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Protest- or Issue-Voting?
An Analysis of the Motivations of Radical Right Party supporters in Scandinavia and Austria

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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s, a group of new political parties gained support and influence throughout Europe. Some of these parties came from a long political tradition in their countries, while others were formed in more recent times of apparent political upheaval (Arter 1999; Betz 1994; Hainsworth 2000). This trend caused the political establishment to react with skepticism. Some thought the parties were a continuation of the Radical Right and Fascism of the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, they feared the destructive potential of the new parties, which I will call Radical Right Parties (RRPs). However, the RRPs of the 1990s do not associate themselves with the fascist movement, and their policies are also different in most respects (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992). Still, they are the first successful movement of the Radical Right since the Second World War.

Most of the new Radical Right Parties experienced a revival in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their success at the polls coincided with an increased movement of immigrants in Europe, and with the end of the Cold War. Some of the parties also changed their leadership-structure in this period (Betz 1994, pp. 12-13; Bjørklund 1988, p214; Goul Andersen 1992, p193; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000, pp. 194-196; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2001; Morrow 2000, p33). In the 1990s, both the Northern League in Italy, and the Freedom Party in Austria received so many votes they managed to become parts of governing coalitions in their respective countries. These events contributed to an increasing concern with European Radical Right Parties in the media, and among politicians and pundits. The mere support and influence of these parties ensured their presence in national political debates. Furthermore, as the parties grew, so did the international debate about the Radical Right, especially so within the European Union.

This ongoing debate is based on some established “truths” or premises about Radical Right Parties and their supporters. These ideas are partly derived from political science research, partly from analogies to the Radical Right of the 1930s, and also from popular perceptions and clichés. The political establishment’s negative attitude toward the Radical Right may have led to some overly derogatory descriptions of these parties and their voters. One such stereotype is the concept of the “protest
party” or “protest vote”, which is often associated with Radical Right Parties. These and similar terms imply a distinctly negative message. They enable political commentators to dismiss the substantive policies and opinions of these parties and their supporters, and rather focus on more diffuse and negative characteristics. I believe there are reasons to question this established perception, not least because it is such a “convenient” argument for opponents of the Radical Right. Therefore, I will take a critical look at these descriptions, and thus, I hope my dissertation will be more nuanced and accurate.

Outline

The object of this introductory chapter is to present the topic of my dissertation as well as its more specific research questions and hypotheses. I will also outline a general theoretical and methodological approach, even though chapters two and three deal with such issues in greater detail.

Specifically, I will start by describing my dissertation’s relationship with a European project on “Extreme Right Parties”. I then proceed identify and elaborate on my specific research questions and hypotheses. In the final part of this chapter, I will perform a thorough discussion of my “comparative” methodology. It seems to me that studies of this sort too often choose a random group of countries for analysis. I will try to justify my choices through an empirical discussion of a number of “contextual variables”.

The Extreme Right Party Project

My dissertation will be a part of a comparative research project on "Extreme Right Parties" in Europe. My tutor, Tor Bjørklund, serves as the Norwegian contributor, and thus, as my link to the project. The participants of this international project have preliminarily decided to use the term “Extreme Right Parties”, as a label for what I have so far called “Radical Right Parties”. Other researchers use terms like “New Radical Right Parties” (Kitschelt 1997), “Right Wing Populist Parties” (Betz 1998), or even “Discontent Parties” (Lane and Ersson 1991, p108). Intuitively I find “Extreme Right Parties” to be too closely related to the Extreme Right of Nazi Germany or
Fascist Italy. Consequently, I will continue to use the term “Radical Right”, which I find more neutral, and not quite as negatively charged as “Extreme Right”.

This pragmatic choice of label stems from my belief that the content is more important than the actual name. I am not arguing that “Radical Right Parties” is necessarily the most appropriate name. By using a relatively neutral name I hope to avoid the dispute about terminology. Thus, I will be able to focus on what is more important: the substantial characteristics that identify this group of political parties. I will discuss these characteristics in some detail in chapter two.

*Supply and Demand*

The Extreme Right Party Project will apply several perspectives to the study of these parties, and they plan to deal with most relevant aspects\(^1\). I will apply a more limited perspective in my dissertation. A good starting point for narrowing down my focus of attention is the well-known distinction between *supply* and *demand* (see e.g. Kitschelt 1997). These economic terms can be used to look at political parties as players in a political market. The political party systems, and the parties themselves, represent a supply of alternatives for voters on Election Day. Citizens, on the other hand, have political demands that they want politicians and their parties to fulfill. Both the demand-side and supply-side need to be met for a new political party to emerge and survive (Kitschelt 1997, pp2-3).

A study of political parties can focus on either supply or demand, or both. My attention will be on the demand, i.e. on voters. As the subtitle of my dissertation indicates, I will analyze the motivations of Radical Right Party voters, given the supply of such parties. I believe supply and demand are intertwined entities. Therefore, this approach should also enable me to make observations about the parties themselves. Although this is a generally accepted position\(^2\), there are those who disagree. Panabianco (1988) calls this type of inference a “sociological prejudice”, which he argues, “consists in the belief that the activities of parties are the product of the ‘demands’ of social groups, and that, more generally, parties themselves are


\(^2\)
nothing other than manifestations of social divisions in the political arena” (p4). Consequently, he rejects this mode of analysis (pp. 4-5).

Panabianco is right in his methodological critique, but I believe he goes too far. Most observers will argue that voters support political parties for a reason. Their choices are presumably based on an, at least partially, accurate perception of the parties. These “commonsense” observations indicate that there is a link between voters and parties, i.e. between supply and demand. Thus, I believe my conclusions at the voter-level of analysis will also be a reflection of the Radical Right Parties themselves.

With these clarifications in mind, I will look at the substantive issues that I intend to deal with in the dissertation. My starting point is the term “protest party”, and that term’s possible applicability to Radical Right Parties.

**Protest Parties?**

Hans Jørgen Nielsen (1976) chose the following title for his study of the Danish Progress Party’s electorate in the 1970s: “The Uncivic Culture: Attitudes towards the Political System in Denmark, and Vote for the Progress Party 1973-1975”. In the conclusion, he explains his reference to Almond and Verba’s “The Civic Culture” (1963; 1989):

> What stands out above all is that former pictures of Danish politics have to be profoundly revised. In view of the Progress Party’s strength, the left-right dimension is not sufficient. Furthermore, the incorporation of Denmark among those nations with harmonious civic cultures seems dubious. There has been a marked instability in the party system, combined with a high amount of distrust and authoritarianism, and these attitudes are related to the party most clearly associated with the upheavals in Danish politics [the Progress Party] (p154).

Nielsen’s attitudes are not unique. Political commentators and analysts often assert that Radical Right Parties threaten the political cultures and systems in which they operate. By referring to “the Civic Culture”, Nielsen illustrates the normative basis for these arguments. According to Almond and Verba, stable democratic systems are dependent on a specific type of political culture. One essential feature of this “culture” concerns the relationship between political trust and influence. As long as individuals feel that

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2 Here are some classical works on politics that make the inference from voters to parties: Campbell (1960); Lipset and Rokkan (1967); Valen and Katz (1967).
they are able to influence political decisions in a democracy, they will be satisfied with, and trusting of the political system. These attitudes will strengthen people’s belief in democracy, and will have a stabilizing effect on the political system. These assertions lead to some normative conclusions about the role of citizens. First of all, people living in stable democratic countries should trust their political system, and consider its decisions legitimate. Furthermore, they ought to express that trust even if they disagree with government policies (Almond and Verba 1989, pp. 191 and 203-204).

Analysts and researchers of Radical Right Parties often find that these parties’ electorates do not confirm to this norm. On the contrary, they usually observe RRP supporters as distrusting and suspicious of politicians and the political system. Some analysts make moral condemnations, along the lines of Nielsen, presumably also on the basis of the “civic culture” norm (Knight 1992; Narum 2001; Nielsen 1979). In terms of empirical results, these researches assert that political distrust leads to Radical Right Party support. Distrusting voters cast their ballot in favor of RRP as an expression of political protest. That does not preclude other protest activities, such as voter abstention, demonstrations, petitions etc, but in terms of actual voting, these parties do appear as the choice of the discontented. Consequently, there is a positive bivariate relationship between political distrust, and RRP support, as illustrated in figure 1.1. This argument is supported by research into each of the political parties I intend to study and not least by political commentators and columnists who deal with these parties (Arter 1999, pp.103-107; Betz 1994, pp. 45-46; Morrow 2000; and Riedlsperger 1998).

Figure 1.1 A bivariate model of political protest

![Diagram of Political Protest]

“Political Protest”

Figure 1.1 incorporates the term “protest”, which I have yet to define. Van Der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000) define a “protest voter” as “a rational voter whose objective
is to demonstrate rejection of all other parties” (p82). I believe they confuse the objective of the protest with the actual protest. I see protest as an act, not an objective, and it should not be confused with the motivation for this act. Political protest stems from some kind of unhappiness, or dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. My model defines that sentiment as “political distrust”. That is the driving motivation for political protest. I have not yet dealt with a protester’s possible objectives. But unless people act in order to achieve an objective, I do not consider them protesters. So, I do not agree with Van Der Burg et al (2000) who define “protest” by a person’s objectives.

I will define “protest” as the act of expressing political distrust or disapproval. Protest serves as the causal link between the two variables “political trust” and “RRP-support” in my model. However, since protest sometimes takes other forms, such as voter abstention, demonstrations, acts of violence etc, I need a more specific approach for my purpose. Therefore, I will define “protest voting” as an expression of political distrust by voting for a Radical Right Party.

Main Research Question

Despite the large amount of previous research, I will try to take a new look at the causal relationship between political distrust, and RRP-voting. My main research question is this: What is the relationship between political distrust and support for Radical Right Parties? Figure 1.1 illustrates my initial hypothesis. It suggests a positive relationship between the variables, which is caused by RRP-voters expression of protest at the polls.

The academic literature on this issue consistently argues in favor of the hypothesis I have illustrated in figure 1.1. Despite this prevailing view and the supporting evidence, I still find the “protest hypothesis” to be both unclear and overly normative. Specifically, the concept of “political trust” is hard to define. I will try to offer a different approach to this and other related terms, than what has become the norm in political science. Thus, I hope to perform a more accurate and less normatively charged analysis, than some analysts have done thus far. In order to do that, I first need to look at relevant theoretical and methodological issues, which I will do in chapters two and three, respectively.
Another reason for my skepticism about the “protest-hypothesis” is the sheer endurance and longevity of these parties. The concept of "protest" seems to refer to a short-lived or fluctuating phenomenon, maybe in relation to a specific hot topic of the day. Most European Radical Right Parties cannot be interpreted as "protest parties" in this sense, since they have gained high levels of support for several decades. Given these objections, I believe a thorough analysis of this issue is warranted.

Further Hypotheses

In addition to the main research question, I will analyze and test three subordinate hypotheses. They are closely related to my main research question, and should be seen as expansions on, rather than alternatives to the established hypothesis. The three hypotheses are different interpretations of “political distrust” in the context of Radical Right Party voting. I believe they represent three possible levels of protest that vary according to the gravity of the protesters’ grievances.

My first hypothesis stems from one of Ignazi’s articles on Radical Right Parties. He argues that RRPs have an “anti-system profile”, and thus, fall within Sartori’s category of “anti-system parties” (Ignazi 1992, pp. 11-13). Sartori defines a party as “anti-system”, "whenever it undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes" (Sartori 1976, p133). Furthermore, people who support these parties are both alienated from, and in opposition to the current political system (ibid. pp. 132-134). It is worth noting that both Sartori and Ignazi presuppose that political parties are elements of a democratic “political system” (Ignazi 1992, p12; Sartori 1976, pp. 56-57). Hence, they argue that RRP voters hold negative attitudes toward their country’s democratic institutions, its political parties, and the democratic principles that the system is based upon.

Despite Ignazi’s focus on supply, I will analyze the demand-side of his argument. That leads me to the following hypothesis: Radical Right Party voters are distrusting of, and in opposition to the political systems of their countries. They express political distrust by voting for an RRP. I consider this the gravest and most threatening form of protest, since it is directed at the political system and its democratic foundations.
Heidar (1989) argues that the Norwegian *Progress Party* express “anti-consensus”-attitudes (p147), while Arter (1999) uses “anti-establishment” as a descriptive term for all the Scandinavian RRP (p123). Despite the semantic difference, I believe they are making similar arguments. “Anti-establishment”- or “anti-consensus”-attitudes relate to incumbent political authorities only. If those terms apply to RRP voters, it makes them less extreme than someone holding “anti-system” attitudes, and more in line with voters of other parties. This is the basis for my second hypothesis: *RRP voters are motivated by their distrust of the political establishment.* If that is the case, they are not as threatening to the political systems as Ignazi’s argument might suggest.

My third hypothesis makes RRP-supporters look even less “radical”. It suggests that political distrust is a function of issues and government incumbencies. That is, voters of Radical Right Parties are distrusting simply because they disagree with the policies of the incumbent government. Thus, they merely distrust certain policies, as opposed to political elites, or the political system. Listhaug’s findings on “Political Disaffection” in Norway (2000) suggest that possibility. Hence, I hypothesize: *substantive issues and belief systems are the primary motivations of RRP-supporters.* Their beliefs are not part of established political thinking, which is why Radical Right Party voters do not trust the political establishment. However, substantive policies are the real reasons for their choices on Election Day.

I have tried to illustrate the three subordinate hypotheses in figure 1.2. It incorporates four variables, in a more complex multivariate model of political protest. The figure distinguishes between political distrust directed at the political system on the one hand, and the political establishment on the other. This is in accordance with my first and second hypothesis. I have incorporated the third hypothesis, by use of a variable called “issues and belief systems”. This model will be the basis of my empirical analysis in chapter four. I will deal with each variable in more detail in the second and third chapters.

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3 One may interpret these differences as more than just semantics, but in terms of my three levels of political protest, I believe they should be counted in the same category.
Before I proceed to a theoretical and methodological discussion of this model, I need to select some countries where I can perform this type of analysis. They obviously need to be countries with Radical Right Parties, but they should also be similar in other respects that are relevant to my research. If the parties that I select exist in similar contexts, I should be able to find common effects in my model, which are not just country specific. That is the goal of my analysis.

**Austria and Scandinavia**

Several Western-European countries have seen successful Radical Right Parties in the 1990s, so there are a lot of possible cases for me to look at. The French *National Front*, the Belgian *Vlams Block*, and the Italian *Northern League*, are some well-known examples. However, for this analysis, I have selected four different countries and their five RRPs. They are the Austrian *Freedom Party* (FPÖ), the Norwegian *Progress Party*, the Danish *Progress Party* and *Danish People’s Party* and the Swedish *New Democracy*. With the exception of the *Danish People’s Party*, which was formed in 1995, all of these parties had some kind of breakthrough or revival in the late 1980s or early 1990s, as shown in table 1.1. Some of these parties went through a period of transformation in connection with this revival. Their focus shifted
toward immigration policies, at the expense of issues like taxation and welfare spending that were in focus in the 1970s (Betz 1994, pp. 12-13; Bjørklund 1988, p214; Goul Andersen 1992, p193; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000, pp. 194-196; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2001; and Morrow 2000, p33;). These changes were particularly dramatic in the Austrian FPÖ. Morrow (2000) argues that the reforms led to the formation of a “New FPÖ”, which was radically different from the old party. To avoid problems of comparability over time, and to increase comparability between countries, I will focus on the period after this revival.

Table 1.1 Election results for Radical Right Parties in the parliamentary elections of Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden since 1973. Percent of valid votes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUSTRIA (FPÖ)</th>
<th>NORWAY (Frp)</th>
<th>DENMARK Progress Party</th>
<th>DENMARK Danish People’s Party</th>
<th>SWEDEN New Democracy</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>9.7</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>16.6</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>21.9</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>15.3</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<td>7.4</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>26.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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Similar Contexts

I have now limited my analysis by selecting four countries and their respective RRPs, and by focusing on a limited time frame. These choices were to a large extent

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4 The Danish People’s Party is now the de facto successor of the Progress Party (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000).
influenced by my personal interests and knowledge. But more importantly, I believe they constitute a good methodological strategy. I will argue that my selected cases are similar in most aspects that are relevant to my research, and that makes them ideal for the type of statistical analysis I intend to perform.

Most political scientists who conduct this type of research into political parties in more than one country are fairly vague about their reasons for choosing some countries, and not others. Some seem to just presume that their selected countries are fit for comparison, especially so if they choose countries that are generally considered to be similar. Others are entirely oblivious to these problems, and appear to conduct a more or less coincidental selection of countries. Betz and Immerfall’s “The New Politics of the Right” (1998) is a case in point. They include Western Europe, Greece, North America, and India in their analysis of Radical Right Parties, but do not discuss the “comparability” of these cases. In this section, I do intend to discuss the extent to which my selected cases are fit for comparison. I believe that will increase the validity of any conclusions that I reach, and it will give the reader the necessary perspective and background on these countries.

My statistical analysis of the model I have outlined in figure 1.2 will probably reveal differences between the countries in several respects. However, my main interest is to be able to say something generally about the protest voting that takes place in these countries. If the five Radical Right Parties that I have chosen operate in similar contexts, I believe that will increase the chances of finding common effects in my analyses; or at least some effects that are comparable. Protest voting and political distrust probably has a similar meaning and stems from some of the same sources in countries that are alike. But if I were to include a very different country in my analysis, like India or Russia who both have Radical Right Parties; chances are that protest voting is an entire different phenomenon there. Even if a statistical analysis provides similar results in these very different countries, the appropriate interpretation of those results may vary. Hence, I will look at the four countries I have chosen, to see if they are similar enough for my analytical purpose.

The question is then what standard I should apply when I evaluate the similarities between the countries. In order to answer that question, I will make use of
Lijphart (1975) and Frendreis’ (1983) term “contextual variables”. Those are variables that are not a direct part of the analytical model, yet they could potentially have an effect on the analysis. One means of controlling for the effects of contextual variables, is through a “most similar” comparative analysis. When employing that method, the researcher selects cases that are similar in terms of context, yet the operative variables have different values in each case (Frendreis 1983, p260; Lijphart 1975, pp.163-165). I do not wish to perform that type of comparative analysis⁵, but I do want to control for context in my analysis, and in my interpretation of the results. Hence, I want any relevant contextual variables to vary as little as possible between cases. I do not have any more specific standard than that, so my discussion of these variables will be somewhat intuitive. What is important, though, is that there are no large differences between the countries, which could affect my analysis.

**Contextual Variables**

At first glance, it may appear as if Austria sits uncomfortably in a comparison with the Scandinavian countries. The histories and political parties of these countries are different in many respects. So, while the three Scandinavian countries seem ripe for this type of analysis, Austria does look like the deviant case. That is mainly due to its political history, which especially in connection with the Second World War, deviates from that of Scandinavia. Austrians’ relation to this part of their history is much more troublesome and tense than in the Scandinavian cases. It is plausible that different memories of Nazism have an effect on current the Radical Right Parties, and their success or failure.

However, these objections are not necessarily relevant to my research. I have limited my analysis to studying the support of Radical Right Parties in recent history. Hence, I will only look at contextual variables that are relevant to the success, failure and the general operation of Radical Right Parties. In order to identify these variables, I will take a look at the literature on RRPs.

⁵ The differences between a “most-similar” comparative analysis and what I intend to do, is that I will treat these countries as a group or a unit, in which I perform my analysis. In a comparative analysis, the researcher focuses more on differences between countries, and the possible explanations for those differences. Still, both means of
Before I get into the relevant variables in this respect, I should mention a few words about my level of analysis. Even though I will perform a study at the individual level of analysis, most of the contextual variables are at the aggregate level. As such, they do not have a direct effect on my analytical model. But that does not mean that they are irrelevant. Various aggregate features of a country do have an effect on individuals. The variable of “unemployment” is a case in point. It affects people’s perception of the economy, and it says something about the difficulties of obtaining jobs. Therefore, it does not make sense to exclude it, based on the methodological criterion that it has a different level of analysis. If find it to be relevant, as long as it could interfere with my analysis, indirectly or directly; i.e. that it is part of the context in which my analysis takes place. With this less rigorous criterion in mind, I will now try to identify the relevant variables from the literature.

Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) emphasize the effect of a high level of taxation in the 1970s, for the success of the two Progress Parties. I will start by looking at taxation.

In the late 1980s, immigration became the new hot topic (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). After a period of increased immigration from Third World Countries, almost every Radical Right Party in Europe emerged as the main opponents of liberal immigration policies in their respective countries. Thus, each country’s level of immigration could have an effect on the success or failure of Radical Right Parties (Betz 1994, pp. 69-72).

Furthermore, some researchers have argued that the combination of immigration and high unemployment strengthens RRP support. These coinciding developments give weight to the Radical Right Parties’ arguments that immigrants deprive natives of their jobs (Betz 1994, pp. 85-89 and Knigge 1999, p260). Others have argued that unemployed people generally prefer radical political solutions such as those offered by RRPs (Arter 1999). That argument bears resemblance to some explanations of the success of fascism in the 1930s. Irrespective of which argument is correct, I need to look at each country’s level of unemployment.
Both Taggart (1996, p51) and Kitschelt (1997, p11) emphasize the importance of a developed welfare state for the success of RRPs. I will use welfare spending as a measure of the size of the welfare state.

