The Basque National Liberation Movement

and the Cease of ETA’s Armed Activity.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to shed light on the Basque National Liberation Movement strategy and why its armed front –ETA- decided to announce the definitive cessation of its armed activity on the 20th October 2011.

Based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of interviews and document data I conclude that ETA responded rationally to a contradiction of its room for manoeuvre. Three main factors made it difficult for the Basque radical nationalist to uphold their ideological paradigm.

(1) Loss of legitimacy in the Basque population.
(2) Increased coordination by Spanish and French authorities.
(3) Effective counter-insurgency methods by the Spanish security forces

Keywords: ETA, MNLV, Basque terrorism, room for manoeuvre.

Bilduma


Ikerlan hau oinarritzen da, erdi-egitaraututako elkar hizketen bidez eta bigarren mailako datuen analisietan. Aldagarriak adierazten dute izan diren oztopoak mantentzeko M.N.L.V.ren paradigmak non zegoen eratua leku murriztea zela eta bere leku eragiketarako.
Abbreviations

**BAC** Basque Autonomous Community

**CAA** Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos

**ETA** Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

**ETA (m)** Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (military)

**ETA (pm)** Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (politico-military)

**EPPK** Collective of Basque Political Prisoners

**ICG** International Contact Group

**HB** Herri Batasuna

**KAS** Koordinadora Abertzale Socialist

**MNLV** Basque National Liberation Movement

**PNV** Basque Nationalist Party

**PP** Popular Party

**PSE-EE** Socialist Basque Party

**PSOE** Socialist Spanish Party
Foreword

I would like to thank, Kristian Helland-Hansen, my supervisor at the University of Oslo, thank you for your support, dedication, great talent and knowledge.

A special gratitude to my informants, who helped me immensely. Thank you all for your time, valuable information and collaboration.

Many thanks to the Mancunian group Doreen, Blanca, Rob and Inigo for your help, comments and positive energy.

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Leonor González Valencia, Oslo.
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INTRODUCTION

On 20th October 2011, two Basque pro-independence newspapers (Gara and Berria, 2011) issued online video statements in which spokespersons of Euskadi ta Askatasuna –ETA- guerrilla group announced a permanent ceasefire. The incident was a major development in the Spanish-Basque standoff, which had lasted for half a century and which had cost some 1000 lives. According to the statement,

“...ETA has decided on the definitive cessation of its armed activity. ETA calls upon the Spanish and French governments to open a process of a direct dialogue with the aim of addressing the resolution of the consequences of the conflict and, thus, to overcome the armed confrontation. Through this historical declaration ETA shows its clear, solid and definitive commitment...”

(ETA 2011)

The move came just four days after an international panel led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan¹, issued a recommendation calling for ETA to give up its armed struggle and for the Spanish and French governments to discuss the possibility of moving the estimated 665 ETA prisoners closer to their families in the Basque Country².

It seems remarkable that ETA, the spearhead of the Basque National Liberation Movement (MNLV), which for 50 years had considered war a necessary continuation of politics, would give up its fight for independence in exchange for a relocation of prisoners. No less striking is the rather euphemistic invitation to discuss the ”consequences of the conflict” –as opposed to the causes of the conflict-, which would seem a minimum demand after 50 years of fighting.

¹ Appendix 1.
² Since 1989 the Spanish Government has allocated ETA prisoners according to a strategy of dispersion. - Spain 597 prisoners in 49 prisons. - France 151 prisoners in 34 prisons. This fact, has been reporting by Human Right Watch and International Amnesty between others. (www.etxerat.org) April 2010.
1.1 Purpose

My research question is: why did ETA end its armed struggle at this point? My main hypotheses are both linked to the concept of room of manoeuvre, albeit in opposite ways:

- ETA had its room for manoeuvre \textit{restricted} and was essentially forced to comply.
- ETA had its room for manoeuvre \textit{widened} and was no longer compelled to fight.

Evidently, the two hypotheses build on opposing conceptualizations of motivation. I will expand on this topic in the theory chapter. Here I will only point out that my findings may have a broader application to the study of conflict resolution than the case-study approach may suggest.

1.2 Definitions

Territorial setting

The “Basque Country” is a politicised term used differently by different actors. When I use the term, it will be equivalent to \textit{Euskal Herria} (see below). Other, related, terms such as \textit{Euskadi} and \textit{Pais Vasco} are the Basque and Spanish terms used to denote a smaller territorial unit, namely the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), situated on the Biscayan coast of Northern Spain. BAC consists of the provinces of Biscay, Guipuzkoa and Alaba. Some 2.169.000 people inhabit the BAC (Eustat, 2010). The Basque language, \textit{Euskera}, is known by 42\% of the BAC population.

\textit{Euskal Herria}, (the land of \textit{Euskera} speakers) refers to the seven Basque “\textit{historical provinces}”, four of which are in Spain and three in France. The total population of these provinces is about 3 million people. The four Spanish provinces known as South, or “\textit{Hegoalde}”, comprises the three provinces of the BAC (Basque Autonomous
Community) plus Spanish Navarre. The northern parts in France are known as Iparralde and consist of Lapurdi, Baja Navarra and Zuberoa.

Although I apply a broad definition of the Basque Country, the reader should be aware that my concern is primarily with the ETA-Spain dyad and the French perspective is largely absent. I believe this delimitation is justified given the scope of the thesis and the fact that the social and political dynamics are very different on the two sides of the Pyrenees. The reader should also be aware that, within Spain, the legal framework is different for Navarre and the BAC.

MNLV

The Basque National Liberation Movement (MNLV) is an umbrella organization for various Basque resistance groups, some of which have used force and others which have used non-violent means of propagation. Its official goals are national liberation and social emancipation. Some groups under the MNLV umbrella have resorted to threats, extortion or murder. (Bullain 2011:20) The Marxist/anti-imperialist ideology of MNLV has been operationalized into a doctrine of “integrated militancy”. (Bullain 2011:41) Like other classic liberation movements, the MNLV contains an armed wing and an institutional front focused on civil and political objectives. Since the mid 1970s, the core of the movement has been constituted by the triad ETA- KAS- HB (See immediately below).

I. ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom) is the armed front of the MNLV movement. It was the original founder of the MNLV and has maintained a leading role over the years.

II. KAS Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (Socialist coordinator) is the coordinating body overseeing the MNLV’s diverse committees: political, linguistic, socio-economic, institutional, external relations, social communication and image (Bullain 2011:203)

III. HB Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity) is the political party responsible for the within-institutional struggle. HB has partaken in local, regional and national
elections. It has been outlawed several times, only to resurface under different names. Here I will refer to it as HB or the Abertzale Left (i.e.: Radical Left).

Room for manoeuvre
A room for manoeuvre has been defined as “the opportunity to change your plans or choose between different ways of doing something” (Cambridge Dictionaries online 2012). The reader may think of it as the set of feasible options (subjectively understood).

Terrorism
The concept of terrorism is contested and politicised (Engene 2004; Horgan 2005) I shall adopt Horgan’s definition, namely, “the use or threat of use of violence as a means of attempting to achieve some sort of effect within a political context” (Horgan 2005:1) In Spain, terrorism is associated with article 55.2 of the 1978 Constitution, which suspends certain civil rights for those found by responsible authorities to have committed so-called “organic acts:

An organic act may determine the manner and the circumstances in which, on an individual basis and with the necessary participation of the courts and proper parliamentary control, the rights recognized in section 17, subsection 2 [Preventive arrest may last no longer than the time strictly necessary in order to carry out the investigations aimed at establishing the events; in any case the person arrested must be set free or handed over to the judicial authorities within a maximum period of seventy-two hours] and 18, subsections 2 [The home is inviolable. No entry or search may be made without the consent of the householder or a legal warrant, except in cases of flagrante delicto] and 3 [Secrecy of communications is guaranteed, particularly regarding postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications, except in the event of a court order.] may be suspended for specific persons in connection with investigations of the activities of armed bands or terrorist groups

The Penal Code does not contain a precise definition of “terrorist group”. Doctrine and case law—following the major trend in Europe and seeking to distinguish terrorism from other crimes committed by organized crime—combine some objective criteria in order to establish the definition:
- A sufficiently large group with a structure (usually including a hierarchy) that has demonstrated a degree of permanence
- The possession of arms and explosives in a quantity sufficient to cause serious destruction.

In addition to these objective criteria, a terrorist group is characterised by a subjective one, namely: a determination to engender fear and to subvert the political order (J.L De la Cuesta, 2007:3) This subjective criterion is often the key element of incrimination.

1.3 The author’s motivation and outlook.

Why study the Basque conflict and its resolution?

I strongly believe the Basque case is worth studying, not only in its own right, but also as a specimen of a larger genus of peace-making. In several senses, the Basque conflict can be seen as a “crucial case” for which solutions should not be in sight. Firstly there are reasons to believe that Basque identity is exceptionally old. Secondly, the political situation had changed from being one of suppression under dictatorship to autonomy under democracy-without either showing the ability to quell the Basque aspirations. Thirdly, the decision-making procedure within ETA is characterised to a large extent by direct democracy. This would seem to give leaders a limited mandate for compromise. But there are also more practical reasons for studying ETA’s fight and ceasefire now. I will give three reasons:

1. The Basque conflict is relatively unknown in Norway.
2. ETA has maintained unusual secrecy. Critique from independent and affiliated academics and civil society organizations has been muffled by a code of honour similar to the Mafia’s “omertá”\(^3\) Even after the publication of the so-called Y

\(^3\) Code of silence and the categorical prohibition of cooperation with state authorities or reliance on its services. Use by the Italian Mafia.
few studies have shed a light on the internal workings of ETA. Moreover, the disinformation related to the structure and strategy of the MNLV is huge in all senses.

3. Now is a window of opportunity. The closeness in time to the events in question minimises memory distortion and gives a unique chance to understand not what happened but what happens.

As a Navarre citizen of Spain, I have an intimate understanding of the situation and I wish to use my insights in a way that may contribute to the resolution of conflicts in the future. I have the necessary language skills and I have been able to make contact with well-placed informers. On the other hand this intimacy is, of course, a potential threat to my objectivity. The reader deserves to know what my basic horizon is when I conduct this study:

Firstly, I believe that political violence is not an involuntary expression of grievances. It takes organisation to make a revolution. The violence seen in the Basque conflict came as a result of deliberate strategies among opposing actors, mainly the MNLV and persons operating under the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Secondly, I think one of the principal objectives of terrorism is to destabilise the regular life of the general population and disturb the activities of governments. This has also been the goal of ETA. I have non sympathy for the killing of non-combatants.

Thirdly, I believe, the Spanish government’s reliance on emergency laws in order to fight ETA, has lead to a de-legitimization of the system itself.

Fourth, I don’t consider all deaths equal in moral terms. Some were unknowingly killed by a neck shot or a car bomb, others while handling explosives or preparing

\[4\] The Y documents were discovered by French Police in 1992, as they acted against an ETA safe house in the Southern French city of Bidart.
attacks. Still others died in prisons, allegedly as a consequence of torture. Whereas I cannot pretend to be in a position to judge on the relative severity of the grievances of people belonging to different sides, I do believe that there are degrees of complicity in violence and that this can be judged with a reasonable degree of inter-subjectivity.

Fifthly, although theoretically possible, it is difficult in practice to pass moral judgement. That is because there is an intense competition for framing the conflict. For example, during the last few years, different victims’ associations have been created and used by political powers. The following excerpt from Aranzadi (2005) shows how charged the rhetoric of such well-meaning associations can be:

“The victims are the ones revealing that ETA is a murderous organization, they can not pretend to be testimony of any cause, constitution, democracy, freedom, the unity of Spain or a Peaceful Basque Country (...) the only thing that all of these dead have in common is that there are victims of ETA, being killed by ETA”

1.4 Structure of the paper

Chapter II gives an historical introduction, to help the reader to understand the background of the Basque Conflict. In Chapter III, I present relevant theory. In Chapter IV I explain my method. In Chapter V, I review the findings. Chapter VI and VII contain my analyses and conclusion, respectively.

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5 According to Spanish daily El mundo, 36 operatives died as a result of mishandling of explosives. [http://www.elmundo.es/eta/historia/etarras_muertos.html](http://www.elmundo.es/eta/historia/etarras_muertos.html) (Bullain 2011:192)

2 BACKGROUND

The historical and cultural roots of the Basque conflict precede the establishment in 1959, of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). ETA is only the violent expression of the Basque people’s wish for self-determination.

2.1 Territorial setting.

The Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) is situated on the Biscayan coast and comprises three provinces in the North of Spain: Biscay, Guipuzkoa and Álava. It contains a population of 2.169.000 (Eustat, 2010). The Basque language, Euskera, is known by ca. 42% of the BAC population.

The BAC was constituted after the death of Franco in 1975. The so-called Gernika Statute, approved in 1979, regulates it: Basque and Spanish are official languages, It has fiscal autonomy (collects and regulates taxes), an autonomous Basque Police, separate radio and television stations and autonomous education and health systems. With the Gernika Statute, the Basques, in fact, obtained the highest level of self-governance enjoyed by any subnational entity in Europe. (Espiau, 2006:4)

While the BAC is the administrative reality, Basque nationalists have traditionally employed the term Euskal Herria, (the land of Euskera speakers). It refers

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<th>Basque Autonomous Community</th>
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to the seven “historical provinces” four of which are in Spain and three in France. The total population of these provinces is about 3 million people. The four Spanish provinces known as South, or “Hegoalde”, comprises the three provinces of the BAC plus Spanish Navarre. The northern parts in France are known as Iparralde and consist of Lapurdi, Baja Navarra and Zuberoa.

Both the institutional realities and the support for Basque self-determination vary in the “seven provinces”. Basque nationalism is clearly marginal in Iparralde. In the South of Navarre and Álava –the southern province of the BAC- public support is also rather weak. Meanwhile in Bizkaia, Guipuzcoa and the northern part of Navarre Basque nationalism is really strong. During the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the late 1970s, the possibility of incorporating Navarre into the BAC was discussed. Navarre was kept as a distinct administrative unit, but the Autonomy Statute of Navarre (1982) contemplates unification with the BAC if a majority of people in Navarre is in favour.

2.2 Basque nationalism as a political movement.

According to Mees (2003:8), the rise of the Basque nationalism came as a reaction to two main factors.8

1. The early wave of industrialization in the late 19th century, which provoked a massive flow of immigration to the Basque Provinces from other regions of Spain.
2. The abolition of the Basque “fueros” during the Carlist wars9.

In 1876, after the liberals’ victory in the last Carlist War and due to the Basque support for the traditionalists, the statutes of self-government were definitively abolished. The fueros were the local civic and economic rights that had survived.

---

8 Mees (2003: 8) writes, “The Basque national radicalism was the answer to the challenge of an also radical and disruptive process of socio economic modernisation”
9 A dynastic confrontation between Isabelle liberalism and Carlist traditionalism Carlos stood for tradition, which meant support for the Catholic Church, absolutism and Fueros.
from medieval times in the Basque Provinces and Navarre. They represented a sort of exceptionalism within Spain and were opposed by the liberals who wanted equality before the law, regardless of ethnicity, religion, language… Hence, the elimination of the fueros was part of the process of Spanish nation building (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2008:4)

In the late 19th Century, Sabino Arana¹⁰ (1865-1903) managed to channel age-old Basque claims into a political, non-violent organization. In 1895 he created a political party called Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, literally meaning “Basque Party of Supporters of God and Old Laws”. The party is commonly referred to by its Spanish acronym, PNV “Nationalist Basque Party” (Partido Nacionalista Vasco) Arana agitated for a restoration of self-government and “defence of the Basque People”.

Following other nationalist movements, the early Basque nationalism portrayed Basques as the “chosen people” or a “superior race”. Arana had one main idea: the Basques are a nation and therefore, they, should have a country. One of the main rhetorical strategies was to cast the abolition of the fueros as the beginning of a new era of colonialism.¹¹

During the twenty years between the death of Arana and the beginning of General Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1930), Basque Nationalism passed through a period of slow but continuous growth, reaching its peak during the First World War. By this time, the movement had acquired all the characteristics of a real mass movement according to Hroch’s model (Hroch, 1995: 6ff). This success can probably be attributed to the confluence of several factors, such as lingual-cultural distinctness, a pre-nationalist conscience, weak Spanish nation-building, the deficit of

¹⁰ The Basque national anthem Gora ta Gora, the Basque National Day, Aberri Eguna, the Basque flag, Ikurriña, which today has an official status, were all creations of Arana. Literally Aberri Eguna means Day of the Homeland. Celebrated on Easter Sunday it is considered that it was on this day that Arana at the age of 18 became nationalist. The first Aberri Eguna was celebrated in Bilbao in 1932. According to Arana, the red background of the ikurriña symbolized the people, the green x stood for the ancient laws (fueros) and the white cross superimposed over it symbolized the purity of Christ, (Kurlansky 2000:166-167)

¹¹ But as L. Mees refers, in liberal Spain it was not, as nationalist frequently argue, the aggressive imperialist attitude of Spanish nationalism but its weakness which permitted the durability of regional and local particularism (L. Mess, 2003:7)
parliamentary democracy and popular participation, socio-economic modernization thanks to the new Basque industry and the decay of traditional political options like Carlismo or Fuerismo. (L. Mees, 2003:7)

In the 1930s, under the leadership of José Antonio Aguirre, PNV started negotiations with the Spanish state in order to receive autonomy for the Basque regions. In 1936, the Spanish government officially approved the autonomy and Aguirre was sworn in as the Lehendakari (Basque president) under the holy oak of Gernika. This experience, however, was short-lived: Like everything else in Spain its character was shaped by the Civil war (1936-39).

