FROM TALLIN TO TASHKENT

Towards uncovering structural preconditions for political freedom in the former Soviet republics

Henrik Pryser Libell
University of Oslo, Department of Political science
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from Baykanor to Oslo

The idea for this thesis was conceived on a eurasian voyage, aboard a train traveling from Alma Aty to Atyrau, passing by the areas around the Kosmodrom Baykanor. thank you, Simon Kruse for helping me conceiving the idea aboard that train and for good company in Kazakhstan and Russia!

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FOREWORD

The idea for this thesis was conceived on a eurasian voyage, aboard a train travelling from Alma Aty to Atyrau, passing by the areas around the Kosmodrom Baykanor. Baykanor was where cosmonaut Jury Gargarin made it first into space 9 am in the morning the Moscow time, 12th of April year 1961. At that time the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USSR was a vast empire extending from the Pacific and China to the Atlantic and Europe, and to many then even seemed ahead of USA on the space and technology race. Some 40 years after Gagarins launch that empire had crumbled, and as I travelled through the remains of it, the post-soviet space, now constituted by 15 independent states, all of them have chosen very different political paths, with enormous differences in political freedom as result. This region is a unique laboratory to understand precondition for democracy, as their variation is so huge today, but their starting point was so similar in 1991. Examining the causes of variation might lead us to the precondition required for liberalization. In this thesis I wish to test structural theories about liberalization, elite and democracy, to see if they can aid uncovering domestic precondition, features of the states, that would explain the level of political freedom in the former soviet republics. By uncovering such precondition I hope to better understand the political development of the former Soviet Union and the foundations of liberalisation and democracy. From Tallin to Tblisi, Minsk to Moscow, Vilnius to Yerevan.

God lesing! Welcome, Dear Reader!

Oslo, April 2006

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1. INTRODUCTION

Political freedom in the Post-soviet space

A remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of democracy as a system of government has emerged throughout the world, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism. Democracy may constitute (...) the “final form of human government,” and the “end of history.”

Francis Fukuyama, 1992

When asked by a foreign journalist what he thought about democracy in post-soviet independent Turkmenistan, the Turkmen President-for-life Saparmura Niyazov replied “Democracy, that is me”. Niyazov was head of the SSR Communist party already in 1985, and when his country became independent by the collapse of USSR, he installed himself as president and no one has ever run against his chair in a presidential poll since. Opposition parties have been banned. Subscribing foreign newspapers is restricted and neighbourhood committees surveil political dissidents. (Freedom House, 2005: Turkmenistan) Another former SSR is Lithuania, which today is a consolidated democracy, where governments have changed several times, peacefully and through free and fair elections. In 2004 Lithuania was accepted as a member of the EU, meaning that its constitution not only guarantees recruiting governments by elections, but also has a built-in judicial protection of minority rights, freedom of speech and press. Both Turkmenist and Lithuania had a politically uniform past in the USSR, but after independence they took very different future paths. They are indicative of the variety of political freedom visible in the region today. The 15 post-soviet successor states differ enormously, despite 70 years of a common single system of Leninism (50 yeas for Moldova & the Baltic SSRs). The Post-soviet space spans from democratic Baltic states to sultanistic Central-Asian states, and from authoritarian Belarus with unlimited presidential powers to semi-democratic, pluralistic Ukraine, with a recently installed and functioning parliamentary system. Ukraine and Georgia have been experiencing so-called “colour revolutions” while Russia and Armenia seems to be in a “authoritarian backlash”. Belarus started on a democratic path 1991-93, but soon sidetracked in 1994. While Uzbekistan violently
cracked down anti-regime demonstrations in 2005, demonstrations in Kyrgyz elections led to the president fleeing to Russia, and leading the opposition leader into power. What determined their different path, if they all departed in 1991 from the same political unit? Because democratisation came instantly and simultaneously to all of the 15 former Soviet republics, the former soviet union republics (from now on called FSU) represent one is one of the worlds most unique and largest labs to compare the political development of new-born democracies, and analyze the process of liberalization. By this study I hope to shed light on precondition for political liberalization in the former Soviet Union, with general implications also for other regions in transit to liberal democracy. The quest is interesting for scholars trying to understand what creates and what deteriorates democracies and political freedom, but also interesting for all foreign policy makers and non-governmental groups inside or outside the FSU whose aim to spread a liberal democracy. If there are precondition for liberalization, the question for policy makers is to review is how those precondition be influenced in order to promote liberalization. I am therefore looking for structural precondition that can be influenced by policy, short-term or long-term.

1.2. Structures decide The quest for preconditions is based on a belief that structures determinates the development. My approach can there best be labeled as a structural approach. I have chosen three structuralist theories, each from development theory, democracy theory and elite theory that suggest measures of internal (domestic) structural preconditions that will determine and explain liberalisation. I will test the ability of these theories to explain the present level of political freedom in the post-soviet space. I focus as mentioned only on theories which base on preconditions that are domestic(internal) and whom on a long-term base can be influenced by domestic (internal) or foreign states policy (external). This means I exclude for instance unchangeable preconditions for liberalisation like “length of authoritarian regime”, “previous history as independent state”, “outcome of first election” or “main religion” (religions I exclude also for other reasons).

The three theories chosen are 1) the distribution of economical and intelectual power resources in a society, 2) the modernisation theory of socioeconomic development and 3) the theory of fragmentation of elites. From here on i will call them IPR-theory, the HDI
theory and fragmented elite-theory, and they will be better presented in the theory chapter. My two research questions are:

1. Can the IPR, socioeconomic development and fragmentation of elites be preconditions explain the variation of political freedom in the post-soviet space?

2. If yes, how can the IPR, socioeconomic development and fragmentation of elites be preconditions explain the variation of political freedom in the post-soviet space?

1.3 Political freedom I define as existence of political features that make free and fair elections possible, that makes turnover of governmental power with democratic means possible, that secures freedom of information and limits the full authority of the state. The most important features of political freedom is judicial independence from the executive power, a functional rule of law, a democratic oversight of military and security services, multiple party system, freedom to form and join organisations, free press, respect for minorities and constitutional protection of human rights. Political freedom is not a synonym to democracy, but an aspect of democracy. All cases (states) in my sample meet a minimalist definition of democracy. However they differ on degrees of democracy; one could say they are different kinds of democracies (from liberal or consolidated democracies to pseudo-democracies, ethnocracies, facade democracies and other labels have been suggested). I argue that degree of any democracy definition is probably best measured by the degree of their political freedom. Studying political freedom will therefor also tell us something about the development of democracy (the democratic consolidation, the development after transition to democracy) in the post-soviet space. The development of political freedom is according to O’Donnel and Schmitter a process of liberalisation (different from democratisation) (Karvonen, 1997: 76). The operationalisation of political freedom will be the Freedom Scale, produced by Freedom House, and this choice is argued and discussed in the chapter on data. The units are the 15 states that came out of the USSR, the post-soviet successor states. They will be referred to as FSU. The FSU are chosen as a lab to test for structural precondition for the process of liberalization, because they all were soviet states when they democratized in 1991, and 15 years later they have a large variety of political freedom. Which precondition determined this development? The three theories suggest three different explanations and I will test
them as independent variables explaining the dependent variable political freedom. I will test them one by one, and later see if they can combined in a two-factor or three factor-model.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABEL</th>
<th>OPERATIONALISATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Independent A) Power resource distribution</td>
<td>IPR - Index of Power Resources (Vanhanen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Independent B) Socioeconomic development level</td>
<td>HDI - Human Development Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Independent C) Elite fragmentation</td>
<td>Nr. of effective president candidates previous. election</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Dependent C) Variation of political freedom in FSU</td>
<td>Freedom Scale 7-1</td>
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1.4 Independent variables. Preconditions for freedom. The theory of independent variable A assumes that higher distribution of economical and intellectual resources, like income, property and education in society will influence the strength of a political freedom: the less concentrated economic and intellectual resources are on few hands, the more freedom persists. The precondition for freedom according to IPR theory is the distribution of economical and intellectual resources, which is operationalised as the Index of Power Resources, invented by Tatu Vanhanen.

Independent variable B is a theory of socioeconomic development. The basic assumption of the theory is that the more well-to-do (educated, healthy and wealthy) a population is, the more political freedom. Socioeconomic development is based on classical modernist theoretical foundation of amongst other Lipset and Diamond, and is operationalised here as the Human Development Index, invented by UNDP.

Independent variable C is the theory of fragmented elites. The basic assumption of this theory is that when political power is distributed, when there is real competition for governmental power, - a fragmented elite, - prospects improve for the existence for the civil and political rights. When a country is ruled by elections with universal fragmentation, high elite fragmentation increases the value of political freedom. This independent variable is based on Mosca and Easter, and operationalised by the effective number of candidates in the most recent presidential election.

I have designed a model to suggest how the theories interact. I will operationalise the theories and then test the their hypothesis by linear regression (and cross reference with
cross tabulation) one by one. For the model I will use observation of the units in a table and causal analysis to check the interaction between significant theories.

Data on political freedom are provided by Freedom House. IPR values are provided by Vanhanen in his book. HDI is published yearly in Human Development Report. Election results are provided Central Election Committees in the FSU, and published in Electionworld.org. Data’s reliability and the validity of the analysis. will be discussed after the presentation of them and after the analysis. Qualitative data on political freedom in the FSU states will be included as background information, but will not be counted as data in the analysis.

1.5 Structure of the thesis The order of appearances is as follows: Chapter 2 - Theoretical framework for the theories and the model: arguing the choice of structural theories. Chapter 3 - Introduction to the concept of political freedom. Chapter 4 - Introduction to the theories. Chapter 5 - The operationalisation of the variables. Chapter 6 Presentation of empirical data and the units and country background. Chapter 7 describes the methodology. Chapter 8 is the analysis on each theories explanatory power on political freedom, and on a model, followed by a discussion on validity and reliability. Chapter 9 is a final discussion of the finding and the discussions of the analysis. In the final discussion I will include points from other theoretical explanations, like external geopolitical environment. All what has been done and found and concluded will be summed up in the Conclusion. I underline that each theory for explaining political freedom will be analyzed individually, and then a possible joint model will be analyzed. In the end follows the conclusion.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Structure of theory chapter

To explain the variation of political freedom in the former Soviet Union I have chosen three theories on domestic precondition that might influence the level of political freedom in FSU. All three theories come from structural, modernisational and universalist tradition, not actor-oriented, procedural and generic. I will argue why I choose structural approaches over actor-oriented and why I choose universalist theories to study democracy and the former soviet union, rather than generic theories.

2.1 Selection of theories

Geoffrey Pridham suggests that a overall-model to explain political freedom in post-communist spaces should include: “historical determinants, (cultural background, authoritarian legacy), authoritarian collapse (type of revolution and transition to democracy and the following consequences for regime type), institutional design, the political dimension (actors and elite reactions), economic transformation (interaction new economy and new policy (...) type of growth, distribution of growth), civil society and elite choices (effects from top to bottom, or bottom to top), the international environment (external influences) and stateness and national identity. (Pridham, 2000: 26–27). Illustration 1 includes these elements and several other suggested theories. Merkcell adds to this the role of the first elections and the institutional design of the first constitution (Merkel, 2002:111–113). As illustration show, such a model is to huge to be run comparative tests on, and it includes not only factors that can be influenced, but all other structural factors, historical, economical and on also non-structural, like actors choice and type of leaders. I have had to limit my study to the three most important structural measures I believe are precondition for liberalisation. Pridhams model is so large model is best tested on cases, and then it can only explain the countries development case by case. It can not help us find common precondition that might determine liberalisation in all countries or any country, and that is what my research question has compelled me to uncover.

Testing Pridham’s model of precondition would be extremely complicated. The model has so many variables anyway, anything could be explained if you tried to combine them. I have preferred to chose three dimensions that I believe can uncover preconditions for political freedom in the FSY and that can be influenced by policy. These three
dimensions are the distribution of economic and intellectual power and the fragmentation of the elites and socio-economic theory. I will now argue why I left other explanations out and why I choose the three I have.

Illustration 1. Overview of structural theories that have been suggested to explain political freedom and liberalisation in the former Soviet republics.

