The Turkish-American Security Relationship

*Changing Representations between 2001 and 2010*

Trine Østereng

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Foreword

My first year at the University of Oslo was spent studying Turkish. Since then I have always looked for chances to learn more about Turkey. I spent a semester as an exchange student in Istanbul the autumn 2008, a semester which taught me a lot about Turkish politics and made me even more interested in the country. After taking a motivating course in American foreign policy at the Master programme at the University of Oslo, the idea of writing about the Turkish-American security relationship was born.

The original plan for this thesis was to travel to Turkey and conduct interviews. Unfortunately I was stopped by health issues, and I ended up with a research design based on analyzing written texts. I am glad I continued with this topic even though I could not travel. It has been an interesting, fun and challenging process.

I would like to thank my supervisor Einar Wigen for extraordinary support and interest in my work throughout the year. Most of the year has been spent as a student intern at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI). I am thankful to Nina Græger and the rest of the institute for welcoming me in such an inspiring environment. One of the persons who helped me the most was Johan Røed Steen, a great student colleague at NUPI. I would also like to thank Morten Skumsrud Andersen, Kristin Haugevik, Iver Neumann, Hilde Restad and Ole Jacob Sending for useful and helpful comments. I am also grateful to Barin Kayaoğlu for sending me relevant literature.

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1 Introduction

The security relationship between Turkey and the United States is a counterintuitive alliance. It is between a mostly Christian western great power and a growing power with a majority Muslim population. The two countries are situated in different continents and have unlike historical legacies. They face diverse challenges in their day-to-day political debate and do not always behave as partners on the international arena. For this reason the theme of this thesis is the changing security relationship between Turkey and the United States between 2001 and 2010.

Countries with a security relationship may share some form of community, when “interstate relations are governed by shared identity and mutual trust, and states do not expect or prepare to go to war against one another” (Rumelili 2007: 1; see also Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998). While the security relationship has never been completely stable and predictable, some degree of shared threat and identity made it stable during the Cold War. In this period a common representation in Turkish discourse said that the security relationship was naturally given, based on the fact that they had the Soviet Union as a common enemy (Bilgin and Çoş 2010).1 Within the United States Turkey was represented as a “NATO’s southern bulwark against the Soviet Union” (Gordon and Taspınar 2008: 15). Now the basis for cooperation seems to have changed.

For instance, Turkey has traditionally been represented as a secular country in American and Turkish discourse. This has now changed, and it is common in American discourse to refer to Turkey as a Muslim country or as a country ruled by an Islamist party. In a period where Islam in global politics has been a heated issue, this makes it worth-while to investigate how this has changed the representations of the security relationship between Turkey and the United States since 2001.2

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1 See definition of the term “representation” on page 3.
2 The United States has since 2001 fought a global War on terrorism (which changed name to Overseas Contingency Operations in 2009 (Wilson and Kamen 2009)), where Islamist terrorism has been identified as a primary threats (Record 2003: 20).
At the same time, the United States has spent the last eight years fighting a War in Iraq, a war Turkey voted against participating in. This has damaged the regional stability, particularly regarding the Kurds - an important issue in Turkish politics.

In light of this I pose the following research question for this thesis:

- How has the security relationship between the United States and Turkey been represented within the foreign policy discourses of the two countries between 2001 and 2010, and how have these representations changed over these years?

I have selected this security relationship as a case based on a certainty that this is an important empirical case in world politics. Turkey is a growing regional power with an increasing diplomatic activity, lately seen in the international debates about Libya. It was a member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 2009 and 2010 and now applies for two new years in 2015 and 2016. Understanding Turkish foreign policy discourse will be important for policy makers in most countries for the next decade. As the United is still the most powerful country in world politics, the relevance of studying American foreign policy discourse is self-explanatory.

1.1 Specification of the research question

The research question demands some specifications. It is an aim in this thesis to study how internal, social dimensions within these two countries play a part in their security relationship. According to Ringmar:

(...) a mere description of material factors will never tell us much about what actions a person will undertake. What an outside observer should study are not material factors, but instead the interpretations given to material factors; the way in which human beings make sense of their world (quoted in Græger 2007: 22).

For this reason the research question focuses on representations. The Norwegian scholar Iver Neumann has defined a representation as “socially reproduced facts; (...) things filtered through that which is in between us and the world: language, categories etc.” (Neumann 2001: 33). Hence, representations are how we give meaning to “things”. How a political issue is

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3 Turkey did not allow the United States open a “Northern front” from Turkish territory in the War against Iraq 1st March 2003. I will come back to this in Chapter 4 of the thesis.
given meaning has consequences for the policy alternatives that are seen as relevant for that issue.

An analysis of the national discourses of both countries will provide information about the status of the relationship, and the strength of the ties between the countries. This is executed through a study of how actors on both sides have represented their security partner and argued for or against this security relationship. I also demonstrate how these representations change.

The term *the security relationship between Turkey and the United States* is used here with reference to the bilateral cooperation between Turkey and the United States on issues related to national security and defence, military training etc., in particular in and through the security organizations NATO and the UN. I also look at other forms of formalised security cooperation between the two countries, including the bilateral agreement on *Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership* in 2006, which was updated in 2009 (Embassy of the United States in Ankara, Turkey 2006; Embassy of the United States in Ankara, Turkey 2009b).

Based on practical consideration I have focused most on the War on Terrorism, the War in Iraq, the War in Afghanistan and the Armenian issue as common security challenges. These issues have been selected in particular because they are those I have identified as having most importance for the representations of the security relationship in both countries. Future research could include more issues into the analysis, such as the Cyprus and European Union (EU) dimensions, but these are not analyzed in this thesis.

The temporal perspective of the thesis is between 2001 and 2010. Throughout these years there has been an enormous change of context in both Turkish and American foreign policy. The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 laid the foundation for American foreign policy during the next decade, such as the War on Terrorism. This made 2001 a natural starting point for an analysis of the Turkish-American security relationship in the post-Cold War world.

Since 2001 there have also been other important changes for the security relationship, such as the War in Iraq in 2003. After this war started, several journalists reported that the relationship was dramatically weakened (Turkish Daily News 2003a; Turkish Daily News 2005c; see also Rubin 2005). Since 2002 there has also been a new government party in
Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). This is a party with Islamist roots, which has executed a more active foreign policy than their predecessors.

I have selected 2010 as an arbitrarily chosen cut off for the analysis in order to study a finished period. This has been in order to avoid constantly updating the analysis as new developments in the security relationship came up as I was writing.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the empirical case itself. The main aim is a solid conceptual validity and reliability, more than strong external and internal validity. The main finding of thesis is that the shared identity has been reduced between these two countries in this period. There has also been a tendency towards more distrust the in representations of the security relationship.

1.2 Literary review

1.2.1 Theory on security relationships

In this thesis a constructivist understanding of security relationships is used as the point of departure. It is however worth noting how this relates to alternative conceptions of security community. The dominant theoretical approach in International Relations today is realism (Dunne and Schmidt 2008: 91). Kenneth N. Waltz (2001; 1979) has argued that state cooperation for a common good is overshadowed by the fact that every state primarily seeks relative gains towards other states. That makes international cooperation a result of necessary power balancing against other states.

As realist theory presents the state as a unitary actor, with fixed interests it does not analyze social dimensions and study what happens when a state changes identity and interests (Cronin 1998: 270; 299-300; Græger 2007: 19). And saying that “security” shapes national interest, and in that manner is the rationale behind foreign policy, is a relatively vague starting point for analysis, since both security and national interests are results of interpretation (Weldes 1996: 278). With a constructivist outlook I am particularly interested in studying these interpretations.

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5 I define validity and reliability in chapter 2.
Another common approach towards security cooperation between countries comes from the liberalist tradition within international politics, represented by Karl Deutsch et al. (1957). They wrote about security communities, how countries share interests and how they go together through alliances. A security community is “one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5). This was partly explained with the “sense of community” the members of the community shared, by which they meant “a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”” (Deutsch et al. 1957:5).

This theoretical perspective has produced several important insights into the nature of international security communities. In that manner it is suitable for studying the Turkish-American relationship. Adler and Barnett (1998) embraced the theory of Deutsch, but claimed that it had several challenges when it came to both theory and methodology. They wrote that Deutsch had a behavioralist perspective on how transnational bonds are made, as well as a bit too simple approach to how national identity and foreign relations are generated (Adler and Barnett 1998: 8-9).

As a result they took this theoretical framework a step further and made a constructivist theory of security communities. They claimed that one must include “both sociological theorizing and the social character of global politics” in order to understand security cooperation between countries (Adler and Barnett 1998: 5). This perspective opens up for studying representations concerning security relationships, based on an understanding that these representations are shaped by social interaction. One can also study the link between national identity and interest (Cronin 1998: 277). This is my intention when studying the Turkish-American security relationship. Rumelili (2007) has made a theory about identity and foreign policy in regional communities based on the work of Adler and Barnett. Combined with theory on discourse analysis and foreign policy (Hansen 2006), this will be my theoretical framework for answering the research question. This framework also has advantages and disadvantages. They will be discussed in chapter 2.

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6 Deutsch differentiated between amalgamated security communities, formed by “two or more independent units into a single larger unit” and pluralistic security communities, formed by sovereign units (Deutsch et al. 1957: 6). Adler and Barnett included only pluralistic security communities in their theoretical framework (Adler and Barnett 1998: 5).
1.2.2 Empirical material

The years between 2001 and 2010 are close to us in time. Several informing works have still been written about the relationship between Turkey and the United States during these ten years (Athanassopoulou 2001; Aydın and Erhan 2004; Cağaptay 2004; 2005a; Gordon and Taspınar 2008; Menon and Wimbush 2007; Türkmen 2009; Uslu 2003). These works are relevant for my analysis, but none of them have the same perspective as this thesis. Henceforth I build on the findings of this literature when I analyse the Turkish and American discourses in the period, in line with the ideal of cumulative knowledge in science.

The literature on the Turkish-American relationship has often been related to single issues, such as Iraq or the EU (Hale 2007; Lesser 2006; Öniş and Yılmaz 2005; Park 2003; Rubin 2005). In these texts the security relationship has been represented as weak since 2001, particularly since the Iraq vote 1st March 2003. This literature gives a good background for studying discourse throughout these ten years. However, most of the existing literature has focused on either Turkish or American foreign policy towards the other, not the relationship as a whole. Consequently this is a field with room for more research.

In order to carry out this research I build on several standard works within Turkish foreign policy analysis. In some of these texts Turkish foreign policy history is presented (Hale 2000; Fuller 2008; Robins 2003b), while others have their focus on Turkish political history more in general (Ahmad 2003). There are also important texts that focus on more narrow aspects within the scope of the research question of this thesis, such as a period (Cağaptay 2005b), the political visions of specific parties (Duran 2006), specific politicians active between 2001 and 2010 (Aras 2009; Grigoriadis 2010b; Herzog 2009; Yavuz and Özcan 2006), certain periods (Kirişci 2006) or single issues (Kardaş 2006). Some have also written on Turkish foreign policy discourse (Demirtaş Bagdonas 2008; Kardaş 2006; Bilgin 2005; 2007) or Turkish political identity (Tank 2006).

The literature on American foreign policy is vast. Many of these texts focus on more general traits in American foreign policy historically (Mead 2001; Merrill and Paterson 2005; Melby 1995), while others are more specific on a president (Jervis 2003), a period (Nye 2005) or an issue (Gaddis 2004). A challenging aspect to this is that Turkey receives less attention in the

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7The 1st March 2003 the Turkish parliament voted against a resolution allowing American troops enter Iraq from Turkish territory. For that reason the United States did not open a “Northern Front” against Iraq, had to change plans and attacked Iraq from only one side from 20th March 2003.
United States, than the United States gets in Turkey. There are still several texts discussing Turkey’s role in American foreign policy making (Brzezinski 1997; Fuller 2008; Chase, Hill and Kennedy 1996), but this thesis will supplement this existing literature from a different perspective.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

The first part of the thesis consists of the introduction and a chapter on theory and methodology. In this chapter I present the theoretical framework of the thesis. Afterwards I discuss the methodological considerations relevant for this theory and explain in more detail how I answer the research question. This section focuses specifically on how I use case study as a research design and discourse analysis as a method. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are also introduced.

Each analytical chapter is devoted to a historical period. I identify what I refer to as dominant and alternative representations within the Turkish and American foreign policy discourses about their security relationship. I also study how these are used to argue for different policies. These representations have been chosen because they are specifically related to identity formation in Turkish and American foreign policy discourse in the period.

In each period I begin with the U.S. discourse, followed by the Turkish discourse. This is based on the understanding that the national discourse in the United States influences Turkish discourse more than vice versa. I also discuss how linking and differentiating is used.8 Finally I consider the relationship as a whole, based on the degree of trust, shared descriptions of threats and whether they confirm each other’s identities.

I have chosen to divide the thesis into four periods. This choice has been made because I have identified three important turning points for the discourse concerning the security relationship. These turning points were after 9/11, after 1st March 2001 and in the end of 2007 when the Bush government opened up for sharing intelligence with Turkey about the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

This is why I in the first analytical chapter I study the representations in 2001 before 11th September 2001 (9/11). In the next chapter I discuss the changes between 9/11 and 1st March

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8 I introduce linking and differentiating in section 2.1.4
2003. In the third analytical chapter I study the period after 1\textsuperscript{st} March 2003 to the end of 2007. The last chapter is about the period from January 2008 up to the end of 2010.
2 Theory and research design

In this chapter I expound the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis. I begin section 2.1 with presenting case study as a research design. Section 2.2 is about discourse analysis. Descriptions of the Turkish-American relationship change from text to text, and they also change over time. Here I explain the advantages of having a relational perspective to the security relationship. I define discourse in section 2.2.1. A central point in discourse analysis is to study the power of representations. What this means, and how I define and identify dominant and alternative representations is presented in section 2.2.2.

National identity is closely related to foreign policy discourse, and this link is introduced in section 2.2.3. In order to define and delimit discourse I show how national identity can be related to national interest. In the same section I outline what I mean by linking and differentiating. These two concepts are used in the analytical chapters in order to present the typical representations from a period in a structured manner. In section 2.2.4 I introduce more particularly theory about security relationships, and in 2.2.5 I expound what is meant both theoretically and methodologically by intertextuality. Afterwards it is natural to discuss how to select texts for the discourse analysis. I do this in section 2.1.6.

I discuss the degrees validity, as well as the reliability that follows the research design and method I have chosen for the thesis in section 2.3. The last section, 2.4 is dedicated to discussing challenges of the chosen theoretical and methodological perspective.

2.1 Case study design

One should always base the choice of method and research design on the research question. I aim to find out how the representations about the security relationship have developed. According to Robert K. Yin, case studies are to prefer when answering how-questions, “when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin 2003: 1). A case study can be defined as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007: 20). Case studies are a proper choice of research design in order to analyse historical events that may be complex (George and Bennett 2005: 45). According to John Gerring, case studies might also “be more useful than cross-case studies when a subject is being encountered for the first time
or is being considered in a fundamentally new way” (Gerring 2007: 40). As I demonstrated in the empirical literary review, this is a perspective on this relationship which has not been considered in the same manner before. For this reason case study is a useful approach.

One can do cases studies based on both qualitative and quantitative methods (Yin 2003: 14). The research question concerns the change in representations of the security relationship between the United States and Turkey. That makes it seem sensible to use a theory which is already established, and use these theoretical glasses in order to understand the case. Hence, this is not a case testing theory, but a case where I use already developed theory in order to shed light on empirical material. Discourse analysis is an appropriate method for giving a structured and theorized answer to such a question (Hansen 2006: 9). This means that the main purpose of the thesis is to understand the case, and that shedding light on a larger class of cases receives less attention. I do however discuss the consequences of my findings for other cases in chapter 7.

2.2 Discourse analysis

2.2.1 Discourses

In International Relations theory there has been debates concerning whether one should focus on substantialism or relationism, and study “static “things” or (...) dynamic, unfolding relations” (Emirbayer 1997: 281; Jackson and Nexon 1999). These perspectives can inform one another, but the research question of this thesis mainly focuses on a constantly developing security relationship. That makes it appropriate with a theoretical perspective which “sees relations between terms or units as preeminent dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substances” (Emirbayer 1997: 289).

A security relationship is a result of diplomatic ties between individuals and organizations on different levels, sometimes with new persons in positions of contact, and in an always changing international context. Norbert Elias has illuminated this through an example of a relationship between two persons:

(...) the two-person relationship AB in fact comprises two distinguishable relationships – the relationship AB seen from A’s perspective and the relationship BA seen from B’s perspective. Working with concepts which make even relationships
seem like static objects, it is difficult to do justice to the perspectival nature of all human relationships (Elias 1978: 126).

The security relationship I study is not static, and is the result of diverse representations of it throughout the period. Discourse analysis gives an opportunity to study these different representations and the interplay between them. This makes it suitable with such an approach. Jennifer Milliken (1999a: 92) has defined discourse as

an ordering of terms, meanings and practices that forms the background presuppositions and taken-for-granted understandings that enable people’s actions and interpretations.

I see all social practices as discursive (Burr 1995; Hall 2001). This is based on a definition of social practices as “socially recognized forms of activity, done on the basis of what members learn from others, and capable of being done well or badly, correctly or incorrectly” (Barnes 2001: 19). However, in this thesis I only study the discourse through written texts. This choice is made based on practical considerations.

Rather than treating the state as a unitary actor I study how the states are represented – “how the state features in the stories told about it” (Rumelili 2007: 13). Discourse analysis makes it possible to analyse how certain a “truth” in a foreign policy discourse is the result of social construction. How a political question is represented, for instance if a question is represented as one the military, and not the parliament, should handle, also has consequences for the outcome of the question (Neumann 2001: 146).

This construction is related to the definition of a certain national identity with certain belonging interests, which I come back to in section 2.1.3. These divergences often take place around the definition of important concepts within foreign policy. I study how the participants in the two national discourses have used different representations, and how these have been used to argue for different policies. It also opens up for the fact that there is not one national interest, but that foreign policy is a field of debate and consists of different understandings of reality (Græger 2007: 29).

One example of such a construction is demonstrated in Kıvanç Çoş and Pinar Bilgin’s article (2010) about how an alliance with the United States was presented as necessary for Turkey after the Second World War. This was because of “Stalin’s demands” for the Turkish Straits.

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9 I define the textual universe and the text sample in section 2.2.6.
However, the Soviet Union had presented similar demands ten years earlier, without Turkey responding by questioning their cooperation. Hence, within ten years the discourse changed, and now it was represented as obvious that Turkey had to change alliance based on these demands (Bilgin and Çoş 2010). Even contemporary literature often presents the Turkish turn away from the Soviet Union and to the United States as a “natural” consequence of the demands from the Soviet Union (see for example Grigoriadis 2010a: 52).