2.3 The Civil War (1936-39) and the Franco dictatorship (1939-75)

At the moment of uprising, the PNV governed The Basque Country. However, due partly to ideological splits, partly to decisions by local officers, the regions came down on different sides: Somewhat simplified, Alaba and Navarre fought with the Nationals whilst Guipúzcoa and Biscay fought with the Republicans. In 1936, the Republic enacted a short-lived Statute of Autonomy for Alaba, Guipúzcoa and Biscay. However the statute only took effect in Biscay and even there it was abolished at the entry of the nationalist forces.

After the war, General Francisco Franco established a dictatorship with strong fascist leanings. The fascist rhetoric was tuned down after the defeat of the Axis in World War II, but the “great leader” of Spain by the grace of God\footnote{Motto during Franco’s period.} retained powers until his death in 1975. The Franco regime’s main characteristics were Spanish nationalism, Catholicism, traditionalism and centralism. The male chauvinist culture, the influence of antiquated religious ideas and the Franco cult cast Spain into, total
isolation and backwardness. All divergent ideas, languages and expressions were violently suppressed under the slogan “one Spain!”\textsuperscript{13}

In the name of progress and unity regional distinctiveness was subjected to the central state. The Basque language was declared illegal and Basque cultural expressions were outlawed as anti-Spanish.

### 2.4 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna.

Three main features confluence in the emergence of ETA in 1959: (a) a second wave of industrialisation resulting in a massive flow of immigrants from other parts of Spain. (b) the context of a long Fascist dictatorship under Franco. (c) the rise of liberation wars inspired by the anti-colonial experience in developing countries.

In 1952, a small group of students in the Northern city of Bilbao decided to establish a Basque-nationalist study group, called Ekin (“doing, undertake” in Basque). The group was for a time affiliated at the PNV, but in 1958 it broke away due to differences of strategy—according to Ekin, PNV was not doing enough for the Basque cause—and created its own group with a clearly activist orientation. The activists adopted the name \textit{Euskadi Ta Askatasuna} (ETA)\textsuperscript{14}, which means “Basque Homeland and Freedom.”

ETA wrote its founding chapter in July 1959. It is a brief document in which the organization defines itself as a patriotic, non-religious, non-political group with the goal of “saving the Basque soul” and “the self-determination of our homeland’s destiny”. At that time it was hard, if not inconceivable, to expect that ETA would end up as an organization engaged in full terrorist violence. (Sánchez-Cuenca 2008:5). During its first years, the organization was focused on cultural and propagandistic

\textsuperscript{13} Motto used during Franco’s period and parodied by the opposition, “if it were another Spain we all wanted to be there”\textsuperscript{14} ETA motto was \textit{Bietan Jarrai} (“Keep up both”). It refers to the need for combining armed and political struggle—symbolised in ETA’s logo by a snake (politics) swirling up an axe (traditional weapon).
actions, such as distribution of pamphlets, graffiti or sabotage of symbols of the Franco regime. (Javato González, 2011:154). With the armed activity, ETA gained popularity thanks to the repressive excesses of the government, such as the Burgos trial\textsuperscript{15}, and also because it stood up, against the dictatorship. One of the most celebrated operations was the assassination of the President of the Government and second in line to Franco, Luis Carrero Blanco in 1973. Some have seen this assassination as instrumental in the subsequent democratisation of Spain.

2.4.1 Internal Splits

In 1974, when Franco was rather ill, internal disagreements on strategy and ideology led to the crystallisation of two wings within the organisation. The political-military: ETA(pm) had a grass-roots orientation and emphasised mobilisation and class struggle; meanwhile military ETA(m) insisted on continued focus on the military struggle. The split intensified with the new prospects of democracy. Although ETA(pm) was initially the strongest wing, it subsequently disintegrated—some of its affiliates joining more institutionalised political parties, while others reunited with ETA(m).

In 1977, ETA(pm) suffered another division and the military commandos of ETA(pm) left for ETA(m). In 1982 ETA(pm) abandoned definitively the armed struggle.

The CAA (Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos) were formed in 1978 by those military activists who left ETA(pm) in 1977 but who refused to enter ETA(m). They were active until 1984.

After 1984, ETA(m) was the only acting terrorist group in the Basque country. Given the continuity between the pre-1974 ETA and ETA(m), I will refer indistinctly to either of the two organizations as ETA.

\textsuperscript{15} A spectacular court-martial against sixteen ETA activist in 1970, judged by a military tribunal
2.4.2 The Basque National Liberation Movement\textsuperscript{16}

The Basque National Liberation Movement (MNLV) emerged from ETA. It was established in 1974 as an umbrella organization, in order to coordinate between different units seeking the same goal with different tactics. The MNLV enabled the radical Basque nationalist to maintain a separation between the military structure and the political system, thus widening the repertoire of protest and making it easier to seek legitimization for the liberation struggle abroad. Officially, the Basque National Liberation Movement had a double goal: national self-determination and social revolution.

2.4.3 The Strategy of ETA

Even if the bulk of ETA’s activity can be seen as a war of attrition against the state, it is possible to distinguish three strategic periods since the first fatality in 1968:


Finding its inspiration in the anti-colonial wars, ETA sought to mobilise a mass struggle. The organization conceptualised victory in terms of triumph -Trung Chinh\textsuperscript{17} meaning full self-determination for the Basque people and a social revolution. ETA saw itself as the armed vanguard that would create the dynamics of a mass uprising among the Basques. The method was to undermine the regime’s authority, both directly –by demonstrating its inability to monopolize force –and indirectly, by provoking it to overreact. The spiral of action-repression-action would eventually bring about the collapse of the state. The logic was aptly captured in a memo discovered in 1992 by security forces.

“…operates along the following lines: 1) ETA carries out a provocative violent action against the political system; 2) the system responds with repression against “the

\textsuperscript{16} In the so-called antiterrorist war it has been habitual to portray the violence of ETA as a nationalist paradigm, assimilating all the MNLV only in ETA and ignoring the anti-system characteristics.

\textsuperscript{17} “The victories in the battlefield of economies, politics and culture provide the military victory to the national resistance”(Egana, 1996: 275)
masses”; 3) the masses respond with a mixture of panic and rebellion, this the right moment for a counterattack to diminish the first [panic] and increase the second [rebellion]” (Y Documents)\textsuperscript{18}

The revolutionary hopes of early ETA failed to materialise. When the end of the Franco regime came near, ETA had to rethink its strategy. If the masses had not made the revolution under dictatorship, it was clear that they were not going to make it under democracy either (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2008: 17)

II. War of attrition (1975-1994)

The changed strategic setting led to a readjustment of ETA’s doctrine. According to one analyst, “The function of the armed struggle is not to destroy the enemy, for that is utopian, but it is indeed to force him, through a prolonged war of psychological and physical attrition to abandon our territory due to exhaustion and isolation” (Letamendia, 1994:114). In 1978 ETA announced the “KAS Alternative” –a set of conditions that if met by the state would lead to the cessation of the violence. The demands were: a) the right of self-determination; b) amnesty for terrorists in prison; c) the constitution of an autonomous region comprising the BAC and Navarre, and; d) the withdrawal of Spanish security forces from the Basque Country. (Ibid)

In 1992 a police operation in Bidart lead to the fall of the entire ETA leadership. This sparked, an internal debate, which led to the realisation that, ETA’s violence could never surpass the resistance threshold of the state.


In 1995 ETA issued a new set of demands, known as the “Democratic Alternative”. A new emphasis was added to the necessity of achieving independence not in direct negotiations with the state, but rather through an agreement with all the nationalist forces in the BAC. The idea was that the state would not be able to prevent secession if there was a broad consensus among the parties. ETA started to kill non-nationalist, elected politicians, particularly at the local level. The calculation of ETA was the

\textsuperscript{18} The Y documents
following: by killing non-nationalists, the BAC would split into two non-reconcilable halves, nationalists and not nationalists. The moderate nationalists would then have no other option but to reach a consensus with the radicals. (Sánchez- Cuenca, 2008:21).

The pact of Lizarra\textsuperscript{19} was a secret agreement between Basque nationalist parties (moderates and radicals) and ETA. In the pact, the political parties agreed to isolate non-nationalist parties and work together for the independence in return for a truce period. Later, when ETA found out that PNV –the main moderates nationalist party to the accord-, were not ready to force a governmental crisis, issuing a unilateral declaration of independence, it broke the truce.

\section*{2.5 The Spanish Constitution and the Gernika Statute of Autonomy.}

After the death of Franco in 1975, the new Spanish transitional government had to create a legal frame to accommodate the social and cultural pressures that had been held down during the dictatorship. Their solution combined parliamentary democracy, constitutional monarchy and a unitary state. The new Spanish Constitution was approved by a nationwide referendum in 1978. Article 2, of the Constitution read;

\begin{quote}
The Constitution is based on the \textit{indissoluble unity} of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions, which make it up and the solidarity among all of them.
\end{quote}

The Basque Nationalist parties advocated a boycott of the referendum, arguing that the process effectively abrogated the Basque people’s right to determine its own fate. As a result, the abstention rate in the BAC was 55,35% even as the Constitution was approved by an 87 \% majority in Spain.

\textsuperscript{19} Was inspired in the political front created by the PIRA with John Hume’s social democratic party, the Dublin Government, and the Irish lobby in the United States.
In 1979, the Statute of Autonomy of Gernika was proposed in order to accommodate Basque nationalist aspirations and achieve broader support for the new political system. The Statute transferred significant powers to the Basque Government.

### 2.6 Divisions represented by political parties

Despite the accommodations of the Gernika Statute, disagreement on the status of the Basque Country has lingered. Locally, two main visions compete:

I. Those who wish to retain regional autonomy under Spanish sovereignty, and;

II. Those who wish to renegotiate the sovereignty issue.

As one might expect, the political divergence has had wide repercussions at the local level in term of split communities, vigilantism and lack of public confidence.

The party system of the BAC is characterised by cross-cutting social and nationalist cleavages. The cleavages coalesce into four main positions, as explained by Ibarra and Ahedo (2010:358)

![Figure II.1 Ideology of the political parties in the BAC. Adapted from Ibarra and Ahedo 2010: 359](image-url)
For a long time, HB and its successor parties obtained roughly 15%\textsuperscript{20} share of the vote in Basque constituencies to the regional and national parliaments. However, in 2002, the Spanish Supreme Court, banned the party for alleged collusion with ETA and for financing a terrorist group with public money.\textsuperscript{21} The Radical Left appealed the case to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that the banning contradicted articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention on Human Rights. (1950)

In 2009, the European Court found the Spanish ruling consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights (Bardi 2009, COE 1950). It seems plausible that this judgment brought HB to a “tipping point”. Either, it could go back to the military struggle, or, it could condemn terrorism (necessary according to the Article 9.2 of the Political Parties Law 6/2002) and retain access to the democratic political system.

### 2.7 From the Brussels Declaration to the end of the armed activity by ETA

Since the ratification by the European Court of Human Rights in 2009, some events have completely reshaped the situation. In fact, from 2009 to 2011 the process accelerated. In just a short time period many independent initiatives were taken in order to convince ETA to end its armed activities. In the Table II.1 bellow, I give a brief chronological presentation of the process.

\textsuperscript{20}http://www9.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?idioma=c&menu=li_2_1_3

2009

November:

- Renunciation of any kind of violence by the Abertzale parties. “A first step for the democratic process: principles and will of the Abertzale Left”\(^\text{22}\)

2010

March:

- Brussels Declaration.\(^\text{23}\) The South African mediator Brian Currin, supported by the Nelson Mandela foundation and four Nobel Peace Prize laureates, called on ETA to declare a permanent, unilateral and verifiable cease-fire leading to "dialogue and negotiation in all fields" under the "Mitchell Principles"\(^\text{24}\)

September:

- ETA declared a cease-fire in a video released on BBC\(^\text{25}\).
- Gernika Accord\(^\text{26}\). The Abertzale left presented an “agreement for a peaceful and democratic solution for the Basque Conflict.”

2011

January:

- ETA announced to the International Community a “permanent general and verifiable cease-fire”\(^\text{27}\).

October:

- International Peace Conference -lead by Kofi Annan-
- Announcement of the end of the armed activity by ETA\(^\text{28}\)

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\(^{22}\) Appendix 2

\(^{23}\) Appendix 3

\(^{24}\) All involved in negotiations had to affirm their commitment to: (1) To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; (2) To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; (3) To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; (4) To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations; (5) To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and, (6) To urge that “punishment” killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions. (Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 22 January 1996)


\(^{26}\) Appendix 4

\(^{27}\) Appendix 5

\(^{28}\) Appendix 1
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this section I present my theoretical framework. I juxtapose two broad theoretical schools, which I believe rest on opposing premises with respect to autonomy, rationality and agency. Between these ideal types, here referred to as Political realism and humanism, I conceive of a theoretical a continuum. Basically, realism presents violence as logical while humanism sees violence as pathological.

Dealing with violence from a social-scientific perspective has always been controversial. As Hoffman observes, is strik(ing) how disturbingly “normal” most terrorists seem when one actually sits down and talks to them (Hoffman 2006:XV). Attempts to analyse terrorism in a factual manner are likely to clash with normative instincts—both in the analyst and in the reader.

Hence, studies of terrorism are manifold and normative to varying degrees. Only recently have we begun to acknowledge that the factors that lead people to join terrorist groups have relatively little to do with what people do as a terrorist (Horgan 2005: intro). Since the aim of this study is to shed light on ETA’s strategy more generally—and my aim is explanatory, not normative—my focus will be on the independent variables. Explanations of violence may easily come across as justifications, but I shall maintain that there is a difference between the two. Understanding is not necessarily condoning. It is important to understand why things happen even though we may not like the explanation—or the outcome.

3.1 Realist and Humanist schools

Conflict Behaviour has been defined as an individual’s intended or displayed outward reaction to the conflict issue experienced (Evert Van de Viler, 1997). While common, and perhaps intuitive, the perception of conflict behaviour as reaction is not self-evident. In his seminal book, Politics Among Nations, Hans J. Morgenthau established
two schools that differ fundamentally in their conceptions of the nature of man, society and politics (Morgenthau, 1985:3). The first of these, which he calls realism, postulates *conflict behaviour as rational choice* among, autonomous, egoistic and amoral actors. The other—which he calls liberalism—, is more loosely defined, but takes as a premise the essential morality of man. Since liberalism is a concept of diverse usage, I shall adopt the dichotomy of Helland-Hansen (2004:39), political realism versus humanism.

### 3.2 Realism

“*The distinguishing characteristic of realism, Morgenthau wrote, was that instead of ignoring or denying what is bad in human beings, it makes use of the bad in order to achieve the good- as in a system of checks and balances*”

(Fromkin, 1993: 84)

Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations* must be understood in its historical context, particularly in the light of the League of Nations’ failure to curtail the Italian occupation of Ethiopia and the Allies’ failure to appease Nazi Germany. The book was published in 1948, the year of Churchill’s “Iron curtain speech” and it cautioned against a naïve reliance on collective security or guarantees. In Morgenthau’s view, security could only arise from self-reliance. Interest and power are the main determinants of political action and peace is the anomalous and precarious product of the *balance of power* (Morgenthau, 1948).

Morgenthau (1948) conceived of the community of states as anarchy—that is: a situation with fundamentally equal units in competition. After Morgenthau, *political realism* has mainly been associated with international politics. But both Morgenthau and his main source of inspiration, Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1998), took as their premises the fundamental autonomy, egoism, amorality and hurting capability of individual humans. Thomas Hobbes introduced in his *Leviathan* (1651) the concept of
a state of nature—a war of all against all. According to Hobbes, competition, difference, and glory drive all into a state of war (Doyle, 1997:115). The conceptualization of man as a rational egoist does not mean that people do not respond to their passions. On the contrary, they pursue their interests intensely, albeit by a constant calculation of the utility of various options. This implies that an actor can forego a very desirable temptation if there is a credible threat attached to it. The basic recommendation of realism, then, is to build power prudently, to economise with it deftly, to use it when useful and to negotiate from a position of strength.

In this scenario, violence is logical. I choose to be violent to defend myself.

One line of theory that shares realisms basic assumptions (autonomy, future-orientation and utility-maximisation) is game theory. Game theory is a mathematical sub-discipline which has found a great audience in economics and political science. Game theory is used to predict or explain outcomes, given a set of actors, a set of policy options and a set of preferences over potential outcomes. An important concept in game theory is the so-called Nash-equilibrium, named after mathematician and Nobel laureate John Forbes Nash. A Nash-equilibrium is a convergence of strategies by two or several actors, where the strategy of one is the subjectively best response to the strategy of the other(s). This could be illustrated by the famous Chicken-game scenario, in which two drivers race towards each other on a road and the one who stays on course the longest wins. In this case, driver A’s best alternative is to stay the course given that driver B yields—and to yield if driver B stays the course. The same holds for driver B. The chicken game has two Nash-equilibria: Either A stays the course and B yields, or B stays the course and A yields. One of these will be the outcome of the game (collision or mutual yield is unlikely). However, as each player knows the preference structure of the other, he/she will try to signal determination to stay the course, thereby increasing the chance that the other yields. If one player can credibly demonstrate contempt for death, that will increase his/her chances of winning. This lesson can be applied to political conflict. Particularly in a situation of power asymmetry, the weaker party may feel the necessity to choose forceful techniques for signalling determination. Terrorism and suicide terrorism are awesome signals.
Critics

An important line of critique against the realist paradigm comes from game theory itself and has to do with the inadmissibility of projecting rational action at the individual level directly to the aggregate level (e.g.: the state). Rational action by micro agents often results in perverse outcomes at the aggregate level (Olson, 1971). Rational choice theories, also have difficulties inexplaining acts that do not seem to benefit the actor—in the most extreme case: altruistic suicide. Constructivists have criticised realism for being too focused on structural determinants and too little concerned with social processes (Wendt, 1992). This brings us to the opposing paradigm, humanism.