2.2. Post-soviet theories

Pridham’s model is a general model for post-communist countries. Several theories that could have been used to explain precondition for a larger group of post-communist are not equally relevant to compare the post-soviet countries. I will elaborate on the difference of post-soviet and post-communis heritage later. But one important point is the degree of existing social capital (apart from the Baltic states, where it plays a role), that suggest the the strength of political freedom is determined by the strength of the civil society, in terms of existing non-governmental organisations and other non-governmental parts of civil society. I do not disregard this theory, but I select the social capital theory out because non-governmental life has been at a relatively equal level in

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all Soviet republics during the Soviet period and remains insignificantly correlated to
democratisation (Dowley, 2003:99) NGOs were mostly banned in Soviet times, and even
labour unions functioned as part of state and the employing unit (Arkady Moshes, 2004).
With social capital being relatively uniform throughout the FSU, social capital can not be
decisively in explaining in for the enormous different level of political freedom 15 years
later (apart from maybe the Baltics, where social capital was noticeable different from the
rest of USSR). As for type of authoritarian collapse was equal for all states: transition to
democracy through the collapse of the USSR (again with a partial exception for the
Baltic, whom received partial democracy under autonomy one year earlier).

Theories of stateness in explaining FSU transition claims that political freedom is linked
with previous experiences of having a state, prior to being a SSR. I leave the theory of
stateness out for two reasons: 1) empirical - both political measured free Baltics and
politically measured unfree Russia has long history of stateness, as is the same for semi-
authoritarian Armenia as for semi-democracy Georgia. 2) Historical stateness can not be
influenced by policy.

**Unchangeable.** Because I am looking for precondition that can be influenced by
policy, I exclude several historical explanations like length of communism and feudal
tradition and geographical ones, like location.

**Actors.** Actors choice theories are left out because they don’t uncover the long-term
precondition. Most theories on external environment are also left out for the same
reason, I wish to study the domestic precondition for what happened, not just the cause
of what happened, and the structural precondition for it to happen regardless of the
choice of actors and the impact of external forces. However, the geopolitical impact is
regarded to be some important in many cases, and it will be brought into discussion.

**Cultural.** I have also left out comparative cultural explanation concerning religions and
religious areas (a Muslim belt, a Catholic belt, etc), the most famous being Huntington’s
“clash of civilisations”. Empirical evidence counters the theory that democracy only de-
velops in certain religions and cultural settings. There are states with political freedom
in all civilisation-areas/religions: India, Japan, Mongolia, Turkey, to mention some exam-
pies. Also, I leave cultural explanations out because they are self-explanatory. Before
there was democracy in the Protestant area, there was non-democracy. If democracy can

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not evolve in the “non-democratic environment”, then how did it develop in the first place? the “supposed correct environment” or as Gel’man states: “while Post-soviet countries cannot achieve democracy because of their “wrong” culture, the “right” culture have a few chances to emerge here because of absence of democracy” (Gel’man, 2004)

2.3 Arguing the paradigm of structuralism

My theoretical framework is materialist, structuralist and a development-theoretical, meaning I emphasize the economical base of society, and structures more than political explanations and more than actors choice. In political science this tradition is often labeled materialist, realist or marxist approach, as opposed to liberalist and idealist, actor-oriented which are typically more oriented on choices, on leaders, on elites and ideas. (Østerud, 2005:51)

As Merkel describes it structuralists trying to explain transition emphasize die “sozio- und machstrukturelle Zwänge” that force transformation. (Merkell, 2002:45) Transformation is a keyword: the basic paradigm of the development-theoretical framework is that development is linear. Structural theories base on development-theoretical perspectives on political regime change (Østerud, 2005:49): the belief in development as a certain type of stepwise development that can be described. I measure units by their level of political freedom. I believe that units through liberalisation can move up the scale, e.g. from dictatorship to democracies, or, in case of backlashes, from democracies to authoritarian regimes.

The paradigm of marxism that the base of society (economical structure) decides its “roof” (political structure). So-called “new modernists” (1970s and onwards) opposed the idea that modernization was one scale to develop along, and believed modernization could come in many forms. New modernization theory also focused more based of society then the pure economical. I think my study could be labeled new-modernistic, materialistic and regional, with universal ambitions, or a structural approach is that combine new-modernization (development-theoretical) and class theory (marxist). Key variables explaining a degree of liberalisation is often levels of development and class structure, and so will I use.

Too early to say. An important critique against searching for “objective” precondition, is that they have not only a long-term pre-history, but also a long-term impact that could
be negligible in short-term perspective. I argue against this that 15 years is sufficient
time to draw conclusions.

2.4 Arguing universalist approach
The development perspective has been criticized for being too universal, and not to
adapt to local particularities, as it believes to create models that will apply to most mod-
ern states. Development theory is divided in a rival school of classic modernization the-
ory (internal factors specialization of labour leads to growth, and growth will produce
democracy) /new-modernization and dependency theory (external factors unfair precondition
for international trade leads to growth only in rich countries, development is deter-
mined by a units placement in systems)/new dependency school, but they share the view
of a line of development, possible to measure and scale, and that political development
can be described with types/trajectories and faces/periods, and that certain explanation
can be given, certain preconditions determine the outcome (modernisationist emphasize
internal/domestic ones, dependency theorists external/systemic ones). The major scholar
counter-argument to such universalist approach stems from the “procedural” /“case
based” /“generic” approach. The procedural approach claims no precondition for any
given development exists: everything is decided in the process (Gelman, 2004:13) The
procedural approach is therefore rather to study what did happen, then creating theories
on what determined the outcome. I argue that too generic approach is unfit for uncover-
ing domestic precondition for liberalisation that can be influenced by policy. A proce-
dural approach will only tell us what happened in each and different, not the underlying
causes for how what made it happen this way, and that is common for all cases.
While the theory of power resources and of socioeconomic development is a theory of modernization, emphasizes the internal structural and dynamical disposition for political freedom in every FSU, the theory of elite fragmentation is a theory of elite.

2.5 Elite theory: Class and elite

Elite theory has not been connected with transitions in the same way as development theory. The main theoretical tradition that that oppose each other inside what is generally called elite theory is “class theory” and “elite theory”. (Hallevy, 1997:14) Class theory derives from a marxist perspective and elite theory from liberal perspective. Class theory is commonly divided into a marxist tradition and takes a more economical perspective, and a Weberian tradition, where its not only means of production who defines class, but also other factors: property, lifestyle, cultural consumption and status. Lockwood, Lenski and Mills are classical Weberians in this aspect (Hallevy, 1997: 17) Elite theory, focuses not on economy like class theory, but on political power. The basic assumption is that society is divided into elites where power is concentrated, and they will always be a minority compared to the mass. Classical theorists are Mosca and Pareto (Hallevy, 1997: 21) Mills formulated the famous concept of “power elites”, which he meant ruled the USA in the 1950s, to such a degree it interfered with the political freedom of the USA. Elite theorists mostly agree on that elites create policy and “rule the ruled”, but they have discourse over the effect of the structure of the elite. Moscas main idea is that the character and structure of the ruling class is forming of the political structure (Hallevy, 1997:59). He ar-
guments historically: feudal society had unfragmented elites - the same elite has military, economical and political powers. The bureaucratic state had a more fragmented elite: differentiation in duties - a economical elite different from the political one. The democratic state divides the political power into those who are appointed (bureaucrats) and popular suffrage. This latter differentiation creates a system where one elite group exercises reciprocal control on the other - and this, according to Mosca, creates more liberty (democracy) for the ruled. Schumpeter extends this idea, also to include other elites than the state/governmental elites: it is the compromise between elites that defines the level of political freedom. Raymond Aron suggests five typical elites in a modern society: political elite, bureaucrat elite, economical elite, labour elites and military elites. His main point is that if they are unified, the less freedom. In Communist states all the five elites, belong to the same elite. In the liberal state, they belong to rivaling elites. This difference is what Aron calls monopolistic vs pluralistic elite structure. (Østerud, 2005;151) The more fragmented elite, the less state. According to Aron a balanced elite fragmentation (among the ruled) is therefore the best elite factor in explaining "freedom for the ruled". (Hallesvy, 1997: 61) Democratic elite theory is a "mixture school" emphasizes political freedom, while structuralist perspectives more economical equality.

In studying the post-soviet union the elite aspect is extremely interesting aspect. The reason is because the USSR had no power sharing divisions in its institutions, or as Aron called it: a monopolistic elite. Thus the elites were unified and often allied across Aron´s five borders - the nomenclature was en elite of both labour, economy, military, political and bureaucracy, because the state was centralized. However, other cleavages did appears, such as ethnical cleavages and economical, where division of labour created a more diversified economy. These cleavages came more apparent when they re-emerged on a national level and elites could compete for governmental power through elections and when the Union level of elite was removed from the national level. Ukraine is an example of a state where elite fragmentation is seen as high based on Ukrainian-Orthodox vs Russian-Orthodox Church, Ukrainian and Russian language, the Western heritage of Austrian-Hungarian empire vs the Eastern heritage of the Russian empire, agricultural and agribusiness vs mining and energy production or privatisated vs state owned enterprises. (Arkady Moshes, 2004). My general assumption in independent variabel C is that the existence of such pluralistic elite is a precondition for explaining the variation of political freedom in the FSU.
2.7 The Region: Sovietology

I have chosen the FSU region because it is a unique political science lab for comparing political freedom in 15 “similar cases”. Before the fall of the USSR, the scholar tradition which studied liberalization used to be concentrated in completely other geographical regions than Eastern Europe (esp. Southern Europe and Latin America), as there was no democracy to study in Eastern Europe (Parrot/Dawisha, 1997: 2). Before the collapse of the USSR, the main scholar tradition to study political freedom in the FSU was “Sovietology”. Sovietologists were divided in supporters of the “the totalitarian model” and “the revisionist approach”. “Totalitarians” argued that the “natural progression” of Soviet/Russian society toward modernity and liberalisation had been artificially diverted by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. “Revisionists, argued that the political dynamics in an industrialized, urbanized, and educated Soviet society were becoming increasingly similar to those of other modern regimes. (Hanson, 2004) None of the Sovietologists predicted the downfall of Communism, and so Sovietology was soon replaced by “transitology” after USSR collapse. In the “transitology period”, the early 1990s, most scholars assumed that the lessons of transition in Latin America in 70s and 80s would be applicable to Central Eastern Europe and FSU in the 1990s. Instead of being “the other” for Western scholars, the Soviet area was now “like us”, and became studied by social science, using methods and concepts that had already functioned to explain transitions in Latin Europe and Latin America. (Rutland, 2003) The first transitologists however soon discovered that lessons learnt from other non-communist transitions were not always applicable in post-communist countries (Parrot/Dawisha, 1997).

Post-authoritarian, Post-Communism or Post-sovietism. The “differentness” of Post-communism from other post-authoritarian transitions soon dawned upon social scientists: a sudden collapse of high-developed welfare system, the sudden privatization combined with the democratization, rise of oligarchs, the shift from organized surveillance and intelligence to organized crime, the lack of tax collection systems and the fact that so many ex-authoritarian states democratized at the same time, not “one by one” to be absorbed into the “democratic fold”. As the post-communist-era developed, it became obvious “post-communism” was not one united phenomena, as it featured such wide variety of cases from Slovenia to Turkmenistan. Vladimir Gel’man is among those who criticizes post-communist and universalist transologists for failing to grasp the essence of
Russianness and Central Asianess. Both Transitology and Sovietology were based on modernization theories expectation that industrialization, urbanization, and education would inevitably transform “traditional” agrarian societies and cultures to produce “modern” societies built on individualism. During the 1990s these modernisationists were confronted with what in a Western context seemed as irrational choices in FSU;

While committed to democratic values in the abstract, Russians did not think very highly of the factual democracy. Russian values were worry of rise of crime and corruption. They were assertive of their own rights but not very tolerant of opposing views. (…) “Their desire for a strong leader was balanced by a corrosive suspicion of the state and skepticism about the law. (…) There were few signs of an emergent civil society. These findings underlined the fact that the break-up of the Soviet Union and the transition to market democracy had been an elite-led, top-down affair in Russia” (Rutland, 2003).

This Russian “mindset” along other features like clan structures in Central Asia, century-old conflicts in Caucasus, the aftermath of Stalins mass exoduses of certain ethnical minorities, the existence of a Russian diaspora and states with no past record of nationhood before 1991 soon “kicked in” on Post-communism to prove that “Post-sovietism” was different from post-communism in Central Eastern Europe and other places. In mid-1990s the problem of coexistence of “universalism” that taken roots in the comparative politics, and “particularism” that reflected specific post-Communist realities, became a core of polemic among scholars.

But all forms of particularism, the occupation-nature of Baltic soviet membership, the “differentness” of Russia for being an empire and geographically stretched, Central-Asia for its nomadic and borderless history, Caspian region with its heavy interest sin oil and other particular groupings would make it impossible to compare anything, e. g a “Russian Russia” and a “Central Asian Kyrgyzstan”. A case could for instance be made against including the three Baltic countries on this scale, as they have less Soviet features than the other 15 (and primarily parliamentary systems) and stayed shorter as SSRs and have developed politically under EU protection and sponsorship. However, they were all one unified system from 1945 to 1991 and by comparing all 15 I hope to uncover measurable structural precondition.
3. DEPENDENT VARIABLE
WHAT IS POLITICAL FREEDOM?

