

# **The Use of Propaganda in the Rwandan Genocide**

A Study of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)

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Oslo, May 2004,

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

*“Consequently, all Rwandans, wherever you are, at roadblocks, on your positions, be vigilant and watch anybody who comes in. Because you know that Inyenzi have many tricks and you know that their aim is to exterminate the Rwandans, to kill them savagely and especially, to take over the country. So, be courageous and have a pleasant day”* (Valérie Bemeriki, RTLM June 22, 1994).<sup>1</sup>

In December 2003, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)<sup>2</sup> reached its verdict in the so-called Media Trial. Although words, not machetes, were their weapons, the defendants were found guilty of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, public incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity (ICTR 2003b:356-357).<sup>3</sup> Two of them, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, had strong bonds to *Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTML)<sup>4</sup> (ICTR 2003b:iv).

The media played a major role in manufacturing the conflict that took place in Rwanda in the 1990s (Puddephatt in Thompson 1999:xi). This thesis will analyze the use of propaganda through RTLM in the genocide in 1994, and the purpose is to develop a further understanding of its role. This is interesting not only from a media-theoretical point of view, but also in the field of political science. The genocide was organized by a small group of people bent on keeping power. In addition to the normal chain of command through the army, police, administration and militias, they used radio broadcasts to emit hate messages, encouraging Rwandans to kill fellow citizens (Newbury 1995:12). Hate radio became an integral component in the genocide. It was used to set the scene for the mass killing (Frohardt and Temin 2003b:2).

The problem at stake that will guide the writing of this thesis is: *How was the radio station RTLM used as a political tool for the Hutu extremists?*<sup>5</sup> I will try to answer this question by demonstrating how RTLM became a propaganda apparatus in

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<sup>1</sup> The RTLM transcripts used in this thesis contain spelling mistakes. Because I do not want to make changes in the analysis material, I have not corrected the mistakes in the RTLM excerpts presented. Unless it is not marked in the transcripts, I will always name the person behind a statement. For information about the external sources, see table 2 in Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> The UN Security Council created ICTR in November 1994, for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

<sup>3</sup> This is the first time the UN Genocide Convention (1948), has been used as a basis for a media trial (Paris AFP, 07/02/2002). The defendants are the first journalists to be accused of crimes against humanity since Julius Streicher, a Nazi editor, was sentenced to death by the judges at Nuremberg (1946) (Temple-Raston 2002:2).

<sup>4</sup> This means *One Thousand Hills Free Radio*.

<sup>5</sup> A *political tool* is an instrument to pursue the political goal of one group. In the case of the Hutu extremists, this means the instruments used to spread the ideology of Hutu Power (see chapter 4.2). According to Evans and Newnham (1998:451), propaganda is by definition an instrument of policy.

the hands of the Hutu extremists. I will show how the RTLM journalists applied different propaganda techniques to create and reinforce an enemy image of the Tutsi, and how they analyzed and interpreted the political situation in favor of their own agenda.

RTLM can be studied from different angles, for instance is freedom of speech one possible starting point. The approach of this study is based on a wish to use transcripts of RTLM broadcasts as the foundation for the analysis. *“Even 10 years on, the weakness of most accounts of RTLM’s role remains a lack of concrete analysis of either the content of the RTLM broadcasts or their impact on their audience. The latter is more excusable than the former”*, Richard Carver (2004:51) writes. Still, a mere analysis of propaganda messages is insufficient if we are to gain a deeper understanding of it. To achieve that, we must understand the environment in which the propaganda is formulated (Malesic 1997:9). Consequently, I will also explain how the context of the conflict influenced the RTLM propaganda. In my attempt to answer the problem at stake, I will particularly focus on the following four research questions:

1. *What kind of institutional framework did RTLM work in?*
2. *How did the context influence the propaganda message?*
3. *What kind of propaganda techniques did the RTLM make use of?*
4. *How did RTLM interpret major political events?*

Due to space limits, not all the questions will get the same amount of attention, but, hopefully, they will all contribute to give a satisfactory answer to the problem at stake.

In section 1.2 to 1.5, the thesis gives an historical explanation of the genocide, however, it does not try to give a complete explanation of the many *why’s* and *how’s* of the massacres in 1994. The aim is rather to give a brief introduction to the situation. Chapter two discusses the research design employed in the thesis and how this has affected the validity and reliability of the study. The next chapter presents the theoretical foundation for the analysis, while chapter four, five and six answer the four research questions. In chapter eight, some conclusions from the study will be drawn.

### **1.1 Radio – a Powerful Instrument**

Radio is the most effective medium in Africa, since poverty and illiteracy make television and newspapers inaccessible to most people (Chalk 1999a:93). Consequently, radio is the premier means of reaching the public with information.<sup>6</sup> Rwanda is one of a few African countries in a linguistically comfortable position regarding broadcasting, because journalists only need to speak Kinyarwanda to be understood by most of the inhabitants (Bourgault 1996:81). The other countries often have a lot of local languages to consider.

Radios and batteries to power them were too expensive for most peasants until the 1980s, when the Rwandan government obtained foreign aid to distribute radios, arguing that they were necessary to promote modern farming technology. The radios were then given away during election campaigns (Chalk 1999b:5-6). By the end of the 1980s, one out of 13 inhabitants had a radio. In 1994, the number was presumably higher (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:10)

RTLTM broadcasted 24 hours a day during the first days of the mass killing (Metzl 1997:632). On April 16, 1994, the *Rwandan Patriotic Front* (RPF) shells targeted the radio station, scoring a near hit. Within a few hours, the station was transferred to a mobile unit, possibly an armored personnel carrier, from which it broadcasted, now with less regular hours, until the RPF captured Kigali on July 4, 1994 (Ibid.:632).

### **1.2 The Genocide in Rwanda**

Rwanda, *the land of thousand hills*, is tucked away in Central Africa, and is one of the smallest countries in Africa, comparable in size to its former colonial power, Belgium (Sellström and Wohlgemuth 2001:10, see figure 2 in Appendix). It is home for 7.4 million inhabitants, and in 1994 the Hutu represented about 84% of the population, the Tutsi about 15% and the Twa about 1% (ICTR 2003b:29). As several other African countries, Rwanda is densely populated and the majority of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Most people also live below the national poverty line (The World Fact Book 2003). What makes Rwanda's situation

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<sup>6</sup> The written press in Rwanda had only limited circulation. The newspapers rarely printed more than 3,000 copies of an issue and they circulated mainly in Kigali, where their high price further limited their readership (Chalk 1999a:95).

different from the rest of the continent is the genocide in 1994.<sup>7</sup> Approximately 800,000 people were killed, and the systematic slaughter of men, women and children which took place over the course of about 100 days will be remembered as one of the most abhorrent events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Carlsson et al. 1999:3) The large-scale massacres in Rwanda began on April 6, 1994 when unidentified assailants shot down the plane with Juvenal Habyarimana, the Hutu President in the one-party state of Rwanda (Caplan (ed.) 2000:106, Mamdani 2001:5). Within hours, a well-planned policy of genocide was implemented which sought to eliminate all Tutsi, as well as the leaders of the newly formed internal opposition parties, the majority of whom came from the dominant Hutu community (Reed 1998:134).<sup>8</sup>

The international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun. This failure has left deep wounds in the relationship between Rwanda and the international community, in particular the United Nations (UN) (Carlsson et al. 1999:3). There was a persistent lack of political will by the UN Members to act, or to act with enough assertiveness. This lack of will was especially evident in the recurrent difficulties to get the necessary troops for the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (Ibid.:3).

### **1.3 Why?**

One can only understand the genocide through an understanding of Rwanda's history. And this history reveals a complex struggle between competing elites, local actors, and outsiders over issues of power and identity (Newbury and Newbury 2000:832).

The German and Belgian colonizers imposed a system of rule through the Tutsi, while they disqualified the Hutu from administrative positions and discriminated them in the educational system (Prunier 1995:23-28). The colonial period ended with the *Social Revolution* of 1959-62 which inverted the power hierarchy and replaced the Tutsi monarchy with a Hutu republic (Caplan (ed.) 2000:16). Now, the Tutsi were systematically excluded from politics, education, jobs and resources. A lot of Tutsi immigrated to Uganda, and for a number of the young

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<sup>7</sup> "Genocide means any acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" (UN Genocide Convention 1948). The killings of Tutsi in Rwanda (1994) constituted genocide (Carlsson et al. 1999:5).

<sup>8</sup> Whether the Hutu extremists deliberately shot down the plane in order to trigger the genocide, or just exploited the opportunity to call for action once it happened, is unknown (Caplan (ed.) 2000:106, see chapter 6.7).



exiles Uganda, and its stormy political climate, provided weapons and military training. They created the RPF, and on October 1, 1990 the guerilla force launched an attack on Rwanda which started the civil war in the country (Ibid.:35-36, Prunier 1995:93). The following peace negotiation between the Rwandan government and the RPF was intertwined with a democratization process, and in the end President Habyarimana reluctantly accepted political pluralism. The simultaneous threats of multi-party politics and the RPF meant that the *Akazu*<sup>9</sup> faced a major loss of power. Consequently, the peace agreement was met with outrage and hostility (Jones 2001:93), and as discussed in section 4.2, the Hutu Power ideology became a mean to justify the Hutu extremists' killings of Tutsi in order to remain in power.

#### **1.4 How?**

While the actual organizers of the genocide were the small group of people belonging to the *Akazu*, the *Presidential Guards* were the first to begin the killings. They immediately called for help from the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* militias,<sup>10</sup> which had been waiting for such a moment for a long time (Prunier 1995:242-243). The militias recruited members from low-class people, and their numbers were estimated at about 50,000. Other actors in the genocide were the Hutu refugees who had fled Burundi after the murder of President Ndadaye (1993). They were recruited into the militias soon after their arrival, and they were known as some of the most brutal killers (African Rights 1995:63). Yet, the main agents of the genocide were the ordinary people themselves. This is a terrible statement to make, but it is apparent after examining the majority of the survivors' stories (Prunier 1995:247).

The genocidal orders were passed down through the administrative and military hierarchies (African Rights 1995:xx). The killings were no spontaneous outburst, but followed instructions from the highest level. "...*there were killers in every locality – from ministers to peasants...*", a Rwandan police officer explained (Mamdani 2001:6).

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<sup>9</sup> *Akazu* means "the little house", and was the name of the inner core of the Habyarimana regime, with a strongly critical connotation of power abuses and illicit enrichment. They had an oligarchic control over the state (Prunier 1995:401).

<sup>10</sup> *Interahamwe*, "those who work together", was the name of the MRND militia established in 1992. *Impuzamugambi* means "those with a single purpose" and was the CDR youth wing and militia (Adelman and Suhrke 1999:370).

Those with state power used their authority to force action from those reluctant to kill (Des Forges 1995:44).<sup>11</sup> They also offered attractive incentives to poor people, promising them the land of the victims. In some cases, local officials even decided ahead of time the disposition of the most attractive items of moveable property. Still, even with the powerful levers of threat and bribe, the officials could not have succeeded so well had people not been prepared to hate and fear the Tutsi (Ibid.:44). The anger among many Hutu toward the behavior of the Tutsi authorities under colonial rule is an important factor. In the wake of the attacks of 1990, Habyarimana accused the RPF of seeking to overthrow the government and reestablish the Tutsi monarchy, thus the RPF invasion resuscitated fears from the past (Newbury 1998:6).

Genocide does not start with the murder of masses of people, it starts in peoples' mind. Before the weapons comes the image, before you can eliminate your enemy, you must define it (Mamdani 2001:9, Keen 1986:10). The Rwandan media played an important role in pursuing this task, and the most critical medium for popularizing the genocidal message was the radio (Carruthers 2000:44, Fujii 2002:6). Through the radio, the extremists created a cognitive and normative framework for mobilizing people to join in the killings (Fujii 2002:8). This is not to argue that Rwandans were easily swayed to kill because they believed everything they heard on the radio. Rather, it is to suggest that the effective use of media and other methods of message dissemination meant that no one could escape the image of Tutsi as the ultimate threat to Hutu survival (Ibid.:8). That is why this study especially focuses on the relation between the RTLM propaganda and the creation of a Tutsi enemy image (see section 3.9.3).

### **1.5 Hutu and Tutsi - Ethnic, Racial and Political Identities**

The genocide in Rwanda left in its wake a fractured and polarized society, in which different, contested histories complicated an already complex political landscape. In this context, it is important to problematize the role and meaning of ethnic identities

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<sup>11</sup> Coercion was an important mechanism for diffusing a genocidal norm because it helped to overturn existing norms that proscribed the murder or assault of unarmed members of one's community. The logic of consequence (enforcement) made possible a logic of appropriateness, Fujii (2002:3) argues. Yet, although compliance was overwhelming, there was also disobedience during the genocide. There were those who refused to kill fellow Rwandans, and those who protected them at great risk to themselves (Hintjens 2001:40).

(Newbury and Newbury 1995:3). This is crucial for understanding why the RTLM journalists used so much energy to verbally attack the Tutsi.

Who are the Hutu and who are the Tutsi? Are they the same people, as many a militant in the RPF insists on? Or are they distinct ethnic, even racial, groups, as the Hutu extremists claim? (Mamdani 2001:41). Each view is anchored in one of the two broad perspectives that have guided scholarship on Rwanda. The *no difference*-position holds that in the pre-colonial past, the Tutsi lived in harmony with the Hutu (Newbury 1998:3). It highlights that Hutu and Tutsi share the same language, have the same religion, inhabit the same geographical space and belong to the same clans. “*Strong cross-cutting allegiances served to prevent the crystallization of anything akin to “ethnic” identities in Rwanda during the pre-colonial era*”, Helen Hintjens (2001:28) writes. This point of view stresses that European colonialism created divisions between the groups, and also put an end to social mobility between the groups. There were a number of administrative reforms introduced by the Belgians in the 1930s, which started to twist the knife of a new form of identity politics into the Rwandan society (Ibid.:30). Such a pro-RPF discourse boosts an idealized representation of the Rwandan history. It glosses over significant social complexities and masks the pre-colonial origins of ethnicity, Pottier (2002:111) stresses.

The second perspective emphasizes that the difference between the Hutu and the Tutsi began with separate migrations of these two racial groups into the Great Lakes region (Mamdani 2001:57). In the distant past, the Hutu were conquered by the Tutsi, who imposed an oppressive and exploitative rule on them (Newbury 1998:3). This view is based on the *Hamitic hypothesis* introduced by colonial scholars (see section 4.2).

The two positions are complementary rather than alternative accounts, each stressing different aspects of history. But they fail to address the issue at hand. It is the political conflict and political violence that pit the Hutu against the Tutsi that has focused attention on the question: Who is a Tutsi and who is a Hutu? (Mamdani 2001:57-58). Hutu and Tutsi are best understood as *political identities* reproduced primarily through the state, Mamdani (2001:59) stresses. There has not been one single and constant definition of Hutu and Tutsi through the history. Rather, the

definition has shifted as a consequence of changes in the institutional framework of the Rwandan state (Ibid.:59, Newbury 1995:12). This is in accordance with Braathen et al. (2000:4) who state that ethnicity is a function of the conditions under which it becomes salient. Similar, political identities are the consequence of how power is organized. Legal enforcement makes them the basis of participation in institutional and political life (Mamdani 2001:22).

The categories Hutu, Tutsi and Twa existed in pre-colonial times, but the terms roughly corresponded to occupational differences, in that Tutsi tended to be primarily pastoralists, Hutu agriculturists, and Twa hunters, gatherers or potters (Newbury and Newbury 1995:5).<sup>12</sup> It was during the reign of king Rwabugiri (1865-1895) that the terms got an ethnic meaning. He instituted large administrative changes which undermined local forms of authority and shifted the loci of power. This process of centralization and reform sharpened the lines between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Instead of only indicating social differences, the terms came to represent a person's proximity to the central court, in other words, their "*proximity to power*" (Fujii 2001:6). Rwabugiri's administration not only consolidated ethnical distinctions, but also engendered a process of ethnic self-consciousness among the groups of Tutsi. This was further nurtured by the Belgian colonizers, who built their administration on the Tutsi elite, and made all Tutsi superior, all Hutu inferior (Prunier 1995:9-10, Pottier 2002:112).

Belgian power did not arbitrarily cook up the Hutu/Tutsi distinction, but it took an existing sociopolitical and ethnic distinction and, for the first time in history, *racialized* it (Mamdani 2001:99). The hierarchy became fixed in the 1930s when Belgium introduced ID cards which identified the inhabitants' ethnical status, created schools for training Tutsi administrators and set up native tribunals headed by Tutsi (Pottier 2002:112). However, with the 1959 Revolution, the Hutu elite embraced the Hamitic myth as the basis for an ideology that no longer viewed Tutsi exotic origins as a sign of superiority but as a sign of threat (Fujii 2002:5). Whereas the Tutsi had

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<sup>12</sup> These distinctions varied considerably. Many Tutsi engaged in agriculture, and many Hutu kept cattle (Newbury and Newbury 1995:5). Social mobility existed, but never affected more than a small percentage of Rwanda's population. However, intermarriage between the groups was common (Pottier 2002:117, Longman 1997:5).

been treated preferentially by the colonial state as a nonindigenous civilizing influence, the First Republic considered this claim reason enough to treat them as politically illegitimate. Thus, the Tutsi continued to be officially defined as a race, and never as an ethnic group. The implication was crucial. While *ethnicity* marks an internal difference among those constructed as indigenous to land, *race* marks an external differences, a difference with those legally constructed as nonindigenous (Mamdani 2001:27). A racial difference could only be with foreigners, whereas an ethnic difference was with locals. And the Tutsi had no right to power in a country where they were aliens (Ibid.:126, 134-135, Prunier 1995:80).

While the First Republic considered the Tutsi a race, the Second Republic, established by Habyarimana's *coup d'état* in 1973, reconstructed the Tutsi as an ethnicity and, therefore, as a group indigenous to Rwanda (Mamdani 2001:138). Once reconstructed as an ethnicity, the Tutsi became Rwandans and their numbers became significant, just as the minority/majority distinction also became of great relevance. As a race under the First Republic, the Tutsi had been confined to the civic sphere and barred from the political sphere. As an ethnicity they were allowed participation in the political field, but limited to a scope said to benefit their minority status (Ibid.:138). Hutu and Tutsi remained alive as different political identities (Mamdani 2001:141-142, ICTR 2003b:98),<sup>13</sup> and Tutsi gains under the Second Republic were more in the civic sphere than in the local authority. For instance, intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi became more common (Mamdani 2001:138).

In the 1990s, the Hutu extremists wanted to reracialize the Tutsi as they had been in the colonial period and in the First Republic (Mamdani 2001:190, see section 4.2). Their final aim was to maintain their own power and privileges, and they used political identities as an instrument to achieve their goals (Ibid.:190, Amoo and Odendaal 2002:7).

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<sup>13</sup> If inclusion or exclusion from rights and entitlements is based on either race or ethnicity, as defined by law, this becomes a central defining fact for the individual and his/her group. From this perspective, both race and ethnicity need to be understood as *political identities* (Mamdani 2001:22).

## 2. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will draw upon theoretical and empirical literature as well as interviews with key informants (see table 5 in Appendix), to resolve the research questions presented in chapter 1. However, the questions concerning propaganda techniques and the interpretation of political events will be answered by analyzing transcripts of RTL M broadcasts. This textual analysis will be the most time consuming part of the study, and also the part that imply greatest methodological challenges. Consequently, this chapter mainly focuses on this part of the thesis.

### 2.1 Textual Analysis

Analyses of media texts are termed *content analysis* (Østbye et al. 2002:63).<sup>14</sup> Whether such analyses should be quantitative or qualitative is often debated in the literature. The quantitative requirement has often been cited as essential. “*There is clearly no reason for content analysis unless the question one wants answered is quantitative*”, Lasswell et al. (1952:45) state. Others stress that a qualitative design constitutes an important and more significant form of analysis. The temptation to count things for the sake of counting is almost certain to yield findings which are either meaningless or trivial, Ole R. Holsti (1969:preface) states. He regards the problem of quantity and quality as a quasi-problem. The relevant question to ask is not: “*Am I being quantitative?*” but rather: “*What is the theoretical relevance of the measures I am using?*” (Ibid.:9).

Qualitative and quantitative methods should supplement each other. It is by using both these approaches that the investigator is most likely to gain insight into the meaning of the data (Ibid.:11, Weber 1990:10). This study will be a qualitative analysis with some quantitative elements. Qualitative content analysis is termed *textual analysis* by Østbye et al. (2002:62) and the same term will be used in this study.

There are different forms of content analyses, and a variety of theoretical frameworks should be used to enrich a study in its search for answers to the research questions (Østbye et al. 2002:61, Hansen et al. 1998:91). Historically, many content

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<sup>14</sup> Text is used as a generic term for media statements. In the field of political sciences, the concept is also used for other kinds of texts, most often various political documents (Larsen and Hausken 1999:19, Ryghaug 2002:304).

analyses focused on propaganda. In fact, an important factor to the development of content analysis was a large-scale propaganda research effort during World War II (Holsti 1969:59, Krippendorff 1980:16). This thesis draws on the tradition of content analysis as it is presented by Holsti (1969) in the book *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. The thesis will also take into consideration one aspect emphasized in the tradition of discourse analysis,<sup>15</sup> which acknowledges that the meaning of a single word or phrase not only can be determined by the “direct meaning” of the words used. The social significance of language lies in the relationship between linguistic meanings and the wider context, such as the cultural, economic and demographic aspects of the situation in which the communication takes place (Jaworski and Coupland 1999:12-13). Using only a “plain” textual analysis, the social aspect of text could be forgotten. As discussed in section 3.7, this study considers the social environment of RTLM by analyzing the context in which the broadcasts took place.

In the 1970s and 1980s, semiotics was the most fashionable mode of textual analysis.<sup>16</sup> In the study of media texts, semiotics focuses on the underlying structure of the text (Deacon et al. 1999:136). By concentrating on the propaganda techniques used in the RTLM broadcasts, I do the same. The propaganda techniques analyzed in this thesis were prominent aspects of the RTLM message, and since these techniques were used regularly they also structured the broadcast.

Textual analysis is always performed on *the message* of a communication process (this process will be discussed in section 3.3), but the results of the analysis can be used to make inferences about other elements of the process (Holsti 1969:24), such as the sender of the message or the channel of transmission. This thesis will use textual analysis to make inferences only about the RTLM message. Previous academic work will be used to discuss the other parts of the RTLM propaganda.

Knowledge that one is being studied may, in some cases, alter the behavior of those under analysis. One of the most important benefits of textual analysis is that it

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<sup>15</sup> Discourse studies are an interdisciplinary field, and are basically the study of the language in use (Jaworski and Coupland (1999:6). Andy Story has done a discourse analysis of the Rwandan genocide in *Story-lines and Scapegoats: Discourse and the Genocidal Imagination in Rwanda* (2000).

<sup>16</sup> Semiotics is the study of signs, developed by the American philosopher Pierce and the Swiss linguist Saussure, among others (Østbye et al.:65).

is does not change the behavior of those studied (Berg 2001:258). If the RTLTM journalists knew that they were objects of propaganda analysis, they may have chosen another style for their radio broadcasts or developed more elusive propaganda techniques (this is of course a hypothetical assumption). Additional advantages of textual analysis are that it is cost effective and it provides a tool to study processes that occur over long periods of time (Ibid.:258).

## **2.2 The Radio Medium**

Chapter 6 contains a textual analysis of transcripts of the RTLTM broadcasts. When undergoing such analysis, it is important to take the distinctive features of the radio medium into consideration, since the language is always subject to medium specific conditions (Østbye et al. 2002:72, Vagle 1990:18).

A key difference between words that appear in written texts and words on the radio is that the latter are always spoken. Consequently, they constitute a binary code in which the words themselves are symbols of what they represent, while the voice in which they are heard is an index of the person who is speaking (Crisell 1986:46). Since the words on the radio cannot be seen by the receiver, the linguistic codes of radio are closer to speech than writing. Much radio talk is, however, first written down, and to that extent it has a literary nature. This means that radio talk often is premeditated rather than spontaneous. As a result, words spoken on the radio do not constitute conventional orality, but can be termed “*secondary orality*” (Ibid.:58). They are a hybrid between spoken and written language (Vagle 1990:27).

While a newspaper can be read in the reader’s own pace and multiple times, a radio broadcast can be heard only once. Additionally, since radio listening often is a secondary activity, radio broadcasts must have a different communicative style than newspapers. Radio talk must be simple or concrete enough to be comprehended through the ear alone. As a result, radio broadcasts often have a high level of redundancy – that is material which is predictable or conventional (Crisell 1986:62).

Radio messages consist of speech. Speech consists not just of words, but the words are also given expression through a voice. The accent, tone and intensity of a voice are factors with semiotic functions which influence how a radio message is understood (Ibid.:6, 46). As this thesis is based upon written transcripts of radio



broadcasts, it will not be able to take such factors into consideration. For the same reason, the RTLM journalists' use of pauses must be excluded from the analysis. Though radio is a sound medium, the absence of sound can be a potent stimulus to the listener, providing a gap in the noise for his/her imagination to work (Ibid.:56).<sup>17</sup> These factors influenced the manner in which the audience understood the message of RTLM. Although none of these factors are discussed in this thesis, the transcripts alone provide a significant amount of material to answer the research questions concerning the propaganda techniques used by RTLM and the radio station's interpretation of major political events. The aim of this thesis is not to analyze how the audience understood the message, as that would have required *listening* to RTLM broadcasts.<sup>18</sup>

### **2.3 Categories and Units**

The text characteristics that are singled out for analysis should relate directly to the overall research questions or hypotheses of the study (Hansen et al. 1998:106). The text characteristics analyzed in this thesis are the propaganda techniques used in the RTLM broadcasts and the sections of the broadcasts that discuss the Arusha Agreements or the 1959 Revolution. These characteristics correspond with research question number three and four presented in chapter 1.

When conducting a qualitative content analysis, there is a real danger that a subjective approach will be adopted (Malesic 1997:8). Researchers may support their own theoretical model of propaganda by selecting only those portions of media messages which correspond to their expectations. On the other hand, if no such theoretical framework is created from the outset, it is quite probable that the research will result in a data-driven model that is limited by the samples taken from a particular media environment (the subject of the study) (Ibid.:8). This study builds upon a solid theoretical foundation, mainly Jowett and O'Donnell's ten-step method of propaganda analysis, which is discussed in chapter 3. The study has also included the part of the RTLM broadcasts that at first did not correspond to the expectations,

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<sup>17</sup> Music on the radio is also an important factor, and it seems to perform two main functions; It is an object of aesthetic pleasure in its own right, and either by itself or in combination with words or sound it performs an ancillary function in signifying something outside itself (Crisell 1986:51). The music played in the RTLM broadcasts is further discussed in chapter 3.9.

<sup>18</sup> The soundtracks of the RTLM broadcasts were not available to me.

mainly by adjusting the categories to the result of the pre-test of the categories used in the analysis. In addition, also a quantitative analysis could have been charged with the same kind of critique that Malesic highlights. The literature about content analysis, either qualitative or quantitative, gives little more than a set of guidelines about how to analyze content in a systematic and reliable fashion. It does not describe what categories of content to analyze or how to interpret the findings (Hansen et al. 1998:124).

A central problem in any research design is the selection and definition of categories into which the content is to be classified. Such categories vary according to the nature of the research and the particularities of the data (Berg 2001:248). The researcher must be familiar with the content, structure and general nature of the material to be able to create categories that are sufficiently sensitive to capture the nuances of the texts (Hansen et al. 1998:107). The pre-test was very important in defining relevant categories of the RTLTM transcripts.

The categories used in this thesis are the various propaganda techniques presented in chapter 3. They are based on different scholars' contributions regarding propaganda techniques and on the pre-test of the RTLTM transcripts. These two selection strategies resulted in both deductively and inductively determined categories. A deductive approach uses categorical schemes suggested by theoretical perspectives. An inductive approach begins with the researchers "immersing" themselves in the text in order to identify the dimensions or themes that seem meaningful (Berg 2001:245). By using both approaches, this thesis includes categories that are both theoretically relevant and sensitive to the nuances of the RTLTM broadcasts.

Textual analysis always involves one or another form of reduction of the content in the texts (Ryghaug 2002:321). To analyze the propaganda techniques individually as will be done in this thesis, may give the impression of a more consistent style in the RTLTM broadcasts than what is actually true. The techniques were seldom found in a pure form, and they often intertwined.

Holsti (1969:95) presents some general principles of category construction: Categories should reflect the purpose of the research, be exhaustive, be mutually

exclusive and be derived from a single classification principle. These principles are made with an eye to quantitative content analysis, and consequently they are of limited importance for the textual analysis which appears in this thesis. For instance, RTLTM used both the propaganda technique *name-calling* and the technique *call for action* in the same section of a broadcast. The requirement of exclusiveness would have made it difficult to take both of these techniques into consideration simultaneously, and could therefore have reduced the validity of the study.

The requirement of reflection of the research purpose is also important in qualitative studies. The analyst must define clearly the variables he/she is dealing with (the conceptual definition), and he/she must specify the indicators which determine whether a given content datum falls within a given category (the operational definition). A good operational definition satisfies two requirements: It is a valid representation of the analyst's concepts and it is sufficiently precise to produce reliable judgments. The conceptual definitions in this thesis are concrete, as they refer directly to the use of language in propaganda, and the operational definitions are in accordance with them.<sup>19</sup> In addition, most of the propaganda techniques highlighted in this study are earlier employed in propaganda analysis by other scholars. As a result, the operationalizations of the techniques are valid representations of the conceptual definitions.

In addition to defining the categories, the analyst must designate the units to be coded. These units are the specific segments of content that are placed in a given category (Holsti 1969:116). Almost all textual analyses use words, themes, characters, sentences/paragraphs or items as units, and in many instances the research requires the analyst to combine several of them (Ibid.:116, Berg 2001:247). This study uses words, themes and items as units.<sup>20</sup> For instance, the category *name-calling* focuses on *words*. Most often *theme* is the unit to be used. For many purposes, the theme, a single assertion about a particular subject, is the most useful unit (Holsti 1969:116).<sup>21</sup> A major drawback is that the boundaries of themes are not as easily identified as those of words, paragraphs or items (Ibid.:116).

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<sup>19</sup> The operational definitions are presented in the discussion of each propaganda technique in chapter 3.

<sup>20</sup> The item is the recording unit when for example an entire radio broadcast is characterized (Holsti 1969:117).

<sup>21</sup> The words theme, sections and/or segment will be used when discussing the recording unit *theme* in chapter 6.

## 2.4 Sampling

The RTLTM transcripts were purchased from the International Monitor Institute (IMI), a non-profit, non-governmental organization that collects, analyzes, and archives audio-visual evidence of human rights violations. In 1996, the IMI was asked to develop a database for the ICTR similar to the database it had developed for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The RTLTM tapes in the IMI database were used as evidence in the Media Trial at the ICTR (see chapter 1).

Krippendorff (1980:157) discusses the concept of *sampling validity*, which assesses the degree to which the selection of data can be regarded as representative of a given universe, or in some specific respect, similar to another sample from the same universe obtained by the same method. An adequate sampling design is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for validity (Holsti 1969:128).

Several hundred RTLTM broadcasts were used as evidence in the Media Trial. The trial largely focused, though not exclusively, on those broadcasts which represented, in the view of the parties, the most incriminating and the most exculpatory evidence. The tribunal reviewed particularly the broadcasts that raised the issue of ethnicity and the broadcasts that called upon the population to take action (ICTR 2003b:118). The selection of tapes were guided by expert witnesses, and the tapes singled out were fairly representative (Rapp 16.02.2003). The RTLTM tapes were created by listeners of the broadcasts, there was no RTLTM archive. The ICTR received the tapes from 16 different sources, often with little information about who did the recording. The IMI database consists of all transcripts made use of in the court (Ibid.).

