Europe de la Défense

The French vision of a European Security System under Chirac and Sarkozy

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Abstract

This thesis has been addressing what vision of the European Security and Defense cooperation one can identify in speeches of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. I have identified whether one can identify an evolution in the vision by claiming that Sarkozy’s vision is more proactive and pragmatic. This has been done through an ideational analysis of speeches of Chirac and Sarkozy at the annual conference of ambassadors.

The findings indicate that despite a changing international context the French foreign policy objectives, which lay the foundation for the French vision, have remained constant. However, the thesis also identifies an evolution of the French vision. Sarkozy is found to emphasize more clearly than Chirac an intergovernmentalist form of cooperation, a proactive role both of France and Europe, and a more pragmatic approach to European security cooperation, also signaling a westernization of the French vision. However, as Sarkozy was not reelected in the election 6 May this year it will not be possible to discover whether this was a continuous trend.

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All misunderstandings and errors in the thesis are entirely my own.

Lillian Skrede
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1 Introduction

1.1 Research question

Security in the European context has traditionally been built on the principle of national sovereignty. The principle of sovereignty was introduced at the peace in Westphalia in 1648 and refers to a system of mutual recognition between states. It includes the principle of legal equality and additionally a principle of non-intervention as inside its own borders the state would have the monopoly of legitimate use of force (Hayman & Williams 2006: 241). After the peace in Westphalia the territorial nation states became the primary actors on the international arena, and a supranational security system could thus not be seen as reliable. However, after several continental wars and two world wars the European states have since the end of the Second World War challenged the principle of sovereignty by creating frameworks for supranational cooperation in the European Union. Yet, despite several attempts of security cooperation since the 50s, it is not until recently that the security cooperation has been constructed inside the structures of the European Union. The sphere of security is thus of particular interest as it concerns the core of the states’ national sovereignty and is traditionally an area where states have been reluctant to cooperate closely, also in the European context (Vanhoonacker 2011: 87).

France has been one of the most influential countries in the building of the European Union already from its start with founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. This is true also in the sphere of security (Major & Mölling 2007: 1). But what defines the French vision of the common security policy of the European Union, and more precisely, what defines this vision in the era of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy? Under Sarkozy one has seemingly seen a more active role of both France and Europe on the international scene and a Europe more determined to act under French leadership (Vaïsse 2008: 1; Torreblanca 2008: 2-3). After Charles de Gaulle’s retreat of France from the integrated military structures of NATO in 1966 and Chirac’s failed attempt of reintegration in 1997, Sarkozy announced a full reintegration of France into the integrated military structures of NATO in March 2009. Furthermore one could witness during the crisis in Georgia in August 2008 a France determined to take the lead in the name of the European Union, followed by a Franco-British
leadership in the military intervention of Libya in 2011. Do these events symbolize an evolution in the French vision of European security under Sarkozy?

This is what the thesis will be addressing. The topic is interesting because there still has been only limited systematic research on the politics of especially Nicolas Sarkozy. Maurice Vaïsse has in several works covered the foreign policy of French Presidents under the Fifth Republic including Jacques Chirac. Gérard Bossuat has looked at the European policy of the same presidents. However, they both include several aspects and are thus not concentrating exclusively on the sphere of security and they leave out the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. Philip H. Gordon presents the French security approach in his book *A certain idea of France* (1993), but as it is published in 1993 it does not cover Chirac and Sarkozy. Others, like Frédéric Bozo covers only certain aspects of the French security policy as the French relations with NATO and French nuclear policy. Authors like Justin Vaïsse, Jean-Dominique Giuliani and Heinz Duthel, while focusing on Sarkozy, have mainly focused on Sarkozy’s relation with the US, the reintegration into NATO or his political style. It has not been focused on his approach to European security. A more thorough analysis of French security policy in the European context in the recent years is thus lacking.

The first objective of the thesis is to analyze what is defining both presidents’ “vision” of a common security policy of the EU. A vision is here understood as a set of ideas. As an idea can be defined as a conviction, an opinion or a principle a vision can be defined as the manner in which one sees or conceives of something. Chirac and Sarkozy both have a set of ideas defining their approaches to political issues and affecting their foreign policy decisions as ideas are considered as guides and constraints to all forms of political agency. The set of ideas thus constitutes the approaches of Chirac and Sarkozy towards security and defense issues in the European Union. Vision is in this respect a question of how they want issues in this sphere to be dealt with. Hence the questions are: In what way do Chirac and Sarkozy distance themselves from previous presidents in their approaches? Do they truly distance themselves from previous presidents, and to what extent? It also includes a question of what position France should have in the European security system. And the opposite, how can a European security system serve France? Thus the first objective must be seen along three dimensions:
France in a European security system, ESDP/CFSPs\(^1\) importance to France and the French vision of ESDP/CFSP versus other countries’ vision.

The second objective is to identify whether there has been an evolution in the French vision of the European security policy between the visions of the two presidents. When defining evolution the Oxford Dictionary of Politics mentions as synonyms the words “change, “development” and “growth”. In this thesis evolution will be defined as a process of gradual development implying a natural alteration of vision through time. It is further implied that divergent visions would rather be a question of divergent approaches to achieve certain foreign policy objectives than a question of divergent foreign policy objectives. In this respect divergences would rather represent an evolution of the vision than a change in the vision. The two objectives of the thesis thus culminate in the following research question:

*What is Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy’s vision of a common security policy for the European Union, and to what degree can one identify an evolution in the French vision?*

The thesis will first of all be limited in terms of policy area and geographical area by focusing exclusively on the sphere of security policy in the framework of the European Union and its relation to NATO. Secondly, the thesis will be limited in terms of actors by focusing on the French President as a political actor. Finally, the thesis is limited in terms of time by focusing on the years from 1995 and until 2012, analyzing only the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.

### 1.2 Structure of the thesis

The thesis will be structured by starting with a presentation of the hypothesis going to be investigated. Next there will a theoretical definition of security followed by a chapter with a historical approach to security looking at the importance of security to France and security in the European context. This chapter will also include a presentation of the traditional approach to European security policy from the beginning of the Fifth Republic and until Chirac’s presidency. Here, as in the analysis, the focus will be on the President as an political actor for reasons elaborated on later in the thesis. The historical chapter will provide the historical

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\(^{1}\) European Security and Defense Policy/Common Foreign and Security Policy

\(^{2}\) “Aujourd’hui la France est à nouveau au cœur du jeu européen, et elle joue collectif” (27 August 2008)

\(^{3}\) “Nous n’avons pas notre mot à dire quand les Alliés définissent les objectifs et les moyens militaires pour les
background necessary to understand the approach of Chirac and Sarkozy. Further on the methodological approach will be presented, including an argumentation for the selection of actors and speeches and challenges to the validity and reliability.

The next chapter of the thesis consists of the actual analysis. The arguments presented in the thesis will mainly be based on an ideational analysis of public speeches held by Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy to accurately discover their vision of a European security system. Through a textual analysis of speeches different terms and words will be identified to answer the research question. A general vision will be identified, lined up after the hypotheses presented in the next chapter. In the analysis five different crises will also be highlighted: the intervention in Kosovo 1999, the intervention in Afghanistan 2001, the war in Iraq 2003, the crisis in Georgia 2008 and the intervention in Libya 2011. By focusing on crises and conflict situations where it is necessary to act immediately, it is more likely to discover how the Presidents want the security policy of the EU to function in practice and not only the general vision. Other crises where France and the EU have been involved could also have been mentioned, but because of the limits of the thesis both concerning time and space they will be left out of the analysis.

The reason for choosing these five conflicts is because they all had implications for the European security either indirectly or directly. The crisis in Kosovo and Georgia took place at the doorstep of Europe. As Balkan is placed within European borders its stability is consequently considered vital for the stability of the EU. Additionally the crisis was seen as a final test for the European Union to establish itself as a credible actor in crisis resolution, when comparing to the Bosnia crisis in 1990-1994. The war in Georgia involving Russia, the largest and most powerful neighbors of the Union, was also vital to Europe’s security because of the strength of Russia and the geographical position of the war. In addition Georgia as a potential member of NATO is also potentially a future EU-member. Thus, in both situations European action was demanded and the world expected the European countries to act as the conflicts had direct implications for Europe. As concerning the war in Iraq it caused deep division within the Union, due to strong disagreements on how to respond to the potential Iraq threat. While France, Germany and Belgium strongly opposed the war, it was supported by the UK, Spain and Italy. The war was also supported by many of the soon-to-be EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, thus causing the American Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to describe Europe as a division between “old Europe” and “new Europe”, implying
the backwardness of the traditional great powers as France and Germany (Wall 2004: 133). The war in Iraq subsequently revealed Europe-US divergences. However, during the intervention in Libya a clear division of responsibilities between the US and the EU was established with the EU taking the political leading of the operation. But it also showed the shortcomings of ESDP dealing with military capacities. The war in Iraq and the Libya intervention therefore had indirect implications for Europe. The NATO-operation in Afghanistan, starting in 2001, will also be mentioned to demonstrate a radical change in the perception of threats to European countries and as it is one of the biggest operations launched by NATO. The analysis will be placed in a historical context which will contribute to a more complete picture of the visions of the two presidents.
2 Hypotheses

The analysis will be done according to four hypotheses which will be presented in this chapter of the thesis. When analyzing the French vision of the European security and defense cooperation it is important to identify the French foreign policy objectives. Foreign policy objectives can be defined as general objectives guiding the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states. In this thesis it would mean certain intentions influencing French behavior in its external relations. Consequently these objectives will affect decision being made considering the European security and defense policy and will guide the French vision in this sphere. It will therefore be of interest to compare them. The development of foreign policy objectives can be influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behavior of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. However, as explained in the introduction, the definition of evolution in this thesis implies that the French foreign policy objectives have been constant. This claim can be investigated through a comparison of the White Papers on Defense published in 1972, 1994 and 2008. The first hypothesis will thus be:

\[ H_1: \text{The foreign policy objectives laying the foundation for the French approach towards European security cooperation have been constant during the Fifth republic, despite of changing threats and a changing international context.} \]

The French position has been challenged structurally since the reunification of Germany in 1991, the enlargement in 2004, and also by the integration process itself. It has also become evident that a strong Europe implies a strong France, and a strong Europe needs a coordinated security policy to respond to changing threats. The military capacity of France and its problematic economic situation do no longer allow it to act alone with a ground force reduced to 131 000 men, a marine force of 44 000 men and an airforce of 50 000 men (White Paper 2008: 228). Integration in the sphere of security policy is therefore in the interest of France and French policies have increasingly become Europeanized. For a France less and less able to act alone in the world, its commitment to a strong European foreign policy is to a greater extent motivated by necessity (Irondelle 2008: 153). In this way it uses the process of European integration as a means of promoting its own foreign policy objectives, and European integration has a key role as the instrument to secure the French position on the international arena (Pachta 2003: 5-7).
With the French-British St Malo Declaration in 1998 calling for “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces”, France continued its leadership in European defense initiatives, now joined by Britain (Irondelle 2008: 159). France is still in the front on military spending, and defense is the second largest post in the national budget after education and was in 2008 accounting for 36, 8 billion euros (White Paper 2008: 289). In the European context the French and British contribution to the EU defense budget alone accounted for 42 percent in 2008 (White Paper 2008: 203). However, as any supranational institution in this sphere would challenge the basic premises of French democracy the French view is that supranational institutions will reduce the state autonomy and undermine the national identity (Schmidt 1998: 7). Thus, the second hypothesis will be:

\[H_2: \text{France considers integration in the sphere of security policy a way to strengthen its own position and thus supports an intergovernmental structure of security cooperation in the EU.}\]

Sarkozy seemingly diverges from Jacques Chirac in mainly two respects. First of all he diverges from Chirac in his political style regarding European security. One of Nicolas Sarkozy’s first statements after being elected in May 2007 was to announce that “France is back in Europe”, thereby pledging action and ending the negative implications of the French No in the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty of the EU in 2005 (Le Gloannec 2008: 15). He also declared in his speech at the conference of ambassadors in 2008 that: “Today France is again at the heart of the European game, and it acts collectively!”\(^2\). He thus quickly established a reputation as a man of action, and by his highspeed diplomacy he has sought quick and effective solutions.

His active involvement in Georgia and Libya has given the impression of Sarkozy being determined to take the lead in crisis resolution, and establishing a more distinct role for France and Europe than during the presidency of Chirac. The EU responded to the crisis in Georgia under the Presidency of France (Forsberg & Seppo 2010: 4) and during the war it was clearly the French Presidency who was publicly speaking for the EU (Dijkstra 2011: 15). This was especially clear as Sarkozy made the ceasefire appear more like a French rather than a European achievement (Frchova Grono 2010: 13). Sarkozy was also personally involved in the bilateral negotiations and went to Moscow himself to negotiate a new ceasefire proposal with Medvedev after the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, and the Chairman of

\(^2\) “Aujourd’hui la France est à nouveau au coeur du jeu européen, et elle joue collectif” (27 August 2008)
the OSCE, Alexander Stuff, had went to Tbilisi on 9 August to negotiate the original ceasefire proposal with Saakashvili. Sarkozy’s proposal consisted of the six points included in the final agreement (Forsberg & Seppo 2010: 4), which was signed on 12 August (Frichovo Grono 2010: 10). Sarkozy also took the lead from the beginning in the Libyan crisis, calling for action when facing a more passive international community. Together with Britain he therefore had to use determination to achieve a UN resolution for military intervention (Radio France International 20 March 2011). His eagerness to define the distinct role for France in the sphere of security and defense can also be seen in the publishing of a new White Paper on Defense and National Security in 2008, the year after being elected.

Sarkozy thus diverges from Chirac in seemingly fronting a more proactive role in the sphere of security and defense, determined to create a distinct role for France in a European security system.

_H3: Sarkozy’s political style in the French involvement in the European security system is characterized by being more proactive than Chirac_

Furthermore Nicolas Sarkozy, being more proactive than Chirac, furthermore diverges from Chirac in the means to achieve the foreign policy objectives. He has shown himself to be a pragmatist at heart and less and less driven by ideology. He seeks quick and effective solutions and is concerned with how to reach the most advantageous solutions in the most effective ways (Vaïsse 2008: 1). This includes a question of where to look for help. What countries or organizations are willing to do what is necessary and who is willing to contribute? Thus, cooperation partners can vary, depending on the case. Seeking ad-hoc solutions when necessary is also emphasized in The White Book on defense from 2008 (White Paper 2008: 203).

This approach was evident during the military intervention in Libya 2011 where Sarkozy used his flexibility to efficiently take the lead by establishing a coalition of forces, also cooperating closely with Arab countries. In Libya he succeeded in uniting both NATO and key EU-military partners, thus overcoming the traditional frictions between the role of the NATO and the EU (The European Institute 15 April 2012). This friction was particularly evident during the crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo where the EU was unable to act and an American-led NATO had to come to the rescue. In Libya the interaction of the two actors was possible because another pragmatic step had been taken by Sarkozy in 2009 when announcing the full
reintegration into the integrated military structures of NATO. Even though there had been a continuous rapprochement between France and NATO since de Gaulle withdrew France from the military integrated structures in 1966, the full reintegration made by Sarkozy in 2009 symbolized a new approach in that France recognized that it had to join the arenas of decision-making to exert influence, as expressed in Sarkozy’s speech on the French return to the integrated command of NATO 11 March 2009: “We do not have a word to say when the Allies define the objectives and the means for the operations. We send soldiers on the terrain, we engage the lives of our soldiers, and we do not participate in the committee defining the objectives of NATO. Who can understand such a policy?” The fourth and last hypothesis is:

\[ H_4: \text{Under Sarkozy the French vision of the EU’s role in crisis resolution has become more pragmatic and flexible, resulting in an increasing degree of ad hoc cooperation in the sphere of security and defense.} \]

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3 “Nous n’avons pas notre mot à dire quand les Alliés définissent les objectifs et les moyens militaires pour les operations. On envoie des soldats sur le terrain, on engage la vie de nos soldats, et on ne participe pas au comité qui définit les objectifs de l’OTAN. Qui peut comprendre une telle politique?” (11 March 2009)
3 Security approached theoretically

A general understanding of security has traditionally meant security as military means and defense. Stanley Hoffmann established a division between what he calls “high politics” and “low politics”. “Low politics” was defined as less important policy areas such as economy. “High politics” on the other hand, includes more sensitive and important policy areas like foreign and security policy. In “high politics”, he claimed, states are reluctant to cooperate as these issues are considered vital national interests (Rosamond 2000: 77). Thus, security can be defined as “high politics”. This can further be linked to the realist school in international relations. It emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War and was introduced by Hans Morgenthau in his book Politics Among Nations from 1948 (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 67). The realist school emphasizes states as unitary, rational actors that first of all seek to secure their own interests. The international society is characterized as anarchy without a supranational authority, and in this anarchy the primary interest of the states is to ensure their own survival (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 60). International relations are thus a power struggle between states for domination and security. As a consequence, in the realist way of thinking, the states can never rely on each other and can only trust their own capabilities and resources (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 60-61). By heightening its own security in military terms, this will be considered a threat by other states, which will respond with a corresponding heightening of their own security, leading to an even more insecure international environment. This is what is referred to as the “security dilemma”. Security is then understood as defense and military force to ensure vital national interests (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 66).

The liberalist school, on the other hand, would argue that even though states are rational actors acting in self-interest, international relations would not end in a security dilemma as mutual interests between states would lead to prevailing cooperation. As rational actors they see the benefit of finding common solutions to common problems and cooperation between states in the sphere of security would create even more secure relations and ensure the states mutual interests. By locking one another into mutually constraining institutions one would achieve some kind of security co-binding. Globalization and modernization have increased the interdependence among the western democracies, making the stakes of war higher and war an unattractive solution (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 111-112).
While realism and liberalism has traditionally been the dominating schools in IR the school of social constructivism has since the 80s gained more and more credibility (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 162). It had its breakthrough in 1999 through the book Social Theory of International Politics by Alexander Wendt. Social constructivism is mainly built on three principles. First, it considers ideational structures and not material structures to lay the foundation of the social and political world (Ruggie 1998: 856). Material structures themselves cannot, contrary to what the neorealists claims, explain how states will act. States first need an identity in order to know their interests. In other words they need an understanding and an expectation about themselves (Wendt 1992: 397). Thus, secondly it is crucial to understand the creation of identity, as identities lay the foundation for interests and actions (Wendt 1992: 398). The politics on the international arena are not given by the laws of nature or structures, but is formed through social interaction (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 164-165). Third, it is an important point that the actors and the structures are formed through mutual construction. The structures are created through interaction and it is through the structures we define our identity and our interests (Wendt 1992: 406). Social constructivists would therefore view cooperation as a result of social interaction and collective identity formation, not inter-state or intergovernmental bargaining. They do not see the interests of states as fixed and independent of social structures (Wendt 1992: 407). A normative security system based on mutual trust could thus develop through interaction.

From both a liberalist and social constructivist point of view security can be more than simply just military means and defense. Economic, societal an environmental stability has also increasingly been understood as security. As this would require a wider definition of the term security, the thesis will discuss security in terms of military operations and defense, meaning peacekeeping tasks, crisis-management and conflict prevention.
4 Security approached historically

4.1 The importance of security for France

The importance of security and defense for France can be traced back to geographical and historical factors. Geographically the French borders were secured by the Alps in the East and the Pyrenees in the South. However, having Europe’s longest coast in the west and the Mediterranean coast posed a maritime challenge. Also, the borders in north-east were wide open, leaving France vulnerable for invasion. Consequently, ensuring the territorial security became important. Additionally the open borders both on the coastline and towards other countries made the French choice of strategy a struggle between pursuing the ambition of a great naval force or a great ground force (Orban 2002: 23-24). Historically France has been a great power, but has also continuously been surrounded by other great powers as the Anglo-Saxons, the Habsburg Empire and the Papacy. Thus for France it has historically been a struggle against more powerful enemies (Orban 2002: 34-40). Both these facts have contributed to the special importance of security to France and have shaped the French security thinking.

In short French security thinking can be divided into three periods: 1648-1871, 1871-1949 and 1949-onwards. The first period, starting with the peace in Westphalia in 1648, was characterized by a solitary approach trying to ensure national security on its own and project power. The peace in Westphalia established the principle of sovereignty, but trying to gather Europe in advantage of France Napoleon greatly overruled this principle with his expansionist strategy. After the Napoleon defeat at Waterloo in 1814 the European powers gathered at the Vienna Congress in 1814-1815 to introduce a European system which would not allow France to become a threat again which would stabilize the relations between the European states, again emphasizing the traditional principle of sovereignty (Orban 2002: 40). In addition the emergence of Britain as dominant naval and imperial power greatly constrained France’s naval and imperial ambitions (STRATFOR May 15 2012). France’s position declined at the European continent as well as globally, and from now on France had to adjust to the new reality with alliances being created to rival its position (Orban 2002: 41-42).

The Franco-Prussian war 1870-1871 marked another turning-point. It marked the start of the second period lasting until 1949 with France being forced to participate in short-lasting
alliances. The outcome of the Franco-Prussian war was extraordinary both because France was defeated by a young kingdom, Prussia, and also because it was defeated by one single country within only six months. The reality of the war made the outcome considered a major humiliation and resulted in a long lasting lack of confidence which could only be surpassed by achieving an overseas empire (Aron 1945: 9). France has been dependent on allies in the sphere of security ever since the war, and has not been able to ensure its own security alone. After its defeat France had to accept the presence of Germany as a substantial, united power on its eastern frontier. Establishing structures of alliances against Germany thus became France's new strategy (STRATFOR May 15 2012). When World War One broke out France entered the war with Russia and the UK in 1914 as the Triple Entente, opposing the Triple Alliance of Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary. The Triple Entente was further joined by Italy in 1915 (Ambrosi 1993: 262-267). After WW1 the League of Nations was created to prevent war through collective security and disarmament, as the first attempt on a global security system (Palmer, Colton & Kramer 2007: 717). However, it did not prevent the outbreak of the WW2 where France was a part of the Allies fighting against the Axis of Germany, Japan and Italy. Occupied only shortly after the outbreak of the war in 1940 and experiencing occupation and devastation for five years, it was a deeply demoralized France which exited the war in 1945 (Gordon 1993: 11; Orban 2011: 126-127).