3.1 Defining political freedom

The dependent variable of my study is: political freedom in the former Soviet Union (FSU).
I define political freedom as existence of political features that make free and fair elections possible, and turnover of governmental power with democratic means likely, that secures freedom of information and limits the authority of the state. The most important features of political freedom are, as I mentioned in the introduction:

judicial independence from the executive power, a rule of law, a democratic oversight of military and security services, multiple party system, freedom to form and join organisations, free press, and constitutional protection of minorities and human rights. Democracy, for reference, I have defined as "political system based on a constitutional guarantee for the executive power to be periodically elected in elections with universal suffrage". This is not the liberal definition of democracy, but a minimal (Østerud, 2005:107) All cases in my meet the minimal definition of democracy. However they differ on degrees of democracy, which I believe the degree of their political freedom will measure. The distinction is important: I measure political freedom, but I believe I can generalize from this to democracy. Political freedom is not a synonym democracy, but an aspect of democracy, especially of the liberal democracy. The liberal definition of democracy derives from liberal thinkers like John Lock, David Hume and Montesqu. The basic principles of their democracy idea is that democracy is not just rule of the majority, or governmental recruitment by elections, but a regime where executive power is limited by certain individual (liberal) rights and liberties. (Halevy, 1993:53) Like Lijphart said “(...) Democracy should “not be measured by it’s ability to give rule to the majority, but on its ability to protect the minority”. Therefore by uncovering precondition for political freedom, I study the development of liberalisation, not democratisation/democratic consolidation, after a transit to a (minimalist) democracy is made.

In a liberal democracy government bodies are separated in a legislative, executive and judicial body who share power and check and balance each other. Schumpeter and Robert Dahl are typical exponents for this type of democracy definitions.
definition of political freedom can distinguish the degree democracy is, by measuring the level of political freedom inside the FSUs formally democratic system. To conclude: our definition of political freedom is not democracy, but democratic civil and political rights, and my definition makes political freedom a indicator of the degree of democracy

3.2 Arguing liberalisation. My definition of political freedom can be criticized for being too focused on its relation to democracy, but I argue that all FSUs have a formal democratic system including periodical elections for president and/or parliament, and thus political freedom is best measured as the ability to realize this democratic regime. I also argue that is is more precise in the case of FSU to study liberalisation than democratic consolidation in the FSU region, because the difference in political development is more clearly visible in terms of freedom than in terms of democracy, which every FSU tries to keep up appearances as. Post-communist democracies, especially post-totalitarian ones like the USSR successor states, are often

for being covers for undemocratic regimes: Diamond talks of “pseudo” democracies, O’Donnels of “delegative” democracies and Zakarias of “il” democracies (Herron, 2001). Even a “beacons of democracy” like Estonia has such a pitfall: When analyzing Baltic democracy in 2002, Gill labeled Estonia a ethnic democracy and a subdivision facade democracies like the Central Asian FSU (Gill, 2002:111) The underlying premise of all these regimes are that the existence of free and fair elections alone is not adequate for a state to qualify as a democracy. Gel’man claims touches the same point: “simple test of free and fair elections could be irrelevant at the time of machine politics and parties of power (...)” where even competitive election (even competitive one) to a certain degree upon opportunities of ruling groups for administrative mobilization of masses as well as electoral fraud, not to mention systematically unequal assess of candidates to campaign” (Gel’man, 2004:6) Herron finds that assumption that “free elections equals democracy” has been challenged particularly in post-communist states, and that elections alone are not sufficient for democracy to emerge. By choosing to study liberalisation (political freedom) rather than democratic consolidation (after transition to a democracy) I am more able to avoid the pitfall of pseudo democracies and variables and pinpoint better the difference in political development between the FSU.
4. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
THE THEORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>OPERATIONALISATION</th>
<th>THEORY ORIGIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>A. The power resource distribution</td>
<td>High distribution of power resources create high political freedom</td>
<td>IPR - Index of Power Resources</td>
<td>Tatu Vanhanen, Lipset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Fragmentation of elites</td>
<td>Highly fragmented elite creates political freedom</td>
<td>Nr. of effective president candidates most recent election</td>
<td>Gerald M. Easter, Mosca, Aron, Schumpeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Socioeconomic Development</td>
<td>The more well-to-do a country, the more political freedom</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>Lipset, Diamond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dependent)Variation of political freedom (PF) in FSU</td>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom House Democracy scale 1-7</td>
<td>Liberal democracy, Locke, Hume, Freedom House</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 Hypothesizes suggested by theories.

1) Countries with a high distribution of economic and non-economic power resources (IPR) will have a high political freedom.

2) Countries with a politically fragmented elite will have have a high political freedom

3) Countries with a high socioeconomic development will have a high political freedom

The theories are expected to have a single causal effects each on political freedom in the FSU, illustrated in this model. This model does not show correlations or interaction between the independent variables.
4.2 Theory A. Vanhanen's power resource distribution

Power distribution determines the evolution of democracy.

Tatu Vanhanen claims democracy arrives on the scene of history as a result of a political evolution. (Vanhanen, 2003:26) When a group in power no longer is able to uphold power over other groups without using too much of the scarce resources available, democracy evolves, as “the fittest” system. The advantage for a former elite in sharing power is no costs in oppression resources or civil wars. According to Vanhanen, the process of democratisation depends on the distribution of relevant economical and intellectual power resources (PR). This is a primarily materialist view: the economic shape of society will form it politically. Political democratisation, Vanhanen argues, takes place under precondition in which PR have become so widely distributed that no group in society any longer is able to maintain hegemony over other groups. (Vanhanen, 2003:29) Vanhanen has produced a index to measure the PR. According to Vanhanen this index (IPR) is able to predict when a non-democracy reaches democratisation. He tested it on 172 countries 1850 - 1979, and what able to predict the ID in ca. 70% of the cases. However, Vanhanen did not predict democratisation in 1991 for USSR. I will claimed democratisation came “imposed” on USSR in 1991 and that Vanhanen's ID is not
enough to describe the effect of the IPR in the FSU. I expect the IPR value to not just to predict democratisation, but explain the level of political freedom. Vanhanen has also suggested this possibility. Parrot has given this perspective especial validity in FSU by claiming the authoritarian Soviet system dug its own grave - created democratisation - by producing a lot of students in higher education over the decades: “their drive to raise educational levels gradually expanded the social group whose members found those (the Communist) ideological claims implausible or absurd” (Parrot, 1997:13) The IPR is able to amongst other measure this process, in combination with the division of labour.

The relationship IPR and ID remained relatively strong throughout the period Vanhanen tested for (Vanhanen, 2003:31). Vanhanen also predicted in 1984 that Poland and Yugoslavia where theoretically “ripe” for democratisation or should already have become democracies. Vanhanen resorted to external factors and dependency theory to explain why they had not: the external role of a Great Power - the USSR. Communist countries he argued later, would increase their IPR greatly if it wasn't for the fact that all assets where formally on the hands of the government, and that “real” distribution of property was difficult to measure during the cold war and formally marxist system. Vanhanen claimed pressure for democracy would probably be enchanted, and the “consequences of this pressure are incalculable” at the same time as most Sovietologists were incapable of predicting the fall of the Berlin wall, or the collapse of the USSR. In Vanhanens 1984 -study of the states of the world IPR explained 64% of the variation. In 1990 IPR explained 70%. In 1990 however, suddenly more Eastern European countries where democracies than the IPR suggested, - which I take as a sign that democratisation was partially imposed externally on several FSU states, and did not develop internally.

Vanhanens view is materialist and structural: political power resources are determined by the structure of economic and intelectual power resources (IPR).

4.3 Fragmentation of post-soviet elite

“Having changed their titles from the first secretary of the Communist Party to prime minister/president was largely the extent of democracy in these states”

Yegeyny Bendersky, 2005

“Therefore, the ruling elites, are, the more political freedom for the ruled.”

This is the basic elite theory I will test. This theory is constructed from the two basic elements: Moscas theory of elite structure and Easters categorization of the post-soviet
elites. Moscas elite theory claims the structure of elites will define the structure of regime: different, independent elites who keep each other controlled provides liberal democracy, while unified, consolidated elites created authoritarianism. (Hallesvy, 1993)

Gerald M. Easter categorized such structures in the post-soviet, into three basic types of post-soviet state elites: consolidated, dispersed and reformed. (Easter, 1997) Elite theory is especially valid for the post-soviet space, of which most historically have been ruled top-down, by elite. (Waage, 1991)

The definitions given by Easter of “consolidated nomenclature“ is nomenclature which suffered little fragmentation and maintained its dominance. The nomenclature is the elite which ruled labour, economy and state in the Soviet times. “Dispersed nomenclatures” are defined by Easters as nomenclature whose power crumbled completely, and has to compete for political power on equal footing with other political actors. “Reformed nomenclature” is a post-independence elite which is split and part of it was able to maintain a share of power by reforming itself. As we can see from this table he also believed that the elites position in the “founding years” of post-soviet states would define the institutional design of the constitutions.

Table 4.3 | EASTERS ELITE . Elite shift in the FSU as defined by Gerald M Easter mid-90s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELITE NAME</th>
<th>DEF.</th>
<th>FSU</th>
<th>SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Reformed old elite”</td>
<td>The old nomenclature split and part of it was able to maintain a share of power by reforming itself.</td>
<td>Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, Belarus</td>
<td>presidential or semi-presidential systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“dispersed nomenclature elites”</td>
<td>Nomenclature crumbled completely, had to compete for political power on equal footing with other political actors.</td>
<td>Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania</td>
<td>Parliamentarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Consolidated nomenclatures”</td>
<td>Nomenclature suffered little fragmentation and maintained its dominance after independence.</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan</td>
<td>presidential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The consolidated elites experience few cleavages or internal fragmentations. In these cases, “opposition forces are too weak to force old elites to alter the means of acquiring power” and these old elites are successfully able to retain their monopoly. Dispersed nomenclature elites experienced internal fragmentation during the breakdown phase, making it easier for opposition forces to mobilize mass support against them. As a result, these elites were forced to compete for power in the same manner as the new political actors in the transition phase. Finally, reformed elites went through a transition that
resembled a midpoint between the two processes described above. They did not come through the breakdown structurally intact, but they only have certain internal fragmentation. Often such nomenclatures are forced to share power with the opposition. I combine Easters three categories from post-soviet studies with Moscas universal theory to formulate a elite theory: The more fragmented (dispersed) the post-soviet elite is, the higher the liberalisation. I use the three categories that Easter used.

An important critique of the elite theory´s possibility to explain liberalisation is that it mixes cause and effect. If you regard that political fragmentation is liberalisation, then there is no causal relationship, only statistical. However the theory suggests that political fragmentation is the symptom of a society divided between elites, and I don´t define liberalisation as a competition between elites, but as a set of civil and political liberties.

Table 3.4. 2 NEW ELITES Elites as defined by operationalisation and freedom rating, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELITE</th>
<th>FSU</th>
<th>FREEDOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Reformed old elite” (medium)</td>
<td>Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Russia</td>
<td>Partially Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“dispersed nomenclature elites” (high)</td>
<td>Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Consolidated nomenclatures” (low)</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.1 **Comparing** the elite theory to Vanhanens IPR-theory, I regard elite theory as a certain political version of the economical and intelectual distribution of power. As political power has always been more concentrated in the area of the Russian empire (through politics of centralisation) this political distribution will be especially important in explaining liberalisation in FSU. Elites have traditionally had both political, economical and military power. The theory suggests that the more competing elites with political power, the more their will to accept political freedom with its minority rights as a way to secure themselves against the influence of the other elites, and a peaceful recruitment of government as way to avoid costly conflicts. However, under the existence of only one elite, the will to accept freedom is little, because they have control, and do not need political freedom to protect their power. While Vanhanens IPR measures elites in society as such (the distribution of economical and intelectual resources), the elite theory measures only political elites and the distribution of political power. Later I will discuss if they interact or measure the same phenomena.
4.4 Theory C. Diamonds model - Development is Democracy

“The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”
Lipset, 1959.

