The Political-Military Matrimony

*Integrated Strategic Leadership and Civil-Military Relations in Norway*

Ida Marie Fottland

Master’s Thesis

Peace and Conflict Studies

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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Abstract

In 2003 the Norwegian government introduced Integrated Strategic Leadership (ISL). The Chief of Defence and his military/strategic functions is now integrated within the Ministry of Defence in an attempt to strengthen the Ministry’s collective abilities in strategic planning, leadership and control of the Norwegian armed forces. ISL has since the beginning been widely discussed, and the most prominent critiques are based on a concern that this ‘political-military matrimony’ challenge the Chief of Defence’s professional autonomy and reduces him to a mouthpiece for political representatives.

The primary objective of this thesis is to assess the Chief of Defence’s influence on long-term defence planning (LTDP) for the Norwegian armed forces, and in particular to analyze whether the extent of this influence appears to have changed after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership. In a comparative case study of the two last processes of long-term defence planning the thesis studies - through a qualitative document analysis - the extent to which the Chief of Defence’s professional military recommendations for the developments of the Norwegian armed forces, were followed by the Norwegian government in the two subsequent governmental propositions.

The analysis of the documents illustrates that Integrated Strategic Leadership appears to have had limited impact on the extent of the Chief of Defence’s influence on the LTDP-process. It further shows how both the long-term defence planning process - before and after the establishment of ISL - was characterized by relatively strong political control. The central argument of the thesis is that the perceived strong governmental control of the two LTDP-processes may be understood in relation to the significant restructurings of the Norwegian armed forces and its strengthened importance as an instrument of foreign policy - rather than as a consequence of the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership per se.
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Last, but certainly not least, Espen for his admirable patience, crucial help and most importantly calming words. And Mamma, Pappa and Anders – for their continuous encouragement and unconditional love.

Oslo, June 2011

Ida Marie Fottland
### Abbreviations/Translations

**Abbreviations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COD</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Control and Reporting Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Combat Service Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSTY</td>
<td>Hærens Styrker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISL</td>
<td>Integrated Strategic Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTAR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTDP</td>
<td>Long-term defence plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTB</td>
<td>Motor Torpedo Boats</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAF</td>
<td>The Norwegian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMSA</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASAMS</td>
<td>Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRE</td>
<td>Norwegian Defence Research Establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOK</td>
<td>Hærens transformasjon- og doktrine kommando (the Norwegian army’s transformation and doctrine command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td><strong>Important Translations</strong></td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English</strong></td>
<td><strong>Norwegian (original)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>(Brukes om) Virksomheter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air surveillance and battle management</td>
<td>Luft overvåkning og stridsledelse (LOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An invasion defence-based concept</td>
<td>Invasjonsforsvar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft defence</td>
<td>Luftvern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured car</td>
<td>Panservogn/stridsvogn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costal Chasseur Command</td>
<td>Kystjegerkommandoen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Staff</td>
<td>Forsvarsstaben (FST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments</td>
<td>(Brukes om) Avdelinger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental proposition</td>
<td>Stortingsproposisjon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governmental statement</td>
<td>Stortingsmelding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrated Strategic Leadership (ISL)</td>
<td>Integrert Strategisk Ledelse (ISL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Chasseur Command</td>
<td>Marinejegerkommandoen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Diving Command</td>
<td>Minedykkerkommandoen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing-defence</td>
<td>Mobiliseringsforsvar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal authoritative basis</td>
<td>Hjemmelsgrunnlag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term defence plan (LTDP) for the NAF</td>
<td>Langtidsplan for Forsvaret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief of Defence’s Defence Study</td>
<td>Forsvarssjefens forsvarsstudie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chief of Defence Professional Military Review</td>
<td>Forsvarssjefens militærlaglige utredning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Norwegian armed forces’ highest military leadership</td>
<td>Forsvarets øverste militære ledelse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Norwegian armed forces’ top management</td>
<td>Forsvarets øverste ledelse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Norwegian Armed Forces’ Supreme Command</td>
<td>Forsvarets overkommando (FO)</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Topic

One of the most important background principles of most Western systems of government is the principle of civil supremacy over the military. The principle of civil supremacy asserts the negative half of the principle that the military is responsible for protecting the country, not governing it. The essential question of civil-military relations theory is how, exactly, is the military controlled by civilian authorities, what policies and structures lead to civilian control, and what kind of civil-military relations best serve the interests of democracies in the long term? Few would deny that the military is responsible for protecting the country against war and insurrections - the main controversy is over whether that is all they are permitted to do.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the notion of what to secure and indeed how to secure it has significantly changed. While war was viewed as a more or less abstract phenomenon during the Cold War period, the use of military power once again became an integrated part of political practice in the 1990s. The changed international climate and a complex threat image make it increasingly difficult to define and indeed decide upon the appropriate and legitimate use of military power. Furthermore, the challenge of deciding upon the proper division of labour between ‘political matters’ and ‘military matters’ has in many countries driven much of the civil-military tensions. Civil-military relations in Norway have historically been viewed as relatively harmonious. Contrary to in many other states, the Norwegian armed forces (NAF) are substantially integrated in Norwegian society and are generally faced with a considerable degree of accept, support and
understanding\textsuperscript{7}. But historical accounts also illustrates that such relations might be particularly influenced and indeed fragile to societal developments and changes\textsuperscript{8}. History also reveals both complexities and grey areas in the relations between the military organization and Norwegian society more generally.

While there throughout the 1990s was an ongoing restructuring of the NAF, there were few changes in the organization of Norwegian Armed Forces’ top management\textsuperscript{9}. At the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century however, this was arguably where the most significant developments took place. The management structures had become too large in relation to the comprehensive rationalizations that had taken place in the NAF more generally\textsuperscript{10}. The organization of the Norwegian armed forces’ top management has experienced periods of both \textit{proximity} and \textit{separation} between the Ministry of Defence on the one hand, and the Chief of Defence and his staff, on the other. The underlying reason behind every process of reorganization appeared to be; how to balance between the government’s need of political control, and the armed forces’ requirement of military professional autonomy\textsuperscript{11}.

In August 2003, the Norwegian government introduced \textit{Integrated Strategic Leadership} (ISL) where the former General Headquarters are closed down and the Chief of Defence and the newly established defence staff (Forsvarsstaben/FST) were integrated as a part of the Ministry of Defence. This new organizational structure represented a turnaround from the established order and indeed the former tradition of the civilian supervision of the Norwegian armed forces.

The purpose of this master’s thesis is to examine civil-military relations in Norway and in particular to analyse to what extent these appear to have changed with the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership. I will study the processes of long-term defence planning trough a qualitative document analysis and use theoretically

\textsuperscript{7} See for instance public polls conducted by 'Folk of Forsvar'.
\textsuperscript{8} Heieraas, Dyndal,(ed) 2010; pp 104
\textsuperscript{9} Forsvarets øverste ledelse
\textsuperscript{10} Austad, Heidi Kristin Teien. ‘Forsvaret mellom fag og politikk: En studie i utviklingen av maktrelasjonen mellom fagmiliter og politisk forsvarsledelse, 1990-2005’. 2010; pp 82
\textsuperscript{11} Røksund, Arne. ‘Forsvaret mellom politisk styring og fagmiliter uavhengighet’; in Tranøy, Bent Sofus & Østerud, Øyvind 'Den Fragmenterte Staten: Reformer, Makt og Styring'. 2001; pp 125
defined variables drawing upon civil-military relations theory as the thesis’ main analytical framework.

1.2. Research Questions and Significance

The challenge of developing a balance between protection by the military and at the same time ensuring protection from the military is the cornerstone of civil-military relations theory. While modern theorists view the threat of a coup d’état as relatively insignificant in contemporary western democracies, these argue that the civil-military problematique has not disappeared but rather changed in nature. Civil-military relations are a fundamentally broad and complex phenomenon that involves direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people have with the military, regulations and discussions over funding and the use of the armed forces, and most importantly, however; it involves the complex bargaining between civilian and military elites to define and indeed implement national security and defence policy. The latter aspect is also the focus of the present thesis.

While the armed forces’ position within Norwegian society always has been a germane matter, the political and public debate concerned with the NAF in general - and its political role and functions in particular, has increased the last decades. Jan Petersen, former leader of the Standing Committee on Defence argued in 2009 that both the Ministry of Defence and the Norwegian Armed Forces possessed too much power, mainly resulting from too strong control and secrecy, which limited other minister’s access to relevant information. In November 2010 the majority of the members in the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence held, however, that the integration between military and political leadership (through Integrated Strategic Leadership) appeared to result in challenges related military professional autonomy,
indistinct areas of responsibilities, and political involvement at a too depleted level\(^{17}\). The Chief of Defence, the Minister of Defence and various members of the Ministry, nevertheless maintain that the cooperation between them is working well that ISL improves civil-military communication and that this type of organization has many advantages\(^{18}\).

In the literature on the Norwegian armed forces and Norwegian defence policy it has been argued that formal organization plays a very important part of civil-military relations in Norway, and consequently also for the power relations between political and military spheres\(^{19}\). It is also emphasized that how the Norwegian armed forces’ top management is organized also affect the Chief of Defence’s influence on the formation of Norwegian defence policy\(^{20}\). Further more, the process of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces is argued to represent the arena where the military has the greatest potential for influence on defence policy\(^{21}\). On this background the thesis addresses the following research question:

‘To what extent has the Chief of Defence’s direct influence on the process of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces changed, following the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership in 2003?’

Investigating the extent of military influence on the process of long-term defence planning allows for discussions over where Norwegian defence policy is constructed – who decides what – and more importantly, whether this actually appears to have changed after the establishment of ISL.

Critics of Integrated Strategic Leadership often argue that this form of organization results in a wing-clipped Chief of Defence reducing him to a mouthpiece for the


\(^{18}\) For some illustrating examples see for instance: Aftenposten (21.01.2011), 'Det er jeg som er sjefen'; Lectures at Oslo Militære Samfund: Arne Bård Dalhaug 'Integrt Strategisk ledelse – muligheter og utfordringer’ (03.03.2003); Grete Faremo: 'Statsrådens nytårsforedrag' (10.01.2011) Frede Hermansen: 'Langtidsplanlegging i forsvarssektoren’ (31.01.2011)

\(^{19}\) Bjerga, Kjell Inge 'Forsvarets sentrale ledelse: styring gjennom organisasjon’ in Dyndal (2010); pp 111

\(^{20}\) Græger (2007); pp 153

\(^{21}\) Ibid; pp 156
political leadership and, consequently, leading to a significant decrease in his military professional autonomy. Supporters of the proximity or integration models argue, however, that integration results in a greater potential for military influence on defence policy and on political decision-making more generally. Civil-military relations theory holds that while it is crucial that the civilian authorities make the final decisions related to for instance the use of force, the complexities of contemporary conflicts and the developments in weapons technology, make shared responsibility between the political and military leadership on national defence and security policy even more important than in previous periods.

Furthermore, it has been argued that when civilian authorities ignore the military leaders these become alienated from their administrative superiors. This alienation is, according to Richard Betts, a rupture in civil-military relations and greatest in the ‘indirect proportion to the decline in the [military’s] direct influence and their perception of the gap between their rightful and actual authority’. The recent public and parliamentary debate illustrates that there in contemporary Norway exists a real concern that the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership in 2003 has resulted in challenges related to military professional autonomy, and that the military leadership has become increasingly restrained by the political representatives. I argue here that if research indicates that the Chief of Defence’s influence on the process of long-term defence planning has decreased after the establishment of ISL this may lead to significant challenges both in terms of the strength of the Norwegian armed forces, and of civil-military relations in Norway more generally.

The Norwegian Armed Forces have in the last decades experienced numerous changes, resulting from an altered threat picture, the transformations within NATO and reduced defence budgets. The more complex and vague distinctions between national and international security began to characterize Norwegian defence and security policies

22 Røksund, in Tranøy & Østerud (2010); pp 152
23 Ibid; pp 152-153
24 Betts, Richard 'Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises' (1991); pp 5-12 cited in Bland (199); pp 12
25 Græger (2007); pp 1
after the end of the cold war. It is frequently argued that the internationalization of the Norwegian armed forces represented an almost complete ending to the separation between the NAF’s international and national responsibilities and functions\textsuperscript{26}. International operations became a part of a political engagement, and made the Norwegian armed forces subject to new foreign political interests and ambitions – making it, not only a defence and security political instrument, but also an important foreign policy tool. Furthermore, the increased interactions between security and defence policies meant that Norwegian politicians, to a much larger extent than previously, had to relate to and indeed engage more actively in traditional security and defence political issues\textsuperscript{27}. More over, because international operations had become such a significant part of the NAF’s functions, the conduct of defence and security policy also became more politicized\textsuperscript{28}.

As the long-term defence plans are one of the most important documents in the shaping of Norwegian defence policy, a secondary objective of the thesis is to discuss what the two processes of long-term defence planning indicates about the overall developments in the Norwegian armed forces in general, and within Norwegian defence policy in particular. In these discussions and analyses I will use some of the main debates and arguments raised in the academic literature on the Norwegian armed forces and Norwegian defence policy as a point of departure. This will in turn strengthen the thesis’ contribution to the field as its’ empirical analysis will allow me to either challenge or strengthen the validity of these.

1.3. Structure of the thesis

Chapter I has presented the thesis’ main research question and secondary objective, and argued for why it views the research as significant. The purpose of Chapter II is to review relevant exciting literature and to outline the thesis’ methodological framework.

\textsuperscript{26} See for instance; Austad (2010); pp 98
\textsuperscript{27} Matlary, Janne Haaland “Internasjonaliseringen av militærmakten – makt eller avmakt?” pp 203 in Matlary, Janne Haaland & Østerud, Øyvind (2005)
\textsuperscript{28} Matlary in Matlary & Østerud (2005); pp 201
Chapter III will present the thesis’ theoretical framework and outline how the theory will be used in the present thesis.

The main objective of Chapter IV is to provide a brief empirical background to the most important aspects under examination in the present thesis. The chapter will review how the organizational structure of the Norwegian armed forces’ top management has developed between the intersections of relative proximity and relative separation, and following that examine the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership in 2003. The second part of the chapter will discuss the purpose and processes of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces as to familiarize with these are crucial for any further analysis and consequently also for the validity of the present thesis.

Chapter V and VI are the thesis most important chapters these representing its empirical examination and analysis. In order to assess whether the degree of military influence on the LTDP-process appear to have changed after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership, it is crucial to first attempt to establish the Chief of Defence’s extent of influence prior to the introduction of ISL. Chapter V will consequently study the recommendations articulated in the Chief of Defence’s Professional Military Review 2003 (MFU 03) and further examine to what extent these also were incorporated in governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004). Chapter V will further, in order to address the thesis’ secondary objective, discuss what the examination of these two documents indicates about the developments in the Norwegian armed forces in general, and Norwegian defence policy in particular.

Chapter VI is structured similarly to the preceding, however, focused on the period after the establishment of ISL. The thesis will examine and analyze the accordance between the Chief of Defence’s defence study 2007 (FS 07) and governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008), and discuss what the documents indicates about the developments in the Norwegian armed forces and Norwegian defence policy. Chapter VII presents the thesis’ most important findings, arguments and its main conclusion, and suggests areas for future research.
2. Literature Review and Methodological Framework

2.1. Literature Review and Knowledge Gaps

The scholarly contributions on the Norwegian armed forces has until relatively recently been rather limited. Some academics have argued that this might be due to the secrecy associated with the military organization, which resulted in limited relevant research material. Others have pointed out that during the cold war, few Norwegian officers had participated in war, and furthermore that defence policy in this period was characterized by a significant degree of consensus which made both the armed forces and Norwegian defence policy a less interesting area of research. While the interest in the Norwegian armed forces and Norwegian defence policy has increased significantly the last decades, the field of research remains fairly understudied and is dominated by relatively few, however consequently the more important researchers and academics.

Ståle Ulriksen’s ‘Den norske forsvarstradisjonen – militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?’ is perhaps most accurately described as an historical account of the Norwegian armed forces. What Ulriksen in his work identifies as the Norwegian defence tradition is ‘a set of opinions, attitudes, values and assessments, which together constitute a certain idea of what the role of the Norwegian armed forces is - and indeed ought to be’. The main argument of the book is that the Norwegian armed forces in approximately two hundred years, and in particular in the last hundred, have been shaped and constructed first and foremost to meet other requirements than that of the military. Like Ulriksen, Nina Græger also argues that Norwegian defence policies are anchored in specific national values, traditions and defence identities, which in itself are important, but in

29 Kjellberg, Franesco. 'Offiserne som sosial gruppe'. (1961) in Gærger (2007); pp 144
30 Gærger, (2007); pp 144
31 Not all relevant exciting research and literature are reviewed in these sections. The work presented here represents a selection of influential writers, which I find particularly applicable and important. Other academic contributions have however also been important for this thesis and will consequently be used throughout the succeeding chapters.
32 Ulriksen, Ståle; 'Den norske forsvarstradisjonen – militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?. 2002; pp 267
33 Ulriksen (2002); pp 19
particular when they are related to the practices of the armed forces. Græger’s main argument is that much of what she identifies as continuity in the Norwegian defence discourse after the end of the Cold war, can be explained by how Norwegian defence policies to a large extent is domestically driven.

In ‘Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?’ Janne Haaland Matlary studies, in her contribution, the denationalization of defence, the Norwegian relationship with NATO and how the use of the Norwegian armed forces in the aftermath of the Cold War has been increasingly politicized. She further argues that the restructuring of the NAF results in a relatively new situation in which the interests regarding the Norwegian armed forces is no longer only found within the military organization – but is also very much present in the conduct of Norwegian foreign policy. ‘Den fragmenterte staten’ edited by Bent Sofus Tranøy and Øyvind Østerud offers important insight to the changes in the Norwegian public administration. The most important contribution for the analysis conducted here, however, is Arne Røksund’s chapter on the developments in the Norwegian armed forces top management.

The developments of the Norwegian armed forces has also been discussed and analyzed from a military point of view. In ‘Forsvar uten trussel’ Jacob Børresen criticizes contemporary Norwegian defence policy and indeed the restructuring of the Norwegian armed forces. According to Børresen, the development of the armed forces must be founded on Norwegian rights and responsibilities, and he further holds that the NAF first and foremost must be oriented towards solving national responsibilities in Norwegian vicinities. In a newly published book, ‘Fornyelse eller forvitring’, former Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen, discusses the future of the Norwegian armed forces, and argues, on the other hand, that it has not been satisfactory developed to meet the

34 Græger, 2007; pp 298
35 Græger, 2007; pp 297
36 Matlary, Janne Haaland ‘Internasjonalisering av militærmakten – maktk eller avmakt?’ in Matlary & Østerud 2005; pp 185-244
37 Matlary in Matlary & Østerud 2005; pp 188
38 Tranøy, Bent Sofus & Østerud, Øyvind (eds), ‘Den fragmenterte staten: reformer, makt og styring’. 2001
40 Børresen, Jacob. ‘Forsvar uten trussel: Det norske Forsvarets rolle og funksjon etter den kalde krigen’. 2005
contemporary security challenges. Diesen is requesting a more public debate on the future of the armed forces and criticizes Norwegian politicians for continuously proposing an operative structure not compatible with the provided defence budgets. These two different contributors also exemplify an important aspect of the Norwegian defence debate and illustrates those seeking to further professionalize and modernize the Norwegian armed forces, represented here by Diesen, and those arguing for increased focus on the northern areas, and a return to the more territorial or invasion-based concept of defence, represented by Børresen.

In Norway civil-military relations as an academic concept is relatively new\(^41\). Internationally, however, civil-military relations are an important area of research, dominated by political scientists and sociologists. While the literature and study of civil-military relations in Norway still are somewhat limited, it appears that also this field of research has gained prominence in the last decade.

Kjell Inge Bjerga’s contributions are central when studying civil-military relations in Norway. Bjerga’s work ‘Det Norske Pentagon’ is a historical examination of the developments in the Norwegian armed forces top management, and provides important background analysis in the period from 1961-1970\(^42\). Bjerga’s more recent contributions, notably in the book edited by Gjert Lage Dyndal, also provide imperative discussions and analyses of civil-military relations in general, and the historical developments in the Norwegian armed forces’ top management in particular\(^43\). More over, the contributions to Dyndal’s book made by respectively Ole Jørgen Maaø, Bjørn Olav Heieraas and Per Marius Frost-Nielsen offers important historical and contemporary discussion and analyses of civil-military relations in Norway - all of which have provided for important insights for this thesis’ analysis.

A variety of master’s thesis have also in the last couple of years provided important contributions to the field and is worth briefly mentioning. Most interesting for this

\(^{41}\) Maaø, Ole Jørgen 'En innføring i fagfeltet civil-militære relasjoner' in Dyndal, 2010, pp 77
\(^{43}\) Bjerga, Kjell Inge 'Forsvarets Sentrale ledelse: Styring gjennom organisasjon' in Dyndal (2010), pp 115-127
thesis is the work of, respectively, Paal Pedersen (2008); Heidi Austad (2010); Olav Ramberg (2010) and Frank Danjord (2010). Pedersen studies the decision-making process prior to the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership and argues that the process was characterized by an instrumental mentality where the administrative and political actors were the most active participants44. Austad on the other hand, examines the management structures of the Norwegian armed forces and how the power relations between the military and the political organization have developed in the period from 1990-2005. Austad writes within the historical discipline and consequently provides important and detailed analysis of the historical developments in the Norwegian armed forces’ top management45. Austad focus is however limited to the different processes of reorganization per se - rather than exploring its potential effects.

Another important contribution on strategic long term planning in the Norwegian armed forces is made by Ramberg’s thesis. Ramberg explores how these processes have developed in the intersection between political – and professional military considerations. Ramberg finds that a strong political will has over the years impacted the process of long-term planning in different ways, always with some overall political intention: to have a strong influence in the process46. Finally, and particularly related to my research question is Danjord’s analysis of the Chief of Defence’s defence studies and its impact on the subsequent governmental propositions. Danjord studies the processes of long-term defence planning from 1986-200747. As both the defence studies and the subsequent governmental propositions that Danjord reviews are comprehensive documents I argue that his analysis is somewhat limited as he fails to discuss the processes in any detail. Furthermore, Danjord does not analyze his findings in the light of potential effects resulting from the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership.

44 Pedersen, Paal. ‘Forsvaret i en ny tid: En studie av beslutningsprosessen forut for etableringen av integrert strategisk ledelse i Forsvaret’. 2008
45 Austad (2010)
46 Ramberg, Olav. ‘Strategisk langtidsplanlegging for Forsvaret – I skjæringspunktet mellom fag og politikk’. 2010
As these sections have demonstrated, while civil-military relations as a field of research in Norway has expanded in the last decade, these complex relations still remain relatively understudied. Furthermore, very little empirical research on civil-military relations in Norway has attempted to link empirical findings to the broader political theories on civil-military relations. I argue, however, that these two areas of research should not remain isolated or unadjusted, and that to interpret and analyze the findings from the broader theoretical framework of civil-military relations allows for more fruitful discussions of the characteristics of the relationship. While the theory of civil-military relations might be argued to be too broad and general to directly apply to different cases it nevertheless provides crucial arguments, also based on empirical studies, for what constitutes stable and well-functioning civil-military relations. Much of the work reviewed here and elsewhere in the thesis contains important discussions and brief analyses of Integrated Strategic Leadership, however, there has not been conducted any scholarly assessments of its potential impact on civil-military relations in general and on the extent of the Chief of Defence’s political influence in particular. This is rather surprising given the relatively persisting argument that formal organization has an impact on civil-military relations in Norway, and consequently also for the power relations between the political and military spheres. And, not the least, given the heated debates of its potential influences.