Two world wars in less than 50 years caused a wave of shock through the whole Europe. To avoid a new world war the European states found it necessary to establish a collective security system through the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO in 1949. France now considered it necessary to be a part of a bigger and stable global collective security system, characterizing the third period in French security thinking, seeking to obtain a military guarantee by the US (Guillen 1996: 77). The period of the Cold War to a large degree enabled France to ensure the independence of its foreign and security policy. The geopolitical situation was stable and it could be argued that the American guarantee allowed France to pursue its own objectives and national interests, although only inside the structures of the collective security alliance (Anon 1995: 20; Major & Mölling 2007: 4). But from 1989 to 1991 a chain of events resulted in profound geopolitical changes. Until 1989-1991 Europe’s security structure had been frozen by bipolarity and Russia and half of Europe had been excluded from the security dialogue (Gueldry 2001: 158). However, the fall of the Berlin war November 9 in 1989, the reunification of Germany October 3 in 1990, the termination of the Warsaw pact April 1991 and the dissolution of USSR December 1991 all had global
influences (Gueldry 2001: 157). The end of the Cold War brought a new capacity of action, but it also brought geopolitical changes. The events 89-91 led to three essential geopolitical changes which would influence the French security policy the following years: the reunification of Germany, the fall of the Soviet Union and the US as the only remaining superpower. These changes transformed the whole basis for France’s security approximation (Yost 1990: 887). As concerning the fall of the Soviet empire, Russia was still the biggest military power in Europe. Thus, there was a continuous need for Russia to be balanced, and as the new Russian democracy was far from stable it was important to France to remain a great military power (Yost 1990: 888). These changes together with the development of the European construction, as enlargement, have challenged the position of France both globally and within Europe. France has not the same possibility to claim the leadership in Europe anymore (Pachta 2003: 6-7). These factors can explain why integration of the European security policy within the framework of the European Union is a long-term motive of French European policy today, and why the creation of a European security policy is considered a part of the French national interest (Irondelle 2008: 159-161).

4.2 Security in the European context

The previous chapter stated that security is of great importance today, and when speaking of France and security in the European context one must look at three dimensions: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the relation between France and NATO.

4.2.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy

Since the early 50s the French governments have gradually viewed the process of European integration as an important means of promoting the country’s foreign policy goals (Guyomarch, Machin & Ritchie 1998: 104). This was evident already with the French initiative of the Pleven-plan in 1950, proposing a European Defense Community. The plan included West Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries and France, and a European Defense Treaty was signed on May 27 in 1952. After World War 2 France feared a revival of German militarism and the country also feared neutralization of Germany with Bonn negotiating a
neutral status directly with Moscow in return for Russia’s acceptance of German rearmament. The solution to this problem would be the Pleven-plan, as the plan was initiated in most part to prevent the rearmament of Germany (Gueldry 2001: 150). However, the plan was never put into force and EDC was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954 (Gueldry 2001: 150). The rejection of the plan was on the one hand a consequence of there being a new cabinet as the cabinet in 1954 was not the same as the one initiating the plan in 1950. On the other hand, Stalin’s death had made the USSR seem less threatening. Consequently there was less sense of urgency (Gueldry 2001: 150). In addition the plan would in practice mean national forces under US command, which was unacceptable to France. Nonetheless, with the failure of the plan it was now opened for legitimate rearmament of Germany, and West Germany entered NATO in 1955, quite the opposite of what France would have wanted (Gueldry 2001: 150).

In 1957 the Treaty of Rome entered into force, but it did not include a foreign policy dimension (McCormick 2008: 190). It took further a decade before the Intergovernmental Conference in Hague in 1969 established the European Political Community, EPC, as an arena to exchange information and coordinate positions in the sphere of foreign policy. Its main decision body was the conference of foreign ministers supported by the Political Committee, and the rotating presidency had a key role (Vanhoonacker 2011: 87). EPC was however not incorporated into the founding treaties. A foreign policy was not integrated into the treaties until the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP, in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the Treaty on the European Union. In other words there was no security policy dimension before the TEU. During the negotiations of the TEU there were discussions on the institutional structure of CFSP mainly between two camps: the intergovernmentalists and the supranationalists. The end result was the establishment of CFSP as the second pillar, thereby keeping it outside regular Community decision-making. In this way it could be left an intergovernmental area, requiring unanimity among the member states (Vanhoonacker 2011: 87-88). The 1999 Amsterdam Treaty introduced qualified majority voting for implementing decisions and the possibility for constructive abstention⁴, but unanimity still remained the central rule (Vanhoonacker 2011: 88). The TeA also introduced a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to coordinate and represent

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⁴ Constructive abstention: when abstaining in a vote the member state is not obliged to apply the decision, but must not undertake any actions that will conflict with the decision. Those abstaining should not represent more than one third of the member states comprising at least one third of the EU population (Vanhoonacker 2011: 88)
EUs foreign policy, a position headed by the former Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana (Wallace 2005: 60).

But as the European Commissioner for External Relations also represented the EU’s foreign policy there were still need for coordination. The Treaty of Lisbon entering into force in 2009 brought an end to the pillar system and created a new position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The new position is fulfilling tasks earlier carried out by three different persons: the rotating Presidency, the former High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations. It is also established as a double-hatting position as both the Vice President of the European Commission and the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (Vanhoonacker 2011: 89). In this way the Lisbon Treaty has consolidated the cooperation in CFSP.

Concerning the Union’s neighborhood countries the European Neighborhood Policy, ENP, is also an essential part of the Union’s foreign policy. In 2002 the planned enlargement to the Eastern and central European countries led to discussions of a neighborhood policy including all Eastern European countries as well as countries in the Southern Caucasus and the Mediterranean. In the neighborhood of an enlarged EU the ENP would promote stability and security in the near abroad. It was meant to be a new strategic framework taking policy instruments from all the three pillars of the TEU and sought to strengthen human rights and create greater institutional capacity as well as incentives for economic liberalization and development (Edwards 2011: 51). Instead of offering future membership the aim was to promote EU norms and practices in EU neighbor states using conditionality (Edwards 2011: 52). Today the ENP applies to 15 states in addition to the Palestinian Authority (Smith 2011: 178).

For France the Mediterranean area has held a special place as it is close to its borders. The end of the Cold War shifted Western Europe’s focus towards Eastern and Central Europe, but continued instability in the Mediterranean with an increasing degree of immigration from and through North Africa led to expressed concerns for this region. This culminated in 1995 in the so-called Barcelona-process. The Barcelona-process included security, economic relations and humanitarian and cultural relations and reflected a multidimensional view of security with migration, terrorism and drug-trafficking taking precedence (Edwards 2011: 51). In his election campaign in 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a Mediterranean Union, with the support of Spain and Italy, as the focus again had shifted away from the Mediterranean. The
result was, due to German pressure, a Union for the Mediterranean open to all EU member states. It was rather seen as complementary to and a continuation of the Barcelona-process than a replacement of it (Edwards 2011: 52).

4.2.2 The European Defense and Security Policy

Even though the TEU introduced a common foreign policy the defense dimension was still lacking. Despite several attempts, what could be called a European defense dimension was still kept outside the EU in the form of the weakly structured Western European Union. Already on 4 March in 1947 a defense alliance had been established between France and the UK through the Dunkirk Treaty, also called the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, against a possible German threat (Soutou 1996: 28). The cooperation developed into military cooperation between France, the UK and the Benelux-countries with the signing of the Treaty of Brussels 17 March 1948 (Soutou 1996: 48). The WEU was a continuation of the Treaty of Brussels and was established through the Paris Agreements on the 23 October 1954, now also including West-Germany and Italy. It was a response to the already mentioned failed plan of a European Defense Community the same year and for France it was also a question of more easily controlling a West-Germany about to enter NATO. Originally France wanted to establish a common mechanism for OECD, ECSC and EPU5, but the WEU did not focus on the economic sphere (Bossuat 2005: 54). The WEU consisted of a ministerial council, a secretariat, a consultative assembly and a defense agency. On French insistence the WEU included the demands of British participation, a defense guarantee more binding than NATO’s Article 56 and a certain control over Germany which had to give up its nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons (Orban 1997: 17).

As the WEU was given only limited functions its scope of action was limited as well. By many it was considered more like a virtuality than a reality (Nilson & Orban 2000: 18). But US-Soviet cooperation on disarmament of strategic weapons which resulted in the signing of the SALT Treaty in 1972, increasingly caused doubts of the solidarity of the US and its role as a security guarantor in the Alliance, especially in France (Klein 2003: 14). In 1984 it was decided by the Council of Ministers of the WEU to reactivate the union. This was possible as

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5 Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Payments Union

6 Article 5 is the principle of collective defense, meaning that if a country of the Alliance is attacked it is considered an attack at all the members of the Alliance and will take actions deemed necessary (NATO’s official website)
Germany finally had accepted the need for a more European pillar and France had ceased to portray European cooperation as a means to undermine NATO. Due to French pressure the remaining restrictions on German conventional armament were finally removed and the Germans agreed to reactivate the organization (Gordon 1993: 126). The intention was not to substitute or challenge NATO, but to balance the transatlantic relations and the WEU was increasingly seen as a framework for developing a European defense identity (Klein 2003: 14-15). The 1992 TEU represented a breakthrough in security and defense cooperation, dealing with “all questions related to the security of the Union, including eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense”. The Treaty recognized the Western European Union as an integral part of the development of the EU and it established the WEU as the military arm of the European Union, creating the opportunity for a European defense identity (Vaïsse 2009: 144).

An important part of the WEU was the Petersberg tasks, agreed upon at a meeting in Bonn June 1992. The Petersberg Declaration stated that besides contributing to the NATO defense the WEU could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management (Vanhoonacker 2011: 93). Still, the WEU was increasingly seen as inadequate to respond to challenges according to the Petersberg tasks. In addition the political relationship between WEU and the EU was unresolved (Howorth 2011: 204-205). As the security debate evolved in the EU it was seen as necessary to put military operations under the direct responsibility of the EU (Howorth 2011: 205). The Petersberg tasks were thus incorporated into the European Union through the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999, which paved the way for a merger between the EU and WEU. (Vanhoonacker 2011: 93). In this way the EU would be more able to deal with the responsibilities given to it in the sphere of security and defense (Bacot-Decriaud 2003: 265).

Further debate on common defense and security cooperation in the framework of the European Union was finally launched with the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in 1998. The declaration stated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis” (Wallace 2005: 445). It also stated that the Union “must be given appropriate structures and capacities, taking account of the existing assets of the Western European Union and its relations with the EU” (Wallace 2005: 446). The declaration paved the way for a European Security and Defense Policy, ESDP, formally
established at the Cologne European Council meeting June 1999 as a part of CFSP (Vanhoonacker 2011: 93).

ESDP was further developed through the “Helsinki goals” in December 1999 which set up plans for a Rapid Reaction Force supposed to enter into force within 2003. The force would consist of 60 000 men able to act immediately (Wallace 2005: 446). In addition, the “Helsinki goals” included the setup of political and military bodies (Wallace 2005: 446). In the treaty of Nice from 2000 the bodies of ESDP was incorporated and institutionalized and included the Political and Security Committee (COPS), the Military Committee and the Military Staff of the EU, which started operating already in March 2000 (Wallace 2005: 449). The concept of battlegroups was later introduced at a meeting in Berlin between France, Britain and Germany in 2003. Each of the today 16 battlegroups consist of a battalion-sized force of around 1500 troops ready to be deployed in six days (Matlary 2009: 48-49). The groups rotate actively, so that two are ready for deployment at all times and the forces are under the direct control of a unanimous European Council. The battlegroup concept reached some operational capacity in 2005 with France and Britain operating providing one battlegroup each on rotation, and on 1 January 2007 it reached full operational capacity with two battlegroups on rotation simultaneously (Matlary 2009: 48-49, 128).

These developments were followed by the first military ESDP mission, Operation Concordia, in 2003. Through Operation Concordia the EU replaced NATO's mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM. December the same year the Council of the European Union agreed upon the first ever European Security Strategy (Wallace 2005: 446-447). In the later years the EU has taken on several military operations as in Congo, Tchad, and Somalia. However, to date none of the battlegroups have been deployed on a mission (Howorth 2011: 214). Under the Lisbon Treaty 2009 the Petersberg tasks were further extended, now including joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization (Vanhoonacker 2011: 93). The Lisbon Treaty decided that the EU would take over all the tasks of the WEU, and WEU ceased to exist on 30 June 2011. Treaty of Lisbon also renamed ESDP the Common Security and Defense Policy, CSDP, signaling a further consolidation in this sphere (Howorth 2011: 198).
4.2.3 France and NATO

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the French priorities were concentrated on avoiding a remilitarization of Germany and preventing a Soviet attack (Orban 1997: 8-9). In this unstable international environment the US as a guarantor of European peace was acknowledged by France as a necessary precondition for the creation of a Western European defense, and France was a part of the establishment of NATO\(^7\) with the signing of the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949. The power structures within the Alliance which in the beginning had been advantageous to France quickly changed. The Standing group created in 1949 was the executive body of the Military Committee and here France sat together with the US and the UK. Contrary to a Military Committee of twelve the Standing Group assured equality between the UK and France towards the US (Guillen 1996: 81-82). But the installation of SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Europe, in 1951 left the Standing Group with little power (Vaïsse 1996: 221). France found itself more and more isolated at the expense of the growing powers of UK and the US. Also, an increasing threat from Soviet resulted in an American wish to remove the geographical weight from France towards Germany. The removal ultimately led to a decrease in French political and military influence, and the economic development in Germany caused fear of a Europe led by Germany instead of France (Orban 1997: 15-16). Furthermore, the French focus on its colonies led to a decrease in its operational contribution, and its weight in the command structure and the political and military organs decreased accordingly (Bozo 1991: 60; Gordon 1993: 25-26). The Indochina War that saw a great increase in expenditure between 1947 and 1954, and given the war’s outcome it was a waste of resources (Wall 2008: 125). When Charles de Gaulle entered power the reality was a strategically marginalized France on its way out of the Atlantic center of power (Orban 1997: 20). He therefore proposed a new structure of power between the Western great powers. On 17 September 1958 he sent a memorandum to the US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and to the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, in which he set out the need for a reform of the integrated structures of the NATO. His proposal sought to extend the geographical competences of the Alliance, to put into question the military integration of the Alliance and the American monopoly of nuclear weapons and lastly, promote a strategically and politically independent France (Vaïsse 1996: 225-226). De Gaulle wanted NATO to establish trilateral consultations in nuclear matters between the US, the UK and France. His vision was a NATO concentrated around the cooperation of these

\(^7\) North Atlantic Treaty Organization
three member states which would be based on equality (Orban 2011: 220). But while the other members of the EC were not willing to establish a European security system if it undermined the NATO alliance, France would not support a European Security system led by a US dominated NATO (Gyomarch, Machin & Ritchie 1998: 114).

De Gaulle’s efforts to change the balance within the Alliance did not lead to any results, and by 1966 de Gaulle believed that the powers of the UK and the US would make it impossible to balance the organization in favor of Europe. Exiting the military integrated structures was to him the only option (Gueldry 2001: 151). Additionally the war in Algeria had for de Gaulle been the primary occupation of France (Vaïsse 1996: 226). But the war, which ended in 1962, had been costly and de Gaulle also recognized the psychological need of the French army after the French loss of the war. The army had felt that they were fighting a meaningless war and had felt betrayed as NATO had refused to support the war even though Algeria was French territory. De Gaulle therefore believed that the French military could not be asked to serve an American led Alliance (Gordon 1993: 34). De Gaulle also strongly opposed the new strategy of “flexible response” that the US has introduced in NATO. Flexible response comprised a variety of responses to Soviet aggression, also including traditional conventional forces. Additionally it involved a centralized control of nuclear operations that affected the sensibilities of the allies. In practice it would mean a nuclear France subordinated America, and the withdrawal was very much a rejection of the new strategy (Kaplan 1996: 309). By 1966 it was clear that French conventional forces would not be subordinated to NATO doctrine and that France would not accept the logic of flexible response (Gordon 1993: 55). Charles de Gaulle therefore ultimately decided to withdraw from the integrated military structures of NATO on March 11 1966. The withdrawal was a response to strategic divergences and the lack of the division of power (Orban 1997: 23). It was a rejection of the US dominance and due to de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe independent of the US (Gyomarch, Machin & Ritchie 1998: 113). In this way it represented an adjustment to the new strategic situation (Orban 1997: 23). T

But the withdrawal did by no means come as a surprise. Already in 1959 de Gaulle had withdrawn French ships from NATO’s Mediterranean authority because France could have military responsibilities or interests in Africa that other allied countries did not share. Furthermore, when French troops returned from Algeria in 1961 de Gaulle decided not to integrate them into NATO and instead created First Corps which was not subordinated to
NATO (Bozo 1996: 332). Additionally, it was decided in 1963 that France would produce its own tactical nuclear weapons and already in 1960 tests of nuclear bombs had been done in Sahara (Gordon 1993: 40, 54). The decision to produce tactical nuclear weapons was important in that it gave France freedom of maneuver. The French nuclear strategy in the mid-60 was based on proportional deterrence, the principle being that even minimal threat of destroying enemy populations was itself enough to deter. In this strategic thinking having nuclear weapons would deter other states from attacking as their losses would be greater than the potential gains by an attack. As such nuclear power was to France more a strategic weapon than a weapon of battle (Gordon 1993: 58-59). The nuclear weapons would have such a devastating effect on nations that one would not risk entering a nuclear war for another state and could therefore not rely on the nuclear weapons of others. In this respect the nuclear risk could not be shared and France would have to develop its own nuclear weapons (Gordon 1993: 58).

It must nevertheless be emphasized that de Gaulle made clear that France would still honor the Washington Treaty and that the decision did only concern withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structures (Giuliani 2011: 6). It was still considered necessary to control the development of the “German question”, and a complete withdrawal from the Alliance would have meant the loss of the opportunity to keep military forces in Western Germany and to maintain some sort of control over the constrains imposed on Germany through the Treaty of Paris considering weapons (Soutou 1996: 292). After 1966 de Gaulle redefined France’s role in the Alliance from being in the front to placing itself on the bench, thus shifting the focus from integration to cooperation (Giuliani 2011: 8). The new strategy was more solitary, but allowed France to globally present itself as an alternative to the two blocks during the Cold War (Orban 1997: 25).

Despite of the new solitary strategy one could already from 1966 see a rapprochement between France and NATO. The summit in Ailleret/Lemnitzer 22 August 1967 clarified the form of cooperation between NATO and France in Central-Europe. It was decided to keep a French stand-in force in case of war, already then consolidating the strategic role of France in Europe (Giuliani 2011: 7). The White Paper on Defense from 1972 underlined the attachment to the Atlantic Alliance and the strategic solidarity with its European neighbors. The strategic role of France was further concretized in the Valentin-Ferber agreement 3 July 1974 establishing the framework for French participation in two armed forces in Central-Europe.
At a summit in Ottawa in June the same year the French nuclear force had been officially recognized as contributing to the global deterrence of the Alliance (Mélandri 1996: 539). Further rapprochement continued during the 70’s and 80’s, and the rapprochement became especially evident in the era of Mitterand (Orban 1997: 27). In June 1983 a meeting of the Atlantic Council was held in Paris for the first time since 1966 when the headquarters had been moved from France to Brussels (Giuliani 2011: 9). With the creation of a Rapid Assistance Force, FAR, in 1983 conventional rapprochement between France and NATO also took place (Rynning 2002: 104).

In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall François Mitterand initiated explorative conversations to be held in 1990-1991. He considered a rapprochement to be profitable to avoid being marginalized and the conversations would discuss reforms of NATO, how to develop a European pillar in NATO and how to allow a place for France in the Alliance. (Giuliani 2011: 9-10). In addition the French influence in the Alliance had increased as a consequence of its involvement in Central Europe (Orban 1997: 27). Another step was taken with the chief of the French military staff in Brussels entering the military committee to follow the crisis in Bosnia. The White Book on Defense published in 1994 also allowed the presence of the Defense minister, François Léotard, in the Atlantic Council and the presence of the Commander-in-Chief in the military committee (Giuliani 2011: 10). The decision to fully reintegrate was made after the intervention in Bosnia and the French foreign minister, Hervé de Charette, declared in December 1995 that France was ready to fully participate in the renovation of NATO. As a result France reentered its place in the military committee in 1996 (Giuliani 2011: 11).

However, France did not fully return to the integrated military structures. Being elected as a president in May 1995 Jacques Chirac had pressed for further reintegration, but on the condition of a double chain of commandment permitting a European chain of commandment, and a European officer heading NATO’s Mediterranean South Command, AFSOUTH, at Naples (Giuliani 2011: 11-12). Since the end of the Cold War the role of NATO regional commanders had been greatly enhanced and as the AFSOUTH command was the only US-led regional command in Europe, making this a European led command was seen as weakening the US leadership. Many European had interpreted the Berlin Plus agreement, calling for a strengthening of a European Security and Defense Identity, as a pledge to transform AFSOUTH into a European command. The US, however, considered the strengthening of the
role of the European Deputy SACEUR, and the empowering of the WEU as important enough. The French proposal was thus seen as asking too much too soon (Tiersky 1997: 98). It was also a question of the US Sixth fleet placed in this region. Americans feared this would mean French control over the US Sixth fleet, but as the US Sixth fleet responded directly to decisions by the US Head of State and was not submitted to a NATO command this was a rather weak argument. Nonetheless, the boldness of the proposal caused it to be rejected and the French reintegration to be stopped (Giuliani 2011: 11-12).

