation for the participatory and democratization processes at both national and international levels (Willetts, 1996).

NGOs are evidently important in creating opportunities for participation and empowerment (Baranyi, 1998: 3). Participation in this context refers to control and ownership, rather than merely physical presence. Social participation in this regard constitutes access to processes of decision making, production of cultural meaning and facilitation of transformation (Riano, 1994). However, participation in this manner is achieved only when empowerment of individuals and groups are seen as fundamental goals. Thus, people must be able to participate in order to increase their empowerment. Empowerment then, is not merely the individual achievements, or access to certain power positions, but entails the energizing of individual and collective subjects to participate in social movements and processes (Haynes, 1997: 120-122). Within this understanding of empowerment lies a possibility for transformation (Riano, 1994). The concept \textit{empowerment} will be discussed further in the last section of this chapter.

Women in NGOs adds to this framework of empowerment a need for the acknowledgement of differences related to social characteristics such as class, history, culture and gender. Essential to this approach is that the power aspects the concept of gender holds must be recognized (Riano, 1994: 26-29). In other words, participation

\textsuperscript{22}Several reports on women’s NGOs and their work with the realisation of women’s rights in wartime is publicised on the internet (10.04.2006) [online] URL: http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/whywomen.asp#articles
will only be an instrument for change if the differences in subordination and experiences are acknowledged.

Letherby (2003) claims that operating with the category of ‘woman’ undifferentiated by for example class or nationality is unhelpful in intellectual analysis of the socio-political impact of women’s groups. A distinction has therefore been suggested between two broad kinds of women’s empowerment groups, the feminist and the feminine (Haynes, 1997: 128.131). The distinction between these categories is set to be in the strategic or practical concerns of the groups. Whereas feminist groups, concerned with strategic goals consist of mainly educated, middle-class women, the feminine groups, consisting of lower-class women, are concerned with practical goals and mobilize women around general gender-related issues. This characterization is used both academically and by member of the groups themselves (ibid.). However, a dichotomizing of these types of groups is not necessarily a fruitful approach, as the distinction is often blurred. Practical goals often lead to a concern with more strategic questions, and a fruitful way to see the concerns would rather be as a continuum (Fisher, 1993: 103).

Another way of categorizing different women’s groups is to separate the elite networks from organisation of women with lower social status (Kabeer, 2003). What separate these categories are both living standards and amount of political influence. Elite women’s organisations in poor countries are often accused of the same limitations as Western feminists are when they get involved in the struggle for gender equality in development countries; that they do not take into consideration features such as class and ethnicity which can leave women from different levels of the society with little in common (Narayan, 1997). In spite of the sometimes unclear lines between these categories, I find them analytically useful. In chapter five, both the feminist vs. feminine distinction and the elite vs. lower social status distinctions will be discussed in the context of Ugandan women’s organisations.
2.2 IMPLEMENTATION THEORIES
Implementation is an essential part of policies, as judgement on the quality of policy is inherently linked to the implementation of the policies. Policy formulation and procedures of good intent or inputs can never substitute for implementation, action results and outcomes (Squires, 1999). Implementation of SCR 1325 in this context is understood as the realisation of the content of SCR 1325. Thus, in Uganda, formal implementation of SCR 1325 is when policies fulfilling the content of SCR 1325 are adopted and achieved. Policy is here understood as a chosen course of action affecting a large number of people. In addition, policy is understood as the operationalization of political intentions. Thus, policy is both goals and the actions taken to realize and maintain them (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 4-5). Unofficial implementation, however, is understood as the processes and strategies for the realisation of SCR 1325 which are initiated by non-governmental actors not responsible for implementing the resolution in any official sense.

According to Miller (2001: 98), one has to calculate with a time-lag, not only between policy and implementation, but also between statements of principles and practices based upon those principles, when implementation is dependent on those who stand to be dispossessed by complying with the intent of their ideals. Thus, the slow pace by which SCR 1325 is realised, even though adopted more than five years ago, should not be unexpected.

According to Hill and Hupe (2002), the understandings of implementation processes are plentiful. Traditionally, studies of implementation focus on those factors that contribute to the realisation or non-realisation of policy objectives. However, this view is somewhat top-down as it understands policy as something which is introduced at the top-level by the decision-makers and transmitted down a hierarchy to those implementing it at the lower levels (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 3-7).

Different actors, organisations and institutional structures form the arena within which political outcomes is bargained (Nagel, 2002). Activists occupied with the task of
implementation, for one, are concerned with both explaining and affecting what happens (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 51-56). This is especially relevant regarding SCR 1325, where the active lobbying and pressure from external actors to a large extent lead to the resolution. In this thesis I will therefore approach the implementation process as not merely translation of policies into practice, but rather an ongoing process where several differing actors play important roles (Squires, 1999).

Bottom-up theories focus on a complex process of action and reaction (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 50-61). The perspective is bottom-up in the sense that it starts with various implementation agents and examines their behaviour and motivations and perceptions, and the personal and structural conditions which encourages them to act as they do. This perspective accepts the difficulties in gaining political strength faced by those at the bottom. At the same time, it acknowledges the positive contribution they can make to the successful implementation of political decisions (ibid.). Indeed it is acknowledged that implementation today is a multi-disciplinary, multi-level and multi-focus exercise. Thus, analysing a variety of actors, loci and layers should be welcomed (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 16). The broad understanding of implementation is fundamental to my analyses, as my focus is women’s organisations and activists in Uganda as implementation actors, even though focusing much of their work on processes outside the official policy-formulation or policy-implementation process.

An implementation failure, is when what is expected and what is achieved is compared and there is a gap between the former and the latter (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 10). Some main obstacles to the realisation of women’s human rights are the lack of mandate, conceptual clarity, expertise and coordination as well as underrepresentation of women in positions of authority.23 The action, information and capacities needed are often lacking, as well as the political will to fulfil political goals (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002). Also, implementation processes in developing countries do seldom fit into the frames of strong democratic, stable political frames which are set to be the framework

23 There are also discussions regarding whether the Western conceptualization of Women’s rights are the proper way of securing participation and gender equality in non-Western societies (Kabeer, 2002, UNRISD, 2005)
needed for successful implementation of policies (Haynes, 1997, Kabeer, 2002). Thus the Ugandan context for implementation of policies must be discussed alongside the theoretical features of the implementation process, as this context affects and possibly limits the process outcomes.

Finally, it is argued that the production of quantitative data such as gender-sensitive statistics is essential for the implementation of SCR 1325. The argument is that these statistics can contribute both to point at the low participation of women in official resolutions of conflict and peacebuilding, and to show their large participation in unofficial processes for peace (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002). DPKO has committed itself to both producing and taking into account gender-sensitive statistics in their further operations in conflict areas. Reports made by DPKO24 shows that this commitment is taken seriously. However, The Human Security Report 200525 concludes that statistics on the impact of war on civilians, and especially women, is far from satisfactory.

2.3 FEMINISM AND PARTICIPATION

2.3.0 Women and Political participation

Sylvester (2002) argue that a feminist political demand for gender equality underpins the debate on women’s participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Indeed, feminist researchers uphold that it is fruitful to do analyses of women’s participation based on feminist theory. However, this demand is not uncontroversial in its theoretical foundation. Diverse feminist theorists who have engaged in the creation of normative political proposals have been criticised for equating ontological propositions with this task (Nancy Fraser in Squires, 1999: 228). Iris Marion Young has created a theoretical account which builds on ontological conceptions of identity and difference, but also aims at an advocacy. However, before presenting the thoughts of Young, I will outline some criticism of traditional Western accounts of feminism.

2.3.1 “Third World” Feminism
There has been raised critique of how the concept of ‘Third World Woman’ has been authorized through Western discourse. Narayan (1997) has argued that feminist critiques of masculine epistemology overlook the concerns of non-Western women. Central in the critique of the imperialistic nature of Western feminism is its attempts to speak for others. Further, Western feminism has been accused of ethnocentrism, which in a gendered context means that there has been an acceptance of the argument that non-Western women can only be truly free and equal through “our” ideals and values (Jacobsen and Gressgård, 2002: 199). It is also argued that there is, in analytical terms, made a comparative mistake when comparing actual incidents in the life of non-Western women to ideals of gender equality uttered in the Western tradition (ibid.). These arguments are important for my analyses, as the subjects of my research project are non-Western women. However, as feminist theory in general is still marginal in many disciplines and in the approach to non-Western women’s participation in particular, “Western” feminist theories will make up a part of the theoretical framework of this thesis. Nevertheless, I will in my analyses take into account the criticism uttered by non-Western feminists.

Class, race, age and geographical aspects are also relevant features in the analyses of domination and suppression in addition to gender (Voula, 2002). However, in the task of avoiding essentialism of the category of “women” there is often made a similar mistake in essentializing experiences connected to for example race (Jacobsen and Gressgård, 2002: 187-203). Thus, when dealing with marginalised group’s suppression, there is a web of structural and social patterns which has to be dealt with carefully.

2.3.2 Young and the participation of marginalized groups
Research have shown that it is possible to include women through a coupling of inclusion from below, through different activists movements, and from above through inclusion in the political elite (Dahlerup, 2003: 21-24). Iris Marion Young discusses how marginalized groups can mobilize and organize for inclusion through the civil society. Young argues for a politics of difference that accords with affirmative and
positive action approaches to group rights. She argues that social policy should sometimes accord to special treatment of groups (Young, 1990: 158). She tries to overcome the dilemma of women being included in the political sphere only once they behave as men, by arguing that it is possible for women to organize politically “as women” and at the same time integrate women’s experiences and perspectives in the political sphere. She argues for inclusion of women through empowerment. Young contributes to illuminate the general contradiction in deliberative political theory between ideals of inclusion and equality and the actual inequalities and differences based on, among others, gender (Dahlerup, 2003). Central is the point that exclusion of women is not merely a question of power and influence, but also a question of women’s experiences, perspectives and identities in the public life (Young, 2000).

However, even though Young argues that women’s groups do not presuppose a common identity or common interests of women, there are some problems with her approach. First, her claim that women can be seen as a political group with experiences and perspectives in common is not uncomplicated. She has been accused of essentialism taking this stand (Dahlerup, 2003). Second, the claim that organisation of social groups will strengthen the group identity creates a problem regarding the inclusion of those who are not a part of the group (Dahlerup, 2003:15). Finally, critics of Young have questioned the possibility of realisation of the group organisation and mobilisation (Jacobsen and Gressgård, 2002: 216). However, Young’s account is fruitful as it moves the focus from suppression in the private sphere, to inclusion in the public life (ibid.). And, acknowledging its limitation, I find her discussion of women’s organisation and participation through civil society useful in my analyses of women’s organisation for participation in Uganda.

2.4 FEMINIST THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Cockburn (1998) has claimed that International Relations (IR) is a discipline from which women have been absent and to which they have been invisible. Conventional IR theory has concentrated on activities of the great powers at the centre of the system. After the so-called “third debate” in IR opened up important questions about the activity of theorizing and the politics of knowledge, arguments have been made by and
for IR scholars to engage with issues of gender and feminism. Indeed, feminist critique of the orthodox IR realism raises questions about the subject of knowledge (Steans, 1998). Concepts central in IR such as power and security have been framed in terms associated with masculinity. A feminist approach, arguing for the introduction of new a definition of such concepts, which incorporates the experiences of women as well as men, is subversive of the mainstream IR (Tickner, 1992).

As Whitworth (1997: 2) states, in contrast to the field of IR, contemporary feminism has its roots in a social movement: the women’s liberation movement. Feminism is a protest against accepted social values and norms concerning women and men (ibid). In the following, a brief outline of dominating feminist theories will be given. This introduction is given because the analyses in this thesis will draw on various feminist theoretical accounts. Indeed, feminist scholars\textsuperscript{26} have argued that in the real-life struggle for equality between the sexes, it is fruitful to draw on a number of feminist approaches to IR. In the following, a short introduction to liberal, radical, postmodern and critical feminism will be given.