2.2. Methodological Framework

The proceeding sections will outline how I attempt to address the research question and secondary objective of the thesis, the reasons behind the choice of methodological and analytical frameworks, and finally, the thesis challenges and limitations.

2.2.1. Methodological Choices, Selection of Cases and Research Method

The methodological framework of this thesis is a comparative case study of two processes of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces. The comparative case study is first and foremost undertaken in order to assess whether the

48 Græger (2007), Bjerga, in Dyndal (2010); Tvetbråten, Kari (2006)
extent of the Chief of Defence’s influence on the process appears to have changed after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership in 2003.

The long-term defence plans (LTDP) for the Norwegian armed forces are viewed as imperative guidelines for the conduct of Norwegian defence policy. Further, and more importantly for my purposes, the processes of long-term defence planning are argued to be the arena in which the military has the greatest potential for political influence during peacetime\textsuperscript{49}. If one undertakes the premise that in the contemporary international environment, where the complexities of war and weapon’s technology make the deference to military expertise imperative, - the Chief of Defence’s influence on the process of long-term defence planning is consequently also of vital importance.

Peter Feaver, a prominent scholar within the theory of civil-military relations, argues that the increased theoretical focus on military influence ‘captures the idea that the military institutions may be politically powerful even (or perhaps especially) when it does not seize power through a forceful take over\textsuperscript{50}. Feaver further states, however, that military influence is much harder to measure than for instance the threat of military coups\textsuperscript{51} as influence might also take the form of attempts to change the opponents perceptions through more indirect measures or indeed oral persuasion. The degree of military influence through other channels than those officially documented is consequently challenging, if not almost impossible to assess.

My comparative case study of the two last processes of long-term defence planning is based on a qualitative document analysis, which limits the assessments of the extent of military influence to what, the thesis characterizes as direct influence. The Chief of Defence’s defence reviews/studies are the COD’s professional military recommendations for the future development of the Norwegian armed forces. The defence studies are provided to the Ministry of Defence before the Norwegian government, represented here by the Ministry of Defence develop their proposals for

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{49} Graeger (2007); pp 156
\item \textsuperscript{50} Feaver, (1999); pp 218
\item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid; pp 219
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the future development of the Norwegian armed forces. These are in turn outlined in a governmental proposition (long-term plan). The Chief of Defence direct influence on the LTDP process is understood as the extent to which the Ministry of Defence followed his recommendations for the development of the Norwegian armed forces, in other words, the extent to which the COD’s recommendations also were proposed in the two subsequent governmental propositions. While the thesis main analysis will be limited to what it perceives as direct influence, an important part of the analysis will also account for the possibility of influence through other channels than those officially documented. These arguments will however mainly be based on perceptions, and estimated assumptions.

In order to discuss whether the Chief of Defence influence appears to have changed after the establishment of ISL, it is crucial to first attempt to establish his extent of influence in a period before its’ introduction. This will be done through a qualitative document analysis of the two most important documents in the last LTDP-process before the establishment of ISL: the Chief of Defence’s Professional Military Review\textsuperscript{52} 2003 (MFU 03) and Governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004)\textsuperscript{53}. The succeeding chapter will in turn examine and analyze the accordance between the Chief of Defence’s Defence Study 2007 (FS 07) and Governmental Proposition no 48 (2007-2008)\textsuperscript{54}, which represents the first LTDP-process after the introduction of Integrated Strategic Leadership. The comparative analysis of these two processes will in turn allow for discussions over whether there are important differences in the extent of the Chief of Defence’s influence in the period before, and in the period after, the establishment of ISL.

By change the thesis refers to whether the Chief of Defence’s influence appears to either increased or decreased after the establishment of ISL. If the thesis’ empirical

\textsuperscript{53} The process of developing MFU 03 began autumn 2001, while governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) were in fact presented after the establishment of ISL (August 2003). Because ISL was not in practice during the significant part of the LTDP-process - the period from 2001-2003/early 2004 is considered a period before its’ establishment.
findings illustrate that the Chief of Defence’s influence has decreased after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership this will provide some support for arguments that this organizational structure results in a weakening of his function as the highest military advisor and that it might have led to a political overriding of military representatives. If, however, the empirical findings, indicates that the Chief of Defence influence has in fact increased after the establishment of ISL, this would challenge many of the contemporary assumptions. Finally, if research illustrates that the COD’s influence is more or less equal in the two LTDP-processes reviewed here, this might indicate that ISL have not in fact had as much consequence for civil-military relations in Norway as one, based on the contemporary heated debates and given the emphasis on the importance of formal structure provided in the literature, might have expected.

The document analysis is qualitative and consequently not a content analysis in the form of coding variables and developing charts or cross-tabulations. A content analysis would have enabled for more data gathering and arguably also more significant findings, but would have failed to incorporate what will be an important part of this analysis namely multiple contexts and meanings. A qualitative document analysis will allow for discussions over what characterizes the recommendations that the Chief of Defence generally gains/do not gain support for, and how and in what ways the different recommendations are justified or argued for in the different documents. This in turn leads to a more interesting and rich analyses of the cases.

As the four main documents under examination in the present thesis are very comprehensive it has been necessary to limit the thesis’ analysis to the Chief of Defence’s recommendations for operative structures and base structures within the respective military branches of the Norwegian armed forces. The thesis will not focus on either combined capacities and combined bases. The reason for focusing on the recommended operative and bases structure is the assumption that these categories are particularly dependent on the advice of the military expertise. It is not possible, due to the scope of the present thesis, nor necessarily fruitful to outline and discuss all of the recommendations given by the Chief of Defence within these two categories in detail
during the course of the thesis. I will consequently review those of the Chief of Defence’s recommendations that were either not incorporated in the subsequent governmental proposition, or those in which the justifications and rationales for the articulated recommendation is different in the governmental proposition than in the defence study. A great extent of accordance between the documents will arguably indicate an important degree of military influence, while restricted agreement might indicate limited direct military influence on the governmental proposition.

A secondary objective of this thesis is to discuss what the examination of the documents indicates about the developments in the Norwegian armed forces and in turn Norwegian defence policy. The thesis will use the work and arguments outlined in the literature review as a point of departure in discussing both its primary and secondary objective in order to ensure a degree of triangulation in the analysis.

2.2.2. Reliability, Validity and Portability

In qualitative document analysis the evidence embedded in the text is not necessarily objectively identifiable, and the researcher’s particular interpretation of a text is consequently just one of many possible ‘readings’. Qualitative document analysis is often critiqued for placing a too heavy burden on the reader of the study to assess its’ trustworthiness. In fact, as Jarold B. Manheim et al, describe ‘some quantitatively oriented scholars regard at least some qualitative work so dependent on the perceptions of the individual researchers and so focused on specific cases as to be unverifiable and essentially useless’.

In order to overcome some of these critiques and obvious challenges the qualitative document researcher must ‘rely on their ability to present a clear description, offer a convincing analysis, and make a strong argument for their interpretation to establish

55 The research further only examines those recommendations, which are proposed within the planning period and not those that are articulated as more long-term objectives.
56 Wesley, Jared J. 'Qualitative Document Analysis in Political Science’ 2010; pp 4
57 Ibid; pp 6
the value of their conclusion\(^59\). The thesis will consequently make sure to describe the content of the documents when analysis, arguments and conclusions are based directly on these. The thesis’ analysis will as a result, continuously move in the intersection between the descriptive and the analytical. While not all of the Chief of Defence’s recommendations within operative and base structures are reviewed in the thesis for the reasons of space, the persistence of all of these has been studied during the research process. If otherwise not noted or discussed, the Chief of Defence’s residual recommendations were also incorporated in the governmental proposition without any specific divergence in the justifications for its importance. A complete overview of the recommendations for the development of the Norwegian armed forces\(^60\) proposed by the Chief of Defence in MFU 03 and FS 07 as well as those proposed in the two governmental propositions under examination is however provided in appendix I-IV. This is important for the reliability of the research as it creates better transparency and makes the difference or accordance between the documents more visible to the reader\(^61\).

What quantitative researchers often would define as ‘measurement validity’ is often by qualitative document researchers defined as the research’s ‘credibility’\(^62\). The credibility of this research is based on the extent to which my findings accurately represent the concept in which I seek to assess and analyse – military political influence. As previously stated, influence may be exerted through a variety of measures and channels, but is nevertheless, for methodological purposes, defined here as direct influence – meaning the extent to which the Chief of Defence recommendations were incorporated in the subsequent governmental proposition.

Portability is described as another concern of analysts dealing with political documents. Alan Bryman argues that to make substantive contribution to knowledge, most social scientists concur that their inquiries must offer insights extending beyond

\(^{59}\) Ibid; pp 4
\(^{60}\) Still, however, limited to recommendations for operative and base structures.
\(^{61}\) If the readers seek to study the documents themselves these are also easily obtained. See the bibliography for further details.
\(^{62}\) Ibid; pp 4
the specific cases under study. The most articulated critique of case studies as a research method in social sciences is its lack of ability to generalize its findings. The argument that it is not possible to generalize on the basis of neither case studies nor single cases is often considered to be devastating for case studies as a scientific research method. The term ‘transferability’ is often used among researchers conducting qualitative document analysis. I argue that it would be inappropriate to argue that the findings of this research are directly applicable to other cases or should be seen as representing a complete picture of civil-military relations in contemporary Norway. That does not mean, however, that the findings, at least in contingent ways, may be transferrable. This is nevertheless in essence not up to me to decide, as ‘the question of whether the results of a qualitative document analysis can be exerted to another context must be answered – not by the original investigator, but by the reader seeking to make the transfer’.

2.2.3. Definition of Important Concepts

Most often the study of civil-military relations is concerned with the relationship between the civilian authority and the highest representatives of the state’s armed forces. The theory of civil-military relations defines civilian authority as ‘the elected civilians who by constitution, law or custom represent and are responsible and accountable to the sovereign people’. The military, on the other hand, means ‘any and all persons enrolled by the state in any unit or element of the armed forces’. The thesis’ main area of focus belongs to the sub-category of political-military relations represented in this analysis as the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Defence. I will nevertheless also use the term civil-military relations when discussing these relations.

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63 Bryman, Alan. 'Social Research Methods' (2004; pp 539) in Wesley, (2010); pp 5
64 The case study method is also often accused for its tendency for selection bias and argued to mainly be relevant in the primary stages of research and most importantly for generating hypotheses. I argue that the often common critique of case studies as containing both selection bias, lack of objectivity, and a bias towards verification by and large applies to all research methods not just case studies, or qualitative research in general.
65 Wesley (2010); pp 5
66 Bland, Douglas L. Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations’. 2001; pp 532
67 Ibid; pp 532
2.2.4. Limitations and Challenges

Like any other research project, this thesis is faced with some challenges and limitations that ought to be acknowledged. The analysis of the processes of long-term defence planning might be argued to be limited because the thesis only examines the defence studies and the subsequent governmental propositions, and not the influence of the various defence commissions or the analyses from the Norwegian defence research establishment. To also include these actors would have provided a more complete picture of the processes, and furthermore would have enabled for a discussion of the Chief of Defence’s influence in comparison to these two. It was however, necessary to limit the scope of the research and the Chief of Defence’s defence studies are the most important to examine in order to address the thesis’ research question.

Another limitation or at least a challenge of this thesis is related to linguistics. All of the main documents reviewed here, and indeed many of the secondary sources used, are written in Norwegian. Throughout the proceeding chapters, I will consequently have to be cautious that the original wording, meanings and arguments are not lost in translation. It is not possible, however, to completely discard this challenge and it will consequently still to some extent remain a possible limitation of the thesis.

Another challenge, also related to sources, is the limited amount of secondary sources. While, as previously emphasised, the academic contributions on respectively the NAF, Norwegian defence policy and civil-military relations has significantly increased the last couple of years, these research areas still remains understudied. This is a challenge, however, that it is obviously not possible to directly overcome but that nevertheless ought to be acknowledged.

The arguably most important limitation of the thesis is that it mainly studies the relations between the Ministry of Defence, representing the Norwegian government and the Chief of Defence and does not include the other important actor in the civil-military relationship; the Norwegian Parliament (Storting). The importance of the Storting in Norwegian defence policy should not be underestimated, as the governmental propositions are just that – a proposition – and it is the Storting that
passes the resolution for the future development of the Norwegian armed forces. Once again, however, it was necessary to limit the scope of the thesis in order to open for more detailed discussions and analysis on the chosen actors and processes. As the role and function of the Storting reaches outside the formal organization of the Norwegian armed forces’ top management and because it is the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Defence that has been subjected to most discussions both in the recent public debates and in the literature, I viewed these relations as the most interesting and indeed imperative to study. Furthermore, as the purpose of the thesis is to analyse the potential consequences of Integrated Strategic Leadership for civil-military relations - the role of the Storting in essence reaches beyond this. It should however be noted that because the thesis does not for instance discuss whether the governmental propositions were changed after the treatment by the Storting, the analysis does not necessarily provide a completely accurate image of the developments within the Norwegian armed forces.
3. Theoretical Framework

‘The armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian organizations: a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly on arms. They form a prestigious corporation of Order, enjoying overwhelming superiority in the means of applying force. The wonder, therefore, is not why this rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them.’

- S.E. Finer (1969)

3.1. Introduction

S.E. Finer addresses one of the most important questions within the discipline of political science: as who will guard the guardians has interested and fascinated scholars and political scientists since Plato. The empirical domain of civil-military relations is large and includes direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people have with the military, legislative haggling over the funding, regulation, and use of the military and, perhaps most importantly, the complex bargaining between civilian and military elites to define and implement national security policy. Each of these relations, however, ‘varies in form and consequence depending on whether they are found in strong democratic or weak authoritarian states, in economically developed or impoverished states, in states of war or states at peace’.

The theory and analyses of civil military relations and the civil-military problematique are numerous and some of their basic principles and challenges can be traced to the early writings of both Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. The theory and arguments concerned with issues of civil-military relations has significantly developed and indeed changed during the last decades. Furthermore, it has been argued that ‘only in the

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68 Finer, S.E. ‘The Man on the Horseback; The Role of the Military in Politics’. 1969; pp 6
69 Feaver, (1999); pp 211
70 Burk (2002); pp 7
71 Ibid; pp 7
72 Tzu, Sun (first translated in 1910); ‘The Art of War’, Clausewitz, Carl von ‘On War’ (first published in 1832). For contemporary discussions of Clausewitz's civil-military relations see Strachan, Hew & Herberg-Rothe, Andreas: ‘Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century, pp 266-282
loosest sense can one claim to have an overarching of civil-military relations that explain the widely divergent patterns of conduct that occur throughout this domain under the whole range of imaginable conditions\textsuperscript{73}. Rather, what we have instead are somewhat limited theories that examine one aspect of the matter and that aspect is often - the relation between the government and the military leadership.

The chapter will begin with an introduction to the civil-military problematique, as it is crucial to understand \textit{why} and \textit{how} the problematique appears in the first place. It will after that, provide a brief introduction to what it has defined as the classics in civil-military relations theory as more recent contributions tends to either build on, or challenge the arguments of the earlier work and it is consequently important to be familiar with its main content. The more recent contributions to civil-military relations theory will however constitute the most important element of the thesis’ theoretical framework as these to a larger extent than the classics are concerned with how to balance between the dual-importance of civilian control and that of military political influence. The remaining, and most important part of the chapter will consequently elaborate on the more contemporary developments within the theory and on how the theory will be used in the present thesis.

\subsection*{3.2. The civil-military problematique}

The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox; because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created that for protection\textsuperscript{74}. The problematique derives from agency inherent in civilization: ‘We form communities because we cannot provide for all our needs and therefore must depend on other people or institutions to do our bidding’\textsuperscript{75}. In a state of nature where individuals fend for themselves, the protector and the protectee are one and the same, and there is no civil-military dilemma, even if life is, as Hobbes argued: ‘nasty,
brutish, and short. The problem of agency however, arises in two stages once individuals band together in a community. The first stage involves the delegation of decision-making authority from each individual to the collective; the second stage involves the delegation of the fighting mission from each individual to a specialized group. The essence of the civil-military challenge is to ‘reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military strong enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do’. The military must be strong enough to prevail in wars as one of the main purposes behind establishing the military in the first place is the need, or perceived need, for the military force, either to attack other groups or to ward off attacks by others. On the other hand, however, ‘just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs as to not destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect’. The two central desiderata – protection by the military and protection from the military are in tension and this is at the very essence of the problematique - as efforts to assure the one will complicate efforts to assure the other. ‘If a society relentlessly pursues protection from external enemies, it will bankrupt itself. If society, on the other hand, minimizes the strength of the military so as to guard against a military seizure of political power, it leaves itself vulnerable to predations from external enemies.

Early theoretical contributions tended to focus on solving or preventing the coup d’état, which is obviously dangerous, but nevertheless, perhaps only an occasional problem of civil-military relations in most democratic states. Contemporary theorists, have however been more concerned with issues regarding civilian control over the armed forces, how and where this balance is struck and perhaps most importantly - how it is managed over time. In a democracy, the hierarchy of de jure authority favours civilians over the military, even in cases where the underlying distribution of

76 Hobbes, Thomas cited in Feaver (1996); pp 151
77 Feaver (1996); pp 151
78 Ibid; pp 149
79 Feaver (1999); pp 214
80 Ibid; pp 214
81 Feaver (1996); pp 154
82 Bland (1999); pp 8
83 Ibid; pp 12
de facto power favours the military – and the general assumption appears to be that civilians has the right to be wrong. Nevertheless, scholars and theorists on civil-military relations significantly disagree over the preferred nature of civilian control, the ideal degree of military autonomy from the civilian political power, and most importantly how the relations between political and military leadership ought be constructed and maintained in order to obtain the highest level of national security.

3.3. The Classics in Civil-Military Relations Theory
Most scholarly contributions on civil-military relations feel obligated to begin with a reference to the Samuel Huntington’s landmark study *The Soldier and the State*. While Huntington’s work was not the first major analysis of American civil-military relations it is the one, which has had the most lasting influence. *The Soldier and the State* offers impressive historical material and accounts, but is first and foremost, in Huntington’s own words; ‘an effort to develop a way for looking and thinking about civil-military relations, in short, a theoretical framework.’

The main focus of Huntington’s study is the officer corps and the rise of professionalism. Huntington recognizes that there is a potential tension in the desire for civilian control and the need for military security. He further states that civilian control, presumably also is achieved to the extent to which the power of the military group is reduced. Huntington argues that ‘the basic problem in defining civilian control is; how can military power be minimized?’ According to Huntington there exist two broad answers to this question and he held that one could separate between subjective and objective civil control of the military. The simplest way to reduce and indeed minimize military power is by maximizing the power of civilian groups in

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84 Feaver (1999): pp 215-216
87 Feaver (1996): pp 158
88 Huntington argues that the concept of civil control never has been satisfactory defined, but that civilian control has something to do with the relative power of civilian and military groups.
89 Huntington (1957): pp 80
90 Huntington (1957): pp 80
relation to the military. Huntington argues, however that some efforts to enhance civilian control can in fact undermine the military to be an effective fighting force. This tension can nonetheless, according to Huntington by avoided because by following his proposed solutions one can achieve a maximum amount of both civilian control and military security. The proposed solution to the civil-military problematique is objective civilian control of the military, which is received through professionalized soldiers. Huntington argues that the ‘essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control, on the other hand, is the denial of an independent military sphere’.

According to Huntington, objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making it the tool of the state, as opposed to subjective control that seeks to civilize the military making it mirror the state. Huntington further warns that subjective control, ‘can politicize the military such at it becomes an arena for the political struggle of the various civilian groups represented or not represented in the accession policy’. More recently Huntington emphasized that ‘objective civilian control [involves] the recognition and acceptance by [civilian leaders] of an area of professional competence and the autonomy of the military [and] the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military’. Peter Feaver sums up Huntington’s causal chain as follows: ‘autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which lead to secure civilian control’.

The sociologist Morris Janowitz work *Professional Soldier* is regarded as the most important landmark study after Huntington. Janowitz is also concerned with both civilian control of the armed forces and the military’s ability to fulfil its

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91 Huntington (1957): pp 80
92 Feaver (1996): pp 158
93 Huntington (1957): pp 83
94 Huntington (1957): pp 83
95 Feaver (1999): pp 227
96 Huntington, Samuel P. *Reforming Civil-Military Relations*. 1995; pp 9
97 Feaver (1996): pp 160
98 Feaver (1999): pp 212
responsibilities in meeting the security needs of the state. However, in contrast to Huntington, Janowitz argues that relying on the creation of an apolitical military in order to ensure civilian control is an unrealistic and indeed wrong approach.\(^9^9\) Janowitz argues that ‘in the United States, where political leadership is diffuse, civilian politicians have come to assume that the military will be an active ingredient in decision-making about national security’\(^1^0^0\). Janowitz further holds that it is inevitable that the military will come to resemble a political pressure group, and that this is not necessarily a problem as long as its’ activities remain ‘responsible, circumscribed, and responsive to civilian authority’\(^1^0^1\).

One of Janowitz’s most important arguments is that the strongest guarantee of the maintenance of civilian control is the military’s ‘meaningful interaction with civilian values’\(^1^0^2\). Contrary to Huntington who emphasized the necessity of distinct civil and military spheres, Janowitz held that ‘the professional socialization of the military through its relationship with and sympathy for the values of the society it serves, ensures civilian control over the armed forces’\(^1^0^3\). To some extent, Janowitz’s arguments can consequently be understood as favouring subjective civilian control of the armed forces, which was the type of control Huntington so strongly warned against. Janowitz argues that it is impossible to draw a clear line between civilian and military functions, and that it is very dangerous to treat the military as an institution that does not form a part of society, or to alienate the military from society\(^1^0^4\).

Huntington and Janowitz are often referred to as having fundamentally opposing views on the preferred nature of civilian control. However, they both emphasized the necessity of a professional soldier, but had significantly different views on what this professionalism ought to represent. The debate between (the schools of) Huntington and Janowitz offers opposing arguments over whether more efficient civilian control is

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100 Janowitz, Morris. ‘Professional Soldier’. 1964; pp 342  
102 Janowitz (1964); pp 420  
104 Maigre (2009); pp 3
achieved by strict separation or full integration between civilian and military spheres in general and decision-making processes in particular\textsuperscript{105}.

The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether the degree of \textit{military influence} appears to have changed after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership and it is consequently not concerned with examining the efficiency of civilian control in Norway per se. As the proceeding sections will demonstrate, however, more contemporary theorists of civil-military relations argue that a degree of military political influence is necessary both in order to develop satisfactory policies for national defence, and also, perhaps surprisingly, in the attempt to secure civilian control of the armed forces.

