The World Bank and Development

-Determining the Bank’s Approach to Development and Poverty Reduction in Three African Countries

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Acknowledgements

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Vital to the whole process has of course been my advisor at the Department of Political Science, Karin Dokken. Thank you very much for all input, and for guiding me when my creativity has conquered my sensibility.

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Many thanks obviously to my parents and Aleksander and Andreas for unconditional support and advice during this time, and for the necessary ‘encouragements’ when needed!

Last, but not least: Thanks for your patience, Hege!
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department For International Development</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP-ERS</td>
<td>Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION AND THEME

The debate of what is the “right” kind of aid and development assistance has taken several turns the last couple of decades. The question of what “development is” has been equally disputed. The variations of the correct path to development, therefore, seem as numerous as the many different regions of concern, and the many different institutions that construct these paths. Among the most important development institutions in the international community, we find the Bretton Woods-institutions, The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, most of the debate about international development today, especially the poorest countries, evolves around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals, set by the UN, aim at reduce world poverty by a half by 2015, including such indicators of poverty as child mortality, HIV/AIDS and literacy. With the trend shifting from technical assistance and emergency aid a few decades ago, via Structural Adjustment in the 80s, the focus is now on reaching the individual to positively influence the named indicators of poverty. The international institutions’ tools for building sustainable development have changed.

This dissertation will explore the World Bank’s (in the text usually referred to as ‘the Bank) approach to development in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank has been a major player in the field of international development and reconstruction, its first ever task was to lend money for France for post-World War II-reconstruction (www.worldbank.orgA ). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been subject to heavy debate throughout the last decade or so, most notably for the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) that was implemented in many developing countries by the two institutions. The SAPs were ‘packages’ for development aimed at building mainly an economic environment for development. With these

A – from the World Bank History Archives [online]. For full reference see the Literature on page 88.
programmes, the World Bank and IMF moved from financing specific projects in developing countries to financing the country’s economy as a whole. At the end of the 1980s however, the SAPs became more and more criticised. The programmes were said to create too great social costs for the people of the countries involved. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa for instance, stated that “The overall assessment of orthodox programmes has led to the conclusion that, although these programmes aim at restoring growth, (...) these objectives cannot be achieved without addressing the fundamental structural bottlenecks of African economies.” (Skogly 2000:33). In it lies the idea that structural, institutional, infrastructural and political conditions must be improved and, especially, prioritised by the authorities. The effectiveness, accountability and predictability of these are given increased focus. Thus, the beginning of the 1990s saw the emergence of what has been referred to as the good governance-agenda, most famous is the publication “Governance and Development” (World Bank 1992). The agenda has consisted of a number of different policies towards strengthening a developing country’s system of governance. Today, the World Bank defines ‘governance’ in terms of development in the following way:

*We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.*

([www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/about.html#approach](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/about.html#approach))

The dissertation will explore the World Bank’s programmes for assistance in Africa south of Sahara. More specifically, it will look at what makes that part of the world special concerning choice of development-path by looking at the Bank’s programme
for assistance in three countries. To be able to draw conclusions about the Bank’s work in sub-Saharan Africa, I will use selected theory on Economic growth, Structural capacity, Social capacity, and on African politics. These four Approaches, as they will be called, represent possible paths to development each with its own main focus. Using these Approaches gives us the chance to answer the following research question:

**To what extent are the World Bank’s country assistance strategies in sub-Saharan Africa shaped by the continent’s distinctive political reality and legacy?**

Do the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategies coincide with the nature of African politics? I will search the Country Assistance Strategy papers for their dominant path to development to see whether or not the Bank is focused on the local challenges found in the African countries (the Approach referred to as the African Uniqueness Approach). What I refer to as ‘the continent’s distinctive political reality and legacy’, or ‘local challenges’, will be shown through the African Uniqueness-Approach. It is thus a constructed pattern to be matched against the Bank’s assistance strategies. The assistance strategies are given through the Country Assistance Strategies, documents which are official reports from the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation to the Bank’s executive directors.

A further description of the Bank’s policies, i.e. the documents used in the analysis will follow in chapter 1.3, after a run-through of the methodology used.

I have chosen three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as my case studies: Chad, Kenya and Zambia. The reason I have chosen these countries, is primarily their relatively equal status of development and geographical prerequisites. The United Nations Development Programme ranks them among the 30 less developed countries in the world on the Human Development Index (www.undp.org[^1]), and they are situated in the same region in Africa south of the Sahara. I could have chosen other countries in

[^1]: For full reference see Literature on page 88.
the same region without facing serious risks in the research, but I have also taken into account the fact that the Country Assistance Strategies for these three countries are quite new (from 2003 and 2004) and that they are all results-based in their approach, meaning that they focus on future outcomes over a period of time rather than evaluation of past programmes.

The theory is meant to be used on the Country specific policies of the Bank. It is through these cases of study that I expect to find elements that, put together, can be generalised to show a real development approach by the Bank in the region. The theory relevant to concepts of good governance and international development are vast, it includes theory of democracy and democratisation, economic growth and modernisation, international institutions and much more. I have chosen to differ between growth and development in the different parts of African society. The theory- chapter is divided in four: “The Growth-approach”, “The Structural Capacity-approach”, “The Social Capacity-approach”, and the “African Uniqueness-approach”. The reason for this is mainly that different authors/schools have focused on different paths to development. It seems for instance normal in a debate about development to focus on either economic growth or the growth and development of institutions/structures, or vice versa. Having gone through many of the annual reports of the Bank, the World Development Reports, I have also come to realise that this is also a fact in the Bank. Either a report focuses on macroeconomic tools for development (very much so regarding the Structural Adjustment Programmes), or it focuses on ‘meeting the basic services of the poor’ (e.g. in the 2004-report), or it focuses on a pure structural problem as in the 1997-report, where ‘the role of the state’ is the issue. These are some of the reasons why I have chosen to relate the specific themes of the CAS-reports to different development-spheres in theory. My task is basically to find a common theme in the theoretic approaches, and see if these are present in the CASes for my three countries of study, to thereby be able to see which approach is the most dominant.
So, what is it I expect to find? With the research question and the African Uniqueness-approach as a point of departure, I expect to find the dominant theoretic Approach, and determine the possible presence of the African Uniqueness-approach. The presence of the theoretic approaches is again dependent on the presence of the constructed terms laid out in chapter 2.5 page 28. Being aware of the fact that the theories I intend to use can often overlap, for instance that the term ‘transparency’ can be used in many different ways, I have in chapter 2.5 specified how I will use these terms. Also, I am aware of that the notions of economic growth, good governance and poverty reduction for instance are all interdependent. It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss these as isolated phenomena. This is why I have chosen pattern-matching as the method for my research. A presentation of pattern-matching will follow shortly.

1.1 THE OUTLINE

After a presentation of the methodology and the data used that will follow immediately, I will in chapter 1.3 shortly describe the nature of the Country Assistance Strategy papers.

Chapter 2 presents the theory. As mentioned above, I have divided this into four approaches, “growth”, “structural”, “social” and “African uniqueness”. The Growth-approach will include a discussion of the connections between economic growth, political development and poverty reduction, to get a picture of some potential causal connections. The Structural-approach regards capacity in state structures. It discusses states’ potentials in development and, also, the notion of regimes as a factor in the “development equation”. The Social Capacity-approach introduces participation and mobilisation of citizens as an element of growth and development, while the African Uniqueness evolves around the question of patrimonialism, state structures and state legitimacy. The last includes for instance explanations that vary between the problems of patrimonialism, and the notion that “Africa works” (Chabal and Daloz
1999) despite obvious problems. In chapter 2.5 the theoretical framework will be presented, which will lay the foundation for the pattern-matching that will follow.

In chapter 3 we get to know the countries of study. Chad, Zambia and Kenya will, briefly, be introduced with their current developmental status. Also, the CAS for each country will be presented. This includes the overall World Bank strategy for each country as well as what is known as the ‘Bank program for assistance during the CAS period’. The CASes are strategies for a period of a few fiscal years. Further, the CASes are results-based which does not mean that they evaluate development projects that have already been implemented. It rather means that the papers are focused on specific outcomes over a given period of time.

Chapter 4 is the main discussion for this dissertation. The point is to answer the research question: “To what extent are the World Bank’s good governance-based assistance strategies in sub-Saharan Africa shaped by the continent’s distinctive political reality and legacy?” At first, the chapter gives the pattern-matching of the three countries. Thereafter, the theoretical and empirical patterns will be discussed. With the theory on state-, structural-and social capacities and the uniqueness of African politics in mind, how do the Assistance Strategies fit in? Which theoretic approach is dominant and why?

The dissertation will be rounded up with a conclusion (chapter 5).

1.2 METHODOLOGY

As discussed earlier, the goal of the theory-chapter is to find some indicators of each bloc (Growth, Structural, Social and African Uniqueness) that can be applied to the Country Assistance Strategies. The further purpose the, in the analysis, is to see which approach is the most present. Thus, some key terms of each theory contribution will be looked for in the CASes. Then we will hopefully see which approach to development and growth that is the most dominant in the Bank’s Country Strategies. The search in the CASes for the key terms identified in the theory...
represents the operationalisation of the research question. What key elements of African growth, structural- or social capacity, or African political uniqueness are to the largest extent shaping the CAS?

### 1.2.1 Research design

This study is qualitative. The main dataset used for the empirical analysis are the three Country Assistance Strategy papers of the World Bank. The CASes are not statistical. In that it differs from for instance experiments, surveys, Archival analysis’, and historical analysis’, the dissertation is a case-study (Yin 2003: 5). Yin (2003) also differs between three strategies of a case study, (i) to explain potential causal links in an empirical case, (ii) to describe an empirical intervention or situation and the context in which it occurs, and (iii) to explore potential outcomes of an empirical intervention or situation (ibid.: 15). In the sense that we want to use standards (key terms) derived from the theory to qualitatively measure the CASes, and the fact that we at this point do not know which of the terms we will find, the dissertation will most likely be seen as an exploratory study. However, one can argue that there is a causal direction between the specific elements of the theory and the empirical cases of study (the Country Assistance Strategies) which we seek to explain, in the sense of ‘What factors are dominant for the Bank’s strategies?’.

Besides being a case study with the Bank’s country strategies as what Yin would call interventions, the research design is also interpretative in its nature. Andersen would most likely describe this design as a comparative theoretical interpretative study. The design would be, having three Bank Strategies, comparative because a “…systematic comparison will lead to a focus on more than one main variable, and the connection between them.” (Andersen 2003: 95- my translation). Further, the design would be theoretical interpretative and not a-theoretical, because theory and other insight is brought in to actively interpret and understand the case(s) of study. The a-theoretic approach is more focused on understanding the uniqueness of the case (intervention), with theoretic models brought in indirectly, merely reflecting a knowledge of the
implicitly (ibid.). Construction of terms is another tool Andersen describes in comparative case studies. Andersen highlights that the definitions of terms must seek to capture the “…essence, a common core that constitute a theoretical universe.” (ibid: 99). This last point, I argue, is also part of the methodology for this dissertation. Even though Andersen is concerned with the construction of terms in the empirical data and not from the theory, this analytical approach is useful at least in one part: I want to find essence of each theoretical approach, an essence that will be sought after in the CASes.

The main challenges regarding the validity of the research concerns external validity. Are we able to generalise the findings of this dissertation to other cases, i.e. other CAS-papers or similar? Yin notes that generalising from one case to another is one of the most common problems facing scientists (Yin 2003; 38). To solve this problem, the researcher should try to construct a ‘theory’ (a set of key principles) from the research and generalise this ‘theory’ to other cases in stead of the specific findings in each case. What we then will do in this study is to create some key terms in the theory and search for these in the CASes. The findings will hopefully be the essence or core mentioned above, some theory-based principles that possibly can be transferred to other cases. Another challenge might be the construct validity. This refers to the “…establishment of the correct operational measures for the concepts being studied.” (Yin 2003; 34). The choice I have made of using the CAS-papers is subjective. This means that I must be aware of the relationship between the theory, the research question and the data I am studying. I must identity, when assessing the CASes, that what I want to find is some few selected elements drawn from the theory. If there are some specific key terms in the Growth approach, then I must explicitly search for them in the analysis. And, if I find them in the CASes, then I must explicitly say why this is of relevance to the research question. To meet these challenges, I will, after I have gone through the theoretic approaches, set up a concrete overview of the key terms from each approach that will be central in the assessment of the CASes.
1.2.2 Research techniques

According to Yin, one of the most frequently used techniques in case studies is pattern-matching. Yin defines pattern-matching as a technique which “…compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions).” (Yin 2003: 116). In my case, the Country Assistance Strategy papers constitute an empirically based pattern. The CASes are empirically grounded patterns of development strategies for the individual countries, constituting three dependent variables that need testing. The test is then to compare these patterns with predicted ones, in my case four alternative predictions referring to the four theoretical approaches. If I find that either of the CAS-papers match one or more of the predicted patterns in the theoretical approaches, then I have made what Yin would call a “…theoretical replication across cases.” (ibid: 117). Finding these results would strengthen the internal validity, i.e. the possible causal connection between the theoretical approaches and the dependent variables. Important to keep in mind however, is that operating with few independent or dependent variables will create a need for the differences in the patterns to be clearer and more dramatic in order to allow comparisons between the cases (ibid.: 119). In our case, this means that we need to find relatively clear matches between the theoretical approaches and the CASes in order to draw firm conclusions.

1.3 The Bank’s Policies for Development and the Data for Study

The World Bank explicitly states that the intention of the Country Assistance Strategy papers is to create a sound development-plan for each individual country to reach certain goals designed by the country itself and the dominant institutions of the international community. The Executive Summary of the CAS of the Republic of Chad, which is one of the primary papers that will be used in the analysis later in the dissertation, says that “The overarching objective of this Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is to help Chad make the best possible developmental use of its new oil
revenues (and public resources more broadly) as it strives to attain the MDGs.” (Chad-CAS: i). In this sentence lie both a domestically set goal and a goal set by the United Nations (UN), namely the Millennium Development Goals. The CAS is, formally, a memorandum from the Presidents of the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to the executive directors of the World Bank. It represents the formal Bank assistance strategy for each country. The development strategies for the given country is primarily based on the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which is the goals, and means to reach them, that the developing country sees as their most crucial to meet. The CAS can, then, be seen as the Banks response to the PRSPs. As the CAS for the Republic of Zambia states: “…comprising of programs, policy dialogue, and partnerships … aligned with the Government’s PRSP/TNDT through three strategic priority areas: (i) a diversified and export-oriented economy … (ii) Improved lives and protection of the vulnerable, and (iii) and efficiently and effectively managed public sector ….” (Zambia-CAS: i). The Strategic Objectives and the Pillars construct the essence of the Bank programme for each country. However, what will not be discussed in the dissertation are the specific lending and investment scenarios and the thorough economic indicators that also make up a fair part of the documents. It is the Bank Programme for Assistance that will be in focus.
2. **BRINGING THE … ?… BACK IN- the missing link(s) of development**

Clear answers to what development should be in Africa seem as distanced in the present days of Darfur as they did twenty years ago in the days of Biafra. But, as Band Aid proves, the topic is still very much alive today. But the concepts of development, economic growth and poverty reduction for example, are difficult to really get a grip on, and seem to mean different things to the many different institutions that are engaged with them. What we then need to do in order to make use of the terminology is to create a theoretical framework that serves our own interest. This should not happen on the expense of existing theories on the subject, but rather happen within our own analytical universe. It doesn’t take much change of any given hypothesis for example, to create a demand for a totally different theoretical framework. The theoretical foundation for this dissertation will, and should, be cynical in the sense that we make use of the theory we want and need, and only that, in order for us to actually see practical outcomes.