After this setback the French contribution in NATO operations still continued to increase and the final decision to return to NATO’s military integrated structures was announced at the NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl 3 and 4 April 2009, after Sarkozy already in 2007 had expressed plans for a full return (Giuliani 2011: 6). Sarkozy did not ask for a European command of AFSOUTH or the Sixth Fleet. Nevertheless, in 2009 the command of the Allied Command Transformation, ACT, was assumed by the French general Stéphane Abrial, former chief of French Air Force. ACT is leading, at the strategic command level, the transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine and is one of two strategic commands at the head of NATO’s Command Structure (NATO’s website ACT). Furthermore, in July 2009, Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz was assigned Commander of Allied Joint Force Command Lisbon which prepares, plans, conducts and sustains the full range of NATO military operations (NATO’s website JFC Lisbon). A certain degree of French influence was thus achieved.

The decision to reintegrate was mainly based on two reasons: changes in the international environment and French participation in all NATO operations (Giuliani 2011: 12). The fall of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist attack September 11 2001 had led to a changing international environment. The reality was now an enlarged Alliance, which is today counting 28 members. The structure of the Alliance had also evolved with the establishment of a zone outside NATO in the fight against terrorism and a Rapid Reaction Force (Giuliani 2011: 13). Concerning French contribution constant rapprochement had resulted in France participating in all NATO operations as Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995, Kosovo 1999 and Afghanistan December 2001. In addition it had become the fourth largest contributor. However, its absence in the military integrated structure made it unable to measure its financial and humanitarian contribution (Giuliani 2011: 13). Membership was thus a question of being able
to measure its contribution. As a full member France would also participate in the planning of the defense (Giuliani 2011: 16).

The European dimension has also been an important factor. To Nicolas Sarkozy European defense and Atlantic cooperation are the two roads to a common defense and security policy which must be seen as complementing each other, rather than substituting or excluding one another (Giuliani 2011: 15). Full membership of France would make possible a greater coherence between the processes in the EU and the NATO (Giuliani 2011: 16). Thus it could assure a greater voice of Europe in the Alliance, with the ideal being a burden-sharing where the domain of crisis management is reserved the EU and NATO is concerned mainly with military force (Van Herpen 2008: 10). The French vision is that NATO’s main purpose should remain what has been its raison d’être: the security of Europe (Van Herpen 2008: 9). France does therefore not want a global NATO and has been reluctant to include countries like Georgia and Ukraine as these countries lacks the prospect of EU membership in the near future (Van Herpen 2008: 9).

4.3 European Security under the Fifth Republic

4.3.1 1958 – 1969: the era of Charles de Gaulle

General Charles De Gaulle came to power in 1958 during the Cold War. In this context his foreign policy ambition was to change the international status quo. He questioned the Cold War order and sought to change the balance of power (Gueldry 2001: 151). In a time of international tensions he wanted Europe to be a political power that could balance the two superpowers (Vaïsse 2009: 100). A multipolar world would, according to de Gaulle, be much more stable than the current bipolar (Vaïsse 2009: 17-18). Furthermore he considered it necessary to have an ambitious foreign policy to regain the country’s position. This is what de Gaulle called “la politique de grandeur” (Orban 2011: 197-199). “La politique de grandeur” was an instrument to gather the nation around a collective ambition (Cerny 1980: 6-7), a nation which had been traumatized and humiliated after the defeat in 1940 and two lost colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria (Gueldry 2001: 163). De Gaulle wanted to create a consciousness among the French citizens of France as a national unit (Orban 2011: 243), and
the fact that it was possible to regain the power of the nation and be an essential part of the international arena (Hoffmann 1974: 315).

When entering power de Gaulle did not hide his hostility towards supranationality. The president valued national sovereignty and he supported a confederal model which he preferred resulting in a “Union of States” rather than a federation (Vaïsse 1998: 541). He opposed the creation of a European army which would undermine the national army and national sovereignty (Vaïsse 2009: 99). The Fouchet-plan, initiating a political union in the sphere of defense, was thus introduced in 1961 to secure a certain degree of intergovernmental structure (Bossuat 2005: 95-96). The plan was respecting national autonomy and promoted de Gaulle’s vision of a close political and military coordination, yet without integration (Gueldry 2001: 151). However, the plan created disagreements among the member states on mainly three points: the place of the Atlantic Alliance, whether to have a supranational or intergovernmental structure and the involvement of Great Britain (Orban 2011: 227-228). The Dutch Foreign minister, Joseph Luns, opposed military and political consultation outside the framework of NATO which did not include the UK. He also feared the plan would lead to a consolidation of Franco-German hegemony (Bossuat 2005: 96). Together with the Belgian minister Paul-Henri Spaak he was suspicious of French motives and wanted to keep the security guarantee of the US (Gueldry 2001: 151), and Italy and Germany demanded a European defense to be established within the Atlantic Alliance. Hence, France agreed to put emphasis on the relations with NATO and the communitarian structures (Bossuat 2005: 97).

But in January 1962 de Gaulle changed the text unilaterally, undermining the reference to the Atlantic Alliance and reducing the competences of the European assembly to lose coordination between the member states. Arguably, it could be seen as a response to the adaption 14 January of the first measures in the Common Agriculture Policy as after the adaption de Gaulle had nothing more to gain from the European Community and could impose his intergovernmental structure of cooperation (Bossuat 2005: 97). France now found itself alone against the other five member states (Bossuat 2005: 98). To ensure some degree of US support the other member states were determined to involve Britain, and Britain was invited to take part in the negotiations. British participation was however firmly opposed by de Gaulle, which continued with bilateral relations with Germany.

The result was the Elysée treaty, signed 22 January 1963. Through the Elysée Treaty de Gaulle tried to achieve bilaterally what he had tried to achieve with all six member states
The Treaty initiated regular meetings between the heads of states, the foreign ministers, the governments and the defense ministers. The aim was consultations on issues in the sphere of foreign policy to develop a common understanding. In the sphere of defense de Gaulle searched rapprochement in the strategic and tactical doctrines and cooperation in armament (Bossuat 2005: 99). France was fully aware that a cooperation between France as the only nuclear power and a divided Germany without any prospects for the future would ensure a certain degree of leadership among the six member states (Orban 2011: 229). With the treaty de Gaulle also tried to reinforce Franco-German cooperation at the expense of Germany’s commitment to Atlantic solidarity. But in May 1963 a preamble was added insisting on Germany’s links with the US (Gueldry 2001: 151). It stated that the Treaty should not endanger the common defense in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance or British participation in the European Community, thereby undermining de Gaulle’s intentions and the Treaty was never fully implemented (Vaïsse 2009: 104; Gordon 1993: 126).

De Gaulle’s firm opposition against cooperation with the UK resulted in French veto of British membership. To him the UK represented a threat to France as it would rival the French position in Europe. Furthermore, the UK gave the impression of not being a part of the continental Europe and de Gaulle was worried UK’s transatlantic relations would change Europe’s relations with the US (Bossuat 2005: 105). His vision was a Europe independent of the US and de Gaulle wanted to distance Europe from the US by creating a common defense (Vaïsse 2009: 105). He introduced the idea of an independent Europe and European defense balancing the superpowers and sought to promote France as a driving force for European cooperation (Vaïsse 2009: 113). Despite of his vision, by once again vetoing British membership in 1967 and leaving the UK out of the cooperation he made further development in the sphere of security and defense difficult (Vaïsse 2009: 111).

4.3.2 1969 – 1974: the era of Georges Pompidou

Georges Pompidou succeeded de Gaulle in 1969. Pompidou was less interested in the high politics of defense and diplomacy than de Gaulle had been and his first priority was to show continuity. In general the European policy of Pompidou was characterized by pragmatism and prudence (Vaïsse 2009: 21). In opposition to federalists he opposed integration and supported

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8 Georges Pompidou belonged to the party Union des Démocrates pour la République, which was the successor to Charles de Gaulle’s party
only a gradual construction of Europe (Vaïsse 2009: 115). He envisaged a confederal Europe where the national governments remained the main decision-makers (Bossuat 2005: 119-120). After the failed attempt of the Fouchet-plan in 1962 there had not been arranged any meetings between the heads of states of the Six (Bossuat 2005: 120). This changed with the arranging of the 1969 Summit in Hague, initiating new frameworks for discussions on security and defense matters. In the program launched by Pompidou the chapter “deepening” included political cooperation between the member states, building on the ideas in the Fouchet-plan. This was further developed into the Davignon-report presented by a deputy from the Belgian foreign office, Étienne Davignon, 27 October 1970 (Bossuat 2005: 124). Defense issues were however excluded from the report due to profound differences on NATO between France and the other five member states.

The report nevertheless laid the foundation of the European Political Cooperation, EPC, launched in 1970. The EPC was meant to be a framework for pooling information across foreign ministries and represented a modest form of foreign policy co-ordination (Gyomarch, Machin & Ritchie 1998: 115). In other words it was the very start of a common foreign policy (Bossuat 2005: 124). At French insistence the EPC was kept intergovernmental, once again proving France’s refusal of transferring sovereignty. The meeting also opened up for British membership and other candidate countries. According to Pompidou no real progress could be made without Britain, and the process starting at the Hague Summit finally resulted in Britain, Ireland and Denmark entering the European Communities in 1973 (Vaïsse 2009: 115, 117).

During Pompidou’s presidency a White Paper on National Defense was published in 1972, for the first time formally defined French national interests as being situated not only in the national territory. The security of Europe was seen as an integral part of the security of France and France vowed to participate in the construction of a European defense. Although the White Paper clearly reaffirmed the more European direction of French security policy, it stated that it would be illusory to claim to ensure the security of the territory without taking interest in the realities that surround it (White Paper 1972: 9). Hence the White Paper also confirmed the continuity with the Gaullist past (Gordon 1993: 70-72). Proportional deterrence was seen as the primary means by which France ensured its own defense and avoided war; the American guarantee was not automatic and the nuclear risk could not be shared (White Paper 1972: 8). Additionally the idea of a global nuclear defense, tous azimuts, was once and for all rejected and the White Paper weakened the French reliance on pure or all-or-nothing
deterrence (White Paper 1972: 6). It was also emphasized that the credibility of proportional deterrence would have to depend at least on some conventional forces. France needed conventional forces that could react to a crisis at the subnuclear level, although the forces could not be so strong that they would give the impression of a France ready to fight a long conventional war (Gordon 1993: 74).

Pompidou furthermore played an essential part in the process of institutionalizing meetings between the heads of states (Bossuat 2005: 126). The process starting at the Copenhagen Summit in 1973 later resulted in the establishment of the European Council. The agenda of the European Council would consist of political questions which earlier had been discussed in the Atlantic Council, at the international arena or bilaterally, and Pompidou thus contributed to the entrance of foreign policy in the communitarian institutions (Bossuat 2005: 126). Despite of this and the initiatives taken at the Hague Summit the 70s were marked by little political development (Gueldry 2001: 154). The oil crisis in 1973 changed the priorities and made economic stabilization the main concern while putting cooperation in the sphere of security in the shadow (Vaïsse 2009: 118-119).

4.3.3 1974 – 1981: the era of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing

Pompidou died in April 1974 with his successor being Valéry Giscard d’Estaing⁹. Entering power at a time when the American influence eroded and Soviet expanded it was important to him to strengthen the relations with NATO while still keeping a privileged relationship with Moscow (Vaïsse 2009: 22). He continued the idea of institutionalizing the meetings between the state leaders launched in 1973, and was the driving force in the final establishment of the European Council at the Paris Summit 9-10 December 1974 (Vaïsse 2009: 123). At the Paris Summit it was decided that the head of states and the governments should meet three times a year (Bossuat 2005: 145). It was an intergovernmental form of cooperation showing Giscard d’Estaing’s loyalty to a confederal model rather than a federal (Bossuat 2005: 142). Thus, like his predecessors he supported a political cooperation without abandoning the sovereignty (Bossuat 2005: 148). The Paris Summit also sought to relaunch a political union, and in 1975 the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindeman launched the Tindeman report on political cooperation. The report was not well received by the member states. Proposing a

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⁹ Valéry Giscard d’Estaing founded the centre-right party Union pour la Démocratie Française in 1978 after tensions with the Gaullists (Gordon 1993: 94)
strengthening of the powers of the Parliament and the Commission it was considered too federalist and it was declared more or less dead in 1977 because of the extensive opposition (Bossuat 2005: 148).

In 1975 Giscard d’Estaing initiated a reorganization of the French army, and a military program law in 1976 was designed to reflect more closely the premises on which his security policy was based. The objective was to create a French army more mobile, more versatile and better equipped with conventional weapons than before. In other words: an army better prepared to contribute to the allied defense of Western Europe (Gordon 1993: 89). Giscard’s military policies included a relative emphasis of conventional over nuclear forces, which was new as De Gaulle had neglected the conventional forces. As had to a large degree the 1972 White Paper (Gordon 1993: 90). The nuclear force still remained the absolute priority of the government whose primary obligation was to maintain it at the necessary level, but the program law nonetheless planned a declining proportion of the total defense budget for nuclear programs while it sought to increase the funding of conventional forces (Gordon 1993: 91). Another controversial initiative was French-American nuclear cooperation. Even though the initiative was not as controversial as it might have seemed since de Gaulle had never opposed technical nuclear cooperation with the US, the cooperation nonetheless made obvious the Giscard administration’s interest in much more extensive and pragmatic military cooperation with the US than had previously been the case (Gordon 1993: 92-93) These measures were more an effort to make the French military doctrine more effective in a changing context than a direct challenge to the past doctrine (Gordon 1993: 100).

4.3.4 1981 – 1995: the era of François Mitterand

Giscard d'Estaing lost the presidential election in 1981 to François Mitterand from Parti Socialiste. Quite the opposite of what is the common view, Mitterand does not represent a rupture with the French foreign policy (Vaïsse 2009: 25). Already in his first speech in the Elysée he gave the impression of wanting to continue the Gaullist foreign policy line (Moïsi 1995: 850). But while being attached to the notion of national sovereignty he still contributed to the communitarian construction, and his two presidencies were marked by a great capacity of initiatives (Vaïsse 2009: 129). In 1985 a committee was put together to explore what institutional measures had to be taken to establish a foreign policy, a common security system and an economic and monetary union (Bossuat 2005: 166). The final report of the committee,
the Dooge report, was published 29 March 1985, leading to discussion of a revision of the Rome Treaty 1957. Negotiations on a new European treaty, the Single European Act of 1987, had as aim implementing parts of the report (Bossuat 2005: 167). In the negotiations on the SEA France argued for more power of the EPC choosing a middle path between a federal Europe and a “Europe des États”, and Mitterand envisaged a Europe where France and Germany would take the lead (Vaïsse 2009: 135). But in reality the end result contained only limited changes (Gyomarch, Machin & Ritchie 1998: 116). Nonetheless, the SEA laid the foundation of a common European foreign policy building on the institutionalization from 1970 (Bossuat 2005: 169). Mitterand wanted to preserve national influence in this sphere, and thus the essential areas of foreign policy were decided to still be ruled by unanimity (Vaïsse 2009: 135-136).

The good relations between Mitterand and the German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, also contributed to numerous initiatives. With Mitterand being elected in May 1981 and Kohl in October 1982, they soon developed a mutual trust which allowed for strengthening of the bilateral cooperation (Gueldry 2001: 154). The bilateral cooperation led to the formation of a permanent Franco-German commission on security and defense in 1982 (Gueldry 2001: 154). Furthermore a Franco-German Defense and Security Council was created in January 1988 to elaborate common defense conceptions, followed by the creation of a 5000 strong force Franco-German brigade in 1989 (Gueldry 2001: 155; Vaïsse 2009: 137-138).

Following the end of the Cold War and the resulting geopolitical changes, the German reunification came as a surprise to Mitterand (Vaïsse 2009: 139). Mitterand had declared on a press conference during a Franco-German Summit one week before the fall of the Berlin Wall that he was not afraid of a German reunification (Vaïsse 2009: 139), while also insisting on a slow and gradual unification (Gueldry 2001: 158). The French position towards German reunification was nevertheless of an ambiguous character (Yost 1990: 890). One the one hand, caused by an exaggerated fear of German power, the French President was worried that the reunification would lead to a too powerful Germany and a decrease in the importance of France in Europe, consequently resulting in the loss of French influence (Yost 1990: 889). He also feared that a reunification of Germany could lead to a demilitarization and neutralization of Central-Europe, leaving France the prime target for others. To avoid demilitarization and neutralization it was important for France that the united Germany joined the Alliance. Joining the Alliance would also reduce the fear of Europe not being able to keep Germany in
the Western camp (Yost 1990: 891). On the other hand, one of the French main goals was to develop capacities in defense to make Western Europe stronger, more autonomous and independent of the US while at the same time dependent on NATO. These capacities would have to be based on Franco-German relations (Yost 1990: 893). Thus, it was important to cooperate closely with Germany.

The events 1989-1991 coincided with the negotiating of a new European treaty. Mitterand and Kohl had suggested making WEU an instrument of the future European defense. The intention of a revival of the WEU was revealed in a letter 11 December 1991 and at the Intergovernmental Conferences 90-91 a list of common actions in the sphere of a common foreign policy and a common security policy was defined (Bossuat 2005: 179). The result of the IGC’s was the earlier mentioned Maastricht Treaty, representing a breakthrough in security and defense cooperation with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a part of the Union’s policy. In the referendum held on the Treaty on Maastricht the treaty was supported by only 50.8 percent of the French population (Vaïsse 2009: 148). But regardless the rather limited support of the treaty, François Mitterand during his presidencies to a large degree managed to establish a French consensus around European values and the idea that there is no alternative to the construction of Europe, declaring in 1992 that “La France est notre pays, l’Europe est notre futur” (Moïsi 1995: 851).

The fact that Mitterand did not represent a rupture with the past has to be emphasized. Entering power in 1981 Mitterand had seen it as necessary to continue Gaullist policies on nuclear and defense questions as it assured him neutralized opinion on defense and foreign policy issues from the political center and much of the political right as well as the support of the army. In the international environment it ensured goodwill from Germany and the US. But by 1986 the French solitary position vis-à-vis the European allies had become increasingly awkward internationally. There was no longer need to support Gaullist policy (Wells 1996: 565). Mitterand opposed Charles de Gaulles withdrawing from the Alliance as he supported a more federal Europe and an international security system (Orban 2011: 280). French power was, according to Mitterand European, multilateral and political rather than national, bilateral and nuclear (Orban 2011: 281). Still, one could find more continuity than would appear at a first glance. Even though Mitterand did not support de Gaulle’s withdrawal from alliances, he openly stated that France and NATO had little in common and did not share any strategic conceptions. At the NATO summit in London 1990 he made explicit the point of France’s
nuclear policy not being the one of NATO’s (Yost 1990: 895). It has always been important to underline the French nuclear strategy as independent of and distinct from the strategies of NATO and the US (Yost 1990: 896). French nuclear weapons were not primarily conceived of as a battlefield arsenal to win a war but as a political instrument of deterrence and for limited pre-strategic use to avoid war (Gueldry 2001: 153; Yost 1990: 895). But after the end of the Cold War nuclear weapons was devalued as an instrument of international policy as the disappearance of the substantial threat to Western Europe from the east undermined a strategy of massive reprisal targeted in this direction (Gueldry 2001: 157; Menon 1995: 21). The sudden loss of nuclear weapons as a strategic political instrument caused disorientation and confusion in France and it led Mitterand to announce the moratorium of underground nuclear experiments in the South Pacific in 1992 (Gueldry 2001: 161).

A new strategy was needed and the President published a new White Paper on Defense in 1994. The new White Paper continued to reaffirm the special relationship with Germany and the role for WEU as a security player, while at the same time calling to strengthen France’s links with the EU and NATO. Still, divergences with the 1972 White Paper were obvious. While the White Paper from 1972 focused on national autonomy and national deterrence the 1994 White Paper focused less on the importance of nuclear weapons and focusing increasingly on conventional forces and its use, alone or multilaterally (White Paper 1994). In the 1994 White Paper opened for multirisk-scenarios and in this respect the EU enlargement was also associated with security. It also opened up for more cooperation with NATO (Gueldry 2001: 161). Thus, the defense of national borders no longer represented the core for France’s military engagement and force projection even beyond the NATO area was considered. In general the notion of interdependence was more apparent in the 1994 White Paper (Gueldry 2001: 161). The last few years of his Presidency Mitterand was seriously ill and in 1995 Chirac was elected president.
5 Methodological approach

5.1 Ideational analysis

The Presidents visions of European security will, as already mentioned, be discovered through an ideational analysis of speeches. The analysis will have an explorative and inductive character. There will inductively be identified different terms and themes in the speeches which will be able to say something meaningful of the Presidents’ visions. An analysis of such a character does not have a specific framework or procedure. This is a challenge as Bergström and Boréus (2000) argue that the loser the analytical model is the more dependent one is on one’s own interpretation. On the other hand, the more specific the analytical model is the more it starts to make use of the same tools as content analysis which it will later be argued is inappropriate for the purpose of this thesis (Boréus & Bergström 2000: 37). When doing an ideational analysis it is nonetheless important to know what to look for. The background chapter has provided a framework by identifying ideas on European security cooperation among earlier presidents under the fifth republic. Furthermore, a certain framework for what to look for has been created through the inductive development of the hypothesis, and the analysis will be done according to the hypothesis falsifying or verifying them. The first hypothesis, however, will be answered through a comparison of the White Papers on defense, published in 1972, 1994 and 2008, also putting them in a historical context.

Regarding the last three hypotheses the principal motive of the research is to discover new terms and new ideas and an explorative analysis will to a greater degree secure that as little information as possible is lost. The procedure will therefore consist of analyzing speeches of Chirac and Sarkozy and look at the occurrence of frequent and important terms, and in which context they are used. This is also why it is chosen not to make use of content analysis as the aim in content analysis is to measure thorough formulated and defined terms. It counts how many times the different terms are used and thus quantifies large amounts of data. This is less relevant for this research as the aim is to discover what terms are used and in what context, rather than how often it appears. It is also desirable to discover new terms and word count and content analysis would therefore not be appropriate for this purpose. Terms of special importance and used frequently in the mentioning of the European security and defense
policy, and the crisis in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Georgia and Libya will be noted and searched for more systematically by looking in what context they appear in each speech. In addition there would probably also be certain sentences of special importance, not including any particular term.