The ICTR translated the RTLTM broadcasts, originally transmitted in Kinyarwanda or French, into English or French. In other words, some French broadcasts were translated into English, and some Kinyarwanda transcripts were translated into French. To use translated material in a textual analysis might reduce the validity of a study, as nuances in the text might get lost during translation. Additionally, the analyst is not able to discover possible misunderstandings on the part of the translators. However, to use translated transcripts was the only option I had to analyze the RTLTM broadcasts.

As I do not speak French, only English RTLM transcripts are examined. Any systematic differences between the English and the French transcripts might reduce the representativeness of this study. The IMI claims that the decision as to which transcripts were translated into which language was made randomly (Lievens 2003). Still, the two groups of tapes differ with regard to the broadcasts' transmission date. This factor might influence the forthcoming analysis, as the RTLM broadcasts will be analyzed to determine whether they developed a different character after President Habyarimana's death on April 6, 1994. The tone and content of RTLM broadcasts changed dramatically after this day, Carver (2000:190) claims, and a major methodological weakness of many RTLM studies is that they do not take this into consideration (Ibid.:190).<sup>22</sup> The French transcripts cover a longer period than the English transcripts do. They run from October 25, 1993 to July 3, 1994, while the English transcripts run from November 20, 1993 to July 3, 1994. At the same time, the French transcripts cover 40 different dates, while the English transcripts cover 25 dates. Conversely, there are more English than French transcripts, nine and six, respectively, from the period prior to the President's death.

Each RTLM broadcast in the IMI database is marked with the date of transmission. There is no clear-cut division between different radio programs and there are no program titles. The IMI have created a scheme in which they identify the types of broadcast the tapes contain, such as monologue, dialogue, group discussion, interview, political speech or news bulletin.<sup>23</sup> These different types intertwine, and this study will only refer to the date in which the tapes were recorded (for a complete list of the broadcasts, see table 1 in Appendix). In some instances, the broadcasts include journalists reading letters or political communiqués from different political parties. These parts of the tapes will also be included in the analysis.

## **2.5 Reliability**

Reliability means that repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results (Holsti 1969:135). Reliability is a function of the

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<sup>22</sup> This is also the case for the report *Rwanda Les Médias du Génocide*, mentioned in chapter 2.7 (Carver 2000:190).

<sup>23</sup> The IMI also created an analysis scheme regarding the content of the broadcasts (see figure 1 in Appendix). This thesis will not make use of this scheme, as it focuses on the propaganda techniques used by the RTLM journalists.

coder's skill, insight, and experience, but also the clarity of categories, coding rules and the degree of ambiguity in the data. Because the nature of the data is usually beyond the investigator's control, opportunities for enhancing reliability are generally limited to improving the coding or the categories (Ibid.:135). *Individual reliability* reflects the extent of agreement between different coders (Ibid.:136). A textual analysis cannot be replicable by *any* person under *whatever* circumstances, still, it should be *possible* for one scientist to replicate the findings of the efforts of another scientist (Andrén 1981:48). As the theoretical tradition of hermeneutics stresses, every researcher is colored by his/her pre-understanding of the phenomenon analyzed (Ryghaug 2002:309). Such subjectivity might influence the results of the analysis and could therefore influence the reliability of the study. I am the only coder in this study, yet, during the coding I have had in mind that others should be able to get the same results as I do.

*Category reliability* depends upon the analyst's ability to formulate categories for which the evidence is so clear that competent judges will agree to a sufficiently high degree on which items of a certain population belong in the category (Holsti 1969:136). Pre-testing of the categories on the material enables the investigator to determine which categories require further clarification. Such a test was conducted on all of the RTLTM transcripts, and several adjustments were made. New categories were added, and the operational definitions of some categories were changed.

Defining an acceptable level of reliability is one of the problems in textual analysis for which there is no single solution. As categories and units become more complex, they may yield results that are both more useful and less reliable. Reliability is a necessary condition for valid inquiry, but the cost of some steps taken to increase reliability might result in a reduction in validity (Ibid.:142). This thesis attempts to strike a balance between reliability and the relevance of categories and units. It seeks to make the operational definitions as concrete as possible, in an effort to increase the reliability of the study. Additionally, as many categories as are necessary to identify the main trends in the broadcasts were developed to make valid inferences.

## **2.6 Validity**

Valid inferences are defined as the extent to which an instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure (Holsti 1969:142, Hellevik 2002:183). *Content validity*, also called *face validity*, is usually established through the informed judgment of the investigator. He/she has to judge if the results are plausible and if they are consistent with other information about the phenomena being studied. *Construct validity* is not concerned with validating the measure, but with the theory underlying the measure (Holsti 1969:148). While content validity focuses on the correspondence between the reality and the results, construct validity focuses on the relationship between the results and the theory supposed to shed light upon the questions behind the analysis (Andr n 1981:53).

Several scholars have stressed the use of propaganda in the Rwandan genocide, but I am unaware of any other studies that have identified the specific propaganda techniques used by RTLM. Rather, other studies often use various propaganda themes such as *Hutu solidarity* or *Restoring the Old Regime* as their starting points, or they focus on which persons the RTLM journalists verbally attacked (African Rights 1995:69-85, Des Forges 1999:65-86). The categories of the different types of propaganda techniques, and the operational definitions of these, are based on a broad range of contributions from different propaganda scholars. The results of the analysis of the propaganda techniques used by RTLM (see chapter 6), are not contradictory to the work of these scholars (see sections 3.10-3.22). Additionally, the results of the analysis are not contradictory to any of the empirical studies of the genocidal propaganda used in Rwanda. Yet, there is one important factor that might evoke some problems regarding the construct validity of this study. Most of the theories about propaganda are developed in the Western part of the world. Could this theory be applied in an African context without any adjustments?

### **2.6.1 The Theoretical Context**

Propaganda in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century has by no means been completely analyzed and illuminated. There are still large gaps in its research (Wilke 1999:3). One gap is lack of research on the use of propaganda in Africa. Additionally, general studies on radio

and other types of mass communication is an underdeveloped field of African scholarship (Ochola 1983:14, Fardon and Furniss 2000:8).

The differences in economy, history, politics and living conditions between the West and Africa are great, and the history of the development of mass media in these two areas of the world is substantially different (Faringer 1991:ix). All too often, we attempt to force nations in the developing world into models of Western progress and experience (Wilcox 1975:101). The demand for an *African approach* to communication issues is part of the general campaign for the adoption of indigenous modes, methods and ideas (Akigbo 1995:24).<sup>24</sup> There are various demands for African approaches to communication research, theory construction, philosophy of communication and journalism practice. African approaches imply doing something in an African way, a prescription that is easier to make than to fill. It could be hard to determine how far theoretical concepts should be Africanized. “*In many cases we are dealing with universal values of truth, fairness, objectivity, etc. which are not necessarily European or unAfrican*” (Ibid.:24). African and Western concepts are not mutually exclusive (Ibid.:25).

“*Propaganda as a phenomenon is essentially the same in China or the Soviet Union or the United States or Algeria. Techniques tend to align themselves with one another*”, Ellul (1973:xiv) states. Thus, the western theoretical contribution about propaganda could be used in a study about RTLM (Bourgault 19.11.2003). The media in Africa might have even more power than they have in the West, because here, the media are “*less common, less everyday*” (Ibid.). In addition, the African audience is generally less educated and therefore less suited to discover biased information (Ibid.). All the key informants interviewed in this study stressed that the theoretical perspectives presented in chapter 3 are appropriate for a study about RTLM.

### **2.6.2 Lack of Cultural Knowledge**

As stated in section 2.6, validity is defined as the extent to which a researcher is able to measure what he/she intends to measure. In this respect, it is a methodological challenge that I am an outsider to the Rwandan culture. Cultural competence is a

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<sup>24</sup> This is partly a carryover from the political movement of anti-colonialism, easily expressible in the slogan of “boycotting all boycottables”. It is also a result of serious intellectual soul-searching on the relevance of many foreign ideas and practices (Akigbo 1995:24).



necessary requirement for doing a good discourse analysis, Iver Neumann (2001:50) stresses, and the same request can be made regarding this textual analysis. Yet, textual analysis is not a culturally specific method, but the cultural context of the text should be taken into consideration (Karangwa 06.01.2004).

The main “qualities” of propaganda are its mutability and adaptability to different cultural, social and textual environments (Luostarinen 2002:16). However, I might fail to notice contextual factors which influenced the RTLM message because I do not know the Rwandan society well enough. Additionally, I might neglect nuances, irony or connotations<sup>25</sup> in the broadcasts, since I do not share the same intuitive sense of neither the Kinyarwanda nor the English language as a native speaker. To mitigate such challenges, I have read academic literature and personal stories about general Rwandan history and the genocide itself. The informants have also called my attention to important aspects of the Rwandan culture, and they have explained to me the meaning of specific segments of the broadcasts. Additionally, the translators have clarified the proverbs used in the broadcasts. The limited nature of this study also makes the lack of cultural knowledge a lesser problem than it would have been if the aim was to make inferences about how the audience understood the RTLM broadcasts.<sup>26</sup> Finally, the advantage of seeing something in a different light because one is an outsider should not be underestimated (Kagabo 11.11.2003).

Related to the issue of cultural knowledge is the question of subjectivity. A media text is not itself amenable to an absolutely definitive interpretation, and it is an illusion to believe that a reader can understand a text in the same way as the author or the intended audience does (Deacon et al. 1999:140). Every human being has a *horizon*, a certain knowledge and preunderstanding that colors the interpretation of a text. To understand a text is to partake in a fusion of horizons, where every new text extends the interpreter’s horizon (Lindkvist 1981:32). Additionally, the understanding of a text changes as the process of interpretation uncovers new aspects of the text’s meaning (Mortensen and Ytreberg 1991:246).

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<sup>25</sup> Connotation constitutes the latent content of what a text may be said to signify, and works at a subjective level of perception and experience, for instance through the emotional charge or political import which a text is taken to carry (Deacon et al. 1999:138).

<sup>26</sup> The textual analysis in chapter 6 only focuses on the propaganda techniques employed by the RTLM journalists.

## 2.7 A Literature Problem

Most academic writing about Rwanda is in English or in French, but I am only able to read the English literature or the French literature that has been translated into English.<sup>27</sup> José Kagabo (11.11.2003), a Rwandan professor of History, claims that the main difference between the French and the English literature is that French literature often is colored by France's close bond to Rwanda. There are also certain differences in the discourse style of the French and English authors (Ibid.).<sup>28</sup>

I am not able to read *Rwanda Les Médias du Génocide*, a French report on the genocidal propaganda in Rwanda.<sup>29</sup> This was one of the first books on the subject and it is often quoted by other scholars. To mitigate this problem, two of the four authors are used as key informants in this study. As a result, I hope to have captured the main points made in the report.<sup>30</sup> I also rely heavily upon the book *Broadcasting Genocide* (1996) by Linda Kirschke, which Carver (2000:190) describes as “*the best documented and most thoughtful account of the role of the media in the Rwandan genocide*”.

## 2.8 Data Sources

The main data sources in this study are previous academic research, interviews with key informants, the RTLM broadcasts, various ICTR verdicts and OAU and UN reports. By using more than three sources, the requirement of *triangulation*, a vital research principle that increases the depth of understanding in a study is met (Yin 1994:90).

The primary data are the interviews with the key informants, while the secondary data are the RTLM transcripts, the academic material, the ICTR verdicts and the OAU and UN material. In case of the key informants (see table 5 in Appendix), semi-structured interviews were used. In such interviews, the questions are broad enough to encourage the interviewees to express their knowledge, but narrow enough to provide the specific data the researcher seeks (Rubin and Rubin 1995:204).

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<sup>27</sup> Though this is problematic, even Mahmood Mamdani, well-known for his book about the Rwandan genocide *When Victims Become Killers* (2001:xi-xiii), did not speak French at the time he began to do research about Rwanda.

<sup>28</sup> For further reading on the French literature about Rwanda, see Bernault, Florence (1998): The French Africanist Community and the Rwanda Crisis in *Africa Today*, Volume 45, Issue 1.

<sup>29</sup> The report was written by Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Jean F. Dupaquier, Marcel Kabanda and Joseph Ngarambe, at a request of the UNESCO (UNESCO 2004:2)

<sup>30</sup> Siri Hellevik, a study colleague, translated the report's table of contents, which was used to guide the interviews with the two authors.

### 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The use of propaganda as a means of controlling information flow, managing public opinion or manipulating behavior is as old as recorded history (Jowett and O'Donnell 199:47). This chapter will briefly examine the history of propaganda, but mostly it will discuss the theoretical framework for the analysis of the RTLM propaganda.

#### 3.1 The History and Definition of Propaganda

Propaganda, in its most neutral sense, means to disseminate or promote particular ideas. In Latin, it means *to propagate* or *to sow* (Jackall 1995:1). The term can be found as early as the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, when it was used to denote the committee of Catholic cardinals, *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, who were appointed by Gregory XV to oversee foreign missions of the Church. Because the Roman Catholic Church intended to spread the faith to the New World as well to oppose Protestantism, the word *propaganda* lost its neutrality and subsequent usage has rendered the term pejorative (Brown 1963:10-11, Wilke 1999:ix).

Most propaganda theories have been developed in the West (see section 2.6.1). Propaganda activities expanded greatly during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, and the widespread use of propaganda during the First World War became a watershed in the history of propaganda studies (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:105). Since then, propaganda studies have been the meeting place for different disciplines, for instance history, political science and psychology (Luostarinen 2002:32).

Some scholars, notably Leonard Doob (1989:378), argue that no systematic or clear-cut definition of propaganda is possible. Doob claims that the complexity of the subject and the wide range of cultural values in the world make such a definition impossible (Ibid.:378).<sup>31</sup> Besides a reluctance to define the term in any systematic way, some scholars have also been prone to include everything from advertising to the leaflets dropped by military behind enemy lines to persuade enemy soldiers to give up a fight (Wilke 1999:ix). *“This kind of comprehensive treatment of the subject has limited usefulness. There is a major difference between rhetorical inducement and propaganda. The former seeks voluntary compliance, the latter does not”* (Ibid.:ix-x).

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<sup>31</sup> In the book *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (1948), however, he defines propaganda as *“the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value of any in a society at a particular time”* (quoted in Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:4).

One of the most influential propaganda scholars, Harold D. Lasswell (1927:9), presented in his classic work, *Propaganda techniques in the World War I*, one of the first attempts to define propaganda: “It refers solely to the control of opinion by significant symbols, or, to speak more concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumors, reports, pictures and other forms of social communication”. Ten years later, he launched a slightly different definition: “Propaganda in the broadest sense is the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations” (reprint from 1934 in Jackall 1995:13). These definitions include most advertising and also a teacher influencing a class to study, acts many people would not want to call propaganda (Severin and Tankard 2001:109).

Another famous scholar in the field of propaganda, Jacques Ellul (1973:61), emphasizes that “propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization”. This definition includes the notion of propaganda as a mass phenomenon, but neglects that propaganda sometimes can have a passive and sedating effect, and that it can be an effective way to prevent undesirable action.

This thesis is based on the definition of propaganda applied by Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:6) in *Propaganda and Persuasion*: “Propaganda is a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”. Contrary to the definitions above, this stresses that propaganda promotes the interests of the propagandist.<sup>32</sup>

The word *deliberate* implies a sense of careful consideration of all possibilities (Ibid.:6). Jowett and O’Donnell chose the word because it means that propaganda is carefully thought out ahead of time in order to select what will be the most effective strategy to promote an ideology or to maintain an advantageous position (Ibid.:6). The word *systematic* complements deliberate because it means carrying out something with organized regularity (Ibid.:6). For instance, some governments or corporations establish departments or agencies specifically to create systematic propaganda. The *shaping of perceptions* is usually attempted through language and images, which is why slogans, posters and symbols develop during wartime (Ibid.:6).

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<sup>32</sup> Marjan Malesic (1997:36) and Caroline Page (1996:42) are among the other scholars who have made use of this definition.

Chapter 6 analyzes the RTLM journalists' shaping of perceptions through their use of language. As perceptions are shaped, *cognitions* may be *manipulated*. The formation of cognitions is a complex process related to cultural and personal values. Propaganda seeks to *achieve a response*, a specific reaction or action from an audience that *further the desired intent of the propagandist*. These last words are the key to the definition of propaganda. The person or group, who benefits from the audience's response, if the response is the desired one, is the propagandist and not necessarily the audience. The audience may believe that the propagandist has their interests at heart, but in reality the propagandist serves his/her own cause (Ibid.:9).

In modern times, propaganda in Africa has mainly been used by the leadership of the one-party states that many places developed after independence was won. In these states, the national media were required to disseminate a message of unity and to promote national consensus. To achieve these ends, African governments have kept broadcasting under tight control (Bourgault 1995:78).

While the media situation varies in each African country, the style of reporting is often quite similar. In contrast to Western media, the African media tends to be propagandistic rather than informative (Hydén and Leslie 2002:10). Helge Rønning (1989:82-83) describes African journalism as "*minister and sunshine journalism*" because the political leaders are rarely criticized. The radio in Africa is a major propaganda instrument, Alfred Mutua (1997:5) proclaims in *A Study of Propaganda and the Press in Africa*. Radio has become a propaganda tool serving the elite, and "...radio stations in all African countries have been under government control and have served as propaganda mouthpieces for the governments" (Ibid.). The radio has become a "*political megaphone*" (Kellow and Steeves 1998:115). Many African presidents still regard state radio as their exclusive property, and the print media have increasingly suffered the same fate (Hydén and Okigbo 2002:3). "*The content of mass communications in Black African countries abounds in propaganda*", Boafo (1991) concludes (cited in Bourgault 1995:83).

### **3.2 Propaganda Effects and RTLM**

The study of mass communication is based on the assumption that the media have significant effects, yet there is little agreement on the nature and extent of these effects (McQuail 2000:416). We can be sure that particular media effects are

occurring, however we are not able to see or predict the aggregate outcome or to know after an event how much is attributable to the media. Nevertheless, the media are rarely likely to be the only necessary or sufficient cause or effect, and their relative contribution is extremely hard to assess (Ibid.:416).<sup>33</sup>

Several authors have highlighted the effect of the RTLM propaganda (Des Forges 1999, Frohardt and Temin 2003a, Chalk 1999a). The role of RTLM in the genocide remains, apparently, the clearest example of the baleful role that radio can play (Kirschke 1996:3). On the other hand, many of the accusations leveled at RTLM are exaggerated and inaccurate (Carver 1996:2). The causal relationship between the killings and the propaganda is difficult to establish with certainty. *“RTLM did not independently cause the violence, but rather served as one of many instruments which this elite (MRND and government) used to facilitate the killing once it was underway. RTLM engaged in incitement to genocide during this period, however, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that its broadcasts caused a significant number of random individuals to partake in the killing”* (Kirschke cited in Frohardt and Temin 2003b:2).<sup>34</sup> It is such an understanding of RTLM that is the basis for this study. The massacres would have taken place with or without RTLM (Carver 1996:2), but that does not mean that the radio station was not crucial in building and maintaining conditions which made genocide possible (Caplan (ed.) 2000:44). RTLM built upon and nurtured the culture of hate toward the Tutsi.

### **3.3 Analyzing Propaganda**

Analyzing propaganda is a complex task. Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:280) recommend using a ten-step plan that recognizes the following stages of propaganda:

1. The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign
2. The context in which the propaganda occurs
3. Identification of the propagandist
4. The structure of the propaganda organization
5. The target audience
6. Media utilization techniques
7. Special various techniques
8. Audience reaction to various techniques
9. Counterpropaganda, if present
10. Effects and evaluation.

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<sup>33</sup> McQuail (2000:417-422) divides the field of media effect research into four different phases: 1: All-powerful media, 2: Theory of powerful media put to the test, 3: Powerful media rediscovered, and 4: Negotiated media influence.


<sup>34</sup> *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND), the political party of President Habyarimana, was a totalitarian party in which every single Rwandan citizen had to be a member

These ten steps take into account toward what ends, in the context of the times, a propaganda agent working through an organization, reaches an audience through the media by using special techniques to obtain a desired reaction (Ibid.:280).

Jowett and O'Donnell (1999:23) define communication as a process in which a sender transmits a message to a receiver through a channel. This process has been represented by both linear and transactional models. Contrary to the linear versions the transactional models also stress that the sender and the receiver of a message create and share information in order to reach mutual understanding (Ibid.:23).

Holsti (1969:24) stresses that all communication is composed of six basic elements: A source or sender, an encoding process which results in a message, a channel of transmission, a detector or recipient of the message, and a decoding process. These elements are reflected in Lasswell, Lerner and Pool's (1952:12) classic definition of the communication process: "*Who says what, to whom, how, and with what effect?*".<sup>35</sup> Holsti (1969:24) also adds "*why?*" and he presents the communication process in a figure similar to figure 1 (Ibid.:25).

**Figure 1: The Communication Process**



Jowett and O'Donnell's ten-step method reflects this figure<sup>36</sup> and the thesis analyzes the RTLM propaganda by using a simplified and limited version of their method. The limitation is based on this figure, in that this thesis does not answer the question "With what effect?" As a result, steps eight and ten are excluded from the analysis. A sufficient assessment of these steps would have required in-depth interviews with the RTLM listeners, and such a reception analysis will be beyond what is possible to do in this study.<sup>37</sup> However, the starting point for this thesis is that

<sup>35</sup> This model has been the dominant paradigm of American communication research (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:172).

<sup>36</sup> Identification of the propagandist (who?), the ideology and purposes of the propaganda (why?), the structure of the organization (how?), media utilization techniques (what?), special various techniques (what?), audience reaction to various techniques (with what effect?), effects and evaluation (with what effect?) and the target audience (to whom?).

<sup>37</sup> According to Holsti (1969:61), the most evident weakness of propaganda analyses is the absence of systematic research to relate categories of appeal, techniques, and dimensions to effects. This study can be criticized for the same. To measure the effect of media is a highly complex endeavor and the methodological difficulties are immense.

the propaganda from RTLM *did* have an effect (see section 3.2). To further limit the scope of this thesis, steps three and four, and steps five and six, are combined as they contain much of the same elements.

What Holsti (1969) and Lasswell et al. (1952) do not take into consideration is the context of the communication process. A mere analysis of propaganda messages is insufficient if we are to gain an understanding of propaganda disseminated via the media. To achieve that, we must also understand the environment in which the propaganda is formulated (Malesic 1997:9). This aspect will be highlighted in the thesis. Consequently, the following six steps from Jowett and O'Donnell's ten-step method will be the focus of this thesis:<sup>38</sup>

1. Identification of the propagandist and the structure of the organization.
2. The ideology and purpose
3. The target audience and the media utilization techniques
4. The counterpropaganda
5. The context
6. The propaganda techniques used

Step six will receive most of the attention, for in order to understand the role of propaganda in the genocide, we must understand the focus of the propaganda used by the Hutu extremists. Generally, in order not to fear, but to fight, propaganda, we must first understand what it is and how it is composed (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:ix). This also necessitates a deeper understanding of the context in which the propaganda occurred. Thus, step five will be highlighted. When discussing step one, the institutional framework of RTLM will be analyzed. When examining step two, the aim is to understand why the RTLM propaganda campaign was instituted, while the discussion of step three focuses on the listeners of the RTLM and the other hate media that were operating. The discussion of step four focuses on the RPF propaganda.

### **3.4 Step 1: The Propagandist and the Structure of the Organization**

The owners of the media exercise control over the communication message (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:284). The source of the propaganda message is often an institution or an organization with the propagandist as its leader or agent. The agents

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<sup>38</sup> The order of the steps has been revised to better suit the needs of this study.



are those who facilitate messages directly and through the media for an institution. Sometimes there will be complete openness about the identity of the organization behind the propaganda, while other times the organization will conceal itself in order to achieve its goals (Ibid.:283). Additionally, successful propaganda campaigns tend to originate from a strong, centralized decision-making authority that produces a consistent message throughout its structure (Ibid.:283). Section 4.1 analyzes the organizational structure of RTL, and the persons connected to it will be presented. Most of these persons belonged to the ruling political party, nevertheless, the radio station was presented as independent (see section 6.5).

### **3.5 Step 2: The Ideology and Purpose of the Propaganda**

The function of propaganda within an ideological framework is to provide “*the audience with a comprehensive conceptual framework for dealing with a social and political reality*” (Kecskemeti 1973:849-850). In locating the ideology of the propaganda, Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:281) advise the researcher to look for a set of beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors, as well as ways of perceiving and thinking that constitute a set of norms that dictate what is desirable and what should be done.

Øyvind Østerud (1997:91) defines ideology as political principles and goals for a society, organized systematically and with a program through which these goals can be achieved. These principals are often referred to as doctrines and are usually thought of as being explicit philosophical systems (Evans and Newnham 1990:236). In light of this, it could be problematic to view what Mahmood Mamdani (2001:190) calls “*the ideology of Hutu Power*” as a real ideology. The heart of this ideology was the conviction that the Tutsi were a race alien to Rwanda, and not an indigenous ethnic group (Ibid.:190, Prunier 1995:226).<sup>39</sup> The Hutu Power ideology, however, was not an explicit philosophical system with references to all aspects of a society. On the other hand, this was clearly systematic thoughts, among others written down in the *Bahutu Manifesto*. Evans and Newnham (1990:236) emphasize that the claim of ideologies as philosophical system is a too narrow view. And in accordance with Kecskemeti’s statement above, this thesis views Hutu Power as an ideology which guided the acts of the extremists, the RTL staff included (Mamdani 2001:199).

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<sup>39</sup> This ideology developed with the revolution in 1959 (Fisiy 1998:17).

The main purpose of propaganda is to achieve acceptance of the propagandist's ideology by the people (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:282). The intention of propaganda may be to influence people to adopt attitudes that correspond to those of the propagandist (in other words his/her ideology) or to engage in certain patterns of behavior. "To furnish the collective ideological motivations driving man to action is propaganda's exact task", Ellul (1973:141) states. Because the essence of propaganda is its deliberateness of purpose, considerable investigation is required to discover what the purpose is (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:279). The ideology and purpose the RTLM propaganda will be discussed further in section 4.2.

Ellul (1973:70-75) divides between the propaganda of integration and the propaganda of agitation.<sup>40</sup> *Integration propaganda* is a propaganda of conformity, aiming to stabilize, unify and reinforce the social body. Additionally, it attempts to maintain the positions and interests represented by those who sponsor the propaganda message (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:282).

*Agitation propaganda* seeks to arouse people to participate in or support a cause (Ellul 1973:72). Agitation consists of stimulating mass action by hammering home one prominent feature of the situation that is threatening, iniquitous, or outrageous (Kecskemeti 1973:849). Because of its role as a mobilizer in the genocide (see section 6.14), RTLM falls within this category of propaganda.

According to Ellul (1973:37), agitation propaganda is the easiest propaganda to make. In order to succeed, it only needs to be addressed to the most simple and violent sentiments through elementary means (Ibid.:37). Hate is generally the most profitable resource of agitation propaganda, and hatred is probably the most spontaneous and common sentiment. Hate consists of attributing one's misfortunes and sins to others who must be killed in order to alleviate such misfortunes (Ibid.:73). Agitation propaganda succeeds each time it designates someone as the source of all misery, provided that he/she is not too powerful. The less educated and informed the people to whom agitation propaganda is addressed, the easier it is to make. Therefore,

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<sup>40</sup> Lasswell (1927:195) claims that there are four major objectives when using propaganda: To mobilize hatred against the enemy, to preserve the friendship of allies, to preserve the friendship and, if possible, procure the co-operation of neutrals and to demoralize the enemy. The first and last objectives resemble what Ellul (1973:72-75) defines as propaganda of agitation, the two others are related to the propaganda of integration.

it is particularly suited in Africa, Ellul (1973:74) explicitly claims. RTLM's *call for action* in the Rwandan genocide might indicate that he is right. In 1994, the school attendance rate in the country was only 36.4%. Conversely, the German Nazi propaganda, which incited hatred toward the Jews, was not aimed at a particular low-educated or ill-informed people (Holocaust Learning Center 2004).

### **3.6 Step 3: The Target Audience and the Media Utilization Techniques**

All communication must take its audience into consideration, and propaganda is considered to be more effective if it is in line with the audience's existing opinions, beliefs and dispositions (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:290, Evans and Newnham 1998:453). A target audience is selected by a propagandist for its potential effectiveness. The propaganda is aimed at the audience most likely to be useful to the propagandist if it responds favorably (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:286). Radio stations can, among other things, reach its audience through the style of program or choice of presenter (Street 2001:55). Section 4.3 discusses the intended audience of RTLM and how the radio station reached this part of the population.

It is important to examine which media are being used by the propagandist (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:287). Propaganda must be total; it will not succeed if it is used in a sporadic fashion. The propaganda agent utilizes all of the technical means at his/her disposal – the press, radio, TV, movies, posters and meetings (Ellul 1973:9). The various messages provided by the same source through the various media outlets should also be compared to see if there is a consistency of apparent purpose (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:288). The analyst should examine the flow of communication from one medium to another and the relationship between the media themselves. The focus should be on how the media are used. The propagandist might show a film and hand out leaflets afterward. This type of practice maximizes the potential of the media (Ibid.:288). While RTLM is the focus of this thesis, the radio station was not alone in transmitting propaganda in Rwanda. In fact, it was in the print media that hate speech against the Tutsi first gained prominence (Frohardt and Temin 2003b:3). Section 4.3.1 discusses the relationship RTLM had with the largest extremist newspaper Kangura and the state-owned radio station *Radio Rwanda*.

### 3.7 Step 4: The Propaganda Context

Research on context is crucial as media messages have little meaning apart from their cultural and political-economic origins (Kellow and Steeves 1998:111). The media do not exist outside the political and social world they describe (Allen and Seaton 1999:4), and “perhaps the most fundamental defect of most studies made on the subject [propaganda] is their attempt to analyze propaganda as an isolated phenomenon” (Ellul 1973:xvii). Successful propaganda incorporates the prevailing mood of the times, and that is why it is essential to understand the socio-political context in which propaganda occurs (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:282). Nevertheless, to identify all possible contextual factors surrounding a message is an impossible task. A context is to be seen as open, as the contextual factors are infinite (Lindkvist 1981:27).

Messages have greater impact when they comport with existing opinions and beliefs. Propaganda cannot create something out of nothing, it must build on a foundation already present in the individual (Ellul 1973:36). Consequently, action cannot be obtained unless it responds to a group of already established tendencies or attitudes stemming from the regime, the churches and the schools. Propaganda is confined to utilizing existing material; it does not create it (Ibid.:36).<sup>41</sup> Propaganda must be familiar with collective sociological presuppositions, myths and ideologies of a particular country (Ibid.:38). The propagandist uses the predispositions of the audience to reinforce an ideology or in some cases to create new attitudes and behaviors. Rather than attempting to change political loyalties, racial and religious attitudes or other deeply held beliefs, a propagandist that supports commonly held views is more likely to be effective (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:290).

When trying to understand the context in which the propaganda exists, one needs to be aware of the important historical events that have occurred and the propagandist’s interpretation of these events. Propaganda is like a packet of seeds dropped on fertile soil, and to understand how seeds can grow and spread, analysis of the soil, that is, the times and events, is necessary (Ibid.:282). Included in this task is the need to understand the historical background for the conflict. History is powerful,

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<sup>41</sup> That the propagandist’s need to base himself on what already exists does not prevent him from going further. What exists is only the raw material from which the propagandist can create something strictly new, which in all probability would not have sprung up spontaneously (Ellul 1973:37).

it can be used and misused. The analyst must understand the events that occurred prior to the propaganda, including the beliefs and values of the population. Likewise, it is important to understand the myths of a culture (Ibid.:282).<sup>42</sup>

Section 6.19 analyzes RTLM's interpretation of two major political events in Rwanda, the Social Revolution and the Arusha Agreements. The propaganda technique called *card-stacking* will be the starting point for this part of the thesis (see section 3.22). The two events occurred during different political periods, and the RTLM journalists used both to their benefit. The Hutu usurped power in the 1959 Revolution, and RTLM used the Tutsi defeat in 1959 to explain why the RPF attacked the country in the 1990s. The Arusha Peace Agreements (1992) removed power from the Rwandan elite, and the extremists efficiently undermined the agreements (Jones 1999:143). This was evident in RTLM's discussion of the Arusha Peace Process. There were of course other political events that also influenced the propagandists. Two of these, the *political situation in Burundi* and the *RPF Invasion in October 1990*, are discussed in section 5.3 and 5.4.