2.1 The Growth-Approach

In “Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies”, Ronald Inglehart refers to the established writers a generation ago that argued that it is economic development that leads to democracy (Inglehart 1997: 160). The writers included ‘celebrities’ such as Lipset, Rostow and Dahl (ibid.). The debate between the schools we will come back to later, but the statement Inglehart makes throughout his chapter, which is basically one that backs up the idea made by Lipset et al, is one that points to the core of my further discussion of good governance and the World Bank in Africa. If it is true that economic development is conducive to

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\[ \text{A The terms "Bringing the…?…back in" and "the missing link(s) of development" refers to the debate of state-society relations in development, where for instance John Harriss has discussed the role of social capital and Peter Evans et al (ed.) have argued for "Bringing the State Back In". For full references, see Literature on page 88.} \]
democracy, and democracy is not conducive to economic development, how can we then understand the increased focus on good governance as a tool for poverty reduction? This will be the crucial question for the further discussion.

Michael Todaro gives a definition of the factors of economic growth that is of importance in any society, hence also in developing countries. He shows three components that constitute the economics of growth:

1) Capital accumulation, including all new investments in land, physical equipment, and human resources.

2) Growth in population and hence eventual growth in the labour force.

3) Technological progress.

(Todaro 2000: 115)

While Inglehart’s argument is based on the notion that it is economic development that leads to democracy, he points out that the economic development needs to provide “certain changes in culture and social structure” (Inglehart 1997: 161). Thus, it is not the wealth itself that brings democracy and democratic governance, but the spin-off effects of how this wealth is distributed and how it creates participation, stability and, preferably, accountability.

Chabal and Daloz devote their chapter on development in the book “Africa Works. Disorder as political instrument” on the idea of ‘modernity without development’ (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 125). They argue that the African continent is moving in a direction of its own, emphasising the uniqueness of the continent with its ability to participate in the world economic system without being ‘developed’ in the traditional sense (ibid.). This argument we will mainly come back to in the “African Case”-part, but it can be useful to keep in mind the point made by Chabal and Daloz that despite the famous ‘backwardness’ of the African continent, the continent still interact very much with the international economic and political community.

The case of the uniqueness of the African continent, which is heavily discussed by other authors of African politics and affairs (f ex. Bayart and Bratton/van de Walle),
is obviously also linked to the relationship between economic growth, political
development and poverty reduction. The main question will be whether development
and growth in the continent should be handled differently than in other parts of the
world, or if the continent meets certain standards needed to gain development and
growth. We will come back to this question in the last part of the chapter. What, then,
are the relationships, or rather, the factors of influence and overlapping features
between the three parts of the following triangle?

\[
\text{Economic growth} \quad \text{Political development} \quad \text{Poverty reduction}
\]

First, let us try to identify if there are any obvious causal relations between the three.
In a scientific approach it becomes clear that poverty reduction would be the
dependent variable. Talking about the African continent with its vast challenges in
the economy and in the human/social standards, poverty reduction seems like the
‘final goal’. The term ‘poverty reduction’ is a normative, overarching one, focusing
on an improvement in basically all socio-economic and living standard-related fields
of society, from micro-level economic efforts to national measures on e.g. birth rates.
No matter if we are talking about political development or economic growth, it would
seem clear that poverty reduction would come ‘after’ in a causal direction. We talked
earlier about Inglehart’s notion that economic growth/ development was conducive to
democracy (in this context: political development). Conducive in this sense, I
interpret as something that contributes too, or promotes. However, as Pierre
Englebert argues in “State Legitimacy and Development in Africa”, the direction of
causality between governance and growth and between the introduction of policies
and growth is unclear (Englebert 2000: 38). Englebert uses the book to empirically test the relations between developmental policies and governance on one hand, and economic growth on the other. By regression analysis and the use of indicators the author explores possible explanations for the poor, and paradoxical, economic and human performance of the African continent. Of the underlying problems Englebert deal with, the causal relations between governance and economic growth are of the most important. Englebert looks at state capacity. He sees policies as offensive moves by governments to create economic growth, for instance policies towards resource allocation, sector- or region-promoting or employment. The idea of governance, this new set of government actions as “…more subtle ways in which governments can provide or withhold the foundations for economic growth.” (Englebert 2000: 22).

“The recent empirical evidence strongly supports the idea that good governance, defined as the quality of state institutions, the accountability of governments, the stability of property rights, and the absence of corruption, has beneficial effects on growth.” (Englebert 2000: 24).

I assume that both Inglehart and Englebert would say that the issues of economic development and governance/political development are closely linked, but their focuses are different, and the causal direction are opposite of one another. While Inglehart focuses on the beneficial effects economic growth will have on democracy and political development, Englebert sees it the other way around.

To understand the relationships between political development/democracy and economic performance/growth, we need to specify the former in terms of what political development would mean. The different schools in development-theory would obviously see political development in different ways, the role of the state is the point of attention for all of them. To the World Bank and most aid donors, political development has meant liberalisation, liberalisation of politics, reforms and the economy. The classic divide between neo-classicism and post-Marxists, and between the modernising-theorists and dependency-theorists will always be important in such a discussion, and we will also come back to it when discussing the push for good governance mainly by the World Bank in Africa.
2.2 The Structural Capacity-Approach

2.2.1 Developmental Capacity in Africa

The system of random power-relations in African state institutions, I argue, leads to a legitimacy-problem between the institutions and the people. Neopatrimonialism and a frequent pattern of systemic corruption in bureaucracy and public services create a lack of accountability from the people up and a lack of transparency from the institutions down. The latter will again lead to an even greater lack of accountability. How much of the lack of capacity in growth and human development can then be explained by this lack of legitimacy? The patrimonial, or indeed presidential, system of rule creates a distanced system of government. Therefore, the leaders’ willingness and capacity to provide facilities of growth for a wider range of the population seem difficult. Englebert argues that “…the freer its rulers are from the imperative to consolidate their power, and thus the more likely they are to adopt policies with a longer time horizon.” (Englebert 2000: 116). So, the more focused a leadership is on clinging to power and maintaining the established power-relations, the less are they likely to front long-time development policies. Englebert states that this tradition goes back to the pursuit for legitimacy at the given country’s independence. In ethnic heterogeneous societies, an early post-independence leadership will most likely search for the parts of the people that will ensure their positions, i.e. often their own ethnic group or tribe. As the country today seeks development policies, the support for these policies can not be found on the expense of their already established patrimonial system. As Englebert puts it, “…the construction of despotic power takes place at the expense of the infrastructural power of the state.” (ibid: 117).

A more structural description of the developmental state is made by Georg Sørensen in the book “Political Conditionality”. Sørensen highlights the fact that his model must be seen in context with the given case studied. Each case obviously must have different standards to live up to. Sørensen lays out the following model useful for us to discuss governance and development:
Socio-historical context: (economic, political, social, cultural etc.)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>AUTONOMY</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>STATECRAFT</td>
<td>Economic development outcomes</td>
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(Sørensen 1993: 13)

Sørensen sees statecraft as the state’s relative willingness to implement ‘good policies’, the degree of it resulting from the autonomy and capacity of the state. Sørensen uses the model in discussing prospects for growth in different types of regimes, giving the familiar example of the ‘tiger economies’ vast growth-rates while having authoritarian systems of rule. Sørensen links this debate with the main topic for the book, political conditionality. As noted in chapter three of this paper, political conditionality has been widely used by aid-agencies and donors when constructing the terms on which the aid is given. Sørensen claims that the challenge will be to help fragile, elite-dominated democracies to secure a popular basis in the civil society (ibid: 31). The link to the civil society becomes eminent.

2.2.2 Regime-type – A factor of growth

Following on the discussion of Inglehart and Englebert, the identification of regime-type in a given developing country has been vital, most notably between democracies and authoritarian regimes. Because in our context, democracy does not necessarily mean that all standards of political development is being reached. Most African states today hold multi-party elections. About eight years earlier than Englebert published his book, Adam Przeworski noted on the empirical evidence on the relationship between regime type and economic performance that “…eight found in favour of democracy, and eight in favour of authoritarianism; the other four discovered no difference…” (Bienen & Herbst 1996: 24). The authors argue that the simultaneous pursuit of both political and economic reform in Africa will be more difficult than in other parts of the world, as the African continent lacks factors that normally promote such reforms (Bienen & Herbst 1996: 23). The cases that mainly have contributed to the criticism of democracies’ responsiveness to economic reform have been the great
economic success-stories of the East Asian “tiger-economies”. These cases have had authoritarian regime-types during the time of economic reform, giving stability and discipline and a leadership that can go through with necessary reforms without having to worry about a populist approach to satisfy opinion polls. Bienen and Herbst identify certain obstacles for assessing relations between political development (in terms of liberalisation) and economic outcomes. They argue that to create such a ‘picture of performance’ in the whole will be very difficult in a short term period giving the vast variation and differences between cases in time-periods, exogenous factors etc. More fruitful will be to examine the decision-making process of each case and the time and space in which this process takes place (Bienen & Herbst 1996: 24).

2.3 The Social Capacity-Approach

2.3.1 The Broad Concepts of Good Governance and Democratisation

I find it useful to start off this discussion with identifying the linkages between theory on democratisation in developing countries and the concept of good governance. There are quite a few elements that seem to overlap the two. Some established scientists, like Dahl and Lipset noted earlier for their emphasis on the need for economic growth to lead to democracy, have also become famous for a heavy focus on ‘the rules of the game’ and on elections and multi-party competition, hence also Diamond and Huntington (Abrahamsen 2000). Their theory dates back to Weber and Schumpeter. The critics of this argument say that the rules of the game are obviously important, but will loose relevance if the people playing the game are not equally equipped. So the argument will consist of people’s preconditions to be a part of the game at all, a question of the quality of the means (preferably Rights and Institutions) that will lead to the ends (preferably for instance a free and fair election of a government on local or central level.) (stv4344: 12/2-04). But, will a society that has given the players the right preconditions and manages to reach its ends automatically
be a democracy? Is democracy still the same as electoral competition? A Schumpeterian answer to the last question would be that a democratic society enables the people to organise and compete for the implementation of reforms, but democracy itself doesn’t guarantee welfare and justice (Abrahamsen 2000). It is people’s ability and capacity to use the system and the system’s capacity to create accountability to its people that creates welfare and social justice.

Olle Törnquist has made a model that describes that last statement, namely the people’s ability to move and use a system of government, civil society and social structures. The model puts the actors at the bottom of the model, and their instrumental aims at the top. In between there is the (i) civil, political and other constitutional rights upheld by an independent judiciary, (ii) ‘free and fair’ elections and open and accountable government according to law and (iii) civil society including media, culture, additional political participation, citizen organisations etc. (Törnquist 2003: 37). Within such a system, the actors have several options with regard to what they want to achieve, they tend even to bypass one or more of the three main ‘blocs’ in the middle. Törnquist notes that, for instance, pro-democratic groups have been seen to focus their work on civil society and on the law, while more or less ignoring elections and government institutions. Elites, however, have tended to pay less attention to the civil society, probably not surprising (ibid.).

Models of mobilisation, such as the one of Törnquist, will come in handy for more reasons when we soon enter the part of governance in Africa. The reason for that is that we want to find a combination of both societal structures and dynamics of mobilisation, i.e. the societal capacity of the people, and more instrumental capacities. The first one I will categorise as a broad definition of democracy, while the last one will be a narrow definition in compliance with Dahl and Lipset. The two, societal capacities and instrumental capacities, obviously are very closely linked. A persons’ ability to move within a given system, by for instance bypassing political and governmental institutions and in stead moving through civil society-organisations, are at the same time either boosted or hindered by law, norms and other practises. Institutions can be obstacles for people trying to reach instrumental
aims, but social structures (e.g. class, ethnicity, religion) can be obstacles for the same instrumental aims even though the institutions are there to be used.

2.4 The African Uniqueness-Approach

Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz develop what they call a new paradigm of contemporary African politics, in “Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument”. They start the concluding chapter (chapter 10) with a link to Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism. Originally used on studies of the middle-East and the Arab world, the theory explores how societies, today maybe categorised as ‘less developed’, are seen by the western world as backward and barbarian. Chabal and Daloz argue that many have seen black Africa as “the dark opposite of what Western civilisation is taken to represent.” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 141). How we from a western, and highly developed society according to practically all development indexes, discuss politics and economy from a scientific view in a continent that is in all aspects different from our own society, should always be taken into account. Obviously, our standard of living is not the only, and maybe not the most important, difference we should be aware of when approaching such an outside-in-approach of case-analysis. The most important is, I will argue, our imbedded preferences of what, in our case, development, growth and democracy should look like. Chabal and Daloz discuss these shared assumptions, especially the political and anthropological scientists’ shared assumptions of the term ‘development’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 142). They note that all seek to explain the same: why the African continent has failed to developed either along western or eastern (socialist) lines. The term ‘development’ thus has become a definition of modernity, modernity amongst western and socialist lines, from neo-liberal via dependency to neo-Marxist. Before reaching the discussion of developmental capacity on the African continent, let us see what makes this continent different from other parts of the less developed world. What is Africa’s uniqueness or ‘otherness’?
It is not my attempt to bring about any key answers as to why African countries make up the better part of the bottom 50 places on UNDPs Human Development Index. I can only try to identify some of the most commonly used possible explanations.

Of the most commonly used descriptions of postcolonial African politics, neopatrimonialism has probably been the most frequently used. The term, derived from weberian concepts of authority, is seen as a system where “…an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power; ordinary folk are treated as extensions of the “big man’s” household with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler.” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 61). Bratton and van de Walle explain how the concept of neopatrimonialism has been embraced by the scholars of African politics, though the shapes and forms of the term have varied slightly. “Personal rule”, “prebendalism” and “politics of the belly” are examples used respectively by Jackson and Rosberg, Richard Joseph and Jean-Francois Bayart (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 63). Within the neopatrimonial system of rule, we find other features that often have been used to describe African politics. We find presidentialism, i.e. the system where all decision-making but the most trivial are placed in the hands of one individual. We find clientelism, the system of patron and clients where distribution of resources, jobs and other goods are made on the award of personal favours, and we find the use/misuse of state resources, a system closely linked to clientelism, where state resources (e.g. oil, mining etc) have been used to legitimise and fund neopatrimonial leaders (ibid: 63-66).

The topics that Chabal and Daloz take up in part 2 of their book, “the ‘re-traditionalization’ of society, captures some older features of African politics that have contributed to people’s view of the continent as ‘backward’. The features include religion and witchcraft, the identity-and citizen-issue and the profits of violence. The first chapter of part 3, the (ab) use of corruption, can in a way be put in the same category. These are features that are frequently used to explain African politics, and features that are also closely linked to the system of neopatrimonialism. Religion, identity, violence and corruption are often used tools for personal rulers. Presidents are known to put religions and ethnic groups up against each other, and to
use for instance religions and witchcraft to present themselves as the ultimate gods. The former president of Democratic Republic of Congo (which he named Zaire) Mobutu sese seko, was famous for portraying himself as a god, hovering over the TV-screen on a cloud in his famous leopard-skin hat. He took this name in 1972, meaning “The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake” ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobutu_Sese_Seko](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobutu_Sese_Seko) 31/5-04).

Peculiarities of the African state such as these can give explanations to many problems in African societies, but was it about the African state that makes such good preconditions for developing exploiting leaderships and incapable state institutions? A common argument seems to be the boundaries of the state. The relationship between the state and the society, as discussed among others by Kohli and Shue, are in general blurred (Kohli and Shue 1994: 294). According to Chabal and Daloz, neopatrimonialism seem to be the main obstacle to overcome if there is to be a successful emergence of the state (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 4). The authors argue that the bureaucracy is heavily amputated as a consequence of patrimonialism, creating a system based on pure self-interest by the civil servants. The system is, in fact, expecting such personal exploitation by the servants. Thus, the bureaucratic institutions become mere shells, rather than effective extensions of the government based on merits and predictability for the employees.