A discourse is an analytical construct (Christie Mathisen 1997: 19). Within a discourse texts may converge when they define problems, construct identities and find political solutions. This is also the case in the Turkish and American debates. Since a discourse is an analytical tool, it is possible to both gather all texts into a single discourse, as well as identify one discourse for each text (Hansen 2006: 51). For the purpose of this thesis I have treated the debate in Turkey as one discourse and the debate in the United States as another.

### 2.2.2 Discursive power

In this section I introduce power, and use this as a basis for showing how a certain representation may be taken for granted within a discourse. Within the relational perspective, it is a logical consequence to view power as relational too, rather than something one can “seize” or “hold” (Emirbayer 1997: 291). It is defined as inherent in a relationship, meaning that one cannot take the power from one relationship and apply it into another (Elias 1978: 166).

Elias has demonstrated how this works through a card game as an example of a relationship. The players are interdependent. If every player except one leaves the table, the game is no longer (Elias 1978: 130). In the card game, the power is spread out between the players, and their strength changes as the game evolves. Norbert Elias calls such a game a “figuration”, and explains how the power relationship works:

(…) the concept of power (is) transformed from a concept of substance to a concept of relationship. At the core of changing figurations – indeed, the very hub of the figuration process – is a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium, a balance of power moving to and fro… This kind of fluctuating balance of power is a structural characteristic of the flow of every figuration (Elias 1978: 131).  

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10 Elias (1978) defines “figurations” as “the changing pattern created by the players as a whole… the totality of their dealings in their relationships with each other”.

11
Such a perspective of power implies that the power dimension in the representations of the Turkish-American security relationship make “a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium”. A discourse generally has a set of dominant representations that are the most powerful representations, but alternative representations may position themselves towards these (Hansen 2002: 30-32; Neumann 2001: 57).

A discourse also often has several representations that are usually not considered as possible to change. These representations are considered normal or natural (Neumann 2001: 168). This is close to what Fairclough and Chouliaraki (1999: 24) refer to as hegemony:

Hegemony is relations of domination based upon consent rather than coercion, involving the naturalisation of practices and their social relations as well as relations between practices, as matters of common sense (...) (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 24).

Discursive representations are constantly in the process of being produced and reproduced (Hansen 2002: 30-32; Cronin 1998: 278). As a relationship is not a one-way street but consists of the interaction between the two countries, studying the discourse of both sides provides a major advantage in understanding the dynamics of the relationship.

By identifying the dominant and alternative representations in both countries, and the changes in these, an understanding of the basic fundaments of the relationship may be provided. For the purpose of this thesis I operationalize dominant representation as the representation I identify as mostly used by members of the government in a country. Alternative representation is operationalized as a representation which is clearly visible in a national discourse, but which is not the one mostly used by a government. These inferences are results of my subjective interpretation. In order to increase their validity I include examples of these representations in order to make it more clear how I have decided whether to call a representation “dominant” or “alternative”.

2.2.3 National identity and interest

This is close to Michel Foucault’s (1995) theory of power, which assumes power is everywhere, but that it comes into being within relationships. Power is a result of the divisions in the relationship, but also a condition of these divisions (Foucault 1995: 104-105). This means that analysing power in discourse is a complex task, and one cannot quantify how much power each actor has within a discourse. Instead, discourse represents different strategies of power from different actors, and it can be a tool for both increasing and reducing power (Foucault 1995: 112).
Policy is usually made by reference to a shared identity, which is continuously reconstituted. Identity is not a static phenomenon - a constant factor causing the foreign policy - but identity and policy are mutually constitutive (Weber 1998: 92). A consequence of this theoretical perspective is the fact that a national interest is socially constructed (Weldes 1996; Cronin 1998: 277). According to Lene Hansen (2006: 6):

> To say that identity is *discursive* and *political* is to argue that representations of identity place foreign policy issues within a particular interpretative optic, one with consequences for which foreign policy can be formulated as an adequate response.

A constructed identity does not necessarily lead to one single policy, but can be linked to different policy outcomes in different discourses (Bilgin and Çoş 2010). The construction of national interest depends on how different actors within the country position themselves towards other countries. This positioning takes place through a construction of identity (Pizzorno, quoted in Emirbayer 1997: 296).

Representations of national interest reconstitute certain parts of the commonly defined national identity. And when arguing for changes in policy, it is common to use well known representations of identity, with a twist, in order to grant legitimacy to the change (Campbell 1992: 30). To study change in discourse, it can be worthwhile to examine whether important representations of identity are challenged. Politicians in opposition will usually try to redefine the policy, which may include a reformulation of identity at the same time. However, they may also agree upon both identity and political aim, but criticize the actions the policymakers have chosen for not working the way they want them to (Hansen 2006: 30-31).

In discourse analysis it is common to see meaning as constructed in a discursive relationship. Identity is relational and defined based on difference - you know who you are based on what or who you are not. In this manner, identity is constituted in contact with other identities. The identity of the self is usually defined based on being in opposition to the typical traits of the other, which the self does not share. Hence, identity is a result of interpretation (Neumann 2001: 124-127).

Explained in a more detailed manner, identity is often constructed in terms of a “juxtaposition between a privileged sign on the one hand and a devalued one on the other” (Hansen 2006: 19; see also Bergström and Boréus 2005: 317; Milliken 1999b). In that manner a self’s identity will be “constructed based on two dimensions” (Hansen 2006: 19). First it is
constructed based on positive representations that bind it together in a system of regularity. This semantic process is called linking. Lene Hansen (2006: 19-21) uses gender roles as an example on this. Women have often been defined as a group by being identified as “emotional, motherly, reliant and simple” (Hansen 2006: 19). At the same time there is a negative process, differentiating. The group is bound together by what it is not, based on a comparison with another group. Hansen shows how men have been represented as women’s opposition – “rational, intellectual, independent and complex” (Hansen 2006: 19). Hence, this is an example of how such structures can be represented as stable and fixed within a discourse, while it is not given from nature how these identities are constructed.

Characteristics that are represented as positive in one group may be identified as negative in another group. As I demonstrate in the analytical chapters, Turkey was at one point represented as a Muslim democracy in the dominant representation in U.S. discourse, and this identity was framed as an advantage in foreign policy. In Turkey, however, a Muslim identity was represented as something negative in an alternative representation held by the opposition.

If there are different representations of a identity within one group, the identity constructions may get unstable. For instance one has observed that women’s movements have challenged the traditional perspective on gender roles. Female identity has changed after new representations gained power in the discourse of gender (Hansen 2006: 21).

National interests can be represented as obvious or natural given a country’s amount of power, geography or relationship to another country. For instance does the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, often argue for a certain policy as a “necessity” (see e.g. Davutoğlu 2009b). This does not make it less true that the policy is a result of political considerations, but makes it more difficult for opponents to discuss alternative policies.

2.2.4 Discourse in security relationships

The process of linking and differentiating also takes place in a security relationship. The cooperation needs constant care in order to survive. It needs to be constantly justified by defining a shared identity and shared threat(s) (Rumelili 2007: 26). The discourse of the cooperation, specifically on identity, influences the foreign policy discourses of the two countries (Rumelili 2007: 45). It is common that countries within an organization, both
regional and security organisations (NATO can be defined as both), claim to build upon and aim to strengthen a shared identity. In a security organisation there is an expected stability between the countries, and the relationship is based on trust (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998; Rumelili 2007). According to Deutsch et al. the security relationship will come to an end the day the countries do not share interests any more (Deutsch et al. 1957:5).

Bahar Rumelili has identified several dimensions of collective self/other-relations. I use one of these dimensions. This is about the response the Other gives a representation which the Self has used of the Other when it constituted its identity. This response may both reproduce and undermine the identity of the Self. Rumelili (2007) has an example:

For example, a state constituted as non-democratic, in the course of performing its identity, can produce discourses that accept or challenge the moral superiority of democracy as a system of rule. The identity discourses and performances of the other can lend recognition to or resist the construction of its identity as non-democratic. Alternatively, the identity discourses of the other can undermine the democratic states` identity claims by pointing to flaws in their practices. Any one of these “responses” by the other will shape the social definition of democracy and the notions of difference it depends on (Rumelili 2007: 39-40).

This reaction will affect the representations of difference between the two (Rumelili 2007: 40). One of the goals of this thesis is to look at the security relationship as a whole, instead of studying only one of the national debates. Then one can look at how representations in one country affect the other (Rumelili 2007: 31). This dimension is important, because the identity of the self depends on being recognized by the other. If not, the identity will become unstable (Rumelili 2007: 40).

Identity within a security relationship is often related to the definition of common threats. According to Barnett (quoted in Brown 2008: 92): “actors with a shared identity are likely to have a shared construction of the threat”. In this manner the identity in a national discourse delimits which actors can be represented as legitimate allies, based on shared definitions of threats (Brown 2008: 92).

**2.2.5 Intertextuality**

Every text refers, explicitly or more hidden, to former texts (Kristeva 1986). In this process of reference, the text retells the points it finds most significant from the former text, as well as presenting its own hermeneutics of the same text. Finding which texts the most important
authors refer to and how they interpret these texts, can help identifying how identities and policies are being constructed. This is called intertextuality. A text may also refer to a well-known debate, including many texts, without referring openly to a specific text (Hansen 2006: 55).

One example can be when an author refers to a term well known from an article without defining it any further. For example, referring to an “axis of evil” without mentioning President George W. Bush (2002a) and his State of the Union speech 29th January 2002 still includes a reference to this speech, since the expression was introduced in American foreign policy for the first time in this speech.

I utilize intertextuality in order to trace the meaning and interpretation of important concepts often used in the discourses. In this manner I am reading “backwards” to important texts from before the period I study, since these texts have been referred to in the chosen period. Understanding these references and their former use will improve the depth of the discourse analysis.

### 2.2.6 Textual universe and text sample

In this section I delimit the universe of text material, and show how I select the texts I have actually analysed in this thesis. It is an aim to read as much as possible when doing discourse analysis. However, I cannot read everything written about Turkey in the US and everything about the US in Turkey for the last ten years. So, at a certain point I have to stop, with the knowledge that I may have had to change some of the discourses if I had the chance to read more (Neumann 1994: 55).

The textual universe relevant for this thesis is operationalized as all texts written for a Turkish or an American public about the security relationship between Turkey and the United States between 2001 and 2010. This means that I include texts written outside of the United States or Turkey as long as it is written as a means of participation in the American or Turkish debate. Unfortunately I do not read Turkish as well as I read English. For this reason I mainly use English sources from the Turkish debate.

Hansen recommends three criteria for text selection when doing discourse analysis of foreign policy discourse. I utilize these criteria in order to identify “texts within a foreign policy
discourse”. First, the text should define a national identity, provide a policy recommendation or present a foreign policy aim. It should also be a text that other people read, in order to claim that it has an effect on the national discourses. Third, it should be written by someone with authority in the debate. Otherwise it would not have any power in the struggle between discourses (Hansen 2006: 85). This means that I mainly include representations I have identified as relevant for a dominant or alternative representation.

I started by reading academic texts about foreign policy and the construction of national identity in both countries in the period. This gave a basic impression of the development of foreign policy in the period, as well as the foundation in the foreign policy discourses. Afterwards I have read newspaper articles, speeches and strategic documents by politicians and public documents about the security relationship from the period.

More specifically I have read speeches from politicians in important positions for the security relationship. This has been narrowed down to the Secretary of State and the President in the United States, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the President and the Prime Minister in Turkey. I have not read all their speeches in this period, but mostly those I have seen referred to as important by other scholars, as well as some speeches I have found relevant based on title or when and where they were held. These speeches have been relevant for the research question because they have given insight into how public officials represent the security relationship.

The analysis of official texts demands focus on details, but these details still give information into the development of affairs. For instance, one of my findings in this thesis goes on how American officials used the expression “strategic partnership” of their relationship to Turkey in the beginning of the decade. This expression was not used after the War in Iraq started in 2003 until 2005. In 2009 President Obama visited Turkey. Then he said that the security relationship was a “strategic partnership”, but also more than that, namely a “model partnership”. These points can be interpreted as details, but these details are American representations of the status of the security relationship. When U.S. officials stopped calling Turkey a “strategic partner”, this has consequences for the scope of their cooperation and for how members of Turkish opinion represent their relationship.

I have chosen to study particularly the representations I have seen as most influential within the Turkish and American discourses. More practically this has meant to supplement included
representations by politicians with those made by scholars and journalists as well. I have excluded representations from more popular culture, even though it might have given interesting insights. This has been in order to focus upon what I have found most relevant for the dominant representations in the two countries. Lene Hansen explains:

Understanding official foreign policy discourse as situated in a wider discursive field opens up a theoretical and empirical research agenda that examines how foreign policy representations and representations articulated by oppositional political forces, the media, academe, and popular culture reinforce or contest each other (…) (Hansen 2006:7).

To identify different representations of the relationship, and locate who these representations come from, may be a key to understanding the security relationship between Turkey and the United States during the last ten years.

In the Turkish debate, I mainly use English sources, particularly the two newspapers in English, Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News. I use these sources in order to detect translated quotes by Turkish politicians and diplomats, but also to read editorials and comments by journalists from the newspaper. Moreover, there are other scholars that have identified different discourses within the Turkish foreign policy debate in the 2000s, but mainly focusing on one period of these years, or focusing mainly on one of the discourses. Most of these have used sources in Turkish language. I use this former research in order to control from a bias, based on the fact that I mainly use two Turkish newspapers written in English.

Turkish newspapers write more about the security relationship to the United States than vice versa. Hence, I have concluded with the fact that reading Turkish newspapers has been enough material to identify the dominant and alternative representations between 2001 and 2010. In the U.S. debate I needed more material than newspapers. Since the Congress has had several hearings about Turkey in the period, it has been a practical source I have used to supplement newspaper articles. Both sources have given an opportunity to detect representations which never would have been said as public statements, but which still may be seen as “common sense” among elites (Rumelili 2007: 14).

I have made a table with an overview of the text material behind the analysis:
A broad text material like this demand a lot of reading, but it results in a broader basis for an analysis. I also identified certain representations I saw as important for the discourse, such as “strategic partnership” or “geopolitics”. Afterwards I have studied more chronologically the use of these important representations in the period and how the use of these representations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT MATERIAL</th>
<th>TEMPORAL LOCATION$^{12}$</th>
<th>Historical material</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Between January 2001 and December 2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Texts from Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Speeches and articles by Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers</td>
<td>Academic texts about construction of Turkish national identity and Turkish foreign policy discourse</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Articles and editorials from Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News</td>
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<td>Policy advices from scholars</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Texts from the U.S.</strong></td>
<td>Speeches and articles by Presidents and Secretaries of State</td>
<td>Academic texts about construction of American national identity and American foreign policy discourse</td>
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<td>Debates in Congress and Senate</td>
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<td>Articles and editorials from New York Times and other newspapers</td>
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<td>Policy advices from scholars</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Texts about the security relationship</strong></td>
<td>Shared Vision documents (2006; 2009)</td>
<td>Academic texts about the security relationship</td>
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$^{12}$The table is inspired by Lene Hansen (2006: 92).
has changed. Finally I have applied Rumelili’s theory of security communities on these findings and drawn the longer lines about the security relationship as a whole.

I study variation between representations found in texts within the case. So, in the scholar John Gerring’s (2004: 341) words: “Case studies rely on the same sort of covariational evidence utilized in non-case study research”. In this variation I focus on the texts I identify as most relevant in the national discourses. This means that all texts in the universe do not have the same probability of being included. This is because in discourse analysis the relevance of a discursive representation depends not on the amount of texts using such a representation (Neumann 2001: 51; Wigen 2009: 22). It also depends on the status of the text in the discourse – a speech by the American President has different discursive influence than a comment within a less important American newspaper. The actors I study have different amounts of power. Prime Minister Erdoğan clearly has a larger ability to influence Turkish foreign policy than a columnist in the Turkish newspaper Radikal. This is taken into account when considering the power relations between representations.

2.3 Validity and reliability

Sound validity and reliability are usual demands for solid research A researcher often meets a dilemma between going into the details of one case and more parsimoniously into many cases. My solution is a case study where I use a qualitative method. This has been in order to achieve high conceptual validity, meaning that the validity of inferences about concepts is high (George and Bennett 2005: 19).

In order to recognize the typical representations of a national discourse, one must understand the context within which texts are written and speeches held (Yin 2003: 14-15. This point makes case study an appropriate research design for this research question. Context is important in order to detect the most relevant text material. An advantage with this case is that I have an extensive knowledge on the subject, which is an advantage when analysing the foreign policy discourses in the two countries (George and Bennett 2005: 24). This specific case is selected on the basis of a broad interest in Turkish foreign policy and international relations more generally. This increases the ability for a high internal validity in this case.

This is a benefit when studying a security relationship debated in two countries on different continents, with different political cultures and traditions for political discussion. In order to
compare the discourses properly, one must go deeply into the debates and be aware of these differences. This helps me making concepts from the national debates “analytically equivalent”, and be sure that I compare what Locke and Thelen calls “apples with apples”. However, when one cannot find apples, or analytically equivalent concepts, in both countries, Locke and Thelen argue that one should instead compare “apples with oranges” by have an analysis which is aware of the contextual differences between the countries (Locke and Thelen 1998: 9-10). For instance, the presidents in Turkey and the US have different roles in foreign policy making. When I compare and analyse presidential statements, this is important knowledge.

If a research can be repeated with the same results as in the original research, it has high reliability (Yin 2003: 34). I analyze a large text material. This makes it less likely that the findings would be the same if the research was repeated than if the text material was of a more narrow scope. Since I have focused on a specific period in the past, the thesis will have several similarities with the methodological considerations of historians. Gudmund Hernes has called history “the history of the winning models”. That is because the models historians apply to find meaningful points often are hidden (Hernes 1997: 90). If one wants good reliability, this is a problem. Hence, the aim of this paper is to be as clear as possible on presentation of procedure and analytical models.

A researcher will always write within a discourse. In this case this thesis is written outside of the two national discourses I have constructed, but this does not mean that this thesis is no discursive construction (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 62). A recognition of the fact that science is not objective, does not mean that one cannot consider questions of validity and reliability. On strategy for increasing validity can be to be explicit on how inferences are made (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 120; 168). Hence, transparency of the analytical procedure is crucial. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) this should be done by including examples one finds representative of the discourse. These examples should be analyzed into details in order to show how one interprets them. In this manner it becomes clear for the reader how the writer has come to her conclusions (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 134). The validity of interpretations can also be “checked” by reading how the analysis is executed based on what the researcher presents and interprets examples of a dominant or alternative representation (Potter 1996: 13).
2.4 Challenges

Discourses are usually centred round certain texts, which the other texts respond to or place themselves in relation to. Texts reproducing accepted positions in the discourse will rarely create much discussion. The result is that texts proposing change, or challenging the discourse, usually will get more attention than status quo texts (Neumann 2001: 52; Wæver 1999). This does not mean that dominant representations do not have to be repeated in order to stay dominant. The only way to stay influential, without being repeated them, will be if these representations are embedded in other representations that are often repeated (Neumann 2001:143).