The Hamitic hypothesis, discussed in section 1.5 and 4.2, was important for the Hutu extremists, and thus for the RTLM propaganda. In chapter 5, the influence of central institutions, such as the Church and the school, on the propaganda content will be examined. Additionally, the Rwandan media politics until the time of genocide will be reviewed. The independent press, which boomed in the early 1990s, had little experience at the time of the genocide, and there existed no independent institutional framework to counteract or arrest the hate media. This lack of sanctions was beneficial for the RTLM propagandists (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:25).

### **3.8 Step 5: The Counterpropaganda**

Counterpropaganda can be as powerful as propaganda itself (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:297). The enemy of the Hutu extremists, the RPF, had its own radio station called *Radio Muhabura*. In section 4.4, the role of this radio station is briefly discussed. The situation of counterpropaganda will also come into view when analyzing the use of the technique called *the Other is lying* (see section 6.6).

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<sup>42</sup> A myth is a story in which meaning is embodied in recurrent symbols and events, but it is also an idea to which people already subscribe; therefore, it is a predisposition to act (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:283).

### 3.9 Step 6: The Propaganda Techniques

In 1937, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) was established in USA. Its aim was to “conduct objective, non-partisan studies in the field of propaganda and public opinion” and “to help the intelligent citizen to detect and analyze propaganda” (Jackall 1995:223). The same year, the institute published seven propaganda devices that often are used by propagandists.<sup>43</sup> These famous devices have been criticized for being too simple and that detecting them would necessitate a subjective method of analyzing propaganda (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:290). Yet, they are still widely quoted in textbooks on propaganda, and some of them will be used in this study. Each device has a specific and theoretically defined content, thus the use of these devices does not require a reliance on personal opinions. Rather, the scientific principle of reliability could be followed (see section 2.5).

Propaganda is not an arsenal of ready-made techniques and arguments suitable for use anywhere (Ellul 1973:34). Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:290) have chosen not to make a comprehensive list of propaganda techniques because “*propaganda is too complex to limit its techniques to a short list*”. Nevertheless, they recognize certain principles that can assist in the analysis of propaganda. Some of these principles resemble what other scholars define as propaganda techniques. For instance, what Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:293) term the principle of *source credibility* is similar to what Brown (1963:29) describes as a propaganda technique called *the appeal to authority*. The principle Jowett and O’Donnell term *reward and punishment* resembles what Hvitfelt (1983:44) identifies as a propaganda technique on its own.

Jowett and O’Donnell’s (1999:293) principle of *music as propaganda* is treated as a propaganda technique by Jerry Domatob (1985:207) in his article *Propaganda Techniques in Black Africa*. He claims that music is one of the most popular propaganda techniques used in Africa, and he gives examples of this use in Zaire, Congo and Cameroon (Ibid.:207). RTLM also used music in its hate propaganda. Several times a day the radio station played the anti-Tutsi songs of the popular singer Simon Bikindi (ICTR 2001:4). Yet, the transcripts do not include the

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<sup>43</sup> Name-calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain-folks, card-stacking and band-wagon (reprint from Propaganda Analysis Volume 1, Issue 2, 1937 in Jackall 1995:217).

text of the songs played on the air. Thus, this aspect of the RTLM propaganda will not be discussed any further in this thesis.

The principle called *predisposition of the audience/creating resonance* stresses that the propagandist supports commonly held views in the population (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:290). This aspect of propaganda will be discussed in chapter 5. The principal of *monopoly of the communication source* will be addressed in section 4.3.1.<sup>44</sup>

Scholars often claim that propaganda manipulates emotion more readily than reason (Carruthers 2000:33). Propaganda is associated with emotional language and presentations, and *arousal of emotion* is defined as a propaganda principle by Jowett and O'Donnell (1999:295). Quite often the propagandist attempts to arouse strong emotions of hatred or approval for or against another group for motives of expediency, strategy or plain greed. Emotional pressure, whether it takes the form of arousing positive or negative collective feelings, or simply that of presenting emotionally biased views, is not just something added to propaganda to make it more acceptable. It is fundamental to the whole process, Brown (1963:12) claims. He adds that rational and dispassionate arguments employ a totally different technique. The propagandist does not engage in genuine argument because his/her answers are determined in advance (Ibid.:12). For instance, the Nazi propaganda mobilized the Germans by appealing to their emotions rather than their capacity for rational arguments (Carruthers 2000:75). Since all the basic motives in human beings are emotionally conditioned, a propagandist makes ample use of love, anger, fear, hope, guilt, and other feelings and sentiments to manipulate the public (Brown 1963:23).

As the principle about arousal of emotions can be viewed as a superior characteristic of all propaganda, it will not be treated as a specific propaganda technique in this thesis. Still, the emotional aspect of language will be addressed. For instance, section 6.15 discusses how the RTLM journalists sometimes used the phrase “to work” when they meant “to kill”, and section 6.13 discusses how the RTLM staff labeled the Tutsi as “*wicked savages*” (Kantano, RTLM May 23, 1994) and “*dogs*”

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<sup>44</sup> The principles called *visual symbols of power* and *face-to-face contact* (Ibid.:290-291) will not be discussed at all, due to the fact that this study focuses on radio broadcasts. Additionally, neither the principle of *group norms* nor the *use of opinion leaders* will be examined, since this thesis does not make an analysis of the effect of RTLM.

(Kantano, RTLM June 20, 1994) to alleviate latent feelings of guilt when the Tutsi were killed (Savich 2000:12). Additionally, one function of the technique *using the other as a scapegoat* is to spark feelings of hate and to channel frustration (Domatob 1985:204, see section 6.7).

The last principle Jowett and O'Donnell (1999:294) discuss is *language usage*, which is the principle that will be the center of this thesis. However, unlike Jowett and O'Donnell, this thesis identifies specific techniques to facilitate the analysis of the RTLM broadcasts (see sections 3.10-2.22). These techniques are not a complete and exhaustive record of all possible propaganda techniques, but they are selected on the basis of different academic contributions in the field of propaganda studies and on the basis of a pre-test of the categories used in the analysis of the RTLM broadcasts. The concept of enemy images and Spillman and Spillman's characteristics of such images, also guided the selection of propaganda devices.

### **3.9.1 Propaganda: Inclusion and Exclusion**

Propaganda is a tool of exclusion and inclusion. It is frequently used to underscore the difference between *us* and *them*, and it may fuel or create antagonism (Taithe and Thornton 1999:4). If the focus is on how bad *they* are, the propaganda is motivated by exclusion. If the focus is on how good *we* are and how important it is for *us* to unite, then the propaganda is inclusive. Both processes operate at the same time as including one group implies the exclusion of another (Ibid.:4). This opposition between *us* and *them* is required in all propaganda and assumes a hierarchical hostility between groups. The term *us* is given superiority over the term *them* (Savich 2000:11).

The distinction between the Hutu and the Tutsi was apparent in the RTLM broadcasts (see chapter 5). RTLM even played an important role in inciting killings and hate against the Tutsi population (ICTR 2003b:319, 351). This has led both the verdict of the Media Trial and several scholars to describe RTLM's broadcasts as *hate speech* (ICTR 2003b:351, Schabas 2000:1, Frohardt and Temin 2003b:2).



RTLTM is one of the most extreme and notorious examples of such kind of broadcasting, Carver (1995:15) claims.<sup>45</sup>

Ursula Owen (1998:1) describes hate speech as “*abusive, insulting, intimidating and harassing. It may lead to violence, hatred or discrimination; and it kills*”. She finds the most dangerous threat behind hate speech to be that it can go beyond its immediate targets and create a culture of hate, a culture which makes it acceptable, respectable even, to hate on a wide scale (Ibid.:7). Hate speech is a discriminatory form of aggression that destroys the dignity of those in the group under attack. It creates a lesser status not only in the eyes of the group members themselves, but also in the eyes of others who perceive and treat them as less human (ICTR 2003b:351).

Hate speech is an extreme version of the use of the distinction between *us* and *them*, and because RTLTM’s hatred toward the Tutsi was salient in the radio station’s broadcasts, it is relevant to discuss the concept of *the Other* and *enemy images* regarding an analysis of the RTLTM propaganda.

### **3.9.2 The Other**

To designate someone or some group as *the Other* is similar to stereotyping in terms of representing an evaluative form of naming or labeling which defines someone or some cultural grouping in reductive terms (Pickering 2001:41). To define someone as the Other is a collective process of judgment which feeds upon and reinforces powerful social myths (Jordanova 1998:109). Conceptions of the Other and the structures of differences and similarities which they mobilize do not exist in any natural form. There is no real Other out there, the location of the Other is primarily in language. “*It is through language that selves and others are mediated and represented*” (Pickering 2001:72).

The concept of the stereotypical Other can be used to support a range of different attitudes, from mild condescension to overt hostility. Nevertheless, the Other is always constructed as an object for the benefit of the subject who needs an objectified Other in order to achieve a masterly self-definition (Ibid.:71). The Other is constructed with the purpose of subordination in mind (Ibid.:76).

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<sup>45</sup> Other African examples of hate speech are Radio Pretoria in South Africa during the apartheid regime and the media in Zaire in the beginning of the 1990s (Carver 2000:191).

The process of *othering* begins with the use of derogatory terms to refer to the group that is perceived as different, and then elaborates and justifies the injurious difference and symbolic distance established. This is a denial of humanity of those treated in this way because it divests them of their social and cultural identities by diminishing them to stereotyped characteristics (Ibid.:73). The creation of enemy images builds upon such a process of de-individualization and denial of humanity (Rieber and Kelly 1991:15-16).

### **3.9.3 Enemy Images**

Control over media and information is a central tool in the maintenance of or struggle for power (Eknes and Endresen 1999:12). Probably every conflict is fought on two grounds: The battlefield and via propaganda (Shah 2003:1). And “*the history of battle is primarily the history of radically changing fields of perception*” (Virillio 1989:7).

The process of elaborating and allocating characteristics to groups of people defined as the enemy, and disseminating a particular view of them, is critical in the internal mobilization of opinion. Depicting the enemy as a mad, raving tyrant has always been a propaganda tool, and the media can play a central role in the projection of enemy images, a vital prerequisite in war (Allen and Seaton (ed.) 1999:45-46). “*In the beginning we create the enemy. Before the weapon comes the image. We think others to death and then invent the battle-axe or the ballistic missiles with which to actually kill them. Propaganda precedes technology*”, Sam Keen (1986:10) writes in the book *Faces of the Enemy*. It is unlikely that we will have any considerable success in controlling warfare unless we understand the logic of political paranoia and the process of creating propaganda that justifies our hostility, he adds (Ibid.:11).

But how do you make a monster out of the man you know personally, who lives next door? Such enmification is a process that goes beyond objective and historical conditions, and it entails a psychological process (Rieber and Kelly 1991:6). It has profound roots in the individual psyche and can in some situations be manipulated for the purposes of mass mobilization. “*When we speak of collective enmity, we are talking about a social-psychological process that exists on multiple levels*” (Ibid.:6). When the organs of propaganda come into play with the mass media, the potential for promoting an enmification process grows immeasurably (Ibid.:7).

Psychological research concerning the reasons and roots of violence and evil underwent important developments in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Lundwall 2001:10). Explanations have shifted from “aggressiveness” as being a static biological drive that is innate in human nature, to a more flexible cognitive learning theory perspective where the human being is considered to learn and develop morality as well as evil in the interplay with his/her environment (Ibid.:10-11).<sup>46</sup> The consequences of such a process of enmification are that empathy and identification disintegrate to such an extent that persons who are perceived as enemies are robbed of their individuality, and are no longer considered as fellow men (Spillman and Spillman 1991:71). The enemy becomes a homogenous mass, an object to hate and to kill (Savich 2000:13). As soon as people in a group are perceived as “less than human”, engaging in conflict with them, and killing them, become easier to justify (Frohardt and Temin 2003a:7). Spillman and Spillman (1991:57-58) identify the following seven characteristics as belonging to *the syndrome of the enemy image*:

1. *Distrust*. Everything originating with the enemy is either bad or, if it appears reasonable, created for dishonest reasons.
2. *Placing the guilt on the enemy*. The enemy is responsible for the tension which exists and is to blame for everything that is negative under the current circumstances.
3. *Negative anticipation*. Whatever the enemy does is intended to harm us.
4. *Identification with evil*. The enemy embodies the opposite of what we are and what we strive for, and wants to destroy what we value most and must therefore be destroyed.
5. *Zero-sum thinking*. Anything which benefits the enemy harms us and vice versa.
6. *De-individualization*. Anyone who belongs to a given group is automatically our enemy.
7. *Refusal of empathy*. We have nothing in common with our enemy; human feelings and ethical criteria towards the enemy are dangerous and ill-advised.

Images of the enemy are thus formed by perception created solely by negative assessment (Spillman and Spillman 1991:58). Film, television, radio, newspapers and

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<sup>46</sup> For additional reading, see Staub, Ervins (1989): *The Roots of Evil: the Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*, Staub, Ervins (2000): *Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation* and du Preez, Peter (1994): *Genocide: The Psychology of Mass Murder*.

cartoons may serve to sanction the inhuman treatment of those no longer regarded as fully human (Carruthers 2000:44). The media in the former Yugoslavia prior to the outbreak of war in the early 1990s and the media in Rwanda before the genocide are examples of this (Ibid.:44). “...Rwandan hate radio sought to demonize and “dehumanize” Tutsi in order to create the impression that killing was not akin to killing other humans, thus making the act somehow more acceptable and easier to carry out” (Frohardt and Temin 2003b:2). Propaganda can be used to create enemy images (Luostarinen 2002:35). Consequently, in the rest of this thesis the characteristics of *the syndrome of the enemy image* will be linked to the propaganda techniques applied by the RTLM journalists.

### **3.10 Biased Use of Sources**

To be *biased* can be defined as the extent to which media content is systematically favorable to a particular set of interests (Street 2001:15). The term will be discussed in section 6.1, and the thesis will analyze if RTLM was biased in its selection of sources, by examining who, in addition to the staff, were permitted to talk on the air.

People have a tendency to admire authority figures for their knowledge and direction, and expert opinion is effective in establishing legitimacy (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:291). The way in which the sender of a message is viewed by the audience has important implications for how the message is interpreted, and that is why the use of sources is of primary importance for a propagandist (Hvitfelt 1983:13). This aspect of RTLM will be discussed in section 6.2.

If the sender of a message is powerful and authoritative, the message gains considerable in credibility (Kotnik 1997:141). In general, the Rwandan propagandists included references to past and present political authorities into their materials as often as possible (Des Forges 1999:71). The former President Grégoire Kayibanda, as well as President Habyarimana, often appeared in pictures and they were regularly cited. In addition, the propagandists acknowledged the great respect Rwandans have for formal learning by occasionally asserting that their information came from intellectuals or professors at the national university (Ibid.:71). For instance, RTLM journalist Valérie Bemeriki stated: “...I consulted other intellectuals, our country has got many scholars, professors of University, people who completed universities...I had a discussion with

*them. Their views and our editor's confirm each other, which means that what Gaspard Gahigi said was true*" (RTLTM June 28, 1994). Because they had been the ones to profit from university education and studies abroad, a large number of the university faculty were from Habyarimana's home region, and they ranked among his sincere supporters. Others teaching at the government-sponsored schools (the vast majority in the country), as well as the staff of research institutes, knew that advancement and continued employment could depend on backing the government position. Both those within Rwanda and those studying abroad wrote letters and made public statements that reported facts wrongly or misinterpreted data to support the official party line (Des Forges 1999:71). Thus, when analyzing RTLTM's use of sources, I expect to find that the radio station lent the air waves more often to persons that already had a high status among the Hutu population, than to people of lower social rank. In accordance with the definition of bias, I also expect the sources to mainly represent the view of the Hutu extremists.

In some circumstances, propaganda messages can be made more potent by incorporating opposing arguments in a manner that tends to discredit them, while at the same time give the audience the impression that it is hearing both sides of a debate (Africa 2000 Media Group 2003). Section 6.4 examines whether the RTLTM journalists utilized this method when they quoted Tutsi sources.

*Biased use of sources* might have contributed to the creation of a Tutsi enemy image, as far as the elite sources who reflected the views of the Hutu extremists, or the journalists' interpretation of the quoted statements from the Tutsi, included negative statements about the latter group.

### **3.11 Presentation of Own and the Other's Intentions**

Propaganda is by its very nature an enterprise for perverting the significance of events and of insinuating false intentions (Ellul 1973:58). There are two prominent aspects of this fact. First, the propagandist must insist on the purity of his/her own intentions (Ibid.:58). This is apparent in the RTLTM broadcasts, for instance when the RTLTM journalists presented their workplace as an independent radio station. Section 6.5 discusses further RTLTM's self-presentation. In accordance with Ellul, I expect

this presentation to be fairly positive, and, this propaganda technique is therefore termed *creating a positive self-image*.

In addition to praising itself, a propagandist often hurls accusations and assertions at his/her enemy (Ibid.:58). The RTLM journalists regularly stated what they claimed were the intentions of the RPF and the Tutsi population. For instance, on March 31, 1994, Gaspard Gahigi, Editor-in-Chief of RTLM, stated: “*You know, however, that the RPF does not want power sharing. It wants to take it all...*”. A category of propaganda techniques called *alleged intentions* was therefore created. In accordance with the characteristics Spillman and Spillman give *the syndrome of the enemy image*, I expect that the intentions RTLM presented on behalf of the RPF and the Tutsi were harmful for the Hutu population. This will be analyzed in section 6.10.

The propagandist’s accusations are never made haphazardly or groundlessly (Ellul 1973:58). The propagandist will not accuse the enemy of just any misdeed, he will accuse him of the very intention that he himself has and of trying to commit the very crime that he himself is about to commit. The accusation aimed at the Other’s intention clearly reveals the intention of the accuser (Ibid.:58). This is a technique that Robert Muchielli, author of *Psychologie de la publicité et de la propagande*, labels *accusation in a mirror*. Attributing one’s own actions or planned actions to another party is typical of propaganda, he argues. “... *the party using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror. With such a tactic, propagandists can persuade listeners and 'honest people' that they are being attacked and are justified in taking whatever measures are necessary for legitimate self-defense*” (Muchielli quoted in Beyers 2002:3).

This tactic worked extremely well for the Hutu extremists’ propaganda, both in specific cases such as the Bugesera massacre of March 1992 and in the broader campaign to convince the Hutu that the Tutsi planned to exterminate them (Des Forges 1999:66). The Media Trial ruling also stressed RTLM’s use of this tactic (ICTR 2003b:36). This thesis will not focus particularly on this propaganda technique, as I find it more important to pay attention to aspects of the RTLM propaganda that have not come in to light earlier. Still, *accusation in a mirror* will be included in the part of the analysis where it seems natural to do so.

### 3.12 The Other is Lying

Propagandists often accuse the enemy of conducting a lying propaganda campaign (Lasswell 1927:72), and the RTLM journalists were no exception. For instance, on April 1, 1994, journalist Emmanuel Nkomati stated that Radio Muhabura was “*telling lies and misleading people*”. Section 6.6 analyzes how the propaganda technique called *the Other is lying* highlighted the differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi, and, as a result, contributed to the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of RTLM. The link between *the Other is lying* and the characteristics of an enemy image will also be discussed in this section.

### 3.13 Using the Other as a Scapegoat

Scapegoating involves identification and isolation of a social problem in a single individual or stereotyped category of persons (Pickering 2001:183). The propaganda technique called *using the Other as a scapegoat* is frequently employed by African leaders who state that the continent’s problems only are caused by “imperialists” and “saboteurs”, Domatob (1985:204) argues. The strategy of using the other party as a scapegoat sparks hatred and attempts to relieve frustrations in the population (Ibid.:204). Kotnik (1997:155) describes the technique as one of the basic characteristics of language usage in propaganda, and this is identical to the characteristic of *the syndrome of the enemy image* termed *placing the guilt on the enemy* (see section 3.9.3). For that reason, I expect that the RTLM staff used this technique when they were talking about the Tutsi or the RPF. Section 6.7 discusses the occurrence of this in the RTLM broadcasts, such as when journalist Habimana Kantano asserted: “*These people [the Inkotanyi] and all other accomplices in the country have ruined this country, plunging it in such misfortunes*” (RTLM April 12, 1994).<sup>47</sup>

### 3.14 Band-Wagon

Group identities are defined by relationships with other groups, and group boundaries are drawn with the purpose of delineating positive or negative interaction between *us* and *them* (Amoo and Odendaal 2002:8). War propaganda tries to utilize the feeling of communality and solidarity created by a conflict (Luostarinen 2002:34), and *band-wagon* is one of the propaganda techniques that particularly plays on peoples’ desire

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<sup>47</sup> The term Inkotanyi referred to the RPF soldiers or to the Tutsi population (see chapter 6.12).

to be in accord with the crowd (Domatob 1985:201). Alfred Lee (1952:70) defines *band-wagon* as a means of “*making us follow the crowd and accept a propagandist’s program as a whole because of its supposed popularity and without taking the time to examine and to weigh evidence. It has as its theme, “Everybody – at least all of us- is doing it”*”. Ellul (1973:150) states that propaganda often includes statements like “*everything is in the clutches of evil. There is a way out. But only if everybody participates*” and “*you must participate. If you don’t, all will be lost, through your fault*”. This is the feeling that propaganda must generate (Ibid.:150).

The reference to *everybody* in the propaganda message is important (Kotnik 1997:141). Through this, the propagandist attempts to convince people that all members of the group to which they belong are accepting his/her program and that they must follow the crowd and “jump on the band-wagon”. *Band-wagon* implies that people are in the minority if they oppose the propagandist (Domatob 1985:201).

*Band-wagon* may contribute to creating enemy images because it stresses the differences between *us* and *them*, which is the foundation of all propaganda (Savich 2000:12) The RTLM journalists’ use of *band-wagon*, such as when Kantano said: “*You listeners of RTLM, stand firm, we are together*” (RTLM April 12, 1994) and when Gahigi stated: “*The population and the army would stand up together as one and fight against the RPF*” (RTLM March 31, 1994), will be discussed in section 6.8.

### **3.15 Highlighting Its Own Strength**

The RTLM journalists often highlighted the strength of the *Rwandan Armed Forces* (FAR) and emphasized the good will of the government or the Hutu population. For instance, on April 1, 1994, journalist Noel Hitimana stated: “*Because when they [the Inkotanyi] found us in this country, they didn’t know how far we were in the matter of progress, intelligence and self-knowledge. ...the only thing we’re looking for in this country is peace*”. Such statements enhanced the division between the Hutu and the Tutsi because they made a positive image of *us* (the Hutu) in contrast to an unfavorable image, presented through other propaganda techniques, of *them* (the Tutsi). The propaganda technique termed *highlighting its own strength* and its link to *the syndrome of the enemy image* will be analyzed in section 6.9.



### 3.16 Use of Stereotypes

Everybody harbors a large number of stereotypes (Ellul 1973:35). From this arsenal the propagandist must select those stereotypes easiest to mobilize, those which support the action he/she wants to precipitate (Ibid.:35). Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1998:366) defines stereotypes as simplified descriptions of conventionally perceived cultural distinctions in categories of people, which ignore individual variations within these categories. In accordance with Brown (1963:26), this thesis will treat stereotyping as a propaganda technique on its own.

Stereotypes give ideological legitimacy to ethnical borders and strengthen the feeling of group identity. They also contribute toward creating order in the social world by providing a limited number of types of people to relate to (Hylland Eriksen 1998:366). In a hostile situation, the result can be a world in which everything is seen in black or white, where the out-group is bad, and the in-group is good. This is the reason why stereotypes about the in-group are just as important as stereotypes about the out-group (Kotnik 1997:152). Because this thesis focuses on the creation of a Tutsi enemy image, it will only analyze the stereotypes made about the Tutsi.

Keen (1986:15-88) reviews the historical usage of enemy images, and he identifies the following archetypes/stereotypes that have been used to describe an enemy: The greedy enemy, the enemy as a criminal, a barbarian, a torturer, a rapist, a beast, a reptile or insect, a worthy opponent, an abstraction and as death. It is especially the image of the enemy as an insect that is salient in the RTLM broadcasts (see section 3.18 and 6.13.3).

Stereotyped images of each other have always been an aspect of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi (Prunier 1995:6, Mamdani 2001:44). Section 6.11 analyzes the utilization of traditional stereotypes in the RTLM broadcasts. The *use of stereotypes* resembles what Spillman and Spillman (1991) describe as the *de-individualization* aspect of *the syndrome of the enemy image*. Thus, I expect the stereotypes used to describe the Tutsi or the RPF to be negative, such as: “*Tutsis are lazy*” (Kantano, RTLM June 20, 1994).

### 3.17 Use of Threats

One widespread propaganda technique is to present threats, the main purpose of which is to incite fear in the audience (Hvitfelt 1983:44). A propagandist may use threats and physical inducements toward compliance (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:293). Thus, the propaganda technique termed *use of threats* might have been used by RTLM to mobilize the Hutu to take action against the Tutsi, first of all when the threats were pointed toward those Hutu who did not participate in the killings.

The threats presented on RTLM were most often directed at the Tutsi or the RPF, such as this excerpt from the broadcast on March 16, 1994 demonstrates: “MRND informs RPF-Inkotanyi that it won’t keep on standing and looking without reacting any longer at such criminal acts which are done to innocent people” (Kantano).

*Use of threats* contributes to the creation of enemy images by creating a negative atmosphere between groups and by accentuating the differences between *us* and *them* by only point the threats toward one of the parties (see section 6.12).

### 3.18 Name-Calling

The propagandist attempts to influence his/her audience by replacing neutral terms not strong enough to his/her purpose with more suitable terms (Brown 1963:27). Particularly transparent in the utilization of language for propaganda purposes is the specific application of names used to designate the Other, which alone impart negative connotations. At the same time, the designation of one’s own forces and their actions is characterized by positive words (Kotnik 1997:154). From the viewpoint of the propagandist, the audience is expected to respond favorably to the *name-calling* without examining any evidence (Domatob 1985:195). Kotnik (1997:144) gives some examples of the use of this propaganda technique in the Serbian media during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They labeled the Serbian opponents as “*Muslim extremists*”, “*Muslim criminals*” and “*Butchers of the 108 Croatian and Muslim Brigade*”.

Several scholars identify *name-calling* as a specific propaganda technique, but they use varied terms for it.<sup>48</sup> The technique contributes to the creation of an enemy

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<sup>48</sup> Some terms used are *name-calling symbols* (Lee 1952:64), *nouns designations* (Kotnik 1997) and *substitution of names* (Brown 1963:27). This technique is frequently used in Africa, Domatob (1985:195) claims.

image, as far as the labels on the Other are negative. I expect that this is the case when RTLM labeled the Tutsi or the RPF. *Name-calling* also resembles the characteristics of *the syndrome of the enemy image* termed *negative anticipations* and *de-individualization* (see section 3.9.3). As discussed in section 6.13, there are several examples of *name-calling* in the RTLM broadcasts. For instance, RTLM often labeled the Tutsi and the RPF soldiers *Inyenzi*, which means cockroaches: “*All the people got up and fought against Inyenzi*” (Gahigi, RTLM April 15, 1994).

### **3.19 Call for Action**

Much literature about the propaganda used in the Rwandan genocide highlights the mobilizing role of RTLM (African Rights 1995:78, Kirschke 1996:116, Berry and Berry (ed.) 199:116). “*During the genocide, it [RTLM] became what one listener at the time called ‘vampire radio’ openly calling for more blood and massacres*” (Prunier 1995:189). The journalists’ *call for action* was a striking factor of the RTLM broadcasts, and this will be treated as a propaganda technique on its own. One illustrative example of this technique is when Kantano proclaimed: “*...be stronger than ever and kick Inkotanyi out*” (RTLM May 28, 1994). *Call for action* and its connection to *the syndrome of the enemy image* will be discussed further in section 6.14.

### **3.20 Description of Activities**

Both sides in a conflict often aim to mobilize their own group by means of frequent negative reporting on the activities of the opposing side (Kotnik 1997:146). In situations where it is reasonable to assume that people are suffering emotional strain because of their own actions, an acceptable rationalization for these activities must be provided to alleviate latent feelings of guilt and prepare them for similar activities in the future (Ibid.:153). Kotnik (1997:153-154) gives the following examples of this tactic used by the Serbian media during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia: “*It is the Croatian side which constantly attacks*”, “*Our policy is one of peace*” and “*We shall defend our country through force of arms, because it is force of arms which threatens us*”. Using language in such a manner not only increases the level of hatred toward the enemy, it also alleviates the feelings of guilt of those who may have behaved brutally (Kabanda 07.01.2004). While the violent actions of the enemy are presented as brutal, one’s own violence tends to be described as necessary and done in defense (Hvitfelt

1983:40). This could also be the result of a *dispositional image* of the Other. If a dispositional image of a group is created, the opposition expects the members of this group to behave aggressively (Höjelid 1991:28-29, 111). Once this image is created, it is difficult to change (Ottosen 1998:52). This method of describing the enemy's activities resembles the characteristics of *the syndrome of the enemy image* termed *negative anticipation* and *refusal of empathy* (see 3.9.3). As will be discussed in section 6.15, this discriminating method of describing the activities of the different groups was used by the RTLM staff. For example, they repeatedly stated that "...*the population must defend itself*" (Bemeriki, RTLM June 4, 1994), and that the Hutu were being "*harassed by the enemy*" (Bemeriki, RTLM 22 June, 1994).

Propagandists often use euphemisms when they are describing the activities of their own group (Delwiche 2002). Euphemisms are those words designed to have mitigating effects and which blunt the cutting edge of certain words. The aim is to remove the negative emotional connotation carried by a particular word, thereby creating more positive emotional atmosphere (Kotnik 1997:154). For instance, the Hutu extremists regularly used the word *working* as a euphemism for *killing* during the Rwandan genocide (Kagabo 11.11.2003, Karangwa 06.01.2004, see section 6.15).

### **3.21 Repetition**

A message demands constant repetition to attract attention (Kotnik 1997:140), and Brown (1963:27) lists repetition as a propaganda technique per se. "*The propagandist is confident that, if he repeats a statement often enough, it will in time come to be accepted by his audience*", he claims (Ibid.:27) claims. Repetition might also prevent or preclude a real discussion about the subject (Savich 2000:25). In other words, when creating enemy images the propagandist will repeat the hate message continuously. Section 6.16 examines the use of repetition in the RTLM broadcasts.

### **3.22 Card-Stacking**

*Card-stacking* is a technique the propagandist uses to win support for his/her cause. He/she uses under-emphasis and over-emphasis to dodge issues and evade facts and permits half-truths to masquerade as truth (IPA 1937 in Jackall 1995:221). The propagandist, out of a mass of complex facts, selects only those suitable for his/her

purpose. The use of this technique distorts the audience's image of the reality (Hvitfelt 1983:46).

*“In propaganda we must make a radical distinction between a fact on the one hand and intentions or interpretations on the other; in brief, between the material and the moral elements. The truth that pays off is in the realm of facts. The necessary falsehoods, which also pay off, are in the realm of intentions and interpretations. This is a fundamental rule for propaganda analysis”* (Ellul 1973:53). Even when using the other techniques discussed above, almost all propaganda relies on the selection of facts. The use of *card-stacking* during civil wars is common practice in Africa, Domatob (1985:203) claims.

The role of the propagandist is to hide the political reality by talking about it (Ellul 1973:59). Hence, I expect that the RTLM journalists used *card-stacking* when they interpreted the Arusha Agreements and the 1959 Social Revolution, two of the major political events in Rwanda (see section 6.19.1 and 6.19.2). The propaganda technique *card-stacking* contributes to the creation of enemy images, as far as it is used in favor of the in-group, in this case the Hutu population.