5.2 Selection

5.2.1 Selection of actors

In the selection of actors mainly two things have been emphasized: 1) the relevancy of the actors and 2) not overburdening the workload. The thesis will focus on French presidents as actors. Its relevance as an actor in the sphere of security is obvious as it has an important position as the leader of the state and is the main executor of the French foreign policy. The powers of the President were established through the existing constitution, initiated by Charles de Gaulle and adopted by the French population 28 September 1958 through a referendum. It established the Fifth Republic and to de Gaulle it was important that the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branch was properly established. Furthermore, the highest authority would be concentrated around the President who had to be able to make quick decisions (Orban 2011: 200).

During the Third Republic, established in 1870, the Constitutional Letter of 1875 gave the President power over diplomacy and war, under parliamentary control. The President could negotiate and ratify treaties, appoint ambassadors and ministers and declare war. In this way the President had the actual power in foreign affairs. However, the international position of the President declined after World War 1 and foreign affairs to a greater extent became a governmental matter (Kessler 1999: 22). During the Fourth Republic, established with the 1946 Constitution, the President kept its representational functions, but he did not negotiate treaties as was the case under the Third Republic. The President only signed and ratified them, and in reality had no real saying in major foreign policy decisions (Kessler 1999: 22-23). Charles de Gaulle changed the situation with the adaption of the new constitution in 1958 which established the President’s privileged powers (Kessler 1999: 23). Through the existing Constitution the President has exclusive powers in decisions concerning the area of foreign-
and security policy. While Article 5 establishes the President as the guarantor of national independence, territorial integrity and observance of treaties, Article 15 makes the President Commander-in-Chief of armed forces and responsible for the defense councils and committees. Furthermore, the President is granted constitutional authority and the responsibility for the nation in times of crisis through Article 16. The role of the President since 1958, in the conduct of external relations thus became more and more privileged and is considered the domaine reservé for the President (Kessler 1999: 24-28).

However, the powers of the President are constrained by the possibility of cohabitation, during which the President and the government belong to different parties. The President is forced to appoint a Prime Minister from the opposition when the opposition wins the legislative election as the Prime Minister must be accepted by the majority of the parliament. Through article 20 and 21 the Prime Minister is given the right to participate in the execution of the foreign policy and is given the responsibility for the conduct of “la politique de la nation” (Kessler 1999: 40). Also, during cohabitation the Foreign Minister is replaced by the Prime Minister as a participant in international summits together with the President (Kessler 1999: 31). As the borders between domestic and external politics have eroded the division of labor during cohabitations has become increasingly difficult (Kessler 1999: 39). Cohabitation challenges the principle of domaine reserve and raises the question of how a two-headed leadership can react to foreign changes and threats in the foreign policy and who would decide when critical defense decisions would have to be made (Gordon 1993: 139, 144). Article 15 states that the President of the republic is the “leader of armed forces” and that he “presides over the councils and high committees of national defense”. However, article 20 and 21 state that the government “disposes of the armed forces” and that the prime minister is “responsible for national defense” (Gordon 1993: 145). The foreign policy is thus a domaine réservé for the President only by tradition and not by law as the President and Prime minister have competing powers in the Constitution (Kessler 1999: 24).

Since the establishment of the Fifth Republic there has been three periods of cohabitation: François Mitterand/Jacques Chirac 86-88, François Mitterand/Édouard Balladur 93-95 and Jacques Chirac/Lionel Jospin 97-2002. In 1986 the right-wing won the legislative election and Jacques Chirac was appointed prime minister under the presidency of Mitterand until 1988. 86-88 was a critical period for French security policy as the Western European countries saw a significant increase in the pressures to augment their contribution to European defense
Chirac was very present at the international scene (Kessler 1999: 42). His intention was to take the lead in security policy making and he argued that “as prime minister, and as such responsible for national defense, I intend…to exercise fully the role that is mine”. However, he also believed that national defense should remain a domain of national unity and that there should be no open divergences between Mitterand and the government (Gordon 1993: 145). During the cohabitation Mitterand and Chirac tried to keep a united position, but disagreements became clearer as the Presidential election approached (Gordon 1993: 146). The greatest conflict in the sphere of security concerned the anticipated withdrawal of the American missiles in Europe, the so-called Euromissiles (Gordon 1993: 148). This conflict caused Mitterand to state that: “the President is the only one who can decide if and when the vital interests are at stake. The Federal Germany is our allied…but this will not end in a division of the decision and the employment of nuclear forces”\(^{10}\), as a response to Chirac arguing in December 1987 that the intervention of France should be quasi-automatic in case of an attack in the direction of the Federal Republic (Orban 2011: 307).

During the cohabitation 93–95 Mitterand’s position had been weakened by the limited success of the Maastricht Treaty with barely 50 percent of the French population voting for ratification in the referendum. Thus it was easier for the Balladur-government to follow a more nationalist and pragmatic policy-line at the expense of the European construction (Kessler 1999: 209). Mitterand had to modify his approach and as a result the tensions were less visible during the second cohabitation (Kessler 1999: 43). Mitterand’s illness during the last years of the presidency also contributed to the absence of great conflicts. The first cohabitation is therefore characterized as “hyperconflictuelle” as opposed to the second which is characterized as “hyperconsensuelle” (Elgie 2002: 298). The third cohabitation took place under unusual circumstances as it was caused by Chirac’s decision to dissolve the national assembly in 1997, with the result being the left side winning the following legislative election. The President’s authority was thus called into question and his position weakened (Elgie 2002: 299). Lionel Jospin became the Prime Minister during the cohabitation which lasted until 2002, being the longest lasting cohabitation. The cohabitation had a tense start with Chirac declaring in the traditional interview 14 July that the President always had the last word in all issues. This led Jospin to declare two days later that there were no political spheres

\(^{10}\) “Le Président est le seul à pouvoir décider si et quand les intérêts vitaux sont en cause. L’Allemagne fédérale est notre alliée…mais cela ne pourra aller jusqu’au partage de la décision et de l’emploi des forces nucléaires” (Orban 2011: 307)
where the President had the last word (La documentation française). The cohabitation was after this marked by trying to express common position, although experiencing an increasing degree of tension as the presidential election in 2002 approached (Elgie 2002: 307).

Despite periods of cohabitation the French President has been of great importance. This is also true in the European context. The importance of the French president became especially clear under de Gaulle’s presidency by the vetoing of British membership both in 1963 and 1967 (Bossuat 2005: 105, 113). It was again demonstrated during “the empty-chair crisis” 1965 when de Gaulle withdrew all French participation in the Council as a reaction to extended use of qualified majority voting instead of unanimity in the decision-making process in several political sectors (Bossuat 2005: 109-111). In recent years the position of the French President became clear with Chirac’s strong opposition to the war in Iraq causing deep division within the EU. In this respect the French President is the most relevant actor when analyzing France in the European context, both due to its domestic powers and its position within the EU. To further narrow down the number of actors the selection must be limited both in time and quantity, meaning in the number of presidents. Thus this thesis will make a comparison of only two presidents: Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. The reason for choosing these presidents is the interest in analyzing recent development and also because there is an implied divergence in their positions even though they represent the same party.

5.2.2 Selection of speeches

When selecting speeches important questions to ask are: when are the speeches held, under what circumstances are they held and to whom are the President’s talking? The message in the speeches is likely to change according to the context and target audience. In this respect it is important to choose a representative selection of the speeches. It would have been optimal to analyze all speeches held by the Presidents concerning European security from 1995 until today to assure the strength of a generalization. This, however, is not possible as it would be too time-consuming. On the other hand, considerations of time consumption must be balanced against the adequacy of the research. The selection cannot be too limited as it must cover aspects of the analysis. In other words one must be sure to analyze a sufficient number of speeches to be able to tell anything at all about Chirac’s and Sarkozy’s vision. Choosing a representative selection of the speeches is especially important since there is an unbalance in the length of presidencies between Chirac and Sarkozy. While Chirac has completed two
presidencies being elected both from 1995-2002 and then 2002-2007, while Sarkozy being elected in 2007 as the successor of Chirac has barely finished one presidency.

The objects of the analysis will be speeches held by the Presidents at the annual conference of ambassadors at the end of August. This tradition was started by Mitterand in 1993 and in the speeches instructions are given to the ambassadors and the main orientations of French foreign policy presented. It is thus a chance for the President to elaborate on issues he considers most important. The audience of the speeches is the ambassadors and as they are the ones to promote the French position in other countries this is an important speech. All the speeches under Chirac’s and Sarkozy’s presidency, thus from 1995-2011, will therefore be analyzed, counting in total a number of 17. Regarding the unbalance in the length of the presidencies between Chirac and Sarkozy a problem is that there are only five speeches from Sarkozy’s presidency. One must therefore ask oneself whether five speeches will be adequate to discover a certain policy line. However, the speeches are very informative covering all important aspects, including the European defense and security policy. As such there is a good chance of being able to discover Sarkozy’s vision. There being few speeches from the presidency of Sarkozy are nonetheless an argument one has to bear in mind. When looking at the crisis in Kosovo a declaration on the reason to intervene held 24 March 1999 and a press conference on the intervention in Kosovo 24 April 1999 are also included. From the crisis in Iraq an interview with Chirac by TF1 and France 2 10 March 2003 is included. This is done to obtain a more complete picture of the two crises.

5.3 Validity and reliability concerns

5.3.1 Internal validity

Internal validity refers to whether the research is able to say something meaningful about the phenomenon being investigated, in other words whether there is coherence between the observations and the theoretical ideas developed (Bryman 2004: 273). It concerns whether the operationalization of the variables is able to tell us something about the causal connection, in other words if the procedure one has chosen to do the research actually is able to answer the research question (Bergström & Boréus 2000: 37). The internal validity is often one of the
strengths of qualitative research, such as ideational analysis, as one gets closer to the phenomenon being investigated and in this way achieves better knowledge of which variables and terms are important to the research and how to operationalize them in a best possible way (Bryman 2004: 273). This is especially true in this research of an explorative character as one avoids ruling out interesting findings when the framework is not too fixed.

In this thesis the objective is to reveal the presidents vision of the EU and eventual divergences between them. Then the question would be whether ideational analysis of the Presidents’ speeches is suitable for this purpose. Do the terms found through the analysis answer the research question? Are the chosen speeches adequate to say something meaningful about the Presidents’ vision? There can be differences in what one express in a speech and how one act. Words do not necessarily express the real intentions. Thus it might be more fruitful to analyze actions. On the other hand, how states choose to act will also be constrained by a number of factors which can be difficult to identify. It is difficult to identify each state’s influence on decisions. Then speeches might be more accurate to identify the president’s visions. Speeches do not present the reality as such, but it is nonetheless interesting to look at how the French presidents want to present themselves in the meeting with others. What speeches can reveal is thus differences in how the presidents present themselves and their opinions. Speeches cannot discover underlying intentions and reasons for divergences. It will be useful to point out some of the factors which might have caused the eventual differences by looking at the international context and so on, but it is difficult to imply their effect on the dependent variable through an analysis of speeches.

5.3.2 External validity

External validity concerns whether the results are transferable to other similar situations (Skog 2010: 214). External validity is one of the weaknesses with qualitative analysess as they often are based on a limited selection which makes such a generalization difficult (Bryman 2004: 273). First of all it concerns whether one can generalize to a population, across time or across space. In other words it is a question of whether one can tell something about each president’s vision in general. The optimal would have been to analyze all speeches concerning European security to control for external events and other factors which could have an impact. However, this must be weighed against time and resources available.
Secondly external validity concerns how broadly one can generalize. Can the results be generalized to all French presidents and can it tell us anything about the French vision in the near future? In this thesis, however, the aim is to find divergences between Chirac and Sarkozy and not to find evidence of a single French vision applicable to all French presidents. Generalization to all French presidents is thus less relevant. On the other hand it would be interesting to see if a divergence between Chirac and Sarkozy also could tell something about the vision in the future. It is a question of generalizing across time and situations. Can divergent historical contexts have made the results inadequate to make a comparison between the presidencies of Chirac and Sarkozy? By analyzing the speech at the conference of ambassadors one has a speech for each year of the presidencies and potential influences from external events and so on are therefore more likely to be discovered, thus it increases the external validity. The external validity is also increased as the subject of the analysis is speeches held for the same audience at the same arena, thus making possible a certain degree of generalization. However, the low number of speeches during Sarkozy’s presidency is a weakness of the external validity lowering the possibility of generalization which must be weighed against the amount of information extracted from the speeches.

### 5.3.3 Reliability

While validity broadly considers the correspondence between the research question on one side and the selected data and method on the other, reliability refers to the manner in which the investigation itself is pursued. The concept of reliability relates to what degree the research is accurate and to what degree the results of the research can be said to be correct.

One distinguishes between external and internal reliability. External reliability concerns the degree to which the research can be replicated. To secure a high degree of external reliability the research must have the possibility of replication: in other words it must be transparent and verifiable (Bryman 2004: 273). In an ideational analysis this presupposes that the research must have a precise description of the procedure, regarding both the selection and the collecting of data. In this way it will be possible for others to see how the research is done making it possible to follow the same procedure to verify the results at a later stage.

Internal reliability concerns whether other researchers can agree with the results of the analysis (Bryman 2004: 273). Is it possible for two researchers, working independently from each other, to find the same answers by looking at the same speeches? Ideational analysis
makes a certain room for interpretation, which can reduce the internal reliability. One of threats in this research is therefore that researchers might be expected to attach different meanings to the terms used by the presidents. While the internal validity of the ideational analysis is high, the reliability runs the risk of being low. The explorative character of the analysis also makes the analysis more prone to the author’s interpretation as the problems of interpretations are reduced the more specific the criteria for the terms are (Bergström & Boréus 2005: 175).

Extensive use of direct quotation from the speeches will however increase the transparency of the research and reduce problems of interpretation (Bergström & Boréus 2005: 354). In the analysis the author therefore strive to base its arguments on direct quotation of the speeches rather than the authors own summary of the speeches when analyzing in what context the different terms are used. This will also increase the possibility for others being able to replicate the study, as it will be possible to see from which terms and quotations the conclusions are derived. Direct quotation is also important as the analysis is done by analyzing speeches held in French while the results of the thesis are presented in English. It is therefore a risk that some nuances will be lost in translation. In the text the direct quotation will be used through the author’s own translation into English to avoid confusion, but with a belonging footnote with the original quote in French. In this way it is possible to see how the author has chosen to translate the terms and the quotes. In addition it is also important to note that French is not the mother tongue of the author. When analyzing speeches in another language the risk of misunderstandings are higher, and there is also a risk that nuances known to people more familiar with the French culture will be lost in the translation.

The last point which will be mentioned is that analysis of speeches is based on close reading, which makes source criticism of special importance to secure a high degree of reliability. In the thesis the author make use of direct reproduction of the speeches, but there is still a danger of the speeches not being correctly reproduced. Even minor divergences of words or words left out can have major implications for the true message of the speech and the author must keep this in mind. An evident precaution which in this research is taken against such errors is analyzing the speeches in their original language, and thus avoiding translation errors.
6 Analysis

6.1 First hypothesis

H1: The foreign policy objectives laying the foundation for the French approach towards European security cooperation have been constant during the Fifth republic, despite of changing threats and a changing international context.

6.1.1 White Paper 1972 – stable and constraining bipolarity

The foreign policy objectives can be discovered by comparing the White Papers from 1972, 1994 and 2008. The White Paper on National Defense from 1972 was published during Cold War and the presidency of Georges Pompidou, thus at a time when the international community was characterized by a constraining bipolar world order. France was trapped between the US and the Soviet Union and the White Paper was marked by a neutral France seeking independence, and the White Paper expressed as one of the elements of its foreign policy: “the refusal of the blocs, which means non alignment with superpowers”\(^{11}\). It stated that France recognized its attachment to the Alliance while also seeking a détente with Russia. While de Gaulle had withdrawn France from NATO’s military commandment six years earlier, the White Paper recognized France’s attachment to the Alliance. But de Gaulle’s policy line was continued and in the context of the Cold War the White Paper identified nuclear force as the absolute primary threat. It was stated that the nuclear risk had added a new dimension to defense. One could now speak of an era of dissuasion. The exclusively national character of dissuasion was emphasized, also stating that the nuclear threat could not be shared.

Based on these facts the White Paper formulated the first objective as ensuring the security of the national territory and its inhabitants. In this respect the objective concerns protecting the French identity as such stating that one must defend a France which “is one of the oldest nations in Western Europe”\(^{12}\). Politically the objective referred to protecting the national independence, in this respect: “the existence, independence and strength of France are the starting point of a policy that naturally leans on the national feeling and the will to develop

\(^{11}\) “Le refus des blocs, c’est-à-dire le non alignement sur les grandes puissances” (White Paper 1972)

\(^{12}\) “est une des plus anciennes nations de l’Europe occidentale” (White Paper 1972)
Morally the objective thus concerned the liberty of France and the French population. The second objective in the White Paper was to participate in the defense around Europe, especially in the Mediterranean. This included the notion of European solidarity and also participation in peacekeeping and reestablishment of peace to ensure stability in the neighborhood, and it is stated in the White Paper that this second objective depends largely on the first objective. The third objective was formulated as protecting the distant territories around the world who express their membership in the French community, stating that France would have to affirm its cultural and economic influence even outside the Western world (White Paper 1972).

6.1.2 White Paper 1994 – a changing world order

The 1994 White Paper was published after the end of the Cold War and during Mitterand’s cohabitation with the Balladur-government. France had to adjust itself to the new reality with the end of bipolarity, the disappearance of a Soviet superpower and the German reunification. The White Paper was thus published in a transition period and must additionally be read in the light of a compromise between a socialist president and a right-side government. The last point is even more relevant as Mitterand was dying the last years of his presidency. Consequently there was a change of threats as the White Paper stated that: “For the first time in its history France has no direct military threat near its borders. However, the new risks can affect its security and its defense.”14. It is also recognized that: “More than other factors, the upheavals in the international context may affect our policy and our defense strategy”15. In this new international context the threats was identified as first of all a new order between the great powers.

The White Paper recognized that recent movements had resulted in a different allocation of balances between the powers. New forms of cooperation were sought between the economic blocs and the security structures which would influence the military and defense systems (White Paper 1994: 7-8). It also identified Russia as a remaining threat even though the Soviet

13 “L’existence, l’indépendance et la force de la France sont le point de départ d’une politique qui prend naturellement appui sur le sentiment de la nation et la volonté de son développement” (White Paper 1972)
14 “Pour la première fois de son histoire, la France ne connaît plus de menace militaire directe à proximité de ses frontières. En revanche, des risques nouveaux peuvent affecter sa sécurité et sa défense.” (White Paper 1994: 7)
15 “Plus que tout autre facteur, les bouleversements du contexte international sont susceptibles d’affecter notre politique et notre stratégie de défense.” (White Paper 1994: 7)
superpower had diminished. The uncertainty of the future of a democratic Russia and as Russia would remain a great military power because of its heritage, made Russia still a threat. The ex-Soviet states seeking its independence would also cause a source of instability (White Paper 1994: 12). Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was recognized as not being a new threat, but new kinds of such weapons as chemical and biological weapons, has made it an increasing threat (White Paper 1994: 15). In addition new vulnerabilities was identified as terrorism, religious extremists and nationalists, drug trafficking and globalization of security and communication strategies. These new vulnerabilities were however not given a lot of space. The last threat mentioned in the White Paper was the insufficiencies of the international order (White Paper 1994: 20-21).

In this context and based on these threats the 1994 White Paper stated the objectives of the French foreign policy as: 1) defending French interests, 2) contributing to the European construction and international stability and 3) putting into force a global perception of defense. Concerning the first objective the vital interests is first of all attached to the survival of the nation. It was thus stated that “the first objective of our defense policy is to still be able to provide, only if necessary, the ultimate defense of our vital interests against any threat whatever origin”16. The French vital interests therefore included ensuring the survival of the state and its territorial integrity, to ensure national independence and sovereignty and to protect the population (White Paper 1994: 24). The French strategic interests referred to peacekeeping on the European continent and the neighbor zones, particularly the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It was also recognized that France had certain international responsibilities from the obligations of being a permanent member of the UN Council, its history and its ambition. Thus, it would have to preserve the independence of countries, assume its international responsibilities, promote democracy and law which are finalities linked to its position in the world (White Paper 1994: 25). The first objective of France in this respect also concerned to “defend its vital and strategic interests in such a way that they correspond to our international responsibilities and our position in the world”17.

The second objective included the notion of the autonomy of French capacity to join allied and to prepare a European capacity in the future, and also to contribute to international

16 “le premier objectif de notre politique de défense demeure d’être en mesure d’assurer, seuls si nécessaire, la défense ultime de nos intérêts vitaux contre toute menace quelle qu’en soit origine” (White Paper 1994: 24)
17 “défendre les intérêts vitaux et stratégique du pays ainsi que ceux correspondent à nos responsabilités internationales et à notre rang dans le monde” (White Paper 1994: 26)
stability and conflict prevention. It is recognized that the position of France in the world is attached to its capacity to influence the European construction. France would have to remain strong at the continent. France recognized its responsibilities in the world as a member of UN, the EU, alliances and as a part of international treaties and agreements and if France remains strong at the continent France can express a firm voice in other places of the world (White Paper 1994: 26). This was also a question of conflict prevention and prevention of wars (White Paper 1994: 27). Considering the third objective the White Paper acknowledged that security was not only limited to only military and strategic aspects. In this respect it stated that a global conception of defense was associated with military defense and a civilian and economic sphere, but also sociological and cultural (White Paper 1994: 27).