In discourse analysis one may easily focus more on more “noisy” texts, since one looks at texts other refer to and reproduce. Hence, I look for repetitions of points others have made as a way of reproducing the existing discourse. If I do not find texts challenging a dominant representation, this may be because these texts never made it to print. They may have been refused by publishers, or they may not have the competence necessary to make it to the newspaper columns. However, my object of study is the actual printed discourse, and this is no direct problem for my analysis (Neumann 2001: 53).

Methodologically a discourse analysis with such a broad textual scope will meet challenges such as why a certain quote is included in the analysis and why others are not included. These choices have been made based on a mapping of the national discourses based on the text material introduced on page 20. I have included the examples I have found most representative for a certain representation. When there has been disagreement between texts qualifying to be included in the analysis, according to the criteria of Lene Hansen I presented on page 17 and 18, I have included this disagreement in the analytical chapters. A large amount of the examples I use are based on quotes. This gives a probability that people have been quoted incorrectly. The chance of this happening is reduced by the amount of material I have read. Most of the quotes are examples of representations I have seen used by others as well. However, the chance of incorrect quotes is still there and must be taken into account when considering the findings.

A critique against discourse analysis has been that it focuses too little on material factors. This is a critique which does not take into account that one in discourse analysis actually studies
how both material and ideational factors are given meaning through representations (Hansen 2006: 23).

Discourse analysis is no good tool if one wants to examine if there is realism in the threat considerations of a country. However, it is difficult for a researcher to consider whether policymakers speak of “real threats” or whether they mention threats for rhetorical reasons (Rumelili 2007: 15). One can only state that the threat considerations existed, and estimate the consequences of those considerations (Wendt 1999: 55-56). For that reason I base this analysis on how threats are represented within the discourses.
3 A strategic partnership. From January 2001 to 9/11.

In this section I outline how both countries mainly represented each others as having a shared West identity, and they identified common threats. The security relationship was argued to be strong in both countries, even though both national discourses also had alternative representations challenging this shared identity.

3.1 Historical timeline. The Turkish-American security relationship before 9/11 2001

Turkey became a NATO member in 1952. It fought with the United States in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. According to the Turkish scholars Eylem Yılmaz and Pınar Tank (2005-2006: 46), Turkey’s membership in NATO was an important part of the construction of Turkey’s western identity. During the Cold War the two countries were allies with the Soviet Union as their common enemy. Even though the security relationship mainly has been stable, there have at difficult moments been debates in both countries about the desirability of the cooperation. One such difficult moment was after the publication of the letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister İnönü concerning the Cyprus question in 1966 (Ahmad 2005: 130).13

In 1991 Turkey and the United States cooperated in the Gulf War. This was particularly argued for by President Turgut Özal from the Motherland Party.

The U.S. House of Representatives almost issued a genocide resolution in 2000, declaring that a genocide had been committed on the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire in 1915. This was stopped by a letter from President Clinton “in the last minute” (Hürriyet Daily News and Economic Review 2001a). In January 2001 the Republican George W. Bush became President of the United States.

13 American President Johnson wrote in 1964, during the Cyprus crisis, a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü saying that Turkey could not expect to get NATO support in the Cyprus crisis. He wrote: “I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies (Bölükbash 1993: 517).” When the letter was published two years later, it led to large anti-American demonstrations in Turkey (Hale 2000: 150).
3.2 Turkey as a strategic partner for the United States

In the U.S. discourse one dominant representation of Turkey before 9/11 2001 can be identified. This was a representation of a strategic partnership with importance for the United States. Turkey’s geography, democracy and secularity were used as arguments for this security relationship to stay strong.

The Bush administration was in power from January 2001. In his previous election campaign Bush had argued against an active foreign policy abroad. Instead he argued in favour of narrowing down the focus in foreign policy towards critical interests (Jervis 2003: 365). The Bush administration did not focus as much on Turkey in the beginning as the Clinton administration had done (Hale 2007: 91). However, in the representations I have identified, there was a large degree of continuity between the two presidents.

This security relationship was commonly referred to as a strategic partnership in U.S. discourse in early 2001. This term stems from President Bill Clinton’s speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara in November 1999 (Clinton 1999; see also Hale 2007: 90). In his speech, Clinton said that “in the post-Cold War era, our partnership has become even more important” (Clinton 1999). Turkey had been represented as an important ally for the United States during the Cold War as well, often as “NATO’s southern bulwark against the Soviet Union” (Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 15). Hence Clinton’s statement was of a very strong security relationship, since he gave it even more importance now than during the Cold War.

This representation of importance was upheld by both the new U.S. Secretary of State in 2001, Colin Powell, and President, George W. Bush. The newly inaugurated President Bush said to the Turkish Press “You are a very important country. You have got very strong friends here in our country. My foreign policy team and national security team are keenly aware of the importance of Turkey (…) and we look forward to working with you” (Bush quoted in Athanassopoulou 2001: 163). When Secretary of State Powell was asked about his attitude towards Turkey by a journalist, he was quoted answering: “Turkey has been one of our closest allies for many years now. I am proud of the many years of relations that have existed between myself and the leaders of Turkey and her armed forces. (…) I will support a strong Turkey that still makes significant contributions to Europe.” (Powell quoted in Turkish Daily
News 2001c). In this fashion Powell also stated that the security relationship was strong and argued for Turkey as an important ally.

In American newspapers the relationship was also represented as unproblematic. This was illustrated in an article in the New York Times about a power struggle between the army and the government in Turkey. Here the bilateral relationship was referred to in one sentence: “Turkey, a NATO and American ally, fields the region's strongest army and is regarded as a bulwark against instability” (Frantz 2001). Again the metaphor of a “bulwark against” something negative (“the Soviet Union” during the Cold War, now “instability”) was used about Turkey. Hence, the representation of Turkey as a strategic partner was dominant in this period.

3.2.1 Geopolitical importance

In order to understand this continuation more properly, it is worthwhile to look at how Turkey was represented before January 2001. In U.S. arguments for Turkey as a strategic partner, geopolitical importance was a main line of reasoning. For instance, in 2000 the American scholar Ian O. Lesser wrote: “Only the narrowest (“homeland defense”) approach to U.S. interests places Turkey outside the definition of an important ally. (…) The phrase “location, location, location” has considerable relevance in the Turkish case.” (Lesser 2000: 61). In this manner, Turkey’s geography was used in order to argue that it was in the “U.S. interest” to cooperate with the country. Particularly pivotal state, bridge and model (and bulwark against, as demonstrated above) were important metaphors of Turkey in the U.S. discourse at the time.

The American scholars Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy (1996) called Turkey a pivotal state for the United States in 1996. A pivotal state was defined as “a hot spot that could not only determine the fate of its region but also affect international stability”. The concept has been used in geography as an argument saying that some countries are more important than others. Chase, Hill and Kennedy wrote that as a “crossroads between East and West, North and South, Christendom and Islam, Turkey has the potential to influence countries thousands of miles from the Bosporus” (Chase, Hill and Kennedy 1996: 33-34). Hence, Turkey’s geography was making it important as an ally to the United States.

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14 “Pivotal state” was actually also used in the nineteenth century about the Turkish part of the Ottoman Empire by British and Russian politicians (Chase, Hill and Kennedy 1997: 34).
The argument was that a similar mechanism as in the *domino theory*, a U.S. strategy during the Cold War, could be used as a strategy for political stability in the world. If the United States could keep Turkey, and the other pivotal states, stable, they could keep status quo and the United States could remain a hegemon in global politics (Chase, Hill and Kennedy 1996: 34). In the time that followed several scholars would call Turkey a “pivotal state” for the United States (see Brzezinski 1997: 34; Fuller 2008).

In his Ankara speech, President Clinton (1999) also referred to Turkey as a bridge: “Since people have been able to draw maps, they have pointed out the immutable fact of Turkey’s geography -- that Asia Minor is a bridge between continents”. According to President Clinton, it was not only this geographical fact which made Turkey important, but rather the combination of geography, an unstable neighbourhood and Turkey’s political system, based on democracy and secularism:

> You are almost entirely surrounded by neighbours who are either actively hostile to democracy and peace, or struggling against great obstacles to embrace democracy and peace (…) All told, there are now billions of people around the region and the world whose future depends upon decisions made in this very room over the next 25 years. Each has a stake in Turkey's success in defining itself as a strong, secular, modern nation, proud of its traditions, fully part of Europe” (Clinton 1999).

So, among the political traits of Turkey that Clinton mentioned as positive, were democracy, secularism, modernity, Turkey’s European identity and its bid to become an EU member. These traits, combined with geography, linked Turkey to the United States as an important ally.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States had started representing Turkey as a “model for secular democracy”. According to the scholar Shireen Hunter (1999: 197), this was used by both President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton. Hunter claimed that this was a manner of containment towards countries that had been under the influence of the Soviet Union in order to avoid radical Islamist movements coming to power.

### 3.2.2 Poor human rights record

An alternative representation was of Turkey as a country with a poor record on human rights and minorities. Turkey has been criticized both for its treatment of its Kurdish minority and

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15 Chase, Hill and Kennedy (1996: 37) argued that Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Indonesia should be other pivotal states in U.S. foreign policy strategy.
for not recognizing that there was a genocide on the Armenian population by the Ottoman Empire in 1915. President Bush promised in his election campaign in 2000 that he would declare that there was genocide on the Armenians in 1915 (Turkish Daily News 2001b).

He did not bring the declaration when he became president. Again this was a continuation of Clinton’s framing of this issue (Armenian National Committee of America 2001). So, in this period no American president mentioned the issue as a genocide, but several politicians in Congress and the Senate, as well as journalists, did. For this reason, President Bush received criticism from the Armenian community. For instance, the Armenian National Committee of America (2001) wrote in a press statement that “The President, in using terminology that does not accurately identify the genocidal nature of Turkey’s crime against the Armenian people, has made the grave error of subordinating fundamental American principles to the demands of the Turkish Government”. In this quote there was a clear division between “fundamental American principles” and the “demands of the Turkish Government”. Hence, according to this statement, the Bush and Clinton administrations had given up parts of their identity (“fundamental American principles”) in order to cooperate with Turkey.

3.2.3 Summary

The security relationship to Turkey was represented as an important partnership in U.S. discourse before 9/11. This representation was dominant, based on Turkey being important because of its geography as well as its political characteristics. Being a secular, democratic country placed as “a bridge” between several unstable regions made up the metaphor of Turkey as a “bulwark” against threats to NATO. At the same time it was common to characterize Turkey as having human right challenges in opposition to what the U.S. should support, but this representation was not used by neither President Bush nor President Clinton while they were in the presidential chair.

3.3 The United States as an important ally in Turkish discourse

In the Turkish discourse there was also only one dominant representation of the security relationship to the United States before 9/11 in 2001. In similarity to the U.S. discourse the main threat, or “other”, in this discourse had been the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
After the Cold War the main threat to Turkey was identified as Turkey’s unstable neighbourhood (Çakmakoğlu quoted in Bilgin 2005: 186). This argument opened up for the military to decide most of the security policy.¹⁶ According to Turkish scholar Pinar Bilgin (2005: 195), this was demonstrated by the fact that “the defence budget goes on the nod in the Turkish Grand National Assembly”. Even though the main threat was changed after the Cold War, the United States was still represented as an important ally in Turkish discourse.

3.3.1 Turkey’s Western identity

It appears as if the security relationship to the US was taken for granted in Turkish discourse before 9/11. The relationship was not being questioned much in the public debate. For instance, when summing up the year 2000 and drawing up foreign policy challenges for Turkey in 2001, journalists in Turkish Daily News did not specifically mention the security relationship between Turkish and the United States. Instead they mentioned several cases where the US was involved, but only indirectly: EU accession, the Armenian genocide issue, the plans of creating an EU military force, the peace process in the Middle East, NATO questions and the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline.¹⁷ Another repeated point was the fact that Turkey and the US were allies helping each other. However, the newspaper articles also had representations of Turkey as being an actor with increased diplomatic activity (Birand 2001; Demirelli 2001; Hürriyet Daily News and Economic Review 2001a; Ilter 2001).

In these newspaper articles the United States and Turkey together were linked as an “us”, which faced common challenges such as the EU question and the peace process in the Middle East. Turkey and the United States were depicted as having the same interest in peace in the Middle East. Turkey and the United States were also reported to have a common desire to employ diplomacy in order to reach peace (Demirelli 2001; Ilter 2001, Birand 2001).

This might be related to the fact that ever since Atatürk’s time there has been a common representation that Turkey belongs in the West. In the 1920s Atatürk initiated several reforms

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¹⁶The military has a special role in the Turkish political system, through the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu – MGK). The MGK is an important body in Turkish foreign policy making. Up to 2001 it had a majority of military personnel, and up to 2003 it was changed from a decision making body to an advisory council (Lefebvre 2005-2006: 107). The Turkish military is also large in a global perspective. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) found in 2004 that Turkey was on fourteenth place on a list of military expenditures. Israel was the only country in the Middle East spending more on its military (Fuller 2008: 81).

in order to make Turkey more similar to the West, which he called “the civilized world”. He said in 1925:

The civilized world is far ahead of us. We have no choice but to catch up. It is time to stop non-sense, such as “should we or should we not wear hats?” We shall adopt hats along with all other works of Western civilization. Uncivilized people are doomed to be trodden under the feet of civilized people (quoted in Mango 2004: 438).

This was a comment he had to one of the Westernization reforms. These reforms included secularization and change of laws on headgear, calendar, civil code, penal code, alphabet and names (Mango 2004: 433-498). The adherence to the West was reinforced when Turkey joined NATO. According to the British historian William Hale: “Turkey’s membership of NATO continued to be a vital part of its links to the West, since this was the most important Western institution of which it was a full member, and in which it enjoyed clear treaty rights” (Hale 2000: 229).

As the Norwegian scholar Einar Wigen has showed, the Turkish discourse “represent the Turkish self as on the way to being either civilised or western” (Wigen 2009a: 107). A consequence is that being part of the “the West” still was an important representation in Turkish identity, and this might help explaining how the security relationship to the United States was taken for granted in early 2001.

### 3.3.2 Disagreement on Turkey’s activity level

Despite the dominant representation taking the security relationship for granted, some argued in favour of doing more than just continuing the alliance with the United States. Ismail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Democratic Left Party, stated that Turkey had been standing uncritically close to the United States in foreign policy. In that manner Turkey had not allowed itself take independent decisions. In the foreword of a book based on his foreign policy speeches and texts, he wrote:

What we had was a foreign policy that was alienated from its own roots, cut off from its own assets, indeed, divorced from the very elements that could nourish and sustain it. In this foreign policy’s perception of the world and of itself, history was nonexistent. (…) It is as if the genesis of Turkish foreign policy was considered to coincide with Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the Cold War. In the process, Turkey’s foreign policy was crammed into a straightjacket of some fifty and sixty years’ time (Cem 2001: 2).

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18 This is one of two dominant representations Wigen identifies in Turkish foreign policy discourse.
Cem wrote that Turkey was in a position, based on a historical legacy, to have much closer relations to other countries, in addition to the United States. This was no direct criticism of the alliance with United States. It was rather an argument for a continuation of the alliance where Turkey could be more independent. Cem made use of historical ties in order to argue for a new line in foreign policy – a more active Turkey.

This argumentation was in contrast to the traditional view of members of the Turkish military. Members of the military have traditionally used positive characteristics of the West. This can be traced back to when the army was the first institution to start Westernization reforms during the Ottoman Empire (Özgürel 2001). Even though these representations traditionally have been of positivity towards supporting the United States, it has not been combined with support of a high Turkish activity level in its neighbourhood. This was demonstrated during the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, when most of the Turkish elites were negative towards Turkish participation, even though they supported the security relationship with the United States in general.

So, even though the identity construction of Turkey as western seemed dominant in Turkish discourse at this point, it was challenged by an alternative representation used by a very influential person in Turkish foreign policy discourse.

### 3.3.3 Summary

The security relationship was taken for granted in Turkish foreign policy discourse in early 2001. This was partly explained with a representation of Turkey as a western country, commonly held among members of the military, an important group for foreign policy decision making in Turkey in 2001. At the same time there was a disagreement in Turkish foreign policy debate about which activity level Turkey should have in its neighbourhood. While the Minister of Foreign Affairs argued for more diplomatic contact to Turkey’s historical partners, this was not represented as positive by certain members of the military.

### 3.4 A solid security relationship

Between January and 9/11 2001 the security relationship was represented as stable in both Turkey and the United States. The relationship did not seem weakened on either side, even though the Cold War was over. Both countries had a dominant representation of each other as
important allies against Turkey`s “unstable neighbourhood” as a common enemy. In that manner the two security partners identified shared threats in the period.

In both countries the other country was represented as a partner for peace (Athanassopoulou 2001: 163; Demirelli 2001; Ilter 2001, Birand 2001). The United States and Turkey were also bound together by representations of a common wish of Turkey entering the EU (Turkish Daily News 2001c).

At the same time the traditional foreign policy representation of Turkey as a passive country in its neighbourhood was being challenged by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem. This was not a challenge of Turkey`s security relationship to the United States, but rather a challenge of Turkey`s activity level in addition to this relationship. Such a change could be seen as an opening up for taking different standpoints than the United States. This representation points towards a changed identity for Turkey. According to Cem, Turkey should keep its western identity, but at the same time not “cut off its own roots”.

The U.S. dominant representation of Turkey was that of a strategic partner. An alternative representation was of Turkey as a country with a poor human rights record. Hence, Turkey was in contrast to “fundamental American principles”. This was often seen in Congress, where a resolution asking Turkey to recognize that there was a genocide in 1915 almost won through in 2000.

The main finding in this chapter has been that both countries identified themselves, and each other, as parts of the West, and in Turkey this was particularly tied to its membership in NATO. In that manner, the two countries confirmed each others` identities. This functioned to strengthen the representation of a strong security relationship, according to Rumelili`s theory (2007).
4 Partners against terrorism. From 9/11 to the War in Iraq.

In this chapter I present the dominant representations in American and Turkish discourse between 9/11 2001 and 1st March 2003. I demonstrate how the War on Terrorism in both countries was argued to be their main priority in foreign policy. Politicians in both countries represented religion and terrorism as two different things in the first period after the terrorist attacks. The security relationship was declared to be solid in both countries.