\textit{Liberal feminism}

Liberal feminists argue that women have been excluded from many of the most important public spheres of modern social, political and economic life. After showing this, liberal feminists have sought to draw attention to the legal barriers to women’s participation in the public world, and overcome these barriers. Regarding the studies of peace and conflict, the activities of women in war has been the object of research. Important tools for the operationalization of women’s rights have been the United Nations human rights (Steans, 1998). Critics, however, argue that the collection of empirical information about women, although important, is made at the expense of any assessment of the structural features of relations of inequality between men and women (Whitworth, 1997).

Radical feminism

Radical feminists argue that relations of subordination and domination between women and men constitute one of the most fundamental forms of oppression. In the view of a radical feminist, the way in which IR scholars do research and the policy prescriptions which emerge from their analyses, all stem from a masculine worldview which must be replaced by a feminine one (Withworth, 1997). Unlike liberal feminists, radical feminist are concerned with outlining women’s different attitudes towards peace and conflict, suggesting that women in general are more peaceloving and connected with life through childrearing, and therefore will think differently about these matters (ibid.). Arguing that the personal is political, and presenting a more profound epistemological critique of mainstream IR than liberal feminist, claiming the need to examine the specifically masculine bias brought to the study of IR by men, radical feminist theorists makes some advances over liberal feminist theory.27

Postmodern feminism

However, also important to the field of IR is the postmodern critique of both liberal and radical feminist theories which tend to treat woman as a unified group. The majority of feminist theorists have adopted some form of essentialism in order to reflect upon “women” as a category and have argued for some form of autonomy in order to campaign for women’s legal and political rights. According to Smith (2001), this is not an unproblematic approach, because unless a sensitivity towards a multiplicity of women’s voices are heard, feminists themselves runs the risk of reproducing the same dualizing distinctions that feminists objects to in patriarchal discourse, and to essentializing the meaning of women. This has been a strong argument among postmodernists, Black feminists and ‘Third World’ feminism. These accounts emphasises the multiple differences among women and groups of women (Squires, 1999). Postmodern feminists argue that essentialism is problematic because it is characterized by exaggerated claims about the stability and clarity of individual and social identities and their meaning. It is claimed to be a simplistic and non-reflexive discourse, often described as most of all a successful strategy for political mobilization.

27 For a more thorough discussion of liberal versus radical feminism in IR, see Judith Squires (1999)
(Steans, 1998). Denying the possibility of ambiguity or change of identity, it projects supposedly timeless and unambiguous conceptions of identity. By contrast, the creation of peace out of conflict, or of equality out of inequality, both relevant transformations in the case of women’s participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, depend on people changing. And in this context, essentialism is unreliable (Smith, 2001: 44-46). The problem with essentialism is claimed to be, not that it identifies characteristics of identities, but that it freezes them (ibid.). Even so, what is problematic with the postmodern feminist account is that it can result in political paralysis (Steans, 1998). By claiming that using the category of “women” is wrong, any political demand for women as a group is also made impossible (ibid.).

Critical feminism

According to Jill Steans (1998), like liberal feminists, feminist theorists building on critical theory, here labelled “critical feminism” are interested in documenting the underrepresentation of women in particular spheres. However, strategies of including women or women’s experiences are not sufficient, as it responds only to how women appear in IR, and not to why they appear in the ways that they do (ibid.). Thus, in addition to documenting underrepresentation, by examining gender as sexual difference, the critical feminist account incorporates some of the insights of radical feminists. Still, it is important to avoid any essentialist vision of a feminine perspective by acknowledging that gender does not refer to women or men per se, but to the ideological and material relations between them, one which historically has been an unequal relationship. Further, gender is understood, as in the postmodernist tradition, a social construction. Critical theory further analyse the self-understanding of groups committed to transforming society (Sylvester, 2002). The goal is to move beyond the ‘adding in’ of women as political subjects or making visible gender inequalities. Rather, the aim is to empower women as subjects of knowledge. Critical feminists in IR argue that social forces and material conditions combine to reproduce social practice, and that gender informs and is reproduced by the practices of actors, institutions and international organisations. Gender relations must be seen in the context of inequalities rooted in social class or race or other social factors. Central to
this theoretical approach is the understanding of hegemonic structures and institutions as deeply imbued with patriarchal ideology and male dominance (Steans, 1998: 45-47, Sylvester, 2002).

2.5 GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2.5.0 Gender Approaches to IR

Hegemonic masculinity - the culturally dominant masculinity distinguished from other subordinated masculinities and femininities, a stereotypic image of masculinity which does not fit most men - has created and creates a gender dichotomy in IR. A result of this hegemonic masculinity has been a celebration of male power and the male warrior, leaving issues of women’s roles in silence (Tickner, 1992, Høglund, 2001). The essence of discussions of gender in IR, will in the following be outlined, drawing on the accounts of Jill Steans (1998), J. Ann Tickner (1992), Sandra Whitworth (1997), Judith Squires (1999), Christine Sylvester (2002) and Tarja Väyrynen (2004a+b).

A masculine approach to analyses in IR has resulted in only a partial view, and thus only a partial system of security. With a gendered approach to security, however, traditional assumptions of the content of the term are questioned. Within the orthodox IR militaristic conception of security women have been left with little control over their own security. Women have been regarded as in need of protection, the receivers of security delivered to them from the protectors; the male warriors. This conventional distinction between ‘protectors’ and ‘protected’ is, however, challenged by feminists because it obscures the degree to which women are involved in war. A feminist analysis of war emphasizes the connections between war as an instance of state-sanctioned violence and other forms of violence. A gendered approach to accepted conceptions of the roles of men and women in armed conflicts and wars can reveal underlying, and taken for granted, working relationships which in reality inhabits discriminating features resulting in inequalities between men and women.
The feminist objective is to move the feminist discourse from the periphery to the centre. The feminist project of rethinking theory is a project of reconstruction; the hegemonic domination is not just a question of the social relations of inequality and domination, it is also about the production of knowledge, and the formulation of concepts and ideas that set the parameters for how we think about peace, conflict and security. It is further essentially about the ability to be heard.

Revealing the masculinist underpinnings of contemporary IR discourses suggests that realism, as well as the approaches of many of its critics, has constructed worldviews based on the behaviour of only half of humanity. Ignoring women’s experiences contributes not only to their exclusion but also to a process of self-selection that result in an overwhelmingly male population both in the foreign policy and security world and in the academic field of IR. The invisibility of major social inequalities, such as those between men and women, in IR is a powerful form of exclusion. Following is a discussion of feminist approaches to the concept of power.

2.5.1 Feminist conceptualization of power
Feminism, both as a social movement and a political project is inherently linked to concept of power. Sylvester (2002), states that the gendered understanding of the concept of power is as an inequality of power. As a social movement, feminism seeks to end a particular kind of unequal power relationship, that between men and women. All approaches to women’s inclusion or strengthening of women’s position rely on power in some form (Sylvester, 2002). Feminists seek to empower women as subjects (ibid.).

Hannah Arendt introduced a definition of power as the ability to act in concert (Arendt, in Tickner, 1992: 65). In this view, power is not the property of one individual, but belongs to a group and exits only as long as the group keeps together (Squires, 1999: 35). This interdependent and cooperative view of power challenges the traditional view in IR where power is usually characterized by force and domination, and in terms of zero-sum (Steans, 1998). However, this focus on `power with’ instead of `power over’, is criticized for downplaying the conflictual aspects of power. Indeed,
this view presupposes a public sphere in which people behave non-violently and argue rationally free from domination (Squires, 1999). I nevertheless find Arendt’s approach to power interesting and useful related to for example the postmodern claim on the difficulties with group approaches to ‘women’.

Further, the concept of empowerment is central in the discussion of women’s participation in decision-making. One way of thinking about power is in terms of the ability to make choices. Power can deny choice without appearing to do so. Indeed, cultural or ideological norms may deny either that inequalities of power exists or that these inequalities are unjust (Kabeer, 2003: 172). Empowerment refers to the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such ability (Kabeer, 2003: 170). In processes of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, where women have been marginalised, one precondition for the inclusion of women is to empower women. The concept of empowerment can be explored through three interlinked dimensions: agency, resources and achievements. Whereas agency refers to how choice is put into effect, resources are the medium through which the agency is exercised. Achievement refers to the outcome of agency (ibid.). These aspects of empowerment are central in the discussion of strategies for women’s increased participation in chapter four. Also, the ability to make choices is essential in the feminist debate on contemporary and ideal definitions of security, which will be elaborated in the following paragraph.

2.5.2 A broader definition of security
Caprioli (2004: 412) argues that research show how women’s security is systematically violated in both public and private spheres. She claims that although human security necessitates the elimination of violence and unjust social relations, violence against women is often overlooked. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) states in a report that any type of discrimination which restricts the freedom and safety necessary to make economic, political and social choices, undermines human security.\(^\text{28}\)

Women continuously suffer from economic, social and political discrimination. An important aspect in most feminist approaches to IR is the demand for a broader definition of security, which incorporates the aspects which currently leaves women insecure. The hegemonic masculinity, within which the contemporary definitions of security have been produced, leaves women insecure partly because of gender exclusion (Caprioli, 2004). The mainstreaming of a broader definition of security is only possible if rigid gender hierarchies are challenged (Tickner, 1992: 142). One main challenge in this case is to address the structural violence many women suffer from. Galtung (in Caprioli, 2004: 413) defines structural violence as systematic exploitation that becomes part of the social order. Then, when societal tolerance of gendered violence is supported and legitimimized by structural violence, women’s security ceases to exist.

However, Caprioli (2004: 413) also argues that measuring women’s insecurity are difficult, as it is often rooted in and defended by the state and social politics. Data on women are not routinely collected, and ill-legal discrimination is underreported to protect those in power (ibid.).

Especially in post-conflict societies, women bear a disproportionate burden of insecurity (Higate and Henry, 2004: 482). A gendered analysis of security therefore promotes a positive definition of peace where economic and environmental security is valued in addition to absence of violence (ibid.). In addition, Väyrynen (2004b: 133-136), argues that a comprehensive vision of security presupposes that women are seen as agents, rather than victims. In the creation of a more multidimensional approach to security, human nature must be seen in an inclusive perspective, as both conflicting and cooperative. Through an expansion of the traditional security agenda, a discursive space where gender can enter is created. Letting views on security that do not represent the state penetrate the discourse of gender and peace would bring into being non-state agency in security matters (Väyrynen, 2004b: 139-140).
2.6 THE UN DISCOURSE ON GENDER IN CONFLICT
When discussing women’s security, the UN discourse on women and security is of interest. The UN discourse on gender and conflict resolution, according to Väyrynen (2004a), contains some challenges. The issue of disadvantages and injustices experienced by women because of their gender has been neglected both within UN organs established for the monitoring of the UN human rights, and also in traditional human rights NGOs (Connors, 1996: 148). Gender, in the UN discourse is equalled with women, and women are differentiated from men. In ignoring the possible performative construction of gender, the discourse is founded on essentialist and biologically binary hierarchy of sexes (Väyrynen, 2004b). This discourse leaves women with the restricted roles of objects of protection. In a continuation of these gender roles, women’s agency is also limited.

However, SCR 1325 is an example of a new approach which suggests an enlargement of the concept of security. The resolution, at least rhetorically, includes gender aspects in deliberations on peace and security, and thus matches feminist demands for a broader definition of security. However, Väyrynen (2004a: 26) criticises the UN for avoiding to ask an essential question regarding gender and conflict resolution/peacebuilding, namely; How does the UN itself produce certain type of femininity and masculinity as hegemonic. She further claims that there is a need for structural changes within the UN in order to reach gender equality. One strategy for bringing alternative thinking on peace, war and gender into the UN discourse is through the ongoing dialogue between the UN, NGOs and the civil society (ibid.). SCR 1325 calls on an increase in both respect for and cooperation with these fractions of society. Thus, the implementation of SCR 1325 is one approach to challenge both the UN discourse on gender, peace and conflict, and more deeply, the current structures of the UN which discriminates against women.

