Lebanese Political Identity

Exploring sovereignty and democracy in Lebanon through norm socialisation processes

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Foreword

Perhaps due to a dose of adrenalin caused by the uncertainty of the quality of the brakes on the bus, but nonetheless, I was increasingly grateful for surviving the decent from the Lebanese hills into Syria when I started comparing what I had experienced with what I was going to see. As the bus sailed down towards the flatter and dustier roads leading to Damascus, I realised just how interesting, intriguing, and difficult the subject of Lebanese political identity and history was going to be to explore.

Since this moment I have to admit to having become both impatient and frustrated at many occasions, but fortunately my surroundings had patience with me. For this they deserve many thanks. At the end of the long, winding road I am grateful to my family, and Maria Ramberg and Ine Berg for their support. Katrine Ziesler was a great travel-companion through the Middle East in 2002. Thanks to Cathrine Skjolden, the thesis has experienced a circa ninety percent decrease in grammatical errors (the rest are my own doing). Finer points of political science and other, entirely unrelated subjects were thoroughly discussed with members of Statsvitenskapelig Selskap, which made the writing process much more enjoyable.

I also want to thank Jeffrey Checkel at the University of Oslo and Kari Karamé at NUPI for sharing their valuable expertise, comments and time.

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1. Introduction

As the states of the Middle East have remained in their current territorial form since the First or Second World War, it is relevant to ask whether there has there been a consolidation between ethnic identity and state identity. Lebanon, a small and plural Middle Eastern country by the Mediterranean, has close ties to both France and the other Arab states. After the Lebanese war (1975-1989), the images the West has of Lebanon still depict war and conflicting confessional groups, despite the fact that Lebanon’s last fourteen years have been peaceful and dedicated to rebuilding. There are, however, still many multi-faceted issues to explore concerning political identity in Lebanon. The book *House of many mansions* starts by saying: “The Christians and the Muslims disagree on how to run the country, but agree on the country’s existence as it is” (Salibi 1989). As the author points out, the Lebanese war did not destroy Lebanon’s political and administrative structure, nor did it put an end to Lebanon’s existence. It is still defined as a sovereign and democratic republic. However, sovereignty and democracy are also some of the most debated issues on the Lebanese political agenda today.

Lebanon is a product of the distribution of former Ottoman territory between the British and the French. France gained Greater Syria in 1920 after the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and established the State of Greater Lebanon in 1920, introducing the Cedar tree as a symbol for the coastline state. Previous analyses of Lebanon have focused on its plural political system, the causes of the war, and the cleavages and differences in Lebanese society. Another popular theme is the current Syrian control of Lebanon, focusing on Syrian security issues and commercial interests. Some of the central issues debated in Lebanon after the war have been sovereignty and democracy, and the influence and legitimacy of Syrian presence. Syria has gained a central role in Lebanon through the Ta’if Accord from 1989, and has been militarily present since the beginning of the Lebanese war.¹

¹ The Ta’if Accord is the agreement that put an end to the Lebanese war in 1989 (Baaklini 1999: 94)
An exploration of the development of these two ideas into norms can provide an insightful path through Lebanese political history, and can show how sovereignty and democracy have become part of Lebanon. Sovereignty and democracy were not part of a Lebanese identity form the beginning, and these ideas have gone through certain processes in order to reach where they are now. The norms are at the core of a heated debate over the legitimate future of Lebanon. It could be that sovereignty and democracy norms form some sort of common ground for a Lebanese political identity. These norms make an interesting angle for an exploration of what binds Lebanese political history and identity together, rather than focusing on what divides. The defining and redefining of Lebanese political identity through the socialisation process of norms of sovereignty and democracy can be said to represent a consolidation process between qawmiyya and wataniyya. The norm-socialisation approach provides an interesting perspective on Lebanese pre- and post-war political history.

1.1 Theme
The view of state-identity as flexible and changeable is a constructivist approach to the importance of norms for state interests and behaviour. Barnett (1996b) has applied the constructivist norm-approach to sovereignty questions, and uses roles when tracing the change in Arab nationalist thought from unification to the upholding of the sovereign state. Barnett (1996b: 149) claims that the Arab sovereign state has a real existence and basis in society, caused by a consolidation of state sovereignty and a changed meaning of Arab nationalism.

The pre-war period can provide information which gives a more complete picture of the development of Lebanese sovereignty and democracy, starting when the state was made a French mandate in 1920, which introduced sovereignty and a semi-

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2 The terms qawmiyya and wataniyya are two different notions of nationhood concerning respectively country and people, as presented in a lecture by Bjørn Olav Utvik for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Oslo, October 16, 1998.

3 As a sovereign political entity with a given territorial area that has international recognition (Owen 1992)
democratic political system. This could reveal not only how these two norms became part of Lebanese political identity, but also what other factors have affected these central concepts. This groundwork may in turn shed light on the status of these norms in the post-war period, which represents a new Lebanese political context due to Syrian control and presence. This angle provides an interesting and detailed exploration of Lebanese political identity. The main theme is how norms are socialised into identities, more specifically how sovereignty and democracy were socialised into a Lebanese political identity. The thesis is based on basic constructivist notions about identity and the impact norms can have.

Before presenting the main theoretical framework, the following sections will introduce the case with central arguments and principle definitions.

1.1.1 Introduction of the case and main questions

I focus on sovereignty and democracy as two major themes in Lebanese political identity before and after the Lebanese war, in the time periods 1920-1975 and 1989-2002. My interest lies in how sovereignty and democracy were socialised into Lebanese society in the pre-war period, and what factors shaped these socialisation processes. The challenges sovereignty and democracy norms are subject to in the post-war period has triggered a debate over Lebanon’s sovereignty and democracy, and looking at this period can disclose evidence of further socialisation of sovereign and democratic norms. This makes for an interesting case study of sovereign and democracy norms in Lebanon’s pre- and post-war periods. The main theoretical question is:

- How do new norms become part of identity, and what other factors affect the socialisation processes of these norms?

How norms can change identity is based on the constructivist notion that interaction between actors can cause change. How this happens, and what other factors are

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4 I use the terms pre- and post-war period referring to the time before and after the Lebanese war, which lasted from 1975 to 1989.
central to changing identity will be further presented in the next chapter. The theoretical question is the basis for a set of more case specific questions related to sovereignty and democracy norms in Lebanon:

1. Were sovereign and democratic norms socialised into Lebanese identity prior to the war?

2. Does the post-war period contain evidence of further socialisation of these norms?

These two questions can highlight important things about how, how much or even if sovereignty and democracy became part of Lebanese political identity. They also structure the analysis in two analysis chapters, one concerning the pre-war period, the other concerning the post-war period. The first question involves a look at the course of the socialisation of sovereignty and democracy in the pre-war period, including an initial section exploring other influencing factors. The socialisation processes as a dependent variable are affected by the variables state-society relations, central actors who introduce new norms, previously present ideas, and historical context. The first question will require much of the space available for a thesis, limiting the scope of the second research question. Thus the second question will have to be limited to a more descriptive approach, focusing on the new context Syrian presence represents for sovereignty and democracy.

1.1.2 Argument

I argue that sovereign and democratic norms were socialised into a Lebanese identity in the pre-war period, and were affected by norms and factors already present in society. The post-war period has involved a new political context that has triggered identity debate, maybe causing new rounds of socialisation and redefining the Lebanese Self. Central socialising agents have played an important part in how Lebanon’s sovereignty and democracy norms have been defined and redefined. Other factors which could have an effect on the socialisation processes are socio-economic change and the physical presence of foreign forces, like Israel and Syria. The presence of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), between 250 000- 300 000
Palestinian refugees, plus an unknown number of Syrian workers has also had its effects on Lebanese political history.

A central question to ask to grasp the possible internal differences in Lebanon is sectarian differences. Why does the Syrian presence seem to constitute more of a threat to the Christian population than to other parts of Lebanese political society? What are the different perceptions of Lebanon’s interests concerning sovereignty and democracy, and what does this indicate for the effects of the socialisation processes? The main focus is however on the general socialisation of sovereignty and democracy.

1.1.3 Definitions
My research topic is based on constructivist ideas of identity, the meaning of norms and how identity changes. Identity is defined in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary as “the distinguishing character or personality of an individual”. In IR theory identity can be defined as “a label for varying constructions of nation- and statehood, which exist both domestically and internationally” (Katzenstein 1996: 4). Identity can be defined as the notions of what constitutes the Self. The constructivist view on identity is that identity is something which evolves and can be constructed and changed through interaction with other actors (Statsvitenskapelig leksikon 1997: 89). I use the concept political identity in order to signal that I am talking about identity traits that concern participation in political life and ideas about what constitutes a legitimate form of organising government and state. Habermas (1996: 361-363) defines the political system as the official, institutionalised decision-making system, which entails administrative and state bureaucracies that make and enforce binding decisions.

Governments and domestic societies can clash over identity-related issues. Stability depends not only on the ability of the regime/government to uphold law and order by force, but also the basic notion of legitimate rule as perceived by the people is important (empirical legitimacy). That a person or an organisation has legitimacy means that others trust that the person or organisation will act in accordance with
acceptable values and norms (*Statsvitenskapelig leksikon* 1997: 138, author’s translation). What norms are present shape what is considered appropriate behaviour and legitimate actions. By *norms* I refer to “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996: 5). Norms can specify standards for behaviour for given identities, while other times norms act like rules (ibid.). The “induction of new members (...) into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in a society” is the definition of *socialisation* (Barnes, Carter and Skidmore 1980: 35 in Risse et al. 1999: 11). Norms become an integral part of an identity and are regarded as morally valid (Risse et al. 1999). *Norms of sovereignty* is the expectation of the territorial and legal state being the sole legitimate entity that can and should be the organisational frame for its citizens, here being Lebanon as a separate state as the legitimate organisational frame for its citizens. When talking about *norms of democracy*, I am referring to the general democratic idea of the people of the state constituting a political entity which decides the contents of the decisions they are to follow through regular free and fair elections (*Statsvitenskapelig leksikon* 1997: 39, author’s translation). This also involves other freedoms such as freedom of speech and association. *Institutions* are both formal and informal structures that affect the behaviour of actors, constrain activity and shape expectations (*Statsvitenskapelig Leksikon* 1997: 96-98, author’s translation, Barnett 1996b: 152).

### 1.1.4 Theoretical framework

My first concern in this thesis is how norms become part of identity. Social constructivists argue that ideas and the communicative processes we engage in define the way we perceive material factors as relevant (Risse et al. 1999: 7). Risse, Ropp and Sikkink claim that even an instrumental adoption of norms may trigger a process of identity transformation, so the norms “initially adopted for instrumental reasons are later maintained for reasons of belief and identity” (1999: 10). Their theory of socialisation of human rights norms present three ideal types of social action in the socialisation processes of norms (Risse et al. 1999: 20):

1. Instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining
2. Argumentative dialogue, moral consciousness-raising, persuasion and shaming

3. Institutionalisation and habitualisation

Risse et al. (1999) assume the socialisation processes to be influenced by traits of the society they are socialised into, and authors such as Checkel (1998), Kholi and Shue (1994), Marcussen et al. (2001) point to the effect of previous state-society relations and what actors introduce the new norms. The Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) theory seems to provide what the main questions need: a comprehensive outline for the tracing of socialisation processes of norms. Though this theory’s take on norms is an approach to socialisation processes of human rights norms in norm-violating states, it presents the three processes as general processes of socialisation of international norms (Risse et al. 1999: 11). Both sovereignty and democracy can be perceived as international norms. They also describe norms that are in part introduced in a top-down manner, as sovereignty and democracy were in Lebanon. Though this presents a common starting point needed to be able to apply this theory, there are some challenges.

The processes are based on general social sciences, anthropology and sociology which focus on group-interaction and group definitions (ibid.). When the model is used on pariah states where democracy is absent it differs from this case, where democracy is institutionalised and upheld to a certain degree at an early stage. This could affect the socialisation processes due to two things: First, the international community does not press for change in the same degree they do with real pariah states. Secondly, this subsequently causes the interaction to occur mainly inside the state between domestic groups. This could also have effects on the processes themselves and their possible chronology. Still, with modification it is possible to use these three processes and their phases as tools for tracing the norm socialisation of sovereignty and democracy in Lebanon. I will discuss the applicability problems further in chapter two after presenting the methodology of the thesis.
1.1.5 Structure
I ask how sovereignty and democracy as norms have been socialised into a Lebanese political identity in pre-war Lebanon, and use the post-war situation to explore these norms’ socialisation further in a new political context. I use the socialisation processes presented by Risse and Sikkink (1999) to structure this exploration, and consider contextual factors as well. This is mainly exploratory research where I try to consult as many different sources as possible, since this can help balance the underlying interests that the different sources may have.

The next chapter is a theoretical presentation of the constructivist theories and arguments the research is based on. The importance of already existing state-society relations will be discussed in relation to the process when new norms become part of identity (the socialisation processes) and how identity can change. After I have presented the theoretical background for the central concepts and operationalised the three socialisation-processes further, I will give a historical overview of Lebanon to put current history in context. I will then trace the socialisation processes of sovereignty and democracy norms in Lebanon from 1920 until 1975. A central question is why the Syrian presence seems to constitute such a threat to some of the Christian political factions, which brings up the meaning of state-society relations and the role of central socialising agents. The post-war period 1990-2002 will be analysed in the following chapter, where I will focus on the debate over Syrian presence partially triggered by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in May 2000. In the concluding chapter I will answer the initial research question and assess how the theory worked in exploring this case. The Lebanese war itself will not be included, since exploring the socialisation of norms is easier in periods of relatively stable political conditions.

1.2 Method
How and whether sovereignty and democracy have been socialised into a Lebanese political identity is a complex question. I have chosen to break down the exploration
of these two norms into a two-part case study. The main problem will be explored by
tracing socialisation processes in the pre-war period and the post-war periods.

The central research question involves the exploration of norms, which are tricky and
evasive to capture. Given the limits of both time and finances, there was no
opportunity for me to conduct my own surveys, which could have resulted in a more
quantitative dimension specific to this thesis. The ideal research approach embraces
both qualitative and quantitative sources. Though I use mostly qualitative data, I also
look at some quantitative data, which includes information on Lebanese elections and
legislature both in the pre-and post-war periods.

1.2.1 The qualitative case study
This is an explorative single case study, where I look at how certain processes happen
by using many different sources to disclose the socialization processes of sovereignty
and democracy in Lebanon. The purpose of this approach is to gain insight into
questions of process and meaning regarding how sovereignty and democracy became
part of Lebanese political identity.

A case study is a good strategy when asking how concerning contemporary events
(Yin 1994: 9), since questions of process and meaning are common for case studies
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” This
in-depth approach is an “intensive research method” (Hellevik 1999: 97-99, author’s
translation) which makes it difficult to draw any general conclusions because it looks
at many aspects in one specific case, instead of just one or a few aspects in many
cases. When exploring processes or narratives, a qualitative method gives space for
the contextual issues to be considered (Devine 2002: 199 in Marsh and Stoker (eds.)
2002). A case study also gives a picture of the chronological development, making it
easier to see the order of change in the variables (Hellevik 1999: 99). This seems an
appropriate approach to my main research question.
It is not my goal to draw general and transferable conclusions, since I am seeking to explore certain aspects of norms specifically in Lebanese political life. Still, I am founding my research on constructivist theory concerning the general importance of norms for both domestic and foreign politics and policy. The case study approach means that I am not only discussing general theoretical ideas, but also putting these ideas in an empirical environment and exploring what case specific factors have an effect. As such, this is in part a theoretically driven study, where the motivation for studying the case is not only the case itself, but also the opportunity to use existing concepts and theories to highlight particular aspects of the case (Andersen 1997: 69). Here the chosen theoretical approach is used to structure and organize the empirical material.

1.2.2 Sources
I have had to rely on previous analyses of pre-war Lebanese politics and society and media documentation of debates and discussions, which in both cases makes it important to be aware of the source’s agenda, and consult several different sources with several different views. I have used multiple sources of data, relying on secondary literature, newspaper articles and periodicals, as well as direct observation and informal interviews. Making use of multiple sources gives a more complete picture of the unit of analysis, and addresses the issue of triangulation, as discussed by Yin (1994).

It was essential for my research to do personal observation by going on a research trip in the autumn of 2002. Talking to people informally and observing firsthand has been a valuable addition towards a more complete understanding of the chosen case. I noticed some of the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal, and heard people talking of how things were before or during the war compared to the current situation. I previously visited Syria for four weeks in May 2000, when Israel pulled out of southern Lebanon. Seeing the media’s 24-hour coverage of this particular event put the region’s history in a current perspective and contributed to my choice of topic later.
My knowledge of Arabic is limited, so I could not conduct interviews in Arabic, or make use of Arabic language media. This has put restrictions on the sources I have been able to use, and one meeting with a politician had to be cancelled due to the language barrier. I am sure that a discourse analysis done in Arabic would have discovered interesting and fruitful identity aspects of the post-war Lebanese identity. Still, the educational system in Lebanon is better than in most countries in the Middle East, and most Lebanese speak at least some English (many speak English very well). Therefore the language barrier was not nearly as big as I had anticipated before the research trip. I have been able to consult some sources in French, which has helped diversify my gathered material. Also, Lebanon is a country subject to many and thorough analyses since it was established in 1920, so I have been able to consult a number of detailed sources on major Lebanese events, mostly English and Norwegian, but also some French sources.

The main English language Lebanese newspaper is the Daily Star. It is relatively outspoken and thorough. Journalists in Lebanon tend not to interpret the political situation as they can get in trouble for drawing any provocative conclusions (about Syria). Instead of analysis they often describe events, situations and quote statements made by political actors (Husem 2002). This provides good coverage of political events despite there being a certain amount of self-censorship in Lebanese media. The Syrian political influence in Lebanon’s political life that restricts freedom of speech has also caused a restrained discourse in Parliament, so discussion over Lebanese identity and Syrian presence takes place mainly outside the Parliament (which is also due to the government being dominated by politicians loyal to Syria).

The interviews I conducted in Parliament were carried out in an informal manner, lasting from twenty to forty-five minutes in duration. How I got the interviews was in itself an interesting insight into Lebanese politics, as I spent time talking with security officers and observing the Parliament “in action” while I waited for my

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5 I talked with a member of AMAL, a member from Hizbullah, and a member from Prime Minister Hariri’s election list of Beirut.
appointments. I also had the opportunity to talk with a member of the organised opposition, who presented me with a complementing side of Lebanese politics.

The coverage of Middle Eastern issues is good in English forums, though a lot of research is focused on American or European security issues. Periodicals such as The Middle East Report and The Middle East Review of International Affairs have been helpful for analysis and coverage. The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (MEIB) has been a relatively good source for translated articles and news on Lebanon and the Middle East from the time MEIB was established in 1999. Moreover, there are a number of Lebanese academics who publish articles concerning both past and present political and historical events and analyses in English (for example professor Farid al-Khazen). The archive of earlier Daily Star editions at the American University in Beirut was also of help.

1.2.3 Reliability and validity

I believe my gender worked to my advantage when I approached the Parliament in order to get appointments with members of Parliament, since a woman is less threatening in a society where patriarchy still is strong (much stronger than in egalitarian Scandinavia). I was appointed my own policeman to help me get appointments with the Parliament members. This did affect who I got to talk with, since the policeman was very concerned that I should be treated well. When I wanted to interview someone from the Hizbullah party, the policeman claimed to have found a Christian Hizbullah member, probably to reassure me.

Recognising a source’s agenda is one of the biggest challenges you face when going into the field on a case-study where there are restrictions on how openly and freely people speak. While researching, one has to be aware of the possible biased views or agendas a source may represent and promote (Kjeldstadli 1999: 180). This is vital to the reliability of the collection of data, that is, the accuracy in the process of collecting data (Hellevik 1999: 183). The goal of being accurate in collecting data is for the process to give the same results if done again (Yin 1984), which again brings in the importance of multiple sources of evidence and triangulation.
The relevance of the data for the chosen problem is central, which reflects a study’s **validity** (Hellevik 1999: 183). The many different sources will give different measures to the same phenomenon (Yin 1984: 93). As mentioned above, I have tried to consult a number of sources on the same events. This in turn strengthens the **construct validity** of the thesis, which signifies that the correct operational measures have been established for the concepts being studied (Yin 1984: 33-34).

There are many different views on Lebanese identity and its relation to sovereignty and democracy. Some authors emphasise the conflictual aspect of Lebanese history when discussing Lebanese sovereignty and democracy, like Zamir (1985) who writes about Lebanese Christian nationalism. Authors like Cobban (1987), Cleveland (1997) and Hanf (1993) also point to the conflicts over identity-related issues Lebanon has gone through, but also consider cooperative aspects of Lebanese politics and society. Hanf (1993) takes this a bit further, emphasising the fact that Lebanon survived war as an indication of there being a Lebanese identity. Baaklini (1999) also has a more optimistic approach when evaluating Lebanon’s democratic institutions, concluding that they did in fact work and improve over time. These different angles to Lebanese politics and identity have balanced my approach, but also challenged my thoughts about the case. For example, whereas some authors would say that the 1958 violence was proof of Lebanon being an artificial state in deep identity-conflict, others would say that the aftermath of this conflict proved the presence of Lebanese compromise-politics and the existence of a certain common Lebanese ground (see for example Zamir 1985 and Hanf 1993 for two different views on this incident).

The test of **internal validity** is relevant for a causal explanation, by having several measures of the same variable provides valid measure of the concept (Manheim and Rich 1995:75). Since I am conducting an explanatory study, this does not apply here. Still, internal validity can be said to include the problem of **inference** (Yin 1984:35). I am not seeking to make general conclusions from my case, so the issue of **external validity** is not considered here (Yin 1984: 35-36), although I do use general constructivist theory on identity and norms.
1.2.4 Possible validity and reliability problems

The theoretical background I base my analysis on has its foundation in the Western hemisphere. There has been criticism of the transferability of Western concepts, and the issue of ethnocentricity has been, and still is, a real problem in western-based research on non-Western issues. Still, the basic concepts in this thesis, sovereignty and democracy, are issues that are a real and central part of the organisational and political make-up of Lebanon. Therefore it is important and relevant to explore them in a Lebanese setting.

The modifications made to the theory, which will be presented in the theory chapter, are important due to the fact that the theoretical framework of Risse et al. (1999) is promoted as best used on pariah states and movement towards norm-compliant behaviour regarding human rights norms. However, by using these three stages as tools, and modifying them to fit a more general look at how norms can change identities, this approach is worth trying. This includes, as mentioned previously, looking at other contributing factors to change (contextual factors).

The biggest obstacle I faced when gathering material was that there are few available sources documenting pre-war discussion and debate. This will affect how much can be concluded about the second socialisation process in the pre-war period. However, the pre-war aspect of sovereignty and democracy still provides an interesting angle of exploration of Lebanese political identity, and the socialisation of these norms. I will therefore trace the processes as thoroughly as the available material allows. The inclusion of Arabic sources would have complemented my thesis, but I do not think it is likely to change or alter the results of my research in a way that could imply serious reliability problems.

One of the major problems when looking at identity in present-day Lebanon is the control Syria has over political discourse. There have been numerous incidents of arrests, kidnappings, disappearances and mock trials against people who have too loudly voiced their scepticism toward the Syrian government. However, the Lebanese daily newspaper Daily Star together with the periodicals and bulletins mentioned in
1.2.2 have provided comprehensive and relatively thorough coverage of the Lebanese political debate.

As demographical statistics in Lebanon is a difficult issue, numbers concerning issues such as population growth and voter turn-out have been hard to check. This is due to that counting people and how many there are in each community is a highly political issue. The numbers concerning voter turn-out that I have used have been referred to by several thorough authors, and is originally from Al-Intikhabat al- Niabiah 1861-1992: Al-Quaneen Al-Nataej 1992, as presented in Hassam Krayem’s article “Political Parties and Electoral Systems in Lebanon and Israel: Interactive Reinforcement”.

1.3 Summary
The main question which drives this thesis is whether sovereignty and democracy became part of Lebanese political identity before the war, and what factors have influenced the socialisation processes of these norms. I further ask what traces of socialisation processes can be found in the post-war period. The theoretical basis of the thesis rests on constructivist notions of political identity as being constantly reshaped and reformed through interaction with other actors, as well as being affected by the society’s previous structures and norms. The main goal of the thesis is to take an in-depth look at Lebanese political identity before and after the Lebanese war. The next chapter will present further the thesis’ central theoretical outline, and the operationalisation and modifications made to the applied theory.
2. A theoretical presentation of key concepts

How identities change and how they affect both international and domestic politics is a recurring theme in constructivist theory. Marc Lynch (2002:18) claims that: “The identity and norms that inform the articulation of state interests are both domestic and international”. The challenge Lebanon has faced since its creation is the political integration of several cultural identities into a common “Lebanese”, or as Khalil Gibran (1926) wrote: “I have my Lebanon. You have yours”.