The same two researchers also argue that RRPs are products of the Western European countries’ transition from industrialism to a postindustrial society and economy. Hence, I will also measure the degree of postindustrialism in each country, and use that as a contextual variable.

Finally, I will add three political factors to my list of context variables. They have all been used in the literature on Radical Right Parties, as explanations of success or failure. One is the electoral system, which could limit the opportunities for new parties (Miller and Listhaug 1990). Some also believe that a high degree of (ii) corporatism and (iii) consociationalism lead to successful RRPs (Taggart 1996).

I will take a look at each of these variables in the four countries I have selected for my study. I do not intend to dwell on details, but I will rather try to give an intuitive sense of these variables, and how they have developed over time. After all, they are not part of my main analysis, and thus, do not warrant an extensive discussion. I will use some empirical data, as well as a literature study on some variables. Thereby, I hope I will be able to determine if the countries are sufficiently similar for my main analysis.

Taxation

Figure 1.3 illustrates the level of taxation in each of the four countries. Their differences appear to have grown from the 1960s to the 1980s, with Sweden ending at the highest level of taxation, and Austria at the lowest. It is tempting to suggest that the influential FPÖ in Austria has managed to hold down the tax-increase, while the tax revenue in Sweden has been unchecked by any strong party of the Radical Right. Of course this is speculation on my part; there could be a number of other explanations.
Despite some differences in taxation, the figure displays the same trend in each of the four countries: they have gradually increased their taxes from 1965 to 1988. Austria’s tax revenue was somewhat lower than in the other countries from 1970 onwards. But overall, these countries appear to tax their citizens at a roughly similar level.

**Immigration**

I do not have accurate statistics on the exact numbers of immigrants in the four countries. The available immigration statistics does not have the same definitions and categories in the four countries, which makes it difficult to compare them directly. Hence, I will use some other data-sources to give a sense of the scale of immigration to the four countries. I will start with current numbers of refugees.
There were about 82,500 refugees living in Austria, in 1999. The corresponding figures in Norway were 47,800; in Denmark, 69,000; and in Sweden, 159,600. These data indicate a good deal of variation between cases. Sweden has by far the greatest refugee population. Again, that may be explained by the lack of an “anti-immigration” Radical Right Party in this country, for more than a short period of time. However, there are several other factors at play in the complex issue of immigration statistics.

What is more surprising is the relatively low number of refugees in Austria. Austria shares a border with the former Yugoslavia, and is close to most other Eastern European countries. It is plausible that these factors would lead to a substantially higher rate of immigration in Austria than in the Scandinavian countries. Apparently, that is not the case.

Current refugee-numbers are not a sufficient measure of the rate of immigration. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (2001) suggest that relative changes can be equally important. They argue that increased levels of non-western immigrants living in Denmark and Norway have boosted the support for the two Progress Parties. This is an effect of relative change, which occurs despite modest overall numbers of immigrants in the two countries. I believe Goul Andersen and Bjørklund’s finding indicate that I should also study development over time in each of the four countries.

In order to do that, I have chosen a measure used by Betz (1994, p77), which I will make a slight improvement on. He uses absolute numbers of asylum seekers in European countries. I believe these numbers should be controlled for inhabitants in each country. Hence, figure 1.4 shows asylum applications per 1000 inhabitants from 1980 to 1999.

The figure confirms that there is some variation between countries. The period around the end of the Cold War saw the greatest variation, with Norway at the lowest level and Sweden at the highest. In the early 1980s, Sweden and Austria were the only countries to receive applications. Austria’s unique geographic position appears to have had an effect at that time, as it got the largest number of applications. 1981 is a

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6 UNHCR population data 1999.
7 “Non-western” immigrants in Norway constitute 3.2 percent of the population, and about 3 percent in Denmark. However, these figures are the result of a doubling of the number of immigrants from 1987 to 1997 (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2001).
noticeable year in that respect. However, there are some similarities between the countries. First of all, each country experienced a rapid increase in applications, at some point between 1989 and 1993. Second, the diverging trends in the figure appear to stabilize toward the end of the 1990s, as the four countries received similar, though not identical levels of applications. The relative similarities are surprising given the apparent differences between the countries, both in terms of geography and current refugee populations. Since my analysis will focus on the 1990s, I will consider the countries as similar enough in this respect.

*Figure 1.4 Asylum applications per 1000 inhabitants in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden; from 1980 to 1999*


Finally, I should make a methodological point. The data in figure 1.2 is based on the number of asylum applications in each country. It does not measure rejections
of these applications. Ideally, I should have controlled for rejections. That would give a more accurate picture of the real numbers of people settling in these countries. But rejections sometimes come years after the applications, and that makes it difficult to perform such a control. I have tried to compensate for that in figure A.1 in the appendix. It presents a similar measure of rejections, which amplifies on the information in figure 1.4. The numbers in that figure also stabilizes in the latter half of the 1990s. In addition, figure A.1 makes some of the tops in figure 1.2 seem less dramatic. For instance, the large number of applications to Sweden in 1992 is followed by an increase in rejections the following year.

Unemployment

Scholars have for some time discussed the relationship between rising unemployment-rates, and support for Radical Right Parties. Betz (1994) argues that there is a positive correlation between the two, while Knigge (1998) find no connection whatsoever. Nor does she find a combined effect of immigration and unemployment, as one might expect from some of the literature (p267). I found surprisingly contradictory evidence in my data. In Austria, there is a strong positive correlation between FPÖ election results, and unemployment since 1970. In Denmark, the correlation is equally strong, but negative. There is no significant correlation in Norway.

These results should not be used to draw definitive conclusions. That would require a more thorough analysis, for which these data are a good starting point. However, in the present context, I am able to conclude that there might be some kind of connection, and that illustrates the need to study this variable. I have attempted to do that in figure 1.5, which displays the unemployment-rates in each of the four countries, from 1969 to the present.

The evidence indicates that Denmark had the highest level of unemployment for most of this period. Austria, Norway, and Sweden had a low level of unemployment until the mid- or late 1980s. There appears to be considerable variation between cases in the 1990s. Still, I would argue that when Denmark moved below the

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8 Pearson’s r: .87, significant at the 1%-level. Based on the data in figure 1.3, and official election results.
9 Pearson’s r: -.82, significant at the 1%-level. Based on the data in figure 1.3, and official election results.
10%-limit, all four countries should be considered to have a low level of unemployment. There is some variation, but not to such an extent that unemployment disqualifies as a “contextual variable”. Granted, this is not the only possible conclusion from figure 1.5.

Figure 1.5 Unemployment in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden from 1969 to 1999. Percent of workforce

Welfare expenditures
Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden all have extensive and generous welfare-systems (Taggart 1996, pp. 51-54). As can be seen in table 1.2, spending on welfare constitute more than half of all government expenditures in these countries. It is a stable, and roughly similar expense in each case. I have also included a measure of
variance in the table. That is, the difference between the highest and the lowest level of spending each year. Variance, in this sense, decreases over time, and hence, the countries become even more similar.

The data in table 1.2 is less than ideal for my purpose, since it does not cover the main period of my analysis: the 1990s. There is a possibility that there have been some major changes since 1985, and that weakens any conclusions based on table 1.2. Despite this fault, I will consider it unlikely that this variable varies to such an extent that it moves beyond the range of a “contextual variable.”

Table 1.2 Welfare expenditures, of total government expenditure, in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, from 1970 to 1985. Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between lowest and highest level</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Postindustrialism

Scholars have argued that the transition from an industrial to a postindustrial society was an important contributing factor to the emergence of Radical Right Parties in Europe (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1997; Taggart 1996). In order to determine whether such a transition has taken place, I will try to provide a measure of postindustrialism. This is not an easy task. Scholars have produced different definitions of the term, and I will not be able to capture every possible interpretation. However, most political scientists emphasize the same two variables: higher education and employment in the service-sector (see e.g. Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1997). I will use both as indicators of postindustrialism, and thus, as contextual variables.

Figure 1.6 shows a stark increase in higher education enrollment, in each of the four countries. The rate of increase is surprisingly similar in each case. Austria, Denmark, and Sweden have almost the exact same level of enrollment in the 1990s, with Norway at a slightly higher level. The variation between cases is marginal. It is
especially so, compared to the dramatic variation over time in each of the four countries. In that sense, figure 1.6 illustrates an almost perfect example of a contextual variable.

![Figure 1.6 Levels of enrollment in higher education*](http://unescostat.unesco.org)

* Enrollment levels are measured by “gross enrollment ratios”. That is, the “total enrollment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age populate corresponding to the same level of education in a given school-year” (http://unescostat.unesco.org).

By contrast, figure 1.7 illustrates some stark differences between the countries. It displays the level of service-sector employment in each of the four countries. The three Scandinavian countries vary at a similar rate, while Austria, no doubt, is a deviant case. The Austrian work force has not reached the Scandinavian level of employment in the “postindustrial” sector. However, the figure does show an increase
in service sector employment in each of the four countries, which indicates a similar trend. But overall, Austria is a deviant case in this respect.

In sum, the two postindustrial indicators provide a mixed picture. The education measure displays a remarkable degree of similarity; while sector employment differs to a greater extent. If each variable showed this kind of ambiguity, I would be forced to abandon my presumption that the countries are sufficiently similar. So far however, this variable appears to be the exception.

Figure 1.7 Employment in the service sector*, in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, from the 1970's to the 1990's. Percent of employed citizens

Source: ILO labor statistics, at www.laborstat.ilo.org
* The tertiary sector includes the following work-categories: wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communication; financing, insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, social, and personal services.
Electoral systems

All four countries use Proportional Representation (PR) in elections for Parliaments. They also employ similar thresholds for the representation of small parties. Austria, Norway, and Sweden have 4% thresholds, with some differences in how the thresholds are applied. In theory, the Austrian threshold only relates to the distribution of a few seats in Parliament; but in practice it functions as an absolute threshold\textsuperscript{10}. The Norwegian threshold does only relate to the distribution of eight seats by national election results. Each county distributes the other 157 seats, without using a threshold. So, in effect, Norway has a very low threshold. The Swedish threshold of 4% is absolute, while in Denmark it is set at 2%.

Miller and Listhaug (1990) let the relatively small differences between Norway and Sweden account for the fact that Sweden does not have a Radical Right Party, while Norway does. I find that to be an unsatisfactory explanation. Most of the contextual variables I have dealt with in this section are possible contributors to the success of Radical Right Parties. Electoral systems, on the other hand, only serve as limitations on the activities of new or small parties. They cannot give a sufficient explanation for the success or failure of one type of political party or another. Proportional Representation might enhance the success of some Radical Right Parties. Yet, the success of the National Front in France shows that majoritarian systems need not be an insurmountable obstacle. Therefore, I find this contextual variable less important than others I have dealt with thus far. The similarities between the countries that I have described here are sufficient for my purpose.

Corporatism

My last two contextual variables are related, but should be treated as distinct concepts. Corporatism involves cooperation across political and economic spheres, while consociationalism also includes religious, ethnic and cultural cleavages (Taggart 1996, p14). Lane and Ersson define “corporatism” as a system in which “big interest organizations conduct far-reaching negotiations to reconcile peacefully their interests
and where the same hierarchically structured organizations partake in various forms in
government policy-making, in the framing and implementation of policies in formally
designed channels” (1991, pp. 36-37).

The degree of corporatism in Austria and the Scandinavian countries gives reason to separate them from the rest of Europe. Researchers on European politics usually make that distinction on the basis of the influence of these countries’ interest groups. Some of these groups are involved in both government policy-making and implementation. The political parties also cooperate closely and openly with labor organizations and other interest groups (Lane and Ersson pp. 257-260; Schmitter 1991; Taggart 1996 pp. 14-15). Similar traits can be observed in other European countries, but not to the same extent as in these cases. This makes the four countries unique in the European context. Thus, in terms of corporatism in these four countries, they are certainly similar.

**Consociationalism**

Lijphart (1979) defines Austria as a “consensus-democracy”, just like he does the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland. The defining traits of these democracies are cooperation, consensus, and minority rights. They are plural societies, in which political, economic, religious, cultural, and ethnic cleavages create separate and distinct communities within each country. In these countries, consociationalism is a necessary tool to forge coherent and acceptable policies to all parties, and to keep the country united (Lijphart 1984, pp. 21-32).

Most political scientists do not consider the Scandinavian countries to fall within this category (Heidar and Berntzen 1998; Lijphart 1979). That may indicate that Austria and Scandinavia should not be grouped together in an analysis. I do not believe so. Lijphart probably exaggerated the consociationalism of Austrian politics at the time of his analysis. Furthermore, Austrian politics has changed considerably since that time.

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10 Because of the small electoral districts in Austria, it is very difficult to gain any of the other “non-threshold” seats without getting at least 4 percent in the national tally. Hence, breaking the threshold is the only realistic hope for a small party to gain representation.
The three groups or “lagers” of Austrian politics are not as separate and distinct as, for instance, the different cultural and political groups of the Netherlands. Austria’s political parties are no longer as closely connected to specific social groups as they used to be. Rather, they have become “catch-all”-parties who cross social boundaries. And finally, Austria is not as ethnically or religiously diverse as Lijphart’s description might suggest (Heidar and Berntzen 1998, p209, Lane and Ersson 1991, pp. 257-260, and Luther 1992). In sum, Austria may have been a “consensus-democracy” at some point, but it can no longer be characterized as such. Thus, do not consider differences in terms of consociationalism to be a barrier against my comparison of Austria and the Scandinavian countries in the 1990s.

**Sufficiently Similar**

Having looked at nine variables, I feel confident in concluding that the four countries are sufficiently similar for further analysis. That is not to say that Austrian politics and society is the same as in the Scandinavian countries. Austria deviates from the other countries in many respects. However, in terms of these nine factors that influence Radical Right Party success or failure, I find an acceptable degree of similarity. These results indicate that I will not encounter any major “disturbances” in my analysis, by the fact that I have grouped these four countries together. I can perform a statistical analysis of these countries and their RRP-supporters, without having to worry about contextual variables. This detour from my main analytical purpose, which I hope has given the reader sufficient background on these countries, enables me to focus only on the statistical analysis. First however, I will provide some more background, as I take a closer look at the Radical Right Parties I have chosen for my study. I believe my description will further amplify and illustrate the similarities between my selected cases.
Four Countries and Five Political Parties

Austria – the Freedom Party

The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is the most successful Radical Right Party among the five parties in my study. It was founded in 1955 as an attempt to replace the short-lived and discredited League of Independents (VdU). Most VdU members were previous nazi-officials. As a result of the peace settlement in 1955, that party disappeared from the political scene (Morrow 2000, p41). The new FPÖ leaders tried to distance themselves from Austria’s past by presenting the party as a centrist advocate of reform (Betz 1994, p11). Until the 1980s, FPÖ gained around 5 percent of the votes in national elections, but it hardly had any influence. The Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Christian-Democratic People’s Party (ÖVP) dominated Austrian politics in the postwar era, which excluded FPÖ from any real power. These two parties formed coalition governments that assured a high degree of stability to the country’s political life. Austria’s turbulent past, as well as its critical position on the frontlines of the Cold War, made most Austrians support this rigid arrangement (Heidar and Berntzen 1998, pp. 206-209).

After a conflict between fractions of the FPÖ, Jörg Haider emerged as the new leader in 1986. He changed the party into a “modern” Radical Right Party by focusing on immigration, market liberalism, and opposition to the dominance of the two major parties and their “spoils-system” (Morrow 2000, pp. 46-52). The result was a gradual increase in support to the top level of 26.9 percent in 1999. That election led to an unprecedented governing coalition between the FPÖ and the ÖVP. The Freedom Party secured a number of cabinet posts, while the leader of ÖVP became Prime Minister. The inclusion of FPÖ in government led to massive international protests, most notably from the European Union.

Norway – the Progress Party

Anders Lange, a Norwegian dog-kennel owner and magazine editor, formed his own political party in 1973. The unambiguous name of this new Radical Right Party was

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11 The “spoils-” or “proportz-system” was an arrangement by which jobs, housing, and government contracts were distributed according to party affiliation to the two major parties (Betz 1994, p50).
Anders Lange’s Party or a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties, and Public Intervention. It received 5.0 percent of the votes in the so-called “earthquake election” of 1973. This event changed Norwegian politics in several respects\(^\text{12}\). The Labor Party, Norway’s main governing party, got around 45 percent support up until 1973. That year it decreased to 35.3 percent. Anders Lange’s success stemmed in part from his protest against the Labor policies of expanding the welfare system and increasing taxes. To the dismay of Lange and his supporters, the non-socialist government from 1965 to 1971 continued the same line of policy. Thus, the opposition to Labor seemed both weak and unprincipled (Bjørklund 2000, p443). By contrast, Lange introduced an uncompromising political program. Its main elements were reductions in welfare spending, lower taxes, and cuts in government bureaucracies (Iversen 1998, pp. 23-24).

Anders Lange died shortly after his election to Parliament. A few years later, the new party leader, Carl I. Hagen, changed the party’s name to the Progress Party. During the 1980s, the issue of immigration became increasingly important for the party. It was particularly important for the “second breakthrough” in the 1987 local elections\(^\text{13}\) (Bjørklund 1988, pp213-214). Despite internal conflicts during the 1990s, the party has expanded its electoral base (see table 1).

**Denmark – the Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party**

The Danish Progress Party was formed in 1972 by the millionaire tax-lawyer Morgens Glistrup. He became famous a year earlier for arguing in favor of tax evasion on national television (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990, p196). As in the case of Anders Lange, Glistrup’s party entered the political stage in a 1973 “earthquake election”\(^\text{14}\). But Glistrup’s success was greater than that of Lange in Norway. The

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\(^{12}\) David Arter (1999) includes this in his list of Scandinavian “earthquake elections”. In addition to Anders Lange’s success, the new and relatively short-lived Liberal People’s Party also gained some representation. As did the Socialist Electoral Alliance, which was an attempt by some parties of the political left to form an alliance.

\(^{13}\) Those were local elections, in which Progress gained 10.4 percent at the municipal level, and 12.3 percent in elections for county councils.

\(^{14}\) The term “earthquake election” comes from David Arter (1999). In 1973, three new parties emerged to take seats in Parliament: the Center Democrats, the Christian People’s Party, and Progress. Consequently, the older established parties decreased their share of seats, and the Danish party system entered an era of greater volatility (Heidar and Berntzen 1998, pp. 78-82).
Danish Progress Party gained 15.9 percent of the votes in its first election. Prior to this dramatic event in Danish politics, the Labor Party had been the country’s main political force (Arter 1999, p71). They got around 40 percent of the votes in most national elections in the postwar era, but in 1973 they had to settle for only 25.6 percent.

The 1970s was a successful period for the Progress Party (see table 1). For most of the decade, they emphasized policies such as tax cuts, reducing bureaucracies, and cuts in government spending, especially on welfare (Arter 1999, p104). During the 1980s, they turned their focus toward the anti-immigration stance that is common to most Radical Right Parties (Goul Andersen 1992, p198). The issue was somewhat obscured by the internal conflicts in the party, which is probably why the Progress Party did not gain the same level of support as in the 1970s. These conflicts stemmed from disagreements about political strategy, and a struggle for personal power. They escalated in the mid-1990, and finally led to the formation of a new party, the Danish People’s Party, under the leadership of Pia Kjærsgaard. The party succeeded in replacing Progress in the 1998 election, as the main Radical Right Party in Denmark, and it strengthened that position in the 2001-election (see table 1.1; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2001).

Sweden – New Democracy

Sweden’s New Democracy is the least successful Radical Right Party of those I am studying. It emerged prior to the parliamentary election of 1991, in which it had its most successful result of 6.7 percent of the vote. It has not gained any political seats since. Again, this breakthrough election for a Radical Right Party has been called an “earthquake election” (Arter 1999, pp. 106-109). It represented a break with the established “postwar consensus” in Sweden (Betz 1994, pp. 46-47; Heidar and Berntzen 1998, pp. 67-69). After the Second World War, and prior to 1991, the Labor Party never got less than 40 percent of the votes in elections for Parliament. Labor governed Sweden for most of that period, while the opposition was limited to four
By 1991, three new significant parties had emerged. One of those had a “radical right appeal” based on opposition to immigration and social expenditures, favoring lower taxes; with the slogan “life must be more fun” (Betz 1994, p9). For a Swedish election campaign, that was a highly unusual political platform.

As a result of a conflict between the founders of New Democracy, Ian Wachtmeister and Bert Karlsson, the party broke up and lost most of its support in the 1994 election.

Outline of the Dissertation

I have now introduced the topic of my research, and its more specific research questions and hypotheses. I have also discussed the “comparability” of the four countries I have selected, and I have provided some background and information on the cases.