3.3 Humanism

“Beyond all ideology, all plans, projects and conspiracies, beyond human greed, rage and fury, there lies that one essential ingredient: “acting out”, or behaviour” (Horgan 2005: intro)

The Liberalist or Humanist school postulates that man is essentially a peaceful creature (Helland-Hansen, 2004: 25f; Morgenthau, 1948). In this perspective, violence is seen as pathological and brutal acts are explained by inner or outer disturbances of the subject (Helland-Hansen, 2004:40). Aggressing individuals simply respond emotionally and instinctively to their grievances. They are not choosing to do so—it is the situation that drives them there. In the words of Dollard et al. (1971),

“[A]ggression is always a consequence of frustration. More specifically the proposition is that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contraries, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” (Dollard et al., 1971: 166).
Dollard et al. (1971) did not mean that aggression always follows frustrating events immediately. On the contrary, the human capacity for acceptance and readjustment is impressive—and it is learnt early in life. However, such repression will sooner or later produce a reaction, perhaps against the person who instigated the frustrating event, or perhaps against third parties—or even the self (Dollard et al., 1971: 170). Psychological theories of aggression vary with respect to the mechanisms involved in the reaction (e.g.: cues, catharsis, imitation), as well as the subject’s level of cognizance (Mackal, 1979). But the concept of a subject aggressing semi-randomly, perhaps even without knowing why is very different from the goal-oriented realist actor who not only weighs his/her options in one game, but is able to integrate information from many games in order to choose the overall best action.

Obviously, the conceptualization of action as either rational choice or as emotive response has policy implications. Whereas realists will rely on force and deterrence to forestall aggression, humanists will find such action to increase frustration and to be counterproductive in the long run. Their solution to aggression will have some element of accommodation. Realists will warn against such appeasement—because it will induce the aggressing actor to aggress again (Helland-Hansen, 2004: 26f).

*Human reflexivity* defines personal existence and is the basis on which people form social units. It is therefore the process of human interaction, which needs to be kept at the centre of any method of appraising human existence (Holland, 1999:481). The language and it practices, the families, groups and environments influence how we approach the social reality. As identity markers and collective symbolism take extremely emotional and ethical significance, we should not, as the realists do, take preferences as given, but try to understand why the subject internalises some concepts and norms—and not others.
Critics

From Morgenthau onwards, realist critics of humanism (idealism, liberalism) have pointed to the dangers of a) showing softness in the face of challenge or aggression; b) relying on security arrangements that are not grounded in common interest, and; c) letting idealist impulses overrule prudent self-interest in foreign policies (Kissinger, 1994; Mearsheimer, 1995; Morgenthau, 1948). Humanism would seem to have difficulties in explaining rational restraint under extreme stress and deprivation. The implication that the subject is not ultimately responsible for his/her actions can be seen as a threat to human society (Helland-Hansen, 2004:29)

Realism and humanism has now been posed as opposites. Whereas realism posits man as an autonomous, amoral, future-oriented calculating actor, humanism presents man as a basically good, but vulnerable, reflexive subject. Between the two, there is a continuum which has been filled by various social-psychological theories.

3.4 Hybrid theories

3.4.1 Constructivism

One of the most explicit attempts to synthesise humanist-historicist and realist-rationalist approaches to agency has been provided by Pierre Bourdieu (1990). Bourdieu’s point is that what seems to the observer as rational, goal-oriented action, may in reality be semi-automatic response to a program that has previously been “written into the body” by a process akin to natural selection. Basically, we automatize the procedures that “work” and perform them routinely without contemplating the utility of this or that action in each and every case. An individual’s set of programs constitutes his or her habitus (Bourdieu, 1990)
Bourdieu has invented the concept of social space made up of various domains—economic, cultural, social, and symbolic—each of which has its own capital. Social classes result from the position held in the social space by individuals measured in terms of present capital and social legacy (Alvarez Souza, 1996:172). The position in the social space constitutes the *social conditions of existence*, which in turn generate various *habitus*, practices and *lifestyles*. Positioning in a given social space is not determined by the personal worth of an individual, but rather the path followed by his or her family—in this respect, the author rejects functionalist theories of *social mobility*, theories that are used to legitimate power. Conversely, he defends the existence of *class trajectories* from which it is very difficult to escape, albeit conceding that the course of these trajectories can swing both forward and backward. (ibid)

Thus, the social environment can determine our position in society. For my purposes it seems relevant that the majority of ETA volunteers came from the industrial centers of the province capitals in Euskadi. Bourdieu, criticises current theories which hold that social and class positioning can be upgraded on the basis of human capital and education. According to Bourdieu, there is no escaping from what he calls *social reproduction*, and there is no such thing as equality in education inasmuch as the school system is geared to meeting the needs of the culturally
privileged classes and, as such, discriminates against the socially underprivileged layers of society. (Bourdieu 1990, Alvarex Souza 1996)

3.4.2 Relative deprivation theories

The theory of Relative Deprivation (RD) was first articulated by Stouffer and his colleagues in 1949 to explain a series of unexpected relationships between feelings of satisfaction and one’s position in the U.S. army (Stouffer et al. 1949). In the early 1970’s the concept was taken up by inter alia Ted Gurr (1970) and James C. Davies (1971) to explain why revolution did not occur in times of extreme poverty, but rather in times of moderate economic growth. The 1990’s saw a rediscovery of RD and its integration into theories of collective behaviour (e.g.: Hernes and Knudsen, 1992). The basic insight of RD theory is that frustration may not be directly proportionate to grievance, but rather be most intense when a person’s experienced needs satisfaction differs hugely from his or her expected needs satisfaction. This typically happens when a period of economic growth flattens out. Importantly, people’s reactions to objective circumstances depend on their subjective comparisons (Walker and Smith 2002:1).

The ways in which people interpret grievance—central to RD—are now recognized as essential to a full understanding of social movement participation (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans, 1997; Simon et al. 1998).

From the 90’s until now, RD researchers have elaborated the distinction between feeling deprived as a unique individual and feeling deprived as a representative group member. RD theory has thus merged with other related theories such as social identity theory, social comparison theory, and distributive justice theory. One of the risks of having a concept such as RD ranging as widely as it does is that it becomes a fit-for-all formula. Therefore several works have set out to clarify the nature of RD and specify a number of preconditions for its usage (Folger 1986). For example, Crosby (1982) reduced the concept to two basic presents: (1) Wanting what one does not have and (2) feeling that one deserves whatever it is one wants but does not have.
3.5 Previous findings.

What has previous research taught us about the relative merit of realist and humanist models?

Clearly, the rationalist/realist scenario has been vindicated by certain empirical findings. In the 2004 article *Greed and Grievance in Civil War* by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the two authors found civil war onsets to correlate more closely with factors that had to do with economic prospects in time of conflict (e.g.: primary commodity exports/GDP) than variables associated with grievance (e.g.: high inequality). In a later article, Collier et al. (2004) investigated the duration of civil wars with respect to three explanatory models: *rebellion as investment, rebellion as business* and *rebellion as mistake*. They concluded that the first model emphasising political prospects after conflict was unimportant, whereas the two other scenarios were compatible with the data. All in all, this research indicates that civil wars are caused more by economic opportunities than by grievance—which fits with the realist concept. The findings of Collier et al. (2004) correspond interestingly, with the studies of ETA by Bullain (2001). Bullain adopts a conflict-as-business scenario, comparing ETA’s tactics to those of the Mafia. In his view, revolutionary groups practice violence in order to obtain power and determine politics. According to Bullain (2001:13), the MNLV took advantage of an identity conflict in order to accumulate wealth and amass coactive power. Paradoxically, ETA terrorism only produced benefits for itself and for the units specialized in combatting it²⁹ (Bullain, 2011:92).

In another respected article, Fearon and Laitin (2003) found state strength to be negatively associated with internal conflict. Since realism sees violence as a result of lacking deterrence, this finding also seems to corroborate realism.

Several empirical studies negate the poverty-terrorism hypothesis (Ahmed, 2005; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010; Krueger and Malečkova, 2003).

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²⁹ The cost of a bodyguard is 7000 euros per month. In 2009 the Spanish government spent more than 120 millions to protect citizens from terrorism.
In a widely cited article, Hegre et al. (2001) found a curvilinear relationship (similar to an inverted U) between state authoritarianism and civil war. The authors argued that the tendency to rebel is greatest when there is a modicum of grievance and also a modicum of power. Although grievances are higher with more authoritarian regimes, they will not produce rebellion—because the authorities will repress any attempt at insurrection. In democracies, grievances are low because of government legitimacy and restraint on the use of force. However, in the middle of the spectrum, grievances may be sufficient—and the will to power inadequate—to forestall rebellion. These findings are less easy to interpret, but they would perhaps seem to fit best with the Relative deprivation scenario. Semi-democracy holds the promise of democracy, but not its fulfilment.

But there are also studies that fit well with a humanist interpretation. In a series of experiments Fehr and Gächter (2000) found their participants to punish each other for not keeping agreements—even in situations where meeting out the punishment was disproportionately costly to the punisher.

3.6 Conceptualization of “room of manoeuvre”

*Concepts are the building blocks of theory and represent the points around which social research is conducted*  
(Bryman 2008; 143)

The relevance of the concept of *room for manoeuvre* should now be obvious. Basically, both realists and humanists expect actors to conform to increases and contractions in their perceived space of manoeuvre—albeit in opposing ways. Where realists would predict an opening in the space of manoeuvre of actor A to induce him/her to pursue a more offensive strategy, humanists would see an opening in the space of manoeuvre to reduce pressure on the individual, and hence lessen the risk of
aggression. Essentially, realists would assume a *positive relationship* between space of manoeuvre and will to fight, while humanists would expect a *negative relationship*.

![Diagram](image)

*Figure III.2: The relationship between ETA space of manoeuvre and will to fight.*

I shall now explain what I have done to measure these concepts.
4 METHOD

This is a case study of the Basque conflict with particular emphasis on its cessation. With that objective information has been collected through semi-structure interviews with experts and secondary data related to the conflict.

A case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single unit of analysis, where the purpose is to shed light on a larger class of cases (Gerring, 2007:20). Case studies vary in ambition—from exploratory description to explicit hypothesis testing. (Rueschemeyer, 2003) They also vary in complexity—from single units of observation to multiple observations at different points in time, levels of analysis etc. (Gerring, 2004). This study’s unit of analysis is the ETA-Spanish conflict, with particular focus on its termination. My principal units of observation are a) conflict-years, and; b) eight informers with knowledge of the termination process.

Case study method has important virtues. The word “intensive” indicates that the researcher is able to study her object in great detail. This means that she can observe a relatively large number of variables; that she can go “deeply” into each variable—in the sense of minimizing error; that she may take notice of the “context” in which the unit of analysis/observation operates, and; that she may observe more or less continuously over time (George and Bennett 2005). The case study researcher can more easily than others make use of qualitative data. She can use self-formulated answers and ad-hoc questions rather than standardized queries.

But case studies also have important drawbacks. They lack the powerful inferential tool of experiments, that is, randomised and controlled assignment of treatment. They also lack the statistical power of non-randomised quantitative studies. To some degree, they even lack the explicit comparison with other cases associated with comparative

30 The utility of case studies for hypothesis testing is debated in the literature. Proponents of case studies argue that they can be used for hypothesis testing if the case is strategically selected with reference to the theory. See e.g.: George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; or Eckstein, Harry. (1975). “Case study and theory in political science.” In F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of political science (Vol. 7, pp. 79-137). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
method. According to Gerring (2004: 341), “The case study survives in a curious methodological limbo.” Therefore it is important to present some defense for my choice of method.

First of all, a case study may be a useful strategy when the researcher has little control over the events that are being studied (Beaty 2003:138, Yin 1994:1). The Basque conflict is a real-life event, which deserves attention although it falls short of the ideals of experimentation. In order to make causal inferences, I shall adopt process tracing. This means that I observe my unit of analysis over time, noting changes in selected independent variables and subsequent responses (or non-responses) in the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005). In this way, my unit of analysis is multiplied into many units of observation (Gerring, 2004). Secondly, I select a case that may be thought of as a “strategic experiment.” This means that I choose a case for which a given hypothetical outcome will simultaneously negate one hypothesis and corroborate another (Stinchcombe, 1987). As already noted, I think the Basque conflict could be seen as a “most likely” case to be solved under increasing constraints if we presume ETA leaders to behave rationally and proactively, while “least likely” to be solved if we presume them to react emotively. In this way my project is informed by the logic of “crucial case” (Eckstein, 1975; Gerring, 2007).

A major strength of case study method is the opportunity of applying multiple sources and types of evidence (Yin 1994:84). Methods triangulation implies the use of multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data and/or methodologies (Denzim 1970:310). In this study I supplement secondary quantitative data relating to the conflict-years with primary data from semi-structured interviews. Some of the interview data are qualitative, while others are quantitative.

Using different sources of evidence in this way facilitates cross-data validity checks and renders a study less vulnerable to errors of measurement and inference than studies that use only one method (Patton 1999:1192). Still, one may ask if it is really necessary to add qualitative and subjective data to the conflict-years data that are, after all, fairly objective. I believe it is. There are two main reasons: Firstly, some of the
presumed independent variables may have time-lags, which makes it difficult to ascertain which of them actually was instrumental. Secondly, the concept of *room for manoeuvre* is complex, in the sense that many factors contribute to it simultaneously—and these factors may to some extent contradict each other. For example, the opening of negotiations coincided roughly with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights and the Spanish policy of *prisoner dispersion*. In order to know which of these factors actually affected ETA policymakers’ perception of constraints, we need to know how they thought.

### 4.1 Primary sources: Interviews.

During December 2011 and January 2012 I conducted my fieldwork in the cities of Bilbao, Vitoria, San Sebastian and Pamplona. I carried out eight semi-structured interviews with expert witnesses, each of whom had his/her own perspective on the Basque conflict.

1. **Paul Rios. Lokarri headquarters, city of Bilbao.**
   Lawyer. Coordinator of *Lokarri* (Peace promotion organization)

2. **Iñaki Garcia Arrizabalaga. Deusto University, city of San Sebastian.**
   Lecturer at Deusto University’s Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
   He has been involved in a reconciliatory project to meet ETA’s prisoners. His father was killed in 1980 when he was 19 years old, presumably by ETA operatives.

3. **Jesus Eguiguren. Basque Parliament, city of Vitoria**
   Lawyer, PhD. President of the Basque Socialist Party. Eguiguren has been the main mediator with ETA since 2006. He has written a book about the last truce period.

4. **Emilio Alfaro. Basque Parliament, city of Vitoria.**
   Journalist. Secretary of communication of the Basque Government.

5. **Eva Aranguren Arsuaga. BILDU headquarters, city of Pamplona.**

6. **Florencio Dominguez. Vasco-press headquarters, city of Bilbao.**
7. **Iñigo Bullain. Online interview.**
   Lawyer PhD. Teacher at the UPV (University of the Basque Country). Author of “Patriotic revolutionaries” and many articles concerning the Basque conflict.

8. **Anonymous ETA political prisoner. Regular mail.**
   Member of ETA. Caught in 2003 while preparing explosives for an attack. Sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

### 4.1.1 Unit selection

I selected my informants purposefully, knowing that they had particular insights into various aspects of the peace process. The selection procedure had an element of “snowball sampling,” as some informants led me to others.\(^\text{31}\) Convenience and snowball sampling have been criticised for their liability to produce biased samples (Beardsworth and Keil 1992; Bryman 2008:185).

Working on how to respond to the critics, I have to say that:

1. My “snowballs” originated from different sources, i.e.: different persons with varying views on the conflict. This ensured that there was a diversity of political and social opinions in the sample. Crucially, my sample contains respondents both from within the ETA, and from without.

2. Due to the limited time and resources at my disposal, a representative sample was out of the question. In this case, expert opinion may indeed be more valuable than public opinion, so I decided to focus on the former.

### 4.1.2 The interviews

My interview sessions consisted of two parts: Firstly, a closed-ended questionnaire\(^\text{32}\) (two of the respondents declined to answer it), and secondly; a semi-structured

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\(^{31}\) With *snowball selection*, the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with others (Bryman 2008:184)

\(^{32}\) Appendix 1
interview, relying on an interview guide with open-ended questions.\textsuperscript{33} I chose semi-structured interviews because of the flexibility of that format; the interview guide was flexible enough to allow room for the informants to express their preferences freely and to clarify ambiguities.

\textbf{4.1.3 The standardised interview.}

The first part of the investigation consisted of a standardised self-completion questionnaire; compounded by a battery of ten questions. I asked my informants to evaluate the importance of seven factors potentially influencing the decision on conflict termination. The respondents were asked to indicate the impact of each factor on a six-point scale running from little influence = (1) to big influence = (6). Simultaneously, they were asked if they considered the influence positive or negative. The twin indicators enabled me to construct several 13-scale indexes, ranging from -6 (strong, negative influence) to +6 (strong, positive influence). These indexes could finally be merged into a single additive \textit{composite index of conceptualisation of resolution}.

The seven factors mentioned were:

\begin{itemize}
\item (1) Socialist victory in the Basque Country\textsuperscript{34}
\item (2) Judicial action of Spanish and French systems,
\item (3) Spanish and French police action.
\item (4) The opening of negotiations
\item (5) The example of Catalonia (Autonomy Statute)
\item (6) The Northern Ireland Peace process
\item (7) Economic crisis
\end{itemize}

All these items were intended in some way to reflect upon the concept of \textit{room for manoeuvre}. Some of them (2, 3 and 7) were formulated to suit realist expectations.

\textsuperscript{33} Appendix 2

\textsuperscript{34} Being the Socialist as well, in the central government of Spain. Leading to a possible facilitation of measures.
The others presumably reflected a humanist logic. By alternating questions with different “tendencies” in this way, I hoped to cancel out bias from yes-saying.