### **3.23 Before and After the Assassination of the President**

As mentioned in section 2.4, Richard Carver (2000:190) claims that a major methodological weakness of different RTLM studies is that they make little or no distinction between what the radio station broadcasted prior to the assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, and what they broadcasted after. *“Before 6 April RTLM was heavily suffused with general, implicit propaganda against the rebels of the RPF and – by implication but never explicitly – against the Tutsi population as a whole. ...on 6 April, RTLM took an entirely different role. It acted as direct organizing centre, sending militias to particular locations and broadcasting names, descriptions and car number plates of those fleeing the genocide”*, Carver (Ibid.:190) writes. Section 6.17 examines whether this changed style of broadcasting is reflected in the application of the propaganda techniques discussed above. RTLM reached its peak activity during the genocide (Kirschke 1996:109), and I presume that the propaganda techniques were used more often in the broadcasts after the President's death than in broadcasts before this event.

#### **4. STEPS 1-4: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF RTLM**

This chapter will analyze the RTLM propaganda through four of the steps in Jowett and O'Donnell's (1999:280) method for propaganda analysis. The institutional framework of RTLM will get most of the attention, because this is important to understand how RTLM could develop to be an important instrument in the genocide.

##### **4.1 Step 1: The Propagandists**

RTLM was established on April 8, 1993, one year prior to the genocide. Although several applications for private radio stations were made, RTLM, with its strong bonds to the Hutu Power faction in the government, was the only station granted a license. It is widely believed that the radio station was started as a way to circumvent the ban imposed on "harmful radio propaganda" to which the government had committed itself (Fachot 2000:1, Radio Netherlands 2003:1). The idea of creating a radio station devoted entirely to the agenda of the extremists within the MRND and the CDR<sup>49</sup> also appears to have arisen in response to reforms at Radio Rwanda, which had been under pressure from opposition parties to grant them access to present their views. In 1991, the major opposition parties succeeded in obtaining 15 minutes of weekly airtime each. This move did not otherwise affect the content of the radio programs, but it seems to have been a central factor in the increased support for opposition parties over the next several months (Kirschke 1996:47, 70-71, Prunier 1995:165, 188).

RTLM director Ferdinand Nahimana was one of the initiators of the radio station. In the trial against him at the ICTR, the Media Trial (see chapter 1), he testified that the primary idea behind RTLM was to make a radio station to counter RPF's *Radio Muhabura* (see section 4.4). In addition, Radio Rwanda was in the hands of the MDR,<sup>50</sup> and Nahimana wanted to ensure that the voice of his party, the MRND, was heard (ICTR 2003b:166).

RTLM began broadcasting on July 8, 1993, but the official contract between the government and the radio station was not signed until September 30. Another

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<sup>49</sup> *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CDR) was a radical Hutu racist party working to the right of the MRND (Prunier 1995:76, 128).

<sup>50</sup> *Movement Démocratique républicain* (MDR) became Habyarimana's main opposition party in the 1990s (African Rights 1995:31, Prunier 1995:409).

procedural irregularity also occurred. Article 13 of the Statutes specified that the radio station was required to be managed by a Board of Directors, composed of five to nine members nominated by RTLTM's General Assembly. The Board of Directors was responsible for electing the President and Vice-President of the Board, who would be legally responsible for all matters relating to the station. Still, individuals involved with RTLTM reported that the Board of Directors never was appointed. Instead, RTLTM was run by an informal commission led by Nahimana who, by all accounts, was the driving force behind the project (Kirschke 1996:71-72).

The agreement between RTLTM and the government included an undertaking by RTLTM that it should not "*broadcast any programs of a nature to incite hatred, violence or any form of division*", and that "*the broadcaster must refrain from telling lies or giving out information that may mislead the public*" (ICTR 2003b:194). Yet, the radio station never cared much about this regulation.

#### **4.1.2 The Founders and the Funding**

RTLTM was established as a jointly founded company with 50 shareholders.<sup>51</sup> They were for the most part extremely prominent figures, ranging from bank managers and businessmen, to journalists in the official media, army officers and government officials. The singer Simon Bikindi, whose anti-Tutsi songs were repeatedly played at CDR rallies and on RTLTM, was also among the shareholders (Kirschke 1996:73). It is possible that some of the shareholders were not aware of the political program of the founders, but subsequently may have been too intimidated to publicly distance themselves from the men in charge (African Rights 1995:162).

Forty of the shareholders were from the North, the region of the President, whose elite dominated the inner circles of power. Many had close personal ties with members of the Akazu and with the President himself (Kirschke 1996:72, Chalk 1999a:2). 39 of the founders belonged to the MRND. In the Media Trial, Nahimana clarified that these people contributed as individuals and that RTLTM never considered itself as an MRND company (ICTR 2003b:167). Only two of the founders belonged to the CDR. They were, however, represented in the top management of the radio

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<sup>51</sup> The number increased after a few months, and President Habyarimana became one of the largest shareholders. The newspaper Kangura is also listed as holding one share (ICTR 2003:168, 173).

(and in the leadership of the party), and Prunier (1995:88) describes RTLM as the “brainchild of the CDR intellectuals”.<sup>52</sup> “As a political institution CDR provided an ideological framework for genocide, and the two media institutions [Kangura and RTLM] formed part of the coalition that disseminated the message of CDR that the destruction of the Tutsi was essential to the survival of the Hutu”, the verdict of the Media Trial states (ICTR 2003b:193, 374).

Beyond their regional, political and ideological affiliations, the founders were noticeable for the key positions which many of them held in the government. In some cases, this meant that they were well-placed to assist RTLM with practical issues. For instance, Joseph Serugendo, who worked as the Head of Technical Services at *Office Rwandais d'Information* (ORINFOR),<sup>53</sup> provided free technical services to the radio station, which does not appear to have employed its own technicians. In addition, RTLM was provided with free electricity (Kirschke 1996:73, 82).

All the factors discussed in this section, demonstrate how RTLM was a fairly strong organization, something which was stated as a common characteristic of successful propaganda campaigns in section 3.4.

RTLM had several links to the militias. A significant number of high-level militia members were involved in creating and financially supporting the radio station, and six of the founders were leaders of the Interahamwe (ICTR 2003b:167). Moreover, a number of individuals were targeted by RTLM because they had tried to criticize or stop militia activities. By virtue of RTLM’s relationship to the militias, individuals who were denounced or even cited by the radio station risked attacks by these organizations. “...people who were prudent absolutely needed to listen to this station in case they were mentioned. If this happened you knew you had to change your address that day”, BBC journalist Sixbert Musangamfura explains (quoted in Kirschke 1996:94-95).<sup>54</sup>

Although the conduct of RTLM was attributable to the militias and the government (Argren 2003:40), the radio station presented itself as independent (see section 6.5). Carver’s (1991:5) definition of independence refers to privately-owned

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<sup>52</sup> CDR-member Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, one of the defendants in the Media Trial, was a member of the *comité d’initiative*, which organized the founding of RTLM. He was also the Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of foreign Affairs (ICTR 2003b:2).

<sup>53</sup> ORINFOR was a parastatal organization created by Habyarimana in 1974 to control the media (Kirschke 1996:x).

<sup>54</sup> RTLM did not verify information received from the Interahamwe before broadcasting it, Georges Ruggiu testified in the Media Trial. In addition, several of the journalists carried guns and participated in the combat, he claimed. According to Valérie Bemeriki, the weapons came from the army. However, the Court found both these persons unreliable as witnesses, and did not include their statements when making the judicial decision (ICTR 2003b:182-183, 188).



media institutions which cover political affairs but which are not politically aligned, either with a government or with opposition parties. The strong bonds to the Hutu parties and the militias make such a description inappropriate to RTLM. “*Kangura and RTLM were not open or neutral. They had well-defined perspective for which they were known*”, the ruling of the Media Trial concludes (ICTR 2003b:340). The following statement from RTLM journalist Bemeriiki illustrates this: “*I am greeting the Rwandan Armed Forces... We know how useful you are for us*” (RTLM June 22, 1994).

RTLM was not a commercial success, but for the extremists the radio station was politically profitable (African Rights 1995:78). The founders of RTLM mounted a massive campaign to solicit funding for the radio station, which required a minimum capital of Rwfr 3 million (17,836\$) in order to operate. RTLM appears to have relied on large investments from a few key individuals who supported the project from its inception. The founders also received smaller amounts from a wide section of people (Kirschke 1996:75). Virtually all active members of the MRND and the CDR in Kigali contributed with 5,000 francs each, Ali Yusuf Mugenzi (1994:12), a former Radio Rwanda journalist, claims. The total amount of funds raised by the persons who donated money is unknown (Kirschke 1996:74-75).

#### **4.1.3 The RTLM Staff**

RTLM employed eight journalists, or propaganda agents, as we perhaps ought to call them (see section 3.4). All of them had previously worked for the government media or with pro-MRND newspapers and they are believed to have been members of the MRND or the CDR. *Gaspard Gahigi*, RTLM’s Editor-in-Chief, was a member of the central committee of the MRND. He had a Master’s degree in Journalism from Paris, and previously he served in high-level positions at ORINFOR (Kirschke 1996:77, African Rights 1995:160). *Ferdinand Nahimana*, a historian who did his PhD on the Hutu kingdoms of northern Rwanda, became the new station’s programs director (RSF 1995:247). He gave up teaching to take charge of ORINFOR. After being forced from this position, he was supposed to become the Rwandan ambassador in Bonn, but the German government refused to accept him (Des Forges 1999:71).

RTLM journalist *Habimana Kantano* obtained a Master’s degree in Journalism from Leningrad, and later he worked at the government newspapers *Imvaho* and

*Umurwanashyaka* (African Rights 1995:160). He was particularly popular because of his loose and comical style on the air (IMI 2003). *Noel Hitimana*, another well-known RTLM figure, worked at Radio Rwanda for several years before being sacked, reportedly because of chronic alcoholism. At RTLM, he openly joked about his heavy drinking, a particularly taboo subject in Rwanda. Sometimes he went on the air so drunk that he had difficulty speaking clearly. *Valérie Bemeriki* was also a prominent personality at RTLM. Unlike many of her contemporaries, she did not attend university but had previously worked on MRND party papers. Another notorious RTLM figure was *Georges Ruggiu*, a teacher and Belgium national of Italian origin. He is reported to have led the anti-Belgian and the anti-UNAMIR campaign on RTLM (Kirschke 1996:78, African Rights 1995:161).<sup>55</sup> RTLM journalist *Ananie Nkurunziza* had previously worked as Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper *Intere*, which was founded by a leading member of the death squad *Network Zero*.<sup>56</sup> He is not known to have received any formal training as a journalist. *Emmanuel Rucogoza*, a younger and less well-known journalist, came to RTLM after a brief, but unsuccessful, stint at Radio Rwanda (Kirschke 1996:78, African Rights 1995:161).<sup>57</sup>

#### **4.2 Step 2: The Ideology and Purpose of the Propaganda**

Section 3.5 concluded that Hutu Power is an ideology. This part of the thesis will examine how this ideology developed, and how it influenced the RTLM propagandists.

Colonial scholars often concluded that the ancestors of Hutu and Tutsi migrated as different peoples into the Great Lakes region. This assumption was further reinforced by regional myths that predated the colonial period. Yet, the idea that the Tutsi were superior because they came from elsewhere and that the difference between them and the Hutu was a racial one, was an idea of colonial origin. The colonists believed that wherever in Africa there was evidence of an organized state, the ruling groups must have come from elsewhere. These groups were known as the

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<sup>55</sup> In May 2000, Ruggiu was given two concurrent sentences of twelve years each, after admitting to direct and public incitement to commit genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity (Radio Netherlands 2003:4).

<sup>56</sup> Network Zero was a joint enterprise between the Interahamwe and the Presidential Guards, and the death squad played an important role in the political assassinations during the genocide (African Rights 1995:65).

<sup>57</sup> It was not possible to find information about the RTLM journalists Mbirizi Philippe Mbilizi and Emmanuel Nkomati.

Hamites, and the notion that they were behind every bit of civilization on the continent was known as the Hamitic hypothesis (Ibid.:44-46, 80).

The core of the Hutu Power ideology was the conviction that the Tutsi were a race alien to Rwanda, and not an indigenous ethnic group. In defining the Tutsi as a foreign race, the Hutu extremists were reaffirming the colonial legacy and constructing their identity the same way that Belgian colonizers had constructed them prior to independence (Mamdani 2001:190). The idea that the Tutsi were a race not indigenous to Rwanda became important in the 1959 Revolution. In the Hutu Power ideology, the Tutsi were demonized by the Hutu as a foreign invading power with no entitlements in Rwanda. They had no right to power in a country where they were aliens (Caplan (ed.) 2000:1). Just as the first version of the Rwandan ideology had been a perfect construct to legitimize the domination by a few high-lineage Tutsi over everybody else, this second version, put forward from the days of the Revolution, was a marvelous tool for the new elite to rule over both the Hutu peasant masses and the disfranchised Tutsi community (Prunier 1995:80). Nahimana was one of the Rwandan scholars that strongly proclaimed the Hutu Power ideology (Jefremovas 2002:60). The central ideological document, the *Bahutu Manifesto*, reflected the ideological language that the Belgians, the Church, and the Tutsi leadership had imposed. The central passage of the manifesto highlighted that the problem basically was that of the monopoly of Tutsi race (Caplan (ed.) 2000:15).

The Second Republic, which started with Habyarimana's coup d'etat in 1973, made a difference regarding the question of race.

Habyarimana spoke of the Tutsi as an ethnic group, not a race, as Rwandans, and not as an alien minority. This is why the birth of Hutu Power as an organized political tendency went alongside a comprehensive propaganda effort discrediting Habyarimana's effort at reconciliation. The Hutu extremists had to undo the President's attempt to rehabilitate the Tutsi as an ethnic minority in the Rwandan society, Mamdani (2001:190) states. Consequently, the objective of the Hutu extremists' propaganda was to reracialize the Tutsi, as they had been in the colonial period and under the first postrevolutionary republic (1961-1973) (Ibid.:190). This is in line with what Jowett and O'Donnell stress is the main purpose of propaganda: To

achieve acceptance of the propagandists' ideology (see section 3.5). To recast the Tutsi as a race was to confirm that they were aliens in Rwanda. RTLM was central in this effort (Ibid.:190). This also resembles the ICTR, which argues that RTLM was set up "*in order to promote the ideology of Hutu extremism*" (ICTR 2003a:2). A strong ideology behind the propagandists is a characteristic common to all kinds of hate media. This was the case in Rwanda as well as in Germany under the Second World War (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:24).

As always in situations where a social group has to transgress generally accepted norms of behavior in order to defend its interests, it is extremely difficult to do so without the justification of an ideology depicting the transgression as justified. So in the 1990s, when the political situation looked as if the Tutsi were going to come back to positions of power, desperate remedies become necessary. Killing became an act of self-defense (see section 6.15), because the evil incarnate was now threatening to destroy the peaceful agrarian democratic Hutu republic. It was a matter of survival and the mistake of 1959 could not be repeated: If the evil race had been thoroughly eradicated then, their children would not have been threatening the country now (Prunier 1995:226-227). And the more credibility Hutu Power ideologues gained among the Hutu multitudes, the more they were able to turn the Tutsi minority inside Rwanda into a hostage population (Mamdani 2001:191).

René Lemarchand (2001:2) does not agree that it was the Hutu Power ideology that made the foundation for the genocidal acts in Rwanda. "*Whereas the Holocaust is the classic example of an ideological genocide, rooted in the most stridently racist ideology, the Rwanda genocide is better seen as the byproduct of the mortal threats posed to the revolutionary Hutu-dominated state by the RPF*", he writes. Lemarchand bases his conclusion on the writings of Yehuda Bauer (2001:47) in the book *Rethinking the Holocaust*. Bauer observes that one major difference between Holocaust and other genocides, among them the genocide of Rwanda, is that pragmatic considerations were central in all the other genocides, abstracts ideological motivation less so. If by pragmatic considerations is meant a conscious attempt to counter the clear and present danger of a Tutsi takeover, these considerations were more important than ideological ones, Lemarchand (2001:8) states. "*Without trying to minimize the impact of*

*anti-Tutsi propaganda in the years following the RPF invasion, the impetus to kill all Tutsi cannot be traced to a long-standing ideological commitment” (Ibid.:10). Instead, he claims that from the October 1990 invasion to April 1994, the overriding objective was to prevent the RPF from seizing power, and that throughout this period resource of violence served different intermediate goals. In the period from October 1990 to the opening of Arusha talks in August 1992,<sup>58</sup> hundreds of Tutsi civilians in the north and the west of the country were massacred. The aim was essentially to eliminate Tutsi who might join hands with the aggressors while at the same time accelerate the polarization of the yet unmobilized peasant communities. Later the extremists had another purpose in mind: Maintaining their power by destroying the Arusha accords and its supporters, including the moderates within the government parties (Ibid.:11).*

Catharine Newbury (1998:8) stresses that the efforts of Habyarimana to dampen ethnic tensions only lasted to the mid-1980s and that the regime’s controversial policy of ethnic quotas for jobs and educational opportunities undermined this effort. This argument works in favor of Bauer and Lemarchand’s arguments, because it implies that the need to reracialize the Tutsi was more pressing in periods earlier to the 1990s. Yet, even though the overriding goal was to prevent the RPF from taking power and to maintain own authority and privileges, as Lemarchand points out above, the Hutu Power ideology had a significant role in justifying this demand for authority and control. Although it might have been an intermediate factor, it is not wrong to claim that RTLM was set up in order to promote the ideology of Hutu extremism.

RTLM also had a second goal: To mobilize the Hutu population, especially the militias, to action. Several authors have highlighted this aspect of the radio station. “...RTLM radio, was a key tool used by extremists within the political parties to mobilize and incite the population to commit the massacres”, the ICTR (2000) states. This could be seen as just an aspect of the propaganda message, but because of RTLM’s close relation to the militias, it is appropriate to treat it as a goal in itself. This is also in accordance with what Ellul defines as *agitation propaganda*, which is a kind of propaganda that seeks to arouse people to participate in or support a cause (see section 3.5). This second

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<sup>58</sup> The Arusha Agreements between RPF and the Rwandan government are discussed in chapter 6.18.2

purpose of RTLM is not in contradiction to the first one. Fujii (2002:7) summarizes it like this: “*The power of RTLM was its ability to provide an overall framework for understanding what was going on in the world, and for understanding how to react to these events. By interpreting the world for its listeners, the station was able to prescribe particular actions that under normal circumstances most people would have found objectionable and immoral*”. Thus, in sum the media served as an instrument for the legitimization the killings of the Tutsi.

#### **4.2.1 A Deliberate Strategy**

As discussed in section 3.1, propaganda is a deliberate attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behavior. There is a strong case for concluding that this also was the case for the RTLM propaganda. First of all, in December 1991, a commission of ten officers prepared a secret report on how to defeat the enemy “*in the military, media and political domains*” (Des Forges 1999:62). This suggests that behind the extremists’ propaganda campaign was a calculated and well-planned strategy.

More facts point toward the same direction. In the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, the government subsidized production of radios, which were sold at a reduced price or given away (Chalk 2003). Some of these radios could only receive FM broadcasts, so that broadcasts from distant countries were not available (Dupaquier 08.01.2004). And prior to the genocide, the library in Butare had a lot of books about propaganda. This indicates how deliberate the propaganda was (Ibid.).

In the Media Trial, Prosecution Expert Witness Alison Des Forges testified that after the genocide, a document was found in the Butare prefectural office, written by an unknown propagandist who based his work on the book *Psychologie de la publicité et de la propaganda* by Robert Muchielli (ICTR 2003b:36). Drawing also on Lenin and Goebbels, this propagandist advocated the use of lies, exaggeration, ridicule and innuendo against the adversary and suggested that the public must be persuaded that the adversary stands for war, death, slavery, repression, injustice and sadistic cruelty. He also stressed the importance of linking propaganda to events and suggests simply “creating” events, if necessary. He proposed the use of *accusation in a mirror*, meaning that one would impute to the adversary one’s own intentions and plans. “*In this way, the party which is using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror*”, the person wrote (Ibid.:36). As discussed in section 3.11, this tactic worked extremely

well in the campaign to convince the Hutu that the Tutsi planned to exterminate them. The document is obviously written by someone who had studied at university level, but it is no proof that the other propagandists were familiar with this particular document, although they regularly used the techniques described (Des Forges 1999:66). The propaganda techniques mentioned by this unknown propagandist are not explicitly referred to as one of the techniques examined in this thesis. They are, however, indirectly included in the analysis. For example is *accusation in a mirror* discussed when the thesis analyzes the RTLM journalists' descriptions of the RPF activities (see section 6.15).

“...RTLM is instrumental in awakening the majority of the people. ...today's wars are not fought using bullets only, it is also a war of media, words, newspapers and radio stations”, Nahimana said in an interview on Radio Rwanda on April 25, 1994 (ICTR 2003b:184). This reveals that he was fully aware of the power of broadcasted words. In a MRND meeting in 1993, attended by about 15,000 people, Nahimana spoke about how RTLM should be used to disseminate ideas relating to Hutu empowerment, and he requested the crowd to support the radio station financially. He also spoke of using RTLM to fight against the Inyenzi. RTLM reported on the meeting and broadcasted many of the speeches, including Nahimana's (ICTR 2003b:305). The following statements broadcasted on RTLM on April 15 and June 22, 1994, also demonstrate how deliberate the propaganda campaign was:

*“However, our war does not use bullets. It uses papers and words”* (Barahinyura).

*“However, your weapon RTLM is there, it will fight against them...”* (Bemeriki).

ORINFOR repeatedly communicated to RTLM, both in letters and in meetings, its concerns over the broadcasting of ethnic hatred and propaganda. Some of the witnesses in the Media Trial explained that the RTLM staff responded to these complains by defending their own programs (ICTR 2003b:210).

All these factors show that the RTLM propaganda was a well-planned part of the genocide. This is an important fact, because otherwise it could be a lot easier for the directors and journalists at RTLM to disclaim all their responsibility for the hate speech they broadcasted. In demonstrating to what extent the propaganda was

incorporated in the genocidal strategy, it is less likely that the propagandists enjoy the long tradition of impunity in Rwanda (see section 5.5).

### **4.3 Step 3: The Target Audience and the Media Utilization Techniques**

Propaganda is aimed at the audience most useful to the propagandist (see section 3.6). Beyond addressing the general public, RTLM appears to have focused on the security forces and the militias. In the genocide, these groups, rather than the population, orchestrated and carried out large-scale massacres throughout the country at a relentless pace, Kirschke (1996:132) states. Prunier (in Kirschke 1996:86) agrees that RTLM had the militia members as its target audience, but in the book *The Rwandan Crisis History of a Genocide* (1995:247), he claims that it was the ordinary peasants who were the main actors of the genocide (see section 1.4). Thus, it seems that RTLM only pointed toward one of the major agents in the genocide. However, the militias constituted about 50,000 persons, so regardless of who killed the most, the members of Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi were important to reach for the extremists. Day after day RTLM encouraged, guided and motivated the government troops and the militias in their bloody task, RSF (1995:248) concludes.

The militias attracted mainly young men from the low-class people (Prunier 1995:243).<sup>59</sup> The gangs and young thugs were therefore an important audience to RTLM (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:16). This was a group not greatly impressed by the standard government propaganda, which was largely based on obscure references to the evils of the Tutsi monarchy in power prior to 1959. The extremists had to get support from people not having experienced the Revolution. “*The ideas of ethnic hatred against Tutsi had been around for years. RTLM presented them in a form more palatable for the younger generation. RTLM used street language*”, Prunier states (cited in Kirschke 1996:86).

The effect of a message will be more powerful if its language is adjusted to that of the target audience (Kotnik 1997:139). On many occasions, the banter in RTLM’s broadcasts was crude. This type of language shocked and offended many listeners, but it served to attract the young people. Thus, RTLM targeted its audience through the chosen style of the language. As Street mentions, the choice of presenters

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<sup>59</sup> By the late 1980s, Rwanda had severe economical problems. Coffee prices dropped and international financial institutions imposed programs that exacerbated inflation, unemployment and land scarcity. Young men were hit particularly hard (Caplan (ed.) 2000:2).



also worked in favor of the target audience. For instance, Habimana, already a well-known journalist by the time he began working at RTLM, was also a football fanatic, making him a favorite among younger males (IMI 2003).

#### **4.3.1 The Media Utilization Techniques**

The newspaper *Kangura* was one of the most active voices of hate, and is noted for its virulent abuse of the Tutsi population. Its slogan was “*the voice which seeks to awaken and defend the majority people*”, and it appears to have been established to counter the influence of the popular catholic newspaper *Kanguka* (Kirschke 1996:62).<sup>60</sup>

*Kangura* appeared to enjoy support of the President who argued that it was merely exercising the right to freedom of expression.<sup>61</sup> From April 1991, the newspaper was printed free of charge by a national printing company (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:15). Perhaps the most compelling indication of *Kangura*'s official connections was the content, which in many ways mirrored official rhetoric. *Kangura* engaged in incitement to hatred, presented at its crudest form in the *10 Hutu Commandments*, which mimicked the 10 Commandments of the Bible, well-known throughout the predominantly Christian country.<sup>62</sup> These described the Tutsi as “*blood and power thirsty*” and that their only goal was “*ethnic superiority*”. At the same time, they contained instructions on how to behave toward the Tutsi, for instance that a Hutu man never must get a Tutsi wife (Schabas 2000:145, Barcott 1999:Appendix).<sup>63</sup>

Several witnesses in the Media Trial described hearing RTLM broadcasting information that had been published in *Kangura*. Some claimed that every single issue of *Kangura* was commented on by RTLM journalists (ICTR 2003b:314). The only examples of this in the RTLM transcripts are in the broadcast from January 21, 1993 when Kantano said “*read Kangura No. 54*” and “*you should have a look at that Kangura issue*” on the air. There were many links between *Kangura* and RTLM. The newspaper was a shareholder, albeit a limited one, of RTLM, and they collaborated closely. When RTLM went on the air, Hassan Ngeze, Editor-in-Chief of *Kangura*, in

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<sup>60</sup> Both *Kangura* and *Kanguka* mean “Wake up!” (Kirschke 1996:62).

<sup>61</sup> *Kangura* was joined by other newspapers that also received support from persons linked to the regime. Often, the written word was underscored by cartoons, most of them so graphic that they could not be misinterpreted (Des Forges 1999:67). For further reading about these cartoons, see Barcott, Rye (1999): *Fear and Hate, Evocations of Genocide*.

<sup>62</sup> About 90% of the population is Christians (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 1999:85).

<sup>63</sup> Two witnesses in the Media Trial testified that they heard RTLM broadcasts the Ten Commandments (ICTR 2003b:149).

fact welcomed the arrival of this new ally in the “*fight to defend the republic*” (Des Forges 1999:70). “*Kangura and RTLM functioned as partners in a Hutu coalition, of which CDR was also a part. Kangura and RTLM promoted each other... The purpose of the coalition was to mobilize the Hutu population against the Tutsi ethnic minority*”, the ICTR concludes (2003b:316). As discussed in section 3.6, cooperation between different media institutions maximizes their potential effect (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:288).

Until 1992, state-owned Radio Rwanda was very much the voice of the government and the President. It announced prefectural or national meetings, nominations to and removals from government posts, as well as the results of admission examinations to secondary schools. Before the daily news programs, the radio station broadcasted Habyarimana’s speeches (Des Forges 1999:67-68).

Although nominally private and opposed to Radio Rwanda, RTLM was linked to it in a number of ways. RTLM was allowed to broadcast on their frequencies when Radio Rwanda was not transmitting, an arrangement that encouraged listeners to see the two as linked. The new station also drew personnel from Radio Rwanda (Ibid.:69). Once the genocide began, Radio Rwanda was pulled into the orbit of RTLM. The RTLM popularity had an impact on Radio Rwanda, which did not want to stay behind. The public radio station decided to adopt a more violent hateful tone. Its director, Jean-Marie Higiuro, fled the country, himself targeted for death by RTLM broadcasts. He was replaced by Jean-Baptiste Bamwanga, a journalist fired from Radio Rwanda in 1992 for his role in inciting a massacre of Tutsi (Des Forges 1999:71, Alexis and Mpambara 2003:17). And the real rival radio station, RPF’s Radio Muhabura, never became much of a threat (see section 4.4).

A lot of speeches, songs and poems also supported the extremists’ cause, and throughout 1992 and 1993, extremists toured the country inciting people in public meetings (African Rights 1995:75-76).<sup>64</sup> Such meetings offered the propagandists an essential opportunity to spread their doctrine (Des Forges 1999:83). A speech in 1992 by Dr. Leon Mugesera, a leading ideologue among the Hutu extremists, is often quoted in this context. “*They [the Tutsi] belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find a shortcut to get there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo River....Wipe them all out*”, he stated (Prunier

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<sup>64</sup> Few transcripts of these extremist speeches are available (African Rights 1995:76).

1995:172). This was clearly a reference to the Hamitic hypothesis which was used as an argument for those who asserted that the Tutsi did not originate from Rwanda. Some of the advocates of this view in fact stressed that the Tutsi came from Ethiopia, and during the genocide a lot of dead bodies were thrown in the river mentioned in the speech of Mugesera (Keane 1995:14-15, Jefremovas 2002:60-61).

Thus, the Hutu extremists used every possible means to spread their message and the Hutu extremists' propaganda became total. This is important for propaganda campaigns to succeed (see section 3.6).

#### **4.4 Step 4: The Counterpropaganda**

The RPF radio station, Radio Muhabura,<sup>65</sup> began its broadcasts from Uganda in July 1992. It broadcasted regularly from that time. Its signal did not reach throughout all of Rwanda, still, its audience grew steadily during the next two years. Radio Rwanda, and later RTL, immediately instructed listeners not to believe what they heard on the rebel radio broadcasts (Des Forges 1999:68, see section 6.6).

Radio Muhabura broke the Rwandan government's monopoly on broadcasting, yet, it did little to contribute to the free flow of information. Instead, as its name suggests, the radio station continued the culture of propaganda and counter-propaganda, providing little concrete information and spending a lot of air time presenting and promoting the RPF to the Rwandan population (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:13, Kirschke 1996:45). Although Radio Muhabura glorified the RPF, it did so in a nationalist rather than an ethnic context, and this was consistent with the general RPF emphasis on minimizing the differences between Hutu and Tutsi (Des Forges 1999:68). The controllers of the RPF's weakly powered radio station apparently never called on Tutsi to flee or, for instance, warned Tutsi that the killers were not respecting churches as sanctuaries.<sup>66</sup> As Chalk (1999b:6) describes it: *"Apparently for political reasons, RPF radio broadcasters tried to avoid discussing the ethnic and political basis of the killings, talking about the "Rwandese", and not about "Tutsi", doing everything possible to minimize the differences between "Hutu" and "Tutsi", even at the cost of Tutsi lives"*.

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<sup>65</sup> Literally, Radio Muhabura means "leading the way" (Kirschke 1996:xi).

<sup>66</sup> Churches were safe havens in the upheavals of 1959, but in 1994 they became traps of death (Chalk 1999b:6).

Although the journalists at Radio Muhabura knew that genocide was taking place, they did not state anything specific to support this claim and they failed to explain that Tutsi were being systematically targeted in the violence. At the same time, the radio station systematically denied all reports of abuses by the RPF troops, even when there was substantial evidence to the contrary (Kirschke 1996:51).

Clearly it would have been difficult for the RPF journalists to enter Rwanda to conduct on-site investigations, and Radio Muhabura relied heavily on confidential contacts for information on developments in the country. Perhaps for this reason the radio station focused on the RPF rather than on events within Rwanda. Radio Muhabura broadcasted official statements by the RPF leaders, and generally tried to encourage people to support the movement in its battle (Ibid.:50). The IMI database consists of one tape with a Radio Muhabura broadcast. A look at this transcript reveals a more formal tone and a less aggressive style than RTLM had. In addition, there are no groundless indictments about the FAR, compared to all the accusations RTLM made about the RPF (see section 6.10). Nevertheless, the broadcast is propagandistic because it obviously tries to place the RPF in a favorable light:

*“Journalist: ... which military signification can you give to the fact that Kanombe camp has been captured [by RPF] since you know it because you were a soldier too?”*

*Mukurarinda Alphonse: The fact that that so strong camp is defeated shows that the Rwandan Army is defeated, they have to drop the arms. The camp was strong...”* (Radio Muhabura June 6, 1994).