3.4. \textbf{Shared Responsibility and the Importance of Military Political Influence}

The different arguments over the military’s proper role in politics are a persistent element of civil-military relations theory. The separatist view within the theory essentially holds that ‘the military officer is not equipped by background, training, or inclination to fully participate in defence policymaking’\textsuperscript{106}. Further, it argues that ‘mastering the profession of arms is so demanding and time-consuming, and the military system so limited, that an understanding of the policy process is beyond the ability of the military professional’\textsuperscript{107}. The changing international climate after the cold war has however, resulted in increased scholarly research on civil-military relations, many of which challenges the long-lasting assumption that ‘war is too serious a matter to entrust military men’\textsuperscript{108}.

Michael Howard has argued that the very existence of an armed force raises problems of profound political importance. Howard argued that ‘to be effective its members obviously must be conditioned to unquestioning obedience’, but posed already in 1957 the essential question of ‘whether there then are no limits whatsoever to the

\begin{flushright}
\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid; pp 3
\textsuperscript{106} Hooker JR, Richard D. \textit{Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations}. 2004; pp 13
\textsuperscript{107} Cohen, Elliot A. \textit{Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in War time} in Hooker JR, (2004); pp 13
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\end{flushright}
unquestioning obedience?’. Howard argues that if there are no limits to the question of civilian control, and if the armed forces owe an unquestioning obedience to the heads of state, this opens the door to tyranny at home and irresponsible aggression abroad. If, however, on the other hand, military leaders have the right to exercise their independent judgement, ‘the door is open to Caesarism and civil war’. Howard captures a part of the civil-military problematique, which has increasingly preoccupied more contemporary theorists.

Douglas Bland, in his discussion of what he argues to be the main problems facing scholars in their attempt to develop theories of how to manage the civil-military problematique, acknowledges that early contributions focused perhaps too much on preventing or solving the potential of a coup d’etat, and emphasizes that more recent contributions are more concerned with how to manage civil-military relations after the power of the military has been curbed. An often-neglected dimension of civil-military relations, according to Bland, concerns protecting the armed forces for what Michael Howard called ‘the double problem of the subordination of military force to the political government, and of the control of a government in possession of such force’. Bland argues that ‘controlling the armed forces means more than the simple unquestioning obedience of the military from politicians who would use their authority over it to enhance partisan interests and their own power’. Bland’s main argument is that ‘civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers’. He further states that it appears that one can generalize that shared responsibility is evident in civil-military relations in most states, but that ‘the breadth and nature of the sharing vary from state to state and within states over time’. An obligation of theory is

110 Ibid; pp 12
111 Bland (1999); pp 13
112 Howard (1957); pp 12 cited in Bland (1999); pp 13
113 Bland (1999); pp 13
114 Ibid; pp 15
according to Bland, to ‘explain the dynamics of shared responsibility and to account for differences between and within states over time’.

Another related issue is also discussed by Huntington who termed it ‘the relationship of the expert to the minister’. While Huntington argued for the importance of the apolitical soldier, he also held that one of the responsibilities of what he referred to as the military man was an advisory function, meaning essentially ‘to analyze and report on the implications of alternative courses of state action from the military point of view’. Consequently, the military should be involved in developing the states’ defence policies, however the advice of the military man should be based only on military considerations - not political.

Peter Feaver, building to some extent of Michael C. Desch’s ‘Civilian Control of the Military’ also distinguishes between different dependent variables and their effect on civilian control. The most interesting dependent variable for the purposes of this master’s thesis is Feaver’s discussion of military influence which he argues ‘captures the idea that the military institution may be politically powerful even (or perhaps especially) when it does not seize direct power through a forceful takeover.

In his discussion of the argued crisis in American civil-military relations Richard D. Hooker takes these issues somewhat further and discusses what has often been described as the separatist vs. fusionist debate, which represents two competing views on the subject of the military’s proper role in the politics of policy. The fusionist view holds that direct participation by military leaders in defence policy is both necessary and indeed inevitable. Hooker argues that ‘if the assumption of unique expertise is accurate, only the military professional can provide the technical knowledge, informed by insight and experience, needed to support high-quality

\[^{115}\] Ibid
\[^{117}\] Huntington (1957): pp 72
\[^{118}\] Feaver (1999): pp 218
\[^{119}\] Hooker (2004): pp 13
\[^{120}\] Ibid; pp 13

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national security decision-making. Hooker further states that military advocacy cannot in fact be avoided in recommending or supporting some policy choices over others. Both Bland and Hooker argue that the main problems facing civil-military relationships cannot be finally and absolutely resolved, but that if they are to be managed to everyone’s advantage the military must be involved in the effort and that successful civilian control of the military also partly depends on the senior leadership of the armed forces. Hooker also states that ‘far from wanting politically passive soldiers, political leaders in both legislative and executive branches consistently seek military affirmation and support for their programs and policies’.

To sum up the newer contribution to civil-military relations theory’s causal chain; if the military leadership is not involved in the process of developing the state’s security and defence policies this might result in two possible and equally potentially destructive situations. First of all, it can result in a rupture in civil-military relations because, when military leaders are ignored by civilian decision-makers, they become ‘alienated from their administrative superiors’. This alienation in turn, is according to Betts greatest in ‘indirect proportion to the decline in the [military’s] direct influence and their perception of the gap between their rightful and actual authority’.

Secondly, and as I will argue, most importantly; if the shared responsibility on national defence and security policies are not practiced, the necessary and crucial involvement of the expert is not maintained, which in turn may significantly challenge the strength of the state’s armed forces.

The cornerstone of civil-military relations theory continues, however, to be the issue of civilian control of the armed forces and how it ought to be exercised in order to secure well-functioning civil-military relations and more importantly national security. Within the theory there are on the one hand ‘discussions over the stringency of restrictions that should be imposed on the military, so that they would closely follow

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121 Ibid; pp 13
122 Bland (1999): pp 13
123 Hooker (2004): pp 15
124 Betts, Richard ‘Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises’ (1991); pp 5-12 cited in Bland (1999); pp 12
the instructions given by politicians and civilian officials without exceeding their authority’\textsuperscript{125}. On the other hand, however, ‘the importance of the military’s freedom of action so the armed forces professionally can fulfil their demanding tasks of national defence, is emphasized’\textsuperscript{126}. The dominant argument in the newer contributions to civil-military relations theory appears to be the importance of the military officer as an advisor, expert, commander and partner, the unanswered question remains, however, how and where the balance of these functions are struck and perhaps most importantly for these purposes – how it is managed over time\textsuperscript{127}.

3.5. Summary and Specification of the Theoretical Framework

The theory of civil-military relations and in particular the aspect of military political influence will mainly be used in the following ways. The thesis theoretical framework has first and foremost been imperative in terms of guiding the research by offering crucial insights of what to look for in the study civil-military relations in Norway. The theoretical framework is consequently crucial for the thesis as it provides important principal views and indications of what the different actors’ roles ought to be and what constitutes a good relationship between the civilian authorities and the military.

Further, these arguments will in turn be crucial when discussing the thesis’ findings as the theory functions as a legitimate point of reference as to how these relations ought to be - and how civil control of the military ought to function. The purpose of the thesis is not to test the theory’s validity in terms of explaining its findings, but rather to use the theoretical framework in interpreting the findings once these have been illustrated or established. The thesis will assess whether the degree of military influence, according to the theory, is considered to be satisfactory, which in turn is argued to be crucial for good democratic control of the armed forces, and indeed well functioning civil-military relations.

\textsuperscript{125} Maigre (2009) pp 1
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid
\textsuperscript{127} Bland (1999); pp 12
As the introductory section illustrated, studies and theories of civil-military relations are often criticized for being too wide, and that one ‘only in the loosest sense can claim to have overarching theories of civil-military relations that explain the widely divergent patterns of conduct that occur throughout this domain under the whole range of imaginable conditions’\(^{128}\). Civil-military relations theory essentially discuss everything from the social status of the armed forces to decisions related to the use of force. Perhaps as a result of this, it is also continuously faced with challenges, as critics have held it is too broad to be considered a unified theory.

Furthermore, the contemporary attempts to examine only one aspect of the phenomenon, for instance military influence, have been critiqued for being too limited or specific to explain or understand such a complex phenomenon. As A.R. Luckman emphasises, ‘it is not one variable that constitute the key to explaining civil military relations’\(^{129}\). Another theoretical viewpoint holds, however, that because the theory is so broad, it ‘makes sense to distinguish between a variety of dependent variables, any one of which be the most important or interesting in that particular region at a particular time’\(^{130}\). I will consequently assess whether the extent of military political influence appear to have changed after the establishment of ISL, not because I believe that this will illustrate every aspect of civil-military relations in Norway but because I argue it to be the most important and interesting to study in this particular state, at this particular point in time.

\(^{128}\) Burk (2002); pp 7
\(^{130}\) Feaver (1999); pp 217
4. A Historical Sketch: the Norwegian armed forces’ top management and long-term defence planning

This chapter will illustrate and discuss how the organization of the Norwegian armed forces’ top management has been organized and developed, and the purposes and practices of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces.

4.1. Proximity, Separation or Integration?

The difficulties often associated with attempts to strike a balance between professional considerations and politics are not exclusive for the defence sector, and are also found in areas such as health, development aid and justice. Some of the strongest movements appear, however, to be found in the defence sector, and the organization of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ top management has been repeatedly debated since the end of the 1800s. Throughout modern Norwegian history the NAF’s top management has been organized in different ways, the relationship between democratic political control and military professional autonomy being the central issue - resulting in persistent tensions. In Norway the relationship between the government and the military leadership has often boiled down to one essential query; what affiliation should it be between political and military leadership and, specifically, whether it should be established organizational proximity or separation amongst the Ministry of Defence on the one hand, and the NAF’s highest military leadership on the other.

The structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ top management has mainly been organized around three different models, and reorganizations have often occurred in response to changing security political circumstances of relevance to Norway or

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132 Røksund in Transøy & Østerud (2001a); pp 125
133 Ibid
134 Bjerga in Dyndal (2010); pp 115
changes in the domestic economic situation. While there are different varieties of the models it is appropriate to describe them as representing respectively: proximity between the MoD and the military leadership, relative separation between the two, or a combination meaning proximity in some areas and separation in others.

Varieties of the *proximity model* characterized the NAF’s top management from 1814 until the beginning of the 20th century. The proximity model is characterized by including the professional experts in the Ministerial structures, resulting in collocation and often close cooperation. A new organizational structure was established in 1910 where the commanding general and commanding admiral was separated from the Ministry of Defence. This form of organization was maintained until the beginning of the Second World War, where its weaknesses became devastatingly visible during the German invasion of Norway in April 1940. The separation between the Ministry and the military leadership is for instance illustrated by the fact that no representatives from the military were present during the governmental emergency meeting the 9th of April.

After the Second World War, the main question was how to create a central administration that could effectively shape and carry out government policies, and the Cold War period was characterized by periods of both the *combination model* and the *separation model*. Immediately after the Second World War and from 1970-1980 the MoD and the highest military leadership were physically localized in the same place, but organizationally separate by still representing two different institutions, representing a combination model of proximity through collocation - but separation in organization. The *separation model* between the Ministry of Defence and the military leadership is characterized by localizing the military leadership in institutions outside the Ministry, but nevertheless simultaneously under the overall control of the MoD. Through most of the Cold War period there existed a division between political/civil

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135 Røksund in Østerud & Tranøy (2001a); pp 126: Heieraas in Dyndal (2010); pp 104
136 The names and general descriptions of the models are based Bjørga's sections in Dyndal (2010); pp 115-117
137 Bjørga in Dyndal (2010); pp 116
138 Røksund in Tranøy & Østerud (2001a); pp 129
leadership under the Minister of Defence and a military professional leadership under
the lead of the Chief of Defence. With an international climate understood as
essentially bi-polar and with invasion as the only threat scenario, there was generally
little need for continuous political involvement or clarification in defence planning\(^{139}\),
and the Chief of Defence became a strong and powerful head of department. During
the Cold War there existed relatively clear distinctions between war and peace and
consequently a relatively obvious separation between political and military
responsibilities. Further, Norwegian defence policy was ‘depoliticized in the sense that
there was a broad national consensus about Norway’s strategic situation, the Atlantic
security policy orientation and the role of the armed forces, whose main purpose was
territorial defence’\(^{140}\). The international security environment changed radically after
the cold war, with a complex climate that required continuous assessments of different
scenarios and more rapid decision-makings\(^{141}\).

At the beginning of the 1990s there were not any significant changes in the NAF’s top
management, and the approach from both the political and military spheres was to
rationalize through reductions in the existing organization, economic savings, and
through small organizational readjustments. It nevertheless soon became apparent that
these efforts were not sufficient and more radical processes of reorganization began at
the beginning of the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) Century.

4.2. The Establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership

It is argued that in a model with a department (for example a directorate) separated
from the Ministry, the political leadership will avoid much of the department’s imprint
and the department will on the other hand be more shielded from the signals and
political control of the Ministry. The model of separate departments is generally
considered as satisfactory as long as the departments are not too politically delicate.
From a political viewpoint, however, the model is often considered potentially

\(^{139}\) Græger (2007); pp 153

\(^{140}\) Græger, Nina. ‘Norway in a Transatlantic Tight Spot Between the US and European Security Strategies?’. 2005; pp

\(^{141}\) The following two sections builds mainly on Græger (2007) pp 154
dangerous if the trade itself is politically sensitive, which the Norwegian Armed Forces increasingly became after the end of the Cold War.\(^{142}\)

In governmental proposition no 45 (2000-2001) the Norwegian government held that the NAF’s top management was too comprehensive and resource draining in comparison to the NAF more generally, and expressed the necessity of more comprehensive reductions in the organizational structures of the management\(^{143}\). The government proposed to abolish the Norwegian Armed Forces Supreme Command (FO), while the Chief of Defence was to take on the role as the highest military advisor in a civil-military integrated Ministry\(^{144}\). The government further held that an extended Ministry would strengthen its abilities in strategic planning, leadership and control of the NAF for international security-, defence- and military-political cooperation, and in its abilities to function as an effective leadership apparatus at peace, during crises and in war.\(^{145}\) The Norwegian Parliament passed the 13\(^{th}\) of June 2002 to abolish the Norwegian Armed Forces Supreme Command (FO) and to establish a defence staff (FST) that was to be integrated in the Ministry of Defence.\(^{146}\) The Parliamentary decision resulted in bisect of the overall personnel (the Supreme Command and the Ministry of Defence) from 1600 to a total of 800. The 1\(^{st}\) of August 2003 was a turning point for the Norwegian Armed Forces top management and the Norwegian defence sector, with the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership (ISL). The NAF’s supreme command was shut down, and the Chief of Defence and the Defence Staff was integrated in the Ministry of Defence.

I will argue that the relationship between the civil authority, represented by the politicians, and the military trade is of essential principal. The difficulties of striking a balance between civil societies’ need for democratic control of its military power and the armed forces need to maintain its professional military competence and some of its

\(^{142}\) Bjerga in Dyndal (2010); pp 115
\(^{144}\) Ibid
\(^{145}\) Ibid

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freedom of action is fundamentally challenging. Furthermore, the reorganizations in the NAF’s top management are perhaps particularly comprehensive and complex as the NAF traditionally always has been an organization with a relatively high degree of autonomy.\textsuperscript{147} Heidi Austad argues that throughout the 1990s was an increased politicization of the defence department despite of its status as independent\textsuperscript{148}. She further argues that the establishment of ISL was an expression of an almost complete political divesting of power. While it seems plausible that the reorganization of the Norwegian armed forces’ top management at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century was to increase the political control and management of the Norwegian armed forces, I argue that to say that the establishment of ISL ‘should be seen as an intentional effort to minimize the military professional aspect of the NAF’s top management’\textsuperscript{149} is a simplification of a far more complicated issue. However, whether this actually came to be the result of the establishment of ISL is a different matter, and is a crucial element of analysis of the present thesis.

4.2.1. Integrated strategic leadership – critics and proponents

The different solutions for the organizations of NAF’s top management have raised numerous debates on what models that offer a satisfactory balance between professional military considerations on the one hand, and politics on the other. In 2000 the Chief of Defence undertook organizational changes in the Norwegian armed forces supreme command, which resulted in more power to the COD at the expense of the leaders of the different military branches. Arne Røksund argues that this change touches upon a traditional conflict line in the NAF representing the dual-objective of autonomy for the military branches on the one hand, and the need for a superior leadership of the total structure of the armed forces on the other\textsuperscript{150}. The extent to which the leadership of the NAF is characterized by autonomy or a holistic leadership with power mainly vested in the Chief of Defence also provides consequences for the possibilities of the democratic political control of the armed forces. Røksund holds that

\textsuperscript{147} Pedersen (2006)
\textsuperscript{148} Austad (2010); pp 82
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid; pp 107-108
\textsuperscript{150} Røksund in Tranøy & Østerud (2001a); pp 25
the general assumption has been that political control is more stable and effective when the main leadership of the armed forces is centralized rather than fragmented\textsuperscript{151}. That the changes in the Norwegian armed forces’ supreme command also could be understood as a political rather than a purely professional military requirement consequently seems plausible.

Many critics of Integrated Strategic Leadership have come from within the organization of the Norwegian armed forces. With the restructuring of the NAF, and in particular with the establishment of ISL, a debate concerned with the balance between the Chief of Defence’s role as the highest leader of the armed forces and his function as a senior government official for the Ministry of Defence, began to flourish. The debate was in essence about where the loyalty of the Chief of Defence actually lay, and to what extent he was able to express his real professional opinions of the different aspects of the restructuring of the NAF\textsuperscript{152}. In other words - whether the Chief of Defence had developed into a politician disguised as an officer.

From the political perspective the purpose of integrating the civil and military leadership in the Ministry was to strengthen the Norwegian armed forces collective abilities for strategic and effective control\textsuperscript{153}. Supporters of the proximity model in general, and integration in particular, often hold that it results in a greater potential for military influence on defence policy and political decision-making more generally\textsuperscript{154}. The supporters also argue that integration means that the Chief of Defence obtains direct intake to ongoing processes of decision-making in the Ministry and among political leadership, which in turn strengthens his position. Critics of ISL however, argue that this form of organization results in a wing-clipped Chief of Defence reducing him to a mouthpiece for the political leadership and a significant decrease in military professional autonomy\textsuperscript{155}. The concerns raised from the military were that the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[151] Røksund in Tranøy & Østerud (2001a); pp 25
\item[152] Græger (2007); pp 265
\item[154] Røksund in Tranøy & Østerud (2001a); pp 152-153; Græger (2007); pp 265
\item[155] Røksund in Tranøy & Østerud (2001a); pp 152
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
integrated leadership model had organizational characteristics, which would obstruct the Chief of Defence’s ability to maintain the interests of the armed forces as well as his aptitude to openly question or critique political decisions or the political leadership\textsuperscript{156}.

The public debates on the NAF at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century might indicate that many felt the military leadership had ignored its’ ‘own people’ for the benefit of the loyalty towards the political representatives. By doing this, the military leadership had arguably not provided recommendations based on the needs and requirements of the armed forces, but rather focused on what was possible to obtain within the provided defence budgets\textsuperscript{157}.

If military representatives outside the comparatively small central leadership does not feel that its’ representatives in the Ministry succeed in satisfying their own professional needs and requirements I argue that the military professional advice is of little essential value. It should however also be kept in mind that in discussions and debates over the future developments of the Norwegian armed forces there will always be deputizing arguments and motivations and the potential of personal or institutional agendas. I will consequently, for methodological purposes, assume that the recommendations articulated by the Chiefs of Defence in their review/study was believed to be the best option for the developments of the Norwegian armed forces as a whole, but nevertheless account for the possibility that this might not always have been the case.

4.3. Long-term Defence Planning and Civil-Military Socialization

4.3.1. Purpose

An examination of the process leading up to the final long-term defence plan is assumed to provide a better understanding of how civil and military processes of decision-making relate to - and attempt to influence each other\textsuperscript{158}. Norwegian defence

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{156} Graeger (2007): pp 265 \textsuperscript{157} Ibid; pp 267 \textsuperscript{158} Graeger (2007): pp 156}
planning involves both civil and military actors and provides good opportunities for socialization and indeed normalization between the two spheres.

The purpose of the LTDP is to generate plans for the development of the NAF within a long-term perspective. Traditionally the plans have been relatively concrete for the first 3-4 years, but have also included more general descriptions of the perceived and proposed developments the following 15-20 years. The long-term plans are strategic in the sense that they deal with factors viewed as crucial for the development of the NAF. These factors have mainly related to security – and defence political considerations, technological and economic development and the existing force structure. The LTDP should not however be confused with the NAF-planning which focus is for instance on developing more concrete plans for potential crises and war scenarios.

4.3.2. Procedures, Actors and Documents
The making of the LTDP has normally involved approximately sixty people in the Ministry of Defence, the NAF’s supreme command (now Defence staff), and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. The number of officers working in the Ministry has varied since 1990, but from 2003 about one third of the employees has come from the Norwegian Armed Forces.

The process of long-term defence planning has often started with the Minister of Defence defining a set of policy frameworks for the preparation of the military professional recommendations later given by the Chief of Defence. According to an instruction from 2003 the Chief of Defence is ‘the highest military advisor in the Ministry of Defence (…) and shall contribute with independent professional advice

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159 Ramberg (2010); pp 6
160 Forsvarsplanlegging
161 It has also often been the practice that the supreme command contributes with 3-4 officers (often colonels) at the disposal of the Ministry during the planning process, these officers come in addition to NAF’s individual recommendations, which are expressed in defence studies and other professional military reviews.

162 These section builds mainly on Græger (2007); pp 157-179. It should however be noted that these descriptions were written in 2007 and some details might consequently have changed. Græger’s chapter is nevertheless applicable to the LTDP-processes under review here – and consequently undertaken.
and recommendations. The military studies and reviews are regarded as the main and most important input from the military in the process of long-term defence planning as they represent the Chief of Defence’s recommendations to the Minister Defence for the development of the defence sector in general and the NAF in particular. The C defence studies are further more, argued to represent the basis for the subsequent governmental proposition. The studies are comprehensive and are typically conducted over a period of two to three years. Significant resources are spent on the studying-process and the recommendations are generally thorough and well anchored. The Chief of Defence initiates a defence study or review approximately every fourth year and the study is a careful assessment and analysis of how the Norwegian Armed Forces should look in the future, accounting for credible security-political, strategic, economic, technological developments.

The first defence study was conducted in 1986 and since then there have been five studies, which according to Danjord have had a varying influence on the final governmental proposition. Many of the professional military recommendations and studies throughout the 1990s were characterized by budget proposals in an attempt to reduce the gap between disposable resources and articulated political goals and objectives.