2.7 SUMMARY
In this chapter I have presented the theoretical framework within which I will discuss my empirical findings on women’s organisations and activists’ work for the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda. The chapter started with showing how social
activists and NGOs are understood in this thesis. The problem with an essentialist approach to the concept of “women” was briefly discussed. Then, I introduced theories of implementation, and possible roles for non-governmental actors in these processes. Further, “Third World Feminism” and the critics towards Western feminism were presented. We saw how it is not unproblematic to discuss empirical findings from a non-Western country in a theoretical framework anchored in Western experiences. Further, Iris Marion Young’s account on women and participation, and some problems with this approach, was outlined. Then, I presented a more general discussion on feminist approaches to the discipline of International Relations. The chapter was ended with discussions on gender in relation to power, security and the UN discourse on peace and conflict. Following in the next chapter is an outline of relevant features of the UN and Uganda.

CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXTUAL OUTLINE

3.0 INTRODUCTION
There are special features of the UN organisational structures and the political discourse in Uganda which I find relevant for the analyses of my empirical findings. Therefore, an introduction to the United Nations historical and contemporary approaches to gender in general will be given. Further, I will outline the current progress with SCR 1325 both internationally and in the Ugandan context. The Ugandan civil war and legal framework relevant for the implementation of SCR 1325 will be presented before the chapter is ended with an introduction to the special features of women and gender issues in Ugandan politics.

3.1 UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK

3.1.0 GENDER AND PARTICIPATION IN THE UN CONTEXT
Since the formation of the UN, there has been a gradual formulation of an indirect and two-way strategy that has been used to advance women’s objectives. This relationship of collaboration has resulted in resolutions, recommendations and international conventions that are more advanced than those adopted on a national level (Pietilä, 2002). From a feminist perspective, the UN has been seen as a forum for discussing,
and gaining consensus for, gender equality long before these issues were discussed in the individual member countries (ibid.). Women’s rights are especially mentioned in the UN charter, and in 1947, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was established. In addition to being a part of the UN inter-governmental system, the CSW has also worked closely with various women’s NGOs. This contact has given women’s NGOs access to decision-making bodies in the UN. The close contact with the UN has also given the NGOs more strength and impact in relation to their own national governments (Pietilä, 2002).

In 1979 the single most important document on women’s rights was adopted with the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). However, when CEDAW was created, the particular problem of violence against women was overlooked, and consequently the convention does not include a single mention of it. Later on, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) was adopted in 1993. In the Beijing Platform for Action, which main purpose is the general empowerment of women, one of the key objectives is “the elimination of all forms of violence against women”,\(^\text{29}\) including violence against women and girls in armed conflicts. Through CEDAW and DEVAW the elimination of discrimination and violence against women has become part of international law, and thereby provide international recognized standards that can be used in for example peace operations (Kabeer, 2003).

The UN has called on all its member countries to set up national machineries for the advancement of women, defined as “the central policy-coordinating unit inside government. Its main task is to support government-wide mainstreaming of a gender-equality perspective in all policy areas”.\(^\text{30}\) These machineries, if established, have so far had limited effect (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002). There have, however, in the last decade evolved a broad recognition of the fact that women’s participation in all areas of societies is not only their legitimate right; it is also a social and political

\(^{29}\) The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995 (A/52/231)

necessity in making progress towards a more humane and sustainable future (Pietilä, 2002:45). However, as I have already mentioned, the rhetoric acceptance of women’s rights does not automatically result in the realisation of these rights. It can, in fact result in political relaxation and an idea of accomplishment (ibid.). Still, as Riano (1994) claims, among activists the acknowledgement of rights can serve as catalysts for action. Rise of awareness, possibilities for political pressure and the ideological recognition

3.1.1 UN SCR 1325

The UN charter gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. A Security Council resolution is a decision made by the Council on a specific theme.\footnote{The UN Charter (02.04.2006) [online] URL:www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html} Reports and studies that are endorsed through Security Council Resolutions usually represent the culmination of advocacy and effort by a range of pressure groups, academics, external researchers, policy institutions, community-based and international nongovernmental institutions, and other concerned authorities.

The UN’s encounter with and response to the issue of women, peace and security takes place within several bodies such as the Security Council (SC), the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). SCR 1325 and four subsequent presidential statements on women, peace and security provide a framework for action.\footnote{Report of the Secretary General on Women and Peace and Security, S/2005/636}

The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan admitted in his report launched in October 2004\footnote{S/ 2004/814} that even though there are positive trends, especially in the areas of knowledge and understanding of the specific problems women face in armed conflicts, the implementation of SCR 1325 moves slowly. However, progress is being made. In
September 2005 ten out of eighteen UN peacekeeping and political missions had a full-time gender adviser, and the rest had a gender focal point.  

A problem identified by both NGOs and the UN Secretary-General, related to the implementation of SCR 1325 is the lack of economic commitment, both at the national and international levels. Further, an ad hoc approach to the participation of women creates a lack of a generally acknowledged strategy for implementation. In addition, NGO-initiatives for implementation of SCR 1325 need to be recognised to a larger extent. Further, after key UN resolutions on gender and peacekeeping had been adopted, most notably SCR 1325, the so-called Brahimi-report, meant to reform UN Peacekeeping was launched (Bellamy et al, 2004: 75-76, 165-166). This report, almost completely disregarding the gendered aspects of peacekeeping operations, was a disappointment to all those engaged in gender mainstreaming in the UN (Olsson and Lindestam, 2003: 3-5).

Finally, the dependency on voluntary engagement regarding the implementation of UN resolutions is both a strength and a weakness in the case of SCR 1325. The weakness is that the adoption of such resolutions is not followed by any sanction mechanisms or proper funding for its implementation. A strength, however, is that the great engagement with SCR 1325 among several NGOs and activists world-wide results in attention and visibility. The UN Secretary-General has called on all member countries to develop policies, action plans, guidelines and indicators for the implementation of SCR 1325. Further, he urged the governments of the UN member states to support initiatives by women’s groups for implementation of SCR 1325.  

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3.2 THE UGANDAN CONTEXT

3.2.0 Modern Politics in Uganda

A brief outline of the main historical, political and legal features relevant for the understanding of the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda will now be given.

Uganda in East-Africa, bordering Kenya, Sudan, D. R Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania, has had problems with producing effective government in its independence period. The regime of Idi Amin (1971-1979), who gained power through a coup d’etat in 1971, was marked by serious instability and brutality. Amin’s regime proved catastrophic for Uganda’s political, social and economic development. He made little attempts to build institutions or links with the civil society in order to legitimize his government (Thomson, 2000: 133-138). The heritage from Amin’s period of rule was ‘one party’ rule and the military as a prominent player in Ugandan politics. The current president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled since 1986, gained power through an armed rebel group, the National Resistance Army (NRA). Uganda then moved from the ‘one-party’ system, to a ‘zero-party’ system, allowing in principle for several political parties, but putting severe restrictions on political and civil rights. The conditions improved after Museveni gained power (ibid.). However, the country has still proven unable to handle the problem of political power equating economic power and the strong link between military and political power. The government of Museveni has suffered from severe corruption scandals during the last decades (Byarugaba, 1998: 184). However, considerable political progress was made in February 2006, when multiparty elections were held for the first in twenty-six years. The elections came about after public demands for constitutional change (Onyango-Obbo, 2006).

The freedom of expression and organisation in today’s Uganda is relatively high. The country is considered a relative democracy by official observers from both the UN and the EU. Elections were conducted during my filed study, and the sitting president Yoweri Museveni won in what was deemed an unfair transition phase from a zero-
party to multi-party system, with unlevelled playing filed for the different presidential candidates, but a relatively fair and democratic election (EUs electoral observation report referred to in Daily Monitor 24th and 25th of February and in New Vision 24th and 25th of February). However, in Northern-Uganda there has been a civil War since the take-over of Yoweri Museveni and his political party National Resistance Movement (NRM).

3.2.1 The Civil War in Uganda
For more than twenty years there has been a more or less active civil war in Northern-Uganda, mainly between the rebels group The Lord Resistance Army (LRA), the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), Allied Democratic forces (ADF), and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), and the Government of Uganda forces (GOU). In addition a number of small guerrilla armies have been defeated by the GOU. Ugandan forces, both governmental and non-governmental, have also participated in the wars in D.R Congo (Zaire) and in Sudan (Byarugaba, 1998). The armed confrontations since the early 1980s, which followed the unstable and violent period of rule by Idi Amin, has led to severe human suffering and violation of human rights. The humanitarian conditions of the victims of war, people wounded, killed and otherwise harmed both physically and psychologically, are great challenges both to the government and the civil society in Uganda.38 Not least is the lack of cooperation between these fractions of the society a hinder for the achievement of enduring peace and stable development.39

The Ugandan civil war is Sub-Saharan Africa’s longest running war. It is fought mainly in the districts of Lira, Gulu and Kitgum. Today, the main parties of the war are the government army (GOU) and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). LRA is a conservative Christian army, whose original goal was a Christian theocracy with laws based on the Ten Commandments.40 However, LRA has developed a broader political

40 The Ten Commandments are from the Hebrew Scriptures, and have historically been accepted by Judaism, Christianity and Islam as the most important rules of behaviour that God expects of humanity. For a discussion
approach to their aim of rule in Uganda. Today, they define their goals as both seeking an end to the marginalisation of the Acholi people, and an end to the Museveni regime.\(^ {41}\)

Hopes are expressed that the peace process in Sudan will have a positive effect on the conflict in Uganda, as the LRA are losing the support they earlier received from the government in Khartoum. The Sudanese government supported the LRA to waken the government in Kampala who was accused of supporting the rebel movement in South-Sudan. After the peace agreement, the LRA has been officially forced to leave Sudan, but the rebel army still operates from bases in South-Sudan. The African Union (AU) has decided to engage more heavily in the Ugandan conflict. However, to what extent the AU can play an effective peacekeeping role is partly dependent on funding, which traditionally has been scarce. During the last official AU meeting (January, 2006), there were still serious financial obstacles to the realisation of the operations of AU forces in different African countries.\(^ {42}\)

The civil war has been characterized as a “dirty war” in which civilians are the principal victims of military violence. Civilians rather than soldiers are the tactical targets, and fear, brutality and murder are the foundation on which control is constructed\(^ {43}\) (Nordstrom, 1992: 261). The abduction of children, forcing them to fight or keeping them as slaves is common practice. In addition, sexual violence, rape and defilement\(^ {44}\) have been increasingly used weapons towards civilians, leading to, amongst others severe human suffering and an accelerating spread of HIV/Aids. Women and children have been deliberately targeted and experienced various forms of gender based violence. Also, women suffer largely from the humanitarian consequences of the conflict such as poverty, lack of education and the degrading

\(^{41}\)CSOPNU report, (30.03.2006) [online] URL: www.care.no/?module=Article.publicShow;d=1027;pa
\(^{43}\)CSOPNU report, (30.03.2006) [online] URL: www.care.no/?module=Article.publicShow;d=1027;pa
\(^{44}\)Defilement is sexual abuse of minors.
social and political structures\textsuperscript{45} (Isis-WICCE, 2004a,b,c, 2005b,). The situation for the civil population in North-Uganda has been claimed to be one of the worst crisis on the African continent, due to the continuous and cruel attacks by both government and rebel forces.\textsuperscript{46} In March 2006, Uganda had 1.7 million internally displaced refugees.\textsuperscript{47} Even though the most intense campaigns of abuses of civilians have been blamed on the LRA, the Ugandan government has also been accused of attacking civilians and blaming the attacks on the LRA (UNDP-report, Uganda, 23.12.05). Further, the government’s insistence on a military solution to the war, which so far has proven unsuccessful, has been strongly criticised. In fact, the government in February 2006 claimed that the war was over, and that it only remained some “cleaning up”, even though new figures show that death rates directly linked to the war in Northern-Uganda are severe. Furthermore, in spite of recent LRA calls for taking up the peace negotiations, the government has not responded to this initiative.\textsuperscript{48}