Explaining patrimonialism, presidentialism and the lack of capacity in state institutions and other features of the state in Africa takes us one step back in a causal diagram. Colonialism should be taken into account in explaining African political and societal tradition. The most famous heads of states that were exercising presidentialism and heavy (read: corrupted) patrimonialism, were all leaders of the opposition to the colonial powers. They won independence, a victory which gave them a place in people’s hearts and the opportunity to carry on in power for decades. Amin, Bokassa and Mobutu were the revolutionaries who won independence, but who later are known for being horrifying despots. How was it possible for these people and their peers to stay in power without being overthrown by other
resourceful groups in society? There must have been groups that could pose a sufficient political threat, bearing in mind that the construction of African borders were merely drawn up by Europeans at a table in Berlin without considering much the complexity of ethnic complexion in the region. Or?

Pierre Englebert uses the phrase “why Congo is poor and Botswana is rich” to discuss the transition from colonial rule to sovereign rule in the two countries (Englebert 2000: 105). Englebert argues that the path that the former Belgian Congo (which Mobutu named Zaïre) took after independence was a consequence of the given nation-building and neopatrimonial pattern that were posed by the lack of historical legitimacy in the postcolonial power (ibid.: 107). Botswana on the other hand, was in a situation were postcolonial power and construction of authorities followed along the lines of precolonial powers. The nation-building continued were it had left off before the British came, whereas the nation-building started on scratch in the Congo without an historical reference and legitimacy to back it up. Further after independence, the new citizens of the new state represented only a fraction of the people actually living within the borders. As Mahmood Mamdani argues, it was the new elites, the évolués that was among the few who received education during colonialism, that were the new citizens. These new citizens looked down on their compatriots and abolished their historical legacy of precolonial times. Englebert gives the example of the naming of the capital as Leopoldville, an example of the new elite’s disregard for a precolonial national identity (ibid: 108). This was of course prior to Mobutu’s re-traditionalisation of the country, changing the names again from Leopoldville to Kinshasa and from Congo to Zaïre.

For Englebert, the differences in state capacity and growth within the African continent and between the continent and the rest of the world, has to do with state legitimacy, or rather the lack of it. “The answer lies in the manner in which deficits of state legitimacy condition the economic policies that rulers choose and the quality of the government they provide.” (ibid: 115). The policies the rulers choose seem to be a key element. How much resources and effort has to be put in consolidating the rulers’ power? How much resources and effort is then ‘left’ to be spent on welfare and
growth? Englebert’s approach is based on a rational-choice assumption saying that the rulers will do what is necessary for holding on to power, further, he sees a clear link between the likelihood of development policies and the elites’ choice of self-interest of power in stead of national integration and conflict resolution (ibid: 118). Englebert stresses the importance of, as he puts it, reconciling two strands of literature: the one that concerns the elites’ quest for hegemony as determinant of their political behaviour, and the one that concerns the imported nature of the African state as the root of policy deviances (ibid.).

2.5 The theoretic framework

To be able to use pattern-matching as a research technique, we must construct a pattern. After I now have gone through the four theoretic approaches, I will in the following present the key terms seen as the alternative predictions in the matching with the CASes (see chapter 1.2.2 at page 14). I will select the essence of each theory approach (Growth, Structural, Social and African Uniqueness) narrowed down to a few key terms. Then, under each approach, I will give a short prediction of what we may find of specific World Bank policies given that the Bank are focused on the respective approach.

KEY TERMS OF THE GROWTH APPROACH

The Growth Approach discusses what comes first of economic growth and democracy. It also discusses the economic growth, political development, poverty reduction-triangle. The argument evolves around what can happen if economic growth-indicators are increased in a society with a democratic deficit. The principles of for instance Todaro and Inglehart concerns not necessarily the initial reasons why economic growth should precede political and democratic liberalisation, but focuses rather on the outcomes, the potential for development, human and social, that this create. The following key terms will constitute the pattern of the Growth Approach:
-- **Resource Accumulation and Production** of people and capital. In accordance with the definition on economic growth by Todaro (page 17), it is easy to argue for the importance of the mobilisation of people and money in the search of long-term development. To create production on a wide scale both gives people income and (should) give them a higher standard of living. The accumulation of capital in a macro economy will also increase the competitiveness of the country’s markets.

-- **The Governments’ Economic Policies.** Regardless of what comes first, economic growth or political liberalisation, policy-making towards the economy is a tool for building economic growth. With Englebert (page 19) in mind, economic policies are offensive moves by the governments to create growth. This approach does not necessarily take into account any democratic deficits.

-- **Spin-off Effects** from Growth. An early push for economic growth can create spin-off effects that are crucial for long-term development. Participation and stability are things that appear quicker if economic growth is promoted.

**What we expect to find in the Country Assistance Strategies:** If the Bank are to be focused on the accumulation of capital and labour, the sound economic policy-making, and the promotion of ‘spin-off’ or ‘trickle-down’, then we will expect to see specific programmes and projects in the three CASes aimed at just these. The resource accumulation, we assume, will require policies on increasing production and market competitiveness, possibly also an orientation on exporting industries. Further, this will require a focus on improving the fairness of wages and income. We also assume that this potential flow of capital creates a need for policies on stabilising currency and interest rates. The focus on the economic policies and the possible spin-off effects these might create will possibly make the Bank’s policies evolve around governmental and political decision-making. We will expect to find specific policies pushed forward by the Bank that makes the government both responsible and potent to create long-term economic reforms friendly to the whole economy. Such policies might include investments in the agriculture, primary exporting commodities or barriers on import.
KEY TERMS OF THE STRUCTURAL CAPACITY-APPROACH

It is not difficult to argue that the capacities of institutions and state structures are vital in long-term development. From chapter 2.2 I have extracted the following key terms that will work as a pattern towards the Country Assistance Strategies of the World Bank:

-- The **Pursuit for Legitimacy**. I argued at page 20 that the random power-relations in African state structures lead to a legitimacy problem between the institutions and the people. The capacity of state structures is dependent on the eventual pursuit of legitimacy from the leaders. The effectiveness of pro-development policy-making is, thus, dependent on how necessary it is for the government to cling to power. According to Englebert, this tradition goes back to the leaders’ pursuit for legitimacy in the years of independence from colonial powers (Englebert 2000: 116-117).

-- **Statecraft**. Pro-development policy-making, according to Sørensen (1993), is normally a question of statecraft, i.e. the state’s willingness to promote ‘good policies’ (Sørensen 1993: 13). This statecraft, sound actions of the state, is again relying on the state’s degree of autonomy and relative capacity. In the pattern-matching of these theoretic approaches and the CASes, it will be useful, then, to search for principles such as statecraft, a willingness to promote sound policies even after the policy-makers have consolidated the necessary capacity and autonomy.

-- **Regime-type**. The argument evolves around what types of regime are most likely to lay the foundation for and experience sound long-term development. With reference to the “tiger-economies” of East Asia, there is a need to keep in mind, and possibly identify the role that either authoritarian or democratic regimes play in the work for development. Is ‘regime-type’ a factor of the Bank’s Assistance Strategies, as I have argued it is in a Structural Approach for development?
What we expect to find in the Country Assistance Strategies: If the creators of the Country Assistance Strategies are focused on the structural capacity approach, then we must expect to find specific policies in the CASes promoting the strength of institutions and the state. In the CASes then, I will be in the search for specific projects aimed at making the institutions more effective on all levels. To increase service provision and promote poverty reduction, the policies by the Bank should be focused on strengthening the effectiveness of institutions and bureaucracy possibly through public sector management, decentralisation of public services and the rewarding of frontline service providers. If there is a lack of willingness to promote sound policies by the government, then such programmes could ‘push’ the government to do this.

KEY TERMS OF THE SOCIAL CAPACITY-APPROACH

While the Structural Capacity-approach focuses on the abilities of state structures and institutions, the Social Capacity-approach focuses on the abilities of the people and the society:

-- Accountability. The creation of accountability among the government and the people has been of overarching focus in the Social Capacity-approach. The implementation of development reforms seems farfetched without a mutual trust between the providers and the recipients of welfare. The next couple of terms are seen as components of accountability.

-- Bodies of independent Evaluation and Monitoring. To have instruments of evaluation and monitoring towards the government can give a direction of responsibilities. A society which has in place systems of independent (read: free) overlook of the government’s actions, seem more healthy and accountable than one that does not have this.

-- Mobilisation-structures, Voice and Empowerment. This point is two-folded. First, to create participation and accountability, Törnquist among others, have argued for the ability of people and civil organisations to move within the
different spheres of society. These systems of mobilisation include state institutions, legal systems and election systems on one hand, and the potentials for free speech and opinion. The notion of mobilisation-structures can be divided in two capacities of people and civil organisations; instrumental capacities and social capacities. Secondly, mobilisation is also about empowerment and participation of individuals. In the social capacity-approach, I include the strengthening of people’s rights on an individual level, something that should increase the people’s ability to mobilise and increase their chances of moving out of poverty.

**What we expect to find in the Country Assistance Strategies:** If the mobilisation of the people and civil society is a prerequisite for poverty reduction by the Bank, then this will be shown by the CASes. As I have argued that accountability between the people and the government is a part of social capacity, then we will be in the search of Bank policies that promotes this. A mutual trust, accountability, can possibly be emphasised by making the government responsible for its actions at the same time as they will be given new opportunities by the voice of the people. As it is a fact that the World Bank is not to engage in the strictly political sphere (e.g. party politics and parliament affairs), the Bank should present instruments for the people to evaluate, monitor or control the government. Making such organs of evaluation and monitoring independent and official, could meet requirements of accountability. Also, enabling civil organisations to mobilise support and to lobby officially for their causes could be one instrument for creating social capacity. Giving unions and interest organisations the opportunity to be a part of decision-making through cooperative channels could also promote accountability. Thus, programmes by the Bank aimed at this inclusion of the people and organisations are expected to be found if the Bank is social capacity- oriented. On the individual level, I expect to find policies by the Bank that seek to empower the people on a local level, as the mobilisation of people also should include the protection of people. Though it should not be confused with ordinary relief-and emergency aid work in
communities, we are looking for Bank initiatives that increase the standard of living through empowerment and security.

KEY TERMS OF THE AFRICAN UNIQUENESS APPROACH

The African Uniqueness Approach focuses on characteristics of African politics that (not exclusively obviously) are special to the continent. The following key terms/ principles are the main ones extracted from chapter 2.4, thus constituting the pattern of the factors of development in the African Uniqueness-approach. These are the principles that will be looked after in the CASes of the World Bank.

--- **Patrimonialism.** The concept of patrimonialism is central in the theory used on African politics. Both Bratton/ van de Walle (1997) and Chabal/ Daloz (1999) are concerned with it. Coming in different shapes and forms, patrimonialism identifies for instance the system of patron-client relationships, personal systems of rule and the preferential treatment of specific families or ethnic groups.

--- **Boundaries of state institutions.** The boundaries in which the state institutions operate, i.e. the boundaries between the state and the civil society/ the people, is linked to patrimonialism. Both Chabal & Daloz (1999) and Kohli & Shue (1994) note the ineffectiveness of state institutions and bureaucracy, an ineffectiveness much created by patrimonialism.

--- **Transparency.** Of the many problems patrimonial characteristics and inefficiency in state apparatuses create, the lack of transparency seem to be the critical one. The lack of transparency in institutions and in policy-making is not something that developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is alone about having, but it is something that seems increased in systems of patrimonialism and inefficient structures. The examples made in chapter 2.4, the roads to power by Mobutu, Bokassa et al and the difference in post-colonial nation-building in Zaïre and Botswana, have, I argued, made the foundation for the degree of transparency in today’s state institutions. Fighting for transparency to create development
should be a pattern made necessary by the African Uniqueness. A pattern expected to be found in the Country Assistance Strategy-papers.

**What we expect to find in the Country Assistance Strategies:** If we assume that the Country Assistance Strategies are constructed on a basis of an African Uniqueness, then Bank policies should reflect this. To fight the challenges caused by patrimonialism, personalised systems of rule and power-systems based on ethnicity, the Bank should present programmes promoting equality and transparency in decision-making and resource management. Programmes aimed at making budget-processes public, the recruitment to public offices equally available to everybody and for instance equal opportunities for the private sector’s companies to bid for public development projects are ways to meet these challenges. The statement I made earlier (page 26) that state institutions are becoming mere shells as a result of patrimonialism, should also, if focused on an African Uniqueness-approach, be met by programmes aimed at building transparency and increased competitiveness in the public sector. Further, in accordance with the focus on transparency and predictability in state institutions, we are expected to see programmes on anti-corruption. Anti-corruption is a highly prioritised principle of the Bank, but we need to spot specific policies in the CASes to draw conclusions about how this is relevant to an African political situation, i.e. relevant to the African Uniqueness approach.
3. THE COUNTRIES OF STUDY

I will now go through the three countries used in the study of good governance-policies in sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia, Kenya and Chad. I will, briefly, present an introduction and a developmental status of each country, which are followed by the Bank’s strategy for reaching the country’s respective goals as they are set out by the recipient through a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (or equivalent) and through the Country Assistance Strategy. As the CAS for each country is built up basically around the same last, I have chosen to differ between two strategies: strategic objectives and program for assistance in the CAS period. Strategic objectives are closely linked to each country’s PRSP or equivalent (Kenya has an Investment Programme for Economic Recovery Strategy (IP-ERS)).

3.1 The Republic of Zambia

Zambia is, according to the United Nations Human Development Report 2003, the twelfth least developed country in the world ranking at a 163rd place out of 175 (UN 2003: 240). As Zambia is situated inside the sub-Saharan mainland, the relatively high percentage of people living in the cities is heavily dependent on what the agriculture is able to provide. But with drought and a decrease of agricultural subsidies, the commercial growing of corn, rice and durra has deteriorated, leaving shortage of food in the cities (Geographica 2004: 344). The main commodity and source of income in Zambia is copper, and, according to the Country Assistance Strategy on Zambia that we will use in the following analysis, the decline in the copper prices together with an increase in oil prices in the early seventies led to a “…considerable deterioration in Zambia’s terms of trade.” (Zambia-CAS: 1).

The political context in which we can place the economic situation, is one of a newly democratised country like many other in the continent in the first half of the 1990s (often referred to as the ‘third wave of democratisation’). The first free elections as an independent state came in 1991 as a result of economic recession and political
agitation, dismissing the president of 25-odd years from power (Geographica 2004: 344). The elections in 1996 and 2001 were contested, but were in the end still regarded as democratically sound.

### 3.1.1 Developmental status and the Bank strategy

As said above, Zambia is regarded as one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the Bank, Zambia has seen a fall in per capita income of nearly 5 percent annually between 1974 and 1990 (Zambia Country Brief- [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)). The reasons have been many, economic instability, insufficient implementation of policies and reforms by the government and inefficient state-owned enterprises have all contributed to the low economic and social indicators. In addition, of course, to the fluctuation in copper-prices mentioned above. The latest shock in the copper industry came in 2002 when the Anglo-American Corporation withdrew from the Konkola Copper Mines which produces about 70% of the country’s copper. At the same time, the global copper-prices fell. Adding to this, Zambia was at that time hit by a drought which left over 2 million people in either lack of food or in other problems related to the agriculture industry (ibid.).

The Zambian government has through a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and a Transitional National Development Plan as late as in 2002 set out their goals for poverty reduction and export-oriented economic growth. These include supporting infrastructure, improved governance, improved access and quality of gender and the environment, anti-corruption and macro-economic stability (Zambia-CAS: i). In addition, the government has stated that increased government ownership is needed to “…break with the past…” (ibid.) and to secure an efficient use of resources.