The second part of the questionnaire was designed to rule out another kind of bias, namely the one from personal outlook. A person inclined towards realism, might prefer “realist” explanations simply because it corresponds to his or her nature—as opposed to the facts at hand. Moreover, it is plausible that outlook correlates with abilities. My selection of expert witnesses (typically élite) might therefore have produced a sample biased towards realism (or, perhaps, humanism). To control for such error, I asked three “normal life questions” intended to measure outlook along the humanism-realism scale. Specifically, I asked:

Q8: Crime is a constant threat to all societies. What do you think the level of punishment should be?\(^{35}\)
Q9: What should the authority of a teacher be in school (in relation to the pupils)?
Q10: You are teaching your son/daughter how to cross the road in a city. In the middle of the explanation he/she starts to run, putting his/her life in danger as well as the lives of others. How do you react? Will you try to explain it in an educative way or you will turn to physical punishment? Please indicate the sternness of your reaction on a scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high).

I shall return to the discussion of the validity of these measures below.

4.1.2 Validity and Reliability of the standardised interview items.

In its widest definition, validity pertains to the integrity of conclusions that are drawn from a piece of research—including the degree to which findings can be generalized across social settings (Bryman 2008, 32). Some common subtypes of validity are,

- **Measurement validity**: To what extent an indicator really reflects the concept it is supposed to measure.
- **Internal validity**: Whether a conclusion of causality between two or more variables actually holds water.

\(^{35}\) The respondents were presented with a six-point scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high).
• **External validity.** Whether the results of a study can be generalized beyond the specific research context or sample.

• **Ecological validity.** Whether social scientific findings are applicable to people’s everyday lives—i.e. their natural social settings. (Bryman 2008,32-33)

Here, I shall use the term *validity* in the sense of *measurement validity.*

Reliability refers to *replicability*—to what extent an investigation would yield the same result if repeated, or if conducted by another analyst (Bryman 2008:376; LeCompte and Goetz 1982).

Do my indicators accurately represent the background concepts they were supposed to measure? This question can be rephrased in two ways:

a) Are the queries ambiguous?
   b) Are the queries formulated in a way that will lead certain respondents to answer in certain ways for exterior reasons?

The first question is one of reliability. It concerns the amount of random error in my data. The second is one of validity. It concerns the amount of systematic error in my data (Hoyle et al., 2002). Before I discuss the pros and cons of each indicator, it should be noted that measurement invalidity is considered a graver threat to inference than unreliability is. That is because random errors blur patterns and bias analyses towards type II error (finding no correlation where there is one), while systematic error can lead to faulty positive conclusions (type I error: seeing a connection where there is none).

The first seven items supposedly measure my respondents’ appreciation of how *room for manoeuvre* affects ETA’s willingness to accept a cease-fire. The background concept, then, could be called *respondent’s interpretation of resolution*—construed as a scale ranging from principled humanism to principled realism. Out of these seven indicators I retained four—for reasons I shall explain soon. The four included indicators are presented in Figure IV.1 below:
A potential threat to all the indicators comes from their commonly formulated introductory question:

*Please evaluate on a scale from 1 to 6 the impact of the following events towards the current situation (1=little influence; 6=big influence). Indicate also if you consider the influence positive or negative.*

I think the main problem with this formulation is the connotations of the words “current situation.” What is the “current situation”? Are different respondents likely to interpret it in different ways? Quite likely, radical respondents closely associated with ETA may see the current situation as something close to defeat. Moderate respondents with a critical distance to ETA may view the situation in more positive terms, as peace. When asked to evaluate which factors had a “positive or negative” impact upon the current situation, that may be differently understood by the respondents—depending on their evaluation of the “current situation” itself. The terms “positive or negative” are in themselves somewhat ambiguous. They could be understood normatively as in “good or bad” or factually as in “positive or negative effect.” This ambiguity, however, is a problem of reliability rather than validity, and I am not particularly concerned with it. The question is if the mentioned problems are

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36 The text here is a translation from the Spanish questionnaire. The original text read: Valoración del 1 al 6 de la influencia de los siguientes acontecimientos para la situación actual. Siendo 1 poca influencia y 6 la mayor de ellas. También me gustaría conocer si crees que es positiva o negativa.
invalidating in practice? Some caution is due to the fact that two respondents declined to answer the questionnaire—perhaps for the mentioned reasons. However, I believe the data collected do give interesting information and that they deserve to be analysed.

Another potential problem arises from the omission of a “don’t know” option. Those who are uncertain about the importance of an item might have been drawn towards the middle of the scale (values 3 or 4). When I construct the index, however, I multiply the original value with -1 if the respondent considers the impact negative. As a consequence, values that were intended to indicate uncertainty (ideally: 0) will come to rank quite highly (3 or 4) on the [-6,6] scale. Fortunately, bias from indecision is ameliorated by the use of items with opposing tendencies. (I have to “turn” the scales with “humanist” tendencies when constructing the eventual composite index out of all the four indicators).

Let us now turn to the specific queries:

**Q1: Socialist victory in the Basque Country**

My reason for including an item of socialist victory was this: The ascendancy of the Spanish socialists (PSOE) in the 2004 general elections plausibly set in motion a dynamics of peace. The new prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero signalled his willingness to negotiate with the ETA and also showed in his general policies a “softer” approach than the previous Aznar government had done. Notably, Zapatero withdrew the Spanish forces from Iraq. When the socialists came to power in the BAC in 2009, this might have been seen as a decisive development towards reconciliation with ETA. Not only did the socialists rule, they ruled in coalition with the People’s Party and therefore constituted a credible negotiating partner. My idea was that people who believe that softer policies towards the ETA were reciprocated offer a humanist interpretation of the process.
In order to identify the room for manoeuvre I asked about the Socialist victory in 2009. That could lead to different assessment of the question. (1) The Basque Country is ruled by a non-nationalistic government; for the first time in its democracy. (2) The Basque Socialist ruled the government in a coalition with the Popular Party. (3) For the voters of PSE (Basque Socialist party) and PP (Popular Party) there could be an electoral and sacrificial reason for the change, since, from 1994 they are possible military targets of ETA.

Validity

The question is if the respondents who consider PSOE’s victory positively important for “the current situation” would agree that the socialist victory increased ETA’s room for manoeuvre? In the BAC, the socialists replaced a government emanating from the PNV-EAJ—that is, a Basque-nationalist government. In this sense, it could be argued that the Basque socialists’ victory was an infringement on ETA’s space for manoeuvre, as it signalled a less nationalist tendency in the electorate. This line of thinking is perfectly compatible with a realist interpretation. In hindsight, I should have asked about PSOE’s victory in Spain in 2004 rather than the victory of its Basque affiliate in 2009.

Reliability

There is no particular ambiguity in the query itself.

Q2: Judicial action by Spanish and French authorities.

By “judicial action” I wanted to capture the legal action taken against ETA by the relevant authorities. This includes, primarily, the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, the adoption of anti-terrorism legislation and the harmonization of Spanish and French legal practice. All these actions would seem to infringe on the Basque radicals’ room for manoeuvre and any explanation that values such action would seem to reflect a realist rationale.
Validity

Will the informants respond to the concept of “judicial action” as intended? If they do, we would expect those most closely associated with ETA to be most negative towards this item. As we shall see in Chapter V, the observed distribution fits this expectation quite well. I therefore consider this measure useful.

Reliability

Both the term “legal action” and the term “Spanish and French system” are somewhat unclear. A couple of them asked me to clarify, but I decided not to do that in order to keep the procedure as uniform as possible. I think the word “system” is more standard in Spanish than in English. All in all, I consider the reliability of the indicator OK.

Q3: Spanish and French police action.

By “Spanish and French police action” I meant relevant police practices such as the frequency of arrests, the policy of prisoner dispersion, discriminating treatment of ETA prisoners, surveillance, roadblocks, crowd control, shutting down of ETA-affiliated organisations, clandestine death squads etc. As such measures constitute physical enforcement, their use would seem to appeal to realists—and not humanists.

Validity

The concept of room for manoeuvre is directly related to police action, in the sense that it determines the number of prisoners—and hence, ETA’s operational capabilities. On the other hand, forceful police action is likely to generate resentment and compound the grievances that ETA claimed to be fighting—thereby plausibly increasing ETA’s appeal. As such, the item seems well placed to discern between realist and humanist explanations. The observed distribution on this variable seems logical—which gives some empirical basis for accepting it (see Chapter V).


**Reliability**

“Police action” could be understood as referring to an absolute level at any given time or to a recent change. A “humanist” respondent observing a reduction in police activity could describe this as “positive and important” and would then appear to the analyst as a “realist.” Although such confusion is theoretically possible and might have been avoided with a more precise query—I think the scenario is quite far-fetched. The respondents generally have strong (and logical) opinions on this variable, which means I can reasonably rule out confusion as a problem. This being said, I must admit that some of the respondents asked what I meant by “police action.” When they did, I avoided value-laden concepts and did not delimit the time that the query referred to.

**Q4: The Beginning of negotiations**

The opening of negotiations between Spanish/Basque authorities on the one hand and *de facto* ETA representatives on the other hand, could be seen as a major concession to the ETA. Realists would in general reject “negotiating with terrorists” as an invitation to further terrorism. Humanists, on the other hand, would see negotiations as a useful way to establish trust and to signal attention to the grievances of the other. To use the commencement of negotiations as an explanation of peace would therefore be to espouse humanism—or so I figured.

**Validity**

Realism is hardly incompatible with negotiations as such. Although realists do not favour negotiations with terrorists (somehow the opponent is always a terrorist), they do emphasise that value judgements should yield to vital interests. Basque-nationalist realists could perhaps present the beginning of negotiations as a victory and therefore as a crucial step towards the end of hostilities. Thus, although the variable is factually interesting, its role as an indicator of the humanism-realism scale may be contaminated by respondents’ identity (Basque, mixed or Spanish).
Reliability

“The beginning of negotiations” is somewhat vague and may be differently understood by different respondents. I do not consider this a problem.

Qs 5-7: Excluded indicators

I shall not burden the reader with any lengthy discussion of the excluded variables. They were:

(5) The example of Catalonia (Autonomy Statute)
(6) The Northern Ireland Peace process
(7) Economic crisis

Two of the variables (5 and 7) had missing values. The Catalonian autonomy statute was widely perceived as unimportant, had no strong opinions attached to it, and a distribution that I could not logically make sense of. The economic crisis could probably best be connected with the realist rationale, but the reasons for doing so were not particularly convincing. The Northern Ireland Peace process could have been retained, in the sense that the respondents attached clearly more significance to it than they did to the two other variables. I decided to let it go because it could be given possible interpretations in both a humanist and a realist perspective. (The process could be interpreted humanistically as an inspiring and hopeful precedent and realistically as a loss of international network supportive of the ETA).

4.1.4 Control variables

As pointed out before, the objective of the control variables is to give a better understanding of my interviewers in terms of objectivity. In other words: Do they see what they see because that is what happened, or do they see what they see because they tend to think in a certain way? I will use the control variables to shed light on the
profile of the informants, thereby indirectly bolstering confidence in the validity of my own findings.

For the three control variables of personal outlook, I used 6-point scales from low = (1) to high = (6)

**Q8: Level of punishment for a crime**
The question was presented as: “Crime is a constant threat to all societies...what do you think the level of punishment should be?”

**Validity**
Obviously, the formulation was highly abstract. I did not refer to any specific type of crime, nor did I associate the 6 values on the scale with any kind of sentence. This concession to unreliability was made partly for time-economic reasons, partly in order to strengthen validity. If I had entered into the question things that could be associated with particular cases (the respondent might have had a sister raped or be relative to a convicted terrorist), that could have contaminated my measure without my knowledge. The alternative would have been to use many more specific items, but that would have been unduly time-consuming. All in all, I think I made the right decision.

**Reliability**
I clearly traded off reliability in this case. It was a calculated gamble whose merit may be evaluated by the convergence of this measure with the other control variables (Adcock and Collier, 2001). As can be seen from Table IV.1. below, the maximum distance between the values of any given individual on indicators Q8 (crime punishment level) and Q9 (Authority of teacher) is two (Inaki Garcia and Eva Aranguren). In other words, low scores on Q8 tend to go together with low scores on Q9 (and vice versa for high scores). This consistency could be taken as a good sign—both for reliability and for validity. The third indicator deviates from the pattern of the other two. I shall return to the discussion of that indicator below.
**Q9: Authority of teacher**

The question was presented as: “What should the authority of a teacher be in school?”

**Validity**

Again, I chose a very abstract formulation in order to make the respondent think in hypothetical-principled terms rather than respond to private-contemporary experiences outside my control.

**Reliability**

Theoretically, I should have specified that I was thinking about the teacher-student relationship. However, my respondents seemed to understand that without my spelling it out. As noted above, the observed distribution corresponded well with item 8—an indication of inter-item reliability and validity.

**Q10: In order to teach do you use educational ways or physical punishment?**

The question regarded appropriate reaction to a situation where your child runs into the street. For the precise formulation, I refer to the quote above.

**Validity**

I introduced this question in order to differ from the previous two. My aim was to use a specific situation to see if the respondents would answer differently when faced with a concrete scenario. They clearly did. I believe this query has lower validity than the two above, since the interviewer effect becomes more relevant when confronted with a private choice—particularly as it is related to child-raring. All the respondents chose
the second-lowest category, except one who chose category three (Domínguez). In other words, the indicator hardly discriminates between the respondents. Still, I chose to retain the indicator when constructing the index. With such a uniformity of answers, I think the one difference is significant. It very likely says something about the informant in question—particularly as he appears to have a solidly realist outlook on the two first indicators.

**Reliability**

The reliability of this query is presumably higher than for the two previous ones. I am convinced that the respondents would have confirmed their initial choice if asked again.

### 4.1.5 The open-ended interviews

The semi-structured interviews comprised seven open-ended questions concerning the dissolution of ETA. Despite several advantages, the data have obvious limitations mostly related to the sensitivity of the topic: ETA’s strategy. Since ETA uses illegal methods, it is difficult to gain access to them. Even the representative that I got access to must have had constraints upon his freedom of speech. I therefore focus on the reports of experts and of persons with direct experience of peace-making in the Basque Country.

The sensitivity of the topic also made demands on me in the interview situation. I had to choose my words carefully, but I also had to be alert to the respondents’ choice of words. As Bryman (2008) points out, knowing how words are used and the meanings of specific terms in the local vernacular (often called argot) is frequently viewed as crucial to an appreciation of how the social world being studied is viewed by its members. (Bryman, 2008:493).
My personal background may have compounded the interviewer effect. My name and surname are Spanish, which may have made the respondents suspicious of my intentions. Perhaps, the fact that I came from the University of Oslo gave me a more detached look—at least I believe that was positive. On the positive side, our common working language is Spanish. All the meetings took place in the work places of my interviewees (Basque parliament, political and journal headquarters and universities). This may have given the respondents a feeling of security and control over the situation.

**Data collection.** In all the cases I recorded the interviews using digital audio-recording devices with the consent of the informants. Thereafter I transcribed all the interviews to make them easier to analyse.

The average duration of the interviews was approximately 75 minutes, slightly more than what I expected. In general, the atmosphere was really good. We had plenty of time and we worked without interruption.

### 4.1.6 Dependent variable (y)

My dependent variable is ETA’s strategy, understood in terms of fighting or non-fighting. In practice, what I observed was the informants qualified views on the reasons for ETA’s choice of strategy.

My measurements included three items under a common question IV:

QIV: *How and when did ETA change its position with respect to the use of violence?*

   a) *Was it a “top-down” or a “bottom-up” process?*
   b) *What were the main reasons for the change?*
   c) *What were the main obstacles to the change?*
Validity and reliability

The questions seem reasonably clear. Here, the informants were free to formulate their own answers and I could interact with them in case they misunderstood or answered evasively. They did not seem perplexed by the double question (“how and why…”) of QIV. Nor were they noticeably put off by the terms “top-down” and “bottom-up.” Items b) and c) were intended to enable me to detect possible inconsistencies in the informants’ explanations.

4.1.7 Independent variables (x)

The independent variables are factors hypothesised to have a causal influence on the dependent variable. In my study, they included variables of background and identity (QI), conceptualisation of the Basque conflict (QII), evaluation of several events prior to ETA’s announcement (QIII), appreciation of change after ETA’s announcement (QV), degree of surprise at ETA’s announcement (QVI), and evaluation of several actors involved in the process (QVII).37 For a more detailed presentation, see Appendix 2.

Validity and reliability

Open-ended questions put a greater demand on post-coding efforts than closed-ended questions do. The interpretation of the analyst enters into the equation in a more acute manner. In the Findings Chapter (V), I usually present transcribed quotes in order to let the reader evaluate statements for herself. My emphasis is on the content of the arguments rather than on the correlation among different variables. In other words, my analysis of the open-ended data is predominantly qualitative.

37 The organizations were: Lokarri, The International Contact Group, The Collective of Basque Political Prisoners (EPPK) and the Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT).
4.2 Secondary sources.

4.2.1 Statistical data.

The dependent variable: ETA strategy.

I also utilize statistical data from secondary sources. Again my dependent variable is ETA’s strategy. These quantitative data allow me to think of ETA’s strategy as something that can vary in intensity, rather than as a dichotomy. My indicators of ETA’s strategy (violence) are:

a) Persons killed by ETA operatives.
   My data source of fatalities produced by ETA is The Spanish Department of Interior, which indicates 829 victims as of April 2012 (SDI, 2012).

b) Attacks perpetrated by ETA.
   My source of attacks data is The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to terrorism (START), which holds ETA responsible for 2005 attacks as of September 2011 (START, 2011)

c) Frustrated attacks.
   My sources are media reports. There is no official number of frustrated attacks. So I decided to focus on some remarkable frustrated attacks that have been published.

d) Number of ETA prisoners.
   My source of the number of political prisoners is based in the association Etxerat close to the EPPK. The actual number of prisoners is 639 (April, 2012)

Validity and reliability

I chose to use multiple data because data triangulation is likely to improve both validity and reliability. I consider my sources trustworthy. Still, the reader should be aware of the potential inflation- diminishing of numbers.
The Spanish Department of Interior refers to the number of victims that had been indemnified by the state. Others associations reflect a bigger number of victims. As “Vidas Rotas” an exhaustive study presented in 2010 estimating 857 victims. (Alonso et All, 2010)

The independent variable: Room for manoeuvre.