In late 2002, however, terrorism was framed to a larger extent as a radical Islamist threat in U.S. discourse. At the same time, Turkey was represented more as a Muslim partner to the United States, while it earlier had been mostly represented as a secular partner. The Turkish Muslim identity was argued to be an advantage by the Bush administration. This was challenged by an alternative U.S. discourse representing Islam as problematic for Western values. It was also challenged by the Turkish national identity, which traditionally represented Turkey as secular and Western. The AKP government slowly started identifying Turkey as a Muslim country as well.

I also demonstrate how the War in Iraq was represented as a necessary part of the War on terrorism in the United States. In Turkey the war was mainly represented as a threat to stability and territorial integrity. Hence, the declared foreign policy aims of the two countries were divergent in late 2002 and early 2003, before Turkey voted “no” to allowing the United States using Turkish territory in order to create a northern front in the War in Iraq.

4.1 Historical timeline from 9/11 2001 to March 2003

11th September 2001 the United States was attacked by terrorists from the organization al-Qaeda. In response the Bush administration launched a Global War on Terrorism and went to War in Afghanistan in October the same year. Turkey participated in this war with troops from November 2001.

In 2002 the United States started arguing for a War against Iraq as well. A part of the American war plan included entering Iraq from two sides, where one side would be from Turkish territory, attacking Iraq from the north. Turkey had general elections in November
2002, and the United States waited for the new government in order to finish these plans. It made them postpone the planned date for starting the war from January to late March 2003 (Hale 2007: 101).

In November 2002 Turkey had elections. Only the AKP and the CHP, with a secularist electorate, managed to cross the threshold on 10 per cent. AKP got 34, 3 per cent of the votes, and this gave them 66 per cent of the seats. CHP got 19, 4 per cent of the votes (Robins 2003a: 550-551).

1st March 2003 the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted against a resolution allowing American troops enter Iraq from Turkish territory. 264 voted in favour of the resolution and 250 voted against, but four votes lacked in order to gain the required majority. More than 50 deputies from AKP voted against the resolution (BBC 2003). For that reason the United States did not open a “Northern Front” against Iraq. It had to change plans and attacked Iraq from only one side from 20th March 2003.

4.2 A Muslim ally in the War on Terrorism?

4.2.1 The War on Terrorism

In the beginning of the War on Terrorism the dominant American representations of terrorism was of a phenomenon which was not related to religion itself, but rather a misused form of religion. Terrorists were characterized as enemies of freedom and democracy. For instance, on the 20th September 2001 President Bush (2001: 552) held a speech about the terrorist attacks 9/11. He defined the terrorists as “enemies of freedom” and mentioned several reasons why these terrorists “hate” the US, such as “a democratically elected government” (Bush 2001b: 551, 553). Bush made a clear difference between the terrorists and Islam, by saying that “The terrorists practice a fringe from Islamist extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that prevents the peaceful teachings of Islam” (Bush 2001b: 552).

In that manner, Muslim countries were not represented as enemies of the US after the attacks, which Bush underlined by saying “[Islam is] practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends” (Bush 2001b: 552-553). Terrorists were rather identified as the “other” in U.S. foreign policy, characterized as being
against democracy and freedom. The United States and its Muslim friends, on the other hand, were linked to each other through characterizations of having peace and freedom.

However, in the National Security Strategy (The White House 2002) which was launched the following year, this changed. Now terrorism was linked to a radical type of Islamism. This was combined with a strategy of supporting the moderate part of this divided Muslim world: “We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. This includes (...) supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation” (The White House 2002: 6). Turkey was not mentioned in particular in this document, but one could interpret this representation as a support to moderate governments also in Turkey.

7th October 2001 the United States started its War in Afghanistan. According to President Bush, the aim was “to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime” (Bush 2001a). Turkey participated in this war by sending troops and opening up Turkish airspace for the United States.

In the following period, Turkey was represented in a very positive manner in U.S. discourse. A Republican congressman, Curt Weldon, was quoted saying that Turkey was “a shining crown jewel” (Economist 2001). The American ambassador to Turkey between 1997 and 2000 wrote that “Turkey’s response to 11 September has been everything one could expect of a “strategic partner”” (Parris quoted in Hale 2007:91). So, even though Islam was linked more closely to terrorism in U.S. discourse, this did not have any consequences for the representation of Turkey in the first period after 9/11.

4.2.2 Turkey as a Muslim country

At this point Turkey was starting to be represented more as a “Muslim” country than before in U.S. discourse, where it earlier had been mostly represented as “secular”. Officials from the Bush administration argued that the Muslim identity of Turkey was an advantage for the security relationship. For instance, in November 2001 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell argued for sending a “coalition of the willing” to Afghanistan, consisting of Muslim nations, including Turkey, in order to strengthen a "bridging political structure" under UN control. Powell argued that this was better “than one of the big-power nations coming in to do it”
(Tyler 2001). In this manner Turkey’s Muslim identity was represented as an advantage for U.S. national interest. This was the dominant representation at the time.

At the same time an alternative representation was seen more often in the U.S. discourse. This alternative representation was of Islam as a religion with several negative traits tied to it. For instance, Paul Weyrich, who started the Heritage Foundation, wrote that “Islam is, quite simply, a religion of war” (quoted in Kristof 2002). Another columnist, Ann Coulter, asked the US government to “invade [Muslim] countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity” (Armstrong 2002). These representations were criticized by other participants in the discourse and characterized as “hate speech” (Kristof 2002).

However, there was an increasing tendency of characterizing “the Muslim and Christian worlds” as categorically different. This was partly based on an already existing literature about Islam in U.S. discourse. For instance, the American scholar Graham Fuller, who also has published on Turkey (see Fuller and Barkey 1998; Çandar and Fuller 2001; Fuller 2008), wrote based distinction between “the West” and “the Muslim world”:

> When Westerners talk about political ideals, they naturally hark back to the Magna Carta, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution. Muslims go back to the Koran and the Hadith to derive general principles about good governance (including the ruler’s obligation to consult the people) and concepts about social and economic justice (Fuller 2002: 50).

In this analysis, Fuller claimed that the ethical fundament of Christians and Muslims diverged. Such a representation has political consequences. It could be hard to argue for a continuation of a security relationship to a country which does not use nation, but religion as organizing principle, combined with different main beliefs for good governance than “Western principles”.

Another important scholar when it comes to understanding Islam in U.S. discourse is the Princeton scholar Bernard Lewis (Merrill and Paterson 2005: 557). He wrote in 2001 about the Muslim world, and contrasted “the Western world” with “Muslims”. According to Lewis there was a significant distinction between the two “worlds”: “In the Western world, the basic unit of human organization is the nation, which is then subdivided in various ways, one of which is by religion. Muslims, however, tend to see not a nation subdivided into religious groups, but a religion subdivided into nations” (Lewis 2005: 559). This representation was of Muslims as a distinct “other” for the United States.
However, Lewis later in his text wrote that Turkey might be an exception to the “fact” that Muslim countries never have succeeded with Western democracy: “The record, with the possible exception of Turkey, is one of almost unrelieved failure. Western-style parties and parliaments almost invariably ended in corrupt tyrannies, maintained by repression and indoctrination. The only European model that worked, in the sense of accomplishing its purpose, was the one-party dictatorship.” (Lewis 2005: 568). Even though Turkey might be an exception of this record, Lewis did not give much support to the representation of Turkey as a model democracy, neither as a model of a “secular democracy” nor a “Muslim democracy”, with this statement.

The representations of Islam exemplified by Lewis, Fuller, Coulter and Weyrich were not dominant in U.S. discourse. But they were winning ground at the same time as Turkey was identified more as a Muslim country by the Bush administration. Even though the Bush administration argued that this Muslim identity was an advantage, this discoursive change opened up for using the representations of Lewis et al. in order to argue for less cooperation with Turkey. This did not happen yet, but would be seen more often a few years later.

4.2.3 The War in Iraq

In his State of the Union speech in January 2002 President Bush (2002a) mentioned Iraq as a threat to the United States. He characterized the threat in this manner:

This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic (Bush 2002b).

So, Iraq was represented as a country which was seeking weapons of mass destruction and cooperated with terrorists. This led to U.S. plans of going to war against Iraq, if Saddam Hussein did not follow a list of demands. President Bush presented these demands in a speech in the UN General Assembly 12th September 2002 (Bush 2002a). The following international debate led to the UN Security Council resolution 1441 in November 2002 (United Nations Security Council 2002). The idea of going to war against Iraq was disputed in the American

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19 Based on the understanding, simplistically put here, that Islam is a threat and Turkey is a Muslim country. Hence cooperation should not be something to pursue.
foreign policy debate. The plans were criticized on several grounds, such as being against American interest (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003) or based on exaggerated threats (Kaufmann 2004)

In October 2002 Bush held another speech where he argued for going to war against Iraq. One of his arguments was:

Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles — far enough to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and other nations — in a region where more than 135,000 American civilians and service members live and work (Bush 2002c).

Although Bush mentioned Turkey as a country under threat from Iraq in this quote, this was represented as mainly a threat to Americans in Turkey. At the same time weapons of mass destruction from Iraq were not represented as a main threat in Turkish discourse. Hence, even though Turkey was represented as an ally to the United States in this period, Iraq was represented as more of a threat against the United States than against Turkey.

Before the 1st March vote 2003 Turkish support for the plans was expected, or more precisely, assumed in the U.S. discourse. Even though the Americans paid attention to the Turkish objections, there was an expectation that those objections would be overcome. Before the 1st March vote Tommy Franks, the commander of the US Central Command, had been quoted saying before the vote that he would be “outraged” if Turkey said “no” to the US (Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 31). And in January 2003 the U.S. representations of Turkey were those of a “strategic partnership”. The Air Force General Richard B. Myers, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quoted saying: "Turkey has been very cooperative in all of this. I'm leaving Ankara, as many Americans have done in the past, very sure of our strategic partnership and very sure of the vision that we both have in terms of what we want for the region, and that is peace and stability" (quoted in Vick 2003; see also Kardaş 2006: 309).

4.2.4 Summary

In this entire period Turkey was represented as a strategic partner to the United States. Now, however, the focus was on Turkey’s Muslim identity, in contrast to Turkey’s secular identity, which has been lifted as Turkey’s asset by President Clinton in the late 1990s. After 9/11 terrorism was argued to be the main threat to the United States. In the beginning, the Bush administration represented this to be unrelated to religion. But in 2002 the terrorism they
fought was described by the same administration to be a radical version of Islamism. The same year Iraq was pointed out as a new main threat to the United States by President Bush, based on having weapons of mass destruction and cooperating with terrorists. In the U.S. war plans it was taken for granted that Turkey would cooperate.

4.3 The United States as an ally against terrorism for Turkey

4.3.1 Afghanistan

After 11th September 2001 Turkish politicians argued for more activism and cooperation with the United States against terrorism. Both President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit sent messages to the United States after the attacks. They stated that they shared grief with the Americans (Turkish Daily News 2001a). There was an agreement among all Turkish parties to support their ally. Prime Minister Ecevit was quoted telling President Bush that “the Turkish government is ready as ever to cooperate with you” (Hale 2007: 91). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, said that he saw Turkey and the US as natural allies against terrorism, a point he also came with before 11th September 2001 (Mango 2002). 13th September Turkey declared that it was ready to participate in a NATO operation, and the day after the Turkish forces were declared in high alert. 22nd September Turkey opened up for U.S. use of Turkish airspace and declared that they would share intelligence with the United States about Afghanistan (Aydın, Erhan and Erdem 2001).

When Turkey’s participation in the war against Afghanistan was declared the 1st November 2001, a statement from the government said that Turkey’s aims in the war were: "surveillance, struggle against terrorists, guiding the Northern Alliance, supporting humanitarian missions, protecting innocent people and helping the evacuation of civilians when necessary” (quoted in BBC News 2001). In addition to these aims, military sources added “provide security on the Afghan-Uzbek border, prevent the penetration of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militia across the border, safeguard the Amu Derya River and help to police Kabul after it falls into
Northern Alliance hands" (quoted in Kurkcu 2001). In that manner the Turkish aims for the war were far more ambitious than the American aims.\textsuperscript{20}

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem was quoted saying that the Turkish forces would show that the War on Terrorism was: "not a war against Islam -- terrorism does not have a religion" (CNN World 2001). So Cem represented Turkey as a country with a Muslim identity. He argued that this was an advantage in foreign policy, helping gaining legitimacy to the War on Terrorism as a war crossing religious boundaries.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who would later be Turkish Prime Minister, had a different representation of Turkish participation in the War in Afghanistan. He stated in 2001 that he was supportive of the "international struggle against terrorism".\textsuperscript{21} He was still questioning the military operations in Afghanistan, based on worries that it would lead to more support to radical Islamists (Aykan 2008: 11). This was a parallel aim to the aim President Bush had declared for the war, namely stopping radical Islamism, but it did not mean that they had similar representations of how to reach that shared aim.

\textbf{4.3.2 Terrorism not related to religion}

Turkish politicians argued throughout this period that terrorism was not related to religion, in line with the arguments of the Bush administration in the first period after 9/11. This was stated by politicians from all the relevant political parties (Carroll 2002). Already September 13\textsuperscript{th} 2001 Prime Minister Ecevit was quoted saying that “it would have been very unfair to associate terrorism with the Islamic world. Though secular by constitution, 99.8 percent of Turkey's population is Muslim and has been fighting radical Islamism, such as Hizbullah, within its own territory (Sariibrahimoglu 2001).”

In a speech in February the following year Minister of Foreign Affairs Cem clearly defined terrorism as the major enemy of Turkey. This was not related to religion or geography, as the summary of his speech said:

\textsuperscript{20}Economy was by some represented as a reason for Turkey to support the United States in Afghanistan. The day after Turkey declared that they would send troops to Afghanistan, the World Band sent the economic aid it had promised against the economic crisis in Turkey. A Turkish official was reported saying that Turkey's economy was saved by 9/11 (Aykan 2008: 16).

\textsuperscript{21}Erdoğan shared the opposition against the war with most of the Turkish people. 80 per cent of the population opposed sending troops to Afghanistan in the autumn 2001 (Kurkcu 2001).
He stressed that this tragedy revealed among other things how vulnerable the basic understanding among different cultures and civilizations was, leading to reactions to identify terrorism on cultural and religious lines. (...) [T]errorism did have neither a religion nor can be linked to a certain geographical area, and could not be justified on any ground whatsoever (Republic of Turkey. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002).

Turkish President Necdet Sezer had the same representation as Cem in the OIC-EU Joint Forum in 2002 and underlined that terrorism was not related to religion or geography (Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002).

Members of the military represented the War on terrorism as a war against Islamic fundamentalism, a threat the military claimed to have acted against in the coup in Turkey 28th February 1997.22 This was their argument for supporting the American initiative against terrorism (Aykan 2008: 7).

4.3.3 Stability and territorial integrity

Not long after 9/11 Iraq was also debated as a possible military aim for the United States. The Turkish official response to this as a common aim was negative. Two of the most dominant Turkish representations against the war were stability and territorial integrity. For instance, in October 2001 Prime Minister Ecevit was quoted saying that a war in Iraq would “destabilise the Middle East very much, and it could lead to the partitioning of Iraq, which in the meantime could create problems for Turkey, for Turkey’s independence or territorial integrity” (quoted in Park 2005: 23). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, also summed up the disagreement that would follow between Turkey and the United States in two sentences: “the priority of the United States government is to topple the present regime, whatever the costs. Our priority, on the other hand, is to protect the territorial, national and political integrity of Iraq (Mango 2002).”

This representation of a possible partitioning of Iraq (as well as Turkey) could be linked to what has been called the “Sèvres Syndrome” or the “Treaty of Sèvres Complex” in Turkish foreign policy. The syndrome is based on the experiences from the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920,

22 This “post-modern coup” happened against the government of the Islamist Welfare Party 28th February 1997. The National Security Council declared that political Islam was a threat to Turkey and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan had to moderate his position. For this reason he resigned 18th June 1997 (Ahmet 2007: 172).
where the Western powers tried to split up Turkey into several smaller countries. It is still a common representation in Turkish discourse that the Western powers aspire to partition Turkey, and that Turkey must pay constant attention in order to avoid that (Park 2005: 13-15; Hale 2007).

For instance, Prime Minister Ecevit was quoted saying that the oil reserves in Kirkuk and Mosul in northern Iraq would make it easier to establish a Kurdish state. He said that this was in complete conflict with Turkish interests (Hale 2007: 96). And the army chief in Turkey, General Huseyin Kivrikoğlu, was quoted saying that “we will never accept the establishment of an independent Kurdish state [in Northern Iraq] (quoted in Economist 2001).

These negative arguments were reinforced after the leaders of the Iraqi Kurds had been discussing the war with the Pentagon, where they had agitated for Kurdish control of Kirkuk and perhaps Mosul. The precondition would be that the Kurds helped the United States in the War against Iraq (Hale 2007: 96). In the autumn of 2002 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell also was quoted welcoming a Kurdish parliament in northern Iraq. According to Robins (2003a: 561) the Turkish representations of a possible war in Iraq were more negative afterwards.

The Turkish discourse in the period also consisted of a representation of the UN as an important organization in order to gain legitimacy for a War in Iraq. Some Turkish politicians argued for supporting the war if the UN Security Council supported it, such as President Sezer did in a telephone call with President in October 2002 (Hale 2007: 95; 100-101). The National Security Council also stated in December 2002 that one should continue: “the necessary efforts for the solution of the problem through peaceful means on the basis of U.N. decisions and the legitimacy of international law” (quoted in Turkish Daily News 2001d).

4.3.4 The Turkish election

Woodrow Wilson was one of the ideological architects, arguing for sovereignty for the Kurds, and more territory to the Armenians and the Greeks. The treaty was fought against through a War of Independence, led by Mustafa Kemal, and they won in 1920. In the new treaty, replacing the Treaty of Sèvres, the Treaty of Lausanne from 1923, there was still controversy about the region of Mosul, which Turkey meant belonged to its territory. Turkey was supposed to consist of both Turks and Kurds, hence they also had Kurds fighting on the Turkish side in the War of Independence. They lost that debate, and Mosul went to Iraq, influenced by Britain (Park 2005: 13-15).
During the autumn 2002, the possible American war plan against Iraq was getting well known internationally. During the Turkish election campaign neither this possible war, nor the relationship to the United States, were among the most discussed subjects. The declared policy aims of the AKP, the favourite in the run-up, were to keep Iraq’s territory complete and follow the decisions made by the UN. Both of the AKP figureheads, Erdoğan and Gül, as well as the sitting Prime Minister Ecevit, were quoted saying that they were in favour of participating only if the war received support from the UN Security Council (Hale 2007: 102).²⁴

Traditionally Islamist parties in Turkey have mainly represented the West as an inappropriate partner in security policy. The AKP broke with its Islamist roots, even though the party actually consisted of many of the same people as the former Islamist parties. For instance, Abdullah Gül had been member of the Refah Partisi, which had been closed because of Islamism. He was quoted in 1994 saying that one of the aims of the party was to grant protection of Turkish values, which were threatened by the EU (Robins 2003a: 553).