This chapter will present the socialisation-processes norms go through, and conditions or factors that influence the degree and speed of norms socialisation. Other factors besides norms that may contribute to a change of identities will also be discussed. Before I embark on the theoretical outlines of identity and norms, I will briefly present the central norms, sovereignty and democracy, and the conceptual framework of identities and norms.

2.1 Sovereign and democratic norms

The focus of this thesis is on the possible socialisation of sovereignty and democracy as ideas into norms in Lebanon. I will therefore not embark on any in-depth theoretical debate concerning democracy or sovereignty as ideals or criteria.

Sovereignty and democracy are “new” social concepts. Gellner points out in Culture, Identity and Politics (1987: 6) that Renan correctly noted that antiquity knew no nations in our sense. Gellner also says that a nation provides its citizens with the “anonymity of membership”. Membership in Lebanon, on the other hand, could be said not to provide anonymity, but includes different labels (of the different communities, i.e. religious communities) that are all categorised as Lebanese.

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6 The existence of institutions, laws and an economical framework is a platform for developing national integration into a common political identity, and the feeling of national belonging can grow stronger in crisis situations or as a reaction to uncertainty and reduced national control (Østerud 1997: 109).
2.1.1 Sovereignty

The geographically specified state has become a universal form for organisation during the last two hundred years, as a rule of co-existence within the state system (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 1). The modern principle of sovereignty includes a perception of a highest authority and source of law domestically (Østerud, Goldmann, Pedersen eds., 1997: 266-267). Sovereignty embodies the principle of non-interference, which means the state has authority over its domestic space and the authority to act as a legitimate member of the international society (Barnett 1996b: 154). Sovereignty can be seen as the institutional investment of political authority by states in a given territory (Katzenstein on Ruggie 1996: 45-46). In other words, sovereignty includes territory, population and authority, and each of these components is socially constructed (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 3). The modern state system is therefore based on the continual production of a normative conception that links authority, territory, population (society, nation) and recognition in a unique way, and in a particular space (the state) (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 3-5).

Barnett (1996a) analyses in his contribution in *The Culture of National Security* how the Arab states have moved from a concept of Arabism in the sixties, as something that should and would unify the states, to a mutual recognition of the Arab states as sovereign. He does not discuss the incorporation of sovereignty as a norm in the political identities of the Middle Eastern domestic societies, but he implicitly assumes that *qawmiyya* has consolidated with *wataniyya* (notions of nationhood concerning the country and the people). This connection is interesting and deserves a closer look, here attempted by looking at the socialisation of domestic recognition of territory and authority as belonging to the Lebanese state (sovereignty), and of democratic representation as the right form of government in Lebanon (democracy).

The domestic identification with Lebanon as a separate identity, the view that Lebanon should exist as a separate state because the people that inhabit this area are specifically Lebanese, includes that the people living in Lebanon, being Lebanese citizens, recognise a *We* of Lebanese as opposed to *Them* in other states (for example Syria). Sovereignty involves the belief that a state should exist as a separate political
and territorial entity. The dichotomy of the Us and the Other translates into the existence of an explicit identity called Lebanese, which differs from that of the identity of Syrian. The idea of Lebanon existing as a separate state and having an identity different from others can be said to represent sovereignty norms. This means that the socialisation of sovereignty puts certain rules to work about who should decide what goes on in Lebanon, who should control its territory and who should constitute its population. When the breach of these rules is treated as illegitimate and/or protested, sovereignty can be said to have become part of political identity. Participation in state-specific institutions (voluntarily) can indicate acceptance of the state and its boundaries and institutions.

2.1.2 Democracy

Democracy is considered to be the principle through which both individual and collective freedom can be sought and protected, which is a central part of human rights. The two main principles of democracy are freedom and equality, democracy being in its most basic definition the rule of the people. The make-up of the state has to be taken into consideration. The multinational or multicultural states have different constitutional or political terms to deal with their heterogeneity (Kellas 2000: 76). The multi-confessional make-up of Lebanon and the state-society structures have thus had implications for the way democracy has been socialised.

The rule of the people as the right way of governing is the basic democratic norm. Democracy is, however, tied to a number of aspects of freedom, like freedom of participation, expression and association. Conditions for the existence of a consolidated democratic rule include that no significant actors seek to meet their goals by undemocratic rule, that there is a consensus over democratic procedures and institutions, and that conflicts are solved within democratic rules, regulations, procedures and institutions (Linz and Stepan 1996: 6). These preconditions offer general signs to look for when tracing socialisation of democracy norms. Dahl’s seven institutions distinguishing democratic rule suggest more specific clues to the development of democratic rule (Dahl 1971: 3). The first four institutions guard
democratic elections and include chosen representatives, free and fair elections, inclusive rights to vote, and the right to participate/run in elections. The last three institutions are thought to guard political and social rights, and include freedom of speech, access to alternative sources of information and freedom of organisation. Seeking to improve these institutions are signs that signify that democracy is considered a valid governing form.

This thesis does not aim to evaluate whether the Lebanese political system meet certain criteria for a just democratic system. I am concerned with the processes through which democracy becomes socialised, seen in a Lebanese setting. In the first analysis (Lebanon before the Lebanese war) I am mainly concerned with the socialisation of electoral institutions, while the second analysis also explores the post-war socialisation processes of democracy concerning political and social rights.

2.2 Conceptual framework

This chapter’s next section presents my conceptual framework. The next sections will present the notion of who we are and what political identity is before discussing norms in theory.

2.2.1 Who are we?
Constructivist theory on identity, norms and interests emphasise the importance of habit, that the every day social practices that reproduce the social cognitive structure causes a habitual reproduction of interests (Hopf 2002, Risse et al. 1999). Maureen Whitebrook (2001: 4) suggests in her book *Identity, Narrative and Politics* that “identity is a matter of the stories persons tell others about themselves, plus the stories others tell about those persons and/or other stories in which those persons are included”. She defines identity as a matter of the way we portray ourselves, and also how others interpret our portrayal and portray us back. She also claims that the construction of identity is putting the Self in the public sphere, thereby making it possible for the Self to take on a political role (ibid.). A collective identity, or a national community/society, is central in the legitimisation of the decision-making
unit and its rules (Østerud 1997: 113). As mentioned in the introduction of the first chapter, it is relevant to ask if there is a collective Lebanese political identity.

Constructivist thought is based on two main ideas: That identity and preferences are constructed through social processes, and that people act on the basis of what objects mean to them. A constructivist look at identity involves the notion that identity evolves, changes, and is constructed through interaction. This view takes into consideration how we define ourselves in relation to others. The concept of identity is originally taken from social psychology, and refers to our images of ourselves and our images of our distinctiveness. Our identity and belonging outline who belongs in which group: Us or Them. This involves a perception of the Self as being able to make finer distinctions among its own members than of the Others (Riggins 1997: 5). Thus identity becomes as much a notion of who we are, as who we are not, what group we want to be a part of, and what group we do not want to be associated with.

### 2.2.2 Political identity

Regarding political identity, the constructivist approach would say that varying constructions of identity involve frames of reference of meaning. This points out what things like political structures, institutions and rules mean to us. These frames of reference give us an understanding of the purpose of political activity and of the interests of the individual or collective (Lynch 1999: 9). This is in contrast to other theoretical approaches in political science, which assume the actor as rational with a given set of interests (realism), or as a product of components which limits the actor’s ability to act rationally (Statsvitenskapelig leksikon 1997: 89, author’s translation). In Lebanon, political identity has been structured from the start, first by the French Mandate, to accommodate and preserve cultural identities and interests.

Marc Lynch (1999: 9) points out that constructivist theory argues identity as constitutive of the answers to why one is part of political activity, and that this can

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7 Lecture in International Politics, foundation level Political Science, University of Oslo 1997, by professor Dag Harald Claes.
contribute to a sense of collectiveness through shared actions and reasons. Identities are seen as flexible and changeable, which presents the question of when identities are most likely to change. I will examine this question further after first discussing norms in theory and the impact state-society structure can have on norms.

2.3 Norms in theory

Norms are “used to describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”, and can define identity or regulate behaviour, or do both (Katzenstein 1996: 5). Identity is subject to defining and redefining in the process of socialising new norms: “Norms become relevant and causally consequential during the process by which actors define and redefine their collective identities and interests” (Risse et al. 1999: 8-9). However, already present norms and structures have carved paths in society which direct the socialisation of new norms. This means new norms are not drawn on a blank slate, the slate has the markings of the already existing society (or societies). Defining and redefining is done by states, groups and/or people that have a history, exist in a context, and act by norms already present in society. An opportunity to change ideational frameworks and boundary definitions presents itself in times of perceived crisis, when old norms are viewed as irrelevant or as having failed (Olsen 1996: 252-253).

People learn through interaction, including interaction with norms and discursive structures (Checkel 2001: 53), and public justifications are a part of evaluating and developing norms (Lynch 1999: 6, 9-11). Public spheres are important places where identity is re-told and new norms can be introduced and put in common frames of reference. A public sphere is defined as “a contested participatory site in which actors with overlapping identities engage in negotiations and contestations over political and social life” (Calhoun 1993). This is also where understanding of norms and identities are reached through contestation and communication, which are keys to changing identities. This is especially relevant in new situations where the persuader is a member of the in-group, and the agent holds few beliefs that oppose the persuader’s message (Checkel 2001: 54).
Communication taking place in an open public sphere can produce change, because an open public spheres is an “effective site of contestation” (Lynch 1999: 261). However, there need to be “cultures and institutions that are responsive to and can accommodate some meaningful degree of internal debate and external influence” (Risse et al. 1999: 263). Open public spheres provide the space for kicking around new ideas and redefining the Self. This may in turn either reify the already prevailing dominant norms in that issue area, or it can expand, limit or change the boundaries for legitimate ideas. However, the new ideas presented are already to some extent limited by norms and structures that are already part of society.

2.3.1 When do identities change?

If norms do not fall from heaven, it also means they do not appear out of thin air. Some authors promote the importance of windows of opportunity for identity change to occur. Barnett gives two conditions under which identity conflict in states can occur (Barnett 1996a 411-412). The first condition says that there can be conflict when there are competing definitions of what should be the collective identity or the identity of the state. However, it is reasonable to think that the identities need not be conflicting, since “As long as there is difference, there is a potential for change” (Hopf 2001: 180). It is when identities call for contradictory behaviour that a conflict occurs and the possibility for change presents itself. The other condition for identity conflict Barnett gives is when definitions of the collective self no longer are acceptable under new historical conditions. New historical conditions can create the opportunity for certain discussions to be initiated.

Though identities may often be different, many authors claim that identity does not change frequently or fluently. Lynch claims that identity does not change continuously, but “primarily during moments of crisis” (Lynch 1999: 12). Lynch points to the role of an external or internal trigger that pushes identity issues into the public sphere. This means that identity may go through changes due to changed historical context, socio-economic changes, or changes in the physical world (Marcussen et al. 2001: 103, Lynch 1999: 12). Moravcsik (2001: 178) uses the term
critical junctures, meaning times of political crisis, major events and situations that initiate discussion over identity. Marcussen et al. (2001: 103) also use the term critical junctures much in the same sense, meaning perceived crisis situations caused by policy failures and external events. Contextual factors play an important role in creating opportunities for identity change to begin. This includes material factors such as socio-economic change and physical factors such as the presence of foreign forces, which may also influence change in identities and how new norms are socialised. It can be expected that the different Lebanese communities may display different paces of socialisation, depending on factors such as state-society structure, ideas and norms already present, as well as socio-economic factors. Since democracy is closely tied to human rights norms, it is likely that the socialisation of this norm can resemble Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) approach more closely.

The notion that identity seldom changes, and only when in crisis, is logical, but many theorists say nothing about how severe or long-lasting the crisis has to be. Do people go to bed during a revolution and wake up the next day with a new identity? If historical events initiate identity-change, how enduring does the event have to be, and how much and what does it have to change before it triggers identity discussion or identity transformation? I will not attempt to give a generalised answer to this question, but it is necessary to be aware of this in order to stress the other factors that apply in identity-changing situations, factors that are not norms. On the one hand authors like Lynch (1999), Barnett (1996a) and Marcussen et al. (2001) suggest that identity rarely changes, pointing to the notion of institutions as being hard to change and guarding norms.

The French mandate’s implementation of a new state structure presented an opportunity for new norms to become socialised, by introducing Lebanese sovereignty and (semi-) democracy. The Lebanese war can be considered a critical juncture, another opportunity for the introduction of new norms. Syria’s dominating role in post-war Lebanon represents a new context and a new framework for norms of sovereignty and democracy. The post-war period presence of Syrian political
influence has triggered a domestic debate over the sovereignty and democracy of Lebanon.

2.3.2 State-society structure

As presented in *Constructing Europe? The Evolution of nation-State Identities* (Marcussen et al. 2001: 103): “New ideas about particular order do not fall from heaven, but need to resonate with existing identity constructions embedded in national institutions and political cultures”. This thought is essential when considering Lebanon, where several co-existing communities existed before the establishment of the Lebanese state in 1920. The communities also had set ways of leadership and how state-society relations worked. Political traditions often exhibit continuity (Kholi and Shue 1994: 302), and thus are a key to understanding how new political norms are socialised, and how and whether certain aspects of the norms change.

A society’s existing, institutionalised political order usually does not get thrown out with the bathwater when a new norm for political organisation comes along. The background upon which new norms are placed has already limited the number of legitimate ideas present, as well as what actors are central to the introduction of new norms into a particular society. This is a factor that Risse et al. (1999: 260) point to when they present factors that influence the timing of the socialisation processes and the scope of change that happens. They present *blocking factors* (ibid.) as factors that can influence the socialisation processes. These are domestic currents, groups or ideas that threaten the territorial integrity or internal cohesion of the state. I will later show how an ethno-religious structure was transferred to the representational system of the Republic of Lebanon, and though they carried with them the institutions of pre-Lebanon society, the Lebanese were exposed to new, institutionalised norms initially imposed top-down by a colonial power (France) and parts of the Christian community.

Institutions play an important role since they can work as a frame of context where norms and values are transferred from one actor to another and new identities and
beliefs are formed (Barnett 1996b: 152). Adler (1997: 340) points out the importance of contact and interaction with the institutions or rules that frame the norms in question. Institutionalisation also means that it requires great effort to deconstruct already institutionalised ideas/norms, because the institutionalisation of these norms provided protection from sudden change as institutionalised norms are thought to be sticky (Risse et al. 1999: 104).

The analysis will present how certain aspects of a local political system were in part institutionalised before Lebanon was established, and how this tradition continued in the French mandate and after independence in 1943. Also, other aspects of state-society relations that continued will be presented in order to get a complete picture of the background and influence these factors provided for the socialisation of sovereignty and democracy norms.

### 2.4 Theoretical outline for the socialisation processes

My focus is initially on how (and if) sovereignty and democracy became norms in Lebanese political identity during the pre-war period, and whether the new context of the post-war period demonstrates further socialisation. Exploring these aspects of Lebanese political history and identity demands a comprehensive theoretical outline for tracing the socialisation of these ideas into norms. Using existing theory requires that it presents concepts that can organize the material in a comprehensive manner (Andersen 1997: 70). Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999: 5) argue that through three ideal processes of interaction, with the help and initiatives of certain leading actors, norms eventually become part of identity. Their theory is based on a theoretical interest in how principled ideas become norms, which in turn affect the behaviour and domestic structure of states. Thus it seems reasonable that the three processes can provide a helpful outline for the socialisation of sovereignty and democracy. Risse et al. (1999) focus on human rights, and assume that norms are initially implemented in a top-down fashion, creating pressure for compliance with the norms, which starts the first process of instrumental compliance. The Lebanese case deals with norms that
also were initially implemented in a top-down fashion, causing pressure to comply, which makes it possible to use the basic outline of the three socialisation processes.

### 2.4.1 Three processes of socialisation of norms

The first socialisation process is the instrumental adoption of the norms in question. This is when norms are invoked by domestic actors, but without any notions about the norms being “true” or “right”. In other words, norms are not yet an integral part of identity. They are adopted only for instrumental reasons, for example to gain power, or material or strategic benefits (Risse et al. 1999: 12, 15). It is important to consider whether instrumental reasons play a role in norm-compliant behaviour later as well. Here instrumental adoption of sovereignty and democracy is accepting Lebanese citizenship and political authority in order to gain access to various material improvements (for example the building of roads, schools and hospitals in the politician’s local constituency) and political power. Abstaining from demands of reuniting with Syria is an early indication of there having occurred at least an instrumental adoption of sovereignty. Participation in Lebanese political institutions can signal that at least the first stage of socialisation has been reached, as this presents the opportunity to gain political influence, which again creates advantages for one’s community. This case focuses on what goes on inside Lebanon, and leaves out the element of external pressure which Risse et al. (1999) include in their study of human rights norms-compliance.

The second process of socialisation involves raising moral consciousness, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion. This is when moral discourse takes place, something that “challenges and seeks justification of norms, and entails identity-related arguments” (Risse et al. 1999: 13). Political communication revolves around persuasion, manipulating the language from the intention of gaining rhetorical and political goals (Heradstveit and Bjørgo 1992: 101). Risse, Ropp and Sikkink emphasise the importance of argumentative discourse and shaming as major contributors to behavioural change. The discourse revolves around challenging validity claims (Risse et al. 1999: 13), and actors eventually accept the validity of the
norms in their discursive practices. This process also assumes that there exists a space where discourse and persuasion can take place. For sovereignty, this stage in the socialisation process can be arguing the legitimacy of the separate Lebanese state, for democracy, arguing the legitimacy of upholding and adhering to a democratic political system.

This process can also be recognised by behaviour which signals that the validity of the norm no longer is controversial by improving and upholding the norm. For sovereignty this would mean that it is adhered to and sustained in times of crisis which hold the potential to challenge Lebanese sovereignty. Undemocratic behaviour would be criticised as wrong and protested, and improvements to democratic practice would be made along the lines of the democratic criteria presented in 2.1.2. Moravcsik points out an important underlying aspect to this process’ aim of persuasion: “An individual’s specific policy ideas are most likely to change when other ideas are held by ‘authorative’ members of an ‘in-group’ to which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong” (Moravcsik 2001: 181). The human rights socialisation approach proposes that the group of states promoting human rights is a desirable in-group not only for regimes, but implicitly for domestic society. This proposes a clear-cut and homogenous view of what the state’s in-groups and out-groups are. In this case, however, this stage includes the action of defining the Self, thus also the country’s out-groups and in-groups.

The final socialisation process is called “institutionalisation and habitualisation” (Risse et al.1999: 11). This stage or process is when norms have become part of the legal and bureaucratic framework of a state and are upheld as right and morally valid norms. The moral validity of norms can be indicated through talk and action that signal norms are being taken for granted. Absence of demands for reunion with Syria can indicate a habitualisation of sovereignty, while absence of demands for other governing forms than democracy can indicate a habitualisation of democracy. This has to coincide with other signs, though, most importantly the absence of norm violating behaviour. On the background of identity and norms being capable of unlimited change, this final criteria’s position as an ideal process has to be
underlined. Defending sovereign principles such as authority over territory, government and military, and defending democratic principles such as freedom of participation, organisation and expression, are indicators for habitualisation of sovereignty and democracy as norms in Lebanon. This process assumes, however, that taken-for-grantedness precedes institutionalisation of new norms, leaving out the possibility of top-down implemented institutions initially introducing the norms in question. This case is an example of this, as the French mandate imposed sovereign and semi-democratic institutions in Lebanon before the norms had become a matter of consensus. I will get back to this and other critical questions in the next section.

There are however three central differences between the Risse et al. (1999) approach and this case. First, the theory outlines the socialisation of norms in pariah states (i.e. norm-violating states/governments). Second, international and transnational actors play a central part in driving the socialisation dynamic forward. Third, the human rights approach presents a chronological view of socialisation where instrumental compliance is followed by argumentative discourse, which results in the inclusion of the norms in the state’s bureaucratic framework and eventual habitualisation and institutionalisation. These differences do pose some challenges to the application of the theory to my case, but the basic design of the norms-socialisation processes can still be useful in order to recognise the processes, keeping the mentioned critique in mind. The differences should mainly present themselves in the operationalisation of the processes, which will be presented in the section after a closer look at some of the theory critical questions.

2.4.2 Theory critique and application problems

Although their theory is especially designed for socialisation of human rights norms in pariah states, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink have based their three processes on the general constructivist concern of how individualistic ideas become collective expectations for behaviour (norms) (Risse et al. 1999:7). This relates to my initial question of whether qawmiyya has merged with wataniyya (see 1.1.2). Although they do not provide a perfect fit for socialisation of other norms, using these three
processes of socialisation on this case can give an impression of the socialisation path of sovereignty and democracy. The differences will be discussed to assess whether they present unmanageable challenges to the application of the processes to this case.

Repressive governments are the main norm rejecting actors subject to socialisation in the human rights approach (Risse et al. 1999). Though this case shares the initial top-down introduction of norms, which makes it possible to use the basic outline of the socialisation processes and their phases to explore domestic socialisation of new norms, the domestic approach illuminates what goes on inside a state. The theory has a top-down and regime/government oriented focus, as human rights norms are thought to descend down from international regimes and connect with assumed domestic interest in pro-human rights change. The human rights- approach is concerned with how norm-violating governments start to believe in the validity of human rights, but assume that the domestic public see human rights norms as valid almost instinctively because they perceive it as positive change. This is problematic, as it makes domestic society a black box where constructivist arguments about socialisation of new norms do not apply.

There must be examples of human rights norms socialisation processes where the domestic public has used much of the same initial reasoning applied to norms-violating governments, such as: “These norms are not compatible with our society”, and instrumental reasoning such as “If we comply, we get such and such funds”. By looking for traces of the socialisation processes on all levels of society, the problematic assumption that the domestic population automatically adopts new norms disappears. This also opens for the role domestic elites can play in introducing new norms to society, and suggests that socialisation of new norms does not happen at the same time and/or in the same manner throughout the society in question. Additionally, domestic elites can play important roles when change happens to aspects of the norms in question.

Another important difference between this case and the human rights approach is that transnational actors play an important part in the latter. This case focuses on domestic
interaction, where certain internal actors play leading roles in the dynamic. In the Risse et al. theory, transnational and international actors are considered key elements in the dynamic which drives the socialisation processes further. This role can, however, be played by prominent domestic actors, who can also mobilise parts of the population around new norms. If the theory is modified to assume that similar socialisation processes happen at all levels of society, with the help of central domestic actors, it diversifies the assumption that domestic society automatically accepts the norms as valid. This makes domestic society a dependent variable influenced by other factors as well, such as state-society relations, historical context and socialising agents. This diversifies how socialisation happens, and could uncover why in some cases social mobilisation is slow to happen or seemingly does not happen at all.

A critical point of the human rights approach is the theory’s fixed chronology, which sets a socialisation course from instrumental compliance to a final goal of norm-compliant behaviour. If identity can and does continue to change, then this last stage must involve redefinition-aspects which can change identity further by possibly changing the content of the norms that have become habitualised. Instrumental reasons, which Risse et al. (1999) place at the beginning of the socialisation process, may be an important factor later in the socialisation processes, even when the norms have become habitualised. Also, placing institutionalisation as a final stage of norms-socialisation seems rigid, since institutions as bureaucratic frameworks imposed top-down can introduce new norms, and may trigger the initial compliance process before the norms themselves have become consensual.

These processes need to be operationalised in order to work as tools for exploring the socialisation of sovereignty and democracy, which will include some modifications due to the previously mentioned points.

### 2.4.3 Phases of socialisation

The three processes are operationalised in a so-called spiralmodel consisting of five phases (Risse et al. 1999: 22-30). These phases are (a) repression, (b) denial, (c)
tactical concessions, (d) prescriptive status, and (e) rule consistent behaviour. The human-rights approach describes the interaction between international/transnational actors, norm-violating government and domestic society. The phases, when applied to this case, will involve slightly different things.

It can be expected that the human rights first phase of repression does not initially apply to the first part of this analysis, since this case does not concern violation of international human rights. This case concerns more the definition of a new state, which was introduced by a colonial power. If this is seen as a separate phase, it would have to be called the “introduction phase”. The Lebanese were not in a position where they could repress the norms as they were under French rule, but they could deny their validity. Therefore I will consider the first phase to be the denial-phase, when actors refuse to accept the validity of the norms in question, labelling them illegitimate and holding other norms as more legitimate. When discussing the post-war period, however, Syria can be said to represent repression of sovereign and democratic norms through the pro-Syrian government.

The phase of tactical concessions is the start of instrumental reasoning for participation. In this phase argumentative discourse is initiated, and the actor becomes entrapped in his or her own rhetoric (Risse et al. 1999: 26). The norms are complied with to gain instrumental or strategic interests, thus trapping the participating actor in a beginning discourse over the validity of the norm(s). Most importantly, this is when social mobilisation happens. In this case it can be expected that this will happen by domestic initiative and in a limited sense due to the absence of international and transnational pressure and support. Participating in Lebanese sovereign and democratic institutions signals an instrumental compliance with sovereign and democratic norms. This is likely to be accompanied by the abandoning of demands for union with Syria and beginning defence of democratic practice.