6.1.3 White Paper 2008 – the globalization of threats

When Sarkozy published the White Paper on Defense and National Security in 2008 nearly two decades had passed by since the end of the Cold War. The years between the two White Papers were marked by an increasing degree of globalization with the emergence of other great powers on the international arena in addition to new, global threats. It is recognized in the White Paper 2008 that since 1994 the number of democracies has increased significantly (White Paper 2008: 19). It is further recognized that the globalization has profoundly changed the international security structure and that: “it constitutes one of the most important significant developments since the end of the Cold War, the event which served as the background for the White Paper on Defense from 1994”18. The perception of threats is therefore radically changed as can be seen in the speeches at the conference of ambassadors.

Chirac had already declared in his speech at the conference of ambassadors in 1995 that: “With the end of the Cold War the threats have become more uncertain. But who can pretend that they have disappeared? The instability of the ex-Soviet countries, on the territory which disposes nuclear arms, the resurgence of ancestral conflicts even in Europe, the temptation of proliferation which will not disappear with the signing of treaties, binding and verifiable as they are, all this must be taken into account19”. The terrorist attacks 11 September 2001

18 “Elle constitue l’un des changements les plus importants intervenus depuis la fin de la guerre froide, événement qui servait de toile de fond au Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994” (White Paper 2008: 19)
19 “Avec la fin de la guerre froide, les menaces sont devenues plus incertaines. Mais qui peut prétendre qu’elles ont disparu ? L’instabilité des pays issus de l’ex-Union soviétique, sur le territoire desquels subsistent des milliers d’armes nucléaires, la résurgence en Europe même de conflits ancestraux, ailleurs la tentative de la
further changed the perception of threats and overnight made evident the states vulnerability against global threats such as terrorism. In the speeches at the conference of ambassadors it is put increasing emphasis on the threat from terrorist and the threat from extremists in the Arab countries after 2001. Before 2001 terrorism was mentioned by Chirac only in relation to the Middle East and as a challenge included in EU’s pillar of Justice and Home Affairs. However, the terrorist threat was significantly more emphasized after the attack 9/11. In the first speech after the terrorist attacks 9/11, held 29 August 2002, Chirac stated that France has always participated in the fight against terrorism, and would still be military present by the US side. He also pointed out the fragile situation which is the result of the confrontation between the western model and radical Islamism and its terrorist astray. But at the same time he acknowledged that terrorism is not the only threat and that: “the world must not uniquely organize around the respond to the challenge we launched the 11 September as we then will play the same game as those we fight against.” In the speech 2003 he acknowledged that the increasing degree of terrorist attacks is a reminder that the fight against terrorism is far from won. Worrying of the enduring threat from terrorism is moreover expressed in his speech in 2005 proclaiming that: “The attentats taking place in London and Charm El-Cheikh, Turkey and Israel reminds us of the permanent threat from terrorism. Against this barbarism which usurps and distorts the causes it claims to defend, we must fight without respite or weakness, and this, of course, in full respect of our values.”

Yet, the threat of terrorism was even more strongly emphasized in the speeches by Nicolas Sarkozy. In his speech at the conference of ambassadors in 2007 he defined the current threats as terrorism, proliferation and crime, recognizing that these threats have no borders. Additionally a confrontation between Islam and the West was listed as one of the primary challenges claiming that: “We would be wrong to underestimate the possibility: the affair of the caricatures was an early sign.” The risk of a confrontation between the West is also pointed out in his speech in 2008, emphasizing that one must continue the fight against

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20 “Le monde ne doit pas uniquement s’organiser autour de la réponse au défi qui nous a été lancé le 11 septembre, car alors nous ferions le jeu de ceux-là mêmes que nous combattons” (29 August 2002)
21 “Les attentats qui ont frappé cet été Londres et Charm El-Cheikh, la Turquie et Israël nous rappellent la permanence de la menace terroriste. Contre cette barbarie qui usurpe et dévoie les causes qu’elle prétend défendre, il nous faut lutter sans répit ni faiblesses, et ceci, bien sûr, dans le respect absolu de nos valeurs” (29 August 2005)
22 “Nous aurions tort d’en sous-estimer la possibilité: l’affaire des caricatures en a été un signe avant-coureur.” (27 August 2007)
terrorism in Afghanistan further stating that: "France, permanent member of the Security Council, will assume its responsibilities. It will not give in to terrorists"\textsuperscript{23}. In his speech 2011 he recognized the progress which has been made in Afghanistan and salutes the death of Bin Laden as a progress, yet emphasizing that it does not symbolize the end of terrorism and that the threat of terrorism will still be present. Another challenge Sarkozy pointed out in his speech at the conference of ambassadors in 2008 is how to integrate the emerging giants in the new global world order like China, India and Brazil as they pose a threat to the international stability.

Thus, one can see a changing perception of threats. This is also evident in the White Paper. In the White Paper the earlier global ambitions of France now are limited to a bow of threat from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean stretching from Mauritania to Pakistan, as it is considered a challenge to lead an effective global security- and defense policy. The threats were considered being the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan and the White Paper states that as a result of those conflicts one has seen an increased degree of terrorism within and outside Europe in the shape of nuclear, chemical or biological attacks from state or non-state actors (White Paper 2008: 43-44). Terrorist attacks were identified as the primary threat, with a strong probability and genuine risk. Other risks mentioned were information attacks and ballistic threats, in addition to pandemics, natural and industrial catastrophes and organized crime (White Paper 2008: 59). In this respect the White Paper from 2008 acknowledges that the globalization process makes the division between defense and security and between domestic and external security less relevant than before and it broadens the scope of the security term because of terrorism, internationalization of crime, securitarization of energy and the vulnerability of IT-systems.

Against this background the French foreign policy objectives in the White Paper on Defense and National Security from 2008 are stated as: 1) remaining a great military and diplomatic power and 2) assuring French independence and the security of the French population (White Paper 2008: 9). The first objective includes the notion of assuring French contribution to the European and international security. It acknowledges the necessity of proper security which is also influenced by events outside its own borders, and it also acknowledges the responsibilities due to its position in the UN, alliances and international treaties. In addition it

\textsuperscript{23} "La France, membre permanent du Conseil de Sécurité, assumera ses responsabilités. Elle ne cédera pas aux terroristes." (27 August 2008)
includes the perception that security must be seen in a global context. The strategy of national security concerns external security just as much as internal security. The second objective includes being able to prevent risks and threats from harming the nation. Additionally, it includes defending the territory and the population, but also the republican principles as the principle of democracy, individual and collective freedom, the respect of human rights, solidarity and justice (White Paper 2008: 62).

Thus, one can see that the foreign policy objectives in 1972, 1994 and 2008 are strikingly similar despite of changing threats and a changing international context. One can find common objectives as the desire to ensure the French independence and autonomy, the importance of national interest and French contribution to European and international security. The first hypothesis is thus confirmed.

6.2 Second hypothesis

H$_2$: France considers integration in the sphere of security policy a way to strengthen its own position and thus supports an intergovernmental structure of security cooperation in the EU.

6.2.1 A balanced multipolar world order

A word frequently used in both Chirac and Sarkozy’s speeches at the conference of ambassadors is the word *multipolaire*. Chirac recognized in his speeches that with the end of the Cold War new powers have emerged, which in his speech in 2004 are listed as China, Russia, India, Japan, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa in addition to regional groups as ASEAN, Mercosur and the Cooperation Council of the Arab states in the Gulf. In the same speech he claimed that these emerging states had become new poles in the international order adding to the already existing powers, in this way making the world multipolar. As stated in the 1999 speech, Chirac did not consider the current situation as ideal with the US being tempted by unilateralism and isolationism. He stated that: “We can only deal with these serious risks with establishing an international system based on veritable multipolarity”, and
further on that: “For me this system can only exist if the EU itself becomes a real power”24. As later stated in 2003 the French vision was a harmonious, solidary, humanitarian and managed multipolar world.

The word équilibre, in the meaning of balance, is important in this respect. In Chirac’s speech in 1995 it is used in the context that France must seek to create a balance in the multipolar world. A balanced multipolar world would assure that a single state cannot act totally unaffected by other states. It thus would assure that the view of other states would have to be taken into consideration, and it would prevent unilateralist action which Chirac in his speech in 1999 claimed was a risk to a stable world order. In his speech in 2005 Chirac declared that: “Facing crises, no country today, even less than yesterday, has the response alone”. “This conviction”, Chirac continued, “guides the French engagement in favor of an international system more democratic, more just and more representative of the realities of the contemporary world”25.

Nicolas Sarkozy also recognizes a multipolar world order, but to him the emerging poles and “this multipolarity, which could announce a new concert of great powers, is rather heading towards a political clash of powers”26. In his speech in 2008 Sarkozy recognized that the emergence of new powers has created a new situation where no country is in the position anymore to impose exclusively its own vision, stating the fact that France will not succeed alone. Sarkozy argued in the same speech that there is a new concert of great powers, but one which is still left to be organized, calling it the era of relative powers. He claimed that: “the era of relative powers which we have entered and the shortcomings of a fragmented multilateral system carry risks of instability, rivaling and clashes. But this new situation can also lead to a stronger and more sustainable cooperation if it is founded on shared principles and compromises elaborated together”27. And Sarkozy was also emphasizing équilibre

24 “Nous n’échapperons à ce risque grave qu’avec la mise en place d’un système international véritablement multipolaire. Or, pour moi, ce système ne pourra exister que si l’Union européenne devient elle-même une vraie puissance.” (26 August 1999)
25 “Face à ces défis, aucun pays, encore moins aujourd’hui qu’hier, ne détient seul la réponse. C’est cette conviction qui guide l’engagement résolu de la France en faveur d’un système international plus démocratique, plus juste et plus représentatif des réalités du monde contemporain” (29 August 2005)
26 “Mais cette multipolarité, qui pourrait annoncer un nouveau concert des grandes puissances, dérive plutôt vers le choc de politiques de puissance.” (27 August 2007)
27 “L’ère des puissances relatives dans laquelle nous sommes entrés et les insuffisances d’un système multilatéral fragmenté sont porteuses de risques d’instabilité, de rivalités, d’affrontements. Mais cette nouvelle donne peut aussi déboucher sur une coopération plus solide et plus durable si elle est fondée sur des principes partagés et sur des compromis élaborés en commun” (27 August 2008)
stating in his speech in 2007 that without Europe assuming its role, the world would lack a pole necessary to create balance. He claimed in the same speech that one of the greatest challenges is the emerging powers which are the greatest factors of imbalance in a multipolar world because as “giants of tomorrow they want their new status to be recognized, without always being ready to respect the rules which are in everybody’s interests”28. Sarkozy argued that it is necessary to contribute to the emergence of an effective multilateralism founded on respect of the common rules and reciprocity. It is thus a question of managing the multipolar world.

6.2.2 A distinct pole in a multipolar world order

In the speech in 1995 Chirac claimed that a balanced multipolar world would best be achieved by strengthening the European Union as a global actor, of which France will be one of the driving forces. Chirac argued that “the European Union has the potential to become one of these poles and without a doubt one of the two or three most powerful on the”29. In all his speeches it was expressed that the EU must progressively affirm its place as a major pole of power. In his speech in 1997 Chirac made plead for Europe to be just as determined in the sphere of foreign and defense policy as it had been concerning the Euro, further claiming in 1998 that France wants Europe to be a major actor in all spheres “because a unified, democratic and peaceful Europe must contribute to balance the world. Because a Europe affirming its place on the historical scene is for France the greatest mean to preserve its influence and promote its interests in a globalized world”30. This was also the message when Chirac declared in his speech in 1996 that: “When France knows what she wants and mobilizes Europe to obtain what she wants, she wins. In the economic sphere, but also in the political and strategic sphere, even if the French population is less conscious about it, the

28 “Géants de demain, ils veulent que leur nouveau statut soit reconnu, sans être toujours prêts à respecter des règles qui sont pourtant dans l’intérêt de tous.” (27 August 2007)
29 “L’Union européenne a vocation à devenir l’un de ces pôles et sans doute l’un des deux ou trois plus puissants de la planète (31 August 1995)
effort is still just as important”\textsuperscript{31}. It is thus clear that Chirac considers a strong Europe an advantage to France.

It is emphasized in all speeches of Chirac and Sarkozy that Europe must strive to be a \textit{credible actor} with sufficient strength on the international scene, both being rather similar in what is meant by a credible actor. First of all they both see the establishment of a \textit{Europe de la Défense} as necessary to become a credible actor on the international scene. Chirac mentioned the project of a \textit{Europe de la Défense} already at the conference of ambassadors in 1995 and emphasized that one should bring new life to the project. But four years later the crisis in Kosovo 1999 was in the speech of Chirac described as proving the lack and necessity of a common security and defense policy. Chirac stated in the speech that the moment had come to launch a Europe de la Défense and that “Kosovo has confirmed the necessity and even the urgency for the affirmation of a \textit{Europe de la Défense} acting may it be within the Atlantic Alliance, may it be in an autonomous fashion, depending on the nature of crisis”\textsuperscript{32}. Chirac’s wish for Europe to be able to act autonomously is thus expressed. Furthermore, Chirac declared that progressing towards a \textit{Europe de la Défense} was their duty and one of the priorities of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2000.

Kosovo is once again emphasized in the speech in 2000 as having proved the necessity of a credible European security and defense policy. In the speech in 2001 Chirac stressed that one had to establish a European defense policy to become a credible actor. Chirac recognized in the same speech that: “Despite its progress, the Union still gives an image of being an economic giant while its political weight does not converge with its place in the world”\textsuperscript{33}. To him the divergences on methods between the member states were too frequent and he also saw as a weakness the fact that the common foreign and security policy was too often the result of declarations reflecting the lowest common denominator. In other words the current policy was not satisfactory. In 2002 he once again affirmed the importance of reinforcing the \textit{credibility} and efficiency of the external action of the Union, continuing the same line in 2004 underlining that he wanted Europe to be capable of making its voice heard on the

\textsuperscript{31} “Quand la France sait ce qu'elle veut et qu'elle mobilise l'Europe pour obtenir ce qu'elle souhaite, alors elle gagne. Sur le plan économique, mais aussi sur le plan politique et stratégique, et même si les Français en sont moins conscients, les enjeux sont tout aussi importants.” (29 August 1996)

\textsuperscript{32} “Le Kosovo a entièrement confirmé la nécessité, et même l’urgence, de l’affirmation d’une Europe de la Défense agissant soit au sein de l’Alliance atlantique, soit de façon autonome, selon la nature des crises” (26 August 1999)

\textsuperscript{33} “Malgré ces progress, l'Union européenne offer encore l'image d'un géant économique dont le poids politique n'est pas à la mesure de sa place dans le monde” (27 August 2001)
international scene and undertake its *responsibilities* in the military sphere in the framework of a European policy of security and defense or NATO.

Sarkozy emphasizes in his speech in 2007 that the emergence of a strong Europe as a major actor on the international scene, can contribute to the reconstruction of a more efficient, more just and more harmonious world order. He stated that almost ten years after the St.Malo agreement it was time to give *Europe de la Défense* new attention. Sarkozy wanted Europe to assume its responsibilities and its role in service of its security and the security of the world. According to Sarkozy, as with Chirac, France would benefit from a strong Europe on the international scene and he also claimed that Europe needs France, explicitly stated in his speech from 2007: “There is not a powerful France without a powerful Europe, just as there is no powerful Europe without France”34. Further on he stated in the same speech that the European construction was the primary objective of the French foreign policy as France could not respond to the current challenges without a strong and active Union. He declared in the speech in 2008 that to respond to the current risks and challenges it was necessary to reinforce Europe which he describes as an indispensable global actor. It is thus clear in the speeches of both Chirac and Sarkozy that they want Europe to be a major actor on the international scene and that this would serve French interests.

6.2.3 A credible actor with military capacities

It is underlined by both Chirac and Sarkozy that the ambition of a credible Europe on the international scene presupposes *military capacities*. In the speech in 1997 Chirac expressed the wish for EU to be just as determined in the sphere of security and defense policy as in the economic sphere, underlining the need for the EU to give itself the means to security. This was one year after Chirac had announced a new reform of the French defense policy and the military 22 February 1996. This was a revolutionary announcement since no president had put into force such a reform since de Gaulle in 1958 (Orban 1997: 35). The reform announced the reduction of the duration of conscription and in May its progressive abandonment. With the abandonment of conscription the French military should go from 500 000 to 350 000 troops between 1997 and 2002, the final goal being a professional army of 130 000-140 000 men (Gueldry 2001: 163).

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34 “Il n’y a pas de France forte sans l’Europe, comme il n’y a pas d’Europe forte sans la France” (27 August 2007).
Economically the reform was a response to the tough Maastricht criteria one had to meet to be a part of the Economic Monetary Union. Hence, a decrease in employment was made to reduce the military costs in order to match the criteria (Iordonelle 2001: 13). In total there was a manpower cut of one third and a budget cut of one fifth (Tiersky 1997: 98). The military costs were further reduced with reductions in spending on military equipment and the defense expenditure was budgeted to be reduced by 100 billion in the period 1997-2000 (Orban 1998: 20). As the laws had followed an increase in the defense budget until 1995, the new reform represented a radical change of course which was caused by pressures on European integration on the budget (Orban 1997: 32-33; Iordonelle 2001: 13). Strategically the reform was a response to the reunification of Germany, the French involvement in the Gulf war and the conflict in Bosnia. The French lesson of the Gulf war against Iraq had been its insufficient readiness to intervene with its allies in a non-European field of action. The war had revealed the fragility and vulnerability of French unity and equipment (Bureau 1997: 70). While France had sent only 12 000 troops in the French Opération Daguet, Britain had sent 35 000 troops (Gueldry 2001: 163). The gap between British and French participation was thus evident (Tiersky 1997: 98). In other words, strategically the reform can be seen as a means to improve and strengthen the contribution of France in operations outside of Europe.

In addition the reform expressed priority given to interventions and conventional forces, with less emphasis on nuclear deterrence (Iordonelle 2001: 12). The 1972 White Book on Defense had been based on the conflict between the blocks and the country’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structures. It focused on an independent defense based on the importance of nuclear weapons and France’s doctrine of deterrence. The deterrence arsenal got most of the investment, while the conventional forces came in second line. However, with the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany the defense doctrine had to be revisited (Orban 1997: 30). In the new strategic reality the French borders were no longer threatened and the defense of national territory was thus not the primary priority (Iordonelle 2001: 12; Bureau 1997: 70). This was recognized in the White Paper on Defense from 1994 which as mentioned earlier in the thesis to a greater degree emphasized the importance of conventional forces and in the reform and new defense doctrine the decline of nuclear weapons as the heart of French strategy was confirmed (Bureau 1997: 72). The reform building on the White Paper 1994 through its focus on conventional force had as motive to make France better equipped to participate in a European defense and increase the European commitment of France (Major & Mölling 2007: 5).
In his speeches Chirac also considered a European armament industry an essential part of a European defense. Already in his speech in 1995, and later in 1996 and 1997, he spoke of developing a reliable armament industry which he claimed was the condition for an efficient cooperation between the armies. To him building its own defense first of all meant to construct a strong and competitive armament industry as the Europeans would have to gather its forces faced with emerging groupings in the world. This included, as he stated in the speech in 1997, the establishment of a European Armament Agency and common planning of the needs. He had claimed in his speech in 1995 that this construction was developing to slow and proposed a restart of a European defense, and continued by stating in the speech 1997 that: “We have to go much further. And we have to move fast”\(^{35}\). In the speech in 1996 Chirac argued that the restructuration of the defense industry would permit the conditions for a European capacity to improve. The necessity of the disposal of sufficient military capacities and projection means to be credible was again emphasized in 2002. While recognizing the efforts of UK and France to have made the decision necessary to give the armies the means which would contribute to the international ambitions and defense engagements taken in the framework of the EU Chirac declared in his speech in 2002 that: ”I call for our partners to do the same choice. It is at this prize Europe can make its voice heard and impose its influence on the international scene”\(^{36}\). A strengthening of the military contribution from all the member states was seen as necessary to make the EU a credible military actor.

Sarkozy acknowledged in his speech in 2007 that facing an increasing number of crises there were challenges to the capacities in Europe. Europe would have to prioritize, as stressed in his speech in 2007, to “reinforce our capacities of planning and conduct operations; develop within Europe the armament with the new programs and rationalize those who exist, assure the interoperability of our forces; and that everyone in Europe does its part in the common security”\(^{37}\). Sarkozy called for Europe to affirm progressively itself as an actor in the front of peace and security in the world, in cooperation with the UN, the Atlantic Alliance and the African Union as the Union disposes all the instruments of intervention in crisis. “Besides instruments”, he argued in the speech in 2007, “we need a common vision of the threats

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\(^{35}\) "Nous devons aller beaucoup plus loin. Et nous devons aller vite" (27 August 1997)

\(^{36}\) “J’appelle nos partenaires à faire, dans ce domaine, les choix courageux qui s’imposent. C’est à ce prix que l’Europe pourra faire entendre sa voix et exercer une influence sur la scène international” (29 August 2002)

\(^{37}\) “...renforcer nos capacités de planification et de conduite des opérations; de développer l’Europe de l’armement avec de nouveaux programmes et de rationaliser ceux qui existent; d’assurer l’interopérabilité de nos forces; et que chacun en Europe prenne sa part de la sécurité commune.” (27 August 2007)
against us and the means to respond. Together we must adapt a new European security strategy as a continuation of the one from 2003. The adaption of a security strategy would contribute to reaching a new level with the relaunch of Europe de la Défense and would contribute increasingly to world security and Sarkozy announced in his speech in 2008 that the moment had come to do this.

Like Chirac Nicolas Sarkozy spoke of a European defense industry and he stated in the speech in 2008 that the security strategy should include an agreement on the level of ambition for the Union’s operations and the necessary military and civil means. In other words it would be a strategy creating a framework of how much the member states would be willing to contribute to a European defense. In the speech he further expressed the wish for progressing towards a strong and competitive European defense industry by developing the necessary equipment between voluntary countries and organizing the formation of the officers in a Military Erasmus. In the speech in 2011 he also argued that one could not have a real defense in the name of Europe without robust military capacities and real industrial and technological policies. The importance of military capacities of the EU is thus evident in the speeches of both presidents.

6.2.4 Collective responsibility versus individual responsibility

In the speeches the fact that the cooperation on security and defense should preferably remain of an intergovernmental character is obvious. In 1995 and 1996 Chirac explicitly stated that the sphere of security and defense must preserve an intergovernmental character and continue to be under the authority of the Council. In addition the sovereignty of the states was emphasized in the speech in 1995 and that in the decision-making states would have to be able to protect their vital national interests. Even more explicitly it was stated in the speech in 1998 that: “The Union does not want to be a United States of Europe. It wants to be a Europe united by states.” He continued this line by asking in 1999 how the states could keep the control of the globalization. Chirac’s vision of Europe, further explained in the speech from 2000, is a Union where the member states place its destiny, without giving up their identity. Thus Chirac does not want a form of cooperation where states have to give up their

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38 "Mais au delà des instruments, nous avons aussi besoin d'une vision commune des menaces qui pèsent sur nous et des moyens d'y répondre : il nous faut élaborer ensemble une nouvelle "stratégie européenne de sécurité”, prolongeant celle adoptée en 2003 sous l'égide de Javier Solana.” (27 August 2007)
sovereignty, compromising issues of vital national importance. He recognized in the speech in 2000 that some competences cannot be assured by a framework of common decision-making and that it is necessary to keep these competences on state level. He explicitly affirmed the role of the member states by saying in the same speech that: “The member states, as the Union, are actors on the international scene. They will remain” 40, hereby declaring that in the sphere of security and defense states must continue to be the main decision-makers. Even though it is necessary for the Union to speak on behalf of all the member states and speak with one voice externally the member states are still the essential parts of which it is made up. This led him to promote a “federation of nation states” in his speech in 2001.

The emphasis on an intergovernmental character of the cooperation is also evident in the speeches of Sarkozy. In his speech from 2007 he stated that the states remain at the heart of the international system, furthermore arguing in the speech in 2009 that the states are alone facing their responsibilities and that the states have refound their place in the international system. Sarkozy does not use expressions like Federation of nation states or “Europe of united states”, like Chirac did. In this respect one find even less evidence of a vision of the European states as attached to each other, and could thus argue that Sarkozy support a more intergovernmental form of cooperation. This argument is further supported by looking at the use of the word responsibility which is a word of frequent use and therefore catches the attention. When Chirac speaks of responsibility he speaks of the responsibility of the Union, Europe or the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. This is evident in statements like: “Our will to see Europe take on its political responsibilities...” 41, “The end of the Cold War has faced Europe and China with its responsibilities” 42, “But this affirmation of the European Identity has yet to be translated into a better division of responsibilities between the Europeans and the Americans in the military structure of the organization” 43, and, “A Europe I want to be able to make its voice heard on the international scene and assume its responsibilities, including in the military sphere, within the framework of a European security and defense policy or

41 “Notre volonté de voir l’Europe assumer des responsabilités politiques...” (31 August 1995)
42 “La fin de la guerre froide a mis l’Europe et la Chine face à leurs responsabilités” (27 August 1997)
43 “Mais cette affirmation de l’identité européenne doit encore se traduire par un meilleur partage des responsabilités entre Européens et Américains dans la structure militaire de l’organisation” (27 August 1997)
NATO. Only in a few cases he emphasizes the responsibility of each country as for example in 2003: “In the United Nations, in the Atlantic Alliance, within the European Union, everyone has taken its responsibilities and in 2006: “France, for its part, has undertaken its responsibilities”.

Sarkozy, however, speaks of responsibility in a more individual and nationalistic manner. While also speaking of the responsibility of the Union, the Atlantic Alliance or the international society as a whole, he speaks frequently of the responsibilities of each single country. “Let us be clear: France, a permanent member of the Security Council, will assume its responsibilities, “Everyone must assume their responsibilities and put their actions in accordance with these proposals”, “The responsibilities facing the states are directly the function of their weight. The stronger one is in Europe, the more responsibility one has”, “Beside the rights of everyone, what are the duties and the responsibilities that each state is ready to assume in order to make the European Union become one of the leading actors in the 21st century?”, “France does not want to lecture anyone, but France has certain responsibilities due to its economic power and history”, “At the big table where decisions are made new actors have joined the established powers. They rightly claim recognition of their rights. But they must also accept that with these rights also comes duties, responsibilities to assume.”. By emphasizing the responsibility of each state and not Europe as a whole Sarkozy implicitly expressed a wish for strengthening the role of the state, in other words a strengthening of an intergovernmental form of cooperation.

44 “Une Europe que je souhaite capable de faire entendre sa voix sur la scène internationale et d’assumer ses responsabilités, y compris dans le domaine militaire, et ceci dans le cadre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ou de l’OTAN” (27 August 2004)
45 “Aux Nations Unies, dans l’Alliance atlantique, au sein de l’Union européenne, chacun a pris ses responsabilités” (29 August 2003)
46 “La France, pour sa part, a pris ses responsabilités” (26 August 2006)
47 “Soyons clairs : La France, membre permanent du Conseil de Sécurité, assumera ses responsabilités” (27 August 2008)
48 “Chacun devra prendre ses responsabilités et mettre ses actes en accord avec ses propos” (26 August 2009)
49 “Les responsabilités qui pèsent sur les Etats sont directement fonction de leur poids. Plus on est fort en Europe, plus on a de responsabilités.” (26 August 2009)
50 “Au delà des droits de chacun, quels sont les devoirs, les responsabilités que chaque Etat est prêt à assumer pour que l’Union européenne devienne, au XXIème siècle, un acteur de premier rang ? ” (26 August 2009)
51 “La France ne veut donner de leçon à personne, mais la France a des responsabilités par sa puissance économique, par son histoire.” (26 August 2009)
52 “A la grande table où se prennent les décisions, de nouveaux acteurs ont rejoint les puissances reconnues. A juste titre, ils réclament la reconnaissance de leurs droits. Mais il leur faut aussi accepter qu’avec ces droits viennent des devoirs, des responsabilités à assumer.” (25 August 2010)
In sum, both Chirac and Sarkozy want the sphere of security and defense to be characterized by intergovernmental cooperation, although more emphasized by Sarkozy. They also want France to strengthen its position by contributing to reinforced cooperation in this sphere which will make the EU a credible actor on the international scene. Hypothesis 2 is thus confirmed, adding the aspect of an increasing intergovernmentalist character in the speeches of Sarkozy.

6.3 Third hypothesis

H3: Sarkozy’s political style in the French involvement in the European security system is characterized by being more proactive than Chirac.

6.3.1 A proactive France

The answer to this hypothesis first of all concerns the role of France in Europe. In his speech in 1995 Chirac declared that: “France has all the means to remain in the front, lead its partners and share with them its vision and ambition”\(^{53}\). Additionally he declared in the same speech that “When France knows what it wants and mobilizes Europe to achieve what it wants, it wins”\(^{54}\), implying that France itself must mobilize Europe to take action if it wants to obtain results and progress. He once again emphasizes the importance of mobilizing in his speech in 1996 proclaiming that: “My ambition is to give the French population real reasons to hope and to mobilize them showing them that France has everything to succeed, when it knows where it is heading, that it can lead Europe, that it can contribute to the emergence of a more secure and more just world”\(^{55}\). In the speech in 1997 he recognized that “to preserve its position and defend as best as possible its interest France must engage”\(^{56}\), furthermore claiming in 1998 that: “France by the very fact of the end of the Cold War has refound a great freedom of initiative and action. Our freedom of maneuver is even greater as we know how to

\(^{53}\) “La France dispose tous les atouts pour demeurer au premier rang, entraîner ses partenaires, leur faire partager sa vision et son ambition.” (31 August 1995)

\(^{54}\) “Quand la France sait qu’elle veut et qu’elle mobilise l’Europe pour obtenir ce qu’elle souhaite, alors elle gagne.” (31 August 1995)

\(^{55}\) “Mon ambition est de donner aux Français de variés raisons d’espérer, et de mobiliser en leur montrant que la France a tout pour réussir, quand elle sait où elle va, qu’elle peut entraîner l’Europe, qu’elle doit contribuer à l’émergence d’un monde plus sûr et plus équitable.” (29 August 1996)

\(^{56}\) “Pour preserver ce rang et defender au mieux ses intérets, la France doit s’engager”. (27 August 1997)
show cohesion in determination and ambition”\textsuperscript{57}. As such, Chirac calls for France to use its new advantages given by the end of the Cold War to establish its position. In Chirac’s speech in 2003 he asks: “Can France pretend to be in control of its destiny? Can it continue to make its voice heard to respond to important issues facing human beings? I have the conviction that it can and it must. It is a matter of will and it is our ambition, it is your ambition.”\textsuperscript{58}. Thus he expresses that the ambition must be an influential France able to secure its future. One year later he stated that: “Our network is an irreplaceable instrument of influence. A France which keeps its eyes open to the world, present at all continents has the largest weight in Europe.”\textsuperscript{59}. In this statement he thus calls for a France being present in all areas of the world, maintaining its global influence. One can find Chirac most proactive statement in his speech 2005 declaring that: “More than ever, today, France must be in the forefront of action”\textsuperscript{60}. But Chirac to a large degree emphasized a multilateral degree of cooperation. As recognized in his speech in 1995 he declared concerning the situation at the Balkans that France would not succeed alone. He also declared in his speech in 1998 that it is together with the other European powers that France will achieve the construction of a Europe puissance and a Europe based on human rights stating that: “I want France and the European Union to be in the front in the fight for these values, this engagement in favor of a new international order more just and harmonious.”\textsuperscript{61}. As earlier mentioned Sarkozy, on the contrary to Chirac, declared that it is time that each member state assumes their responsibility in the sphere of security. And as Sarkozy seemingly seeks a stronger degree of intergovernmentalist cooperation than Chirac, as found in hypothesis 2, he seeks a stronger position for each state, including France. The particular role of France is especially underlined claiming that France has a special responsibility in Europe because of its demographic weight, and as stated in the earlier mentioned quote from the speech in 2009: “…France has certain responsibilities given by its economic power and by its

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\textsuperscript{57} “La France du fait meme de la fin de la guerre froide, a retrouvé une grande liberté d’initiative et d’action. Notre marge de manœuvre est d’autant plus grande que nous savons faire preuve de cohesion, de détermination et d’ambition”. (26 August 1998)

\textsuperscript{58} “La France peut-elle pretender rester maîtresse de son destin? Peut-elle continuer à faire entendre sa voix pour apporter sa réponse aux grandes questions qui se posent aux hommes? J’ai la conviction qu’elle peut et qu’elle le doit. C’est affaire de volonté et c’est notre vocation” (29 August 2003)

\textsuperscript{59} “Notre réseau est un instrument irremplaçable d’influence. Car une France qui garde les yeux ouverts sur le monde, présente sur tous les continents, pèse d’un poids plus grand en Europe.” (27 August 2004)

\textsuperscript{60} “Plus que jamais, aujourd’hui, la France doit être à l’avant-garde de l’action”. (26 August 2006)

\textsuperscript{61} “Je souhaite que la France et l’Union européenne soient au premier rang de ce combat pour les valeurs, de cet engagement en faveur d’un nouvel ordre international juste et harmonieux.” (26 August 1998)
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During the crisis in Georgia 2008 France assumed this responsibility by taking the lead in the peace negotiations. Considering the context for the crisis in Georgia it was convenient to Sarkozy that it coincided with the French Presidency of the EU. The Presidency gives a country a certain power of initiative in foreign policy issues as article 18(1) of the Treaty on the European Union stipulates that “the Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy”. It is suggested a clearly asymmetrical power relationship between the Presidency and the High Representative as Article 18(3) state that the Presidency “shall be assisted by the ... High Representative for the common foreign and security policy”. (Dijkstra 2011: 4). This will be even truer when a large member state chairs the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Larger member states have more political expertise and more diplomatic resources and are consequently less inclined to depend on the High Representative. In many ways it is a question of risk-aversion. Smaller states with less experience are more prone to make wrong decisions and will thus seek to the High Representative for a second opinion on matters (Dijkstra 2011: 4). For a large member state like France the presidency in this respect is a great opportunity to take the lead in foreign policy issues, and this is what Sarkozy did during the crisis in Georgia.

Also in his speeches at the conference of ambassadors Sarkozy emphasized to a greater degree than Chirac that France must take the lead and be avant-garde. In his speech in 2008 Sarkozy proclaimed that France must be avant-garde in the European project “as it must remain a power with global ambitions”63. He further declared in his speech in 2009 that “the role of France is to take initiative and not submit. It is too easy, when people suffer, to say: we wait for the others to move before we move ourselves. And one does it by habit, one just wait, since by construction the others do not move if we do not move”64. The message of Sarkozy is action. It is necessary to take the initiative, it is necessary to act. And France must take the lead to make the Union progress. One cannot be in a state of apathy. He thus fronts a more active role of France. By emphasizing the particular responsibility of France he envisages the distinct role of France in the security sphere. He envisages a more distinct role for France as a power with global ambitions.

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62 “...la France a des responsabilités par sa puissance économique, par son histoire.” (26 August 2009)
63 “comme elle doit demeurer une puissance à vocation mondiale.” (27 August 2008)
64 “La role de la Francec'est d'ètre en initiative et pas de subir. C'est trop facile, alors que tant de gens souffrent, de dire “on attend que les autres bougent pour bouger”. Et l'on fait comme d'habitude, on ne fait qu'attendre, puisque que par construction les autres ne bougeront pas si nous bougerons pas.” (26 August 2009)
taking the lead in the European security and defense cooperation, thus being more proactive than Chirac.

6.3.2 A proactive Europe

Chirac had stated both in his speech in 1999 and 2000 that Kosovo had proved the necessity for a Europe being a credible military actor, and the need for a European security and defense policy. Together with Tony Blair Chirac had pleaded for a military intervention in Kosovo after a diplomatic solution had been refused by Milosevic. Chirac himself declared in his speech in 1999 that he had pleaded for this intervention “In the name of Human Rights. In the name of a certain idea of Europe and the role of France in Europe. But also in the name of a certain idea of the world tomorrow, and the role the Union must have in it”. 65 It is thus clear that Chirac wanted Europe to act in Kosovo to establish its position as a global actor and to be in the front when fighting against abuse of human rights and concerning humanitarian intervention. And Chirac wanted France to have a distinct role within Europe. In the speech from 2000 Chirac declared that one of the lessons from Kosovo was the victory over barbarism, and that France and Europe must take the lead in the fight for such values. He further argued that it was necessary for Europe to be in the front and avoid being paralyzed as it would have to be able to respond to a necessity.

Yet, what is also clear is that Chirac only wanted Europe to intervene inside its zone of responsibility, meaning within the Article 5 of NATO. During the crisis in Kosovo the discussion was whether the situation was when it was legitimate for NATO to operate. In a press conference 24 April 1999 Chirac recognized that beside its traditional mission of defense against a potential aggression NATO had developed new missions with participation in peacekeeping operations and peacemaking operations. And this was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, the question Chirac posed was under what conditions NATO could conduct those new missions in the future. Could NATO act on its own when decided by its members? More explicitly Chirac asked in the press conference: “Can NATO do what it wants, where it wants, when it wants, or on the contrary does NATO have to intervene with the agreement of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United

Nations?”66. And Chirac answered his question by emphasizing that France defined the competence of the Atlantic Alliance as geographical limited to the Euro-Atlantic zone, further stating that a UN-resolution was necessary for all operations outside the NATO-zone. However, the intervention in Kosovo did not have a UN-mandate from the beginning, but it was claimed by the French that it fell under the mandate of Article 5. As a part of Europe it represented a situation where it was necessary to act because, as stated in the declaration 24 March 1999: “it concerns peace at our continent, because it concerns the human rights of the people at our continent.”67

This was nevertheless according to Chirac, not the case in Iraq in 2003. Chirac only considered Iraq a crucial threat if there where proves of Iraq having Weapons of Mass Destruction or if Iraq refused to destroy them, and he recognized that there were two paths to the disarmament of Iraq, as stated in an interview with TF1 and France 2 March 10 2003: war or control and constraints. The last path, he argued, consisted of being present with the authority of the UN to take care of the armaments, find them and destroy them. He pointed out in the interview that the international community, by voting unanimously for resolution 1441 in the Security Council had taken the decision saying that: “we will peacefully disarm Iraq, in the meaning of inspections. We will send inspectors and they will tell us whether this path is possible or not”68. Chirac acknowledged that Iraq would only be veritably dangerous if it had the means of aggression and the means to attack. The fixed objective was therefore the elimination of WMD’s. The UN inspectors had not found any prove of this, and Chirac did therefore not consider it legitimate to intervene as without the WMD’s Iraq did not pose any direct threat to the NATO countries. The abuse of the regime of the civilians concerned Iraq’s sovereignty, and was not a case for the NATO-countries.

Sarkozy not only wants France to take the lead, but also the European Union to take the lead on the international arena. Sarkozy pointed out in the speech in 2008 that in the sphere of peace and security one ignore too often that the Union has conducted the last ten years 15 military and police operations at the Balkans, in the Middle East and Africa. Regarding the

66 “L’OTAN peut-elle faire ce qu’elle veut où elle veut, quand elle veut ou au contraire l’OTAN doit-elle faire les choses, intervenir avec l’accord du Conseil de Sécurité et conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies?” (24 April 1999)
67 “Parce qu’il s’agit de la paix sur notre continent, parce qu’il s’agit des droits de l’homme sur notre continent.” (24 March 1999)
68 “Nous allons désarmer l’Iraq de manière pacifique, c’est-à-dire par les inspections. Nous allons nommer des inspecteurs, et eux nous diront si cette voie est possible ou si elle ne l’est pas” (10 March 2003)
crisis in Georgia Sarkozy recognized in the same speech that this conflict would have consequences for the Union, as it would influence the Union’s relation with Russia. “What is at stake in this conflict is absolutely essential. It will determine for a long time the Union’s relation with Russians”\textsuperscript{69}. That the conflict would have implications for EU-Russia relations was thus an important reason to find a peaceful solution and Sarkozy further argued in the same speech that “the crisis in Georgia have shown for the first time that Europe could if it wanted, be in the lead in a conflict to search a peaceful resolution”\textsuperscript{70}. The Europeans, represented by the French presidency, succeeded through peaceful negotiation to end the Russian invasion of Georgia. But the success of European action and French leadership must be seen in the international context. In the US the presidential elections were being held in November, and therefore a power vacuum was left to be filled (Atlantic Review January 5 2009). The focus of the US administration was elsewhere. Also, the position of the Europeans and the French Presidency as peace negotiators were more advantageous as it was they were considered more neutral negotiators than the US which quickly gave its support to Georgia (Kurtbag 2008: 61). Thus, the Europeans were given the opportunity to show what they were capable of and Sarkozy recognized this opportunity and took it.

Regarding the intervention in Libya in March 2011 Sarkozy declared in his speech 2011 that the crisis showed that for the first time a Europe capable of intervening in an open conflict at its doorstep, through the initiative of France and the UK, furthermore announcing that this was a remarkable progress compared to the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. He thus acknowledged the ability of Europe to act. Europe was able to act through a strong leadership, Sarkozy emphasizing the role of France as one of the driving forces. The context for the Libyan intervention must also be kept in mind. The Arab Spring had caught France and Europe by surprise. France, which has strong links to these countries because of its history as a colonial power, did not respond to the events starting in Tunisia in December 2010 and continuing in Egypt. The events were in the beginning more or less ignored and not taken seriously. But as the events developed into regimechanging revolutions the importance of the events became evident. However, in Libya the demonstrations did not lead to the fall of the regime as the Gadaffi-regime begun airbomb attacks on the civilian population as a means of suppression. In this situation a quick response by France became crucial especially to avoid

\textsuperscript{69} “Ce qui est en cause dans ce conflit est absolument essential. Son issue déterminera pour longtemps la relation de l’Union avec la Russie” (27 August 2008)

\textsuperscript{70} “La crise en Géorgie a montré, pour la première fois, que l’Europe pouvait, si elle le voulait, se porter en première ligne dès le début d’un conflit pour rechercher une solution de paix” (27 August 2008)
the image of France being perplexed by the events during the Arab spring (Mikhail 2011: 5-6; Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies 21 December 2011). This is one of the underlying factors behind Sarkozy’s strong determination to take the lead in Libya.

In the intervention in Libya Sarkozy also showed that NATO could also intervene outside its areas, linking it to the UN-resolution of Responsibility to Protect. Talking about the situation at the Ivory Coast and in Libya Sarkozy declared in his speech in 2011 that: “We have promoted respect of the international law: not with phrases but with actions. Mobilizing the Security Council we have specified for the first time a principle of action (…) the responsibility to protect.”71 According to Sarkozy one therefore had a responsibility to engage in humanitarian intervention even when it did not directly threaten the NATO-countries. In this way he clearly envisages a different role for NATO and Europe as such, allowing “out of area-operations”.