“The higher the socio-economic development, the higher the political freedom” This is the basic hypothesis of the socioeconomic theory. Economic development as a structural precondition for a strong democracy is one of the most classical theories in democracy theory. As Burkhart and Beck note there are few “iron laws” in comparative politics, yet, one hypothesis that seems established beyond challenge is the causal link between economic development and democracy”. Seymour Martin Lipset formulated the most influential piece on the development hypothesis in American Political Science Review in 1959 and his book in 1963: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy”. Lipset defined well-to-do as a high level of economic development, measured in national wealth and economic growth. His and later scholars arguments were that it creates better circumstances for a civil society to flourish and a more moderate, patient and tolerant population minimizing preferences for undemocratic solutions (Huntington 1991, Przeworski 1996). Lipset argued that high economic growth safeguards democracies after a democratisation has taken place, because it will increase, or at least not decrease, the legitimacy of the democratic regime. Economic crisis is expected to increase dissatisfaction among both the masses and powerful elites and thereby undermine the support for democracy and probably raise the longing for a strong man. Which could well be said, is what has happened in many FSU states where the economy often collapsed to half or a third of its former size and economic growth from that point of has been low, or negative in the first ten years of democracy.

The typical outlier in Lipset’s empirical data were oil-rich Middle Eastern regimes: they were extremely undemocratic, still they had high GDP. To answer this critique Diamond extended Lipset’s theory with redefining well-to-do from pure economic to socioeconomic development. He included factors such as health and education. This explained why some well-to-do states didn’t democratize even when growing economically: because the development of economy was only benefiting certain layers or pockets in society: “Oil rich states, whose economic and class structures are grossly distorted by the fact of centralized state control of the oil sector look economically developed in terms of their per capita income are much less so when we examine education levels, status of women, civic life, and state-society relations” (Diamond, 2003).
Lipset and Diamonds theory will in my test be retranslated to the regional setting: the more well-to-do the former Soviet republic (FSU), the higher political freedom (DS). Outliers can expected to be a case like Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan, where economical development has been high, because oil incomes booze GDP but socioeconomic (health, education, average life span) has not. They are rich from oil - but it has not had any effect on the political freedom - maybe even opposite: the income from oil has created a motive for the elites to remain in power, and more resources to do so.

Lipset’s theory was more common in the 50s and 60s, but still has supporters. Cutright, Diamond, Olsen, Helliwell all provided further support using multivariate correlations with larger numbers of countries. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators state that the “level of economic development has a very strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive” and Samuel Huntington establishes a “coup-attempt ceiling,” beyond which military coups are unlikely to happen, at a GNP of $3,000 USD per capita (Schedler, 2001: 73) Przeworski has shown statistical evidence for Lipset’s theory, but Przeworski did not suggest any causal relationship with high growth resulting in political freedom. Steven Fish’s empirical evidence shows that there is only very weak correlation between HDI and the Freedom House Index (Fish, 1998: 225-226).

Lipset’s thesis has had to take critique for being valid only for Western states: since the relationship between development and democracy differed on the variabel region. (Diamond, 2003: 93) and scholars have showed (like Huntington did on social peace in 1968) how economic development has also proven to leads to lower levels of democracy for poor countries, especially when traditional, ingrained precondition change suddenly and ethnic and other divisions are strengthened. Coppedge challenged the modernisation theory that modernisation creates democracy by claiming it was difficult to say which is cause and effect: does urbanisation, spread of mass media and education boom explain democratisation or does democratisation explain modernisation. Though, Coppedge, when testing his counter-theory concluded that the modernisation theory functioned also in other parts of the world than the West. (Vanhanen, 2003: 16) I include the socioeconomic theory in my analysis because I believe the general income and social development could to be a decisive precondition for political freedom in general, and by testing it on the “post soviet lab” we can see if it is valid for this region. Rejections of Lipset’s theory on behalf of third world development countries does not necessarily
mean it can not apply to former socialist republics, of whom many have a high industrialisation and could be ranged “second world”, if one uses the term of graded worlds.

4.5 Causal relations between independent variables

The regression analysis will only show if there is statistic covariation between each independent variable and political freedom. We can not prove causal relationship by statistics. The causal correlation i suggest between the independent and the dependent variabel is based on the theoretical explanations given here. They live up to Mills three criteria for causal relations: the cause comes before the effect in time, there is a relation between them and that the relation remains when controlled for a third variabel (Lund, 1996: 30) IPR, Elite fragmentation and HDI are seen as phenomena coming first in time, and causing the level of political freedom, and even when controlled for a third variabel.

Illustration 3. Towards a model of the theories. Suggested causal relation between the variables

Towards a model. I believe they all independent variables have individually have causal effect on political freedom, but I wish to check for correlation between the the independent variable IPR or HDI and elite. In my causal model, IPR is hinter-lying factor, and elite fragmentation is probably related to it. In the analysis I will test each theory single as a one-factor analysis. My prime hypothesis in the prospected model is that the
IPR is the most important explanatory factor, but that a fragmented elite can increase political freedom to a higher level then IPR suggests, and a that a consolidated elite will decrease the level of political freedom that the IPR suggests.

The theories are tested individually as they are expected to partially measure the same phenomenas, but in different ways. All theories include different ways of estimating distribution, but A has a economical focus, B a more general and C a political focus. It is likely to think that elite fragmentation will produce a distribution of power means, as each elite competes to get education or control of economic resources like land, capital and industry. The effect goes the other way too - if there is such a distribution, and an increase in division of labour, it will produce different elites. Distribution of educational and economic powers are partially overlapping with the theory that a “well fed” population will liberalize a democracy, because distribution of economic power is parallel distribution of wealth.
5. OPERATIONALISATION

I have in the previous chapter presented and argued my theoretical framework and my choice of theories. I will now present and argue my choice of operationalisations for the variables.

5.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

5.1.2 Operationalisation IPR

The operationalisation of the power resource theory will be Vanhanens IPR, which was well described in the presentation of the theory. Alternative, possible operationalisations of power distribution could have been the relative size of the middle class, degree of absence/prescence of feudalism and levels of literacy. I have chosen Vanhanens Index of Power Resources (IPR) because it contains several operationalisation of important dimensions to economic and intellectual power in one single index. The six subindexes of IPR are divided in three sub-indexes:

1. Index of Occupation Diversification (IOD)
   - urbanisation - percentage of population living in urban areas
   - agricultural dominance - percentage of non-agricultural population
2. Index of Knowledge Distribution (IKD):
   - education level - number of students per 100 000 inhabitants
   - literacy - percentage of populations with literacy
3. Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources (IDEPR)
   - selfowning peasants. percentage of share of family farms of the total area of holdings
   - degree of decentralisation of non-agricultural economic resources

The source of IPR will be the numbers Vanhanen use in 2003 (Vanhanen, 2003: 189-226), and they have not been updated in 2004,2005 or 2006, from what Mr. Vanhanen tells me by correspondence, because of the complexity by collecting the data for the indexes values. For the table analysis, the IPR is converted into categories: High, medium and Low IPR. Conversion is done of the basis of a scale from the IPR score of the FSU with the highest (Latvia) and lowest value (Uzbekistan) (38,3 and 5,7).

5.1.3 Operationalisation - Nr of effective candidates

An alternative, possible operationalisation of fragmentation among post-soviet elites could be the institutional design (given that Easters theory was right), a estimation of
number of parties in parliament, the present role of USSR Communist Party (in or outside government, over or under 20% in parliament etc). Easter suggested no other operationalisation of his theory apart from his own assessment of case studying each FSUs political development. However, in order to use a more objective operationalisation than assessment for the quantitative data, I have decided to measure the fragmentation of elites in the FSU by the effective number of presidential candidates in the most recent presidential election. This number reflect whether there is one, powerful elite in politics or several competing elites, de facto competing for power. (If the country has one powerful elite, this will most probably be the nomenclature). The effective number of candidates is calculated as: 

\[ N = \frac{1}{\sum \nu_i^2}, \]

where “\( \nu_i \)” is the share of votes for each respective candidate “\( i \)” (in other words, it demonstrated how many “real” or “meaningful” candidates run in the election). The measure was invented by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (Laakso/Taagepera, 1979), and since then it used as a most conventional measurement of electoral competition. If there are four candidates, each of whom got 25% of votes, this meant that the effective number of candidates is 4. If one of four candidates got 97% of votes, and three remaining candidates received 1% each, then the effective number of candidates will be close to 1. 1 means a 100% vote for the president, which is what happened in Turkmenistan when the presidential candidate ran unopposed.

This independent variable will be converted into categorical values

1 = Effective candidates in last presidential election > 2 = reformed elite = 1 (high)
2 = Effective candidates in last presidential election 1,7-1,9 = reformed elite = 2
3 = Effective candidates in last presidential election > 1,7 = consolidated elite = 3

5.1.4 Operationalisation - Human Development Index HDI

Possible operation of the socioeconomic development could by GNI and other pure economical indicators like debt or annual growth. I choose UNDPs Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI – human development index – is a summary composite index that measures a country’s average achievements in three basic aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living.

- Longevity = life expectancy at birth (Source: UN Population Division)
• Knowledge = combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics)

• Standard of living = GDP per capita (PPP US$). (Source: World Bank)

I have chosen operationalisation HDI because it includes all the important quantitative measures on living age, health condition, education and GNI and the index producer is reliable, and especially reliable for comparative analysis, as they have one global system of delivery of the data. The source is UNDPs Human Development Report. For the regression analysis continuous values will be used. For the table analysis the HDI values will be converted into the categories high, medium and low. These categories are defined inside a scale from the highest HDI score of a FSU to the lowest HDI score of a FSU. As the FSU HDI measured on a global scale ALL are relatively low, the conversion is based on the size of the figures for the FSU countries. the HDI High are HDI-indexes above 0,8, medium are HDI-indexes 0,71 - 0,79 and low are ,070 or lower.

5.2 OPERATIONALISTAION DEPENDENTVARIABEL

5.2.1 Operationalisation Freedom scale
How to measure political freedom? The most famous operationalisation is Freedom House’s Freedom Scale. This scale is updated every year, and largely considered among the worlds most reliable, and often used for comparative analysis. (Dahl / Saphiro, 2002: 530) An alternative, possible operationalisation could be the Polity 4 democracy barometer. Polity 4 is a joint-scholar program that quantifies democracy on a scale from +10 to -10. Dahl and Saphiro recommends also Polity 4, the large disadvantage of the Polity 4 is that it is not updated every year, and so this choice would have forced my to “freeze” the data for all the dependent variables on to material published in the year 2003 (date for 2002). Since then two or three “colour revolutions” have taken place after 2003, the 2002-limit is a clear disadvantage, although Freedom House is not updated beyond December 30, 2004 either. A second acknowledged measurement for political freedom is the Democracy and Development (DD), developed by Preworski. DD is a a bicotom scale with values of either “democracy” or “dictatorship”. But DD is more suitable for the transit to democracy than for the development after a system of elections for choosing executive power has been installed, and the dichotomy of DD makes linear regression impossible and also there is the internal FSU differences.
I choose Freedom House scale. It is very precise measure according to our definition of political freedom. Freedom House scale has both metric (Freedom scale) and non-metric values (Regime name). They are presented in this table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIME NAME</th>
<th>FREEDOM SCALE</th>
<th>DEFINITIONS</th>
<th>DEFINITIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Democracy</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Existence of policies that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law.</td>
<td>Existence of best practices that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconsolidated Democracy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Existence of policies that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law.</td>
<td>Existence of most practices that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Existence of many policies that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law.</td>
<td>Existence of many practices that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconsolidated Authoritarian Regime</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Existence of many policies that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law.</td>
<td>Existence of some practices that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Authoritarian Regime</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>Existence of many policies that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law.</td>
<td>Absence of many practices that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Absence of policies that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law.</td>
<td>Absence of practices that adhere to basic human rights standards, democratic norms, and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3 SELECTION OF UNITS: UNIQUE FREEDOM LAB

The units studied will be the 15 former soviet unions republics: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, operationalised as the they are defined as members of the UN. Contested territories, like Transnistria in Moldova,
Abkazhia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabach in Azerbaijan and Armenia are excluded from the definition of the units. Contested areas often are rules by military law and technically they severely decreases the quality of political freedom in Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia if they count as parts of these units. (That they might have an indirect effect in political freedom in the uncontested area is still possible) Freedom House have separate country reports on these contested areas. By choosing all the FSUs the selection of units covers the complete universe of the research question. However, if we want to generalize from preconditions in the FSU to all post-authoritarian regimes with a democratic constitution, FSU as unit for study have to be discussed as a defective sample (ufullstendig utvalg).

5.3.1 Arguing the units. The FSU a lab for political freedom

I have chosen the FSU because it is a unique lab for evaluating the democratic consolidation after transition from authoritarian regime to democracy. 15 states “started” from the same point of departure (with the Soviet legacy) in 1991. As SSRs the post-soviet heritage made them so-called “most similar cases”. By comparing them on a liberalisation scala 15 years after transition to a (minimal defined) democracy we might achieve to identify the structural precondition for liberalisation.