In the next phase, called prescriptive status, the actors “regularly refer to the (norms) to describe and comment their own behaviour”, and the validity of the norms are no longer controversial (Risse et al. 1999: 27-28). The authors also give this phase as the
time when the norms are ratified into the legal body, and when actors engage in
discursive practices about the norms. In Lebanon, sovereignty and democracy were
made part of the legal body with the French mandate. The discourse practices that can
disclose if this phase has been reached includes three practices that are relevant to the
socialisation of sovereignty and democracy: The first is argumentative consistency
independent of the audience, the second practice is that actors still adhere to the norm
despite changes in material and power related interests. The last discursive practice
that signals a prescriptive phase is that words match the deeds, in other words that
efforts are made to sustain the norms (Risse et al. 1999: 29-31). In face of alternatives
to a sovereign and democratic Lebanon, sovereignty and democracy is adhered to and
argued for. Democratic practices can undergo improvements by including some of
the institutions pointed to in 2.1.2 in Lebanese law, and abiding by the criteria these
institutions present.

The last phase is characterised by habitualisation of the norms, and their integration
into identity and society. This is when the norms are taken for granted, and can be
recognised in part by there not being present any alternatives to the norm in question,
as well as rule consistent behaviour. This is not likely to present itself in this case.

2.5 Summary

The exploration of the socialisation of sovereignty and democracy requires a
comprehensive theoretical outline. The chosen theory of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink
(1999) is based on an interest in how ideas become norms, and recognises three
processes of interaction by which this can happen. Though they focus on human
rights norms and pariah states, the basic framework this theory provides can function
as a tool for recognising socialisation processes in this case as well. Both the human
rights approach and this case have the same point of departure, as they concern norms
which are initially imposed in a top-down manner. With certain modifications, the
processes can be used as tools, traced with the help of signs of four different phases
of socialisation.
New norms are socialised through processes of interaction which include an instrumental adaptation process, a process of argumentation and persuasion and a final process of institutionalisation and habitualisation. These processes are operationalised in phases, for this case starting with denial, then developing into a phase of tactical concessions to the norms, leading to prescriptive status which ideally leads to norm compliant behaviour. The new norms introduced to a society have to resonate with already present norms and institutions. Also, the socialisation processes do not happen evenly throughout a state or society, there may be different paces of socialisation. Factors like state-society relations influence the socialisation processes.

The processes of self-definition are continuous, and there is no final product. This modifies the last process of habitualisation to be a stage where the basic traits of the norms are morally valid, but the norms’ contents can still continuously be subject to discussion and redefining. This could mean that the socialisation processes instead of being three stages leading to norm compliance, result in a continuing cycle of redefining the Self. Using the phases of the socialisation processes of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink approach in a general manner can be fruitful when tracing the socialisation of sovereignty and democracy in Lebanon. The next chapter will give a historical presentation of Lebanese history in order to point out some of the formative events that have influenced Lebanese political history.
3. History

Some point to the Phoenicians as the forefathers of Lebanon, others to the shared history with Syria. Phoenicians or not, the modern notion of the nation-state was not an idea that was a part of the identity of all people in this area at the time of the making of the state of Lebanon. The Maronites had an idea of the mountains being their special homeland, but this idea was not shared by Muslims. Salibi claims that it was only after the end of the mandate in the forties that the Lebanese citizens began to consider themselves as something other than Syrains (unless they were Syrian nationalists) (Salibi 1989: 71).

The main goal here is to give an outline of the beginning and the continuance of Lebanon as a sovereign state, as well as the regional history that has had an impact on the course of Lebanon. The purpose of this chapter is to underline and present central factors that have contributed to Lebanon’s history and development. The chapter will also present the background for the Syrian-Lebanese relationship and the Syrian presence in Lebanon. As Tilly points out, one weakness of political development literature lies in “the treatment of each country as a separate, self-contained, more or less autonomous case” (Tilly 1975: 627 in al-Khazen 2000: 21). As mentioned in chapter 1, the war itself will not be covered in depth.

3.1 Lebanese politics

First I will briefly present some of the main political parties in Lebanese political history. This will provide an overview for future references to Lebanese political parties. This section is based on information in Suleiman’s (1967) Political Parties in Lebanon, Esposito’s (1995) The Islamic Threat- Myth or Reality, Karpat’s (ed.) (1982) Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East and Ajami’s (1997) The Vanished Imam.
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) was founded in 1932 on aspirations for a Greater Syria (as in encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Jordan and the Sinai peninsula). It had its basis of support in the Greek Orthodox community. It was banned after conflicting with both Lebanese and Syrian government, and has not been able to regain its political foothold after once more becoming legal. Its founder Antun Saadeh was executed after an incident of violent unrest in 1949 which involved the SSNP. SSNP was part of the pre-war Lebanese National Movement, which I will get back to in the in analysis chapter four.

The Lebanese Communist Party was established as early as 1924. Its glory days were in the seventies, when socio-economic changes created a change in the political patterns of Lebanon, and subsequently the Communist Party gained new followers. This party was also part of the Lebanese National Movement.

The Progressive Socialist Party was founded in 1949 by (amongst others) Kamal Jumblatt. It is based on socialist ideology, but is considered to have become more of a specifically Druze party after Kamal Jumblatt died and his son, Walid Jumblatt, took over the leadership.

The Arab Nationalist Movement, a mainly Sunni-based party, was influenced by Nasser and Arabism in the fifties and was part of the opposition against the Chamoun- government in 1958. Though initially advocating pro-Arab union sentiments during the heights of Nasserism, doubts to whether an Arab union was right or beneficial emerged by 1966 (Suleiman 1967: 166).

The National Liberal Party was the party of the now deceased Camille Chamoun, and defines itself as a defender of an independent, democratic and free Lebanon (http://www.al-ahrar.com/historic.php, 12.03.03). It was founded in 1958, is opposed to Syrian involvement in Lebanese politics, and boycotted the first post-war elections.

The Kata’ib started as a youth organization for Christians in 1936, and became a political nationalist movement. It became legal after independence, but was banned again in 1949. It gained mainly Maronite support when it came back in 1952 under
the name Phalanges Libanaise (al-Kata’ib al-Lubnaniyya in Arabic). It defines itself as a social democratic party, and has focused on Lebanese issues prior to Arab issues. The party has had a smaller political role after the war ended. (Phares 1995: 86-87, Cobban 1987: 67-69)

The National Bloc is lead by Carlos Eddé, who lives in exile in France. The party was established by Carlos’ grandfather Emile Eddé right after independence, and had its strongest following in Mount Lebanon.

Musa Al-Sadr founded the Harakat Mahrumeen in 1974, vowing to struggle to better the deprived situation of the Shi’a (and others). The Harakat Mahrumeen developed a militia, the Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyya, known by the acronym AMAL. AMAL supported Syria from 1976, when Syria intervened for the first time in the war, and during the war AMAL clashed several times with Palestinians. AMAL today is a major moderate party with mainly a Shi’a following.

Hizbullah started as an umbrella organisation in the early eighties, and has developed two branches, one political and one militant aimed at fighting Israeli occupation. The party has strong ties to Syria and Iran. Hizbullah has gained a lot of popularity on account of its providing much needed social services in poorer areas of Lebanon and Lebanese cities, like running schools, hospitals and providing water and electricity. It has mainly a Shi’a following, but it is popular among many other Lebanese who are not Shi’a, but who benefit from the party’s social services.

3.2 Lebanon, a presentation
Situated between Syria and Israel, Lebanon is literally caught in the middle. Nassif Hitti (1989) claims Lebanon has nothing but a foreign policy due to its geopolitical location, but it is undeniable that the 10 400 square kilometres of coast and mountain has a complex domestic recipe as well (“Lebanon”, Caplex online, 13.06.03). With a population estimated just under four million people, the country has nineteen acknowledged religious communities, and a history of political representation by community.
Under Ottoman rule, Beirut had its own political culture: Ottoman liberalism. This was a unity based on equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as representational institutions (Hourani 1988). Still, there was no national consciousness, and loyalties were tied to traditional leaders (Salibi 1989: 18). Around 1900 the Maronites pressed for the extension of the political status Mount Lebanon had gained in the 1860s, an idea that was pursued after the First World War by Maronite leaders. Still, most people in the *mutasarrif* of Mount Lebanon called themselves Syrians (Salibi 1989: 50-70). Lebanon, like other Middle Eastern countries, had a political culture based on relationships between notables and clients. Special for Lebanon was the religious diversity of the notables, as well as the fact that they were based in both rural and urban areas (Cleveland 1994: 210). The Lebanese feudalistic system of the Ottoman period was a socio-economic and political system of districts, and political authority was distributed amongst autonomous feudal families (*muqata' jis*) (Gellner and Waterbury 1977: 188).

The Constitution of 1926 is still valid, and still embodies these basic principles of Lebanese government. The Lebanese president is the formal head of state. Today the army is under the government’s control, and legislative power lies with the Parliament, where the seats are distributed by religious belonging. The political representation of the French mandate period mirrored the basic representation by religious community in the Administrative Council of 1864, but also the Maronite nationalist ideas, as the president was to be a Maronite. The fixed allocation of political positions according to religious community was established as the norm with the National Pact of 1943, ascribing the presidency to a Maronite, the post of Prime Minister to a Sunni, and Speaker of the House to a Shi’a (many other lower positions were also distributed to the different communities).

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* Meaning organisational unit
3.2.1 Birth of a republic

The Lebanese state is a product of the distribution of previous Ottoman territory by the League of Nations. France was granted Greater Syria in 1920 after the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which consisted of the territories today known as Lebanon and Syria. Lebanon was created as a separate state by France in 1920. The State of Greater Lebanon was given its own flag, introducing the Cedar tree as a symbol for the former coastline of greater Syria. In 1926 the mandate was given a republican constitution, creating the Lebanese Republic (Salibi 1989: 17).

One of the objectives of the French Mandate in 1920 was to safeguard the Maronite community (Cleveland 1994: 209), but the inclusion of a large Muslim population also made sure that the Maronites were dependent on France for maintaining political dominance (ibid.). Acceptance of Lebanon as a separate state and Lebanese citizenship in all communities grew during the thirties and forties. According to Salibi, it was not until the forties that most Lebanese ceased to consider themselves Syrians (Salibi 1989: 71).10

The French mandate was in force until World War II (ibid.).11 Continuing as a French mandate until 1943, Lebanon achieved independence in the Second World War. The National Pact of 1943, which set the precedence of the distribution of political positions to the different communities, was a gentlemen’s agreement between central Sunni and Maronite politicians, presented through a number of speeches and interviews on the understanding the two parties had come to. With the Pact the seats were now allocated in relation to the numerical size of the groups as registered by the 1932 census, and Lebanon was defined as independent and Arab (Hourani 1988, Cleveland 1994, Hanf 1993). Lebanon was a founding member of both the Arab

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10 Syrians meaning inhabitants of the geographical area stretching from the coastline of eastern Mediterranean, to the Red Sea and Yemen, enveloping the Dead Sea, and connecting with Iraq in the Taurus mountains (Salibi 1989: 58). Syria was given formal political rehabilitation under the Ottoman empire, which named the Ottoman Vilayet of Damascus the Vilayet of Syria (Salibi 1989: 69)

11 Lebanon and France made a Treaty in 1936, which provided for independence after a three- year period of transition. This was not ratified by France, but the Free French proclaimed Lebanon an independent Republic after defeating the Vichy government which had controlled Lebanon during the beginning of World War II until 1941. Elections were held in 1943, and Lebanon became independent on Jan. 1, 1944.

Albert Hourani (1988) suggests this specific tradition of sectarian power-sharing originated in the 1860s, when it was decided that Lebanon was to have a governor appointed by the Ottoman government. He was to be a Christian, but not a Maronite, and was to be assisted by an administrative council that represented the different communities.

3.2.2 Liberal and liable Lebanon
After independence was achieved in 1943, Lebanon developed and prospered during the next decades. The fifties and sixties were times of flourishing free press and ideas, as new generations of intellectuals were educated at the many Lebanese schools and universities (Hourani 1988). During the fifties, Lebanon prospered due to its liberal and unrestrained capitalism, and Lebanese banks were popular for placing oil money from the Gulf states due to their secrecy. State intervention was at a minimum, and commerce and service business grew, attracting banking business from all over the world. This was when Beirut became known as the Paris of the Middle East. Being the place in the Middle East for education and new ideas and theories, Lebanon was established as the main modern intellectual centre in the Middle East. There were other changes as well, as the cities grew rapidly, creating an urban working class. The Lebanese political system proved to be incapable of governing the rapidly growing cities of rural immigrants (Hourani 1988). People mainly settled within their own communities in the urban areas, and their ties to their traditional leaders in their hometowns and villages were severed.

Farid al-Khazen (1992) promotes two recognisable patterns concerning the Lebanese integration process between the different communities, one starting in the early 1940s, the other in the 1970s. The first period was characterised by a perception of intersectarian co-operation as advantageous. This lasted until the seventies, when the process reversed due to a number of factors, like the declining economy, raised expectations to living standards, and future prospects that were not met, as well as
demographical changes that had lead to demands for political reforms, and a gap between the political elite and the masses, plus a widening gap between urban and rural areas. The seventies were dominated by a trend towards factional contentions rather than co-operation. The different sects had acquired different goals, ranging from socio-political issues for the Shi’a, to old notions of Lebanese nationalism for the Maronites. Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt’s formation of the Lebanese National Movement (LMN) in the late sixties stood for abolishing community based representation, and was a result of a combination of pro-Palestinian sentiment and opposition against Maronite political dominance (Cleveland 1997: 345, Cobban 1987: 107).

The fifties and sixties were also times of building tension between the West/Israel and the Arab states. After a period of unrest in the late fifties, the Arab-Israeli wars, followed, which were serious blows to Arab self-esteem (Cleveland 1994). The creation of Israel is perhaps the event that has had the most profound implications for both Lebanese and regional politics and security issues, especially due to the Palestinian refugee situation.

3.2.3 The implications of the creation of the state of Israel

The Jewish forces sought to secure the territory allotted to the Jewish state in the UN partition plan. The areas (with a predominantly Arab population) resisted, and about 400,000 Palestinians fled to neighbouring areas. The day the British mandate was proclaimed to end (May 15 1948), Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq invaded Israel.12 This resulted in the defeat of the joint Arab forces, and the war ended abruptly in December 1948. Over 700,000 Palestinians had by this time become refugees, without the possibility of return (Cleveland 1994: 247-248). This

12 The state of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May 1948 after the UN’s plan for dividing the area into a Jewish and an Arab state. This was, as mentioned, followed by an attack by the neighboring Arab states. (“Israel”, Caplex, http://www.caplex.net/web/artikkeli/artdetalj.asp?art_id=9316500&L=1, accessed 03.05.04)
marked the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem which has had a profound impact on the entire region since.\textsuperscript{13}

Another important regional event is the June War in 1967, which altered both the circumstances and the attitudes of Palestinians. The Arab states were defeated again, this time losing additional Palestinian territory to Israel. This turned the Cairo based bureaucracy of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)\textsuperscript{14} into an independent resistance force. The Arab states were attempting to restrict Palestinian resistance activity operating independently (and thus uncontrollably). The PLO relocated to Jordan, and relocated again to Lebanon and Beirut after the Jordanian military had killed 3000 Palestinians in Jordan in September 1970 (known as Black September).\textsuperscript{15} The Palestinian commando organisation thus joined 300,000 Palestinians already present in Lebanon. This increased and stronger Palestinian presence attracted external intervention from both Syria and Israel.

The next major Israeli-Arab event followed in October 1973, when Syria and Egypt confronted Israel yet again in the October War. Lebanon was deeply divided by the issue of supporting the Palestinians (Cleveland 1997: 344). Israel retaliated the Palestinian raids from 1970 onward, and began in 1972 a series of ground invasions of southern Lebanon. Israeli commandos raided Beirut in April 1973 and killed three Palestinian leaders, whereupon the Lebanese government resigned. The Palestinians received political support from Druze leader Jumblatt, providing an alliance between the Palestinians and the Lebanese Left. However, the general public was critical to the Palestinian guerrilla presence since Israel had attacked Beirut International Airport in 1969. The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon swelled, and more and

\textsuperscript{13} The UN registered 960,000 Palestinians for relief in 1950, the number rising to 1.3 million in 1968. The refugees are mainly located in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip (Cleveland 1994: 325).

\textsuperscript{14} The Palestine Liberation Organisation was founded in 1964 with the blessing of the Arab League, based first in Cairo (Cleveland 1994: 326)

\textsuperscript{15} The PFLP had hijacked civilian airliners and landed them on Jordanian territory, threatening to blow them up if the Jordanian government interfered. King Hussein chose to break the power of the guerrillas, and the Jordanian military directed all its force against Palestinian presence, making no distinction between civilians or guerrillas (Cleveland 1994: 331).
more Palestinians joined the PLO (Cobban 1985: 126). The Palestinians and PLO had interfered in interior Lebanese affairs by being allowed to operate freely within Lebanese borders. The Christian factions armed themselves in preparation for a confrontation with the Palestinians, starting an arms race between all factions. Another destabilising factor was that the demographic change was unaccounted for in Lebanon’s political representational institutions. The growing Muslim population, which now clearly outnumbered the Christian population, were demanding a fairer share of political power (Cleveland 1994: 345).

The Palestinians refugee situation in both Lebanon and in many neighbouring countries seems to rest in an unmoveable and unsolvable status quo. What the general press calls the Middle East problem has caused Israel to invade the south of Lebanon several times, finally withdrawing from the south in May 2000.16

3.3 Syria and Lebanon
This part of the chapter is important to map out the background of Syrian presence in Lebanon for chapter five, which will address post-war sovereignty and democracy.

Syria and Lebanon have numerous treaties today, but prior to the Lebanese war there were no formal treaties between the two countries (Thompson 2002: 75). The countries did not have diplomatic relations either, a fact that was and is explained by officials as being because of the close, fraternal relations between Syria and Lebanon (ibid.).

3.3.1 The beginning of the Syrian affair and the end of war
When the Lebanese war began, Syria became a dominating force in Lebanon practically overnight during the spring of 1976. Syrian involvement was mainly due to the worries Syria had about its own security situation. Syrian troops were deployed into northern Lebanon, advancing to Beirut (Thompson 2002: 76). The Arab League

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called for a “symbolic Arab Security force” to calm the Lebanese situation (Thompson 2002: 75). Syria backed this decision, promoting their military presence in Lebanon at the time as a part of the “Arab solution” to Lebanese strife. The Arab League met again in 1978, this time adopting a resolution which transformed the Arab Security force into the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), intended to implement a cease-fire and re-establish peace. Since the Arab states could not agree on how many troops each state should contribute, this decision was left to the Lebanese President, who had been backed by Syria. He decided that Syrian forces should constitute vast majority of the ADF (circa 25,000 of the ADF troops). The mandate of ADF expired in 1982, and no request for extension of the mandate was made from the Lebanese government. Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, though recognising the termination of the ADF, advanced a resolution at the Fez Arab Summit that the withdrawal of Syrian forces would be on certain conditions: as long as Israeli forces were in Lebanon, Syrian military presence could continue its military presence (Thompson 2002: 78).

Various members of Lebanese government and political and militia leaders acknowledged Syria’s role in stabilising the situation after the Ta’if. Syria had also negotiated and implemented cease-fires during the war (Thompson 2002: 89). Syria was able to articulate further justification for presence in Lebanon through the US-led coalition in the Gulf crisis. Assad drew on the Iraq-Kuwait paradigm, pointing out that Syria did recognise Lebanon as a separate state (while Iraq did not regard Kuwait the same way) (Thompson 2002: 89). Lebanon and Syria also signed the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination in 1991, which stated that a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee was to define the areas where Syrian military was to be present (Abdelnour and Gambill 2003). This can be said to have further consolidated Syria’s military presence in Lebanon.

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17 Thompson claims the late Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad created an international acceptance of Syrian presence in Lebanon as legitimate using international law (Thompson 2002: 91).
3.3.2 Syria in Lebanon after the war

In 1988 Amin Gemayel stepped down from the Presidency, appointing Michel Aoun as the acting Prime Minister in accordance with the law, as no new president had been elected. The Muslim Prime Minister Salim al-Huss refused to recognise this, and as a result there were two rival governments in Lebanon. Violence resumed as Aoun and Syrian forces clashed. The Arab League formed a three state committee consisting of Morocco, Algeria and Saudi-Arabia to seek a final solution to the Lebanese situation (Thompson 2002: 80). The surviving Parliament members and Syrian representatives met in Ta’if, Saudi-Arabia, in 1989, which resulted in the Lebanese National Accord Document, known as the Ta’if Accord. The “special relationship” between Syria and Lebanon was put in writing\textsuperscript{18}, and Syria also managed to include a provision which ensured Syria a legal right to have forces in Lebanon for a period of time which could not be delimited by any outside body (Thompson 2002: 81).\textsuperscript{19}

The attack on the Presidential Palace by the Syrian Air force is generally regarded as the end of the war (Cleveland 1997). All of the militias withdrew from Beirut in 1991 and were disarmed, except for Hizbullah, and the Lebanese army was able to assert its authority in 50 percent of the country with the help of Syria (Cleveland 1997: 445). Hizbullah was allowed to remain active, and the SLA (South Lebanon Army) refused to disband (BBC country profiles: “Lebanon”, online, 03.05.04).

Syria has played a major part in controlling who gets to run for elections since 1992, approving the candidates for presidency. Syria has also sought and managed to secure the loyalty of the five main governmental positions for foreign policy: The President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House, the Interior Minister and the Defence

\textsuperscript{18} “Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances.” (Ta’if Accord 1989, last paragraph)

\textsuperscript{19} The Ta’if Accord appoints the governments of Syria and Lebanon as the bodies who shall determine the extent and scope of Syrian presence on Lebanese soil in the last part of the document.
Minister. This has caused a legitimacy problem, culminating in extensive Christian protests against Syrian presence in 2001 and 2002.

When Hafiz al-Assad died of a heart attack in June 2000, one month after the Israeli pulled out from southern Lebanon, his son Bashar inherited the Syrian Presidency. However, the change of rule in Syria had little impact on the Lebanese-Syrian relationship, though the Syrian military troops have redeployed several times: in June 2001, April 2002, and most recently, in February 2003 (Abdelnour and Gambill 2003).

The geopolitical situation Lebanon finds itself in is still dominated by the same foreign policy issues, as the end of the war did not end the troubled relations with Israel. The nineties saw the Israeli Operation Accountability in 1993, which was the heaviest attack on southern Lebanon since 1982, as well as the 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath. The unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in May 2000 was celebrated as a victory over the enemy, but subsequently sparked debate over the legitimacy of Syrian presence in the country.

3.3.3 Israel withdraws, discussion begins

Though Israel left Lebanese soil in the south in May 2000, Hizbullah continue to fight for the last piece of land they see as occupied by Israel, the Sheba’a Farms. The Lebanese government endorses the fighting, referring to it as resistance against an occupying force. There have been changes in the Arab-Israeli relationship the past twenty years, though, as Jordan has given up the claim to the West Bank and the Palestinians rose to a second Intifada.

After the Israeli withdrawal, the Maronite Bishop Cardinal Nasrallah Sfeir in September 2000 publicly called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanese soil. The Cardinal was calling for the Syrian troops to return to Syria in order to implement part of the Ta’if Accord from 1989. The mainly Christian protest against Syrian presence and interference in Lebanese politics has stirred protest
against the opposition, which claims that this discussion of the legitimacy of Syrian military presence in Lebanon will cause renewed sectarian strife.

In April 2001 a number of politicians and intellectuals gathered in Qornet Shehwan and published a manifest as an answer to the Cardinal’s call in September. Referred to as the Qornet Shehwan gathering since then, the group claims to represent the Lebanese opposition. They are opposed to the influence Syria has on Lebanese politics, saying it compromises Lebanon as a sovereign and democratic state. The Qornet Shehwan (QS) is also concerned with the Lebanese economy which has taken a turn for the worse (public debt has reached a staggering 32 billion dollars), despite political assurance of better times ahead with the help of friends like France. The QS is concerned with the implementation of the Ta’if Accord’s political reform and its sovereignty components, as well as the upholding of human rights.

The religious leaders of Lebanon’s communities are becoming more and more outspoken and vocal about the political situation, some focusing on Syria, others on changing electoral laws, others again on how Lebanon’s political elite should stand together. Lebanon is facing a challenging future and challenging discussions concerning its political organisation, as well as its relations with Syria.

3.4 Summary
The pre-war period in Lebanon saw many major events which had a profound impact on not only Lebanon, but the entire region’s history and development. Lebanon’s history and identity is marked by its geopolitical situation (Cleveland 1997: 203-215, 244-251). One of the central historical events for the entire regions’ recent history has been the founding of the Israeli state in 1948. This event has lead to the physical presence of foreign forces in Lebanon, Israeli and Syrian, as well as the PLA. The Israeli presence in southern Lebanon had major implications for the development of this area and the political mobilisation of the Shi’a, as well as implications for the Lebanese perception of Self in a wider Arab context. The prospected permanent physical presence of what was perceived as a foreign or pro-Western state (Israel) in times of anti-colonialism, and movements towards independence may have triggered
a stronger definition of the Arab Self as an opposite to Western, imperialistic powers (see Barnett 1996a and b).