3.2.2 Legal Framework

Key documents which SCR 1325 build upon and relate to include the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women (1985), the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993), the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action and Beijing +5, and the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective on Multidimensional Peace Support Operations. Central initiatives include those developed by member states, the establishment and rulings of the ad-hoc international criminal tribunals, a series of reports by the secretary-general on issues of peace and security, and the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operation.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} Speech made by UN Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland, January 2004 OCHA/IRIN
\textsuperscript{47} Report from flyktninghjelpen in cooperation with Refugee Law Project at Makerere University, Kampala (available at: http://www.refugeelawproject.org/publications.htm)
\textsuperscript{48} Statements from the above mentioned UNDP report.
\textsuperscript{49} The UN framework is further and more profoundly discussed in Hilkka Pietilä (2002).
Uganda has guaranteed the equality of women through the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Ratification means to incorporate a convention, which the government has signed, in the national legal framework. Uganda has incorporated provisions from CEDAW into their constitution and national legislation (Anderlini et. al, 2006)

UN conventions are obligating and outline the framework for the national, political space of action (Chenoy and Vanaik, 2002). The conventions give basic norms which are to protect the individual from random assaults from the government. However, in spite of assuring fundamental human rights, they are not unlimited. The conventions also admit that the rights can be legally limited when it is found that this is necessary according to the national, democratically developed, legal framework and when the intention of the violation of one set of rights is to secure other rights which are considered more important (St.meld.nr.49, 203-2004: 41). Even so, in the Ugandan constitution article 36 it is stated that “Laws, cultures, traditions or customs working against women’s dignity, welfare or interest are prohibited by the constitution” (UHRC, 2005).

Finally, Uganda is a poor country and differs from e.g. Norway in both BNP and human development50. The Norwegian government launched an action plan for the implementation of SCR 1325 the 8th of March 200651, while Uganda has not yet produced or promised such a document. However, even though budgets are more limited in Uganda, politics is always to some degree a question of priorities, and the full implementation of SCR 1325 by the Ugandan government is an obligation the country has, both as a member of the UN and as a government responsive to needs and rights of its population.

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51 Published by the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs, 8th of March 2006.
3.2.3 Gender in Ugandan politics

As the general political access of women in Uganda is important for the discussion of women’s participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, a short account of women’s participation in Ugandan politics will now be given.

After Uganda became politically independent from Britain in 1962, women’s issues where for a long period handled as a sub-area by varying departments. The military government of Idi Amin banned all women’s organisations. Still, in 1978 the Ugandan Council of Women (NCW) was established. The NCW ran on a very limited budget within the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. NCW focused its efforts mainly in a top-down-manner of cooperation with different grassroots women’s organisations and groups (Kwesiga, 2003). There was a general tendency to handle women’s issues with a welfare approach, and the limited capacity of NCW can be illustrated by a comparison to the neighbouring countries of Tanzania and Kenya during the same period. The attention brought to women’s rights during the UN Women’s Decade from 1975-85 proved, on a contrary to Uganda, quite successful in the Tanzania and Kenya in terms of improving women’s conditions.52

However, the current president Musevni has activated the women’s machinery through the democratization process, economic reform and structural adjustment policies introduced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Kwesiga, 2003). In 1998 the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) was established. However, the constantly changing structure of the ministry and the assumption that gender issues are addressed through issues of social development, not as an issue of its own, has made gender mainstreaming a complicated task in Uganda (ibid.). Yet, several independent women’s organisations have been established during the last decade (Guma, 2001). The country has a progressive and gender sensitive constitution which is quite unique on the African continent (ibid.). What is

52 Reports from the World Bank on the economic contribution of women show that women in Kenya and Tanzania experienced greater economic achievements than women in Uganda. Further, a large number of women from several different women’s groups in Tanzania and Kenya attended the 1985 UN World Conference to Review and Apprise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women, compared with only a small, official delegation from Uganda (Kwesiga, 2003:220).
continuously discussed publicly, however, is the lack of realisation of the intentions of the constitution, for which the government must take a great deal of the responsibility (Isis-WICCE, 2005b, Isis-WICCE 2004d, Daily Monitor March 8th 2004).

Finally, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are addressing the explicit commitment to both poverty reduction and gender equality by various international and national actors, including Uganda (Kabeer, 2003: 204). In official UN evaluations of PRSPs, however, it is reported that there is in general little attention paid to gender inequalities in voice, power and influence (ibid.). However, it is worth mentioning that in general the PRSPs are heavily influenced by international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Kabeer (2003: 211) argues that “[i]n fact, the treatment of gender in the PRSPs is entirely consistent with the practices – as opposed to the rhetoric- of the World Bank”. As we shall see in the next chapter, this also accounts for the Ugandan PRSP.

3.2.4 Official initiatives for gender equality and the roles of NGOs
Women’s representation in parliament in Uganda is guaranteed by separate elections for women MPs, securing one female representative from each district. It is argued, however that in reality there is a gap between official initiatives for the advancement of women in Uganda and the actions taken to realise them (Kwesiga, 2003, Isis-WICCE, 2004a,b,c).

MGLSD’s central role is to ensure that the national development process in Uganda is gender responsive. Among its responsibilities is the monitoring of various policy implementations (Isis-WICCE 2005a: 11, and 18-19). However, in spite of this commitment by the Ugandan government to gender equality, there are still several obstacles at the political level. The funding for women’s participation in the public life in general, and also in the area of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, is weak (ibid.). Further, it has been argued that the mandate of MGLSD is unclear and that there is a lack of trained human resources to carry out the monitoring and evaluation of gender mainstreaming in Uganda. Still, in spite of constraints, Joy C. Kwesiga, former Dean

53 Report on Women and Elections (23.03.2006) [online] URL: www.humanrightshouse.org/dllvis5.asp?id=4262
of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Makerere University in Kampala, claims that “[…] an important achievement of MGLSD is that it has legitimized gender. The gender variable is progressively forming part of public decisions” (authors emphasis) (Kwesiga, 2003: 215). Furthermore, the various networks of NGOs in Uganda are important because they do represent a channel for political influence (ibid.). Thus, it appears that there is space for both introducing gender issues and demands for gender equality, and an arena for women’s organisations and activists in Uganda.

3.2.5 SCR 1325 in Uganda
I consider three points made in SCR 1325 especially relevant for my research question. First, in the introduction, the Security Council;

“[Reaffirms] the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution”.

Second, the Security Council;

“Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict”.

Third, the Security Council;

“Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: […] (b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements”.

Thus, in my analyses of my informants’ strategies for engendering the processes for conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Northern-Uganda, I consider especially

54 UNSC 1325 point introduction and point 1 and 8b, see appendix 2.
relevant the elements of (1) an integration of a gender perspective in all aspects of peacebuilding processes, (2) the right of women and girls to participate in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and, (3) the inclusion of local women’s groups in this work.

3.3 SUMMARY
In this chapter I have outlined the context of my analyses. I started with exploring the approaches to gender within the UN and the special features of SCR 1325. Then, I gave an introduction of the political development in Uganda the last decades. Women and their roles in Ugandan politics were presented as well as the legal framework relevant for the realisation of women’s rights in Uganda. We saw that there is indeed a space both for NGOs and the articulation of demands for gender equality in the public sphere in Uganda, even though this space may not be fully concurred yet. Finally, I pointed out which parts of SCR 1325 I consider especially relevant for my discussions.

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSES

4.0 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I will discuss the main features of the official and unofficial bodies’ engagement in the realisation of SCR 1325 in Uganda. Further, I will discuss my understanding of the initiatives for implementation by my informants from a feminist perspective. The issues of power and security will also be elaborated. Finally, I will discuss how the strategies of my informants may work to challenge the UN discourse on gender. However, before moving on to the analyses, my informants in Uganda will be briefly presented.

4.1 PRESENTATION OF INFORMANTS
Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE)
My main cooperation organisation in Uganda was Isis WICCE. The organisation has a long tradition with work on women’s rights in general and women’s rights in conflict in particular, both nationally, regionally and internationally. Isis WICCE is a non-governmental, global, action oriented resource centre which was established in Geneva Switzerland in 1974. The aim was to promote justice and the fundamental rights of women through documenting women’s realities. In 1993, Isis-WICCE relocated to
Uganda to bring African women’s concerns to the global agenda. The organisation offers women activists working in the area of human rights, armed conflict and peacebuilding an opportunity to develop their skills by using the human rights framework for advocacy and sustainable peacebuilding. Isis-WICCE is concerned with using international, regional and national mechanisms built in international, regional and national instruments. The main framework for their work is CEDAW, UN Security Council SCR 1325, International Humanitarian law, the International Criminal Tribunals and other relevant rights-enhancing documents (Isis-WICCE, 2005a).

_Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET)_
UWONET is an advocacy and lobbying network of Ugandan NGOs and individuals, operating in Uganda. UWONET is Non-Governmental. The vision of the group is to “[…] have a peaceful Uganda free of wars, gender violence and all forms of discrimination and uphold human rights and the principles of gender equity and equality” Further, a main goal is to “open up a democratic space for women’s groups in Uganda” (UWONET, 2005). The organisation works towards both political bodies, law enforcement structures, religious and cultural leaders, mainly with policy advocacy, networking and information collection and capacity building (ibid.). Isis-WICCE and EASSI is a member of UWONET.

_The Eastern African Sub-Regional Support for the Advancement of Women (EASSI)_
EASSI is a sub-regional NGO established in 1996 to facilitate systematic follow up of the Platform for Action emanating from the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, 1995. EASSI is a collaboration networks committed to the advancement of women. The vision of the organisation is a “society where all enjoy equality, social justice, peace and development” (EASSI, 2005). EASSI has special consultative status with ECOSOC and the main programme implementation strategies are reasearch and documentation, advocacy, networking and information sharing and capacity building (ibid.).
**MS Uganda**

MS Uganda is a Danish NGO working with development and democratisation. The organisation does not demand a specific gender policy of its NGO partners, but continuously launches educational and supportive campaigns for the development of gender awareness with its local Ugandan partners (MS Uganda, 2001).

**Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC)**

UHRC is a government appointed commission for the surveillance of the conditions of the UN Human Rights in Uganda. The commission is independent and performs constitutional functions. Its constitutional mandate is to investigate alleged violations of Human Rights. Annual reports of the conditions of the Human Rights in Uganda are officially published and are meant to be guiding for the governments work. UHRC cooperates with different NGOs. The commission has its own gender adviser, and aims at gender mainstreaming throughout all its work (UHRC, 2005).

**Sudan Human Rights Association (SHRA)**

SHRA is an independent NGO working to secure the respect for Human Rights of refugees both in Northern-Uganda and Southern Sudan. The vision of SHRA is to monitor the empowerment of refugees. The organisation works with advocacy, documentation and spread of information to refugees on their constitutionally guaranteed Human Rights. The organisation does not operate with a particular gender focal point (SHRA, 2005).

**Other relevant informants**

Makerere University in Kampala has a Department of Gender sponsored by Norad. My contacts at the university were both academically and personally engaged in the task of improving the realisation of women’s rights. The Makerere University employees was often referred to or writing themselves, in the media. Further, they

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55 The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)
where generally known to be, both in the media and in research, outspoken and critical towards the government of Uganda and other power-holders.\textsuperscript{56}

In addition, I met with and interviewed students at Makerere, two journalists from the newspaper Daily Monitor, one journalist from the state owned newspaper New Vision, representatives from UNDP Uganda, and had contact via e-mail and telephone with the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development.

\textbf{4.2 IMPLEMENTATION ACTORS IN UGANDA}

Implementation, as outlined in chapter two, is broadly speaking the translation of goals into actual results. It was pointed out that the reality of the implementation process is not merely translation of policies into practice, but rather an ongoing process where several differing actors have a saying.