Like all three CASes we are analysing, the CAS for Zambia is closely linked to the PRSP and TNDP.

The World Bank strategy for Zambia evolves around the following three priority areas: 1) **sustained economic growth anchored in a diverse and export-oriented economy** which creates a healthy environment for private/foreign investment and
development, **2) improved lives and protection of vulnerable groups** and to improve the quality of life through an effective service delivery to reach the MDGs, and **3) to create an effectively managed public sector** to improve governance and effectiveness of public expenditure programmes. These Strategic Objectives are the key elements of the CAS and represents the three overarching goals of the World Bank operations in Zambia for the fiscal years 2004-2007. I will shortly present them one by one, after some technical details about the CAS.

As explained in the introduction, the CASes we analyse are results-based, which means that they focus on the potential outcomes of the programs at hand. As the CAS on Zambia states: “Focus of Bank support is to create an enabling environment for Zambia to attain the specified outcomes and results.” (Zambia- CAS: 15). Thus, the outcomes and results are specified, giving a clear indication of the issues and obstacles that are the most significant in Zambia, which also means that the long-term goals that the Bank are focusing on are actually measurable.

Let us then go through the three Strategic Objectives that constitute the Bank Programme for Assistance:

**1) SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH ANCHORED IN A DIVERSE AND EXPORT-ORIENTED ECONOMY**

The first Strategic Objective is two-folded, concerning the creation of a growth-conducive macroeconomic environment, and concerning a diversified and export-oriented economy.

**The economic environment.** The CAS states that the current economic environment in Zambia, is one that makes sustainable macroeconomic stability highly possible (ibid: 17). But, the obstacles are vast. Firstly, it is needed intensive consultations among a wide range of the implicated institutions in the Zambian society on how to create the healthy environment needed. Also, it is likely that there will be cut-downs in public enterprises and in wages in the public sector to gain control over the public sector wage bill that has been passed. Secondly, it needs to be taken greater control
over the financial, fiscal and social consequences caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Thirdly, an independent central bank will most likely contribute highly to the macroeconomic environment, with an enhanced regulatory and supervisory capacity.

The Bank’s activities towards the economic environment mainly concerns a strengthening of the government’s ability to make sound use of its resources (ibid: 18), though this mostly is done through Strategic Objective 3 (see above). Improvement in the financial sector will be made in collaboration with the IMF. Among other things, this will concern an assessment of the remaining state owned financial institutions and the proposed recommendations towards legal and regulatory institutions in the financial sector.

**A Diversified and Export Oriented Economy.** The Bank acknowledges that development in the following six areas is necessary to diversify Zambia’s export and economic structure, mainly through being less dependent on copper and through increasing productivity in agriculture:

Zambia’s agenda on *trade* will be supported with help from the Bank’s partners on the subject. Trade will be encouraged with countries in the region, most importantly through the Everything But Arms-, and African Growth Opportunity Act-programmes. To enhance the climate for investment in the country, the Bank will contribute with analytical work, mainly an Investment Climate Assessment and Administrative Barriers to Investment (ibid: 20).

The Support to Economic Expansion and Diversification-project (SEED) is set up to provide appropriate legal and policy frameworks to attract private and foreign investment to three strategic sectors: agribusiness, gemstone and *tourism*. Zambia is working hard to front the area of Livingstone to be the centre for tourism and for that proper infrastructure and investment is needed.

In the *infrastructural sector* in general, Analytical and Advisory Activities (AAA) will help to identify the main bottlenecks of the sector, to improve competitiveness and efficiency in the service delivery. Through the HIPC initiative, the company
ZESCO (the biggest power utility plant in Zambia- www.zesco.co.zm 10/4-05) will be strengthened and turned into a company that operates on commercial terms. Zambia will also benefit from the Southern African Power Pool Project if the Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance-and Water Sector Reform-projects provide the necessary capital.

To increase the participation of women and socio-economically disadvantaged groups, technical education, vocational and entrepreneurship training will be enhanced. The Bank will support the government’s work on these reforms aimed at making the labour market financial sustainable, through IDA Credits.

If the necessary follow-up is given by the government on the PRSP/TNDP, the Bank will provide AAA on agricultural policy regarding planning of infrastructure such as roads and electricity to remove the bottlenecks that hinder the farmers’ production for the markets. Having seen the AAA work through, the Bank will introduce an Agricultural Support Project to assist the government in the challenges of using the potential for poverty reduction that lie in smallholders and commercial agriculture.

Through the Bank’s environmental projects in the Copperbelt area, the environmental concerns of the government will be supported. Also, each individual project (mainly regarding infrastructure) will have an assessment of environmental safeguarding as usual in the Bank programmes (ibid: 21).

2) IMPROVED LIVES AND PROTECTION OF THE VULNERABLE

Strategic Objective number two regards human development, and is divided in three: Better Health and Long-Term Survival, Coverage and Quality of Education, and Protection of Vulnerable Individuals and Communities.

Better Health and Long-Term Survival. As the PRSP/TNDP has laid a special emphasis on malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, sexually transmitted infections, child health care and provision of safe water and sanitation, the Bank will help the government to make more efficient use of the financial and human resources of the
health system and in ensuring equity in access to basic services, especially in underserved regions (ibid: 21). The IDA is financing the Ministry of Health with US$12 million to fight AIDS over a variety of sectors in Zambia. This will be expanded in the fiscal year 06. In addition, the Bank will provide support for human resources in the health sector through the IDA in 04, which will be followed up in 06 through a Public Expenditure Review (PER) (ibid: 23). On HIV/AIDS work, the Bank stresses that a multilateral support must continue, as the current situation is not satisfactory. On a political level, the Bank urges that a “…sustained political leadership, similar to Uganda and Botswana, is required to help mobilize support for behaviour change and increased use of condoms…” (ibid.).

**Coverage and Quality of Education.** The Bank is supporting the Ministry of Education through IDA lending that is to be devoted to a wide range of purposes in basic education. This includes the construction of two high schools in the Eastern Province. The IDA expects this to be expanded with more credit in the fiscal year 06. Through a PER, the Bank will support expenditure effectiveness and management in the sector. Among the main challenges addressed by the government are the uneven distribution of textbooks and the frequent absence, low payment and low number of lower grade teachers. The Bank seem positive to reaching the education-related goals of the MDGs as the government sets out a goal of 100% admission of pupils by 2007.

**Better Protection of Vulnerable Individuals and Communities.** Vulnerable groups and persons include those who are malnourished, those living with HIV/AIDS and AIDS orphans, women and youths, pensioners without pay or whose pay have eroded by inflation, people living in very remote areas and the unemployed.

To help with social security, the Bank is in the process of creating a wide ranging Social Protection Strategy. It is stressed that the complex security situation in the country creates a need for a wide cooperation among institutions in society. At the same time, this participation should start working on social security *not* in the traditional sense of safety nets and welfare, but on a more elementary level. This
should concern risk-assessments and risk-prevention programmes. In this matter, the Bank will help with a Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment (ibid: 24).

The Bank will also support rural development and food security through various projects. Especially important will be securing of food distribution in areas that are the most sensitive to climate shocks, droughts and famines. An Emergency Drought Recovery Project is ongoing and an Integrated Framework for Disaster Relief and Mitigation are underway by the Bank and the government (ibid.).

3) EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY MANAGED PUBLIC SECTOR

The Bank acknowledges that development of an efficiently managed public sector is crucial for poverty reduction. A well-functioning public sector will promote macroeconomic growth, private investment and effective delivery of services to the poor (ibid.).

A Transparent and Accountable Public Sector. The Bank identifies the following three challenges for the public sector:

- The budget system lacks transparency and effectiveness. The budget preparations have tended to concentrate on the immediate year, on inputs rather than outputs, it has created little engagement from politicians, and the outcomes have varied widely from the original plans.

- The public procurement system also lacks transparency and effectiveness. The unpredictability and inconsistency in the procurement system has led to opportunities for corruption and breakdowns in tenders.

- Finally, there is a lack of accountability and transparency in the use of public funds. As the budget monitoring and the Parliamentary oversight of the budget has been weak, and the fight against corruption has not been well integrated in the public sector, corruption continues to undermine the entire system of public administration.
The Bank programme for public sector management will be a combination of improving the instruments and institutions responsible for budget-and public fund-oversight and monitoring, and the restoring of the role of the budget as something more than government priorities. The budget also needs to have the role of promoting discipline in the use of public resources. To tighten the loopholes for corruption, the legal and regulatory frameworks will be supported (ibid: 26).

**A Productive and Efficient Public Service.** To improve poverty reduction and to secure the promotion of private sector development, the service delivery to the poor needs to be enhanced. The system of public service all the way from the top and down to the frontline service providers will be supported. The Bank’s programme for assistance includes the following points:

- Restructuring of the wages in order to provide an affordable and performance-based service. This includes the consolidation into base salaries to be able to provide greater incentives for key professional and technical positions as well as fitting this awarding system with the budget envelope.

- To increase the effectiveness of the line ministries and civil servants in line functions. Once initiated, one should expect to see a greater share of public resources reaching the frontline providers.

- To strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of public sector reform through quarterly reviews. This should be followed by reporting of these findings to the Parliament.

- The Bank will support frontline service provision through a strengthening of local government capacity and community-driven development as well as capacity-building in the ministry (ibid: 27).
3.2 The Republic of Kenya

Being mostly an agrarian country, like most of the continent, Kenya still is the most industrialised country in eastern Africa (Todaro 2000: 285). Michael Todaro notes that Kenya rarely has been as politically dangerous and beset by unemployment as it was in the late 90s, the country being controlled by a government infected with “corruption, cronyism, and economic plunder…” (ibid: 284). But, despite the poor governance found in the once so prosperous country, Kenya still has a great potential.

3.2.1 Developmental Status and the Bank Strategy

Despite also having experienced a decline in most social indicators and an overall rise in poverty during the 1990s, Kenya is the one of our cases that has the most significant potential for growth. The CASes reasons for this are various, but giving that Kenya can organise its public finance management and provide sound investments in infrastructure and public services, an attractive climate for both private and foreign investment will emerge. The CAS states that the bad trend that has been seen the past decade is about to turn, parallel with the election of the first new president in 24 years. The new government of December 27, 2002, has begun serious clean-up in government institutions, seeing through the Anti-Corruption Act, the Public Officer Ethics Act and the Public Audit Act (Kenya- CAS: 1). Not only in words has the government sought to break with the past, but changes have been made large scale with regards to senior staff in key government positions. Central in the new governments’ public reform programmes have been the Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (IP- ERS). The IP- ERS practically represents the Kenyan governments’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which includes the full participation of the parliament, non- governmental organisations (NGOs), development partners and other stakeholders (ibid.).

Though the government is showing that it is set on restoring the facilities that deteriorated during the last decade with the old regime, and though the country has
one of the most vital private sectors in Africa, the challenges are still many. Kenya could again be the driving force of a poverty-struck east-African region.

The IP-ERS points out the three pillars that form the main development objectives: strengthening economic growth, enhancing equity and reducing poverty, and improving governance (ibid: i). Like a PRSP, the IP-ERS constitutes the government official plan for growth in Kenya. And like in countries that operate only with PRSPs, the Bank has constructed the CAS in close relation with the IP-ERS. The framework for the CAS we intend to analyse, draws on the same framework as that of the IP-ERS. It is the last pillar, improving governance that strikes us as the most relevant to our discussion. But, as we remember from the theory in chapter 3 and 4, the concepts of economic growth, inequity and poverty reduction and improvement of governance are closely linked together. Kenya’s third pillar in the IP-ERS, improving governance, states that “to enhance governance, the program proposes far reaching reform of the judiciary, strengthening the rule of law and security, and implementing reforms in public administration to achieve increased transparency and accountability.” (ibid.). What is then the Bank’s strategy for development in Kenya?

The World Bank Group’s strategic objectives for Kenya are:

- Strengthening public sector management and accountability, parastatal reform and privatisation, and monitoring and evaluation capacity.

- Reducing the cost of doing business and improving the investment climate, including support of restructuring the financial sector, promoting private sector development, improving infrastructure as the basis for economic growth, and reducing barriers to trade.

- Reducing vulnerability and strengthening communities, including support for increased agricultural productivity and competitiveness, improved environmental management, strengthened local governments, and reducing poverty in the poorest rural areas and urban slums.
• Investing in people, including support for an improved understanding of poverty, the health sector, the education sector, and the national fight against HIV/AIDS (ibid.)

1) PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Of the biggest challenges facing the government of Kenya, is the development of infrastructure to channel basic social services out to the poor. The Bank will support the reforms set by the government, through the IP-ERS, in several ways. With regards to Public Sector Management itself, the Bank will follow up the Public Sector Management Technical Assistance Program that is due to end in the fiscal year 2005. The Program provides support to capacity building in the civil service, improving internal auditing, development of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), implementation of a financial management information system, and improving procurement practices (Kenya-CAS: 11). To follow up on the Program that is soon to end, the Bank will support a Public Sector Reform Technical Assistance Project, which will include the support of reforms in rationalising ministries and the civil service, strengthening of the Kenya Revenue Authority and strengthening of the public expenditure management. The use of Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) will be increased, with extended discussions with stakeholders in civil society and other relevant groups about the public expenditure, to ensure transparency in the government’s work (ibid.).

To combat potential misuse of public funds, the Bank will support reforms in parastatals (read: state-controlled enterprises). As the parastatals can be a massive source of income for the government, the Bank will help to increase their competitiveness and efficiency through budget preparations, technical assistance and assistance in the relevant sectors. If the Bank can help in this preliminary part of the process, and not merely contributing with a single credit (loan), the enterprises will hopefully be able to work on commercial terms, eliminating the
financial burden the loss-making enterprises have on the national economy (ibid: 12).

Several funds from different donors (DFID, Norwegian Trust Fund among others) channelled through the Bank will help to increase the evaluation and monitoring of public expenditure and policy-making. The use of statistics and measurement of poverty indicators will help the flow of information and the transparency of projects and policy-making.

2) REDUCING THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS AND IMPROVING THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE

Of the four Strategic Objectives, this one is given the most space in the CAS for Kenya. The high cost of doing business (cost of financial and infrastructural services) in Kenya is limiting the development of the private sector. This again, will lead to limited access to basic services by the poor. Improvement of the business and investment climate will include reforms of financial services, polices for private sector in the provision-industry, management of infrastructural services, and reforms in trade policy (ibid: 13).

Restructuring Financial Services

To cope with a fragile financial sector and to build institutional capacity, the Bank proposes two financial sector operations: the Financial and Legal Technical Assistance Credit (FLSTAC) will focus on the capacity to deliver financial services and to solve in a fair manner disputes and disagreements. The Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC) will support institutional reforms including review the state’s ownerships in the banks, improved supervision of banks, and support for a policy to improve access to financial services especially in rural areas (ibid: 14). Programmes for a sustainable pension systems, mortgage programmes, housing finance institutions and improving financial services for small and medium enterprises have also been proposed.

Private Sector Development
The Bank’s support on Private Sector Development will be based on a series of studies that have just been completed or are underway of being completed. The Bank will follow up on the Kenyan government’s own recognition of the importance of revitalising private sector investment, as well as downsizing the role of the state in productive enterprises to boost production and competitiveness. Measures needed include improving efficiency in the supply chain, to upgrade skills and to reduce administrative barriers to private sector investment (ibid.). Also, to promote Private Sector Development, the Bank will help with the dialogue between the government, private sector, civil society, development partners and others. Additionally, a pilot-project is under way to introduce advanced information technology to improve the communication between the mentioned (ibid.).