The arrival of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the relocation of the PLO (the Palestinian Liberation Organisation) from Jordan to Lebanon contributed to the many coinciding circumstances which lead to the outbreak of war. The presence of many Palestinian refugees in Lebanon represented several challenges for the Lebanese. For the Christians it represented a challenge to the representational recipe if this group was to be naturalised, since political representation was based on the 1932 census which showed the Christians to constitute a slight majority. For the Shi’a it could also be considered a demographic threat due to the fact that most of the Palestinians were Sunni Muslims. It was the Shi’a AMAL that embarked on the war on Palestinian camps in 1984. Still, the Shi’a Hizbullah has made it its trademark being the force de resistance against Israel and thus fighting for the Palestinian cause. To many Lebanese the naturalisation of the Palestinians would translate into an unacceptable acknowledgement of Israel. This last reasoning has been official policy through affirming the Palestinian’s “right of return”, which is still the official policy today.

The post-war period brought a new historical situation. Now dependent on Syria, peace is secured in Lebanon. However, Syria exerts control over Lebanese political life. The end of the war itself marked a new era in Lebanese history, and the influence of Syria has caused concern about the future of Lebanon’s sovereignty and democracy. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in May 2000 was a historic event which ended the long period of Israeli presence on Lebanese soil. This brought forth a discussion about Lebanese identity in relation to its sovereign existence and its plural democratic governing form.

The following chapter will look at the socialisation processes of sovereignty and democracy in Lebanon in the pre-war period. The chapter intends to draw lines of socialisation processes from the beginning of Lebanon as a state to the Lebanese war regarding sovereignty and democracy, and also present the implications previous
state-society relations and central political introducing agents have had on the socialisation processes of these norms.
4. Lebanese political identity before the war

After having presented the main research questions, the theoretical approach and introduced Lebanon’s geo-political and historical context, it is now time for the analysis. This thesis looks at the socialisation processes of norms, and the initial top-down introduction of the new norms of sovereignty and democratic representation onto Lebanon. This will be explored by using the framework of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) norm socialisation theory. Other important contributing factors like state-society relations, socialising agents and contextual factors will also be presented and discussed in order to get a more complete picture of the socialisation processes. The chapter focuses on the domestic development of sovereignty and democracy into possible collective expectations for proper behaviour in Lebanon. This involves tracing the phases of the socialisation processes by exploring historical and political analysis and articles about the Lebanese pre-war period (1920-1975).

After first presenting some critical questions concerning the application of the concepts sovereignty and democracy to Lebanon, I will look at state-society relations and ideas of sovereignty preceding the establishment of Lebanon. These are important because they form the basis on which the socialisation processes of norms are grounded. I will also describe socio-economic factors which had an effect on state-society relations. In the last section of this chapter the three processes of norms-socialisation will be explored. This includes first looking at the initial instrumental compliance with sovereign and democratic institutions. Adhering to and improving the norm and referring to the norm when commenting on behaviour indicates the second socialisation process of argumentation and persuasion. This part will attempt to indicate how actual acceptance, if only for material or strategic gains (i.e. the first socialisation-process), snowballs into a deeper commitment and engagement to the sovereign Lebanese state and its representational democratic norms, possibly leading to signs of the third socialisation process of habitualisation and institutionalisation of the norms.
4.1 Sovereignty and democracy as contested concepts

Some words of caution are in order when putting Lebanese political identity, sovereignty and democracy together in an explanatory attempt. Critical voices claim that Lebanon has never gained a sense of a sovereign Self. Hitti points to two defining factors which blur Lebanese foreign and domestic politics: the open political system ridden with lobbying of every cause and goal, and the “absence of the statehood value” (Hitti 1989: 3-4). Hitti claims the Lebanese do not have the widely shared consensus a state is usually based on, and that Lebanon suffered from a chronic bipolarised culture drawn between Lebanese nationalism and independent Arabism (ibid.).

Others have seen the Lebanese representational system as an example of plural democracy, and used it as an example of co-existence. Lijphart (1977) regarded the Lebanese model in this manner, and called it the consensus model. Some authors emphasise the patron-client relations which still dominate politics as a major reason for questioning the democratic-ness of Lebanon’s political representational system. For example, Harik says that “The political party vote in Lebanon does not serve the same purpose as in the studies of other countries, simply because the Lebanese send only one-third of their representatives to parliament with party labels; the rest are independent” (Harik 1980: 27). This tendency has increased in post-war parliaments, and the strong patron-client relations which are a part of political Lebanon can be said to undermine democratic practice. Still, it is not my goal to grade Lebanon’s sovereignty and level of democracy, but rather to point to factors which have influenced the socialisation processes of these norms, and give one view on the possible sequence and scope of the socialisation processes of these norms in Lebanon.

4.2 Heritage and watermarks of Lebanon

As presented in the theory chapter, ideas (which are not yet norms) and norms (collective expectations for the correct behaviour of actors with a given identity) that are present before the introduction of new norms can influence how and to what
extent the new norms are socialised (Risse et al. 1999: 260, Marcussen et al. 2001: 103-104).

Some assumptions about the impact state-society relations can have on norm socialisation can be made based on the outline presented in the theory chapter. First, the better the new norms fit with old norms, the faster the new norms are socialised, and the more durable they are (Checkel 1998). Second, the new norms themselves are, to a certain extent, moulded by society and its existing norms and ideas. This means that already present norms not only change in the meeting with new norms, but they can also to some degree survive under new norms by having set certain boundaries to the number of legitimate ideas. This section will explore what aspects of state- society relations survived in the modern Lebanese state, and some of the consequences state- society relations and ideas of sovereignty had on the socialisation of the new norms. Finally, this chapter will present the changes in Lebanon’s socio-economic context, which had an effect on state-society relations.

### 4.3.1 State-society relations

This section will point to three aspects of state-society relations which were transferred into the new state order: political representation based on community belonging, patron-client relations as the main incentive for political participation, and personal leadership as the dominant political leadership style. The new state order resonated in part with how state-society relations were already organized, but also influenced the old norms to change with the introduction of centralizing democratic institutions in a sovereign setting. According to authors like Hanf (1989: 64), Baaklini (1999), Johnson (2001) and Khalaf (1987), personal leadership and patron-client relations are still cornerstones in Lebanese politics, where political parties have played a marginal role.

Marcussen et al. claim that already existing norms are important to the introduction of a new political order, as “new ideas about social order and the nation state need to resonate with previously embedded and institutionalized values, symbols and myths” (Marcussen et al. 2001: 103-104). In Lebanon, representation by religious community
has been the main principle since the Administration Council of 1864 through the Constitution of 1926 to the National Pact in 1943 and the Ta’if Accord in 1989.\textsuperscript{20}

A Christian headed the Administration Council where six other communities were also represented. The following French Mandate’s political system mirrored this aspect of the Administration Council. The National Pact of 1943 established community representation on all levels of government, and continued the tradition of co-community rule and a Christian leader (as president). The norm of community representation is also reflected in Lebanon’s civil rights, which are upheld by different religious courts. Although 19 religions are recognized, those who choose no religion or who are of an unrecognised religion have no acknowledged general Lebanese civil law (Middle East Report, Spring 1997: 37-39).\textsuperscript{21}

Patron-client relations and personal leadership were central in Lebanese politics before and after 1920. Before 1920, the Mount Lebanon area was ruled by feudal elites (feudal meaning certain families could collect taxes), known as the ‘\textit{iqta} system (Khalaf 1987: 24). The area was divided into political districts which were distributed to autonomous feudal families (ibid.). These families became a class of notables as they consolidated their positions by the 1800s, and some were to dominate Lebanese politics until present time. This period also introduced leadership as a matter of inheritance (Hanf 1993: 64). The old feudal aristocracy and notables did give way to a new class of political elite, who were better educated and professional (Khalaf 1987: 121-123). This new class continued to rely on kinship ties for participation in politics, and most were still first and foremost representatives for local interests (Khalaf 1987: 134).

After the National Pact of 1943, the communities came to regard not only political offices, but all positions in the ranks of civil service as objects of patronage (Hanf

\textsuperscript{20} Explicitly stating that sectarianism should be abolished did not happen until the Ta’if Accord of 1989, although it was stated to be a temporary system already in the 1926 Constitution (Cobban 1987: 62-63).

\textsuperscript{21} It is possible to convert if two people of different religions want to marry, for example. If neither wants to convert, they have to get married abroad (Cyprus has been a destination for this). Lebanese children are given their father’s religion.
The deputies showed little concern with national interests, as local issues tied to the patron-client roles continued to be the representatives’ foremost concern (Harik 1975: 214). Between 1960 and 1972 the parliamentary representation of parties with primarily single-community support and policies increased (Hanf 1993: 79). A winning candidates’ further success relied on how he was able to strengthen ties with his constituencies, for example by giving them jobs, thus augmenting his local resources by patronage (Harik 1975: 215). Lebanon’s politics are still thought to be based on patron-client relations, so the expectation of politicians acting on behalf of their local community’s interests continues to be central in Lebanese politics (conversation with Kari Karamé at NUPI).

Farid al-Khazen speaks of a general gap between mass and elite in political Lebanon which varies according to community, but exists in all of them (al-Khazen 1992). Still, pre-war representatives from parliamentary families held roughly fifty percent of the seats (according to the numbers presented), which indicates that the parliamentary families’ role as political representatives of their communities was strong. However, there was increasing competition and a relatively high turnover rate for representatives, as I will discuss further in 4.5.6. Khalaf shows the number of representatives that belong to parliamentary families in the course of Lebanese elections (presented in table 1, including numbers from before the Lebanese war) (Khalaf 1987: 138). This indicates the important position kinship and personal leadership continued to have in Lebanese politics. This can also explain the relative lack of success of party politics proper.

Table 1: Percentage of parliamentary families elected into Parliament 1943-1972

Khalaf talks of parliamentary families when discussing the role of the political elite in Lebanon that emerged mostly after 1920.
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<td>Reps from parliamentary families</td>
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<td>Percentage</td>
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There is a much lower percentage of MPs from parliamentary families in 1960 (35.3%), but when looking at the number of seats, the total number of family-representatives shows consistency. The increased number of deputies (from 66 to 99) is probably a contributing reason for this temporary decline in percentage of deputies from parliamentary families (Khalaf 1987: 138). The 1964 elections show that about the same percentage of deputies were being elected from parliamentary families as before the increase in number of seats. This means that instead of new, independent politicians participating in elections, the parliamentary families looked within themselves to fill the new seats. The continued election of parliamentary family members is based on continuing patron-client relations in politics as an established way of gaining political and material benefits.

Women began participating in elections in the 1950s (Harik 1980: 29), which does not seem to have had any effect on voting-patterns. In 1953 an all-time high percentage of family-deputies were elected. However, in 1968 there was a slight decline, and 1972 shows a relatively low percentage at 44.4. The 1968 elections had the highest percentage of party members winning parliamentary seats at circa 30%, the same as the first elections after the war (Krayem). This could indicate that the parliamentary families were losing legitimacy as political representatives, and that a

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23 Literate women were given the right to vote in 1952, made to include all women in 1957 (Harik 1980: 29).
change was beginning to happen to voting patterns, which could be related to socio-economic change. Political parties were mostly confined to extra-parliamentary activities, which allowed them to be more radical (Hanf 1989: 84).

There has been a continuation of family led politics until today, which has been a hindrance in the possible pursuit of de-confessionalising Lebanese politics and of party politics proper. No real effort was made in the pre-war period to change the community based political system, though the Constitution of 1926 stated it to be a temporary system. Patron-client relations dominated politics as national issues were absent in favour of local issues tied to the representative’s local communities. I will come back to some of these factors later in the chapter when I discuss the socialisation of democracy. The next section will present other ideas of sovereignty that were part of certain Lebanese communities.

### 4.3.2 Ideas of sovereignty

This section will present some central ideas of sovereignty that were present in parts of Lebanon before the state was established, and which had a certain influence on the creation of Lebanon. However, the Lebanon the French mandate created was not an already existing idea in the Lebanese communities. Ideas of a Lebanese sovereignty did exist, but as Maronite nationalism.

A beginning Lebanese nationalism emerged in Mount Lebanon amongst the Maronites, who became more aware of their communal belonging after a series of violent clashes between Maronites and Druze from 1841-1860 (Zamir 1985: 8). In the aftermath of these events, Mount Lebanon was established as an autonomous Ottoman province where the Maronites were the strongest community, politically, numerically and economically (Zamir 1985: 9). In 1876, petitions were made in opposition to Mount Lebanon’s involvement and participation in the Ottoman Parliament. There seems to have been a clear (although mainly Maronite) notion of Ottoman centralist rule and authority as illegitimate, though their position as a minority in the Middle East was also a factor (Zamir 1985: 18).
Prior to the petitions, the European powers together with the Ottoman Empire decided to establish two separate districts in 1842, one Maronite lead and one Druze lead, in order to stop an escalation of tension between Druze and Christians (Phares 1995: 49). With the organisation of two districts, the Druze, the Maronites and the Great Powers stood together against the Ottoman government’s attempt to install an Ottoman official as governor. The three parties also agreed on the previously mentioned Administrative Council, where six major sects were to be represented (Azar 1984: 44). These representatives were elected by the sheikhs of the villages, and were to proportionally represent the different communities. The establishment of the semi-autonomous administration is considered the beginning of a political administrative elite with traces into today’s Lebanon (Khalaf 1987: 194).

Allied forces liberated Lebanon in 1917, and through the Sykes-Picot Agreement a French mandate was imposed on what was to become Syria and Lebanon (Phares 1995: 58-62). The Administration council’s survival until the Lebanese state was declared in 1920 can be seen as an extension of semi-sovereignty into the French Mandate period, when “two-thirds of the parliament was elected on the basis of universal male suffrage, the remaining one-third being appointed by French authorities” (Salem 1997). Thus the mandate-period also involved some notion of semi-sovereignty, as the Lebanese were made a part of the decision making processes.

The nationalistic ideals among many Maronites portrayed an image of Lebanon as a Maronite homeland, and through Maronite lobbying the idea gained some acknowledgement in the French government. A debate concerning the future of the Arab Orient happened in the wake of the First World War, and an idea of an ‘independent Lebanon’ emerged. This idea received most support from already politically organised Christian forces in the Lebanese area, such as the members of the Administrative Council of pre-war Mount Lebanon and the Maronite hierarchy (Phares 1995: 68). These ideas have roots in nascent Lebanese sovereign ideals in the
last part of the 1800s (Zamir 1985: 119-120). However, though France set the precedence of a Maronite as the Lebanese head of state, it also made sure to compose the Lebanese state so that no community was in clear majority, thereby securing its own position and interests (Cleveland 1997: 210). Thus the French mandate secured their own dominant role while simultaneously conserving an existing value or myth, which secured support among some parts of the population.

When Lebanon was established as a state, there were ideas of a sovereign Lebanon, mostly as a Christian homeland in the Maronite Mount Lebanon. The areas surrounding Mount Lebanon which were included in the Lebanese state were more oriented towards Syria (Baaklini 1999: 84). The Lebanon established in 1920 came about as a combination of Christian lobbying for a homeland and French self-interest in keeping all communities in Lebanon dependent on the colonial power. Thus the Lebanese state which was established was not a mirror of an ideal of a sovereign state. The existing ideas of Christian sovereignty and Arabism eventually made a compromise which resulted in an independent state that removed itself from the West to put on an “Arab face” in the National Pact of 1943.

4.3.3 Socio-economic factors

Most scholars who discuss the causes of the Lebanese war (1975-1989) describe socio-economic change as a contributing factor to the causes of the war. These changes also had an effect on aspects of state-society relations. For example, when people moved from rural to urban areas, their ties to their traditional political elite were severed, causing them to look elsewhere for political representation. This shows how socio-economic factors can affect socialisation processes, in this case by creating the space and opportunity for new political leadership to mobilise parts of the population. The political elite itself will be discussed in section 4.4, but first I will

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24 Including the Akkar plains meant that a large number of Muslims would become part of the state. This was also an area with fertile land, which was of major importance due to the experience from World War I, when blockades lead to famine and the death of some 100 000 inhabitants.
present the socio-economic background that brought new leaders like Musa al-Sadr to the central political stage and changed aspects of the old political elites.

Prior to the war, Lebanon went through a period of growth from the fifties to the early seventies, both economically and culturally. Lebanon became the banking and trade centre linking the Middle East and the West. The fifties and sixties were also times of increased freedom of expression. Beirut became the centre in the Middle East for writers, journalists, artists and intellectuals (Cobban 1987: 97-98). The changing economy also caused a rapid wave of urbanisation in the sixties and seventies, as farming declined and tertiary services increased (Hanf 1993: 108). The land surrounding Beirut previously used for agriculture became the ground for the newcomers’ makeshift houses and Palestinian refugee camps, creating a poverty belt around the city. A political cleavage appeared between established inhabitants and new migrants in Lebanon’s quickly expanding cities. Political loyalty shifted from loyalty to the leading families to the community itself (Cobban 1987: 116-117). Urbanisation especially affected the rural Maronite and Shi’a population (Hanf 1993: 85, Cobban 1987: 116). No longer under the protection of local traditional leaders, the new urban lower class sought political representation elsewhere, since ties to hometowns and political families were severed because of relocation to urban areas. Also, the newcomers were not registered in Beirut, but in their hometowns, which caused them to become more and more marginalized from their zu’ama (Hanf 1993: 85).

Socioeconomic changes also affected the backgrounds of new representatives, as professionals or businessmen replaced old-fashioned landlords (Harik 1975: 205). However, the political elite continued to act as caretakers of local communities, as discussed in 4.3.1. The inherited role of certain families as mediators between state and society was challenged, though, when urbanisation relocated certain groups away from their local leaders. Community representation took on a slightly different form, as the traditional zu’ama lost some ground (Hanf 1993: 85). This did however vary from community to community. The Maronite political parties managed to replace the zu’ama, while the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic notables were still central.
The Sunni notables lost only a limited amount of voters to parties like the Najjadé, Ba’ath and smaller Nasserite groups. Shi’a who had moved to Beirut started joining the Communist Party, the Ba’ath and the SSNP, lacking an urban Shi’a political alternative at the beginning of the urbanisation trend.

Muslims had become the largest communities in Lebanon (Esposito 1997: 143), but the basic power sharing quotas from the National Pact were kept despite demands for political reform from Sunni and Shi’a leaders in the pre-war period. Changes in these quotas were finally made in the Ta’if Accord in 1989. Esposito claims the Shi’a grew from 18 % to closer to 30% of the population from 1932 to 1968 (Esposito 1995: 143).

The two parties that sprung out of the mobilisation and changes in the Shi’a population both argued for improved conditions for the Shi’a, though their approaches were different. Musa al-Sadr founded AMAL, which did not call for an Islamic state, but worked within the sovereign democratic framework to promote Shi’a interests (Esposito 1995: 145-149). Hizbullah, a sort of umbrella- organisation of like minded groups such as al-Jihad and Jund Allah, called for the dismantling of the Lebanese state in favour of an Islamic state. Hizbullah was inspired by the same currents that fed the Iranian revolution, and was based on interests beyond Lebanese national interests (Esposito 1995: 145-149). Iran and Syria supported Hizbullah, which also had a more direct anti-American approach than AMAL, which was focused on national issues (Esposito 1995: 145-149). Though the emerging of Hizbullah is moving outside the parameters of this thesis, it is interesting to notice the importance external events have had on the internal politics and political identities of Lebanon. This suggests that another interesting approach to Lebanese political identity is the making of a Lebanese Self versus the Other, and how versions of a Lebanese Self competed with each other.

4.4 Socialising agents

This chapter has now presented factors concerning previously present values, symbols and myths which have influenced the norm socialisation processes by
limiting the number of valid ideas for the Lebanese political system and sovereignty. Risse et al. point to the central role certain actors play in introducing and arguing for new norms (Risse et al. 1999: 17-18). Whereas Risse et al. focus on international and transnational actors, in Lebanon leading political and/or religious leaders have played important roles as introducing agents of sovereignty and democracy. Also, the institutionalisation of a state separate from Syria was initially introduced to the majority of the population through the institutions implemented by the French. I will first briefly discuss the implications the French implemented institutions had on triggering the socialisation processes before presenting some of the central community leaders and their role as introducers of new norms.

**4.4.1 The French mandate**

The initial introduction of a Lebanon separate from Syria and institutionalised political representational norms was done by the French government in 1920. The French mandate’s formal institutions were the framework of a new, separate state made from what was originally a part of Syria, embracing several communities into one new state. This made Lebanon a separate, bureaucratic entity before ideas of sovereignty and democracy were a matter of general consensus. The French mandate thus triggered discussion and argumentation over what this entity was to be, and the validity of Lebanese sovereignty and political system.

The Constitution of 1926 still embodies the basic principles of Lebanese government. It gave Lebanon legislative power in two houses, but the Senate was abolished in a revision the following year. Representatives were to be elected on basis of religious belonging, and a second revision in 1929 gave the President more power and extended the Presidential term in office to six years (Baaklini 1999: 81-83). The constitution also stated that administrative positions in government should be divided amongst the different religious communities (although this was stated to be a temporary system), and that Lebanon was a democratic republic (Cobban 1987: 61-62). These essential traits are still central definitions of Lebanon’s more recent
constituting documents, like the Ta’if Accords of 1989. The anchoring of the norms in national constituting documents, like in this case of the Constitution and the National Pact, make them harder to change (Risse et al. 1999, Checkel 1998, Marcussen et al. 2001). However, they were not generally held norms by the Lebanese before they were put into a Lebanese bureaucratic framework in 1920.

Two principles of the political system which lasted from the Administration Council until the war were representation by community and Maronite political dominance. Representation by community is still the norm in Lebanon, despite both the 1926 Constitution and the Ta’if (1989) stating sectarian politics to be abolished sometime in the future. How embedded this way of organising the political system is in parts of Lebanese society can be illustrated with the comment one Parliamentarian had when asked whether the Ta’if’s goal of abolishing sectarianism was feasible (interview by author September 2002): “Not now. People are not ready; it is not just a matter of law. I think it is a problem of our generation, we were built like this. Perhaps with the new generation, with the new atmosphere in schools and in the families”.

4.4.2 Religious and political leaders as introducers of new norms

Religious leaders and heads of political families played central, though different, roles in introducing sovereign and democratic norms to their respective communities. The Lebanese political system was (and still is) based on bargaining between the different groups lead by the elites, thus being an elitist democracy based on mutual trust. The elite lead politics bear reminiscence of the pre-Lebanese state-society relations, where leading families also were the mediators between the people and the power. Thereby one can expect that domestic elites played an important role in Lebanese society. This section will focus mainly on the mobilisation of the Shi’a, since this community’s history is central to Lebanese political history.

25 The Ta’if states that Lebanon’s general principles are that it is a sovereign, free and independent country, that it is Arab in belonging and identity and a democratic parliamentary republic (“The Ta’if Accord”, online, 12.01.04).
Political elites like Michel Chiha represented the pluralistic Lebanese nationalism. Chiha said about the future of Lebanon: “La diversité est notre destin“ (Hanf 1993: 70), stating plurality and co-existence as an ideal in the framework of a liberal state and in cooperation with the other Arab states (Hanf 1993: 70-71). Chiha was also the principal author of the 1926 constitution (Cobban 1987: 61). Central political actors in the political elite like Bishara al-Khuri and Riad al-Solh promoted sovereignty and a cooperative democracy as valid norms in Lebanon through the National Pact. The Pact balanced between contrasting ideas of what Lebanon was to be, affirming sovereignty and assuring closeness to the Arab states as opposed to France. The mentioned actors’ views on Lebanon as a plural sovereign state can be said to have been important for the creation of the National Pact and independence, as they presented a compromise between the fractions.

The Pact did not make room for changes for the Shi’a community in its fixed power sharing quotas, and the poor communities of the Shi’a in southern Lebanon and in the Bekaa were kept on the political outskirts. However, regional political events and socio-economic change were to affect Shi’a politics. The fifties and Nasser’s popularity challenged the political power of the traditional Shi’a zu’ama, and from the late fifties onward migration to the urban areas increased, which (as mentioned) especially affected the rural Shi’a population (Olmert 1987: 194). The severing of ties with the local zu’ama thereby provided an opportunity for changes to happen to the political representation traditions of the Shi’a. A central political and religious leader could take centre stage in bringing the Shi’a into the political limelight, Musa al-Sadr (Hanf 1993: 84, Ajami 1997, Esposito 1995: 142-145).