Soviet legacies - most similar case. The important common Soviet heritages that made the FSU “most similar case” are the one-party Leninist government model, the bureaucractic state, centrally planned command economy with 5 years plans, massive collectivization of agriculture, free mass education for all citizens, high welfare benefits-regimes, Russianification (or Sovietification) of non-Russian groups, surveillance and intelligence institutions, interpersonal distrust, the threat of Gulag/prisoner camp for dissidents, censorship of culture and media, use of mandatory participation in social organizations + in mass education and the ban on voluntary participation. During Stalin terror was used to force compliance with plan economy, and after end to terror method, planning economy was penetrated by widespread corruption and bribery. Soviet heritage should then be a relevant similarity when testing for power resource distribution, socio-economic development and elite shifts.

Post Communist heritage. This Soviet heritage also includes the more general post-communist heritage, which is described by Holmes in a 14 point-list on Eastern Euro-
pean post-communist heritage: assertion of independence and rise of nationalism, near absence of a culture of compromise, high expectations of leaders, mistrust of political institutions, rejection of ideology & “grand theories”, a total democracy and market economy transition (as opposed to South Europe’s political & not economical or China’s economical & not political), a feeling of temporality while the population awaits transition into something else other than post-communism, political instability and frequent reforming and change amongst the elite, a widespread sense if insecurity, and legitimation problems for the new political elite. (Holmes, 1997: 17-19). Holmes also point out the feature of Eastern European transitions that is came sudden and parallel with a economic cool-down in the West. Tucker agreed that the Soviet heritage was more than just a history, it was reflected in the way of thinking, and affected all 15 states, even after independence (Tucker, 1995:237).

5.3.2 Arguing the 15 unit-choice Critique could be leveled against choosing all the 15 FSU for comparative analysis. The most common objection is that the Baltics reached autonomy already at the late phase of Soviet history and have been under EU “protection” - sharing close toes immediately after independence, while other FSUs have not. Historically it is argued that Baltics, Western Ukraine and Moldova joined the USSR as occupied territories, while most of rest where parts of the former Russian empire. Another difference some would argue is unreasonable to compare them on has to do with level of modernization. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are industrialized on a “second world standard” while most Central Asian states have third-world agricultural economies. Nevertheless, all of the states emerged in 1991 from a highly centralized unitary system of Leninism and democratized simultaneously. The Baltics are also interesting cases, or “mirrors” to the mainstream development in FSU. Excluding deviant cases in the lower part of the scale, like Belarus, or deviant cases as the Baltics in the higher part of the scale, would be to trying to adapt the landscape after the map, instead of adapting a map to the landscape. The theories try to define the variation of DS in the FSU, because FSUs Soviet heritage is a unique opportunity for comparing democracies.

5.3.3 Country background The empirical data presented for my study is primarily bases on Country Reports from Freedom House Country Reports 2005 and Vanhanens book on IPR and Election results from www.electionworld.org and Erik Herron’s article 2002. The country background is Master thesis, Political science, University of Oslo, 2006

**Lithuania**

Population: 3,500,000 Capital: Vilnius

*History:* The state Lithuania merged with Poland in the sixteenth century and was subsequently absorbed by Russia in the 18th century. After gaining its independence at the end of World War I, Lithuania was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1941 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Independence regained 1991, but certain autonomy granted even earlier. 

*Post-soviet:* Lithuania became a EU member in May 2004 after referendum. 

*Democracy conclusion:* Lithuanians can change their government democratically.

**Latvia**

Population: 2,300,000 Capital: Riga

*History:* As the Estonians and the Lithuanians, Latvians have been a distinct ethnic group at the Baltic coast with their own language for centuries. However the territory has mostly had foreign rulers since Swedish invasion in the 17th Century. It was part of the Russian empire in the 18th and 19th Century and became independent in modern times only in 1917. Latvia was re-annexed by Russians to the USSR in 1941, and re-emerged as independent in 1991.

*Post-soviet:* Latvia ascended to the EU in 2004 after a referendum.

*Democracy conclusion:* Latvians can change their government democratically.

**Estonia**

Population: 1,400,000 Capital: Tallin

*History:* Estonia has had many rulers: Swedes, Germans and Russian. After gaining its independence from Russia in 1918, Estonia was re-occupied by the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and annexed. Approximately 1/10 of the population was deported, executed, or forced to flee abroad during the 50 years of occupation by USSR. When reaching independence in 1991, ethnic Estonians constituted only 60% of the population.

*Post-soviet:* Estonia joined the EU in 2004. Like other Baltic regimes, after fall of Communism most of the nomenclature was shifted out and the former Communist party is marginalised. Until 2004 Estonia kept low rating because the Russian part of the population was not included in the political process.

*Democracy conclusion:* Estonians can change their government democratically
Moldova

Population: 4,300,000  Capital: Chisinau

History: Moldova did not exist as a state until Stalin took then-called landscape of Bessarabia from Romania during WW2 and created the Moldovian SSR.

Post-soviet: Independence was declared in 1991, but a separat part of the country, Transnistria has not accepted the independence, and remains de facto autonomous. As discussed under units, we will here consider Moldova as the unit disregarding the contested territory. Moldova in 2001 became the first FSU to democratically elect a Communist Party member as president. Some meant the return of Communists to power by democratic means offered some prospects for long-term democratic consolidation. (Demokratizatsiya; 9/22/2004; March, Luke ), but other has seen a worsening of political freedom in Moldova since Communist take-over, including the ban of opposition party and closure of free media. (Way, Luke, Journalist of democracy 13.4, 2002) Freedom House concludes Moldova has not made the kind of substantial progress toward stable democracy seen in some of its Western neighbors. Frequent changes in political leadership have impeded the development of consistent and effective policies. Local elections held nationwide in 2003 were declared by the OSCE to be in line with international standards, but some observers expressed concerns about intimidation of opposition candidates, bias among the media, and irregularities during the poll. Democracy conclusion: It is doubtful whether Moldovans can or cannot change their government democratically.

Ukraine

Population: 47,800,000  Capital: Kyiv

History: Ukraine was an independent state in mediaeval times. Due to pressure on its borders from different enemies Ukraine was forced to become a part of the Russian empire in the 17th Century, and gained its first independence in modern times in 1991.

Post-soviet: Ukraine is in many ways similar to Russia: a populous nation (48 million), vast territory (similar to that of France), a Slavic language and Byzantine-Influenced Christianity (Russian Orthodox, Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek Catholicism). The national-minded nomenclature in Western and Central Ukraine that got their hands on nationalised property (taken from Soviet). The Russian-minded elites in the East of Ukraine were content to have their hands on Soviet property like Crimea and industrial wealth. Dawisha/Parrot Demo. 1997:345) Democracy conclusion: Since the “orange revolution” Ukrainian voters have been able to change their government democratically, in 2004. Ukraine’s civil liberties rating improved from 4 to 3 due to increases in media independence and associational rights resulting from widespread civic mobilization protesting fraudulent elections in November.

Russia

Population: 145,500,000  Capital: Moscow

History: Russia traces its roots as a state back to the centuries before 1000 AD, with the original state being based in Kiev, which today is in Ukraine. Russia became an empire under tsar Peter I, expanding rapidly in territory and military size. After the 1917 October revolution Russia became the core state of the Soviet Union, and the dominant actor in the Union until the break-up in 1991. Russia was ruled as monarchy by tsars until 1917 and was under Communist centralist one-party rule (tsar or Communist Party) until 1991, when the first constitutional multiparty democracy was established (apart from the February to October 1917).

Post-soviet: Russia was ruled by president Yeltsin for two periods 1991-96, 1996-99, and his successor Putin from 1999 to elections in 2000. Putin was elected president twice, in 2000 and 2004. During 2004, President Vladimir Putin took further steps toward the consolidation of executive authority by increasing pressure on opposition political parties and civil society, strengthening state control over national broadcast media, and pursuing politically-driven prosecutions of independent business leaders and academics. In the March 2004 presidential election, Putin easily defeated his closest challenger with more than 70 percent of the vote. The 2000 and 2004 presidential vote and, even more so, the 2003 Duma elections was marred by irregularities. Next elections are in 2008.
Democracy conclusion: Russian can not change their government democratically, particularly in light of the state's far-reaching control of broadcast media and growing harassment of opposition parties and their financial backers, of local governments and recently the NGOs. Russia's political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 on the Freedom Scale, and its status from Partly Free to Not Free, due to the virtual elimination of influential political opposition parties within the country and the further concentration of executive power.

Armenia
Population: 3,200,000  Capital: Yerevan
History: Armenia is a ancient kingdom and long-time independent Caucasus country, predominately Christian in Muslim region. Armenia was conquered by Russia in the 19th century. Post-soviet: After independence it maintains strong bonds to Russia, amongst others military alliance and Russian soliders on Armenian soil, due to the military challenges of war within the borders and with neighbours. Armenia also maintains good relations with the European Union, due to its geographical proximity.
Democracy conclusion: Armenians can not change their government democratically. The 1995, 1996, 1999 and 2003 elections were strongly criticized by international election monitors.

Georgia
Population: 4,700,000  Capital: Tbilisi
History: Georgia traces its root as a state back to ancient kingdoms and is united by the Georgian Orthodox church at the border regions between Christianity and Islam. Asking security from the Mongolian and Muslim invaders, Georgia signed a pact with the Russian tsar in the 19th Century and was later included into the Russian Empire. (Dawisha/Parrot, 1997:157) Georgia became independent for a short period from 1917 to 1921.
Democracy conclusions: Citizens in Georgia can change their government democratically. Still ethnic, clan and personality struggles continue to define Georgian politics. International observers noted significant voting irregularities at elections in 2003 and thousands of protesters took to the streets and forced a regime change, in the so-called “Rose revolution”. Mikhail Saakashvili, a long-time critic of the Shevardnadze government won the January 2004 presidential election with 96% of the vote. This “colour revolution” happened at the end of 2003, but is not reflected in the democracy scores of Georgia. The fact that Georgias last presidential election had such a high score - 96% for one candidate, makes it look as a very consolidated elite while in-fact this number represent a elite shift.

Kazakhstan
Population: 14,800,000  Capital: Astana
History: Kazakhstan is a predominately Muslim country in Central Asia. Darwish claims it is a “accidental country, a nation carved out of a Soviet republic whose boundaries where never intended to be those of a independent state. “ (Olcott, in Dawish/Parrot, 1997:201) The areas
which to today is Kazakhstan were for centuries ruled by leaders, kahns, of the three major hordes. The area was incorporated into Russian in the late 19th century as the republic of Turkestan.

Post-soviet: Almost 40% of the population is ethnic Russian, and the previously poor state is becoming rich from oil wealth onshore and in the Caspian Sea. There has been no change in executive leadership in post-independence Kazakhstan. State leader is President Nursultan Nazarbayev; Chairman of the Supreme Soviet since 1990; first elected president 1991; reelected 1999 and 2005. The pre-Communist and post-Communist elite remain in general the same, and so elite power is consolidated. Independent political parties continue to elect small numbers of deputies to the legislature (Polity 4, Cook, 2004/ Darwish/Parrot, 1997:201)

Democracy conclusion: Kazakhstan citizens can not change their governmental democratically.

Tajikistan
Population: 6,600,000 Capital: Dushanbe

History: Conquered by Russia in the late 1800s, Tajikistan shares borders with the unstable state of Afghanistan, and Tajiks is a ethnic group living both in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Tajikistan was made an autonomous region within Uzbekistan in 1924 and a separate SSR 1929.

Post-soviet: After independence in 1991, long-simmering clan-based tensions, combined with various anti-Communist and Islamist movements, soon plunged the country into a five-year civil war for central government control. Over 60,000 Tajiks were killed and over 10% of the population was internally displaced. Zones are still left where armed bands terrorize the population at will.

Democracy conclusion: Citizens of Tajikistan cannot change their government democratically. Elections in Tajikistan remain simply a legitimizing ritual. Emomali Rahmonov was initially elected in 1992; reelected 1999 and enforced his power through a referendum in 2003.

Azerbaijan
Population: 8,200,000 Capital: Baku

History: Azerbaijan is a pre-dominantly Muslim country with rich oil resources in the caspian sea and onshore. Its present territories were conquered by Russia in the 19th Century, and it never enjoyed independence as a modern state before 1991.

Post-soviet: Azerbaijan maintains relative good relations with the EU and Russia, mainly because of oil interests, despite of a war with Armenia. Citizens of Azerbaijan cannot change their government democratically. In 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey was elected president in a generally free and fair vote, but ousted by military coup in 1993, directed by the former first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, Heydar Aliyev, who rigged presidential elections in 1993 where he claimed a 99% electoral victory. The 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2003 elections were considered neither free nor fair by international observers. The older Aliyev has passed the power on to his son, Ilham Aliyev, who ascended to the presidency in late 2003, attempt to put his mark on Azerbaijani politics and consolidate his power base among the country's ruling elite. Aliyev won elections in 2005, though riots after allegations of electoral fraud were cracked down on with police.

Belarus
Population: 9,900,000 Capital: Minsk

History: Belarus became independent first time in 1918, but soon incorporated in USSR. Belarus is a state who shares common features with Russia and Ukraine (Slavic ethnicity and language, Orthodox church) but has its proper language.

Post-soviet: Close ties are maintained with Russia, especially after 1994 elections of president Lukaschenko, which led to Belarus’ expulsion from the Council of Europe. Belarus has unlimited presidential authority after amendments to the Constitution in 1996. The government preserves social stability through welfare policies that provide the population with minimally acceptable living standards. the state-bureaucratic elite forms the basis of Lukashenka's regime, providing “the two
pillars of presidential power - collective farms and collective labor in state-run enterprises.” (FH)

Demonstrations against electoral fraud after the presidential election in March 2006 were violently cracked down on. (press, 2006)

_Democracy conclusion:_ Citizens of Belarus can not change their government democratically.

**Turkmenistan**

Population: 5,700,000  
Capital: Ashgabat

_History:_ Turkmenistan was conquered by the Mongols in the 13th century and seized by Russia in the late 1800s, incorporated into the U.S.S.R. in 1924.  
_Post-soviet:_ President Saparmura Niyazov has governed Turkmenistan SSR since 1985. He became president in 1990, elected in 1992 and announced president-for-life in 1999. President Niyazov maintains a personal monopoly on power through political repression and constitutional manipulation and has taken the name “Turkobash”; father of the Turk nation. He decides what books to read in the schools, and even changed the calendar to his own liking.  
_Democracy conclusion:_ Turkmen citizen can not change their government democratically.

_Citizens of Belarus and Turkmenistan cannot change their government democratically. America is a Free Country, but Turkmenistan is not._

Freedom House lists Turkmenistan amongst the 15 less free countries in the world. The regime ban all political parties, enjoys complete control over the media, censoring all newspapers and forbidding independent criticism of government policy. Elections are not considered free or fair, and neither the reformed Communist Party (stil in power), the legislative, nor the judiciary has any significant autonomy from the executive branch.

**Uzbekistan**

Population: 25,700,000  
Capital: Tashkent

_History:_ Located along the Silk Road, Uzbekistan was incorporated into Russia by the late 1800s. Uzbekistan SSR was established in 1924. Citizens of Uzbekistan cannot change their government democratically. President Islam Karimov and the executive branch dominate the legislature and judiciary, military, and security police. Elected in 1991 and reelected with 92% of the votes in 1999. Open and free private discussion is limited by the mahalla committees, a traditional neighborhood organization that the government has turned into an official system for public surveillance and control. The country’s best known opposition parties have been banned. Rebellion against the government in May 2005 was cracked down upon by military forces. American criticism of this act led to expulsion from the military bases in 2005/2006.(Press, 2006)

**5.3.4 Patterns in country background**

Some interesting notes on the FSU is that on most measures of democracy, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania score on the high ends of scales, while all Central Asian states, and Belarus and Azerbaijan score in the low end of the scale. The same pattern is seen in the variation of IPR, although not for Belarus and Azerbaijan. Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Belarus often come in the “middle” of scales, wether it bee democracy barometers, GDP, IPR or other measure. The Baltic states and Moldova came latest to the USSR and left fastest. They and Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia all share the fact that they have a pre-Soviet experience of an independent state and all, apart from Moldova, has a majority of the name-bearing ethinical group (similar to stateness definition). Only the Baltic states and Russia had independence in the 20th century before the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

_Master thesis, Political science, University of Oslo, 2006_
Another important difference lies in the GNI, the “middle countries” mentioned are often middle income countries, while Central Asian are low income-countries. For industrialisation no statistics is provided by the data, but it is possible to imagine that the higher-income countries, apart from a “oil effect” on Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, are more industrialised than the low-income countries.

Three of the five Central Asian republics have the same head of state as in 1991. The Borders of the Central Asian republics in the 1920s were neither national, ethnic, linguistic, or cultural borders. (Bendersky, 2005). Note also: Tajikistan experienced a vicious civil war from 1992-1996, and also Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Armenia have war experiences in the 1990s.

Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have experienced so-called “colored revolutions” between December 2003 and February 2005. In my data this can not be reflected in Kyrgyzstan, unfortunately. Russia has fallen lately, under Putin’s second term starting 2004, because of new legislation that decreases freedom of speach and the limitations on executive power.

The Former Soviet Union
6. **EMPIRICAL DATA**

6.1 Table **QUANTATIVE DATA** Summary of data, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSU</th>
<th>Index of Power resources</th>
<th>Freedom scale</th>
<th><code>NR. OF EFFECTIVE CANDIDATES LAST ELECTION</code></th>
<th><code>YEAR OF LAST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION UNTIL 30.12.04</code></th>
<th>Human Development Index 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>25,2</td>
<td>5,18</td>
<td>2,96 (5,64)</td>
<td>2003 (1999)</td>
<td>0,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>17,8</td>
<td>5,86</td>
<td>1,63 (1,67)</td>
<td>2003 (1999)</td>
<td>0,73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>6,64</td>
<td>1,39</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>36,5</td>
<td>1,96</td>
<td>5,55*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>33,7</td>
<td>4,96</td>
<td>1,084 (1,5)</td>
<td>2003 (2000)</td>
<td>0,71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,41</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0,76</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5,64</td>
<td>1,73</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>38,3</td>
<td>2,14</td>
<td>5,49*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>34,7</td>
<td>2,21</td>
<td>3,27</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0,85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>5,07</td>
<td>1,85*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>5,6</td>
<td>1,89 (2,7)</td>
<td>2004 (2000)</td>
<td>0,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>5,79</td>
<td>1,06</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0,65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6,7</td>
<td>6,93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4,5</td>
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<td>2004 (1999)</td>
<td>0,77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>6,43</td>
<td>1,18</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0,69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*- Not presidential, but parliamentary elections (not included in linear regression)

The year of last election is only included for background.
6.2 Summary of all variables for table analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSU</th>
<th>Index of power resources</th>
<th>Human Development Index 2005</th>
<th>Elite Fragmentation</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Freedom Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Consolidated Democracy</td>
<td>1,96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Consolidated Democracy</td>
<td>2,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Consolidated Democracy</td>
<td>2,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Hybrid Regime</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Consolidated*</td>
<td>Hybrid Regime</td>
<td>4,96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>Semiconsolidated Authoritarian</td>
<td>5,07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Semiconsolidated Authoritarian</td>
<td>5,18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>Semiconsolidated Authoritarian</td>
<td>5,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>Semiconsolidated Authoritarian</td>
<td>5,64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Consolidated</td>
<td>Semiconsolidated Authoritarian</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>medium</td>
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<td>Semiconsolidated Authoritarian</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>Consolidated Authoritarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>Consolidated</td>
<td>Consolidated Authoritarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Consolidated Authoritarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Consolidated</td>
<td>Consolidated Authoritarian</td>
<td>6,93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conversion:** as Freedom Houses conversion.

Elite fragmentation Dispersed > 3  Reformed 1,7 - 2,99  Consolidated < 1,69
IPR converted : High > 19     Low < 19
HDI converted into dichotomies as UNDP measures it. < 0,8 is high     > 0,8 is low


* Technically, Georgia rates as consolidated because the number of effective candidates is close to 1. The winning president got 96% of the votes. But we have to remember that this is the “Rose revolution”, and in the second round, the real opposer, the old regime, was not running at all.
7. RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

The data is analysed by linear regression, cross tabulation and simple table analysis. The draft for an eventual model is evaluated by a causal analysis. The correlations between the variables was calculated by SPSS, and gave us the following correlation matrix, from which I decided what methods to run for analysis. However, only the IPR theory and the Elite theory seem significant. The causal effect by HDI is proved insignificant by the correlation matrix (0.056 is higher than the 0.05 level), so regression will not be run for HDI.

The correlation matrix also show that there is a strong correlation the independent variables between (0.59 / 0.46 / 0.62). This means that a multivariat analysis by regression would be insignificant. Consequently I can not test a joint model of the variables by multivariat regression. This correlation between the independent variables was to be expected from the theoretical review. As mentioned the Elite fragmentation factor is a form of “political IPR”, while IPR is a form of “economical elite fragmentation”, and both Human development index and IPR measure (by different means) the levels of education, - which are similar all trough the post-soviet space. A consolidated elite might be able to prevent the HDI and IPR to increase by redistributing values to the elites from the state (cleptocracy) instead of general distribution, and this can explain why elite fragmentation is correlated with both IPR and HDI. Only if the correlation between the independen varibles was zero or low, could a multivariat analysis be run for all together.

![Correlations Table]

Master thesis, Political science, University of Oslo, 2006
According to the causal model suggested I will run a causal analysis of IPRs effect on Freedom, controlled for elite fragmentation and socioeconomic level.

**Regression**

A linear regression would tell us how many of the units in the sample the variable is able to explain. For a one-factor analysis we need the residual to be normally redistributed. The PP plot show that they are for variabel A and C.

**Bivariate relations and causal analysis**

Since the independent variables show correlation between eachother, we need to use the bivariate correlations instead of multivariat regression to determine the strength of the correlations of an eventuell joint model, like suggested in illustration 3.

**Simple table analysis**

The number of cases in the sample are only 15. Therefor I have made conversion of the continuos, metric values for elite and IPR (which passed the test of being significant theories on the model) into excluding nominal categories with three values: high medium low. From this table, with a low number of N, and a clear tendency in the units, it is possible to extract information on both of the independent variables., even without procentuation,

8. **THE ANALYSIS**

In the analysis chapter I will test the three operationalised theories effect on the operationalised freedom in the FSU, using the data and the methodology presented in chapter 6 and 7. First I present the results from the regressions, then I use bivariate relations to run a causal analysis of the suggested model.

**8.1 Test for requirements.** A mentioned, the correlation of HDI (Human) and Freedom is higher than the critical value of significance. Therefore I will run regression only on theory A and C.

**8.2 Independent variable IPR on Freedom**

\[ H_0: \text{there is no correlation between high degree of IPR and high political freedom (closer to 7)} \]
**Covariation.** IPR theory shows strong covariation with the dependent variable. The R-square for IPRs explanatory power on political freedom is 0.778, and 0.761 for adjusted R-square\(^1\). Both indicate a very strong covariation between IPR and Freedom. Significance: IPR theory is statistically significant. The t value is -6.7.

![Model Summary Table](image)

In social science this as strong covariation, and the result is significant. The result is also not far from the results Vanhanen reached when explaining the entry of democratisation in 177 countries. It strengthens both hypotheses of theory A.

**Discussion of outliers.** The case-wise diagnostics of IPRs effect on PF explain very precisely, apart from Georgia, Kazakhstan and Armenia (too little freedom) and Estonia, Tajikistan and Lithuania (too much freedom). Especially Georgia remains a mystery. That means that if we know the value of theory A we still don’t automatically know the value of PF. (this is interesting because when testing for Polity 4 democracy 2003 the unexplained were not only Georgia, but also Russia and Ukraine. These have fallen and risen on Freedom barometer since 2003 - and this could explain the difference.)

**Conclusion A** on correlation IPR-Freedom: Ho was dicarded. The same impression as the regression results give, can be observed in the table of Strata: Low IPR consequently gives Low freedom, High IPR gives consequently high freedom and Medium IPR gives mediary freedom. All Consequently.

**8.3 Socioeconomic theory**

Regression was not run for the effect of HDI on Freedom, as the correlation was not significant.

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\(^1\) R-square close to 1.00 indicates a very strong relationship between y and the x variables. If R-square is near 0.00 y is not explained by the x’s, hence R-square near 0.00 means no distinguishable pattern between the given explanatory variable and the dependent variable.

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**Conclusion B:** Correlation indicates in a weak relationship and it is not significant. Ho was strengthened: there is no causal relationship between HDI and political freedom in the FSU.