**Infrastructure for Growth**

In upgrading the road networks in the north and west of the country (the Northern Corridor), and upgrading the Uganda and Kenya Railways, the Bank will support the government in reducing the costs of transportation. Preferably, this will also foster regional integration and increase competitiveness. The management of these heavy investments will be supported through the Northern Corridor Transport Improvement Project, and with close cooperation with other development partners. To improve tourism, security measures are to be promoted in the biggest airports and in dialogue with the Federal Aviation Authority. Also important regarding infrastructure, are the improvement of energy-, water- and sanitation management (ibid: 17).

**Reducing Barriers to Trade**

Most important on the issue of trade, is the trade relations with neighbouring countries. Kenya’s trade is growing much faster than the trade with other parts of the world (ibid.). The Bank is thus concerned with the regional trade opportunities. For the Eastern Africa Community (EAC) the Bank has performed a study showing the positive effects of common external tariffs between the
relevant countries. Through the EAC, the Bank will support the establishment of a new customs secretariat, as well as a trade-and transport-facilitation project. In addition, the Bank will support environmental management-improvement of the shared resources in the Lake Victoria area.

3) REDUCING VULNERABILITY AND STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES

Crucial to Kenyan poverty reduction is the involvement of the rural areas. As the great majority of the population live in rural areas, the raising of their income could prove as a massive trigger of development. Vulnerable groups and the strength of communities constitute the third Strategic Objective.

Firstly, there is a need for an increase in agricultural productivity and competitiveness. The Bank will support analytical and research-initiatives that will enhance the knowledge on the agricultural markets, on governmental policies’ effect on rural areas, the linkages between agriculture and economic growth, and will also include studies on commodities such as cotton and tea. Through the Public Sector Reform Technical Assistance Project, the Bank will advise on the mechanisms between the government and the agricultural sector. For instance, it will support a defining of the core functions that the government has in this respect. This to enhance the effectiveness of the government’s role. This also includes a possible restructuring of major agricultural parastatals (that is the companies or agencies wholly or partly owned by the state). Donor partners such as DFID, USAID and the European Union will help the reform process in key institutions as well as improving mechanism on reducing risks and vulnerabilities in the sector (Kenya- CAS: 20). The general competitiveness of the agricultural sector will be improved through transforming the sector into a more demand-driven and pluralistic system. The farmers will gain greater control over their own production sites. In addition, regional trade arrangements will hopefully
help to improve the sector in an increased focus on the export mechanisms of the commodities that Kenya has comparative advantages on (ibid.).

Second, to reduce the vulnerabilities of the local communities, the Bank will help to strengthen *environmental management*, mainly in terms of management of natural resources and the coastal zone. In addition to a focus on the Lake area, the Bank will with help of other development partners, seek to (i) include in a greater way forest-and water resources into the Kenyan economy, (ii) to protect the biodiversity that so much of Kenya’s tourism is dependent on and, (iii) to explore the connections between economic growth and environmental management (ibid.).

The third point concerns *local governance itself*. UK’s DFID has been the Bank’s major partner in this respect. While the Kenyan government has already acknowledged that an improvement of local government institutions is necessary for improving the delivery of basic services to the poor, the Bank and DFID has, and will continue to, further specify the demands needed at local levels as well as the local governments’ resources to meet them. The central government has, through its constitutional review process, started to redefine the structures and areas of responsibilities of the local elected councils versus the tasks of central ministries. The Bank’s support is mainly technical, advisory and procedural. Through a proposed Public Sector Reform Technical Assistance Project (to be launched in the fiscal year 2007), focus will be laid on institutional, legal, technical and procedural reforms both in the central and the local level (Kenya-CAS: 21).

The fourth and final point regarding reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening communities is the work against the poverty in the *country’s poorest regions and in the urban slums*. The Community Driven Development (CDD) scheme that has been successful in 11 provinces is to be expanded to 22. These schemes are aimed at the poorest regions in serious need of better management on drought-control, rural service-delivery and HIV/AIDS-control. In addition to the Technical Assistance Project mentioned above, the Bank will in the urban slums support
studies on youth and poverty, mainly in Nairobi. The fight against gender inequalities is important for development in all communities. The government and the Bank stress that women are more likely to be poor and that they are more exposed to adverse shocks (ibid.). To fight these inequities mechanisms of participation in local projects are launched to secure equal rights and goods. Also, projects in the agricultural sector and similar are set out to increase the employment of women.

4) INVESTING IN PEOPLE

The fourth, and last, Strategic Objective concerns the more social sides of poverty. The Bank wants to support four areas: the Understanding of Poverty, Health, HIV/AIDS, and Education (ibid: 22-24).

To increase both the Bank’s and the government’s understanding of poverty, the Bank will support a wide variety of assessments and studies on the impacts and consequences of poverty. The Bank will help the further development of such institutions as the Central Bureau of Statistics, as information and data about, for instance, people’s access to health and education are crucial to improve policy-making. Also, surveys on household, migration and productivity of crops, are useful to improve service delivery, which is something the Bank will support.

The Bank believes the improvement of people’s health is crucial to poverty reduction, and is in compliance with the government’s own strategies. The support in the health sector represents a combination of analytical work (through a pharmaceutical review and a health sector public expenditure review), capacity building and targeted interventions. Capacity-building and interventions primarily include the decentralisation of service delivery while making the ministry’s more efficient. The services to be decentralised mainly regard projects on child survival, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. Also, the medical supplies sector will undergo decentralisation (ibid: 23).
“The Bank is vigorously supporting the government’s program.” (ibid.) on HIV/AIDS. This support evolves around a combination of a vast number of community-level initiatives and one large regional one, the Africa Region’s Multi-Country AIDS Program.

Being a top priority of the government, Education also is important to the Bank. The focus is on primary and secondary education is emphasised through grants by the Bank to support an Early Childhood Development Project and the new Free Primary Education Project (ibid: 24). In addition, the Bank supports a Public Expenditure Review (PER) and analytical work on primary and secondary education. However, in the future the Bank’s approach will be of a more programmatic nature compared to the analytical and financial approach here shown.

3.3 The Republic of Chad

Being a highly densely populated state, the republic of Chad has had some serious problems building a nation since it broke out of French rule in 1960. Ethnic strive dominated the country in the three decades following independence. The history of conflict in Chad, and its fragmented and densely populated geography has resulted in weak institutions both on all three levels of government. Corruption is rooted in a state structure also infected with patron-client-relationships, giving low competitiveness and low transparency in both the private and the public sphere.

3.3.1 Developmental Status and the Bank Strategy

“The overarching objective of the CAS of Chad is to help Chad make the best possible developmental use of its new oil revenues-as well as public resources more broadly-to attain the MDG’s.” (Chad- CAS: 16). Reaching for this objective, the CAS has two pillars. Initially, one can say that the first one is political and the other is economic. The first reads: “…to strengthen governance, including resource management and service delivery arrangements, the rule of law, and
environmental and social safeguards for oil exploitation.” (Ibid). The second pillar “… is to ensure inclusive, broad-based growth as the country embarks on oil-production.” (Ibid.). The CAS for Chad is results-based. This does not mean that it is based on indicators from goals already set, or from results that have or have not been achieved. It means that it is based on a framework of forecasted results. More specifically, the CAS sets up expected outcomes from itself to be achieved in three years. In addition it has a link through these goals to what the Chadian government has set out in its PRSP. The first pillar (the governance-pillar for simplicity’s sake) is again divided in two categories with a reference to what part of the PRSP it complements. The first point, that public resources and oil revenue is to be spent transparently and accountably, refers to chapter 4.2.1 in the PRSP titled “Improvement in Governance”. The second part of the first pillar, concerns that the rule of law and the governance structures are strengthened. This again, refers to chapter 4.2.1.1 in the PRSP named “Consolidation of the rule of law”. (Chad-CAS: 17). The economy-pillar is also divided in two: (i) increase economic opportunities outside oil, which is founded in the PRSPs chapters on “Achievement of strong and sustained economic growth”, “Development of basic infrastructure” and “Achieve a sustainable increase in rural production”, and (ii) expand opportunities and reduce vulnerability, which refers to “Role of the state/decentralization” and “Improvement in human capital” in the PRSP (ibid.).

The Bank sets out the goals of both the pillars as concrete achievements. Let us look closer at a few of the specific challenges facing the Chadian development of the state and the “new” economy by a presentation of the two pillars.

**PILLAR ONE: STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE**

1) The Public Procurement System: The Bank will support the government to secure transparency and efficiency in the procurement system, through the government’s adoption of the Public Procurement Code. Computerised monitoring and frequent audits will see to that procurement contracts and
transaction of public funds will happen within certain limits of time and be
done with necessary competitiveness and transparency.

2) The Budget: The Bank will help to improve the preparation, execution and
monitoring of the Budget and help the proper ministries to be able to track
government expenditure. An improvement of preparation, execution and
monitoring will include a design-and process-evaluation, capacity-building of
priority sectors, ensuring efficient use of new resources and developing new
scenarios for oil revenue. The public expenditure-tracking includes annual
participatory reviews by civil servants and the civil society in a broad sense.
This to enhance the accountability of and efficiency in the government budget
and expenditure. Computerised management will be a priority as well.

3) Oversight and Control Institutions: Through support, training technical
assistance, the Bank will help to further develop organs that are built to control
and monitor government actions, especially regarding the Petroleum sector.
These institutions are independent, like the Collège de Contrôle et de
Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières (CCSRP). A development of control-
organs in other parts of the state structure (e.g. the Parliament, Ministry of
Finance) will also be encouraged.

4) Environment and Social Safeguards in Oil Activities: In implementing an
Environment Management Plan, the Bank will help to ensure monitoring and
preparation of oil exploitation. Parallel to this, capacity-building of the
Ministry of Environment and Water is a priority, together with the
management of protected areas and environmental regulations.

5) Strengthening the Rule of Law and Improving Security: The CAS for Chad
states that a poor judicial system and an unstable defence and security force is
a characteristic of poor governance. The Chadian government itself made this
a top priority in its PRSP. However, the ensuring of this sector as a priority is
in danger because it is not included in the Petroleum Revenue Management
Programme, hence, it might soon be in lack of funding. The Bank will therefore support the judiciary and security sectors through various channels. The judiciary will go through a strategy for reform financed by the Bank, other donors and through a subordinate Petroleum Economy Project. Security challenges will be met with the support of a programme to re-integrate 25 000 former combatants into civil, social and economic activities. The IDA will provide funding for an additional 5000 combatants. Finally, the Bank will help the decentralisation process forwards by developing further the legal and regulatory provisions needed.

**PILLAR 2: ENSURING BROAD-BASED GROWTH**

1) To **increase the opportunities outside oil**, the Bank will support the improvement of availability and infrastructure in the economy. First, the transport system and the transport services will become more reliable and efficient. This will be reached through investments and through community-initiatives towards pavement of roads, training-measures and promotion of rural transports. Second, the Bank will support the reliability and availability of energy and electricity. Technical and financial support will ensure the expansion of energy to rural and peri-urban areas. Thirdly, there will be an improvement of private firms’ access to financing. SME-lending, technical support and investments will seek to improve the growth of private companies in local and urban areas. Fourth, there is to be an improvement in urban infrastructure. Water, sanitation and drainage will be updated to improve the quality of life of citizens in urban areas. Finally, production in the agricultural sector is to be broadened. Productivity, especially in the cotton-sector, is supported, empowerment of local authorities’ decision-making over rural infrastructure is supported, road networks are supported, and, the monitoring of the ministries in charge of rural development is also supported (ibid: 22).

2) To **expand opportunities and reduce vulnerabilities**, the Bank supports the development and empowerment of communities and vulnerable groups, as
well as the delivery of basic services. Community participation will be supported through frameworks for decentralised funding, strengthening the capacity of local communities and the implementation of demand-driven community projects. Hereunder, interventions, financing and prevention-and condoms- programmes to fight HIV/AIDS will be supported. With regards to basic services, a six-regions-initiative is supported to improve access to health. Mainly, the Ministry of Health will be helped to monitor and manage health programmes to fight epidemics and disease. On primary and secondary education, the Bank is supporting instruments to increase the teachers in local schools. Basic training and financing of this provision will be encouraged. Beyond this goal, the Bank will in the future focus on the overall access to education, especially for girls, be of assistance in the training of teachers and the building of schools as well as promote higher education. Finally, programmes towards drinkable water and sanitation will be supported. In the rural areas this means a strengthening of the dialogue with the government and the local communities as well as technical assistance to implement rural water supplies. In the urban areas this will mean a rehabilitation of the existing installations, as well as a critical improvement of the sanitation facilities in the main cities (ibid: 24).
4. FINDING THE PATTERNS - Analysing the CASes

4.1 Introduction

As one would expect, the Country Assistance Strategy papers of the World Bank are shaped by many things. The team of researchers and analysts that put the papers together are subject to influence by trends, norms and guidelines within the Bank itself, but also to influence by numerous external factors, the most obvious might be the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. Some of the people working on the CASes are located in the countries of study and some are situated in Europe or the United States. The main thing that the CAS should be influenced by however, is the countries’ own plan for poverty reduction, usually the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) or Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy (IP-ERS). As we have gone through earlier in the dissertation, the CASes are meant to follow up on the established strategies of the recipient country. Throughout the CASes, the Bank’s objectives are subject to several comparisons with the PRSPs and the IP-ERS’, both to show the relevance of the objectives and the overarching challenges facing the respective country. The terms used in these comparisons to describe the relationship between countries’ challenges and the Bank’s strategies are overall compatible. Our task however, is to look beyond this relationship, to see how the Bank strategies compare with our theoretical-approaches. We want to match the patterns of the theory-approaches with the patterns of the Country Assistance Strategies. I will perform this pattern-matching in depth country by country, and then, knit the three together in the end. I will analyse the countries in the same order as in the former chapter, starting with Zambia followed by Kenya and finishing off with Chad.
4.2 Zambia

The Bank Group’s Country Assistance Programme for Zambia, as laid out in chapter 5.2, consists of three Strategic Objectives: (1) Sustained Economic Growth Anchored in a Diversified and Export-Oriented Economy, (2) Improved Lives and Protection of the Vulnerable, and (3) Efficiently and Effectively Managed Public Sector. These Priorities form the platform which all other aspects of the CAS are built around (Lending Scenarios, Lending Triggers, Evaluation Programs, Risk Management, Partnerships in the Region etc). It is the three Priorities that are of importance to us, and which constitutes the program for development. Initially, the three Priorities seem compatible with our earlier classification of three of the development-terms; the social-, structural- and economic approach. The first one is an economy-aimed goal, the second a social-and “opportunity-related” goal, and the third is a structural aimed goal. However, this is not sufficient for our discussion. Let us use the Objectives as a point of departure, as we did in the presentation of the CASes in chapter 5, and match the Theoretic Approaches against these.

OBJECTIVE 1- Sustained Economic Growth Anchored in a Diversified and Export-Oriented Economy

The first Priority is divided in two, a Growth Conducive Macroeconomic Environment, and a Diversified and Export-Oriented Economy. Both parts are concerned with creating a healthy environment and climate for, respectively, economic growth itself and for an exporting and diverse industry. Thus, the two parts, and indeed the sustained poverty reduction in the country, are shaped by a focus on economic growth as a prerequisite for poverty reduction: “Zambia’s quest for sustained poverty reduction depends largely on achieving macroeconomic stability and creating an economic environment conducive for growth, diversification, and export orientation.” (Zambia-CAS: 16).