To measure ETA’s room for manoeuvre, I use the number of ETA prisoners. My assumption is that a high number of ETA prisoners simultaneously represents a constrained operative ability for ETA and a high level of frustration in the Basque country.

a) **Number of ETA prisoners.**

My source of prisoner data is the association called *Etxerat*, which is close to the EPPK. By April 2012, the reported number of prisoners was 639 (Etxerat 2012).

Validity and reliability

I decided to use the data from Etxerat, where I found an evolution in the number of political prisoners (1977 -2012). The main problem, with these data is the selectiveness: Etxerat only reports, the number of prisoners of the official prisoner collective, the EPPK, without score of other ETA prisoners that are not part of the collective.

As can be seen from the comparison below, *Etxerat* (2012) reported a lower number of prisoners in April 2012 than the National Court (2012) did:

National Court (2012):

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38 “I believed the interior department take into account the persons indemnified. An example that is in our book: An angry brother of a victim since the department had refused to indemnify as didn’t considered him an ETA victim. We have the document in which ETA declared that it was an ETA murder, that is the prove for us (...) another example is a person that suffered a kidnapping and according to the judgement as a consequence developed a cancer and die afterwards” (Domínguez, 2012)
• 559 prisoners in Spain  
⇒ 438 serving sentence.
⇒ 121 preventive detention. Waiting for trial.
⇒ 39 in Euskal Herria.

Etxerat (2012):
• 486 prisoners in Spain:  
⇒ 7 in Euskal Herria.

This being said, it is quite possible that the Exterat figures give a more valid measure of the reduction in ETA capability than the National Court’s figures do. That is because the EPPK consists of prisoners that have refused to condemn ETA, whereas the National Court’s figures includes ETA prisoners who have later condemned the organisation’s practices. Those in the latter category might not have been willing to fight if they were free. Only EPPK offered longitudinal data—which is important to measure the space of manoeuvre over time. Besides that I decided to use the numbers of Etxerat because represent the main organization of ETA political prisoners.

### 4.2.2 Documents

I selected some documents related with the last part of the Basque conflict. All belonged to the Abertzale Left and ETA.

I. A first step for the democratic process: principles and will of the Abertzale Left (November 2009)\(^{39}\)
II. Brussels Declaration (March 2010)\(^{40}\)
III. Gernika Accord (September 2010)\(^{41}\)
IV. Permanent ceasefire. Declaration by ETA. (January 2011)
V. Announcement of the end of the armed activity by ETA (October 2011)\(^{42}\)

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\(^{39}\) Appendix 2  
\(^{40}\) Appendix 3  
\(^{41}\) Appendix 4  
\(^{42}\) Appendix 1
5  FINDINGS

In this section primary and secondary data will be evaluated. Observing the indicators and personal outlook in order to determine the Humanist or Realist perspective.

5.1  The standardised interview

Six out of eight respondents answered the self-completion questionnaire. The two who declined to answer it gave no particular reason and it is difficult for me to assess whether or not their abstention should be seen as random or as caused by a factor that may also be related to the subject-matter. The questionnaire was done at the beginning of the interviews. It had two parts:

1) Seven items measuring the respondents’ evaluation of factors that could have affected ETA’s choice of strategy. (The respondents were asked to indicate both importance (six-scale) and contribution (positive/negative)).

2) Three items measuring the respondents’ general orientation on the humanism-realism axis.

The seven first questions, related to the interpretation of the conflict’s resolution can be analysed in two ways. Firstly, the factors can be compared substantively. Secondly, the items can be utilised as indicators of a background concept of conflict interpretation—in terms of assessment of the effect of changes in ETA’s room for manoeuvre.

The three last “real life” questions formed the control variable that is—the index of personal outlook.

I shall begin by discussing the relative importance of the first seven items, as seen by the respondents. Table V.1. presents the respondents’ views on importance by a numerical value and the indications of effect by a positive or negative sign.

43 The two abstainees were: a) imprisoned ETA member, and; b) Inigo Bullain, a lawyer and university lecturer who has written books on the ETA with a critical angle. Both have a Basque-nationalist self-identification.
Table V.1: Respondents’ assessment: seven possible causes of ETA strategy.

The bottom row of Table V.1 reports the sum of absolute values under each item. This figure gives an indication of the relative importance of the items in the respondents’ views (regardless of positive or negative influence). The maximum possible score is 36 and five of the items score above half of this value.

In the first position of importance, we found the *Action by Spanish and French Police* with 83.33% out of the total possible score. The other items listed in order of attached significance are: *Judicial action* (80.56% of maximum score); *The opening of negotiations* and *Socialist victory in Euskadi* (each with 61.11% out of the total possible score); *The precedent of the Irish peace process* (55.56%); *The economic crisis in Europe* (30.56%), and finally; *The statute of autonomy for Catalunya* with only 16.67% out of the total possible score.

In relation to the positive or negative character of the indicators there is an interesting pattern: The clear majority of assessments (27 out of 31 valid values)\(^{44}\) were positive. This could be a sign of yes-saying, but it could also mean that I have been able to

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\(^{44}\) The Journalist declined to evaluate items 5 and 7, considering them unimportant (Alfaro 2012). The Investigator gave (low) numerical values on items 5-7, but he said that the three items were unimportant and that he didn’t see the point in attaching positive or negative values to them (Dominguez 2012).
identify a set of plausible contributing factors. On the other hand, it casts some doubt on the validity of these items as indicators of Interpretation of conflict resolution. Ideally, I would wish that those who gave items 1, 4, 5 and 6 a high positive score would simultaneously give items 2, 3 and 7 a high negative score—and vice versa. This did not materialise. On the four “most important” indicators, all the informants except Politician (a) gave positive assessments. She, meanwhile, gave negative assessments on items 1-3 and only viewed the opening of negotiations as (strongly) positive [+5]. It is not surprising that a politician associated with the Aberzale Left would view the actions of Spanish police and judges as repressive and counterproductive. The fact that she did not consider the Socialist victory a positive contribution goes against my initial expectations, but—as discussed in the methods chapter—it is not strictly illogical.

I find it more remarkable that the other respondents—all of whom have either a clear Basque identity or an identity that includes a Basque component—would appreciate the police and judicial action of Spanish authorities to the extent that they do. As I previously explained in the methods chapter, when I constructed the questionnaire I did not ask about personal sympathies, I only asked about the importance of the events and whether they were “positive or negative.” I do believe that the majority of the informants disagree with the police and judicial practices as such, but understand that they were instrumental in the consequent permanent cease-fire and the announcement of the end of armed activity by ETA.

The mediator and politicians (a) and (b) rank the opening of negotiations as the most important factor towards new realities in the Basque Country. Probably, their opinion is coloured by their position. This is not to say that their evaluation is wrong, or that they misrepresent their own influence. But we should be aware of the potential bias from subjective outlook. Unsurprisingly, mediators and politicians see themselves as the main actors in bringing about the changes.

The investigator gives high and positive values to three indicators: Socialist Victory, police action and judicial action. On the other hand he views negotiations as
unimportant and potentially harmful [-1]. This may be explained by a suspicion that ETA were only engaging in negotiation in order to buy time and rearm. During the interview he argued: “the position of ETA towards violence has not changed, they are only in a different stage of the fight” (Dominguez 2012). It is important to point out that he does not disregard negotiations as such—only in this particular case.

Like the investigator, the victim and the journalist consider the opening of negotiations unimportant, but they do consider them positive. They attach a moderate to high significance to the socialist victory and give a high rating to the action by Spanish police and legislative and judicial authorities. Perhaps, these three could be seen as constituting a group within the sample.

The question now, is whether or not it makes sense to construct an index of Interpretation of conflict resolution. Although the indicators do not converge nicely into two groups of negatively correlated variables, there are signs of opposition within the dataset. Most respondents attach lower values to negotiations and to the Irish peace process than they do to the first three indicators (Socialist victory, Police action and Judicial action). Politician (a), however, considers the first three indicators harmful and thinks the opening of negotiations and the Irish precedent crucially positive. Hence, although the majority of respondents consider Socialist victory an influential variable, it does not separate among the respondents in the intended way. As discussed in the methods chapter, this can be explained by the fact that the socialist victory actually replaced a Basque-nationalist government—and hence, can be seen as a decrease in ETA’s space of manoeuvre (not an increase as originally intended). If it is to be included in the index, then, it has to be aligned with the other “realist indicators” (Police action, Judicial action).
I calculate the index of *Interpretation of conflict resolution (ICR)* thus:

\[
ICR = \text{Soc. Victory} + \text{Pol. action} + \text{Jud. Action} - \text{Negotiations-Irish peace process}
\]

The index has a theoretical range of [-30, 30], where -30 stands for extreme humanism and +30 stands for extreme realism. Table V.2. shows the indicators that go into the index construction as well as the index distribution itself.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soc. victory</th>
<th>Police action</th>
<th>Judicial action</th>
<th>Negotiations</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Index (ICR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Politician (b)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician (a)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table V.2: Items related to the index of interpretation of conflict resolution (ICR)*

The mean value on ICR is 4.83 (i.e.: >0). Hence, presuming ICR is a valid instrument, we may conclude that my sample leans towards a realist interpretation of resolution of the Basque conflict. The bulk of the evidence from the standardized questionnaire suggests that ETA became more inclined to choose a peaceful strategy as its room for manoeuvre contracted.

But can we be sure that my sample is unbiased? Perhaps my findings are driven by the fact that my selection procedure led to an overrepresentation of realists in the sample?

---

45 The values on this index are not simple row sums. The values of indicators “Negotiations” and “Ireland” are *subtracted* (not added) in the calculation of the Index of Interpretation of Conflict Resolution (ICR).
To assess this critique it may be useful to look at the three last items from the questionnaire.

As explained in Chapter IV, I asked my informants three “ordinary life questions” in order to gauge their general outlook on issues related to agency and responsibility. Specifically, I asked them to indicate their views on the appropriate level of punishment for crime, the degree of authority that a teacher should have and the forcefulness of response to a child behaving dangerously. I used 6-scale indicators (from low to high). Table V.3. presents the respondents’ answers on the three mentioned indicators as well as the distribution on the additive index of personal outlook.

**Table V.3.: Indicators of personal outlook (humanist-realism).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level of punishment</th>
<th>Teacher authority</th>
<th>Education /violence</th>
<th>Personal outlook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician (b)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician (a)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigator</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The theoretical range of the index is [3, 18] and the midpoint is 10.5. The mean value on personal outlook is 10.67, that is—slightly realist. Our first suspicion of a biased sample is therefore strengthened.
Figure V.1. presents a diagram, where the respondents’ values on personal outlook is indicated along the X axis and their respective values on ICR is indicated along the Y axis.

![Correlation diagram](image)

*Figure V.1.: The correlation between Personal outlook and ICR.*

As can be seen from Figure V.1., there is a strong positive correlation between personal outlook and Interpretation of conflict resolution. Pearson’s $r = 0.7346$. This casts doubt upon my initial findings and warrants a scrutiny of additional data.

5.2 Open-ended interviews.

The semi-structured interviews comprised seven open-ended questions concerning the dissolution of ETA.

5.2.1 Dependent variable (y): ETA’s strategy

*How and when did ETA change its position with respect to the use of violence?*
In the question I put as a premise that ETA’s strategy has changed. Some of the respondents agreed and offered various explanations, emphasising different levels and processes in and around the organisation. Others, however, declared that the strategy of ETA has never changed.

**Change of strategy:**

Among the respondents most clearly conceptualizing ETA’s policies in terms of change, was Iñigo Bullain (2012), Professor of the Basque University and author of one book and several articles critical of the ETA. According to Bullain,

“The change in the strategy came as a consequence of a terminal situation in the political-military paradigm in which the MNLV was configured. The movement wasn’t any more. It was paralysed. It was detained, trapped in a legal, police, judicial and international net. In order to continue, it was necessary to change and sacrifice the power of the violence. It was assumed that the development of the patriotic revolution demanded other formulas. The major sector in ETA was forced to assume the approach” (Bullain, 2012)

The words “paralysed” and “trapped” seem to be clear indicators of constraint. The words “legal, police, judicial and international” seem to indicate that the constraint was mainly brought upon ETA from outside. In other words, ETA’s change was instigated by an external pressure.

**No change of strategy**

Other informants declared that the strategy of ETA had never changed. According to these informants, ETA is only in another phase of the liberation process. One imprisoned ETA member put it thus:

“The objective of the use of force by ETA has always been to achieve a political scenario in which violence was not necessary anymore. So, I don’t think the position of
ETA, about the violence, has changed in the last period; the novelty is the understanding of the liberation fight, in which phase we are (...) The potential option of the accumulation of forces [as Bildu] is extraordinary and we have to support that option, so the time of the armed struggle has finished” (ETA prisoner, 2012)

Two things about this answer strike me immediately as significant: Firstly, the ETA prisoner communicates that ETA has never used violence lightly—only as a last resort. When violence was not “necessary” any more, ETA simply fell back on its favoured option, a purely political struggle. Secondly, the informant emphasises processes within the Basque liberation movement, particularly the unification of fronts under BILDU. This unification would seem to represent an asset to the Basque nationalists. Hence, what the informant seems to say is that a strengthening of the position of the Basque nationalist movement facilitated the renouncement of violence.

While Bullain’s interpretation points clearly towards hypothesis 1 (the realist scenario), the ETA prisoner’s account is supportive of hypothesis 2. Both must be considered first-class informants. Each has his own particular strengths (Bullain, a more objective locus; the ETA prisoner, more inside information). Still, their interpretations could hardly be more different. Again, the accounts seem to reflect more on the eye of the beholder than on the facts themselves.

From a policy-making point of view, this is no trivial matter. The interpretation that gains currency is likely to dominate future doctrine. A wrong assessment could therefore unleash renewed violence. Perhaps a seed of future conflict could be identified in the ETA prisoner’s statement itself. Notice that,

1) If ETA is having a change of strategy it is breaking with the past and the violence.
2) If ETA is simply entering a new phase in the liberation process, they are implicitly upholding the justification for
Although I have so far identified the contraction scenario with rational agency, there is nothing in the ETA prisoner’s statement that could be seen as an admission of irrationality. On the contrary, the peaceful strategy is presented as a continuation of a violent strategy under new circumstances—consistency usually being regarded as a hallmark of rationality. Thus, one might say that in both statements, ETA is identified as a rational actor: Adapting to a new situation when the violence is not beneficial anymore, that is—when all the “requirements” of the previous phase are fulfilled.

**When did ETA change its position?**

Some of the informants asserted that delimiting phases in the life cycle of an illegal group such as ETA is complicated. Nonetheless, the majority identified the time between the last truce period of 2006 and the ratification of the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 as the initial phase of the process.

“The position of ETA changed after the bombing of Barajas. In the grass roots of the Abertzale Left they wanted peace even before that, but ETA was in charge, and after what happened in Barajas, the grass roots decided to control the movement. (Eguiguren, 2011)

The materialization of the change can be seen in the Gernika accord in 2010.

“In autumn 2010, when there is international pressure, we find the bases of the Abertzale left and the Gernika accord” (Rios 2011)

I shall return to discuss the Barajas bombing incident in Chapter VI.

**How did ETA change its position?**

The respondents generally explained the change of direction—in the grass roots and among the leaders—in rationality terms.
“They arrived at the conclusion: If ETA were to continue to lead the movement they will never arrive at negotiations” (Eguiguren, 2011).

“It is simply a utilitarian vision of the violence in which the paradigm of violence is obsolete and is not working anymore” (Garcia, 2011).

Both theses statements conceptualise violence as a matter of choice—something you do as long as it is useful. It could be relevant however, that Garcia (2011)—identified above as “victim”\(^{46}\)—has the highest score on the ICR index and comes across as a rather consistent realist. Eguiguren (Politician b) is more complex and could perhaps be described as an “outlier,” as he scores high on the ICR, but low on the control index of personal outlook.

**a) Was it a “top-down” or a “bottom up” process?**

The majority of the informants (four) asserted a double process, in which the Abertzale Left and ETA gradually found themselves to have diverging interests. They talked about the importance of the social movement that supports the Abertzale Left and its leaders. The power of decision-making shifted from ETA to the Abertzale left (in which we can observe the internal change of the leadership of the movement).

“*The direction of the process came from up—after a consultation with the bases in order to gain legitimacy. Around 5000 people had participated in the assemblies, and the majority had given a positive answer. Meanwhile the electorate will continue to grow, the tensions on the inside will be smaller*” (Bullain, 2012)

“The process is going in both directions. On the one hand the leaders of the Abertzale Left had constructed an alternative channel for the demands of the bases and on the

\(^{46}\) Garcia’s father was killed by ETA operatives.
other hand the bases had contributed in different mobilizations, assemblies, elections...” (ETA’s prisoner, 2012)

Two respondents gave clear unidirectional answers:

Top – down:

“There had been the leaders of Batasuna, once the Strasbourg sentence had showed them that there was no way out: If they follow ETA they will have to be indefinitely in an illegal situation” (Dominguez, 2012)

Bottom-up:

“Inside ETA, those less willing to abandon the armed activity were the leaders, the copula” (Garcia, 2011)

b) What were the main reasons for the change?

Most of the informants list the exhaustion of ETA as the principal reason for its change of strategy. If ETA were as strong as used to be all the other measures would have been insufficient.

