The New Kids on the Block
BRICs in the World Heritage Committee

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Acknowledgements

The idea and inspiration behind this thesis have several origins. International organisations’ capability to arrive at common solutions despite colossal differences has fascinated me ever since I observed these dynamics as an intern at UNESCO Headquarters, Paris. That a group of so immensely different countries such as the BRICs can unite under one acronym inspired me to set out this thesis.

Throughout the search for the common denominator of the BRICs, I have not been alone (although during the academic storms it often felt so), and I would like to thank some persons who have contributed to making this task achievable.

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Blindern, May 2011

Ida Breckan Claudi
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1 Introduction

The BRIC story is the story about how an acronym, coined to describe the club of rising economic powers, turned into a political reality. The Western global economist Jim O’Neill created the concept in 2001, uniting Brazil, Russia, India and China. In his analysis, “Building Better Economic BRICs”, O’Neill identified the BRIC countries as the new emerging global economies. O’Neill projected that the four countries’ economies together would grow larger than the G6 (i.e. the G7 without Canada) by 2040. Already, BRICs are exceeding this initial forecast (O’Neill and Stupnytska 2009).

Their rapidly growing economies were the hallmark that made O’Neill think of the four countries as one group. China, for instance, being the BRIC with the fastest growing economy, had an increase of 3 trillion GDP dollars from 2003 to 2009. “It’s the equivalent of China having created two United Kingdoms in seven years” (Jim O’Neill 2009a). Thus, it was predominantly their common economic features that were the reasons for why O’Neill united them under one acronym. Eight years after the term’s naissance, however, the BRIC countries convened their first joint summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, making the term into a political reality as well. Out of the Summit came a cross-continent political institution and a joint declaration stating, inter alia, their common vision on global governance, international economic and financial issues, international trade, development and commitment to joint cooperation. In their 2nd Summit, they BRICs stated that:

*We reaffirm our commitment to advance cooperation among BRIC countries in science, culture and sport*” (II BRIC Summit – Joint Statement 2010:7)

It is this statement that encourages my thesis. It forces the question of why four politically, geographically and, last but certainly not least; culturally different countries wish to advance cooperation within these fields. In order to acquire an in-depth understanding of the motivation behind this statement, I have limited the thesis to focus on the cultural part of the statement. My research therefore sets out to study how the statement of reaffirmed commitment to advance cooperation on culture manifests itself in the World’s only global intergovernmental organization with a mandate on culture,
namely the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and its World Heritage Committee.

My research question reads as follows;

*How and to what extent does the BRICs’ joint statement of culture cooperation manifest itself in UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee?*

### 1.1 Building BRICs

Needless to say, the BRICs are as culturally distinct as they are geographically divided. They share no common language or history, and even their respective forms of central governance differ, varying from democracy to one-party states. The four countries never, at least publicly, conceived of themselves as one unit. The BRIC countries bilaterally and trilaterally, however, have been and are still linked through various accords between the capitals. Examples include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which was established as a border security strategy between, inter alia, Russia and China, but serves also as a means to strengthen the geopolitical position of the East and uphold the multipolar world order (Tsygankov 2006:149). Moreover, the SCO served as regional joint attempt to find solutions to international and regional problems, and to promote regional economic and cultural cooperation (Lukin 2007:1). Other Cross-continental collaboration agreements are found in the tripartite IBSA group uniting India, Brazil and South Africa. IBSA seeks to invigorate South-South cooperation, as well as enhance cooperation on a wide range of hard- as well as soft policy issues (Manmohan Singh, 2010). Other bilateral agreements between the BRIC members include the “strategic partnership” that since 2005 has formalized the diplomatic relation between China and India, aiming to settle the long-lasting Himalayan border dispute, and to boost economic and trade cooperation (Huanxin 2005:1).

What this shows is that the BRIC countries have been connected through various agreements across their national borders. Nevertheless, the motivations behind the establishment of cross-continental and cross-cultural BRIC cooperation are still unclear. Finding the common denominators that unite this group therefore requires extensive examination. Some shared attributes are the structural features that they had in common at the time of their naissance: large populations, underdeveloped economies
and governments that appeared willing to embrace some of the elements of globalisation. Another aspect was their position at the time of the 9/11-terror attack. Among other things, what the attack represented was strong resentment towards the US and Western-led globalisation process. The attack was a powerful demonstration that the non-Western world was starting to matter more and more. And the BRIC countries – being increasingly important actors in the globalization process – were, together with the rest of the world, reminded of the power domination of the West, and that the power distribution in the world order was somewhat unfair (Tett 2010). Moreover, the expansion of the G8 to G20 also signalled the increased economic position of developing countries (Keohane and Underdal 2011:60). As Jim O’Neill suggests, the BRICs and the rest of the world became aware of the weakened position of the US and the role that they could play in the future globalization process. “In the back of 9/11, the message was; if the world is going to thrive, globalisation cannot be Americanisation” (Jim O’Neill 2010c)

The recent inclusion of South Africa into the acronym, making the BRICs into BRICS, further complicates the hunt for the common denominator of the group. Moreover, it indicates their ambitions and potential vigorousness. As South Africa joined the club of rising powers after the time of data collection, this thesis is concerned with the BRICs without the capital S.

1.2 Towards “BRICanisation”?
There are many and varying speculations as to why the BRICs have come to formalise their cooperation. Equally varying are the projected trajectories for the BRICs’ role and future position in the international order. Scholars belonging to the realist school of international relations would argue that the BRICs use their power to overthrow the existing world order and seek vengeance for the decade-long dominance of the US and the West in the international system. John Ikenberry’s (1980) description of the US’ exercise of hegemonic power during the post-war years, suggest that this has evoked hostilities and desires to reduce the US’ enjoyment of the unipolar power structure. Other, less dramatic projections suggest that the BRICs seek to adapt to the existing international order (Glosny 2010) and that they have no ambitions to avenge US
dominance. The BRIC trajectory is yet to be formulated, but looking at certain aspects that the BRICs have in common may go some way in mapping out possible paths.

Collectively, the four countries make up 40 per cent of the World’s population. Their annual GDP in 2009 ranks the BRIC countries at respectively 8th, 12th, 10th and 3rd on the list of the World’s largest economies (World Bank, 2009). Their individual military capacity, for instance, accounts to an annual sum of respectively 33.5, 58.6, 41.2 and 119.4 billion US dollars for each of the BRICs (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2010) giving them a collective strategic strength that certainly challenges the dominance of the US that characterized the last decade.

“It’s the world turned upside-down. The US is certainly not going to be anywhere near its dominance in the next coming decades” (Jim O’Neill 2010b) As O’Neill argues, the geopolitical paradigm is changing. With the BRICs’ increasing economic power, comes their demand for an international position that reflects their capacities on the global arena. This is clearly demanded in their Joint Declaration of 2009.

> We are committed to advance the reform of international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the world economy. The emerging and developing economies must have greater voice and representation in international financial institutions. (I BRIC summit – Joint Declaration 2009:1)

The 2009 financial crisis further proved the economic power of the BRICs. While the US – long serving as the global economic backbone – was heavily hit by the crisis, the BRIC countries, especially China, survived the crisis without severe injuries. Rather, BRIC countries such as China and Brazil who once begged the US and Western-defined financial institutions for financial support were suddenly the ones feeding into the global economic reserves of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This, together with their growing economic size, may have reminded the BRIC countries that they were worthy of a stronger voice in the global financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. This may be what motivates them to push for reform of the global financial system and to call for the introduction of an alternative currency to the dollar as the World’s reserve currency (BRIC Summit – Joint Declaration 2009, 2010, 2011).

Projecting the consequences that a shift from the US dollar as reserve currency would have on global affairs is beyond the scope of this analysis, but if the BRICs were to utilise
their own trade currency amongst themselves, it would undoubtedly weaken the US’
global capabilities. What this suggests is that weakening the role of the US may be one of
the motivations behind BRIC cooperation. Whether or not this is verifiable is yet to be
seen, but this, together with other policy factors such as the fact that all of the BRIC
countries practice “territorial denial” against the US¹ (Skak 2010, Kraft 2010) support
this assumption.

The BRICs are also demanding their voices be heard in global non-financial institutions.
In the UN for instance, Russia and China, holding permanent membership to the UN
Security Council, call for a stronger representation of the current Council members
This, together with China and Russia’s veto against the American intervention in Iraq
and the collective BRIC countries’ recent abstention from the UN vote on military action
in Libya, may indicate that the group strive to gain political clout on the international
arena. If these assumptions are correct, one could assume that the BRICs seek to shift
the geopolitical axis east- and southwards and to rectify the imbalance between the
West and the “Rest” that for long has prevailed in the international order (Underdal &
Keohane 2011, Barma et. al 2009) The following quote from the Joint Declaration of
2010 illustrates their explicit endeavour of developing a multipolar world order in
which international law, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of non-
interference in domestic affairs prevails:

*We underline our support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order,
based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated
action and collective decision-making of all States (II BRIC Summit – Joint
Declaration, 2010:1).*

### 1.3 Building BRICs in UNESCO

The Joint Declarations from the BRIC Summits proves the widespread assumption that
BRIC countries endeavour to sustain the role and importance of the UN in the
international arena. The UN and other global intergovernmental organizations have
never been as influential on world politics as they are today (Barnett and Finnemore
2004:1). They define global, nationally transcendent problems and initiate action (Boli

¹ Territorial denial entails refusing any US’ military activity within their respective borders.
and Thomas 1999 a, b; Finnemore 1996; Meyer et.al 1997). Relying on these premises, possessing the power to influence and control the dynamics and outcomes of international organization, is a valuable source of power in international relations. (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:894ff, Nye 1990, see also section 7.3)

If you look at these [intergovernmental] organisations, they are all remnants of World War II. The main benefit that I observe of them [the BRICs] meeting and pronouncing together, is that it should embarrass the US and the G7 members, and the heads of the IMF and the other “true” global organisations. (...) To get a move-on with making our global organisations more representative. (Jim O’Neill 2010b)

Whether the BRICs’ motivations are what Jim O’Neill portrays above remains to be examined. There is little doubt, however, that the BRICs seek to enhance their position within the world’s international organisations. Strengthening their position within UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee (also referred to as the Committee) may be a clever step towards increased influence in the international society. This is because UNESCO, as a “soft issue” organization with a mandate on culture, may serve as an arena to promote national culture and -supremacy. Moreover, the World Heritage Committee holds weak sanctuary capacity, but influence state behaviour and encourages compliance through standard setting instruments and normative discourses (Turtinen 2006:13). The normative approach that UNESCO takes on is illustrated in the Organisation’s working methods:

UNESCO works to create the conditions for dialogue among civilizations, cultures and peoples, based upon respect for commonly shared values. It is through this dialogue that the world can achieve global visions of sustainable development encompassing observance of human rights, mutual respect and the alleviation of poverty, all of which are at the heart of UNESCO’S mission and activities. (UNESCO 2001)

Thus, through conventions, recommendations, declarations and resolutions as well as a normative discourse, international organisations contribute to defining problems and shaping states’ interests, perceptions and reactions toward certain problems (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:3). This is highly pertinent characteristics of the World Heritage Convention, which makes it an influential tool in the international arena. Moreover, UNESCO’s slogan reflects the cognitive influence that the organisation aims to exercise:
Since wars began in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.

The World Heritage Committee represents an arena for discussing preservation and conservation of the world's cultural and natural heritage, but it also serves as an arena where ideas are developed and constructed, and where ideological and cultural influence may affect states and their perceptions of problems, practices and the social reality (Turtinen 2006:14). Relying on the premises of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:903) who claim that emergence and establishment of norms have a significant influence on state behaviour in international organisations, one can assume that much political power lies within the construction of norms. Therefore, being a norm entrepreneur in a norm generating organization such as UNESCO may be a potent political strategy that the BRICs seek to endorse. Thus, the power to influence the “minds of men” might be what encourages the BRICs to enhance cooperation on culture.

1.4 The political side of the World Heritage Emblem
As argued above, the World Heritage Committee may contribute to norm diffusion and to shaping and defining ideas. The World Heritage Convention also encapsulates material assets through its economic, social and environmental potential, which brings in a political dimension into the World Heritage Convention. World Heritage as a brand is becoming increasingly recognised and the designation represents a “powerfully evocative symbol” (Jason and Sari 2010:534). Having a property enlisted almost exclusively produces revenues through increased tourism, investments and employment. (Bandarin, Hosagrahar and Sailer Albernaz 2011:4ff) However, depending on the management and organisational structures associated with the World Heritage Site, the listing of a site (also referred to as property) can generate vast benefits from activities associated with it. If managed incorrectly, however, the designation may cause severe damage to the site and to stakeholders involved. This, one has seen examples of in, for instance, Machu Picchu.

Bandarin, Hosagrahar and Sailer Albernaz (2011) have identified how culture generates development, first and foremost with reference to the economic revenues that World Heritage status produces, but in addition to these, they address how World Heritage status generates social spin-offs through crafts, music and other cultural and creative
products at and around World Heritage Sites. Through good management practices, capacity building and training connected to World Heritage Sites, social conditions, awareness and education levels may also improve (Scottish Natural Heritage Commissioned Report 2007:2). The management of the Saint Sebastian Fortress Site in Mozambique serves as a valuable example in this regard. The restoration of a historical cistern at the World Heritage Site did not only employ approximately 100 locally recruited workers, but also resulted in bringing clean water to the local community. Moreover, these activities generated large-scale crafts development, bringing in revenues local stakeholders. What this shows is the economic and socio-economic potential that lies within the World Heritage Convention, which the BRICs and other state parties strive to tap out.

World Heritage status may further generate intangible spin-offs such as increased self-esteem and national identity. The Convention highly recognizes the respect and need for cultural identity and enlisting of properties may strengthen sentiments of pride and local and national affiliation. As addressed by the classic social science-theorists such as Stein Rokkan (1987), these are important elements for acquiring national stability, and are effective tools in the process of state- and nation building. Thus, World Heritage may be an essential tool for national governments in their efforts in upholding territorial integrity and stability.

The democratic effect of World Heritage Status should also be mentioned in this regard. As cultural heritage encapsulates sentiments of pride, identity and resilience, it may prompt empowerment of communities, resulting in broader participation in national and global contexts, facilitating dialogue and fostering social cohesion (Bandarin, Hosagrahar and Sailer Albernaz 2011: 6ff). Moreover, the international recognition and prestige that is associated with the World Heritage status makes the emblem a valuable tool for states parties in their efforts to gain visibility and strengthen the position in the international community.

1.5 Structure of the thesis
This introduction has presented some of the incentives that may motivate the BRICs to articulate their cooperation in the area of culture. It suggested that BRIC cooperation is
motivated by their rising economic powers and the wish to rectify West’s power dominance. I have also suggested that this is not at all the case, and highlighted the economic and socio-political interests that the World Heritage emblem encapsulates.

As little is previously written about the BRICs, this thesis takes on a highly explorative approach when I try to answer how and to what extent the BRICs’ statement on culture cooperation manifest itself in UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee. I have set out a study which is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides the necessary empirical background of UNESCO and the World Heritage Convention, its Committee and the bureaucratic processes and institutional framework. Chapter 3 outlines and discusses the research design, which triangulates between three different methods. Theoretical perspectives on coalition formation and multilateral negotiations are presented in Chapter 4, developing the analytical framework for the thesis. Having established and discussed the methodological challenges and theoretical expectations, Chapter 5 sets out to statistically test whether the assumption presented here, that of BRIC cooperation motivated by a wish to diminish American and Western cultural hegemony, finds empirical support. The conclusions from Chapter 5 establish the point of departure for the next part of the thesis. This is explored in Chapter 6, in which the findings of the statistical analysis are examined further through qualitative research strategies. Chapter 7 uses the theoretical framework to discuss the findings from Chapter 5 and 6 and, before summarising and landing on a conclusion in Chapter 8.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation is, through the integration of the World Heritage Convention, the only intergovernmental organisation with a global mandate on culture. The cultural mandate of UNESCO is assured by The Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, commonly known as the World Heritage Convention (hereinafter referred to as the Convention), which came into being when it was adopted by UNESCO’s General Conference at its 17th session in Paris, 1972.

The World Heritage Convention is commonly referred to as UNESCO’s flagship, and the Convention in itself is claimed to be the world’s most significant heritage conservation agreement for preservation of the World’s cultural and natural heritage (Cameron & Rössler (pre-printed paper 2011:2)\(^2\) The Convention states that; “parts of the world’s heritage are of outstanding interest and need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole” (Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972:preface).

### 2.1 The Outstanding Universal Value of World Heritage sites

There are currently 911 World Heritage Sites (also referred to as properties) spread across 151 countries represented on the World Heritage List. The List is amended annually when state parties of the Convention, holding membership in the World Heritage Committee, come together and create a “fictive moral and political community” in which humanity and the world are perceived as one unit (Turtinen 2006:53). This entails that when sites are inscribed on the World Heritage List, it is removed from its national context and placed in a global context in which its value becomes universal for all humanity. It is this idea – that of universality and the world as one unit – which make...
up the key framework of World Heritage, namely that each World Heritage site must be of *Outstanding Universal Value* (OUV). The concept of OUV is what makes properties qualify for inscription on the World Heritage List, and is defined by the Convention text as follows;

> Outstanding universal value means cultural and/or natural significance, which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity. As such, the permanent protection of this heritage is of the highest importance to the international community as a whole. The Committee defines the criteria for the inscription of properties on the World Heritage List.³ (Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, 2005: para. 49)

*Cultural* heritage of OUV refers to history, art or science in the case of “monuments” and “groups of buildings”, and to historical aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of view in the case of “sites”. *Natural* heritage of OUV would apply to natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, or areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation. (The World Heritage Convention 1972: art. 1 and 2)

2.1.1 **Organisational structure**

Identifying and defining World Heritage is an extensive process involving a set of defined procedures, routines, concepts, criteria and actors with various tasks. All elements in the process are regulated by the Convention and its rules of procedures, which are encapsulated in the Convention’s implementation tool; *Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention* (hereinafter referred to as the Operational Guidelines (OG)). The OG describes the rules of procedure for inscription, the procedure for protection and conservation of World Heritage Sites, the roles and responsibilities regarding granting of international assistance as well as mobilisation of international support to the Convention.

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³ A site must fulfill certain criteria of authenticity and integrity in order to qualify for World Heritage status. See UNESCO's Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention for description of the criteria for inscription. (WHC. 05/2 2 February 2005 paragraph 77 (i-x))
The World Heritage Committee holds the responsibility to establish, publish and keep up to date the World Heritage List. (The World Heritage Convention 1972: art. 7) The Committee is elected by UNESCO’s General Conference and makes decisions that are to be based on objective and scientific considerations. Thus, the Committee is (intended to be) a politically neutral expert committee, which today consists of 21 members, represented by state parties elected by UNESCO’s General Conference. A Committee member’s term of office is for six years, but according to customs, most State parties choose voluntarily to be Members of the Committee for only four years. Within the period in which the data for this study is collected the BRICs have held Committee membership for the following terms: Brazil 2007 – 2011; Russia 2001 – 2005 and 2009 – 2013; India 2001 – 2007; China 1999 – 2005 and 2007 – 2011.

Seven of the 21 Committee members make up the World Heritage Bureau, which prepares the World Heritage Committee’s work and drafts the decisions that the Committee discusses during the meeting.

The decisions of inscriptions made by the Committee are made on the basis of Expert Bodies’ (here referred to as Advisory Bodies (AB)) technical and scientific assessment of the sites’ OUV. The ABs present their recommended decision for each nomination directly to the Committee (before 2005 the ABs presented and elaborated their recommendations to the Bureau before presenting them to the Committee), which since 2005 has resulted in a broader, and potentially more political and less scientific discussion during the Committee meeting, according to Jokilehto (2011:3). Jokilehto’s assumption is an essential point which is subject to extensive discussion and examination in the later parts of the thesis.

The central administrative function is upheld by the Convention’s Paris-based Secretariat; the World Heritage Centre, which in addition to implementing the decisions of the Committee4, also organises Committee meetings, upholds correspondence with state parties and the ABs, controls economic affairs, as well as holds responsibility to spread information- and knowledge about the Convention.

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4 Except decisions of inscriptions. State parties are responsible for the implementation of the Convention and the protection and conservation of the enlisted sites.
The table below illustrates the structure of the inscription processes for getting a nomination inscribed on the World Heritage List. Only state parties can submit nominations on behalf of themselves. It is during the World Heritage Committee sessions that the discussions take place and where the Committee must be persuaded of a nominated site’s OUV, and as I later will show, this is where political conflicts are latent.

**Table 2. The Inscription Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Parties</th>
<th>The World Heritage Bureau</th>
<th>Decisional phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>submit nominations of national sites that they expect to be of Outstanding Universal Value</td>
<td>makes draft decisions based on the recommendations from the ABs</td>
<td>The World Heritage Committee makes decision of inscription to the List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unesco World Heritage Centre</td>
<td>Evaluation phase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>controls that the nomination dossiers are complete</td>
<td>Advisory Bodies assess the value of the nominated site. Submit their recommendations to the Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 based on Turtinen’s illustration 2006:59
3 Methodological Framework

There are no bullet-proof research designs (David Collier 1995).

The purpose of this Chapter is to present the methodological framework designed to collect and process the data needed to answer the question of how and to what extent BRIC cooperation manifests itself in the World Heritage Convention. Moreover, the Chapter aims to outline and discuss the methodological choices made, in an attempt to make the research design as bullet proof as possible. For inductive studies such as this, where the outcomes of the research methods often are unpredictable and where surprising findings often lead to unanticipated methodological turns, designing an adequate methodological framework is an exacting task. Thus, being explicit about the grounds on which the research strategic choices are made is, as King, Keohane and Verba (1994:8) emphasise, crucial for enabling others to discuss and criticise the research design, and for assessing the reliability and validity of the data collected. The following pages are therefore dedicated to outline the methodological exercise and argue how the framework developed here will answer the research question.

3.1 Studying BRICs in the World Heritage Committee

The comprehensive study of the BRICs in the World Heritage Committee is a study of how and to what extent BRIC cooperation is designed and operationalized in the universe of intergovernmental organisations. The overarching research design embedded in this thesis is a case study design. Case studies are generally associated with qualitative research strategies and are suitable for small N-, in-depth analyses (Gerring 2007:18, George and Bennet 2005:17). A case study may be understood as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study – at least in part – is to shed light on a larger set of cases” (Gerring 2007:20). Although often associated with qualitative methods, there is no rigid universal methodology recipe for case studies. The strategy used for this study triangulates between quantitative analyses and qualitative

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As quoted in R. Doorenspleet and E. Mastenbroek (2008:2)
interviews. This is a somewhat unconventional case study recipe, but no less a good strategy that will collect the data needed for answering the research question.

The complexity of the BRIC phenomenon is the main reason behind the choice of a multi-strategy research design. The newness of the phenomenon reduces the extent to which existing literature is of aid, and further calls for an exploring research approach to the phenomenon. Furthermore, obtaining insight into the intricate context surrounding the BRICs necessitates multiple research methods, as one method alone cannot grasp the complexity of the processes and the organisational contexts in which the BRICs act. The mix between qualitative and quantitative methods will by no means provide perfect insight into the phenomenon, but it enhances the understanding of the political reality (Doorenspleet & Mastenbroek 2007:18). Nevertheless it enables me to reap off the benefits of each method while at the same time limiting their weaknesses, which contributes to enhancing the reliability and validity of the inferences of the study. The statistical method’s strength in detecting tendencies and falsifying theoretical assumptions (George & Bennet 2007:18), is highly valuable for this study. These benefits serve a valuable purpose for this analysis, as is detects information about the BRIC phenomenon that determines the next, qualitative step of the analysis, which allows me to study the tendencies more in-depth and illuminate eventual unforeseen correlations.

3.2 Collecting and applying quantitative data

The statistical analyses conducted in this study serve two functions. The first is to examine the existence of what I call a “Western bias” in the World Heritage Committee. Second, is to establish a point of departure for the qualitative analysis. The quantitative analyses detect tendencies and interesting findings that the qualitative analysis sets out to examine in-depth.

The data collected for the statistical analysis consists of nominations submitted to the Committee between 2002 -2010. Here, I have created a dataset based on the nominations submitted to the Committee. I have coded the variables according to the nominations’ respective decisions, country/region origin, time of submission, recommendation by the ABs, BRIC/not BRIC, and whether the nomination’s decision aligns with the ABs’ recommendation. N = 328 and the nominations make up the units in
the dataset. I have limited the scope of the quantitative analysis to only entail decisions regarding inscription of sites, and not other decisions that the Committee makes. The timeframe from 2002 – 2010 is based on the BRICs’ history, and is limited to the year before the BRIC concept became internationally known\(^7\). I found it appropriate to gather data from before the term’s (international) naissance and up until today, in order to detect eventual temporal changes before and after BRICs’ naissance. All units fulfil information on all variables, thus there are no missing values. Moreover, the sample of units equals the universe, making the role of the standard deviation estimate of limited substantial value as the data fully reflect the social reality. As the dependent variable in all analyses is dichotomous, binary logistic analyses are conducted.

All decisions are publically available on UNESCO World Heritage Centre's website and have been downloaded from there (see literature list) and coded into the variables used in the analysis. In Chapter 5 I discuss and operationalize the variables.

### 3.3 Collecting and applying qualitative data

As the analysis will show, the multi-strategic research design allows me to explore the tendency detected in the quantitative analysis further. Moreover, it allows me to look for support for the proposed assumptions as well as other explanations behind the BRIC cooperation.

#### 3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews

Two methods stand out as adequate strategies for answering the research question: *document analysis* and *qualitative interviews*. Minutes from the Committee meetings would have provided valuable insight into the BRIC phenomenon. Because the written reports from the last two\(^8\) World Heritage Committee sessions are inaccessible per the time of research, the document analysis consists of decisions from the 34\(^{th}\) Session as

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\(^7\) The concept was invented in 2001, but received full attention with O'Neill's Report of 2003 "Dreaming with BRICs: the path to 2040"

\(^8\) The last two Sessions from 2009 and 2010 are the ones of interest because these found place after the formalisation of the cooperation.
well as a White Paper from the Norwegian and Swedish Governments, reflecting the 34th Committee Meeting in Brasilia, 2010. The latter method, qualitative interviews, comes in many forms. *Semi-structured interviews* serve as a middle ground between unstructured interviews - best suited as a source of insight into a phenomenon, and structured interviews with closed-ended questions - suited for hypothesis-testing, but without flexibility to provide detailed and nuanced information about the subject (Bryman 2004, Andersen 2006:279). Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions capture the benefits of both methods, and may thus provide details, depth, the insider-perspective, while at the same time allowing hypothesis testing (Leech 2002:665).

“The best interviewer is not the one who writes the best questions. Rather, excellent interviewers are excellent conversationalists” (Berry 2002:679). As Berry’s argument underscores, semi-structured interview is a dynamic process between the researcher and the informant. The unstructured, open-ended features of this method is highly pertinent for this study. For research on complex phenomena such as this, where informal meetings, diplomatic relations, cognitive influences and personality factors may play a significant role in the negotiation dynamics and –outcomes (Hampson 1995:15), the interview situation may enable met acquire extensive knowledge about the phenomenon and detect unanticipated mechanisms and correlations. By leading the conversation into areas in which I desire more insight and by asking follow-up questions, I can get deeper into the empirical material. The informants may thus provide me with unique in-depth and nuanced information that neither quantitative analyses, nor literature or written records would grasp. That the researcher takes an active role does not, however, mean that the researcher should dominate or override the conversation. (Andersen 2006:287).

The open dynamics and the lack of structure that characterise this method may contest the reliability and objectivity of the information acquired. In order to enhance reliability and maximise the benefits of the interview method, Andersen (2006:287) suggests that the researcher be active in a way that enables her/him to balance between an open
conversation and hypothesis testing during the interview. This exercise requires a well-prepared interviewer that possesses knowledge, and holds expectations of what will be said and found during the interview. Exactly how prepared the researcher ought to be is disputed among scholars, as some claim that too much knowledge may lead to prejudice and bias the data (Andersen 2006:286), whereas others recommend that the researcher “play dumb” in order to acquire as extensive information possible (Leech 2002:665). I will use elements of both tactics in order to maximise the benefits of each.

Whatever interview-tactic used, an interview guide may balance and structure the interview. In developing the guide, the question order and the manner in which the questions are asked should be considered thoroughly, as they may influence and bias the response (Leech 2002:666, Bryman 2004:110) and jeopardize reliability and validity of the data. In order to detect why and how the BRIC cooperation manifests itself in the World Heritage Committee Meeting, the interview guide is deliberately developed in a way that leaves out the term BRIC in the first part of the interview, enabling me to play “dumb” as Leech (2002:665) recommends. This is a measure taken in order to increase reliability and validity as it avoids setting any guidelines for what the respondent should feel is important to mention. Using an interview strategy such as this is not to be understood as an attempt to confuse or mislead the informants, but rather a way to reduce the risk of biasing the data.

3.4 Considerations regarding reliability and validity

“All inference – in quantitative and in qualitative research – is uncertain” (King, Keohane & Verba 1994:31). Presenting and discussing my research design in this Chapter, is an effort to increase the certainty of the inferences from this research. Keeping in mind, however, that no research designs are bulletproof as expressed by Collier (1995), this section sets out to discuss some the threats towards this study’s reliability and validity.

While the quantitative analyses provide precise quantitative estimates for reporting of errors and certainty, there are no exact estimates of the certainty of my conclusions from the qualitative interviews. The lack of standardisation in the qualitative data collection process therefore constitutes the greatest threat towards reliability and validity of this thesis. Moreover, the subjectivity in the interviewees’ answers as well as
my own subjectivity is a possible source of bias that is difficult to avoid when conducting semi-structured interviews. The measures taken in order to reduce the risk of bias, has been to not mention the BRICs in the beginning of the interview, and to include politically neutral observers into the arsenal of informants. Andersen (2006:283 - 285), however, has an interesting point with regards to qualitative methods and subjectivity. He argues that qualitative interviews may enhance reliability and validity, as the dynamic interview situation enables the interviewer to understand the relation between subjectivity and the social reality much better, than do quantitative methods. This reduces bias in the data. Andersen's argument is valuable here, as the interview situation allowed me to get an impression of the informants’ perception of BRIC cooperation. Another obstacle to reliable and valid data, is the fact that one of the BRICs are missing among my informants, and, moreover, the overarching possibility that bilateral agreements among the BRICs are falsely interpreted as representative of the BRIC as a group.

With regards to the quantitative analysis, it is the small N of 328 that constitutes the greatest threat to reliability, and increases the likelihood of making type 2 errors, which is to falsely accept the null-hypothesis. Triangulating between qualitative and quantitative methods is a strategy reduces the risk of doing type 2 errors, and enhances the confidence of the inferences made from this analysis. It should be emphasises that the multi-strategic research design significantly enhances the confidence of my inferences and produces data that with certainty may be considered reliable.

Having presented my research strategy developed for collecting and applying the data for this analysis, the next Chapter sets out to present the theoretical framework developed for the analysis.
4 Theoretical perspectives

The purpose of this chapter is to present theoretical perspectives that relate to the research question of why and to what extent the BRICs statement of cooperation on culture manifests itself in the World Heritage Committee. Moreover, it develops an adequate theoretical framework which will serve as a reference point in the analysis of BRIC behaviour in the World Heritage Committee. The newness of the phenomenon, and the complexity of the setting in which the BRICs operate, calls for the use of multiple theoretical approaches. I here make use of three theoretical perspectives. The first, coalition theories suggest when coalitions occur and what they seek to achieve. As these are developed for parliamentary negotiation settings, they do not fully apply to multilateral negotiations. For this reason I look towards Joseph Nye’s Soft Power theory in order to complement the coalition theories’ suggestions of what may encourage coalition formation. Having established a theoretical framework for understanding why coalitions emerge, I confer approaches within negotiation theory, as these propose how the negotiation setting influences state behaviour and coalition formation.

4.1 Coalition theories

Coalitions are unique features of multilateral negotiations. They serve different functions, have different objectives and roles and use different strategies in various negotiation settings. Coalition is here defined after Wagner's concept (1988) and understood as “the unification of power or resources (or both) of two or more parties so that they stand a better chance of obtaining a desired outcome or of controlling others not included in the coalition” (Wagner 1988:461-481 as quoted in Ulrichsen 2002:24). What outcomes coalitions desire to obtain, however, is subject to discussion subsequently. Within the existing literature on coalition theory, one may distinguish between two different “groups”, depending on their perceptions of when and why coalitions occur (Underdal and Midgaard 1977:340). “Apolitical” coalition theories of Riker (1962) make up the first group, while the second group constitutes “policy distance” theories of Axelrod (1970) and De Swaan (1973).
4.1.1 **Apolitical coalition theories**
The apolitical coalition theories view the negotiation setting as a static situation in which actors are sole and rational entities, who seek to maximise net benefit. According to Riker (1962), the sole purpose of coalition formation is coalition success, which is defined as winning the majority of a decision-making body. Winning the majority is further expected to increase the actors’ net gains. What the coalition wins is presumed to be a *fixed pot*, which the coalition members share. In order to keep the dispersal of the pot as minimal as possible, coalitions will entail no surplus members than those needed to win the majority (Riker 1962:32-46). Riker’s theory, however, presupposes that the negotiated issue has a dichotomous outcome, i.e. that the actors either win or lose, and that “the winner takes it all” (Underdal and Midgaard 1977:340).

Riker’s definition of coalition success is too narrow to sufficiently explain the BRICs in the World Heritage context. There are several reasons for this. First, Riker’s theory is developed within the context of parliamentary decision-making bodies, and not within international negotiation contexts where the decision rules often are based on consensus and not majority rule. Second, in multilateral negotiations, there may well be other benefits of joining a coalition than the shared payoffs among the winning coalition members. Third, the perception of negotiation outcomes as dichotomous, does not match coalition formation in consensus-based multilateral organisations, where neither negotiation success nor coalition success are easily categorised as a win or lose.

4.1.2 **Policy distance theories**
The policy distance theory of Axelrod (1979) and De Swaan (1973) is also developed within parliamentary decision-making bodies, but as they operate with different presuppositions of coalition formation, it applies to the multilateral negotiation context. The basic notion of Axelrod and De Swaan’s policy distance-theory is that actors strive to be included in a winning coalition that they expect to adopt a policy which is as close as possible to their own most preferred policy (De Swaan 1973:88). Success of a coalition is still operationalized in terms of winning or losing the majority of the decision-making body, but the policy-distance theory suggests that actors assess the value of a coalition according to the proximity of the coalition’s expected policy to their own political preferences. The value of a coalition is hence contingent upon the political
distance between the coalition members’ political preferences. This means, the degree to which the coalition members gather around a common political goal (De Swaan 1973:88). All coalitions do not have the same likelihood of forming, as the political distance between the negotiating actors will affect coalition formation.

The policy distance theory further differs from that of Riker, as it does not presume that there is a fixed pot to be shared among the coalition members. Therefore, coalitions will not necessarily strive to stay minimal, as Riker presupposes, but may well include unnecessary members. They may even include all actors in a decision making body (De Swaan 1973:88). This is because the value of a coalition is defined as the sum of the policy distance between the members, and not as the distribution of the pot of limited material goods. Nevertheless, it is likely that the smaller the policy distance the larger the gains.

4.1.3 Common aversions and blocking coalitions
Keeping the idea of some sort of common political preference in mind, the policy distance theory opens up for another approach to understanding coalition formation, namely coalitions emerging as a result – not of proximate political preferences – but of common political aversion. The coalition members may not have a uniform perception of what policy should be executed, but may be united through a unanimous perception of what policy should not be executed.

Unlike dilemmas of common interests, in which the actors have a common interest in insuring a particular outcome, the actors caught in the dilemma of common aversions have a common interest in avoiding a particular outcome (A. Stein 1982:309).

Stein’s assumption is supported by Hampson’s argument that opposing interests, manifested through blocking coalitions may act to prevent agreement on or implementation of a treaty (Hampson 1995:30). Blocking coalitions are often comprised by states that possess enough structural power that their refusal to arrive at a solution will be sufficient to prevent the settlement of an agreement (Hampson 1995:30). Stein’s and Hampson’s idea of coalition formation as a result of common political aversion is

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10 Policy distance is defined in terms of weights (votes) and policy positions of the actors (De Swaan 1973:88)
therefore relevant for this study, as the thesis already has suggested that the BRICs are united through a common resentment towards the US’ dominance of the international order. Moreover, given the BRICs vast differences in all aspects, it seems easier to unite around a common aversion rather than a common political preference.

4.2 Objectives of coalition formation

The coalition theories presented hitherto presuppose that winning the majority of the decision-making body or securing a particular negotiation outcome is the purpose of coalition formation. As the negotiation outcomes of the World Heritage Committee, i.e. inscriptions to the World Heritage List, cannot be put into a fixed pot, nor easily be measured in terms of policy distance, securing a particular negotiation outcome may not be of primary concern for the World Heritage Committee members. The negotiation process, however, may encapsulate political incentives and interests. As UNESCO and the Committee represents an organisation where “soft issues” are debated and where culture and norms may be spread, there may be potent political goods embedded in the negotiation setting. Considering the fact that the World Heritage Committee works under consensus, further feeds into this assumption.

Conferring Joseph Nye’s Soft Power theory gives reason to devote attention to the negotiation process as a political arena. Nye argues that traditional “hard power” i.e. command power defined by military resources, are to an increasing extent being replaced by what he calls co-optive “soft power”. Nye defines this as the “ability to make others want what you want” (1980:166) and can further be understood as “the ability to shape the preferences of others” (Keohane and Underdal 2011:53). Nye argues that soft power assets, such as ideological power, media power, persuasion-power, and the power to shape and decide the international agenda are becoming increasingly important in the international society. This suggests that states interact with the aim to exercise and enhance their soft power resources when acting in the World Heritage Committee Multilateral negotiations generally, and the World Heritage Committee specially, may be an ideal arena to communicate and strengthen these assets. If further understanding soft power as the ability to influence and define the norms of international society, and if relying on the premises of Finnemore and Sikkink
who address the power of norm-entrepreneurs\textsuperscript{11}, holding soft power capabilities may be a significant source of power to influence international dynamics, and hence something that the BRICs strive to achieve.

\textbf{4.3 Negotiation theory}

The idea that the negotiation process itself may generate payoffs finds support in the \textit{process analysis approach} to negotiation. This approach is less concerned with rationality and concerns about a particular outcome as a determinant of state behaviour and negotiation outcomes, as do the traditional theories of explaining multilateral negotiations (Hampson 1995:15). The process analysis approach holds that the broader environmental context surrounding the negotiation process affects state behaviour and negotiation outcomes. Moreover, that situational pressures, cognitive influences, personality factors and interaction factors influence the actors involved in negotiations (Hampson 1995:15). Most essential, however, is that the process analysis approach treats multilateral negotiations as a \textit{process} and holds that negotiation outcomes and emerging coalitions are results of a “sequence of connected events” rather than something fixed and static, as Riker suggests. Further, the process-oriented approach treats negotiation as an integrative process where the creation of new norms and values, as well as evolution of trust and reciprocity, is considered valuable payoffs of the negotiation process.

As multilateral negotiations typically go through different phases, one may assume that these also influence coalition formation. Equally, one may assume that the presence of coalitions during the different negotiation phases give and indication of the “depth” of the coalitions. During the first phase of negotiations, the \textit{pre-negotiation phase}, is the phase were where one or more parties consider their behavioural options prior to the formal negotiations (Hampson 1995:25). Finding evidence of BRIC cooperation in this phase may therefore indicate that the BRICs coordinate their efforts and that the cooperation is solidly manifested in the Committee. The second phase, the \textit{negotiation phase}, is the phase in which the formal negotiations take place and where coalitions are

\textsuperscript{11}Finnemore and Sikkink argue that defining and developing norms is a significant source of power and of influence in the dynamics in international organisation. (1998:894ff)
formed. One may thus assume that coalitions that emerge during this phase may just as well be a result of randomly coinciding positions among actors as of planned and coordinated actions.

The three phases of negotiation and their content can be illustrated as follows:\textsuperscript{12}:

\textbf{Table 4.3 Phases of Negotiation}\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline
1 Prenegotiation \hspace{2cm} \\
\hline
\textbullet Problem identification \\
\textbullet Search for options \\
\textbullet Commitment to negotiate \\
\textbullet Agreement to negotiate \\
\hline
2 Negotiation \hspace{2cm} \\
\hline
\textbullet Agenda debate \\
\textbullet Search for principles \\
\textbullet Issue definition \\
\textbullet Bargaining concessions \\
\textbullet Details of agreement \\
\hline
3 Agreement and Implementation \hspace{2cm} \\
\hline
\textbullet Mutual Commitments \\
\textbullet Accommodation \\
\textbullet Verification and compliance \\
\textbullet Implementation \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{4.3.1 External and internal negotiation groups}

During the different phases of negotiation various groups emerge (Ulrichsen 2002:18). Buzan (1980) distinguishes between \textit{informal external} and \textit{–internal} groups present in multilateral negotiations. What distinguishes these groups is the motivation behind their formation, their function within the negotiations, and their temporal perspective (Ulrichsen 2002:18). \textit{External groups} have a general purpose and hold a long-term perspective. These groups often emerge and exist outside of the negotiation forum and are established on the basis of geographical, political or cultural commonalities. They have as primary priority to uphold its longstanding structures and to promote a common policy line. This is reflected by the fact that these groups often are coordinated

\textsuperscript{12}The third phase of negotiations is when parties reach a preliminary settlement and seek to translate these into concrete actions (Hampson 1995:28). This phase is of less relevance for the study of coalition formation, and is therefore not elaborated upon here.

\textsuperscript{13}As illustrated in Hampson 1995:26
and receive instructions from their home governments. Internal groups contrast the external groups in the sense that these are largely ad-hoc groups that emerge within the context of a specific negotiation forum or issue-discussion. They tend to emerge as a reaction to conflicting interests, and evolve and dissolve with the discussions of the issues at stake. Buzan further divides this group into separate categories, of which the common interest groups is relevant to this case.

Common interest groups are made up by states with some shared geographical, functional or policy-attribute and with some common views on the implication of this attribute (Ulrichsen 2002:19). This group is closely related to Axelrod and De Swaan’s policy distance-coalitions, as common interest groups enable coalition formation and mutual support between states with similar preferences. The groups are flexible in the sense that they can easily dissolve in the case of “bad fit” (i.e. that the coalition members don’t arrive at a common platform) and are not limited by structures embedded in groups with long term perspectives. Their purpose is simply to advance or to defend a particular policy (Ulrichsen 2002:19). Buzan’s categorization of negotiation groups is a valuable point of reference for the analysis of the BRICs behaviour, as finding an adequate label will signal the depth of the cooperation and thus indicate the extent to which BRIC cooperation is manifested in the Committee.

4.3.2 Summary

This Chapter has presented theoretical perspectives of when and why coalitions emerge in multilateral negotiations. The coalition theories provide valuable suggestions for when BRIC coalition will form in the World Heritage Committee and to what extent it is manifested. From these theories, I can expect that the BRICs will form a coalition if they share a preferred negotiation outcome, and if they expect that they by acting together will achieve this objective, as suggest the coalition theories. Joseph Nye’s Soft Power Theory and Finnemore and Sikkink’s demonstration of power through norm-entrepreneurship, this Chapter further suggests that the negotiation process encapsulates interests that motivate the BRICs. Negotiation theory suggests likewise, and holds that formation of a BRIC coalition it something that happens through a sequence of connected events, in which the environmental context surrounding negotiations is important. Analysing the BRICs with reference to Buzan’s negotiation
groups that occupy the different phases of negotiation will indicate the political anchoring of the BRICs and the degree to which their cooperation is manifested in the Committee.
5 The West and the Rest

Having established the analytical framework, this chapter sets out to examine whether there exists a political divide between the West and the Rest in the World Heritage Committee, by which BRIC cooperation may be motivated. Identifying this is decisive for the next course of the analysis.

The majority of UNESCO’s 911 World Heritage Sites are situated in the Western part of the world (UNESCO World Heritage Centre. Per 31 December 2010). The unequal dispersal of Sites may well raise questions about the credibility of the World Heritage List, as well as the process of inscribing nominations to it (Jokilehto 2011:2ff). Equally, the imbalanced World Heritage List may reflect a disproportional power structure of the international order that dates back to the post World War II era, and to a Western-shaped multilateral order that for decades have favoured the West and hindered the “Rest”14 (Jim O’Neil 2010, Ikenberry 1989, Keohane & Underdal 2011: 1-2). This Chapter sets out to examine whether the unequal number of inscriptions of Western nominations to the World Heritage List is the result of a political bias within the institutional framework of the World Heritage Convention, in favour of the West. If this proves to be the case, rectifying the imbalanced List could be a possible motivation behind the BRIC’s statement of cooperation on culture. The result of this analysis therefore determines the next step of the analysis and serves as point of departure for the qualitative approach.

5.1 Looking for a Western Bias

Throughout the decade that followed the post-war years, the US enjoyed a hegemonic position with extensive economic and military resources. The position allowed the US to lay down much of the premises for the formation of the international order (Ikenberry 1989:115, Keohane & Underdal 2011:1-2), including the United Nations (UN). Relying on the premises of the realist approach to international relations i.e., that institutions

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14 I here operate with three different categories of countries. The West is defined within the traditional geographical boundaries, incorporating the USA and the Western European countries. The Rest is defined and operationalized in two turns: one based on a geographical definition and a second definition is made along a political dimension. This is thoroughly discussed subsequently.
are shaped by state interests and power, one can assume that the Western UN-entrepreneurs made sure that the institutional framework of the organisation was developed in line with Western norms and interests. What this suggests is that the UN, at the time of its establishment, was biased in favour of the US and the West.

65 years after the establishment of the UN, almost all of the world’s state parties have ratified the UN Charter. As “new” nations entered into the Organisation throughout the post-war decades, they implicitly agreed to an institutional and legal framework that they were not part in developing. Rather, they became subject to discourses and norms that they may have felt, and may still feel, alien to. If translating the well-known theory of March and Olsen (2004) to the case of membership to the UN, one could argue that the new members become subjects to the Logic of Appropriateness. From this perspective, actors who enter into already established political institutions tend to become socialised into the formal and informal rules and norms of conduct. As the new actors may be concerned with fulfilling the obligations and expectations encapsulated in certain roles, identities or memberships, they tend to adapt to the already existing institutional framework, rather than trying to change it. Applied to this case, new state parties to UNESCO may be imposed an institutional framework which they do not seek to change as they see fit, but rather, that they strive to integrate into, thus securing the persistence of the institutional framework.

If the “new” members to UNESCO do not agree with the rules and norms of conduct that the West established, and if they do not possess the power or ability to change them, one could well assume the Western-defined norms and interests still remain prominent within the institutional framework. Thus, that there may exist a Western bias\(^\text{15}\) within UNESCO, in favour of the West. For the case of the World Heritage Convention, this may prove evident if the Committee makes decisions in favour of the West, for example by inscribing a higher share of Western nominations on the World Heritage List than nominations submitted by other countries.

\(^{15}\) See definition and operationalization of the term in section 5.1.1
Looking towards the distribution of submitted nominations among the regions in table 5.1, gives alone reason to suppose that there exists a Western bias in the Committee. The table shows that almost 45 per cent of all nominations submitted to the Committee from 2002 – 2010 come from the West. The disproportional extent of submitted nominations may have several explanations, but following the reasoning outlined here, one may well assume that a bias facilitates inscription of Western nominations. Proving the existence of a Western bias, will feed into the assumption that BRIC cooperation is motivated by a wish to rectify the imbalance and to compensate for the long lasting Western dominance in the international order. Put in John Ikenberry’s (1989) terms; that BRIC cooperation is motivated by a wish to undermine Western cultural hegemony.

Table 5.1 Nominations submitted to the World Heritage Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Nominations Submitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The West</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East/Cent Eur</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin-Am/Carib</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-States</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 shows the share of submitted nomination by region, from 2002 – 2010.

5.1.1 Western bias
I expect that a Western bias exists if nominations submitted by the West are more likely to be inscribed on the List than nominations submitted by non-Western countries. Moreover, that the Western nominations are more likely to be recommended for inscription by the ABs, than are non-Western nominations (the role of the ABs and their recommendations is elaborated upon further in section 5.3) Western bias is thus
operationalized as likelihood for having a nomination inscribed, and likelihood for having a nomination recommended for inscription. In order to detect a Western bias, this Chapter sets out to analyse two phases of the inscription process; the decisional phase (the negotiation phase in the Committee) and the evaluation phase, i.e. the process where the ABs assess the OUV of the nominations.

The analysis that follows is many-fold; the first part probes the probability of inscription between the West and the Rest. Here, the effect of two different definitions of the West and the Rest are tried out. First, the analysis examines the effect of a geographically operationalized region-variable on the likelihood of inscription. As the effect proves insignificant, the operationalization of region is expanded to also entail a political dimension. As none of these variables show significant effects on the dependent variable “Inscription”, the study proceeds to look for a Western bias deeper within the inscription process: in the evaluation phase. In this part, the analysis brakes up the dichotomous categorisation of the West and the Rest in order to provide a more thorough and nuanced picture of where in the inscription process the Western bias may be found.

5.2 The West, the Rest and the probability of having a nomination inscribed

The dichotomous dependent variable, “Decision to inscribe/not inscribe”, calls for a binary logistic analysis. This is because logistic analyses allow one to see the linear effect of a variable despite the constraints that follow dichotomous variables with upper and lower value limits (Skog 2009:351-397). The two-fold operationalization of the region variable is done in an effort to detect whether the lack of significant results is caused by inadequate operationalization of region. Moreover, it is done in order to identify whether the effect of region changes with the inclusion of a political dimension into the West-Rest definition.

5.2.1 The effect of geographical region on inscription

The first analysis examines the difference in likelihood for inscription between nominations submitted by the West and the Rest when the two groups are defined
geographically. The definition is made on the basis of UNESCO’s six electoral groups. With minor modifications from this categorisation, the groups are defined as follows:

Group I: EU member states prior to 2010 and North American States
Group II: Eastern (non-EU members) and Central European States
Group III: Latin-American and Caribbean States
Group IV: Asian and Pacific States
Group V: African States
Group VI: Arab States
Group I makes up the West, all other groups are included in the Rest.

Table 5.2.1 Effect of the geographical West on likelihood of inscription

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>(S.E.) b</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept b_0</td>
<td>.869</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to inscribe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nomination/ not inscribe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X_1</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.273</td>
<td>.593</td>
<td>1.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The geographical West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 328
The dependent variable “inscription” holds value 1 = decision to inscribe, and value 0 = decision not to inscribe.
Independent variable, X_1; “The geographical West” holds value 1 = the West and 0 = the Rest.

Interpreting results of logistic analyses
A binary logistic analysis makes it possible to see a linear effect between the variables, through a recoding of the values on the dependent variable to log its, expressed through odds and log odds, which indicate the increase or decrease in the odds of value 1 occurring on the dependent variable with increasing values on the independent variable. As the recoding of the values on the variables makes the interpretation of the results of a logistic analysis far from intuitive, the effect indicated through odds ratio is a valuable tool facilitating the interpretation of the results. Odds ratio >1 indicates that the odds increase with increasing values on the independent variable. Odds ratio <1 indicate that the odds that value 1 occurs on the dependent variable decrease with increasing values on the independent variable. Odds ratio = 1 shows no effect on dependent variable.

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16 Electoral groups are a regional categorisation of state parties.

17 The choice of including Eastern European EU member states that granted EU membership after the 2004-enlargement to Group I, is grounded in the notion that these states to a high degree fill the criteria of Western membership (here defined as commitment to market economy and democracy), and are, thus, more suited with the “West-label” than without.

18 Israel is included in Group II because of its geographical situation.

19 In nominations submitted by more than one state party, region has been decided on the basis of the geographical group that the majority of the state parties represent.
Table 5.2.1 shows that the likelihood of having a nomination inscribed on the List increases with a factor of 1.157 if submitted by a Western country, compared to if submitted by a non-western country. In substantial terms this means that the odds of inscription are 1.157 higher for Western nominations than for others, or that Western nominations hold close to 12 per cent better chance of having a nomination inscribed than do non-Western nominations. The effect is, however, not significant. This may be due to the small N of 328, but also due to inadequate operationalization of the region variable. Therefore, the next section conducts the same analysis, only with an extended operationalization of $X_1$.

5.2.2 The effect of political region on inscription
Although the Committee shall be exempted from political influences, it is an institution made up by political entities. Therefore, the political dimension should be considered when defining criteria for membership of the West. Countries such as New Zealand and Australia are examples of countries that, due to their Western political orientation, justify membership to the West. The extended definition of the region-variable is based on two ideological and institutional criteria for membership to the West: commitment to democracy and market economy. These are the same criteria used for membership in the OECD, and are used in the research of Barma et al. (2009). The following analysis examines the effect of the political West on the likelihood for inscription. When including a political dimension into the analysis, the effect of being a BRIC member should also be tested.

Table 5.3.1 Effect of the political West and of BRICs on likelihood of inscription

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>(S.E.)b</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept $b_0$</td>
<td>.824</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to inscribe nomination or not</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>.421</td>
<td>1.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ The political West</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.396</td>
<td>.592</td>
<td>1.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ BRIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The independent variable, “Inscription” and $X_1$, “the political West” hold the same values as in the previous analysis.

$X_2$ “BRIC” holds value 1=BRIC member and 0=non-BRIC member.

Table 5.3.1 indicates that neither the politically operationalized region variable has a significant effect of likelihood for inscription. Moreover, there is hardly any change in
likelihood of inscription when region is operationalized politically, an increase of only .078. The most plausible explanation behind the weak change is the fact that the two categories of groups are largely overlapping. The results of a bivariate correlation analysis between geographical and political region show a Pearson’s correlation of .784 (See appendix 1) giving support to this explanation. Thus, when defining region by political affiliation instead of geographical situation, there is still no statistically significant basis to claim that the West has a higher probability of having nominations inscribed that do the Rest. Albeit weak, the effect indicates a tendency that aligns with the assumption proposed initially.

The effect of being a BRIC country, $X_2$, has no stronger effect than being a Western country. In fact, the table shows close to identical effect on the dependent variable. A correlation analysis between the $X_1$ and $X_2$ shows a Pearson’s value of -.341. This excludes that the similar effect is due to high correlation between the variables (appendix 1). Neither effects are significant, providing no statistical support for the assumption that Western nominations, from 2002 – 2010, have a higher probability of inscriptions than others, i.e. that the Committee is subject to a Western bias. It should not be undervalued that the results indicate a tendency pointing towards an increased probability of inscription of nominations submitted by Western or BRIC countries. Neither should one infer from these non-findings that a Western bias is non-existent in the World Heritage Committee. The inscription process is multiplex, thus a Western bias may be present elsewhere in the process. For this reason, the next section looks for a Western bias in the evaluation phase, i.e. where the ABs assess whether or not a nomination qualifies for inscription.

5.3 The West, the Rest and the Advisory Bodies

The use of external expert bodies is not unique to the World Heritage Convention, but is a rather common practise within international organisations. Expert bodies are expected to facilitate the decision-making process by developing a consensual knowledge base on which proper and effective decisions may be made (Tora Skodvin, 2000). Moreover, the establishment of expert bodies within international organisations has been a measure taken in order to equalise the alleged disproportional power distribution within UN organisations. The idea is that the expert bodies will provide
politically neutral knowledge and recommendations on which decision can be made. Although politically neutral, the expert bodies have also been subject to political dispute and critique from non-Western state parties (Joyeeta Gupta 1997)\textsuperscript{20} and the knowledge that they create have been subject to political debate.

*The world is divided into two civilisations that interact strongly, albeit in a one-sided way. One civilisation is based on the growth of scientific knowledge, the other demonstrates a more or less passive acceptance of results generated by the first.* (Salomon, 1995:9)

Salomon's observation gives reason to examine whether this is the case within the World Heritage Convention as well, and whether a Western bias exists within the Committee's "knowledge managers", i.e. the ABs.

### 5.3.1 The process of evaluation

Before the Committee meets to decide on inscription of nominations to the World Heritage List, the nominations undergo extensive evaluation by three external Advisory Bodies. These are the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Centre for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). After the evaluation process, the ABs submit their recommendation to the Committee, based on their scientific assessments of the value of the nominated property as well as the sites' State of Conservation (SOC)\textsuperscript{21}

The Committee is by no means obliged to make decisions that align with the recommendations from the ABs, but one can assume that their recommendations influence the decisions of the Committee. If the ABs to a greater extent recommend inscription for nominations from the West than from other regions, it is possible that this explains the high number of Western nominations as shown in 5.1.

\textsuperscript{20} Gupta's findings are discussed in section 7.1.3

\textsuperscript{21} In order to limit the scope of this thesis, I have only included the ABs recommendations regarding inscription of sites, and not regarding sites' SOC
The recommendations from the ABs may fall into the following five categories:

I = inscription
OK = inscription of the nomination to extend an already existing property
R = referral
D = deferral
N = not inscription

Recommendation to refer a property back to the state party entails that the state party should conduct minor modifications of the nomination dossier before it can be resubmitted to the Committee within less than one year. These modifications may be extension of information, modification of formulations etc. Recommendations of deferral are understood as a harder option than referral, as a deferred nomination must undergo substantial revision before it can be resubmitted to the Committee. Recommendations to defer are often a result of inadequately or insufficiently completed nomination dossiers as well as improper formulations of the site’s OUV. (Advisory Bodies’ background information document on referral and deferral of nominations 2010). Table 5.3 below presents the distribution of recommendations from the ABs between the (politically defined) regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political region</th>
<th>The West</th>
<th>Eastern/Central Europe</th>
<th>Latin-America &amp; Caribbean</th>
<th>Asia Pacific</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Arab States</th>
<th>BRIC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABs’ recommendation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inscription</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK Extention</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referral</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferral</td>
<td><strong>17.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not inscribe</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>145</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers show the percentage share of recommendations from the ABs for nominations submitted by countries categorised by political region from 2002 to 2010.

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22 Because the analysis seeks to detect possible political bias in the Committee, including the political definition of the region over the geographical, is logical.
5.3.2 “Defer back to state party”

The table shows that Eastern/Central Europe; Latin-America and the Caribbean; Asia Pacific and Africa have considerable higher shares of nominations recommended for deferral than nominations from the Western and Arab state group. This indicates a possible tendency of deferring nominations from these regions and suggests that a Western bias exists within the ABs. A binary logistic analysis tests the statistical significance of the assumption and whether the likelihood of having nominations recommended for deferral varies across region.

Table 5.3.2 The effect of region on the likelihood for deferral

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and Central Europe</td>
<td>.432</td>
<td>.433</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>1.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>.567</td>
<td>.502</td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>1.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>.439</td>
<td>4.830</td>
<td>.028**</td>
<td>2.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>.700</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>2.757</td>
<td>.097*</td>
<td>2.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab states</td>
<td>-.351</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>.367</td>
<td>.545</td>
<td>.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>.453</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (the West)</td>
<td>-1.521</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>49.366</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 328

**Significant on 5 per cent level
* Significant on 10 per cent level

The results of a binary logistic analysis.
The independent variable “recommendation to defer” holds value 1= “deferral” and 0= “all other recommendations”
All independent variables are recoded into dichotomous variables (see syntax file in Appendix 2). For all independent dummy variables, value 1 indicates the region they represent. Value 0 = every other region.

Table 5.3.2 shows the effect of each region on the likelihood for having a nomination recommended for deferral, relative to the West. The analysis identifies that only Africa and Asia and the Pacific have significant effects on likelihood for deferral. In substantial terms, this indicates that the odds that the ABs will recommend to defer a nomination from these regions increases with a factor of 2.014 if submitted by an African country and of 2.624 if submitted by a country from Asia and the Pacific, than if submitted by a
Western country. The effect of Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean are weak and insignificant. Still, they indicate an interesting tendency directing towards a higher probability of deferral for these non-Western countries than for Western countries.

The dichotomous BRIC variable is included here in order to isolate and examine the effect of BRIC countries on the likelihood of deferral. The table shows a weak negative effect, which indicates that the likelihood for deferral decreases with a factor of .818 if submitted by a BRIC country, than if submitted by a country from the West. A similar effect is detected for Arab nominations, as also these hold a smaller likelihood for having a nomination recommended for deferral than the West. Here, one should consider the fact that these regions submit relatively few nominations to the Committee, which may be the reason why these effects prove not to be significant.

The high standard deviation values prove that even with a liberal level of freedom degrees, the effects are too weak to infer any conclusion. However, one may conclude that the analyses conducted hitherto have detected interesting tendencies directing towards a World Heritage Committee that does not seem to benefit nominations from the “Rest”.

5.4 Politicisation of the Committee

“The World Heritage Committee has, during the last 10-15 years, become increasingly politicised in its work” (Norway’s Report from UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee’s 34th Session in Brasilia July 25- August 3, 2010:3) Not only does the Norwegian report from the 34th Committee Meeting express this impression, but other informal sources of information suggest that there is a widespread perception that the Committee is becoming more politicised. Observers of the Committee argue that politicisation becomes evident through increased lobbying activities among the state parties during the negotiations, and through increased deviation between the decisions of the Committee and recommendations from the ABs.

Politicisation is here understood as state behaviour and activities undertaken in the Committee with the purpose of achieving other goals than those embedded in the Convention text (i.e. goals of preserving the World’s natural and cultural heritage). It is
difficult to measure to what extent states act in accordance with the Convention text, and moreover, to collect quantitative data indicating this. As recommendations from the ABs are supposedly apolitical and submitted with the sole aim of preserving the World’s Heritage, I assume that opposition towards these, and attempts to inscribe nominations that the ABs recommend to defer or refer, indicate politicisation of the Committee. Politicisation is thus operationalized as discrepancy between the recommendation from the ABs and the decision made by the Committee.23

5.4.1 Analysing politicisation of the World Heritage Committee
If the assumptions expressed in the reports and by committee-observers prove right, it opens up for the possibility that the BRICs utilise the Committee for other purposes than those embedded in the Convention, and that there may be other motivations than those associated with a Western bias behind their statement of increased culture cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>(S.E.)b</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept $b_0$</td>
<td>-1.405</td>
<td>.271</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$ Time</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.046*</td>
<td>1.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$ BRIC</td>
<td>-.321</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 328
*Significant on 5 per cent level

Dependent variable “Alignment” holds value 0=alignment between decision and recommendation, and 1=non-alignment.
$X_1$, “Time” holds the values 0=2001, 1=2002, 2=2003 etc.
$X_2$, “BRIC” holds value 0=not BRIC and 1=BRIC.

Table 5.4.1 shows that there is a significant tendency towards a growing discrepancy between recommendations from ABs and Committee decisions over time. The odds of non-alignment increase with a factor of 1.112 each year, meaning that the probability of non-alignment increases by nearly 12 per cent between each Committee meeting. Albeit weak, the effect is significant on a 5 per cent level. Calculating the predicted probability for dealignment in 2002, I find that the probability of alignment was 0.20, whereas it increased to 0.36 in 201024. This suggests that the Committee has close to doubled the

23 I criticise and revise this operationalization in Chapter 7
24 The equation for predicting probability is presented in Tufte (2000:29ff)
amount of decisions that do not align with the recommendations of the ABs during the last 9 years. These effects give sufficient indications to assume that the observers of the Committee are right in their claims that the Committee is becoming more politicised.

The effect of BRIC on likelihood for alignment is negative and indicates that the likelihood for non-alignment decreases with a factor of .726 if the decision concerns a nomination submitted by a BRIC country. The small N suggests that this effect may be influenced by the fact that the BRIC variable entails few unites. However, the effect of BRIC is far from significant.

5.5 Conserving the established Western bias
The fact that no proofs of a biased Committee were found in this analysis suggests that the system that was established in the post-World War II era maintains. Further relying on the assumption established in the introduction, that of a UN developed in accordance with Western interests, implies that the Western bias continues to exist in the World Heritage Committee. Thus, the non-findings of the quantitative analysis are not to be understood as the absence of a Western bias, but rather, as conservation of it. It is therefore plausible that the perception of a biased Committee is present amongst the delegations. To what extent this motivates BRIC cooperation, is subject to examination in the qualitative analysis.

5.6 Conclusion and point of departure for the next step
Although not statistically significant, the analyses conducted in this Chapter detected unambiguous tendencies that support the assumption introduced initially. The Committee may not make decisions that directly favour the West, but as emphasised in section 5.5, the lack of bias in the Committee suggest that the West preserves its dominance in the Committee. Another plausible motivation behind the BRICs’ statement, however, may be dissatisfaction with the operation and role of the ABs. As the analysis has shown, the ABs tend to recommend nominations submitted by countries from the Rest for deferral. Moreover, evidences of increased politicisation of the Committee
suggest that state parties utilise the Committee for other purposes than those embedded in the Convention.

These key findings establish a solid point of departure for further analysis of why the BRICs articulate their commitment to cooperation within culture. The next Chapter takes on a qualitative approach as it examines to what extent BRIC cooperation manifests itself in the World Heritage Committee, and whether the motivations behind the BRICs’ (alleged) cooperation suggested here, find support in the qualitatively collected data.
6 Differences and Commonalities

The prior analysis established a point of departure for examining BRIC cooperation in the World Heritage Committee. As no support was given to the first assumption, which suggested that BRIC cooperation is motivated by the wish to compensate for a Western bias, this part of the thesis sets out to examine how and to what extent BRIC cooperation manifests itself in the World Heritage Committee. It looks for other motivations behind their statement of increased culture cooperation than that suggested in Chapter 5. This Chapter further describes the process in which the qualitative data were gathered and presents the findings derived from it. This section does not take on an analytical approach, but provides only a descriptive presentation of the data and the process of gathering them.

6.1 Conducting the interviews – method and objectives

Having scheduled meetings with all informants, except representatives from one of the BRIC countries with whom I despite several efforts never got hold of, I left for Paris and to UNESCO’s Headquarters in Paris, France. During one week, I conducted interviews with three BRIC-representatives and two politically neutral observers of the Committee. I interviewed other observer informants in Norway, and some by telephone. The interviews were conducted within a time frame varying between 30 minutes up to two hours.

The interview guide was well prepared and the dictaphone was made ready for recording. However, the two devices proved not to be of particular assistance as the dialogues kept a more natural flow without the interview guide, and as few of the representatives let me record them. The overall objective was given by the research question; to identify to what extent, and why, BRIC cooperation is manifested in the World Heritage Committee. I also wanted to probe the results from the statistical analysis, and look for empirical evidence of a Western bias in the interviews. I did this by categorising the questions and their respective purposes into four sections or parts.
The first part of the interview was used as a “warm up exercise” building confidence and establishing a comfortable informant-interview relation, which is as an important aspect for eliciting valuable and reliable data. This was achieved by starting off with simple questions about the informant’s experience with World Heritage and his/her role in the delegation. Following that, we continued to the more demanding part identifying the political background and political interests of the delegation through question such as “What would you say are the main objectives of your country when attending the World Heritage Committee Meeting?” The purpose of the first part was, thus, to identify whether the Committee was used as a means to achieve national interests, or whether the politically neutral, expertise purpose of the Committee’s was upheld.

The second part, where I asked questions about the delegations working methods, development of instructions and routines for preparations before the Meeting, was used to create a natural setting for the informant to mention eventual inter-state collaborative efforts, i.e. BRIC cooperation. I asked questions such as “are there any countries with which you keep closer contact with than others?” Hence part two was used to “test” whether collaborative efforts with BRIC were mentioned without me implying it first.

The third part had a similar objective, but the main focus was directed towards the presence of a West-Rest cleavage and perception of a Western dominance and bias in the Committee. Here, questions such as “to what extent does the imbalanced World Heritage List affect your country’s work in the World Heritage Committee?” or “How does your country work to even out the imbalanced distribution of World Heritage sites?” were asked. Here, I expected answers such as “Promoting non-Western nomination” or “working against inscription of Western nominations”.

The final and fourth part was designed to discuss the presence and, possibly, the structure and nature of BRIC cooperation in the Committee. After introducing the question by referring to BRIC’s joint statement, direct questions such as “to what extent does this (statement of commitment to cooperation on culture) manifest itself in the World Heritage Committee?” or “how (and why) is BRIC cooperation pursued in the World Heritage Committee.”
6.2 Detecting tendencies

The following section presents the general tendencies and findings that the interviews detected and is subject to analysis in Chapter 7. For anonymity purposes, the representatives are only referred to as BRIC-representatives and identified by number. When I refer to general impressions, unless otherwise is specified, these are perceptions that all BRIC-representatives share. Information that is only representative of the observers is specifically reported on. To structure the broad insight that the interviews provided me, I have italicised key findings.

6.2.1 Political interests and background; national development and international visibility

On my question of the delegation’s main objective in the World Heritage Committee, all representatives’ immediate answers were “getting nominations inscribed”. Making sure that the Committee made adequate decisions for protecting the world’s cultural and natural heritage was also mentioned, but less emphasised. Moreover, all delegations highlighted the increasing prestige, status and international recognition of the World Heritage emblem as something that their countries found important. In this regard, some countries more than others underscored the economic and social potential that the emblem encapsulates, making me understand that obtaining national development was another objective when meeting in the World Heritage committee;

“We have two or three main objectives. One is to have nominations approved. This is done for the people back home. (...) These nominations are prepared with serious preparation to consider culture for development, you know, to alleviate poverty. Actually, this is strategic thinking! (BRIC representative 3)”

As the quote explicitly states, there are certain national interests embedded in the delegation’s efforts in the World Heritage Committee. However, not only national development proved to be of importance for the BRIC countries, but also increased visibility was equally emphasised as an important objective. In fact, one delegation set visibility to be the most important motivation behind their work in the Committee.

Another goal was to pursue diplomatic relations with other state parties. This was done by exchanging votes, not only for decisions regarding the nominations to the List, but also for decisions in organisations outside of the Committee and UNESCO.
6.2.2 Working methods and cooperation strategies
When I asked how the BRIC countries work before and during the Committee it was obvious that they all work after instructions from their national government, and that the World Heritage Convention was something of high priority to the BRICs. Moreover, all of the BRIC representatives emphasised that much work was put into securing a good presentation of a nomination, and that persuading the Committee of their nomination’s OUV was an important feature of their work in the Committee. That the BRICs were particularly active in this regard, was stressed by some of the observers who argued that the BRICs were recognised by their tendency of “playing tough” in the negotiations.

The purpose of the question posed in this category was to elicit information about collaborative efforts within the BRICs. None of the representatives mentioned anything about collaborative efforts between them in round of questions. Rather, all emphasised regional coordination and cooperation as working methods that prevails in their strategy. All representatives pointed out that they were not subject to any overarching collaborative arrangement with any other countries, but that issue-based cooperation sometimes occurred. “We may cooperate with some countries on some issues, and maybe sometimes countries come together in order to get forward a nomination” (BRIC representative 2).

Furthermore, one of the informants emphasised several times that “nothing comes for free” (BRIC-representative 1), underscoring that the delegation’s efforts were expected to be reciprocated by those receiving support. Thus, vote exchange and mutual support were also detected as one of their cooperation strategies.

6.2.3 The Rest’s relation to the West
The most evident and unambiguous finding derived from the interviews was the evidence of a political cleavage between the West and the Rest. This was more or less explicitly stated by all interviewees, but wrapped in diplomatic terms such as “there is a general solidarity within the developing countries and within developed countries” as several of the informants expressed. On my question on how the delegations perceived the fact that 50 per cent of the world’s Heritage Sites were situated in the West, all informants – observers as well as BRIC representatives – regarded this as problematic.
The cleavage between the developed countries and the developing countries (i.e. respectively the West and the Rest) was present on several organisational levels.

The immediate topic that followed the question regarding the West’s dominance of sites on the List was the role of the Advisory Bodies. Throughout the interviews it became clear that the ABs were considered the main reason behind the imbalanced World Heritage List. They were also perceived as a potential source of bias if they were to influence the Committee decisions. Through the interviews I learned that the scepticism towards the AB’s influence on the Committee decisions stemmed from a more general imbalanced knowledge-structure. As the quotes from the informants above illustrate, the interviews detected unambiguous tendencies towards a lack of credibility and legitimacy of the ABs within the BRIC group, and a perception that the ABs favoured the West.

UNESCO’s working language (English and French) was also something that all of the BRIC representatives pointed out as a challenge for the developing non-Anglophone and -Francophone countries when encountering the World Heritage bureaucracy, while at the same time favouring the West. This was also said to reflect a more general structure enforcing Western dominance and maybe even contributing to a Western bias in the decisions of the Committee.

A third finding from the discussions based on the West-Rest relation, was challenges regarding the nomination dossiers. All BRIC representatives emphasised that the nomination format had developed into a complex process that necessitates extensive technical expertise that most developing countries are in deficit of. BRIC representative 3 expressed: “Western Countries are better prepared and they have the technical expertise needed to prepare the nominations.”

6.2.4 Evidence of BRIC cooperation
None of the BRIC-country representatives mentioned the abbreviation during the interview. In fact, all representatives gave examples of political groupings and coalitions without including BRIC in these. Only at the end of the interview session, when I addressed the question directly, was the term used and elaborated. “The BRIC
cooperation is probably the most artificial political coalition in the world.” (BRIC representative 1)

“A freak arrangement” was another description of the group when I brought up the topic (BRIC representative 1). BRIC representative 3 even needed some seconds to think of what the abbreviation meant before emphasising that the term was created by an American professor, and that its country didn't really understand why they were put in one group together with three other countries with whom they shared so few commonalities.

Although none of the BRIC representatives projected the BRIC group to be of vast significance, an interesting finding was the various descriptions of the role of the BRICs presented by the different countries. One of the delegation informants denied any form of cooperation or diplomatic ties with any specific country and did not support the assumption of BRIC cooperation in the Committee. Another delegate, however, had a somewhat different description, saying that the BRIC ambassadors to UNESCO had monthly meetings where they exchanged views, and that “yes, maybe there is a certain coordination of positions” (BRIC representative 1) Moreover, the same delegate informed me that its delegation's ambassador had paid its second courtesy visit to another BRIC country after its inauguration in the UNESCO family. The same BRIC representative stated that “They have their own gatherings, and yes, sometimes on particular agenda items we have similar points of view” (BRIC representative 1).

6.3 Diverging perceptions - bilateral or BRIClateral cooperation?

The interviews give weak grounds to claim that BRIC cooperation is solidly manifested in the World Heritage Committee. Interestingly, the impression I got of BRIC cooperation from interviewing BRIC representatives almost systematically diverged from the impression derived from the observer interviews. While the former group rejected my assumption of BRIC cooperation, most of the observers reported instances of coinciding BRIC position, which could symbolise BRIC cooperation. This divide is further addressed in the subsequent analysis. In my analysis take it that one BRIC country's action and sentiment is representative of the other BRICs. I am, however, well aware of the
possibility that incidents of coinciding BRIC positions may reflect bilateral agreements, and not “BRICompetition” coordination i.e., BRIC cooperation.

In the next Chapter I discuss the key findings in light of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 7, I focus on the findings that I consider crucial for answering the research question. The BRICs’ common interests and perceptions of the institutional framework of the Convention are key features in this regard. The findings identified through the interviews are summarised in the table below.

Table 6.2 Findings from the Interviews

| 1. Political background/interests | 1.1 Getting nominations inscribed  
| 1.2 Ensure adequate decisions by the Committee  
| 1.3 Increase visibility  
| 1.4 Pursue diplomatic relations |
| 2. Methods and cooperative efforts | 2.1 Regional cooperation  
| 2.2 Issue-based cooperation  
| 2.3 Persuasion of the Committee members |
| 3. West-Rest division | 3.1 Advisory Bodies considered biased  
| 3.2 Working language perceived problematic  
| 3.3 Nomination dossier format requirements are considered to contribute to the Western domination |
| 4. BRIC cooperation | 4.1 No BRIC cooperation  
| 4.2 Cultural confidence  
| 4.3 Dividing perceptions about the reality of BRIC cooperation |
7 Incentives and political strategies

Having established that the evidence of BRIC cooperation in the Committee is weak, this chapter sets out to discuss why this is. In light of the theoretical framework and in combination with the quantitative results, the analysis resolves around three main arguments. *The first* is that the BRICs share certain perceptions and interests, which indeed could serve as a common platform enabling BRIC coalition. *Second* argument is that BRIC cooperation manifests itself through issue-based cooperation, which indicates that cooperation is inconsistent and motivated by self-interest. *The third* argument is that their behaviour in the World Heritage Committee contributes to politicisation of the Committee. Finally, I propose that the divide between the West and the Rest, as found in this analysis, is due to dividing perceptions of what the Convention is and ought to be.

7.1 The BRICs’ shared preferences and aversions

In the following section I argue that the BRICs have common interests, aversions and perceptions of the World Heritage Convention. As their common attributes imply that BRIC coalition should form, I analyse their behaviour in light of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4.

7.1.1 Shared discontent towards Western domination

When I asked how the delegations regarded the fact that 50 per cent of the World’s Heritage Sites are situated in the West, the answer from one of the BRIC-representatives was: “We find that fully illogical, fully illogical. Of course, the West was much earlier and faster than us. They did their homework” (BRIC representative 2). All BRICs shared the impression that the West dominated in the Committee, and depicted this as something negative. Brazil demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the Western-defined Operational Guidelines (OG) during the 34th Committee meeting in Brasilia. In connection with a dispute concerning a state party’s lack of fulfilment of certain criteria embedded in the OG, Brazil suggested to amend the OG, rather than to encourage the state party to comply with them. This instance was also reflected in Norway’s Report from the 34th Session of the World Heritage Committee Meeting in Brasilia (2010:3) as particularly provocative:
The host country Brazil, argued that it was ok to make decisions that exceeded the framework of the Operational Guidelines. The representative also expressed that since the Committee is the highest decision-making organ, such decisions should be fully in place.

According to the observers, the Brazilian suggestion was perceived as “trivialisation” of the OG and as lack of respect for the Convention’s institutional framework. Seeing this instance in light of the assumption suggested in Chapter 5, that of BRIC cooperation as a reaction to Western dominance, opens up for interesting interpretations. In light of Ikenberry’s (1989) article on the power of American cultural hegemony, the instance may represent a general resentment towards Western hegemony and Western-defined practices in the organisation. Thus, it may be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the Western-defined system and even to dismantle the Western institutional framework of the organisation. If further relying on the conclusions of the quantitative analysis, which demonstrated that the Western bias continues to exist in the Committee, the interpretation seems plausible.

One should, however, be careful in landing on this conclusion. First, the empirical data gathered through the qualitative interviews provided no evidence of direct attempts by the BRICs to undermine the position of the West in the World Heritage Committee. Roberts (2010), Skak (2011) and Glosny (2010) also argue along this line and stress that the BRICs strive to have their voices heard and to increase their political influence internationally, although not by overthrowing the existing world order. As Skak (2011:16) argues: “Yes, the BRICs are rising powers, but this does not automatically turn them into challengers.” Rather, Glosny holds that the BRICs seek to submit to the existing Western-defined order, and to obtain a political position and political influence that corresponds with their international economic position from the system’s inside. This argument finds support in the BRICs’ Joint Declaration where they explicitly call for a reform of the share of votes in the World Bank and the IMF (BRIC Joint declaration 2010:2f). This demonstrates that they are open in their communiqué calling for reform of the share of votes in the World Bank and the IMF, and that they do not secretly wish to overthrow the world order.
7.1.2 Shared opposition against the role of the Advisory Bodies

In the interviews, however, I detected perceptions that suggest otherwise. The unambiguous indications of a joint malcontent among the BRICs with the Western-defined practices embedded in the OG, was specifically directed towards the ABs. Some informants claimed that there was a cleavage in the Committee, defined by the countries’ attitudes towards the ABs. The cleavage divided the Western member countries from the non-western member countries by their perception of the ABs role in decision making. The Western countries tended to dedicate much weight to the recommendations of the ABs when deciding upon inscription, whereas the non-Western countries, therein the BRICs, tended to downgrade the importance of ABs’ assessments.

According to the informants, the dividing perception of the role of the ABs is inarguably present in other UN agencies as well. “The West dominates everywhere in the UN”, BRIC representative 3 expressed. Joyeeta Gupta (1997) supports this notion. Gupta detected a similar political divide between developed and developing countries during the negotiation of the Framework Convention of Climate Change (FCCC). Gupta argues that certain ideas and problem solving approaches are often considered irrelevant during negotiations and holds that the FCCC is a good example of a Convention that for those reasons only reflects the industrialized country perspective, and excludes the developing country perspective. Gupta argues that international negotiations are conducted in a way that promotes issue-based coalitions of like-minded states and which, for political efficiency reasons, avoids North-South controversies. She further claims that this approach to international negotiations is “justified by the ideology of political realism that the world is what it is, and one should focus on what is possible, rather than what should be achieved.” (Gupta 1997: preface x). Gupta’s observations suggest that a BRIC coalition could emerge as their shared opposition against the role of the ABs make them a group of “like-minded states”.

Another reason behind the wish to downgrade the influence of the ABs’ may be the Western bias that is latent in the science that the ABs produce and represent. This notion was clearly expressed by one of the BRIC representatives:

(...) if you think that you have one Advisory Body based in Paris and another one based in Switzerland, and one in Rome. Most of their staff comes from the West and their experts hold education from European universities. It is only natural that the
way they view reality is based on their cultural background and it is impossible not to have that influencing your assessment. Like the French word implies; “forcement”

they will look at the reality from their perspective.(BRIC representative 1)

The perception was widespread among the BRIC-representatives. That the ABs were subject to a Western bias was further expressed by BRIC representative 3 who expressed that “sometimes, a site’s Outstanding Universal Value lies in the eyes of the beholder”. The BRICs’ notion of a potential bias embedded in the ABs is supported by Ernst B. Haas who argues that “knowledge incorporates scientific notions relating to the social goal. Such notions are rarely free from ideological elements. Nor are they necessarily free from the self-interest of their proponents” (Haas 1980:368).

Where’s the coalition?

Put into theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4, the BRICs’ shared perception of the role of the ABs implies that BRIC coalition should occur. Stein’s theory of coalitions emerging from common aversions suggests that the BRICs’ shared aversion against the ABs induce coalition formation. Translated into Axelrod and De Swaan’s policy distance-theory, the BRICs’ common political preference would be to make inscriptions despite the ABs’ recommendations. Also then, the policy distance-theory projects BRIC coalition. One may therefore question why coordinated BRIC efforts did not prove more solidly manifested in the Committee, as the coalition theories predict so.

Looking towards the result of the quantitative analysis provides a plausible explanation. As table 5.3.2 showed, the BRICs’ nominations tended not to be recommended for deferral by the ABs the last decade. This suggests that the BRICs are not sufficiently negatively affected by the ABs’ function in the Committee for coalition formation to find place. Another explanation may be found in the argument presented above, that the BRICs do not wish to position themselves against the West (Roberts 2010; Skak 2011:16; Glosny 2010). Given that the results of the quantitative analysis referred to above, were not statistically significant, one should be careful in landing on this conclusion.

25 Forcement; something that is necessary or inevitable.
Yet another explanation behind the mismatch between the empirical data and the projections of the coalition theories may be that my understanding of BRIC cooperation is too constricted. When interviewing the BRIC representatives, I looked for evidences of consistent BRIC cooperation. Within Buzan’s terminology, what I searched for was evidence of an external negotiation group, i.e., a group that exist outside of the negotiation forum and which is established on the basis of geographical, political or cultural commonalities. As findings from the interviews and the documents analysis suggest that the BRICs cooperate on certain issues, it gives reason to examine the presence of an issue-based BRIC coalition in the Committee. This proposal lines up with Gupta’s argument: that international negotiations are conducted in a way that promotes issue-based coalitions of like-minded states (see section 7.1.3). Therefore, if understanding BRIC cooperation as issue-based, the concept may gain broader support in the empirical data.

7.2 Issue-based BRIC cooperation in the Danxia-instance

Little evidence proved that the BRICs utilise their common features to regularly and jointly pursue their shared interests. Observing inconsistent BRIC cooperation suggests that the group takes form as an ad hoc group, or if put in Buzan’s terminology, as a common interest group. In these groups, states collaborate with the aim of pursuing self-interest and secure a particular policy attribute. In this section, I present and analyse an instance in which BRIC cooperation was evident. Form the analysis I suggests that the BRIC group serves as a policy instrument used whenever political clout is needed. The following section presents an instance which exemplifies my argument.

The Danxia-instance, which took place during the World Heritage Committee’s 34th session in Brazil 2010, was a dispute that arose during the negotiation of the Chinese nomination of the Danxia region to the World Heritage List. The discussion circulated around the question of whether or not Chinese mining activity was within or outside of the buffer zone of the nominated World Heritage Site. The ABs recommended the

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26 A buffer zone is an area that surrounds a World Heritage Site and aims to provide an additional layer of protection to a property.
nomination for deferral due to their concerns about the activity. The Chinese delegation strongly opposed the ABs’ assessment and claimed that the mining activity was outside of the buffer zone. During this discussion Brazil – allegedly surprisingly – took the floor and strongly supported China. The session was described by the informants as very controversial. Moreover, the observers claimed that the discussion generated a clear division between the Western countries on the one side, supporting the ABs’ recommendation, and the non-western countries, with China and Brazil as strong opposing voices, on the other side. In the end, however, the site was listed.