Musa al-Sadr came from Iran to Lebanon in 1959 and was granted Lebanese nationality. In 1969 he became chairman of the new Supreme Shi’a Council (Dagher 2001: 36). The government’s creation of this council was a response to the Shi’a demands for political reform, voiced through Musa al-Sadr. Al-Sadr aimed to bring the Shi’a communities in the south and in the Bekaa, and the neglect they had been suffering under, onto the Lebanese political agenda by pointing out that they were as integral a part of Lebanon as any of the other communities (Hanf 1993: 85). He
argued that the Shi’a of Lebanon were not only Lebanese, but also a minority group in the Middle East (Norton 1984: 170-171 and Ajami 1997). This reflects the notions of need for minority protection in Christian communities prior to the establishment of the Lebanese state.

Al-Sadr was a central agent for introducing sovereign and democratic norms to the Shi’a community (Ajami 1997). The traditional political leaders did not see the new challenges their community faced in modern times, and by focusing on local issues they lost touch with the new, urban proletariat. Al-Sadr used a language which presented the Shi’a Lebanese citizenship as a weighing argument for extended political rights and powers. His argumentation was based on the integral part the Shi’a had in Lebanon as a part of the country’s population and politics. For example, in al-Sadr’s first public act in 1970 with the manifesto for a declared general strike on May 26 1970, he said the Shi’a did not want charity because it would make them feel like “they are strangers without dignity” (Ajami 1997: 150) . Al-Sadr arguments rested on the assumption that the Lebanese Shi’a was a part of a sovereign and democratic Lebanon (Ajami 1997 and Esposito 1995: 142-145 give a thorough presentation). He later gave the Shi’a a new name in 1974, Shia-t-Lubnan, the Shi’a of Lebanon, thus emphasising the validity of a sovereign Lebanon as the homeland of the Lebanese Shi’a (Ajami 1997: 155). Al-Sadr presented sovereignty as valid for this community (Ajami 1997: 124, Esposito 1995: 142-145). This suggests how al-Sadr emphasised the Shi’a being as equal a part of Lebanon as any other community and the reasoning he used to politically mobilise the Shi’a.

The political mobilisation of the Shi’a became a movement which was named the movement of the Dispossessed, drawing on the disadvantage this community had experienced vis-à-vis the other Lebanese communities. Musa al-Sadr argued that the Shi’a, as one of Lebanon’s many communities, had been cheated of their fair share of power and rights. The arguments used were based on the material and socio-economical disadvantage the Shi’a had experienced, like in al-Sadr’s speech in Baalbek in 1974. In it al-Sadr (again) pointed to the government’s negligence of Shi’a areas of the country regarding water, schools, representation at the civil
services, as well as giving budget numbers on how much the Shi’a should have received (Ajami 1997: 145-146). Later, in Tyre, he asked the gathered crowd for an oath to stay together until “Lebanon had been rid of ‘deprivation’ and ‘disinheritance’” (Ajami 1997: 148). He used the Lebanese state as the legitimate framework for the Shi’a political rights, and his style of political participation was more direct and outspoken than other traditional Shi’a leaders had engaged in. The older generation of Shi’a leaders had, according to Ajami, in general been more concerned with upholding their traditional political role than mobilising their community to partake more actively in Lebanese politics (Ajami 1997).

There have been central actors of the political elites from all communities who have acted as introducers of norms, and I have in this section presented some of the central ones. The elite-lead National Pact represented a new time for Lebanese sovereignty and democracy, as this established Lebanon as independent and affirmed its continued sovereignty and democracy as a compromise between Lebanese nationalism and Arabism. Shi’a leader al-Sadr was a central figure in the political struggle of the Shi’a communities to gain more political power and benefits. He marks a change in Shi’a political leadership, as he claimed much more clearly and forcefully the political rights of his community, based on the Shi’a communities’ Lebanese citizenship.

4.5 Pre-war socialisation processes of sovereignty and democracy

This chapter has until now dealt with some of the central factors that influence the socialisation processes of sovereign and democratic norms. Though I have mentioned some of them earlier in this chapter, it is now time to explore the processes themselves. The three processes and the phases used to recognise them were introduced in the theory chapter, along with the challenges of applying them to this case and modifications made. The political elite will be central in this section, as material thoroughly analysing this group has been easier to obtain. It is also interesting to explore this group’s importance to Lebanese politics and definition of
Self. I will try to point to indications of socialisation of the norms in the general Lebanese public where this can be done.

This part of the chapter consists of two parts, one dealing with sovereignty, the other dealing with democracy. The sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.4 investigate the socialisation of sovereignty, mainly by looking at the Lebanese political elites’ beginning participation and involvement in the new Lebanese state. Sections 4.5.5 through 4.5.7 explore the socialisation of democracy by tracing behaviour in elections and the developing conditions for democracy in Lebanon.

4.5.1 Starting the socialisation processes
Due to the differences between the human rights approach (Risse et al 1999) and this case, it is necessary to comment on how some similarities and differences affect the initial chronology of the first phases of the socialisation processes.

The French mandate introduced the concept of Lebanese sovereignty to a majority of the Lebanese population, which is somewhat similar to international human rights norms, which are defined from outside by an international regime. However, this outside definition causes a difference as well. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s socialisation approach assumes that the norms are first complied with, then argued for, and when the set of ideas about political order have become consensual, they become institutionalised (Risse et al. 1999: 17-29). In Lebanon’s case, the discussion over the validity of sovereignty and the political representational system was based on the French implemented formal institutions from 1920, which established Lebanon as a separate state with a formal democratic governing form before the ideas of sovereignty and democracy had become collective expectations among the Lebanese.

Risse et al. claim that the initial repression (constant violations of norms) and denial of the norms are part of the socialisation processes as this is interacting with the norms (Risse et al. 1999: 22-23). However, Lebanese repression of sovereignty and democracy could not happen since it was initially imposed by a dominating external government. The point of the first phase is to recognise a starting point for when
socialisation processes start, though. In this case the establishment of Lebanon in 1920, and thus the introduction of sovereignty and (semi-)democracy as a political system, is the starting point for socialisation of sovereignty and democracy norms. Though Lebanese repression of the norms was not possible under French rule, denial of their validity was possible, which makes for this case’s first phase initiating interaction with the norms in question.

The implementation of sovereign and (partly) democratic institutions made it necessary to comply with these norms in order to gain political and thereby also material benefits, i.e. instrumental and strategic interests. This does make the chronology of the general socialisation processes similar to that of the Risse, Ropp and Sikkink human rights approach, in the sense that the first socialisation process is compliance with norms for instrumental and/or strategic reasons (Risse et al. 1999: 11-12). The next sections will attempt to recognise signs of the different socialisation phases, as the norms start out as part of an imposed framework of the French mandate. As mentioned in 1.2.4, it has been difficult to access materials documenting discussions and debates in the pre-war period, which has had implications for the visibility of the second socialisation process. Nevertheless, previous historical and political analyses do indicate signs of the phases of this process.

4.5.2 Denial of the validity of a sovereign Lebanon
Salibi says that it was not until the forties, when the mandate ended and Syria and Lebanon went their separate ways, that the Lebanese ceased to consider themselves Syrians (Salibi 1989: 71). Farid al-Khazen (1992) says the time until the mid-seventies was a time of slow, pragmatic integration lead by the communities’ leaders. However, before the political elites started to cooperate for instrumental reasons, the initial establishment of a sovereign Lebanese state did not happen without protests and denial of its validity.

Many people included as inhabitants in the new state Lebanon resented the separation from Syria, especially in the Sunni community (Maktabi 2000: 159). Although there were ideas of a Lebanese nationality amongst Maronites, the new state was generally
not considered legitimate by the newly defined Lebanese citizens (including many Maronites), as most Lebanese continued to consider themselves Syrians (Salibi 1989: 70). Many Lebanese citizens refused the term “Lebanese” in their identity papers (Hanf 1993: 65). This shows that Lebanon as a separate state was not generally accepted. There is evidence of rejection of the new state in the Muslim community in particular. Many Muslims boycotted the census of 1921 and the elections for the Advisory Council in 1922 and 1925, and Muslim notables demanded unity with Syria in 1923, 1926, 1928 and 1936 (Hanf 1993: 65-66).

The National Islamic Congress in Lebanon stated in a declaration in 1936 that national sovereignty was to be in the framework of a unity with Syria. The declaration also demanded equitable representation of all communities in public offices. This can be considered an answer to a Christian congress in Bkiri which stated the goal of maintaining Lebanon’s current borders and signing a treaty with France (from the daily Beirut no.66 1936, in Phares 1995: 84-85). The presence of an idea of a Christian nation-state (as presented in 4.3.2) can explain the adherence to the new state demonstrated by the congress in Bkiri.

The refusal of being identified as Lebanese, the Muslim boycott of the 1921 census, and the demands for unity are evidence of denial, but the demand for equal representation shows how the Muslim political elite were starting to interact with sovereign democratic institutions. Others, such as parts of the Maronite community, accepted the new state as they already had ideas of a separate Lebanese state. The above demonstrates how the socialisation dynamic for many Lebanese began with the denial phase, and how already present norms can affect how new norms are socialised. Central Lebanese political leaders involved in the establishment of Lebanon, such as Michael Chiha, began promoting the co-existing state of Lebanon as a valid norm already during the twenties. An important question here is whether French rule was a dominant factor in regarding Lebanon as illegitimate. It could be that French rule was more illegitimate than a sovereign Lebanese state in itself. Nevertheless, denying the norm in itself is an act of interaction, and indicates that a process of socialisation is already on the way (Risse et al. 1999: 23).
4.5.3 **Different paces for different communities as tactical concessions begin**

The Muslim political elites’ tactic of denial changed from refusing to participate or acknowledge the new state to participation in order to gain political influence during the thirties. The political leaders of the communities had to begin operating within the new sovereign institutionalised framework in order to keep political power and maintain influence on behalf of their communities. This indicates the first socialisation process of compliance with norms in order to advance instrumental and strategic interests (Risse et al. 1999: 12).

After having boycotted the census in 1922, Muslims participated in 1932. This census showed that Christians were a slight majority. From 1934 onward Muslims participated in politics and stopped boycotting public services (Hanf 1993: 69). The last Muslim Congress to demand the union of the peripheral areas with Syria was in 1936 (Hanf 1993: 70), and from then on the tactic of Muslim politics changed from an alienating distance to direct involvement in Lebanese politics and elections in order to gain political influence on behalf of their communities (Phares 1995: 85). Also, more and more Muslims joined and made use of much needed Lebanese civil services (Hanf 1993: 69). For example, in the thirties the Muslim population accounted for circa eighty percent of enrolment in public schools (ibid.). The Muslim political elite and public changed its tactics from denial and rejection of the sovereign state to participating in Lebanese politics by the late thirties. However, although Shi’a Muslims were recognised as a separate community in 1926, they were politically marginalised until a combination of socio-economic factors (such as urbanisation) and introducing/mobilising agents (like Musa al-Sadr) brought this group onto the political agenda decades later (see 4.4.2).

Tactical concessions in the human rights approach describe governments giving in to international pressure, and how a mix of argumentative and instrumental rationality captures the actor in his own rhetoric (Risse et al. 1999: 25-28). In this case, this phase includes the actor getting more and more involved in argumentative behaviour and interaction with the norm as a consequence of initial compliance for instrumental
and strategic reasons. Questioning the validity of the norm is abandoned in order to gain (for example) political power and influence (Risse et al. 1999: 26-28). The Muslim elite stopped officially questioning the validity of a sovereign Lebanese state from 1936 onward by ceasing to demand union with Syria, but still questioned French rule. Further cooperation and participation was sought as central Sunni and Maronite leaders started what was to become formative for the independence of Lebanon. It started partly in the late thirties, when central Sunni leader Kazim Solh argued in a pamphlet entitled “Unity and Separation” that there should be dialogue with the Christians in order to pursue Arab nationalism in the framework of Lebanon (Goria 1985: 21-22). This coincided with the thoughts of Khuri’s Constitutional Bloc, who wanted to collaborate with Muslim leaders to gain Lebanese independence (Hanf 1993: 70). This brought the Muslim and Christian elite into a discussion over what a sovereign Lebanon should be.

The human rights approach emphasises this phase as one where a coalition between domestic society and INGOs (international non-governmental organisations) is strengthened, and when the transnational advocacy network uses shaming as an effective communicative tool to point out norm violating governments (Risse et al. 1999: 26-27). Here this phase lacks these external transnational and international actors, and is more about the role the political elite plays in accepting, defining and introducing sovereignty. This makes no longer denying the validity of the norm one of the central indicators of this phase of socialisation, which has here been recognised by looking at the abandoning of claims of union with Syria and elite political participation in defining a sovereign Lebanon.

The Sunni political elites joined the Christians in favour of an independent Lebanon in 1943 (al-Khazen 1992). Authors like Phares consider the Lebanese independence in 1943 a result of a compromise between Arab nationalism and Christian nationalism, making a sovereign and Arab Lebanon the best common alternative to French colonial rule (Phares 1995). In the time preceding the 1943 elections, there were discussions and negotiations between leading Sunni and Maronite leaders in Beiruti town houses (Nasr 1982: 37). These discussions had begun after the Muslim
community abandoned their demands for reunification with Syria in 1936 (Hanf 1993: 72). According to authors like Phares (1995), Hanf (1993), and Cobban (1987), the Maronite and Sunni political elite engaged in a discussion where the validity of a sovereign Lebanon was central, resulting in the National Pact of 1943.

A Muslim-Christian pro-independence coalition won the elections over Christian resistance to independence, and brought an Arab oriented regime to power in 1943 (Phares 1995: 94). The National Pact itself was a number of speeches and interviews given after the elections by the (Maronite) president al-Khuri and (Sunni) Prime Minister Riad al-Solh. Riad al-Solh gave a speech in Parliament in October 1943 which outlined the principles of the National Pact (Khalidi 1979: 161-162ff). In it he acknowledged the validity of a sovereign Lebanon when he stated that “Lebanon is a homeland with an Arab face seeking the beneficial good from the culture of the West” (ibid.). The Parliament passed a number of constitutional amendments in November 1943, reaffirming the independence of Lebanon.

Though the National Pact and its preceding discussions were not written down agreements, the National Pact marks a change from the political elite having diverse views on Lebanese sovereignty to cooperation over the future of a common Lebanon. The thirties were dominated by Muslim rejection of the validity of the Lebanese state until discussions started after 1936. With the National Pact central Sunni and Maronite political leaders emerged as a coalition which had agreed on a common independent Lebanese future. Before the Pact there was no shared view on Lebanese sovereignty, but after the discussions and talks which lead to the Pact, there now existed a shared view on the future and legitimacy of a sovereign Lebanon. This suggests to some degree that the second socialisation process of argumentation, persuasion and dialogue did occur to some extent. However, as the Pact was mainly an agreement between Maronite and Sunni leaders, the Shi’a community ended up with only 3.2 % of the higher administrative positions (Olmert 1987: 194).

An immediate withdrawal of all French troops was demanded, and Lebanon was defined as an Arab sovereign state (Phares 1995: 94). The National Pact set the
standard of a Maronite President, a Sunni Prime Minister and, after 1947, a Shi’a Speaker of the House, thus continuing the tradition of co-community rule with Maronite dominance from the French mandate period. The Pact initiated the Lebanese membership in the Arab League in 1945, which marks a further distance from the French Mandate, and also a further inclusion of Arab nationalists into Lebanese politics (Phares 1995: 95).

After the National Pact, central political elites in general no longer denied the validity of a sovereign Lebanon, which is evidence of the socialisation processes having moved beyond the phases of rejection and denial. That dialogue sought by members of both sides lead to discussions and the subsequent joint Sunni-Maronite validation of Lebanese sovereignty and independence through the National Pact, indicates that there was a dialogue, suggesting the second socialisation process of argumentation, dialogue and persuasion (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 11, 13). However, the reasons for entering a co-community pact which affirmed Lebanon’s sovereignty could be explained with instrumental and strategic reasons as getting rid of French rule would leave more political power to the Lebanese politicians. A point here is that voting turn-out increased from 52, 32 % in 1943 to 61, 38% in 1947 (Monde Arab Maghreb Machrek no.169, July- Septembre 2000: 124). The increased voting can be a sign of increased legitimacy for the Lebanese state after it became independent and was no longer under French rule, as the French withdrew completely from Lebanon in 1946.

Certain pockets of the Lebanese population were still in denial after independence. The Beirut Maronite Bishop Monsignor Ignace Mubarak represented a minority of Maronites who still clearly expressed aspirations of a specifically Christian homeland in Lebanon (Phares 1995: 95). They signed a Maronite-Zionist treaty in 1946, which aimed to establish an alliance between the Jewish people of Yishuv and the Christian people of Lebanon against a shared perceived Arab threat. However, the pro-Arab Christians forced them to withdraw this agreement (Phares 1995: 97), and no public statement about ethnic nationalist claims of Lebanese Christians was made from the late forties until the beginning of the seventies (Phares 1995: 96). The central political elite signalled that ideas of a smaller Lebanon (and ideas of reunification)
were not acceptable, and replaced the Beirut Bishop. Also, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (see 3.1) advocated a greater Syrian state encompassing the countries of the fertile crescent (except Israel). The party was, however, forcefully dissolved by the Lebanese government in 1949 (Suleiman 1967: 92, Karpat 1982: 51).

Even though the Christian and Muslim elites reached a compromise for independence through the National Pact, parts of the population still regarded other state ideas as more legitimate than the sovereign Lebanon within its 1920 borders. It is likely that the general population still saw themselves as Syrian, as Hanf points out (Hanf 1993). However, the political elites, as introducing actors, had reached some level of socialisation of sovereignty beyond denial at the time of the National Pact. Central Christian politicians had acted as founders of the modern Lebanese state, and presented the sovereignty norm as something valid already in the French mandate period. Muslim (and parts of the Christian) political elite accepted Lebanon’s sovereignty after a period of denying its validity in the forties. The National Pact of 1943 institutionalised a compromise between Arabists focused on the illegitimacy of French rule and nationalists focused on maintaining separation from Syria.

**4.5.4 Reaching prescriptive status?**

Prescriptive status is when “the validity claims of the norm are no longer controversial” (Risse et al. 1999: 29). In this case this would be the absence of demands for alternatives to the established Lebanese state and active participation in its definition of Self. The prescriptive phase of the socialisation processes includes signs such as argumentative consistency, continuing to adhere to the norm despite shifting power related interests, and efforts made to sustain the norm (Risse et al. 1999: 29-30). The phase is also when the norms are included in the country’s laws, but in this case this particular sign of the prescriptive status happened before the general socialisation processes of the sovereignty norm began, due to Lebanon’s status as a former colonial state. It should, however, be possible to recognise and use the other signs as markers for further socialisation. This section will show whether
sovereignty was sustained and adhered to during times of political crisis when alternatives to a sovereign Lebanon had the opportunity to be voiced.

When looking at the absence of demands from the political elite for reunification with Syria or the establishment of a Christian state by the late forties, it seems like sovereign Lebanon on some level was a valid idea, at least in order to gain access to political power and material benefits that Lebanese civil services could provide (like education). Reunification with Syria became more distant as the two countries grew apart in the pursuit of different goals and ideologies from the fifties onward (al-Khazen 1992). However, a major challenge to the socialisation of sovereignty was the rise of Arabism and the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, and the preceding Lebanese foreign policy tug between the West and the other Arab states.

Before 1958, the leader of a general congress of Muslim parties, associations and organisations had in 1954 sent a letter to then Sunni Prime Minister Sami al-Solh. The letter was a demand for political reform, like the abolition of confessionalism and equitable distribution of government positions and jobs on behalf of the Muslim community (Qubain 1961: 32). The letter also demanded the implementation of an economic union between Lebanon and Syria. However, it did not demand a full reunification between Lebanon and Syria, and the demands made referred to the existing sovereign Lebanon, for example by demanding the application of “Lebanese laws to all those who apply for Lebanese citizenship”. The letter suggests that central Muslim political leaders were getting drawn into argumentative behaviour (before 1958) where they acknowledged the validity of a sovereign Lebanon. This suggests there was adherence to a sovereign Lebanon, which indicates prescriptive status for sovereignty.

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26 The United Arab Republic was a union between Egypt and Syria which lasted from 1958 until 1961.

27 As referred by Pierre Gemayel (1956) in a letter to the president (Karpat 1982: 74-75)
The 1958 crisis can shed light on the status of Lebanese sovereignty. The crisis was in part caused by the fluctuating foreign policy which was drawn between the West and the Arab states. After the National Pact in 1943, Lebanese foreign policy tried to balance between a special relationship with France and reassured links to the Arab world. However, leaning towards the West and the US Eisenhower Doctrine in the fifties channelled much adversity in the Muslim population, as well as in parts of the Christian communities, which contributed to the 1958 crisis. Whether sovereignty was adhered to as a valid norm in this event can give some evidence of the scope of socialisation of the norm, as it was an opportunity for alternative ideas (like joining the UAR or separating into a smaller, Christian nation-state) to challenge the existing Lebanese sovereignty.

The Suez crisis of 1956, the Baghdad treaty in 1955 and the Eisenhower Doctrine coincided with Arabism and anti-colonialism, which clashed with Lebanese nationalist notions. This caused increasing distance between the two fractions. The Sunni street, many of whom had previously been pro-reunification, supported Nasser and Arabism (Cobban 1987: 85). Though Lebanon was pro-Arab after the National Pact, the Chamoun-government of 1955 sought to realign with the West through the Baghdad treaty. This caused opposition from pro-Arab fractions, both Muslim and Christian. When the opposition lost the 1957 elections, apparently due to manipulation by the government, the tense situation developed further (see also section 4.5.7). The refusal of Lebanese President Camille Chamoun to join Egypt in the Suez crisis caused the UAR to support guerrilla movements in Lebanon against the central Lebanese authorities, and fighting broke out early in 1958. The opposition did not explicitly demand joining the UAR, though. A compromise was reached in the summer that same year, stating that there had been “no victor, no vanquished” (Cobban 1987: 88-90, Phares 1995: 99).

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28 Egyptian president Nasser is regarded as one of the central political leaders in the Middle East after the Second World War, incorporating Islam and social and political reform (Cleveland 1997: 302-304). This building of Arab self-esteem combined with anti-colonialism was a major part of the Middle East in the times surrounding the world wars, and is referred to as Arabism or Arab nationalism.
The 1958 crisis speaks against defining the norm as having reached prescriptive status. The establishment of the UAR inspired Lebanese Sunni dominated coastal cities, where there was (according to Cobban 1987: 87) pro-union agitation after the UAR was established. On the other hand, once Chamoun resigned, political consensus was easily reached (Cobban 1987: 88). Also, Hanf points out that: “No prominent Muslim politician called for Lebanon to join the union” (Hanf 1993: 118). Hanf says that only a minority supported actually joining UAR, as the majority were mere supporters of the Arab union (Hanf 1993: 111). Then again, Kerr points out that the Lebanese literature which followed the 1958 crisis reveals that the opposition, most of which were Lebanese Muslims, saw Chamoun as an extension of Western powers, and that their loyalty was more in the hands of Nasser and the UAR than to Lebanon (Kerr 1961: 212). It is likely that there were strong currents in the population which spoke for a union with Syria and Egypt in the UAR. However, the political leaders in general adhered to a sovereign Lebanon. One has to consider that the possibility that the leaders’ silence on the matter was due to a wish of continued power balance and political power on their own behalf. The event also shows how socialisation of sovereignty was affected by other ideas and events of the time. Another factor was the Chamoun regime itself, which held little legitimacy in parts of the population due to a combination of its Western oriented foreign policy and accusations of corruption and foul play in elections.

That there was a fight over what legitimate foreign policy was to contain during the fifties, does indicate an emotional involvement in the matters of the Lebanese state as an independent and sovereign entity on behalf of the central political elite. Lebanese sovereignty itself was not the centre of discussion, the policy content of this sovereignty was. Independent sovereignty was again complied with after 1958, and was sustained and adhered to, which are prescriptive status criteria. The controversy over Lebanese foreign policy and the 1958 crisis reflects the general theoretical proposition Moravcsik draws out of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s theory: the persuader’s in-group belonging makes it more likely that the persuadee will change in accordance with the norm promoted (see 2.4.1) (Moravcsik 2001: 181): The tug
between the legitimacy of Western oriented policy and Arabism demonstrates how the dispute over whether the West was an in-group or out-group caused conflict, and suggests that a common in-group is important for progress in the socialisation processes.

Shehab was elected President after Chamoun in 1958 and stabilised the country by including both radical Muslim leaders and Phalange support in government (Phares 1995: 100). The UAR fell apart in 1961 (Cleveland 1997: 307), and Syria’s appeal to the Lebanese Sunni public subsequently declined (al-Khazen 1992). That Lebanese sovereignty survived the 1958 crisis reflects the sustaining of the norm, as well as adherence to it by the political elite. The Christians split, one part supporting Shehab due to his stabilising politics, the other resenting the authoritarian way of governing due to a perception of Lebanon as a land of “freedom”. The latter fraction saw Shehabism as anti-Christian and pro-Arab, emphasising this as a dichotomy (Phares 1995: 101). Circumstances made it difficult to maintain a neutral stance between Arabism and Lebanese nationalism because of the connotations the two terms evoked.