Another lesson from the Libyan intervention was expressed in Sarkozy’s statement in the speech 2011 arguing that: “We must face the facts. Beyond Libya Europe is threatened by a strategic narrowing. What do we see? A continuous decline in defense efforts: invocation of a soft power that serves as a screen-denial, and too often blindness to threats”72. Sarkozy thus recognizes the role of Europe in the resolution of the Libyan crisis. At the same time he makes a strong call for Europe being more than a soft power, with more than soft power means. He calls for a strengthening of the defense and he implicitly calls for a reversion of the trend of declining defense budgets. This had also been recognized in his speech in 2010 where he pointed out that the economic crisis had increased the gap between the American and European efforts in the sphere of security and defense as the European efforts were even more reduced and dispersed. He announced that: “Under the French Presidency of the Union we have together defined the response. It is necessary to put them into force as one does not defend Europe with a wall of procedures and paper battalions”73. With this statement Sarkozy

71 “Nous avons fait progresser le respect du droit international; pas avec des phrases mais avec des actes. En mobilisant le Conseil de sécurité sur ces deux crises, nous avons concrétisé pour la première fois un principe d’action (…) la responsabilité de protéger.” (31 August 2011)
72 “Ceci dit, ne nous voilons pas la face: au-delà de la Libye, l’Europe est menacée de rétrécissement stratégique. Que voit on? Une baisse continue des efforts de défense; l’invocation d’un soft power qui sert de paravent au renoncement; et, trop souvent, l’aveuglement face aux menaces” (31 August 2011)
73 “La crise accroit encore le décalage entre l’effort de nos alliés américains et ceux, en réduction et dispersés, des Européens. Lors de la Présidence française de l’Union, nous avons défini ensemble des réponses. Il faut les mettre en oeuvre, car on ne défendra pas l’Europe avec des murailles de procédures et des bataillons en papier” (25 August 2010)
declared that Europe is more than a big non-governmental organization and that the military forces should not only be agreed on paper, but must be able to be put into force.

An even more explicit description of what kind of Europe Sarkozy wants one can find in his speech from 2009: “Europe must reinforce its military capacities because Europe is not a Big Red Cross (...) Europe is not a big non-governmental organization. Europe is a commercial, political, economic, monetary and military power. Europe must defend its interests as it did in the Balkans, Georgia and Tchad”. He thus explicitly call for Europe to not only have power in theory, he wants Europe to confirm its power through action, including military action.

Following the same argumentation line he proclaimed in the same speech that “every time Europe wants, Europe can”. However, he recognized that the problem is that Europe does not always want. Once again the word responsibility is important. In general the word responsibility is more underlined and more frequently used in the speeches of Sarkozy than in the speeches of Chirac. In his speech in 2009 Sarkozy argued that concerning European progress “it is a question of the state of mind, because a number of big countries have not wanted to put enough petrol in the European vehicle to make it progress. It is too easy to say: the others do not agree, so we cannot progress. One wait for everybody to agree, and as no one agrees one does nothing but wait. Waiting is not an ambition”.

In this respect this argument can be seen in relation with a free rider problem. Making progress in the sphere of defense is expensive. While hoping that other states will pay the costs and develop cooperation, cooperation which all the member states will benefit from, many states chose not to participate even though the costs would be less invasive if all the states had participated. The result is that there are not a sufficient number of states participating because of the fear of having to bear the costs alone. There is thus no progress and nobody benefit. By emphasizing each member states responsibility to contribute and the European responsibility in general one is more likely to make them contribute. To Sarkozy each of the member state has a choice of participating or not participating. He emphasizes that

74 “L'Europe doit renforcer ses capacités militaires parce que l'Europe n'est pas une immense Croix Rouge ! Loin de moi l'idée de critiquer la Croix Rouge qui fait un travail international considérable et remarquable, mais l'Europe n'est pas une immense ONG. L'Europe est une puissance commerciale, politique, économique, monétaire et militaire. L'Europe doit défendre ses intérêts comme elle le fait dans les Balkans, en Géorgie, au Tchad ou au large des côtes somaliennes.” (26 August 2009)

75 “C'est une question d'état d'esprit, parce qu'un certain nombre de grands pays n'ont pas voulu mettre dans le moteur de la voiture européenne, suffisamment de carburant pour avancer. Et c'est trop facile de dire: les autres ne sont pas d'accord, donc on n'avance pas. On attend que tout le monde soit d'accord et encore une fois, comme personne n'est toujours d'accord, on ne fait qu'attendre. Attendre n'est pas un ambition.” (26 August 2009)
to make progress there must be willingness. The member states have a responsibility to want to progress. Sarkozy’s use of the word responsibility is thus arguably a part of his proactive style, seeking to progress and obtain results as effective and quick as possible, by recognizing that everybody has to participate to make progress in the sphere of defense and security. It is also a form of moralization which could not be found in the speeches of Chirac, telling the states when to act.

In his speeches Sarkozy expresses a more profound impatience and a stronger drive to take initiative, as for example with the already mentioned peace negotiation between Russia and Georgia. Sarkozy is concerned with obtaining results. To a certain degree Sarkozy has defined more clearly the role of France and Europe and his actions thus symbolizes a Europe and a France which has become more secure regarding its position in the world and what role it should play after many years of confusion after the end of the Cold War. While the Cold War did not force Europe and France to think of its future role as its scope of action was rather limited, the end of it brought a new capacity of action which forced it to start thinking about its role in the world and its means and purposes. One could therefore argue that Sarkozy’s emphasis on action shows signs of a France, under Sarkozy, which has finally managed to overcome the impact of the Cold War and has managed to adapt to a new strategic environment.

In sum it has been discovered that Sarkozy fronts a more proactive style, both concerning the role of France and the role of Europe. The hypothesis is thus confirmed.
6.4 Fourth hypothesis

$H_4$: Under Sarkozy the French vision of the EU’s role in crisis resolution has become more pragmatic and flexible, resulting in an increasing degree of ad hoc cooperation in the sphere of security and defense.

6.4.1 Pionergroups and voluntarism versus inequality of duties and determinism

In the speech in 1995 Chirac argued that to succeed with an enlarged Union it would be necessary to introduce the *flexibility* needed in the treaties to permit the member states with the capacity and the will to reinforce their solidarity and cooperation. At the conference in 1996 he continued to plead for institutionalization of reinforced cooperation permitting the states, which wanted and was able, to gather within the EU and with the consent of the Council take common actions of a more ambitious character. Voluntary reinforcement was also emphasized in the speech in 1997 when speaking of the Amsterdam Treaty and the clause on reinforced cooperation “permitting the states who wanted to move further and faster in the common exercise of certain responsibilities”\(^76\). During the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2000 Chirac explained that the French presidency wanted to facilitate reinforced cooperation because of the necessity of preserving the capacities to progress within the union, introducing the term pionergroups. The pionergroups would form the “peloton de tête” of the states who wanted to move further in Europe, functioning like the motor of the European Union as mentioned in his speech in 2000. The proposal thus further developed the idea of reinforced cooperation.

The proposal for pionergroups was first introduced two months earlier in a speech in Berlin on June 27 2000\(^77\). Concerning the upcoming enlargement to the Central and –East European countries Chirac presented his idea of deepened cooperation for those who wanted to progress even further and faster. These countries could together with France and Germany form pionergroups which would open up for reinforced cooperation. Chirac’s hope was that from 2001 the pionergroups would seek reinforced coordination in the economic sphere and a strengthening of the security and defense policy. Chirac presented the pionergroups as a

\(^76\) “qui permettra aux États qui le souhaitent d’aller plus vite et plus loin dans l’exercice en commun de certaines responsabilités” (27 August 1997)

\(^77\) Jacques Chirac speech to the Bundestag in Berlin 27 June 2000
mechanism of flexible coordination with a secretary ensuring the consistency of the policies and the positions of the members of these groups. This would assure that advancement of Europe in the transition period while preparing the institutional reform.

As underlined in the speech at the conference of ambassadors in 2000 the pionergroups would be established not on an arbitrary basis, but on a voluntary basis. The countries would strive to better organize common actions, while preserving the acquis of the Union and ensuring the possibility for other countries to join at any given moment. In his speech in 2001 Chirac spoke specifically of the need for an avant-garde, a pionergroup in the sphere of security and defense. It would be a foreign and security policy based on reinforced cooperation within a group of states, which would be open to all states wanting to go “plus loin, plus vite”, the goal being: ”by adopting convergent positions on essential foreign policy issues, by launching common defense projects, some countries, as the experience has proved, can be a driving force which would benefit all those who would like to join this effort”78. In the speech in 2003 he spoke of the potential of France and Germany being at the heart of the pionergroups, the same year France and Germany had reaffirmed their relation on the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty and also the same year as the war in Iraq where France and Germany had been united in their condemnation of the military intervention.

Chirac had already in his speech in 1995 addressed the need for France and Germany to show the way and keep in life the communitarian construction. The Franco-German cooperation in the sphere of security, which had been formally initiated with the Elysée Treaty in 1963, was deepened and reaffirmed December 9 in 1996 when France and Germany announced a Common Concept on Defense and Security, known as the Nuremberg Declaration. The declaration reaffirmed the two countries common destiny and the existence of a common vital interest in each other’s stability (Gueldry 2001: 168; Bloch-Lainé 1999: 148). It also stated the importance of NATO in a European security system (Nilson & Orban 2000: 20). Through the declaration it was decided to accelerate the process of achieving complementarity between their respective armed forces. It was also decided to reinforce their cooperation in two particular fields: airlift capacities and intelligence. This was precisely the areas in which European armed forces was weak thus making them dependent on American assets within

78 “...en adoptant des positions convergentes sur des questions essentielles de politique étrangère, en réalisant en commun des projets de défense, quelques pays, l’expérience l’a prouvé, peuvent avoir une force d’entraînement qui bénéficie à tous ceux qui veulent se joindre à cet effort.” (27 August 2001)
NATO. The underlying issue was thus that of a real defense role for the union (Bloch-Lainé 1999: 154).

The Franco-German axe has in all the speeches of Chirac’s been considered fundamental and was in 1996 described as “the perfect entente offering the best chances to a balanced and coherent global approach”. Chirac emphasized in his speech 1998 that France must: “also and especially propose to Germany new and even more ambitious paths, to affirm our entente and our cooperation. At the heart of the European project the relation between Paris and Bonn, tomorrow between Paris and Berlin, is more than ever fundamental”79. It was later emphasized in the speech in 2002 the Franco-German axe was not sufficient to make Europe progress, but has always been necessary. Its necessity was also expressed in the speech in 2005 when stating that “I will reaffirm with strength the French vision of a political, ambitious, social and solidary Europe. A vision France share with Germany which our two countries, the irreplaceable motor of the European construction, will continue to bear together.”80. Chirac clearly considered Germany an important partner, the sphere of of security and defense being no exception.

But in the sphere of security and defense the Franco-British cooperation has also been crucial. A momentous event in the sphere of security and defense was the bilateral Franco-British Saint Malo declaration published on 4 December 1998. The declaration called for “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”81. Further on it stated that “In pursuing our objective, the collective defense commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained”82, thus centering the European defense in the juridical framework of the Alliance. But for the first time the reference to the Alliance was not exclusive stating that “the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational

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80 “Je réaffirmerai avec force la vision française d’une Europe politique, ambitieuse, sociale et solidaire. Une vision que la France partage avec l’Allemagne et que nos deux pays, moteur irremplaçable de la construction européenne, continueront à porter ensemble” (29 August 2005)
81 St Malo Declaration 4 December 1998
82 St Malo Declaration 4 December1998
European means outside the NATO framework). After the St.Malo summit Chirac declared: “the declaration we have adopted (…) affirms some essential principles: the respect, naturally, of engagements, of our Alliances, this goes without saying, but also the role of the European Council, the purely intergovernmental character of CFSP, the necessity of an capacity of autonomous action, the possibility of European military means inside NATO or outside NATO, if necessary, the necessary adaption of our military means”\(^8^3\)\(^8^4\) (Bossuat 2005: 191).

The declaration was quickly received as undermining and damaging the Franco-German axis leading Chirac to explain in public that the Franco-German relations were special, but also that cooperation in the sphere of defense and security could not be made without the agreement of the two greatest military powers in Europe\(^8^5\). In the sphere of defense and concerning military capabilities France thus considers the relation with the UK of great importance. However, the Iraq War caused deep division between France and the UK finding themselves on the opposite poles in the support of the war. The Iraq war can in this respect be seen as a setback for European cooperation in the sphere of security and defense. Yet, the Franco-British cooperation continued to be considered as important and Nicolas Sarkozy from the beginning of his presidency characterized in his speech at the conference of ambassadors in 2007 that the reinforced cooperation between France and the UK in the sphere of security and defense was natural declaring that: “In Saint Malo, France and the UK pursued this construction as it is natural since together our defense budgets represent two thirds of the total of the other 25 countries in the Union, and our defense research budget the double.”\(^8^6\).

In the speeches of Sarkozy there is no mention of the term pionergroups. However, in his speech in 2007 he emphasized, just like Chirac, the Franco-German entente as the essential

\(^{83}\) St Malo Declaration 4 December 1998  
\(^{84}\) “La déclaration que nous avons adoptée (…) affirme quelques principes essentiels: le respect, naturellement, des engagements, de nos Alliances, cela va de soi, mais aussi le rôle du Conseil européen, le caractère purement intergouvernemental de la PESC, la nécessité d’une capacité autonome d’action, le recours à des moyens militaires européens dans l’OTAN ou hors de l’OTAN, en cas de besoin, l’adoption nécessaire de nos moyens militaires.” (Bossuat 2005: 191)  
\(^{85}\) “La relation franco-allemande est une relation essentielle, dans la mesure où elle est nécessaire à la construction de l’Europe. Pourtant elle n’est pas suffisante ou exclusive (...); il n’y aura pas de politique étrangère et de sécurité commune européenne si les deux principaux pourvoyeurs diplomatiques et militaires de l’Europe, enfin deux parmi les plus importants puissances diplomatiques et militaires de l’Europe, ne se mettent pas d’accord” (Bossuat 2005: 201)  
\(^{86}\) “A Saint-Malo, la France et le Royaume-Uni ont poursuivi cette construction, comme il est naturel puisqu’ensemble, nos deux budgets de défense représentent les deux tiers du total de ceux des 25 autres pays de l’Union, et nos budgets de recherche de défense, le double” (27 August 2007)
motor of the Union which has made the European construction progress. Referring to the Lisbon Treaty he recognized that the Treaty was obtained “thanks to the perfect Franco-German entente, the essential motor of the European Union”\textsuperscript{87}. He continued in the speech 2008 to describe the Franco-German entente as an indispensable entente, stronger than ever. But in the speech in 2009 he added a new aspect by stating that European states are equal by law but not by duty, arguing that in times of crises when it is necessary to find a solution the duties of France and Germany are bigger than the other countries because France and Germany are the largest countries in the EU. Thus one finds an interesting difference in the use of the word responsibility. According to Sarkozy the responsibilities of the countries are directly a function of their weights. The stronger one is in Europe, the more responsibility one has. This is not a particular structure he claimed in the same speech, but is what characterizes the Franco-German entente. In every crisis the Franco-German entente has helped Europe to take on all its responsibilities. This is a difference of Chirac’s vision of pionergroups. While the pionergroups are based on assuming responsibility on a voluntary basis, and thus making them a sort of ad-hoc arrangement varying from issue to issue, responsibility is according to Sarkozy more a given fact, thus of a deterministic nature. There is no talk of cooperation on a voluntary basis in any of Sarkozy’s speeches. Sarkozy only talk of a certain degree of voluntary cooperation regarding the armament industry in speech in 2008 stating that the countries who wants can decide to develop the equipment one needs. One can thus argue that less emphasis on voluntary cooperation characterizes Sarkozy as less flexible system, in the sense that he emphasizes a more fixed and deterministic system of cooperation. Being of a deterministic character the cooperation in Sarkozy’s speeches is also centered around the largest member states, thus standing in contrast to Chirac’s focus on multilateral cooperation involving all states. According to Sarkozy it is the largest member states with the greatest capacity which should make the decisions and take actions.

6.4.2 Balance and complementarity in the transatlantic framework

Regarding transatlantic cooperation Chirac first of all emphasized the necessity of the Atlantic Alliance. He argued that a Europe de la Défense would have to be built in relation to the Atlantic Alliance declaring at the conference of ambassadors in 1995 that the “immediate search for a resolution in ex-Yugoslavia underlines the importance for the construction of a

\textsuperscript{87} “obtenu grâce à une parfaite entente franco-allemande, moteur essentiel de l'Union européenne” (27 August 2007)
European and transatlantic architecture taking into account the consequences of the
democratic revolution of 1989 and the emergence of a security policy of the European Union
in development. The two approaches are, in reality, inseparable. That the two
developments were interrelated was thus emphasized. In this respect he also emphasized the
importance of Europe to balance the Atlantic Alliance, stated as one of his priorities in the
speech 1995. The objective was to balance the Atlantic Alliance by developing a European
pillar within it. In the same speech he had declared that the proposal of a new Transatlantic
Charter included a new division of responsibilities which called for the affirmation of Europe
on the international scene. He called for the Atlantic Alliance to recognize Europe’s place,
while he was also calling for the new mechanisms permitting the Europeans to use under its
commandments certain instruments of NATO to enter into force. As Chirac expressed in the
speech in 1996, he wanted the European identity to be properly affirmed within the Atlantic
Alliance.

The Berlin Plus agreement between EU and NATO was signed in June 1996 and Chirac
recognized in his speech in 1996 that it would not be easy to assure the agreement to enter
into force “because it concerns changing profoundly the structures of NATO and adapt them
to the new missions who call for an upheaval of the strategic context. Because it particularly
concerns specifying the modalities of a new division of responsibilities between the
Europeans and the Americans. At the same time he recognized that the renovation of the
Alliance was an important stage towards the affirmation of a European defense identity as
from now on the Europeans could perform operations under the conduct of the WEU while
calling for NATO-means. He recognized that this would assure a coherent European
commandment. He stated that it concerned: “permitting Europeans to assure, through WEU,
the effective conduct of operations the Americans do not want to associate with, and this by
using the means of the Alliance (...) This permits a more precise definition of the contours of
the transatlantic partnership (...) and France is ready to fully resume its place in the

88 “La recherche immédiate d’un règlement en ex-Yougoslavie souligne l’urgence de la construction d’une
architecture européenne et transatlantique prenant pleinement en compte les conséquences de la révolution
démocratique de 1989 et la lente émergence d’une politique de sécurité à l’échelle de l’Union européenne. Les
deux démarches sont, en réalité, indissociables.” (31 August 1995)
89 “Parce qu’il s’agit de transformer profondément les structures de l’OTAN, de les adapter aux nouvelles
missions qu’appelle le bouleversement du context stratégique. Parce qu’il s’agit surtout de préciser les
modalités d’un nouveau partage des responsabilités entre Européens et Américains.” (29 August 1996)
profundely renovated Alliance”90. He thus recognized that as the Alliance is a transatlantic cooperation, there could potentially be cases where NATO’s and Europe’s interests are divergent, and in these cases the Europeans would have to be able to act on their own. This is why there must be a specified division of responsibilities.

In the speech in 1997 he claimed that: "the affirmation of a European identity must still be translated into a better division of responsibilities between the Europeans and Americans within the structure of the military organization. As I have underlined the whole year this presupposes that the South Command must in the future be confided a European”91. He declared that this was one of the conditions France relied on in its further relations with NATO. As explained in an earlier chapter, the proposal of a European South Command was rejected and the French reintegration to the military structures stopped. This demonstrates Chirac’s willingness to reintegrate, although not at any prize. To him a European South Command represented a level of independence he was not willing to let go of. In the situation where his condition was not met he considered entering the integrated military organization of NATO as entering a less advantageous reality.

Not entering the military integrated structures Chirac in his speech in 1998 expressed a wish for the future of the WEU to be defined. Chirac viewed the WEU as having the potential to become the agency of defense for the EU, progressively integrated in its institutions, while still being articulated on NATO. Chirac stated that it was therefore necessary to establish a Council of the defense ministers of the EU to affirm the member states solidarity in this sphere. In this way, he claimed in his speech in 1998, the transatlantic partnership would be clarified, balanced and more effective. In the same speech he stated that “in the sphere of security the Union and Alliance are complementary to each other and must pursue the clarification of their respective missions in a radical transformed context”92, linking the need for a specified division of responsibilities with complimentary roles.

90 “De permettre aux Européens notamment d’assurer, à travers l’UEO, la conduite effective d’opérations auxquelles les Américains ne souhaiteraient pas s’associer, et ceci en faisant appel aux moyens de l’Alliance.” (29 August 1996)

91 “Cette affirmation de l’identité européenne doit encore se traduire par un meilleur partage des responsabilités entre Européens et Américains dans la structure militaire de l’organisation. Comme je l’ai souligné depuis un an, cela signifie notamment que le Commandement Sud doit être, à l’avenir, confié à un Européen” (27 August 1997)

92 “Dans le domaine de la sécurité, l’Union et l’Alliance sont complémentaires et doivent poursuivre la clarification de leurs missions respectives dans un context radicalement transformé” (26 August 1998)
Complementarity was again emphasized in the speech in 2001 when Chirac described the arrangements negotiated with NATO as satisfactory. He emphasized that they guaranteed that Europe de la Défense was constructed in harmony with the Alliance. Without double deployment it assured autonomy in the decision-making of the union which could act with its own means. In this way, at the end of the year, Chirac declared in the same speech, the disposals imagined in St.Malo would be operational. But: “This new capacity of action will naturally affect the priority of crisis resolution which directly concerns the security of the Union. Should one go there? For my part, I am rather favorable as I consider it the call of and in the interest of the Union to make an important contribution to the entering into force of the peace keeping operations of the UN”\^93. He continued by stating that it is in the first months of an operation the European contribution would be useful, in the most difficult part of an operation as “thanks to its new projection capacities the Union could, of course on the basis of an agreement with the UN, be asked for the launching of certain operations when it is not started by others”\^94.