Different reasons for the lack of attention on gender issues and women’s participation in Ugandan politics were suggested by my informants. Lack of funding, lack of a broader structural framework for the implementation of gender related policies and the lack of a political commitment were the most commonly mentioned. In addition, concerns were expressed that there is not enough political or public focus on the fact that Uganda is a country in war. In the richer southern part of the country, the war is seldom discussed in public. During the political campaigns in February 2006, the war was not a main topic, which, according to journalist Charles Onyango-Obbo (Daily Monitor, 17.02.2006), can be used as a mirror of peoples general engagements. Interviewees from Makerere University explained that the southern population was most represented in the media and engaged in politics, while the northern population was, as one professor expressed it “merely busy creating themselves a livelihood and possibilities to survive”. Thus, when presenting the scarce political initiatives for implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda below, it is worth mentioning that the public attention on these issues seemed scarce as well.

\textsuperscript{56} Information form my informants and from employees at the University of Bergen who cooperates with Makerere. Further, articles over the last five years, collected from the newspaper archives of the two largest newspapers in Uganda were supporting this characterisation.
4.2.1 Official policy in Uganda and implementation of SCR 1325

The Uganda Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) does under both the Governance and the Conflict Pillars touch upon various elements of relevance to SCR 1325. Among these are the rights of Internally Displaced People (IDP) which lies under the Conflict Pillar, and access to justice, which lies under the Governance Pillar. However, as women’s particular situation during armed conflict is not specifically mentioned, their protection is weakened in the implementation of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) (UHRC, 2005). The PEAP Pillar 3 on Conflict is, however, new and its actual operationalization may leave room for specially targeting women. At least, representatives from the UNDP office in Kampala and the MGLSD claimed that the policy framework was broad enough to potentially allow an inclusion of the special targeting of women.

Further, the Ugandan National Internally Displaced People Policy (2004) is the most important current Ugandan policy framework for engaging with women in war-affected areas. This document is, according to the gender adviser at the UNDP in Uganda, weak in terms of the particular needs of women and girls both at policy, i.e. the objectives and clauses, and implementation levels, i.e. structures for implementation of the policy. At national level there is no significant role for the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development and at district level the same applies for the District Gender Officer. As with the PRSP and PEAP, the Ugandan National IDP Policy is also fairly new and broad enough to allow for a process of engendering it. For example, after its initial implementation, lessons learned can be derived and applied for later implementation stages.

Finally, both UNDP and UNIFEM are currently initiating support to the Government of Uganda through MGLSD to address sexual and gender based violence in the conflict areas in Northern-Uganda. Further, both UNDP and UNIFEM are discussing a partnership with the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

57 UN Report (11.04.06) [online] URL: www.undp.or.ug/poverty.htm
58 Information gained through e-mail and interviews.
59 Interview via telephone with representatives from UNDP and Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, 12-16 February 2006.
(OHCHR) in promotion and protection of Human Rights in Northern-Uganda. This collaboration will explicitly address the implementation of SCR 1325. Still, when it comes to the official Uganda the current status of SCR 1325 is weak. Even though there are several policies allowing for an inclusion of gender perspectives in the future, this has not yet been officially initiated.\(^6^0\)

Even though there seems to be a lack of current official commitment to implementation of SCR 1325, different parts of the civil society in Uganda are constantly laying pressure on the official bodies in order to be included in the making and the implementation of all state policies, including those concerning women, peace and security (EASSI, 2005b). As we saw in chapter three, the Security Council encourages member states to establish regular contact with local women’s groups and networks in countries and regions of conflict to utilize their knowledge of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls. NGOs in Uganda are instrumental in demands for peace talks, negotiation and operationalization of the constitution. Following is an analysis of their work for the implementation of SCR 1325.

### 4.2.2 Activists and implementation of SCR 1325

My informants from Isis-WICCE, EASSI and UWONET agreed that there is a contradiction between the declared official discourse of gender equality and women’s rights in Uganda, and analyses, made by among others themselves and other non-governmental actors, of continuous and persistent working inequalities (Isis-WICCE, 2004a, EASSI, 2002, UWONET, 2006). In other words, there is an implementation failure in realising women’s rights. There was a general agreement among my informants that gender is often shuffled aside when other political concerns appear. However, implementation is, as we saw in chapter two, not necessarily merely happening at the top-levels of politics. The contribution from non-political bodies of the society can be considerable as well. Indeed, as I shall argue, my findings suggest that in spite of the lack of political engagement, there is an ongoing process of realisation of SCR 1325 in Uganda.

\(^{60}\) Interview with representatives from the UNDP office in Kampala, Uganda.

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I chose two main indicators which I looked for in my research on the work for realisation of SCR 1325 in Uganda. The indicators are chosen on the background of suggestions for strategies for implementing SCR 1325 made by the Secretary-General of the UN, by the UN Security Council, in the independent assessment report by Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (2002), and in the shadow report by NWGWPS (2005), all of which were presented in the introduction.

First, I looked for their initiatives for increasing women’s participation in politics and decision-making in general and in the area of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in particular. Second, I looked for the organisations’ and activists’ contribution to spreading knowledge on either the resolution itself, or topics relating to the content of the resolution. These two strategies were not approached as two different areas of action, but rather as parts of a holistic approach for gaining inclusion of women, and the realisation of women’s rights in conflict, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. I have, however, chosen to discuss them in two separate sections in order to maintain some analytical clarity. This is not to say that the spreading of knowledge was not a strategy for increasing women’s participation and vice versa. Finally, I have not attempted to make any assessment of the quality of the methods and strategies applied by the women’s organisations and activists. Neither have I tried to measure their consequences. My intention is to understand the actual strategies applied by my informants, and their reasoning for these strategies, when analysing these methods in light of theoretical understandings of women’s participation, women’s organisation and bottom-up strategies for implementation.

4.2.3 Strategies for increasing women’s participation
As seen in the literature review, women’s organisations are often placed outside official decision-making processes. My informants in Uganda make no exception to this rule, even though some of them were closer to official decision-making bodies than others. As they stated themselves, their level of action is the informal and civil. They experience this level of action as important. Indeed, one interviewee from the Isis-WICCE network said; “whatever is being done with the implementation [of SCR 1325] is being done by the civil society”. In fact, informants at Isis-WICCE put
emphasis on the possibilities, rather than restrictions, which rests in creating and acting in a space where the government was not active. Further, informants from EASSI emphasised the importance of operating in simultaneous processes directed towards both the grassroots level and the national, regional and international bodies. The reason for these parallel processes was, as they said, the need to keep up the pressure up-wards. Further, the work towards the grassroots was important, because as an UWONET informant stated “the real implementation is at the grassroots. Our politics [lobbying] is mostly for facilitating our grassroots training”

All my informants engaged at some level in the struggle to increase women’s participation in higher decision-making bodies. They defined the work for women’s increased participation as two parallel processes; both striving for direct representation where women are recruited as professional politicians, and the increased influence of women’s groups and activists, and acknowledgement of the importance of women’s issues, by decision-making bodies. These strategies for women’s participation can, as I understand them, be equalled with the official strategies for gender equality in the UN of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming.

Regarding gender balancing, two major problems were emphasised. First, women were underrepresented in all political bodies. Second, in spite of politics of affirmative action and some representation of women in higher political bodies, all my informants, with no exception, expressed dissatisfaction with the gender focus of female politicians. One representative from UWONET expressed her dissatisfaction as following; “being a women MP [Member of Parliament] unfortunately does not mean being gender sensitive”. And further, “Women in parliament are not taking gender serious”. However responding to this problem, Isis-WICCE, EASSI and UWONET engaged in “training” of women MPs. Through workshops and educational seminars, the NGOs engaged in creating gender awareness among women MPs.

I will return, then to Iris Marion Young’s argument presented in chapter two, that the exclusion of women is not merely a question of power and influence, but also a
question of including women’s experiences, perspectives and identities in the public life. I understand the gender training of women MPs arranged by the women NGOs as a strategy for adding experiences, perspectives and identities of women, when power and some amount of influence is already gained through affirmative action. Thus, I suggest that the strategy for increasing women’s participation and, at the same time women’s perspectives, through women MPs, is a combination of inclusion from below and inclusion from above. The women NGOs acts to, both pressure for the realisation of increased number of women in politics, and assuring that these women are adding a gender perspective once the power positions are secured. To what extent one can expect a female politician to add a gender perspective to politics was not discussed to a large extent by my informants. When I asked them if it was reasonable to expect female politicians to be “loyal” to a general group of women, both EASSI and Isis-WICCE informants said that training women MPs actually worked. Further, looking at this from a power-perspective, Hannah Arendt’s argument that power is the ability to act in concert could, if not explain, then at least support the demands my informant put on the women MPs. As I understood them, they saw the women MPs as possible channels for gaining political power. And they acted on that possibility.

Further, another method for increasing women’s participation and gender-awareness in the official politics was through the launching of reports and holding of public meetings. The goal was defined as above, both increasing women’s participation in general, and making sure that the women actually represented in politics were “the right types of women”.

There was agreement on the need for a separate ministry for gender and increased budgets for this ministry. Severe dissatisfaction was expressed with gender being included in the MGLSD, and the low budgets this ministry, and particularly gender issues within the ministry, received. Indeed, the topic of budgets was mentioned continuously. Informants from SHRA, UWONET, EASSI and Isis-WICCE said that they lacked funding internally to apply all the strategies for the realisation of women’s rights in Northern-Uganda to the extent that they wanted. Also, it was stated that
funding necessary to meet the general needs of the population in the conflict areas in Uganda was far from satisfying. One informant from SHRA said; “We must create the understanding that the rights of people are not being realised because resources of different character are missing. We need communication between providers and receivers, and common understanding of the others situation”

Regarding participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Northern-Uganda, the strategy of gender mainstreaming in all Ugandan politics, it was argued, would if successful result in a gender sensitive approach to the resolution of the conflict in the North. However, the near total breakdown of both legal and social structures in Northern-Uganda complicates the mainstreaming process. Putting pressure on local decision-making institutions was articulated as difficult, because these institutions ran on very limited budgets and mandates with a rapidly decreasing public legitimacy. This was pointed out as an obstacle to the work for both gender mainstreaming and gender balancing. The absence of proper political and social structures limited the outreach of the strategies for gender equality. I understand this as an example of how the implementation processes initiated by my informants in Uganda is hampered due to the lack of a democratic and stable political environment. As argued in chapter two, these features are set to be the framework needed for successful implementation of policies.

UHRC, who where closely linked to the government, also claimed that they adopted the strategy of gender mainstreaming when handling the issue of violation of women’s rights in the areas of conflict in Northern-Uganda. SHRA approached gender as “an interconnected issue, not a specific one”. None of the informants from neither UHRC, nor SHRA had heard of SCR 1325. However, they were working with the realisation of parts of the content of the resolution such as engaging in the protection of women’s human rights (WHR) in Northern-Uganda. Further, UHRC, in their annual report to the government of Uganda, stresses the importance of adopting a gender perspective on the violations of WHR in the North. Indeed, one of their main, constitutionally given functions, is to handle cases of the violations of WHR. Still, the statistics
presented in the same report shows almost no reported violations of WHR in the conflict areas of Uganda (UHRC, 2005). As I have already mentioned, there are severe violations of WHR in Northern-Uganda. This indicates that there are some inconsistency between the goals and the practice of the UHRC. I argue that this is an example of a gap between official rhetoric on the protection of women’s rights, and official practice. In other words, what was labelled implementation failure in chapter two.

Both the gender adviser in UHRC and the security adviser in the UNDP Uganda mentioned Betty Bigombe as an example of women’s participation in the peace process. She was appointed head negotiator in the now stalled peace negotiations between the government of Uganda and the LRA. However, my informants did not agree upon whether she added a gender perspective to the peace process. One informant from Makerere University said “yes, people saw that she was a woman, this is important for the representation. But she did not add a gender perspective to the negotiations”. This argument is in line with the general claim made by several of my informants that women in higher positions did not provide gender perspectives to the politics. Thus, adding to the reasoning for working for both increased participation of women at all political levels, and increased awareness of the gender aspects of politics among both women and men.