The only effective weapon against propaganda on behalf of one policy seems to be propaganda on behalf of an alternative, Lasswell (reprint from 1934 in Jackall 1995:22) states. This was not enough in the Rwandan genocide. Radio Muhabura never became a serious threat to RTLM. In a country where both the official media and the rebel radio station were notoriously formal, the more entertaining RTLM faced no serious competition, and Chalk (1999c:2) describes it as *“enormously popular and widely heard”*. Sources close to the RPF claim that even the RPF soldiers preferred listen to RTLM, instead of Radio Muhabura with its more traditional, politically correct and “preachy” style. Also Alexis Kanyarengwe, the RPF chairman, is reported to have been an avid listener to RTLM (Kirschke 1996:85, Prunier 1995:189, Alexis and Mpambara 2003:16).

## **5. STEP 5: THE PROPAGANDA CONTEXT**

The racialization of Hutu and Tutsi was not simply an intellectual construct; Belgian power turned Hamitic racial supremacy from an ideology into an institutional fact. Key institutions such as the school, the state administration and Church built upon racial privileges and reproduced racial ideology (Mamdani 2001:87). The Tutsi were not about to become equals under any Hutu government, but during the first 15 years of Habyarimana's regime, life was tolerable. Yet, ethnic identity cards governed all public and commercial relationships. In addition, ethnic quotas and spheres of exclusive ethnic concentration remained hallmarks of the society, and at every level power was monopolized by the Hutu. There was neither a single Tutsi head of a prefecture nor a single Tutsi burgomaster until the very end of the period. There were only a handful of Tutsi officers in the army, and the Hutu officers were discouraged from marrying Tutsi women (Caplan (ed.) 2000:22).

This chapter demonstrates how the RTLM propaganda was in line with existing attitudes stemming from central institutions in the society. It also discusses how the situation in Burundi, the 1990 RPF invasion and the media politics in Rwanda influenced the Hutu extremists' propaganda. Such a contextual understanding is important if one wants to understand how RTLM could turn into a dangerous weapon of words.

### **5.1 The Role of the Church**

As a process both ideological and institutional, the racialization of the Tutsi was the creation of a joint enterprise between the colonial state and the Catholic Church (Mamdani 2001:87). The missionaries were the primary ideologues of colonization, and a necessary prerequisite for membership in the elite the Belgians were creating was to become a Christian (Prunier 1995:31). It is little wonder that the first bishop of Rwanda cultivated close relationships with both the royal house and the colonial administration, which provided security for the missionary enterprise and left the development of social, educational and medical services to the Church (Schonecke 1998:2). When the Catholic Church began to recruit native Rwandan clergy, it selected exclusively Tutsi, and these priests, nuns, and brothers played an important role in interpreting Rwandan history and culture (Longman 1997:5).

After the Second World War, a number of the missionaries who came to Rwanda were influenced by social-democratic philosophies and they became concerned by the plight of the Hutu who, despite constituting more than 80% of the population, were entirely excluded from political offices and other opportunities for advancement (Longman 1997:3). The combination of changes in clerical sympathies, struggle for control of the Rwandan church and increasing challenge of the colonial order by the Tutsi elite, contributed to bring about a slow but momentous switch in the Church's attitudes, from supporting the Tutsi elite to helping the Hutu rise from their subservient position toward a new role as a counter-elite (Prunier 1995:44). The Hutu who replaced the exiled Tutsi authorities in 1962 were drawn from this new elite, and they owed their positions substantially to the Church (Longman 1997:4).

In theory, churches in Rwanda could have used their independence to challenge state power. However, the church leaders were close to political power in the Habyarimana regime, and they played an important role in the development of the Hutu extremism (Rinaldo and Rinaldo 2004). The archbishop was a prominent member of the MRND, and he was also a close friend of the President. Thus, the church leadership never confronted the propaganda message, and they never challenged the injustice of the regime or warned the people of the impending danger (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 1999:86). Some of the leaders even stated that the Tutsi were condemned by God (Rinaldo and Rinaldo 2004). The propagandists, on their side, used religion and the Church to validate their teachings (Des Forges 1999:72). They frequently couched their ideas in religious language or referred to passages from the Bible. This helped the propagandists to make the teaching of fear and hate more acceptable (Ibid.:72).<sup>67</sup>

The interests of the church employees were closer to the parallel state elite, with whom they had attended school and who had a similar privileged lifestyle, than to the rest of the society. They often socialized together and they frequently cooperated on business ventures. Leaders of the churches, like leaders of the state, had vested interests in preserving the status quo that had given them significant privileges and power. The churches provided additional symbolic legitimacy to the state, which,

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<sup>67</sup> There are no examples of such religious overtones in the RTLM broadcasts analyzed in this thesis.

in turn, facilitated church activities (Longman 1997:7, Caplan (ed.) 2000:24). This might explain why the churches not only failed to oppose the genocide but also participated in it.<sup>68</sup> Priests who had condemned the government's use of ethnic quotas were also among the first victims of the massacres (Mamdani 2001:226).

## **5.2 Educational Difference between Hutu and Tutsi**

Under Belgian rule, education became a portal which gave access to political power. It was also the portal of the Catholic Church. Political conflict in Belgium, and lack of money and men in Rwanda, left the educational system almost entirely in missionary hands (Linden 1977:152-155). Most often, they restricted admission mainly to Tutsi, especially in the upper schools. Since the Tutsi were the “natural-born chiefs”, they had to be given priority in education so that the Church could enhance its control over the future elite of the country. In schools where both Hutu and Tutsi children were admitted, the latter group was given a “superior” education taught in French. This educational divide underlines the political fact that educated Hutu were not destined for common citizenship (Mamdani 2001:89-90).

The political leadership nurtured by the Catholic Church in the 1950s was Hutu, but the church leadership in postrevolutionary Rwanda continued to be predominantly Tutsi.<sup>69</sup> As a result, in 1966 the political elite created a law which established state control over the schools, and this became an instrument for Hutu control over the educational system (Mamdani 2001:136). By the 1970s, entry to all schools was determined by ethnic and regional quotas. With regard to admission to secondary schools, the results of the primary examinations were never published and children were admitted, or not admitted, on criteria which were not available for scrutiny (Obura 2003:43). Based on fictitious statistics, the Hutu were officially allowed 90% of educational and employment opportunities, while the Tutsi and Twa got only 9% and 1% respectively (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 1999:72). Additionally, a disproportionate number of the Hutu places went to northerners, and a disproportionate number of northern spaces went to those from Gisenyi, the home

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<sup>68</sup> The many extreme examples of the churches participation in the genocide include the story about the two Catholic nuns, Gertrude Mukangango and Julienne Kisito, who were involved in a slaughter of at least 5,000 civilians that had sought refuge in their monastery (Hennig 2001).

<sup>69</sup> However, seven of the nine bishops were Hutu (Des Forges 1999:43).

region of the President (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 1999:64). This system created more regional and ethnic animosity than had ever been known in the country. This partly explains why, in the propaganda and in the killings, the target groups were both Tutsi and members of the Hutu oppositions, often from the South (Ibid.:72-73).

UNICEF (1995) describes the school system as having “to a large extent reflected the destructive divisions in Rwanda society” (quoted in Obura 2003:45). Racism was propagated at school, and history syllabus painted the Tutsi as natural enemies of the Hutu, and projected the PARMEHUTU<sup>70</sup> as a salvation force (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 1999:72). This systematic preaching of racial ideology served to keep alive racial hatred at a time when opportunities existed for national reconciliation (Ibid.:72). Thus, the propagandists built upon the lessons Rwandans had learned in school. It was hardly necessary even to repeat the basic assumptions that Hutu and Tutsi were different peoples by nature (Des Forges 1999:72, Fujii 2002:5). Still, the degree in which the teachers promoted a racial ideology differed from person to person (Karangwa 06.01.2204).<sup>71</sup>

### **5.3 The RPF Invasion**

On October 1, 1990, an estimated 10,000 well-armed soldiers from the RPF carried out an invasion of Rwanda. During the first few days they benefited from a surprise effect, but it did not take long before things started to go wrong. On October 30, the invasion ended, and when the RPF troops briefly occupied a border post the next days, it looked more like a desperate act of defiance than a calculated military move. Yet, it signaled the beginning of a long-term struggle which was to last the next four years (Otunnu 1999:31, Prunier 1995:93-96).

The invasion gave Habyarimana a chance to reawaken an ethnic consciousness in Rwanda, which viewed the Tutsi as the invader and the enemy. Extremism was reinforced and slowly it began to consolidate (Kakwenzire and Kamukama 1999:73). “It is our view that the invasion of October 1, 1990 ranks, along with the Belgian policy of

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<sup>70</sup> *Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu* (PARAMEHUTU) was created as the party of Kayibanda in 1959 (Mamdani 2001:121).

<sup>71</sup> Today, the history of Rwanda is such a contested issue that it is excluded from lessons in school (Kagabo 11.11.2003, Lurie 2004).



*institutionalizing ethnicity and the triumph of the ethnic extremists in the early 1960s, as one of the key defining moments in Rwandan history*”, Caplan (2000:34) writes.

From the first day of the war, the officials and propagandists warned that the RPF had come to restore the monarchy (Des Forges 1999:76). In order to dramatize the gravity of the situation, the government staged a fake attack on Kigali during the night of October 4, 1990. This was used as a pretext to engage in a range of human rights abuses, including mass detention of suspected political opponents. Between eight and ten thousand people, mainly Tutsi, were detained (African Rights 1995:29, Prunier 1995:101-102). Many people had believed the fake fighting to be genuine and they expected the RPF fighters to attack Kigali at any time (Prunier 1995:109). Hence, the government created more fear in the audience than was actually necessary.

Around one million people were internally displaced as a result of the invasions of the RPF in 1990 and 1993 (UN 1995:2). And the RPF’s expectations that Rwandans would embrace them as saviors from the Habyarimana regime were swiftly dispelled. Even the Hutu who opposed Habyarimana and disavowed ethnic categorizations must have resented the attack, Caplan (2000:35) claims. What right had this band of unknown soldiers to invade a sovereign country? Most of the invaders had not even been born in Rwanda, had no known roots in the country and had certainly no support from the majority of Rwandans. “...it is little wonder that Habyarimana and his followers could easily appeal to the vast majority of Rwandans to unite against the outsiders” (Ibid.:36). The war was used by the government to take advantage of the “Tutsi feudal threat” and to recreate around itself the atmosphere of unanimity it used to enjoy before the onset of the democratization movement (Prunier 1995:108).

The invasion gave an ethnic strategy immediate credibility, and thus facilitated the propaganda message promoted by RTLM. The propagandists echoed the position adopted by the government in 1990, Des Forges (1999:76) claims. The carefully inculcated fears about Tutsi conspiracies, about alleged plots to regain control and merciless attacks on all Hutu, which had been dormant for so many years, were deliberately revived. The nation was reminded that the Tutsi were the Other; they were all alien invaders (Caplan (ed.) 2000:37). Was it therefore not self-evident that all Tutsi were accomplices of the invaders? In addition, it was not difficult for the

government to exploit its own failures in order to rally the majority behind them. In a country where so many had so little land, it took little ingenuity to convince Hutu peasants that the newcomers would reclaim lands they had left long before and on which Hutu farmers had immediately settled (Ibid.:37).<sup>72</sup>

#### **5.4 The Situation in Burundi**

*“Learn from what happened in Burundi”*, Gahigi, RTLM’s Editor-in-Chief, proclaimed (RTLM January 21, 1994). He probably had the assassination of the Burundian President Melchior Ndadaye in mind. As the first Hutu President of the country, Ndadaye brought to a close 28 years of Tutsi hegemony in June 1993 (Lemarchand 1995:10). His death (October 1993) at the hands of a Tutsi army carried a powerful demonstration effect to the Hutu of Rwanda. As violence swept across Burundi, causing some 200,000 panic-stricken Hutu to seek refuge in Rwanda, the message conveyed by the murder came through clear and loud: “Never trust the Tutsi!” (Ibid.:10).<sup>73</sup>

To understand the impact of Ndadaye’s death on the political situation in Rwanda, we have to remember that Rwanda and Burundi are the two opposite ends of a political seesaw. Their parallel, and at times common, past, their comparable social structures, their constant and obsessive mutual scrutiny, fated them to be mirrors of each other’s hopes, woes and transformations (Prunier 1995:198). Each act of repression in one of the states became the pretext for a renewed round of killing in the other (Caplan (ed.) 2000:20) It was largely the fear aroused in the Tutsi community of Burundi by the Rwandan massacres of 1959-63 which led to the construction of a Tutsi dominated political system in Burundi. It was the renewed fright caused by Rwanda-inspired Hutu restlessness in the late 1960s which drove Burundian Tutsi extremists to start the mass killings of the Hutu intellectuals in 1972, in order to deprive a Hutu movement of its potential elite (Prunier 1995:198). At the same time, the 1972 massacre, the killings of Hutu by the Burundian Tutsi government in 1988

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<sup>72</sup> According to a government study done in 1991, the richest 16% of landowners held 43% of the land, while the poorest households tried to eke out living on holdings that ranged from one quarter to three-quarters of a hectare (Des Forges 1999:45).

<sup>73</sup> These refugees, highly politicized by the events in Burundi, were now available for political mobilization in Rwanda (Lemarchand 1995:10, see chapter 1.4).

and the assassination of Ndadaye by a Tutsi-dominated army, were critical to the capacity of Rwandan Hutu extremists to incite fear (Jefremovas 2002:112).

For the Rwandan Hutu extremists, the killing of Ndadaye was a clear example of Tutsi perfidy and it strengthened them in their decisions to resist the Arusha Agreements at all costs. It also convinced them that the time had come for action. They knew that the shock felt in Rwanda after Ndadaye's death would enable them to rally many hesitant people (Mamdani 2001:199). Thus, the murder of the President and the arrival of thousands of Hutu refugees spreading tales of terror and massacre at the hands of the Tutsi army of Burundi, added fuel to the fire of hate propaganda (Prunier 1995:200). Additionally, the assassination made it easier to proclaim that the Tutsi would not accept elected politicians (Berkeley 2001:264, RTLM November 20, 1993).

### **5.5 The Media Politics in Rwanda**

This part of the thesis focuses on the condition of journalism in the years before the genocide and it discusses some of the factors that made genocidal manipulation of the media possible (Frohardt and Temin 2003:3).

Journalists were at the extremists' death lists, and at least 48 journalists, half of the profession, were killed during the genocide. It is hard to determine exactly who were killed because of their ethnic origin (half the victims were Tutsi), their political activities (most belonged to opposition parties) or of their work as journalists. Nevertheless, the result was that the authorities silenced any voices that might be raised against the extremist propaganda. Most of the journalists died in the early days of the massacre, in addition, several journalists were sent to jail (RSF 1995:249, Kellow and Steeves 1999:117).

Each year, the *Reporters Sans Frontières* (RSF) writes about the situation of freedom of speech in the world. In the reports from 1992 to 1995 (covering the period from 1991 to 1994), Rwanda was described as a country with harsh conditions for independent journalism. The journalists, whose articles seem to have displeased the authorities, were arrested; others went into hiding in order to avoid imprisonment. Some of them even got killed (Amnesty International 1992:6).

A real independent private press emerged in Rwanda in 1988, starting with the establishment of the Kinyarwandan publication *Kanguka* by the Tutsi businessman Valens Kajeguhakwa. This independent newspaper spurred the Church's publication *Kinyamateka*, which again became more critical (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:12, Longman 1997:8).<sup>74</sup> After the legalization of opposition parties in June 1991, the number of independent newspapers in Rwanda rose from about a dozen to 60. Most of them were either affiliated with or financed by various opposition parties or by the ruling party, the MRND. Many of these newspapers ceased publications after the first year, and in 1992, only 30 newspapers were left (Kirschke 1996:52).

The development of the media roughly corresponded to the first RPF attack on Rwanda. Thus, the media multiplied in an atmosphere of beginning civil war and this brought restrictions on the freedom of movement of journalists. Private media critical of the ruling party had problems traveling in the country, so it was easier for authorities to promote their version of events (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:12).

At the same time as the explosion of the number of private media, a press law was adopted. Although the law guaranteed freedom of the press and confidentiality of sources, it placed numerous obligations on the media, especially concerning the detailed documents on finances and orientation to be submitted before a newspaper or radio station could be launched. Article 3 of the Law said that the press should “*ensure sincere and/or fair, independent and responsible reporting*”, but journalists who criticized the government, especially in relation to its handling of the RPF invasion, risked denunciation by the authorities as “the enemy”, “RPF supporters” or “accomplices” (Ibid.:13). They could also be targeted by Article 47, which stated that it was a crime to provoke Rwandan soldiers “*in order to divert them from their military duties or from their obedience to their superiors*”. Negative coverage of the Rwandan troops, including articles on their losses, was classified as “*an attack on the morale of our armed forces*” (Ibid.:13-14, RSF 1993:253). Yet, with the legalization of opposition parties, the new Press Law of 1991 and the new transitional government in 1992, journalists enjoyed greater legal protection and there were fewer cases of arbitrary arrests and detentions.

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<sup>74</sup> As an organ disseminating a rival ideology to that of the Tutsi elite, *Kinyamateka* was important in the political evolution of Rwanda during the 1950s (Linden 1977:235).

Just as formal respect for freedom of speech was improving, informal repression was introduced with the emergence of the MRND and CDR militias (Carver and Kirschke 1997:15, see section 1.4). Consequently, Rwanda continued to have a hostile political climate for journalists (Donnadieu 1992:28). Journalists who did not obey orders were pressed to resign, the rest of them tried to comply to keep their jobs (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:10).

In the harsh environment for freedom of expression, the road to hate propaganda used to incite killing was not long. Rwandan journalists were easy to manipulate because of their general lack of journalist capacity, which refers to the journalists' ability to carry out their job with a reasonable degree of professional integrity and skill. This is important because more capable journalists tend to make media outlets less susceptible to abuse (Frohardt and Temin 2003a:4). In addition, journalists who were generally not well paid and unorganized were easily attracted by financial and material advantages. The private press, which existed just before the genocide and was denouncing the hate propaganda and the increasing violence, did not have much experience. The militias commonly harassed them, and several journalists chose to flee in exile (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:25). Thus, the groundwork for using the media as a genocidal weapon was laid over a period of several years (Longman 1997:9, Frohardt and Temin 2003a:1).

How could hate media succeed to this degree in Rwanda, Alexis and Mpambara (2003:25) ask in their report *The Rwandan Media Experience from the Genocide*. Among the factors they highlight is the lack of an independent institutional framework to counteract and stop propaganda institutions. Public broadcasting was a government monopoly with a management board which was not independently appointed, had no financial autonomy and no editorial freedom. There was no transparent and accountable system to license private broadcasters. Indeed, the only private station eventually to be licensed was RTLM, owned by a group of Hutu extremists allied to a faction within the government (Ibid.:13, 25, Carver 2004:52). In addition, violations of the laws were not sanctioned. RTLM violated both the Press Law and the penal code, it received several warnings from ORINFOR, but there were no sanctions (ICTR 2003b:195-203). Defamation cases were raised but blocked by

non-independent courts. Impunity made it possible for RTLM to go on broadcasting as usual (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:25). Kagabo (11.11.2003) highlights the situation of impunity as one of the most important contextual factors that facilitated the radio propaganda. People who killed in 1959 were glorified instead of being punished, and other massacres by the governments also went largely unpunished. Thus, a pervasive culture of impunity began to complement the growing culture of violence that was emerging (Caplan (ed.) 2000:20). The organizers of the killings in 1994 correctly assumed that they could act with impunity, and this made it easier for the propagandists to call for action among the Hutu population (Lemarchand 1995:11).

## **5.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed how the RTLM propaganda was a child of its age. It was supportive of, rather than discrepant from, commonly held views. Rather than trying to change the racial attitudes in the community, the RTLM message was in line with what central institutions had passed on for years. As discussed in section 3.7, this kind of propaganda is most likely to be effective because it is familiar with existing presuppositions. This aspect was important for RTLM's mobilizing character, because such familiarity with the propaganda message makes it easier to generate action in an audience (see section 3.7).

## 6. STEP 6: THE PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES USED BY RTLM

The aim of this chapter is to show how the propaganda techniques discussed in chapter 3 created a Tutsi enemy image. These techniques resemble what Spillman and Spillman (1991) describe as the characteristics of *the syndrome of the enemy image* (see section 3.9.3). The use of the propaganda techniques also illustrate the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of the RTLM propaganda (see section 3.9.1), as well as the increased intensity and brutality of the RTLM broadcasts following the assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994 (see section 3.23).

### 6.1 Biased Journalism versus Propaganda

In section 3.10, to be *biased* was defined as the extent to which someone is systematically favorable to a particular set of interests. If being biased is to prefer one side in a dispute, to favor one interpretation or to sympathize with one cause, it does not follow automatically that it is wrong. It is only on some occasions that such behavior should be criticized,<sup>75</sup> and bias is a matter of concern in journalism because journalists present themselves, or are required to be, unbiased (Street 2001:17). A journalist can argue for any political cause in private, but if he/she does the same when reporting a story, he/she fails to meet a journalist's responsibilities (Ibid:17).

To describe a news story as biased is to challenge its validity and to see it as failing to live up to the journalistic ideals of being impartial, objective and balanced (Ibid.:16). The RTLM staff presented the radio station as independent and they highlighted the veracity and authenticity of their broadcasts (see section 6.5). As discussed in section 4.1.2, RTLM did not, however, live up to such principles. On the other hand, there is impossible to present a one hundred percent objective truth (Savich 2000:16). Every human being has a *horizon* that colors our understanding of the reality (Lindkvist 1981:32). This acknowledgement does not render the term bias meaningless, but a distinction must be made between what is an acceptable and what is an unacceptable level of bias (Street 2001:19). How these boundaries are drawn varies with forms and systems of communication, and they are not permanent. RTLM

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<sup>75</sup> For example, in political arguments in informal settings, to be biased is viewed as reasonable (Street 2001:17).

which promoted an ideology of killing Tutsi did, however, cross the boundaries of what is an acceptable level of bias in journalism.

A journalist whose story is biased, who for instance uses only a few elite sources or who builds upon established stereotypes, is not necessarily a propagandist. He/she might just be a journalist with lack of the required skills and professional pride. On the other hand, biased use of sources and use of stereotypes can be an important part of a propaganda strategy. To differentiate between biased journalism and propaganda it is necessary to review the journalists' motive. Propaganda is a deliberate attempt to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandists, while biased journalism is the result of missing journalistic skills. Because the RTLM staff belonged to the group of extremists whose purpose was to promote the Hutu Power ideology and who initiated the genocide (see section 4.1.3), it is useful to draw on propaganda theory when analyzing the RTLM broadcasts. Nevertheless, it is important to note that biased journalism and propaganda often approach each other in their use of techniques. In some parts of this chapter, the division between biased journalism and propaganda will be further elaborated on. I will also return to the issue in the conclusion of the study (see section 7.1).

## **6.2 Biased Use of Oral Sources**

This part of the thesis will discuss if the RTLM journalists were biased in their selection of sources by analyzing who was permitted to talk and present their opinion on the air, except for the editorial staff.

The selection of sources is to a great extent ignored in the literature about the Rwandan genocidal propaganda. For that reason, the subject gets much attention in this thesis.<sup>76</sup> The use of sources is often a vital part of a propaganda campaign (see section 3.10), and because RTLM was set up as a propaganda instrument (see section 4.2.1), the radio station's use of sources can be viewed as a propaganda technique. This does not mean, however, that biased use of sources never occurs in ordinary journalism.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Allison Des Forges touches upon this subject in *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (1999).

<sup>77</sup> For example, only 19% of the sources in the Norwegian press are women, but very few would describe the Norwegian media as propagandistic because of that (Verdikommisjonen 1999).



In addition to the RTLM staff, 50 different persons were interviewed on RTLM in a total of 57 times.<sup>78</sup> Usually, only one external source was used in a broadcast. The highest number of external sources used in one broadcast was seventeen, with the second highest number being eight (RTLM May 28 and May 29, 1994). The two broadcasts with the highest number of external sources differed from the other broadcasts because the journalist did not sit in a studio, but was interviewing people on the street.

As discussed in section 3.10, RTLM used powerful sources to sway the listeners' opinions. These sources had political assignments or leading positions, and they were categorized as *elite sources*. Because Rwandans have great respect for formal learning (Des Forges 199:71), students were also placed in this group. The group of *ordinary sources* consisted of civilians who were not presented with any title or occupation.

21 of the 50 persons interviewed on RTLM were defined as elite sources, and 26 were ordinary sources.<sup>79</sup> This proportion is not in accordance with the assumption presented in section 3.10, concerning a greater number of elite sources than ordinary sources. Rather, it implies that RTLM also lent the airwaves to ordinary people. However, if one excludes the two tapes not recorded in a studio, the same numbers are 20 elite sources (80%) and three ordinary sources. Consequently, the assumption was confirmed after all, but only in the case of studio broadcasts.

Whether such a preference for elite sources reflects propaganda more than biased journalism, is a question open to discussion. Elite sources are often over-represented in journalism as well as in propaganda. This could be a result of the fact that journalism critical to the circles of power has to focus on the power elite. Alternatively, it might indicate that biased journalism allows the media to function as a microphone for the elite (Allern 1992:92). With regard to the discussion about the deliberate propaganda strategy of RTLM in section 4.2.1, the radio station could be said to use elite sources as a means of propaganda. This seems also reasonable to conclude when viewed in light of the findings discussed in the next paragraph.

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<sup>78</sup> From now on, these 50 persons will be referred to as RTLM's external sources.

<sup>79</sup> It was not possible to place three of the sources in any groups, due to lack of information about their occupation or because their statement was too short to fairly identify a particular group.

Section 3.10 assumed that most of the external sources represented the view of the Hutu extremists, and based on their formal positions,<sup>80</sup> some of the sources were categorized as *Hutu Power friendly* (HP friendly). Sources interviewed while they were working at checkpoints<sup>81</sup> and sources whose statements supported the extremist agenda,<sup>82</sup> were also placed in this category. Based on this classification, 31 (62%) of the sources were defined as HP friendly, and four were not.<sup>83</sup> This is in favor of the assumption concerning sources who reflected the view of the extremists. The use of HP friendly sources led to consistency of RTLM's propaganda message. This increased the impact of the radio station on the listeners (Des Forges 1999:250).

Because the majority of the sources were both HP friendly and from the elite, RTLM was biased in its use of sources. These sources contributed to create a Tutsi enemy image as far as they presented disparaging statements about the Tutsi on the air. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the HP friendly sources, particularly the civilians, did not necessarily agree with the extremists. Because of a situation of “*kill or be killed*” (Fujii 2002:6) it is unlikely that civilians would dare to express other views on the air. Three of the four sources not categorized as HP friendly were Tutsi. The last person in this group of sources was not categorized at all, due to missing information about him.

### **6.2.1 The Treatment of the Sources**

The degree to which the RTLM journalists asked the sources leading questions, presented them with their names and titles or commented on their statements differed. In seven broadcasts the journalists explicitly made positive remarks either to the sources themselves or with regard to their statements. For instance, when Froduald Kamira, vice President of the MRND Power, spoke positively about the government,<sup>84</sup> journalist Valérie Bemeriki said:

*“Thank you for your good constructive ideas and I hope that our listeners have gained something from these views”* (RTLM April 12, 1994).

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<sup>80</sup> For example membership in the CDR or having a ministerial post in the interim government.

<sup>81</sup> Roadblocks were a central element of the strategy of controlling the Tutsi. A dense network of checkpoints on all roads and paths prevented the targeted people from escaping (African Rights 1995:51).

<sup>82</sup> For instance, if they claimed that the Tutsi or the RPF were the enemy of Rwanda.

<sup>83</sup> It was not possible to place 15 of the sources in any groups, due to lack of information about their position or because their statement was too short to fairly identify a particular group. Twelve of these were ordinary sources.

<sup>84</sup> The self-proclaimed interim government that was established on April 8, 1994 consisted entirely of extremists and their fellow-travelers, though the ministerial portfolios were divided among five parties (African Rights 1995:102).

The journalists presented negative comments about four of the external sources, and, not surprisingly, three of these sources were the not HP friendly, Tutsi sources.<sup>85</sup> An example of this negative commentary is when RTLTM journalist Habimana Kantano proclaimed:

*“...listen to the answers I have been given by Dr. Rutaremara Tito, Deputy of RPF. When you hear his opinions on some issues, you find out that he is playing games”* (RTLTM January 6, 1994).

The comments from Bemeriki and Kantano show how RTLTM undermined the sources who were not HP friendly, while placing the HP friendly sources in a favorable light. This treatment of the sources underlined the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of the RTLTM propaganda. Whether the statements from the sources were in accordance with any of the characteristics of an enemy image are discussed implicitly in the rest of the analysis.

### **6.3 Biased Use of Written Sources**

Written sources, such as political statements or letters, were used less frequently than oral sources. Still, the two groups of sources had some striking similarities.<sup>86</sup> 28 of the 33 written sources (85%) were classified as elite sources.<sup>87</sup> This is in accordance with the assumption concerning the use of more elite sources than ordinary sources (see section 3.10), and this assumption was also confirmed regarding the oral sources. Yet, this does not necessarily indicate that RTLTM used written elite sources only to pursue their propaganda strategy. In a country with a 47.9% illiteracy rate (RSF 1995:246), the literate probably consisted of mostly high-ranked persons. This could explain why the elite also dominated this group of sources.

Another similarity between the oral and written sources is the extensive use of HP friendly persons. 23 of the written sources (70%) were categorized as HP friendly and ten were not. This contributed to the creation of a Tutsi enemy image as far as what the sources wrote reflected the extremists' agenda. This will be discussed as an implicit part of the rest of the analysis.

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<sup>85</sup> The fourth source was not categorized, see footnote 83.

<sup>86</sup> In 11 of the 25 tapes, the journalists explicitly referred to 33 different written sources, by saying, for example: *“Those two communiqués are worded as follows:...”* (Ruggiu, RTLTM June 22, 1994).

<sup>87</sup> This categorization was based on the same principals as for the oral sources.

#### 6.4 The Quoted Tutsi Sources

As discussed in section 3.10, a propaganda message can be made more powerful by incorporating opposing arguments in a way that tends to discredit the message, while at the same time leading the audience to believe that they have heard both sides of a dispute. A prime example of this is when the RTLM journalists quoted what Tutsi persons, from now on called the *Tutsi sources*, allegedly had stated.<sup>88</sup>

There are two striking features of the quoted Tutsi sources. First, only three of them could be classified as elite sources. This stands in contrast to the findings regarding both the oral and written sources (see section 6.2 and 6.3). Additionally, other than the three elite sources, RPF Major Paul Kagame, RPF Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe and RPF Deputy Tito Rutaremara, the Tutsi sources were not referred to by name. Instead, the journalists presented them as a group or as nameless persons:

*“That Tutsi woman with a gap between the front teeth asked me: “Kantano, why did you tell lies?””*  
(Kantano, RTLM January 6, 1994).

*“The same Inyenzi have declared this morning that our President, His Excellency Theodore SINDIKUBWABO is becoming fusty with old age, because of his encouragement to Kibuye population, he lastly visited. The Inyenzi said that, “in his old age, he should follow Mandela's example””*  
(Nkurunziza, RTLM March 16, 1994).

By failing to identify the Tutsi sources, the statements of the RTLM journalists comported with the *de-individualization* aspect of an enemy image - anyone who belongs to a given group has the same beliefs and behaves the same way. As a result, all people in the given group are our enemy (see section 3.9.3).