The reform demands from Sunni and Shi’a leaders in the late sixties made no mention of union with Syria (Phares 1995: 102). This suggests a continued adherence to a sovereign Lebanon after the 1958 crisis, indirectly indicating prescriptive status. Otherwise the sixties were dominated by the tension between the Arab states and Israel, and the beginning organised resistance among the Palestinian refugees. As explained earlier in the chapter, this presented a threat to parts of the Lebanese population and challenged Lebanese internal security, and the question of how and whether to support the Palestinian cause was hotly debated.

It is unclear whether the pro-Arabist public (mostly Sunni) expressed Arab solidarity or a wish for Lebanon to join the Arab union. The relatively easy resolving of the 1958 conflict indicates that Lebanon’s sovereignty was not a questionable norm in itself before the Lebanese war broke out, the conflicting idea was the description this sovereignty should have. This suggests that although there was some common
acceptance of the Lebanese state, the state’s in-group belonging was contested. This redirects the focus to the socialisation of an Arab identity as a norm in Lebanon and the definition of the Lebanese Self, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. The question of sovereignty reaching prescriptive status thus remains inconclusive. Despite sovereignty having reached some sort of general consensus, it was still hotly debated due to other identity related issues and different views on in-group and out-group belonging.

4.5.5 Socialisation of democratic norms- starting the socialisation
The next sections will deal with the socialisation of the second norm in focus: democracy. I will first present how certain traditions of a political system continued into the French mandate period and beyond, and the implications of this on the initial norm socialisation process.

As mentioned, the Administration Council was the first institutionalised version of co-community rule, and the Constitution of 1926 continued this norm as well as asserting Lebanon as a democratic republic. There was an indirect election system in place when the French arrived under the Administration Council, and direct election of deputies was implemented in 1934 (Harik 1980: 29). This made the French mandate period a mix of old and new political systems, still being based on co-community rule, but under the supervision of French authorities. Lebanon’s political system went through a gradual change from the Administration Council of 1864 onward. It is hard to point out any clear rejection and denial of the validity of the democratic system as an initial phase of the socialisation processes. Although Muslim political leaders boycotted Lebanese electoral institutions up until the mid-thirties, this was more due to a denial of the validity of the sovereign state itself (see 4.5.2).

The lack of denial of democracy as a political system confuses how to apply the early phases of socialisation. The time surrounding the Administration Council and the French mandate could hold more hidden clues to earlier phases of socialisation, but material which could have revealed this has not been available to me (documented discussions, for example). However, considering that the political elite kept their
positions and power in the French mandate period, this could in part explain a lack of conflict over the changes to the political system implemented by the French. Also, the gradual democratisation of Lebanon started relatively early, before the existence of human rights NGOs which could have pushed for norm-compliant behaviour. Repression and denial of the validity of democracy had probably been more explicitly present if the traditional power base had initially been more challenged. Repression and denial of the validity of democracy may appear later, when the power and positions of the political elite are challenged due to either improved democratic conditions and/or changing socio-economic events. This can cause the socialisation of this norm to later resemble the pariah-state status Risse et al. (1999) use in their approach.

Due to limitations to time and space, I shall proceed by investigating Lebanese democracy after independence for signs of tactical concessions. This was a period when the Lebanese democratic system went through important changes and improvements. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) socialisation processes can provide the tools needed to explore the further progress of the socialisation of democracy in Lebanon during this period.

4.5.6 Tactical concessions to democracy

If one sees the time surrounding independence as a critical juncture in Lebanese history, the power elites could have used this as a window of opportunity to promote a different political system. Keeping democracy as a defining trait of Lebanon after independence shows a certain adherence to this type of political system, although instrumental and strategic reasons like political power and position on behalf of the political elite has to be taken into consideration. Tactical concessions as a phase in the socialisation processes include that the validity of the norm is no longer questioned.

Independence was reached through the legislature, when voters elected an anti-French government. This shows a certain know-how of democratic procedure (see 4.5.3), and that this was a valid way of organising the Lebanese political system.
Thus it can be assumed that the first socialisation process of instrumental compliance was well on its way at the time of independence. Tactical concessions also include improving the conditions necessary for the norm to be upheld, as well as shaming norm violating behaviour. An improvement to democracy like universal male suffrage was included as a part of the National Pact, which marked the beginning of an independent Lebanon (Harik 1980: 29). Harik claims there was a general trend in the pre-war period that “practically every new regime came about as a result of a struggle against the excesses of the previous one”, indicating the gradual improvements to the Lebanese political system after independence (Harik 1980: 30).

Although they now included the democratic improvement of universal male suffrage, the elections in 1947 were tainted by fraud and manipulation (Hanf 1993: 114). However, the irregularities concerning the elections of certain candidates were reported by a Lebanese parliamentary credentials committee (Kerr 1961: 215). In other words, there existed an institution for checking electoral fraud which worked, which shows a commitment to democracy and suggests that there was a will to improve democratic conditions. However, certain politicians did not see the point of splitting hairs when it came to elections. One central traditional political leader, Sami al-Solh, defended the erroneous elections on the grounds that the politicians in question were prominent people who ought to be welcomed into Parliament despite having been defeated in the elections (Kerr 1961: 125). His reactions reflect that traditional patron-client relations were part of Lebanese politics, and suggests that parts of the traditional political elite held primarily instrumental and strategic reasons (keeping political power) for complying with a democratic political system. At the same time, there was a commitment to mapping out the faults of Lebanese elections, and election tampering was pointed out as irregular and thus undesirable and not a valid way of gaining a seat in Parliament.

There were further problems with Lebanon’s first independent government. The 1947 Parliament, many of whose members were bought off by then president Bishara al-Khuri, secured al-Khuri’s power by amending the constitution which limits the president’s incumbency to six years. In 1952 some of the Chamber’s prominent
politicians like Camille Chamoun, Kamal Jumblatt, Ghassan Tuweni and Raymond Eddé had managed to generate parliamentary support against al-Khuri (Baaklini 1999). Chamoun had resigned in opposition to the amendment which made it possible for al-Khuri to serve a second term as President (Goria 1985: 29). The assassination of Riad al-Solh in 1951 further undermined al-Khuri’s legitimacy (Hanf 1993: 114, Goria 1985: 34). The opposition towards al-Khuri was also in part due to accusations of personal gain for al-Khuri’s friends and family in his earlier years as president (Cobban 1987: 82). There was a general strike in 1952 in protest of al-Khuri’s government, due to the allegations of corruption, the fraudulent election by which they had been put in government and al-Khuri’s lack of support for the Arab cause. The head of the military, General Shehab refused to use troops against the strikers, and al-Khuri had to resign.

The use of a general strike as a demonstrative means to shame the behaviour of al-Khuri indicates support for the political system Lebanon had obtained and decided on through independence. The possible loss of personal political power must also be considered a central contributing motivation for the political elite and their supporters to react. The opposition never claimed the validity of any other norm for political system over the Lebanese consensus democracy, and was therefore not an attempt to promote an alternative political system.

4.5.7 Improving democracy towards prescriptive status

Al-Khazen (1992) claims that although the elections in the forties were dominated by fraud and corruption, the fifties and sixties showed signs of improving democratic conditions. This suggests that there could be signs of prescriptive status in this period. Efforts made to improve elections and reactions to violations of democratic norms are important signs to look for in order to see if prescriptive status was reached before the war. Signs of this phase include efforts made to sustain the norm, continuing to adhere to it despite shifting power related interests, and including the norm in laws (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 29-30).
Camille Chamoun took over the presidency after al-Khuri and subsequently changed the electoral law, causing many of the zu’ama to loose their traditional majority constituencies (Hanf 1993: 114). This could have been an effort to improve Lebanese democratic conditions, or an instrumental use of power in order to consolidate Chamoun’s own power. Either way, efforts were made to disrupt the election of traditional leaders in the 1953 and the 1957 elections by assigning electoral districts so they did not coincide with the territories of certain zu’ama (Hottinger 1961: 131). The changes were directed especially towards those who opposed Chamoun, indicating that the Chamoun government implemented these changes for instrumental reasons: to secure their own power. Further exploration of the fifties and the turmoil surrounding the Chamoun government shows how democracy to a certain extent showed signs of prescriptive status, as norm violating behaviour was protested and demands for upholding and improving democracy were made.

A demand for political reforms made in 1954 by a general congress of Muslim parties, associations and organisations included measures such as the abolition of confessionalism and equitable distribution of government positions and jobs on behalf of the Muslim community (Qubain 1961: 32). This Muslim congress happened in the wake of a published pamphlet called “Muslim Lebanon Today”, which listed Muslim grievances of unequal representation, educational opportunities and economic and social services (Qubain 1961: 31-32 and Karpat 1982: 74-75). The demands made referred in both cases to the existing political structure, questioning its power sharing quotas rather than the principle of democratic rule itself. This indicates that central Muslim political leaders accepted “the validity and significance of norms” (Risse et al. 1999: 13).

Chamoun pursued a pro-West foreign policy, and when he accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine this outraged the more Arab oriented parts of the Lebanese population (Cobban 1987: 86). Much of the opposition organised into the United National Front (UNF), an oppositional organisation which represented a wide range of political groups, predominantly Muslim but also including many Arab oriented Christians (Qubain 1961: 50). The opposition sought to bring down the government and its pro-
West policies initially through elections, and their electoral platform in 1957 included a demand for supervision of the elections to ensure fairness (Qubain 1961: 54). This is a sign of adhering to democracy as the valid norm for the Lebanese political system. Risse et al. characterise this as something which happens in the tactical concessions phase (Risse et al. 1999: 25-26).

After a general strike and demonstrations, negotiations resulted in two additions to the government, assigned to ensure free and fair elections, Yusuf Hitti and Muhammad Ali Bayhun (Qubain 1961: 56). However, when the opposition only gained eight seats in the 1957 elections despite the strong and central political position many opposition candidates had, the elections were perceived as having been manipulated by the government (Qubain 1961: 56-58). By complying with the initial demands from the opposition by adding two members to the government who were meant to supervise the elections, the government recognised the validity of free and fair elections, but the results of the elections imply that the government pursued norm violating behaviour to stay in power. This is also evidence of the tactical concessions phase. The UNF refused to recognise the results of the elections, stating that they were the product of “governmental pressure and intimidation” (Mideast Mirror July 7, 1957: 12 in Qubain 1961: 58).

When it became evident that Chamoun was pursuing the second term by amending the constitution, it heated the tension between the government and the opposition (Qubain 1961: 66). When Nasib al-Matni (a newspaper publisher previously arrested for criticising the government) was assassinated, there was a general strike to protest the government’s foul play. Al-Matni was believed to have been killed because of his critical attitude towards the sitting government (Qubain 1961: 68-69). When there was no indication that the government would resign or amend to the opposition’s demands, the UNF decided to call for an armed revolt (Qubain 1961: 69-73). Calling for armed revolt is clearly not adhering to democratic norms, but the outcome

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29 A contributing factor to the 1958 crisis was the establishment of the UAR, see also 4.5.4.
of the 1958 crisis still indicates that this was a critical juncture, and that democracy had been socialised to a certain extent, especially since democracy was quickly reinstated. After some months of violent events, the parties came to an agreement that dismissed Chamoun as president. The democratic system survived a severe conflict brought on by the perceived failure of government policy and norm violating behaviour. Shehab was elected President, and the elections for Parliament in June and July 1960 were held without trouble (Kerr 1961: 211).

Shehab made the security service, the Deuxième Bureau, a powerful institution in Lebanon (Hanf 1993: 119), and stabilised the country by including both radical Muslim leaders and Phalange support in power (Phares 1995: 100). Shehab was followed by Charles Helou in 1964, whose presidential term included the 1967 war and increased Palestinian activity in Lebanon. The late sixties were the start of continuous demands for political reform made by Sunni and Shi’a political elite, demands for reformation of the political system to give Muslims more political power (Phares 1995: 102). These demands, again, were in the framework of a democratic political system. The sixties were, however, also dominated by the escalating fighting between Israel and Palestinians, and in 1968 Israeli commando units blew up thirteen airliners at the Beirut airport, intervening directly in Lebanon for the first time to try to pressure the Lebanese government to restrain the Palestinian guerrillas (Cobban 1987: 108-109). The question of support of the Palestinians in Lebanon became a predominant question in Lebanese politics, and in combination with factors such as socio-economic changes and external events, the Lebanese internal situation became volatile.

Several improvements for democratic conditions were made part of the legal and bureaucratic framework during the fifties and sixties, which is a sign of prescriptive status (Risse et al. 1999: 29-30). Shehab made efforts to meet demands of political reform on behalf of the Muslims by equalising the number of Christian and Muslim
civil servants (Hanf 1993: 95). The secret ballot was introduced in 1957, and victory determined by plurality of votes on the first count replaced the run-off election practice (Harik 1975: 29). A decision that improved freedom of choice in 1969 was the use of isolation booths at elections (Harik 1975: 29). These efforts show a commitment to improving Lebanese democracy. These are efforts made not only to sustain democratic practice, but also to improve it by putting the norm into law, another sign of prescriptive status (Risse et al. 1999: 13). That no other political system was promoted, but the existing system was subject to debate and discussion over its numbers and make-up, shows sustaining democracy as the norm for the Lebanese political system. However, the lack of material showing evidence of the dialogue between the norm violators and its critics makes it difficult to conclude on whether democracy actually did reach prescriptive status by the end of the sixties, though some other signs as mentioned above can suggest this phase of socialisation.

The elections in the sixties are generally regarded as better handled (Hanf 1993: 125, Baaklini 1999: 91). Taking over the presidency from Helou, Suleiman Franjieh smashed the Deuxième Bureau, charged several high-ranking officers with electoral fraud and embezzlement of public funds, and gave free reigns for freedom of expression (Hanf 1993: 125). Baaklini claims that the Chamber adopted legislation which “protected and strengthened freedom of speech and political action as well as the rule of law” (Baaklini 1999: 94). Lebanon is generally considered to have become the centre of freedom of expression in the Middle East during the sixties (Cobban 1987, Hanf 1993). However, Franjieh was part of the traditional political elite himself, as he had inherited the role when his older brother died of a stroke (Hanf 1993: 124).

I have earlier pointed to the effect state-society relations have had on the socialisation processes in this case, as strong patron-client relations continued to be a major part of political life. However, this aspect of Lebanese democracy also went through

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30 In a system dominated by patron-client relations, “the distribution of benefits is directly associated with power” (Hanf 1993: 93).
changes. Even though the majority of representatives continued to come from leading political families, the elections in the period 1943 to 1972 became increasingly competitive, as a growing number of individuals competed for a seat in Parliament, and won by smaller margins (Hudson 1966: 174 in Baaklini 1999: 90). So, though patron-client relations continued to be part of Lebanese politics, the elections themselves involved increasing competition. This also suggests that the voting public made use of their choice to influence who got a seat in Parliament. This means that although personal politics was still tied to certain dominating families, voting was not tied to one single prominent leader regardless of his behaviour and achievements.

The percentage of people voting in the first elections after independence in 1947 was to be an all-time high of 61%, though these elections were, as mentioned, not the fairest elections in Lebanese electoral history. Voter participation increased slightly but steadily from 1960 until the last elections (of 1972) before the war. It is interesting that voter turn-out showed a clear increase on two occasions, from 1943 to 1947 (from 52.32% to 61.38%) after independence and the withdrawal of the French troops, and after the 1958 war (from 49.4 % in 1960 to 54.24 % in 1972). Both occasions involved a prior period of disagreement over the contents of sovereignty and democracy of Lebanon (like foreign policy and the make-up of political representation). The following increase in voting numbers could indicate that the improved conditions for democracy increased legitimacy, also causing the government to have increased legitimacy.

Material like records of early parliamentary debates or public discussions from the mandate period could have revealed early arguments against a democratic political system. The example of Sami al-Solh, protesting why certain candidates did not just

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31 When looking at electoral numbers there are some critical questions that come to mind. Harik (1980: 36-37) points out that the official numbers of voters include Lebanese emigrants who are likely to not have participated in Lebanese political life in a long time. This can have caused official numbers on voter turn-out to be too low, if one were to exclude the Lebanese who were in fact out of Lebanese political life all together. On this note, the numbers presented here are quite sober, and are taken from Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek no. 169, July-Septembre 2000: 124.
get assigned a seat in Parliament in 1947 solely because of their good name and reputation, suggests more resistance against democracy than the material available to me shows. Nonetheless, in the period between 1943 and the Lebanese war thirty years later demands for political change were made within the democratic framework. This shows adherence to democracy, as democratic laws were improved and undemocratic behaviour was protested. Instrumental compliance with democracy for the sake of keeping power dominated the forties and fifties, as the Khuri and Chamoun governments manipulated the political system to keep position and power was part of the forties and fifties. The elections of the sixties and 1972 were subject to additional improvements (as mentioned before). The predestined distribution of political positions according to community was to be challenged, though, as the make-up of the political system, not the system itself, was questioned and challenged before the war. In this sense, democracy had reached prescriptive status before the war. However, the lack of sources showing the discourse and discussion of violations of democracy makes it hard to distinguish between signs of tactical concessions and prescriptive status. In addition to the destabilising internal and regional events by the end of the sixties, the discussion over the Lebanese democracy’s numbers and power sharing quotas adds to the uncertainty of drawing a conclusion to tactical concessions or prescriptive status.

4.6 War

In order to ease this part of the thesis to a gentle halt, a brief presentation of the events which lead up to the start of the Lebanese war is necessary for a completed picture of pre-war Lebanon.

Fouad Boutros stated in 1961 that the “problem of two nationalisms, Arab and Lebanese, is insoluble in the short term” (Hanf 1993: 363). As mentioned in chapter three, the arrival of a large number of Palestinian refugees and the PLO in Lebanon attracted several raids from Israel and caused a polarisation of Lebanese politics. According to Cobban, Sunni political leaders were caught between a rock and a hard place when popular Sunni opinion was pro-Palestinian and the political leaders
depended on alliances with Maronite leaders, who were not pro-Palestinian (Cobban 1987: 104-105). This caused a political vacuum, which was filled by Kamal Jumblatt’s Lebanese National Movement (LNM), formed in 1969 (Cleveland 1997: 345). LNM was pro-Palestinian and for the abolition of the confessional basis for politics. This movement was in opposition to Maronite political movements such as the Phalange, who were loyal to the government. There was an escalation of clashes between the Lebanese Army and Palestinians from 1969 onward (Cobban 1987: 109).

By the time the economic crisis hit Lebanon in the early seventies, the country showed signs of a pre-revolutionary situation. Armed conflict was caused by miscalculations of the chances one’s demands had of being met, making the power politics of communities “strongly resemble the classic pre-nuclear power politics of nations” (Hanf 1993: 37). Demands for revolutionary change were, however, tied to the way political power was shared rather than questioning democracy itself as a governing form. The National Pact had fixed the political shares of each community without room for potential demographic change. Also, despite the efforts made by for example President Shehab to improve conditions in neglected parts of the country, there were still huge socio-economic differences which only grew as the economic boom failed to take large parts of the Lebanese population with it.

By the early seventies, revolutionary tendencies were strong amongst unemployed secondary school and university graduates (Hanf 1993: 37). The problems with the political system’s fixed quotas, combined with a growing Muslim population that never gained more political power and a dire economic situation, affected the situation. The presence of the PLO caused the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict to be acted out in Lebanon. When the security situation in the south deteriorated due to the presence of thousands of fedayeen in the early seventies, al-Sadr called for armed struggle (Ajami 1997). An escalation in clashes between the Lebanese army and Palestinians started in 1969, and the situation exploded in 1975. The war lasted until the Ta’if Accord of 1989 managed to secure a final agreement between the parties.
4.7 Summary

The initial French implementation of a sovereign state was the beginning of the Lebanese state as it is today. The institutions built under French rule kept some already present norms of co-community rule and Maronite political priority, and introduced the sovereign Lebanese state, defined as a democratic republic. The lack of an initial repression phase in this case is due to the fact that Lebanon was under French rule. Later, though, Lebanese governments in the forties and fifties showed signs of pariah state behaviour as they tried to hold on to power through norm violating behaviour.

There were several improvements to democracy made throughout the pre-war period, and despite a serious crisis in 1958, elections were upheld. The norm violating behaviour of the government added to the increased tension prior to the 1958 crisis. This same crisis challenged Lebanese sovereignty by presenting an alternative in the United Arab Republic, but no central Muslim leader demanded that Lebanon joined. The Muslim leaders had not officially demanded alternatives to the sovereign Lebanese state since 1936. There were, however, strong pro-UAR currents in the population, but it is unclear whether this was support of the Arab states against the West and Israel or actual pro-unification sentiments.

Tactical concessions to the validity of a sovereign Lebanon brought the political leaders into a discourse over what Lebanon was to be, resulting in the National Pact. The Pact was a joint Christian-Muslim effort at establishing a shared view on the future of Lebanese sovereignty and political representation. All in all, independence and the National Pact in 1943 indicate that Lebanese sovereignty was gaining ground, if only as a reaction to what a Lebanese Us was not: neither a French mandate nor an integrated part of Syria. However, the unavailability of documented discussions and debates has made tracing the second socialisation process itself, and not just signs of the phases which are a part of this particular process, difficult. The change in Muslim leaders’ policies and relationship with the sovereign Lebanese institutions during the thirties and after the National Pact does, however, indicate a change towards norm compliance through discussions.
The norm of democratic representation was affected by previous community co-existence and cooperation, and was heavily influenced by the patron-client relations that existed in the area. Basing political representation on community affiliation can be said to have contributed to the continuance of patron-client relations, since this system consolidated the traditional leading families’ positions as mediators between the people and the power. Community representation was also a central, institutionalised part of Lebanese politics since the Administration Council of 1864. Baaklini points to two principles which have dominated Lebanese political governing (Baaklini 1999: 79). One, political offices are distributed according to community, and secondly, inter-communitarian accommodation happens through bargaining between the different community leaders. This also points to the role political leaders played in the introduction of sovereignty and democracy in Lebanon, and suggests that much of the socialisation processes happened top-down. The political mobilisation of the Lebanese Shi’a is an important event in Lebanese history. Their particular socio-economic situation affected the socialisation processes in their community, and is an example of how material explanations can influence norm socialisation. The urban emigrants were more inclined to vote for a political party than for their traditional local leader. Also, when the make-up of political representation did not change in response to changing demographics, demands were made for more Muslim power in politics and/or the abolishing of confessionalism.

Neither sovereignty nor democracy can be said to have reached rule-consistent behaviour before the Lebanese war broke out, so the final stage of the socialisation processes where the norms are taken for granted was not reached. Sovereignty continued to be the source of debate as a result of the Lebanonism-Arabism duality. The major debate issue was how Lebanese sovereignty should be presented. Material from parliamentary debates or other discussions between people in government could have revealed more initial animosity towards a democratic political system which challenged the traditional elite’s power, but the analysis shows that democracy itself was not challenged in favour of other political systems in the pre-war period, and continuous efforts were made to improve democratic conditions.
Democratic institutions were quickly reinstated after the war was over with the Ta’if Accords of 1989. The next chapter will present how this period of Lebanese political history has been dominated by the challenges of the aftermath of war, in addition to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and Syrian military presence and political influence. Though Syrian involvement in Lebanon did stabilise the situation, the continued military presence and meddling in Lebanese democracy presents challenges and has provoked opposition. An exploration of sovereignty and democracy in the post-war period can provide an interesting angle on the Lebanese-Syrian relationship and Lebanese political identity.
5. Post-war sovereignty and democracy

Some claim that Lebanon survived the war due to external forces keeping Lebanon together at the seams (such as Hitti 1989), while others contribute Lebanon’s survival to there being a Lebanese national identity (such as Hanf 1993), and/or that Lebanon’s war was caused by outside forces (as implied by some of the Lebanese I spoke with during my research in Lebanon in September 2002). I will not attempt to validate any of these theories (or the ones in between), as the purpose of this chapter is to explore aspects of sovereignty and democracy in post-war Lebanon. Although I will initially present both sovereignty and democracy in post-war documents, the rest of the chapter will mainly focus on democracy norms, as including a deeper look at the post-war debate over sovereignty would make it too long. This is done with regret, though, as a more extensive exploration of sovereignty could reveal exciting aspects of post-war takes on Lebanese identity in relation to the Arab and Syrian identity. Though I will point out where suggestions of the norm socialisation theory are present, the main goal of this chapter is to give an empirically descriptive exploration of sovereignty and democracy in their current setting.

I have chosen three aspects of the post-war period that can illuminate the recent context for democracy and sovereignty in Lebanon. The chapter will first deal with the Ta’if Accord and other post-war documents, which not only re-established Lebanon, but also consolidated Syrian presence and influence. I will then explore the Lebanese elections in 1992, 1996 and 2000 in order to present post-war democratic practice and its condition. Finally, I will briefly explore the debate that gained momentum in 2000, after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad died. This debate involved additional aspects of democracy beyond free and fair elections, as the government restricted freedom of expression in the mid-nineties. This will also disclose some characteristics of Self and Other that appear in this debate.
5.1 A new context after war

The main reason for leaving out the Lebanese war itself is that norm socialisation of sovereignty and democracy is complicated to explore in a setting of war. However, a central question is how fifteen years of war may have affected the norms in question or the other factors affecting the socialisation processes, such as state-society relations. This section will present some of the issues relating to an after-war context.