“Position of the Basque society after 2007, the de-legitimisation of violence, weakness of ETA and the fact that HB was eroded” (Rios, 2011)

“Exhaustion of ETA, they were almost as dead as Franco47, the police were really effective, the level of activity was non-existent. There were voices, even from its own media, saying that if they were able to kill 100 people a year there is logic, but killing only one is senseless” (Eguiguren 2011)

“In first place came police and judicial action, then the mobilization of citizens and only in the latest phase of the process the Abertzale Left, when they realised that there was no other option” (Garcia, 2011)

47 Franco died at bed.
Even the ETA prisoner had recognised the structural debility of the movement, pointing to, *inter alia*, international processes.

“A social demand for a sovereign and pacific movement, the danger of losing the alliances constructed in the last decade, the tiredness after 50 years of armed conflict and the process in which few Europeans countries will be suffering internal changes in their borders as pacifically as Belgium or Scotland” (ETA’s prisoner, 2012)

This being said, his main focus was on the new unification of the nationalist front

“The bases of the Abertzale left, the possibility of a political accord and the international implication” (Arsuaga, 2012)

**c) What were the main obstacles to the change?**

Here we find two main positions: The inertia of ETA and the immobility of the central government.

“Inertia, habits ... the fact that violence has been an incentive in the political environment, and when this started to have a cost, they had to rethink the situation” (Domínguez, 2011).

“There is a politicization of the justice with everything related to the Basque conflict, and to the anti-terrorism legislation (...) The systematic application of the preventive measures, in some cases exhausting the 4 years of preventive prison and releasing them without any evidence...Violating the confidentiality of the accused, publishing their names in the media...That strategy, the anti-terrorist fight that some had defended as crucial to the end of the violence, was a main generator of confrontation, in which instead of leading people to think and to question the strategy that produces suffering and hate caused by ETA, actually results in a generation of hate in the more radical sectors...it has been absolutely damaging for the Spanish judiciary system” (Arsuaga, 2012).

And a combination of both
“ETA’s position, mistrust towards the Abertzale Left, lack of communication between the political parties and the position of the central government” (Rios, 2011).

5.2.2 Independent variable: self identification.

Apart from general outlook, the respondents’ interpretation may have been coloured by their positioning vis-à-vis the parties. I therefore asked them to tell me their life story and indicate their identity.

QI. Background and identity.

Four of the informants declared themselves to be Basques. Three had no clear identity, and one claimed to be both Spanish and Basque.

As we can observe, the identification is more concerned with the exclusive identity than the inclusive one. The 3 people who declare themselves to have no clear identity say they do not have any problems in being Basques or Spaniards.

Interestingly, the three respondents with a double or unclear identification have an average score on the ICR index of 13.67. Two of the other respondents did not obtain any score on ICR, due to abstention. However the average ICR score of the three remaining respondents with a clear Basque self-identification was -4. Thus, the effect of identification on conceptualisation of conflict resolution is very strong indeed.

QII. Conceptualisation of the Basque conflict.

In order to have different perspectives, I asked them to explain the Basque conflict. In general terms it is conceived as a political, historical, legal and identity problem.

Historical-identity explanation:
“The problem of Basque society is its division into different identities, that bring to a head the identification problem within Spain, because one of the parts of the Basque society don’t want to be integrated in Spain. There is a historical problem in the integration of some provinces with particularities in liberal reformism (…) But if we take away the problem of terrorism, there is no conflict, It is the richness of this country, because it is plural, with different cultures and identities. It is a complex society, compartmentalized and the usual solution is democracy” (Eguiguren, 2011)

Historical-legal problem:

“The conflict is a clash of interest between the Basques that considered the decision of the people to be fundamental, (whatever the intention was), and the position of the Spanish and French states opposing the will of Basque society to decide their future in a free and democratic way” (ETA’s prisoner)

Political explanation:

“Fundamentally it is a problem between Basques, a different conception of what should be the Basque political Community” (Domínguez, 2012)

QIII. Evaluation of several events prior to ETA’s announcement.

- Brussels Declaration.
- Gernika accords.
- International Peace Conference.
- Definitive cessation of the armed activity.

There is a general trend in the assessment of the events: positivity and scepticism. All the events have occurred as a chain in the direction of the steps taken by the Abertzale Left and ETA.

We can observe the timing and demands of the diverse pronouncements. There was the Brussels declaration in March 2010 asking ETA a ceasefire = ETA will declare a ceasefire in six months -September 2010-.
20 days after of the ceasefire, the Gernika accords demanded a permanent and unilateral ceasefire (= January 2011) and a definitive cessation of ETA’s armed activity (=October 2011)

The International Peace Conference on the 17th of October 2011 was the last push. Three days after the conference, ETA announced the definitive cessation of the armed activity. Mainly the informants argue that, “those events were necessary in the liturgy of the MNLV, but not for Basque society” (Garcia, 2011) nonetheless they helped with the situation, and that is positive, “it was the best news for this country” (Eguiguren, 2011)

QV. Appreciation of change after ETA’s announcement.

The majority of the informants agree that even if all the steps to the normalization and finalisation of a democratic political process in the Basque Country has been really positive, it is still really early to indicate a final judgement.

QVI. Degree of surprise at ETA’s announcement.

All coincidentally remarked on the clarity of the press release. Usually long and complicated this time it was easy to read and very clear. ”Of course it was a really good notice but I was not jumping, it is already time for the normalization of the situation” (García, 2011)

QVII. Evaluation of several actors involved in the process.

Lokarri.

International Contact Group.

EPPK. (Collective of Basque Political Prisoners)

AVT. (Association of Victims of terrorism)
The informants that had evaluated *Lokarri* (Peace promotion organization) in a positive way also had positive feelings for the International Contact Group (ICG). In fact there are connections relating the two groups. Together they organised the International Peace Conference in October 2011 three days prior to the announcement of ETA. In addition *Lokarri* administered the web of the ICG.

Some of the informants evaluated *Lokarri* in a negative way indicating, “*a false equidistance between the parts implicated in the conflict*” (Garcia, 2011)

The measures promoted and adopted by *Lokarri* have been positive even if some say it was “*only valid and necessary for the MNLV*” (Alfaro, 2011)

According to informants the EPPK as a group is extremely hierarchized.

“The group leaves no space for internal debate, because it is focused on the leadership of 8-10 people. They have thought about prisons as a front for the revolutionary fight, than a place from which they can contribute in a constructive way (...) A group that should have an internal and deep reflection in order to look at the future and understand what is possible and what is not” (Rios, 2011)

In order to evaluate the *Association of victims of terrorism* all agreed on its initial and important role, in the work they did, helping and supporting a “forgetting” collective, but as well all agreed that it, and its radical ideas, had been used instrumentally by some of the political parties.

“As victims I had respect for them, but I think their attempt to monopolize the voice of the victims is horrible. The collective is so plural, because terrorism had affected so many different people, (...) of the group of victims they represented the more extreme voice, in the sense that they were conceiving justice as a revenge, they do not believe that people deserved a second opportunity (...)” (Garcia, 2011)
5.3 Secondary Sources.

The secondary data allow me to think of ETA’s strategy as something that can vary in intensity, rather than as a dichotomy.

5.3.1 Statistical data.

My indicators of ETA’s strategy – violence – are: (1) Persons killed by ETA operatives, (2) Number of political prisoners, and (3) Attacks, frustrated attacks, truce periods and negotiations.

Persons killed by ETA operatives.

Even if ETA was created in 1958 with a clearly active orientation it was not until 1968 that they started to carry out abductions and assassinations.

We can observe how the peaks of the armed action coincided with significant historical moments, hence they respond to an organized strategy.

As previously pointed out the main objective of terrorism is to destabilise the regular life of the population and the activities of governments.

ETA victims, according to the Spanish interior department (2012), number 829. Of those, 486 are members of security forces, 32 politicians, 11 judges and lawyers and the rest civilians. Known as the “bloody decade” it was between 1978-87 when the average number of victims was 50 a year. 94% of the victims were assassinated after the death of Franco.
## Table V. 4.: Fatalities from ETA violence and ETA prisoners.

During the first decade of armed activity the number of actions and victims was progressively increasing. The big peak in ETA’s activity (1978-1980) coincided with the end of Franco’s Dictatorship and the years of the democratic transition, in which ETA had opposed the 1978 Spanish Constitution.

ETA was able to maintain a high level of intensity especially from 1978 until the end of 1980. In 1981 an enormous decline in the number of killings and attacks can be observed, from 92 victims in 1980 to 30 victims in 1981. A possible explanation for this is the escalation of violence and an increase in the number of arrests, to the point that so many had been arrested that ETA was not able to replace them. The table confirms that hypotheses. There is an increment of 170 political prisoners in the space of one year, an increase of 61%; from 265 to 435 prisoners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Fatalities from ETA violence</th>
<th>ETA Prisoners</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Fatalities from ETA violence</th>
<th>ETA Prisoners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>46</td>
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</tr>
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<td>No data</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>No data</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>526</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Spanish department of interior and Etxerat (2012).
The following peak overlapped with the entrance of Spain into NATO (1982) and the European Union (1986). The highest point was reached in 1987 when the deadliest attack in ETA’s history happened: 21 victims and 45 injured people in a shopping centre in Barcelona.

At the beginning of the nineties we observe another increasing peak, coinciding with the celebration of the Olympic games in Barcelona 1992. 1999 was the first year in three decades with no casualties, coinciding with the Pact of Lizarra (a negotiated accord made by the nationalist Basque parties in 1998) and a truce period.

Thereafter we see the last peak of activity in 2001 when the truce broke and the Spanish central government of the Popular Party continued with the anti-terrorist policy.

**Number of ETA Political prisoners.**

Another factor for the observation of the will and capacity of ETA is based on the number of political prisoners the organization have at liberty.

I will infer that the bigger number of members at liberty, the bigger the capacity to act, and on the contrary, the fewer number of members, the smaller capacity of action.

There are two important events shaping the number of political prisoners:

1. The amnesty in 1977, releasing about 600 Basque political convicts.
2. The collaboration of French authorities in confronting terrorism, leading to a big effectiveness of the anti-terrorist policy.

A correlation can be established between the negotiations of the central government and ETA, based on the number of imprisonments the year after these took place:

   In 1998 the Zurich conversations (Popular Party) –see 1999-

   In 2005 Geneva-Oslo conversations (Socialist Party) –see 2006-
Leading to the idea that the Spanish government had used political prisoners in exchange for truce periods in 1999 and 2006. Maybe not directly, but at least, “softening” the detentions. (Dominguez 2007:33)

The important point is to see if there is a relation between the number of fatalities from ETA violence and the number of ETA political prisoners. In the next graphic we can observe a negative correlation in which, the number of fatalities is going down and ETA prisoners are continually increasing.

![Graph showing correlation between fatalities and number of ETA prisoners.](image)

**Figure V.2.: The correlation between fatalities and number of ETA prisoners.**

**Attacks, frustrated attacks, truces periods and negotiations.**

The patterns of activity show ETA as responsible for 2005 terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2010, making them the fourth most active terrorist group in the world during this period (START, 2010:1) In all, 28% of all ETA’s attacks resulted in at least one fatality.

In order to analyse the approach of ETA, and the will of the organization, it is not only important to look into the effectiveness of armed activity, but the armed activity per se. Also, another factor to take into account is the number of frustrated terrorist attacks.
However the well-known frustrated attacks are the ones intercepted by the security forces, there being no figures for the number of prepared attacks that turned out in unfulfilled actions. Beyond this, there is no available data, apart from the ones reflected in the media.

In the next graphic we can observe the number of attacks and ceasefires between 1970 and 2012. It is noticeable that there were always incidents even during the truce periods.

![Chart showing attacks and ceasefires between 1970 and 2012.]

*Source: Global terrorism Database. 2012.*

**Figure V. 3.: Attacks and ceasefires by ETA 1970-2012.**

Terrorism means the systematic use of murder, injuries and destruction, or the threat of such acts for political ends. It is, at the same time, a “strategy of communication” since the main goal of terrorist organizations is not a particular act of killing or destruction, but the political message to society or certain sectors of it. (L. Mees, 2003:4)

Some of the worst attacks in the history of ETA happened during the process of dialogue and negotiations. During the war of attrition (1975-1994) ETA became
convinced that further pressure in the form of more lethal attacks would end up with sitting at the negotiating table and accepting secession. (Sánchez-Cuenca 2008:19)

5.3.2 Documents.

Chronologically presentation of five official documents presented during the process. From 2009 to 2011

“A first step for the democratic process: principles and will of the Abertzale Left” Is presented in November 2009, as a “new political phase in the democratic solution” (2009:2). The movement is reaffirming ideas, and presenting the evolution process “We are a political movement which has been proven correct by the course of the time (...) In the last few years we have made progress in some questions (...) a change of cycle that will replace the armed confrontation, blockade and lack of prospects with dialogue, agreement and a just, stable and lasting solution for our country” (2009:1)

The Brussels Declaration is presented in March 2010. As a “Statement by international Leaders in Conflict Resolution and Peace Processes” and they stated: “We welcome the proposed steps and new public commitment of the Abertzale Left to exclusively political and democratic means and a total absence of violence to attain its political goals (...) we appeal to ETA to support this commitment by declaring a permanent, fully verified ceasefire” (2010:1)

The Gernika accord is presented in September 2010 as an “Agreement for a scenario of peace and democratic solution” asking for a “declaration by ETA of a permanent and unilateral cease fire, verifiable by the international community, as an expression of will of a definitive cessation of its armed activity”
They also asked for the abolition of the Political Parties Law, following measures toward amnesty and the use of the Mitchell Principles.

The **permanent ceasefire** came with a declaration in January 2011, and is directly connected with the Brussels declaration and Gernika as is stated: “*In recent months from Brussels to Gernika well known personalities have stressed the need to bring a just and democratic solution (...) ETA agrees, the solution will come through the democratic process with dialogue and negotiations (...) Therefore ETA has decided to declare a permanent and general ceasefire which will be verifiable by the international community*” (2011: 1)

The announcement of the **end of the armed activity** on October 2011 is the most important one in ETA’s history is concise. They talked about a “*new political time*” in which “*the Basque Country has accumulated the necessary experience and strength to address this [democratic] path*” they declared is a “historical opportunity” and pointed to the decision of a “*definitive ceasing of its armed activity to overcome the armed confrontation*” (2011:1)

5.4 **Models**

In order to analyse the data I created informal models for a better understanding. The objective of crossing variables is to observe the different dimensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JUDICIAL ACTION</th>
<th>Non mentioned</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important (+)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Expected distribution.

I will say that the people who identified the Basque conflict as a legal problem will think that judicial action has been important in bringing about the present situation.

The other possibility is a total rejection of the legal system, in which the judicial action leads to a problem of legality and legitimacy of the system.

Real distribution.

The results revealed none of those expected distributions. All the informants, with the exception of one, had chosen judicial action as crucial in the subsequent renunciation of violence by ETA. Once again, I did not ask about the perception or how they felt about the judicial-legal actions, as this is not being evaluated. They were asked about the judicial action in the development of the situation created after the announcement of the 20th of October.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expected distribution.

It would be expected that people with two identities, that is a mixed or plural identity, would have a better capacity of understanding and of putting themselves in the place of others, and would have positive inclinations towards dialogue and negotiations.
Real distribution.

The results revealed just the contrary:

- One identity: negotiations are important.
- No clear identity: less importance on negotiations.
- Double identity: negotiations are not important.

In the graphic we can observe how identity is related to the importance of the negotiations. The people who see themselves as having a Basque identity believe more in the power of negotiations than those who had chosen the “double identity” -Basque and Spanish- or the “not clear identity”. The ‘not clear identity’ group showed the opinion of two interviewees: They do not give importance to the identity factor. One of them has declared, “I don’t bother about my identity, I do not spend time thinking about that”. The other asserted, “I have a rational identity, it is a rational utility, nothing else”.

Returning to the point, about the relation between identity and negotiations we see that it can be related to the fact that the people who are exclusively Basque see the problem as something that can be solved with dialogue, meanwhile in the other extreme the person representing the unimportance of the negotiations does not believe in the capacity of the negotiations, or in the intentions of the interlocutors, and is also the person with the highest level of realism in our scale (13). The two representatives in the middle, having no clear identity think the negotiations are not important at all.

We can see a distribution that represents a decreasing model.
**Bottom-up or top-down process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEGOTIATIONS</th>
<th>Top-down (1)</th>
<th>Double process</th>
<th>Bottom-up (0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important (+)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non important</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important (-)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Expected* distribution

The informants who believed in the importance of negotiations will be identifying the process as double or bottom-up dynamic.

*Real* distribution

There is a majority of persons (4) evaluating the negotiations as important. Meanwhile there is only (1) person looking negatively and (3) pointing as non-important in this case, even if they had positive values towards the negotiations in general. This can be understood as a valid approach but not in this specific case.

We can clearly see how the persons supporting the use of negotiations believe in a double direction process and a bottom up process, those ones probably understand the negotiations as a valid process and really important in this situation. We can see how the persons that established negotiations as a valid and important tool, believe as well in its ability to change.
6 ANALYSIS

There are many arguments presenting the definitive ending of ETA armed activity as an internal evolution of the organization, as well as a defeat. Was ETA forced to give up or was ending the armed struggle its own decision?
In the next section I want to analyse and point out the different options that led to the announcement made on the 20th of October with the continuum of Humanism and Realism as a framework.

6.1 Realist approach

Departing from a realist point of view, all the players are rational actors. The assessments are based on future orientation and calculation. Following this approach we state that ETA was forced to end the armed activity.

I want to analyse the will and capacity of ETA, in order to establish if the room for manoeuvre was restricted. This is the version defended by the Spanish government and the authorities: the defeat of the group.

With that aim the focus will be from the year 2000 onwards.

The offensive after the 1999 truce started really strongly with 23 victims in 2000, the tendency went down with 15 victims in 2001 and 5 victims in 2002. The same year, the Spanish Supreme Court banned Batasuna for alleged collusion with ETA, and in 2003 a new law promoted by the main political parties denied the access of Batasuna to the democratic political system (Laws party 6/2002). In 2002 they had counted 30 attacks by ETA. The year after, 2003, there were 18 attacks and many casualties. This could be a consequence of illegalizing Batasuna, in which ETA and the Abertzale Left were flexing their muscles, proving who was in charge.