Second, despite being Tutsi, the journalists' interpretation of what these sources said or the context in which their statements were placed made it possible to categorize them as HP friendly. Thus, even the quoted Tutsi sources contributed to the creation of a Tutsi enemy image. For instance, on November 20, 1993, Ferdinand Nahimana and Gaspard Gahigi claimed that both the international community and all Rwandans denounced the Inkotanyi's extermination of Rwandans. In this way, they focused on how the Tutsi were harming the Hutu population, something which resemble the enemy image characteristic termed *negative anticipation*. In the same part of the broadcast, Nahimana further stated:

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<sup>88</sup> Because of the small number of Tutsi sources among the oral and written sources, this part of the thesis will focus on the cited Tutsi sources. Every broadcast contained quoted Hutu sources, twenty of them also contained sources who belonged to the Tutsi population. Members of the RPF are of course included in this group of sources.

*“He [Kanyarengwe] said: “I can swear I did not send my Inkotanyi to kill people of Ruhengeri, to kill Rwandans. Habyarimana’s soldier killed them.” I even saw him on the Rwandan television. That is what he was emphasizing. He said “In February, my Inkotanyi never killed.” Now, how can he deny this? The Rwandan soldiers, not Habyarimana’s soldiers, are positioned where they were told. The surviving residents said: “It is the Inkotanyi...””*

Thus, Kanyarengwe’s alleged statement was used to undermine his credibility because Nahimana questioned his trustworthiness.

Another illustrative example appeared in a broadcast seven months later, where Gahigi proclaimed:

*“French troops are coming to Rwanda saying that they are coming to stop killings in Rwanda. ... The Rwandan government says: “French troops, you are welcome.” The Inkotanyi say: “All our supporters who are in the country or outside the country, stand up against the bad initiative of France.” So, who is the killer? The killers are obviously the Inkotanyi as we have always been telling you” (RTLTM June 22, 1994).*

The RPF was opposed to the French intervention in the conflict and they were quite vocal in their opposition (IMI 2003). By not presenting the true arguments of why the RPF was opposed to the intervention, and by placing the alleged statements in the context of the ongoing killings, Gahigi concluded that the RPF was responsible for the murdering.<sup>89</sup> Although the listeners might believe they heard the Tutsi arguments, the broadcast did not contribute toward further understanding of the Tutsi’s real arguments. Instead, the alleged RPF statement was used against the Tutsi as proof of their responsibility for the killings.

The RTLTM journalists’ treatment of the Tutsi sources contributed to discreditation of the arguments of this group. The Tutsi sources’ lack of status and the interpretations made by the journalists placed these sources in an unfavorable light.<sup>90</sup> This *distrust* of the Other is one of the characteristics of an enemy image.

The RTLTM passage cited above also illustrates the use of the propaganda technique *accusation in a mirror*, which implies that the propagandists impute on the enemy what they do or intend to do themselves (see section 3.11). Although the RPF was negative toward the French intervention, it was not because they intended to kill

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<sup>89</sup> The RPF found the timing of the French intervention suspect. From their point of view, their victory in the war against the FAR was already assured, and little credit was given to the notion that the French were suddenly interested in a humanitarian mission after the Rwandans already had suffered two months of horrific violence. Furthermore, the French were the staunchest European ally to President Habyarimana, and the primary source of military aid. They also intervened on behalf of the FAR during the RPF’s initial foray into Rwanda in October 1990 (IMI 2003).

<sup>90</sup> In addition, the cited Tutsi arguments are generally short. Weighty Tutsi arguments that are discussed in much the literature about the genocide (for example that the Tutsi fought for the same right to education and political positions as the Hutu, or that the Tutsi refugees claimed their right to move back to Rwanda) were never discussed by the RTLTM journalists.

people. Rather, killing was the aim of the Hutu extremists, and contrary to the RPF, they welcomed France's arrival because they believed the French intervention would assist them strategically (Barnett 2002:149).

RTLTM's use of sources favored the extremists. By systematically placing the quoted statements of the Tutsi sources in an unfavorable light, by including negative commentary with regard to the oral Tutsi sources and by preferring HP friendly elite sources, who were the only one receiving positive remarks, the journalists' biased use of sources followed the division between the Hutu and the Tutsi. This treatment of sources contributed to a further widening of the gap between the two groups, and in this way the biased use of sources contributed to the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of RTLTM (see section 3.9.1). Additionally, the messages of the HP friendly elite sources might have had an especially strong effect on many listeners, because Rwanda has a strong tradition of obedience to authority (Prunier 1995:141). "*When the highest authorities in that state told you to do something you did it, even if it included killing*" (Ibid.:245). Thus, these sources contributed to the creation of a Tutsi enemy image.

### **6.5 Creating a Positive Self-Image**

The pre-test of the categories revealed that the RTLTM staff always presented the radio station in a positive manner. This is not necessarily a propaganda technique, what kind of a media institution would not do the same? As discussed in section 3.11, however, Ellul (1973) claims that it is important for propagandists to insist on the purity of their own intentions, and thus the RTLTM journalists' self-presentation can be interpreted as a propaganda technique per se. Such an approach is particularly fruitful compared to the technique *the Other is lying* (see section 6.6).

The journalists and the external sources created a positive image of the radio station in 19 of the 25 broadcasts, and altogether 56 thematic parts of these broadcasts belonged to this category. This high number indicates the importance RTLTM placed on creating a positive self-image.

The 56 sections can be divided into four subgroups. The largest one includes 29 segments, which all emphasized that RTLTM was *independent* or *private*:<sup>91</sup>

*"You are still tuned in to the independent radio RTLTM broadcasting from Kigali"* (RTLTM January 21, 1994)

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<sup>91</sup> Some sections belong to more than one group because they have multiple meanings/interpretations.

“You are still tuned to RTLTM, a private radio which transmits on magic frequencies 106.4” (Mbilizi, RTLTM March 31, 1994).

However, is the word *private* a positive description for a radio station? Some believe that private media institutions are less reliable than public ones. Others view private media as free and independent, and for them the word brings positive connotations. RTLTM used the word *private* as a positive description of itself. Due to the lack of any self-critical statements, it is unlikely that the journalists would have used the word *private* in a disparaging manner.

The term *free and independent* is often used as a synonym for privately owned (Eknes and Endresen 1999:10). In the RTLTM broadcasts, both the words *independent* and *private* were used to disassociate RTLTM from state-owned Radio Rwanda:

“We are so used to Radio Rwanda. But this is the independent radio RTLTM broadcasting from Kigali. You can feel that the manners of Radio Rwanda and RTLTM are different” (RTLTM November 24, 1994).

Conversely, the differences between these two stations narrowed during the genocide (Des Forges 1999:71). Radio Rwanda gradually adapted a more extremist style, and Habimana Kantano described these changes as a transformation of Radio Rwanda from a “*rival*” to a “*sister*” (see section 4.3.1).

The words *independent* and *private* were also used to instill the listeners that the radio station was not related to the government, in order for the government not to be accused for transmitting hate propaganda (Kabanda 07.01.2004).

RTLTM was far from being independent pursuant to Carver’s definition of the word (see section 4.1.2), but Rwanda had a short history of free media and few people had clear expectations about how an independent radio station should behave. Most Rwandans had little understanding of how media outlets operate (Frohardt and Temin 2003a:3, see section 5.5), and consequently the statements about RTLTM’s independence were easily believed in.

### **6.5.1 RTLTM is Telling the Truth**

The second subgroup consists of nine sections which highlighted the *truth-abiding nature* of RTLTM, as evidenced in the following excerpts:

“They [the Inkotanyi] will hide the truth from you and RTLTM will reveal it, even if it were to be in trouble because of that. That is our unique assignment” (Kantano, RTLTM November 24, 1993).

“We will tell you the truth on our radio” (Gahigi, RTLTM April 15, 1994).

The first excerpt demonstrates how *creating a positive self-image* sometimes was combined with *the Other is lying*. When the proclamation of truth telling was combined with blaming the enemy of the opposite, it highlighted the difference between *us* and *them*, and in this way *creating a positive self-image* contributed to the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of the RTLM propaganda. It also resembles the aspect of *distrust* of an enemy image (see section 3.9.3). This combination, however, only occurred in three of the nine cases.

During the genocide, when travel and communication became difficult, radio grew to be the sole sources of news and the sole authority for commenting on these news (Des Forges 1999:71). As previously stated, Rwanda has a tradition of obedience and respect for authority. Due to the use of elite sources (see section 6.2), it is likely that many listeners believed that RTLM actually told the truth, a belief that was facilitated by this subgroup of *creating a positive self-image*.

### **6.5.2 RTLM has good intentions**

The third subgroup consists of statements from 17 different broadcasts that either directly or indirectly presented the (*good*) *intentions and actions* of RTLM.<sup>92</sup> A statement from Bemeriki on April 22, 1994 illustrates this point:

*“So RTLM will go on broadcasting in its armored vehicle, wherever it will go, it will keep speaking for the majority of Rwandans, it will give you its opinions, it will never be discouraged, it will never close”.*

Immediately after this statement was made, another journalist proclaimed:

*“Dear fighting friends, we [RTLM] are here for you, during war we don’t give you up, we go on fighting at your side. [RTLM] ...represent the popular will”.*

These excerpts also indicates that RTLM clearly stated its position as to which part of the population it belonged, and in this way, RTLM is a prime example of the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of propaganda. The “*majority of Rwandans*” did not include the Tutsi, who before the genocide represented about 15% of the population (ICTR 2003b:29). At the same time, the use of words like “*war*” and “*fighting*”, accentuated the aspect of conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. The creation of enemy images builds upon a process which distinguishing between *us* and *them* (see section

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<sup>92</sup> The statements that proclaim that RTLM tells the truth are not included in this subgroup.



3.9.3). Thus, statements like the ones mentioned above contributed to the formation of a Tutsi enemy image.

### **6.5.3 Other Positive Remarks About RTLM**

The fourth subgroup contains ten segments that did not fit into the other three subgroups. Their common feature is a focus on the agreeable aspects of RTLM. According to the journalists, RTLM was, among other things, a “friendly”, “pleasant” and “sympathetic” radio station (RTLM January 6, January 21 and March 31, 1994). The aim of statements like these was to create a positive attitude toward the radio station in order to get more listeners (Kabanda 07.01.2004).

### **6.6 The Other is Lying**

To claim that *the Other is lying* not only contributes to a reduced level of trustworthiness of the opponents’ arguments, but also adds credibility to one’s own arguments. This technique relates to the aspect of *distrust* regarding *the syndrome of the enemy image*- everything originating from the enemy is created for dishonest reasons (see section 3.9.3). The RTLM staff blamed others of lying in twelve of the 25 tapes, often several times in each broadcasts. In the broadcasts from December 8, 1993 to March 30, 1994, however, RTLM did not accuse others of deceit, a fact that indicate a less aggressive style before the genocide started on April 6, 1994.

*The Other is lying* manifested itself in two ways, either by the journalists or the external sources who directly accused someone of lying:

“*This proves how, the Inyenzi are inventing lies...*” (Nkurunziza, RTLM May 23, 1994),

or by the journalists or sources who made indirect accusations:

“*So reports from RPF saying our soldiers are escaping and the town is being taken, it is purely false because it ignores the population is standing tall*” (Kantano, RTLM April 22, 1994).

In contrast to the positive image they portrayed of their own radio station, the RTLM journalists and the external sources several times accused Radio Muhabura of lying. In the broadcast from April 11, 1994, journalist Nkurunziza read a declaration from the Ministry for Defense which stated no less than four times that the RPF radio station was lying:

“*The population and the army are requested not to believe the lies of Radio Muhabura and other radios which monitor news from Inkotanyis because their aim is nothing else than to divert, divide and threaten Rwandans*”.

Together with propaganda techniques such as *creating a positive self-image* and *highlighting its own strength*, *the Other is lying* accentuated the alleged differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi. For instance, on November 24, 1993, an unidentified journalist said:

*“You [the Inkotanyi] will tell lies people, and we [RTLM] will tell them the truth”.*

When used together, these techniques might have had a mutual reinforcing effect. The technique *the Other is lying* contributed to distrust the Tutsi and the RPF, and RTLM compounded this distrust by also emphasizing the good intentions of the radio station or the FAR. This contributed to the creation of negative anticipations toward the Tutsi and the RPF. The RPF even use lies as a weapon, RTLM journalist Kantano stated (RTLM April 11, 1994). *Distrust* and *negative anticipation* are two of the characteristics of *the syndrome of the enemy image*.

Opposition politician Faustin Twagiramungu was the only named person branded as a liar.<sup>93</sup> Usually, the RPF and the Inyenzi as groups were accused of lying, thus RTLM treated all Tutsi alike. Consequently, the use of this technique also resembles the characteristic termed *de-individualization of the syndrome of the enemy image* (see section 3.9.3).

### **6.7 Using the Other as a Scapegoat**

*Using the Other as a scapegoat* involves the symbolic identification of a social problem in a single individual or stereotyped category of persons (see section 3.13). This technique was applied in twelve of the 25 RTLM tapes, and the broadcast from April 12, 1994 exemplifies how this technique was used. This broadcast has an especially aggressive style, and after a long section which focused on the horrible acts committed by the Inyenzi, Kantano said:

*“The sad events we are living are brought about by people like Twagiramungu Faustin alias Rukokoma, Kanyarengwe, Bizimungu Pasteur, the latter who spoilt all the Arusha Accords believing that Rwandans would accept the declarations he made in Arusha. These people and all other accomplices in the country have ruined this country, plunging it in such misfortunes”.*

To hold these few persons responsible for a very difficult peace negotiation and a tense national situation was obviously a simplification of the reality. Such a presentation was advantageous for the propagandists because it relieved the Hutu

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<sup>93</sup> Twagiramungu was the MDR President designated as the new Prime Minister in the Arusha Agreements (1993).

politicians of all responsibility. This contributed to creating a positive image of the Hutu, something that made it easier for people to identify with this group and to comply with the extremists' requests (see section 6.14). Thus, the mobilizing effect of scapegoating might have been stronger when it was used in combination with the technique called *highlighting its own strength*. Together, these two techniques contributed to enhance the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of the RTLM propaganda. However, the two techniques were never used in the same part of a broadcast and the degree to which they influenced each other is uncertain.

*Using the Other as a scapegoat* works in favor of the *distrust* aspect of an enemy image - everything originating from the enemy is bad. However, scapegoating is so important in the construction of an enemy image that Spillman and Spillman list it as one of the characteristics of an enemy image (*placing the guilt on the enemy*).

The genocide was triggered by the assassination of President Habyarimana. As soon as the President's plane crashed, the Presidential Guards began killing. Prunier (1995:223) sees these events as a support for the view that the assassination and the ensuing killings were connected. An unknown RTLM journalist agreed:

*"Rwanda is facing many problems and many misfortunes because of the death of the Chief of State His Excellency Major General Habyarimana Juvenal... After that, many other bad things happened, we lost many people..."* (RTLM April 14, 1994).

Consequently, accusations of who was responsible for the President's death were included in the category *using the Other as a scapegoat*.<sup>94</sup> In all of the seven tapes in which this incident was discussed, the Inkotanyi or the Inyenzi were blamed for the killing. In the broadcast from April 12, 1994, Gahigi stated:

*"...wrong doers [the RPF] brought down his plane on his return from the meeting..."*.

By quickly relating this shocking event to the RPF, it became easier for the propagandists to turn the Hutu against the Tutsi and to encourage the Hutu to take action. Revenging the death of the President was used as an argument to mobilize the Hutu (RTLM April 14 and June 28, 1994).

There are no certainties about who killed the President, or even exactly why he was killed. Most scholars believe that Habyarimana was killed by members of the

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<sup>94</sup> However, while Prunier sees this as an indication of the extremists standing behind the assassination, the RTLM journalists viewed it either as originating from the RPF or that people started killing to revenge the President's death.

Akazu (Prunier 1995:221).<sup>95</sup> On April 3, RTLM broadcasted that “*On the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup>, heads will get heated up. On 6 April, there will be a respite, but a little thing might happen*” (Ibid.:223). RTLM was also the first source to announce the plane crash. 30 minutes after the accident, the station began reporting about the murder. International radio stations reported the news within an hour, while Radio Rwanda waited until the following day (Kirschke 1996:109-110). This could indicate that the RTLM staff knew about the accident before it happened. If the assumption about the extremists’ guilt is correct, it is likely that someone at the RTLM knew about the plan prior to the accident, as they had close links to the extremists in the government and the militias (see section 4.1.2 and 4.1.3). In view of that, this element of the RTLM propaganda also serves as an example of use of lies by the propagandists.

## 6.8 Band-Wagon

The *band-wagon* technique was found in twelve of the 25 RTLM tapes, and it is a propaganda technique that plays on the audience’s desire to be in accord with the crowd (see section 3.15). The sections of the broadcasts that referred to the feeling of community among the Hutu, were placed in this category. In these sections, the RTLM journalists often referred to *us* or *we*:

*“I remind you that the problems we are facing require joint effort so that security can be preserved. If we do so, we will have supported the president and the cabinet”* (RTLM April 11, 1994) (Emphasis added).

*“But for us, we apply that word [Interahamwe] to all of us, to all Rwandans who stood up together, at the same time, who got united in order to beat the Inyenzi Inkotanyi. I think that this name is not a name of a youth affiliated to a political party, it is rather a name given to us, all the Rwandans who worked together, who got united to beat the enemy Inyenzi”* (Bemeriki, RTLM June 22, 1994) (Emphasis added).

*Band-wagon* is the technique that most explicitly contributes to the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of propaganda. When focusing on *we* and *us*, it is also important who *they* are. Including some means excluding others. Some of the sections in the *band-wagon* category, but only a minor part, also included statements that pointed out who *we* are against. In addition to the excerpt from June 22, the following statement from Gahigi on April 15, demonstrates this aspect of *band-wagon*:

*“All the people got up and fought against Inyenzi...”* (Emphasis added).

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<sup>95</sup> Recently, a black box, possibly from the president’s plane, was given from the UN to outside experts. These experts will try to find out if the box can give new information about who were behind the killing (Reuters 11.03.2004).

The inclusion-exclusion function of the *band-wagon* technique was most effective when notions about the Other were included in the statement. Then, there was no doubt against whom the community was united.

Sometimes *band-wagon* was combined with *call for action*, as the following excerpts from April 14, 1994 demonstrate:

“So, we appeal all the citizens to unite their efforts for facing the enemy” (Renzaho)

“Citizens of Kigali town, as you have always helped us with the problems that we have met, listen to the instructions given to you and try to act according to them. If you follow them, you would have greatly helped your country and that is the war you can wage. Thank you” (Renzaho 1994).

This combination indicates that it could be easier to *call for action* (a propaganda technique discussed in section 6.14) in the same sections as the *band-wagon* technique was employed (Kabanda 07.01.2004).

*Band-wagon* does not correspond with any of the enemy image characteristics discussed in section 3.9.3. However, if we expand the characteristic termed *de-individualization*, it does. When all Hutu were treated as a *we*, the diversity of the people in this group was masked, such as the differences between the members of the different opposition parties like the MDR, the PSD, the PL and the PDC.<sup>96</sup> Thus, a de-individualized *we* seemed to be just as important as a de-individualized other.

## **6.9 Highlighting Its Own Strength**

In conflicts, people tend to exaggerate their own positive qualities while overstating others' negative sides (Rank 2004:1). A striking aspect of the RTLM broadcasts is that the journalists regularly stated how strong or how good the FAR, the Hutu population or the Hutu extremist politicians were. This is treated as a propaganda technique, because it so obviously reveal which side the journalists were on. Although being biased is not necessarily the same as being propagandistic (see section 6.1), it appears that exaggerating the positive qualities of the Hutu was a vital part of the RTLM propaganda strategy.

The propaganda technique called *highlighting its own strength* was used in 19 broadcasts, often a number of times in each. The technique often implied focusing at

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<sup>96</sup> *Mouvement Démocratique Republican* (MDR) was the main opposition party in Rwanda. *Parti Social Démocrate* (PSD) was the second largest of the opposition parties. *Parti Libéral* (PL) had many Tutsi members and ranked as the third among the opposition parties, while *Parti Démocrate Chrétien* (PDC) was the smallest of these four parties.

the strength of the FAR. At the same time, statements about the losses of the government forces on the battlefield were conspicuously absent. The following excerpt from a broadcast on June 5, 1994 illustrates the use of this technique. Here, Kantano highlighted the strength of the FAR. In addition, he contrasted this strength with the weakness of the RPF:

*“Then I saw their equipment: guns and ammunitions and this led me to conclude that there is no way we will not finish off Inkotanyi because when you consider the guns of Rwandan soldiers and those of Inkotanyi, you notice that they are far different. While the Rwandan soldiers bring ammunition in vehicles, Inkotanyi use people, Tutsi old men to carry ammunitions on the head in the night but they can't carry the same quantity of ammunitions like that transported by cars. We have armored cars which run after Inkotanyi but Inkotanyi don't have them. When you consider how armored cars shoot at Inkotanyi with a lot of bullets, you notice that Inkotanyi will be exterminated in this town. And when you consider our guns called "quadriliple". I like saying this because once it shoots at Inkotanyi, you say "you got have them" because at one time, it releases one thousand bullets in an hour. I think that such a rain of bullets doesn't spare Inkotanyi wherever they are”.*

This extract demonstrates how inclusion and exclusion are connected. To emphasize how good and strong *we* are is more effective when simultaneously stressing how weak *they* are. However, the technique does not correspond directly to any of the characteristics of *the syndrome of the enemy image* (see section 3.9.3).

Unlike the broadcast from June 5, the April 22 broadcast did not refer to the strength of the FAR, but rather focused on the good intentions of the CDR. At the same time, it made a distinction between the goodness of the CDR and the RPF:

*“...Rukokoma and RPF wanted power...we want the end of the war”* (Bemeriki).

*“CDR has long contributed to correct what was not perfect because it was not seeking its personal interest but Rwanda's interest. CDR could not make any harm to the agreements since they seemed able to bring peace... Unfortunately, RPF on its part was against and CDR did everything to show it. RPF impinged on their application until it sought to prevent CDR from being part of the transitional institutions whereas our participation was specified by the agreements”* (Karamira).

These examples show that when *highlighting its own strength* is combined with the technique called *alleged intentions*, also the first technique belongs to sections of the broadcasts that resemble the characteristics of an enemy image termed *distrust* and *identification with evil*. The latter characteristic includes that the enemy stands opposite of what *we* are and what *we* strive for (see section 3.9.3). Other broadcasts also combined *highlighting its own strength* with the techniques termed *name-calling* and *band-wagon*.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> *Highlighting its own strength* might have been a consequence of the Press Law (1991), which forbade journalists to report negatively about the FAR and their losses. On the other hand, RTLM never cared much about the law regulation of the country (see chapter 5.5).

## 6.10 Alleged Intentions

Sixteen tapes contains sections which discussed the intentions of the RPF or the Tutsi, and these sections were categorized as belonging to the propaganda technique termed *alleged intentions*.

The *alleged intentions* of the Tutsi were mainly centered on three themes. One was the theme of power:

“...*Tutsis are seeking power in this region...*” (Gahigi, RTLM June 22, 1994).

The second theme was the desire of the Tutsi to eliminate the Hutu:

“...*the objective of the Tutsis is obviously to exterminate the Hutus, the majority mass*” (Gahigi, RTLM June 22, 1994).

The journalists’ discussions of these themes exemplify the use of *accusation in a mirror* (see section 3.11). For the Hutu extremists, a central aim of the massacres of the Tutsi was to retain power. The Hutu Power ideology was used to justify this aim (see section 4.2). Nevertheless, the RPF wanted to overthrow Habyarimana. This was a consequence of their difficulties in fulfilling their original goal: To let the Tutsi-exiles return to Rwanda (ICTR 2003b:33).<sup>98</sup>

The broadcast from June 22, 1994 does not contain the third theme discussed when presenting the *alleged intentions* of the RPF and the Tutsi, but the following statement from the March 30 broadcast does:

“...*RPF does not want to play the democratic game and does not at all believe in free and democratic elections because it would lose them...*” (Gahigi).

Discussions of the alleged anti-democratic aspect of the RPF were repeated in several broadcasts. This is another example of *accusation in a mirror*. It was the Hutu extremists more than anyone who fought against a multi-party political system (Caplan (ed.) 2000:31-32).

The alleged intentions of the Tutsi, as they were presented in the RTLM broadcasts, comport with three enemy image characteristics (see section 3.9.3). First, these intentions resemble the characteristic termed *distrust*. They clearly show that what originates from the enemy is bad. Second, the intentions manifest the

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<sup>98</sup> The RPF argued that they were Rwandans with a right to return to their native land. They would have preferred to do so in a more gradual, systematic way. Clearly, Habyarimana did not have the slightest intention to make any such arrangement, and therefore, the exiles had no choice but to use force (Caplan (ed.) 2000:37).

characteristic of *negative anticipation*. Spillman and Spillman (1991:57) define this as “*whatever the enemy does is intended to harm us*”.

As discussed in section 6.10, the technique *alleged intentions* was sometimes combined with *highlighting its own strength*. In these cases the technique was in accordance with the characteristic termed *identification with evil* - the enemy embodies the opposite of what we are and what we strive for.

### **6.11 Use of Stereotypes**

Sometimes even journalists who are working for independent media institutions are accused of presenting stereotypes. Still, they differ from propagandists in that the latter persons present stereotypes deliberately with an aim to mobilize the audience (see section 3.16). In accordance with Brown (1963), stereotypes can be viewed as a propaganda device per se. In total, seven RTLM broadcasts contained this technique.

Colonial anthropologists emphasized the physical differences between the Tutsi and the Hutu. The Tutsi were said to be a tall, beautiful people with thin, long noses. The Hutu were described as short and thick-set with wide noses and enormous lips (Prunier 1995:6, Mamdani 2001:44).<sup>99</sup> When analyzing the RTLM transcripts, it becomes clear that these stereotypes remained alive in the 1990s. There are eleven examples, which are found on five different tapes, of how the RTLM journalists cultivated the stereotypes invented by the colonizers.<sup>100</sup> For instance, on January 6, 1994, Kantano talked about “*that tall Tutsi...*” and he described an RPF Deputy as a “*slim black man*”. In addition, he commented on the front teeth of a Tutsi woman, which referred to the stereotyped belief that the Tutsi has protruding teeth (Kagabo 11.11.2003). Later in the program, Kantano described how some Tutsi were drinking milk because of nostalgia. This referred to the stereotyped theory that only the Tutsi were pastoralists in the pre-colonial period. However, more and more evidence has showed that the predecessors of the Hutu had cattle before the Tutsi appeared on the

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<sup>99</sup> This heavy bombardment of highly value-laden stereotypes inflated the Tutsi’s cultural ego inordinately and crushed the feelings of the Hutu, resulting in an inferiority complex. If we combine these subjective feelings with the objective political and administrative decisions of the colonial administrators favoring one group over the other, we can see how a very dangerous social bomb was manufactured throughout the peaceful years of European domination (Prunier 1995:9).

<sup>100</sup> Other stereotypes presented in the RTLM broadcasts were of a more general character. “*Funny*”, “*puzzling*”, “*hopeless*”, “*lazy*” and “*shameless*” were words used to describe the Tutsi as a group. These stereotypes do not correspond to any historical or cultural notions about the Tutsi, rather they were used for the simple purpose of disparaging the Tutsi as a group.



scene (Mamdani 2001:51). The identification of Tutsi with cattle and Hutu with land needs to be understood as a historical artifact created alongside the institutionalized power of the Rwandan state (Ibid.:51).

The broadcasts on June 5 and June 22, 1994, made a point of the Tutsi's noses. This was a stereotype the Hutu militia also proclaimed by force. One of their methods to discover the ethnical background of a person was to put two fingers into the nostril of someone believed to be Tutsi. If the fingers fit inside the nose, the militia declared the person Hutu (Kimani 2001:1, ICTR 2003b:101).

It is not surprising that RTLM cultivated the stereotypes invented by the colonizers - the Hutu Power ideology built upon an inverted version of the Hamitic hypothesis introduced by the Belgians. Whereas the Tutsi had been treated preferentially by the colonial state as a nonindigenous civilizing influence, the Hutu Power considered this claim reason enough to treat them as politically illegitimate (see section 4.2). Thus, the Hutu extremists constructed themselves the same way that the colonizers had constructed them prior to independence (Mamdani 2001:190). By using these stereotypes, the RTLM journalists built upon existing beliefs in the population. Propaganda cannot create something out of nothing, and these stereotypes were probably the easiest to advocate in the audience (see section 3.16). They reinforced the idea that Hutu and Tutsi were two different groups with different histories. Hence, the use of these stereotypes contributed to the inclusion-exclusion function of propaganda.

Stereotypes blur the differences between members of a given group, in this case the Tutsi, and thus comport with the *de-individualization* characteristic of an enemy image (see section 3.9.3). Stereotyping is important when constructing an enemy image of an entire group of people and not just a single person. "...*RTLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping in a manner that promoted contempt and hatred for the Tutsi population*", the ruling of the Media Trial concludes (ICTR 2003b:165).

## **6.12 Use of Threats**

Twelve of the 25 RTLM tapes utilized the propaganda technique *use of threats*. With one exception, in all 19 sections of the broadcasts placed in this category, the threats

were pointed toward the Tutsi or the RPF soldiers. The broadcast from May 28, 1994 contains the following examples of the technique:

*“...the cockroach who will dare getting in Kimicanga will be seriously ill treated” (Karekezi).*

*“I want to say that we will beat the Inkotanyi whatever their illusions are. We will beat them. We will beat them in such a way that they cannot even remain in our town Kigali for more than fifteen days” (A soldier).*

*“If any of them [the Inkotanyi] make a mistake and come here, he will see how the Rwandan Army will beat him for long time” (A soldier).*

The main purpose of this technique is to ensure that the listeners will feel a real threat (see section 3.17). Although RTLM was a Hutu extremist radio station, even RPF soldiers listened to it and there is no reason to believe that the propagandists did not know this. The threats served another purpose as well. They indirectly depicted Hutu fighters as strong, and consequently they had the same effect as *highlighting its own strength* (see section 6.9). The only threat not aimed at the Tutsi was intended for the Hutu population who had fled. On May 28, 1994, Kantano stated:

*“Then those who are running away while there is nothing wrong with the town, who set fright in the country side pretending that things have turned bad, all those people whose legs have grown fat because of running, let their legs get fat, but the time will come when we will share their goods and that will teach them to flee. They will find us stronger than ever, we will laugh at them. We will treat them like wheelbarrows and donkeys, we will tweak their ears, we will beat them”.*

This threat was presented just before the technique *call for action* was used, and it might have made the latter technique more effective. Threats against the Hutu were a central element of the genocide. Many Hutu found themselves caught in a “*kill or be killed*” situation, where the threat of being killed did not come from the supposed Tutsi enemy, but from Hutu authority figures (Fujii 2002:6). Civilians were forced to participate in the killings, however, the degree of compulsion varied from place to place (Gourevitch 2000:95, Prunier 1995:247).

*Use of threats* contributes to the creation of enemy images by creating an antagonism between groups, and by legitimizing the use of force against the Other. The threats presented by RTLM were devoid of empathy and human feelings, and hence it manifested the characteristic of an enemy image termed *refusal of empathy* (see section 3.9.3). The threats also enhanced the division between Hutu and Tutsi, because they mainly were directed at the latter group. Thus, the threats contributed to the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of the RTLM propaganda.

### 6.13 Name-Calling

To designate someone as the Other is a form of labeling which defines a person or a cultural grouping in reductive terms (Pickering 2001:41). As discussed in section 3.9.2, the Other is constructed with subordination as the purpose. RTLTM’s use of the propaganda technique *name-calling* matches this description, and the technique contributed to sustain the Tutsi’s inferior status in the eyes of many Hutu (Savich 2000:12).