I will divide the analytical part of my dissertation into the four remaining chapters. I hope to resolve most theoretical issues and problems in the next chapter, which I will organize in accordance with figure 1.2. I will start the chapter with a discussion of the category “Radical Right Parties”, and continue with a look at the variable “political trust”. I will then discuss the final variable of “issues and belief systems”, and try to form an overall theoretical approach to the multivariate model.

Chapter three introduces my empirical data, and my approach for utilizing them. I will make several methodological choices, both in terms of operative variables and analytical tools.

I will attempt to perform a thorough analysis of all my research questions and hypotheses in chapter four. I will start with a simple bivariate model, and move toward a more complex multivariate model in my final analysis.

In chapter five, I will attempt to release myself from the specific data analysis, and discuss the implications of my findings. It seems to me that some of the condemnations of RRP-supporters can be related to citizenship-norms. I will discuss

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15 The Conservative Party, the Center Party, the Liberals, and the Leftist Party.
16 In addition to New Democracy who got 6.7 percent of the vote, the Christian Democrats got 7.1 percent of the vote. They competed in several elections prior to 1991, but that election constituted a breakthrough. The Greens’
some of these norms and their applicability, both in terms of RRP voters and the general population in modern societies.

breakthrough came in the previous election of 1988, and in 1991 they lost their seats in Parliament. But, they later regained those seats and had continued success through the 1990s (Heidar and Berntzen 1998, pp. 64-68).
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Any reader of political science literature on protest voting, political distrust, and Radical Right Parties, has experienced the problematic and diffuse nature of some of the terms in these fields of research. Definitions of concepts vary from one researcher to another, and more often than not, there is substantial ambiguity as to the meaning of some terms. I believe several of these works suffer from a lack of a clearly defined theoretical and methodological approach.

In this chapter, I will deal with theoretical issues that are relevant to my research. I aim to provide an approach that is both logically coherent and substantially accurate. The first point is clearly important in any theoretical discussion, but I find it equally important to have an approach that will be useful to my empirical analysis. To ensure that I fulfill both requirements, I will use figure 1.2, as a point of reference throughout this chapter. It incorporates the relevant terms that are in need of an analytical discussion, and I will use it as the starting point for my analysis in chapter four. Thus, the figure serves as a link between theory and the actual analysis.

Figure 1.2 consists of four variables. The dependent variable, “support for a Radical Right Party”, is a question of voting or voting intention. It is a seemingly unproblematic variable, yet it does not clarify the meaning of “Radical Right Parties”. If the five parties I have selected do not belong to a coherent “family” of political parties, I will not be able to do a comparative analysis. If that is the case, it will not make sense to compare the act of voting for the Norwegian Progress Party, with voting for the Austrian Freedom Party, for instance. However, if the parties belong to the same party family, their electorates are likely to be motivated by similar factors in each country. So far, I have assumed that that is the case. The academic literature does not take that for granted (Mudde 1996); nor do the parties themselves. Most refuse to acknowledge their relation to any other parties, since they claim to be unique and do not want to be associated with any “foreign parties”. I need to resolve this question, and will discuss it at some length in the following section of this chapter.

My model also includes two variables that concern political trust. I have distinguished between “system distrust” and “elite distrust”. That distinction as well as other choices that I have to make with respect to the variable “political trust”, connect
to a long debate in political science. It is a complex debate that has both theoretical and methodological implications. In this chapter, I will review some of the most significant contributions to the debate, and start to develop my own approach. I will deal with related methodological issues in chapter three. By taking both theory and methodology into account, I intend to develop a new approach. It will differ somewhat from that of previous researchers, but I believe it will be both accurate and useful to my analysis.

The final variable in figure 1.2 is “issues and belief systems”. It is not as problematic and diffuse as e.g. “political trust”, and does not require an equally extensive theoretical discussion. I will only discuss its relevancy to my model of protest voting.

In the final part of this chapter, I will take an overall theoretical look at my model. I hope it will then appear as a reasonable approach to the study of protest voting.

**A Coherent Party Family?**

It has become customary to use the concept of “party families” in political party research. Researchers in this field argue that parties in different countries can be seen as specific expressions of more general “cleavage structures” in modern societies. That idea comes from Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) theory of “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”. They argued that important historic events had a profound effect on the party systems of some European countries. The so-called “national” and “industrial” revolutions were particularly important, in that they produced cleavages that are still relevant today. Most European countries have gone through these “revolutions” in their process of nation building. They have made different choices at these points in their histories, but they have still gone through the same process. This has led to the formation of relatively similar political parties in different countries. These groups of similar political parties are usually called “party families”. Conservative parties or socialist parties are cases in point.

In modern European societies it appears as if a new “family” of political parties has developed, namely Radical Right Parties. Maybe these societies have gone through
some kind of a “postindustrial revolution” that among other things led to the formation of a new family of political parties (see e.g. Kitschelt 1997). In this section, I will take a look at available literature on RRPs, and see what it says about this idea. By means of a literature study, I intend to determine whether RRPs are a coherent family of political parties.

\textit{The Collective Hunch}

Most researchers agree that there is a distinct “party family” on the European Radical Right. The same scholars usually concur that the five parties in my analysis are included in this family (Mudde 1996, p234). Nevertheless, it is difficult to read a firm conclusion from the literature on this topic. The researchers use different arguments, which are filled with exceptions and uncertainties. Mudde’s (1996) qualified remarks is a case in point:

\begin{quote}
Even while it might be true that these parties are more difficult to compare than parties of other families, this should not be seen as a reason to ignore our collective ‘hunch’ that there is something common about these parties (p226).
\end{quote}

The researchers’ preferred mode of analysis is to argue in favor of a few defining characteristics for the Radical Right, which they proceed to test against real-life cases. The defining characteristics vary markedly from one researcher to another\textsuperscript{17}, yet they all reach the same conclusion: that there is a distinct “party family” on the Radical Right. This paradoxical situation, in which different arguments lead to the same conclusions, makes Mudde (1996) criticize this established method. I believe he rightly argues that it would be better to start by studying the parties, and look for common defining characteristics later (p244). Still, I believe it will benefit my analysis to a look at some of the most influential of these arguments.

\textit{Definitions and Categories}

The simplest definitions of Radical Right Parties consist of just a single defining feature. In those cases, the researcher usually names the party family by that one characteristic. Typical examples are “Anti-Immigration Parties” (Van Der Burg et al
2000), and “Discontent Parties” (Lane and Ersson 1991, p108). Most scholars disapprove of this approach, and argue that the RRPs are more complex than what these definitions imply (Fennema 1997). Betz’ (1998) definition is slightly more complex, in that he employs two defining features: “pragmatic radicalism” and “populist appeal” (p3). On that basis, he incorporates more than a dozen political parties, including the Scandinavian and Austrian Radical Right Parties.

Husbands (1992) uses a similarly parsimonious approach. He argues: “what (...) unites all of these parties is their particular commitment to some sort of ethnic exclusionism – a hostility to foreigners, immigrants, Third-World asylum-seekers, and similar outgroups – as well as aggressive nationalism or localism” (p268). He further groups the parties into five categories: “populist-nationalist parties” (p269), “neo-Fascist parties” (p273), “nationalist extreme-right parties” (p279), “traditional xenophobic parties” (p281), and “militant neo-Nazism” (p282). The first category consists of my selected cases, as well as the Italian Northern League. Hence, Husbands clearly sees my selected cases as part of the same distinctive type of Radical Right Parties.

Some of the most respected and oft-quoted contributions to the debate about Radical Right Parties, are those of Piero Ignazi. He uses three criteria, through which he distinguishes between “old” and “new” “Extreme Right Parties”. Both types of parties on the “Extreme” or “Radical” Right are characterized by a placement to the far right in their respective party-systems. Thus, the first criterion states that leaders and voters of these parties should display “rightist” attitudes (Ignazi 1992, pp. 7-9). According to the second criterion, “the extreme right parties should exhibit ‘opposition of principle’ and should express an ideology which undermines the constitutional rules of the democratic regime” (ibid. p12). The distinction between “old” and “new” RRPs relates to the third and final criterion: “the declared party ideology and its reference to fascism”. Ignazi argues that the old RRPs are fascist, while newer parties of the Radical Right do not display any coherent ideology (1997, pp. 52-54). The prototype of “new” RRPs is the French National Front (Ignazi 1997, p57), while the Austrian

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17 Mudde (1996) found 26 definitions in the literature, in which 58 different features were mentioned at least once (p229).
and Scandinavian parties are “doubtful” cases for inclusion (1992, pp. 13-15). I interpret this to mean that they are less radical versions of the “new” RRPs. In that sense, Ignazi does argue that my selected cases are similar types of political parties (1992 p15, and 1997 p53).

Herbert Kitschelt’s (1997) approach to this debate is characteristic of political science researchers. He sets out with two criteria for inclusion in the Radical Right “party family”, which he tests against his empirical evidence. They are “(1) whether a party’s competitors perceive it to be located ‘on the right’ and not a viable coalition partner, and (2) when the party appeared on the political scene” (p49). He argues that the parties should have appeared since the second half of the 1960s (p49). The party that best fulfills these criteria is the French National Front. It is the ideal-type of a “New Radical Right” party (p91), while the Scandinavian parties are “milder versions” within the same category (p121). The Austrian FPÖ does not fulfill either of the two criteria; nevertheless, it is part of the same “family tree”. Kitschelt categorizes it as a “populist anti-statist” party. As such, it is particularly distinguishable by its early anti-democratic history (p159), and its current opposition to corporatism and the elite political culture (p161).

Kitschelt’s distinctions run contrary to my selection of the Austrian and Scandinavian parties for comparative analysis. He argues that there are fundamental differences between the appeal and successes of the FPÖ on the one hand, and the Scandinavian RRPs on the other. This is not a generally accepted distinction. The researchers I have referred to in this section consider these parties to be members of the same party family. Moreover, to the extent that these researchers make distinctions between different types of Radical Right Parties, they include my selected cases in the same category.

I believe that Kitschelt’s analysis suffers from a “static” viewpoint. He explicitly points out that his research “ignores dynamic change in each country’s rightist mobilization over time” (1997, p48). In this sense, Kitschelt’s mode of analysis deviates from most other researchers, who emphasize the dynamic and changing nature of these parties. Evans et al (2001), for instance, make a point of some crucial changes in recent years. They argue that the parties on the European Radical Right...
have gone through a process of consolidation. The parties got started for different reasons, and in different national contexts, but in the last few years they have become increasingly similar. Thus, dynamic change makes these parties more similar, and thereby strengthens the argument that there is a coherent party family on the Radical Right. Kitschelt does not take these developments into account. That is why I will not consider his distinctions a valid objection to my comparative approach.

The Danish People’s Party
Most of the researchers I have quoted above study four of the five cases I will include in my analysis: the Austrian Freedom Party, the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties, and the Swedish New Democracy. They do not look at the Danish People’s Party; and for obvious reasons: most of the research was conducted prior to that party’s first electoral contest in 1998. It is now only starting to get noticed by researchers. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (2001) do analyze it in their recent research on Scandinavian RRPs. They argue that the Danish People’s Party is the “main successor of the Progress Party”, and should be analyzed as such. I accept that generalization, and will consider it a member of the same party family as the Danish Progress Party.

The Radical Right Party Family
I have now reviewed some of the most influential literature in the debate about the Radical Right Party family. I believe the literature suffers from too many arguments and conflicting perspectives. I trace that back to the deductive mode of research, which most political scientists employ in their discussions, in which they start out with a theoretical definition that they test against real-life cases. It would have been preferable to use an inductive approach, by studying the parties first, and look for common characteristics later (Mudde 1996, p244).

Despite this methodological critique, I find that the contributors convincingly reach the same conclusion, namely that RRPs are a distinct family of political parties. My selected cases are included in this family. To the extent that researchers employ further distinctions, they also categorize these cases as part of the same sub-category.
In sum, I do believe that my selected cases are sufficiently similar to be considered members of the same party family. As such, they are suitable objects for comparative analysis.

**Political Trust**

The concept of “political trust”, or rather its negative contrast “political distrust”, is an essential element of my analytical model (see figure 1.2). The concept has been a subject of a long debate in political science, which started in the 1960s. Despite, or perhaps because of the large amounts of research in this field, scientists have not agreed on a common approach or framework for analysis. “Political trust” remains an ambiguous concept that needs further clarification. The various terms used to connote the same concept, is testament to the lack of a coherent approach. “Support”, "confidence", "satisfaction", "internal or external efficacy", "belief", and "affection", are typical examples of terms that are sometimes used as synonyms, and at other times have subtle differences. These terms are usually implicitly defined only, and when they are explicitly defined, the meaning varies from one researcher to another.

The ambiguity of terms makes it difficult to interpret my analytical model. For one thing, I have distinguished between system and elite distrust. A brief reading of the literature will indicate that this is not the only possible distinction. In fact, most scholars use a more sophisticated distinction with several “objects of trust”. Some also include the related concept of “efficacy” in their discussions of political trust. I have not yet defined the latter term, nor have I specified its relation to my model.

These considerations highlight my need to take a look at this important subject in political science research. I will begin with a look at some of the classical contributions before I start outlining my preferred approach. As will become evident in my discussion, there are some relevant methodological aspects to this debate as well. The question of how to measure political trust is specifically important. I will deal with that in chapter three, where I also intend to specify the methodological aspects of my own approach to the term “political trust”.
David Easton

A significant part of the literature on political trust is either indirectly or directly based on David Easton's political theories. He distinguishes between inputs to, and outputs from the political system. Inputs are either demands or support from citizens, while outputs are the actions and decisions of government (1965, pp. 29-33). This is a circular process where "the inputs provide what we may call the raw material on which the system acts so as to produce (...) outputs" (p31). These outputs, in turn, have an effect on the support and demands of citizens. From my perspective, "support" is the most interesting variable in Easton's model. It is the equivalent of "political trust". Easton distinguishes between three different objects of support: the authorities, the regime, and the political community (p172). These are all part of the political system, or "black box" that creates outputs of inputs (see figure 2.1). Outputs will to a large extent determine citizens' level of political support (p267).

Figure 2.1 Easton’s simplified model of a political system

![Figure 2.1 Easton’s simplified model of a political system](image)

Source: Easton 1965, p32

Easton (1965) further distinguishes between diffuse and specific support. The latter is the direct effect of the fulfillment of demands (p268), while diffuse support is more of a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed" (p273). In my model, diffuse support is the effect of political trust irrespective of issues or belief systems, that is, the direct effect of political trust. Specific support is explained by issues and belief-systems. Thus, it is
the indirect effect of the latter variable, through the trust-variables (see figure 1.2). In this sense, the word “specific” refers to the reason for a person’s trust or distrust. Diffuse trust has no such immediate explanation, but in the long run it can also be affected by outputs (Easton 1965, p273). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) criticize this distinction, with some justification in my view, for being too vague and unclear (pp. 12-13).

**William A. Gamson**

William A. Gamson (1968) makes use of Easton's ideas as a basis for developing his own theory of "Power and Discontent". This influential book is a common frame of reference in the literature about political trust. Gamson starts with the broad concept of political alienation, which he argues, is the effect of a low level of both efficacy and political trust. Efficacy relates to Easton's input function, and "refers to people's perception of their ability to influence" the political system (p.42, my italics). "Political trust" depends on output, and on people's "perception of the necessity to influence" (ibid. my italics).

According to Gamson, there are four objects of trust. They are (i) the incumbent authorities, (ii) the political institutions of a regime, (iii) the public philosophy of a regime, and (iv) the political community (1968, pp. 49-50). He considers these objects hierarchical, in the sense that the incumbent authority is the first object of trust, and the political community is the final object. Higher-level forms of distrust are more threatening to the political system, than distrust directed at the lowest level. Gamson also argues that distrust toward one level may over time lead to distrust directed at the next level (pp. 51-52). However, this is a theoretical claim, for which he does not provide any empirical evidence.

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18 This is based on my reading of the literature. The following are examples of direct reference: Gamson 1968, Miller 1974, and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995. Listhaug 2000 and Betz 1998 are examples of indirect “references”.

19 See e.g. Miller 1974a and b, Miller and Listhaug 1990, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1996.
The Miller-Citrin Debate

Arthur H. Miller and Jack Citrin set the tone for the debate about political trust, in their 1974-exchange in the American Political Science Review. Their opposing views reflect an ongoing dispute within political science on this subject. Miller (1974a) started the debate with an article that appeared to confirm Gamson's theoretical claims. His data on the American public's attitudes toward their political system, from 1964 until 1970, indicated that discontent had become more widespread. Voters in the United States were less trusting of their politicians and political institutions in 1970 than they were in 1964. Political efficacy, as defined by Gamson, showed the same trend, and its correlation with political trust increased in the same time period\(^{20}\) (1974b, p990). Hence, Miller’s data seemed to confirm Gamson's claim that trust and efficacy are two dimensions of the same phenomenon, namely “political alienation”. Based on the empirical findings, as well as on Gamson's theory, Miller claimed that there were serious reasons for concern. Discontent toward one level of the political system could move on to the next level. While referring to Gamson, Miller wrote: "further increases in alienation would presumably bring into question the very philosophy and goals of the political system, as well as the viability of the political community itself, and a 'desire for political separation may develop'" (1974a, p971).

In his response, Citrin ridiculed this dramatic conclusion. He argued that Miller’s measures of political trust were inadequate, in that they only measured support for incumbent political authorities (p974). Thus, the results merely served as a confirmation of the well-known fact that we do not trust those we disagree with (p973). Furthermore, Citrin argued that the American people were highly supportive and trusting of their system of government. He introduced new survey-evidence to support this argument (pp. 974-975). Thus, he exposed a lack of empirical evidence in Miller's research: the supposed link between trust of different levels of the government hierarchy. Miller was unable to prove Gamson’s assertion that distrust will eventually be directed toward higher and higher levels of government.

\(^{20}\) From Pearson's \(r = .17\) in 1964 to .35 in 1970.
Political scientists and theorists do not agree on what levels or “objects of trust” are relevant to this debate. Easton (1965) identifies three levels (p172), while Gamson (1968) expands those to four (pp. 49-50). Pippa Norris (1999) uses five levels of political trust in one of her more recent works. They are, (i) the political community, (ii) regime principles, (iii) regime performance, (iv) regime institutions, and (v) political actors (p10). Despite these various distinctions, it appears that the empirical debate between Miller and Citrin principally focused on two levels. That is, the incumbent political authorities on the one hand, and political institutions on the other.

From a theoretical point of view, I believe Citrin rightly saw these two levels as fundamentally different. Political philosophers often separate the role of political elites from that of political institutions. De Toqueville is a case in point. He identified the danger of corrupt and tyrannical elected officials in his “Democracy in America”. Therefore, he argued that the role of political institutions was to limit the power of the elite, and thus, to organize democracy (1984, pp. 81-85). From this perspective, elites need not be trustworthy, but institutions certainly should be. Consequently, distrust directed at the political elite, need not lead to distrust of institutions, as Gamson and Miller argued. Quite the contrary, it could be rational to distrust the establishment while at the same time have confidence in political institutions.

This is of course a theoretical argument, and so far I have no empirical evidence to support it. However, I believe some evidence from public opinion research supports this interpretation. First of all, the distinction between two levels of trust is both fundamental and relatively easy to understand. I find it hard to believe that the bulk of democratic citizens are able to distinguish between Norris’ five levels of trust. I myself do not organize my thoughts on politics with such a fine-tuned distinction, nor do I believe other citizens do. In fact, public opinion research has shown that people simplify their thoughts about politics as much as possible. Converse’s (1964) famous article on the “Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” made that point very clear. As do other scientists who may not agree with Converse’s conclusions. They still concur that citizens use stereotypes and immediately accessible considerations when they express opinions about political objects (see e.g. Zaller 1992). That is why I
believe few people will consider more than two levels of political trust. A more sophisticated distinction will be too abstract, and thus, irrelevant to the way most people think about politics.

My second theoretical point was that Gamson and Miller might be wrong when they argue that distrust will gradually reach higher and higher levels of government. According to democratic political theory, it is rational to be supportive of political institutions, while distrusting political elites. Inglehart’s (1999) empirical evidence indicates that people do organize their thoughts in accordance with that argument. He finds that the populations of modern democratic societies are increasingly distrusting of authorities and political elites, while their support for the democratic system is on the rise. That is, increased distrust toward one level coincides with expanding support at a higher level. This is an opposite development from what one would expect from Miller and Gamson’s arguments.

In sum, the indications in this section point toward a two-level approach to political trust. It seems reasonable to argue that citizens think in terms of two levels of political trust, rather than the more complex distinctions offered by other scientists. Furthermore, most indications are that distrust toward the lowest level will not automatically lead to distrust at the next level. Still, there probably is some kind of connection between the two levels, which I will explore empirically in chapter four.