At first, Strategic Objective number one seem straight forward, a pure economic goal in accordance with The Growth Approach. As we remember from the theory (chapter
4.1), the Growth Approach includes the following terms: Resource Accumulation and Production, Economic Policies and Spin-off Effects. The Bank programme for the first Strategic Objective evolves around different sectors, and in most of these sectors the programme is very much economic. The Bank has projects concerning the development and strengthening of the financial sector and the state-owned financial institutions to increase investments. Also, the Bank has projects to improve private investments, trade and labour-intensive and regional business development. These objectives are mostly in accordance with the Growth-Approach. The Bank is involved in labour-intensive development and a diversification of the economy and the industry, which is easily seen as Resource Accumulation and Production-enhancing policies and as clear policies aimed at creating Spin-off Effects in the economy to create a healthy environment for growth. However, the CAS gives an impression of something more. The Bank is also concerned, in the first Strategic Objective, with two other areas: interventions towards improving the government’s management of resources in an efficient, transparent and accountable manner (Zambia-CAS: 18), and technical education and entrepreneurship training aimed at underrepresented groups (ibid: 20). These initiatives by the Bank are, in my view, not so much economy-building as they are capacity-building. Capacity in the sense of the Structural Capacity-approach and the Social Capacity-approach. The improvement of the government’s management of resources in an accountable and transparent manner is an initiative that basically touches the three other Approaches of our theory. The dynamics of accountability between the government and the public opinion is an element of building Social Capacity. The notion of Transparency in state institutions is, according to our theoretic framework, an element of an African Uniqueness Approach, aimed at building predictability and trust in institutions.

The first Strategic Objective of the CAS for Zambia includes mainly elements of the Growth-approach, projects aimed at strengthening the economy and financial market through production, environment for investment and the sound accumulation of resources. But the Objective also includes clear elements of capacity-building through a Social-, Structural- and an African Uniqueness-approach; to deepen the
sustainability and to ensure the effectiveness of the economic policies, the Bank want to see accountability, statecraft (willingness by the state to make sound actions) and transparency. In addition, the CAS refers mostly to Objective 3 regarding accountability and transparency: “The Bank’s interventions are geared towards improving the Government’s ability to manage its resources efficiently and effectively in a transparent and accountable manner (see strategic priority 3)…” (ibid: 18). As the Bank refers to the third Objective (on public sector management), and with the emphasis on strengthening underrepresented groups, it is clear that the goals the Bank have for economic growth and diversified economy can not work without the two following Objectives.

OBJECTIVE 2 – Improved Lives and Protection of the Vulnerable

Objective number two by the Bank is divided in three: to improve health and long-term survival among vulnerable groups, the coverage and quality of education, and the protection of vulnerable individuals and communities. The first two are in most respects aimed at concrete social indicators, a sort of direct poverty reduction through improvement of health and education, though not in an emergency aid context. Rather, the programmes toward health and education are constructed around and in cooperation with the relevant ministries and other institutions. So, they are improvements of the authorities that are to deal with the challenges on a local level in Zambia.

The third part of this Objective concerns vulnerable groups, including malnourished, HIV/AIDS-affected, women, the unemployed and people in remote areas. The initiative by the Bank is related to emergency prevention in times of climate changes and food shortages. Its aims are to help the government provide food security and social security in crisis. Though this may also sound like emergency aid and drought- and famine early warning systems for instance, it is clear that the Bank’s intentions are on a more structural and government-level policy making. As the CAS states: “In light of the complex and crosscutting nature of risk and vulnerability in Zambia, the Bank is assisting Government in developing a cross-sectoral Social Protection
Strategy.” (ibid: 24). As this project is to be seen as a top-down initiative on human development, and not on a local level, I argue that this falls in under a Structural Capacity-approach, to increase the statecraft of the Zambian government. Also on the same Objective, the Bank seeks to strengthen the rural areas and the agricultural sector. To increase food security and protect the living conditions of the poor, pilot programmes on labour intensive agricultural production in rural areas are to be implemented. This is to be managed in combination with feeding programmes in primary schools to increase knowledge among one of the most sensitive groups: the children. The rural development policies just mentioned are a combination of an economic growth approach and a social capacity-approach. I argue that a higher focus on labour intensive activities on a local level is a combination of a Spin-Off-centred economic policy that seek to increase production and the people’s purchasing power, and a social capacity-approach that seek to empower and mobilise the local communities. If one sees an increased production of agricultural products in a given community, and this is followed by food-knowledge programmes in the primary schools in that community, then I argue that both economic and human development is taken into consideration. Though there are elements of the Structural-and the Growth-approach under the second Objective, this must mainly be seen as a Social Capacity-approach. In chapter 4.1 I expected to find programmes for mobilisation and empowerment for peoples and individuals. This seems to be the aim of the second Objective, with for instance the Social Protection Strategy (see above). With the Structural Capacity-approach, I expected, among other things, to find programmes for rewarding frontline service providers and decentralisation of institutions for such provision. I have found no indications of these. On education, for instance, the Bank programme is concerned with efficiency in the Ministry and with funding for building two new high schools (ibid: 24). I have mentioned that the top-down initiative on Social Protection has elements of the Structural Capacity-approach, to increase the Statecraft. But there are no signs in this Objective of frontline service provision. Not even regarding HIV/AIDS, can this said to be the reality: “The HIV/AIDS National Strategic Framework is receiving support from the Bank and a range of other bilateral and multilateral donors (…) In Zambia, a
sustained political leadership, similar to Uganda and Botswana, is required to help mobilize support for behaviour change…” (ibid: 23). This concentrates on creating willingness in the government, but can hardly be said to directly promote local, frontline human development work.

OBJECTIVE 3- Efficiently and Effectively Managed Public Sector

The Bank’s Strategic Objective number three is one that concerns two of the most ‘trendy’ terms of the international development debate: good governance and public sector management. In the introduction of the Bank’s overview of this third objective, it states that “While macroeconomic stability and private investment are preconditions for stimulating growth, the effective delivery of basic services depends upon improving the performance of the public sector.”(ibid.). This Objective is split in two, Transparency and Accountability in the Public Sector, and Productivity and Efficiency in the Public Service. Thus, the issue on Public Sector Management regards, on one hand, the management of the bureaucracy and institutional and budgetary processes, and the decentralisation and efficiency of service delivery to fight poverty on the other.

In the first issue, A Transparent and Accountable Public Sector, the Bank seeks to improve the public sector through budget management, procurement systems and the accountability of public funds. The Bank will mainly do this through a combination of traditional lending and through Analytical and Advisory Activities (AAA). In this, the budget should be used not only as a tool for the government’s economic and financial priorities, but also as a tool to tighten the discipline around the use of limited resources. The legal and regulatory framework on procurement is to be strengthened to limit the prospects of corruption. In addition, the authorities responsible for procurement management (Zambia National Tender Board for instance) should be gradually decentralised. Regarding the use of national funds, the Office of the Auditor General and the Parliament should strengthen their roles as oversight-and reporting- institutions. A Financial Information System and an
enhanced legal framework should increase the capacity of the monitoring in the areas of resource allocation, budget execution and accounting (ibid: 26).

In the second issue of Strategic Objective 3, concerning the Public Service, the Bank hopes for a combination of effective service delivery to the poor and a creation of an environment for private investment and growth. The Bank programme for assistance include reforms for a sustainable and competitive wage system in the public service, projects to secure line ministries to make a more effective use of budget down to frontline service providers, strengthening of monitoring and evaluation of the public sector with reports to the Parliament, and, to strengthen local government capacities and community-driven development.

There are a number of elements in Strategic Objective 3 that comply with the notions of good governance, as we defined governance in the introduction (page 7). I will argue that this Objective is one that is dominated by the African Uniqueness-approach, with elements of the Growth-approach and the Structural Capacity-approach. The African Uniqueness-approach, as I have argued in chapter 3.5, is one that sees the efficiency-deficits of the state institutions in combination with the culture of African bureaucracy (in many states based on patrimonialism), more specifically, where the boundaries of these institutions are, and that there is a severe lack of transparency. When the Bank aim to bring the budget process and the procurement processes “down to” a frontline service provision-level (e.g. increasing accountability by making sure resources is allocated to the local level and constructing line ministries), and, when it aims to strengthen monitoring of the public expenditure, it says that there is an efficiency-deficit and that there is a lack of transparency. The Bank, as one would expect, does not say anything of the reasons for lack of efficiency and transparency, as this probably would come in conflict with the Bank’s mandate.

The types of programmes I expected to find within the African Uniqueness-approach are well represented in the third Objective. Publicity around the budget-and fund-processes, opportunities and transparency in bidding-and procurement-processes,
public sector management and effectiveness in this are all a part of the Objective. However, programmes for fighting corruption in its purer form are not mentioned. The sound usage of public resources and funds demands obviously limited corruption, but there are no direct projects of this aim. The word ‘corruption’ is hardly mentioned.

A DOMINANT PATTERN?

What Approach is the Country Assistance Strategy for Zambia then dominated by? As I have noted before, the CAS is aligned with the PRSP/TNDP constructed by the Zambian government. The latter’s main goal is to “Promote Growth and Diversification In Production and Exports, To improve Delivery of Social Services And to Incorporate Crosscutting Policies for HIV/AIDS, Gender, and Environment” (ibid; 16). In my view, both the PRSP/TNDP and the CAS are quite broad in their approach to development. Except from some infrastructural aims in the mining industry and some regional trade-goals, it doesn’t seem like the CAS is very custom made for Zambia. As the long-term goals for Strategic Priority 2 is specified for instance (improving lives and protection of the vulnerable), the specifying is merely to improve health and long term survival, improve education, and to improve security for individuals, households and communities (ibid; 16). The long-term clear aims as to why this represents a special challenge in Zambia is not given. In the CAS for Chad for instance, is at large dominated by the country’s new situation as an oil-producing country. Oil may obviously represent a much bigger shift in the economy, but it is still odd that the primary commodity, copper, is given so little space, considering that it represents 80% of the income from exports. On the other hand, the policies actually presented in the CAS, are aimed at, among other things, building a climate for investments and a diversification of the economy. This should mean that the Bank is taken measures to decrease the vulnerability given by the situation Zambia is in at the moment, being too dependent on one export commodity. At the start of the CAS, the Bank gives some reasons for why the lending programme looks
like it does. It is argued that the Zambian portfolio (read: the economic and financial abilities/opportunities/capacities of the state) has been limited by weak implementation capacity of the government, and that inefficient procurement, inadequate release of Government funds and weak project management by the government have all contributed to poor commitment and ownership (ibid: 13). Thus, it is not necessarily a lack of financial-and investment opportunities that is the main problem, it is the government’s lack of commitment to these opportunities and its lack of capacity to take advantage of them that is the main problem. It seems rather an issue of poor governance than of a lack of resources and opportunities.

Not surprisingly, there are elements of all four Theory-Approaches in the CAS for Zambia. Actually, as I have shown above, the three Strategic Objectives are dominated by each of the four Approaches. The first is steered by the Growth-approach, with elements of the three others to provide the “climate for growth” through resource-and production accumulation. The second Objective is steered by the Social-and the Structural Capacity-approach to provide human development and social security for vulnerable groups through improvement of statecraft and increased empowerment, with touches of the Growth-approach to create Spin-Off effects. However, the emphasis lies on the Social Capacity-approach through the empowerment of vulnerable groups. Finally, the third Objective is steered by the African Uniqueness-approach to make improve Public Sector Management through monitoring and increased transparency. From this, we can see that the only Approach that is represented in all three Strategic Objectives is the Growth-approach.

The fact that I have found what Yin would call a theoretical replication across cases (see page 14), strengthens the internal validity of my research. But, in the case of Zambia, the replication seems to be almost perfect. Why is this? Where do the reasons for this ideal pattern-match lie? With regards to the terms extracted from the theory- approaches (page 28 and onwards), I have found at least one from each approach in the three Strategic Objectives of the CAS, terms from the Growth-approach being the most represented. The question remaining then, is how broad the
CAS is compared to other CASes, how “all-catching” is it? Are the CASes of the Bank taking the ‘safe route’ in including several development-paths, or is Zambia special in that it requires attention to very many parts of society? To answer these questions, let us continue with Chad and Kenya.

4.3 Kenya

The Bank’s programme for assistance in the Republic of Kenya consist of four Strategic Objectives: Strengthening public sector management and accountability, Reducing the cost of doing business and improving the investment climate, Reducing vulnerability and strengthening communities, and, Investing in people. These Objectives are aligned with the three pillars of the government’s Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy (IP-ERS), which are (i) Economic Growth with macroeconomic stability, (ii) Equity and poverty reduction, and (iii) Improving governance (Kenya-CAS: i). However, in the following analysis of what development theory-approach dominates the CAS, it can be interesting have in mind a few shortcomings that the Bank staff find in the IP-ERS. First, the IP-ERS’ analysis of poverty needs to be strengthened with regards to information gathered in surveys and determinants. Second, a more specific prioritising and identification of the policies towards growth and pro-poor spending programmes could be presented. Third, clearer strategies for health and education programmes to reach the MDGs would be preferable. Fourth, capacity-building in key areas is to be more specifically spelled out, especially those funded by the donor community. Fifth, systems for monitoring poverty outcomes are weak. Finally, preferred outcomes of future consultations and poverty diagnoses should be better described (ibid: 9).

Starting with the first Strategic Objective, let us now go through the Bank programmes for assistance, to see what of our theory-approaches are the most dominant.

OBJECTIVE 1- Strengthening public sector management and accountability
This first Objective is one that refers to governance. More specifically it refers to the management of resources, an efficient and effective public administration, rational budget making, and an effective service delivery. The first two issues of the first Objective, Public Sector Management and Parastatal Reform and Privatisation are concerned with the government’s actions and spheres in which the government operate, while the third issue, Monitoring and Evaluation is concerned with “outside” initiatives to monitor the public expenditure decisions and the government’s policy-making.

The Public Sector Management initiative is constructed to improve the civil service, internal auditing, administrative capacity building, implementation of an advanced information system, and of procurement practices, and, is supported through lending and AAA. The concept of Public Sector Management, I argue, is as close to an operationalisation of “good governance” as one can come in the present development discourse, especially in the World Bank. But what type of Approach is it? Reforms in the bureaucracy or public sector mainly falls under the African Uniqueness-approach, with equal amounts of elements from the Structural Capacity-approach (the search for Statecraft in state institutions) and from the Social Capacity-approach (the Monitoring and Evaluation). A hint of the Growth-approach is also detectable. The main reason I argue it is the African Uniqueness that is dominant, is that the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of the Public Sector has most to do with the Boundaries of the State and Transparency. Though it is easy to argue that public sector reforms are instruments to improve state structures and institutions, i.e. Structural Capacity, I have labelled this under a different path to development because I find that the problems in the bureaucracy in many sub-Saharan African countries are unique. The CAS for Kenya is one year old in the time of writing, and the careful introduction of New Public Management is merely in an early stage.

There is another feature that strengthens the presence of the African Uniqueness-approach, especially in Strategic Objective one. The Bank considers the multi-sector fight against corruption as vital for further development in Kenya (ibid; 10).
Measures against corruption are to be taken parallel with the Strategic Objectives, and include legal and procedural instruments to improve transparency in procurement-and tender-processes, project management and budgetary issues. I see corruption in relation with the African Uniqueness-approach. Not because we don’t see corruption elsewhere in the world, but because I believe that corruption in African state institutions create the need for a specific type of development. I am certainly not alone on connecting corruption with transparency, but I also consider it to be highly connected to the ‘boundaries of the state’, i.e. also it is highly connected to neopatrimonialism. As we saw in chapter 2.4, Chabal and Daloz argued that neopatrimonialism is the main obstacle to overcome if there is to be a successful emergence of the state.