“In a terrorist organization the main argument is strength (...) ETA solve discussions by assassinating” (F. Dominguez, 2012)
In 2002 the Spanish government sent a report to the Fiscalía General (attorney general), with 23 motives\(^{48}\) for the illegalization of Batasuna by the Supreme Court. (El mundo, 2002) Within the motives, we can identify among others:

- No condemnation of the violent ETA attacks by the Abertzale Left in the Basque Parliament.
- José Enrique Bert, Batasuna spokesperson in Vitoria, manifested literally that the Abertzale Left “has no aspiration to end the violence by ETA”. July 2002.
- ETA made a press release in August 2002, intimidating the democratic parties supporting the illegalization of Batasuna.

In 2002 we can see how ETA and the Abertzale Left were side by side, making a defence of the political-military strategy on the nationalist front. It is important to remember that in 1994 ETA had decided to start a “socialization of violence” commencing the killing of non-nationalist, elected politicians, particularly at local level.\(^{49}\)

Over a period of years, the courts were unable to establish the link between ETA and the rest of the movement; the judge Baltasar Garzón had been successfully working on that link since 1998, and on the illegalization of associations and organizations inside the MNLV.\(^{50}\) In this context, the party law came as a response, and a defence of the rule of the law. The state effectively pressurised the MNLV, politically, judicially and with police action.

“In November 2003, ETA had more than 500 members at liberty, with that number they are still a powerful organization, but it seems that they had lost their capacity to determine politics and to maintain the level of violence they wanted.” (F. Dominguez, 2012)

In some sectors of the Abertzale Left an idea started about the negative balance: ETA is no longer beneficial, for the level of suffering “ETA killed five and the government


\(^{49}\) Political representatives of the two main parties, mainly at local level, (PP-PSOE) are military targets.

\(^{50}\) I do not agree in the thesis of Baltasar Garzón that everything is ETA, assimilating all the MNLV to ETA. But there is a well defined coincidence of strategy between ETA and the Abertzale Left.
arrested 600”\textsuperscript{51} and, even more for the incapacity of the Abertzale left to act politically because of their subordination to ETA. This confrontation was rather small when there was a common enemy which was the government and its law party.

According to conservative sectors (PP), the negotiation process between the PSE-EE and ETA in 2005 led to a substantial deterioration in the anti-terrorist policy. The main characteristics of the truce were based on the fact that it was a negotiated cease-fire between the government and the terrorist group, establishing previous conditions accepted by the two parties.\textsuperscript{52}

The direct consequence is the acceptance of ETA as a “valid interlocutor”. Giving ETA the role of interlocutor contributed to the legitimisation of the terrorists and the idea that the fight would force the government into negotiations. Threatening to fight in order to bring about talks was the reaffirmation of the attrition-war in the nationalist front.

Nonetheless the negotiations blew up with a car bombing in Madrid’s main airport at the end of December 2006, with ETA’s accusation of government failure in the road map. After those events, Batasuna and ETA became completely marginalised. There was a high mistrust of Batasuna by all political forces. Being outlawed it could not participate in politics and the activity and effectiveness of ETA was really low.

\textit{“The decision of the state to declare Batasuna illegal in 2003 created a clash of interest between ETA and Batasuna. This became clearly manifest in 2009”}\textsuperscript{(Alfaro, 2011)}

In 2009 the European Court found the Spanish verdict consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights. In that year there were registered almost 30 attacks and 3 casualties.

\textit{“On the 30\textsuperscript{th} of June 2009, the Strasbourg tribunal announced the consistency of the Spanish tribunal, and that was devastating news for Batasuna. Since there was no

\textsuperscript{51} Pako Arísti. Gara 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2003.

\textsuperscript{52} The previous cease-fire in 1998 was also negotiated, but not with the Spanish government, but with two Basque nationalist parties agreed secretly with ETA.
other chance of coming back to legality, they had to break with ETA. Batasuna assumed that as long as ETA were active, they could not have any political role. These were the seeds of the conflict between ETA and Batasuna. But this was not as a result of a political evolution of Batasuna or ETA, it was as a result of the strength of the rule of law” (Dominguez, 2012)

This fact, based on 30 attacks and 3 casualties, as has been pointed out, could be understood in two different ways: ETA was attacking the government for the grievances of the illegalization of Batasuna, or ETA was “giving a message” to their own social bases in Batasuna and ETA members.

In November 2009 the Abertzale Left presented a document under the title “A first step for the democratic process: principles and will of the Abertzale Left” in which it declared “the democratic process must be developed in a complete absence of violence and without interference, by the use of exclusively political and democratic means. We are convinced that this political strategy will make advances in the democratic process” (Abertzale Left, 2009:2)

With this declaration the Abertzale Left was adopting a new approach after being outlawed.

As has been previously indicated, it is not only about the number of attacks, but in order to identify the will of ETA we have to look at the frustrated attacks: Here, an important indicator is the attempt to act in January 2010.

The Spanish police intercepted a van travelling in the direction of Obidos (Portugal), in which the Otazu commando had prepared 1300 kilograms of explosive material. The objective of the attacks was the Kio towers in Madrid. (El País, March 2010)

In January 2010, after the illegalization of Batasuna and during the internal debate between ETA and Batasuna, members of the Otazu commando were preparing one of the most spectacular actions carried out by ETA.

But, why was ETA planning an enormous attack in Madrid after Batasuna had already presented a political and pacific compromise in November 2009?
“ETA had to assume that it had no military capacity, and no capacity to control Batasuna. It could sound a bit strange, but they called it exercising control of the political direction of the movement (...) From the mid-seventies, ETA was in the vanguard of the movement, and had exercised control of the sectorial organization: ETA led the movement. But in 2010 they recognized their incapacity to exercise control of the political direction. That was when Batasuna led the political direction. Resigned to that, ETA took the decision to renounce the violence” (Dominguez, 2012)

We can understand those events as a positive feature of Batasuna leaders: They realised violence was not an option in politics. Also, they decided to take some steps in the movement towards a new situation. Does the leader of the Abertzale Left change? Does ETA change?

“The actual Batasuna leaders have been lucky, the police have debilitated ETA. Confronting an organization without leaders gave strength to Batasuna. The same Arnaldo Otegui [imprisoned leader of Batasuna] that we have now, is the same leader that was here in 1998, and he didn’t confront ETA then, neither did he in 2007” (Dominguez, 2012)

A correlation can be established between the negotiations of the central government and ETA based on the number of imprisonments the year after these took place:

In 1998 the Zurich conversations (Popular Party) –see 1999-

In 2005 Geneva-Oslo conversations (Socialist Party) –see 2006-

Leading to the idea that the Spanish government had used political prisoners in exchange for truce periods in 1999 and 2006. Maybe not directly, but at least “softening” the detentions. (Dominguez 2007:33)
In relation to the time of the study, from 2000 a gradual increase in political prisoners can be seen with a big peak in 2004.

In 2009 a relative stability can be observed, diminishing for a short period in 2010. The tendency from 2010 until 2012 is one of continued falling. This can be due to:

- New scenario after the announcement of the 20th of October 2011.
- Time of the year, still in the first semester.
- No ETA active members.
- Effectiveness of the pressure of the government into the EPPK.

If we cross the number of victims caused by ETA and the number of ETA members in prisons, a negative correlation can be established for ETA in which the number of victims is de-escalating while the number of prisoners is continuously growing.

6.1.1 Summary of realist explanation.

According to the Realist assessment, and after using the indicators in a systematic approach it can be said that:

- The Spanish central Government, ETA and the Abertzale left are acting according to rational behaviour.
- Judicial, police and political actions have forced ETA and the Abertzale Left to change their strategy.
  - The Abertzale left has adapted to the new laws.
  - ETA has seen how its influence and power have eroded.
  - ETA did not lose the will, it lost the capacity to act.

53 The government is offering penal advantages to the prisoners that compel an auto-critic and ask for forgiveness. That leads to the abandonment of the EPPK. The numbers of political prisoners of this study are from the EPPK.
6.1.2 Critics of the realist explanation.

As I explained before in the methods chapter, I decided to interview eight individuals with the aim of creating a better understanding of the Basque conflict situation. Also, expecting a possible bias in their explanations I decided to create some control variables. The objective of the control variables is to give a better understanding of my interviewees in terms of objectivity. Said that, and after an analytical look into the three variables I can establish an overlapping of the explanatory variables and the profile of my informants. In other words, the ones defending a realist point of view had a realist personal outlook.

That result, gives the analysis a negative connotation, in which the informants see what they see because they think in a certain realist way.

6.2 Humanist approach

The Humanist School postulates that a man is essentially a peaceful creature. In this perspective, violence is seen as *pathological*, and brutal acts are explained by inner or outer disturbances of the subject (Hellan-Hansen, 2004:40)

The individual responds emotionally and instinctively to the grievances. They are not choosing to act violently, it is the situation that drives them to it.

I want to analyse the reasons for the change of strategy, in order to analyse if the room for manoeuvre widened, leading to a renouncement of violence.

The MNLV is defending the new situation as an evolution of the liberation fight, as a consequence of an internal debate.

Overlapping the same period, but with other explanatory variables we found the announcement of the 20\textsuperscript{th} of October 2011.
Some of the consequences are the same, but the implications and their importance change.

"After Franco’s period the security forces are corrupted, people coming from the old structures, torturers\(^{54}\) ... there is a huge democratic deficit. In the eighties the dirty war, the state terrorism with the GAL, they had used the same strategies and bias to finish ETA, with the moral difference that the a state has to exemplify and guarantee the rule of law...in political terms the emergence of Aralar [Basque independence party that refused the violence], the ideas of political parties that had never supported the violence working for self-government, Ibarretxe’s plan, with a plebiscite to add democratic legitimacy to the process (...) all the legal and democratic proposals of the Basque Parliament, in that sense are denied, disdain by the central government in Madrid” (Arsuaga, 2012)

### 6.2.1 Internal debate process MNLV

The internal process as the base of the MNLV came as a consequence of a new time/era, a different step in the armed struggle. Nonetheless the impulse for change came from different parts:

- Disagreement and erosion of the grass roots of the Abertzale movement.
- Accumulation of political forces.
- International implication.
- Tiredness after 50 years of fighting.
- Position of Basque society

It is in the Political Parties law where the dissidence started inside the movement. The world of the MNLV reacted against the new law launched in 2003, but from then on, the whole movement was losing capacity.

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\(^{54}\) According to the Memory Basque Foundation since 1960 until the publication of the study in 2010; there had been 474 victims from the Basque Country that died as a consequence of paramilitary groups or state repression, in which the National Police and the Civil Guard had caused the 42,5% of the casualties. (Eztiker 2010:4)
“The Abertzale left has been a social agent of decisive influence, but from 2004 there is a feeling that they are loosing leadership (...) after the break up of the Lizarra Pact, as well as after the illegalization of Batasuna, the internal critics were diluted in combatting the external enemy” (Rios, 2011)

On the 24th of March 2006 a new negotiated truce period began: During 2005, the PSE-EE and ETA had started a dialogue in Geneva and Oslo. Nonetheless, this truce period would last for only 6 months. Differences arose and on the 30th of December 2006, ETA decided to put an end to the conversations. A car bomb exploded in Barajas –Madrid’s main airport- leaving two mortal victims, twenty injured and major damage to the infrastructure of the airport.

The car bomb in Barajas marked an inflexion point in the negotiations and the dialogue between the government and the group. The Abertzale Left interpreted the car bomb as a big mistake.

“In 2006 they [the Abertzale Left] were really optimistic about the new process. ETA has justified violence during the last years as a toll in the aim to force the state into negotiations, but why, when you finally have the government ready, when you finally get there, would you break the process?? (...) The failure of negotiations in 2006 was a great disappointment for some of the leaders of the Abertzale left, who had worked really hard to get there” (Rios, 2011)

The 9th of January in a press release ETA claimed responsibility for the attack, explained that the objective was not to cause any victims. They are willing to maintain the ceasefire but they will attack if the repression continues.

“The objective of the armed action was not to cause victims, we want to denounce a non vacation of the parking lot after three calls explaining the exact location of the explosive. We want to send our sincere condolences to the two people, Carlos Alonso Palate and Diego Armando Estacio, who lost their lives in this action, as well as their families, friends and the people of Ecuador” (ETA, 2007:3)
On the 9th of January, the socialist Minister of the Interior, Pérez-Rubalcaba, in an interview with the New York Times\(^5\) said;

“Nobody really knows why ETA did it, because we’ve even seen that Batasuna has been completely shaken by it, (...) ETA even deceived its own political arm. We knew there was tension with ETA and with Batasuna, but this was a surprise. It was impossible to predict something like this.”\(^{\text{(New York Times, 2007)}}\)

The success had a big repercussion in Basque society. The attempt of the PSE to finish with ETA by dialogue was well received, but ETA broke it.

“ETA realised they had lost the battle of reason and opinion in Barajas [Madrid Main airport]”\(^{\text{(Rodriguez Aizpeolea, 2011:228)}}\)

In 2009 the European Court, ended HB’s hope to come back to legality, being consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Less than five months after the sentence, the Abertzale Left presented a document called “A first step for the democratic process: principles and will of the Abertzale Left” in which they stated, “the basic instrument for the new political phase is the Democratic Process. Its activation is a unilateral decision of the Abertzale Left”\(^{\text{(2009:2)}}\) and they recognize the necessity to “increase the accumulation of forces and to move the confrontation with the state to the field in which they are weaker: the political field”\(^{\text{(2009:2)}}\) The accumulation of forces with the same objective can unite the fragmented map of Basque nationalist forces in order to create a big movement.

“The necessity of considering fundamental questions can be brought about with the accumulation of forces (...) this political rapprochement speeded up the critics of the bases around the violence” \(^{\text{(Aranguren, 2012)}}\)

With the document of 2009 and the possibility of the so called accumulation of forces the Abertzale Left can explain to ETA that there are more possibilities in following the democratic path than with the armed strategy.

This document will be the central argument in which the politics of the Abertzale Left will be based, the first step in bringing about a “political and democratic process in order to achieve an inclusive democracy, where the Basque people freely and without any intimidation of any kind will be able to decide their future” (2009:3)

“The leaders of the Abertzale Left had decided to design another strategy as a movement, but ETA was foreign to this process (...) that leads to an internal struggle until the Brussels declaration” (Rios, 2011)

The Brussels declaration launched in March 2010 by international leaders gave international coverage and led to a situation of guaranties for the Abertzale Left: Assuring the involvement of international actors will pressure the state away from immobility, Also, the Abertzale Left will be a valid actor, gaining trust between the other political parties in the Basque Country. And, last but not least, empower the new strategy of the Abertzale Left to the detriment of ETA.

“The Brussels declaration was a moment of a shift of power in the MNLV, in which the politics won over the military” (Rios, 2011)

In the short text of the Brussels declaration the international leaders were appealing to ETA to declare a permanent and fully verified ceasefire.

On the 5th of September 2010 in a video obtained by the BBC, ETA announced a decision “not to carry out offensive armed actions” asserting that “the political struggle has opened up new conditions” So ETA has responded positively to the Brussels declaration

The Gernika accord came only 20 days after the ceasefire and is “an agreement for a scenario of peace and democratic solution” “we have to settle into a non-violent situation (...) and a first stage of political normalisation”. During the text they asked for a declaration of a permanent and unilateral ceasefire as an expression of will for a
definitive cessation of its armed activity, both of which materialized in January and October 2011. There is a well-organised strategy between the Abertzale Left and the international actors involved. The aim is to guarantee a process and establish collaborations with other political agents to create a real movement and continue to push ETA in the direction of the renunciation of violence. The Gernika accord established relations of trust between the Abertzale Left and other political and trade union forces.

In January 2011 the declaration of a permanent and general ceasefire, started with an explicit “from Brussels to Gernika” leading to the idea of security barriers, “it is a definitive decision because there is the involvement of the international community, the grass roots movement of the Abertzale Left and the social barrier of the Basque people” (Rios, 2011). On the other hand it gives a chance to ETA, in order to end “with a minimum of dignity” (Rios, 2011)

On the 20th of October the definitive cessation of armed activity was the culmination of the process. ETA was no longer involved in the armed struggle, the Abertzale Left was politically empowered, and Basque society had recovered the hope of a solution to the political problem.

6.2.2 Summary of humanist explanations.

The Abertzale Left has led to a change of strategy in the MNLV. The former power of the military front has shifted, and empowered the political movement.

The main characteristics are,

- The Abertzale Left has worked in trust with other actors.

- The Abertzale Left has shown ETA that the political route is the valid one.

- As a consequence, the Abertzale Left has convinced ETA.
The involvement of international actors had given an extra dimension to the process: it had created security barriers for the process. Constructing a scenario acceptable by ETA, the Abertzale Left, the international community and Basque society.

It has overcome the stalemate of ETA-government dynamics, looking to other options for the process.

6.2.3 Critics to the humanist explanations.

A look at the control variables points out a coincidence of the explanatory variables used in the description of the situation, and in the profile of the informants. The ones defending a humanist point of view had a humanist personal outlook.

That result gives the analysis a negative connotation, in which the informants see what they see because they think in a certain humanist way.
7 CONCLUSIONS

The causes that led ETA to the definitive cessation of its armed activity shall be explain from a Realist perspective rather than, Humanist. The space of manoeuvre shrunk leading no other option for ETA.

In this paper we have seen how ETA’s strategy correspond with a logical approach. The different phases of the liberation war were created as a response of the necessities in the armed front. From 2010 onwards the strategy shift providing main focus to the political front.