**Definition**

I will define “political trust” in accordance with my observations in the previous discussion. Webster's dictionary defines trust as an "assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something"; or "one in which confidence is placed". I consider it an adequate definition, but I would like to emphasize the "someone or something" that you can either trust or distrust. In the case of "political trust", they are obviously political objects. I will distinguish between objects at two different levels: the political elite on the one hand, and the political system and its institutions on the other.
Efficacy and Trust

Scholars in the field of opinion research and political trust often choose to include the concept of “efficacy” in their discussions. The term comes from Gamson’s theory (see page 41). It refers to one’s perceived ability to influence political decisions. Those with a low level of efficacy are also expected to be politically distrusting (Gamson 1968, p42). In this sense, “efficacy” could have an effect on my analytical model. Should it be included as a separate variable from political trust, as is often done in literature in this field?

Gamson’s arguments in this respect come from Easton’s model of a political system (see figure 2.1). Efficacy relates to the input function, and political trust has to do with output (Gamson 1968, p42). Those who feel they are unable to influence political decisions will not support or trust the “decisions and actions” of government. Thus, efficacy serves as an explanation of political trust or distrust. Consequently, efficacy has an effect on political trust, not the other way around. If I were to include the efficacy-variable in my model, it would have to be placed prior to the trust-variables in figure 1.2. I believe it could either have an intervening effect between “issues and belief-systems” and “political distrust”, or an independent effect on trust. It would not have a direct effect on my dependent variable. So, the possibility of a separate efficacy-variable in my model will not change any of the connections that are the subject of my research. I will not include it in my model, as that would only complicate it to an unnecessary degree.

Political Issues and Trust

I have called the final variable in my analytical model “issues and belief systems”. The variable refers to the substantial political issues that make some voters chose a Radical Right Party on Election Day. People’s beliefs on issues are sometimes connected, so

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21 A person’s lack of efficacy could have two causes: either he or she feels that the system is unresponsive to people’s demands; or he or she feels personally incapable of influencing political decisions. This distinction has led some researchers to separate external efficacy (system responsiveness) from internal efficacy (personal capabilities) (see e.g. Lane 1959, pp. 148-149; Listhaug 1989, pp. 216-217).

22 The feeling that you are unable to influence political decisions should not lead you to choose one political party over another. However, it could have an effect through “protest voting”, which is covered in my model.
that one specific policy-preference correlates with another on a different subject. These clusters of beliefs can be seen as “belief systems” (Oskamp 1991, p80).

The issues and belief-system variable obviously has a direct effect on voters’ party choice. But it could also have an indirect effect on RRP-support, through political distrust. Several scholars on political trust have argued that distrust correlates with certain political beliefs. Miller (1974a) was the first to conduct this kind of research. In his study of American electorates, he found that certain positions on political issues led to distrust. More specifically, those who disagreed with government policies were most distrusting. As government policies changed, those in favor of the new policy became more trusting, and those who preferred the previous policy changed from trust to distrust (pp. 955-961). Miller’s findings indicate that opposition-voters are distrusting because they disagree with government policies. The distrust that he describes is what Easton referred to as a lack of “specific support”. Research into each of the countries I will study, indicate that there is such an effect.

In Norway for instance, researchers seem to have found an effect of issues on trust in recent years. Aardal and Valen (1995) and Aardal et al (1999) have argued that people’s attitudes toward immigration have an effect on their expressions of trust or distrust. Their data further indicates that people’s attitudes toward a potential Norwegian EU-membership correlated with trust, but the correlation appears to have weakened (Aardal and Valen 1995, pp. 213-220; Aardal et al 1999, p182). In a similar fashion, Løvsethau’s (2000) analysis revealed especially strong effects of "aid to underdeveloped countries" and "economic support for immigrants". Voters who wanted these expenditures reduced were the most distrusting (Listhaug 2000, pp. 10-13).

In their study of the 1994-Election in Denmark, Borre and Goul Andersen discovered an effect of “policy distance” on political trust. They found that on certain issues, people’s political beliefs correlated with their level of political trust. The clearest connections were found on issues such as immigration, welfare spending, and Denmark’s relation with the European Union. Those who disagreed with government policies had the lowest level of political trust (1997, pp. 306-309).
In Sweden, there appears to be a connection between people’s attitudes on taxation, and their trust in government. According to Jonas Edlund (1999), those who disapprove of the tax-system in Sweden are also the most distrusting (pp. 10-15).

The evidence for Austria is somewhat more diffuse, due in part to a lack of public opinion research in that country. But there are some indications of a connection between issues and trust there as well. Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992) argue that “issue voting” and political protest are increasing as part of the same general trend in Austria (pp. 30-31). Gabriel (1998) further argues that certain “value orientations” lead to political distrust in Austria. These values are measured by use of questions about issue-positions (pp. 366-370). Thus, there appears to be a connection between political issues and political trust in Austria as well.

In all of the countries in my study, political distrust appears to correlate with people’s beliefs on certain issues. It is also notable that some of the issues with the greatest effect are also the favorite issues of the Radical Right, such as immigration, taxation, and welfare spending. This indicates that RRP-voters distrust politicians or political institutions because of their beliefs. Supporters of the Radical Right hold opinions that are contrary to established policies, and thus, they distrust the establishment. In this sense, there may be a spurious effect of “issues and belief systems” on both political distrust and RRP-support, as indicated in figure 1.2, on the next page. This effect, if it exists, relates to Eason’s concept of specific support; and it would indicate that RRP-voters are expressing “specific protest”, based on substantive policy positions. The alternative hypothesis is that there is no such effect, i.e. that these voters express “diffuse protest”.

Easton’s (1965) distinction between specific and diffuse protest has led me to include the final variable in my model. By adding the concept of “issues and belief systems” to my analysis, I will be able to test these two competing hypotheses. Thereby, I hope to shed further light on the motivations of Radical Right Party supporters.
**Figure 1.2 A multivariate model of political protest**

![Diagram of a multivariate model of political protest]

- **Direct effects**
  - Issues / belief systems
  - System distrust
  - Elite distrust
- **Spurious effects**
  - RRP-support

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**A Summary of My Model**

My main hypothesis is that some voters express political protest by voting for a Radical Right Party. I have defined “protest voting” as the expression of political distrust by voting for an RRP. Thus, I can test the hypothesis by looking at the relationship between distrust and RRP-support (see figure 1.2).

Furthermore, I have introduced three additional hypotheses that will be part of my analysis. They led to an expanded analytical model, which I illustrated in figure 1.2. In this chapter, I have discussed each of the four variables in the model. I found, first of all, that the dependent variable of “RRP-support” can be used in a comparative analysis. In the four countries I have selected, there is a coherent group of political parties on the Radical Right. Thus, it makes sense to compare voters of these parties in one country, with those of another. I have also discussed the concept of “political trust”, and I believe that a two-level approach to this term is appropriate. That is, I will distinguish between attitudes of trust or distrust toward the political system on the one hand, and toward the political elite on the other. Finally, I have found that the variable of “issues and belief systems” is relevant to my analysis. It may have a spurious effect on the other variables in my model, which I need to control for in the analysis.

My next step is to form a methodological approach to these variables, that is, I have to decide how I will measure and test each part of my analytical model. I will do that in chapter three, in which I deal with data and methodology. Thus, I hope to
develop an appropriate empirical approach to the theoretical issues I have discussed in this chapter.
CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

My theoretical discussion from chapter two will only be useful to my analysis if I am able to measure the theoretical concepts that I discussed there. In this chapter, I will provide an empirical framework that enables me to do just that. First, I will describe and briefly evaluate the available empirical data. Then, in the main part of this chapter, I will present my means of analyzing the data. In short, this chapter is about data and methodology.

As I discuss and evaluate the choices I need to make in this chapter, I will invoke the following two concepts: reliability and validity. They are measures to evaluate the quality of my approach. Hellevik (1988, p120) defines “reliability” as the “degree to which data are free of random measurement errors”. Data should be collected in a systematic way, which precludes any errors. That will be the main evaluative criterion in my discussion of the data. “Validity”, according to Hellevik, is the “degree of correspondence between the theoretical meaning of a variable in the causal model and the measure used for the variable in the empirical analysis”. I will try to use empirical measures that capture the precise content of my operative variables. At least they should come as close as possible to that ideal.

My goal in the analytical part of my dissertation is to test my analytical model, as portrayed in figure 1.2. The only realistic means of studying this individual-level model is by use of data from opinion surveys. I will not be able to collect new data; I will rely on existing surveys. Obviously, they were not designed to accommodate my research questions, but I still believe I will be able to find some relevant material. My influence over data-reliability in this situation is limited to my choice of existing data sets. Thus, my discussion of the data will be brief, and I will focus on describing the data.

My hands are not as tied in terms of methodology. I will be able to select and manipulate variables in the available data sets, and to analyze them in my preferred fashion. The bulk of this chapter deals with how I shall do that; hence, I will focus most of my attention on data validity. In that discussion, I will look at each of the variables in my analytical model (figure 1.2). I will perform the most extensive discussion around the concept of “political trust”. Some empirical questions in this
respect remain unresolved from my discussion in chapter two. I will attempt to resolve those, and thus to fill in the blanks in my approach to this concept. I will do the same for the other variables in the model. Finally, in the last part of this chapter, I will discuss what statistical techniques should be used to study the relationship between the variables.

Data

My analysis may be limited by what data are available. The surveys were not designed to accommodate my needs; still, I believe my analytical model is no more ambitious than what the data permits. I am fortunate to have access to a large amount of extensive survey data, most of which comes from NSD\textsuperscript{23}. It is a Norwegian state-owned organization that gathers a wide variety of data from other sources, and makes it available for social scientists and students. In addition to the data from NSD, I also have access to five Austrian Exit Polls through the Extreme Right Party Project’s database.

The World Values Survey

The World Values survey (WVS) of 1990 is the only comparative data set I have access to that includes all of the four countries in my study. Since I intend to analyze these countries as a group, I would have preferred to have more surveys of this nature. But the 1990 WVS is the only survey that allows such direct comparison. I also have access to the 1996 WVS, but that only covers two of the countries I intend to study, namely Norway and Sweden. I will use that data set in the present chapter, as a part of my discussion of political trust, and various facets of that concept.

The World Values Surveys are the products of large comparative research-projects on values and political change in more than 65 societies around the world\textsuperscript{24}. It includes questions about voting, political trust, values, political issues, and social

\textsuperscript{23} The Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) have anonymized the data sets from the Norwegian Electoral surveys. Bernt Aardal and Henry Valen were the Principal Investigators of these surveys and Statistics Norway collected the data. Neither the principal Investigators, Statistics Norway, nor the Norwegian Social Science Data Services are responsible for the analyses and interpretation of data presented here.

\textsuperscript{24} The World Values Survey homepage at http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/index.html
background. A respected research institution in each country conducted the polls, under the leadership of a social scientist. These scientists and several others have used the data in over 300 publications. In sum, these are some of the most trusted and oft-used available survey data in the world of social science. I have no reason to question this reputation; and I will consider the data to be sufficiently reliable for my purpose.

**National Surveys**

A single comparative data set is not enough to perform a thorough analysis of my research questions. I will also apply national data sets from each of the four countries. The available survey data from Austria, Norway, and Denmark has the advantage of being longitudinal, which means that the same questions have been asked repeatedly, usually in connection with elections. This enables me to study how attitudes change over time. I do not need this kind of data from Sweden, since New Democracy only gained enough support in one election in that country, for it to be represented in Parliament. I have access to the Swedish Election Survey of 1991, which includes a substantial number of New Democracy supporters.

The Extreme Right Party Project has made five Austrian Exit Polls available for its researchers. The data comes from the Austrian polling firm *Fessel*, which made one poll for each parliamentary election in Austria since 1986. They asked questions about actual voting, social background and the reason for people’s choice of political party. They did not include attitude-questions or questions about political trust. Therefore, I will use a different methodology when I analyze the Austrian data, as opposed to all the others. I will deal with that methodology later in this chapter. My only means of testing the Austrian data’s reliability is to test its accuracy in predicting election results. It has been remarkably accurate

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and thus, I consider the data to be reliable.

NSD has provided me with the data from the Norwegian election surveys from 1977 to 1997. There is one data set for every parliamentary election, which adds up to six data sets. I will only use four of those, since I have limited my analysis to a certain timeframe. The surveys come from the Norwegian Electoral Program, headed by Bernt

\[25\] The largest differences between the actual result of one of the three major parties, and the predicted results are .5 percent in 1986, .2 percent in 1990, .7 percent in 1994, .5 percent in 1995, and .3 percent in 1999.
Aardal and Henry Valen. They conducted the research at the time of each of these elections. They used questions about numerous political issues, political trust, actual voting, social background etc. The surveys are part of a long research tradition in Norway, starting with the election survey of 1957. The data has been used in several publications, and is well respected. I have no reason to question its reliability.

I have also gained access to as many as eleven Danish election surveys, through NSD. They include every parliamentary election that the Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party have participated in, from 1973 to 1998. Again, I have a more limited timeframe that that, so I will only use some of the more recent surveys, but I will also take a look at 1973, which is an interesting year for the Progress Party. The number of questions and types of questions vary to a greater degree in the Danish surveys than in the Norwegian ones. However, Danish social scientists have dealt extensively with the issue of political trust, and so the surveys include several questions that are relevant in that respect. That makes them useful for my analysis. I believe the long research tradition on political trust in Denmark makes the data sufficiently reliable for my research. But I have no other means of evaluating reliability.

Finally, I will use the Swedish Election Survey of 1991. It is the only extensive survey that includes a substantial number of New Democracy voters. However, one survey is not enough to perform a thorough analysis of New Democracy voters as such. That would require more extensive time-series data. Thus, my analysis of New Democracy only makes sense in a comparative perspective, that is, as a member of the Radical Right Party family. The Swedish survey includes questions about political trust, social background, political issues, and assessments of individual politicians. It is part of a research tradition in Sweden, similar to that of the other two Scandinavian countries. Again, I will have to assume a fair degree of reliability. I have no evidence or indications to the contrary.

Having identified the available data, I now turn to the question of how I will use the data for my purpose. In the remaining part of this chapter I will focus on methodology.
Methodology

In this section, I will determine how to measure and test each part of my analytical model, as outlined in figure 1.2. I will use validity as an evaluative criterion to discuss and assess the accuracy and usefulness of my approach. My model includes four variables; I have discussed relevant theoretical aspects of each in the previous chapter. I will now in a similar fashion discuss how to measure and test each of the variables. I also need to determine what analytical tools I should use to study the relationship between the variables. I see that as mainly a choice between least squares regression analysis and logistic regression. I will determine which technique is more useful for my purpose. Finally, I will look at the Austrian Exit Polls, and try to come up with an approach to analyze that data.

Radical Right Party Support

I will start with my dependent variable: support for a Radical Right Party. There are two ways to measure that. First, you may ask a question like the one from the world Values Surveys: “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party (…) would you vote?” I consider this to be a measure of voting intention. Secondly, you can measure actual voting, that is, to ask what respondents voted in the previous election. The election surveys, and the Austrian Exit Polls, use these kinds of questions, and some use both.

I believe there are advantages and disadvantages to both these measures. Questions about voting intention do not depend on memory; rather they serve as expressions of current feelings and attitudes. As such, they probably correspond with other attitude questions that measure current feelings and opinions. However, answering a question about voting intention does not entail the same commitment as actual voting. Voting intensions are more influenced by current events and whatever the respondent has at “the top of his head” (Zaller 1992, p48), than actual voting is. In this sense, measuring actual voting has some advantages both in terms of commitment, and because it is an expression of actual behavior. The main problem in measuring actual voting is the respondents’ faulty memories. This becomes an increasing problem as time passes since the election. Therefore, the Austrian Exit Polls have a special
advantage, in that the questions were asked literally minutes after the respondents voted. The same can be said for the other national surveys that were conducted within a brief time-span after the elections.

Based on these observations, I believe I should use measures of voting intention in surveys that are not directly linked to an actual election. In the election surveys and exit polls, actual voting seems to be a better alternative. Thus, I avoid some of the problems of memory loss, and I am able to measure current attitudes. I will use voting intention for a RRP as the dependent variable in my analysis of the World Values Survey data, and memory of actual voting in the national surveys. Thus, I believe I have found a valid measure of Radical Right Party support in each of the surveys.

Political Trust
I argued in chapter two that political trust should be measured at two different levels, according to the object of trust or distrust. First, there is trust directed at the political elite; and then at a higher level: trust of the political system. I will now add some methodological points to my discussion of this concept. When I have completed my discussion, I hope to have developed an overall approach that will be useful to my analysis.

There are a number of different survey questions that can be interpreted as measures of political trust. Some ask about confidence in political parties, others ask whether politicians can be trusted, and still others question whether the respondent supports the democratic political system. With all these survey-questions at hand, it is important to find out how respondents interpret and respond to different questions. John Zaller’s (1992) theory about the “Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion” is useful in that respect. He parsimoniously presents his theory as four “axioms”, through which he attempts to answer two questions: “how citizens learn about matters that are for the most part beyond their immediate experience, and how they convert the information they acquire into opinions” (p40). The latter question is relevant to my methodological discussion. Zaller answers it by stating the following two axioms:
A3. **Accessibility Axiom.** The more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use (p48).

A4. **Response Axiom.** Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them (p49).

These axioms indicate that it is difficult to get meaningful answers on questions that people do not think about in their everyday lives. That is not surprising. Most pollsters would agree that you should not believe poll-results concerning some distant foreign policy question or other complex issues that are not covered by the media and are not part of public debate. These observations relate to my previous discussion of political trust. In that discussion, my main focus was on different objects of trust. I assume that the frequency of people’s thoughts about these objects varies. That is, most citizens probably do not think as much about institutions and principles, as they do about individual politicians, for instance. The objects that they think about frequently will be easily accessible for consideration in a survey interview. Others may be more difficult, or even impossible to evaluate under the constraints of a short interview over the phone. In that case, a respondent may interpret the question to be simpler than it actually is, by substituting one object with another that is more easily accessible in the person’s mind. For example, a question about the institution of the Supreme Court may be interpreted as a question about judges in general. Such simplifications are common, and well known in opinion research. In my case, they indicate that I need to look more closely at how people answer questions about political trust.

John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (1995) looked at that question in their analysis of public attitudes toward the US Congress. They found that "when people are asked what they think of Congress, with no additional information (as is usually the case with such questions), the answer given is very much an evaluation of the membership of Congress, not of the institution” (p107). In general terms, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue that when respondents are asked about political institutions, they think about the people in those institutions (p44). Zaller’s theory can be used to explain this phenomenon. In his terms: the abstract idea of an institution qua institution is not immediately salient or accessible to a respondent. Rather, he or she “simplifies” by thinking about people in those institutions, which in most cases means politicians or bureaucrats. By specifying the referent in a long introduction to some of their
questions, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse were able to measure attitudes toward the institutions themselves. The introduction read as follows:

Now, I’ve asked you to rate some people in government, but sometimes when we talk about parts of the government in Washington, like the Supreme Court, the presidency, and the Congress, we don’t mean the people currently serving in office, we mean the institutions themselves, no matter who’s in office. These institutions have their own buildings, historical traditions and purposes laid out in the Constitution. I’d like to know how warm or cold you feel toward these institutions, not the people currently in office (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, p44).

The answers to these questions were radically different from the answers to the “ordinary” questions about trust in institutions. People were more supportive of the institutions themselves than the people in those institutions (p45). Findings like these are usually not taken into account in the literature on political trust. I believe that has led to some overly dramatic conclusions. Researchers who observe a high degree of distrust in response to questions about political institutions often argue that the institutions themselves lack support. They see this as evidence of a potential threat to the democratic political system (see e.g. Miller 1974a). That is not how Hibbing and Theiss-Morse see these questions; rather they argue that questions about institutions should be interpreted as being about the political elite.

In order to specify how I should interpret different questions about political trust in my analysis; I will perform a factor analysis of some of the empirical material. I believe that analysis will enable me to find valid measures of political trust. The World Values Survey of 1996 is useful in that respect, because it includes quite a few questions about political trust; more than in the 1990 WVS. The factor analysis will indicate how the more limited set of questions from 1990 should be interpreted. It will also be useful in my selection of trust-questions from the other data sets, in the sense that it will indicate how various types of questions should be interpreted.

Unfortunately, the 1996 WVS only covers Norway and Sweden of the four countries I intend to study. I will have to assume that my findings in these two countries are valid in Denmark and Austria as well. If I get radically different results in Norway and Sweden, I cannot make that assumption. However, if I observe the same trend in the two countries, then that will be an indication that my findings are part of a general pattern in countries that are similar to Norway and Sweden. As I have
previously discussed, I believe that the four countries in my analysis are sufficiently similar for the type of analysis I intend to do.

I have selected seven questions or variables from the 1996 World Values Survey that I will use in the factor analysis. The first question lets the respondent choose between different directions that the development of society may take; one of which is: “the entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action”. That sounds like a negative attitude toward the current organization of society, including the political system. I have made that variable into a dummy variable. The second and third questions compare the current democratic political systems with other alternatives. They appear to be measures of “system-trust”, as well. In the fourth question, the respondent shall indicate whether he or she has confidence in the political parties. The fifth and sixth questions are about confidence in Parliament and the Civil Service, respectively. My previous discussion indicates that these questions could measure trust in the political elite, not in institutions. Finally, in the seventh question respondent shall indicate whether he or she is satisfied “with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs”. It measures satisfaction with incumbent office-holders. I have coded all questions, except the first, on a scale from one to four.