The Danxia-instance shows how the BRICs spontaneously aligned their positions and supported each other. Given that the opposition was directed towards the ABs – towards which all the BRICs share sentiments of resentment – the political dimension of this coalition proved present. The policy distance theories explain this instance. Translated into Axelrod and De Swaan’s terminology, their common political preference can be understood as to downgrade the role of the ABs. Put in A. Stein’s theoretical framework, the BRICs’ joint performance may have been motivated by their common aversions towards the role of the ABs, as suggested above. Viewed in the framework of Riker, one may have difficult in seeing what interest the other BRICs would have in winning the majority, i.e. getting the Chinese nomination inscribed on the List. Another implication contesting Riker’s theory is the presupposition of a fixed pot. The inscription of the Chinese nomination can difficultly be shared among the coalition members.

If extending the understanding of Riker’s “fixed pot” to also entail intangible elements such as vote-trading, reciprocal support etc., the apolitical theory may be explanatory. “In terms of the dynamics within the Committee, It works a bit like ‘I vote for you, you vote for me’, even though it is not put in those terms, but that is what you feel in the end” (BRIC representative 1). As the BRIC representative’s statement shows, the “pot” may consist of a guaranteed reciprocal vote. The presence of reciprocal practices was further indicated by the same BRIC-representative who emphasised the diplomatic challenges that followed whenever a state party brought a nomination to the table, and asked for support. In such a case, the informant found it hard to refuse “because in the end, we are counting on them [their support] as well” (BRIC representative 1). With this
background, one may well assume that Brazil supported China in the Danxia-event as part of a ‘tit-for-tat’ agreement, which Brazil expected China to reciprocate.

*Inconsistency is strategy*

This instance is one of very few where BRIC cooperation was evident. The spontaneity of Brazil’s support to China, further questions to what extent this represented BRIC cooperation, and not just spontaneously aligning positions or bilateral coordination. Thus, the instance gives little reasons to claim that BRIC cooperation is solidly manifested in the Committee. Rather, it proposes that the BRICs’ behaviour fit into Buzan’s Common Interest Groups. These groups build coalitions in support for particular policy positions, which here may have been to diminish the influence of the ABs on Committee decisions (see above). That the BRICs qualify for this label, further feeds into the assumption that BRIC cooperation is not solidly manifested in the Committee, but rather that their cooperation is inconsistent and self-interest driven. Furthermore, it proposes that the BRICs use each other as a strategic instrument whenever political clout, guaranteed votes and mutual support is needed.

The strategic features of the BRICs are further reinforced by recent inclusion of South Africa to the acronym. Given BRICs’ financial engagement in the African continent, South Africa may serve as a strategic partner securing the BRICs a “gateway” to the continent. For instance, China’s surging demand for raw materials has led to vast extension of China’s diplomacy network in, and engagement throughout, the African continent (The Economist27 2011). Although South Africa is the continent’s biggest economy it is also the continent’s biggest laggard with regards to economic growth, compared to Angola which is Africa’s fastest growing economy, with an average annual growth of only 3.5 per cent (The Economist 2011). Thus, the economic assets of South Africa alone, cannot be what makes the country merit membership to the BRICs.

### 7.3 Ruling the world by creating it

The coalition theories presuppose that the goal of coalition formation is coalition success, i.e. winning the majority of the decisions-making body. As emphasised in Chapter 4, section 4.2, coalitions may be equally, or more, concerned with the political

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27 Article author unknown
interests embedded in the negotiation process as with ensuring a certain outcome. The negotiation setting offers a unique opportunity to influence actors and their interests, through problem solving and problem identification (Barnett of Finnemore 2004:16f). These attributes may explain the BRICs’ behaviour in the Committee.

In the interviews I found that the BRICs give high priority to increase international visibility (see table 6.1, point 1.3). Prior to the 34th Committee meeting, Brazil laid down vast efforts in order to be granted permission to host the meeting in 2010. This, together with the recent and planned international events within the BRIC countries further demonstrates this. Moreover, the fact that the most recent Joint BRIC Declaration (2011) devotes a whole paragraph to express their common support for these activities, suggests likewise. Their joint declaration reads:

*We express our confidence in the success of the 2011 Universiade in Shenzhen, the 2013 Universiade in Kazan, the 2014 Youth Olympic Games in Nanjing, the 2014 Winter Olympic and Paralympics Games in Sochi, the FIFA 2014 World Cup in Brazil, the 2016 Olympic and Paralympics Games in Rio de Janeiro and the FIFA 2018 World Cup in Russia. (BRICS summit 2011 Joint Declaration, 2011:5)*

Viewing this in light of Nye’s Soft Power theory offers interesting interpretations. Relying on Nye’s premises of the power of soft power, these events can be understood as attempts to enhance soft power assets. The BRICs’ statement of cooperation on culture can be interpreted likewise. The World Heritage Committee is an ideal arena for increasing international visibility and a showground for spreading national culture and prestige. For these reasons, the BRICs’ interest in obtaining international visibility may be a way of shaping the preferences of others and make them “want what they want” (Nye 1990:166). Further relying on Finnemore and Sikkink’s demonstration how norms develop and influence international organisations, one may understand the BRICs’ controversial behaviour as an attempt to influence how the “ought” becomes the “is” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:916). Seeing the World Heritage Committee as a showground for national culture and prestige, it suggest that the BRICs strive towards taking the role as norm-entrepreneurs, although in another manner than that suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink: through international visibility.

Further emphasising Nye’s theory and the political dimension of negotiation process, the Danxia-event may be interpreted as a strategic manoeuvre aimed at enhancing the
BRICs’ soft power through visibility. Brazil and China’s controversial position may be understood as a provocative act aimed at marking their political position and clout in the Committee. This suggests that for Brazil, who could not enjoy any shares of the coalition success, i.e. winning the majority, the motivation was primarily to make a stance and achieve attention in the Committee, and to contest the norm of complying with the ABs’ recommendations. This perspective equally explains Brazil’s controversial proposal to amend the OGs during the 34th Committee meeting (as elaborated upon in section 7.1.2) as a political stunt to demonstrate its position.

7.4 BRICs under process

Staying within the analytical framework of the process analysis approach, one could assume that the BRICs’ suddenly coinciding positions in the Danxia-instance was a result of situational pressures, cognitive influences and personal relations, rather than an instance of coordinated and planned efforts. Moreover, as the process analysis approach treats negotiation and outcomes as a “sequence of connected events”, it offers interesting explanations of the BRICs’ behaviour. Viewing the BRICs’ spontaneously aligning positions as one cooperation event, one could assume that this can process into a more solidly manifested BRIC coalition through future BRIC events. Alternatively, one can understand the BRICs’ behaviour in the Danxia-instance as a result of a “sequence of connected events” that was initiated elsewhere, in intergovernmental fora outside of UNESCO. This assumption does not require extensive argumentation, as the most recent BRIC summit declares:

*We reviewed the progress of the BRICS cooperation in various fields and share the view that such cooperation has been enriching and mutually beneficial and that there is a great scope for closer cooperation among the BRICS. We are focused on the consolidation of BRICS cooperation and the further development of its own agenda. We are determined to translate our political vision into concrete actions and endorse the attached Action Plan, which will serve as the foundation for future cooperation (IV BRIC Summit – Joint Declaration 2001:6 par.27)*

The Action Plan proposes new areas to explore, within which they aim to “establish, at UNESCO, a ‘BRICS-UNESCO GROUP’, aiming at developing common strategies within the mandate of the Organization” (IV BRIC Summit – Joint Declaration 2001:9). This statement contests the assumption proposed above, that the BRICs fit into Buzan’s
common interest groups. Rather, it demonstrates that the BRIC(S) are becoming an external group. The statement clearly demonstrates that the BRICs conceive of themselves as a group that qualifies for Buzan’s external negotiation groups.

The BRICS’ ambitions further demonstrate the validity of the process analysis approach. Its manner of treating multilateral negotiations as a process in which negotiation outcomes and -coalition occur, demonstrates that the planned BRIC UNESCO group is a result of a sequence of connected (BRIC-) events that started outside of UNESCO. That the interviews did not reflect this plan, may simply be because the action plan was under development within the BRICs’ respective government at the time of the interviews, and had not yet reached the delegations in Paris.

7.5 Politicisation of the Committee

*This Convention is only a means to achieve the goal of development (BRIC representative 4)*

My findings suggest that the BRICs’ utilise the Committee for other purposes than those embedded in the Convention. Given that the results from the quantitative analysis suggested that the Committee is becoming more politicised, one may ask how the BRICS planned UNESCO group will feed into this process. Before assessing whether the planned BRICS group will contribute to politicisation, one should establish solid empirical grounds to conclude that this development has taken place. One should therefore be careful in drawing conclusions solely relying on the conclusion from Chapter 5. Extending the operationalization of politicisation to also include other indicators gives more reliable inferences. In the following section I use other indicators and examine whether these support the assumption derived from the quantitative analysis.

7.5.1 More debate and heavier representation

Hours spent on debate in the Committee serves as indication of politicisation. Similarly, the number of delegation representatives indicates the political priority that the state parties give to the World Heritage Committee. If extending the operationalization of politicisation to also entail these indicators, one can see a weak, but no less a tendency towards a more political Committee since 2001.
Table 7.4.1 hours of debate

The 25th Committee session (25COM) was convened in 2001, the 26COM was held in 2002, the 27COM in 2003, and so forth (The Statistical Analysis of Decision-Making by Statutory Organs for the Past 10 years (2001-2010), 2010:2).

The chart shows the evolution of the number of hours of debate during the Committee sessions and the number of decisions adopted. The Chart indicates that the Committee has experienced a steady increase in hours spent on debate during the sessions. In 2001, the hours amounted to 39, whereas 62 hours were spent on debate in 2010 (Ibid.) It should be emphasised, however, that the increase in hours spent on debate, is influenced by an increase in number of decisions adopted by the Committee. Thus, the development does not solely reflect politicisation. Looking at the number of participants from each of the Committee members’ delegations, however, further complements the operationalization.

28 The exact figures for the BRICs was not accessible, thus the figures presented here, indicate the tendency on an aggregate level where all state parties are included.

Table 7.4.2 delegation representatives present in the Committee meetings

Table 7.4.2 shows the average number of participants registered for each Committee member delegation. In 2001, each Committee-member delegation was represented by an average of 5.1 participants, whereas the number reached 7.7 in 2009 (Ibid.:11). One could thus assume that the delegations to an increasing extent prioritise the Committee and value strong representation in the Committee meetings. The numbers presented here show a weak, but nevertheless, a tendency that supports the assumption of an increasingly politicised Committee. The same is reflected in the Swedish report from the Committee meeting in 2010, which states that the agenda for the 34th meeting was the most comprehensive in the history of the Convention, “leading to long discussions and voting in some cases” (Swedish Report from the World Heritage Committee Meeting in Brasilia 2010:1). These figures, combined with the findings from this analysis gives solid empirical foundation to claim that the Committee, the last decade, has become increasingly politicised. The next section sets out to examine how the BRICs have contributed to this development.

7.6 The BRICs in politicisation of the Committee

The quantitative analysis showed that the BRICs had a negative effect on politicisation. As the effect was statistically insignificant, one cannot exclude the possibility that the BRICs contribute to this development when acting in the Committee. The interviews
generated an overall impression that the BRICs acted with other intentions than preserving the world's natural and cultural heritage. The assumption finds support in the Norwegian Report from the 34th Committee Meeting in Brasilia, 2010, which explicitly claims that the Committee, during the last 10-15 years has become more political. (Norway's Report from the 34th Session of the World Heritage Committee Meeting in Brasilia 2010:3). Moreover, the BRIC countries were highlighted as actors contributing to this:

Brazil, China and Egypt were particularly active in their work in the Committee. (...) China was perceived as particularly political in their work. The country established a practice of putting pressure on the Committee Members in order to get support for their nominations to the List. (...) This [practice] was also pertinent for nominations that the Advisory Bodies had recommended to defer or refer back to the state party. Several delegations informally expressed that they found the situation uncomfortable. (...) Politicisation became evident by the fact that the Committee continuously inscribed nominations that were not recommended for inscription. (Norway's Report from the 34th Session of the World Heritage Committee Meeting in Brasilia 2010:3)

The same impression was reinforced by an observer who claimed that BRIC cooperation became evident by incidents of coinciding interests characterised by a willingness to set aside previous rules in favour of national interests. Moreover, the person described that the BRICs held high level of interest and participation in issues that were of direct national concern, whereas the level of engagement was low in issues of collective interest and which did not concern the BRICs directly (Observer 1). This fits well into Mancur Olson’s (1965) theory of the “Logic of Collective Action”, which briefly holds that actors will never voluntarily act to achieve a collective good. Even if all of the individuals in a group would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common objective, they will still not act to achieve that common objective unless some coercion measure or specific incentives are present (Olson 1965:2). Applying this to the BRIC case, it suggests that the BRICs act collectively whenever there is a possibility of achieving common goods. Their collective good in the World Heritage Committee would be to undermine the role of the ABs, whereas their individual good would be to inscribe their respective nominated site. Olson's logic supports the proposal in section 7.2, i.e. that the BRICs' are self interest-driven and, moreover, that they contribute to politicisation if the Committee.
7.6.1 Other political groups
The BRIC countries’ involvement in various cooperation groups further enforces the presumption that the BRICs act a strategic group that contributes to politicisation. If translating what Alter and Meunier (2009) call forum-shopping into “group shopping”, it adds to the understanding of the BRICs’ behaviour. In “forum-shopping” an actor will select the international arena where he/she believes that they are best able to promote specific policy preferences, with the goal of eliciting a decision that favours their interest. In “group-shopping”, one could assume that the BRIC members ally with the group that they believe will provide best support and enhance the chances of achieving a specific outcome. This line of thought aligns with Riker’s apolitical coalition theory, and the logic that proposes that actors enter into a coalition with the aim of winning the majority, or of achieving a specific outcome, and not on the basis of ideological attraction or political preferences. Multi-group involvement is not unique to the BRICs, however, and many countries participate in various groups based on ideological, geographical or political affiliation. Thus, the “group-shopping” alone is not sufficient to claim that the BRIC group contributes to politicisation of the Committee. Nonetheless, it contributes to the assumption that the BRICs act with other purposes than what is indicated in Convention, and feed into the politicisation development of the Committee.