When talking of the responsibilities and tasks of the two parts Chirac was clear. In his speech in 1998 he strongly spoke against an Alliance intervening everywhere for everybody, a role France would not accept. This was further elaborated in the speech in 1999 when stating that: “France will never accept a regional organization to develop into a Sainte Alliance for everybody and everywhere. This role as a worldpolice is confided the Charter of the UN in the Security Council and it alone”\^95. He also spoke of the responsibilities of the Alliance in his speech in 2006 stating that: “To seek to engage the Alliance in non-military missions, in partnership à la carte, in technological adventures, in an insufficiently prepared enlargement, could only distort the vocation”\^96. Again it concerned the division of responsibilities between NATO and the Union. For France it was preferable that NATO engage only in strictly

\^93 “Cette nouvelle capacité d’action sera naturellement affectée en priorité au traitement des crises qui concernent directement la sécurité de l’Union. Faut-il aller au-delà? Pour ma part, j’y suis plutôt favorable car je considère qu’il est dans la vocation et dans l’intérêt de l’Europe d’apporter une contribution importante à la mise en œuvre des opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU” (27 August 2001)

\^94 “Grâce à ses nouvelles capacités de projection, l’Union pourrait en effet, sur la base bien sûr d’un accord conclu avec les Nations Unies, être sollicitée pour le lancement de certaines opérations avant que le relais ne soit pris par d’autres” (27 August 2001)

\^95 “La France n’acceptera jamais qu’une organisation régionale s’érige en Sainte-Alliance pour tout et partout. Ce rôle de gendarme du monde a été confié par la Charte de l’ONU au Conseil de Sécurité et à lui seul.” (26 August 1999)

\^96 “Chercher à engager l’Alliance dans des missions non militaires, dans des partenariats à la carte, dans des aventures technologiques, dans un élargissement insuffisamment préparé, ne pourrait que dénaturer la vocation” (26 August 2006)
military missions and did not engage in civilian missions, as those expressed by the Petersberg-tasks.

Chirac’s view of the transatlantic relation can be summarized in two statements: the speech 2003 saying that: “The transatlantic relation, the partnership between Europe and US, our primary allied, constitutes a fundamental element in the security of the world. A stronger Europe is first of all a stronger Atlantic Alliance. Rivaling between the EU and NATO does not make sense”\(^97\), and in the speech 2005: “A strong Europe also contributes to the vitality of a balanced transatlantic relation, necessary to the stability in the world and founded on a relation of cooperation and confidence with the US, of which we are attached by common values. This is why we must search for the force of a new European impulse”\(^98\). Chirac saw both a European defense and NATO as necessary to assure the security, but recognized that the relation between the two would have to be balanced and the role of Europe would consequently have to be strengthened.

The complementary role of a European defense and NATO was also emphasized in Sarkozy’s first speech at the conference of ambassadors in 2007. He stressed that the progress of Europe de la Défense is not a competition with NATO stating that: “This Atlantic Alliance, one must remember, is ours, we founded it and we are today one of the principal contributors. Of the 26 members 21 are also members of the EU. To put the Union against NATO does not make sense: we need both. Better: I am convinced that it is in the interest of US that EU gathers its forces, rationalize its capacities, briefly: organize its defense”\(^99\). By calling the Alliance ours he emphasized that France considered itself as one of Allied and that France has no interest of weakening NATO. He pointed out that France, even though not a part of the military integrated structures, participated in the work of NATO. As a further evidence of the complementarity he pointed out that: “…the Union has conducted 15 operations on our

\(^97\) “Le lien transatlantique, le partenariat entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unies, notre premier allié, constituent un élément fondamental de la sécurité du monde. Une Europe plus forte, c’est d’abord une Alliance atlantique plus forte. Mettre en rivalité l’Union européenne et l’OTAN n’a aucun sens” (29 August 2003)

\(^98\) “Une Europe forte contribue aussi à la vitalité d’un lien transatlantique équilibré, nécessaire à la stabilité du monde et fondé sur une relation de cooperation et de confiance avec les Etats-Unis, auxquels nous sommes liés par tant de valeurs communes. C’est pourquoi nous devons rechercher, dans la crise que nous traversons, la force d’une nouvelle impulsion européenne” (29 August 2005)

\(^99\) “Cette Alliance atlantique, faut-il le rappeler, elle est la nôtre: nous l’avons fondée, nous en sommes aujourd’hui un des principaux contributeurs. Sur 26 membres, 21 sont aussi membres de l’Union. Oppose l’Union à l’Otan n’a pas de sens: nous avons besoin des deux. Mieux: je suis convaincu qu’il est dans l’intérêt bien compris des Etats-Unis que l’Union européenne rassemble ses forces, rationalise ses capacités, bref organize sa défense” (27 August 2007)
continent, in Africa, in the Middle East, in Asia. These interventions show that when necessary there is not competition, but complementarity between NATO and the Union” 100.

In his speech in 2008 Sarkozy characterized the relation with the Atlantic Alliance and the US as a rupture recognizing that: “in the decades of constraining bipolarity, as in the decade of unipolarism, it was just and wanted that France marked its difference with Washington. But now one has entered a radical different period which will last several decades and which I would call the era of relative powers” 101. In this era, he claimed “not that the US has lost its great assets, but the remarkable rise of China, India, Brazil and the return of Russia has created a new situation: No country is in the position to impose its vision alone anymore” 102. He pointed out that some people were worried that France would lose its range of maneuver, but announced his conviction that France had gained credibility in this era. According to Sarkozy, France has increased its possibility of action and capacity of influence within its western family as much as outside its western family. Mentioning the NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008 he welcomed that: “for the first time since the creation of the Alliance, the President of the United states have given a public support, clear and net, to the European defense project. He did it because he was convinced that France does not want to weaken the Atlantic Alliance with this project, that the two are complementary and not antagonist” 103.

After finally reentering the military integrated organization of NATO Sarkozy commented in his speech in 2009: “With a France which is fully resuming its place in NATO, it is the Europeans which will be stronger in the Alliance (...) It concerns constructing the Atlantic Alliance one needs for the next decades (...) France now has the means to use all its weight in

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100 “...l'Union a conduit une quinzaine d’opérations sur notre continent, en Afrique, au Proche-orient, en Asie. Ces interventions démontrent, s’il en était besoin, qu’il n’y a pas compétition, mais bien complémentarité, entre l’OTAN et l’Union” (27 August 2007)
101 “Pendant les décennies de contrainte bipolaire, comme pendant la décennie de la situation unipolaire, il était juste et souhaitable que notre pays marque sa différence par rapport à Washington. Mais nous sommes entrés, depuis quelques années, dans une période radicalement différente, qui va durer plusieurs décennies et que je qualifierai d’ère des puissances relatives” (27 August 2008)
102 “Non pas que les Etats-Unis aient perdu leurs formidables atouts; mais l’ascension fulgurante de la Chine, Inde, du Bresil, le retour de la Russie creent une situation nouvelle: aucun pays n’est plus en mesure d’imposer seul sa vision des choses; les conditions objectives d’un nouveau concert des grandes puissances existent mais celui-ci reste à organiser” (27 August 2008)
103 “Pour la première fois depuis la création de l’Alliance, le Président des Etats-Unis a apporté un soutien public, clair et net, au projet de Défense européenne ; il l’a fait parce qu’il était convaincu qu’en portant ce projet, la France ne souhaitait pas affaiblir l’Alliance Atlantique, que les deux étaient complémentaires et non antagonistes” (27 August 2008)
this debate which is central to our security”\(^\text{104}\). Elaborating on the subject he asks: “Who could understand that at the moment of the renovation of the Alliance, France will not pursue fully its place? And who can think that a France outside will have more influence than a France inside? And who could think that one can reinforce the European pillar in the Alliance without France?”\(^\text{105}\). For Sarkozy the reintegration was far from a loss of independence. On the contrary, it was a question of increasing the French influence and gaining freedom of maneuver also within NATO. This did not only concern France, but also the European Union as an actor. With a France staying outside the integrated structure the increasing of the European pillar was less realistic.

But while stating in his speech in 2010 that the military and nuclear Atlantic Alliance is essential to European security Sarkozy also calls for a reform to make it able to adapt to the new international structures. He claimed the experience in Afghanistan showed that NATO was in need of robust projection forces to better coordinate military and civilian action. Sarkozy also claimed that the new threats would make a closer relation with the EU necessary. In the speech in 2011 he further linked a strengthening of the EU-NATO cooperation with French return to the integrated military organization. He declared that: “In Libya the United States did not want to engage heavily, for the first time since 1949, NATO was put in service of a coalition led by two determined European countries, France and the UK. It is because our airplanes had resumed fully its place in the integrated command that this was possible”\(^\text{106}\). For Sarkozy the new relation with NATO has thus improved the freedom of maneuver of France and to an increasing degree made France capable of acting. He argued that the lesson from Libya is not that France has lost its independence or that the image of France is destroyed in the third world by being committed to NATO. Rather, “NATO has shown to be an indispensable instrument in service of our military operations”\(^\text{107}\).

\(^{104}\) “Avec une France qui prend toute sa place dans l’OTAN, ce sont les Européens qui sont plus forts dans l’Alliance (...) Il s’agit de construire l’Alliance transatlantique don’t nous aurons besoin pour les prochaines décennies (...) La France a maintenant les moyens de peser de tout son poids dans ce débat central pour notre sécurité” (26 August 2009)

\(^{105}\) “Qui pourrait comprendre qu’au moment où l’on rénouve l’Alliance, la France n’y exerce pas tout sa place? Et qui peut penser qu’une France en dehors aurait plus d’influence qu’une France à l’intérieur? Et qui peut penser que l’on peut renforcer le pilier européen de l’Alliance sans la France?” (26 August 2009)

\(^{106}\) “Les États-Unis ne souhaitant pas s’engager fortement en Libye, pour la première fois depuis 1949, l’OTAN s’est mise au service d’une coalition emmenée par deux pays européens déterminés, la France et le Royaume-Uni. C’est parce que nous avions repris toute notre place dans le commandement intégré que cela a été possible” (31 August 2011)

\(^{107}\) “L’OTAN s’est révélée un outil indispensable au service de nos opérations militaires” (31 August 2011)
By analyzing the speeches one could argue that Sarkozy have a more pragmatic approach concerning NATO. While still wanting to develop a stronger European pillar to balance NATO he also to a larger degree confirms the necessity and the advantage of the framework and security structure NATO propose. He has a more pragmatic approach and the conditionality of Chirac is gone. One could argue that while Chirac was of the opinion that one was in a stronger position to achieve what one want outside NATO, Sarkozy expressed explicitly in his speech in 2009 that it is first inside of the structures one is in the position for asking what one want and is able to have influence. This is an increasing pragmatism, a way of thinking that to have a certain influence one must join the arenas one would like to influence. It is no longer a choice between ESDP and NATO. France can fully focus on NATO and play the NATO-card when the capacities of the EU come to short. Thus his pragmatism can be seen in relation to his proactive style, as shown in the second chapter of the analysis, causing him to be more pragmatic in order to find quick and effective solution. Sarkozy did not demand any positions before reentering NATO, nut still managed to obtain the French commandment of ACT and JFC Lisbon.

However, the question of whether France has obtained more inside NATO than it did outside still remains a big discussion in France with Gaullists claiming that France has lost its independence. This is true for the Gaullist and earlier foreign minister Alain Joxe. In a short article published 30 March 2009, just a couple of weeks before the decision to fully reintegrate was announced, he strongly opposed a reintegration as he claimed the decision would result in a France submitting to the American hegemony. He further argues that French reintegrating in exchange for two major commandments, talking about the ACT and JFC Lisbon, will not increase the French influence on the field when the increase of the contingent decided by Obama further reduces the French workforce and its influence on American strategy (Joxe 2009: 3). Concerning ACT Joxe claimed this to be the very existence of the American hegemony which operates in the long by the modernization and imposition of norms in the new warfare, further claiming that this is the nodal point of American military dominance and will never become the point of application for French or European influence (Joxe 2009: 4). Thus it is stated: “By accepting or seeking that the high commands held by France will be directly placed under the American super commands, France manifeste an ambition to instruct, but also to adhere to an American system dominating the world and contribute to it, which is not at all the same thing to reintegrate in the military organisation of
a defense alliance.” Hence, it is obvious that the question of NATO is still very much linked to the question of a France independent from the US and there is not French unanimity on the decision to reintegrate into NATO military commandment.

**6.4.3 Western pragmatism**

Another finding which was not expected to discover through an analysis of the speeches is Sarkozy’s pragmatism orienting towards the Western world. Sarkozy explicitly places France in the Western Community and in his speech 2008, when speaking of the French return to NATO’s integrated military structures, he emphasized that he wanted to place France within the Western community declaring that: “I have wanted to place, openly and clearly, France within its Western family, restore a confident relation with the American people and the American leaders and renew the relation with the Atlantic Alliance.” Sarkozy’s decision to fully reintegrate into NATO’s military commandment can in this respect be seen as a pragmatic step in defining France as a part of the Western Community, calling it its “Western family”.

As earlier mentioned, Sarkozy has put increasing emphasis on terrorism as a threat. When speaking of a confrontation between the West and the Muslim Sarkozy has established a distinct division between the Western world, which France is a part of, and the rest of the world. This confrontation was frequently mentioned in his speeches, to a much greater degree than in the speeches of Chirac. Thus his emphasis on the war against terrorism can arguably be seen as a part of his characteristic as more oriented towards the West. His emphasis on the war against terrorism can be seen in his mentioning of the situation in Afghanistan which has become the symbol of this war. In his speeches he put great emphasis on the French contribution. The speech in 2008 is held only ten days after ten French soldiers died in an attack by the Taliban and Sarkozy declared that: “Our soldiers fell to protect France, to protect the French population against the direct threat of terrorism which is to a great extent

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108 “En acceptant ou en recherchant que des hauts commandements tenus par des Français soient placés directement sous des super-commandements américains, la France manifeste donc une volonté de s'instruire, mais aussi d'adhérer au système américain de domination du monde et d'y contribuer, ce qui n'est pas tout à fait la même chose que de réintégrer l'organisation militaire d'une alliance défensive.”

109 J’ai voulu situer, franchement et nettement, la France au sein de sa famille occidentale, restaurer une relation confiante avec le peuple et les dirigeants américains et rénover notre relation avec l’Alliance Atlantique” (27 August 2008)
rooted in this region of the world. This is what is at stake in Afghanistan.”\(^{110}\). He also recognized in the speech that the war against terrorism is a fight for human rights, for their values and for their liberty. Thus it is a justified war, and Sarkozy declared in his speech in 2009 that France will stay strongly engaged in Afghanistan together with its Allies and the Afghan people. This is also emphasized in his speech in 2010 stating that France will stay as long as necessary and as long as the Afghan people want. In the speech 2011, ten years after the terrorist attacks 9/11, Sarkozy characterized Afghanistan as one of the places where France has assumed its responsibility, which has led to progress. However, he also emphasized that the progress does not symbolize the end of the terrorist threat, thus underlining the continuous threat of terrorism. Sarkozy’s strict division between the Western world and the rest of the world also symbolizes a shift towards the West.

Defining France exclusively as a part of the Western community is something previous presidents, including Chirac, have always refrained from. Instead they have tried to place France between the Western world and the Muslim world, because of its links with many Arab countries and its overseas areas. As a former colonial power it has been important for France to maintain a certain degree of influence in these countries. This was recognized by Chirac and was one of the reasons for his reservation against the war in Iraq. There were strong opposition among the Muslim population in France and Chirac wanted to improve relations with Algeria and avoid the hostility of the Muslim world (Wall 2004: 133).

Sarkozy’s willingness to intervene in Libya can on the contrary be seen as a break with this tradition, and his focus on the Western world has in fact resulted in the nickname “Sarko l’Américain” (Van Herpen 2008: 1). In this respect one could speak of a westernization of French security and defense policy under Sarkozy.

In sum it is evident that Sarkozy’s approach is characterized by an increasing degree of pragmatism, this confirming the last hypothesis, also adding the aspect of a westernization of French security and defense policy under Sarkozy.

\(^{110}\) “Nos soldats sont tombés pour protéger la France, pour protéger les Français de la menace directe du terrorisme, qui prend pour une large part sa source dans cette région du monde. C’est cela qui est en cause en Afghanistan.” (27 August 2008)
7 Conclusion

The thesis has been addressing what vision of the European Security and Defense cooperation one can identify in speeches of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. Security has traditionally been of great importance to France because of geographical and historical factors, and increasingly so through security cooperation in the European context. A changing world order due to the end of the Cold War, globalization and a changing perception of threats has contributed to an increasing focus on security in the European context. In addition economic constraints have made France increasingly dependent of the other European states. By looking at the historical background one can see that there has generally been continuity in the approach to security cooperation under the fifth republic. When discovering whether there is still continuity in the era of Sarkozy the research question has been answered by doing an explorative ideational analysis of the speeches of Chirac and Sarkozy at the annual conference of ambassadors, following the structure of four hypotheses which have been developed inductively. Based on this analysis it has been discovered whether an evolution of this vision has taken place, and differences and similarities between Chirac and Sarkozy has been be identified.

In the analysis there is found both continuity and ruptures. By comparing the three White Papers on Defense published in 1972, 1994 and 2008 it has been showed that the French objectives guiding the foreign and defense policy have been constant during the Fifth Republic as the desire to ensure the French independence and autonomy, the importance of national interest and French contribution to European and international security. This is true despite of the changing international context and the changing perception of threats. In this respect the first hypothesis of the thesis is confirmed, also underlining the fact that an evolution of the vision concerns divergent means to achieve the objectives, rather than divergent objectives. In the second hypothesis a common vision is identified regarding the emphasis of strengthening Europe as a global actor in a multipolar world to establish balance, which in turn will benefit France. And to be a credible actor the EU must not only limit itself to the projection of normative values, but should also be able to manage crisis outside Europe developing credible military capacities. The emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation is also confirmed. But in addition a stronger emphasis on the nation state can be identified in the speeches of Nicolas Sarkozy, something which was not anticipated in the hypothesis. He speaks of the state in a more individual and nationalistic manner than Chirac, emphasizing the
responsibility of each state more than the common responsibility, thus emphasizing a stronger form of intergovernmental cooperation. Thus also the second hypothesis is confirmed, moreover adding the aspect of emphasizing cooperation of an increasing intergovernmentalistic character in the speeches of Sarkozy.

When answering the third hypothesis both the role of France and Europe must be analyzed. Here one can find divergent vision, with Sarkozy to a greater degree emphasizing a proactive role for France. This must also be seen in relation to his emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation and each state’s responsibility. In addition a more active role of the European Union is emphasized by Sarkozy, explicitly proclaiming that the Union must be more than soft power and must be able to act, also militarily. While Sarkozy claimed that the conflict in Georgia showed that Europe could when it wanted be a crucial part in peace resolution, he claimed that one of the lessons learned from the intervention in Libya was a Europe able to intervene in an open conflict and that this was a remarkable progress from the crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, these events must also be seen in a larger context with the US government focusing elsewhere during the Georgian crisis due to the Presidential election, and French determination during the Libyan crisis because it had earlier ignored the importance of events during Arab Spring.

Divergent visions are also revealed when answering the last hypothesis. While both speak of the importance of the Franco-German bilateral cooperation Chirac speaks of reinforced cooperation on a voluntary basis through the concept of pionergroups, functioning like the motor of the European cooperation. Sarkozy on the other hand speaks of reinforced cooperation based on duties. He claims that the states are equal by law but not by duties, hereby claiming that the bigger states have more responsibilities than the smaller states. In this respect reinforced cooperation is according to Sarkozy of a deterministic character and Sarkozy can thus be argued to have a less flexible vision of European cooperation in the sphere of security. Within the transatlantic framework both Chirac and Sarkozy has sought to strengthen the European pillar in order to balance the US. Since de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military structures of NATO there has been a constant rapprochement and France has to an increasing degree contributed to NATO’s operations. However, Chirac’s attempt on a full reintegration failed in 1997 as the current situation made it difficult for the Americans to accept his conditions. Still, in April 2009 Sarkozy announced a full reintegration to the integrated military structures of NATO. Unlike Chirac he had not
introduced any conditions and proclaimed that France was much more influential inside than outside, thus signaling a new form of pragmatism seeking influence on several arenas by participating where decisions are made. Thus, one can identify a more pragmatic vision in the speeches of Sarkozy, resulting in France obtaining the command of ACT and JFC Lisbon.

Sarkozy’s pragmatism can also be seen in relation to his determination to front a proactive France and Europe as participating in several arenas and not exclude itself will increase the possibility to make quick and efficient decisions. Even more strikingly his pragmatism can be seen as an orientation towards the West, which was not expected to find through the analysis of speeches. Sarkozy explicitly defines France as a part of the West in his speeches, which has never been done to such an extent by a French President before. His emphasis on the war against terrorism and increasing emphasis on terrorism as a threat also underlines his western orientation, and under Sarkozy it is possible to speak of a Westernization of French security and defense policy.

An evolution in the French vision of European security cooperation has therefore been identified. The new vision can be interpreted as a France which finally has found its position in the post-Cold War world order: A France which has finally managed to adapt to the new strategic reality. Chirac came to power few years after the Cold War when the situation was still uncertain, strengthened by the increasing globalization. Chirac also experienced a long period of cohabitation from 97-2002, thus he was in a difficult position to front a distinct position for France and Europe. But concerning the reintegration in NATO and Sarkozy’s western orientation the question remains whether France has obtained more by following this policy line or has lost some of reputation as an independent country. Traditional Gaullists and a large part of the French left side would claim that France has not benefitted from this development and by defining itself as a part of the West France has excluded itself from exerting influence in other parts of the world.

It would have been interesting to see whether Sarkozy would have continued this trend in a second presidency. As such one could have even better identified a divergent vision. However, in the presidential election 6 May this year he was not reelected. A new president was elected, François Hollande, and for the first time since 1995 France will have a president from the socialist party. It will thus be interesting to see whether this will affect the French vision of European security cooperation. It will also be interesting to see whether the legislative election in June will result in a new period of cohabitation. It is nonetheless
unlikely that Hollande will continue the vision of Sarkozy. The Western orientation of Sarkozy is likely to be emphasized to a much lesser degree as Hollande is more likely to seek the role as a bridge between the Western world and the rest of the world. Additionally, while Sarkozy has focused more on the role of the nation state Hollande is expected to focus on multilateral arenas and cooperation, and not the exclusive role of the largest member states in the Union.
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