### 8.4 Fragmentation of elite

*Ho: there is no correlation between countries with a high Elite fragmentation (Elite) and high political freedom (closer to 7)*

**Covariation.** Elite fragmentation theory shows weak correlation with the dependent variable. The R-square for Elite fragmentations explanatory power on political freedom is 0.596 and 0.555 for adjusted R-square. For a correlation in social science it is still a valid result, and the t-value of -3.8 show that the theory is statistically significant. An important notice is that N for this regression was only 12, because my operationalisation of elite fragmentation excluded the parliamentary Latvia, Lithuania and Moldovas lack of presidential elections since ~96. The case-wise diagnostics show that Georgia and Lithuania have more freedom then explained by the elite fragmentation. Especially Georgia, and this is a result of the operationalisation where high shares for one candidate indicates unified elite. Ironically, when an old elite was dispersed in Georgia in 2003, the opposition candidate won by landslide - which gave Georgia the label consolidated elite, while the correct would probably have been dispersed. Armenia remains a mystery. A reason why elite theory shows so little correlation could also be because of an invalid operationalisation - maybe the number of effective candidate is misleading indicator. The other explanation could be because three countries which would have been explained by this precondition, were left out.

**Conclusion C.** Ho is discarded, but the proven correlation is not convincingly strong. Political elite fragmentation is a major force in explaining variation of political freedom in the FSU. The data matrix confirms that the findings only work for high values. Low values (consolidated elites) explain both authoritarian regime and crossroad, and regimes with a medium elite Unless Georgia counts for dispersed elite after Rose revolution, Reformed elite give medium political freedom, meaning all medium elites give medium freedom. But consolidated elites give both low and medium freedom, and dispersed elites give both democracies (baltics) and crossroad regimes: Armenia and Ukraine.

**Table DATA MATRIX IPR and ELITE on FREEDOM**
The units placed on their values for IPR and Elite. The scheme shows that high IPR and dispersed elites are connected with Democracy (High on the Freedom scale). Medium IPR and Reformed elites are (except Georgia) connected with Crossroad regimes - semi-democratic and semi-authoritarian. Low IPR is connected with authoritarian forms of democracies (low on Freedom). Consolidated elites are found both at crossroad regimes and authoritarian.

Source: Dataset.

Political freedom 1-3 consolidated and semi-consolidated democracy as high = 1 Democracy 4-5 hybrid regimes and semi-consolidated authoritarian regime as medium = 2 Crossroad 6-7 Consolidated authoritarian regime = 3 Authoritarian

8.5 Analysis of case-wise diagnostics

After regression and cross tabulation I have left HDI theory out of the model. How can IPR and Elite fragmentation combined explain the preconditions for FSU countries?
We will need to use causal analysis to find the question, but the case-wise diagnostics do give an indicator. Elite theory seems to “correct” IPR in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in the sense that where IPR predicts the Political freedom score to be higher than measured, the elite fragmentation suggests that the political freedom score to be lower, and vise versa. This indicates that elite fragmentation could be explanatory in combination with IPR theory, at least for these units. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan all score worse than IPR predicts. Especially Armenia. Lithuania and Tajikistan are more free than predicted, especially Tajikistan. Elite theory can not explain Armenia either.

In sum IPR has a high predictability in level of political freedom. In Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan’s and Kyrgyzstan IPR and elite fragmentation works together. In the other cases the deviation from IPR must be explained by other factors, and elite theory, as operationalised here, seems to only be an explanatory precondition for certain countries.

8.6 Causal analysis - Interaction between independent variables

Returning to our causal model I wish to measure the combined explanatory strength of the effects of the two significant theories, IPR and Elite. IPR is the hinter-lying factor in the model because it is reasonable to believe (with a structural, materialist perspective) that a wide distribution of economical resources will have certain influence on the fragmentation of elites: if resources are scattered on many hands, the more chance elites will derive in different spheres of the specialised economy, or at least that the distribution
will empower eventual groups that differ from the politically ruling elite, turn them into elites, and this create fragmentation. Elites can also appear from other source, such as cultural, language or other sources of societal cleavages. For instance if the IPR reflects the establishment of new agricultural industry, which gives rise to a new elite, in opposition to the old heavy-industrial elite in power. From the bivariate correlations of the operationalised variables we can calculate whether IPR has more effect on Freedom alone or in combination with elite fragmentation and socioeconomic development. The latter showed no statistically significant bivariate correlation with Freedom, so it will be left out of the model. This illustration shows the joint effect on freedom of the IPR and the elite fragmentations theory in something that could be a model.

Illustration 4. Causal analysis chart, the outline of a IPR -Elite model

Explanations of causal analysis. The total effect of the model is IPR and Elite fragmentation on political freedom (sum of directe and indirect effects. Direct Effects = Bivariat correlations (BC) minus indirect effects. Indirect effect (0.4) is the BC of IPR -Elite multiplied with Elite -Freedom. If HDI constituted a spurious effect it would have been (Total effect minus Indirect effect). However, there was no correlation between HDI and Freedom. (Lund, 1993) From this table we can conclude that even if there is a certain “overlapping”, interaction, between IPR theory and Elite fragmentation that makes it impossible to run them together in a multivariate analysis, there might be an
increased explanation from combing the theories. The model tells us this because the
Indirect effect of the hinter-lying IPR to Freedom over Elite fragmentation (0.4) is
larger than the direct effect of IPR to Freedom.

8. 7 Validity of the test

Our study is in general valid, but suffer from certain weaknesses. Important to have in
mind is that generalisations from the conclusion on FSU to all transitory regimes might
not be very valid (outer validity of the data) given what I have described as the post-
soviet heritage.

Datas validity is constituted by the reliability of the data and the validity of the
operationalisation. The major danger of an invalid operationalisation is to operationalise
something that does not reflect the theoretical size it is suppose to represent.
Defintional invalidity is probably biggest for theory C, elite, because it is highly
questionable if the political competation in a given election is enough to measure the
fragmentation of an elite. What if there is, but they dont compete on the political scene,
or one elite is totally outrun in one election, like in Georgia in 2003. The defintional
validity of A and B are higher. In general they and the dependent variabels defintion have
few validity problems in the transformation from theoretical term to operationalistaion
(empirical data). For one, they are all indexes, with several dimension,s and they are well
theoretisized about and argued for in the litterature where they are presentend.

Inner validity. Even if statistically significant, the test can suffer from inner validity.
For instance, as simple as the fact that there is no causal relationship between the depend-
ent and independent variable. There could also be causal relationship, but it apperad
weaker than real, because of a factor in history which now is gone. (Lund, 1996:23). In our
case this historical dimension is relevant for all three theories, especially IPR, because
we are talking about long-term precondition. Other events could have happened around
the collapse of the USSR that effeected the preconditions, which are not observable today,
, these could be the real cause of the variation, not, instead of the supposed cause: IPR.
For instance, the elite fragmentation can have been settled by the “pacts” being done by
the elits in 1991, and casting shadows unto the figures for 2004. The longer since the his-
torical unknown cause, the greater the chanse for this source of invalidity.
Selecting correct units can be a cause of invalidity, but since the research question is to look for the preconditions of FSU democracy, the selection of units is valid. However, the “outer validity” might suffer when I generalize from a test on the FSU transition to all transitions to democracy. (Lund, 1996:33)

**Subjective mistakes.** Intrasubjectivity in my data is fairly low, because over time I have run regression on both the Freedom House scale 2003 and 2005 and Polity 4 2003 has been used and gave fairly the same results (apart from some important difference later discussed, especially in Ukraine and Georgia). The differences between results over time could probably not be measurement mistakes, but be due to real changes in data for the units, because the political development in the FSU change so fast, especially since 2003. Intersubjectivity is whether or not other scientists reach the same result from the same data.

Interasubjectivity is to see if different scholars reach the same result with the same data (Hellvik, 1999:168) Other scholars have run similar tests: Vanhanen has run IPR on Freedom scale 2003, Fish on HDI. But not with the exact same data and year as I have.

**Indexes.** The validity of IPR has been put under question for other validity problem; an index “overheats” when it measures too many of the same phenomena, which is likely that the subindexes of the IPR does. I ran a intra-index test on the IPR index to check for multi-collinarity. The bivariate analysis of subindex Economic Decentralisation (ED) and IPR shows a strong correlation which weakens the reliability of the index, but not severely.

**8. 8 Reliability of the empirical data**

The large majority of empirical data for the analysis derive mostly from these sources:

- Freedom House Country Report 2005
- Erik Herron: “Too few or too many parties”, Conference paper (Results 1998-2002)
- Electionworld.org: Results for Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia

**Sources of information.** These three first are secondary sources, users, not producers, of statistical data. The reliability of that data this depends on my confidence in these secondary sources ability to gather correct information from their sources, and the primary sources ability to collect data. The greatest advantage of Freedom House and
UNDP is that they are comparative and made on an international level, so their analysis of data is done by comparative means, and intended for comparative research. Freedom House is an international data user, that combines information from statistical bureaus and governmental institutions in East European and Central Asian with assessments from scholars in and outside the FSU. UNDP is an international data user, whose statistic data come from UN-related sources: UN Population Division, UNESCOs statistics and the World Bank. Freedom House have the advantage of several decades of experience with cross-country comparable analyzes, and UNDP experience since 1993. I confide in these providers an regard source reliability as good.

As for the elite dimension, I use Herrons calculations and my own. Herron has done his tests on election results, and to test the reliability I calculated some of the same numbers and got the same result. Gel’man reaches the same result for Russia. Electionworld is not a user of data, and electoral results given here are provided by election committees in the respective countries. The results of presidential elections between 2002 and Dec 30 2004 I have calculated by the formula given by Laakso/Taagpera.

**Subjective.** Qualitative data on political democracy can be subjective, and this is what our operationalisations are trying to avoid. At least the same method for creating this scale is applied to all 15 FSU, and this means the evr. mistakes in validation would be equal to all units, and not affect the reliability as much as if the same mistake was made for some and some others not. The most severe reliability problem due to subjectiveness is related to the operationalisation of political freedom, as Freedom House use both quantitate sources and qualitative assessment to measure freedom. The comparative purpose for which the Freedom scale is produced, is important. Problematic can be that Freedom scale is a political institution apart from being academic: it advocates political freedom as an idea, and tries to lobby American politics with country reports:

Freedom House (...) conducts advocacy, education, and training initiatives that promote human rights, democracy, free market economics, the rule of law, independent media, and US engagement in international affairs. ([Freedomhouse.org/about us](http://Freedomhouse.org/about us))

This could affect the outcome in the direction that “worst cases”, political pariahs for US government foreign policy, (e.g. Cuba, Syria, North Korea) gets rated worse than objectively valid, or that the US gets better(higher) than objectively valid. In the FSU setting this could theoretically lead to a overestimation of the new freedom in Georgia and in Ukraine (now closer US allies, rejecting treaties with Russia, Ukraine opting for

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NATO membership) and a devaluation of “lost friends” like Uzbekistan (rejecting American bases on its territory since 2005).

**Dysfunctional collection.** Another reliability problem for data is the infrastructure for collection of statistical data: Not all FSUs have a functioning Statistical Service Bureau. In many states, especially the least developed or the most closed, the national statistical data is based on inexact information and international comparing bodies will have to make approximations and estimates. Remote regions, poor infrastructure, linguistic misunderstanding, unclear border relations, popular skepticism to provide information for central government are amongst factors with complicate the correct data.

The second problem is the “plan economy” tradition from when statistics were often manipulated to appear successful (Waage, 1991). An example is the reporting of cotton production in the Breshnev area, where tons of cotton existed only at the paper. Many NGOs in democracy and human rights fields claim that closed countries like Turkmenistan and Belarus still produce such untrue information to “look good”, especially data concerning democracy. Freedom House calculates with this effect, but still it is a challenge for the reliability.

**Unequal collection.** The reliability for a comparative study is even further enhanced by the fact that some states have better collection of data than other. Although all states have post-soviet features, some states are small and easy to get a overview over, while some are large and rural, like Russia’s regions are or Kazakhstan. Some have internal conflicts, like Georgia and Tajikistan, which make data collection difficult. This makes the reliability of the data of each country even less, and the more misbalance from country to country, the lesser reliability on the comparative analysis.

**Missing values.** My operationalisation of elite fragmentation was based on the last presidential elections, but this lead to the loss of Latvia and Estonia, who are parliament, and the “time lag” for Moldova, which has not had a president election since 1996.

**Misplot.** Misplotting values, or other mistakes in the but the number of N is low in my study, so it easy visible. I can minimize the risk by using common sense when reviewing figures. I can also double check and let other scholars review the dataset, which is done in the case of elite fragmentation.
Not great, but as good as it gets. My conclusion on the reliability of my empirical data is therefore that is is partially poor and inconsistent, and not precise, both from case to case, and especially when comparing some cases with higher reliability than other. Still I conclude that it is “as good as it can get”. I have used statistical sources of reputation and double checked several sources on each country and run a set of reliability tests. To solve the problem of lack of exact data I have chosen a crude, minimalist definition of democracy for which there exist a academic recognized measure scale. I choose data until Dec 30 2004 because it is the year where all my sources could give me the most reliable and comparable data, especially the Freedom Scale.
9. THE FINAL DISCUSSION

My research question has been if structural approaches to can uncover structural precondition for political freedom in the FSU. I launched three structural theories, based on development theory, democracy theory and elite theory that might explain the variation of political freedom. I operationalised the theories and tested them one by one, and analyzed a possible joint model of two factors. Here I discuss the results, theory by theory and for the model.