7.6.2 Using the Committee as a political arena
BRIC representative 1 was explicit in the description of how his/her country’s position in the World Heritage Committee enabled the delegation to pursue diplomatic relations that exceeded the Committee’s mandate. One example was an instance where another non-Western nomination was recommended for deferral by the ABs. Here, the representative’s delegation again expressed its strong opposition towards the ABs’ assessments and claimed the nomination to be inscribed. On my question of why the delegation chose to provide its support to the other state party, the answer was simply that the informant’s national government recently had established an embassy in the country that had submitted the nomination. This demonstrates that BRIC countries use the Committee as a political arena to pursue diplomatic relations that find place outside of its Committee. Another example includes mutual support between BRIC members where BRIC 1 supported BRIC 2’s nomination in exchange for support for BRIC 1’s candidature for representation in an external UN organisation. That such vote trading
and issue-linkage of this scale found place in the Committee, is something that the observers described as controversial and new. Other observers emphasised that the BRIC countries, together with certain African state parties, were the most “aggressive” actors in this regard.

7.7 Diverging perceptions of the Convention

Another explanation behind the BRICs’ “political” behaviour in the World Heritage Committee may be dividing perceptions of what the World Heritage Convention is and ought to be. For developing countries that are faced with severe challenges through war, social issues and poor development levels, preserving the world’s cultural and natural heritage is not of primary concern. Put in Ronald Inglehart’s (1980) terms, not all state parties have reached the level where post-material values prevail. For developing countries, whose costs of submitting a nomination are significantly higher than for developed countries, having a nomination deferred or referred back by Western experts may well be perceived as forlorn efforts and even as a condescending signal.

This further explains the West Rest division that proved present in the Committee and elsewhere in the UN family, as indicated through Gupta’s (1997) research. Moreover, this suggests that the BRICs’ opposition against the ABs stems from for diverging perceptions of the function of the ABs. BRIC-representative 3 gave me the impression that the ABs were little more that obstacles to inscription and that had to be overcome. Among the BRICs, the Convention was generally perceived as a means of economic and social development. Moreover, the role of the Committee was perceived as to inscribe nominations, even if the nominated properties “sometimes do not qualify for World Heritage status” as BRIC representative 1 expressed. That the Convention should favour the developing countries was another shared attitude among the BRIC representatives. Allegedly, for the Western countries, the purpose of the Convention is to preserve the World’s cultural and natural heritage, whereas for the BRICs – as representatives of the developing world – “this Convention is only a means to achieve the goal of development” as BRIC representative 3 unmistakably expressed.
7.8 Summary

This chapter has argued that the BRIC countries share perceptions and interests that would imply BRIC coalition to emerge. I found little evidence of a consistent BRIC cooperation, similar to Buzan’s external negotiation groups. If understanding BRIC cooperation as issue-based, I found evidence of BRIC cooperation during the Danxia-instance that took place in 2010. This instance demonstrated spontaneous and mutual BRIC support, which suggest that the cooperation is strategic and self-interest driven. Put into Buzan’s categories, the BRICs behaviour qualify as common interest groups. In the analysis, I have stressed the political potential embedded in the negotiation process and suggested that the BRICs seek to gain political clout through increasing visibility. Moreover, that negotiation is a process which influence state behaviour has found support in the recent BRIC(S) announcement of establishing a BRICS UNESCO group. In light of this statement, I have demonstrated that there are reasons to believe that the BRICS will contribute politicisation of the Committee. Finally, I proposed that the BRICs’ political behaviour is due to varying perceptions of the role and purpose of the World Heritage Convention.
8 Conclusion

From the closing outlook on this thesis, a number of findings stand out as humble contributions to the story about the BRICs, as well as to the broadened understanding of intergovernmental cooperation and coalition formation. From the data generated in this research, the answer to my initial question of how and to what extent BRIC cooperation is manifested in the World Heritage Committee can be articulated in two adjectives: inconsistent and weak. In this closing Chapter I will briefly summarise the key insights that have led to this suggestion.

After having provided the brief introduction to the mandate and organisational structure of the World Heritage Convention in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 discussed the methodological research design developed for the thesis. Here I presented and justified the methodological choices made. I developed a multi-strategic research design that I utilised for gathering and applying the data that eventually brings me to this conclusion.

The reliability and validity of the data, as well as the inferences drawn from it, have gained significant confidence by triangulating between quantitative and qualitative methods. Despite the methodological strength of this thesis, it still faces the reliability challenges that follow the use of qualitative interviews. Not mentioning the BRICs in the beginning of the interviews, was one way of reducing the risk of bias. Another was to interview politically neutral observers. The fact that the interviews did not pick up the planned establishment of a “UNESCO BRIC GROUP” questions the validity and reliability of the data. The most plausible explanation behind this, is that none of the interviewees were on ambassador level and may not have had full insight into the processes within their home governments. Moreover, the analysis suffers under the lack of access to the minutes from the Committee, which would have provided valuable information, strengthening the confidence of the findings.

Among the weaknesses of the statistical analysis, the small N stands out as a threat towards reliability. By expanding the scope of units to include more nominations, statistically significant results might have been found. Moreover, by including more units might have derived significant results. Ideally, I could also have included a BRIC variable to control for changes on the dependent variable before and after the
establishment of the BRICs. I refrained from doing this, as there were few units on the BRIC variable, because the BRICs did not submit many nominations after 2009 (when BRICs were formalised into cooperation). Therefore, bringing in a BRIC control variable would not have provided much information.

Chapter 4 argued for the theoretical expectations of when and how coalitions occur. Some of these suggested that coalitions occur with the aim of winning the majority of a decision-making body i.e. to secure a particular negotiation outcome. Coalition theories provided different perspectives of coalition success and what makes actors join coalitions. They suggested that the BRICs would strive to join a coalition whenever they expected that it would lead to winning the majority, and/or if the coalition's expected policy were proximate to their own political preferences. The theoretical perspectives of Joseph Nye (1990) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggested that the negotiation process embedded political interests, and explained BRIC behaviour as an attempt to enhance soft power assets. Negotiation theory supported this proposal. This treated negotiations as a process and emphasise the influence that the negotiation context may have on state behaviour. Moreover, the inclusion of Buzan's negotiation groups aided to evaluate the political depth of the cooperation. How the findings have matched the theories is elaborated upon subsequently.

The statistical analyses conducted in Chapter 5 examined statistically, the evidence of a Western bias in the World Heritage Committee, and determined the course of the qualitative analysis. The analyses demonstrated that a Western bias exists through the continued dominance of the West on representation on the World Heritage List. Moreover, the bias proved present within the Convention's ABs who tended to defer non-Western nominations more frequently than Western nominations. Nominations from the BRICs, however, did not have a significantly higher likelihood for having a nomination recommended for deferral than did Western nomination. But as this effect was not statistically significant, I did not exclude the possibility that the BRICs were motivated by biased ABs. This, together with the statistical evidence of an increasingly politicised Committee constituted the point of departure for the qualitative research and the semi-structured interviews.
Chapter 6 outlined the process of collecting the qualitative data and descriptively presented the findings identified through the interviews. The findings provided weak evidence of BRIC cooperation in the World Heritage Committee, but found that they share certain attributes, such as political interests and perceptions of the Convention and its framework. “A freak arrangement” was the label that BRIC representative 1 put on the cooperation. The label proved surprisingly descriptive of the groups’ behaviour in the Committee, both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. That is, if translating “freaky” into “inconsistent” in academic terms.

Chapter 7 discussed the key findings detected in Chapter 6 in light of the theoretical proposals of Chapter 4. Empirically, the BRICs proved to be a “freak arrangement” as they shared astonishingly many attributes despite their vast differences in all aspects. Key attributes in this regards were their negative perception of the dominance of the West in the Committee and of the role of the ABs. That these sentiments possibly motivate BRIC behaviour was exemplified through the Danxia-instance, where BRIC cooperation was evident, although weak. From the theoretical perspective, what makes the BRICs into “freaks” was their lack of planned and coordinated efforts (i.e. coalition), despite their common features. The coalition theories predicted that the BRIC would act in coalition, as their common objective of diminishing the role of the ABs would incentivise coalition formation between them. Here, I detected a weak spot of the coalition theories. They do not distinguish between spontaneously arising coalitions connected with a specific issue, and coalitions that are consistent over time. One can therefore not asses from these theories, the depth or reality of the BRIC cooperation.

Buzan’s categorisation of negotiation groups aided me in evaluating the extent to which BRIC cooperation manifests itself in the Committee, and suggested that they qualify as common interest group. Although the empirical data of this study suggest that BRIC cooperation is self-interest driven and inconsistent, one cannot exclude from the data collected here that the BRICs qualify for the external group label. Although their most recent joint statement suggests so, their spontaneous and unpredictable joint performance in the Committee, holds that the BRICs are ad hoc-groups during the negotiation. Moreover, that they act jointly whenever they expect that they by doing so, can achieve a common objective.
Including the process analysis approach to negotiation theory, and combining this with Nye's and Finnemore and Sikkink's perspective of political power assets, proved valuable theoretical contributions. As several incidents suggested that the BRICs were motivated by features of the negotiation process and not solely negotiation outcomes, these theories gave explanations to the BRICs' controversial behaviour. It suggested that negotiations are results of a sequence of connected events. Because BRIC cooperation proved not to be solidly manifested in the Committee, this analysis suggests that the inconsistent cooperative efforts be a beginning sequence that may eventually leads to more solidly – and externally – manifested BRIC cooperation. This prediction seems startlingly right, as the recently closed IV BRIC Summit proposed to establish a BRIC UNESCO group.

I found unambiguous indications that the Committee is becoming more political. Whether or not the BRICs contribute to this development is less clear. The BRICs' active involvement in various groups, and their pursuit of diplomatic relations outside of the Convention’s mandate, proposes that the planned BRICS UNESCO group will contribute to politicisation of the Committee. It suggests that they be motivated by political purposes exceeding those embedded in the Convention.

Amongst my contributions to the field coalition formation generally and BRIC cooperation specifically, the unmistakable aversion towards the ABs stand out as my main finding from this thesis. The finding adds to the already proposed assumption by Joyeeta Gupta (1997), and may be useful contributions to understanding the dynamics within international organisations which operate with expert bodies. A second main finding that I detected in this thesis, is the scientific value of triangulating between methods. Combining statistical analysis, document analysis and qualitative interviews have enabled me to land on acceptably reliable and valid conclusions. The strength of the quantitative analysis in detecting tendencies, established a valuable point of departure enabling me to identify correlations that otherwise might have been overlooked, such as the reasons behind the West-Rest divide, caused by diverging perceptions of the role of the ABs. The power of method triangulation therefore stands out as an important finding, contributing to development of future research designs within the political science field.
The BRICS' recent proposal to establish a BRIC UNESCO group demonstrates the relevance of my thesis. Now that the small S has gone capital and South Africa has joined the club, there are reasons to believe that the club of rising powers will take on an influential position in the international society in the years to come. The need for research and knowledge about this unlikely cooperation will possibly be accordingly. My research has been a minor contribution in this regard. Although my findings suggest that the BRICs are dissatisfied with some of the practices within the organisation, one cannot infer from my findings that the BRICs wish to retaliate for Western world dominance. The BRICS' historic good diplomatic relations to the US and the West further suggests this. However, there are many reasons to follow the BRICS story, but few reasons to believe that the “New Kids on the Block” are trying to get rid of the old block.
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Informant Interviews

Interviews conducted in France and Norway. For anonymity purposes, names are withheld and transcription material is kept by the author.
Appendix 1 – Correlation Matrix

Correlation matrix between Decision to inscribe/not inscribe and geographical and political region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations</th>
<th>PolRegDik</th>
<th>GeoRegDik</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PolRegDik</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GeoRegDik</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.784**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation matrix between the variables BRIC and the Political West

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations</th>
<th>nyBRIC</th>
<th>PolRegDik</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nyBRIC</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PolRegDik</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.341**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>328</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Appendix 2 – syntax files from SPSS

Table 5.2.1 Effect of the geographical West on likelihood of inscription

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES DecDik
/METHOD=ENTER GeoRegDik
/Criteria=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).

Table 5.3.1 Effect of the political West and of BRICs on likelihood of inscription

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES DecDik
/METHOD=ENTER PolRegDik nyBRIC
/Criteria=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).

Table 5.3.2 The effect of region on the likelihood of having a nomination recommended for deferral

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES ABDeferralDik
/METHOD=ENTER PolRegWest PolRegECEur PolRegLaAmCarribean PolRegAsiaPac PolRegAfrica PolRegArab nyBRIC
/Criteria=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).

Table 5.4.1 The effect of time and BRIC on likelihood for alignment between decisions by the Committee and recommendations from the Advisory Bodies

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES DikAlignment
/METHOD=ENTER nyTime nyBRIC
/Criteria=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).

Dichotomisation of independent the independent variables for analysis in table 5.4.1

RECODE PolRegSnudd (0=1) (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) INTO PolRegWest.
VARIABLE LABELS PolRegWest 'PolRegWest'.
EXECUTE.
RECODE PolRegSnudd (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) (1=1) (0=0) INTO PolRegECEur.
VARIABLE LABELS PolRegECEur 'PolRegEastCentralEurope'.
EXECUTE.

RECODE PolRegSnudd (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) (0=0) (2=1) (1=0) INTO PolRegLaAmCarribean.
VARIABLE LABELS PolRegLaAmCarribean 'PolRegLaAmCarribean'.
EXECUTE.

RECODE PolRegSnudd (4=0) (5=0) (0=0) (1=0) (2=0) (3=1) INTO PolRegAsiaPac.
VARIABLE LABELS PolRegAsiaPac 'PolRegAsiaPacific'.
EXECUTE.

RECODE PolRegSnudd (5=0) (0=0) (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1) INTO PolRegAfrica.
VARIABLE LABELS PolRegAfrica 'PolRegAfrica'.
EXECUTE.

RECODE PolRegSnudd (0=0) (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=1) INTO PolRegArab.
VARIABLE LABELS PolRegArab 'PolRegArab'.
EXECUTE.