One of the key changes of war has been the increased defending of communal identity and belonging compared with the late sixties and early seventies (Picard 1996). On the other hand, the failure of the state to provide basic services in poor neighbourhoods and areas has made the Hizbullah popular where they provide basic needs such as water and electricity, regardless of community belonging. Also, there have emerged NGOs, which are inter-sectarian. Another central issue in the post-war period is whether there has been an elite turnover, if a new political elite taking centre stage in Lebanese politics, perhaps with different ideas about Lebanese sovereignty and democracy. It is interesting to note that the 1972 Parliament renewed its mandate throughout the war, and the representatives who survived the war participated in the talks which became the Ta’if Accord. The 1972 Parliament was never denounced during the war, which also contributed to the affirmation of Lebanon as an independent democratic republic in 1989. However, the former warlords have gained a central political position in post-war elections, perhaps because they assure Syrian influence and power in the country to uphold their own positions.  

Marcussen et al. say that critical junctures provide opportunity to “alter existing ideational frameworks and boundary definitions” (Marcussen et al. 2001: 103). However, identity “defines the range of options considered legitimate for new nation state identities” (ibid.), so socialised norms define the range of what are considered legitimate ideas. Thus the legitimate ideas presented on the post-war political order

32 It should be noted that there are several politicians in Parliament who are critical to norm violating behaviour, but Lebanon’s leading political positions are held by Syrian-loyal politicians, and Lebanese internal politics and policies are to a large extent dictated from Damascus.
should be limited by previously socialised norms. The next part of the chapter will present how the post-war constituting documents, though making room for Syrian influence, kept sovereignty and democracy as central defining traits of the Lebanon.

### 5.1.1 Institutionalisation of Syrian presence

To explore the status of Syria in Lebanon I have relied on the in-depth analysis of Thompson’s (2002) article and Husem’s FFI report (the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment). The amended constitution from 1926 together with the Ta’if and the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination form the basis of post-war Lebanon: a sovereign and democratic republic under the protection and influence of a sisterly Syria. Syria has been militarily present in Lebanon since 1976, and through the Arab League’s Arab Deterrent Forces Syria legitimized its presence during the Lebanese war (Thompson 2002: 81).

The Ta’if Accord from 1989 added something to the sovereign and democratic post-war Lebanon, namely Syria as a central part of Lebanese politics:

“Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. (…) Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria’s security (...)”.

It is generally considered that all treaties and agreements between Syria and Lebanon have strengthened Syria’s role and position in Lebanon. The close historical and strategic link between Lebanon and Syria and their joint main enemy Israel are the central legitimising Syrian arguments for its presence and influence. The Ta’if also stated that a joint Syrian-Lebanese military committee would decide on the specifics of Syrian military presence The Ta’if set a timeframe for Syrian forces to withdraw to

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33 All references from the Ta’if Accord are taken from “The Ta’if Accord”, the Middle East Information Network (online), accessed 15.01.02.
the Bekaa Valley: “the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years” (The Middle East Information Network: The Ta’if Accord).

The Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon in 1991 did include a Syrian acceptance of Lebanese sovereignty (Thompson 2002: 82). It also said that Syrian redeployment from Lebanon would be decided after the “expiration of that provision of the Ta’if Accord” (ibid.). The Defence and Security Agreement of September 1991 empowered each country’s military to uphold the previously made security agreements (ibid.). All in all, the different treaties and agreements between Syria and Lebanon are considered to have strengthened Syria’s role and position in Lebanon. However, the sovereignty and democracy of Lebanon is also recognised in these treaties, though to a certain extent undermined by Syrian interests.

5.1.2 Sovereignty and democracy in post-war Lebanon

It is important to notice how the definition of the Syrian-Lebanese relationship is held within certain predetermined boundaries in these documents, like Syria recognizing Lebanon’s sovereignty in the Treaty of Brotherhood. Syria emphasizes the countries’ shared history and common goals, not reunification, to legitimate continued military presence (see quotes in the previous section). This tells us that though the war could have provided a window of opportunity for elites to promote alternatives to a sovereign and democratic Lebanon, this has not happened. This indicates that these norms have placed limits on possible redefinitions of Lebanon after the war.

Several leading government politicians expressed support for Syria’s presence and help, like in 1990, when President Harawi and the Council of Ministers publicly thanked President Assad for his efforts to stop the Lebanese war, re-establish the Lebanese Army’s authority, and the help the Syrian Army had extended in securing the release of Western hostages (FBIS August 12, 1991: 45). Syria’s role in stabilizing Lebanon was acknowledged by other political leaders as well, some of
who had been opposed to Syrian involvement in Lebanon from the beginning, like the Lebanese Forces. Syrian forces were perhaps regarded as the only means that could stabilize the country, having the strength to police a ceasefire.

The main Lebanese constituting document is the Constitution originally from 1926, which is still in effect. It was given some amendments after the war, and paragraph (c) of the preamble added to the Lebanese constitution on 21 September 1991 says that “Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary Republic, based on respect for public freedoms, foremost amongst which is freedom of opinion and belief, and on social justice and obligations among all citizens without distinction or preference” (as quoted by Amnesty International library online). This quote shows the continuation of Lebanon as a sovereign country with a democratic governing form. This gives an impression of a will to sustain and adhere to sovereign and democratic norms, as respect for individuals' rights and freedoms is protected by the Lebanese Constitution of 1943 and was further affirmed in amendments introduced after the war. Lebanese law also guarantees the preservation of individuals' rights and their protection from any act of arbitrary deprivation of their freedoms (ibid.).

However, journalists and students are arrested and imprisoned for criticising Syrian influence and presence in Lebanon. Furthermore, between 130 000 and 250 000 foreign residents were naturalised in June 1994, and were used by the government in elections, reportedly being picked up by government buses and handed government voting lists.34 There have been many other reports of fraud and mismanagement as well (Gambill and Aoun 2000, Dagher 2001: 142). Thus, despite seemingly re-instating democracy, there have been many violations of this norm.

One of the Ta’if Accord’s main goals was to reform the regime through guaranteeing the religious groups equal participation in the state and ending the war (al-Khazen 1992). The Ta’if stated that the powers of the President were to be reduced to the

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34 Dagher (2001: 74) says it was between 130 000 and 250 000, whilst Gambill and Aoun (August 2000) claim it was circa 300 000. I refer to the more sober estimate presented by Dagher.
benefit of the cabinet and Prime Minister. The Parliament and the Speaker of the House also gained power (Baaklini 1999: 95). The Ta’if includes the goal of erasing sectarianism in Lebanon, but no timeframe was set and no plan was drawn. The Ta’if stated that the electoral districts were to be based on the muhafazat, six districts which are bigger than the previously used qada (Baaklini 1999: 98). This was supposedly in order to discourage sectarianism in politics, but resulted in a Christian fear of being politically undermined, as Christians do not constitute a majority in any larger muhafazat district. The fear of losing political power was also the reason for similar concerns from Druze leader Walid Jumblatt (ibid.). These concerns show how representation by community still was (and is) part of Lebanese democracy. As mentioned, the victorious politicians after the war were the war lords, who often survived the reimplementation of elections and democratic institutions (Dagher 2001, Krayem 1993, Hanf 1993). Syrian support is vital for politicians to participate and win elections.

The implementation of sovereignty and a democratic political system in the post-war institutional framework seems to suggest that these norms were adhered to and sustained. However, though democracy and sovereignty seem to be the valid labels for characterising Lebanon, the government and Syria have engaged in norm-violating behaviour in order to keep political power.

5.2 Lebanese elections in the post-war context

The previous sections have shown that sovereignty and democracy are still central traits of the documents that define the Lebanese state after the war. However, Syrian presence has restricted the conditions of these norms. For example, the election of leading positions in government such as the President, the Prime Minister, Speaker of the House, the foreign and the interior minister are all positions controlled by Syria. The presence of Syrian troops and intelligence has lead to Syrian arrests of Lebanese citizens, and Lebanon does not control the entrance of Syrian workers. The Lebanese democratic institution of regular elections has been criticised for being manipulated
in favour of pro-Syrian politicians, compromising the legitimacy of many of the chosen candidates.

### 5.2.1 The 1992 elections: A re-implementation of democracy?

The first elections after the war had a low voter turn-out (at circa 30%), and there were accusations of fraud and mismanagement (Salem 1997: 27). The winners of the 1992 elections were former war lords, the Islamic parties, a number of pro-Syrian parties, and an independent bloc lead by former Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss in Beirut (ibid.). The losers of the elections were mainly the Christians, as a boycott was successfully called for. In Mount Lebanon, the Maronite heartland, voter turn-out was as low as 13.5% (Baaklini 1999: 99). That a large part of Muslim voters stayed home also contributed to the low turn-out in the elections (ibid.).

There were two main reasons for controversy and boycott: the timing of the elections, and the last-minute changes made to the electoral constituencies (al-Khazen 1992). The critics claimed that Lebanon had not recovered enough from the war for elections to be held in a free and fair manner. There was also critique of the changes made to the electoral constituencies, saying they were made to secure certain politician’s positions and undermine other’s according to Syrian interests. The Ta’if said that electoral districts in Lebanon were to be based on the muhafazat, a relatively large district (though not specifically defined in size in the Ta’if). The electoral districts according to the new law were for the most part the larger muhafazat, except for in certain areas such as Mount Lebanon. Here the smaller electoral districts called qada (also transcribed as caza, see Salem 1997) were applied, supposedly to ensure the election of certain politicians (Salem 1997, Rougier 1997). Last-minute decisions also contributed to uncertainty, like increasing the number of seats in Parliament from 128 to 134 without there being any clear reason for the increase (al-Khazen 1992).

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35 Though opposition to Syrian presence is dominated by Christians, Syrian- loyal Christian politician families include traditional political heavyweights such as Murr and Frangieh.
The reactions to the first elections can to a great extent be contributed to the fact that these were the first elections after a long period of war. Feelings of insecurity and distrust of the candidates are important factors when explaining why the turn-out was so low. The swiftness with which Lebanese democratic institutions were put in use again point to democracy being taken for granted as the norm for the political system. No demands of reunification with Syria were made, and no claims to other political systems than democracy were made either. Representation by community continued, but the Ta’if did state that the abolishment of sectarianism was a “fundamental national objective” (“The Ta’if Accord”, the Middle East Information Network, online, 15.01.02).

5.2.2 The 1996 elections: Increased participation
In the 1996 elections Hariri’s list won 14 out of 19 seats in Beirut. After the first round of these elections, Syrian troops redeployed from Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon. Volker Perthes (1997) thinks this signalled that Syria had confidence in the Lebanese government’s ability to guarantee internal security, political stability and the re-election of main Syria-supporters to Lebanese government. This government did, according to Paul Salem (1997), gain a de facto legitimacy. The pro-government lists had gained 95 percent of the seats (ibid.), the opposition (not including Hizbullah) a meagre three seats (Baaklini 1999: 106-107).

Salem (1997) does, however, point to the lack of sovereignty, political freedom, and an exclusionary election law, fraud and intimidation when he says the elections could hardly be called democratic (see also Baaklini 1999: 105). This implies that although the government adhered to holding elections and did not deny the validity of democracy per se, manipulation of the elections continued. Continued norm-violation suggests the phase of tactical concessions. The same year as the elections a restriction was put on the number of radio and TV stations that could be licensed, resulting in the licensing of only four private TV networks and three private radio stations, which were all owned by Lebanese officials’ friends or family (Dagher 2001: 142). Public demonstrations were banned, and restrictions on freedom of
association were put in effect (ibid.). The government, though adhering to elections as the legitimate way to elect political representatives, were also restricting central aspects of democracy such as freedom of expression and association.

A factor considered to have influenced the election results is the already mentioned naturalisation of between 130 000 and 250 000 foreign residents in June 1994 (see 5.1.2), which increased Lebanon’s population with 10%. Eighty-five percent of the new residents were Muslim (Dagher 2001: 74). According to the newspaper al-Nahar 19 August 1996 (Gambill and Aoun 2000), they played a big role in the elections, especially in the Bekaa and in the Akkar districts in North Lebanon, as the new citizens were collected by government buses to the voting stations and handed government election-ballots.

The opposition was divided on whether or not to boycott again, as the 1992 boycott did not gained any real political results and put the opposition in the political outskirts. This time, the Maronite Patriarch did not support a boycott either. Opposition figures in exile, such as Raymond Eddé, Amin Gemayel, Michel Aoun and Dory Chamoun had called for boycott, whilst the opposition in Lebanon decided to participate in order to attempt to gain some political influence (Baaklini 1999: 104).

Discussion revolved again around the make-up of the electoral districts, ending in the introduction of a law almost identical as the one applied in the 1992 elections. Ten deputies in Parliament sent the law to the Constitutional Court, which ruled it unconstitutional. The government made a few changes and added that this electoral-district structuring was for one time only, as it had in 1992 (Salem 1997, Rougier 1997). Still, the voter turn-out did increase compared with all-time low of 30% of the 1992 elections, to about 45 % (Baaklini 1999: 105). For example, voter turn-out in Mount Lebanon rose to 45 % in these elections, and in the Bekaa it was 52% (ibid.).

Now NGOs defending democratic norms were starting to appear, which Risse et al. (1999: 27) place in the tactical concessions phase. The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections was established on March 13, 1996. It is a non-
association which is concerned with the development of democracy in Lebanon, and issues reports on elections before and after they have taken place. The formation of this group was inspired by similar initiatives in Yemen 1992 and Bulgaria 1996 (LADE report 2001). The following year the “Observatory of Democracy in Lebanon” project was launched by a non-profit organisation backed by the European community (Dagher 2001: 57). According to Risse et al., the establishment of NGOs defending the norms is important for driving the socialisation processes further (Risse et al. 1999: 27).

The government does adhere to democracy as the valid political system in Lebanon. For example, Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss said in a speech at the “National and Islamic Conference” in 1998 that “Lebanon differs from other Arab regimes in that it is a democratic country” (Dagher 2001: 45). This was also brought up by a pro-government politician in the Lebanese Parliament when I asked him about Lebanese identity. He answered that one thing which separated Lebanon from other Arab countries was that: “We have democracy, real democracy” (interview by author September 2002). This indicates that the Syrian-loyal government acknowledges the validity of democracy irrespective of the audience, which could indicate that the norm could have reached prescriptive status. However, the continued lack of liberalisation, electoral manipulation and denouncing critics as either foreign agents or trouble-makers speaks against the prescriptive phase.

Municipal and mukhtar elections were held in 1998, after not having been held for thirty-five years. The voter turn-out was much higher than in the national elections two years previously, which could indicate that the local elections were regarded as more valid (LADE report 1998). The municipal elections are thought to have been less manipulated than the national elections, and around forty percent of the Syrian-backed candidates were defeated (Gambill 1999). This contrasts the success the government representatives had in the 1996 national elections.
5.2.3 The 2000 elections

The elections in 2000 were dominated by the socio-economic crisis that Lebanon faced (and still faces). President Lahoud had prior to the 2000 elections expressed that it was a goal to fight corruption and construct a fair and democratic electoral law. This goal was previously declared in a ministerial decree released by the Hoss government, and a committee was formed to pursue this goal. The electoral system itself had been deemed “inconsistent, unconstitutional and undemocratic” by the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE report 2001).

The government seemingly made efforts to better democratic conditions, again indicating that democracy is the valid norm for the Lebanese political system. However, only minor amendments were actually introduced to the electoral law in January 2000. The failure to make any real and major improvements to Lebanese democracy can be contributed to a combination of things, like the Syrian presence and the post-war political elite’s stakes in Lebanese politics and personal political power- interests. One of the most important changes was the decision to divide Lebanon into 14 electoral districts. Nonetheless, these districts were not based on what could be considered objective standards, but rather to ensure certain politicians victory (according to the LADE report 2001).

Several Christian politicians who had been out of the political game due to their anti-Syrian views were now allowed to participate or chose to participate in these elections (Gambill and Aoun August 2000). There were, however, conditions attached to their allowed participation. The Christian religious leaders went out with statements encouraging people to vote, in order to “live up to our national duties as citizens and practice our right to vote so that we will come out with competent men who will defend national standards”, as Maronite bishop Jaoud said at a news conference (Gambill and Nassif September 2000).

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36 LADE (2001) gives an example: “In the North for example, Becharreh was merged to Akkar and Dennieh into one constituency, even though there is no geographical continuity between Becharreh and Akkar, or between Becharreh and Dennieh. Also, Nabatieh and the South were merged together; the result was that some candidates needed over two hundred thousand votes to be elected, while others needed less than twenty thousand. These deficiencies confirms the prevailing impression that the engineering of electoral districts was still catering to the narrow political interests of certain parties”
It seems that even if democratic norms were adhered to and some improvements were made, norm violating behaviour continued. However, despite many problems with the elections, LADE point out that by the 2000 elections, there had been progress (LADE report 2001). LADE contributes this mainly to the fact that people now had voting experience. The existence of a NGO such as the LADE, critique from the opposition and central political leaders in Lebanon, as well as the success of the municipal elections, suggests that there is a domestic mobilisation around democratic issues. The 2000 elections were also the first after the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 and after Syrian President al-Assad had died in June 2000. These events triggered a renewed debate over the Syrian presence in Lebanon, now more openly questioning the legitimacy of Syrian military presence and political influence, and its impact on Lebanese sovereignty and democracy.

5.3 Israeli withdrawal
The Israeli withdrawal is a political landmark in Lebanese history. The event triggered a debate over Syrian presence, as the opposition claimed Syria was violating Lebanese sovereignty and democracy, not only during elections, but also in connections with freedom of expression and association. This part of the chapter will describe the mobilisation of an organised opposition, its reactions to norm violating behaviour and the governments’ reactions towards this criticism.

I am looking for frames of reference of meaning that indicate the understanding of the purpose of political activity and collective interests regarding sovereignty and democracy. This approach rests on the idea that public spheres are important for public justifications, as this develops norms, and puts state behaviour within an intersubjective structure of meaning (Hall 1999). Looking for public justifications of democracy and sovereignty can provide further evidence of whether the norms are at a tactical concessions phase, in the second socialisation process of argumentation. I

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37 Another issue the Lebanese and Syrian governments face criticism for is arbitrary political arrests and detainment, torture and ill-treatment, and violations of the right to a fair trial.
have gone through approximately twenty issues of the Daily Star from 2001 and 2002, as well as reading it daily online in 2002 and 2003. I also consulted the coverage of the debate at the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (MEIB) and the L’Orient du Jour (both available online). The debate over Syrian presence was much more subdued prior to the Israeli withdrawal, and it was only after the Maronite Cardinal Sfeir called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops in September 2000 that the debate gained serious momentum. This is the reason for the focus on articles from 2001 onward. Interviews and quotes in articles written after the debate exploded have provided a good basis for putting statements and political comments in context and present an interesting look at the discussion over democracy and sovereignty in Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal.

The first section will present the opposition and the circumstances surrounding the renewed debate over Syrian presence. The second section will present the reactions to the government’s norm violating behaviour which draws in other aspects of democracy than elections. After looking at other important reasons for protesting norm violating behaviour, the last section will deal with the government’s counter-arguments towards its critics, which will also give a glimpse of Lebanese Othering.

5.3.1 Opposition gets organised

There were instant expressions of joy over having beaten the enemy when Israel unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad died not long after, leaving the presidency to his son. All eyes were on southern Lebanon as many feared violence and repercussion for members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA)\(^3\). This was the end of fifteen years of Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which had been one of the major arguments for Syria in its reasoning for staying in Lebanon. There was also anticipation towards the new Syrian leader, as many wondered whether this would have any effect on the Lebanese-Syrian relationship.
The Israeli withdrawal sparked a debate over the Syrian military presence and political influence in Lebanon, some demanding a Syrian redeployment while others argued that Syrian presence was still needed to ensure stability. For example, acting chief of the higher Shi’a Council, Abdel-Amir Qabalan, called for the redeployment of Syrian forces to the eastern Bekaa valley as stipulated in the Ta’if of 1989 (Gambill and Nassif April 2001). On the other hand, Hassan Nasrallah (the Secretary-General of Hizbullah) spoke before 300,000 people on April 4, 2001, and said the Syrian forces in Lebanon were “a regional and internal necessity for Lebanon” and that Syrian presence was in Lebanon’s interest (ibid.).

Former Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss spoke moderately for a change in Syrian-Lebanese relations after the Israeli withdrawal. In a statement in April 2001 he called for an “equitable relationship” between Syria and Lebanon, and that the countries should “stop one interfering in the domestic affairs of the other” (Gambill and Nassif April 2001). However, the government has in general supported upholding the relationship, stressing that any reassessment would have to be, and should be, agreed on jointly by the Lebanese and Syrian governments.

On March 23, 2000, the editor of the Lebanese newspaper al-Nahar Gibran Tueni wrote an open letter to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, emphasising that the “Lebanese are utterly devoted to their dignity, liberty, independence and sovereignty, and that they are understandably angered when they feel that Syrian behaviour threatens these values” (MEIB April 2000). Gibran Tueni also said that “Syria must recognise the sovereignty of Lebanese territory and institutions, as well as the civil liberties that we hold sacred, and for which we have sacrificed so much over the years” (ibid.). This was one of the most direct critiques of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship in the post-war period, which added to the escalating debate.

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38 The SLA was founded, funded and controlled by Israel (MEIB July 2000)

39 The relationship between Hizbullah and Syria is interesting. It is thought that they endorse Syrian presence because of Syrian support of Hizbullah’s fighting Israel.
The most direct and ardent demands for Syrian redeployment came from the Christian communities. The Maronite Bishop’s Council released a declaration on 20 September 2000, stating that: “Now that Lebanon has reached a point of crisis, we must disclose the reality as we perceive it in our hearts, without any reticence or equivocation” (MEIB October 2000). The declaration also calls Lebanese politics the last twenty-five years “improper and imposed”, and says that Lebanon is “losing its way by losing its sovereignty and (external) hegemony over institutions, public authorities, and economic facilities have prevailed” (ibid.).

The declaration was followed by the formation of the Qornet Shehwan gathering (QS), which included members from all communities (though the majority are Christian). The QS stands for what they see as the proper implementation of the Ta’if, of both its political reform and the aspects tied to Lebanon’s sovereignty (i.e. it considers Syrian presence to compromise Lebanon’s sovereignty and democracy). Another main concern of the QS is the Lebanese economical crisis. Another oppositional force who shares this view on Syrian presence is the more radical Free National Current (FNC), headed by exiled former Prime Minister Michel Aoun. Members and sympathisers seem to be mainly students, from all communities. The Qornet Shehwan is one of three types of opposition related to the debate over Syria presence. The other two are the fraction loyal to President Lahoud in opposition to Prime Minister Hariri, and a group in Parliament consisting of 40 Christian MP’s that are in opposition to the Qornet Shehwan. The President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker back this parliamentary opposition.

40 The Daily Star March 8, 2001 reports that during a visit in the US in autumn 2000 the Cardinal expressed in several statements that the Syrian presence in Lebanon should end in accordance with the Ta’if, and that “the Lebanese were capable of managing their own affairs without outside influence”.

41 This information on the opposition is based on personal correspondence with Farid al-Khazen, professor in Political Science at the American University in Beirut. The QS focuses on three main issues: The implementation of the Ta’if (i.e. redeployment of Syrian troops to the Bekaa), the economy, and the “correcting of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship” (Daily Star April 12, 2001).
5.3.2 Reactions to norm violating behaviour

Commenting the Syrian intelligence presence in Lebanon, spiritual leader of Hizbullah Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, said in a speech at a seminar supporting the Palestinian intifada at the Order of Engineers and Architects: “Don’t we all in this Arab world and in the Third World try to control ourselves when thinking about freedom, because we are afraid that an intelligence apparatus might have placed a detector in our minds?” (Nasser 2002). Freedom of expression and the media in Lebanon have been subjected to several restrictions imposed by Syria during the last decade. Still, Lebanese press has been, and probably still is, amongst the most outspoken in the Middle East. The media as a place for exchanging arguments and comments on political issues and policies is central. This section will show how opposition, originally organised around opposition towards Syrian presence, also mobilises around other democracy related norms, such as freedom of speech.

The word “freedoms” is often used by the opposition when criticizing the governments’ actions and describing what is at stake because of the government’s actions. Though never defined per se, it seems to be used by the opposition in contexts where rights such as freedom of expression and organization have been restricted by the government.