Strategic Objective 1 also discusses Parastatal reform and Privatisation. This is where Objective 1 touches the Growth-approach. An economic element in an otherwise society-and institution-based Objective. This issue has to do with the governance of businesses and enterprises, mainly those controlled by the state. As the main goal is to eliminate the financial risks of the parastatals, making them work on commercial terms, the Growth-approach appears with the terms economic policies and spin-off effects. Again, we see a link between traditional governance-policies and economic growth-policies with the notion of creating a healthy climate for growth. Looking past this naivety however, there is little doubt the reforms of the parastatals in many cases mean privatisation, or in the words of the Bank, private sector development. Our intention is not to question how good development this is, but to determine what development it is, and it should be clear that this is an economic goal, even though an initial set goal is to “…make an important contribution to growth and governance by increasing the efficiency and competitiveness of public enterprises, and by reducing opportunities for misappropriation of public funds.” (ibid: 11), which is a goal influenced by monitoring (Social Capacity-approach) and transparency (African Uniqueness-approach).
The third issue of the first Strategic Objective is called Monitoring and Evaluation, the same as one of our Social Capacity-approaches. In the Social Capacity-approach, Monitoring and Evaluation is an instrument of Accountability, an instrument mainly for the citizens to be able to make the government responsible for its actions. In the first Objective however, the emphasis is laid on information and data collection for the government, making it better able to measure poverty. At the end, some space is spent on support for expenditure reviews and tracking, which would mean the same as in the Social Capacity-approach. Nevertheless, instruments supported by the Bank that are to improve the evaluation and monitoring of the government’s activities, mainly with regards to poverty, are in accordance with the Social Capacity-approach in it that it promotes the people’s voice and the government’s awareness of the people’s wishes.

Strategic Objective 1 is dominated by the African Uniqueness-approach, with the focus on public sector management. More specifically, the focus on creating transparency and an effective state apparatus. The boundaries of the state are to be improved, i.e. a clearer definition of the spheres in which the state is to operate. In addition, the other theory-approaches are touched. However, this is relatively incidental. Elements of the Growth-and Structural-approach are, I argue, mentioned as means to reach the goal of transparency and boundaries of the state within the African Uniqueness-approach. In addition, there is a clear focus on anti-corruption, which is one element of the African Uniqueness-approach that I expected to see, and which is one that weren’t present in the case of Zambia.

OBJECTIVE 2- Reducing the Cost of doing Business and Improving the Investment Climate

This Objective is to be reached through four issues: Restructuring financial services, Promotion of private sector development, Infrastructure for growth, and Reducing barriers to trade. Among the four Strategic Objectives in the Country Assistance for Kenya, this is initially the economic-growth related.
Of the terms that we have extracted from the Growth-approach, it is the Economic Policies that are the most compatible with Restructuring Financial Services. As the goals by the Bank are to Deepen the financial intermediation, Expand access to financial services, Enhanced economic governance (corporate governance) of the banking sector, and Reduced state-controlled banking sector, this goal is to promote offensive moves by the government to create a broader growth in the sector. Such Economic Policies can appear building Structural Capacity, through improving Statecraft. However, as I have noted before, I choose to see Economic Policies as different from the possible good governance-centred state, no matter how much these policies are pro-growth. For instance, the growth-path taken by South-Korea in the 60s-70s under General Park among others, can hardly be said to be good governance-centred, but secured an economic growth rate 18 times that of North-Korea (http://www.cia.gov/). So it is important to differ between economic measures taken for growth, and political measures taken for growth. The second issue in Objective 2 concerns Private Sector Investments. Initially also related to the Growth-approach, this issue is most compatible with Resource Accumulation and Production. Central in the Private Sector Development goal is improvement of the environment for small and medium size enterprises, reducing the cost of transport and telecom, and generate employment. If we are to argue that this issue are anything other than Growth-related, it can be mentioned that it seeks to strengthen the legal and regulatory frameworks of energy and water delivery (Kenya-CAS: 19). Even though legal and regulatory actions in the industrial sector such as this is aimed at improving the economy for citizens, improving law and legal procedures are often, as in this research, in accordance with good governance. Thus, it fits better in with the other three approaches than with the Growth-approach. Infrastructural Services is the third issue under Strategic Objective 2. This goal supported by the Bank is even more difficult to see as something other than in accordance with the Growth-approach. With relevance to security in transport, regional transport routes, the water-and energy sector, the aim is mainly to reduce costs, this again, to improve investments and the strengths of businesses. The last part of this Objective, reducing the barriers for trade, concerns the regional links Kenya has. It aims to improve the infrastructure
in the boarder regions, as well as make evaluations of the tariffs and taxes on regional trade. The CAS gives no targeted goals regarding the improvement of governance or other institutions in the issue of reducing trade barriers.

OBJECTIVE 3- Reducing Vulnerability and Strengthening Communities

The third Objective is targeted at the poorest part of the population, in the rural areas and in the urban slums. The programmes under this Objective can be described as a mixture of economic, political and social tools for reducing poverty in these regions. The programmes are: Increasing Agricultural Productivity and Competitiveness, Improving Environmental Management, Strengthening Local Governments and Reducing Poverty in Kenya’s Poorest Regions and Urban Slums (ibid: 20-21).

Objective 3 thus work on many levels, from reforms in the government organisations and analytical work on export commodities, to rural food security and the inclusion of women in production. When I argued that Public Sector Management and accountability in the first Objective was perhaps the purest form of good governance, this is arguably the broadest sense of the term. All approaches in the theoretic framework are in one form or another represented in this Objective. An increase in agricultural competitiveness requires production and investments. But before that can happen in a sufficient manner, the Bank will help with Advisory and Analytical Activities and a Technical Assistance Project. The Bank will then help to improve the efficiency among the responsible authorities and on a regional and local level. The agriculture is to be competitive, farmer-led and demand-driven. In addition, the Bank will help to put together a research that will study the linkages between poverty and agricultural growth. This first point, agricultural competitiveness and production, represents the Growth-approach element of this third Objective. Policies for production and resource accumulation, whether it is through lending, AAA or technical assistance, are by our standards and definitions, parts of the Growth-approach.
The next point in this Objective, is improving the environmental management. Environmental management can be a bit hard to place within a “path-for-development” context. The Bank will help to “…improve governance and management of Kenya’s natural resource base.” (ibid: 20). To do this, a combination of studies of environment and growth will take place, as well as various programmes for management of the country’s water-systems, eco-systems etc. I choose to see this point as wanting to create Spin-Off effects. Wanting to expand the environment-sector (in it being energy, nature, and other resources), can bring value in terms of labour and investments itself. But it also means contributing to sustainable economic growth by combining the need for substituting industries to make up for the value of the biodiversity one wants to preserve, with, for instance expanding tourism. This must account for Economic Policies and Resource Accumulation as we find it in the Growth-approach.

Strengthening local governments and poverty-struck communities I see mainly as a combination of an African Uniqueness-approach and a Social Capacity-approach. On local government development, the Bank will support improvements in procedures, institutions, legal frameworks and infrastructure to manage effectively the service delivery to the poor. The reason I see the African Uniqueness-approach in this part of the third Objective, is the scope and boundaries of the state institutions. The Bank proposes a decentralisation of service delivery-functions and authorities, giving the locals more responsibility and power to exercise the needs of its area. As regards to an African tradition of state apparatuses, I argue this represents a shift. Given the close links between neopatrimonialism and transparency-deficits, the African Uniqueness-approach is present. Also, it is clear that the Social Capacity-approach is present. The programmes initiated on the poorest regions and the urban slums are set to secure the rural livelihoods, service delivery in the slums, and works on gender inequities. This work that goes down almost to an individual level is mostly about empowerment and participation. Empowerment of the highly vulnerable groups that are living on practically nothing, and that are very vulnerable to climate shocks is crucial to poverty reduction. Participation is equally important. This goes not only for
women, but also for the young and poor living in urban slum-areas. The inclusion of these groups will increase Social Capacity.

OBJECTIVE 4- Investing in People

As laid out in the presentation of the CASes, chapter 3.2.1, the fourth and final Strategic Objective for Kenya concerns the traditional social indicators; Health, HIV/AIDS and Education, as well as several Bank programmes for Understanding Poverty. The latter is merely a description of the initiatives towards making statistics and information about the scope of poverty, better. It is presented as a range of Assessments to be made by the Bank and the government (Kenya-CAS: 22).

Though the programmes for Investing in People are recognisable as human development issues, the Bank’s assistance strategies are not necessarily that simple. To take the problems “by its roots”, the development approaches are various. Obviously, the Social Capacity-approach is present, with the empowerment and mobilisation of the people through increased knowledge of Health, HIV/AIDS and, and through, education. Reaching the MDGs with respect to primary education and the people living with diseases, would mean drastic empowerment of vulnerable groups. But, Objective 4 also has elements of other approaches. Both in the Health sector and the Education sector, the Bank wishes to safeguard the delivery of services. Firstly, the service delivery should be more decentralised in order for it to reach the frontline. Second, financial management and planning of the resources allocated for these sectors should be improved. Finally, the Bank stresses the need for the budgetary process to be more accountable and transparent (ibid: 23-24). As the intentions of the government are good, and good programmes are undergoing, there is a need to follow up these so that the long-term goals can be reached. These three last points stresses the need for increased Statecraft and Accountability through Monitoring and Evaluation, as well as Transparency in state processes. Thus, within the Social Capacity-approach that is dominant for Investing in People, Structural
Capacity and African Uniqueness is taken into account. With regards to improving governance, and what would constitute as African Uniqueness-based programmes, the Bank proposes for Kenya “– Enhance procurement systems, - Maintain coordinated and nonpoliticized administration of HIV/AIDS programs, and – Strengthen reporting mechanisms.” (ibid: 24).

A DOMINANT PATTERN?

In the Country Assistance Strategy for Zambia, we saw that all four development-approaches were represented. Not surprisingly, all four are also present in the CAS for Kenya, but not all four are dominant for each Strategic Objective. To sum up the findings, I will now identify one dominant approach for each Strategic Objective.

The first Objective, Strengthening Public Sector Management and Accountability, is dominated by the African Uniqueness-approach. The reason is, as we have touched upon earlier, that improving the efficiency of the public sector is best covered by the defining of the boundaries of the state, the remains of the neopatrimonialism and the lack of transparency in state institutions. The concept of accountability is also present with the emphasis on monitoring and evaluation that is to be enhanced. After the first Objective, the CAS moves into the Growth-approach for the next two. The Objectives, concerning Vulnerable groups/communities and Reducing Cost of doing business and improving the Investment climate, are dominated by the Growth-approach, but also have elements of African Uniqueness as means to reach the goals. In the second Objective, African Uniqueness becomes clear in programmes for Private Sector Development as the programmes mainly has to do with enhancing the legal and regulatory frameworks. The latter are, I argue, instruments for fighting transparency. The third Objective, on vulnerable groups and communities, also have signs of the African Uniqueness-approach in its emphasis on strengthening local governments. However, the Growth-approach is present in the focus on agricultural competitiveness and productivity and in environmental management where economic
policies and resource accumulation are dominant features. In the fourth Objective, the Social Capacity-approach is weighing the heaviest. The emphasis on health and education gives an impression of the search of empowerment of vulnerable people. At the same time, the Bank wants to see a continued willingness by the state to make sure services reach the frontline providers. This Statecraft shows a presence of the Structural Capacity-approach.

When trying to identify a dominant pattern for the CAS of Kenya, we should be aware of the blurry boundaries between the theoretic approaches. As I have stressed before, it is for instance difficult to point out exactly what ‘governance’ is. The term, along with ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’ and ‘climate for investment’, might have several different meanings. The Bank also points out in the CAS for Kenya that the sector in which the programmes for assistance are to operate, tend to overlap. All operations by the Bank are to happen simultaneously: “…Bank operations to improve public sector management, simultaneously address issues of economic growth, of equity and poverty reduction, and of improved governance.” (Kenya-CAS: 10). So, the programmes for assistance do not only operate parallel with each other, they each have more than one task.

Using the pattern-matching method, I have found that it is the Growth-approach that is dominating the Country Assistance Strategy for Kenya. From the discussion above, having gone through each issue/programme under each Strategic Objective of the CAS, I have seen a pattern of the terms, i.e. the essence of one or more of the Approaches, throughout the document. The result that is given for Kenya is that it is the potential Economic Policies and possible Spin-Off effects of these policies that are of the Bank’s main focus. I see that the Growth-approach is the most dominant because two of the four Objectives are Growth-centred. Objectives 2 and 3 emphasises on Private Sector Investments, Infrastructural Services (Northern Corridor, Energy Sector Recovery and Water Resource Management) (ibid: 19), and on Agricultural Productivity Project, Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project and Western Kenya Integrated Ecosystem Management Project (ibid: 20).
These are dominant features of the majority of the Objectives, and also contributing to making the CAS for Kenya dominated by the Growth-approach through Economic policies, Spin-Off Effects and the Accumulation of people and capital, which is the operationalisation I have made of the Growth-approach. The essence of creating a ‘climate for growth’ and ‘environment for economic development’ is dominating, terms that are most applicable with the Growth-approach and less applicable with the others.

4.4 Chad

The Country Assistance Strategy for Chad has one clear, overarching aim: “…to help Chad use its oil resources for poverty reduction by strengthening governance and creating greater and more inclusive income-earning opportunities outside oil.” (Chad-CAS: 16). As Chad is expecting vast incomes from oil the coming years, the challenges facing the country might prove different from the two other countries I have gone through.

The CAS has two main Pillars (as opposed to the Strategic Objectives of Zambia and Kenya). The Pillars are: (i) to strengthen governance, including public resource management and service delivery arrangements, the rule of law, and environmental and social safeguards for oil exploitation, and, (ii) to ensure inclusive, broad-based growth as the country embarks on oil production (ibid.). Intuitively, the first Pillar is one concerned with structural and political development, while the second is purely economic. However, this needs to be tested.

PILLAR 1- Strengthening Governance

This first Pillar consists of five issues, the first four being under the heading “Public Resources, particularly oil revenues, will be managed and used transparently and accountable.” (ibid: 18). Starting with this, we see that they mainly concerns instruments of monitoring and reforms towards making the public expenditure processes more transparent. The first point concerns the public procurement system.
The new Public Procurement Code supported by the Bank is to ensure that the transaction system is more reliable, monitoring of contracts is efficient, and audit reports will ensure the control mechanisms after a project. This first issue I consider a good example of an African Uniqueness-approach. It is easy to argue that the procurement system is an area that have been suffering from patron-client relations and have, thereafter, been draining the public expenditure accounts of money. This reflects transparency-deficit, and possibly also the spheres in which the state is operating, in accordance with the African Uniqueness-approach. The second issue regarding the use of public resources concerns the budget preparations, executions and monitoring. In addition to the fact that priority ministries should increase their capacities to track public expenditure, this point reflects mainly accountability. The tracking of expenditure is, as with the first issue, probably a search of transparency instruments, but the need for an improvement of budget procedures is one in compliance with the Social Capacity-approach. Monitoring and evaluation of government processes, as we have seen before, can be an instrument of increasing the statecraft, i.e. an instrument for the government to improve the efficiency of their own institutions, but monitoring of the budget as it is laid out here gives an impression of a tool for the people to see that the public expenditure is well performed. Thus it becomes a tool for accountability between the state and the citizens through the Social Capacity-approach.

The third issue in the programmes for the use of public resources concerns oversight and control institutions in the petroleum sector. Including the Parliament, key Ministries and independent bodies to be set up, this initiative is to produce transparency in a sector that is to grow rapidly over the next years. This is an example of the point mentioned above, where it can be hard to detect who the monitoring is for. If it is to create accountability to the people (Social Capacity) or if it is to create transparency in state institutions (African Uniqueness). As the relevant independent committees/organisations are to publish regular reports of the processes and handling of revenues, this is mainly a proof of monitoring and evaluation. But, the Bank also states that there is a need for the authorities to create a system of checks and balances
to ensure transparency. Thus, this issue I consider to be one with elements of both the Social Capacity-and the African Uniqueness-approach. A clear good governance initiative, good governance being defined as something with the “best from all approaches”.

The last point in the first part of Pillar 1 is concentrated on environmental and social safeguards. This issue is mainly set up to limit the negative effects the oil exploitation may have on the environment and on societies. In the CAS for Kenya I argued that improvement of environmental management are to be thought of as an element of the Growth-approach because it is closely linked to Resource Accumulation and Economic Policies. This is partly the case for Chad as well. However, this issue also has elements of a wish to increase the Statecraft as well. The Bank seeks willingness by the government to promote sound policies in the environment, for instance by increasing the capacities and resources of the Ministry of the Environment and Water (ibid: 19). The social element is this issue, is merely thought of as one step further in the causality chain, improving environmental safeguards, to then improve the delivery of for instance water to remote areas. This issue, then, should be looked at as a combination of a Structural Capacity approach and a Growth-approach, with the Structural being dominant. The issue as it is stated in the CAS is more concerned with the management on the state-level than on the development of accumulative resources.

The second part of Pillar 2 is titled “The rule of law will be strengthened, and security will have started to improve.” (ibid: 20). These points on legal and regulatory frameworks differ from some of the ones we have discussed in the two other CASes. The reason is that this point concerns the justice system and the security and defence system as a whole. Here, the Bank states the following: “The lack of a reliable justice system and responsible defence and security forces is considered a characteristic of poor governance in Chad and was flagged as a priority issue in Chad’s PRSP.”(ibid.). The Bank wants to see judicial reforms, most notably with regards to the new oil sector. It also wants to see security reforms in the military sector, that are aimed on
re-integrate former combatants into civil, social and economic activities. This view reflects an emphasis on the empowerment of individuals and mobilisation of groups, hence a Social Capacity-approach. But this point also touches elements we have not seen in the other CASes, namely the government’s Pursuit for Legitimacy. As the CAS is constructed in collaboration with Chad’s PRSP, there are no reasons to believe that the government have specific wishes to ‘cling to power’ by using force, not by reading from the CAS at least. But, there are reasons to believe that this has been the case in the past and that this is reflected in the compilation of citizen groups today. So, the Structural Capacity-approach here implied works on a higher level, a more per-definition structure of government and society. The Bank has clear incentives on improving Statecraft. Difficult as it is to just “pick one” approach, this is also to be looked at as a combination of more, we see a pattern of the Structural Capacity-approach and patterns of Social Capacity as more means to reach higher goals.

PILLAR 2- Ensuring inclusive, broad-based growth as the country embarks on oil production.

The two main themes of the second Pillar are: to increase the economic opportunities outside oil, and expand opportunities and reduce vulnerability.

To increase the economic opportunities outside oil, the Bank emphasises the need for producers of other products to reach the markets cost-effectively. The essence of this point is mainly that there needs to be an improvement of the availability and reliability of infrastructure, energy and financial services. Though these programmes are aimed on the economy and the financial sector, there appears a clear initiative towards empowerment and mobilisation of less fortunate groups. There is no denying that the Bank will want to see a rise in economic indicators over time, but what we are discussing are the tools with which the Bank are working. To actually be able to see rising of financial indicators, the producers of smaller crops and commodities
need to be empowered. The first part of the Bank programmes for increasing the opportunities outside oil, shows a pattern of access, mobility and availability towards services and infrastructure: a Social Capacity-approach. The second part of this programme however, concerns the broadening of the economy. This point can be compared with the first Strategic Objective of the CAS for Zambia, namely creating a diversified economy to make it less vulnerable to international price shocks. The programmes include reforms in farmer organisations, extension of agriculture and research in this, reforms to expand the cotton industry, and environmental reforms. The pattern for these goals does not show any signs of anything other than economic growth, i.e. the Growth-approach. The environment issue in this part is, as it was with Kenya, clearer on a Growth-path, improving environmental management for natural resources, giving a pattern of Economic Policies and Resource Accumulation. The programmes for agriculture and cotton concerns how to increase production, a clear Growth-related goal in compliance with for instance Todaro (see chapter 2.1).

Continuing with the second and last part of the second Pillar, we find the “inclusive”-part of the name of the Pillar, to Expand opportunities and Reduce vulnerability. The programme consists of two issues, empowerment of vulnerable groups (women in particular), and the delivery of basic services. The main development approach present here is the Social Capacity. The work on communities and vulnerable groups are to happen in a number of smaller communities, “notably in the oil production area…” (ibid: 23) as the CAS states. The reasons for why the oil production area is a priority, the CAS says nothing about, which, I must admit, sounds a bit strange when the overall focus of Pillar 2 is to ensure a broad-based development outside the oil sector. Still, the community driven development emphasises the participation of groups and individuals. At the same time, projects to empower women and to market condoms to fight HIV/AIDS are present. A clear pattern of empowerment and participation becomes eminent, which shows the Social Capacity-approach.

The delivery of basic services to the poor concentrates on access to health services, access to higher quality education, and access to drinkable water. I see this initiative
being dominated by the Social Capacity-approach, regarding the empowerment of people, which ultimately will increase their mobility. At the same time, there are some signs of the Structural Capacity-approach, as the availability of services needs to be decentralised from ministries and departments in the centre. As with Strategic Objective 2 of Zambia, I argue that the allocation of resources and power from the centre down to local levels to ensure frontline service provision is an act of Statecraft.

A DOMINANT PATTERN?

The CAS for Chad is formed a bit different than the other two. The challenges facing the country on oil production, has given the CAS a big number of indicator-forecasts and appendixes on the potential revenue from oil. However, the two Pillars gone through represents the Bank programme for assistance, the result, however, is that it is less thorough than the CASes for Zambia and Kenya.

The two main themes in the Pillars are improving governance and creating broader income opportunities. It strikes me as a bit surprising how Social Capacity-oriented the two themes is. With regards to vulnerable groups and service delivery in rural communities, this might not be shocking. But the programmes for creating a more diverse economy are also focused on social capacities, mainly through access and participation in the economy as well as in the financial sector. In Pillar 2, which intuitively is an economic growth-related aim, it is only in the mentioning of the production of cotton and agricultural crops that the usual economic targets are central. The rest of the Pillar mainly concerns the empowerment and mobilisation of the poor, and the aim to increase the willingness of the state (Statecraft). The first Pillar concentrates on governance and resource management. With the exception of some growth-concerned environmental management, the Pillar is dominated by the African Uniqueness-and the Structural Capacity-approach.
4.5 Explaining the Patterns

Being what it is (a bank) the World Bank originally has economic incentives in the recipient countries. This is neither a secret, nor is it anything wrong with that. But, the CASes are quite new, and they reveal something worth discussing as to what approach the Bank have towards development. Let us now, finally, repeat the research question for this dissertation:

To what extent are the World Bank’s country assistance strategies in sub-Saharan Africa shaped by the continent’s distinctive political reality and legacy?

In it lies a hint of direction. In the introduction and, implicitly in the choice of theoretic approaches I have focused on the importance of good governance. This choice might strike the reader as rash, being that one should explore the empiric material in relation with the theory before such a direction should appear. But, it is the Bank itself that has in a way given this direction. The development discourse has turned more and more against principles of good governance, public management and anti-corruption. So, I have found it natural to make this a point of departure, and apply this direction in the research question.

The question is what challenges the Bank has been facing in the three countries? Given a pattern in the three cases, I am able to point out which of the approaches are dominant in the Country Assistance in the three countries south of Sahara. When I now can identify which approach is the most dominant, I can also argue for the Bank’s path to development in the three countries.

If I am to count the dominant Approaches from each Strategic Objective/Pillar in the CASes, it is the Social Capacity-approach that is the most represented. If it had not been for Chad, however, the Growth-approach would be the most dominant. The CAS for Zambia has all four Approaches almost equally represented in the Strategic Objectives. Kenya has two, what I would call, Growth-oriented Objectives, while the CAS for Chad is dominated by the Social Capacity-approach. Why is the Social Capacity-approach this present?
The Social Capacity-approach contains terms such as Accountability (through Monitoring and Evaluation), Mobilisation, Empowerment and Participation. These are tools for human/social development. But, they are also terms often related to the grassroots of society, which again, is related to the rural areas where many of the poorest in African countries live. At the same time, I get the impression that, when broadening an economy and increasing productivity (usually economic targets), the Bank turn to the rural areas. In the Bank, then, the mobilisation of poor and creating accountability to these appears to come first in a causal chain where poverty reduction is the dependent variable. This appears to be the case for Chad at least. The reason for the Social Capacity-dominance can of course have something to do with my definitions and how I have differed between the theoretic approaches. In chapter 2.5 I created the expectations I had from each approach, some essential principles that I needed to find in order to draw conclusions as to which approach was dominant. It is safe to say that I have found most of them at some point in the CASes. However, the notions of Accountability through monitoring and evaluation, Empowerment and Participation have been the most present. But, there are actually important elements of the Social Capacity-approach that I have not seen. The concept of increasing the mobility of civil organisations to enhance the participation-options of the people has not been present. According to Törnquist (see page 23), the presence of potent civil organisations and civil society would increase the capacities of the people. Bearing in mind the statement made by Chabal and Daloz, that such a civil society is yet to find in Africa, I had expected to find examples of the Bank’s support for the civil society. This has not been the case. The focus on “Improved Lives and Protection of the Vulnerable” (Zambia’s Objective 2), “Investing in People” (Kenya’s Objective 4), and “Expand Opportunities and Reduce Vulnerability” (Chad’s Pillar 2) have all been Social Capacity-oriented. But, they do not include the development of a civil society.
4.5.1 Explaining the African Uniqueness and the political reality and legacy

“...over the past decade the trend in the majority of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has moved in the wrong direction.” (Zambia-CAS: i).

“...a comprehensive results-based logical framework that lays out how the IP-ERS priority programs will contribute to the achievement of specific targets, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).” (Kenya-CAS: 5).

“The over-arching objective of this Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is to help Chad make the best possible developmental use of its new oil revenues (and public resources more broadly) as it strives to attain the MDGs.” (Chad-CAS: 1).

These three examples from our cases show the standards the Bank are working towards in the support of countries in Less Developed Countries. Why then the focus on African Uniqueness? And, is the African Uniqueness present?

My construction of the African Uniqueness-approach evolves from the Bank’s own proclaimed focus on good governance through the documents “From Crisis to Sustainable Growth” and “Governance and Development” among others. Also, the African Uniqueness-approach is one that has focused on the peculiarities of African politics and society, backed up by literature such as Bratton/ van de Walle and Chabal and Daloz, both of which argue against the “old” image of Africa as “backward” and “dysfunctional”.

Initially I will argue that the explicit emphasis on challenges posed by the African Uniqueness-approach (such as corruption caused by a heritage of patrimonialism) is missing in the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategies. It is only the CAS for Kenya that has a clear policy on anti-corruption for instance. In addition, the concepts I created as the Pursuit for Legitimacy and the Regime-type as factors of development are also as good as absent. Especially the Pursuit for Legitimacy would be something I expected to see programmes on. What resources are spent by the government on clinging to power? Would it not be possible that an overall shortage of resources is a
result of bad allocation of resources? I am aware of the fact that this is closely related to both corruption and transparency. And that transparency is something that the CASes are deeply concerned with. I am still missing more explicit points by the Bank as to the reasons for the transparency-deficits. This, of course, could possible come in conflict with the Bank’s mandate, but the shortage of evidences of the lack of transparency, evidences of the problems in procurement systems, evidences of the bad reach of service provision for instance, would strengthen my impression of the Bank’s engagement with the true challenges faced by African countries on growth and development.

The pattern-matching showed that it was the Social Capacity-approach that was dominant in the CASes. The Growth-approach was the second largest with regards to the Strategic Objectives/Pillars. The purpose of the pattern-matching has been to find out the relevance of one factor, African Uniqueness. So, I have run a test between four independent variables and one dependent (the CASes) to determine the possible effect of one of these. The test has shown that there has in fact been a replication across cases. I have found the examples of the theoretic approaches in the empiric evidence, the patterns seem to match. I have also found the most dominant pattern (the Social Capacity-approach), by identifying the essence of the different Objectives. Overall, the majority of the Objectives are concerned with one or more of the following: Economic Policies, Resource Accumulation, Production or Spin-Off Effects, as I have defined these in chapter 2.5. The African Uniqueness-approach is less visible. Though all CASes has programmes for improving transparency and public sector management, these two only constitute about half of the elements of the Approach. Thus, I have found that the country assistance strategies of the Bank in these three countries south of the Sahara are not dominantly shaped by the distinctive political reality and legacy.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the terms used in the pattern-matching could have been constructed differently. This might have resulted in a different outcome. The most obvious challenge I have had to deal with in the analysis is the fact that the
terms overlap. As I have touched before, the terms such as ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ are being used in several different ways, also in the CASes. More importantly however, is the fact that the theory-Approaches I have used also tend to overlap. The way I have linked the Growth-approach to this debate is its links to poverty-reduction. Economic growth is a wide term, and with regards to poverty reduction it is only natural that it touches discussions about state-society relations and structural growth in a developing country. Thus, it is vital that my construction of Approaches/Paths to development and the terms that construct these do not constitute a final, correct answer. It has merely been an attempt to “organise” the concepts of development and relate these to three countries south of the Sahara.
5. CONCLUSION

The task of this paper has been to explore the World Bank’s approach to development in three countries in Africa south of the Sahara. The background for this idea has been the much debated shifts in the policies by the Bank the last couple of decades. As I briefly have gone through, the end of the era of Structural Adjustment saw the emergence of the governance-agenda, the debate shifted towards human rights, democracy and combating corruption. With this background, I thus sought to explore the path the Bank has taken on development in one of the poorest parts of the world, and created the following research question: To what extent are the World Bank’s country assistance strategies in sub-Saharan Africa shaped by the continent’s distinctive political reality and legacy? I then constructed a theoretical framework consisting of four approaches to answer my research question: The Growth-approach, the Social Capacity-approach, the Structural Capacity-approach and the African Uniqueness-approach. I have used these theory-approaches to investigate the Country Assistance Strategy papers, to then determine the most dominant approach. Using pattern-matching as a method to compare essential terms in theory with essential terms in the Country Assistsances, I have found that it is the Social Capacity-approach that is the most dominant in the way that it is this approach that is represented with the most essential terms. Also, I have found that the theoretical and the empirical pattern in fact do match. A good majority of the essential terms in the approaches are represented in all three CASes.

In the previous chapter (4.5) I have argued for the dominance of the Social Capacity-approach. I have thus put my research question to a challenge. I argued that the CASes lack evidence of the deficits the countries have regarding transparency, and the problems they have with corruption and inefficiency in state institutions. I am, however, not able to dismiss the fact that the Bank’s country assistance strategies are to some extend shaped by the political reality and legacy I have called African Uniqueness. The frequency of the Social Capacity-approach and the Growth-approach does not necessarily mean an absence of the African Uniqueness-approach.
I have found that the World Bank Strategies for Zambia, Chad and Kenya are concerned with improving transparency and efficiency in state-and society-structures. But they are more concerned with creating wide-spread growth and social empowerment and participation.

The dominance of the Social Capacity-and the Growth-approach is not surprising. I have noted the importance of the Millennium Development Goals in the international discourse as standards of sustainable development, and the fact that the MDGs are mainly social indicators. Also, the traditional role of the Bank as a financial and economic institution obviously strengthens the presence of the Growth-approach.

The main reason I have argued that the Country Assistance Strategies in the three countries are not to a large extent shaped by the given countries’ political reality and legacy is a general lack of evidence given by the Bank. The Bank is concerned with transparency and accountability between people, state institutions and service provision, but it gives no further reasons as to why there is a deficit of these. There is no doubt the Bank (and other international institutions for that matter) is aware of the problems patrimonialism, boundaries of state and transparency create in African countries. However, this thesis argues that it is difficult to approach such challenges without giving firm evidences to their existence and to perhaps give reasons for why they do exist.
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