I will use “Kaiser’s criterion” to select factors, and “oblimin rotation” to rotate the factors. The latter choice stems from my belief that any factors extracted from the data will be correlated in some way, this in accordance with figure 1.2. The analysis reveals two factors in both the Norwegian and Swedish data, as presented in table 3.1.

I will make several points based on the evidence in the table. The most important of these is that the analysis confirms my argument from chapter two. That is, the concept of political trust has two different components: one relates to the political system, the other to incumbent political elites. There is hardly any variation between Norway and Sweden in this respect, in the sense that the same factors load clearly on the same variables in both countries. On that basis, I will assume that these findings are valid for Austria and Denmark as well.
Table 3.1 Factor analysis of seven trust-questions that reveals a system-factor and an elite-factor in Norway and Sweden. Factor loadings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway System</th>
<th>Norway Elite</th>
<th>Sweden System</th>
<th>Sweden Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary change</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy: good</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy: better</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence: Parties</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence: Parliament</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence: Civil service</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent satisfaction</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation between factors</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Don’t know”-answers are excluded from the analysis.
Method: Oblimin rotation, “Kaiser’s criteria”.

Questions and coding:
Revolutionary change: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. (1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action; (2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms; (3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces. (1) is coded as 1, all others as 0.
Democracy good: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system”. Coded on a scale from 1 (=very good) to 4 (=very bad).
Democracy better: “I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.” Coded on a scale from 1 (=agree strongly) to 4 (=disagree strongly).
Confidence: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Political parties; parliament; the civil service.” Coded on a scale from 1 (=a great deal) to 4 (=none).
Incumbent satisfaction: “How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?” Coded on a scale from 1 (=very satisfied) to 4 (=very dissatisfied).

The system-aspect of political trust has to do with the current political system, that is, the way our democratic political system is organized. I believe the questions used by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse to measure trust in institutions, as institutions, would correlate with this factor. Their variables, as well as the ones I use, measure the highest level of political trust, which is not directly related to the people who run the system. Rather, they deal with the system itself. In western democratic countries, few people are against the way the system is organized. Therefore, scientists and pollsters have found that these kinds of questions provide such a limited amount of variance that they are not interesting in terms of analysis. That makes it difficult to find data sets that include this type of variable. Fortunately for my analysis, the “revolutionary
change”-variable is part of the 1990 World Values Survey. It has the weakest loading with the system-factor, probably because it deals with society in general, and not just the political system. Still, I will use it as a measure of system trust or distrust in my analysis of the 1990 WVS.

The elite factor loads strongly on four variables, the first of which is confidence in political parties. This is a little surprising. Some experts on political parties argue that the parties have become parts of the political system itself (see e.g. Katz and Mair 1995). Ignazi (1992) makes that assumption when he argues that anti-system parties are against all other parties. In his interpretation, negative attitudes toward political parties are also anti-system attitudes. The data in table 3.1 indicates that the public does not see political parties that way. Rather they evaluate political parties by the same standard as political elites. Thus, they see parties as actors in a political system, not as part of the system itself. That may not be an accurate assessment, but apparently, that is how most people see it.

The other three questions that the elite-factor loads strongly on are, first of all, two questions about political institutions, namely Parliament and the Civil Service. It also loads on the question about incumbent authorities. I find it interesting that the same factor loads so strongly on these three questions. It indicates that people evaluate these objects similarly. That can only mean that when they are asked about their view of political institutions, they answer as if the question related to current office-holders. That is, people interpret questions about political institutions as if they related to the people in those institutions. Thus, my evidence supports Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s assertions in this respect. Their findings appear not only to be valid in the United States, but also in the countries in my study.

Finally, table 3.1 offers support for my expectation that system and elite trust are somehow connected. The data indicates that the two factors are positively correlated. I will explore this connection in greater detail in chapter four.

I will use this empirical evidence as a basis for my selection of variables to measure political trust. First of all, I will use evaluative questions about the democratic

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26 There is another possible interpretation and that is that when people are asked about incumbent office-holders, they think in terms of the institutions or offices they hold. That is not likely, since it would be a more abstract interpretation than what the question actually warrants.
political system and questions about the need for radical changes in the system, as measures of “system trust”. It may be difficult to find these kinds of variables, but I have already identified one useful question from the 1990 World Values Survey. Furthermore, I will use questions about political institutions, without a more specific referent, as measures of “elite trust”. That may not be an accurate interpretation based on the literal wording of the questions, but it is the right choice in terms of how people answer these questions. Questions about political parties in general should also be counted in this category, as should direct questions about elites.

I can now safely conclude that political trust is a concept that should be measured at two different levels. In this section, I have determined what types of questions should be used to measure both system and elite trust. In doing that, I have tried to fill in the blanks from my theoretical discussion of this concept. Thus, I believe I have developed an approach to “political trust” that is both theoretically coherent and empirically valid.

**Issues and Belief Systems**

In the previous chapter, I argued that there may be a spurious effect of “issues and belief systems”, on the other variables in figure 1.2. The issues-variable may partially or wholly explain the apparent effect of political distrust on RRP-support. In this section, I will try to determine how best to measure that variable.

Because there is no one variable that measure “issues and belief systems” as such, I will use a group of variables that capture more than one issue, in addition to some kind of a belief system. It is tempting to include as many variables as possible, and thus to control for every measurable issue. I will try to resist this temptation. It would make my results difficult to interpret, and open up for the possibility of unforeseen effects and inexplicable results. Furthermore, from a statistical point of view, the strategy of including large numbers of variables has some problems. In a worst-case scenario it can lead to false results and invalid interpretations. At the very least it is a strategy that forces results from the data that are not justified (Rubin 1997). Hence, I will select a limited number of variables that measure relevant issues in terms of RRP-support and political trust.
As I indicated in chapter two, it appears that some of the favorite issues of the Radical Right also have an effect on political trust. In order to select issue-variables, I will start by categorizing them as either “new politics” or “old politics” issues. These terms are hard to define, yet useful as an analytical distinction between different types of issues. Ronald Inglehart (1990) is frequently associated with these terms. He argues that in the late 1960s and 1970s, a new generation emerged that had experienced economic security their entire lives. Because of this relative security, they were more interested in social and quality-of-life issues, than traditional economic issues. This generation, which came of age in the 1960s, demanded more environmental protection, social freedom, and a higher quality of life. Their political agenda met some opposition from what Kitschelt (1997) calls the New Right. The conflict between these two groups, which are now often referred to as New Left and New Right, focused more on social issues than on traditional economic issues. I will consider the typical issues that the New Right and the New Left disagree over to be "new politics" issues. Immigration, environmental protection, and law and order are typical points of dispute. These issues are distinguishable from "old politics" issues that are related to the traditional economic cleavage between left and right. Disputes over private versus public ownership of business, taxes, and welfare spending are cases in point.

Radical Right Parties probably gain support based on both new and old politics issues. However, as I look at the literature on these parties, I find that it particularly emphasizes “new politics” issues (see e.g. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Hainsworth 2000; Kitschelt 1997). Therefore, I will always include at least one such issue in my analysis. I will also try to use an “old politics” issue whenever possible. Questions about taxation seem particularly relevant to the success of RRPs. The exact variables that I choose will be dependent on the individual data sets. I will make those decisions as I go along with my analysis.

In addition to three or four issue-variables, I need a measure of a more general “belief system”. A question from the World Values Survey seems to fulfill that need: “in political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” Then, the respondent picks a number from 1 (left) to 10 (right). It is difficult to judge exactly what kind of reasoning
individual respondents use to pick a number on that scale. Some might emphasize new politics issues, others old politics. This ambiguity has some advantages for my analysis. The subjectivity of this scale means that it measures any kind of belief system that the respondent uses in his or her thinking about politics. Thus, it seems likely that it affects voting, which is exactly what I am looking for in these variables. Most of the data sets I have access to include this variable, with some variation in how they phrase the question. I will use these as measures of the general belief systems of voters.

In sum, I will use four or five variables as measures of “issues and belief systems”. I find it particularly important to include one or two “new politics” issues and I will always use the left-right self-placement scale. I am not interested in the individual effects of these variables. Rather, I will include these variables as a block in my model to test for its possible spurious effects.

*Statistical Techniques*

I have now identified how I will measure the different variables in my analytical model. I will proceed to discuss the possible statistical techniques I can use to measure and explore the relationships between the variables. I need to make several choices in that respect. Thus, I will conduct somewhat of a statistical discussion in the following section of this chapter.

I will start my analysis of the empirical data by exploring the relationships between two variables at the time. In order to do that, I will use simple frequency distributions, cross-tabulations and the correlation measure Pearson’s r. Since these techniques are well known and not controversial, I do not find it necessary to discuss them in any detail. However, when it comes to the multivariate analysis, in which I will employ the entire analytical model, I have to choose between at least two statistical techniques. These means of analysis have different purposes and functions. To evaluate their usefulness for my purpose, I will briefly sum up the type of analysis I intend to do, and what types of results I want to get from the technique.

My goal in the analysis of the survey data is to determine the effects of three independent variables on the dependent variable (see figure 1.2). I am especially
interested in determining if there are some effects that are equivalent “protest voting”, as previously defined (see page 7). In Hellevik’s terminology, I will do a “causal analysis”. It should be distinguished from “prediction analysis”, the purpose of which is to predict values on the dependent variable, based on different combinations of independent variables (Hellevik 1988, p152).

In order to perform the type of causal analysis I have outlined in figure 1.2; I need to do a so-called “sequential analysis” (Tabachnick and Fidel 1996, pp. 149, 591). I will start by looking at the relationships between the two trust-variables and the dependent variable, and then proceed to include a group of issue-variables. I am not that interested in studying the effects of individual issue-variables on RRP-support. Rather, I hope to study changes in the effects of other variables, and in the explained variance of the overall model, when I include the last group of variables. This type of analysis will enable me to answer some of my research questions. For instance, if the effects of the trust variables disappear with the inclusion of “issues and belief systems”, it will give credence to the “specific distrust” hypothesis. But if the explained variance of the model increases dramatically when I include the latter variables, it indicates that protest is at best a peripheral motivation for RRP-supporters.

I believe the most relevant statistical techniques for my purpose, are least squares regression and logistic regression. Barbara G. Tabachnick and Linda S. Fidell (1996) offer short and to-the-point descriptions of the goals of these types of analysis:

The primary goal of regression analysis is usually to investigate the relationship between a DV [dependent variable] and several IVs [independent variables]. As a preliminary step, one determines how strong the relationship is between DV and IVs; then, with some ambiguity, one assesses the importance of each of the IVs to the relationship (p128).

The goal of [logistic regression] analysis is to correctly predict category of outcome for individual cases. The first step is to establish that there is a relationship between the outcome and the set of predictors. If a relationship is found, one usually tries to simplify the model by eliminating some predictors while still maintaining strong prediction. Once a reduced set of predictors is found, the equation can be used to predict outcomes for new cases on a probabilistic basis (p576).

In terms of the main purpose of these techniques, regression analysis appears as the best choice for my analytical strategy. Its main goal is to identify relationships
between variables, which is what I intend to do. Logistic regression also involves discovering relationships, but that is only a partial goal of that technique.

However, there are some advantages to logistic regression that are relevant to my research. First of all, it is a technique that is well suited for dichotomous dependent variables. Regression analysis is mainly fit to handle continuous dependent variables. One of the assumptions of regression analysis is that the errors from the linear model should be normally distributed. The variance of these errors should also be equal over the entire data-range (Lewis-Beck 1980, p26). None of these assumptions are met when the dependent variable is dichotomous. Still, Fox (1997) argues that these assumptions are not critical to a least-squares analysis, as long as the sample-size is sufficiently large (p441). I consider my data to have sufficiently large samples, as they all have well over a thousand respondents. Hence, these problems are not essential to my analysis.

However, Fox argues that there is a further problem with linear regression, which is more serious and difficult to solve. Regression analyses with dichotomous DVs may lead to predictions that are higher than 1 and lower than 0, which should be impossible. The more complex logistic function prevents that possibility (Fox 1997, p441; Helland 1999, p36). Accordingly, most prediction analyses with several independent variables and dichotomous dependent variables should be conducted with logistic regression. These facets have made logistic regression a popular tool in the medical sciences. But these arguments are not valid for my research. I intend to do a causal analysis; I am not interested in predicting results. Hence, I do not have to worry about wrong predictions.

Both least squares regression and logistic regression are well suited for conducting sequential analyses. The same principles apply in both cases, in that the researcher starts with some variables, and then adds one or several groups of additional variables. The purposes of the analysis is to see how the effect of the initial variables change with the inclusion of additional variables, and to see how the effect of the model as a whole changes. For the first purpose, I will perform a so-called causal decomposition. I will start out with a bivariate model, and continue to “decompose” that effect into spurious, indirect and direct effects. The various effects that I find
through regression analysis will “add up”; that is, I will have accounted for the entire bivariate effect when I decompose it into other effects. In a logistic analysis, the effects do not necessarily add up, which indicates that the decomposition is imprecise (Hellevik 1988, p187). Hence, linear regression seems a better choice for causal decomposition, though I do not mean to suggest that logistic regression is fundamentally flawed in this respect.

The second purpose of sequential analysis is to study the changed effect of the model as a whole, when one includes additional groups of variables. That effect is measured by “explained variance” or “goodness-of-fit” measures. The most common tool in regression analysis is R2. It is a standardized measure, which varies between 0 (no effect) and 1 (perfect fit). In logistic regression, there are some similarly standardized tools available. But Helland (1999) argues that they are not entirely reliable, and should be avoided (pp. 30-33). That leaves only one reliable tool for this type of analysis, namely “log-likelihood”. It is useful for my analysis because it gives an indication of changes in the goodness-of-fit of the logistic function. However, it is unstandardized, which makes the findings difficult to interpret in terms of substantial results. “Log-likelihood” does reveal whether the sequential inclusion of variables leads to a significant increase in explanatory power, but it is difficult to make a determination as to the “amount” of change. Furthermore, it is easy to achieve significance with several variables in a large data set, so that information in itself is not really interesting.

In sum, even though logistic regression is suitable for analyses with dichotomous dependent variables, I find least squares regression to be the most useful for my purpose. The oft-used arguments in favor of logistic regression do not invalidate the use of ordinary regression in my case. Furthermore, least squares regression offers measures that are straightforward and easy to interpret substantially. That does not mean that I could not use logistic regression in my analysis, but I prefer the simpler method as long as it provides statistically valid results.

The next step is to determine what types of correlation coefficients I should use to interpret the regression-results. The standardized beta-coefficient is useful when one compares the effects of different variables in the same data set and in the same
analysis. I need that measure to compare, for instance, the effects of system distrust and elite distrust on my dependent variable. However, this measure should not be used to compare effects across samples, which I hope to do in my comparative analysis of the 1990 World Values Survey. The beta-coefficient may change simply because the variance of the variables is different in various data sets. Hence, if one effect is the same in two data sets, the beta weight may still be different if the variable varies more in one data set than in the other (Lewis-Beck 1980, p65). In fact, this problem may also occur when one tries to compare R2 in different data sets, since that measure also depends on the amount of variance. I will deal with this problem by including the standard deviation of the variables in the tables where I present my results. If there are only minor differences between data sets, I can compare the standardized measures without hesitation. But if there are some notable differences, I will not make that comparison. Note that this argument is only valid for my analysis of the 1990 WVS. The other data sets consist of different questions or variables that cannot be directly compared with any statistical technique. Nevertheless, I will include the standard deviation of the variables in these tables as well. That will enable the interested reader to calculate the unstandardized regression coefficients from the standardized ones. Some statisticians prefer unstandardized coefficients, and argue that they are the only valid basis for statistical inference. My approach enables these readers to see if they reach the same conclusions as I do, by looking at unstandardized coefficients.

I have now looked at my available options in terms of statistical techniques, and I have decided to use least squares regression to perform the multivariate analysis. Furthermore, I will use R2 and standardized regression coefficients as measures of effects and explained variance. I had several options, but made my choices on the basis of the type of analysis I intend to do, and with the hope that the techniques will provide intelligible results. I also aim to provide enough information for the reader to be able to criticize my approach. That is an important ideal in any data analysis, which I hope to fulfill.

27 The unstandardized coefficients can be calculated by use of the following formula: standardized coefficient * (standard deviation of the dependent variable) / (standard deviation of the independent variable)
The Fessel polling firm conducted the Austrian Exit Polls, mainly as a means of predicting election results. The polls consist of a limited number of questions, and there are no variables that can serve as the independent variables in my model, as I have defined them in this chapter. Consequently, I have to use a different methodology when I analyze these data.

There are only two questions in the Austrian Exit Polls that are of interest to my analysis. The English translations of these questions are phrased as follows: “What was the main reason for you voting for the FPÖ?” and, “what was truly decisive in your vote for the FPÖ?” Both were open questions that have been coded into a limited number of categories in the data sets. I do not find the distinction between “the main reason” and “the truly decisive” reason for party choice to be of any analytical value in my case. Thus, I have merged these two variables into one. I have also classified the original categories into six broader categories. They are “protest against the elite”, “issues and belief systems”, “opposition vote”, “personal vote”, “likes the FPÖ”, and a residual category. I have displayed the basis of these categories in table A.1 in the appendix.

These categories or variables measure the motivations of FPÖ voters. As such, they are highly relevant for my main research question. In the previous parts of this chapter I have developed a strategy for statistically measuring these motivations. The Austrian Exit Polls measure the same thing in a more direct fashion. Therefore, I should be able to reach the same type of conclusions by simply studying the distribution of answers to these questions. I will also study the relationship between different types of answers. Poll-respondents could give an unlimited number of answers to these questions, so each respondent can be counted with an answer in several of these categories. That enables me to look for connections between various types of answers. For instance, I can find out if those who answer “protest” also mention other reasons. In sum, the Austrian Exit Polls require a different methodology than the other surveys I have access to, but they are just as useful to my research.
Summary

I have tried to outline an empirical approach for analysis in this chapter. That is, I started with a description of the available data, and continued with a description of how I will use the data. I have determined how to measure each part of my analytical model, and I have discussed and reached a conclusion on my preferred statistical technique. I have also discussed how to analyze the Austrian Exit Polls, which deviates somewhat from the other data. Having resolved these questions, I now have both a theoretical and an empirical framework for analysis. That enables me to delve into the actual empirical research, which will be the purpose of chapter four.
CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PROTEST

I will now turn to the empirical analysis of political protest and protest voting. In doing so, I will use the theoretical and empirical frameworks for analysis I developed in the previous chapters. That ought to be a solid basis on which to perform the statistical analysis.

I intend to focus squarely on the data-analysis in this chapter. I will comment on my results as throughout the analysis, but I reserve a more elaborate discussion of some implications of my findings for chapter five. In the present chapter, I will start out with the simplest model of protest voting, as discussed on page 6, and illustrated in figure 1.1. The model indicates that political protest is the expression of political distrust by voting for a Radical Right Party. I will measure protest by looking at the bivariate relationship between distrust and support for these parties. I will then move towards a more complex model of protest voting by adding additional variables until I get to the final analysis of figure 1.2. In the last part of this chapter, I will perform some additional analyses to further explore and pursue my findings.

The Bivariate Model

The main purpose of my dissertation is to explore the relationship between political distrust and Radical Right Party support. The academic literature on these parties usually states that there is a positive relationship between the two variables as indicated by figure 1.1. I have used this statement as the basis for my main hypothesis, which is that RRP-voters are motivated by political distrust; i.e. they are "protest voters", according to my definition of the term (see page 7). For the sake of clarity, I include the figure here, to make it easier to follow my analysis.

*Figure 1.1 A bivariate model of political protest*

![Diagram showing political distrust leading to protest voting, which then leads to RRP-support.](image-url)
A good and simple way to investigate the relationship in figure 1.1 is to look at the answers to questions that measure political trust among Radical Right Party supporters, and compare those to the answers of supporters of other parties. I have included a number of such questions in table 4.1 from each of the four countries in my study. The questions were asked at some time between 1989 and 1994.

**Table 4.1 Political distrust among Radical Right Party voters compared to other voters in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden around 1990. Percent distrusting answers, and the percentage differences between the two groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions:</th>
<th>RRP-voters</th>
<th>Other Voters</th>
<th>DiffERENCE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUSTRIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Civil service (1990).</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11**</td>
<td>165 905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action</em> (1990).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>165 905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Civil Service (1990).</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14**</td>
<td>153 1030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action</em> (1990).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>155 1035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel that most Norwegian politicians are competent, and usually know what they are doing, or do you think many of them have little knowledge in the matters they are set to deal with? (1989).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16**</td>
<td>194 1540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In our country, do you feel that most politicians are trustworthy, that they are in general trustworthy, or that few of them are trustworthy? (1989).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22**</td>
<td>202 1593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions:</th>
<th>RRP-voters</th>
<th>Other Voters</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament (1990).</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>16**</td>
<td>76  1131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Civil Service (1990).</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27**</td>
<td>74  1128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action (1990).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75  1145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you quite agree, partly agree, neither nor, partly disagree, or quite disagree with the following statements? In general one can trust our politicians to make the right decisions for the country (1994).</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29**</td>
<td>92  1628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much trust do you have in Danish politicians in general? Is it great trust, some trust, not much trust, or very little trust? (1994).</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38**</td>
<td>92  1634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking, how much do you trust Swedish politicians? Do you trust them a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or not at all (1991).</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21**</td>
<td>162 2108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Significant at the 1%-level.
Level of significance is measured by use of Bernt Aardal and Frode Berglund's "Zigne" computer program. Distrusting alternatives are in italics.