The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has been a dominant actor in the process of developing long-term defence plans since the 1960s. FFI and the department of system analysis have had an approach to defence planning dominated by a quantification of potential threats based on system and operation analysis. This method is based on a threat assessment, where the traditional scenario concerned an imagined invasion force and where the Norwegian defence capabilities was tested by setting up different compositions of structural elements in order to counter such a threat. Based on these analyses FFI provided a proposed structure of defence for the

163 Graeger (2007); pp 166
164 Danjord,(2010); pp 8
165 Graeger (2007); pp 166
166 Graeger (2007); pp 159
167 This paragraph builds mainly on Graeger (2007); pp 158-163
NAF. While this method was partly met with approval, it also faced significant critiques as many argued that it did not consider the also significant non-quantifiable factors. Furthermore, the NAF’s top management were concerned that FFI’s central position reduced the role of the supreme command in Norwegian defence planning and further, the Chief of Defence’s potential to influence the planning process. Another critique was that the FFI analysis was to a large extent based on territorial power, which further substantiated the Norwegian army’s strong position among the respective military services. The role of FFI in Norwegian defence planning was as a result significantly reduced following the beginning of the restructuring of the Norwegian armed forces in 2001. According to the Ministry of Defence, FFI’s analysis and subsequent contributions should now mainly be on issues of material and technology.

In addition to the aforementioned actors there has in some periods also been appointed different defence commissions and defence political committees with mandates from the government. These have consisted of representatives from the different political parties and others with extensive knowledge on Norwegian defence. The appointing of such commissions is often in relation to changing external or internal frameworks for the NAF. The different commissions and committees have had diverse approaches to the treatment of the NAF’s development in terms of breadth, depth and time-perspective, but have generally worked parallel to the CoD’s defence studies. One of the main purposes of the commissions has been to create consensus and to anchor defence policy and defence planning within a broader political process.

This chapter has illustrated the NAF’s top management has experienced periods of the proximity, separation and combination model. The establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership in 2003 represents not only a version of the proximity model, but also one of almost complete integration. The chapter has also demonstrated that the process of long-term defence planning involves a significant number of both political

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168 Such committees were appointed in 1946, 1974, 1990, 1996 and 2006
169 Ramberg (2010); pp 6
170 Graeger (2007); pp 172
and military actors and is to a large extent an intersection point between civil and military relations. The various studies and actors reviewed here form a basis for the Ministry of Defence’s governmental propositions submitted to the Storting. The Storting resolution in turn lays the foundation for the Ministry and the government’s more detailed plans for the development of the Norwegian Armed Forces.

The following two chapters will discuss and analyse the Chief of Defence influence on the process of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces, and in particular assess whether the extent of this influence appears to have changed after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership.
5. The last LTDP-process before the establishment of ISL - and the extent of military political influence

5.1. Introduction

One of the essential premises of the present thesis is that there is an ongoing tension between civilian and military representatives in Norway, which in turn may be understood in terms of an underlying struggle between the requirement of respectively democratic political control and military professional autonomy. These tensions are in turn reflected in areas from how to manage ground forces in international operations to the development of national security and defence policies - the latter being this thesis’ primary focus.

While the Norwegian armed forces traditionally have been substantially integrated in Norwegian society I also argue that the many new functions and responsibilities of the armed forces, and indeed its’ strengthened position as a foreign political instrument, challenges its’ traditional role in Norwegian society. This in turn makes any decision related to the Norwegian armed forces particularly politically delicate. Many of the academic contributions on the Norwegian armed forces and Norwegian defence policy have emphasised how the development of the NAF and the conduct of Norwegian defence policy, to a significant extent has been undertaken to satisfy other needs and requirements than that of the military. The thesis argues that if this assumption is correct, Norway is potentially faced with weakened military strength and effectiveness, resulting from other requirements than those of the military becoming dominant for its development. Furthermore, according to the theory of civil-military relations, Norway is consequently also potentially faced with the double problem of ‘the subordination of the military force to the government, and of the control of a government in a possession of such a force’. According to Michael Howard and Douglas L. Bland, stable civil-military relations mean ‘more than the simple,

172 Howard (1957); pp 12
unquestioning obedience of the military to the government’, but also the protection of the military from politicians who would use their authority over it to enhance partisan interests and their own power\textsuperscript{173}.

In order to examine whether there has been any changes in the extent of direct military influence on the process of long-term defence planning, it is necessary to also analyse the extent of this in a period before the establishment of ISL. Chapter V will consequently examine The Chief of Defence Professional Military Review 2003 and Governmental Proposition no. 42 (2003-2004), while Chapter VI will discuss the Chief of Defence’s Defence Study 2007 and Governmental proposition no. 48 (2007-2008).

The following two chapters are structured in relatively similar ways and will both begin with an introduction to the documents under examination. Following that I will in the respective chapter’s review the Chief of Defence’s recommendations for \textit{operative structure} and \textit{base structures} within the different military branches, and examine to what extent these were incorporated in the recommendations given by the Norwegian Government in the governmental propositions. A great extent of accordance between the documents will arguably indicate an important degree of military influence, while restricted agreement might indicate limited military influence on the governmental proposition. The relationship between the political leadership in the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Defence illustrates the power relations between political and military spheres. Investigating the degree of military influence on the process of long-term defence planning consequently also allows for discussions over how Norwegian defence policy is constructed - and who decides what.

The long-term defence plan is one of the most important documents in the shaping of Norwegian defence policy. It is in the literature also argued that an examination of the planning processes provides good indications of the more general security and political debates\textsuperscript{174}. In addition to the thesis’ main research question I consequently also seek to

\textsuperscript{173} Bland (1999); Howard (1957)
\textsuperscript{174} Græger (2007)
discuss what these two processes of long-term defence planning indicates about the developments of the Norwegian armed forces and Norwegian defence policy more generally.

5.2. Introduction to the Documents – Focus and Perspectives

It has been argued that the reason for naming the document the Chief of Defence’s Professional Military Review 2003 (hereafter MFU 03)\(^\text{175}\), may be understood as an attempt to respond to some of the allegations raised in the debate on Defence Study 2000, were it was argued that the Chief of Defence had not given recommendations based on actual military considerations, but rather the expected defence budget\(^\text{176}\). The very fact that MFU was presented in December 2003, only three months prior to the presentation of governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) might however indicate that the Chief of Defence had in fact provided the Ministry with some of the initiative.

The process of MFU 03 began in autumn 2001\(^\text{177}\) and builds on, and continues the work and presuppositions for the future development of the Norwegian armed forces outlined in Defence Study 2000 (FS 2000), and governmental propositions no 45 (2001) and no 55 (2002)\(^\text{178}\). MFU 03 further builds on different reports and analyses undertaken within the organization of the NAF, and by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)\(^\text{179}\). As a part of the preparation for MFU 03, different sub-reviews on what was believed to be particularly relevant focus-areas were undertaken. These were according to the Chief of Defence imperative proposals, which in turn constituted a vital contribution to the recommendations given in the final report\(^\text{180}\). That a larger extent of the Norwegian armed forces were involved in the process of developing MFU 03 should perhaps also be understood as a response to another critique raised against the Defence Study 2000, namely that the process had

\(^{175}\) Rather that the Chief of Defence's Defence Study which had been, and has continued to be the practice in proceeding periods
\(^{176}\) Graeger (2007); pp 171
\(^{177}\) Danjord (2010); pp 39
\(^{178}\) Forsvarsjefens militærfaglige utreding 2003 (MFU 03) (2003); pp 1
\(^{179}\) MFU 03 (2003); pp 2
\(^{180}\) MFU 03 (2003); pp 2
not been inclusive enough\(^{181}\). One of the main purposes behind these sub-reviews consequently appears to be that any potential difference and disagreement between the respective military branches, the defence staff and civilian employees in the NAF are brought to light. And furthermore, to create a feeling of ownership to the final report within the broader part of the NAF’s organization\(^{182}\).

The final report (MFU 03) represents the Chief of Defence’s military view and recommendations of how the Norwegian armed forces should be organized and structured within the framework of the superior political guidelines provided for the report\(^{183}\). I argue that the very fact that relatively clear political guidelines were presented prior to the development of MFU 03 challenges the authenticity of the military advice as it limits the scope of what the Chief of Defence actually are able to recommend for the armed forces. The Minister of Defence describes for instance the operative requirements of the force structure and develops criteria’s for the prioritization of capacities\(^{184}\).

While I argue that it is both legitimate and indeed necessary that the Ministry of Defence provides descriptions of both the defence budgets and the overarching security and defence political objectives, I believe these guidelines to be too detailed and descriptive in terms of what she argues the military recommendation should be based on. When the political guidelines are as specific as they were here, this might influence the Chief of Defence’s professional military recommendations in the sense that the focus is drawn to how to meet the political requirements rather than what he, in his expert opinion, believes to be most important for the armed forces.

MFU 03 recommends a defence structure for 2008, which is argued to be an important step towards the long-term target image for the structure of the Norwegian armed

\(^{181}\) Ramberg (2010); pp 33  
\(^{182}\) Graeger (2007); pp 171  
\(^{183}\) The provisionally framework for MFU 03 was provided to the CoD by the Minister of Defence the 13th of February 2002, and the final guideline was given in 30th of October 2002 (Devold, Kristin Krohn. "Rammer for forsvarsjefens militærfaglige utredning", 2002), pp 9  
\(^{184}\) Devold, Kristin Krohn 'Rammer for forsvarsjefens militærfaglige utredning'. (Report, 30.10.2002); pp 5
forces, without, however, explicitly stating what he argues this goal to be\textsuperscript{185}. The Chief of Defence clarifies at the very beginning of MFU that concepts such as conflict organization and peace organization have been replaced by the concepts of respectively operative structure and logistics and support structure. This illustrates the importance of continuing to distance the future development of the NAF from the previous mobilization and invasion-based concept of defence. The focus on the importance of a development further away from the invasion-based concept towards an expeditionary force-based concept of defence is evident throughout the review. This change essentially represents the development of military units of high quality, characterized by the ability for fast and effective deployment at home and abroad\textsuperscript{186}.

Governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004)\textsuperscript{187} ‘Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005-2008’ was presented the 12\textsuperscript{th} of March 2004. The proposition begins with an outlining of the status of the reorganization process of the Norwegian armed forces, which it argues to be the most comprehensive in the history of the Norwegian public sector\textsuperscript{188}. It states that the reorganization so far has been successful, and that the Norwegian armed forces essentially are beginning to return from the serious crises, which provided the basis for the previous long-term defence plan.

Græger argues that ‘there is much to indicate that Norway’s defence politicians and military leadership did not consider it necessary to adapt the nation’s defence activities to a new external, post-Soviet ‘reality’\textsuperscript{189}. She further states that ‘this is not to say that they failed to acknowledge the altered threat picture, but rather that this was not seen

\textsuperscript{185} The recommendations in MFU 03 builds on seventeen different conflict scenarios, representing a range of different challenges potentially facing Norway and where military power could be an appropriate instrument to accomplish political aims and objectives. These scenarios were developed by the NAF and approved by the Ministry of Defence.

\textsuperscript{186} MFU 03 (2003), pp 4

\textsuperscript{187} A governmental proposition is conducted when the Norwegian government requests that the Storting passes resolutions on non-legislative recommendations.


\textsuperscript{189} Græger, Nina. ”Home and away?” Internationalism and territory in the post-1990 Norwegian defence discourse’. 2011; pp 4
in connection with the defence concept and the Norwegian defence structure. This argument is supported by the proposition’s sections on the background for the future development of the armed forces. Governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) states for instance that while the restructuring and modernization of the Norwegian armed forces have been significant, the altered threat image and the changes in the international climate have been far more comprehensive. It further acknowledges that there still are elements of the Norwegian defence discourse, which continues to be characterized by the old traditions, and it is emphasized that tomorrow’s challenges can not be solved by yesterday’s solutions. While not explicitly arguing for the Norwegian political representatives own responsibility for the slow progress of reforms, the proposition nevertheless recognizes the challenges continuously facing the Norwegian armed forces.

More generally, the proposition emphasises the importance of developing a modern and flexible system of defence, an available and applicable operative structure and stresses the importance of respectively the UN, NATO and EU. The proposition also discusses different initiatives in which the government seeks strengthen and continued - or implemented, in order to increase NATO’s operative capabilities.

The proposition discusses the role of the Norwegian armed forces as a security political instrument and the use of Norwegian military power. It states that the NAF is one of Norwegian political authorities’ most important instruments in attempts to secure and promote national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The very fact that the proposition refers to the Norwegian armed forces as one of its most important political instruments might to contemporaries seem unsurprising, but is nevertheless new in the Norwegian context. The static military-strategic situation during the cold war, and Norway’s geographical position lead to relative consensus on Norwegian foreign policy, which in turn also resulted in strong guiding principles for

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1. Ibid: pp 4
2. St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 12
3. St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 27
4. St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 9
Norwegian defence policy\textsuperscript{194}. The reference to the armed forces as a political instrument, consequently illustrates the articulated need of the development of a more active and indeed deliberate use of the armed forces to obtain political goals and objectives.

5.3. **Recommendations on Operative Structure**

5.3.1. *The Norwegian army*

The Chief of Defence recommends that the Norwegian Army be further developed with relevant and functional capacities and an ability to operate with other military branches and allies. The COD further emphasizes the necessity of developing a deployable structure for national and international assignments and purposes\textsuperscript{195}. This is also emphasized in the governmental proposition, which furthermore states that the majority of credible future security challenges ought to be solved, among others, through the presence and efforts of ground forces\textsuperscript{196}. It is further stated here that the experiences from Balkan have illustrated the importance of territorial control in providing stabilization and peace support. The proposition holds that because this is a type of operation in which Norway has what it characterizes as good traditions, this will also in the future be an area of priority\textsuperscript{197}. In the first paragraph on its recommended operative structure of the Norwegian army, the proposition consequently refers to its’ importance in international operations, which illustrates some of the changing political priorities for the Norwegian armed forces.

Even though the army is regarded as one of the most important capacities for the Norwegian armed forces in both MFU 03 and governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) both documents state that the most comprehensive investments and processes of modernization within the army ought to be, due to other pressing priorities, postponed to the next planning period (2009-2015). The recommendations proposed by the Chief

\textsuperscript{194} Neumann, Iver B. & Græger, Nina ‘Utenriksdepartementet og Forsvarende s e s b e l s t n i n g s p o l i t i s k e a k tører’ in Fonn, Neumann & Sending ‘Utenrikspolitisk praksis aktører og prosesser’ (2006); pp 72

\textsuperscript{195} MFU 03 (2003); pp 14

\textsuperscript{196} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 61-63

\textsuperscript{197} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 61
of Defence are consequently mainly a continuation of previous practices all of which are also proposed in the governmental proposition\textsuperscript{198}. The only new capacity in the recommended operative structure of the Norwegian army is the acquisition of an 
*Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance* (ISTAR) battalion.

Both MFU 03 and Governmental proposition 42 recommends that an ISTAR-unit should be established. ISTAR is a concept, which seeks to integrate and synchronize the appliance of sensors and information, intelligence and statements of measurement data in support of operations\textsuperscript{199}. The establishment of a modular ISTAR battalion appears to be an important investment for the Ministry of Defence as it is given much emphasis. The proposition states that the ISTAR battalion will function as a subassembly for the mechanized brigade (Brig N), and further emphasizes its’ importance in terms of being an area of priority within NATO. The focus on the unit’s significance in NATO is considerably more evident in the proposition than in MFU 03, which to a larger extent emphasises its importance in functioning as a support unit within the Norwegian armed forces\textsuperscript{200}. This is interesting at it illustrates that both MFU 03 and the governmental proposition state the necessity of an ISTAR battalion, but that the arguments for its establishment diverge in terms of emphasizing respectively its’ functionality and usefulness for the Norwegian Army, and its importance for coordination and cooperation among NATO allies. This may indicate that it is more important, or perhaps more rational, from a governmental perspective, to promote the acquisition of the ISTAR battalion because of its *security political* relevance and how it is a necessary capacity in order to be considered a ‘good ally’. The importance of NATO for both Norwegian foreign policy objectives and the development of the Norwegian armed forces is clearly evident in many of the recommendations articulated in the proposition and will be further discussed once more of these have been illustrated.

\textsuperscript{198} See Appendix 1
\textsuperscript{199} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 56
\textsuperscript{200} MFU 03 (2003); pp 15
5.3.2. The Royal Norwegian Air Force

In terms of the developments of the operative structure of the Royal Norwegian air force the professional military and the political recommendations are generally in great accordance. Both MFU 03 and the governmental proposition emphasizes that the air force’s capacities are required to be flexible and able to provide for fast and effective deployment at home and abroad\(^\text{201}\). Both documents furthermore also argue that the Norwegian air force main priority should be to provide combat air crafts and competence to lead combat air crafts operations nationally as well as internationally\(^\text{202}\).

Moreover, all of the Chief of Defence’s recommendations for the operative structure of the Royal Norwegian Air Force were also proposed in the governmental proposition\(^\text{203}\). Furthermore, the justifications for the different capacities of the operative structure were also more or less corresponding in the two documents, which illustrates that the military and political rationales also were in agreement of why the capacities were viewed as important.

One interesting divergence between the military and political recommendation for the operative structure of the Norwegian air force should however be noted. The Chief of Defence argues that the combat aircraft are given a force-multiplier by the acquisition of a MultiRole Transport- and Tanker aircraft (MRTT). In MFU 03 it is stated that considerations have been conducted over whether to aim for the NATO Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)-initiative within air-to-air tanking, or national abilities by acquiring the MRTT\(^\text{204}\). The COD argues that these considerations have led him to conclude that the potentials are greater by choosing the second alternative, i.e. by acquiring the MRTT.

The importance of air transport, in particular in the transfer of ground forces to meet requirements of supplies, is also emphasized in governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004)\(^\text{205}\). The proposition does not, however, discuss what from the military

\(^\text{201}\) MFU 03 (2003); pp 18; St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 65-66
\(^\text{202}\) MFU 03 (2003); pp 18; St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 66
\(^\text{203}\) See appendix I
\(^\text{204}\) MFU 03 (2003); pp 19
\(^\text{205}\) St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 66
perspective had been argued to be a documented need of the MRTT\textsuperscript{206}. While the Chief of Defence stated that in order to support deployable forces in the Norwegian armed forces it is not sufficient to cover the strategic air transport through PCC, the governmental proposition on the other hand, states that PCC-initiative provides increased capacities of air-to-air tanking which in turn increases the reach and endurance of other aircrafts, and enables for greater protection\textsuperscript{207}. As the Chief of Defence also emphasizes that it despite documented needs is not possible to acquire the MRTT until after 2014\textsuperscript{208}, it cannot in fact be argued that the Ministry of Defence did not follow the professional military recommendations as it per definition reaches beyond the planning period. This nevertheless once again illustrates the importance of NATO. More over, the proposition contains no reference to what from the military point of view was argued to be a crucial. The proposition also states that the Norwegian government will continue to prioritize multi-national PCC-measures, which indicates that the military recommendation of an MRTT presumably not will be prioritized in the foreseeable future. The importance of continuing the NATO’s PCC initiative should also be understood in relation to the political guidelines, which stated that, the developments of the Norwegian armed forces operative structure should be undertaken in line with NATO’s capability requirements\textsuperscript{209}. Further more the PCC is one of the initiatives, which the Norwegian government sought, strengthened in order to increase NATO’s operative capabilities\textsuperscript{210}.

5.3.3. The Royal Norwegian Navy

MFU 03 outlines that the operative structure of the Royal Norwegian Navy is characterized by its ability for continuous peace operative assignments in addition to international commitments and responsibilities\textsuperscript{211}.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{206}MFU 03 (2003); pp 19
\textsuperscript{207}St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 66
\textsuperscript{208}MFU 03 (2003-2004); pp 19
\textsuperscript{209}Devold, Kristin Krohn ‘Rammer for forsvarssjefens militærerfaglige utredning’. (Report, 30.10.2002); pp 4
\textsuperscript{210}St.prp.nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 27
\textsuperscript{211}MFU 03 (2003); pp 16-18
\end{flushright}
According to the Chief of Defence the frigate-weapon is the highest prioritized joint operational combat element in the Royal Norwegian Navy, and he recommends the phasing of five new frigates. He states that this will lead to an increased ability of deploying frigates in multinational naval operations which further means that the most challenging competence requirements will be established by the end of 2008. The logistics-and support vessel KNM Horten’s relevance should according to the Chief of Defence be considered in relation to the obtainment of the five new frigates and is consequently, based on a cost-effective assessment, recommended closed down at the latest in 2008.

The importance of the Fridtjof Nansen frigates is also stressed in the governmental proposition, which furthermore argues that it will represent a flexible capacity, relevant to all types of operations at sea – nationally and internationally\textsuperscript{212}. The proposition does not, however, recommend the closing down of KNM Horten. Based on the political guidelines provided prior to the development of MFU it is unexpected that the proposition does not recommend the closing down of KNM Horten, or indeed contains any reference to it. The political guidelines emphasised that the importance of cost-effectiveness should be prioritized in every aspect of the Norwegian armed forces’ activities. The Chief of Defence accounted for this in his recommendation – the civilian authorities did not. That the governmental proposition did not recommend the closing down of KNM Horten is also unexpected considering that the Storting already in 2001 had decided on its’ closure\textsuperscript{213}.

The Chief of Defence further recommends the introduction of six motor torpedo boats (MTBs), Skjold-class by 2008. In relation to the establishment of Skjold-class MTBs, the CoD suggest the phasing out and reduction of the Hauk-class by 2010. The recommendation of the six MTBs are also outlined in the governmental proposition which states that the Skjold-class presents a completely new capacity, with an included

\textsuperscript{212} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 64
effectiveness in which no other vessels of this type possess. The proposition too, argues for the need of phasing out the Hauk-class.

5.3.4. The Home Guard

The Chief of Defence writes in MFU 03 that a changing threat image and a significant reduction of the mobilizing-defence in its traditional form, is the main reason for the subsequent design of the home guards future assignments, organization and activities. The COD states that it, in line with the Parliament’s resolutions and the political guidelines provided prior to the development of MFU, is recommended a quality reform in the home guard. The reform will entail a focus on the home guard’s support functions in the war on terror and other asymmetrical threats, and additionally contribute to the protection of other vital societal functions. As a result of this, he recommends that the operative structure of the home guard consist of a total of 50 000. One of the main purposes of the quality reform is according to the Chief of Defence to increase the flexibility and accessibility of the home guard. He further argues for the necessity of accordance between the Chief of Defence’s formal ability to convene home guard departments and the level of protection expected by society. The Chief of Defence argues that this is particularly relevant in situations where the missions have to be resolved through longer periods of time. The COD states that in order not to charge the individual home guard soldier, districts and corporations unnecessary a prerequisite would be the ability of dispose the home guard beyond areal-, sectional-, and regional boarders. Based on these arguments the Chief of Defence recommends a reassessment of home guard regulations.

As both the political guidelines and the Parliament’s resolution had emphasized the need of a quality reform in the Norwegian home guard, it is not particularly surprising that also the governmental proposition recommends this. The proposition also recommends that the home guard be divided into the three categories

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214 St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 64
215 MFU 03 (2003); pp 20
216 MFU 03 (2003); pp 21
217 MFU 03 (2003); pp 21
218 MFU 03 (2003); pp 20
recommended by the Chief of Defence and that the total operative personnel structure ought to be reduced to 50 000. The proposition additionally, however, recommends that the home guard ought to possess a number of 30 000 in reserve personnel in order to keep the operative personnel available\textsuperscript{219}. The Chief of Defence on the other hand, does not articulate this recommendation. While the proposition states the need of a revaluation of the legal authoritative basis of calling out the home guard, the proposition does not elaborate on whether to change the home guard regulations\textsuperscript{220}. Furthermore, the COD’s emphasis on accordance between his formal ability to convene home guard departments and society’s expected level of protection is not mentioned in the proposition.