*Name-calling* was used in all but one of the broadcasts, however, the scale to which they were used differed widely. Six labels have been selected for discussion because of their unique meaning in the Rwandan culture. In other words, these labels used in another cultural setting, would not necessarily have created such negative connotations.<sup>101</sup> Other labels, such as “*wicked savages*” or “*killers*”, have a more similar meaning in several cultures. The labels “*criminals*”, “*a barbaric machine*” and “*a war machine*”, correspond to Keen’s (1986:15-88) description of typical enemy images (see section 3.16). Depicting someone as an animal, represented by the word “*dog*” in the RTLTM broadcasts, is also a common description of an enemy (Savich 2000:11).

**Table 1: Labels Placed on the Tutsi Population and the RPF**

A barbaric machine	Dictators	Inkotanyi	Rebels
A war machine	Dogs	Inyenzi	Suicidal extremist Tutsis' sons
Adversaries	Enemy/enemies	Inyenzi Army	Troublemakers
Animals	Family of killers	Inyenzi-Inkotanyi	Tutsi Army
Army rebellion	Feudal-monarchists (+descendants of...)	Killers	Tutsi-terrorists
Assassins	Foreigner	Monarchists	Ugandan terrorists
Criminals	Guerilla fighters	Nihilists	Wicked savages
Dare-devils	Gutter snipes	Rascals	Wrong-doers

#### 6.13.1 Feudal Monarchists

Prior to colonial rule, Rwanda was an advanced monarchy. The monarch, the *mwami*, ruled through his official representatives drawn from the Tutsi nobility. The colonizers reinforced the *mwani*ship because they built their administration on the

<sup>101</sup> Except for the word *terrorists* which is a part of the label “*Tutsi-terrorists*”.

Tutsi elite, and the Tutsi were favored in every part of the society. Toward the mid-1950s, the policy of promoting Tutsi as leaders was challenged. Internal and external pressure mounted on the authorities to allow the Hutu to participate in the government. The Revolution forced the monarch to flee, and on July 1, 1962 Rwanda got its first president (ICTR 2003b:29-31, Prunier 1995:9-10, Kirschke 1996:10).

Rwandan history demonstrates how the Tutsi monarchy was connected to the discrimination of the Hutu. Consequently, the word *monarchist*, used four times as a label in the RTLM broadcasts, obviously had negative connotations for many Hutu. The situation did not improve when *feudal* was linked to the word.<sup>102</sup> Authors presenting the “classical” view of the Rwandan society have inaccurately used the word *feudal* when describing the relations of personal dependence in the Rwandan culture, Prunier (1995:20) claims.<sup>103</sup> These scholars had, for one thing, the system of *ubuhake* in their mind. This was a form of unequal clientship contract between two men, where the Tutsi often was the patron. For the Hutu ideologues, *ubuhake* was a form of quasi-slavery, enabling the Tutsi masters to exploit the poor Hutu (Ibid.:13). Hence, the word *feudal* clearly had negative connotations for many Hutu.

### 6.13.2 Foreigners and Terrorists

The label *foreigner* was used on June 5, 1994, and referred to the Tutsi population:

“...Tutsi should abandon forever their thirst for power...no foreigner will rule Rwanda for us” (Kantano).

This label can be traced back to the historical exploitation of the Hamitic hypothesis, which claimed that the Tutsi originally entered Rwanda from other parts of the continent (see section 4.2).

The RPF was created by Rwandan refugees in Uganda,<sup>104</sup> and on May 23, 1994 Kantano referred to this fact, by stating:

“...we have to liberate our country from those Ugandan terrorists”.

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<sup>102</sup> Feudalism is state control by an entrenched minority for its own benefit. It can be viewed as a social, political, or economic oligarchy (The Webster’s dictionary 2004). The label *feudal-monarchists/feudo-monarchists* is used twice (Gahigi and Mbilizi, RTLM March 30 and March 31, 1994) to describe the RPF and once to describe the Tutsi (Ruggiu, RTLM April 11, 1994). The label *monarchists* is used once (Ngirumpatse, RTLM April 17, 1994), but it is not clear whether it referred to the Tutsi or the RPF.

<sup>103</sup> For a discussion of the use of the concept of feudalism in relationship to East African kingdoms, see Nordman, Daniel and Jean-Pierre Chrétien (ed.) (1980): *Sciences de l’Homme et conquête coloniale*.

<sup>104</sup> After the 1959 Revolution, a large part of the Tutsi population sought refuge in neighboring Rwanda. Some of these refugees formed the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity, which in 1987 became the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

In the 1960s, some of the Rwandan refugees in Uganda carried out a string of cross-border raids in Rwanda, which might be the reason Kantano used the word *terrorists*. In addition, it was from Uganda that RPF launched the attack that started the civil war in 1990 (African Rights 1995:27, Fujii 2002:10). However, the choice of the label *terrorists* could also be the result of simply a wish to use a generally negative word.

### 6.13.3 Inyenzi and Inkotanyi

The name *Inyenzi* was given to the Tutsi guerrillas who attacked Rwanda from Uganda in the 1960s.<sup>105</sup> According to Prunier (1995:402), the label was given partly out of spite and partly because the guerrillas, like cockroaches, tended to move at night. Karangwa (06.01.2004) on the other hand, states that it was a glorifying nickname the guerrillas gave themselves. He refers to an interview on the BBC (November 27, 2003),<sup>106</sup> where Aloys Ngurumbe, one of the RPF founders, explains that they decided to call themselves *Inyenzi* as an acronym of “*ingangurarugo yiyemeje kuba ingenzi*”, which means “*the brave ones in the service of the king’s army*” (Eltringham 2004:47). *Ingangurarugo* was a great military company of king Rwabugiri in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Karangwa (06.01.2004), however, claims that the Rwandans understood the nickname as the word for cockroaches and not as an acronym.

In the 1990s, the Hutu extremists and their allies began using *Inyenzi* to refer to the RPF fighters (Des Forges 1999:51), although the character of the RPF was very different from that of the original *Inyenzi*. For example, whereas the *Inyenzi* were intrinsically monarchist, the same cannot be said for the RPF (Eltringham 2004:48). This distinction was intentionally obscured by those who committed the genocide. The political and ideological history of those who joined the RPF was not of interest for the Hutu extremists, the essential thing was to emphasize that the RPF soldiers were feudalists, and therefore bad (Ibid.:50). Thus, the label *Inyenzi* incurred a negative connotation (Karangwa 06.01.2004).

The label *Inyenzi* was mentioned in 17 tapes, and the scope ranged from one up to sixty times in each broadcast. This label resembles what Keen (1986) identifies

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<sup>105</sup> *Inyenzi* is the (only) Kinyarwanda word for cockroach (Karangwa 06.01.2004). The ICTR staff has used both the word *Inyenzi* and *cockroach* in their translations, consequently both words will be treated as the same label.

<sup>106</sup> The interview is available on the Internet, but it is written in Kinyarwanda so I am not able to read it. URL: <http://66.102.11.104/search?q=cache:M6ABqnWvLoJ:bbc.net.uk/greatlakes/+Inyenzi+Aloys+Ngurumbe+BBC&hl=no>.

as one of the archetypes used to describe enemies: The enemy as an insect (see section 3.16). During the 1990s, the label *Inyenzi* not only referred to the RPF, but it became synonymous with the term *Tutsi*. *Inyenzi* even came to designate the *Tutsi* as “*persons to be killed*” (ICTR 2000:8). In addition, the RTLM journalists sometimes equated *Inkotanyi* with *Tutsi* (Eltringham 2004:50). *Inkotanyi* means “*the tough fighters*” (Prunier 1995:401), and originally it was a name the RPF gave itself. However, once the label became a part of the Hutu extremist vocabulary, it turned into a negatively charged word (Kagabo 11.11.2003).

A striking factor of the RTLM broadcasts is that the journalists were inconsistent in both their use of the term *Inyenzi* and the term *Inkotanyi*. Occasionally, they differentiated between *Tutsi*, *Inyenzi* and *Inkotanyi*, for instance in the broadcast from November 20, 1993. Here, Nahimana stated that the *Inyenzi* were the refugees who fled Rwanda in 1959. And on May 28, 1994, Kantano said:

*“They [the Inyenzi] are Tutsis from Rwanda without links to Inkotanyi”.*

According to Des Forges, however, such statements were only intended to avert international criticism (ICTR 2003b:143). “*These few broadcasts represented isolated deviations from a well-established pattern in which RTLM actively promoted the killing of the enemy, explicitly or implicitly defined to be the Tutsi population*”, she states (Ibid.:165).

#### **6.13.4 The Enemy**

A key aspect of the making of an enemy image is who the propagandists explicitly determine to be the enemy. In 1991, a Rwandan commission defined the enemy as “*the Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power, who have never recognized and will never recognize the realities of 1959 social revolution and who wish to reconquer power by all means necessary, including arms*”. The word *enemy* (both in singular and plural) was used in 19 RTLM broadcasts, but who did the word refer to? Similar to the use of *Inyenzi* and *Inkotanyi*, neither the RTLM staff nor the external sources were consistent in their application of the word. For instance, on May 23, 1994 an unknown speaker said:

*“The enemy can infiltrate, but he won’t go far. Because, in Kigali, people have said: Niet, we won’t move. Either we crush RPF, or we get crushed by it!”.*

In this case, the word *enemy* clearly referred to the RPF. However, in the broadcast from May 29, 1994, another unknown external source said:

*“The one who does not have papers should remain there or even leave his [her] head there. However, in reality, I think that the check should be necessary because everybody should have his [her] papers with him [her] certifying that he [she] is really Rwandan and is really a son of “Sebahinzi” that he is not an enemy, or an accomplice or an Inkotanyi. I think that all those who remain in this country, we know each other, we are the sons of the “same man””.*

Using the term “*Son of Sebahinzi*”,<sup>107</sup> a reference to the Hutu as the real Rwandans, the broadcast in effect equated “*an enemy, or an accomplice or an Inkotanyi*” with anyone who was not a Hutu (ICTR 2003b:134). Many of the RTLM broadcasts also identified the enemy directly as the *Inyenzi* or the *Inkotanyi*. For instance, on June 28, 1994, Bemeriki stated:

*“As a consequence, the enemy of our country, our common enemy, the Inyenzi-Nkotanyi, may take advantage and infiltrate among the population”.*

Despite these different references to who were the enemy, the verdict of the Media Trial states that RTLM’s repeated identification of the enemy as being the Tutsi was effectively conveyed to listeners. This became evident in the testimony of witnesses in the Media Trial (ICTR 2003b:161).

The RTLM journalists’ use of the technique *name-calling* reinforced the division between Hutu and Tutsi, because the labels only connoted negative feelings toward the Tutsi. This made it more difficult for the Hutu to identify oneself, and have empathy, with this group. In this way, the technique is an example of the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of the RTLM propaganda. When it comes to the list of characteristics belonging to *the syndrome of the enemy image*, the RTLM’s use of *name-calling* contributed to *de-individualize* the Tutsi, especially when the labels *Inkotanyi*, *Inyenzi* and *enemy* referred to the whole Tutsi population. According to Frohardt and Temin (2003a:7), such a description of the Other makes it easier to justify violent actions against the opponents. The technique *name-calling* also resembles the characteristics termed *placing the guilt on the enemy* through the use of labels such as “*wrong-doers*” and “*troublemakers*”, *negative anticipation* through the labels such as “*killers*” and “*dictators*” and *identification with evil* by using the label “*adversaries*” (see table 1).

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<sup>107</sup> This expression means “The sons of the father of the cultivators” (Des Forges 1999:77), and is an example of the use of *name-calling* on the group of Hutu.

## 6.14 Call for Action

RTLM played a key role in inciting violence and mobilizing the Hutu to take action against the Tutsi (African Rights 1995:78). The radio station also aided the militias and security forces in their identifying and locating of individuals targeted for elimination (Girard 1996:2). Survivors of the genocide have reported that the journalists frequently read out names of people whom they claimed were RPF soldiers or accomplices, thus marking them for extermination. The only examples of this in the RTLM broadcasts are found in the tapes from March 31 and April 1, 1994, which means in broadcasts transmitted before the genocide began.<sup>108</sup> This might indicate that other scholars have exaggerated this aspect of the RTLM broadcasts. On the other hand, it might be due to the sample of RTLM broadcasts used in this study (see section 2.4), although nothing indicates that this aspect should be under-represented in the English RTLM transcripts.

RTLM acted as the drumbeat behind the violence, goading and cheering the perpetrators of genocide (Kirschke 1996:116). The RTLM journalists called for action in 18 broadcasts, often several times in each of them. The broadcast from May 23, 1994 contains most of the different elements of *call for action*, and it will therefore be used to illustrate how the technique was used.

Most of the requests to take action were directed at ordinary people:

*“So, stay vigilant on roadblocks”* (Kantano).

*“...I’d like ask the population of Kigali to stay courageous. We have to protect our city against the enemy”* (Kantano).

*“I’m also sending my encouragement to all young men within all communes. Hold on! Train yourselves seriously, we have to liberate our country...”* (Kantano).

This appeal to the common people seems to be logical, since they also were the main agents of the genocide (Prunier 1995:247). Additionally, the UNAMIR soldiers and the Rwandan government were encouraged by the RTLM journalists in the May 23 broadcast. Other times, the RTLM journalists also appealed to the country’s prefects or burgomasters (RTLM April 11 and June 4, 1994).<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> However, on April 12, Kantano gave a detailed description of the dress and location of four unnamed Inkotanyi, and he encouraged the listeners to be vigilant and to find them.

<sup>109</sup> Rwanda is divided into ten prefectures, each headed by a *préfet* appointed by the President. The prefectures are divided into 143 communes, governed by a *bourgemestre*, also appointed by the President (Sellström and Wohlgemuth 2001:11).



The excerpts above contain two words that were frequently used in the broadcasts: *Courageous* and *vigilant*. It is not surprising that the journalists asked for courage - the Hutu extremists wanted everyone to participate in the killings (Mamdani 2001:6). In this context, to *be vigilant* became a coded term for aggression in the guise of self-defense (ICTR 2003b:342). This is also one of many examples of how the journalists were not straightforward, but instead presented the act of genocide in a less brutal manner. *Call for action* was often combined with such justifying expressions.

The technique was also combined with *band-wagon* (see section 6.8):

“...we must stand up and fight against the Inkotanyi. Don't listen to what they're saying” (Kantano).

Combinations like this made it easier for the listeners to follow the appeal (Kabanda 07.01.2004).

Most of the *call for action* statements were directed toward the RPF or the Tutsi:

“Watch them closely, because Inkotanyi's tricks are so many” (Kantano).

Such statements widened the gap between the Hutu and the Tutsi because RTLM never encouraged the Hutu listeners to cooperate between the Tutsi. Hence, the technique contributed to the inclusion-exclusion mechanism of the RTLM propaganda. The broadcast from May 23, also contains an example of a *call for action* pointed toward the Hutu who were fleeing:

“Seek for those deserters wherever they are hiding... Beat them, don't give them something to drink” (Kantano).

This excerpt shows how cruel and inhumane the broadcasts could be. RTLM created the impression that participating in the genocide was the responsibility of every Hutu, and that remaining on the sidelines would be unpatriotic (Frohardt and Temin 2003b:2).

The use of the technique *call for action* resembles the characteristic of an enemy image termed *refusal of empathy* because it never encouraged the listeners to have compassion for the Tutsi. Because RTLM called for action against the Tutsi as a group, the technique also contributed to *de-individualize* this part of the population.

### 6.15 Description of Activities and Use of Euphemisms

Negative attitudes toward the enemy can be encouraged by presenting emotional and negative descriptions of the enemy's activities. And while propagandists denounce the activities of the enemy, a relatively acceptable rationalization for own activities must be provided in order to alleviate latent feelings of guilt (Kotnik 1997:153, see section 3.20). Such a method was used in all but one of the RTLTM tapes. Yet, the intensity and scope of this technique termed *description of activities* varied.<sup>110</sup>

Many of the RTLTM journalists' statements implied that it was impossible to trust the Tutsi or the RPF:

*"And you know that guerrillas have tricks, different tricks to de-stabilize the power and regimes in place, to provoke ill-feeling/discord, to provoke hatred and divisions in order to neutralize the regimes in place"* (Rucogoza, RTLTM March 30, 2004).

Other statements focused on the violent aspect of the RPF and the Tutsi. By portraying these groups as ruthless killers, preemptive action to avoid such killings became more accepted (Frohardt and Temin 2003a:1). The RTLTM broadcast from November 20, 1993 contains some of the violent descriptions of the RPF activities, all of which were regularly repeated by the RTLTM journalists. It is also one of the broadcasts in which the technique was applied most frequently. In this broadcast, Nahimana stated:

*"...unspeakable atrocities were committed against the residents by RPF".*

The word *unspeakable* made him elude a more detailed description of what the RPF did. Additionally, the word *atrocities* made it clear that these were horrible events. Atrocity stories have been debased currency in the war of words (Evans 2004:36), and like Nahimana, the other RTLTM journalists frequently accused the RPF of committing atrocities. This is just one of many examples of how *negative description of the enemy's activities* often appeared together with the technique *accusation in a mirror*. Some other examples in the same broadcast are:

*"...they [the Inkotanyi] killed our elected representatives"* (Nahimana).

*"...Kanyarengwe who appears to be exterminating his relatives"* (Gahigi).

These descriptions would be more suitable for the activity of the extremists. Most genocide scholars emphasize the massive Hutu crimes against the Tutsi, and it

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<sup>110</sup> Included in this propaganda technique is an element of accusation.

was mostly Tutsi who were killed during the genocide (Caplan (ed.) 2000:106). Still, the RPF was also engaged in the violence, including the killings of civilians (Reyntjens 1996:1). Although it is not appropriate to make any comparison between the horrendous scale of massacres committed by forces loyal to the Hutu extremists with those committed by the RPF, hundreds, possibly thousands, of defenseless people have been killed by the RPF and its supporters. These violations appear to have gone largely unreported (Amnesty International 1994:1-2). Thus, the RTLM statements about the RPF killings can be said to both illustrate the technique *accusation in a mirror* and a true version of what happened.

Positive descriptions of the activities of the FAR or the Hutu were also present in the RTLM broadcasts, but to a much smaller extent than the negative descriptions of the Tutsi activities. This imbalanced ratio contributed to the aggressive style of the radio broadcasts. Most often, either the negative descriptions of Tutsi activities or the positive descriptions of own activities were highlighted in the broadcasts. Only occasionally did these two different aspects of the RTLM propaganda occur together. In these cases they reinforced the differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi, and hence contributed to the exclusion-inclusion mechanism of RTLM. In addition, they also reinforced the idea that the Tutsi and the RPF embodied the opposite of what the Hutu militia and the Hutu population strove for. In this way, the RTLM propaganda was in accordance with the enemy image characteristic called *identification with evil*.

The depictions of the Hutu activities mostly focused on what the Hutu or the FAR should do rather than describing what they were actually doing. A prominent feature of the broadcasts containing such descriptions was the use of the euphemisms “*protect*”, “*liberate*” or “*defend*”. For instance, on May 23, the listeners were told that:

“*We have to protect our city against the enemy*” (Kantano) (Emphasis added).

“...*we have to liberate our country*” (Kantano) (Emphasis added).

“*They [the soldiers] must fight to defend their families, their lives, their country*” (Kantano) (Emphasis added).

This effort at legitimating violence was meant both to quiet foreign critics and to incite Hutu to kill more (Des Forges 1999:256). The aim of euphemisms is to remove negative emotional connotations carried by a word (see section 3.20). During the genocide, euphemisms and metaphors had to be used, as if the naked truth was

too much to stomach (Prunier 1995:138). The extremists wanted every Hutu to participate in the killings, and their aim was not so much to protect the Hutu as to eliminate the Tutsi, not so much to liberate the country as to get a firmer grip of the state. Euphemisms served to hide the horror of what was planned (Hintjens 1999:269),<sup>111</sup> and they made it easier to alleviate people's feelings of guilt.

Many scholars have stressed the propagandists' use of the euphemism *to work* when they meant *to kill* (Gabirol 2003, Kagabo 11.11.2003):

*"My particular greeting goes to our soldiers, to all security agents, to the youths of parties and to volunteers who are on roadblocks, who are working"* (Ruggiu, RTLM June 5, 1994).

In addition, one of the Hutu militias was called Interahamwe, which means *"those who work together"*. However, their main activity was to kill (Kirschke 1996:ix). Such a euphemism made it easier for the propagandists to mobilize people by hiding the cruelty of the requested activity. The use of the word *"tool"* as a euphemism for firearms had the same effect (ICTR 2003b:42, Des Forges 1999:258, RTLM May 28, 1994).

Prunier (1995:138) identifies the use of other euphemisms as well: Killings were *umuganda* (collective work), chopping up men was *bush clearing* and slaughtering women and children was *pulling out the roots of the bad weeds*. The RTLM broadcasts, however, do not contain any of these euphemisms.

As mentioned in section 6.15, euphemisms were often combined with *call for action*. This made the requested action sound more acceptable, and as a result this combination was important for the role of RTLM as a mobilizer to action. The technique was also used in conjunction with *use of stereotypes* and *highlighting its own strength*.

To turn the Hutu against the Tutsi population, RTLM had to present the Tutsi as *the evil Other*. RTLM's *description of activities* built upon two of the seven characteristics of an enemy image. First, the descriptions resembled the characteristic *negative anticipation*, which include that whatever the enemy does is intended to harm us. Second, the descriptions prevented the development of any empathy with the Tutsi population. As a result, they were in accordance with the characteristic

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<sup>111</sup> Sometimes the real aim became apparent: *"At all costs, all Inkotanyi have to be exterminated..."*, Kantano stated (RTLM May 23, 1994).

termed *refusal of empathy*. At the same time, the descriptions contributed to the exclusion-inclusion function of RTLTM - the actions of the enemy was evil, but the government, on the contrary, was “*restoring peace*” (Ruggiu, RTLTM April 11, 1994).

### **6.16 Repetition**

RTLTM’s use of *repetition* has become apparent in the previous analysis. Not only were the techniques used several times, but the content of these techniques was also regularly repeated (this could actually vary within each category of propaganda techniques). For instance, when *using the Other as a scapegoat*, the journalists often stated that the RPF had killed the President, and when describing the RPF activities, RTLTM repeatedly claimed that the guerilla force committed atrocities.

All kinds of messages require *repetition* to attract attention. Yet, *repetition* might be more important in propaganda than in journalism, because the purpose of a propagandist is to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a certain response that furthers his/her intention (see section 3.1). Consequently, it is reasonable to treat *repetition* itself as a propaganda technique (Brown 1963:27). RTLTM’s use of *repetition* as a propaganda technique contributed to strengthen the view of Tutsi as an enemy. As the techniques themselves were repeated, the different enemy image characteristics embodied in them were repeated as well.

### **6.17 Propaganda Techniques Used Prior to and Following April 6, 1994**

The use of propaganda techniques varied before and after the assassination of the President on April 6, 1994. Eight of the techniques were represented more often after April 6, 1994, than before, and three not (percent of number of broadcasts in each group).<sup>112</sup> This is in accordance with the assumption about a more intense and aggressive RTLTM propaganda after April 6 (see section 3.23). Both *creating a positive self-image* and *highlighting its own strength*, however, occurred more often before the President’s death. This does not undermine the assumption that RTLTM became more brutal after April 6, 1994. Rather, it indicates that the focus changed

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<sup>112</sup> The different types of biased use of sources were not included in this part of the analysis, as the intensity and brutality of the sources statement are captured by the analysis of the other propaganda techniques. Additionally, repetition is not included in this part of the analysis, because this technique was not analyzed as strict as the other techniques.

from *us* to *them* after this date and that it was necessary to build up own self-image before turning against others. This might also be the reason why a larger share of the broadcasts prior to the death of the President, than after, presented RPF's *alleged intentions*. It is easier to present oneself in a positive light, if one at the same time denounces the Other. Thus, the distribution of *creating a positive self-image, own strength* and *alleged intentions* also favor the assumption about increased brutality after the President's death. On the other hand, the use of *band-wagon* does not indicate a high level of brutality in a broadcast, still, the technique was represented more often in the broadcasts after April 6.

All but one of the broadcasts with the highest frequency of a technique took place after April 6, 1994.<sup>113</sup> This supports the assumption about a more intense and brutal style after the death of the President. When taking a look at the average number of the use of each propaganda technique, however, the pattern is more ambiguous. Six of the techniques were averagely used more often prior to the killing of President Habyarimana, and six were not. At the same time, there is great uncertainty connected to this average number. First, some of the techniques, for instance *use of stereotypes* and *using the Other as a scapegoat* are employed only once before April 6, and consequently it is misleading to present their average frequency before the date of the killing. Additionally, the exact frequency of each technique is uncertain. The techniques were overlapping and even though I have tried to be as systematic and concise as possible, mistakes might have occurred. Since we are dealing with very small numbers, and the fact that differences prior to and after April 6 were small, such mistakes can result in large divergences regarding the average number. Consequently, these average values should not be used to consider intensity and brutality.

The ICTR (2003b:163) states that “(a)fter 6 April 1994, the fury and intensity of RTLM broadcasting increased, particularly with regard to calls on the population to take action against the enemy”. In accordance with this, I expect that *call for action* and *name-calling*, here represented by the use of the word *enemy*, indicate brutality and intensity in a better way than the average number of each technique does.

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<sup>113</sup> The exception was *highlighting its own strength*.

The journalists and the sources called for action in five of the nine tapes prior to April 6 (55%), while the number was 14 out of 16 tapes after this date (88%). The technique also appeared more often in each of the broadcasts after April 6, and this indicates a higher level of intensity in the broadcasts following the President's death.

The word *enemy* was only used in four of the nine tapes before April 6, while used in all but one of the tapes afterward. In addition, the frequency of the word in each broadcast was generally much higher after this date. This demonstrates how the intensity and brutality of the radio programs increased after Habyarimana's death.<sup>114</sup>

### **6.18 Discussion of the Analysis of Propaganda Techniques**

The discussed propaganda techniques can be divided in two groups, one which focuses on the qualities of the Hutu and another which focuses on the qualities of the Tutsi. The first group contains *highlighting its own strength, creating a positive self-image* and *(positive) description of own activities* (euphemisms). These devices focused on the positive qualities and admirable intentions of the Hutu. *Call for action* and *band-wagon* also belong to this group because they were directed toward the Hutu population. The propaganda techniques in the other group, *using the other part as a scapegoat, the Other is lying, alleged intentions, (negative) descriptions of activities, use of stereotypes, use of threats* and *name-calling*, focused on the negative qualities and horrific actions of the RPF and the Tutsi, in other words on the actions of the Other.<sup>115</sup>

This two-pronged use of the propaganda techniques was to be expected. It is more effective to praise own truthfulness while stressing that the Other is lying, it is more effective to highlight one's own strength while identifying the weakness of the enemy. Such a duality is also natural because Rwanda at the time of the RTLM broadcasts was a very polarized society. Whether you were a Hutu or a Tutsi determined your educational opportunities, whom one was permitted to marry, and in 1994, who was to be put to death. The techniques that centered on the negative aspects of the Tutsi, led to more antipathy and aggression toward the Tutsi, whereas

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<sup>114</sup> I have not examined every tape to find out who the word *enemy* is directed toward each time it is used, because this would not have changed this conclusion. Even if the word *enemy* seldom was pointed toward the RPF or the Inkotanyi, to mention the word *enemy* creates a tense and aggressive atmosphere.

<sup>115</sup> The use of *repetition* and the *biased use of sources* were not included in any of these groups.

techniques such as *band-wagon* led to a stronger sense of belonging among the Hutu listeners. As stated previously, to include someone in a particular group necessitates the exclusion of others. It will therefore be wrong to claim that the two groups of techniques represent only the inclusion-mechanism or the exclusion-mechanism of propaganda. It was the combination of the techniques that resulted in the prominence of the inclusion-exclusion mechanism in the RTLM broadcasts. Additionally, this combination contributed to the creation of a Tutsi enemy image. As this analysis has shown, most of the techniques resembled one or more of the characteristics of *the syndrome of the enemy image*. The only characteristic not represented by the discussed propaganda techniques was *zero-sum thinking*.

### **6.19 The World through the Eyes of RTLM**

To understand the context of propaganda, it is important to be aware of the propagandists' version of historical events (see section 3.7). By interpreting the meaning of various events, the propagandists can control how people react to them. Media's ability to generate "collective reaction effects", the joint reactions of many in a shared experience, is based in part on the tendency for people to become more dependent on media for information and guidance during times of instability. Hence, in times of crisis, media outlets acquire more power over listeners' perceptions of events (Kellow and Steeves 1998:108-110). In section 6.19.1 and 6.19.2, RTLM's interpretation of two important political events in Rwanda, the 1959 Revolution and the Arusha Agreements, is analyzed.

#### **6.19.1 The 1959 Social Revolution**

An important tactic for spreading fear is to focus on past conflicts and on the history of animosity between groups. Media outlets can incite fear in the public by highlighting the fact that violating conflict has occurred in the past, and that the same groups behind violent acts then are suspected of planning them now (Frohardt and Temin 2003a:6). In this way, the potential for future conflict can appear much greater to media consumers than it actually is, and the means and capacity for carrying out such atrocities more attainable. Media can be used to make the point that "*they did it before, they can do it again*". Such a message creates the impression that preemptive action is necessary, and that such action is really just self-defense. It provides a



rationale for immediate violent action (Ibid.:6). In the discussion that follows, this thesis demonstrates that such a message was presented on RTLM when the journalists talked about the Revolution and the surrounding issues connected to it.

The Social Revolution from 1959 to 1962 inverted the power hierarchy by replacing the Tutsi monarchy with a Hutu republic. In practice, the changes mainly affected the top rungs of the Rwandan society; a small group of Hutu replaced the tiny Tutsi elite (Caplan (ed.) 2000:16). The Revolution constituted the first episode of generalized inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda (Eltringham 2004:44). Houses were burned, and people were clubbed and speared to death. Several hundred were killed, and some 10,000 took refuge in neighboring states (Caplan (ed.) 2000:17).

The Revolution was central to the genocidal propaganda (Eltringham 2004:44), yet, only seven RTLM tapes mentioned this event.<sup>116</sup> Most of the broadcasts that touched upon this subject connected the Revolution with the ongoing conflict:

*“What you fought for in 59 is being taken away”* (Kantano, RTLM January 21, 1994).

Statements like this might have influenced the Hutu’s will to kill. Kantano gave the impression that the gains made in 1959 were in danger of being lost. Some Hutu still had in mind the harsh exploitation of Tutsi overlords, and on April 17, MRND President Ndirumutse insinuated that such a situation could occur again:

*“Maybe the Rwandan people made a mistake of thinking that the Revolution was finished once for all”*.

These excerpts demonstrate how an event from the past was used to incite fear. Both of them implicitly stated that “they (the Tutsi) did it before, they can do it again”. Such a presentation made it easier for the extremists to justify use of violence (Kabanda 07.01.2004).

On April 22, 1994, Froduald Karamira, vice President of the MDR-Power,<sup>117</sup> proclaimed:

*“They [the RPF] are fighting for the power they had in 59 and think they can get it back”*.

This statement implies that it is the same persons who ruled before 1959, who now wanted to usurp the Hutu’s power. This hypothesis is correct to the extent that

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<sup>116</sup> RTLM January 21, November 20, March 30, March 31, April 17, April 22 and May 23, 1994.

<sup>117</sup> MDR-Power was a Hutu political party, which consisted of previous members of the MDR (Prunier 1995:188).

the RPF soldiers were descendants of the Tutsi who fled Rwanda during the violent years of the Revolution. However, many Tutsi had not benefited from being the “superior race”, and the living standard among the poor Tutsi was similar to the living standard of the poor Hutu. Between 1959 and 1967, almost 300,000 Tutsi fled to other countries, and only a small fraction of the refugees belonged to the privileged nobility (Mamdani 2001:100, Prunier 1995:38). RTLM, however, never cared about this division, as shown in the following statement from Nkurunziza on May 23, 1994:

*“In addition, Thaddeus Bagaragaza was asked the reason why, during the 1959 revolution, so many Tutsis were killed, whether they all were on the King's side. He well answered that even Tutsi who were not chiefs were all on the King's side. Here, we have to see the similarity of things”.*

RTLM used the Tutsi defeat in the 1959 to explain why the RPF was attacking in 1994. The propagandists never connected RPF’s entry into Rwanda to the harsh policy against the exile-Rwandans, the difficult situation for the refugees in Uganda or the massacres of the Tutsi who still lived in the country. They gave the impression that the only driving force for the Tutsi was the power they lost 35 years ago:

*“The fathers of Inyenzi fled away in the 59's. However, the fathers told their children: “It's high time to take weapons and fight for the recovery of the power encroached upon us by Hutus. So, stand up!””* (Kantano, RTLM May 23, 1994).