These results are not surprising for students of Radical Right Parties. On most questions, RRP-supporters are significantly more distrusting than other voters are. The differences between these groups are more than 10 percentage points on most questions, and on one question in Denmark, the difference is as high as 38. Overall, the effect of distrust seems weakest in Austria, and perhaps strongest in Denmark. I also find it interesting that Norwegians seem to be more trusting of their Parliament or parliamentarians, than Austrians and Danes do. Norwegian Progress Party supporters are more in line with “non-RRP voters” in both Austria and Denmark on this question. Finally, there is one question that does not produce any significant differences between the two groups, and that is the question about revolutionary societal change. As I indicated in chapter three, this question measures trust in the political system. It appears not to have an effect on RRP-support. Still, I will not draw any conclusions in that respect until I have performed a multivariate analysis.
I could end my analysis at this point. Table 4.1 appears to confirm the established argument that Radical Right Party voters are distrustful “protest voters”. But that is not an interesting finding, since it only serves to confirm numerous previous studies. Thus, I will perform a more complex analysis, where I make use of my theoretical and empirical frameworks.

**Protest at Two Levels**

I have previously argued that there are two types of political distrust and political protest. One is at a higher analytical level than the other is. “System distrust”, or protest against the political system, is at the highest level. I have called the other type "elite distrust", or protest against the elite. This distinction constitutes my first expansion of figure 1.1 into a more complex analysis of RRP support. Figure 4.1 illustrates the expanded model, which I will analyze in the following sections.

*Figure 4.1 A two-level model of political protest*

Figure 4.1 illustrates the two different hypotheses I discussed in chapter one. The "system-protest" hypothesis comes from my reading of Ignazi (1992), who argues that Radical Right Parties are anti-system parties. If his arguments apply to the voters of these parties, I should find a system-protest effect in my analysis. The "elite-protest" hypothesis is more in line with Heidar (1989) and Arter (1999) who see RRP as "anti-consensus" or "anti-establishment" parties. The latter hypothesis suggests that RRP-
voters are merely hostile towards the elite, which is a less radical attitude than the anti-system attitude.

System- and Elite Distrust

Figure 4.1 leaves one question unresolved, beyond the two hypotheses I have just outlined; namely: what is the relationship between system- and elite distrust? I have previously indicated that the two are positively correlated, but I find it necessary to take a closer look at the relationship.

To simplify my discussion I presuppose that there are only two values to each of these variables: trust and distrust. A citizen can either trust or distrust the political elite, and he or she can either trust or distrust the political system. Clearly, peoples’ attitudes are more nuanced than that, but for the sake of my discussion, this is a useful distinction. I then have four possible types of attitudes, as illustrated by table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Four combinations of elite- and system trust / distrust.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite trust</th>
<th>System trust</th>
<th>System distrust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite trust</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that attitudes toward the system are at a higher level than attitudes toward the elite. System-distrust is a “revolutionary” attitude, and I expect relatively few people to fall within that category. I anticipate that most people are at point 1 or 2, in table 4.2. Most of the variation in this table probably occurs between these two points, with Radical Right Party voters closer to 2 than the general population. However, there are always some people who distrust the system, and I expect most of them to be at point 4 in the table. People who distrust the system should also distrust the people who run and support the system, i.e. the political elite. You may be able to justify the attitude represented by point 3 in the table, but that requires an extensive and unusual argument. It is almost self-contradictory attitude, in the sense that it entails a lack of support of the system as a whole, combined with a positive
attitude towards those who embody the system. I do not believe anyone will fall within this category, irrespective of party-adherence. Point four in the table may or may not be dominated by RRP-supporters; I have yet to test that hypothesis.

If my observations are confirmed, I will see a weak positive correlation between the two variables. Most of the variation occurs between point 1 and 2, but there is a correlation, since those who distrust the system will also distrust the elite. I have tested these expectations on the 1990 World Values Survey data, and displayed the results in table 4.3. I have tried to make table 4.3 easy to interpret in light of my discussion, by making two dummy-variables of system- and elite trust or distrust.

Table 4.3 The relationship between elite- and system distrust, in the populations as wholes, and among Radical Right Party Supporters, in Austria, Norway, Denmark and Sweden+. Percent of respondents in different categories, and the correlation between the two variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>RRP-voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust distrust</td>
<td>trust distrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite trust</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson’s r / (sum)</td>
<td>.07* (100)</td>
<td>.06* (101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP-voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite trust</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson’s r / (sum)</td>
<td>.05 (101)</td>
<td>.13 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population: 1319, RRP-voters: 151

* Significant at the 5%-level.
** Significant at the 1%-level.

Questions and coding:
“Elite trust” is measured by two questions: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament, the Civil Service.” Those who give a preponderance of trusting answers are coded as “Elite trust”; those who give the logically opposite answer to the two questions (e.g. quite a lot of confidence and not very much confidence) are excluded; and those who give a preponderance of distrusting answers are coded as “Elite distrust”. I have also made an index out of these two questions, from 1 to 7, which I used to measure the correlation between the variables.

“System trust” is measured by one question: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. 2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.” Those who answered 1) are coded as “system distrust”; those who answered one of the others are coded as “system trust”.

Source: World Value Survey 1990

There is some variation in table 4.3, both between countries, and between the populations as wholes and RRP-supporters. But most of the variation is between what
is equivalent to points 1 and 2 in table 4.2. Most people trust the system, but they disagree as to the trustworthiness of the political elite. Austrians in general are most distrusting towards the elite; supporters of the Danish Progress Party express the highest level of distrust of RRP-voters. Furthermore, some citizens distrust the system, and those who do, combine that attitude with distrust of the elite. I expected no one to distrust the system and at the same time trust the elite. The data in table 4.3 comes very close to confirming that expectation. The limited number of respondents who fall within this category may just be a result of misunderstandings and errors. Finally, as one can see from the distribution of the respondents in the four categories, the two variables are weakly but positively correlated. However, the strength of the correlation and its significance varies. Most notably, there appears to be a stronger correlation in Sweden than in the other countries. I can offer no immediate explanation for that.

None of the correlations among RRP-voters are significant, which is not surprising given the small N, and an overall weak correlation.

I have now explored the relationship between system- and elite trust. However, I have not been able to determine the causal direction of the arrow in my analytical model; does elite distrust lead to system distrust, or the other way around? I have argued that someone who distrust the system should also distrust the elite, but that does not determine which comes first. Gamson (1968) argued that elite distrust eventually leads to distrust at a higher level, i.e. system distrust. But you could also argue that “revolutionary” attitudes toward a system lead to skepticism or hostility toward those who run the system. I believe the arrow runs both ways, as my model indicates, and that it is impossible to definitively determine its causal direction. In real life, people do not deduct their attitudes in a perfectly logical and coherent manner, so I should not try to enforce some logic to my model that is not supported by empirical evidence. Hence, I will accept the model as it is, with the causal arrow pointing in both directions.

Finally, table 4.3 can be used to make some observations about my research questions and hypotheses. It appears that Radical Right Party voters are less trusting of the political elite than the population as a whole is, which supports the “elite protest hypothesis”. There is also a slight difference in system distrust in table 4.3, with RRP-
voters expressing more distrust. This may support the “system protest hypothesis”, but the differences may also be too small for there to be any significant effect. I will try to come up with a more definitive answer to these questions in the following section.

**Protest Voting at Two Levels**

I will now take a closer look at the effect of system- and elite distrust on RRP-support. Thus, I hope to reject or confirm some of my hypotheses. Table 4.4 shows both the bivariate effects of the two trust-variables on RRP-support and the combined effect of the two variables in a regression analysis. The data comes from the 1990 World Values Survey, which includes Sweden. However, the survey was conducted prior to the formation of New Democracy, so, Sweden cannot be part of this analysis.

### Table 4.4 Bivariate and combined effects of system- and elite distrust, on support for the Radical Right Parties of Austria, Norway, and Denmark, in 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria (FPÖ)</th>
<th>Norway (Progress)</th>
<th>Denmark (Progress)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bivariate+</td>
<td>Combined++</td>
<td>Bivariate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System distrust</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance, R2</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.03**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Standard deviations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria (FPÖ)</th>
<th>Norway (Progress)</th>
<th>Denmark (Progress)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System distrust</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>1195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Measured by Pearson’s r.  
++ Measured by standardized regression coefficients.  
* Significant at the 5%-level.  
** Significant at the 1%-level.

Questions and coding: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. 2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.” Those who answered 1) are coded as “1=system distrust”, those who answered one of the others are coded as “0=system trust”.  
“[I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament; the civil service.” The answers are coded on a scale from “1” to “7”. Those who answered “a great deal” on both questions are coded as “1”, while those with the least confidence in both instances are coded as “7”.


I have included the standard deviations of the variables, in accordance with my methodological discussion in chapter three. There are no dramatic deviations from one country to another. Denmark may look different, because the standard deviation of the dependent variable is a little smaller there than in the other two countries. Still, I
believe they are similar enough for comparison across countries, which is what I hoped for.

The table provides some interesting results that have a direct bearing on two of my hypotheses. The “system protest hypothesis” is not supported by this analysis. Radical Right Party voters do not appear to be motivated by a desire to protest against the political system. There is a weak, significant, bivariate effect in Austria, but it disappears with the inclusion of the elite-variable. This finding is not what one would expect from reading some of the literature and commentary on Radical Right Parties in recent years. Contrary to these writings, RRP-voters do not dislike the political systems in their countries; at least their attitudes in that respect have no effect on their voting.

Radical Right Party voters’ attitudes toward the political elite appear to have an effect, though. There is a similar, significant effect in all three countries, which falls within my definition of political protest. Hence, RRP-supporters are “protest voters”, since they express disapproval of the political elite through their vote. The effect is fairly similar in each of the countries. The similarities are also striking for the overall effect of the model, as measured by R2. It shows a small explained variance in all three analyses, which means that the protest variables have a limited effect, and that there must be some other more important factors that explain RRP-support.

So far, I have found that RRP-voters are motivated by protest against the political elite, but this motivation is not central to their choice on Election Day. Table 4.4 shows that there must be other factors that have an effect on peoples’ support for these parties. I hope to fill in the missing pieces in my analysis in the next section of this chapter, where I utilize the entire model of protest voting.

A Multivariate Analysis of Political Protest

I have now reached the point where I will analyze the expanded model of protest voting, as I have indicated by figure 1.2. I have discussed most relevant theoretical and methodological questions that have a bearing on the model, so I will proceed straight to my analysis. I will start with a comparative analysis of the World Values Survey data, before I analyze each country separately, by use of the national data sets.
I have performed a regression analysis of figure 1.2 on the 1990 World Values Survey. I used four questions as measures of “issues and belief systems”. They are, in addition to the left-right scale, one assertion to the effect that higher taxes are justified to pay for environmental protection. Another deals with employment of immigrants versus native citizens, and the final one is more of an old politics question: if government ownership of business and industry should be increased. I have coded these four variables so that the highest value is what I expect to be the “Radical Right” view. That should mean that the variables have a positive effect on RRP-support. I have displayed the results in table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Impact of system- and elite distrust, as well as three issues and one ideology-scale, on support for the Radical Right Parties of Austria, Norway, and Denmark, in 1990. Standardized regression coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria (FPÖ)</th>
<th>Norway (Progress)</th>
<th>Denmark (Progress)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System distrust</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes vs. environment</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs to immigrants</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business ownership</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance, R2</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.09**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.5 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard deviations:</th>
<th>Austria (FPÖ)</th>
<th>Norway (Progress)</th>
<th>Denmark (Progress)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxes vs. environment</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs to immigrants</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business ownership</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>1069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the 5%-level.
** Significant at the 1%-level.

For the standard deviations of system distrust, elite distrust, and the dependent variable, see table 4.4.

Questions and coding: "On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. 2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces." Those who answered 1) are coded as 1 (=system distrust), those who answered one of the others are coded as 0 (=system trust).

"I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament; the civil service." The answers are coded on a scale from “1” to “7”. Those who answered “a great deal” on both questions are coded as “1”, while those with the least confidence in both instances are coded as “7”.

"I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one I read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly? I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental damage.” Coded on a scale from “1” to “4”. Agree strongly=1. Disagree strongly=1.

"Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [own nationality] over immigrants” Disagree=1, Neither=2, Agree=3.

"Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.” 1= “Government ownership of business and industry should be increased”. 10= “Private ownership of business and industry should be increased”.

"In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” 1=left, 10=right.


I consider these standard deviations similar enough to permit comparisons across countries. However, it is worth keeping in mind that the dependent variable varies a little less in Denmark than the other two countries. That should lead the reader’s attention towards the general trends in table 4.5, and not focus too much on the exact values of the coefficients.

The results in this table should be seen in light of table 4.4. The effects of the two elite-variables are almost identical in the two tables. Hence, issues or belief systems do not influence the "protest effect"; it exists independently of the latter variables. That means that the “elite protest”-effect that I found in the previous section of this chapter, really is a form of “diffuse protest” (see page 40). Radical Right Party supporters protest against the elite, but they do not do so because of some specific issue or cluster of issues. So, this evidence refutes the idea that RRP-supporters’ political distrust stems from their protest against specific government policies. Rather,
these voters express a direct protest against elites, which I believe I can best describe in Easton’s (1965) term, as “diffuse”.

Another interesting point of comparison between tables 4.4 and 4.5 is the difference in the overall effects of these two models. R2 increases with the inclusion of the “issues and belief systems” variables in both Norway and Denmark. The increase is significant but not as remarkable in Austria, as in the other countries. These changes are not surprising, given the low levels of R2 in table 4.4; but they are interesting because they confirm my previous argument that protest is not an important consideration for RRP-supporters. These voters are to a greater extent motivated by issues and belief systems. In sum, I have found a protest effect in RRP-supporters’ choice of political party, but the effect is not as important as other considerations. This conclusion is as valid in Austria as it is in Norway and Denmark. R2 in table 4.4 is at a similar low level for Austria as in the other two countries. The fact that it does not increase much in table 4.5 merely indicates that those specific issues are not important for supporters of the FPÖ. Nevertheless, there are some other factors at play in Austria, besides political protest, that have a more determined effect on peoples’ choice to vote for the Freedom Party.

Finally, the effects of the issues-variables are worth a brief comment. The jobs-to-immigrants-question and the left-right scale have significant effects in all three countries. Hence, immigration is important for these voters, but they also think in terms of a more general belief-system. The analysis does not indicate how the voters interpret the left-right scale, other than that it has an effect. The other issues-questions do not have substantial effects in the multivariate analysis. However, almost all of the variables have an effect in a bivariate analysis28, and are thus relevant for RRP-supporters. The left-right scale probably absorbs some of the effects of the issues-variables; which supports the idea that these voters use an overall belief-system in their political thinking.

In sum, my comparative analysis indicates that RRP-voters are motivated by distrust toward the political elite. Still, most of their motivation comes from substantial

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28 The only one of these effects that is not significant in a bivariate analysis, is the taxes versus environment question in Austria.
issues and belief systems. With these observations in mind, I will move on to analyze each country separately.

**Austria**

The Exit Poll-surveys from Austria do not permit the same kind of statistical analysis as the other surveys do. The polling firm Fessel only asked voters about their motivations for voting for one party or another. However, since motivations are what I am studying, I should be able to make use of the surveys to shed light on my research questions. As I indicated in chapter three, I have coded FPÖ-voters’ responses to the poll-questions into six categories (see table A.1). The categorization in itself produced some interesting findings. I was not able to find a single answer that can be interpreted as “system protest”, in the sense that I have used that term. Some of the nuances of the respondents’ answers may have been lost in the first round of coding, or in the translations to English, but that is an uncertainty that I have to accept. I will argue that supporters of the Freedom Party do not express any kind of protest against the political system in Austria. They do, however, express protest against the political elite. Table 4.6 displays the frequencies of “elite protest” and the other five categories of motivations, from 1986 to 1999. Since each respondent could give an unlimited number of answers to these questions, the frequencies add up to more than 100 percent.

**Table 4.6 Reasons for FPÖ-vote in six categories from 1986 to 1999, percent.**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite protest</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues or ideology</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal vote</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likes the FPÖ</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition support</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum</strong></td>
<td>277</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N         | 205  | 354  | 499  | 472  | 589  | 465  |

Source: Austrian Exit Polls

Before I start interpreting table 4.6, I will point to one of John Zaller’s (1992) axioms in his theory of mass opinions. He states: “individuals answer questions by
averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them” (p49). Table 4.6 provides several examples of this. One is the large group of people indicating a “personal vote” as their motivation for voting FPÖ in 1986. The election that year came after a prolonged public struggle for leadership of the Freedom Party, after which Jörg Haider emerged as victorious. That probably made more people think about him when they answered this question, than would otherwise be the case. The “opposition support”-category varies greatly from one election year to another, which indicates a “randomness” that Zaller’s axiom explains. Yet there are some results in the table that are fairly stable over time, especially from 1990 onwards. Political protest seems by far the most important motivation for FPÖ voters, but it is not the only one. Overall, more than half the voters also mention issues or ideological considerations. A substantial number of the responses indicate a diffuse positive attitude toward the FPÖ, which falls within the category “likes the FPÖ”. In sum, I believe the evidence in table 4.6 clearly shows that most FPÖ-voters are motivated by political protest, though other factors also have an effect.

The average for these five elections indicates that as many as 79 percent of FPÖ-voters are “protest voters”. That is a surprisingly large proportion, but it is worth keeping in mind that the respondents could give as many reasons as they wanted to, and the table does not say anything about which motivation is the most important. I will proceed to look more closely at the protest voters in table 4.6 to find out if they had any other motivations for voting FPÖ. The large N in these surveys allows me to make an analysis where I select only FPÖ-voters who were motivated by protest. Table 4.7 shows the percentage of protest voters who mentioned one or several protest-reasons, and the percentage of those who also mention one or several other reasons. Hence, the table serves as a more detailed look at the group of voters represented in the first row in table 4.6.
Table 4.7 Protest voters who are only motivated by political protest, and those who have additional reasons for voting FPÖ. Percent

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only elite protest</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional reasons</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N

107 278 422 403 453 382

Source: Austrian Exit Polls

The table shows that most protest voters are motivated by other factors as well. On average, only 6 percent of them give no other reason for voting FPÖ. The collective effect of other reasons for voting FPÖ seems more important than political protest, even for the “protest voters”. Although I have no definitive proof of this, the evidence points in that direction. Elite protest may still be the most important consideration for these voters, but I find that to be unlikely. If so, I would have expected more people to be in the “elite protest only”-category. It is more likely that most FPÖ-voters share a distrust of the political elite, but that other factors are more important to their voting. The latter interpretation is more in line with the results of my previous regression analysis. Hence, it is fair to say that supporters of the Austrian Freedom Party are motivated by a desire to protest against the political elite. However, this motivation has a limited effect compared to the sum of other factors that influence voting.

Norway

The Norwegian data enables me to perform a statistical analysis along the lines of my comparative analysis of the 1990 World Values Survey data. I will use three surveys from the period I am studying, one from each election survey in 1989, 1993 and 1997. Unfortunately, none of these include a measure of “system distrust” as I have used that term. However, there is one question in the 1977 election survey that requires the respondent to rate his or her satisfaction with the “organization of Norwegian society”. It resembles the question I used in the World Values Survey. I will use the 1977-data as well, even though it falls outside my timeframe, and despite the Progress Party not

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29 That does not mean that they only gave one reason. Rather, they could have given any number of reasons, all of which I have categorized as “elite protest” (see table A.1).
gaining much support in the election. It can serve as a point of comparison with the other surveys.

I have used two questions as measures of elite distrust, which I have made into a scale from 1 to 5. Both questions use politicians in general as objects of trust or distrust. I have selected four issues from each of the surveys, in addition to the left-right scale. The questions are almost identical in the four years, except for one question about immigration that was not asked in 1977. I have decided to use a question about “guest workers” from that year instead. Table 4.8 shows the results of four regression-analyses of my model in Norway.