Civil-military relations theory emphasise the importance of the democratically elected representatives making the final decisions related to the use and deployment of the armed forces - in order to maintain civilian control and good civil-military relations. Based on the thesis’ theoretical framework, it is viewed as sensible of the Ministry of Defence not to provide the Chief of Defence with an increased ability to convene the home guard. While the proposed argument of better formal access of convening the home guard not necessarily is related to the use of force per se, the fact that this recommendation is not even mentioned in the proposition might indicate the importance of keeping such decisions under overall political supervision and authority.

As these sections have demonstrated there were a great accordance between the operative structures recommended by the Chief of Defence and those recommended by the Ministry of Defence in the governmental proposition. With the exception of the closing down of KNM Horten and the recommendation of a project for continuing producing a smaller number of mines all of the Chief of Defence’s recommendations were also incorporated in the Ministry of Defence’s recommendations to the Parliament. Furthermore, by examining these documents in isolation it appears that the theoretically defined relationship between ‘the expert and the generalist’ is considered

\textsuperscript{219} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 59, See appendix 1 for details
\textsuperscript{220} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 59
satisfactory, as the recommended operative structures in the Norwegian armed forces seem to be based on a very sensible deference to military expertise.

When also accounting for the political guidelines provided prior to the development of MFU 03, however, this assumption ought to be somewhat modified. I have argued that the fact that relatively clear and detailed political guidelines were provided to the Chief of Defence prior to the development of his professional military recommendation challenges the authenticity of the military advice as it limits the scope of what sort of recommendations he can actually make. Or as Samuel Huntington argues that some efforts to enhance civilian control can in fact undermine the military to be an effective fighting force.\(^\text{221}\)

The accordance between the documents should consequently also be understood in terms of the already articulated political priorities in which the Chief of Defence to a large extent followed. The essential question is thus whether the Chief of Defence recommendations were in fact what he believed to be the most important for the Norwegian armed forces or rather an attempt to fulfil what the civilian authorities had already defined as the most important requirements for the Norwegian armed forces. As previously illustrated, the Chief of Defence’s Defence Study 2000 was critiqued for being based on the expected defence budgets rather than the military needs and requirements of the armed forces. If the assumption that the Chief of Defence military recommendations to an important extent were based on the political guidelines some of the same type of critiques can consequently also be raised towards MFU 03.

5.4. **Recommendations on Base Structures**

5.4.1. **Introduction to the new concept of logistics and support**

While it is not the purpose of the thesis to discuss this concept of logistics and support in great detail, it is appropriate to briefly note its’ most important characteristics as its very establishment has consequences for the COD’s recommended base structures which will be discussed in the proceeding sections.

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\(^{221}\) Huntington (1957)
The argument for the development of the new concept of logistics and support was ultimately the need to strike a balance between structural elements and logistical capacities and possibilities. The Chief of Defence states that integration and coordination between operative capabilities and the opportunity for support are a significant criterion of success in every military operation\textsuperscript{222}. The main features of the development of the Norwegian armed forces’ logistical resources would up until 2008 consequently entail changes providing for increased access to logistical resources in order to secure fast reactivity, deployability, and endurance for the operative structure\textsuperscript{223}.

The development of the new concept of logistics and support is undoubtedly also closely related to the political guidelines’ emphasis on the importance of an increased ability to encounter the Norwegian armed forces’ collective tasks and functions and of the closer collaboration and integration between the respective military branches\textsuperscript{224}.

The new concept results in changes and consequences for the command structure, the highest strategic military leadership and the different educational and training institutions. The proceeding sections will however, as previously emphasized, only examine and discuss how the concept influences the recommendations for base structures in the Norwegian Army, the Royal Norwegian Air Force, Royal Norwegian Navy and the Home Guard.

5.4.2. The Norwegian Army

The Chief of Defence argues that the processes of reducing the force-producers span of control will be continued. For the Norwegian army this means the establishment of two organizational elements: the Norwegian army’s forces (HSTY) and the Norwegian Army’s transformation and doctrine command (TRADOK). As a result of the establishment of these two organizational elements some departments/bases are recommended formally closed down, these will nevertheless be continued within the

\textsuperscript{222} MFU 03 (2003); pp 21
\textsuperscript{223} MFU 03 (2003); pp 21
\textsuperscript{224} Devold, Kristin Krohn ‘Rammer for forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning’. (Report, 30.10.2002); pp 2
new structure\textsuperscript{225}. The governmental proposition also recommends a reorganization of the Norwegian army. Like MFU 03, governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) argues that the army’s operative force production and competence activities should be organized into HSTY and TRADOK. Also in the proposition the main reason for this reorganization is argued to be to strengthen the army’s operative capabilities\textsuperscript{226}.

5.4.3. The Royal Norwegian Air Force

Overall there is a significant degree of resemblance between the recommendations on the base structures of the air force articulated by the Chief of Defence and those proposed by the Ministry of Defence. The governmental proposition follows almost all of the Chief of Defence recommendations on the respective continuations, closures or mergers of bases\textsuperscript{227}, except from his recommendations of closing-down Gardermoen.

The Chief of Defence argues that the closing of Gardermoen air force base is not necessarily economically justified in the short term, but is nevertheless recommended conducted, as it will contribute to an amalgamation of the air force expertise and operative environments\textsuperscript{228}. The COD do however emphasize that the closing-down of Gardermoen air force base will be economically justified within a period of 20 years. It should perhaps be expected that a recommendation, which is not economically justified within the next two decades, would not be viewed as politically reasonable or indeed justified. That the governmental proposition does not follow this particular recommendation should consequently not be seen as challenging the military expertise. What I however do argue challenge the relationship between the generalist and the expert is that the proposition argues that Gardermoen air force base will be upheld and indeed reinforced because of its’ significance for the Norwegian armed forces\textsuperscript{229}. This argued significance is on the other hand one in which the Chief of Defence argues that the base does no longer possess. This is consequently probably an

\textsuperscript{225} MFU 03 (2003); pp 33
\textsuperscript{226} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 94
\textsuperscript{227} See appendix II
\textsuperscript{228} MFU 03 (2003); pp 35
\textsuperscript{229} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 97
indication of other political objectives and priorities than those of the armed forces becoming dominant for some of its developments.

5.4.4. The Royal Norwegian Navy

The Chief of Defence recommends the continuation of the comprehensive restructurings of the base structures in the Royal Norwegian Navy, which started during the previous LTDP period. While governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) also recommends the continuation of the process of restructuring beginning during the last period, the two documents are generally not in accordance in terms of the recommended base structure for the Royal Norwegian Navy. The Chief of Defence’s recommendation on closing down the bases in Åsegården and Evenes is neither discussed nor recommended in the proposition. While the proposition do stress the importance of the allied training-centres and especially the one in Northern Norway the Chief of Defence’s recommended conversion of allied training centre-North is not articulated in the proposition.

The Chief of Defence’s states that his recommended measure of closing-down the officer candidate school in Horten and continuing the officer and NCO training at Haakonsvern is both rationale in terms of concentrating the professional competence, but also that it will provide an improved present value of 303 million NOK and is further positive/profitable already in the period from 2005-2008. Despite the economic justifications the proposition states that the basic officer candidate training will continue in Horten, this being an important recruitment portal in Eastern Norway. Because concentrating the NCO training at Haakonsvern is argued to represent significant economical savings already within the preceding long-term period, the reason for why the Ministry of Defence did not follow the Chief of Defence recommendation must consequently be based on other than economical considerations. Græger has found that the regional policies’ integration in Norwegian defence policy

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230 MFU 03 (2003); pp 34
231 St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 71
232 See appendix II
233 MFU 03 (2003); pp 34
234 St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 96
has led to the establishment of a practice – a mutual, implicit understanding – that regional political arguments are indeed valid in the defence political discourse. If this assumption is correct, the Ministry of Defence’s recommendation on continuing the officer candidate school in Horten may consequently be an indication of *regional* political priorities rather than its stated importance in the Norwegian armed forces. This assumption is in turn also strengthened by the recommendation of the continuation of KNM Horten discussed earlier.

5.4.5. The Home Guard

The Chief Of Defence states that in order for the home guard to maintain an operative structure which satisfies the need of its’ operative and territorial assignments, it will be necessary to reduce expenses related to leadership, force production, and base structures. Based on his recommended quality reform in the home guard, and the attempt to concentrate and increase efficiency in the Norwegian armed forces through the introduction of the new concept of logistics and support, the Chief of Defence’s recommends a reduction of the quantity of home guard districts from 18 to 12. He also states that the restructuring of the home guard is very comprehensive and consequently recommended carried out through different phases.

Governmental proposition no 42 also emphasizes that the Ministry of Defence’s recommended base structure is necessary in order to finance the recommend quality reform in the Norwegian home guard. The governmental proposition and MFU are furthermore in accordance in terms of arguing for the need of reducing the quantity of home guard districts from 18 to 12, and the proposition recommends continuation, merging or establishment of the same bases as the Chief of Defence. The number of the recommended closure of bases is, however, less in the proposition than in MFU. The proposition also provides stronger emphasis on the reasons for the recommended

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235 Graeger (2007); pp 296
236 MFU 03 (2003); pp 35
237 MFU 03 (2003); pp 36
238 St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 99
239 Appendix II
240 Unlike MFU the proposition does not recommend the closing down of bases in Kongsvinger, Heistadmoen and Mosjøen (St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 99) See appendix II
base structure than MFU\textsuperscript{241}. This is presumably because also the reduction of the quantity of home guard districts might result in regional policy implications and consequently need to be considerably justified and argued for from political representatives.

As these sections and the appendices illustrates the Chief of Defence’s direct influence on the recommendations for base structures were less significant than those on operative structures. While some of the Chief of Defence’s recommendations on base structures also were proposed in governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) his recommendation of closing-down respectively Gardermoen, Åsegården, Evenes and the officer candidate school in Horten were not followed. Further more, the quantity of recommended closed-down bases for the Norwegian guard (Konsvinger, Heistadmoen and Mosjøen) was less in the proposition than in MFU 03. The possible explanations and consequences of this will be further discussed in the chapter’s last section.

5.5. **The Relationship Between the Generalist and the Expert: A Preliminary Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the last process of long-term defence planning before the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership. I have done this in order to analyse what characterized this process both in terms of the defence and security political developments, the general state of civil-military relations and most importantly the degree of military political influence on the process.

The first part of the chapter provided for an introduction to the documents under review. It illustrated that the process of MFU 03 involved more people than the previous defence study, which had been critiqued for being non-inclusive. Prior to the development of the final MFU report numerous sub-reviews were undertaken, arguably in an attempt to bring any potential differences within the organization of the Norwegian armed forces to light and to create a feeling of ownership to the final report within a broader part of the organization. A study of the discussions within the

\textsuperscript{241} St.prp. nr 42 (2003-2004); pp 99-103, MFU 03 (2003); pp 35-36
respective military branches and within the organization of the Norwegian armed forces after MFU 03 was presented would have enabled for indications of whether this actually turned out to be the case. These sections also discussed the reference to the Norwegian armed forces as the government’s most important tool in securing and promoting national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The second part of the chapter examined the accordance between MFU 03 and governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) in an attempt to analyse the degree of direct military influence on the development of the armed forces’ top management. I argued here that when only examining these two documents it appears that the Chief of Defence had a significant degree of influence as more or less all of his recommendations were kept in the subsequent governmental proposition. Based on studying these two documents in isolation one could consequently argue that the sensible deference to military expertise was very much practiced and that the relationship between the generalist in the expert appeared to be very well balanced. I also held, however, that when also accounting for the political guidelines provided prior to the development of the professional military recommendations this assumption ought to be modified. I argue that the fact that clear and relatively specific political guidelines was provided to the Chief of Defence before the development of MFU 03 challenges the legitimacy of his military professional recommendation. This is because becomes increasingly difficult to assess what should be considered a genuine military advice and what should be understood in terms of simply satisfying the already political requirements provided.

In terms of what MFU 03 and governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) illustrate about more general priorities in Norwegian defence policies, I argue that there in essence are two broad tendencies. First, both the military and the political recommendations emphasise the importance of developing a better balance between structure, activities and resources. Furthermore, in both document’s recommendations for the operative structures of the respective military branches it is significantly emphasized that the capacities should be flexible, effective and have the ability for fast deployment. The importance of these elements further illustrates that the Norwegian
defence policy was moving even further away from an invasion-based concept of defence. Further and perhaps most importantly it shows the strengthened effort to develop the armed forces’ importance and contribution to international operations. These tendencies do not represent a challenge to the degree of military influence in itself as these tendencies are present both in the political and the military recommendations. What they however do indicate is rather the increased need to develop the Norwegian armed forces into a relevant and flexible foreign policy instrument. In this sense, I will argue that the focus on international operations is just as much an expression of Norway’s foreign political objectives as it is a characterization of Norwegian defence policies.

Secondly, the recommendations for operative structure in both MFU 03 and the governmental proposition illustrate the continued importance of NATO both in terms of how this is articulated explicitly, and because many of the recommended capacities are argued for in terms of their importance to and for NATO. The importance of NATO both in general and for Norwegian security policy is however increasingly being challenged. Jacob Børresen for instance argues that it is precarious that the Norwegian government continues to base such a large extent of the Norwegian defence policy on its relevance for NATO as he argues that NATO’s security guarantee towards Norway has decreased. He further states that the only way in which Norway can fulfil NATO’s quality requirements is by a reduction of the quantity of forces. This might in turn, according to Børresen, mean that Norway in the future will have a force structure not capable of operating independently or without allied reinforcements. Græger also emphasises that despite the fact that NATO is struggling to survive as a relevant security organization the justification’s of ‘Norway’s participation in NATO operations and in NATO transformation has to a large extent remained the same and that there has been few principals debates about the impact of these events for the course of Norwegian security and defence policy’.

242 Børresen (2005); pp 85-86
243 Græger, Nina. 'Norway between NATOm the EU and the US: A Case Study of Post-Cold War Security and Defence Discourse', 2005; pp 85-86
I would argue that the continued importance of NATO should be seen mainly as representing a political and particularly foreign political objective. While the Norwegian armed forces as it is structured today is ultimately dependent on the guarantee of its’ alliances this is also related to, as demonstrated in these sections, how the civilian authorities prioritize the developments in - and of - the armed forces. The continued efforts to meet the requirements of an ‘alliance which is struggling to survive’ may within a long-term perspective result in a weakened armed force which in the worst-case scenario clearly also pose a challenge to Norwegian security.

The third part of the chapter reviewed its most important findings in the study of the military versus political recommendations on the development of the respective base structures in the Norwegian military branches. This in turn indicated that there was less accordance between MFU 03 and governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) in terms of these recommendations than those concerned with the operative structure. I argue that the indication that the Chief of Defence appeared to meet more challenges in his recommendations on base structures and consequently has two possible and perhaps equally plausible explanations. First, I argue that the somewhat restrained influence on the recommendations on base structure might be explained by how any changes in base structure tend to be particularly domestically sensitive and indeed fragile. Many communities are highly dependent on the military bases and the closing-down or merging of bases tends to result in a domestically political turmoil. If the assumption that the Chief of Defence’s less significant degree of influence on base structure can be explained by other political (or economical) priorities taking prejudice over military considerations and recommendations these findings will provide leverage for this assumption. More over if this assumption is correct it also poses challenges related to civil-military relations in general, as it would be an example of Norwegian civilian authorities enhancing their partisan interests of the armed forces in order to meet other political requirements and objectives.244.

244 Bland (1999); pp 13
Secondly, that the Chief of Defence’s recommendations on base structures had less impact on the governmental proposition might also be explained by how the base structures were not discussed in the political guidelines provided prior to the report. Because the Chief of Defence’s recommended base structure was not discussed in the political guidelines it seems plausible that the Chief of Defence’s recommendations within this area to a larger extent was based on more professional military perceptions of the argued most important developments. If this assumption is correct, the less significant accordance between MFU 03 and governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) on the recommended base structure provides leverage for the argument that the Chief of Defence’s significant influence on operative structures perhaps should be understood in terms of the already articulated political priorities and requirements.

When studying the last long-term defence process before the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership it consequently becomes evident that also this process was in fact also relatively ‘integrated’. This in itself poses challenges to both civil-military relations in general and the relationship between the expert and the generalist in particular, as it becomes increasingly difficult to assess what can be argued to be the military recommendation or viewpoint and what is largely meant to fulfil political requirements. The essential question in this context is thus who will provide for the military expertise when the Chief of Defence’s recommendations, at least to some extent, in essence appears to be an extension of politics? This in turn also challenges the theory of civil-military relations’ emphasis on how the military’s participation in developing the state’s defence policies should be based on military needs and requirements and not political considerations.245

The next chapter will analyze the extent of the Chief of Defence’s influence on the first LTDP-process after the establishment of ISL and consequently also allow for the comparative analysis of the similarities and divergences between these two processes.

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245 See for instance Huntington (1957)
6. The first LTDP-process after the establishment of ISL and the extent of military political influence

6.1. Introduction

The establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership in 2003 has resulted in numerous political and public debates\(^{246}\). According to the literature this reorganization in the Norwegian defence sector diverges from the overall structures of Norwegian public management, where one have seen increased separations between ministries and its respective directorates\(^{247}\). Further more, it is also often argued that how the formal structures between political and military leadership is organized in Norway historically have influenced its’ civil-military relations\(^{248}\).

The purpose of the chapter is to review the last process of long-term defence planning in Norway by outlining the thesis’ most important findings in its’ examination of the Chief of Defence’s Defence Study 2007 (hereafter FS 07) and Governmental Proposition no 48 (2007-2008). The subsequent LTDP process represents a period after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership. The research findings within this period will consequently allow for an assessment of whether, or to what extent, the LTDP-processes before and after the establishment of ISL significantly fluctuates. Further, and more importantly, it will allow for an analysis of whether the Chief of Defence’s influence on the LTDP-process appears to have changed after the establishment of ISL, which one based on the academic literature and recent debates might expect.

The preceding chapter compared and analysed the accordance between the Chief of Defence’s Professional Military Review 2003 and governmental proposition no 42

\(^{247}\) Tranøy & Østerud (2001), Grønlie & Flo (2009), Ramberg (2010)
\(^{248}\) Bjerga in Dyndal (ed), (2010); Græger (2007)
(2003-2004). I argued here that while the influence of the Chief of Defence appeared significant when studying the these two documents in isolation, this assumption had to be modified when also accounting for the political guidelines provided prior to the development of MFU 03. I also argued that the fact that relatively strong political guidelines were articulated before the Chief of Defence began developing his military professional recommendations may challenge civil-military relations in two important ways. First, because the political guidelines arguably limited the scope of what recommendations the Chief of Defence actually could make. And perhaps most important, because the political guidelines made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between what the Chief of Defence’s professional military recommendations actually were and what should rather be seen as an attempt to satisfy political requirements or indeed even as an extension of politics.

As previously outlined, this chapter will be structured similarly to the preceding and will consequently begin with an introduction to the documents under examination here. It will also however, discuss the continued importance of military conscription in Norway, which I argue pose challenges to civil-military relations both from a theoretical and practical perspective. The chapter will continue by reviewing the Chief of Defence’s recommendations on the development of operative and base structures in the NAF and discuss the accordance between FS 07 and governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) throughout. In addition to assessing the degree of military influence on the governmental proposition, the chapter will also discuss what the examination of the documents indicated about the developments of both the Norwegian armed forces and Norwegian defence policy.

6.2. Introduction to the documents – Focus and Perspectives

The process of FS 07 began in January 2006\textsuperscript{249} and was delivered to the Minister of Defence 5\textsuperscript{th} of November 2007\textsuperscript{250}. Unlike during the previous LTDP-process reviewed, the COD’s professional military recommendation was within this period named the

\textsuperscript{249} Danjord (2010); pp 44
\textsuperscript{250} Statement, by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (05.11.2007)
Chief of Defence’s defence study\textsuperscript{251}. FS 07 is the Chief of Defence recommendation on the development of the Norwegian armed forces within a perspective of twenty years, but the main emphasis is nevertheless on the recommended development in the period from 2009-2012\textsuperscript{252}.

The methodology of FS 07 is similar to the one of MFU 03 and builds on different possible conflict scenarios in and for Norway, developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the Intelligence Service. The Chief of Defence states that these scenarios reflected that the greatest security political challenges for Norway are still found in the northern areas\textsuperscript{253}. It also emphasizes that military conflict in Norway or Norwegian localities in the foreseeable future - will be radically different than those prepared for during the cold war, and be a result of far less regional political controversies\textsuperscript{254}. The focus on the continuously decreasing importance of territorial occupation or force demonstration is interesting as it also within this LTDP period illustrates the continued effort to distance the development of Norwegian armed forces from the Cold War rhetoric. It is nevertheless somewhat surprising that the Chief of Defence finds it required to state explicitly that the changing threat image influences the future development of the NAF almost two decades after the end of the Cold War, and after significant and continuous restructurings of and within the armed forces. This may indicate an attempt to signify and emphasise that the processes of professionalization and modernization were far from completed.

FS 07 builds on the framework and the main propositions outlined in the most recent long-term defence plans. It appears that the main objectives of FS 07 are to continue the development of an expeditionary force-based defence concept with relevant operative capabilities, and further more to develop an armed force in a long-term structural, and economical balance. The overall focus and emphasis is consequently similar to those expressed by the former Chief of Defence in MFU 03. FS 07 further

\textsuperscript{251} Which had also been the practice in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000. The only defence study named the Chief of Defence’s Professional Military Review was the one in 2003 (MFU 03).
\textsuperscript{252} The Chief of Defence’s Defence Study 2007 (FS 07); pp 3
\textsuperscript{253} FS 07 (2007); pp 5
\textsuperscript{254} FS 07 (2007); pp 6
recommends an operative structure which mainly is a continuation of the existing capabilities, yet with some exceptions, the most important of these being; the shutting-down of the MTB-weapons, that the home guard be reduced by 20 000 men, and that the two educational battalions of the Norwegian army in Northern Norway be replaced by one standing battalion with mainly recruited manning.

The Chief Of Defence argues that the situation of the Norwegian armed forces is characterized by many of the same challenges typifying all the defence studies after the cold war; an imbalance between the required structure and the defence budgets. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union ‘Norway’s defence apparatus was confronted with major financial challenges due to its large mobilizing army, number of permanent military installations and outdated defence materiel in need of replacement’. The economical situation, often referred to as more of a crisis, was characterized by a dual imbalance; first, between the adopted budgets and defence plans; and second, between the new tasks required of the Norwegian military and has remained more or less a persistent challenge for the development of the Norwegian armed forces.