4.2.4 Spreading Knowledge
All my informants were engaged in dissemination of information on SCR 1325 or topics related to the content of the resolution. The spreading of knowledge was aimed at both grassroots women in the area of conflict, Ugandan politicians and the general public. The defined aim of the awareness raising differed among the target groups. Among the grassroots women, the goal was to empower them and strengthen their ability to demand the realisation of their rights, and their ability to participate in processes where they were currently marginalised. Among the general public, the aim was to create public pressure for political change, with the realisation of women’s rights and ability to participate as the overall goal.
Knowledge-spreading among the grassroots in Northern-Uganda was approached with different strategies. The reasoning was that creation of awareness would lead to demands for realisation of rights, and ability to participate in decision-making processes related to their future and development. As I shall discuss in more depth below, it was argued that increased knowledge was a strategy for empowering women living in the conflict areas. How this empowerment of women was best achieved was defined as one of the main challenges by all my informants.

Methods of communication applied were videos, internet, workshops, reports, and communicating to the grassroots through key persons. The training of key persons was pinpointed as a productive method. Through educating one woman in each group of around twenty to thirty women, the hope was that she would “spread the word”. Articulated and leader-type women in the camps were chosen and educated in women’s rights in conflict and how these were guaranteed through commitments made by the government. Further, much emphasis was put on creating trust among the women. The traumas of war were severe with the women in the groups of Internally Displaced People (IDP), and a precondition for spreading knowledge was that they trusted those who tried to educate them on their rights.

Regarding trust, however, all my informants were what I choose to characterise as elite activists. They were educated, literate and had economic security. In addition, even though some of my informants engaged in activities for the realisation of women’s rights on their spare time, most had it as their profession. Remembering the categorisation in chapter two between elite and grassroots activists, elite women’s organisations in poor countries are often accused of not taking into consideration features such as class and ethnicity which can leave women from different levels of the society with little in common. I acknowledge this as a possible limitation in my informants work for the implementation of SCR 1325. However, interestingly my informants mentioned this possible limitation themselves, but claimed that they still, in spite of class differences had something in common and at stake in conflict situations.
and resolutions as women. I will discuss this from the perspective of radical feminism below.

Furthermore, in order to close a possible gap between my informants and the IDP women, often lacking basic education, an effort was made in communicating in an understandable language. This would mean not using difficult words and phrases such as for example “convention” and “resolution”. Isis-WICCE used two “translated” version of SCR 1325. One was in Swahili, and the other was in what they called “everyday language”. In addition, they engaged in explaining the rights orally to those who could not read. As one Isis-WICCE informant said “we bring the resolution [SCR 1325] to their homes so to speak”. Communicating the message through theatre and dance is also applied as additional forms of communication. As one informant from EASSI said; “We come to them in their homes and their arenas. We must communicate with them in ways they understand; otherwise we are creating distance between us and them, and are no better than the politicians”. Thus, the use of alternative methods of communication and applying knowledge of the local conditions was strategies my informants applied in their work to spread knowledge.

In terms of understanding my informants as implementation agents, it is interesting to see how they insisted on the strength in their own, untraditional methods for communication on SCR 1325. As seen in the theoretical discussion of implementation, it was argued that one could see implementation in terms of the negotiation of approaches. My informants admitted that when they communicated women’s rights through a play or a song, they met both sceptical and patronising reactions from external, often male, actors. Nevertheless, they insisted on the value of these methods and claimed that they were useful for the women they wanted to reach. I see this as an example of a multi-focus approach to implementation by my informants.

The content of the information was a further topic of discussion. It was emphasised that women in the conflict areas needed to be taught both how to understand conflict and how to respond to it. The operationalization of skills was emphasised. In the
handbook Pillars of Peace (2004), made by Isis-WICCE, the theme is how to strengthen women’s roles as peace builders. One objective of the book is to enable women leaders in the districts and community level to acquire skills of managing conflict and violence. Such skills are exemplified as communication, mediation and using positive approaches to both small and larger conflicts. Such positive approaches would mean to analyse the possible solutions of the conflict with a perspective of synergies. Thus, the idea was to avoid a zero-sum understanding of conflict and rigid roles and negative consequences of labelling people and groups as either winners or losers.

Another method for knowledge-spreading was to use the media actively in the struggle for putting political pressure on the government to increase the resources and measures taken to reconstruct the local institutions in the North. By going through the archives of the two biggest newspapers in Uganda, during the five years since the adoption of SCR 1325, I found that several of my informants, both organisations and individuals, had used the newspapers to create public awareness on the situation of women in Northern-Uganda. On the days before and after the international Women’s day (8th March), the UN day (24th October) and the day of the adoption of the resolution (31st October) there were several both news articles, columns and readers letters describing the situation of women in the Ugandan conflict, referring to SCR 1325 and calling for political action. Examples are;

“Women activists officially expressed concerns over the plight of women and girls living in North-Uganda. Claiming that the government had failed to implement the protective framework for women and girls provided for in the Constitution and in international agreements and conventions. […]UNIFEM adviser on governance, peace and security, Anne-Marie Goetz said that what were needed were political and institutional changes in order to boost the number of women in politics” (Article by Patrick Jaragomi, New Vision 7th February, 2006).
And:

“UWONET demands sensibility towards women’s situation in the north. Females’ development is dependent on the recognition of their roles in the conflict” (Chronicle by UWONET, Daily Monitor, 8th March 2003).

Media as an arena for the creation of public awareness was emphasised by informants from EASSI, UWONET, Isis-WICCE, SHRA and representatives from Makerere as a much used strategy. This was also my personal experience when going through the archives. Through the media they both criticised the government’s treatment, or lack of such, of gender issues, and created attention on their own work on these issues. As one representative from UWONET said “we are gender watchdogs”. However, both EASSI and UWONET informants claimed that direct criticising of the government in the media would harm their future possibility for cooperation with and influence over official bodies. One representative from UWONET explained;

“We handle the hardest matters internally; we do not want to put different parties up against each other. Then we loose our trust and their will to participate. We do this to get the information we want. They give it to us if they know we are sensitive. These are very sensitive times, you know. The politicians can easily blame us if they feel we are asking critical questions and they later experience a loss of votes. But that does not mean that you become too, what shall I say? Weak! We care not for empty policies, and that accounts for all parties and official bodies”

Thus, the pressure laid on politicians is moderated by a concern for future abilities to cooperate with official bodies. Uncensored critique of the power-holders is sacrificed for their continued good-will and cooperation. This, they argued, would put them closer to the centres of power, contesting the theoretical understanding of women’s organisations being in the peripheries of power. However, there is arguably a balance between moving closer to power without loosing the organisational goals of being a gender watchdog, struggling for full gender equality in Uganda. Returning to the theories on women NGOs, I argue that even though some of my contact NGOs had evidently overcome the placement of their groups outside official processes and moved closer to the power-centres, this was not an unproblematic move. Indeed, their
closeness to the power-holders seemed to somewhat restrict the sharpness in their criticism of the same power-holders.

4.2.5. Production of reliable data
Both representatives and documents produced by EASSI put emphasis on the need to produce scientifically valuable data on women’s situation in the North in order to gain broader acceptance of their work. EASSI has recently initiated production of gender sensitive statistics on several development variables among women living in the conflict areas in Northern-Uganda. Collecting gender-sensitive statistics is, as seen in chapter two, in line with what different researchers call for when criticising the lack of attention to women’s roles and participation in conflicts and conflict resolution. EASSI-representatives argued in consent with this and claimed that gender-sensitive statistics would be very useful in their work. Statistical data showing the unequal distribution of resources, spare-time and abilities to participate among women and men would make it easier for them to apply for resources to continue, and expand, their projects for gender equity and equality in Northern-Uganda. Further, if the government was presented with “hard facts” as one EASSI-representative called it, it would be more difficult to ignore the great inequalities. She explained;

“If an insignificant person, like me say to them [the politicians] ‘hey, women suffer, do you hear me’, they turn the other way. If I show them the hard facts [statistics] and say ‘Excuse me, you are obligated by the constitution to act on this’, I have a grip on them”

Further, the production of gender sensitive statistics was described as follows;

“First, we produce the statistics. We collect them by using accepted scientific methods. Then, our data must be accepted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Then we can apply for money to do a national study. Then we have a strong foundation for advocating for WHR [Women’s Human Rights]. We need concrete data to advocate for their [the women in the conflict areas] rights. In order to be taken seriously, to gain strength behind our demands”.

Last, arguing from the perspective of the women included in the research project, she claimed that;
“If we tell them [IDP women] they are treated unequal [from the men], they think I am just a wise city-girl. If I show them the numbers, they really get it”

Thus, the statistics would be a tool both for putting pressure upwards and for educating grassroots women. It would, however, also work as a tool for convincing the subjects they worked towards at the grassroots that they were working for them. In other words, the statistics could help closing the above mentioned gap between elite networks and grassroots women. Other organisations and contacts at the Makerere University also emphasised the importance of producing strong, scientifically accepted data on the situation of Ugandan women in the conflict areas. There was a common understanding of this being necessary in order to be taken seriously both nationally and internationally.

To sum up, there were several strategies applied by women’s organisations and activists in Uganda which can be described as parts of bottom-up strategies for implementation. I have discussed two indicators of implementation; the work for increased participation of women in decision-making and spreading knowledge of women’s rights in conflicts. My informants argued that there are strong initiatives for implementation of SCR 1325 on the NGO level.

4.3 FEMINIST PROJECTS
In this chapter, I will discuss how the work of the NGOs and activists whom I interviewed can be understood as feminist projects. The starting point of this feminist analysis was to ask if and how my informants engaged in analysing hegemonic structures of power and institutions. The next question was how they approached patriarchal structures which left women in Uganda in general, and in the conflict areas in Northern-Uganda in particular, marginalised.

4.5.1 A broader definition of security
Isis-WICCE, SHRA and UWONET all emphasised the need to mainstream an expanded concept of peace and security including a gender aspect. They argue that differences in subordination and experiences between men and women need recognition. The concept of security is important in this context, as it is a precondition
for the empowerment of women and the realisation of WHR in general. In order to increase the agency of women in Northern-Uganda, the concept of security needed to comprehend more than just absence of direct violence. A broadened, positive definition of security was promoted. One strategy applied was to teach, and discuss with, both women and men the various roles women actually did have in the conflict. One way of showing these different roles was through theatre and role-plays. To realise the various roles women in reality had was a challenge for both men and women in the conflict-zones, because it meant that the reasoning for treating women as merely victims would be challenged. Several of my informants told me that especially men had difficulties with this, because they felt it disturbed their image of themselves as strong and protective.

However, my informants argued that even discussing gender roles in conflict was challenging the patriarchal structures which in the first place had informed the hegemonic rigid and exclusive definition of security. They further defined the mainstreaming of a new definition of security as a long term goal. In addition, one woman from SHRA argued that their struggle for learning both women and men about their human rights which expanded the question of security to concern economic and social rights as well, was also a strategy for broadening the definition of security. The reasoning was that if people could see how all these other aspects of life where limited by lack of security, they would also demand that the government guaranteed them security that was more than just absence of arms.