Now the AKP members, including Gül, had changed their representations of both their own party as well as of the United States. The break with these roots happened in two manners. Primarily they did not represent the party as Islamist (Kardaş 2006: 307-308). Secondly they did represent the security cooperation with the United States as something positive for Turkey (Robins 2003a: 553). When 1st March came the Erdoğan government supported the resolution opening Turkish territory for the Americans in the Iraq war. As long as there was going to be a war, the AKP government argued for Turkish influence. This had been communicated, but in combination with arguments of the war as a threat to territorial integrity and arguments for finding a diplomatic solution.

There was a high degree of continuation between the old and the new government about the war. For instance, the new government also used economy as an argument against the war. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yaşar Yakış, was quoted in December 2002 saying “We’re telling the United States: You need to support us so we can get over these difficulties” (Turkish Daily News 2001d). This was often linked to the fact that Turkey had lost up to $40

²⁴In this period Erdoğan was banned from going to election. In 1998 he had been convicted for “religious incitement”. He had to leave his position as mayor of Istanbul and be in prison for four months. The decision was changed by the AKP government in December 2002, with help from the CHP, and it opened up for Erdoğan running for election in Siirt on 9th March 2003. Later in March he became Prime Minister. In the meantime Abdullah Gül was Prime Minister, but Erdoğan acted, and was treated as, the real leader, also by other countries (Robins 2003a: 552).
billion in the Gulf War in 1990-91, as well as Turkey`s present process of recovery after an economic crisis (Robins 2003a: 560; Turkish Daily News 2001d). Prime Minister Gül came with a similar argument, such as when he was quoted in January 2003 saying: “A possible war with Iraq would be a very great burden for the economy” (Vick 2003).

Abdullah Gül, the new Prime Minister from AKP from November 2002, used similar representations as the politicians from the previous government, including the UN track, stability and territorial integrity. He wrote that: “for Turkey, the situation in Iraq and the tasks we undertake there are not simply another item on the global agenda. Iraq is our close neighbour, and its future is interlinked with the stability of the region” (Gül 2004: 5). In this manner he described Iraq (and not the United States) as “close”, and “stability” as a main aim. He also wrote that: “UN Security Council resolution 1483 lays out the basis on which the international community can extend its helping hand to make the Iraqi transition smooth and swift. This resolution reaffirms the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq and the Iraqi nation’s ownership and possession of its resources” (Gül 2004: 5). Hence, there was a large degree of continuity between the representations of the Ecevit and Gül governments.

An alternative representation of the security relationship to the United States was seen more often in this period. The United States was described as a country one could not trust. For this reason Secretary General of the National Security Council, General Tuncer Kılınc, was quoted in March 2002 saying that Turkey should supplement its cooperation with the United States with warmer ties to Russia and Iran. Kılınc has also suggested that Turkey should leave NATO (Wigen 2009b: 8). The same year a Turkish Assistant Professor suggested that Turkey should supplement its alliances with a closer cooperation with Israel (Kibaroğlu 2002). This representation did not become dominant, but it was still seen more often in the Turkish foreign policy debate in this period.

4.3.5 Secularism

In Turkey, Islam has traditionally been represented as being in opposition to modernity and progress (Tank 2005: 4). According to Pinar Tank (2005: 6) this representation has been used in order to “destroy the political legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire rooted in Islam”.

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25 This was echoed in the demonstrations before the war in 2003. Demonstrators used the word “irak” (with lower cases), which means “far” in Turkish. The slogan they used said “Onlara irak, bize yakin” – “For them it is far (irak), for us it is next door” (Park 2005: 12). (Translation made by Bill Park).
Secularism was also one of the six principles of Kemalist ideology, and has been a part of the constitution since 1939 (Aydin 1999: 171; Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982). This was the context when the Turkish Chief of Staff, Hilmi Özkök, was quoted in November 2003 saying that: “Religion and politics are too dangerous chemical elements that should not be mixed” (quoted in Tank 2005: 3).

4.3.6 Summary

In the beginning of this period the United States was represented as an ally for Turkey against terrorism, a common threat which was not related to religion. The War in Iraq soon became a point of disagreement with the United States. Both the Ecevit government, which was in power until November 2002, and the following Gül government, spoke positively about cooperation with the United States. At the same time politicians from both governments spoke in disfavor of cooperation with the United States in the War in Iraq, based on arguments of territorial unity and stability.

4.4 Partners against different terrorisms

After 9/11 terrorism was identified as a threat in both national discourses. Terrorism was particularly characterized as a threat against freedom and democracy, and it was not linked to Islam (Bush 2001b; Republic of Turkey. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002).

Both Turkey and the United States participated in the War in Afghanistan. The aims they depicted for the war were not on the same level of ambition. The United States aimed on the one hand “to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime” (Bush 2001a). This can be seen as a narrow military aim. Turkey, on the other hand, had aims of doing: "surveillance, struggle against terrorists, guiding the Northern Alliance, supporting humanitarian missions, protecting innocent people and helping the evacuation of civilians when necessary" (BBC News 2001). In addition to these aims, military sources added “provide security on the Afghan-Uzbek border, prevent the penetration of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militia across the border, safeguard the Amu Derya River and help to police Kabul after it falls into Northern Alliance hands” (quoted in Kurkcu 2001). This showed a Turkish representation of the war which was more about giving aid and showing solidarity with the Afghan people, and less about military aims. Despite
these different ambitions, and perhaps lack of dialogue about each other’s aims, the dominant representations in both countries were of a well-functioning cooperation against terrorism in the beginning of the period.

More negative representations about the relationship were seen in Turkey when the United States started discussing a war in Iraq. The Bush administration argued that the Hussein regime cooperated with terrorists and had weapons of mass destruction, and that one should go to war in order to reach democracy and freedom for the Iraqi people. Turkish politicians rather focused on territorial integrity and stability in Iraq, arguments they used to say that they did not support the war. This point was not picked up in U.S. discourse before 1st March 2003, and Turkey was represented as a “strategic partner” for the United States in this war up to the day of the referendum.

Closely related to this comes the point that the global War on Terrorism, in practice was intended towards two different types of terrorism. While the United States fought against radical Islamist terrorism, and particularly al-Qaeda, Turkey was fighting the Kurdish terrorist group PKK (Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party). And according to Turkish politicians, the War in Iraq would strengthen, not weaken, the PKK. For this reason they argued that it was against their interest to participate in the War in Iraq.

When Turkey was represented more as a “Muslim” than a “secular” country in U.S. discourse, this stood in contrast of the Turkish national identity of the time, which was of a secular country. Hence one was starting to see that U.S. and Turkish discourse had divergent representations of Turkey’s identity. This was a factor which might lead to instability in the security relationship, according to Rumelili (2007). The dominant representation in both countries was however that both countries were members of the western community.

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26 The PKK is also known as KADEK.
5 After the Iraq War resolution

I've tried so hard, my dear, to show that you’re my every dream
Yet you’re afraid each thing I do is just some evil scheme.
A memory from your lonesome past keeps us so far apart.
Why can’t I free your doubtful mind and melt your cold, cold heart?

Pearson 2008. 27

In this chapter I present the dominant and alternative representations in American and Turkish discourse between the War in Iraq vote 1\textsuperscript{st} March 2003 and December 2007. This was a period where the relationship was argued to be weak in both countries by journalists, scholars and politicians in opposition. They used what I have identified as a new alternative representation of Turkey as a country one cannot trust.

In both dominant and alternative representations in the two national discourses the other country was represented as a “threat” in some way. In the United States Turkey was argued to be a threat to the Kurds, an important group to keep as an ally for the United States in Iraq. In Turkey territorial unity was represented as a main aim, and both the alternative and dominant representation in this period referred to the War in Iraq as a threat to this aim.

Turkey’s no to the Iraq War in 2003 was referred to as a “mistake” by the Bush administration in early March. They did not use the term “strategic partner” about Turkey until February 2005. From this year members of the Bush administration spoke of Turkey in a positive manner, but in U.S. foreign policy discourse the alternative, more sceptical representation of Turkey as a changing country was used to an increasing extent.

At the same time members of the AKP government spoke warmly in favour of the security relationship with the United States, and they would soon offer different types of military aid to the United States in Iraq.

5.1 Historical timeline from 1\textsuperscript{st} March 2003 – December 2007

\footnotesize
27 Former Ambassador to Turkey, W. Robert Pearson, used this as a description of the relationship between Turkey and The United States between 2003 and 2008. From the song “Cold, Cold Heart” by Norah Jones, originally a ballad by Hank Williams.
The United States attacked Iraq 20th March 2003. The same day Turkey passed a new resolution giving accepting that the United States could attack Iraq by using Turkish airspace. Turkey was the last member of NATO giving that allowance. In June 2003 Turkey allowed the US to use the base in Incirlik and the ports in Mersin and Iskenderun for logistical means. Incirlik was used as a "logistics base and rotation centre" for "non-lethal" equipment (Hale 2007: 133). The Americans removed their planes from the Incirlik base in Turkey, which they had used to “Northern Watch” in Iraq (Hale 2007: 123).28

The same autumn the Turkish Grand National Assembly agreed to send troops to Iraq, based on a majority of 358 against 183. Almost all the members of the AKP voted for the vote, while the CHP voted against. Opposition from Kurds in Iraq said in response that Turkish troops were not welcome (Kirişçi 2004: 45).

In November 2003 two synagogues, a British bank and the British Consulate in Istanbul were hit by bombs. 55 people were killed, and more than 700 injured. The terrorist attacks were later linked to the Turkish Hezbollah, an organization connected to Al-Qaida (Lefebvre 2005-2006: 115; Hale 2007: 130).

In 2006 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Ankara. This led to the Shared Vision-document between the two countries (Embassy of the United States in Ankara 2006). 29 27th August 2007 Turkey elected Abdullah Gül as their new president.

5.2  Turkey as a disappointing ally in U.S. discourse

5.2.1 Critique of Turkey

The Turkish no to opening Turkish territory to U.S. forces in the War in Iraq was represented as a surprise by American officials. The spokesperson of President Bush, Ari Fleischer, was quoted saying: “The vote was a surprise, the outcome was a surprise, to Turkish officials as well as to American officials” (quoted in Philippine Daily Inquiry 2003). Senator Jay Rockefeller said “It’s huge setback for our purposes. It stunned me” (quoted in Rubin 2005).

28 Operation Northern Watch (formerly known as Operation Provide Comfort) was the deployment of forces near the Iraqi border in order to establish a “safe haven” in northern Iraq (Hale 2007: 50).

29 The full name of the document was Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership.
It was also followed by critique in Washington. The critique was quite unitary, but one can still split the degree of criticism into two types. In the first type Turkey was criticized more strongly than in the second type. Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz was among those using the most critical phrases and responded by calling the Turkish decision a “big, big mistake”. Two months later he asked for an apology from Turkey, and he criticized the military for a lack of a “leadership role”, when they did not support the war plans in a meeting in the National Security Council on 28th February 2003. Secretary of State Colin Powell was less critical, and said to the media that they were disappointed, but that he did not think Turkey should apologize. He was quoted saying that he hoped the relationship would be strengthened in the future (all quoted in Hale 2007: 114). Soon after, 2nd April, Powell visited Turkey and said that “we are looking for a spirit of accommodation” (quoted in Hale 2007: 123).

The first days after the vote there was an expectation among some, such as the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Robert Pearson, that Turkey would vote over the question again (CNN World 2003). The United States had promised Turkey up to $30 billion in aid if Turkey participated in the war. Pearson was quoted saying that he still wanted to give the aid if Turkey changed its mind: "We have hopes, as we always have had, of working closely with Turkey" (quoted in CNN World 2003). The spokesman of the White House, Ari Fleischer, also said: “We continue to talk to Turkey. Turkey is a NATO ally. The particular package that we've been talking to them about was predicated on assistance and cooperation in any plan for the use of force against Iraq. Obviously, it is predicated on that assistance and cooperation. We'll continue to talk to them as we move forward” (quoted in CNN World 2003). After a while, however, it seemed by American representations as if Turkey’s rejection was permanent.

5.2.2 Turkey as a threat to the Kurds

Afterwards a new dominant representation of Turkey was started being used. Now a common theme of debate in U.S. discourse was whether Turkey would enter Northern Iraq unilaterally. This was argued against as a threat to Iraqi territory. The Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman was quoted after the 1st March saying that “We have always said that we believed that it would be a mistake for Turkey to deploy troops into Northern Iraq
unilaterally, yes” (Zacharia 2003). The United States were receiving support from the Kurds in northern Iraq, and this was a group which often criticized Turkey (Hale 2007: 124).

20th March 2003 Turkey had made a new resolution, opening up for allowing the United States use Turkish airspace. Turkey was the last NATO country to open up its airspace. This did not receive much support from the Bush administration, rather criticism. This critique was based on the fact that the resolution also said that Turkey could enter Iraq “to exercise an effective deterrent force”. The resolution did not say who Turkey would deter in Iraq (Hale 2007: 115).

Turkey quickly changed the part about the Turkish forces in Iraq (Hale 2007: 115). 22nd March 2003, news came about Turkish forces entering northern Iraq. These news were not true, but still lead to harsh reactions from Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld. They were quoted saying that they did not want Turkish presence in Iraq (Hale 2007: 116). Rumsfeld was quoted in Turkish media saying: “If Turkish soldiers entered Iraq without informing us this would definitely be a bad development” (Hürriyet 2003). General Tommy Franks expressed the same message the following day: “We would be hopeful that those with their triggers on these weapons understand what Secretary Don Rumsfeld said in his comments yesterday: 'Don't use it. Don't use it'” (quoted in Turkish Daily News 2003c).

Some journalists drew the scepticism even longer. Now the Kurds were taking over Turkey’s role as a “strategic partner”. In April a journalist in the Boston Globe (Oliphant 2003) wrote:

> The Turks should be assigned to observe how a real American ally - in this case the heroic and long- suppressed Kurds - behaves when all the chips are down. (...) Turkey makes France appear downright friendly by comparison. The situation reached absurd dimensions last week as Kurdish fighters completed their month-long service as the shock troops in the northern chunk of Iraq, while Turkey was threatening to send troops across its border if its demands that run directly counter to US interests were not met.

In this quote the journalist both characterized Turkey as a “threat” and as a country with different interests in security questions than the United States.

Some argued that the rejected Turkish resolution would have advantages, because now it was easier to avoid Turkey entering northern Iraq. According to an editorial in USA Today:

30 My translation.
While the fallout from the diplomatic disaster won't be easily overcome, it provides the U.S. an unexpected benefit. Turkey's help beyond its consent for the U.S. to use its airspace and move some supplies over land would have carried a steep cost beyond the U.S. aid: approval for Turkish troops to enter northern Iraq to keep the Kurds in check. Instead, the Kurds are now the indispensable U.S. allies in the north, with 60,000 hardened fighters helping secure Iraqi territory. That presents the U.S. important long-term opportunities along with the short-term military advantages (USA Today 2003).

In this context Turkey was mentioned as a threat: “Turkey has threatened to send massive troops to northern Iraq if the Kurds attempt to seize extra territory or mention independence” (USA Today 2003). So, Turkey was changed from being represented as a “strategic partner” to a “threat to the Kurds” in U.S. discourse over only a few weeks.

At the same time as this discursive shift, the United States did not open up for much cooperation with Turkey in the Iraq War. Grossman also said that: "I think Turkey loses a chance to be involved in [the future of Iraq]," (Zacharia 2003). Some argued that Iraq now could replace Turkey as a strategic ally for the United States (see Hale 2007: 123).

### 5.2.3 Turkey as a model of Muslim democracy

In the run-up to the Iraq war, and after the war had started, the Bush administration focused on spreading democracy in the Middle East. In November 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell had launched a Middle East Partner Initiative, where one of the goals was to “support citizens across the region who are claiming their political voices” (Powell 2002).31 Even though Turkey’s strategic role in northern Iraq was reduced, Turkey continued its importance as a Muslim democracy for the United States. Secretary of State Colin Powell was quoted bragging of the “Muslim democracy” in Turkey (quoted in Cağaptay 2004). The attention towards democracy in the Middle East continued in 2003.

In the autumn 2003 President Bush said in a speech : “Our commitment to democracy is also tested in the Middle East, which is my focus today, and must be a focus of American policy for decades to come” (Bush 2003). He refused that Islam and democracy could not be combined and used Turkey as an example on this. The year after, in Istanbul, he stressed that Turkey could be a model of Muslim democracy: “Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others” (Bush quoted in Hale 2007: 130).

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31 The Bush administration never explained precisely which countries they included in "the Middle East", and later "the broader/greater Middle East" (Sharp 2005:2).
While the Turkish democracy model earlier had been related to secularism, it was the Muslim dimension the U.S. politicians now focused on as positive. The fact that Turkey and Pakistan both were used as examples for democracy illustrates this point (Tank 2006: 476).

Secretary of State Powell also said in April 2004 that Turkey was an “Islamic republic”, and that Turkey and Pakistan could be examples Iraq could follow (quoted in Tank 2006: 475). And the following Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, referred to the AKP as an Islamist party. She said the next year:

So the goal is to, in those places where Muslims are either the majority or in some cases almost without any minority, (...) recognize that there is no contradiction between Islam and the Muslim world and democracy. You have, in Turkey, for instance, a state that is growing up with a strong Islamic party as its ruling party (quoted in Turkish Daily News 2005b).

This was a representation challenging how the AKP defines itself, namely as “democratic conservative” (Yavuz 2006: 8). It was also challenging Turkey’s secular identity, with little room for religion in politics (Tank 2005).

The United States later supported a Broader Middle East Initiative in cooperation with the G8. President Bush mentioned in 2004 Turkey as a “democratic partner” in this project (quoted in Hale 2007: 130). The Bush administration also used Turkey’s Muslim identity as an argument for Turkish EU membership, such as when President Bush was in 2004 quoted saying that Turkish membership in the EU would “be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the west, because you are part of both” (quoted in Park 2005: 64).

In their arguments for democracy the Bush administration often stressed that the clash of civilizations theory was wrong. The clash of civilization theory’s representation of Muslim countries was still an alternative, and not dominant, representation in U.S. discourse, since it was not embraced by the Bush administration.

At the same time, Huntington’s theory was setting the agenda for the debate, in the manner that politicians often referred to this theory as something it was necessary to argue against. For instance, when arguing for Turkish EU membership in 2004, President Bush said in his speech that it would “prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the “clash of civilizations” as a passing myth of history” (quoted in Park 2005: }
Something similar could also be read in the National Security Strategy from 2002: “The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world” (The White House 2002: 31). Hence, now the clash of civilizations theory was something many referred to in U.S. discourse, even if only to argue that it was wrong.