The Chief of Defence states in his preface that Norway spends around 31 billion NOK on its’ armed forces. He emphasizes that this is obviously a significant contribution, which in turn do provide for an adequate system of defence, given that this level is maintained and the defence budgets are adjusted to the contemporary level of purchasing power. The Chief of Defence states that should political representatives continue a budget of declining purchasing power; this will obviously be a legitimate political decision. He also stresses that if a down-prioritization of the Norwegian armed forces proves to be the political decision, it is not the Norwegian armed forces

255 FS 07 (2007); pp 7
257 Ibid; pp 5
258 NOU (2000); Godal, Bjørn Tore; 'Utsikter' (2003); Diesen, Sverre: 'Forsvarets Utfordringer' (Lecture at Oslo Militære Samfund 2006); 'Status og Utfordringer i Forsvaret' (Lecture at Oslo Militære Samfund 2007); 'Fornyelse eller Forvitting? Forsvaret mot 2020' (2011); pp 31-33 and 113-118
259 FS 07 (2007); pp 3
who according to him ‘has to survive on less financial support’\textsuperscript{260}, but rather ‘the Norwegian society’s decision to manage with a decreased armed force and consequently also a decreased level of security’\textsuperscript{261}. The Chief of Defence is further stating that it is his job to inform about the potential consequences of different political decisions\textsuperscript{262} but that the quality of the Norwegian armed forces will be based the quantity of defence budgets which he argues essentially represents a political prioritization of what level of security is considered satisfactory.

Governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) ‘\textit{Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet og verdier}’ was presented to the Norwegian Parliament the 28\textsuperscript{th} of March 2008. The focus on Norwegian interests and in particular values is very perceptible in the proposition’s first chapters and is indeed also incorporated in its’ title. The proposition states for instance that Norway needs an armed force which is capable of maintaining the timeless responsibilities of preserving security for the state, its’ people and society. Norwegian security and defence policy must further more, according to the proposition, be based on those values and interests Norway seeks to secure\textsuperscript{263}. Moskos et al, argues that the new ambiguous nature of many threats challenges the status of the military in society, and that when one cannot identify a clear enemy, it is more difficult to generate popular support for the armed forces and military expenditures\textsuperscript{264}. It may consequently seem very plausible that the proposition’s focus on interests and values, and its accentuation of how that the armed forces will be used (among others) in ‘efforts to secure international peace and security and for humanitarian purposes’\textsuperscript{265} is an attempt to generate popular support for the armed forces in a nation seeking to maintain its self-image as a ‘peace nation’ or indeed as a ‘humanitarian superpower’\textsuperscript{266}.

\textsuperscript{260} FS 07 (2007); pp 12
\textsuperscript{261} FS 07 (2007); pp 12
\textsuperscript{262} FS 07 (2007); pp 12
\textsuperscript{264} Moskos et al (2000); pp 265-267
\textsuperscript{265} St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 10
\textsuperscript{266} The term was first introduced in Norges Offentlige Utredninger (2003) ‘\textit{Makt og Demokrati nr 19}’; pp 51. See also the NUPI Report; Leira, Halvard (ed). ‘\textit{Norske selvbilder og norsk utenrikspolitikk}’ 2007.
Further more the proposition states that in the ambition to maintain international peace and security, both political and humanitarian means and methods is required\textsuperscript{267}. This should in turn be understood in relation to the introduction of concepts such as NATO’s \textit{Comprehensive Approach}\textsuperscript{268}. While any detailed discussions of the comprehensive approach reaches beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to stress its’ importance both in contemporary international peace building - or support operations, and for the developments in Norwegian defence policy and Norwegian participation in these operations. The adoption of the comprehensive approach ‘reflects the lessons learned by the Alliance in the Balkans and Afghanistan that it cannot win the peace alone even if it conducts a textbook military operation’\textsuperscript{269}. It is about the idea that ‘in addition to military security, sustainable peace also requires development, good governance, rule of law and local ownership’\textsuperscript{270}. The increased need to involve both private sectors, NGOs, local communities and host governments in any attempt to obtain sustainable peace consequently is also an important element of civil-military relations namely that of the cooperation and relations between civilian and military actors within conflicts and in international operations.

While FS 07 emphasized the need of establishing a better balance between the defence structure and the defence budgets\textsuperscript{271}, the proposition emphasises how the restructuring and modernization of the Norwegian armed forces have created a better balance between the Norwegian armed forces’ assignments and structure, and the level of resources\textsuperscript{272}. This might illustrate a simple different emphasis in the documents, or as I will argue, somewhat different perceptions of the status and indeed the required needs of the Norwegian armed forces. The Chief of Defence emphasis on adjusting the defence budgets to the contemporary levels of purchasing power is nevertheless also articulated in the governmental proposition\textsuperscript{273}. This could indicate that the Norwegian

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{267} St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 9-10
\textsuperscript{268} The UN and the EU has similar approaches (Integrated Missions and the Whole-of-government approach)
\textsuperscript{269} Jacobsen, Peter Viggo. \textit{‘Right Strategy, Wrong Place - Why NATO’s comprehensive approach will fail in Afghanistan’}; 2010; pp 79
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid
\textsuperscript{271} FS 07 (2003); pp 3
\textsuperscript{272} St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 11
\textsuperscript{273} St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 45-46
\end{flushleft}
The armed forces could begin recouping from the crises characterizing the NAF during the 1990s and early 21st century where the structures passed by the Storting was greater that the defence budgets provided\textsuperscript{274} and which, according to the Chief of Defence, resulted in an armed force which looked much better on paper than it was in practice or in more populist terms – a classic ‘paper tiger’\textsuperscript{275}.

The proposition, like FS 07, also holds that the government seeks to further develop a modern and flexible effort-based defence, which can maintain Norway’s security, interests and values within a holistic and long-term perspective\textsuperscript{276}. The challenges currently facing NATO, or at least Norway’s relationship with the U.S, appears nevertheless to be more discussed and indeed acknowledged in governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) than in the preceding\textsuperscript{277}. This should probably be understood in relations to the many challenges related to the ISAF-operation in Afghanistan. The importance of NATO is nevertheless still extensively articulated in both the governmental proposition and in FS 07\textsuperscript{278} and is also within these documents, as in the preceding, reflected in the recommendations for both operative and base structures.

\textbf{6.2.1. The Continued Importance of Military Conscription}

Morris Janowitz argues that the military and society form an organic whole that should not be torn apart, and that it is dangerous to treat the military as an institution that does not form a part of society or to alienate the military from society\textsuperscript{279}. Janowitz held that the professional socialization of the military through its relationship with and sympathy for the values of the society serves and ensures civilian control over the armed forces\textsuperscript{280}. Samuel Huntington, on the other hand argued that the ‘essence of [objective] civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military

\textsuperscript{274} Ulriksen (2005); pp 271
\textsuperscript{275} Diesen, (2011); pp 12
\textsuperscript{276} St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 10
\textsuperscript{277} St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 29
\textsuperscript{278} FS 07 (2007); pp 3
\textsuperscript{279} Janowitz, Morris in Maigre (2009); pp 3
\textsuperscript{280} Janowitz (1960;pp 420) in Cottey et al (2002) pp 33
and that ‘objective civilian control achieves its’ end by militarizing the military, making it a tool of the state, as opposed to subjective control that seeks to civilize the military making it mirror the state. What is however less discussed within the theories of civil-military relations is what happens when the civilian authorities attempt to exercise a combination of both objective and subjective civilian control, which I argue appears to be the case in contemporary Norway.

Also in governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) the reference to the Norwegian armed forces as a security political instrument is significantly emphasized. What is also, however emphasized is the importance of military conscription. In the tradition and history of Norwegian defence, the close relationship between the armed forces and the Norwegian people has always been imperative, military conscription being one of its most important foundations. The continuation of military conscription is expressed in both documents, however for somewhat different reasons. FS 07 argues for its continued importance in the NAF because of the conscription’s crucial role in the recruitments of competent personnel and its ability for manning important parts of the operative structure. While these arguments are also expressed in governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) the conscription’s importance in anchoring the Norwegian armed forces among the Norwegian people appears to be a just as important rationale for the Ministry of Defence. The proposition also emphasises that a public poll from 2008 demonstrated that 83 per cent of the population believed that military conscription in Norway should be upheld. Further more, the Chief of Defence argues that he recommends two different main practices for the educational system of conscripted personnel: one for the education of the manning to operative departments with fast reactivity, and one for the education of recruited personnel for service in peace operative departments. The Chief of Defence’s recommendations of arguably making the Norwegian system of recruitment more suitable for the

281 Huntington (1957): pp 83
282 Huntington (1957): pp 83
284 St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008): pp 123
contemporary circumstances is, however, not recommended in governmental
proposition no 48 (2007-2008), even though the proposition also states that the
Norwegian armed forces’ needs and requirements will be guiding for how military
conscription is practiced286. The proposition’s emphasis on the importance of the
Norwegian armed forces’ reflecting the values and identities of the Norwegian people
is consequently significantly related to Morris Janowitz’s ideal. The continuous
reference to the Norwegian armed forces as the government’s most important security
political tool or instrument, on the other hand, is closer to Huntington’s ideal.

While few would deny that the armed forces is in fact an instrument for and of the
state, or as the Chief of Defence put it - the armed forces does not exist for its’ own
purposes287 - the maintenance of military conscription is a political objective rather
than a military requirement. The developments in weapons technology, the changing
threat image and the increased participation in international operations have led many
contemporaries to question the continued military relevance of conscription288. In
general, the continuation of military conscription in a period where the Norwegian
armed forces on more or less all other levels are becoming increasingly more
professionalized appears to be somewhat of a paradox. Military conscription, if not
considered military required or relevant, results in an ineffective utilization of the
defence budget by using a high quantity of the economic resources which could have
been spent on other capacities or investments more relevant and important for the
armed forces.

I will argue what has been described as a conservative system of military
recruitment289 resembles an area where other political objectives appears to be guiding
for some of the developments within the Norwegian armed forces. This in turn might
challenge civil-military relations as it illustrates an area where civilian authorities

286 St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 123
287 FS 07 (2007); pp 12
288 Børresen (2005); 173
appear to use their authority over the armed forces’ to enhance somewhat partisan interests\textsuperscript{290}.

The next part of this chapter will review the accordance between FS 07 and governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) on the recommendations on operative structure and subsequently analyze the extent of military influence and whether the process appears to have practiced a sensible deference to military expertise.

6.3. Recommendations for Operative Structures:
FS 07 states that based on the planned economic suppositions, and as a result of the analyses of the assignments, challenges and scenarios of these, that the Norwegian armed forces need an operative structure with standing-forces characterised by high reactivity, good standards of training and material, which can be used in all types of operations, at home and abroad\textsuperscript{291}. The Chief of Defence further states that the recommended structure to a large extent continues the developments starting after the cold war, were operative deliveries nationally and in cooperation with others, will be prioritized at the expense of larger mobilizing forces for national efforts and purposes. This entails that the relative share of management expenses would increase, while the relative share of material procurement will decrease\textsuperscript{292}.

In order to secure the best operative capabilities within the framework of a required economic balance, FS 07 recommends the following main structural measures. First of all, FS 07 recommends a comprehensive concentration on multinational defence cooperation, especially within the areas of logistics, force production and support functions, and by reducing the expenses in these areas it is possible to shield capacities which otherwise would have been susceptible. Secondly, a necessary reduction in operative structure by withdrawing the least critical or important capacities is recommended. On the other hand, a continuation and strengthening of those operative capacities argued to be especially important and valuable in most operations and which

\textsuperscript{291} FS 07 (2007); pp 18
\textsuperscript{292} FS 07 (2007); 54
are believed to have the greatest potential for development is also recommended. Within this recommendation, as in MFU 03, the importance of exploiting information and communications technology in the development towards a network-based system of defence is particularly emphasised.  

6.3.1. The Norwegian Army

Both FS 07 and the governmental proposition recommend the continuation of the mechanized brigade (Brig N). The Chief of Defence recommends that the mechanized brigade ought to be somewhat reduced while the proposition states that it due to its’ significance for the armed forces in general and the army in particular, the brigade should be strengthened. This means that the Chief of Defence argues it not to be necessary to continue mobile tactical land command (6th division command) and the lightly armoured battalion, while the proposition advocates respectively - the merging and continuation of these. From a political perspective it is arguably challenging to explain that reductions in the quantity of operative capabilities not necessarily mean a reduction in the strength of the Norwegian armed forces. There are probably still many people of the impression that a large armed force is equivalent to a strong and capable armed force. This may consequently explain some of the reasons for why the Norwegian government recommends the continuation of capacities, which from the perspective of the Chief of Defence - are argued to be irrelevant for the armed forces.

Further more, in what should be seen as an attempt to increase the professionalization of the army the Chief of Defence recommends the reduction in the use of short-term contracts, and argues that increasing the number of man-labour years, especially for recruited and special commissioned/non-commissioned officers significantly strengthens the Norwegian army. This recommendation is however neither recommended nor discussed in the governmental proposition. This should be seen in relation to the previous discussions of the continued importance of military

293 FS 07 (2007); 4
294 FS 07 (2007); 20
295 St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 75
296 FS 07 (2007); 20
conscription, as the Chief of Defence’s proposal would have reduced the number of conscripted soldiers in the Norwegian army and consequently also presumably jeopardized the persisting egalitarian ideal in the Norwegian defence discourse. The Chief of Defence’s residual recommendations were however recommended in the governmental proposition 297.

6.3.2. The Royal Norwegian Air Force

Because of what he sees as the insignificant threat of a territorial conflict on Norwegian soil, and the potential threat in the Northern areas, the Chief of Defence argues that the most likely military force demonstrations in the future are likely to primarily be aimed at Norwegian Sea or aerial territories 298. FS 07 states that the Royal Norwegian Air Force will continue the existing operative structure, but will however also obtain technology, which increases the ability of operating in combined networks 299. All of the Chief of Defence’s recommendations for the operative structure in the Royal Norwegian air force were also recommended by the government in the proposition 300, except from the Chief of Defence’s recommendation of establishing a new LOS-unit.

The Chief of Defence states that the prerequisite for aerial-operative delivery is air surveillance, battle management and operative support. The most important delivery of the Norwegian air force is consequently aerospace-control maintained through constant air surveillance, and the ability and will to intercept/fight unwanted air traffic with combat aircrafts and/or anti-aircraft defence 301. The Chief of Defence states that continuous air surveillance is maintained through the contemporary LOS-system consisting of the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) Sørreisa and CRC Magerø. Because the sensors and the means of communications in the LOS-system are remote-controlled these functions should according to the Chief of Defence be managed from

297 Appendix III
298 FS 07 (2007); pp 5
299 FS 07 (2007); pp 22
300 See appendix III
301 FS 07 (2007); pp 22
one place. The Chief of Defence recommends the closing down of the contemporary CRC-system and to establish a new LOS-unit with corresponding capabilities.

Governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008), also emphasises the importance of air surveillance and states that a prerequisite for the structure’s operative delivery is control and reporting. Unlike the defence study, however, it argues for the importance of maintaining the already existing CRC-system. The proposition states that an effective CRC-system is crucial in securing sovereignty and other types of operations in Norway’s national areas of interests and further that the system also contributes to NATO’s strategic air surveillance\(^{302}\). This illustrates that it once again appears to be the obligations towards, and the desire to meet, the requirements and developments within NATO that are guiding many of the governmental recommendations.

**6.3.3. The Royal Norwegian Navy**

FS 07 argues that in order to uphold the maritime basis capabilities, a vessel-structure of five frigates\(^{303}\), six mine-clearer vessels, and six sub-marinie boats located at Haakonsvern is recommended. Governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) articulates a similar recommended vessel-structure for the Navy, however with one important exception. The Chief of Defence argues that the MTB-weapons not should continue to be an element of the operative structure as their main capacity – the ability to sink larger surface vessels with long rage missiles – can be maintained by other capacities, mainly the frigates and submarine boats\(^{304}\). This is consequently an element of the operative structure, which is not, from the military perspective viewed as critical or important enough for its continuance to be justified. Governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008), however, recommend the continuation of the MTB weapons these representing a crucial resource, both in terms of naval control and sea denial\(^{305}\).

I will argue that the decision to continue the capacities of the MTBs has two equally important potential explanations. First of all, as the previous chapter demonstrated, the

\(^{302}\) St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 80-81

\(^{303}\) With NH 90 helicopters

\(^{304}\) FS 07 (2007); 7

\(^{305}\) St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 78
military stance in MFU 03 was the MTBs importance for costal presence, monitoring, preservation of sovereignty and crisis management. Further more, the subsequent governmental proposition, arguably as a result of the professional military recommendation, recommended the acquisition of the six MTBs. The first of the total of six new MTBs in the Skjold-class was inserted under military command the 20th of February 2008. This means that the first MTBs were not even operative when the Chief of Defence recommended the abolishment of the vessels. Further more the total cost of the vessels was 5bn NOK; an amount already paid when the capacity was proposed closed down, which consequently would have resulted in a significant political turmoil if the government had in fact recommended its’ closure.

Secondly, the production of the MTBs and its’ main weapon (Naval Strike Missile) is mainly done at Norwegian shipyards which also may provide a political incentive to continue the capacity. When considering these facts, it is perhaps not particularly surprising that the MTBs raison d’être is differently perceived in the governmental proposition. That said, however, the civilian authorities did nevertheless not follow the professional military recommendation in this respect. It remains the issue that the government decided for the continuation of a capacity which from a military point of view was considered to be both costly and ineffective, regardless of how rational the explanations for not doing so might have been. The rest of the Chief of Defence’s recommendations for operative structures were however also articulated in the governmental proposition.

6.3.4. The Home Guard

In FS 07, as in MFU 03, the Chief of Defence recommends a structure of the home guard that he finds more suitable for contemporary security situation and challenges, and more appropriate and relevant for the overall structures in the Norwegian armed forces. MFU 03 recommended to decrease the operative structure of the home guard from 83 000 to 50 000 men, while FS 07 recommends a further reduction from 50 000


\[^{306}\text{MFU 03 (2003); pp 17}\]
\[^{307}\text{Maritimt Båtmagasín: 'Storm' (10/2010)}\]
\[^{308}\text{FS 07 (2007); 23}\]
to 30 000\textsuperscript{309}. The Chief of Defence states that this recommendation is based on an assessment of the economic saving potentials and operative considerations. As previously emphasised, this was one of the Chief of Defence’s most important recommendations\textsuperscript{310}. The quality reform of the home guard is recommended continued.

Governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) also recommends the continuation of the quality reform, and as FS 07 it puts special emphasis on the continuation of the home guard’s quick reactivity, good level of training and well-equipped forces. Consequently, also the government seeks to develop more relevant and modernized home guard capacities. The proposition however, recommends that the home guard’s operative structure should contain a total of 45 000 men\textsuperscript{311}.

Both in MFU 03 and FS 07 the Chiefs of Defence proposed recommendations that would have lead to an important modernization of the Norwegian home guard, and arguably made it more relevant and functional both in terms of the overreaching defence political objectives and indeed in the overall structure of the Norwegian armed forces. In both processes, however, the proposed recommended developments of the home guard articulated in the proposition, were always less comprehensive than those of the Chiefs of Defence. What I perceive as a political rigidity in modernizing the home guard may be explained by how the Norwegian home guard, since its establishment has constituted a very special element of the Norwegian armed forces. Sverre Diesen has for instance argued that the home guard has represented both the best and the worst parts of the Norwegian armed forces. Diesen claims that the home guard’s anchoring in local communities and its close connection with civil society has provided the home guard with an unique political position, one in which it, according to Diesen, ‘always attempt to exploit to protect itself from changes which it does not seek undertaken’\textsuperscript{312}. Further more, the argument of the necessity of merging the army

\textsuperscript{309} FS 07 (2007); 23
\textsuperscript{310} FS 07 (2007); pp 7
\textsuperscript{311} The recommended operative structure is 5000 in the effort forces, 25 000 in the reinforcement forces and 15 000 in the follow-up forces (See Appendix III)
\textsuperscript{312} Diesen (2011); pp 204
and the home guard appears to be a rather persistent element in Norwegian defence debates. The home guard’s questioned relevance for the armed forces, both from various Norwegian defence experts and indeed from the military organization itself, indicates that at least the lack of political support for changes that would significantly would have modernized the home guard once again may be a reflection of other, notably regional policy objectives and requirements, becoming guiding for the developments of the Norwegian armed forces.

The preceding sections have also illustrated that it appeared that the Chief of Defence had a significant influence on development of the operative structures of the Norwegian armed forces also after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership. While the Chief of Defence’s recommendations on, respectively, the reductions in the mechanized brigade; the establishment of a new LOS-unit in the air force; the abolishment of the MTBs and a further reduction in operative structure of the home guard, the degree of rejected recommendations are comparatively small in relation to the recommendations incorporated in the proposition. This illustrates an important degree of continuity from the previous LTDP-process, which also indicated an important extent of military political influence on the development of the Norwegian armed forces’ operative structures and capacities. Further more, both LTDP-processes appeared to represent what civil-military relations theory argues to the importance of a sensible deference to military expertise and indeed a shared responsibility between the military and political leaders for developing and implementing polices of national defence.

As with the preceding LTDP-process, however, the assumption that the Chief of Defence appeared to have had an important extent of direct military influence on the process ought to be modified when once again considering another plausible explanation for the great extent of accordance between the documents; Integrated Strategic Leadership. In comparison to the previous LTDP-process however, it is now

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313 See for instance the most recent contribution of Kjell Inge Bjerga and Gullow Gjølseth 'Heimevernet og Hæren: Landforsvaret stykkevis og delt – eller helt? (2010)
314 See appendix III for a complete overview.
even more challenging to assess what appears to be based on merely professional military recommendations and which of the recommendations had been clarified of discussed with the civilian authorities before the development of FS 07. During the preceding LTDP process I argued that much of the accordance between the recommendations on operative structures in MFU 03 and governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) may be explained by the already articulated political guidelines issued prior to the development of the professional military recommendations. The very fact that no, at least officially obtainable, political guidelines were provided to the Chief of Defence within the LTDP-process after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership, can probably be understood in terms of the now already close integration between the Chief of Defence (and his defence staff) and the Ministry of Defence. In other words, that there was less need for political guidelines now that the military leadership was integrated with the civilian authorities, because much of FS 07’s main content already had been clarified and discussed - rather than the lack of political guidelines being an expression of increased military professional autonomy, or an enhancement of the scope of what professional military recommendations the Chief of Defence was able to make.

The proceeding sections will review what the documents illustrated about the accordance between FS 07 and governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) on the recommended base structures and analyze to what extent the Chief of Defence influence appeared to have changed from the preceding LTDP-process were I argued that the impact of his recommendations on base structures was less extensive than on operative structures.

6.4. Recommendations for Base Structures

In his introduction to FS 07, the Chief of Defence states, when discussing his ambition to develop the best possible operative structure in a long-term economical balance, that one of his main structural initiatives is a significant rationalization and merging of the Norwegian armed forces’ activities within fewer spaces. The Chief of Defence argues
that this will reduce the operating costs and secure a functional balance between operative structure and the quantity of bases\textsuperscript{315}. He further states that many of his recommendations will be based on the necessity of making the Norwegian armed forces’ activities more efficient\textsuperscript{316}. It appears to be important for the Chief of Defence to stress that his recommendations on base- and support structures ought to be viewed from a holistic perspective, and that some of the initiatives and recommendations, in itself, might provide for little visible effects. He further describes how when viewed individually, there might be many good arguments for upholding an activity, especially if this utilize its’ maximum capacities in a cost-effective way. The Chief of Defence nevertheless argues that it is important to recall that the different activities mainly are suppose to support the Norwegian Armed Forces’ operative structure, and that his recommendations consequently have accentuated the Norwegian armed forces as a whole\textsuperscript{317}.