This was defined as a difficult task. However, I see the links made between security and social and economic rights to be in line with theoretical considerations on the content of a broadened security concept, matching feminist demands in IR. In addition, and this is perhaps natural as many of my informants worked within a UN conceptual framework, I see the reasoning as compatible with the essence of the UN human security discourse.
4.3.2 Feminist conceptualisation of power

In relation to the feminist conceptualisation of power, I find arguments presented to me by two professors at Makerere University interesting. They claimed that a restriction to the work with empowering women in the conflict areas was what they called “cultural unwillingness” to morally support activities by women outside the home sphere. The ideology underpinning the dominant discourse of women’s roles was, as they explained it, informed by very restrictive gender-roles. One concrete result of this was the fact that women were culturally confined to the private space, and found it difficult to come out and participate in workshops and other arrangements held by my informants. Returning to the theoretical discussion of power in chapter two, I see this argument as an example of culturally or ideological anchored norms which inhabit a denial of the unjust aspect of power inequalities which, in this case results in gender inequalities. As my informants said, the “cultural unwillingness” to support initiatives for gender equality, was maintained by both women and men. The many protests against my informant’s engagement in producing counter-discourses on women’s roles in the society were, as they said, exhausting because of the severe rejections of the counter-discourses. These are, as I understand them, examples of obstacles to gaining political strength for women. Consequently, reluctance to morally support the initiatives of my informants is restricting the strategies they apply for implementing SCR 1325.

Nevertheless, the production of counter-discourses challenging the dominating social and political discourse means to challenge the hegemonic structures of the society. Through criticising structures in the society and claiming that they marginalise women, my informants engage in labelling the hegemonic structures of power and institutions as patriarchal. As shown in chapter two, this is compatible with a critical feminist approach to the change of gender inequalities.

Returning to the aspect of empowerment from a feminist perspective, my informants argued for different strategies for challenging patriarchal structures. They claimed that basic empowerment of women is a necessity for the ability to demand that their basic
needs are met. It was drawn a link between economic empowerment and social and political empowerment. Needs like food, water, shelter and security, is fundamental for the ability of women to make choices for themselves. This ability to make choices is what in chapter two was called “agency”. As seen in the literature review, empowerment was set as a precondition for participation, which was understood in terms of control and ownership. Keeping in mind the transformative aspect of empowerment, the engagement in empowering women in Northern-Uganda can also be understood as a strategy for participation as discussed above. This shows how the different aspects of the strategies are interlinked.

Furthermore, the strive for empowerment of marginalised women in Northern-Uganda is a way of challenging status quo, and thus the existing power relations. It seemed to be possible to create attention, both among the women themselves and in the general public, to the inequalities experienced by women because of their gender. Then, even though contested, the women engaged in changing these inequalities. I understand this as a way of challenging the patriarchal structures of the Ugandan society which currently leaves women marginalised.

Empowerment was generally focused on IDP women. Returning once again to Young’s argument that women can be included through empowerment, the arguments of my informants was much in line with this. However, my informants from Isis-WICCE were differing from Young in their understanding of why this mechanism would work. While Young argues that the organisation of social groups will strengthen the group identity, and thus empower the women in the group, Isis-WICCE claimed that their target subjects of empowerment were unorganised women outside women’s groups. While some women at the grassroots levels organised in groups, they were not the only ones defined by my informants as target-subjects for the empowerment strategies. Thus, engaging in empowerment of women, but not necessarily including them in their own group or motivate them to start new groups.
Rather, the argument was that empowerment would enable women to participate in
general decision-making processes in their local community, and therefore both single-
subject empowerment and group-subject empowerment were considered fruitful
approaches to the problem of exclusion of women. I did see a similarity with Young’s
reasoning in my informants claim that women’s perspectives and experiences must be
integrated in the political and social sphere through a challenge of the dominating
political discourse in order to alter the exclusion-dilemma. They also agreed in the
possibility of women functioning as a political group, arguing in a radical feminist
manner, as I will discuss below.

However, they did not completely agree with the idea that organisation of social
groups would only strengthen the group identity. They argued that women’s
participation and increased power could happen both through group organisation, and
through empowerment of the individual woman. Then, the goal was merely
strengthening this person and her agency. I see this argument as conflicting with
Hannah Arendt’s understanding of power as the ability to act in concert. If women can
be empowered without acting in or through a group, power must be an ability available
to the individual as well as the group. However, the synergies of women acting
together in groups were not denied. Indeed, it was agreed that in order to strengthen
women’s position it would be effective to act together, or as Arendt calls it, to “act in
contact”. However, this was not the only possibility for women to gain power.

4.3.3 Liberal and Critical feminism

The production of gender sensitive statistics initiated by EASSI can be understood as a
part of a liberal feminist approach to the realisation of WHR. As we saw in the
literature review, critics of liberal feminism argue that this approach is not sufficient as
it does not discuss structural relations resulting in inequality between men and women.
However, I do not understand their project as limited to liberal feminist strategies for
altering gender inequalities. EASSI did not define their goal as merely ‘adding in’
women or making gender inequalities visible. Rather, the gender sensitive statistics
was meant to function as a tool for gaining funding, which was defined as a hinder for
the organisations and activists roles as implementation-agents. In addition, the
statistics would serve to educate marginalised women on the inequalities they suffered from. These inequalities were currently supported and reproduced by, as mentioned above, ideologically anchored norms which inhabit a denial of the unjust aspect of power inequalities and results in gender inequalities. Thus, I understand EASSI’s project partly, but not exclusively, in terms of liberal feminist approaches to the operationalization of women’s rights, where they use gender sensitive statistics to prove that there are severe gender inequalities among women and men in the conflict areas in Northern-Uganda.

In addition, I also see them as applying strategies seen in critical feminism approaches to IR, where these statistics can be used to show how, in these specific areas, women and men experience differences due to among others their gender. Further, motivating the women to protest against the patriarchal structures which underpin this inequality is one of the goals with the project. Consequently, the reproduction of unequal gender roles is challenged.

**4.3.4 Radical feminism**

In interviews with Isis-WICCE, the reasoning for women’s participation in the resolution of conflict and peacebuilding was compatible with radical feminist arguments. One informant stated that;

“We have something at stake as women. We must participate and organise as women because women have different ways [than men] of creating peace”

The argument that women have a different approach to peace because they rear children was also presented. They did however, as I understood them, relate to the postmodern claim that operating with the concept of “women” as an undifferentiated group was not unproblematic. They did indeed, as seen above, argue that not just any women would be useful in promoting a gender-sensitive peace or gender sensitive-politics in general, but that the right *types* of women were required. However, this was not necessarily because they rejected essentialism. Rather, it was argued that women in power-positions “became like men”. Thus, I do not understand their call for the right
women as necessarily rejecting radical feminist epistemology. Quite on the contrary, they argued that women who gained power needed to incorporate women’s experiences in the politics. Women’s experiences, then, was explained as something in common, and special, for all women as apposed to men. Indeed, I see this as compatible with my understanding of radical feminist argumentation.

However, I was curious about how broad the concept of “women” was defined. If they understood it as including all Ugandan women, all African women or just women perse. As seen in chapter two, the problem with essentialism which follows the undifferentiated category of “women” runs the risk of essentializing the meaning of women. I asked one informant what she meant by “women”. She explained to me that this was difficult, it depended on the context, but in this case she meant all Ugandan women who suffered from their unrealised human rights. She did acknowledge the sometimes major differences between Ugandan women in both economic and political power. However, she still saw them all as lacking the fulfilment of fundamental rights, related to for example violence against women. Therefore, she claimed, it was justified to operate with the concept of women. Thus, problematic as it may be, I experienced many of my informants as trying to overcome the problem with essentialism, while still maintaining the means for political mobilisation through referring to context. Still, I often found these distinctions on what accounted as a women, and when, blurred.

However, Isis-WICCE representatives at the same time argued for a change of the legal practice of ignoring women’s complaints on violence and discrimination in the areas of conflict in Northern-Uganda which currently discriminated against women and did not fulfil the constitution. The call for a legal practice more responsive to women’s rights is, as seen in the literature review, in line with liberal feminist demands. In sum, I understand Isis-WICCE’s arguments as compatible to both radical and liberal feminist theories. Remembering the claim of feminist IR scholars that in the struggle for equality between the sexes, it is fruitful to draw on a number of feminist approaches, I see these plural strategies as possibly defining a larger space for the introduction of feminism in the public sphere. In drawing on several approaches to
feminism and the realisation of women’s rights in conflicts, they may create a broader and less rigid political mobilisation reaching different spheres and segments of women and maybe men.

4.3.5 Feminist elite organisations
I further asked all my informants directly if they would label themselves `feminist`. As we saw in chapter two, both a distinction between feminist and feminine networks and between elite and grassroots networks was suggested. Some of my informants labelled themselves feminists while others did not. Others again asked me to define `feminism` before they would answer. I experienced a tendency for the organisations that were connected to regional and international organisations and networks to define themselves as feminist, while those who were not, were more sceptical. Further, when I asked why such a tendency could be found, the internationally anchored organisations explained that they were more familiar with a feminist discourse and more used to argue within a framework of feminist theories and concepts. The more reluctant of my informants, however, claimed that they saw it as limiting to label themselves feminist. They might have goals compatible with feminism, but if they called themselves a feminist group, the scepticism among e.g. religious women and men from which they sought support for their activities, would rise. Further, they explained that calling themselves feminists was only relevant if they communicated with people who knew what feminism was.

As mentioned above, all my informants could to some degree be characterised as part of an elite. However, as one of my informants argued, while women’s initiatives for the participation in resolution of conflict and peacebuilding are diverse, and the women participating are diverse in their activities, their similarity lies in the fact that they address similar issues, and they strive to achieve the objective of lessening the political, social and economic restrictions burdening women. Interestingly, those who refused to label themselves `feminist` partly explained this with their wish to decrease the distance between themselves and the grassroots women with whom they cooperated.
Thus, the regionally and internationally anchored organisations could communicate some of their underpinning ideals and goals just through labelling themselves feminist. As stated in chapter two, even though diverse in theoretical reasoning, there is a general acceptance that feminism is a protest against accepted social values and norms concerning women and men. However, when communicating to women in the conflict areas in Northern-Uganda, the feminist label would not be useful since being a feminist or a feminist organisation did not necessarily mean anything in that context. In fact, if it meant anything, it could be experienced as creating a distance. As we saw above, in their strategies for spreading knowledge, my informants strived to communicate to the grassroots women in a way which was understandable to them. Talking about feminism, it was argued, would not be in line with this reasoning.

Returning also to “Third World Feminism”, I find this argument interesting as it shows how Western feminism may fail to apply to non-Western women. Not only because they overlook the concerns of non-Western women when they criticise masculine epistemology, but also because feminism may be an “empty” concept to many non-Western women. To label a project feminist may be uninteresting if feminism does not give any sense to the receivers in the project. The content and goal of the project may be interpreted as feminist by various scholars, but the labelling of it would not necessarily mean anything to those involved. Thus, non-Western women’s organisations and activists may engage in feminist projects without having any interest in labelling themselves as feminists because it is not experienced as relevant to them.

4.4 UN DISCOURSE ON GENDER
The UN cooperates with NGOs and activists in much of their work, and SCR 1325 is a special case where this cooperation has been comprehensive. EASSI, UWONET and Isis-WICCE all cooperated with the UN in some way. They related to UN standards on women’s rights and used SCR 1325 as a framework guiding their projects. They also produced reports which they shared with the UN. Remembering, then, both the criticism on Western feminism by non-Western feminists, and Väyrynen’s (2004b) critical approach to the gender discourse in the UN. There are two challenges my informants who related to the UN described. One is the general Western discourse
which dominates the UN discourse, and the other is the Western feminist discourse which makes up a dominating part of the UN discourse on gender. However, due to the need for international funding and the need to be able to lay pressure on the Ugandan government, my informants agreed that they responded, and referred, to the UN discourse on women, peace and security, because it strengthened their demands for change. However, they argued that it was important to, at the same time work for increased UN recognition of gender issues in general and increased UN recognition of non-Western feminist or gender issues in particular.

Thus, my informants claimed that they simultaneously used the UN-discourse on gender as support for their demands, and engaged in the production of counter-discourses which incorporated the experiences and sometimes differing gender-perspectives of non-Western women. As a woman from EASSI stated;

“[t]hey [the UN] sometimes write like they do not know us, but we have more to come up with than what they comprehend”

She continued, however, stating that;

“[f]or us it is important to be associated with the UN as an international and accepted level. We use the UN as a point of reference. To make sure that we make our government accountable”

Thus, through their engagement in changing the UN discourse on gender by including the experiences and perspectives of women who traditionally has been marginalised within the UN system both because they are women and because they are non-Western, my informants can contribute to a change in the UN discourse on gender. Consequently they can contribute to changing the structures of the organisation’s which has lead to gender inequality in the first place.

4.5 SUMMARY
In this chapter, I have analysed the work of my informants in a feminist theoretical framework. Starting with the definitions of security, we saw that my informants, in
line with both feminist approaches to IR and the UN discourse on Human Security, argued for a broadened definition of security. In addition they strive for the recognition and stimulation of women’s increased agency. Further, the feminist conceptualisation of power was discussed, focusing especially on the concept of empowerment and obstacles to the empowerment of women affected by the war in Uganda. I then argued for my understanding of my informant’s strategies for the inclusion of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in light of liberal, radical, postmodern and critical feminism. Finally, the UN discourse on gender, and how women’s organisations from non-Western countries may contribute to changing the discourse was discussed. In the next chapter, I will sum up the main point made in this thesis and make some concluding remarks and suggestions.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

5.0 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I will give an account of the major findings in my thesis. Then, I will make some concluding remarks on my findings. Finally, I will make recommendations on how my findings possibly can serve as useful inputs in the more general work with the implementation of SCR 1325.

5.1 FINDINGS
My concern in this project has been to understand how women at organisational levels work to add a gender perspective, as well as to be included in decisions regarding conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Uganda. I have used SCR 1325 on women, peace and security as a framework of reference. In short SCR 1325 calls on all UN member countries to include women at all levels of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and urges all parties in a conflict and a resolution of a conflict to apply a gender perspective in all aspects of future peace processes. I interviewed many women and some men in Uganda working for the realisation of women’s rights in the ongoing civil war in Northern-Uganda. I applied a qualitative method analysing raw data from interviews, newspapers and different relevant official and unofficial documents. I was initially interested in the activists reasoning and explanations of their
work, their accounts on `how’ and `why’ they chose the paths of action that they did. I have analysed my findings using theories on women’s organisations, implementation and several feminist accounts on gender in IR.

In chapter three I gave a contextual outline, showing how gender issues have been and are handled in the UN. Further, I explained the specific features of the civil war in Northern –Uganda and the national legal framework for the implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda. Finally, I gave an introduction to how gender issues are dealt with in Ugandan politics.

In my analyses in chapter four, I suggest that there are extensive work being done on the civil level of action in Uganda regarding women, peace and security. I found that both the awareness on SCR 1325 and continuous efforts for implementing SCR 1325 in Uganda were considerable. I used the two indicators of engagement for women’s increased participation in politics and spreading of knowledge related to SCR 1325, and discussed the strategies my informants applied to reach these goals. Further, I argued for how the work of the women’s organisations and activists can be understood as a feminist project. I suggested that several of my informants argued for, and operationalized the realisation of women’s rights in line with different feminist theoretical accounts. However, taking non-Western critics of Western feminism into consideration, I also suggested that the “feminist” label may not be useful in a national or local context. It may have more relevance and serve as an explanatory factor in an international context, i.e. when relating to the UN or Western-based donors. Finally, I briefly discussed how non-Western discourses on women, peace and security may challenge the contemporary UN discourse on gender.

5.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As expressed by several of my informants, there is an implementation gap between the intentions of SCR 1325 and the actions for change taken at official levels in Uganda. However, actions taken at lower, unofficial levels are arguably broad and activities in line with the goals of the resolution. I found that efforts made in implementing SCR
1325, differs at the various levels of professionalism within and outside the political sphere. In the introduction I argued that there are both rights-based and efficiency-based reasons for the realisation of SCR 1325. The rights-based aspect concerns the fact that women are increasingly targeted in conflicts and women have a right to protection and to participate in decisions that concerns their own future. When it concerns the efficiency-based aspects, it is argued that it is more likely that sustainable peace can be achieved if currently marginalised groups in the area of conflict are included in the peace process. Thus, independent on the value of realising women’s rights, their participation may work as a catalyst for peace. I see my informant’s arguments and strategies for the implementation of SCR 1325 as touching upon both these spheres of reasoning. They argue both for the uncontested value in realising women’s rights in conflict areas, and for the positive effect an inclusion of women would have for the creation of sustainable peace in Northern-Uganda.

However, I understand their as work first and foremost as a long term project of changing the patriarchal structures of the Ugandan society which currently discriminates against women. They work simultaneously with empowering IDP women in Northern-Uganda and pointing at the failure by the Ugandan government of realising the Ugandan constitution, which guarantees women’s rights through among others including elements of CEDAW. Based on their own accounts on their work I find some limitations to their projects. Both in terms of implementing SCR 1325 and in terms of realising women’s rights in Uganda in general. For one, the relations several of my informants explained they were striving to build up with women in the conflict areas were difficult. Obstacles such as language and class differences were severe in some contexts. Structural limitations which are severe in Northern-Uganda due to the long history of war also affected the work. The poor infrastructure and the limited legal and social mechanisms were difficult to overcome. I heard several times that it is difficult to teach women how to demand their constitutionally guaranteed rights when they were to hungry, to beaten up or to depressed to act on what they learned. Maybe this indicates that elite organisations or activists sometimes struggle with understanding the context of other, less privileged people.
Further, all my informants mentioned funding as an obstacle for implementation of SCR 1325. Lack of funding directly hindered their projects, and sometimes limited the ability to follow up projects they had already started. Consequently, reforming their projects after the lessons-learned principle was difficult. Another limitation which can be addressed from two sides was the relationship to official decision-making institutions, such as the Ugandan government and the MGLSD. On the one hand, my informants claimed that they often experienced difficulties in getting these bodies, if not to listen, then to act on the issues of gender inequalities they presented them with. This is evident in the official policies regarding the implementation of SCR 1325 which are, as already mentioned, limited even though the pressure from organisations and activists on these issues is quite strong. Thus, even though some of my informants stated otherwise, it is my impression that their political influence had its limitations.

On the other hand, those of my informants who were closest to the official decision-making bodies, said that they where careful in criticising the politicians in fear of loosing this close contact. Even though they claimed that this gave them real opportunities to affect the politics on gender, I suggest that this carefulness might limit the watchdog-effect they intended to have. Returning then to theories on women’s NGOs presented in chapter two. It was claimed that women’s NGOs are most effective when they operate far from the power-centres. I am not sure if this account for just women, but the dilemma closeness to power-holders creates was experienced as real in the context of my research.

Finally, I do see my informants as important bottom-up actors for implementation. In fact, considering the scarce efforts for implementation of SCR 1325 currently made by the Ugandan government, I see my informants work as one of the most important national initiatives for implementation of SCR 1325 in Uganda at the moment.
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
As one of my informants argued, while women’s initiatives for the participation in resolution of conflict and peacebuilding are diverse, their similarity lies in the fact that they address similar issues, and they strive to achieve the objective of lessening the political, social and economic restrictions burdening women. Their practice can therefore, she argued, be replicated in other countries. Further, such practice can inspire other women to engage in the altering of gender inequalities in their local communities. I consider her argument important. I will therefore end my thesis with some general suggestions for the implementation of SCR 1325, based on the strategies of my informants. I emphasis the importance of sensitivity towards the different contexts of conflict in which it is relevant to implement the resolution. Still, I find some experiences my informants shared with me as interesting, and maybe useful in several contexts.

Funding and recognition. Improving the methods for funding is of great importance if one wishes to uphold the considerable work being done with the implementation of SCR 1325 by NGOs and activists. It has been emphasised, both by the UN and outside the UN that the considerable body of non-official actors surrounding the resolution is important and should be sustained and even strengthened. This, however, depends on will to both recognise the work these actors do as important, and to provide funding for continued engagement in this area.

Dissemination of information among women directly affected by conflict. Women in areas of conflict need to know their rights, guaranteed by among others SCR 1325, in order to demand their fulfilment. However, as I saw with my informants, it is important that the communication between grassroots women living in conflict areas, and elite organisations engaging in UN and national politics, happens on the premises of the grassroots women. I otherwise see this communication, and further, the demands from grassroots women to participate in decision-making, as difficult.
**Increased sensitivity towards gender-issues.** The mainstreaming of gender in all processes, official or non-official, related to peace and security, is essential. If gender issues are ignored by national governments, it will be difficult to facilitate women’s organisations and activists through for example proper funding mechanisms. The lack of a broader structural framework for the implementation of gender related policies and the lack of a political commitment are currently limiting initiatives in this field. Further, if gender is not treated as an integrated issue in politics in general, it may be difficult to argue for gender-sensitivity in a situation of conflict, where both human capital and finances are often marginal.

**Open up a space for non-traditional methods and definitions.** I found it interesting that my informants recognised the lack of seriousness some of their methods where met with, but still insisted on the methods worth. The fact that they hold on to, and develop, their counter-discourses and counter-methods on women, peace and security has positive effects expanding the concrete methods. By insisting on, and promoting, different definitions on security and challenging traditional stories of women in conflict, they create a new and possibly less biased space for the discussions of traditional approaches to gender, peace and conflict. This space may be exactly where the will and power to contest hegemonic patriarchal structures on both national and international arenas stem from.

There are many angles from where the implementation of SCR 1325 can be addressed. I will not argue that one is more important than the other. Rather, I suggest that what is needed if SCR 1325 is to be realised is combined efforts by, and recognition of, a broad spectre of different official and unofficial implementation agents.
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Note: this interview guide was used as a starting-point. As mentioned in chapter one, my questions were often reformulated, subtracted and other added depending on the various replies and interview contexts.

Introduction:
- Describe your organisation/ your work and what your main objections are
- How do you define yourself/ your organisation in terms of policies, goals and achievements?
- Do you have a vision for your work?
- Do you relate to any specific UN resolutions, conventions or other guiding frameworks? If so, which and how?
- How do you define your long-term and short-term goals?

SCR 1325:
- How do you relate to the situation in Northern-Uganda?
- What do you consider the main obstacles for peace?
- How do you (if familiar with the resolution) understand the content of SCR 1325?
- Do you consider this UN document important in your work? If so, why?
- Why do you consider the implementation of SCR 1325 important?
- Have you experienced any changes in your work since the adoption of SCR 1325?
- Have you experienced any changes towards your work since the adoption (attitudes, ability to be heard etc.)?
- Do you consider yourself as contributors to the implementation of SCR 1325?
- If so, what do you consider the main obstacles for the implementation of SCR 1325?
- If not, who do you consider implementation-actors regarding the realisation of the resolution?
- How do you see the official initiatives for the implementation of SCR 1325?
- How do you see the un-official initiatives for the implementation of SCR 1325?

Strategies:
- Who are the main receivers of your work?
- Who do you relate more to, the power-holders or grassroots women? Why?
- What are your strategies for the implementation of SCR 1325/ realisation of WHR?
- How do you engage in dissemination of information among grassroots women?
- What are your strategies for gaining political strength?
- Why do you use those specific strategies?
- How do you relate to the media? Why?
- What methods do you use for the collection of data?
- Are your strategies and methods interlinked/ part of a long-term strategy?

Women and empowerment:
- How do you define empowerment of women?
- What is your opinion on women’s ability to participate in Uganda? In small-scale contexts/ in political contexts/ in conflict resolution and peacebuilding?
- Are women’s rights realised in Uganda? Why/ why not?
• How do you understand gender equality in Uganda? What are the obstacles to gender equality?
• What are the specific situations of IDP women in Northern-Uganda?

Feminism:
• How do you define feminism? Why?
• Are you a feminist/feminist group? Why/why not?
• Do you label your projects feminist? Why/why not?
• How do you define “women”?

Closure:
• How do you see the future?
• What are your main challenges?
• What are your hopes for yourself/your organisation?