In 2006 the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia in the House of Representatives also had a hearing about whether there was a “clash of civilizations” (Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia 2006). Soner Çağaptay was one of the speakers informing the politicians on the situation in Turkey. He said that:

there is a seismic change going through Turkey right now, and in a sense the country’s unique position as a country that is anchored in the Western world is being challenged, and it seems to me that the rise of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, also known as the AKP party government in Turkey in November 2002, is a milestone in this process (Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia 2006: 51).

First of all, Çağaptay used the representation “Islamist” on the AKP. He summed up his introduction by saying “the AKP experience in Turkey shows that once in government, Islamist parties bring forth change in unexpected ways, even in the most secular and democratic of those societies. The AKP’s foreign policy is scratching away Turkey’s sense of Turkishness or national identity, infusing instead a strong sense of Muslim identity” (Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia 2006: 56).

In this manner he was arguing as a scholar in front of American politicians that Turkey was changing towards a new identity. A part of this change was the fact that the AKP did not place Turkey in the West. He explained this in a hearing in the U.S. Congress with using a quote from Erdoğan saying: “The West uses terrorism to sell us weapons” (The Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia 2006: 56). Çağaptay commented: “this is an Arab League summit, so I think in his mind this shows where he thinks Turkey belongs – not in the West, but, ironically, in the Arab world”(The Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia 2006: 56). In that manner Çağaptay argued that secular Turkey was a positive and important partner for the United States, but that Turkey in the hands of the AKP was moving away from the West and towards Islamization.

When Çağaptay argued that Turkey was changing, it would not be unreasonable to interpret it as if he said that change of the security relationship as well. Turkey’s process of change was
also the reason he had earlier used to argue that the United States should cooperate more with the secularists in Turkey, and not the AKP (Cağaptay 2005b: ix-x).

Cağaptay (2004) had earlier also criticized the strategy of using Turkey as a model of Muslim democracy. He wrote that the Muslim democracy model strategy made the secularist elites in Turkey alienated, a group which traditionally had been closest to the United States. He still argued that the United States needed Turkey in its foreign policy, but that this was because of geographic placement and Turkey’s secular model of democracy (Cağaptay 2004).

5.2.4 Losing Turkey?

Several American politicians claimed that the Turkish veto the 1st March 2003 was a loss for the United States. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld said “Had we been successful in getting the 4th Infantry Division to come in through Turkey in the north when our forces were coming up from the south out of Kuwait, I believe that a considerably smaller number of the Baathists and the regime elements would have escaped. More would have been captured or killed, and as a result, the insurgency would have been at a lesser intensity than it is today.” (quoted in Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 32).

In American debate it was time to place the blame – why had things gone wrong? At this point in time there was a new discursive turn. Some blamed Turkey for the colder relationship, and in the 2005 many commentators were negative about the relationship. Mark Parris, who was ambassador to Turkey, claimed in 2005 that the Turkish policy in 2003 was “an unmitigated disaster for US-Turkish relations” (quoted in Hale 2007: 83). Some scholars and politicians started asking: “Are we losing Turkey?”. The alternative representation was of Turkey “being lost”, particularly because Turkey was changing into a different country (see e.g. Cağaptay 2005b). For instance, a neoconservative commentator, Daniel Pipes, said in a roundtable discussion in 2005 that “if things go as they have the past few years I expect Turkey before long to be more in the “foe” category, along with Saudi Arabia, than the “friend” one”. And Michael Rubin, an expert on Turkey, said in the same panel that “the special relationship with Turkey is over… Ankara is becoming more isolated than it has ever been before” (all quoted in Hale 2007: 83).

The same year an article was published in the Wall Street Journal which led to reactions in Turkey. The author, Robert Pollack, called Turkey “the sick man of Europe”. In this article he
wrote that Turkey was an inappropriate partner for the United States because of its growing anti-Americanism. He claimed that Turkey was going through an Islamization and that:

“Most of the heritage of Atatürk is at risk of being lost (...) Turkey is becoming narrow-minded and paranoiac and it has no friendship for the US” (quoted in Gottschlich 2005). This was an untypical text in American discourse and received a harsh reaction in Turkish media (Arslan 2005). However, it was read by many and depicted a changing Turkish identity. And unfortunately for the security relationship, he wrote that Turkey was changing into a country the United States could not trust.

Another example was a statement made by the Under Secretary of Defence, Douglas J. Feith. He commented upon anti-Americanism in Turkey by saying:

It’s crucial that the appreciation of…relationships extend beyond government officials [and] down to the public in general, because otherwise the relationship is not really sustainable (...) We hope that the officials in our partner countries are going to be devoting the kind of effort to building popular support for the relationship that we build in our own country (quoted in Rubin 2005).

This commented was interpreted by Michael Rubin (2005) as a manner of blaming the AKP for the increasing anti-Americanism among the Turkish population.

5.2.5 Still some continuity

Several scholars responded to this new representation of Turkey as a changing country the United States was losing. The dominant representation in this period started mentioning the dangers and possibilities of “losing Turkey”, but continued by arguing against such a thesis on two grounds. The first type of criticism said that Americans did not really understand Turkey, especially after the AKP came to power in Turkey in 2002 (Menon and Wimbush 2007: 129-130). Stephen Larrabee claimed that the Islamization some claimed was happening in Turkey was not really Islamization, but rather a more active, independent and diverse foreign policy. Turkey was reacting to changed circumstances. Larrabee argued that Turkey in this manner can be used “as a bridge to the Middle East” (Larrabee 2007: 103). In that manner he leant on well known geopolitical representations of Turkey.

32 According to a Turkish scholar, “Turkey’s bridge role has stemmed from its international identity, its geographical location, and its function in the international arena. (...) it was the sole example of a Muslim state in the Islamic world that officially embraced Western values of modernization, democracy, human rights,
The second type of criticism said that there was a danger of losing Turkey, but that this was something one should avoid. Philip H. Gordon and Omer Taspinar’s book *Winning Turkey. How America, Europe, and Turkey can revive a fading partnership* (2008) illustrates this point.

Even though there were discursive changes in this period, there was also continuity. Geography was still used as a central argument for why the United States should cooperate with Turkey. For instance, the American scholars Menon and Wimbush (2007: 131) wrote in 2007:

> Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably even more so than during the Cold War. Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran. It abuts, or is proximate to, countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security, whether allies or friends, adversaries, or loci of instability (Menon and Wimbush 2007: 131).

The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 2005 to 2008, Ross Wilson, tried to explain why Turkey should be a close ally to the United States because of “what it is”, in addition to the common argument about “where it is”. And when he explained “what it is” he said a “strong, vibrant, diverse, democratic and free society, stable country, prosperous country, in a part of the world where there aren’t a lot of those things, where those things are all rare commodities” (BBC Radio 2006). So, in an effort to point to other reasons than geography, he still used geography in the end of his argument.

An important issue in Congress in 2007 was the genocide issue. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, suggested voting for a resolution asking Turkey to condemn it as a genocide. President Bush argued against and said that “this resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings. (...) Its passage would do great harm to our relations with a key ally in NATO and in the global war on terror” (Bush quoted in Canwest News Service 2007). Democrat Tom Lantos argued that the consequences of a worsened relationship to Turkey would be “endangering our soldiers in Iraq” (quoted in Cornwell 2007; see also Türkmen 2009: 116).

The resolution was approved. A spokesman of the State Department, Seah McCormack, said that he was “regretting” the resolution (CNN Politics 2007). A spokesman of the White
House, Gordon D. Johndroe was quoted saying that President Bush was “very disappointed” after the resolution was approved (Myers and Hulse 2007). In this manner the governmental approach was to overlook the criticism of human rights in order to keep the security relationship strong. This was a continuation of President Clinton’s approach to the question.

5.2.6 American representations about the PKK

From early 2005 the dominant representation of Turkey as an important ally again to the United States was more visibly used by the Bush administration. In her visit to Turkey in February 2005 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was quoted saying that she wanted to underline that the United States supported the territorial integrity of Iraq and was against Kurdish self-rule (Weisman 2005). In this manner she mentioned two of the main issues in Turkish foreign policy during the last years (Kanlı 2007). According to the Turkish ambassador to the United States, Rice also promised that the problems with the PKK in northern Iraq would be solved (Turkish Daily News 2005b). Rice also referred to the relationship as a “strategic partnership” (Arslan 2005). This was the first time that label was used by American officials about the security relationship since 1st March 2003 (Parris 2005).

But one year later, the American ambassador to Turkey was placing himself in the middle of the American discursive terrain. When asked: “What is Turkey for America? A strategic partner or a country which USA is getting along well with?” he answered that Turkey was an ally of the United States, and that the relationship was close (Radyo ODTU 2006). He did not say “strategic partnership”, a term the interviewer was hinting to get. In this manner he spoke in favour of the security relationship, but without using the most positive words about it, such as “strategic partnership” (PBS Newshour 2006).

He was also quoted saying that he was worried in that Turkey would enter northern Iraq (PBS Newshour 2006). In this manner he upheld the representation of Turkey as a possible threat, at the same time has he referred to Turkey as an important ally. Both in this and other interviews Wilson pointed out that the US wanted to help Turkey fighting the PKK (BBC Radio 2006; PBS Newshour 2006; Radyo ODTU 2006). He explained the lack of effort against the PKK with the strong focus on Baghdad, in addition to the fact that the US forces had been busy fighting many groups. Wilson also said that US military support against the PKK could create harm against the stability in the country. Even though the Turkish discourse
at this point in time was filled with demands of American help against the PKK, this help did not materialize from Ambassador Wilson.

The Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan came to Washington in November 2007. During the visit the United States opened up for sharing intelligence with Turkey against the PKK. President Bush said that the PKK was “an enemy of Turkey, a free Iraq and the United States” (Tanir 2010). This was the first time in a long time that the American and Turkish representations of their threats were so convergent. When asked whether the United States supported Turkish “hot pursuit” operations into Iraqi territory, following PKK, the President did not answer the question, since it was “a hypothetical question”. In this manner the dominant representation of Turkey was more positive in the end of 2007 in U.S. discourse.

5.2.7 Summary

In the first period after 1st March the Turkish “no” was represented as a surprise and a mistake in U.S. discourse. There were suggestions from American politicians that Turkey should repeat the vote in order to correct the mistake. Not many weeks later, however, this changed. Now Turkey was represented in several newspapers as an ally that did not fulfil its tasks. In opposition to this the Kurds in northern Iraq were characterized by several as more proper allies. This discursive shift, where the Kurds were represented more positively than the Turks, might have opened up for the Turkish policy of not cooperating much with Turkey against the Kurdish PKK in northern Iraq before the end of 2007.

At the same time the Bush administration started arguing that Turkey was a model of Muslim democracy. The AKP was represented as an Islamist party. This was a break with the tendency of the Clinton administration of characterizing the secularity of Turkey as the trait which should be an example for the rest of the Muslim world.

The dominant representation from 2005 and onwards was that Turkey was an ally one should not lose. This was challenged by a strengthened alternative representation of Turkey as a changing ally becoming Islamized and heading east. From 2005 and onwards Turkey was again referred to as a “strategic partner” by Secretary of State Rice, a term which the American ambassador did not want to use the following year. The same year the Bush administration also promised to help Turkey against the PKK in northern Iraq, but did not open up for sharing intelligence with them until November 2007.
In 2007 a committee in Congress passed a resolution condemning the Armenian genocide in 1915. This still continued to be an alternative representation, since the Bush administration argued that the resolution was against U.S. interest.

5.3 The United States as a threat to Turkey

5.3.1 Still strategic ties

When it was clear that the United States was going to war even though Turkey had voted against it, the dominant representation was that Turkey should participate in Iraq in some way. Politicians from the AKP discussed whether to vote again. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yaşar Yakış was quoted saying that “We are evaluating it both within the party and the government” (CNN World 2003). Several AKP politicians expressed that the War in Iraq was something Turkey wanted to take part in. AKP leader Erdoğan said early in March that: "Turkey, for its own security and for Iraq's territorial integrity, will not remain an observer to the developments, and I believe in the coming days, (Turkey) will decide on how it needs to intervene and which method it needs to use" (quoted in CTV.CA 2003).

The AKP leader Erdoğan, who was soon to become Prime Minister, referred to the Sèvres Complex when explaining the outcome of the vote. He was quoted saying that Turkey in this vote had been triggered by “historic reflexes” (quoted in CNN World 2003). He continued: “The United States must take a political stance against events in the region that may develop of themselves and establishments that would insult Turkey. (...) No one should provoke Turkey’s sensitivities” (quoted in CNN World 2003). One example of such a sensitivity came a few days before the 1st March vote, when a group of Kurds in northern Iraq had burned Turkish flags. Minister of Foreign Affairs Yakış was quoted saying that “This is absolutely a provocation” (quoted in CNN World 2003).

Even though the developments in Northern Iraq were characterized as a “provocation”, Turkish politicians in the government still did not speak negatively of the United States. Prime Minister Abdullah Gül was quoted the 3rd March 2003 saying that: “Turkish-US ties are strategic ties. They are not linked to a single motion. Of course they will continue” (quoted in Smitt and Watt 2003).
The alternative representation, however, said that the security relationship to the United States was worsened. Turkish media reported that Turkey considered sending peacekeeping soldiers to Iraq in order to “play a role in the restructuring of the war-torn country and fix the soured relations with the United States” (Turkish Daily News 2003a). What was called a “soured” security relationship did not prevent Turkey from participating in a military exercise with Israel and the United States in August 2003 (Turkish Daily News 2003b). Even though the United States was represented as a threat by many, this was not repeated by AKP politicians in the government.

An advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan wrote in 2005 an analysis of the security relationship to the United States for a Turkish newspaper. He was clear in his description of a relationship going well:

Let’s see March 1 in its unique historic context and move on. Lately, there has been talk that Turkish-U.S. relations are on the rocks. As someone working closely with the prime minister, I can assert in good faith, if there is such a thing, that it’s not in the warm dialogue between our leaders (Bağış 2005).

Even a senior Turkish military official characterized the security relationship in the same manner: “There is a problem, one cannot deny. But its magnitude is widely overrated. It’s mostly business as usual. (…) Despite scratches, the partnership is still there, up and running.” (quoted in Turkish Daily News 2005a).

Turkish politicians stated after the Istanbul bombings in November 2003 that the alliance with the United States was “as strong as ever”, which also was said by the United States (Hale 2007: 130-131). In Turkish discourse the framing of the attack was not similar to the one in the United States after 9/11, even though al-Qaida stood behind both attacks. In Turkey the Istanbul bombings was represented as an attack on the West and not on Turkey. This was explained with the fact that two synagogues, a British bank and the British consulate were the locations under attack. In this manner it was represented as “Judaism” and “Britain” that was attacked (see Hill and Taspinar 2006: 86).

A Shared Vision document was signed with the United States in July 2006 (Embassy of the United States in Ankara, Turkey 2006). Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, declared that this was a “new beginning” for the security relationship (Fuller 2008: 160). He also said that “Dr. Rice and I (…) noticed that our common interests span almost every main regional strategic issue” (Gül 2007).
The document was negatively received in the Turkish press, mostly characterized as something “that (…) only papered over or partially legitimized Ankara’s own policy goals, and that it only served to help avoid further mutual irritation between the two countries” (Fuller 2008: 161).

5.3.2 The United States as a threat to Turkey

Even though the dominant representation was of a solid relationship, politicians in the government party sometimes also used the alternative representation of a weakened alliance. For instance, in late 2004 a member of the AKP said that the United States was no longer the ally of Turkey, but could be a potential enemy (Turkish Daily News 2005a).

In 2004 there were many negative representations of the behaviour of the United States in Iraq. Some of these were made in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. For instance, a member of parliament from the AKP, Mehmet Elkatmış, was quoted saying that “such a genocide was never seen in the time of the pharaohs, nor of Hitler or of Mussolini” about a U.S. assault in Fallujah (Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 33). About the same the assault Prime Minister Erdoğan was quoted saying that the Iraqi insurgents were “martyrs”, and that the Muslim world should get together “against powers that are seeking to assert their hegemony” (Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 33). Another member of parliament was quoted saying that Turkey functioned more as a “logistical partner “, than a “strategic partner” for the United States. He suggested that Turkey should “suspend our ties with the United States. If we remain silent, we will be tainted by America’s tyranny” (Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 33).

The most seen movie in Turkey in 2006 was called The Valley of the Wolves: Iraq and gave a very negative impression of the American soldiers in Iraq. They were represented as brutal and some with no moral considerations against killing civilians. The film was seen by a large amount of the government, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly, Bülent Arınç. They came with several positive remarks after having seen the film. (Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 26).

A consequence of this discursive change could be changed opinions towards the United States among the Turkish population. In 2005 a BBC World Service poll had results saying that 82 percent of the Turks saw the Bush administration as a threat to world peace (Turkish Daily News 2005a).
A tendency of both the dominant and the alternative representation was of the security relationship as something that could be disturbed by an American resolution about the genocide issue. For instance, in an article from 2007, the journalist wrote that “Turkey is compelled to cooperate with the United States in Iraq not only for any possible success against the PKK, but for a greater and for more important strategic goal of preserving the territorial integrity of the neighboring country.” (Kanlı 2007). These representations were of the territorial unity of Iraq as a main objective for Turkish foreign policy, and the United States was represented as an actor Turkey would have to cooperate with.

But in the end of the article the journalist also claimed that the relationship would cool down soon because of an expected effort by the Armenian Diaspora and the Democrat Party majority in the U.S. Congress to make a resolution about the Armenian genocide issue (Kanlı 2007). This was representative for how the genocide issue was framed in Turkish discourse.

This question had a tendency to be represented as a conflict between “the Armenian diaspora” and “American interests”. One journalist wrote: “She [Nancy Pelosi] will be faced with the serious question of how to deal with the Armenian issue -- to which she has apparently been committed for at least 20 years -- on the one hand, while keeping Turkey engaged with the United States in a positive manner that serves her country's global -- and not her local -- political interests on the other” (Idiz 2007).

In 2005 there was supposed to be a conference about the genocide issue at Bosphorus University in Istanbul. The Minister of Justice criticized the conference for “stabbing the Turkish nation in the back” (Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 79). That a conference about the issue received such hard criticism sent some signals towards what would happen to the security relationship if the President of the United States called this a “genocide”.

5.3.3 Both Muslim and secular identity

In Turkey there had been a discursive change about what the country was after the AKP came to power 2002. The traditional dominant representation was of Turkey as a secular country. This had changed slightly towards a representation of Turkey where the Muslim identity of the population in the secular republic was given more weight. Such a dual identity was represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, in 2004. He wrote that a Turkish

33 Nancy Pelosi was the new Democratic speaker of the House in 2007.
EU membership would “demonstrate that the EU stands for common values and institutions rather than a common religion” (Gül 2004: 7). In the same article he wrote that: “Turkey’s role in a changing Middle East environment is a function of what it represents in this volatile geography as a European, democratic, and secular country that is attached firmly to the principles of a free-market economy and has valuable and unique experience in implementing reforms, modernity, and regional cooperation” (Gül 2004: 1). In this quote Turkey was represented as both a secular and a Muslim country.