The Chief of Defence’s emphasis on the importance of considering the Norwegian armed forces as a whole may indicate an attempt to meet potential future challenges or critiques from two different spheres – that of the civilian authorities, and that from within the organization of the Norwegian armed forces’ itself. First, and perhaps most obviously, these articulations might be interpreted as an effort to explicitly state to the Norwegian government that regardless of whether a base might seem cost-effective or relevant in itself his recommendations considers the Norwegian armed forces as a whole which consequently means that all of his recommendations, whether they appear significant or not, are in fact very important. Secondly, and perhaps even more plausible, it might be understood as an attempt to respond to the often loud criticisms coming from within the respective military branches when bases are closed down or different capacities abolished. Sverre Diesen argues for instance in his new book that many of the most resistant forces of change are found within the Norwegian armed forces itself and that many officers’ will argue from an institutional self-preservation

\textsuperscript{315} FS 07 (2007); pp 7
\textsuperscript{316} FS 07 (2007); pp 39
\textsuperscript{317} FS 07 (2007); pp 39
perspective rather than what is the best for the Norwegian system of defence as a whole\textsuperscript{318}. Diesen also argues here that the government ought to be cautious not too take all of these concerns too seriously as it would harm the Norwegian armed forces in the long-term if the government continues to provide lifejackets for irrelevant capacities or bases screaming for help\textsuperscript{319}. The Chief of Defence’s aforementioned assessments could consequently also be understood in relation to this.

6.4.1. The Norwegian Army

The Chief of Defence recommends that the army’s future activities mainly be localized in the two different regions of Inner Troms and Østerdalen garrison. The Chief of Defence further states that there have been discussions over whether to move the frontier guard services to the bases in Inner Troms, and the H.M. King’s Guard to other parts of the NAF’s activities in Eastern Norway. The Chief of Defence states that he does not recommend either of these proposals, as they will provide for less flexible solutions and reduced operative capabilities. He also argues that a merger of the TRADOK to Østerdalen garrison has been discussed but is not recommended\textsuperscript{320,321}.

All of the Chief of Defence’s recommended bases structures are also articulated in governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008). This was also the case during the preceding LTDP-process. More generally, both the military and political recommendations on base structures in the Norwegian army result in a further concentration of the army’s activities, which also represents the continuous effort to move away from the mobilizing system of defence as these changes entail less military presence around the country.

6.4.2. The Royal Norwegian Air Force

The Chief of Defence argues that the localization of the Norwegian air force is characterized by a legacy, which has been both costly and which has resulted in a
proliferation of the activities. Despite of what the COD describes as a clear intention of concentrating these activities, he holds that the number of operative bases has remained more or less unaffected and some of these bases will, if continued, undermine the Norwegian armed forces’ collective operative capabilities. Based on these assessments the Chief of Defence argues that the collocation of the combat aircraft will be a challenging but nevertheless necessary measure. The process leading up to the final defence study assessed different alternatives for the localization of the combat aircrafts. The Chief of Defence reviews how the studies has illustrated that there are important positive elements of localization both in Bodø and in Ørland, but that the overall considerations have led the military professional recommendation to be to localize the combat aircrafts in Bodø.

More over, the Chief of Defence recommends that Gardermoen air force base be adjusted to the future transport aircraft structure. I argue it to be surprising that the Chief of Defence argues for the continuation of Gardermoen aircraft base as this was recommended closed down in the preceding defence study. While it might be expected that two different Chiefs of Defence have somewhat different perceptions of what constitutes an adequate system of defence it may nevertheless challenge the legitimacy of the military expertise as, if this becomes, at least the perceived tendency, indicates somewhat ad hoc recommendations. While one should appreciate that circumstances might change during the course of five years, it nonetheless weakens the credibility of the expert advice when a base that is viewed as expendable in 2003 is argued to be important in 2007. This in turn illustrates some of the perceived impacts of ISL as it indicates how a previous military recommendation and objective now significantly has changed - arguably due to political influences.

Governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) appear to have more or less the same ambition for the development of the Norwegian air force as the Chief of Defence.

322 FS 07 (2007); pp 46
323 FS 07 (2007); pp 46-47
324 MFU 03 (2003); pp 35
325 MFU 03 (2003); pp 35,
326 FS 07 (2007); pp 47
Indeed, the very wording is in fact identical which is interesting as it illustrates a significant footprint of FS 07 in the proposition. The Chief of Defence emphasised how the future localization of the combat aircrafts had been extensively assessed but that the studies had shown that Bodø was the best alternative, the proposition states however that the government has decided to postpone this decision.

6.4.3. The Royal Norwegian Navy

The Chief of Defence also recommends a further concentration of the base structures of the Royal Norwegian Navy. The Chief of Defence recommends that the activities of the Norwegian navy be further concentrated around Bergen (Haakonsvern) and around the existing bases in Northern Norway. He further states the importance of not connecting the navy to bases at land more than absolutely necessary.

The recommendation of closing-down Olavsvern base is according to the Chief of Defence necessary, as it is not regarded to provide support for any significant operative requirements and its’ contemporary limited activities may be moved to other areas in the region. The Chief of Defence also outlines how the closing-down of Olavsvern will release important infrastructural funds and will provide for an annual saving of 34 million and 234 million within a twenty-year perspective. The closing-down of Olavsvern is also given much emphasis in the proposition and the justifications for this once again presented in more or less the same wording as in FS 07.

In MFU 03 the Chief of Defence recommended the closing-down of the officer candidate school in Horten, a recommendation that was not proposed in the subsequent governmental proposition. Rather, it was in governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) stated that the officer candidate school in Horten would continue - this being an important recruitment portal in Eastern Norway. Governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) also argues for the importance of closing-down the officer candidate school in Horten.

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327 St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 97-98
328 FS 07 (2007); pp 44
329 FS 07 (2007); pp 44
330 FS 07 (2007); pp 44 and St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 96-97
school in Horten and move the activities to Haakonsvern, and states that this is an important element in the attempt to further concentrate the educational environments of the Norwegian navy. While there probably are various different plausible explanations for the change in political priorities, I do not think that the officer candidate school in Horten’s quality of being an important recruitment portal in Easter Norway had completely changed during the course of four years. But rather that the Chief of Defence, through the functions of Integrated Strategic Leadership, might have had a greater potential to discuss and indeed explain the importance of this recommendation because of the now close integration between him and the Ministry of Defence. If this assumption is correct it will consequently mean that the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership might have increased the potentials of the Chief of Defence’s political influence. As illustrated in the discussions of Gardermoen, however, the perceived increased potential for influence is certainly also exercised the other way around.

More over, all of the Chief of Defence’s respective recommendations on base structures for the Royal Norwegian Navy are articulated in governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008). This entails an important change from the preceding LTDP-process where none of the Chief of Defence’s specific recommendations for base structures in the Royal Norwegian Navy were incorporated in the subsequent governmental proposition.

6.4.4. The Home Guard

FS 07 states that the Norwegian home guard still needs to be more decentralized than the other respective military branches, but that the Chief of Defence nevertheless recommends that the home guard districts be collocated with other military activities when appropriate. As previously emphasised the COD argues that the home guard ought to consist of 30 000 men and further argues for the continuation of only ten of the thirteen contemporary districts in order to adjust the base structure to the
recommended operative structure\textsuperscript{331}. Governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) also argue for decentralized home guard districts and recommend the continuation of the quality reform. The proposition also stresses the importance of maintaining good relations with local and regional associates and a home guard presence in all of the country’s regions\textsuperscript{332}. The total of home guard districts recommended by the proposition is nevertheless eleven, in comparison to the Chief of Defence recommendation of a total of ten.

The examination and analysis of the accordance between FS 07 and governmental proposition no 48 (2007-2008) on the recommendations of base structures for the respective military branches nevertheless illustrates a significant degree of military political influence\textsuperscript{333}. The only distinction between the professional military and political recommendations is that the governmental proposition holds that it will postpone the decision of where to locate the new base for the combat aircrafts, and that it recommends the continuation of eleven home guard districts in comparison to the ten recommended by the Chief of Defence. What it also indicates is that the Chief of Defence’s influence within this area had in fact increased in comparison to the previous LTDP-process where less of his recommendations for base structures were incorporated in the subsequent governmental proposition.

Once again, however, I argue that this assumption ought to be modified when also considering the potential impacts of Integrated Strategic Leadership. It seems plausible, also in terms of the recommended base structures, that much of the recommendations had already been discussed within the integrated leadership and that there were consequently few ‘surprises’. This assumption is supported by the analysis of the preceding LTDP-period were I argued that one plausible explanation for the less extensive accordance on recommended base structures might be explained by how the

\textsuperscript{331} For a complete overview of the recommended new home guard districts see appendix 4
\textsuperscript{332} St.prp. no 48 (2007-2008); pp 100
\textsuperscript{333} See appendix IV
requirements for base structures were not discussed in the political guidelines provided prior to the development of MFU 03.

The preliminary conclusion of this chapter is once again that the Chief of Defence’s influence on the LTDP-process appears significant when only examining the accordance between these two documents. When also accounting for the potential impacts of ISL, and the assumption that this process was in fact meant to be more ‘integrated’, the perceived influence of the Chief of Defence also within this LTDP-process has to be modified. I argue that the analysis and arguments conducted and raised about these two processes of long-term defence planning are in fact mutually reinforcing and I will in the thesis last chapter identify and elaborate on my main findings and most importantly - main conclusion.
7. Summarizing arguments and conclusion

The study of civil-military relations is concerned with the relationship between the state and its armed forces. It is about balancing the two often-incompatible societal desiderata of protection by the military, and protection from the military. Civil-military relations remain a persistent challenge in most states as efforts to ensure the one might complicate efforts to ensure the other. While the threat of coup d’état is viewed as relatively insignificant in western democracies this does not imply an ending to the civil-military problematique, but rather that it has changed in nature. While civil-military relations in Norway have been viewed as relatively stable over time - history also reveals that these relations might be particularly fragile to societal and security political developments and changes.

The Norwegian armed forces have in the last decades experienced extensive processes of modernization and restructuring. The assumption that a strong system of defence is equivalent to the quantity of men one could mobilize with an AG3 - has been replaced by the ability to deploy ‘modern, flexible and relevant forces’. Moreover, the notion that Norway should “remain outside any participation in the combination of states, or alliances that could pull us into the adventures of war with any of the European warrior states”\(^{334}\) has developed into alliance dependencies and a strategic concept of a ‘capable force’\(^{335}\).

In 2003 the Norwegian government introduced Integrated Strategic Leadership in an effort to ‘strengthen the Ministry’s abilities in strategic planning, leadership and control of the Norwegian armed forces - for international security; defence; and military-political cooperation […]\(^{336}\). Proponents of ISL argue that this form of

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335 The Norwegian Ministry of Defence; ’Evne til innsats. Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret’; (01.09.2009)
336 St.prp. nr 55 (2001-2005). Section 5.4.1 Strategisk Ledelse
organization strengthens cooperation between the political and military leadership\textsuperscript{337}, increases the Chief of Defence’s political influence\textsuperscript{338}, and results in a situation where one get ‘more defence for every penny’\textsuperscript{339}. The contrary viewpoint however, maintains that ISL leads to ‘a wing-clipped Chief of Defence’\textsuperscript{340}, ‘military populism’\textsuperscript{341} and ‘challenges related military professional autonomy’\textsuperscript{342}. According to civil-military relations theory, military political influence is one of the variables that ought to be in place in order to exercise democratic control of the armed forces, and to develop sensible policies of national security and defence. In essence the argument that ‘war is too serious a matter to entrust the military men’\textsuperscript{343} has been replaced by the crucial importance of a sensible deference to military expertise\textsuperscript{344}.

The purpose of this thesis has been to discuss civil-military relations in Norway and in particular to analyze the extent of military political influence. I have conducted a qualitative document analysis and have through a comparative case study of two processes of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces attempted to assess to what extent the Chief of Defence’s direct influence on the process of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces - appeared to have changed after the introduction of Integrated Strategic Leadership. My secondary objective was to discuss what the four documents indicated about developments in the Norwegian armed forces in general, and Norwegian defence policy in particular.

The remaining sections of the thesis will identify its’ main conclusions, some argued limitations and suggest important areas of future research.


\textsuperscript{338} Supporters of the proximity/integration models discussed in Raksund in Trøndelag & Østerud (2001a); pp 152-153;

\textsuperscript{339} State Secretary, Roger Ingebrigsten, Ministry of Defence in Aftenposten (18.01.2011) ‘Forsvarssjef måtte love fred i eget hus’.


\textsuperscript{341} Lars J. Sølvberg cited in Grøger (2007); pp 265


\textsuperscript{343} Clemenceau, Georges cited in Howard (1957); pp 20

\textsuperscript{344} Howard (1957); Huntington (1957); Betts (1991); Bland (1999); Feaver (1999); Burk (2002); Cttey al (2002); Hooker (2004)
7.1. Findings and Conclusions

I argue that the analysis and main arguments in the thesis’ two main chapters are in fact - mutually reinforcing.

In the analysis of the last LTDP-process before the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership, I argued that the significant degree of military political influence on recommended operative structures could be explained by the relatively specific political guidelines provided to the Chief of Defence before the development of MFU 03. I further held that the less extensive military influence on base structures could be explained by how the political guidelines were less specific in their requirements here, which in turn strengthened the assumption that the political guidelines had been imperative for the Chief of Defence’s recommended operative structure.

In the LTDP-process after the establishment of ISL, however, the accordance between the documents is extensive both on operative structures and on base structures. Which I argued could indicate that many of the recommendations proposed by the Chief of Defence, already had been clarified with the Ministry of Defence. If this assumption is correct, it also strengthens the arguments raised about the LTDP-process before the introduction of ISL as it provides leverage for the assumption that the accordance on operative structures may be explained by the specific political guidelines, while the divergence on base structures, however, were a result of the opposite. This indicates that in both periods what I perceive as quite strong political control of the LTDP-processes may explain much of the accordance between the documents.

As an extension of these arguments, I have consequently reached the conclusion that, based on the analysis conducted here, the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership appears to have had limited impact on the extent of the Chief of Defence’s direct influence on the process of long-term defence planning.

If one does not support my argument that some form of political supervision and control may explain an important part of the accordance between the documents, and if one studies the documents in isolation without including possible external factors in the analysis, the Chief of Defence’s degree of influence on the process is nevertheless
extensive. Further, this influence might be argued to have increased after the establishment of ISL, as his recommendations on base structures to a larger extent than in the preceding period were incorporated in the subsequent governmental proposition.

If one, on the other hand, supports my argument that the degree of military political influence ought to be somewhat modified when also accounting for the political guidelines, and the assumed impact of the integrated leadership - the conclusion nevertheless remains the same. Integrated Strategic Leadership does not appear to have had any specific impact on this particular area of civil-military relations - as the argued political control and imprint were very much present also in the long-term defence planning period before its’ establishment.

Consequently, many of the contemporary concerns and criticisms raised towards Integrated Strategic Leadership should perhaps be raised towards how the Norwegian civilian authorities control its armed forces’ more generally, as many of these critiques easily also could have been applied to the period before its establishment.

While defence policy obviously has been an important component of traditional Norwegian security policy, strategic military thinking on the one hand and the conduct of foreign policy on the other, remained clearly separated throughout the Cold War. As the preceding examinations and analysis of the two processes of long-term defence planning for the Norwegian armed forces has illustrated, the Norwegian defence policy discourse have significantly developed and indeed changed since then. Because of the altered threat image, the redefinition of security, and increased Norwegian participation in international operations the Norwegian armed forces role and functions have changed considerably, too. The more complex and vague distinctions between national and international security began to characterize Norwegian defence and security policies already after the end of the Cold War. Further more, the increased interactions between foreign, security and defence policies meant that Norwegian politicians, to a much larger extent than previously, had to relate to and indeed engage

345 Græger, Nina & Leira, Halvard. 'Forsvarsopspolitikk som utenriksopspolitikk'. 2005
more actively in security and defence political issues. As international operations had become such a significant part of the NAF’s primary functions, and indeed sidelined with territorial defence, the conduct of national defence and security policies also became more politicized\footnote{Matlary in Matlary & Østerud (2005); pp 202-219}.

I consequently argue that the perceived, relatively strong political control of the developments of and within the Norwegian armed forces, rather should be understood in terms of the changing role of the Norwegian armed forces and indeed its new function as an important foreign policy tool - and not the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership per se.

The more overall discussions of the Norwegian defence policy also illustrated much continuity before and after the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership. In both periods there are increased efforts to develop a modern, flexible and relevant armed force capable of maintaining both its’ national and international functions and responsibilities. Further more the continued importance of NATO is evident both in the way the Norwegian armed forces continues to be developed, and indeed the Norwegian government’s overreaching political objectives and priorities. The emphasis on how the Norwegian armed forces will be used in order to secure ‘international peace and security and for humanitarian purposes is considerably stressed in both governmental propositions. This may be understood, as I argued, as an effort to secure popular support, and that the reference to ‘values and interests’ may be an attempt to secure the legitimacy of the use of the armed forces beyond its’ traditional responsibilities, in a nation, arguably seeking - to maintain the image of a ‘peace nation’ or indeed ‘a humanitarian superpower’. 
7.1.1. The Relationship between the Expert and the Generalist: Military Political Influence or a Politician Disguised as an Officer?

The analysis also illustrated that in both LTDP-periods it was challenging to assess what should be considered mainly a political objective, and what was considered to be the Chief of Defence’s ‘authentic’ professional military recommendation. This does not necessarily represent an absence of the Chief of Defence’s political influence, however, and should presumably be seen as a perhaps natural consequence of the now close integration between more traditional defence policy, and other political priorities notably foreign political objectives. I nevertheless argue that these findings do represent a challenge to civil-military relations as they might challenge the legitimacy of the military professional recommendation per se.

James Burk argues that newer aspects of civil-military relations theory ‘ought to consider how institutional fusion between political and military elites affects the willingness of the lower ranking officers to trust that their leaders are defending the military institution’s interests’\(^\text{347}\). The military argument against ISL has often been based on a concern that because the Chief of Defence and his defence staff would work integrated with political representatives, they would become significantly influenced by political thinking and priorities, and that this would weaken his ability to promote professional military advice and recommendations. This argument is for instance expressed by former general inspector in the army, major general Lars J. Sølvberg who has argued that ‘if the military leadership recommends the development of an armed force commissioned for the contemporary political requirements, this would provide for serious challenges for the Norwegian armed forces in the long-term’\(^\text{348}\).

As this critique also could have been raised towards the LTDP-period before the establishment of Integrated Strategic Leadership I consequently argue that it should be directed towards how Norwegian civilian authorities exercise control of the highest leadership of the Norwegian armed forces more generally, rather than to be seen as a

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\(^{347}\) Burk (2002); pp 17

\(^{348}\) Lars J. Sølvberg cited in Græger (2007); pp 265
consequence of Integrated Strategic Leadership. I will nevertheless also argue that the extent of the Chief of Defence’s direct political influence is of less value when representatives from the organization of the Norwegian armed forces do not experience that the Chief of Defence is proposing a military structure perceived to be the best alternative for the armed forces, but rather one that is argued to be politically acceptable or reflect a political ambition at that particular time.

The analysis also indicated that some of the developments taking place in the Norwegian armed forces perhaps should be understood as being mainly undertaken to meet or satisfy other needs and requirements than those of the military. I argue the most prominent example of these to be that the governmental proposition recommended a continuation of the capacities of the MTB-weapons, the political rigidity of proposals for modernizing reforms in the home guard and military conscription. Further more, the less significant military political influence on recommended base structures in governmental proposition no 42 (2003-2004) also indicated that some the developments in the Norwegian armed forces presumably still constitutes an important element of regional political objectives.

It is not surprising and is indeed legitimate, that the Norwegian government has other concerns than those of the Norwegian armed forces to consider when shaping national defence policy or adopting military professional recommendations. Hence, the latter cannot always prevail when they for instance are incommensurable with other pressing concerns, be they economical ecological or regional. What nevertheless is problematic, from my point of view, is that the Norwegian government on various occasions in the governmental propositions, recommended the continuation of an operative capacity or a military base because of its’ importance for the armed forces. I argue that this may challenge the relationship between ‘the expert and the generalist’, not only because these capacities or bases were in direct contradiction to what the Chief of Defence had recommended and consequently not believed to be relevant for the armed forces, - but also because it symbolizes an ignorance towards, or defiance of the expert opinion, here the military expertise.
7.2. The added value of civil-military relations theory

The theory of civil-military relations is fundamentally broad and arguably as complex as the relations, which it seeks to explain. I have in this thesis used the theoretically defined variable of military political influence because of its’ perceived importance ‘in this particular region, at this particular time’ 349. The theory of civil-military relations has been important for the thesis first and foremost because of its quality as a means to develop ‘a way for looking and thinking about civil-military relations’ 350. Because the theory is so general, its’ usefulness in the direct application to the particular cases has been somewhat limited, however. The reference to the often opposing theoretical contributions and arguments has nevertheless been imperative because of its provision of principal views of what the different actor’s role and functions ought to be - and of how civilian control of the military ought to function.

The extent of military political influence would presumably also from the theoretical perspective at first glance appear significant, but as I have argued, be somewhat modified when also accounting for the arguably strong political control. Further more the analysis also illustrated examples of ‘politicians using their authority to enhance partisan interests over the armed forces’ 351, and an argued imbalance between what the theory has termed ‘the relationship between the expert to the generalist’ 352.

I also discussed what I claimed to be the Norwegian government’s attempt to practice a combination of both objective and subjective control 353. The challenge of exercising objective control through increased professionalization, and the use of the armed forces as an instrument of obtaining political goals and objectives - while simultaneously seeking the armed forces ‘meaningful interaction with civilian values’ 354 - is not sufficiently discussed within the theory. Presumably these challenges

349 Feaver (1999); pp 217
351 Howard (1957); Bland (1999);
352 First used by Huntington (1957)
353 Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960)
354 Janowitz (1964); pp 420
are not only found in contemporary Norway, but also in many western systems of government, which is a weakness of civil-military relations theory.

I will argue that the extent of military political influence in Norway more generally will become even more important or indeed challenging in the decades to come, also drawing more attention to the nature of civil-military relations. For instance if the ongoing professionalization of the armed forces continues this might strengthen the position of the Chief of Defence and give more weight to the professional military recommendations. Further more, the continued professionalization of the Norwegian armed forces and the amplified objective of contributing where Norway ‘can make a difference’ challenge the armed forces’ traditional role and presumably also their general support in Norwegian society. The current Norwegian Minister of Defence has stated that she wants more transparency and increased debates about Norwegian defence and security policy. This is in my opinion a prerequisite to secure popular accept and support for the Norwegian armed forces, a debate, which remains unfortunately and surprisingly - relatively absent.

7.3. Suggestions for future research

Due to the limited scope of this thesis there are a number of important areas for future research, which had to be left out but that ought to be undertaken both to strengthen the significance and validity of the present research, but most importantly simply to increase the knowledge and understanding of these complex relations.