In April 2000, a month prior to the Israeli withdrawal, arrests of FNC members caused a wave of anti-Syrian demonstrations in Lebanon’s universities (Gambill April 2000). Nine students were arrested and sentenced to prison terms. The FNC’s Central Bureau for National Coordination said the youth were not doing anything wrong, “they only called for freedom” (Gambill April 2000). MP Nassib Lahoud said the government’s treatment of the detainees was “unacceptable”, and MP Boutros Harb reportedly also pointed to “freedoms”, saying that “freedoms are sacred in Lebanon and all Lebanese should have the right to express their views freely” (ibid.).

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42 In Arabic: hurriyya. This is translated as “freedoms” in most English language newspapers, like the Daily Star.
An attempt to restrict news broadcasts to state television and radio happened in 1994, but was then overruled by the Parliament (Perthes 1997). However, in 1996 the government managed to pass a decree which stipulated that only a limited number of private radio and television stations would be licensed. Only four private television networks and three private radio stations would be allowed to send news and political programs (Volkes 1997). The greatest controversy surrounding this decree was that the stations allowed to air news and politics were all owned by certain government politicians or their family members or close friends.

The Murr Television station (MTV) and Radio Mont Liban was closed on September 4, 2002, on the grounds of having violated the election law during the Metn by-election in June 2002. This caused protests amongst press, politicians, oppositional and student movements. The Press Federation and Journalists union decided in September 2002 to hold a national conference on the “defence of freedoms” (Azar 2002). At the conference, former Prime Minister Salim Hoss, former Speaker Hussein Husseini, Qornet Shehwan member Amin Gemayel and MP Nayla Mouawad gave speeches on upholding “public freedoms” (ibid.). The president of the Press Federation Muhammad Baalbaki said that the decision to close MTV affects “every free person in Lebanon” (ibid.).

The Qornet Shehwan gathering called for protests in support of Murr Television several times. In October the group asked the country’s educational institutions to take time to explain to the students “the relationship between freedoms and democracy on the one hand and sovereignty and independence on the other” (Darrous and Khoury 2002). In November 2002, the Interior Minister banned the demonstrations planned by Qornet Shehwan. Thus the demonstrations were confined within the campus of Lebanese University, with security forces, the army and anti-riot police surrounding the campus. Students chanted “freedom, liberty and independence” (Assaf 2002), and speeches were made by student leaders criticising the closing of the TV station, the state’s repression of “public freedoms” (ibid.), and Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon.
What is interesting is that Prime Minister Hariri commented on 24 September 2002 that “it isn’t normal for a Prime Minister to own a television station, and the same goes for a speaker or political parties”, that this practice was contradictory to the “concept of freedom”, and that one knows what the politically owned media will say beforehand (referring to his own TV-station Future TV) (Darrous 2002). Thereby the prime minister used norm adhering reasoning when commenting on the effects of the actions of the government, in fact saying that this is not rule consistent behaviour. Hariri has previously, in February 2000, emphasised the validity of a sovereign Lebanon when US Secretary of State Colin Powell cancelled his visit to Beirut, and discussed the situation in southern Lebanon with Syrian officials only. Hariri reportedly addressed Powell directly in a televised interview saying that “Lebanon is Lebanon, Syria is Syria” (Gambill March 2001).

5.3.3 Other reasons for protesting Syrian-Lebanese relations
Material factors also influence the debate over Syrian presence. Factors such as the import of Syrian produce and the economic disadvantages Lebanese farmers suffer under Syrian-Lebanese trade agreements have caused protests. Syrian workers are not required to obtain working permits, and many Syrian workers take on jobs in Lebanon, mainly in unskilled professions such as garbage men, construction workers, street vendors and such. This has caused reactions amongst Lebanese as unemployment rates in Lebanon lie around 30%, and trade agreements concerning agricultural products set Lebanese farmers at a disadvantage compared with Syrian farmers and produce. This shows how norms are not the only factors in the debate over Syrian presence.

During the summer of 2000, young FNC activists performed work usually done by Syrian workers in an act of protest, such as picking apples and selling produce and bread on the streets, urging to “buy Lebanese” (Gambill February 2001). The trade relationship between Syria and Lebanon and the comparative disadvantage of Lebanese farmers in this deal provide material incentives for protesting Syrian presence and involvement in Lebanese politics. This is a major difference from the
demands for an economic union between Lebanon and Syria in 1954 (see 4.5.4). Lebanese workers have protested the Syrian workers’ presence, like in 1995 when Lebanon’s General Union of Lebanese Workers organised widespread demonstrations. Unrest also occurred in 1996, and in 1997 the union’s leader Elias Abu Rizk was arrested after refusing to accept the results of the union’s elections. He claimed the elections had been rigged by the Lebanese regime in order to put a lid on labour unrest and critique of the Syrian implications for Lebanese workers (Gambill February 2001).

5.3.4 Government reactions to critique and protests
The government has often drawn on insinuated and explicit accusations of opposition sympathy with either Israel or the United States, or both, in the debate over Syrian presence. For example, the exiled Syria critic General Aoun was accused of “throwing himself in the lap of pro-Israeli Zionist circles” by Information minister Ghazi Aridi on 25 September, 2002 (Hourani 2002). The Self definition of Lebanon is Arab, and anti-Israeli sentiment is strong due to the Arab-Israel conflict and the violent encounters with Israel in Lebanon, such as the Israeli operation Grapes of Wrath on 1996 and the twenty-two year long occupation of the south.

The antipathy against Israel and the US is sometimes demonstrated by symbolic actions, like on Thursday September 26, 2002, when the Islamic-Christian Gathering convened in Sidon in support of the Palestinian people and in protest of US threats against Iraq. On the way into the conference, the participants walked on the US and the Israeli flags to mark their protest (Zaatari 2002). The Syrian Accountability Act of 2002, proposed by a US House of Representatives sub- committee, which was passed in 2003, also caused great debate and generated claims that the USA and Israel undermine the Arab states. The participants at the conference issued a list

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43 In September 2002 the US International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia voted to endorse the Syria Accountability Act, which mandates economic sanctions against Syria unless Syria ends its funding of terrorist organizations (meaning Hizbullah), stops developing weapons of mass destruction, refrains from violating UN sanctions on Iraq, and ends its military presence in Lebanon (Abdelnour October 2002).
which commented the Syrian Accountability Act as “a project undermining not only Syria, but the entire Arab region, civil peace and the Ta’if Accord in Lebanon” (ibid.).

The government and the President, though adhering to both sovereignty and democracy by accepting their validity and not promoting alternatives to these norms, engage in what is perceived as norm violating behaviour by cooperating with Syrian influence in Lebanon and restricting democratic freedoms. Critics and protesters are rejected as the product of foreign agents and ignorant of the consequences of their actions (such as stirring sectarian strife). For example, the student demonstrations in April 2000 provoked denunciation of the protests. President Emile Lahoud said the protesters were encouraging sectarian strife, and called the initiators of the student protests tools of Israeli propaganda. However, as mentioned in 5.3.1, several politicians in government criticised the way the students had been treated, and stated that freedom of speech is a basic right in Lebanon (Gambill April 2000). This resonates with what Risse et al. (1999:27) advocate as important in the tactical concessions phase: that the government engages in public controversy where the opposition have a chance to justify their accusations.

After the Maronite Council’s call for a reassessment of Lebanese-Syrian relations and the establishment of the Qornet Shehwan, the critics were accused of serving Israeli causes and instigating sectarian bigotry. For example, Lebanese President Lahoud said that the statement "dealt with the Lebanese situation from a narrow and deficient perspective, lacking clarity and encouraging sectarian bigotry". Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Shaykh Na‘im Qasim suggested that the statement was in line with American aspirations “to blackmail Damascus and pave the way for applying pressure on it to make concessions in the settlement process [with Israel]" (Gibreel and Gambill October 2000). Accusations of encouraging sectarian strife are common in retaliation to critique of Syrian presence and norm violating behaviour.

Social mobilisation around democratic norms began in 1996 with the establishment of the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections. Politically, the opposition
mobilised after the debate over Syrian presence was additionally encouraged after the withdrawal of Israel in 2000. The government and the opposition has engaged in a debate since then, where the government tried to write its critics off as ignorant and foreign agents, while simultaneously acknowledging the validity of democratic norms. This suggests democracy is in the tactical concessions phase, and indicates some signs of prescriptive status, as the norms themselves are no longer controversial.

Redeployment of Syrian troops took place after the debate over Syrian presence started. Some 7000 Syrian soldiers were withdrawn from Beirut positions and several other outposts in Metn, Baabda and Mount Lebanon in June 2001, though most relocated to the Bekaa valley. Nevertheless, this is considered a tactical concession of the Syrian government in order to soothe the increasing critique of Syrian presence within parts of the political elite (Gambill June 2001). A further redeployment was made from Mount Lebanon in April 2002, a month after Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Beirut, which was the first official visit by a Syrian president since 1947 (BBC News online, 3 April 2002). Seen in the context of the increasingly heated Lebanese debate over the legitimacy of Syrian presence, these events could be evidence of Syrian compliance to Lebanese and more recent external pressure like the US Syrian Accountability Act.

5.4 Summary
Lebanon’s post-war documents affirmed the state’s sovereignty and democracy, while also ascribing a central role to Syria. This is an example of how “new ideas about social order and the nation state need to resonate with previously embedded and institutionalized values, symbols and myths”, which Marcussen et al. (2001: 103-104) claim are important to the introduction of a new political order.

The presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon can be said to compromise Lebanese sovereignty, though the reactions to this presence differs. Some see it as a necessary presence in order to maintain peace and stability, while others see it as an illegitimate presence which is neither needed nor wanted. Elections have been subject to
manipulation and fraud, as the government has sought to keep pro-Syrian representatives in power, for example by manipulating electoral districts. At the same time government politicians present and define Lebanon as a sovereign democracy, signifying the validity of these norms. The Israeli withdrawal and the death of Hafiz al-Assad triggered a discussion over Syrian presence.

Accusations of connections with Israel and/or the US are used to delegitimise criticism of Syrian presence. In the case of the governments’ endorsement of democracy as valid, the tactical concessions phase has seemingly come to the point where the norm violating government and the domestic opposition engage in public controversy. According to Risse et al., the next step towards rule consistent behaviour should be that the government becomes more and more entrapped in their own rhetoric, leading to prescriptive status (Risse et al. 1999: 27). However, the fact that the repression and reasons for norm violating behaviour to a certain extent originate from another country’s government proposes that pressure only on the Lebanese government is not enough. The Syrian government has shown some concessions to demands for Syrian withdrawal after the Israeli withdrawal and the escalating Lebanese debate. Risse et al. regard pressure from international and transnational agents as central to the progress towards norm-compliant behaviour (Risse et al. 1999: 15). More affirmative external pressure such as the US Syrian Accountability Act of 2002 had not been put in action by the end of the timeframe set for this thesis.

\[\text{44 A point is that external pressure would have to be directed not only towards the Lebanese government, but also the Syrian government, which does not share Lebanon’s developing democracy history.}\]
6. Conclusion

The previous chapters have explored the socialisation of democracy and sovereignty in Lebanon using the outline of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s theory for socialisation of human rights norms. I will now draw some conclusions concerning the object of the thesis, the applicability of the theory, and certain validity issues. Then I will present the main empirical findings, and answer the initial questions asked in the first chapter: Were sovereign and democratic norms socialised into Lebanese society before the war? Does the post-war period contain evidence of further socialisation of these norms?

6.1 Objective of thesis

The object of this thesis was to look at the socialisation processes of sovereignty and democracy in Lebanon. Though these are to some extent controversial issues (see 4.1), this controversy makes the concepts interesting to explore through a socialisation-approach. Analyses of Lebanese political history and political identity tend to concentrate on the uniqueness of Lebanese political history and avoid putting in it a general theoretical framework, as I discovered during my search for information. My main objective for exploring the pre-war period was to try to use a norm socialisation theory to trace sovereignty and democracy in a Lebanese context. I will get back to the pros and cons of using the chosen theory on this case.

The post-war period is interesting regarding the status of Lebanese sovereignty and democracy, as the Syrian presence can be said to violate aspects of both these norms. Exploring this period was in addition to searching for signs of where the socialisation processes were at in a current context, also an opportunity to look at the discussion between the government and the opposition, which not only provided further evidence of the socialisation phase of democracy, but also presents Lebanese images of Self and Other. There is an unexplored angle to this that encompasses the various aspects of a Lebanese national identity. For example, Barnett’s (1996b) claim that 1967 was a milestone in the meaning of Arab nationalism, creating conditions for the
consolidation of *qawmiyya* and *wataniyya*, could have provided a different and interesting angle on some of the same problems explored here. A comparative study of perception on Lebanese sovereignty in Lebanon before and after 1967 could have given an interesting angle on the definitions of the Lebanese Self.

### 6.2 Applicability of theory

Applying the Risse et al. (1999) socialisation theory of human rights norms to a case that involved looking at domestic socialisation of sovereignty and democracy presented challenges. For one, the theory is designed to explore the socialisation of human rights. In this regard it is designed to explore the behaviour of pariah states/governments, and involves transnational and international actors as central actors in the norm socialisation dynamic.

International and transnational actors aiding the mobilisation of inside pressure-groups were also (mostly) absent in this case, and the socialisation dynamic was to a greater extent driven by domestic political leaders in the pre-war period. Later, in the post-war period, NGOs supervising democracy appeared, as well as an external initiative to demand the withdrawal of Syria coming from the US, which was publicly rendered not legitimate by both government and opposition. The post-war period situation concerning democracy resembled to a greater extent pariah-state status, which made it easier to apply the chosen theory. The aspect of Lebanese definition of Self after Lebanon gained independence from colonial rule made the analysis differ from an approach focused on human rights. Human rights are to a greater extent defined by an outside institution, while in Lebanon’s case much of the discussion surrounding democracy and sovereignty was not a question of why to adhere to these norms, but also how to apply them.

However, one of my main reasons for using this theory was that it provided a comprehensive outline for tracing the socialisation of norms. Since the theory is based on general social theory, it was worth an attempt to see if it could be useful to trace sovereignty and democracy norms. This case and the human rights approach do share similarities, like the initial introduction of the norms from outside. Also, norms
like sovereignty and democracy still hold basic defined meanings and content, like human rights. Another difference from the human rights approach compared with my case was evident in the differences in the chronology of certain signs of the different phases of socialisation. For instance, putting the norms into the laws and bureaucratic framework of the country in this case happened early, while Risse et al. see this as a sign of prescriptive status, as late socialisation phase. This difference can be ascribed to the fact that Lebanon was under French rule when it was established and the norms in question were implemented (Risse et al. 1999: 27).

Applying the theory was easier in the post-war period, as there was some pariah state behaviour, establishment of NGOs and organised social mobilisation. The availability of material documenting statements and debate made it easier to assess the signs of the second socialisation process of argumentation. This exposes the missing evidence in the foregoing chapter, where it was difficult to come to a plausible conclusion about the second socialisation process due to the lack of documentation of discourse and debates.

One of the major obstacles encountered when applying this theoretical approach to this case was the theory’s assumption that domestic society is interested in taking on the human rights norms and thereby mobilises for their implementation almost instinctively. It is likely that domestic society go through some of the same socialisation processes as governments or states in order to come to the conclusion that such and such norms are valid and wanted. For example, elites are rendered important for the introduction of new norms also in domestic society.

The chosen theory provided a theoretical outline of a possible sequence of progress in socialisation which did work in this case as well, to a certain extent. Had additional documentation of pre-war discourse been available to me, I would have had a stronger case.
6.3 Reliability

I found that I had to rely on renowned historians and their accounts of what had happened in certain instances (in other words, I had to trust my elders in some cases). By cross-checking with a number of other sources I got a balanced picture of what had happened, but the unavailability of records of discussions and debates in the pre-war period did have consequences for what conclusions I was able to draw about reaching the second argumentative process. However, several of the sources I consulted did mention that a debate had taken place, for example in the instance of the debate leading to the National Pact, which is unwritten, and the debate surrounding the 1958 conflict. Several sources claimed there was debate, where the different parties ended up with a common alternative different from their diverging viewpoints from before the debate began, which suggests that there was some sort of argumentative process. Still, the lack of records of the discussions themselves made it difficult to render whether the process was in a tactical concessions phase or had reached prescriptive status. Had records of Parliamentarian debate been available to me, this would definitely have strengthened my argument. Previously done analyses of Lebanese political history and society did, however, provide an interesting and detailed account of pre-war Lebanese political identity and sovereignty and democracy in this period.

The informal interviews were helpful for gaining insight into the Lebanese government and perceived central political issues. Also, as the politicians interviewed represented three different political groups in government, this helped to reveal the difference between political goals and foci.\(^{45}\) That I had a chance to consult a primary source in the organised opposition gave me further insight to the different sides of the discussion.

I found it much easier to gain access to a wider variety of material in the post-war period due to resources such as newspapers and periodicals available online (such as

\(^{45}\text{I talked with a member of AMAL, a member from Hizbullah, a member from Prime Minister Hariri’s election list of Beirut, as well as a member of the opposition.}\)
the Daily Star, MEIB, LADE). They provided detailed accounts of the post-war debate over Syrian presence and influence, gave insight into how far the argumentative dynamic came by the end of 2002.

6.4 Empirical findings
Sovereignty and democracy were to a certain extent socialised in the pre-war period. There were some signs of prescriptive status and argumentative processes by the time of the last elections before the war. For example, there were efforts made to uphold and sustain the norms, and adherence to the norms despite changing political and/or material incentives. Throughout the socialisation processes there was evidence of previously present norms and ideas. Traits like elite led political life and co-community rule became part of Lebanese democracy. Lebanese sovereignty was influenced by previously held ideas of a Maronite homeland, which affected the power sharing quotas of the political system.

The first decades (1920-1943) of a sovereign Lebanon were dominated by polarized views on the new state and the validity of its sovereignty. Rejection of the validity of the new state and demands for reunification with Syria as well as nationalist Maronite sentiments for a homeland were part of this period. As for the initial introduction of democracy, it seems as if this happened in a less conflictual manner than sovereignty. This could be explained by the fact that the political system implemented by the French mandate was a mix of old and new, and did not challenge the Lebanese political elite’s positions. However, later reactions by parts of the political elite towards defeating election results suggested that there could have been denial and rejection of the validity of a democratic political system early in Lebanese independence. However, materials like documented parliamentary discussion, which could have shed more light on this, was not available to me.

The pre-war socialisation of sovereignty and democracy was affected by geopolitical events and regional ideational currents, such as the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent Arab-Israeli wars, and Arabism and Nasserism in the fifties and sixties. Also, socio-economic events like demographic change, urbanisation and
economic prosperity followed by rising unemployment had an effect on the socialisation processes. The rise of Nasserism and Arab nationalism, causing the establishment of the United Arab Republic, contributed to a severe internal Lebanese conflict. The conflict was also in part due to the Chamoun-government’s lack of legitimacy in parts of the population, which decreased further when the government engaged in norm violating behaviour during the 1957 elections. The lack of material showing the discourse and discussion over violations of democracy made it hard to distinguish between signs of tactical concessions and prescriptive status.

There were pro-UAR sentiments in Lebanon, especially in the Sunni population, but no Muslim political leader called for joining the union. This suggests that sovereign Lebanon was accepted as a valid idea by the political elite, though parts of the public thought alternatives to be more valid. A contributing factor to the diversity in attitudes towards the validity of sovereignty may have been the political focus on local, not national, issues due to patron-client relations in politics. There were differing views on what constituted Lebanon’s legitimate in-group belonging. However, after the UAR fell to pieces in 1961, Arab unions and union with Syria lost its appeal amongst previous supporters.

The 1958 crisis showed that though there was acceptance of Lebanese sovereignty, it was deeply contested what description this sovereignty should have. This reveals that an underlying aspect of this exploration is the socialisation of Arab identity as a norm in Lebanon, and the definition of the Lebanese Self.

The post-war situation provides evidence of previously socialised norms of sovereignty and democracy, though aimed mainly at being a descriptive chapter mapping the post-war context for sovereignty and democracy in Lebanon under strong Syrian influence. A sovereign and democratic Lebanon was made part of Lebanon’s constituting post-war documents though Syria was established as a central actor in Lebanese affairs. The government elected in erroneous elections in 1992 pursued to adhere to Lebanese democracy by continuing elections, rendering it the valid political system in Lebanon, while simultaneously imposing greater restrictions
on freedom of expression and association. Accusations of manipulation of electoral results and irregularities of the elections themselves continued to surround elections after 1992. This reflects Risse et al.’s tactical concession phase, and resembles to a greater extent the pariah state status prescribed by this theoretical approach.

The exploration of these two norms by using the basic outlines of the human rights approach of Risse et al. (1999) did uncover another aspect of how Lebanese political identity is put together. Community belonging, socio-economic identity, Arab identity and Lebanese identity were a part of the exploration, sometimes confusing the search for the socialisation processes of the two norms. These different aspects of the Lebanese identity made pre-war definitions of in-groups and out-groups no clear-cut task. The post-war descriptive exploration of sovereignty and democracy presented an increasingly organised opposition, and the establishment of an NGO monitoring democracy. Also mentioned was a beginning external pressure on Syria to act in accordance with Lebanon’s democratic principles and redeploys its military forces.

6.5 Future prospects

Today there are nineteen recognised religious communities in Lebanon, each with its own civil court. Some argue this plurality is what characterizes the country. Lebanon has been defined as a sectarian state, a society with ideological and political cleavages that run along ethnic lines (Maktabi 2000: 152). The sectarian basis of the political system is a big challenge for the organisation of political power and accommodation of the various group interests. At the same time the different groups have co-existed quite peacefully after the war, but the plural characteristic of Lebanon causes debate over what political system is best. All parties agree that war and violence is to be prevented by all means. Some argue that the only way to do this is to aim for erasing sectarian cleavages, while others promote plural co-existence as

46 Maktabi defines ethnic lines as cleavages that run along linguistic, religious or racial lines. However, this definition of ethnicity does not include any discussion on how a group’s own perception of belonging might change and affect views on ethnicity (Maktabi 2000: 152)
it is today with representational quotas. Some argue that sectarian lines must be erased by organising Lebanon in fewer and bigger electoral constituencies, possibly one single constituency. Others oppose this suggestion, saying that Lebanon is special, and that a majority democracy will trample the interests of certain groups and Lebanon’s plural nature.

Another issue which Lebanon struggles with is the failed economy. Unemployment is high, and the Lebanese are struggling to make their daily living costs. The state has not ensured basic facilities for all areas, for example causing the poorest parts of Beirut to depend on distribution of water and electricity from Hizbullah. Due to the high unemployment rate, the young and educated Lebanese are emigrating to Europe, USA and Canada. This is a trend all over the Middle East, but it seems as if Lebanon has been particularly affected by this current wave of emigration. Young Lebanese seek their future elsewhere, and resign their homeland to increasingly older Lebanese generations of parents and grandparents.

9/11 has brought renewed American attention to Lebanon, and Hizbullah was put under pressure from the anti-terrorist reach the US stretched over the world. At the same time, the US wanted to take advantage of Syria’s traditions in intelligence information. However, there has been a major change in US policy toward Syria during the last year, a change which could have an effect on Syrian presence in Lebanon. The US may now put the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act in effect. The two main issues the US sees as a threat are alleged Syrian pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and its support of militant groups such as Hizbullah. Additionally, Syria’s military presence in Lebanon is also a point in this Act, which renders it illegitimate in the light of the Ta’if Accord from 1989. In December 2003, President Bush approved a set of economic and diplomatic sanctions against Syria, but it was not decided when this would be implemented. According to

Amusingly the Acts’ official acronym is SALSA
the BBC news March 2004, the US vice Secretary of State of Near Eastern affairs warned that the act could be implemented shortly (BBC News Timeline Lebanon).

The US government had been vague about categorizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon prior to ongoing Iraqi war, adhering to trying “constructive engagement” to get Syria to resume negotiations with Israel (Abdelnour and Gambill 2003). According to MEIB, US officials have relatively recently (in 2003) begun calling Syrian presence in Lebanon an occupation (Abdelnour and Gambill 2003). The combination of the Lebanese oppositions’ demands of redeployment of Syrian troops and the US Syrian Accountability Act and threats of sanctions probably contributed to the fourth redeployment of Syrian troops in July 2003. However, US involvement in Lebanese and Syrian affairs is not welcomed, even by the opposition. Lebanese politicians and intellectuals have protested against the US accusations towards a “sisterly country”, and towards the US view of the Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation. Lebanese protests argue that Hizbullah was and is elected to Parliament by democratic means, and that the actions against Israel in the south are legitimate due to Israel being an occupying force.

The events of 2003 and 2004 suggest increased external pressure on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Simultaneously, pressure from within Lebanon criticizes the government’s norm violating behaviour could contribute to a change in Syrian involvement in Lebanese politics. Then again, this external pressure is further complicated by Lebanese and Syrian views on the US as belonging to an out-group rather than an in-group. However, the Syrian president has given hints that Syria could be willing to resume talks with Israel. Whether this is due to economic sanctions, a development in Syrian foreign policy caused by a changing Syrian state identity, or a combination, I leave for future studies to explore. These events do suggest that the Syrian control over Lebanon could be heading for change.
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