The alternative representation of Turkey as a strongly secular country was still apparent in the national discourse. For instance, in 2005 General Özkök held a speech saying that “Turkey is neither an Islamic state, nor an Islamic country (...) Some circles want to describe Turkey in terms of moderate Islam. Almost 99 percent of the Turkish population is Muslim, but its government is secular and democratic and functions according to the rule of law” (quoted in Turkish Daily News 2005c). This could be seen as a response to the tendency of the U.S. to depict Turkey as a model for Muslim democracy. It could also be interpreted as a criticism towards the discursive shift the AKP had stood for after 2002.

The criticism of General Özkök could be seen in the light of a claim used by Turkish secularists, saying that there might be a possible cooperation between the AKP and the United States in order to get a moderate Islamist regime one can use as a model for other Muslim countries (Fuller 2008: 156). This has been interpreted as “whitewashing of the Islamist threat” by secularists (Fuller 2008: 162). The AKP might be represented as an internal threat to Turkey within this discourse, and it has been called the “American party” by parts of the nationalist movement (Fuller 2008: 161).

5.3.4 Elections

Again there was a large debate about the consequences of continued AKP rule. 27 April 2007 the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) published a warning on their websites about what would happen if the AKP came to power after the election. Before the election, Turkish scholar Kudret Bülbül analyzed the foreign policy of the opposition of the AKP. He wrote that the AKP had a “strong will to abolish the traditional foreign policies established during the Cold War” (Bülbül 2007). This could be seen as representative of the alternative discourse in Turkey, characterizing the AKP as a party threatening traditional Turkish principles.
In Washington in February 2007, before the Turkish election, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül (Gül 2007), commented on this alternative representation. He said “Some people feel that Turkey is at a crossroads and that the results of the elections will change Turkey’s direction or orientation for good. (…) I am here to tell you that this is not the case. (Gül 2007).” Instead he said that the AKP government had taken long steps towards more democracy, and that this development would continue under the AKP (Gül 2007). Democracy building in the Middle East was an important representation also within American foreign policy at the time.

Gül also used the speech to present the main points of the foreign policy of AKP. Primarily he said that “we have been pursuing a multidimensional approach based on problem solving”. And he referred to the relationship to the US as a “strategic partnership”. He meant that this had been strengthened by the shared vision document from 2006 (Gül 2007). He continued: “Despite the efforts of some circles to harm our relations (…) I am confident that 2007 will be another good year for Turkey-US cooperation (Gül 2007).” In this manner this was a continuation of the dominant representation of the security relationship as solid.

### 5.3.5 More distrust towards the United States in 2007

In 2007 the representations of the United States turned more negative, based on criticism of how the United States related to the PKK. That the was not cooperating in satisfying manner with Turkey against the PKK actually was the dominant representation until President Bush opened up for intelligence sharing in November.

In July 2007 Gül (quoted in Kılıç 2007) said that “taking measures” against the PKK in Iraq would be the responsibility of the United States. Gül had no answer to why the United States did not give the PKK a higher priority. He said that “they have their reasons, but these are not persuasive to us” (Kılıç 2007). Gül also created a distance by saying “Every country has its own policy” (Kılıç 2007). In this representation the security relationship did not stand out as strong, but rather non-existing when it came to common policy. The representation was of clear distrust towards the United States.

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34At this point in time Gül was a presidential candidate. is presidential candidacy was blocked the same month by the Constitutional Court, after the Grand National Assembly had not managed to elect a new President in May 2007. Hence Sezer was president of Turkey for a bit longer.
Moreover Gül said Turkey would push the United States to take more measures against the PKK, but Turkey would not “seek approval of any country” when their “interests and security is at risk”. In that case it would be legitimate for Turkey to launch a military operation in Northern Iraq (Kılıç 2007). The United States had up to that point been clearly negative towards Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq. Gül used a representation of Turkish “interests and security” as the main concern for Turkey, and said that this would legitimize a military operation the United States did not support.

He said that there was a long lasting security relationship, and that “In the past, we gave solidarity and assistance to each other and even fought side-by-side.” In this manner he pointed to the past in order to justify the security relationship today. Secondly he said that they “even fought side-by-side”, a representation which makes it seem unlikely in the present because of the word “even”. But later in his answer he moderated this position, and he said that the Shared Vision the two countries had made focused on confidence between the parties. Finally, he said “In this regard, [the US] should tackle the problems in a more sincere and considerate manner” (Kılıç 2007). This was a quite open criticism of US foreign policy from Gül.

The distrust was represented in a stronger manner by others. In April 2007 the Turkish Chief of Staff was quoted saying that it was necessary for Turkey to start military operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq. (Birand 2008a). The same year the Turkish Speaker of the Grand National Assembly, Köksal Toptan, said that the United States was “encouraging” the PKK, a declared main enemy for Turkey, in Northern Iraq (Today’s Zaman 2007). And he said that it “hurts deeply” for Turkey when the United States did not act against terrorism. Finally he said that the “US is at a point to make a decision: it will either act with its long-time ally or it won’t.” (Today’s Zaman 2007). This statement was quite hard against the security relationship, and the PKK issue was represented as a “to be or not to be” for continued cooperation.

Later things turned. In October Prime Minister Erdoğan asked the Grand National Assembly for permission to execute cross-border operations into Northern Iraq (Birand 2008a). In November 2007, while Prime Minister Erdoğan was in Washington, the United States opened up for sharing intelligence about PKK with Turkey (Bozkurt 2009). Washington also supported Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq (Birand 2008a). In chapter 6 I discuss the discursive changes following this decision.
5.3.6 Summary

The dominant Turkish representation in this period was of the security relationship as solid. This was challenged by a strong alternative representation of the United States as a threat to territorial stability and the principle of secularism. This representation was at its strongest in the end of 2007, before President Bush said he would share intelligence with Turkey and that the PKK was a “common enemy”.

5.4 Threats and mistakes

After March 2003 Turkish officials continued to represent the relationship to the United States in a positive manner, while other politicians and journalists were more negative. In addition to the threat to Turkish territory in northern Iraq, secularists also argued that the American representation of Turkey as a Muslim republic was a threat to secularism.

Graham Fuller has pointed to the fact that the shared visions Turkey and the United States agreed on in 2006 are very uncontroversial, such as “a peaceful, centralized Iraq” and “an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute”. However, they did not agree on how to reach these common visions, and that is where the disagreements probably come to the surface (Fuller 2008: 157). Fuller claimed that although Turkey and the United States agree on many visions, they disagree more on Turkish core interests (Fuller 2008: 160). Even after Turkey was attacked by al-Qaida in 2003, this was represented as an attack on the West, not an attack on Turkey.

One point of difference was the Turkish and American perceptions of terrorism. Even though both face terrorism as a threat, the terrorists were not the same. Turkey’s largest terrorist threat comes from the PKK, an ethnic Kurdish leftist-separatist organisation, while the largest terrorist threat for the United States comes from Islamist terrorism. Islamist terrorism is only a minor problem for Turkey (Fuller 2008: 157).

Instead of linking Turkey and the United States as allies with a shared western identity, the Bush administration primarily differentiated between the two based on religion. The argument used was that Turkey’s Muslim identity would be an advantage both in Afghanistan and for inspiring to democracy in the Middle East. Even though the argument of the Bush administration was that this was a reason to cooperate, it was a representation which easily could be used in order to refer to Turkey as an Other threatening the United States as well.
This was seen to an increasing extent in the alternative American discourse, which depicted Turkey as a country with a new Muslim identity the United States could not trust anymore.

According to the theory of Rumelili (2007), there will be instability in a relationship between two countries that do not confirm each other’s identities. This was the case in the Turkish-American security relationship at this point. In U.S. discourse Turkey was a “Muslim democracy”, a term with positive connotations according to the dominating representation. In Turkey, however, this was represented by many as an identity Turkey had been through efforts to move away from since the Ottoman Empire (Tank 2005). The model argument of the Bush represented as a threat to secularism, a fundamental part of Turkish identity, in the alternative Turkish representation.

In both countries the dominant representation was of trust towards the other country, but was challenged by strong alternative representations of distrust. In Turkey the distrust became the dominant representation in 2006, saying that the United States did not participate enough against the threat from the PKK in northern Iraq. In United States the alternative representation said that Turkey was changing, and for this reason it could not be trusted anymore.
6 Rebuilding the partnership

Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message to the world. And my answer is simple: Evet -- yes. (Applause.) Turkey is a critical ally. Turkey is an important part of Europe. And Turkey and the United States must stand together -- and work together -- to overcome the challenges of our time.” (Obama 2009).

This period started on the one hand with positive representations of the United States in Turkish discourse. A typical statement of the period was that the relationship was “back on track again” after the United States had decided to share intelligence about the PKK with Turkey. In the United States, on the other hand, the alternative representation of Turkey as a changing ally was gaining ground.

6.1 Historical timeline from January 2008 to December 2010

Even though the AKP won the election in 2007, the Constitutional Court opened up for a case in 2008 where they would consider whether they would close the AKP and ban most of its politicians from being active in politics based on using religion in politics (quoted in Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 90). The AKP was convicted, but did not have to close.

In November 2008 Barack Obama was elected as the new American president. He was inaugurated in January 2009. In April 2009 President Obama visited Istanbul and signed an updated Shared Vision Document (Embassy of the United States in Ankara, Turkey 2009b).

In March 2010 the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives made a genocide resolution with a majority of 23 against 22 (Klein 2010). The Turkish reaction was to recall its ambassador to Washington, Namik Tan, for a few months (Hürriyet Daily News and Economic Review 2010).

6.2 A model partnership in U.S. discourse?

6.2.1 Two divergent representations of Turkish elections
The relationship between the AKP and the CHP was framed in two different manners in the United States, based on the already existing dominant and alternative representation of Turkey. In an editorial named “Democracy’s Close Call in Turkey” The New York Times (2008) wrote about the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court about the status of the AKP in a manner where the AKP represented democracy, while “Turkey’s powerful military-secular establishment” represented practices that “are hardly consistent with democracy as it is practiced in the United States and the European Union”.

The article said that if the Constitutional Court had ruled in favour of the secularists, “an alarming message would have been sent to religious-minded voters throughout the Muslim world that scrupulous adherence to the ground rules of democratic politics was no guarantee of equal political rights and representation” (The New York Times 2008). This article demonstrated the clear change which had happened for the last decade – now the secularist establishment in Turkey, which traditionally had been very close to the United States, and favoured in the United States because of its secularism, was not represented in the same positive manner anymore.

This was in complete divergence with the alternative representation. For instance, Soner Çağaptay had said in 2006 that “I am afraid that a second AKP Government might well turn Turkey into an unrecognizable country – somehow democratic, superficially secular, and definitely not Western” (The Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia 2006: 58).

6.2.2 A new president

At this point the dominant representation in both countries still was of a strong security relationship. When President Gül visited Washington in January 2008, both President Gül and President Bush said that the PKK was a common enemy. President Bush said that the PKK was an enemy “to people who want to live in peace” (Özerkan 2008). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in 2008 that it was an “extremely important relationship that has only grown in importance over the recent years (...) [O]ur cooperation today is closer and more necessary than ever” (Rice 2008). She also referred to Turkey as a “strategic partner” and mentioned that PKK was a common enemy (Rice 2008).
At the same time United States was preparing for a new presidential election. The candidate Barack Obama criticized the War in Iraq for not being done in cooperation with friends of America:

But when we do use force in situations other than self-defense, we should make every effort to garner the clear support and participation of others – as President George H. W. Bush did when we led the effort to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. The consequences of forgetting that lesson in the context of the current conflict in Iraq have been grave (Obama 2007: 7).

Obama also argued for a move of focus from Iraq towards Afghanistan and Pakistan (Obama 2007: 9). In order to do that, he called for a stronger NATO, where the member states would cooperate with more troops and “invest more in reconstruction and stabilization capabilities” (Obama 2007: 12). Hence, Obama’s text had representations of more multilateralism, and it can be interpreted as if Turkey was one of the countries the United States should have had “clear support and participation” from.

Obama visited Turkey in April 2009. This was the first country with a majority Muslim population he visited as president (Shipman 2009). He used the dominant representation by referring to Turkey as a strategic partner, but was even more positive about Turkey than the Bush administration had been. In his speech in Ankara he started by saying that he was committed to renewing the alliance (…) Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message to the world. And my answer is simple: Evet -- yes. (Applause.) Turkey is a critical ally. Turkey is an important part of Europe. And Turkey and the United States must stand together -- and work together -- to overcome the challenges of our time (Obama 2009).

Obama also stated that the two countries faced the same threats: “Make no mistake, though: Iraq, Turkey, and the United States face a common threat from terrorism. That includes the al Qaeda terrorists who have sought to drive Iraqis apart and destroy their country. That includes the PKK. There is no excuse for terror against any nation” (Obama 2009). This was a continuation of the policy of the Bush administration from the autumn 2007.

Obama also continued to speak of Islam in a positive manner, as President Bush had done. He said that Islam was a religion that “has done so much over so many centuries to shape the world for the better (…) In fact, our partnership with the Muslim world is critical not just in rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faiths reject, but also to strengthen opportunity for all its people” (Obama 2009).
6.2.3 The genocide issue

The representations about the genocide issue did not change in this period. Obama was quoted in 2008 saying that he would recognize that there had been a genocide on the Armenians in 1915. In this manner he had used the alternative representation of the issue.

After being elected Obama changed to using the dominant representation, a continuation of the Bush policy. In 2010 the House of Foreign Affairs Committee in Congress voted for a resolution which called on Obama to call it a “genocide”. The resolution said:

The House of Representatives (…) calls upon the President in the President’s annual message commemorating the Armenian Genocide issued on or about April 24, to accurately characterize the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1,500,000 Armenians as genocide and to recall the proud history of United States intervention in opposition to the Armenian Genocide (The Foreign Affairs Committee 2010).

The Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama did not support the resolution. Clinton was quoted saying: “Both President Obama and I have made clear, both last year and again this year, that we do not believe any action by the Congress is appropriate, and we oppose it” (Klein 2010).

The committee chairman, Democrat Howard Berman, spoke typically for the alternative representation when was quoted saying that it was a moral obligation to identify genocides. He also said that “I believe the Turks, however deep their dismay today, fundamentally agree that the U.S.-Turkish alliance is simply too important to get sidetracked by a nonbinding resolution passed by the House of Representatives” (Klein 2010). The critics of the resolution, on the other hand, spoke in a manner typical for the dominant representation. They spoke of it as something which could push Turkey away as an ally. For instance, the Republican Congressman Dan Burton was quoted saying: “Knowing that we may have to take some kind of military action down the road against maybe even Iran, we need to have as many friends in that part of the world as possible” (Klein 2010). President Obama, on the other hand, argued that the resolution could disturb the peace process between Turkey and Armenia. In 2009 he had said that he preferred to focus on the peace negotiations between Turkey and Armenia (Embassy of the United States in Ankara, Turkey 2009a).

6.2.4 A model partnership
One month after President Obama had visited Turkey, the House of Representatives had a hearing named “The United States and Turkey: A Model Partnership”. The title was sending optimism for the relationship. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, the Democrat Robert Wexler, started the hearing by stating that an improved relationship with Turkey was necessary because “we face a global financial crisis and are grappling with serious security challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, the Balkans, Black Sea and the Caucasus regions, and the Middle East” (The Committee on Foreign Affairs 2009: 1). Here he presented a new primary objective for cooperating with Turkey – economy. Suddenly Turkey was a country in strong growth, the world’s seventeenth largest economy and an attractive trade partner.

Afterwards he mentioned Afghanistan, where Turkey played an important part, and finally the argument about Turkey’s geography. He also said that Turkey is “well suited to meet the threats of the 21st century, including nuclear proliferation, countering terrorism, energy security and Middle East peace” (The Committee on Foreign Affairs 2009: 1). It seemed as if this statement was based upon a precondition that Turkey and the United States share these threats – again they were allies against these common threats.

The same month the Obama administration launched a new National Security Strategy (The White House 2010). In this document Turkey was mentioned twice, as an important ally and as a country which should be allowed to enter the EU. The representations of the U.S. enemies stayed quite similar to the enemies Obama had mentioned in his Foreign Affairs article in 2007: weapons of mass destruction and global terrorists. As for important countries to keep an eye on, both Iran and Syria were mentioned. The content of this document was hence double – a representation of desired continuance of the security relationship with Turkey, but a clear distance to Iran and Syria, which Turkey had improved ties with for the last years.

### 6.2.5 More criticism

In this entire period the alternative representation was still gaining ground again. This had been illustrated when the genocide resolution won a majority in 2010. This alternative representation was particularly related to the new activism in Turkish foreign policy, strengthened ties to Iran and weakened ties to Israel. More American politicians started referring to Turkey as a changing ally. The Chairman of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee in Congress was quoted saying that:
This hearing today, however, reflects the fact that we may be at a turning point in U.S.-Turkish relations (…) The policy disagreements that have emerged in recent years pose serious challenges to the bilateral relationship (…) These include: Turkey’s opposition to the sanctions on Iran that have been sought by the U.S. and its other NATO allies in Europe; Turkey’s move instead to rapidly increase its commercial relations with Iran. (…) The Turkish government’s provocation in supporting the May 31st violation of the naval blockade on shipments to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip – Turkish authorities then encouraged efforts at the United Nations to demonize and condemn our democratic ally, Israel; The current Turkish government’s verbal attacks on Israel and the Turkish government’s support for Hamas, which is designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2010).

This turning point was explained with Turkey changing, in line with arguments that had been seen quite often since 2003. A politician said: “Everyone seems to agree that this is ‘not your grandfather’s Turkey anymore (…) The majority ‘Justice and Development’ (…) Party in Turkey is clearly an Islamic party” (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2010).

6.2.6 Summary

The dominant representation in this period was still of the security relationship as a strong alliance. President Obama stood for a continuation of this representation from the Bush administration, but increased the positivity involved by referring to the relationship as a “model partnership”. The new President also declared that the United States and Turkey shared threats.

In 2010 the alternative representation was seen more often in Turkish discourse. A majority in a Committee in Congress voted for a genocide resolution, which could be seen as a consequence of this discursive change. Based on developments in foreign policy Turkey was characterized as a changed and Islamized partner by many politicians in Congress.