First of all, as I only have focused on the Chief of Defence’s direct influence on the recommendations of operative and base structures, future research should attempt to include more recommendations in the analysis. Richer empirical data will allow for stronger conclusions and arguments regarding the potential affects of Integrated Strategic Leadership on the influence of the top military leader.

356 Forsvarsdepartementet (Tale/Artikkel) Faremo, Grete. ‘Jeg ønsker åpenhet’. (10.03.2011)
Secondly, while there are many advantages of qualitative document analysis there are also many challenges and indeed limitations. I have for instance not been able to account for how the different actors experienced the processes, to what extent the different recommendations had been discussed beforehand, and how much communication the actors had with each other during the defence review/study process and the formulation of the subsequent governmental propositions. The analyses I have conducted on these aspects are estimated suppositions based on the characteristics of the documents at hand. Future research should consequently also supply the analysis with at least semi-structured interviews, in order to strengthen or challenge the validity and representativeness of the assumptions, arguments and conclusions raised here. Future research might also attempt to discuss the potential impacts of the different personality characteristics of the respective Chiefs of Defence and Ministers of Defence, and indeed of having different political parties in government in the periods studies. These factors presumably also have an impact on the extent political influence of the military and indeed civil-military relations more generally, which the present research has not accounted for.

By only examining civil-military relations within the framework of Integrated Strategic Leadership this thesis has not discussed the role played by the Storting, which ultimately exercises the popular civilian control of the military. Consequently, future research should finally, - and most importantly, include how the Storting influences the military structure and apparatus through its resolutions of propositions from the government and through other forms of democratic control mechanisms. This would allow for strengthened analysis and arguments on potential changes civil-military relations in Norway in general, and in the degree of the military’s political influence in particular.

This being said, however, it is the intention and interest of the current thesis to contribute to new knowledge about one particular aspect of civil-military relations in Norway, notably the potential effects of ISL, on the influence of the Chief of Defence in the defence planning process. Hopefully, some value has been added and may encourage future research.
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## Appendix I

**MFU 03 and St.prp. nr.42 (2003-2004): Recommended operative structures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MFU 03</th>
<th>St.prp. nr.42 (2003-2004)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Norwegian Army</strong></td>
<td>• 1 x Mechanized Brigade (Brig N)</td>
<td>• 1 x Mechanized Brigade (Brig N)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 1 x mechanized infantry battalion (a part of Brig N)</td>
<td>• 1 x mechanized infantry battalion (a part of Brig N)</td>
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<td>• 1 x mechanized infantry brigade (Brig 6)</td>
<td>• 1 x mechanized infantry brigade (Brig 6 to replace Brig 12)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 1 x mobile-tactical land command (6th Div.)</td>
<td>• 1 x mobile-tactical land command (6th Div.)</td>
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<td>• Division/corps departments</td>
<td>• Division/corps departments</td>
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<td>• 1STAR Battalion</td>
<td>• 1STAR Battalion</td>
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<td>• Transport-unit</td>
<td>• Transport-unit</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Fuel company</td>
<td>• Fuel company</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• AMRC search and decontamination capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Machinery and construction company</td>
<td>• Machinery and construction company</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Viaduct and Crossing company</td>
<td>• Viaduct and Crossing company</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The Army’s Chasseur Command</td>
<td>• The Army's Chasseur Command</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The Frontier Guard</td>
<td>• The Frontier Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• H.M. King's Guard</td>
<td>• H.M. King’s Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Norwegian Air Force</strong></td>
<td>• 48x F-16 Combat Aircrafts</td>
<td>• 48(-9) x F-16 Combat Aircrafts</td>
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<td>• Air surveillance and battle management (LOS):</td>
<td>• Air surveillance and battle management (LOS):</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• ARS Sørøya</td>
<td>• ARS Sørøya</td>
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<td>• ARS Rygge</td>
<td>• ARS Rygge</td>
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<td>• Tanker/transport aircraft – MRRT (2009)</td>
<td>• Tanker/transport aircraft – PCC combined project in NATO</td>
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<td>• Maritime surveillance aircrafts:</td>
<td>• Maritime surveillance aircrafts:</td>
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<td>• 8x PSOr Orion</td>
<td>• 8x PSOr Orion</td>
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<td>• 2x PSOr Orion</td>
<td>• 2x PSOr Orion</td>
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<td>• Electronic warfare (EK-) aircrafts</td>
<td>• Electronic warfare (EK-) aircrafts</td>
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<td>• 2+1 DA20 Jet Falcon</td>
<td>• 2+1 DA20 Jet Falcon</td>
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<td>• C-130 (tac)</td>
<td>• C-130 (tac)</td>
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<td>• Air defence:</td>
<td>• Air defence:</td>
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<td>• 2+3 NAKAMS-net</td>
<td>• 2 NAKAMS-net</td>
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<td>• Air Wing SOF-helicopters</td>
<td>• Air Wing SOF-helicopters</td>
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<td>• 12 Sea King rescue helicopters (to be replaced during the period)</td>
<td>• 12 Sea King rescue helicopters (to be replaced during the period)</td>
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<td>• 12-15 transport-helicopters</td>
<td>• 12-15 transport-helicopters</td>
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<td>• Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit/ISTAR</td>
<td>• Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit/ISTAR</td>
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<td><strong>The Royal Norwegian Navy</strong></td>
<td>• 5x Fridjof Nansen Class Frigates with:</td>
<td>• 5x Fridjof Nansen Class Frigates with:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 6x NH-90 helicopters</td>
<td>• 6x NH-90 helicopters</td>
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<td>• 1 x logistic-vehicle capacity for frigate operations (by 2010)</td>
<td>• 1 x logistic-vehicle capacity for frigate operations (by 2010)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 6x Ultra-class submarine boats</td>
<td>• 6x Ultra-class submarine boats</td>
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<td>• Mine-clearing vessels</td>
<td>• Mine-clearing vessels</td>
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<td>• 8x Okøy-class mine hunters</td>
<td>• 8x Okøy-class mine hunters</td>
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<td>• 2x Alter-class mine sweepers</td>
<td>• Clearance-diving command (KNM Tyr as support-vehicle)</td>
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<td>• 6x Skjold-Class MTB's</td>
<td>• 6x Skjold-Class MTB’s</td>
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<td>• Hank-class MTB's - phased out</td>
<td>• Hank-class MTB's - phased out</td>
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<td>• The Coast Chasseur Command</td>
<td>• The Coast Chasseur Command</td>
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<td>• The Marine Chasseur Command</td>
<td>• The Marine Chasseur Command</td>
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<td>• Tactical Maritime Command</td>
<td>• Tactical Maritime Command</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 1x logistic/support/command vessel (for Mine/MTB-weapons)</td>
<td>• 1x logistic/support/command vessel (for Mine/MTB-weapons)</td>
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<td>• KNM Horten to be phased out</td>
<td>• KNM Horten to be phased out</td>
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<td>• The Coast Guard:</td>
<td>• The Coast Guard:</td>
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<td>• 1x Sviblad class</td>
<td>• 1x Sviblad class</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 3x Norgaard class</td>
<td>• 3x Norgaard class</td>
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<td>• Leased KV-helicopters</td>
<td>• Leased KV-helicopters</td>
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<td>• Inner Coast Guard</td>
<td>• Inner Coast Guard</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 8x KV-helicopters (NH-90)</td>
<td>• 8x KV-helicopters (NH-90)</td>
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<td><strong>The Home Guard</strong></td>
<td>• 50.000 personnel</td>
<td>• 50.000 personnel</td>
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<td>• Quality reform</td>
<td>• Quality reform</td>
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<td>• 13.000 reserves</td>
<td>• 13.000 reserves</td>
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</table>
Appendix II

MFU 03 and St.prp. nr.42 (2003-2004): Recommended base structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Norwegian Army</th>
<th>The Norwegian Air Force</th>
<th>The Royal Norwegian Navy</th>
<th>The Home Guard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The establishment of the Norwegian Army’s forces (HSTY) and The Norwegian Army’s transformation and doctrine command (TRADOK)</td>
<td>The establishment of HSTY of TRADOK entails that some departments is recommended formally closed down, these practices will however continue within the new structure</td>
<td>The Norwegian Army’s school of ammunition (FASK) is located at the new combined base at Sossavollomen instead of at Kjevik</td>
<td>The establishment of the Norwegian Army’s forces (HSTY) and The Norwegian Army’s transformation and doctrine command (TRADOK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The establishment of HSTY of TRADOK entails that some departments is recommended formally closed down, these practices will however continue within the new structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>The establishment of HSTY of TRADOK entails that some departments is recommended formally closed down, these practices will however continue within the new structure</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Norwegian Army’s school of ammunition (FASK) is located at the new combined base at Sossavollomen instead of at Kjevik</td>
<td>The officer candidate school of the Norwegian Air Force is closed down, education and training is continued but in the form of GBU/GBK at Kjevik and within the divisions</td>
<td>The Norwegian Army’s school of ammunition (FASK) is located at the new combined base at Sossavollomen instead of at Kjevik</td>
<td>The establishment of HSTY of TRADOK entails that some departments is recommended formally closed down, these practices will however continue within the new structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The officer candidate school of the Norwegian Air Force is closed down, education and training is continued but in the form of GBU/GBK at Kjevik and within the divisions</td>
<td>The programme centre and the control- and warning school of the Air Force, previously localized at Magrao, is moved to Rygge Air Force base</td>
<td>The programme centre and the control- and warning school of the Air Force, previously localized at Magrao, is moved to Rygge Air Force base</td>
<td>The establishment of HSTY of TRADOK entails that some departments is recommended formally closed down, these practices will however continue within the new structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The programme centre and the control- and warning school of the Air Force, previously localized at Magrao, is moved to Rygge Air Force base</td>
<td>The Air Force base at Magrao to be closed down</td>
<td>The Air Force base at Gardermoen is recommended closed down; 335-squadron is moved to Rygge Air Force base</td>
<td>The Air Force base at Magrao to be closed down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Air Force base at Gardermoen is recommended closed down; 335-squadron is moved to Rygge Air Force base</td>
<td>Evenes, Torp, Langnes, Flesland and Vernes is closed down as mobilized-air stations</td>
<td>Evenes, Torp, Langnes, Flesland and Vernes is closed down as mobilized-air stations</td>
<td>Gardermoen Air Force base is maintained and its importance for the Air Force is strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenes, Torp, Langnes, Flesland and Vernes is closed down as mobilized-air stations</td>
<td>The air-defence moves from Bodo to Ørland</td>
<td>The air-defence moves from Bodo to Ørland</td>
<td>The Air Force base at Magrao to be closed down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The air-defence moves from Bodo to Ørland</td>
<td>There will be established one division at Rygge initially based on 720-squadron as the aerial operative element of the Norwegian Armed Forces chasseur command</td>
<td>There will be established one division at Rygge initially based on 720-squadron as the aerial operative element of the Norwegian Armed Forces chasseur command</td>
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<tr>
<td>A further concentration of the Navy’s organizing, training and equipment of forces around Haakonsvern is recommended</td>
<td>A further concentration of the Navy’s organizing, training and equipment of forces around Haakonsvern is recommended</td>
<td>A further concentration of the Navy’s organizing, training and equipment of forces around Haakonsvern is recommended</td>
<td>A further concentration of the Navy’s organizing, training and equipment of forces around Haakonsvern is recommended</td>
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<tr>
<td>A further concentration of the Navy’s organizing, training and equipment of forces around Haakonsvern is recommended</td>
<td>Allied training center–North should be converted, the staff will be localized at Skjold, and the remainder activities are maintained by available capacities of existing bases in the regions of Troms and Finnmark</td>
<td>Allied training center–North should be converted, the staff will be localized at Skjold, and the remainder activities are maintained by available capacities of existing bases in the regions of Troms and Finnmark</td>
<td>Allied training center–North should be converted, the staff will be localized at Skjold, and the remainder activities are maintained by available capacities of existing bases in the regions of Troms and Finnmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied training center–North should be converted, the staff will be localized at Skjold, and the remainder activities are maintained by available capacities of existing bases in the regions of Troms and Finnmark</td>
<td>The officer candidate school in Horten is recommended closed down</td>
<td>The officer candidate school in Horten is recommended closed down</td>
<td>The officer candidate school in Horten is recommended closed down</td>
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<td>The officer candidate school in Horten is recommended closed down</td>
<td>The Marine Chasseur Command continues at Ramsund</td>
<td>The Marine Chasseur Command continues at Ramsund</td>
<td>The Marine Chasseur Command continues at Ramsund</td>
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<td>The Marine Chasseur Command continues at Ramsund</td>
<td>Reducing Home Guard districts from 18-12</td>
<td>Reducing Home Guard districts from 18-12</td>
<td>Reducing Home Guard districts from 18-12</td>
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<td>Reducing Home Guard districts from 18-12</td>
<td>The following bases are recommended closed down (year of closure):</td>
<td>The following bases are recommended closed down (year of closure):</td>
<td>The following bases are recommended closed down (year of closure):</td>
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<td>The following bases are recommended closed down (year of closure):</td>
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<td>Ravenberget</td>
<td>Eggenmoen</td>
<td>Eggenmoen</td>
<td>Eggenmoen</td>
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<td>Kongsvinger</td>
<td>Skjet, Jelster</td>
<td>Skjet, Jelster</td>
<td>Skjet, Jelster</td>
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<td>Persumet</td>
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<td>Steinkjer,</td>
<td>Steinkjer,</td>
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<td>Kongsvinger</td>
<td>Narvik</td>
<td>Narvik</td>
<td>Narvik</td>
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<td>Kongsvinger</td>
<td>Atlaugard</td>
<td>Atlaugard</td>
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<td>Kongsvinger</td>
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## Appendix III

### FS 07 and St.prp. nr.48 (2007-2008): Recommended operative structures

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<th>The Norwegian Army</th>
<th>FS 07</th>
<th>St.prp. nr.48 (2007-2008)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1x Brigade (to be reduced)</td>
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<td>Brigade Command</td>
<td>Brigade Command</td>
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<td>2x Mechanized infantry battalions</td>
<td>2x Mechanized infantry battalions</td>
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<td>Intelligence battalion (ISTAR bn)</td>
<td>Intelligence battalion (ISTAR bn)</td>
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<td>Communications battalion (HSV)</td>
<td>Communications battalion (HSV)</td>
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<td>Military police (MP) company</td>
<td>Military police (MP) company</td>
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<td>Artillery battalion</td>
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<td>Engineer battalion</td>
<td>Engineer battalion</td>
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<td>Logistics battalion (CSS)</td>
<td>Logistics battalion (CSS)</td>
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<td>Medical battalion</td>
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<td>H.M. King’s Guard</td>
<td>H.M. King’s Guard</td>
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<td>The garrison in Sør-Varanger</td>
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<td>The NAF’s special command</td>
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<td>The Army’s Chasseur Command</td>
<td>The Army’s Chasseur Command</td>
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<th>The Royal Norwegian Air Force</th>
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<th>Air surveillance and battle management (LOS):</th>
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<td>- CRC’s Sivens and Sivens recommended closed down</td>
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<td>- 48-9 x F-16 combat aircrafts</td>
<td>- 48-9 x F-16 combat aircrafts</td>
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<td>- 18 x Bell 412 helicopters</td>
<td>- 18 x Bell 412 helicopters</td>
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<td>- 4 x P-3 C/N maritime patrol aircrafts</td>
<td>- 4 x P-3 C/N maritime patrol aircrafts</td>
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<td>- 2 x DA-20 EK-aircrafts Falcon Jet</td>
<td>- 2 x DA-20 EK-aircrafts Falcon Jet</td>
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<td>- 4 x C-130J transport aircrafts</td>
<td>- 4 x C-130J transport aircrafts</td>
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<td>- 1 x NASAMS anti-aircraft battery (+)</td>
<td>- 1 x NASAMS anti-aircraft battery (+)</td>
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<td>- 1 x base set (aerial)</td>
<td>- 1 x base set (aerial)</td>
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<td>- Search and rescue service</td>
<td>- Search and rescue service</td>
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<td>- 12 x Sea King rescue helicopters</td>
<td>- 12 x Sea King rescue helicopters</td>
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<th>The Royal Norwegian Navy</th>
<th>Coastal Squadron:</th>
<th>Coastal Squadron</th>
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<td>- 1 x tactical maritime command (CNORTG)</td>
<td>- 1 x tactical maritime command (CNORTG)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Closure of the entire MTB-weaponry</td>
<td>- Skjold class MTB’s</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 5 x Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates w/8x NH 90 helicopters</td>
<td>- 5 x Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates w/8x NH 90 helicopters</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 3 x Ok Aksy/Alfa-class mine-hunter/sweeper w/Hugin</td>
<td>- 3 x Ok Aksy/Alfa-class mine-hunter/sweeper w/Hugin</td>
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<td>- 6 x Ula class Submarine boats</td>
<td>- 6 x Ula class Submarine boats</td>
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<td>The Marine Chasseur weaponries:</td>
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<td>- Mine Divining Command</td>
<td>- Mine Divining Command</td>
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<td>- Coastal Chasseur Command</td>
<td>- Coastal Chasseur Command</td>
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<td>- Tactical boat-squadron</td>
<td>- The Marine’s Logistic-weaponry:</td>
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<td>- Valkyrien</td>
<td>- The Coast Guard:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Barton</td>
<td>- 1 x Svalbard class w/NH-90</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Ty</td>
<td>- 1 x Nordkapp-class YKV w/ NH-90</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Coast Guard:</td>
<td>- 6 x Alexander/Hans Tore Eide class coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 8 x (new) NH-90 helicopters</td>
<td>- 5 x Normen-class inner Coast Guard, w/fast lightweight boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 x Svalbard class w/NH-90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 3 x Nordkapp-class YKV w/ NH-90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 6 x Alexander/Hans Tore Eide class coast Guard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 5 x Normen-class inner Coast Guard, w/fast lightweight boats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Home Guard</th>
<th>Reduced from 50,000 to 30,000 officers and personnel</th>
<th>Reduced from 50,000 to 45,000 officers and personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Task forces: 5,000</td>
<td>- Task forces: 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reinforcement units: 25,000</td>
<td>- Reinforcement units: 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Follow-up: 15,000</td>
<td>- Follow-up: 15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix IV

**FS 07 and St.prp. nr.48 (2007-2008): Recommended base structures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FS 07</th>
<th>St.prp. nr.48 (2007-2008)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Norwegian Army</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Army’s future activities should continue to be concentrated in Indre Trøms and Østerdalen garrisons</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Army’s future activities should continue to be concentrated in Indre Trøms and Østerdalen garrisons</td>
<td>• The Army’s future activities should continue to be concentrated in Indre Trøms and Østerdalen garrisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Compiling the Army’s ISTAR departments (incl. the Army Chasseur Company) at Setesmoen</td>
<td>• Compiling the Army’s ISTAR departments (incl. the Army Chasseur Company) at Setesmoen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continued activities at the following locations:</td>
<td>• Continued activities at the following locations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Garrison Sar-Vardanger/Høybakmoen</td>
<td>• Garrison Sar-Vardanger/Høybakmoen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Haiby</td>
<td>• Haiby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lindertal</td>
<td>• Lindertal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tønsengmoen</td>
<td>• Tønsengmoen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The garrison in Persanger should not continue as a base for the Norwegian Army</td>
<td>• The garrison in Persanger should not continue as a base for the Norwegian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not recommended to move the activities of H.M. King’s Guard to other areas of eastern Norway</td>
<td>• Not recommended to move the activities of H.M. King’s Guard to other areas of eastern Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not recommended to move the military training of H.M. King’s Guard to Haiby</td>
<td>• Not recommended to move the military training of H.M. King’s Guard to Haiby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not recommended to connect the frontier-guard activities to the bases in Indre Trøms</td>
<td>• Not recommended to connect the frontier-guard activities to the bases in Indre Trøms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A compilation of the total TRADOK to Østerdalen garrison is not recommended</td>
<td>• A compilation of the total TRADOK to Østerdalen garrison is not recommended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Royal Norwegian Air Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>The combat aircrafts and a co-located anti-aircraft defence is recommended concentrated to one base, yet to be determined</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The combat aircrafts and a co-located anti-aircraft defence is recommended localized as main air force base in Bodø (Orland, Rygge, Bardufoss, Evenes and Andøya Air Force bases has also been considered)</td>
<td>• The combat aircrafts and a co-located anti-aircraft defence is recommended concentrated to one base, yet to be determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Banak continues as station group subject to Hallkirke air artillery range</td>
<td>• Banak continues as station group subject to Hallkirke air artillery range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Activities concerning air surveillance and battle management are recommended reorganized and localized to Heim</td>
<td>• Activities concerning air surveillance and battle management are recommended reorganized and localized to Heim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bardufoss Air Force base recommended as new main base for the helicopter structure</td>
<td>• Bardufoss Air Force base recommended as new main base for the helicopter structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Orland main Air Force base is recommended closed-down</td>
<td>• Orland main Air Force base is recommended closed-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sola Air Force base is recommended closed-down</td>
<td>• Sola Air Force base is recommended closed-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Helicopter-activities at Rygge continues</td>
<td>• Helicopter-activities at Rygge continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gardemoen Air Force base continues</td>
<td>• Gardemoen Air Force base continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Andøya Air Force continues as base for the Norwegian Armed Forces’ maritime patrol aircrafts</td>
<td>• Andøya Air Force continues as base for the Norwegian Armed Forces’ maritime patrol aircrafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Royal Norwegian Navy</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Coastal squadron’s, the Coastal guard’s and the Royal Norwegian Navy Schools continues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Coastal squadron’s, the Coastal guard’s and the Royal Norwegian Navy Schools continues</td>
<td>• The Coastal squadron’s, the Coastal guard’s and the Royal Norwegian Navy Schools continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Officer Candidate School in Horten recommended closed down</td>
<td>• The Officer Candidate School in Horten recommended closed down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A concentration of the Navy’s activities to Haakonsvern naval base, and a further concentration of the Navy’s activities at contemporary bases in Northern Norway are recommended</td>
<td>• A concentration of the Navy’s activities to Haakonsvern naval base, and a further concentration of the Navy’s activities at contemporary bases in Northern Norway are recommended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ørsvann base recommended closed-down</td>
<td>• Ørsvann base recommended closed-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Northern Coast Guard continues at Sandand (assessments has illustrated that it is not economically or operative efficient to move it to another area of the region)</td>
<td>• Northern Coast Guard continues at Sandand (assessments has illustrated that it is not economically or operative efficient to move it to another area of the region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Coastal Chasseur Command is recommended continued with increased Manning, localized to Ramsund and Haakonsvern</td>
<td>• The Coastal Chasseur Command is recommended continued with increased Manning, localized to Ramsund and Haakonsvern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Home Guard</strong></td>
<td><strong>Maintained presence in all existing districts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintained presence in all existing districts</td>
<td>• Maintained presence in all existing districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Merger of districts HV-07 and HV-08, HV-07 and HV-08, HV-17 and HV-18</td>
<td>• Merger of districts HV-07 and HV-08, HV-17 and HV-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Total number of districts: 10</td>
<td>• Total number of districts: 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>