The evolution of the strategy reflected increasing difficulties in sustaining the MNLV paradigm. ETA’s operational capabilities were constrained and the political struggle was muted by the criminalization of HB. Spanish and French authorities cooperated more efficiently to restrain ETA’s activities. Within the Basque Country itself, a growing opposition to ETA and its fundraising methods took place. In other words, the MNLV had its room for manoeuvre restricted on all fronts.

As the pressure on the MNLV increased, its willingness to fight decreased. This development is logical under a realist conceptualization of the process as a chicken game among rational actors.

Having as a starting point the three phases of the armed struggle identified by Sánchez-Cuenca (2008), I found the need to expand them to five:


Ca.1975-1995 War of attrition against the young Spanish democracy.

Ca.1995-2002 Consensus among Basque nationalist forces under the Lizarra accord, creating the conditions for a political struggle and opening the way to a political solution.

Ca.2009-2011. Disillusionment, marginalization and attempts at negotiation with the Spanish state.

The MNLV have always responded as a rational actor in order to maximize its power.

### 7.1 Heterogeneity vs homogeneity

It is well known that in all conflicts we can establish different phases leading to common points in its understanding and resolution, but as well we have to realize how different is every situation and the necessity to adjust to it.

Eguiguren, the president of the Basque Socialists and main mediator in the last negotiated truce in 2005, told me during the interview,

“*The first part of the negotiations in Geneva went really well. We decided to establish a working plan. We meet every morning with the people of the center [Henry Dunant center] and after, we had time to be alone and do our things, but the second part of the process, in Oslo, went much worst, I guess it was a combination of events. The fact that they [ETA representatives] wanted to change many things from the roadmap and the approach followed in Oslo, being all the time together, from early morning to night led to a bad environment, we never had time to disconnect, and the walks in the woods were ineffective...the Basque conflict is a problem between Basques and we are very stubborn people*” (Eguiguren, 2011)

Here I want to point to the necessity to know the reality in which the mediators are taking part, I don’t think he blamed the method as the only fact in the failure of the negotiations, but the method of “humanizing the other” was fruitless and led to a
negative environment. There are no “magic formulas” in the resolution of conflicts and it is extremely important to know the main characteristics.

### 7.2 For Future studies

Conducting this paper I realized how difficult it was to find information related with the conflict. There is no official data, nor agreement in the number of victims, prisoners or people that suffered extortion. This has lead to politicization of the information and in many cases to a wrong utilization of the same by the different sectors implicated in the conflict. I really see the necessity of involvement of the University of the Basque Country, in many levels. First, as a narrator for the future, now with the end of the violence all the political parties want to be the “owners of the truth”. Second, from an academic perspective it is important to study and investigate the Basque case, in order to learn from the past with the objective to construct a durable, peaceful agreement. Third and last, the necessity of dialogue among the Basques in order to normalize the situation.

The University of Belfast has created a webpage [www.cain.com](http://www.cain.com) related with the Irish conflict having all information online. I think is a good example, and even if all the conflicts are different we can always learn something positive.
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Appendix A: Interviews

Guide interview

I. Life Story/ Identification.

II. What is the Basque “Conflict” about?
   - Positioning.
   - Features.
   - Actors.

   How do you will explain the political and social reality of the Basque Country? What are the main features? Why?
   It is a political, legal, historical, social problem?
   How present is this “problem” in your regular life?

III. Recent events. Identification.
   - Brussels Declaration.
   - Guernica accords.
   - International Peace Conference.
   - Permanent Ceasefire
     Knowledge, Opinion, Characteristics, Actors Involve

IV. How and when the ETA’s position has changed respect to the violence?
   Is a top-down process or bottom-up?
   What are the main factors to the change?
   What are the main obstacles to the change?

V. Do you think that there is a difference since the announcement of the end of the violence?
   Political discourses/ social expectation/ searching of solutions

VI. How you remember the 20th of October? (Day of the announcement) It was a surprise or something that you were expected?

VII. Could you give me your opinion of:
   Lokarri.
   International Contact Group.
   EPPK. (Collective of Basque Political Prisoners)
   AVT. (Association of Victims of terrorism)
Evaluation.

Evaluation, from 1 to 6, of the next events in relation to the current situation. (1= little influence, 6= big influence)
Also you have to say if the impact of the event was positive or negative.

- Socialist victory in the Basque Country

  1  2  3  4  5  6 Positive Negative

- Action of Spanish and French police.

  1  2  3  4  5  6 Positive Negative

- Action of Spanish and French judges.

  1  2  3  4  5  6 Positive Negative

- Beginning of the negotiations.

  1  2  3  4  5  6 Positive Negative

- Example of Catalonia (Statute)

  1  2  3  4  5  6 Positive Negative

- Irish Peace-Process

  1  2  3  4  5  6 Positive Negative

- Economic Crisis

  1  2  3  4  5  6 Positive Negative

Crime is a constant threat to all societies…what do you think the level of punishment should be?

  1  2  3  4  5  6

How should be the authority of a teacher school?

  1  2  3  4  5  6

You are teaching to your son/daughter how to cross the road in a city. In the middle of the explanation he/she starts to run, putting his/her life in danger as well as other lives. How do you react? You will try to explained in an educative way or you will turn to a physical punishment. Being 1 the lower level and 6 the highest one.

  1  2  3  4  5  6
Appendix B: Documents

Appendix 1.

Announcement of the end of the armed activity by ETA. October 2011.

With this declaration, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, the Basque socialist revolutionary organization for national liberation, wishes to give news of its decision:

ETA considers that the International Conference that has recently taken place in the Basque Country is an initiative of enormous significance. The agreed resolution includes all the elements for an integral solution of the conflict, and it has attained the support of a wide spectrum of the Basque society and the international community.

A new political time is emerging in the Basque Country. We have an historical opportunity to end a just and democratic solution for the centuries old political conflict. Dialogue and agreement should outline the new cycle, over violence and repression. The recognition of the Basque Country and the respect for the will of the people should prevail over imposition.

This has not been an easy way. The cruelty of the fight has taken away the lives of many comrades. Many others are still suffering in prison and in the exile. For them our recognition and deepest tribute.

From now on the way is neither going to be easy. Facing the imposition that still exists, every step, every achievement, will be the result of the effort and right of Basque citizens. During these years the Basque Country has accumulated the necessary experience and strength to address this path and it also has the determination for doing it. It is time to look at the future with hope. It is also time to act with responsibility and courage.

Therefore, ETA has decided the definitive cease of its armed activity. ETA calls upon the Spanish and French governments to open a process of a direct dialogue with the aim of addressing the resolution of the consequences of the conflict and, thus, to overcome the armed confrontation. Thorough this historical declaration ETA shows its clear, solid and definitive commitment.

Lastly, ETA calls upon the Basque society to commit with this process of solutions until we build a context of freedom and peace.

Appendix 2

A First step for the democratic process: principles and will of the Abertzale Left
November 2009

We are pro-independence men and women from different generations that have been
working and continue to work in the construction and development of a project for
national liberation. Our objective is the construction of our own state, since we believe
it is the only way of fully guaranteeing the survival and full development of the
Basque Country, in harmony and solidarity with the rest of people in Europe and the
World. This is our legitimate political project which we are planning to achieve with
the support of the majority support of Basque Society.

The current legal and political framework, which divides our territory and limits the
rights of its citizens, has been proven to perpetuate political and armed conflict. It does
not allow Basque citizens to decide their own future without constraints. In this
context, the situation of violence and armed confrontation has lasted much longer than
anybody would have wished, with the associated human and political costs that
everybody knows. Our priority is to overcome this scenario.

The last three decades of conflict have led us to another conclusion: We are a political
movement which has been proven correct by the course of time. This is demonstrated
by events such as the initial demand of a democratic break with Franco's regime, the
rejection by the Basque People of the Spanish Constitution, NATO and the nuclear
power station of Lemoiz. It is demonstrated by our efforts to avoid the consolidation of
the trap implicit in statute of autonomy. It is also demonstrated by our opposition to
rogue capitalism.

It is not only in the fields of opposition and protest where the pro-independence
movement has won political and ideological battles. The proposals for the future and
for solutions recommended by the Abertzale Left have been accepted by significant
social sectors, on occasion by the majority. The initiatives for a negotiated solution,
the plans to achieve a new democratic framework and the dynamics of national
construction, have allowed for unquestionable advances in the Basque political
process.

In the last few years we have made progress in some questions which have made not
only desirable but also possible the materialisation of a change of cycle for the whole
citizenship; in the political debate of the last decade, which has clearly identified
difficult problems which require a solution; In the tireless work and struggle of
thousands of persons and social sectors that have permitted us to arrive at the door of
the desired real political change; as well as to leave behind the undesirable
consequences of this conflict.
A change of cycle that will replace the armed confrontation, blockade and lack of prospects with dialogue, agreement and a just, stable and lasting solution for our country.

With correct decisions and with errors we have brought the liberation process to the phase of political change. Now, the issue is to make this change irreversible. Materializing this change also requires changes in ourselves. There was a need for a profound reflexion and self-criticism, and we are doing it.

The Abertzale Left understands that the issue is not so much knowing and waiting to see what the other actors are ready to do, but to what we need to do. This new phase needs new strategies, new political alliances and new tools.

Acknowledging that the objectives to reach in this new phase are the national recognition of Euskal Herria and the recognition of the right to Self-Determination, it is necessary to increase the accumulation of forces and to move the confrontation with the states to the field in which they are weaker. That is the political field. This is why mass, institutional and ideological struggle, the change in existing balance of forces, as well as seeking international support have to be the fundamental pillars of the new strategy.

The basic instrument for the new political phase is the Democratic Process. Its activation is a unilateral decision of the Abertzale Left. Its activation will require us to look for bilateral or multilateral agreements; with Basque political actors, with the international community and with both states for the resolution of the conflict. Definitively, the Democratic Process is the strategic objective of the Abertzale Left in order to reach political and social change.

All these considerations are commonly shared in the Abertzale Left within the debate that is being held with responsibility. At the same time, though this debate, we are trying to reinforce and internalise in all of our social and activist base the following principles, which now we want to share with Basque citizens, political, trade unions and social actors of the country as well as with the international community:

1. The popular will expressed through peaceful and democratic means is the only reference for the process of arriving at a democratic solution. This will increase confidence in its set up and optimal development as well as in the achievement of agreements that will have to be backed by the citizens. The Abertzale Left, as should also be done by the other agents, make the solemn commitment to respect in each phase of the process the decisions that could be freely and peacefully made by the Basque citizens.

2. The legal and political framework resulting at each moment shall be the consequence of the will of the people, and shall guarantee the rights of the whole of the Basque citizenship. The legal framework prevailing at any time cannot be an obstacle or impediment to the popular will, freely and democratically expressed, but a guarantee of its implementation.
3. The agreements to be obtained in the development of the democratic process shall respect and regulate the rights recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It must also recognise other international human rights treaties that may concern individual or collective rights.

4. Inclusive political dialogue and equal conditions should be the main tools to reach agreement between the different political sensitivities in the country. The Abertzale Left expresses a complete willingness to take part in this dialogue.

5. In the framework of the democratic process, dialogue between political forces should aim for a solution based on political agreement which will be subject to referendum. The resulting agreement should guarantee that all political projects could not only be defended with equal opportunities and without any pressure or external interference but they could also be implemented if that was the desire of the majority of the Basque citizenship, expressed though the available legal procedures.

6. The democratic process must be developed in an complete absence of violence and without interference, by the use of exclusively political and democratic means. We are convinced that this political strategy will make advances in the democratic process. South Africa and Ireland are good examples.

7. We reiterate our commitment to the Anoeta Proposal. According to this, there should be a process of multi-party dialogue, where all the forces in this country would participate under equal conditions. This process will take on board the achievement of a democratic framework through which the citizenship will be able to decide its future freely and democratically, without any other limit than the will of the people. We understand that this process has to be conducted in accordance with the Mitchell principles.

On the other hand, a process of negotiation has to be established between ETA and the Spanish government on questions regarding the demilitarisation of our country, the release of Basque political prisoners, the return of those exiled and a just and fair treatment for all the victims of the conflict. For all this, we declare without reservations our support for a peaceful, political and democratic process in order to achieve an inclusive democracy, where the Basque people freely and without any intimidation of any kind will be able to decide their future.

Euskal Herria, November 14th 2009
Appendix 3.


We, the undersigned, welcome and commend the proposed steps and new public commitment of the Basque Pro-independence (Abertzale Left) to "exclusively political and democratic" means and a "total absence of violence" to attain its political goals.

Fully carried out, this commitment can be a major step in ending the last remaining conflict in Europe. We note the expectation that the coming months may present a situation where the commitment to peaceful, democratic and no-violent means becomes an irreversible reality. To that end, we appeal to ETA to support this commitment by declaring a permanent, fully verified ceasefire. Such a declaration appropriately responded to by [Spanish] Government would permit new political and democratic efforts to advance, differences to be recovered and lasting peace attained.


Appendix 4.


The Basque Country is facing the opportunity to take the political conflict and the violent confrontation towards a scenario of peace and democratic solutions.

On that direction, we have to settle a non-violence situation with guarantees and a first stage of political normalisation based on the following contents:

• Declaration by ETA of a permanent and unilateral cease-fire, verifiable by the international community, as an expression of will of a definitive cessation of its armed activity.
• Recognition of civil and political rights, allowing the activity and development of all political projects, taking into account that the recognition and protection of all rights is their fundamental base. Therefore we demand the abolition of the Politic Parties law, as it embodies a juridical instrument on which the violation of basic rights is supported.
• End to all kind of menaces, pressures, persecutions, arrests and tortures against any person motivated by his political activity or ideology
• The cessation of the on going penitentiary policy against Basque political prisoners,
conceived until now as part of the confrontation strategies, and the adoption of
the following measures as a first step towards the amnesty, that will lead us to
the total absence of prisoners and exiles caused by the political conflict:
- Transfer of the prisoners to the Basque Country, ending the dispersal policy.
- Release of prisoners affected by serious illnesses.
- Release without bail of all those prisoners held in prison awaiting a trial.
- Release on parole of all condemned prisoners who have fulfilled all legal
requirements.
- Application without restrictions or arbitrariness of all legally established penitentiary
benefits
- Abolishment of the legislation that imposes 40 years sentence.

- Revision of those judicial processes against persons and organizations structures
based on their political activity.
- Closure of special jurisdictions and tribunals, of all exceptional legislation and the
disappearance of incommunicado detention.
- Lifting of restrictive or/and prohibitive measures on political activity of Pro-
independence activists and organisations.
- Encourage participation of international agents in order to verify that there is not any
kind of Human Right violation.

These political, trade union and social organisations demand ETA and Spanish
Government to take those decisions and initiatives that would allow the creation of an
scenario of this kind, an scenario of non violence with guarantees and of progressive
political normalisation.

In the same way, the endorsers believe that in the frame of a process of these
characteristics, where that scenario of peace and enough political normalisation would
be consolidated, it will become essential to activate spaces of political dialogue and
negotiation in order to fully address the reasons and consequences of the conflict.

This process of political dialogue and negotiation has to be based on the following
principles and contents:

- Dialogue and negotiation in all fields would be ruled according to the commitment
  established on the “Mitchell Principles”.
  - To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political
    issues
- To oppose any effort to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations
- To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree

- The negotiation process to reach political agreements will exclusively belong to political, trade union and social agents.
- The contents of the political dialogue will look for an inclusive agreement among all political cultures of the country, regarding the recognition of both the Basque national reality and the right to decide, and also to the respect of the democratic popular will regarding internal juridical and institutional model, and regarding the type of relation with the states, including independence.
- Need of recognition, reconciliation and redress of all the victims caused by the political conflict and recognition of the reality of the multiple violence.

Women and men of the Basque Country, in a framework where equality of their rights will be recognized, will be active subjects in the compromise for democratisation and peace recorded in this agreement.

Now a days, as a consequence of the existing social model, participation of men and women is not equal. Therefore, women must be an active subject in the solution, because they are not outsiders to the political conflict.

All postulates addressed in this document are assumed by those trade-union, political and social organisations signing it, and commit themselves to fulfil them, transmit them to the international agents and work for the popular activation of Basque society, so that its citizens will adopt them and take their place as the only guarantor of the evolution of the process of democratic solution.

Gernika, Euskal Herria – Basque Country, 25th September 2010

Appendix 5

Declaration by ETA

With this declaration ETA, the Basque socialist revolutionary organisation for national liberation, wishes to give news of its decision to the Basque Country:

In recent months, from Brussels to Gernika, well known personalities on the world level and many Basque social and political actors, have stressed the need to bring a
just and democratic solution to the centuries-old conflict.

ETA agrees. The solution will come through the democratic process with dialogue and negotiation as its tools and with its compass pointed towards the will of the Basque people.

• The democratic process has to overcome all situations of denial and violations of rights and must respond to the key elements at the heart of the political conflict, namely territoriality and self-determination.

• It is the task of the Basque social and political actors to reach agreements in order to come to an agreed formulation concerning the recognition of the Basque Country and of the right to decide, ensuring that all political projects, including independence, are possible.

• At the end of the process, Basque citizens must have their say and their decision in order to choose their future without any limit or interference.

• All parties have to commit themselves to respect the agreements reached as well as the decision of the Basque people, and to put in place guarantees and mechanisms to this end. Therefore: ETA has decided to declare a permanent and general cease-fire which will be verifiable by the international community. This is ETAs firm commitment towards a process to achieve a lasting resolution and towards an end to the armed confrontation. It is time to act with historical responsibility. ETA calls upon those governing Spain and France to end all repressive measures and to leave aside for once and for all their position of denial towards the Basque Country. ETA will continue its indefatigable struggle and efforts to promote and to bring to a conclusion the democratic process until there is a truly democratic situation in the Basque Country.

GORA EUSKAL HERRIA ASKATUTA! GORA EUSKAL HERRIA SOZIALISTA! JO TA KE INDEPENDENTZIA ETA SOZIALISMOA LORTU ARTE! Basque Country, 8th January 2011 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ETA.