This statement from Kantano also reiterates that the ongoing turmoil was a fight between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Tutsi were presented as the party initiating the conflict, and such a version of the truth contributed to the listeners’ acceptance of the propagandists’ arguments about killing as self-defense.

In accordance with *highlighting its own strength*, it would have been logical that RTLM presented the Revolution with an emphasis on the victory of the Hutu, and the fact that in 1962 the Hutu imposed what they termed democracy, but which hardly qualifies to such an honorable description (Caplan (ed.) 2000:18). Only one broadcast stressed that the Hutu won something in 1959 and that the Hutu were behind the positive development of the country in the 1960s (RTLM April 22, 1994). Still, also this broadcast focused on the power-seeking aspect of the RPF.

RTLM’s discussion of the Revolution demonstrates that this event was used to create fear by connecting the situation in 1959 to the situation in 1994. Consequently, the Revolution was interpreted in a favorable way for the Hutu extremists, primarily by creating an image of a power-hungry RPF who still remembered the days of Tutsi

hegemony. The brutal Hutu violence that occurred in both the 1950s, the 1960s and in the 1990s was never mentioned at all. Such a framework gave the Hutu a justification for killing the Tutsi, especially since RTLM did not distinguish between the monarchists of the past, the RPF or the ordinary Tutsi. In other words, the propagandists applied *card-stacking* in their presentation of the Revolution (see section 3.22).

### **6.19.2 The Arusha Peace Process**

In the early 1990s, approximately 600,000 Rwandans lived in exile (Des Forges 1999:48). President Habyarimana's unyielding position was that these refugees were not his concern and that Rwanda was too poor and had too little land to accommodate the enormous exiled community. This policy was instrumental in the RPF's decision to invade Rwanda on October 1, 1990 (Caplan (ed.) 2000:35).

Immediately after the invasion, the government retaliated and violence burgeoned. The only way to end the civil war and to break the cycle of violence was to establish a political process that secured a cease-fire and led to a multiethnic government that enshrined democratic practices. This was the *raison d'être* of the Arusha negotiations, initiated in June 1992 (Ibid.:41, Barnett 2002:113).<sup>118</sup>

All but three of the RTLM broadcasts<sup>119</sup> mentioned the Arusha agreements, but most of them did not delve deeply into the topic. The subject was most widely discussed in the tapes from March to May 1994, which were the three last months of the implementation phase of the accords (Jones 1999:131).<sup>120</sup>

The extremist forces efficiently undermined any efforts to implement the peace agreements (Ibid.:143). The RTLM excerpts discussed in this section illustrate this. At the same time they demonstrate the different elements of RTLM's discussion of the Arusha Accords.

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<sup>118</sup> The negotiations took place in Arusha in Tanzania, after pressure from the OAU and some European countries (Magnarella 2000:16).

<sup>119</sup> RTLM May 29, June 4 and June 20, 1994.

<sup>120</sup> Jones (1999:131) discusses the three phases of the Arusha Agreements: The pre-negotiation phase lasted until a formal negotiation phase began in June 1992. The accord was signed on August 4, 1994, at which time the implementation phase began. The implementation phase included attempts to establish the transitional institutions called for in the agreements, and it also encompassed a last effort taken in April and May of 1994 to salvage the accords.

On March 30, Gahigi stated:

*“The problem is that, in fact, the Arusha agreements have dealt with two main issues, the first issue was to stop the war launched by RPF and the second issue which is in my opinion the main issue was to share the power. And it is obvious that RPF does not want to share the power that they want to keep totally as they wished it when they launched the war in 1990”.*

The RPF invasion was the most important factor in escalating the political polarization in Rwanda, and plunging it into a terrible war (African Rights 1995:1062). In 1992 and 1993, however, the Interahamwe launched a series of attacks against Tutsi who supported certain opposition parties (Des Forges 1999:101). The aim of the Arusha agreements was to stop all kinds of bloodshed, not only the RPF violence. By not mentioning this, Gahigi presented a limited and one-sided view of the purpose of the Arusha Accords.

One of the main issues in Arusha was power sharing. However, the power to share was all held by the regime already in place (Bruce 1999:148). For the Akazu, the deal represented a major loss of power as they would be forced to relinquish oligarchic control over the state (Jones 2001:93). The Akazu did not want to share the power, a fact that Gahigi ignores. Thus, the statement above illustrates the use of *accusation in a mirror*. On the other hand, the RPF had a superior bargaining position in the Arusha process. They were able to exclude the CDR from claiming seats in the Cabinet and the Parliament, and they got a powerful share in what was to become a national army. Still, while gaining power was an important goal for the RPF, their original objective was to be permitted to return to Rwanda (ICTR 2003b:33).

Out the mass of complex facts related to the motivation for the Arusha process and the multifaceted issue of power, Gahigi emphasized the facts that placed the RPF in an unfavorable light. The Hutu extremists did not support the peace process, and Gahigi used the technique *card-stacking* to win support for the extremists' agenda.

On April 17, 1994, Rafiki Hyacinthe Nsengiyumva, minister of agriculture in the interim government, broadcasted an often repeated argument on RTLM:

*“...the Arusha agreements are violated by one party, the RPF, it is to them to come back to the line”.*

In the first phase of the Arusha negotiations, the RPF violated a cease-fire by carrying out a major attack in the areas around Kigali. They justified this assault by pointing to a recent massacre of several hundred Tutsi (Caplan (ed.) 2000:50). It was

the extremists, however, who later become the greatest obstacle in implementing the agreements. This is not surprising, due to the fact that the accords seemed to require a complete capitulation by the Hutu government team to the RPF (Ibid.:53). The Hutu extremists believed that the accords were unfair and one-sided, and they had no intention of following the agreements. This became apparent in, for instance, the refugee movements, which according to the Arusha Accords were supposed to be free, but which continued to be hampered by the FAR (Prunier 1995:170, 196). In view of this, the statement from Nsengiyumva illustrates how the RPF was used as a scapegoat and how the intentions of the extremists were forced upon the RPF. The statement also indicates how accusations and assertions were presented on the air with little justification or proof.

Some broadcasts highlighted the external pressure from other countries on the Arusha negotiations.

*“They [the Inkotanyi] do not realize that they got Arusha thanks to their different accomplices, may they be whites or Belgians”* (Kantano, RTL M May 28, 1994).

Because of the strong international presence at the negotiations, the concessions made to the RPF were seen by Hutu hard-liners as a sell-out by the government imposed by outsiders (Lemarchand 1994:592).<sup>121</sup> However, “...the pressure on the regime within the Arusha process cannot be seen as being overwhelming because of the presence of supportive regimes like France and Zaire in the talks”, Jones (1999:147) stresses. According to him, the RPF did not obtain their superior bargaining position due to international attendance, but through their military advantage on the ground (Ibid.:149). Yet, the listeners were never informed about other influencing factors, as a simplified and HP friendly version of the reality was presented. RTL M hid the political reality by talking about it, as several propagandists do (Ellul 1973:59).

These three extracts from RTL M clearly demonstrate how the RTL M staff, and the external sources, utilized *card-stacking* in their presentation of the Arusha Agreements. This presentation contributed to discredit alternatives to violent conflict. The presentation also contributed to the creation of a Tutsi enemy image, because RTL M made the RPF a scapegoat and presented their intentions in an unfavorable

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<sup>121</sup> Belgium, Germany, France, the US, Uganda, Zaire, and the appropriate regional and international organizations were present during the negotiations (Caplan et al 2000:52).

light. The phrase “*they got Arusha*” from the May 28, 1994 excerpt also demonstrates that the propagandists turned Hutu and Tutsi against each other by creating a situation of *zero-sum thinking* between the two groups.<sup>122</sup> The phrase created the impression that the Hutu were the losers in the agreements, and did not address the fact that the peace agreements would have favored both Hutu and Tutsi civilians.

By favoring the extremists’ version of the truth, RTLM contributed to widening the gap between the Hutu and the Tutsi. By simplifying the complex Arusha process, by focusing only on the gains of the one party and by promoting arguments not based on proper foundations, RTLM paved the way for use of other propaganda techniques as well. In accordance with Frohardt and Temin (2003a:6) the techniques *call for action* and *highlighting its own strength* were probably more successful when used in a setting where the Arusha Accords were discussed, because in these discussions the RTLM journalists gave the impression that the potential for future conflict was greater than it actually was (see section 6.19.1).

### **6.19.3 Conclusion**

Through its interpretation of the 1959 Revolution and the Arusha Accords, RTLM misused the past to promote their own agenda. These two events were interpreted in a manner that contributed to view the Tutsi as an enemy who wanted to restore power and who were the sole party to blame for the problems regarding the peace agreements. RTLM used the propaganda technique *card-stacking* in the presentation of these events. However, they were not alone in doing so. Interpretations of Rwandan history have become political tools routinely used by all parties in the conflict to justify their interest (Caplan (ed.) 2000:9).

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<sup>122</sup> This is one of the characteristics Spillman and Spillman give *the syndrome of the enemy image*, and it implies that anything which benefits the enemy harms us and vice versa.

## 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter will discuss the findings related to the questions presented in chapter 1, and it will draw some conclusions from the study.

### 7.1 RTLM as a Political Tool

The theoretical framework of this thesis has built upon Jowett and O'Donnell's ten-step method of propaganda analysis, Spillman and Spillman's characteristics of *the syndrome of the enemy image* and contributions from a wide range of propaganda scholars. Through this framework, this study has demonstrated RTLM to be an important propaganda apparatus for the Hutu extremists. Despite its position as an independent radio station, RTLM had strong bonds to the power elite.<sup>123</sup> It was owned by a group of extremists allied to a faction within the government which gladly lent a helping hand to the radio station. Thus, these members of the government contributed to an institutional framework useful for RTLM. The Rwandan information office, however, was critical to RTLM's broadcasts. Yet, despite ORINFOR's complaints about the radio station's breaking of the Press Law, RTLM continued its hate speech. Hence, the lack of an independent authority to stop and sanction RTLM created a favorable setting in which the radio station could be used as a tool to spread the Hutu Power ideology.

Successful propaganda campaigns tend to originate from a strong, centralized, and decision-making authority that produces a consistent message throughout its structure (Jowett and O'Donnell 1999:284, 320). RTLM was no exception. The radio station had a centralized structure in which Ferdinand Nahimana was the driving force. Additionally, the Board of Directors was never appointed, and this led to a lack of democratic structure of the organization. Since both the RTLM journalists and the owners belonged to the group of Rwandan Hutu extremists, the promotion of the Hutu Power ideology was ensured in every part of the organization.

The analysis of the RTLM transcripts demonstrated how the radio station was used as an instrument to create a Tutsi enemy image. This was done through the use of different propaganda techniques that resembles the seven characteristics that

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<sup>123</sup> This became evident in the discussion of the shareholders' occupational, social and political status and when analyzing the radio stations use of sources.

Spillman and Spillman (1991:57-58) connect to *the syndrome of the enemy image*: Distrust, placing the guilt on the enemy, negative anticipation, identification with evil, zero-sum thinking, de-individualization and refusal of empathy. The propaganda techniques can be divided in two different groups. One group focused on the Hutu and the other focused on the Tutsi (see section 6.18). The devices in each group complemented the other and were often used in conjunction. For example, *description of activities* was combined with *call for action*.

As discussed in section 2.1, a “plain” textual analysis might have difficulties in deciding if, for instance, biased use of sources are the result of bad journalism or the result of deliberate use of a medium as a propaganda apparatus. Hence, the value of using propaganda techniques as a starting point for a propaganda analysis is reduced. However, some of the techniques are clearly pure propaganda techniques, such as the use of negative *name-calling* of the other part in a conflict and the use of *euphemisms* when describing the activities of one’s own group. In addition, this thesis has drawn upon a lot of literature that stresses the role of RTLM in promoting the Hutu Power ideology and inciting violence against the Tutsi. As a result, it is appropriate to have propaganda techniques as a starting point for an analysis of RTLM broadcasts. Still, the similarity between bad journalism and propaganda techniques underscores the importance of taking the institutional framework into account when analyzing propaganda. Additionally, it is important to have knowledge about the ideology that steers the propaganda. The RTLM message built upon an inverted version of the Hamitic hypothesis, which central Rwandan institutions had been relaying to the population for a number of years. RTLM’s influential force was strong because propaganda which is rooted in a population's existing beliefs and attitudes tends to be the most effective (Ellul 1973:36, Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:290).

The categories of propaganda devices used in this thesis were developed deductively and inductively (see section 2.3). While techniques such as *name-calling*, *band-wagon* and *using the other as a scapegoat* are propaganda techniques employed by different propagandists in various conflicts world wide, this study has demonstrated that it is only meaningful to analyze them within the context of the society in which they are used. For instance, to accuse a Rwandan person of having a



thin nose can evoke feelings of anger and hate whereas the same comment in Norway would be rather harmless. Labeling someone a *monarchist* or a *cockroach* in Norway would create completely different connotations than it would in Rwanda. When RTLM labeled the RPF *monarchists* or *Inyenzi*, they did so knowing that such terms would incite furor as these terms had negative connotations that had been instilled in the Rwandan people over many years. Thus, a contextual understanding of the Rwandan society is of great importance in order to grasp how RTLM was used as a propaganda tool. Otherwise it would have been difficult to understand how the journalists utilized the Rwandan history for their own purpose. In the creation of a Tutsi enemy image, the RTLM journalists interpreted both the historical events of the 1959 Social Revolution and the Arusha agreements in a simplistic and biased way. RTLM used history as a justification for violent action against an alleged power-seeking Tutsi enemy. The political turmoil in Burundi and the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990 were also used to incite fear in the Hutu population. In this way, RTLM was like a packet of seeds dropped on a fertile soil of hate, anger and fear.

This thesis has demonstrated how RTLM broadcasted what Ellul (1973:72) defines as agitation propaganda, which is a type of propaganda that stimulates mass action. A war of words might lead to killings of people, and two of RTLM's founders, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, were found guilty of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity (ICTR 2003b:361). Through the use of propaganda techniques, RTLM defended the indefensible by creating the impression that the actions of the Tutsi enemy justified violence on the part of the Hutu. RTLM was used as a tool to promote the Hutu Power ideology and to create a Tutsi enemy image in order to encourage the Hutu population to take action against the Tutsi enemy.

Although RTLM deliberately created hate, the radio station was not the sole cause of the violence. Rather it was one of several tools used by the extremists in their fight for a Tutsi free Rwanda. RTLM was part of the plot to commit genocide. Other important instruments were, for instance, the militias and Network Zero.

Jowett and O'Donnell (1999:6) define propaganda as a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior

to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist (see section 3.1). This study has shown that RTLM fit very well into this definition. The RTLM propaganda was deliberate and carefully contemplated. The journalists used several different propaganda techniques to shape the perceptions of the listeners and manipulate their knowledge and understanding of the Tutsi. The extremists' fear of losing power resulted in RTLM promoting the Hutu Power ideology and encouraging the Hutu to take part in the genocide. By listening to the journalists' focus on self-defense and their description of the power-seeking Tutsi who wanted to kill all Hutu, the listeners might have thought that the propagandists had their interest at heart, but in fact, the propagandists only cared about their own cause.

## **7.2 Reflections**

Rwanda still remains haunted by the role RTLM played in the genocide. The Rwandan media were abused to justify genocide, today the genocide justify abuse of the media. The authorities use the role of the media in the genocide as an excuse to limit the freedom of expression. They forget that hate media were actually established and supported by those in power. Today, independent newspapers are controlled and harassed if they are critical toward the government (Alexis and Mpambara 2003:26). Not until January 2004, did the government allow the first private radio stations to begin broadcasting. In the ten years since the genocide, only the state radio and foreign stations such as the BBC were allowed to operate (BBC NEWS 2004:1).

Some human rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch, claim that the international community should have jammed RTLM. Others, in example the NGO ARTICLE 19, are more skeptical to such an intervention. However, ARTICLE 19 maintains that RTLM should have been jammed after the assassination of the President. It was not until then, that the radio station was being used as a tool *to organize* the genocide (Carver 2004:54). The killings in Rwanda would have occurred with or without RTLM (Girard 1996). As a way to stop propaganda, ARTICLE 19 rather calls for independent broadcasting systems to be established. Hate speech is best fought with more speech rather than by censorship, and jamming can result in justification for increased control by authoritarian leaders (Reliefweb 2003:1, Eknes and Endresen 1999:13).

## APPENDIX

**Table 1: List of RTL M broadcasts**

Date	Original IMI-code	New code*	Translator**
November 20, 1993	99A • RTL M	1A	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
November 20, 1993	099B • RTL M	1B	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
November 24, 1993	139A • C.2/K 95 RTL M	2A	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
November 24, 1993	139B • C.2/K 95	2B	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
December 8, 1993	144 • C.7/K95	3	Wellars Mugabo
January 6, 1994	045 • RTL M	4	Gaudence Mukakigeli
January 21, 1994	159A • C.37/K95	5A	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
January 21, 1994	159B • C.37/K95	5B	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
March 16, 1994	168A • CE 76/95	6A	Yves-F. Ndimurukundo
March 16, 1994	168B • CE 76/95	6B	Yves-F. Ndimurukundo
March 30, 1994	187 • C.53/K 95	7	Eliphaz Bimenyimana
March 31, 1994	188A • C.54/K 95	8A	Charles Zikuliza
March 31, 1994	188B • C.54/K 95	8B	Charles Zikuliza
April 1, 1994	189A • C.55/K 95	9A	Gaudence Mukakigeli
April 1, 1994	189B • C.55/K 95	9B	Eliphaz Bimenyimana
April 11, 1994	062A • RTL M A/908	10A	Charles Zikuliza
April 11, 1994	062B • RTL M B/908	10B	Charles Zikuliza
April 12, 1994	04 Loose Tape RTL M 4	11	Fabien Nsengiyumva
April 14, 1994	065B • Cassette A/91	12B	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
April 15, 1994	070 • Tape A/916	13	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
April 17, 1994	074A • A/V 920	14A	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
April 17, 1994	074B • A/V 920	14B	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
April 22, 1994	115 • RTL M	15A	Yves-F. Ndimurukundo
April 22, 1994	115 • RTL M	15B	Yves-F. Ndimurukundo
May 16, 1994	002 • RTL M 2	16	Fabien Nsengiyumva
May 23, 1994	131A • RTL M	17A	Gaudence Mukakigeli
May 23, 1994	131B • RTL M 18	17B	Gaudence Mukakigeli
May 28, 1994	012 • RTL M/12	18A	Yves-F. Ndimurukundo
May 28, 1994	012 • RTL M/12	18B	Yves-F. Ndimurukundo
May 29, 1994	14 • RTL M 13	19	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
June 4, 1994	134A • RTL M	20A	Chrétien
June 5, 1994	134B • RTL M	20B	Chrétien
June 20, 1994	035 • RTL M/50	21A	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
June 22, 1994	037A • RTL M 52	22A	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
June 22, 1994	037B • RTL M 5	22B	Lydie R.M. Mpambara
June 28, 1994	137A • RTL M	23A	Gaudence Mukakigeli
June 28, 1994	137B • RTL M	23B	Gaudence Mukakigeli
July 3, 1994	042 • Loose Tape RTL M 68	24	Fabien Nsengiyumva

\*This new code was made to get a better oversight of the RTL M tapes.

\*\* The IMI material contained contradictory information about the original languages of the tapes. Consequently, I do not know for sure which tapes that were translated from English into France, and which tapes that were translated from Kinyarwanda into English.

**Table 2: The Oral Sources**

Broadcast date	Name	HP friendly	Elite source
November 24, 1993	Faustin Twagiramungu	No	Yes: MDR President
	James Gasana	No	Yes: Minister of Defense
January 6, 1994	Tito Rutaremara	No	Yes: RPF leader/deputy
January 21, 1994	Froduald Karamira	Yes	Yes: 2 <sup>nd</sup> vice President of MDR-Power
March 16, 1994	Gaspard Habumuremyi	?	No: Civilian
March 30, 1994	Viateur Kamali	?	Yes: Student
	Félix A. Mujoyambere	?	Yes: Student
	Jean Gakwaya	?	Yes: Dean of the Faculty of Law
March 31, 1994	Stanislas Simbizi	Yes	Yes: Member of CDR Committee
April 1, 1994	Thomas Kabonake	Yes	Yes: Editor and member of MRND
April 11, 1994	Froduald Karamira	Yes	Yes
	Mathieu Ngirumpatse	Yes	Yes: MRND President
	Théodore Sindikubwabo	Yes	Yes: President from April 8, 1994
	Jean Kambanda	Yes	Yes: Prime Minister from April 8, 1994
	Unknown MDR member	Yes	?
	Unidentified prefect	Yes	Yes
	Unidentified speaker	Yes	?
April 12, 1994	Stanislas Simbizi	Yes	Yes
	Froduald Kamira	Yes	Yes
April 14, 1994	Jean Kambanda	Yes	Yes: Prime Minister from April 8, 1994
	Tharcisse Renzaho	Yes	Yes: Prefect of Kigali
April 15, 1994	S. Barahinyura	Yes	Yes: One of the CDR leaders
April 17, 1994	Donat Murego	Yes	Yes: MDR Executive Secretary
	Mathieu Ngirumpatse	Yes	Yes: MRND President
	Rafiki H. Nsengiyumva	Yes	Yes: Minister in the interim Government
	Justin Mugenzi	Yes	Yes: Minister in the interim Government
April 22, 1994	Froduald Karamira	Yes	Yes: 2 <sup>nd</sup> vice President of MDR-Power
	Stanislas Simbizi	Yes	Yes: Member of CDR Committee
May 16, 1994	D. Nizeyimana	No	No: RPF soldier
May 28, 1994	Esilone Twahirwa	Yes	No: Civilian
	Karemana	Yes	No: Civilian
	Unidentified speaker	Yes	No: Civilian man
	I. Unidentified child	?	No: Civilian boy
	II Unidentified child	?	No: Civilian boy
	Unidentified speaker	Yes	Yes: Officer
	Unidentified soldier	Yes	No: Soldier
	Rubayiza	?	No: Civilian
	Jean de Dieu Bahiz	Yes	No: Soldier
	A. Ndengetsimana	?	No: Civilian
	Jean-Pierre Ndayabaje	Yes	No: Civilian
	Thoma Habimana	?	No: Civilian
	Jones Musore	Yes	No: Civilian
	Pierre-Claver Karekezi	Yes	No: Soldier
	Patrick Hitayezu	Yes	No: Civilian
	Eric	Yes	No: Civilian
	Marc Nsengiyumva	Yes	No: Civilian
	May 29, 1994	I. Unidentified speaker	Yes
II. Unidentified speaker		?	No: Civilian
III. Unidentified speaker		?	No: Civilian
IV. Unidentified speaker		?	No: Civilian
V. Unidentified speaker		?	No: Civilian
VI. Unidentified speaker		?	No: Civilian
Daniel Bazarerwanande		Yes	No: Soldier

	VII. Unidentified speaker	Yes	?
June 4, 1994	Vincent Hakizimana	Yes	Yes: Bourgmestre of Mbogo commune
June 5, 1994	Bernard Mukingo	Yes	Yes: Editor of Kamarampaka
June 29, 1994	George F. Hategekimana	?	No

**Table 3: The Written Sources**

Broadcast date	Source	HP friendly	Elite source
November 20, 1993	MDR Communique, F. Kamira & D. Murego	Yes	Yes
	Message, witnesses of alleged RPF atrocities	Yes	No
January 21, 1994	Communique, E. Ruhigira, Cabinet Director	No	Yes
March 16, 1994	Statement, the MRND	Yes	Yes
	<i>The Prince</i> , Nicolo Machiavelli	Yes	Yes
March 31, 1994	Letter, eleven ministers	Yes	Yes
	Statement, eleven party leaders	Yes	Yes
April 1, 1994	Communique, Laurien Karumuhinzi	Yes	Yes
	Letter, a listener	Yes	Yes
	Letter: Andre Nzabihimanda, a listener	Yes	No
	Communiqué, Committee of Democratic Party	Yes	Yes
April 11, 1994	Communique, Dr. J. B. Habyarimana, prefect	No	Yes
	Communique, Ministry of Internal Affairs	Yes	Yes
	Communique, L. Bucyibaruta, Prefect	No	Yes
	Communique, Colonel R. Tharcisse, Prefect	Yes	Yes
	Communique, the Security Committee of Gisenyi	Yes	Yes
	Communique, Muhire Aloys, Prefect	Yes	Yes
	Communique, the Prefect of Cyangugu	Yes	Yes
	Communique, the Prefect of Cyangugu	Yes	Yes
	Communique, the Ministry of Defense	Yes	Yes
April 12, 1994	<i>Rwanda Politique</i> , F. Nkundabagenzi	Yes	Yes
May 16, 1994	Letter, Corporal J.P. Nshimiyimana,	Yes	Yes
	Letter, M. L. Mukobwajana,	Yes	No
	Letter, Corporal C. Bagaragaza,	No	Yes
May 28, 1994	Communique, the Ministry of Defense	Yes	Yes
	Communique, a listener	No	No
	Communique, Rwabuhungu, a listener	No	No
June 22, 1994	Letter, the Bishop of Ruhengeri	Yes	Yes
	Communique, Mudende Student Group	Yes	Yes
	Communique, Byumba officials	Yes	Yes
July 3, 1994	Communique, the PSR	No	Yes
	Communique, Nemeye & Karumuhinzi, the DP	No	Yes
	Communique, Cyangugu Intellectuals	No	Yes

**Table 4: The Quoted Tutsi Sources**

<b>Broadcast date</b>	<b>Quoted Tutsi source</b>	<b>Elite source</b>	<b>HP friendly statement and/or interpretation</b>
November 20, 1993	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	Kanyarengwe	Yes	Yes
	The Inyenzi	No	Yes
	Kanyarengwe and his people	Yes	No
	A Tutsi	No	Yes
	The RPF	No	Yes
	Kagame	Yes	Yes
January 6, 1994	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	A Tutsi women	No	No
	The RPF	No	No
January 21, 1994	Small Tutsi children	No	Yes
	An Inkotanyi	No	Yes
March 16, 1994	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
March 30, 1994	The RPF	No	No
April 1, 1994	The RPF	No	No
	Two Tutsi	No	Yes
April 11, 1994	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
April 12, 1994	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
April 15, 1994	The Tutsi	No	Yes
April 17, 1994	The RPF	No	Yes
April 22, 1994	The RPF	No	Yes
	Tito Rutaremara	Yes	Yes
May 16, 1994	The Cockroaches	No	Yes
	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
May 23, 1994	Kanyarengwe	Yes	Yes
	The RPF	No	Yes
	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	The Inyenzi	No	Yes
	Kagame	Yes	Yes
	The fathers (of the Inyenzi)	No	Yes
May 28, 1994	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	The cockroaches	No	No
May 29, 1994	The Inyenzi	No	Yes
June 5, 1994	The Inkotanyi	No	No
	Two Inyenzi	No	No
June 20, 1994	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	The Ugandan Inkotanyi	No	Yes
June 22, 1994	A captured Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	The Tutsis Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	Kanyarengwe	Yes	Yes
	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	The Tutsi	No	Yes
June 28, 1994	The Inyenzi-Inkotanyi	No	Yes
	The Inkotanyi	No	Yes
July 3, 1994	The RPF	No	Yes

**Table 5: The Key Informants**

Date of Interview	Key Informant	Title
September 4, 2003	Frank Chalk,	Associate Professor of History, Concordia University, Montreal
November 11, 2003	José Kagabo	Professor of History, EHESS, Paris
November 19, 2004	Louise Bourgault*	Professor of Mass Communication, Northern Michigan University, Marquette
December 22, 2003	Erik Møse*	President of the ICTR, Arusha
January 6, 2004	Jean de Dieu Karangwa	Lecturer, INALCO, Paris
January 7, 2004	Marcel Kabanda**	Consultant, UNESCO, Paris
January 8, 2004	Jean F. Dupaquier **	Editor of several newspapers, Pontoise

\* Interviewed by phone.

\*\* Authors of the report *Rwanda Les Médias du Génocide*.

**Figure 1: An Excerpt From the IMI Database**

**THE RWANDA ARCHIVE**  
**AUDIO DATABASE**  
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**099A • RTLM**

Enter Exact Archive Box#  Record No.

H / M\* / S  
IN

Kantano begins side A in the middle of a monologue. He explains that a cabinet m  
**Twagiramungu and the Inkotanyi, who Kantano implies are working together**

**CRITICISM OF:**

INDIVIDUAL  Yes

POLITICAL OPPONENT  Yes

ARUSHA ACCORDS  Yes

RPF RPA  Yes

**TARGETING OF: (DIRECT CALL)**

INDIVIDUAL  Yes

GROUP  Yes

ACCOMPLICES  Yes

POLITICAL OPPONENTS  Yes

FEMALE SEX  Yes

**GENERAL INCITEMENT:**

ANTI-BELGIAN STATEMENTS  Yes

ANTI-TUTSI SLURS  Yes

ANTI-TUTSI RHETORIC  Yes

ATROCITIES JUSTIFIED  Yes

ALLEGED TUTSI ATROCITIES  Yes

WARNING RE TUTSI EXTERMINATION GOALS  Yes

BLAME FOR ASSASSINATION OF HABYARIMANA  Yes

**TARGETING BY**  Yes

**GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS:**

---

SIDE A:

Speaker: Habimana Kantano: ...I was just telling you that the latest hot news wa  
meeting convened and in the chair was the Prime Minister Mrs. Uwilingiyimana A  
18:00, the topic of discussion has been the cellule' leaders issue. **The minist  
agreement because Twagiramungu Faustin and the Inkotanyi held to their positio  
understandable because people who will be working together must share the same**

Explanation: As seen above, the IMI format was by far too large for my screen resolution. Consequently, I had to copy all the transcripts into a text document.

**Figure 2: Map of Rwanda**



Source: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/rw.html>, 20.05.2004.



**Table 7: The Distribution of Propaganda Techniques in the RTLM Broadcasts**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
November 20, 1993			X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
November 24, 1993	X	X		X	X			X	X			X	X	X
December 8, 1993												X		
January 6, 1994	X		X	X					X	X		X	X	X
January 21, 1994	X	X	X	X			X				X	X	X	X
March 16, 1994	X	X	X	X					X		X	X	X	X
March 30, 1994	X		X	X			X		X		X	X		X
March 31, 1994	X	X		X	X		X	X	X			X		X
April 1, 1994	X	X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X	X
April 11, 1994	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X
April 12, 1994	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
April 14, 1994	X			X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X
April 15, 1994	X		X	X		X	X	X				X	X	X
April 17, 1994	X		X				X	X	X			X		X
April 22, 1994	X		X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X
May 16, 1994	X	X	X					X	X			X	X	X
May 23, 1994			X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X
May 28, 1994	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
May 29, 1994	X		X	X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X
June 4, 1994	X							X				X	X	X
June 5, 1994	X			X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X
June 20, 1994	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X
June 22, 1994		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
June 28, 1994			X	X		X	X				X	X		X
July 3, 1994		X	X			X		X	X			X		X
Total	19	11	19	19	12	12	12	19	16	7	12	24	19	24

1: Biased use of oral sources
2: Biased use of written sources
3: Biased use of cited Tutsi sources
4: Creating a positive self-image
5: The Other is lying
6: Using the Other as a scapegoat
7: Band-Wagon
8: Highlighting its own strength
9: Alleged intentions
10 : Use of stereotypes
11: Use of threats
12: Name-calling
13: Call for action
14: Description of activities

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