Table 4.8 Effect of system- and elite trust, as well as four issues and one ideology scale, on support for the Norwegian Progress Party in 1977; and the effect of elite trust and four issues and an ideology scale on Progress Party support in 1989, 1993, and 1997. Standardized regression coefficients

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System distrust</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower taxes</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry vs. Environment</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest workers</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration a threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov't control of business</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explained variance, R2: .01** .02** .03** .16** .00 .06** .02** .16**

Standard deviations:
- System trust: .60
- Elite trust: 1.19 1.28 1.28 1.24
- Lower taxes: 1.36 1.34 1.38 1.42
- Industry vs. Environment: 1.30 1.35 1.32 1.28
- Guest workers: .38
- Immigration a threat: 1.52 1.56 1.47
- Gov't control of business: 1.34 1.22 1.36 1.31
- Left-right scale: 1.65 2.02 1.93 2.15
- Dependent variable: .11 .32 .21 .31
- N: 1088 1512 1492 1607

*Significant at the 5%-level.
**Significant at the 1%-level.

Questions and coding:
- System trust (1977): “Would you say that you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at all with the way our society is organized in Norway?” Coded on a scale from 1 (=very satisfied) to 4 (=not satisfied at all).
- Elite trust (two questions): "Do you feel that most Norwegian politicians are competent, and usually know what they are doing, or do you think many of them have little knowledge in the matters they are set to deal with?" "In our country, do you feel that most politicians are trustworthy, that they are in general trustworthy, or that few of them are trustworthy?" Made into an index from 1 (=high trust) to 5 (=high distrust).
- Lower taxes and gov't control of business: "I shall now read to you a list of proposed policies that some people think should be implemented in Norway. For each of these proposals, please say if you think it is very important to implement it, quite important, if you are not concerned with the issue, if you think it is quite important not to implement it, or if you think it is very important not to implement it. Cut taxes on high incomes. Reduce government control of private
industry." Coded on a scale from 1 (=very important not to implement) 5 (=very important to implement).

Industry versus environment and immigration a threat: "Do you completely agree, agree somewhat, neither nor, disagree somewhat, or completely disagree with the following statements. We still need to develop industry in order to ensure economic growth, even if it conflicts with environmental concerns. Immigration is a serious threat to our national heritage." Coded on a scale from 1 (=completely disagree) to 5 (=completely agree).

Guest workers (1977): "People disagree about the guest workers that have come to our country. Here are some of the most common views. Please let me know which is closer to your opinion. Guest workers should not have any access to the Norwegian labor market. Guest workers should only be let into the country if there are available jobs for them. Guest workers should freely be able to settle in the country." Coded from 1 (=settle freely) to 3 (= no access).

Left-right scale: Question and scale varies somewhat. In 1977 it was worded as follows: "There is a lot of talk these days of radicalism and conservativism. Here is a scale from 1 on the right – representing those who stand on the extreme right politically - to 9 on the left – representing those who stand on the extreme left politically. Where would you place yourself on this scale?" In 1989 and 1993, the scale goes from 1 (=far left) to 10 (=far right), and in 1997, from 0 (= far left) to 10 (=far right). I have recoded the 1977-scale so that 9=far right and 1=far left. I have used the other scales as originally coded.


As table 4.8 indicates, 1977 is a deviant year in many respects. Hence, the results of that analysis cannot be directly compared to the other years. However, the data from 1977 confirms my previous findings, that system distrust has no effect on RRP-support, while elite-distrust does. None of the issue-effects are significant, and R2 remains small.

The standard deviations in table 4.8 vary somewhat between years. That is especially the case with the dependent variable. 1977 deviates, but 1993 also looks a little different. That is probably because it was a bad election for the Progress Party30, and it was an election marked by the debate over EU-membership. Aardal and Valen (1995), as well as Bjørklund and Hellevik (1993) have commented on that election’s “peculiarities”, and on how it deviates from general trends in Norwegian politics. There seems to be no effect of elite distrust on Progress Party support in 1993. Maybe that is because the anti-elitist voters opted for the anti-EU parties in that election.

Since both 1977 and 1993 are deviant years, I am left with 1989 and 1997 as my two main points of comparison. The standard deviations in table 4.8 indicate that those two years are well suited for comparison over time. The results of the two analyses confirm most of my findings from the comparative analysis. But, unlike in table 4.5, the Norwegian data shows a slight decrease in the effect of elite distrust with the inclusion of the issue-variables. Hence, some of the distrust of RRP-supporters is “specific distrust”; it stems from disagreement over political issues. Still, most of the

30 The Progress Party gained 6.3 percent of the votes. 
effect remains in the multivariate analysis, and thus, I consider this finding to support the “diffuse protest hypothesis”.

The change in R2 from the bivariate to the multivariate model resembles what I have previously found. The low R2 in the bivariate model indicates that political protest is not an important motivation for Progress Party supporters; and the increased R2 in the multivariate model means that “issues and belief systems” have a much larger effect. Hence, Progress Party voters are motivated by elite protest, but that is not what determines their voting. Substantial issues seem much more important. That is particularly true for immigration as a political issue. The effect of most of the other issues appears to be absorbed by the left-right scale\(^{31}\), which is what I would expect from such a measure of “belief systems”.

Overall, I have found the same diffuse elite protest effect over time in Norway, as I did in the comparative analysis. My means of measuring system protest were limited to one question I 1977, but the results supported what I have previously found, namely that there is no such effect on Progress Party support. However, political issues did have an effect, and more so than political protest. Hence, Progress Party voters may be “protest voters”, but substantial policy considerations are really what motivate their choices. I will now move on to Denmark, to see if the same effects are at work there.

**Denmark**

The available data from Denmark do not include any measures of system distrust, which satisfy my criteria for the variable. I will have to rely on my findings from the comparative analysis, which indicated that system distrust have no effect on support for the Danish Progress Party.

\(^{31}\) All issue variables, except “industry versus environment” in 1993, have positive significant effects on Progress Party support, in bivariate analyses. When I control for belief system in the multivariate analysis, some of these effects disappear. Still, I find it a little surprising that the “control of business”-variable in 1997 has a positive bivariate effect and a negative controlled effect, both significant. It probably has to do with the different types of voters that are attracted to the Progress Party. Some ideological conservatives may account for the positive bivariate effect, but then the ideology-scale absorbs the effect that those people have. In addition, some non-ideological, perhaps working class, voters weaken the effect in the bivariate analysis, and furthermore, account for the negative effect when ideological voters are controlled for.
I have found two measures of elite trust that I will use separately in my analyses. Both questions were asked in 1994 and 1998, while only one was part of the 1987-88-survey. The same question was also part of the 1973-survey in Denmark. I have decided to include it in my analysis as well, as a historical point of reference. 1973 was the first election for the Progress Party, and a highly successful one: they gained 15.9 percent of the votes. That makes it interesting as a comparison with the 1990s.

The 1987-88-data comes from a panel-survey that the Danish election program conducted in relation to two elections, which were some of the least successful elections for the Progress Party. Consequently, their supporters constitute a very small proportion of the respondents in the survey. So, in order to increase that proportion, I have defined Progress Party supporters as people who voted for the party in either of the two elections. I believe that will make the dependent variables more similar in each year, and thus, I will be able to compare my analyses over time.

Finally, since I have defined both the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party as “Radical Right Parties”, I will consider those who voted for either of the two parties in 1998 as RRP-supporters. I have displayed the results of my analyses in table 4.9. I have used three issue-variables and one left-right scale. Neither of them are part of the 1973-survey, so that analysis is only equivalent to the first regression in the other years.

Table 4.9 Effect of two indicators of elite trust as well as three issues and one ideology scale in support for Danish Radical Right parties in 1973, 1987-88, 1994, and 1998.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust 1</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration a threat</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry vs. environment</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punish crime</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance, R2</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.06**</td>
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</table>

** denotes p < 0.01; * denotes p < 0.05.
Table 4.9 continued

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite trust 1</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite trust 2</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration a threat</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry vs. Environment</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punish crime</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td>1670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td>1670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the 1%-level.  
**Significant at the 5%-level.  

Questions and coding:

Elite trust 1: “Do you quite agree, partly agree, neither nor, partly disagree, or quite disagree with the following statements? In general one can trust our politicians to make the right decisions for the country?” Coded on a scale from 1 (=quite agree) to 5 (=quite disagree).

Elite trust 2: “How much trust do you have in Danish politicians in general? Is it great trust, some trust, not much trust, or very little trust? Coded on a scale from 1 (=great trust) to 4 (=very little trust).

Immigration a threat, industry vs. Environment, punish crime: “Do you quite agree, partly agree, neither nor, partly disagree, or quite disagree with the following statements? Immigration constitutes a threat to our national culture. Economic growth should be secured by means of industrial build-up even though this may conflict with environmental concerns. Violent crime should be punished far stricter than it is today.” Coded on scales from 1 (=quite disagree) to 5 (=quite agree).

Left-right scale: “In politics one often talks about left and right (show card…) where would you place yourself on this scale?” The scale goes from 1 (=far left) to 10 (=far right).


The results of table 4.9 are similar to both the comparative analysis and my findings for Norway. Overall, the table shows that elite trust has a limited effect, most of which remains when I include the issues-variables. The latter has a stronger effect on RRP-support than the trust variables. Furthermore, I believe I should be able to compare the results of the three analyses from 1987 to 1998, since the standard deviations do not change much in those years.

Some deviant results in the table are worth commenting on. The 1987-88-data shows no effect of elite trust. I have no immediate explanation why, other than the fact that these were bad elections for the Progress Party. There were some similarly deviant elections in Norway, where the trust-variable had no effect. That may indicate that not only does elite trust have a weak effect on RRP-support, it may also be an unstable effect that shifts with changing times. However, the significant effect in 1973 indicates that RRP-supporters have been protest voters ever since the party's establishment.

Apparently, the left-right scale and a question about immigration are the only attitude-questions that have significant effects on RRP-support. That is not the case when I look at each issue individually; they all have significant bivariate effects on RRP-support. I assume that the left-right scale absorbs these effects. Still, the apparent
The strength of the immigration-issue, even when controlled for an overall belief system is surprising, and it reveals some of the appeal of the two Radical Right Parties in Denmark.

The general pattern in this Danish analysis is in accordance with my previous findings. RRP-supporters in Denmark express some form of "diffuse protest", directed at the political elite, and it is a significant motivation for their choice on Election Day. However, diffuse protest is not that important, compared to more "substantial" motivations, such as political issues and belief systems.

**Sweden**

New Democracy only participated in the one election in Sweden, in 1991. Thus, I will only perform one regression analysis on Swedish data. I have previously argued that New Democracy is part of a larger "family" of Radical Right Parties, which makes just one election interesting in a comparative perspective. My analysis of the 1991-election should be seen as one of a larger group of elections with Radical Right Parties.

There are no questions that measure system trust in the Swedish election survey of 1991. This is unfortunate, because this is the only survey where I can analyze New Democracy voters. As previously mentioned the 1990 WVS did not measure support for New Democracy, since the survey was conducted prior to the formation of the party. However, I believe my previous analyses of the other three countries strongly indicate that system distrust has no effect on RRP-support. I will assume that is the case for New Democracy as well.

Table 4.10 displays the results of my analysis of the Swedish data. I have used one question to measure elite trust, as well as three issue-questions, and the by now well-known left-right scale.
Table 4.10 Impact of elite distrust separately, and in combination with three issue questions, and one ideology-scale, on support for New Democracy, in the 1991 Swedish election. Standardized regression coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>.16**</th>
<th>.13**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment versus growth</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce government influence over business</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td></td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance, R2</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.06**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard deviations:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment versus growth</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower immigration</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce government influence over business</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1859</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the 5%-level
** Significant at the 1%-level.

Questions and coding: “Generally speaking, how much do you trust Swedish politicians? Do you trust them a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or not at all?” Coded on a scale from 1= “a great deal” to 4= “not at all”.

“On this card are listed some suggestions for possible future societies that some people want us to pursue here in Sweden. I would like to hear what you think of these suggestions. Please answer according to this [10-point] scale. A high number on the scale means that you like the suggestion, a low number means that you dislike it. What do you think about the suggestion that we should pursue an environmentally friendly society, even if that leads to low or no economic growth?” Re-coded, so that 0= a very good suggestion, and 10= a very bad suggestion.

“I will now read you some things that different people want to implement in Sweden. For each suggestion, could you please tell me if you think it is a very good suggestion, a fairly good suggestion, neither a good nor a bad suggestion, a fairly bad suggestion, or a very bad suggestion? Accept fewer immigrants to Sweden; reduce the government’s influence over private business”. Both are coded on a scale from 1= very bad suggestion, to 5= very good suggestion.

“Sometimes we imagine the parties ordered according to their position on a scale from left to right. On this card is a scale from 0 [=left] to 10 [=right]. Where would you place yourself on this scale?” Coded from 0 to 10.

Source: Swedish Election Program 1991

The results in table 4.10 are similar to what I have found in the previous analyses. Elite trust has a significant effect that remains almost unchanged when I control for the attitude-variables. The "diffuse protest hypothesis" is confirmed once again; as is my observation that protest is a significant, yet relatively unimportant motivation for RRP voters. An R2 of only .03 indicates that other factors, besides protest, are more important for New Democracy voters. However, I have only captured some of the other factors with the four attitude-questions. An R2 of .06 in the multivariate analysis is not very impressive either.
Surprisingly, the left-right scale does not appear to have an effect, while all the specific issue-questions are significant in the analysis. The left-right scale actually had a significant, albeit weak, bivariate effect that disappeared when controlled for other variables. That is the opposite of what happened in the other analyses, where the scale appeared to absorb the effect of some of the individual issues. This finding may indicate that New Democracy was more of a "populist" party than the other parties I have analyzed, in the sense that it gained most of its support from popular stances on specific issues rather than from an overall view of politics.

In sum, I believe my analysis of the Swedish data confirms what I found in the other countries. New Democracy voters protested against the political elite, but that was only a minor part of their motivation on Election Day. Political issues were probably more important than protest, but they were not motivated by a general belief system. The last observation makes the Swedish voters a little different from the other RRP-voters I have studied in this chapter.

*A Summary of the Multivariate Analysis*

Before I continue my discussion, I will summarize my findings. It looks as if Radical Right Party voters distrust the political elite, and are motivated by distrust when they vote. That makes them "protest voters" according to my definition of the term. However, they are not protest voters in the sense that they distrust the political system. Rather, they are as supporting of their country's political system as voters for other parties are.

Furthermore, I have found strong support for the "diffuse protest hypothesis". That is, RRP voters do not protest against some specific policy or another; they are generally skeptical of the political elite irrespective of political issues. These voters’ “diffuse protest” may mean that they express a deep-rooted, and perhaps, long lasting distrust. My analysis of country-specific data seemed to indicate that, since the effect of distrust remained fairly stable over time. However, I have also found that elite distrust is relatively unimportant for RRP voters' choices on Election Day. They are mostly motivated by their attitudes and belief-systems. Hence, even though I have
confirmed one of the protest-hypotheses, any conclusions based on that should be strongly modified. RRP voters should not be seen as "protest only voters".

Since I have not found an explanation for the significant, albeit weak effect of political protest, I find my conclusions to be less than satisfactory. The diffuse protest hypothesis is just that: diffuse. Thus, I will explore my findings further by looking at other groups of political parties to see if there are similar or different effects at work among their voters. I hope such an analysis will shed some light on what I have found so far.

Protest or Opposition Voting?
In addition to being similar political parties, the Radical Right Parties I have looked at had one thing in common in the timeframe of my analysis: they were opposition parties. Neither of them took part in the formation of any of these countries' governments. FPÖ participated in one governing coalition in the early 1980s and are now part of another coalition. However, since my analysis of Austrian data spanned from 1986 to 1999, I did not capture any of those periods.

My analysis indicated that RRP-voters distrust the political elite to some extent. The people in government are part of the political elite, which makes it possible that RRP-voters’ distrust is directed at them. The protest effect that I found in my analysis may not be the result of any unique characteristics of RRP-supporters; rather, distrust could be a shared attitude among all opposition party voters. I will try to test that hypothesis in the remaining part of this chapter, by looking at other “families” of political parties. I will start by looking at a group of parties that are at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum compared to RRPs, namely Left Libertarian Parties.

Left Libertarian Parties
The term “left libertarian” comes from Kitshelt (1997), and refers to New Left Parties or Green Parties. All of the four countries I am studying have a party like that. Austria and Sweden have Green Parties, while Denmark and Norway have the “Socialist People’s Party”, and the “Socialist Left Party”, respectively. None of these parties have participated in governing coalitions. They are, like the Radical Right Parties,
"permanent" opposition parties. But they are also ideological opposites of RRPs, and I expect that to be reflected in an analysis of their voters. The issues and belief systems of Left Libertarian voters should have the opposite effect of what they did in my analysis of RRP-voters. The same may or may not be true of the trust-variables. Table 4.11 shows the results of my analysis on the 1990 World Values Survey data. I have performed the same analysis as in table 4.5, with “support for a Left Libertarian party” as the dependent variable.

Table 4.11 Impact of system- and elite distrust, as well as three issues and one ideology-scale, on support for the Left Libertarian Parties of Austria, Norway, and Denmark in 1990. Standardized regression coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria (Greens)</th>
<th>Norway (Socialist Left)</th>
<th>Denmark (Socialist People)</th>
<th>Sweden (Greens)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System distrust</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes vs. Environment</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs to immigrants</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business ownership</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
<td>-.33**</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance, R²</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.01*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                           | .06**            | .15**                   | .01**                     | .23**           |
| System distrust           | .14              | .15                     | .12                       | .23             |
| Elite distrust            | 1.31             | 1.17                    | 1.23                      | 1.36            |
| Taxes vs. Environment     | .97              | .86                     | .87                       | .99             |
| Jobs to immigrants        | .76              | .96                     | .94                       | .93             |
| Business ownership        | 2.15             | 2.05                    | 2.20                      | 2.15            |
| Left-right scale          | 1.73             | 2.04                    | 1.90                      | 2.10            |
| Dependent variable, sd.   | 2.8              | 3.4                     | 3.8                       | 2.9             |
| N                         | 1064             | 1182                    | 1195                      | 1107            |

* Significant at the 5%-level.
** Significant at the 1%-level.

For questions and coding see table 4.5.

First of all, the issues and belief-system variables have the opposite effects in table 4.11 from my analyses of RRP-supporters (table 4.5). This is not surprising; it confirms the idea that the two groups of political parties are diametrical opposites. What is surprising is the apparent effect of political protest in table 4.11. There is hardly any system protest effect, but the elite variable is significant and positive in each case. Furthermore, the effect of elite distrust hardly changes when I control for
issue-variables. That means that Left Libertarian voters express diffuse political protest, directed at the political elite. I found the same phenomenon among RRP-supporters.

My analysis of Left Libertarian Parties supports the idea that elite protest is related to opposition voting. Despite the fact that Left Libertarian voters disagree with RRP-voters on most issues, they seem to express the same type of political protest, which they direct at the elite. This commonality can be explained by some other characteristics that these voters have in common, most notably their age. Left Libertarian and Radical Right Parties have, at least in parts of their histories, had significantly younger electorates than other parties. Young people may be more skeptical of elites and authorities, which would account for a protest effect in my analyses. That appears not to be the case. I have performed a separate analysis, in which I controlled for age, and that did not change the effect of protest either for RRP-support or support for Left Libertarian Parties. Hence, I have found support for the hypothesis that elite protest is related to opposition voting. I will continue my exploration by looking at Social Democratic parties.

Social Democratic Parties

Social Democratic parties, or Labor parties as they are sometimes called, have been the major governing parties in the four countries in my study, in the post-WWII years. That is especially the case in Scandinavia, and more so in Sweden than in any other country. SPÖ in Austria has been in government more than any other party since World War II, although it has usually shared the position with ÖVP. In sum, these Social Democratic parties are symbols of position and power, unlike the Radical Right or Left Libertarian Parties. If my hypothesis that protest stems from opposition voting

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32 The effect actually increases in Norway and Sweden, which suggests that some of the issue-attitudes of these voters predispose them to hold trusting views of the elite. Hence, when issues are controlled for, the opposition-motivated distrust becomes clearer.

33 The Danish Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party deviates from that pattern in recent history; the elderly are now somewhat over-represented among their voters (Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2001).

34 I did multivariate analyses like those in tables 4.5 and 4.11, with age as an additional independent variable. It had a negative effect on support for both Radical Right and Left Libertarian parties. But this statistical control did not change the effect of the trust-variables in any substantial way. The standard regression coefficients of the elite distrust variable were as follows in the controlled analysis, for RRPs: Austria .10, Norway .14, and
is accurate, I should find the opposite effect at work with the Social Democratic Parties’ voters. I do not have a good word for it, but it would be a kind of “approval-effect” toward the political elite. I expect the effects of the issue-variables to vary somewhat between countries, but they should primarily have negative effects, indicating a left-wing view. Table 4.12 shows the result of my analysis, with “support for a Social Democratic Party” as the dependent variable.

Table 4.12 Impact of system- and elite distrust, as well as three issues and one ideology-scale, on support for the Social Democratic Parties of Austria, Norway, and Denmark, in 1990. Standardized regression coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria (SPÖ)</th>
<th>Norway (Labor)</th>
<th>Denmark (Social Dems.)</th>
<th>Sweden (Social Dems.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System distrust</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes vs. Environment</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs to immigrants</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business ownership</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>.04**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable, sd. .50 .48 .47 .45

* Significant at the 5%-level.
** Significant at the 1%-level.