**Discussion Socioeconomic theory**

The level of socioeconomic development does not seem to be an important precondition for explaining political freedom in the FSU. The correlation is low and not significant. The theory suggests that high levels will foster free societies. I operationalised the level as a combination of wealth, education and health precondition measured in HDI - but the test for regression showed that there was no linear relationship, and neither did cross tabulation show any significant bivariate relationship of size. Belarus and Azerbaijan are typical examples of FSUs with a high HDI - but low political freedom.

Maybe this explainable by the fact that the real difference in HDI between the FSU is not large, and nothing near to explain the enormous difference in political freedom. Most of FSU (apart from the Baltics) are in the UNDPS range of “medium HDI -countries” countries and, and although there exists internal differences in the value, this difference might not be significantly large enough to strengthen the HDI theory, given that the theory is correct. We always risk discarding a true hypothesis because of mistakes in validity, reliability or research design. In this case the largest mistake might lie in the choice of sample, since reliability and validity are generally considered high: the HDI is produced by a reliable source and it is created of several dimension to create an impression of socioeconomic development. A weakness of this index for comparing differences in the FSU is that high education is one of their prime soviet heritage similarities, still 15 years after, and the level of education will create a HDI that is similar all over the FSU.

Nevertheless, my research question was out to find precondition to explain FSU variation, and our finding indicate that HDI is not such a precondition. My finding is in ac-
cordance with amongst other Fish, who also found little covariation between the level of HDI and Freedom scale (Fish, 1998).

**Discussion IPR theory**

IPR theory seems to explain a large part of the variation of political democracy. The theory assumes that a distribution of economical and intellectual power resources (like property and education) will create larger political freedom through political power-sharing. The theory was tested by regression analysis. The relationship was linear and significant, and IPR could explain ca. 60–70% of the sample. Looking at the cases, IPR fairly well explained the level of political freedom too, with Georgia and Armenia as important outliers. This strengthens the IPR theory. We discarded the zero-hypothesis. However, the same potential threats to validity and reliability as the discarded socio-economic theory apply also to IPR. The operationalisation could be invalid - not measuring the real distribution of power resources. This for instance given that Eastern Europe is a historically more political and centralized region than Western Europe, - this being reflected in the fact that what IPR measures in FSU are not as relevant as power resources as it might be in other regions, where economy is more diverse, civil society stronger and the state weaker and governmental power less concentrated. Property rights are historically “an imported phenomena” for the average Russian, imported in the 1800s, and never really established (Wortman, 2004/ Kotsonis 1989). IPRs validity is further taken into doubt by the fact that IPR is an index. Indexes have the same problem as a model with many explanatory variables - if you have many enough you can explain everything. Reliability of the IPR is also limited by difficult collection of data (Vanhanen has not been able to update since 2003, and some data in the index are from 1998). therefore there is a mis-relationship between old IPR and present Freedom scores.

**Discussion Elite theory**

The Elite theory explains only part of the variation. In the chapter on theory I worried that elite fragmentation and political freedom might be the same phenomena - mixing cause and effect. Elite theory also suffers from definitional invalidity: it only measures the political strength of elite in a given election, as can be the case with Georgian Rose-Revolution. Maybe elites “fight” on other scenes, or maybe the measured election is not representative for the structure of the elite. Our regression analysis and our simple table...
analysis lead us to strengthen/verify the hypothesis of the theory, and we discard the zero-hypothesis; correlation does exist. The data for elite theory are pretty reliable: central committees official election results. However, many elections in the FSU are deemed not be free or fair, for instance the latest presidential election in Belarus March 17 2006. The president Lukashenka got approximately 3/4 of the votes, but most western observers deemed the election to be marred by irregularities (Press, 2006). Calculating the elite fragmentation on base of a fake election would on one hand prove that there is no visible elite capable of challenging the elite in government. However, if such elite does exist, and is almost strong enough to force a colour revolution (and thus a free election where elites fragmentation can be viewed more objectively), the fraudulent election result will cover the existence of such elite. The definition of fragmented elite might improve the explanatory power of this elite theory. The definition could be improved and developed by case studies. A index might be a better way to reflect elite fragmentation, rather than then the competitiveness in a given election. Elements could be diversification of economy, ethnical division, the strength of oppositional forces or simply a formula combining the effective candidates in presidential and parliamentary elections, or several elections over time. Assessment could also be a method, like it is with freedom score. Especially interesting is the fact that the elite operationalisation shows outlier in Georgia, and in Armenia. Elite fragmentation is worth a closer look. Its combination with IPR seems to be fruitful.

**Discussion of a model**

In my model IPR is seen as the hinter-laying factor and Elite fragmentation as the mediary factor. The indirect effect of IPR over elite is larger than the sum of IPRs effect and Elites effect alone. This indicates that elite fragmentation could be a precondition for political freedom in some cases. A closer look at the residuals shows that this case is atleast Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. If we left out the lower part of the scale, Central Asian countries, and the higher end, the Baltics, we might find that fragmentation of elites can explain the level of political freedom in the middle region of Caucasus and Slavic Europe, where other factors like geopolitics (e.g. Russia vs EU both have interest in these countries) or IPR (Medium level) are relatively equal. Case studies would be a better method to examine this result more closely.
Discussion of preconditions

Pinpointing relevant preconditions for political freedom in the FSU is complicated. Distribution of economical power and education has proven an important precondition. Elite fragmentation shows potential to be an important explanatory factor, at least in the “middle” segment of my sample - where the effect of IPR is less clear, because IPR is at medium values.

The complexity of Pridhams model comes back to haunt the discussion of preconditions. A large range of factors should have to be considered to create the full picture. IPR and elite can not alone explain the level of political freedom. It is likely to be influenced by other internal factors, like the ethnic composition of the population, the size of the country and population, the size of a Russian minority, internal war or peace time. It is also likely to be affected by external factors like geopolitical spheres, stability and instability in neighbouring countries, support to elites from Moscow or Washington, trade agreements, military alliances and other bonds. Adrian Hide-Price stresses the role of key international institutions active in the FSU the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. EU has defined their closest neighbours in the Baltic, the Balkan and Central Eastern Europe as the area of security intrest and “sphere” where democracy and rule of law is actively encouraged by euro in PHARE programs and EU military and police-forces and resources. (Parrot/Dawisha, 1997:9) Some states are “inter-sphere”: Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus were all mentioned in the EUs draft on the EU Commissions New neighbourhood paper of May 12 2004 and many of them are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is a “Russian Union” if you compare it to a “European Union”.

In some states the development after a transit to democracy is made might not favour liberalisation. This could be said to be the case with Belarus: it choose through elections a path “back to the USSR” and “strong man - strong state”- system. Russia could develop along the same line. Explanations to such “backlash” could be cultural: the “Russianness” - the willingness to subdue to a strong state, and in order have protection, safety and be part of something large (empire) and sacrifice for large ideaed (socialism) (Waage, 1991) Armenias “backlash”, or low freedom score compared to the expected value from all of our three theories, could be linked with the war in Nagorno-Karabach. Both Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Armenia all have internal military struggles, which could be a major
influence on political freedom in general. It could also be related to oil. All the states on the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan-line for oil from the Caspian Sea to Turkey, – Azerbaijan, Georgia (transit) and Armenia (transit) – have lower political freedom than any of the precondition proposed by my model explain. Geopolitics could be an explanation. When Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are surprisingly free compared to their IPR could it be because of their small size and great unimportance? Both are small countries, few people and no oil. When the Baltics perform more political freedom than their IPR suggest might it be an effect of the EU-membership? The discussion on possible preconditions, explanatory factors and events goes on forever. From the analysis we can ascertain that empirical tests shows evidence for the level of IPR being a precondition for liberalization in the FSU, that the level of HDI is not a decisive condition, but that the fragmentation of elite might be an important condition, especially in combination with IPR, and specifically in the belt between the “unfree Central Asia” and the “free Baltic region”, in the states which of Caucasus and Eastern Europe, that are in flux between authoritarian and liberal regimes – at a crossroad.
10. CONCLUSION

PRECONDITIONS FOR FREEDOM IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

The distance from Tallinn to Tashkent is indeed long. The longest distance in freedom is actually from Tallinn to Ashgabat, but our analysis show that some of the suggested structural preconditions in the units were able to explain much of this variation. The most important explanatory precondition seems to be IPR. IPR reflects the distribution of political and economical power resources in a country, and assumes that this creates higher political freedom. My analysis of the former soviet republics show that there is a strong relationship between having a high IPR and high political freedom. (Regression analysis shows a significant valid persons $r$ of 0.76, which is very high for social science). Similar strong relationships were not shown for the elite fragmentation, where the correlation was weak, and especially not for the HDI, where the correlation was not significant. It was impossible to combine all three factors in a model because of high interaction between the independent variables.

Validity for the finding of IPR and HDI is high. The index that constitutes IPR, HDI and Freedom score are well established and long elaborated operationalisations of their theoretical size, and both validity and reliability of data I judged being sufficient, atleast for making a comparisons and testing the theories.

When validity of data are so high and no correlations are shown for HDI, on Freedom, I regard this mostly as a weakening of the theory’s real ability to explain the variation of freedom: HDI is not a significant precondition for liberalisation and for explaining political freedom in the FSU.

The opposite conclusion is drawn for IPR theory. Due to high validity and reliability of the data and a high explanatory effect (Pearsons $r$) IPR seems to be a significant precondition for political freedom in the FSU.

The factor of elite fragmentation remains the difficult interpretation. One reason is the uncertain validity of the data. The measurement of elite fragmentation has not been tried
on freedom scale before, as I know of. It is not a index, and its validity might fall victim for unrepresentative elections which don´t reflect the real elite fragmentation. Our causal analysis of the model indicates that IPR in combination with elite fragmentation can increase the explanatory power for explaining variation of political freedom in the FSU. The regression of elite fragmentation on freedom individually is weak, but scrutinizing the regression output closely we find that elite theory in combination with IPR seems to predict well the freedom score of Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. This suspicion is further strengthened by the causal analysis where we observe a indirect effect of elite and IPR which is larger than IPRs or Elites direct effects. When this is observed for the whole sample, it is likely that it could be even stronger if applied only to a small number of states in the “twilight” between high and low IPR and geopolitical field between “east and west”. The academic implication of this finding is that elite theory should be taken into consideration to explain political freedom in these three countries, where colour revolutions have happened. Instinctively it would be interesting to analyze if the lack of fragmentation in Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Armenia can explain the same “democratic backlash”.

HDI is not such a precondition. The political implication of that finding is that policy makers who wish to empower liberalization in the FSU and raise the level of political freedom can not go over the strategy of liberalization trough economical growth and raising living standards. A good indication of this is Belarus, with rising HDI and low political freedom, or Russia after the oil price rise early in the 2000s ever higher HDI, and ever lower political freedom. (Freedom House, 2005:Russia) It also means that all forms for trade and modernisation might not be automatically increasing liberalization. Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan prove the quite opposite.

The political implication of finding IPR to be a important precondition is that any policy or intent to increase the distribution of economical power resources and intellectual power resources will probably raise the level of political freedom. This could mean support to land reforms, fair privatization of state property, increased education especially in areas with low educational levels and market reforms that favor small and medium-sized companies before large companies.

The political implication of the effect of elite fragmentation is that any support that will empower elites outside governmental power will eventually increase the political free-
dom. This could mean support of oppositional parties in elections, strengthening the role of civil society, especially in areas where it is expected to represent alternative elites, empower ethnical groups who are outside political power and other policy means that might favor competition between elites: either strengthening the elites outside government or w How the three theories can explain weakening elite in government.

Concluding my research question I can answer positively to the open question: can the theories explain the variation. Yes, IPR and elite can explain variation, but HDI can not. This means there exists structural preconditions in the former soviet union republics that explain the variation of political freedom and that can be affected by policy, internally and externally. How the three theories can explain variation is shown in the model and argued in the conclusion.
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12. APPENDIXES

Enclosed on CD in Folder “Tallin to Tashkent”

Folder: Oppgaven som PDF
the paper in PDF

Folder Appendixes

1) Regressions run with HDI, IPR and ELITE as independent variable
2) Bivariate correlations from HDI, IPR, ELITE and FREEDOM
3) Country reports in extended version, inclduing GDP

Technical note: This document is created in Pages. Converted into Word * Times New Roman * 13 points * 1,5 size between lines, the number of pages are 88.