6.3 Strategic depth

6.3.1 Strategic partnership with the United States again

After the United States had opened up for sharing intelligence with Turkey against the PKK in November 2007, the dominant representation of the relationship was clearly positive. A journalist (Kalyoncu 2008) asked “Is the so-called US-Turkish strategic partnership really gaining a strategic depth?”. Another journalist dropped the “so-called” before referring to the
relationship as a “strategic partnership” (Özmenek 2008). It was also written that: “Turkey will apparently make 2008 the “United States Year.” Let alone mending bilateral relations that have been frosty since 2003, “reinforcement” of the relations seems a priority in Turkish foreign affairs” (Çandar 2008).

Journalists wrote even more positively about the fact that President Abdullah Gül visited Washington in January 2008, only two months after the last visit of Prime Minister Erdoğan. The relationship was categorized by a journalist (Ergin 2008b) as: “back on track again”, and “Gül's visit seems to add zest to the honeymoon period” (Ergin 2008b). The optimism was also shared by President Gül (2008), who said in a speech in Washington that:”Our trans-Atlantic relations within NATO stand stronger than ever”.

Even though Turkey and the United States agreed on a Shared Vision document in 2006, and President Gül had stated that “a new beginning” had started for the security relationship (Fuller 2008: 160), Turkish officials continued in 2008 to claim that there now was a “new spirit”. Before Abdullah Gül visited Washington in January 2008 Turkish diplomatic sources were referred in this manner in an article (Turkish Daily News 2008a) saying that:” The objective is to create new momentum and a spirit of cooperation and spread bilateral ties to all areas, added the same sources and stressed that the two sides have the political will to do so and that Bush's invitation to Gül is a clear indicator in that respect”.

On his way to Washington President Gül said that: “The new phase in the fight against terrorism and the developments in Iraq reveal that the difficult period was left in the past and a new era is approaching. A trustworthy environment has been created” (Turkish Daily News 2008b). This confirmed the findings from chapter 5, that there was of a lack of trust towards the United States in the previous years. Now Gül said that they had “a trustworthy environment” again. Gül also said that “the joint stance against terrorism marks a turning point” for the security relationship (Turkish Daily News 2008b). It became clear that the common stance against terrorism had not always been faced towards the same terrorist groups. But now Gül said that they had found this joint stance.

6.3.2 Mainly positive representations

The aims Turkish politicians presented for Northern Iraq were primarily territorial unity. But now the United States was to a larger extent than before represented as a partner: “Turkey and
the United States are partners in Iraq. Needless to say, we both have great stake in Iraq's security and stability, and welfare. Territorial integrity, sovereignty and political unity of this country remain our top priority” (Gül 2008). The representation of stability as an aim for Turkey in Iraq was continued in 2009. Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu (Davutoğlu 2009a) dedicated his address to the Security Council about Iraq to this point. He mentioned several other objectives for Iraq, such as peace and democracy, but these representations were always attached to words like unity and stability.

Several journalists (Kanlı 2008; Özerkan 2008), and a former Turkish ambassador to the United States, Faruk Loğoğlu (quoted in Özerkan 2008), wrote in early 2008 that it would be “too early” to declare if there was a new spring in the security relationship. This was explained partly by one of them with the fact that “tomorrow we may have tensions when the time comes to apply the carrot part, that is the political option, or the reforms related to the Kurdish problem” (Kanlı 2008). The Armenian genocide issue was also represented as a possible hinder for a shining security relationship in the coming period (Özerkan 2008). The Turkish Professor Ersin Onulduran commented upon the visit by Gül in Washington and said that: “It appears cooperation will be stronger in the upcoming days and will always continue as long as mutual interests do not clash” (Özerkan 2008). So, all in all the security relationship was represented as better than in a long time in Turkish discourse, but this was combined with saying that one should wait and see whether the interests of the two countries continued to be shared.

President Obama came to Ankara in April 2009. The Turkish newspaper Hürriyet welcomed him by this message: “Welcome Mr. President... You are welcomed in a country that has friendly relations with the United States. But we have been offended for the last eight years. Now, it is time to heal them. Welcome to Turkey” (Today’s Zaman 2009). In this representation the United States was the part to blame for the worsened security relationship between the two countries, and it was very much up to the United States to fix it.

Obama held a speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Turkish news commentators wrote mainly positively about President Obama`s speech, but criticized it for lacking clear political content. They would like to hear how he would reach his political aims. Thus, they wrote it was filled with positive symbolism, and that the aims were fine. The problem was that it would be a challenge for Obama to do these things in practice. His remarks about helping Turkey more against the PKK received positive reactions in Turkish
discourse. All in all the dominating representation was of sharing Obama’s vision of foreign policy.

Obama’s speech was also received as a new policy, a break with the Bush period. One analyst wrote that the visit would increase the “soft power” of Turkey. Obama mentioned several issues from Turkey’s neighbourhood, and this was interpreted as Turkey being relevant in these issues, therefore Turkey was a “pivotal country” (Bozkurt 2009). The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Babacan, had also said that a “new era” had started in the security relationship with the United States after Barack Obama had been elected (Wigen 2009b: 13). This representation, “a new era” was used about the security relationship both when they launched the Shared Vision document in 2006, when Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül visited Washington in late 2007 and early 2008 as well. This did not hinder Babacan from declaring it again.

6.3.3 Multilateralism

Turkish discourse had a dominant representation of the United States as a country which should cooperate more and use less unilateral strategies. And in early 2008, when the security relationship was framed in a more positive manner, a new type of representation of the former years was used. A journalist (Kalyoncu 2008) characterized the period of the Bush administration as a period of mistakes:

The conviction on both sides that the US can no longer go it alone assures an emphasis on multilateralism in US foreign policy after the Bush administration. In addition to such a paradigm shift in US foreign policy, converging regional and global interests of Turkey and the US are likely to bring about increased cooperation between the two so long as the former is able to draft long term foreign policy goals driven purely by national interests (Kalyoncu 2008).

First, the tone seemed to be that the worsened security relationship between the two countries was because of “mistakes”, and that the United States soon would have to go back to a multilateral approach again. Second, he wrote that Turkey and the United States would share interests in 2008, and this would increase the opportunities for cooperation, but only “so long as the former is able to draft long term foreign policy goals driven purely by national interests” (Kalyoncu 2008).
This statement said that the fundament of the security relationship was challenged by an administration with the wrong ideas, but that one could see “increased cooperation” with a new administration “driven purely by national interests”. All in all these representations were of a Bush administration that had not been able to see its own interests. This inability had also worsened the U.S. security relationship to Turkey.

A similar representation was given by another journalist who blamed the “neo-cons” in Washington for the worsened relationship. He wrote in early 2008 that: “Most neo-cons were eliminated in the second Bush term anyway. The U.S. has gradually transformed into a U.S. we are familiar with” (Çandar 2008). In this manner the United States was represented as a country which usually uses multilateral strategies and shares interests with Turkey, but that the Bush administration had not understood this.

6.3.4 Closure case against the AKP

During the visit by President Abdullah Gül in Washington President Bush mentioned that it was fantastic that Islam and democracy lived together in Turkey. He also said that Turkey functioned as a “bridge” between Europe and the Islamic World (Ergin 2008a). A Turkish newspaper editor covering the visit said that “This is undoubtedly to strengthen the thesis that the United States sees Turkey as a state model for “moderate Islam” governed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) with an Islamic background” (Ergin 2008a).

In a speech during the same visit President Gül (2008) started saying some words about what Turkey is. His first point was that: “Today Turkey stands proud to be a secular democracy with a growing liberal economy.” (Gül 2008). The fact that he said secular democracy can be interpreted as a negation of the representation of the idea with Turkey as a model of a Muslim democracy. However, the role of Islam in Turkish society would be a burning issue in Turkey later that summer.

The indictment against the AKP the summer 2008 was based on quotes from politicians that were considered as breaking with secularism. The prosecutor had a comment within the indictment where the Islamization of Turkey he said the AKP was trying to do was a result of “Great Power strategies” (quoted in Gordon and Taspınar 2008: 90). The court decided that the AKP had been doing activity in conflict with the principle of secularism, and that they now would receive only the half amount of party support from the government. This meant
that the AKP would not have to be closed, even though it was convicted (Gordon and Taspinar 2008: 94). The case stands as an illustration of the narrow room for Islam in Turkish politics, even after the United States had referred to Turkey as a “model for Muslim democracy” for several years.

6.3.5 Turkey as a center

1 May 2009 Ali Babacan stepped down from the post as Minister of Foreign Affairs, which was taken over by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Ahmet Davutoğlu had been an influential person within the AKP government since 2002. He was mostly known for his foreign policy strategy. He wrote himself that this strategy had been the basis of the foreign policy of the AKP since 2002 (Davutoğlu 2008: 79).

The foreign policy of the AKP became more in contrast to US policy after Davutoğlu became Minister of Foreign Affairs. He also argued for Turkey being a more independent country in foreign affairs. He has argued that Turkey should be characterized as a “center”, not only as a “bridge” or a “frontier”: “A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West” (Davutoğlu 2008: 78). According to Davutoğlu, Turkey could not be categorized as a member of a certain region, but as member of several regions (Aras 2009: 5). He wrote that one of his aims was to reduce the tendency of “alienating” Turkey’s neighbouring countries (Aras 2009: 3). The fact that Turkey is part of several regions gave an advantage when it came to influence and diplomacy (Aras 2009: 6). This foreign policy was a change from Turkey’s traditional identity as western.

In that manner he defined Turkey as a more important country than usual in the traditional Turkish foreign policy identity. Based on this description of what Turkey is, he continued with what Turkey should do: “Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs” (Davutoğlu 2008: 79). Again stability was represented as a main aim in Turkish foreign policy, a continuation from the previous government. The new element was the

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35He wrote in 2001 a book about Turkish foreign policy strategy. The book is called Stratejik Derinlik. Unfortunately it has not been translated to English yet. For this reason I base the presentation of the strategy in this thesis on others’ introductions to it (Aras 2009; Türkmen 2009), as well as his own articles and speeches (Davutoğlu 2008; Davutoğlu 2009a; Davutoğlu 2009b).
activity level Davutoğlu wrote that Turkey should have. He has summarized these basic principles into five points:

1. Balance between freedom and security
2. Zero problems with Turkey`s neighbours
3. Multi-dimensional and multi-track policies
4. A new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility
5. Rhythmic diplomacy (Davutoğlu 2008).

According to Davutoğlu the zero problems-policy was necessary because of Turkey`s geography and historical legacy (Davutoğlu 2009b). He wrote that Turkey was a mini model of its neighbours, because Turkey had so many groups from its neighbouring countries living inside its borders. So, “If you have such a mini model of the surrounding regions, you must have a very careful regional strategy; because whatever happens outside will affect you. Therefore, we tried to develop a zero-problem policy with our neighbours. We cannot afford continuous tensions with our neighbours. Otherwise, we will not be comfortable or peaceful or relaxed in the Anatolian landscape, working for economic development” (Davutoğlu 2009b). This argument was presented in a speech in Washington. The content of it was not uncontroversial for the United States, specifically because Turkey`s neighbours are Iran and Syria, among others.

Davutoğlu also used another important representation in Turkish foreign policy, “peace at home, peace in the world” (Davutoğlu 2009b). This was said by Atatürk in order to argue for neutrality and little involvement in foreign policy. Turkey had since Atatürk`s time had a policy of a reduced activity level in the Middle East, with the 1950s as an exception (Larrabee 2007: 103). However, now Davutoğlu used this phrase in order to argue for a completely different activity level.

6.3.6 Model partnership

In his speech in Ankara President Obama had mentioned that the Turkish-American relationship was a “model partnership”. In a speech in June the same year, the Turkish Minister of Affairs (Davutoğlu 2009b) embraced the concept and explained how he
interpreted it. He said that one earlier had used the representations “strategic partnership” and “strong alliance”, and that the new concept did not mean that Turkey and the United States did not have a strategic partnership anymore.

However, “model partnership” meant that they had a unique security relationship, and that their relationship was based on more than being just strategic, but also cultural, financial and diplomatic. In order to explain this uniqueness, he referred to the geography and history of both Turkey and the United States. Davutoğlu said that the United States had both advantages and disadvantages with its geographical placement, but that its distance from the rest of the world demanded three prerequisites in order to stay a global power: inclusiveness, multilateralism and “an understanding of regional or sub-regional orders in the Afro-Eurasian mainland” (Davutoğlu 2009b).

In this speech Davutoğlu once again referred to geography or history as a reason for a certain policy, but this time he applied it to U.S. foreign policy. Consequently he ended up with political prescriptions for the United States. Usually the advices he gave would be controversial in U.S. foreign policy debate, such as degree of multilateralism, but Davutoğlu said that it was absolutely necessary for the United States to keep this course in order to stay a global power.

Davutoğlu (2009b) has also stated that it would be an aim for Turkey that the United States should stay a global power. This spoke in favour of good intentions on behalf of the United States. But at the same time he said that Turkey was “a regional power (…) becoming more and more active in global politics” (Davutoğlu 2009b). In this representation the dynamic aspect of the security relationship was stressed. It also said that Turkish politicians defined their country as more powerful than before.

Finally, Davutoğlu said that he was sure that Turkey and the United States would define common challenges in foreign policy, even if they were asked to define them independently. And, “if this is the case, then this model partnership is not a matter of choice, it is a matter of necessity” (Davutoğlu 2009b). Again Davutoğlu argued based on “necessity”, but this necessity was not guaranteed independently of the interests of the countries. So, there seemed to be a precondition of shared interests for the security relationship.

6.3.7 Genocide
As a reaction to the genocide resolution in Congress in March 2010 Turkey called home its ambassador to the United States (Tanir 2010). Prime Minister Erdoğan was quoted commenting the resolution by saying: “We condemn this resolution, which accuses the Turkish nation of a crime it did not commit” (Whittell 2010). The ambassador returned in early April 2010 (Tanir 2010).

In 2010 there was also a lot of tension related to if President Obama would call the Armenian tragedy in 1915 a “genocide” on the remembrance day of 24th of April. This can be seen as a continuation of the representation of the United States a good security partner “as long as there is no genocide resolution. This led to the cancellation of a conference in the Turkish-American Council in the beginning of 2010 (Engingsoy 2010). Obama did not use the word “genocide” at the remembrance day, and that meant that Turkish-American relationship could continue as before. Henceforth the council also took up its work (Engingsoy 2010).

6.3.8 Summary
In this period the dominant representation of the security relationship to the United States was of a strong relationship. At the same time this discourse identified more as a “center” country participating in many regions than only a “western country”. Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu used this as a reason to have a more active foreign policy in the Middle East, a policy which often was divergent with the U.S. policy.

The dominant representation also embraced the concept “model partnership” which President Obama had introduced in 2009, but the closure case against AKP demonstrated the narrow room for religion in Turkish political discourse. It showed that the American reference to Turkey as a model for Muslim democracy was not used in the same manner in Turkish discourse.

6.4 The relationship
The dominant representations in both countries were of a strong security relationship against common threats in both countries these years. While the alternative representation in Turkey was not so strong in this period, the alternative American representation, of distrust towards Turkey, was increasing its influence in the discourse. This was particularly seen in a hearing in Congress in 2010.
The Turkish government argued that Turkey was a “centre” country that should have good relations to many countries in its region, and that this would not be in conflict with a security relationship with the United States. The alternative representation in the U.S. discourse drew the opposite inference, that Turkey’s improved ties to Iran meant that the security relationship with Turkey was weakened.

President Obama used the dominant representation going back to the Bush government of Turkey as a strategic partner. He even emphasized the strength of this security relationship by calling it a “model partnership”. This was embraced by the dominant Turkish representation of the time. Both dominant representations also were of terrorism as a shared threat for the two countries.
7 Conclusion

7.1 Main findings

Turkey is a rising star internationally, with increasing economic and political power. At the same time the foreign policies of both Turkey and the United States have developed in several respects since 2001. In this thesis I have investigated whether the changing representations about the Turkish-American security relationship in Turkish and U.S. discourse.

In every analytical chapter I have summed up the changes in how the two countries have represented their security relationship through these ten years. A journalist (Idiz 2007) referred to it as a “rollercoaster ride”, a useful term for the developments I have identified.

The leaders and Ministers in both countries have mainly referred to the security relationship between the two countries as an important and solid alliance. At the same time, alternative representations in the national discourses of both countries have changed. While Turkey is now commonly referred to as a country becoming “Islamized” in U.S. Congress, the United States is often represented as a threat to the territorial unity and secularism in Turkish discourse. In this manner the alternative representations in the two countries conceive of each other’s identities differently. As pointed out by Rumelili (2007), this leads to imbalance in the security relationship.

As national identity and national interest are tightly interconnected, it is increasingly possible that the two countries will define divergent national interests in the years to come. In the worst case, according to Deutsch et al. (1957), an alliance will come to an end when the parties of a security community do not share interests any longer. Such a development has been challenged by Turkish and American politicians agreeing on documents for “shared visions” between the two countries. However, these documents are vague on concrete political issues. A shared aim for peace in the Middle East, for instance, does not mean that the countries have similar strategies for how such a peace should be reached.

Another interesting observation has been the lack of dialogue between the two national discourses. Even issues on which the two countries have declared shared aims, there have mainly been divergent representations of the details of these aims. For instance, the Turkish war on terrorism has been against Kurdish terrorism, while the American war on terrorism has
been against radical Islamist terrorism. And while both countries have participated in the War in Afghanistan, they defined different aims with these wars. While the United States argued for combating extremist Islamist terrorism in Afghanistan, Turkey focused more on protection of civilians.

According to Barnett (in Brown 2008) divergent identities might lead to identification of divergent threats. With this theoretical perspective it is a relevant observation that the Bush administration often stressed the difference between the United States and Turkey when arguing for this security relationship. This discursive change opened up for characterizing Turkey as a Muslim country “heading east” in the alternative American representation. Several have argued throughout this period that Turkey itself was a threat to U.S. interests.

The findings of this thesis illustrate how important a shared identity and shared threats are for a security relationship. Even though these findings cannot be directly generalized to other security relationships, they can be used to stress the theoretical point that security relationships are results of social activities, not only materially defined interests. In this manner the case supports the theoretical perspective I have used in order to understand this case.

All in all the security relationship is increasingly fragile, as common interests, shared identity and mutual trust appeared to be diminishing, despite public assurances of the contrary. The future of the strategically important alliance thus remains as uncertain as ever.

### 7.2 Further research

This thesis has helped filling a knowledge gap on the role of a common identity in the Turkish-American security relationship. Still there are limitations to the study. For instance, I have not studied particular issues important for the relationship, such as Cyprus, Iran or the EU, in detail. This has been based on practical considerations, not because these questions are not important for international politics today. Taking the events of the last months into consideration, with large political changes in the Middle East, it could also be useful with an analysis of how Turkey and the United States have met these changes as security partners. In a world changing quickly, understanding these two countries seems even more important than before.
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