For questions, coding, standard deviations of the independent variables, and N, see tables 4.5 and 4.11.

The effects of the elite trust variable generally confirms my expectation. There is a negative effect of distrust, or to avoid double negatives: a positive effect of trust. The effect is weakest in Austria, and it disappears when I control for the issues-variables. The effect appears to be strongest in Sweden, with Denmark and Norway somewhere in between. This order of the approval effects corresponds fairly well with the degree of “dominance” that these parties have in their respective countries. It looks like the party that has been longest in government (the Swedish Social Democratic Party) elicits the strongest approval effect of their voters. Thus, I have found additional support for the idea that protest/approval relates to opposition/position voting.

Denmark .12. For Left Libertarian Parties: Austria .11, Norway .12, Denmark .09, and Sweden .09. All effects were significant at the 1%-level.

35 I am able to make this comparison because the standard deviations in this analysis are very similar.
There are some interesting effects of the issue-variables in table 4.12. Most are negative, which confirm that Social Democratic voters hold leftwing views; but there are also some positive effects, indicating rightwing views. The latter is evident in both Norway and Denmark on the question about taxes and environment, as well as on immigration. Swedish social democratic voters are also “rightwing” in their views of immigration. When it comes to the other distrust variable, i.e. system distrust, there is one interesting result in the table. It appears Social Democratic voters in Sweden are motivated by a positive attitude toward the political system (there is a negative effect of distrust). There is no such effect in the other countries. My findings in table 4.3 indicated that the two levels of trust were more closely correlated in Sweden than in the other countries. That may account for the effect, although the correlation in itself is not a satisfactory explanation. The dominant position of the Social Democratic party in Sweden can provide a further explanation. The party may have been in government for so long that voters identify it as part of the political system itself. I am not in a position to make a final conclusion in this respect, beyond these initial suggestions. However, I do not believe that this Swedish abnormality has any bearing on my conclusion that there is an approval effect associated with support for the Social Democratic parties in these countries. I will now turn to Conservative parties to see what effects are at work among their voters.

Conservative Parties

Conservative Party voters probably share some of the attitudes and opinions of voters on the Radical Right, but I expect them to be different in terms of political protest. Conservative parties have been in government in all four countries at various times in their recent histories. The Austrian ÖVP, for instance, has taken part in several governing coalitions since the Second World War. The party has shared government control with SPÖ for most of the post-war years, and is identified as a “governing party”. Hence, I expect ÖVP voters to express approval of the political elite.
The conservative parties in Scandinavia have a less dominant position, although they have all been in government at some point in their history. The Danish and Norwegian parties took part in several government formations in the 1980s. I expect that to be reflected in conservative voters’ attitudes toward the political elite in the 1991 World Values Survey. The Swedish Conservative Party was in a different position in 1991. It had gone through a long period of opposition, through most of the 1980s. Although they got into government in 1991, that was after the election, and after the WVS-data was collected. Hence, I do not expect Swedish conservative voters to express approval of the political elite in my analysis. Table 4.12 shows the result of an analysis of Conservative Party voters in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden.

Table 4.13 Impact of system- and elite distrust, as well as three issues and one ideology-scale, on support for Conservative parties in Austria, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, in 1990. Standardized regression coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria (ÖVP)</th>
<th>Norway (Conservatives)</th>
<th>Denmark (Cons. / Liberals)</th>
<th>Sweden (Conservatives)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System distrust</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite distrust</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes vs. Environment</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs to immigrants</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business ownership</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance, R2</td>
<td>.01*</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.01*</td>
<td>.02**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable, sd. .47 .46 .45 .43

* Significant at the 5%-level.
** Significant at the 1%-level.

For questions, coding, standard deviations of the independent variables, and N, see tables 4.5 and 4.11.

The evidence in the table confirms my main expectations. Conservative voters in Austria, Norway and Denmark express an approval of the political elite, like Labor party supporters. There is no such effect in Sweden; instead, conservatives in that country express disapproval of the elite. Generally, conservative voters are supportive of the elite, when “their” party is or has recently been in government. If,

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36 I consider both the Liberal and the Conservative parties in Denmark to be conservative parties. Support for either of these parties will be the dependent variable in my statistical analysis in table 4.13.

37 Conservative Party supporters in Sweden actually express what I have previously called “specific distrust”. The protest effect disappears when I include the issue variables, which means that the protest stems from those very issues. Hence, these voters distrust the elite because of policy-disagreements.
like in Sweden in 1991, a few years have passed since the last conservative
government, these voters get increasingly hostile toward the elite. I consider this
finding to be strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that political protest is related
to governing positions.

I have now analyzed four different families of political parties in Austria,
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. I believe I have found a general explanation for
“protest voting” and “approval voting” that is valid irrespective of political parties.
Radical Right Party voters are not unique because they express disapproval of the
political elite. Rather, their attitudes confirm a general pattern that is directly related to
voting for an opposition party.

Conclusion
I have looked at protest voting and political distrust from a number of angles in this
chapter. I have found, first of all, that Radical Right Party voters are motivated by a
“diffuse” protest against the political elite. That finding serves to confirm the
arguments from parts of the literature on RRPs, which stress protest as an important
motivation for RRP-supporters. However, this is in many ways a misleading
observation, and it is highly insufficient as an explanation of RRP-support.

RRP-voters do not express distrust or opposition against the political system in
any of the countries I have looked at. Their distrust is solely directed at the elite, i.e.
politicians or people in government. RRP-supporters share a distrusting attitude with
other opposition party voters. In fact, I have no reason to believe that political distrust
is in any way unique to RRPs. The results of my analysis indicate that opposition party
voters generally distrust the elite, while voters of parties in government express
approval of the elite.

Although I have established a relationship between position/opposition voting
and trust/distrust, I have some doubts as to the causal relationship between these
variables. I have assumed that political protest leads to support for one political party
or another (see figures 1.1 or 1.2). That assumption may be accurate if people who
distrust the elite generally choose opposition parties. However, it may be that
supporting a party that is unable to access executive positions is so frustrating that you
end up distrusting the people in power. If so, the causal arrow should point in the opposite direction: from RRP support to the distrust variables (see figure 1.2). I will not explore this question further; suffice to say that both processes are probably at work.

Finally, I will point out an observation that easily gets lost in an extensive discussion of political protest, namely that distrust is not a very important motivation for opposition party voters. It is present among opposition party voters, but they are to a much greater extent motivated by substantial policies and beliefs.

Now that I have answered my research questions and explored the relevant hypotheses, I will move on to discuss some of the consequences of my findings in the fifth and final chapter. I believe there are some lessons to be learned from my findings, and I will express some of my thoughts in that respect.
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

Radical Right Party supporters in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden are no threat to the political systems of their countries. Their attitudes towards the political system do not deviate significantly from those of other voters. My analyses have confirmed and re-confirmed this finding throughout the previous chapter. I have not tried to reach any conclusions about the nature of the parties themselves; rather, I have focused on their voters. However, I believe this finding should ignite some skepticism about assertions to the effect that RRP s are a threat to the political systems of their countries. If RRP supporters do not express anti-system attitudes, the political parties they support may not be “anti system” either.

Generally, I have found that the RRP-supporters’ attitudes of trust or distrust are consistent with their status as “opposition voters”. Like other voters who support parties that have not taken part in government formations for some time, they are skeptical or critical of the political elite. I also found that supporters of “governing parties”, i.e. parties that have recently taken part in government formations, were supportive of the political elite. Based on these findings, I find it reasonable to conclude that voters identify the “political elite” as the people in government. The fact that opposition voters do not trust the people in government does not seem like much of a sensational finding. That is why I will discuss some implications of my findings in this chapter, to find out if they are just a confirmation of what we already know, or if there are some lesions to be learned from my analysis.

One of Robert Putnam’s (1976) advices to social scientists is a good starting point for this discussion. He argues: “the most important question to ask about any finding of social science is ‘so what?’” (p41). In other words: what does the finding mean in a larger context? Does it have any substantial implications for our understanding of politics and society? I will pose these questions to myself in the present chapter, as I look at my findings in a broader context than I have done thus far.

As I pointed out in chapter one, RRP-supporters have been subject to criticisms and condemnations because of their distrust of the elite. I will now look at these criticisms and try to analyze their basis, in light of my findings. I will divide my discussion into two sections, the first of which deals with citizenship norms and
democratic ideals, and the extent to which RRP-supporters conform to such norms. In the second, and relatively brief section, I will suggest that critics of RRPBs are politically biased against these parties. The critics’ bias may have led to some exaggerated denunciations of voters on the Radical Right.

**Democracy and Citizenship**

There has been an ongoing debate about the role of citizens in democracy, ever since the birth of political theory. I will not delve into all aspects of the debate, but rather focus on what I have found to be a predominant view among political scientists since the Second World War. The views I will outline here constitute an important basis for the critique of RRP-supporters. I will look at two examples of a much larger body of work that came about in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. This was a period when the future of democracy was an important subject for debate among political scientists. Several researchers of the time used the new tools of social research to test the democratic ideals against the workings of actual democracies (see e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Converse 1964; Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975; Lane 1959). The scholars found reasons for optimism as well as pessimism on behalf of democracy, and some developed new theories that they adjusted to their findings. One famous such work is Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s “The Civic Culture” from 1963. It has both normative and descriptive aspects that relate to the role of citizens. A second and more explicitly normative work that I will use is Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki’s “The Crisis of Democracy” (1975). Both works represent similar and generally accepted views on democracy and citizenship. I will proceed to offer a mild critique of these views, based on my findings in this dissertation.

Almond and Verba describe the “Civic Culture” both as part of stable democracies and as a normative ideal for democratic countries. The “culture” has numerous facets, one of which relates to trust or “support” for political authorities. Almond and Verba argues that citizens who are able to participate in democracy will be “more satisfied with the decisions, and will be more attached to the system than those who cannot participate” (p191). This should be equally true for those who agree and for those who disagree with the government’s decisions. The British and
American populations hold democratic attitudes in this respect, since “participation in politics in these two nations is linked with both affective orientation to the political system and specific pragmatic expectations of the system” (p204). Still, Almond and Verba concede that their view of citizenship is somewhat inconsistent, because citizens are both subjects to, and the source of the government’s authority. To keep a balance between the two aspects, citizens must have an exaggerated belief in their own ability to influence decisions. When citizens believe strongly in their abilities in this respect, they will remain supportive of political authorities, which what secures democracy (p346).

Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki use similar arguments about the role of citizens in their discussion of the “Crisis of Democracy” (1975). They have a pessimistic view of the future of democracy, in part because so many citizens fail to live up to the ideals outlined by Almond and Verba. The decline in political trust in the mid-1970s, led to a “delegitimation of authority”, in Crozier et al’s view. Whenever that happens, political leaders will be unable to exercise their power and the system fails to function like it should (pp. 162-163). They particularly emphasize the threat from parties of the Radical Left or Right who thrive on the trend toward delegitimation. Crozier et al argued that democratic and egalitarian attitudes were the reason for increased distrust and lack of support for authorities. Hence, they warn against an “excess of democracy” which would only add fuel to these flames. Their prescription is rather a “greater degree of moderation in democracy” (113).

Crozier et al’s negative view of democracy seems particularly relevant for the attitudes of opposition voters I have found in my analysis. These voters do not trust the authorities, and they are not satisfied with their own lack of influence. Hence, they may represent, in Crozier et al’s words, an “intrinsic challenge to democracy”. I believe most of the criticism of RRP-supporters from political scientists and others is based on this view. The critics see distrust as a negative “defect” of democracy, which is present among RRP-supporters, in particular (Knight 1992; Morrow 2000; Nielsen 1976; Riedlsperger 1998). I will argue in favor of a different, and more optimistic view of democracy and political distrust.
I have found that opposition party voters in Scandinavia and Austria protest against the political elite, but they are also supportive of the political systems in their countries. I believe the combination of those two attitudes is consistent with democratic principles, and it is in no way threatening our systems of government. The political systems of democratic countries function through an organized struggle for power, between “opposition” and “position” parties. I can see no reason why democracy is harmed by feelings of hostility between opposing political camps, as long as everyone accept the rules of the system.

Furthermore, I do not believe distrust toward the elite leads to a “delegitimation of authority”, as Crozier et al suggested. In my analysis, I tried to distinguish the voters who support a political party that is or has recently been in government, from those who support parties that have been in opposition for some time. I found that these two groups of voters express markedly different levels of political trust. The first group expressed approval of the political elite, while the latter group consists of protest voters. Presumably, governments derive most of their legitimacy from the support of their own voters, and they are the same people who support political authorities. When governments change for a prolonged period of time, I observed a corresponding shift in who supports political authorities. I do not believe that the process of trust versus distrust and position versus opposition is threatening to political authorities. I see it as a natural continuation of the struggle for political power, which is part of every democracy.

Finally, I will argue against what I will call the “diffuse rationalism” that is prevalent both in the theoretical writings I have referred to above, and in the general critique of RRP-supporters. This view is so well known and generally accepted, that writers often do not mention it directly. They argue that a well-functioning democracy depends on citizens who are rational, and who make informed decisions on Election Day. The ideal voter is a person who carefully weighs the policies and ideologies of one party against the others to make his or her decision. The “rational” view of citizenship in democracy corresponds to the “liberal” or “progressive” view of politics, which is predominant in most public debates of these types of issues (Schudson 1998).
I do not believe these views should be “blindly” accepted. For one thing, any “non-rational” considerations by voters are alien to these views, and maybe even a threat to democracy. Political distrust is such a potential threat.

The foremost exponents of a rational and substantive political debate are highly educated people, especially academics and political commentators. They are also the first to condemn any deviations from the rational ideal by voters or politicians. I do not believe that the political debate or politics in general should have to conform to the ideals of this elite-group. Since politics is important and concerns every citizen, it should play out in a way that allows everyone to participate. That means allowing for passion and emotion to play a part in the debate, as well as technocratic or rational arguments. Furthermore, passion has always been a part of politics; it is not new to political life. Academics, and especially political scientists can often be heard to defend party politics as the best way to organize democracy, but they seem to dislike the passion and emotion that has always been part of partisan politics. Political distrust and anti-establishment protest are a part of the same tradition (see e.g. McGerr 1986). As long as these attitudes do not threaten the democratic system, which I have found they do not, they should not be condemned. In fact, those who want greater engagement and participation in politics might do well to appeal to these and similar attitudes (Schudson 1994).

To sum up: we should not worry too much about political distrust, as long as it is only directed at the political elite. I see distrust as a healthy sign, or an indication of a critical populace that does not blindly support political authorities. We should not expect opposition party voters to trust the people and parties in power; nor should we expect them to limit themselves to a strictly policy-oriented or ideological critique of the elite. Their emotionally charged and partisan expression of political distrust is also a part of democracy.

**Indecent Political Attitudes**

I want to add one more point to my discussion. I have found that all opposition party supporters express political protest, and I have now argued against the view that their attitudes are threatening to democracy. However, I have not explained why Radical
Right Party supporters have been the focus of most of this type of critique. In other words, why do some commentators and pundits criticize RRP-voters only, when all opposition party supporters express political distrust?

I think the policies of Radical Right Parties and the views of their supporters can explain some of the criticism directed at them. In the public debate, the word “indecent” is often used in regard to RRPs. Commentators, pundits and others see some of the views of these parties as less than acceptable for public debate. This is especially the case in debates on immigration and racial issues, where RRPs are seen as at least borderline racist. I agree with some of the criticism of RRPs, but I do not believe their policies are directly related to political distrust. In fact, my analysis indicated that the political distrust of RRP-voters is unrelated to specific issues or attitudes; it is a “diffuse” political distrust. So, protest voting and possible indecent attitudes are separate issues and should be analyzed as such. The critics of these parties ought not to use political disagreements as an ulterior motive when they decry protest voting as a threat from the Radical Right. I have found that most opposition party voters are motivated by political protest. I see no reason why protest is especially threatening when it occurs on the Radical Right.

Two Lessons

I have discussed some of the implications of my findings in this chapter. I think my analysis served to refute some established perceptions about RRPs and their voters. Whenever you find reasons to change established perceptions, there are usually lessons to be learned for future research. The first lesson I draw from my discussion is that some oft-used and well-known citizenship norms should not be applied blindly to political science research. The ideal of the informed and always rational citizen is not entirely applicable to modern political life (if it ever was), yet democracy is not threatened by the failure of that ideal. Voters may be passionate, irrational, and less than well informed, without that having a negative effect on democracy. Shudson (1994) and others have written extensively on the subject, and I believe my findings support their argument in favor of a revised and updated ideal of democratic citizenship.
The second lesson I have learned is that political biases can occur in unexpected places. I have suggested that intellectuals and academics are no friends of Radical Right Parties, and that their attitudes have influenced political science research. Their dislike of RRP[s may be justifiable, but they should not extend their bias to condemning protest voting on the Radical Right. That only serves to undermine their cause.
APPENDIX

Figure A.1 Asylum rejections per 1000 inhabitants in Austria, Norway, Denmark*, and Sweden, from 1980 to 1999


* There are no Danish data from 1988 to 1995.
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<td>Protest, dissatisfaction</td>
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<td>To weaken the large parties</td>
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<td>Commitment to clean politics and removal of privilege</td>
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<td>To give both main parties something to think about</td>
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<td>Exposure of corruption and scandals</td>
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<td>Privileges / nepotistic system</td>
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<td>Scandals / corruption in other parties</td>
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<td>Warning to the main parties</td>
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<td>Warning to the SPÖ</td>
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<td>Warning to the ÖVP</td>
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<td>FPÖ truly fights against scandals and privileges</td>
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<td>Against wastefulness</td>
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<td>Scandals, privilege, party accounts economy</td>
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<td>Uncovering political disgrace</td>
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<td>AK-scandal</td>
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<td>Warning, protest</td>
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<td>Disapproval of other parties, large parties in general</td>
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<td>Pike in the carp pond</td>
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<td>Basic national tendency of FPÖ</td>
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<td>Basic liberal tendency of FPÖ</td>
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<td>Give nationalists voice again</td>
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<td>Immigrant policy</td>
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<td>Best program</td>
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<td>Conviction</td>
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<td>National awareness</td>
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<td>Abolition of compulsory membership</td>
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<td>Single issues</td>
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<td>FPÖ has the right policy on immigration</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>Party program</td>
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<td>In agreement with opinions / good policy generally</td>
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<td>Immigration policy, anti-immigrant</td>
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<td>Law and order</td>
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<td>Against the EU</td>
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<td>Other policy themes</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>Program, line, conviction</td>
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<td>Immigrant questions</td>
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<td>Taxes, saving, economy</td>
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<td>EU problem, rural economy</td>
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<td>Commitment on other themes, social groups</td>
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### 3: Opposition support

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<td><strong>To</strong> strengthen the parliamentary opposition</td>
<td><strong>Give a chance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Opposition, control, power-balance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Opposition, control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Breath of fresh air / change</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Hope to change things through the FPÖ</strong></td>
<td><strong>Breath of fresh air</strong></td>
<td><strong>Critical of SPÖ</strong></td>
<td><strong>Change of power, FPÖ in government</strong></td>
<td><strong>FPÖ into government</strong></td>
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<td><strong>To give the FPÖ a chance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strengthen the opposition role</strong></td>
<td><strong>Critical of ÖVP</strong></td>
<td><strong>Good opposition party</strong></td>
<td><strong>Good opposition party</strong></td>
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<td><strong>To bring a breath of fresh air into Parliament</strong></td>
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### 4: Personal vote

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<tr>
<td><strong>Jörg Haider</strong></td>
<td><strong>Jörg Haider’s personality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Haider’s arguments</strong></td>
<td><strong>Haider says what people think</strong></td>
<td><strong>Haider</strong></td>
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<td>Helmut Krünes generally</td>
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<td>Other FPÖ politicians</td>
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### 5: Likes the FPÖ

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<td><strong>Party membership</strong></td>
<td><strong>Few / no scandals in the FPÖ</strong></td>
<td><strong>Family tradition / regular voter / member</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Family) tradition, regular voter, member</strong></td>
<td><strong>Family tradition, regular voter</strong></td>
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<td>Regular voter</td>
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<td>Represents my interests</td>
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<td>It’s a tradition to vote FPÖ for me</td>
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<td><strong>Regular voter / tradition</strong></td>
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<td>6: Residual category</td>
<td>Lack of other parties that could vote for Compared to the other parties, the FPÖ is the least of all evils Other reasons (Coalition-) proved party</td>
<td>Private reasons Only party that one can vote for Other responses Compared to other parties FPÖ is least of all evils</td>
<td>Good, better, only party Other responses Compared to other parties FPÖ is the least of all evils (7)</td>
<td>Lesser evil Other reasons No response</td>
<td>Tactical voting Lesser evil Don’t know No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LITERATURE


Goul Andersen, Jørgen and Tor Bjørklund (2001): "Anti-Immigration Parties in Denmark and Norway: The Progress Parties and the Danish People's Party", in Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patric Hossay (eds.) *Shadows over Europe*:


