Developing an EU Arctic Policy: Towards a Coherent Approach?

A study of coherence in European Foreign Policy

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Acronyms

CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
COEST Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy (post-Lisbon)
EEAS European External Action Service
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy (pre-Lisbon)
HRCFSP High Representative for CFSP (pre-Lisbon)
HRFASP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (post-Lisbon)
JHA Justice and Home Affairs

European Commission Directorate-Generals

DG CLIM Directorate-General for Climate Action
DG ENER Directorate-General for Energy
DG Enterprise Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry
DG ENV Directorate-General for Environment
DG MARE Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs
DG MOVE Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport
DG RELEX Directorate-General for External Relations
DG Research Directorate-General for Research


ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists Group
EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
EPP Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)
Greens/EFA Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
S&D Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
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1. Introduction

Arctic challenges and opportunities will have significant repercussions on the life of European citizens for generations to come. It is imperative for the European Union to address them in a coordinated and systematic manner.

The Commission’s Communication on the EU and the Arctic (2008: 2)

The Arctic region is said to serve as an early warning system for the impacts of climate change. It is receiving massive attention from scholars, scientists, politicians and the media as Arctic ice is melting at an alarming speed.\(^1\) During the last five decades, average temperatures in the region have risen almost twice as fast as the rest of the world (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004: 8; Bernstein, et al. 2007: 30; Cini 2007a). According to Bernstein et al. in the International Panel on Climate Change (2007: 46), Arctic late-summer sea ice might disappear almost entirely by the latter part of the 21st century.\(^2\) Perhaps even more importantly, a decrease in the enormous Greenland ice cap would cause global sea levels to rise considerably (Cf. Mernild, et al. 2009; U.S. Geological Survey 2000a). The consequences of the ice melting, however, are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, political leaders are becoming aware of the risks of rising sea levels and changing sea currents, projected to have a global impact on costal communities, water resources and human health (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004: 2). On the other hand, the very fact that the ice is disappearing creates opportunities for a variety of actors within fields such as resource extraction, shipping, fisheries and tourism (Cf. Hoel and Vilhjamsson 2004; Phillips 2008; Skogrand 2008; Snyder 2007; U.S. Geological Survey 2000b).\(^3\) Global warming is thus creating an urgent need to balance possibilities for human activity in the Arctic with the fight against climate change.

A potential gradual access to the Arctic Ocean raises questions such as what kind of governance mechanism should be used to manage activities in different sectors and

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\(^1\) This is not to deny the relevance of issues that might attract attention independently of climate change, such as legal obligations and commercial interests.

\(^2\) Others report that northern polar waters could be ice-free in summers much sooner than 2040 (Amos 2007).

\(^3\) It is important to note that the possibilities for exploiting the Arctic remain highly uncertain. It is not known exactly how much oil and gas there is, how important the region will become in military terms or whether the sea passages and straits will actually attract the shipping industry (Cf. Lasserre 2009; Offerdal 2009)
how to protect the Arctic environment while ensuring energy security. In addition to the above questions jurisdictional issues in the Arctic marine realm are many and complex (Cf. Hoel 2009). The existing legal framework in the region, of which the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) constitutes the essence, is the current institutional basis for Arctic governance. In addition, the Arctic Council, although having little political clout, is an important body for cooperation and coordination among the Arctic states (Young 2009: 79). Nevertheless, some actors, such as the EU, have uttered concern about the ability of the legal framework to manage increased activity in the region. The European Commission has stated that the rules and regulations under UNCLOS and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) need to be adopted to the particularities of the Arctic region concerning fair and sustainable regulations on navigation, fisheries and resource extraction (European Commission 2008e).

There is also great uncertainty as to what states and actors will be involved in shaping the future of the region, what interests they will have and what course of action they will pursue. Some scholars and journalists warn about great-power politics and a race for resources, emphasising the inadequacy of international rules and regulations (cf. Borgerson 2008; Burkeman 2008; Graff 2007). Other scholars downplay the geopolitical importance of the region, emphasising the existing international legal framework and cooperation in the region (cf. Holtsmark 2009; Lasserre 2009; Offerdal 2009; Pedersen 2009; Rottem 2009). What is beyond doubt, however, is that developments in the Arctic attract the attention of actors and states far outside the Arctic Circle. In addition to the “Arctic Five”, i.e. Canada, the U.S., Russia, Denmark and Norway, countries and actors such as China, South Korea, Japan, NATO, and the European Union are carefully watching the course of development in the region (Arctic Council 2009; de Hoop Scheffer 2009; Hansen 2008; Jakobson 2010; Nøra 2010; Se-jeong 2008). Indeed, as former EU commissioner Joe Borg (2009), has argued; “With new shipping routes, fish stocks moving north and the environmental

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4 There are a variety of governing mechanisms in place in addition to the Arctic Council, such as the International Maritime Organisation, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and coast guard cooperation amongst others.
implications of climate change, the Arctic has become a matter of concern far beyond the States bordering the Arctic Ocean”. With the increase in attention among external actors comes the need for knowledge about stakeholders and interests.

According the European Commission (2009a), the European Union is the world’s largest trader, accounting for one fifth of global trade.\(^5\) It has a significant merchant fleet, and 90 per cent of its foreign trade is carried by the sea (Gateway to the European Union: Fisheries and Maritime Affairs). In addition, the Union is the world’s second largest importer of fisheries aquaculture products and one of the most important consumers of Arctic fish (European Commission 2008e: 7; Cf. European Commission 2008d). Furthermore, the EU has sworn to be a leader in the fight against climate change (Cf. European Commission Website). It is also heavily dependent on energy imports and concerned with energy security (Cf. European Commission 2009b). Moreover, three of its members, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, are Arctic states. Norway and Iceland are members of the European Economic Area and Iceland is about to start membership talks with the Union (BBC 2010). According to the EU, the Arctic region and the Union will have a mutual impact on each other (Cf. European Commission 2008e). The 27 EU member states constitute an actor of considerable weight when they act together. Thus, the fact that they consider Arctic issues\(^6\) important enough to desire a standalone Arctic policy, should make it interesting to study how the Union handle the accomplishment of such a policy.\(^7\)

In March 2008, the High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Commission jointly published a paper to the European Council in which they highlighted security impacts of climate change.\(^8\) The

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\(^5\) It is not specified whether intra-EU trade is included.

\(^6\) Arctic issues are taken to include any policy area that has either been mentioned in the Commission’s Communication or that could have implications for the Arctic or for the EU’s relationship with the region.

\(^7\) According to the Oxford Online Dictionary (2010), the term “policy” signifies a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by an organization or individual. Furthermore, in a European Union context, it often refers to an overarching decision that is typically decided at a heads of state meeting (Informant C).

\(^8\) The European Commission will also be referred to as simply the Commission. Similarly, the European Parliament will most often be referred to as the Parliament. The Council of the European Union or Council of Ministers (not to be confused
paper called for an “EU Arctic policy based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region” (European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP 2008: 11). The European Parliament followed suit by adopting a resolution in October 2008 calling for a stronger role of the EU in Arctic matters, particularly in relation to protecting the Arctic environment (European Parliament 2008a). One month later the Commission published a communication which is said to constitute the first step of an Arctic policy for the EU (European Commission 2008e). The Council welcomed the document first in its Conclusions in December 2008, then again one year later. It presented 23 detailed points in the 2009 Conclusions to serve as guidelines for the future EU Arctic Policy (Swedish EU Presidency 2009). In short, European institutions have made several calls for an EU policy on the Arctic in the last two years.

Until now the EU has not had a coordinated approach towards the Arctic, mostly due, of course, to the fact that the Arctic has not figured predominantly on the EU agenda (Airoldi 2008: 13). As Kristine Offerdal (2010: 39) argues, EU interest in the Arctic up until early 2008 was “ad hoc, coincidental, and to a certain extent based on the interest shown by individuals within the EU system”. According to Offerdal, the Commission desired a more consolidated policy around Arctic issues from 2006, but it remained unclear whether this policy was to be part of the Northern Dimension or the maritime strategy, or part of a broader foreign policy. Since 2008, the EU institutions as such have clearly devoted more attention to the Arctic, embracing the view that the current EU approach needs to be more coherent. Diana Wallis (2008), Vice-President of the Parliament in 2008, said in a speech to the Standing Committee

with the European Council, which is composed of heads of state or governments, or with the Council of Europe, which has nothing to do with the EU) will be most often referred to as the Council.

9 For the purpose of this thesis the term ‘Arctic’ will refer to the region above the Arctic Circle. It includes the Arctic Ocean and land territories of Russia, the U.S., Canada, two European Economic Area partners (Iceland and Norway) and three EU Member States (Denmark with Greenland, Finland and Sweden). Five countries are coastal states with special rights and obligation under international law; Russia, the U.S., Canada, Denmark and Norway.

10 A Communication sets out the background and context to a given policy area. It may indicate the Commission’s intended course of action in this field. It does not constitute a legislative proposal, but it may well accompany a legislative proposal in order to aid understanding of the proposed action (UK Local Government Association 2010).

11 Council Conclusions are just one of the many acts of the Council. Other acts include regulations, directives, decisions, common positions, recommendations or opinions, declarations or resolutions (Cf. Council of the European Union Website).

12 For an overview of the Northern Dimension, see the European Commission website on the Northern Dimension in the reference list.
of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region that same year that the EU already had an interest in the Arctic. This interest was rooted in firstly, the Northern Dimension policy, and, secondly, in various policy areas such as energy security, climate change, maritime issues, and fishing. Yet, she was frustrated at the “lack of coordination across these various areas” and thus the “failure to create a holistic Arctic policy within the EU”. Indeed, as Alexandr Vondra (2009), President-in-Office of the Council during the Czech Presidency in 2009, pointed out to the Parliament in April that same year, “issues with an Arctic dimension have tended to be addressed […] within the context of sectoral policies such as the maritime policy or the fight against climate change. […] the Union has not developed a broad Arctic policy bringing together all the relevant individual policy areas”.  

The Commission Communication thus emphasises that “it is imperative for the European Union to address [Arctic challenges and opportunities] in a coordinated and systematic manner” (European Commission 2008a: 2). According to the Commission press release, the EU has to state its position concerning a unique region of strategic importance which is located in its immediate vicinity. “It is time for the EU to clearly assess its interest and develop a holistic and systematic Arctic approach. This will increase the efficiency of the EU’s action and open new opportunities for cooperation with the Arctic states” (European Commission 2008c). Mr. Vondra (2009) confirmed to the Parliament in 2009 that the Council is taking the issue of coordination seriously; “We fully recognise the growing strategic importance of the Arctic region. We agree that the European Union should have a comprehensive and coherent policy”.

The principle of coherence, also referred to as consistency, in the external activities of the EU is not a new concept; it has been the subject of academic debate and a source of concern among European and national policy-makers for almost four decades (Caspers 2008: 19; Cf. Duke 1999; Duke 2000; Gauttier 2004; Missiroli  

13 The Presidency refers to the Council arrangement whereby each member state takes turns in presiding over the Council for a period of six months. The Presidency plays an essential role in organising the work of the institution, particularly in promoting legislative and political decisions. It is responsible for organising and chairing all meetings, including the many working groups, and for brokering compromises (Cf. Council of the European Union Website).
Its origins in EU external policy-making goes back to the late 1960s, and it has been recalled and altered in successive Treaty revisions ever since (Nuttall 2005: 94-96). Coherence, or consistency, is in fact a political requirement; according to the Single European Act (1986), there is a “responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency […] in order more effectively to defend its common interests and independence” (Official Journal of the European Union 1987). Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) stipulates that the Union shall “ensure the consistency of its external relations as a whole” (Official Journal of the European Union 1992). As noted by Missiroli (2001: 4), “the assumption is […] that by acting unitarily and with a common purpose, the EU [i.e. the member states and the community/union] becomes also, *ipso facto*, more efficient and effective (emphasis in the original).” However, according to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 121), “the EU’s complex system of competences, institutions, decision-making procedures [and] policy-making processes […] cannot but lead to significant problems with regard to consistency”. Such a lack of coherence in EU external relations is “undermines its credibility as an international actor as well as its ability to achieve specific foreign policy goals” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 121).

Furthermore, according to the literature on European foreign policy-making, the term coherence may be divided into three separate, but correlated types of coherence, to be discussed in detail in the following chapter; firstly, horizontal coherence between different policies and sectors, secondly, institutional coherence between the policy-making institutions (i.e. the Commission, the Council and the Parliament), including intra-institutional coherence related to the internal dynamics of the institutions, and

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14 As will be explained in the theory chapter, the terms “coherence” and “consistency” are considered synonyms. According to Nuttall (2005: 93); “attempts to distinguish between them risk ending up in linguistic pedantry”. For the sake of clarity, however, “coherence” will be the preferred term throughout the thesis.

15 The term “unitarily” is interpreted as signifying both horizontal coherence i.e. coherence among policy sectors and vertical coherence i.e. coherence between EU and member states’ policies (Duke 2000: 4; Missiroli 2001: 5).

16 The term “competence” is “eurojargon” and is derived from the French word compétence. It refers to the authority, responsibility or power to do or develop something. It is often used in the debate about European integration concerning what powers and responsibilities should be given to EU institutions and what should be left to national, regional and local authorities.
finally, vertical coherence between member-state policies and EU policies (Christiansen 2001; Duke 2000: 4; Missiroli 2001: 5; Nuttall 2005: 92).

The focus of this thesis is on institutional coherence and the extent to which the institutions have so far conducted a coherent process of deliberation on Arctic issues. This will, in turn, allow a discussion of challenges and opportunities that the EU is facing in developing an Arctic Policy. However, considering the extent to which the different types of coherence are interrelated it is difficult to analyse institutional coherence without also taking into account the other two other types. For example, studying the relationship between the Commission and the Council ultimately involves looking at the relationship between member states and the Commission, or, in other words, vertical coherence. Furthermore, Arctic issues involve several policy sectors within pillars and between pillars (cross-pillar issues).\textsuperscript{17} The term “cross-pillar” refers to issues or policies that involve more than one type of cooperation among the EU institutions. Arctic issues thus necessitate coordination between policy sectors i.e. horizontal coherence. This might, in turn, involve challenges to institutional coherence among the Commission and the Council and the Parliament, particularly if they were to pursue different objectives.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, in order to address institutional coherence in the EU’s approach to Arctic issues, it will be necessary to also address aspects of horizontal and vertical coherence.

Considering the issue of coherence in European foreign policy in general and the desire for a coherent EU Arctic policy in particular, the research question of this thesis is as follows:

\textit{With a focus on institutional coherence, what are the main challenges and opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy?}

To address the research question, the study draws on insights offered by the literature on foreign policy analysis (FPA) and on European Foreign Policy (EFP), approached

\textsuperscript{17} The term “pillar” is used to illustrate the various forms of cooperation within the EU depending on which policy area and which part of the treaty provisions is involved (Folketinget Website).

\textsuperscript{18} See Appendix i: Institutional competences in the EU for more information about the pillars of EU policy-making.
from a Multi-level Governance perspective (MLG). MLG is supplemented with aspects of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. While FPA and EFP provides the basic theoretical foundation for understanding European foreign policy, MLG as a decision-making system offers a “useful and neutral characterisation of EFP, breaking free from debates over whether the EU can have a FP and over whether liberalism or realism is the right theory of choice” (Ginsberg 2001: 32) Furthermore, the concept of coherence in foreign policy will be employed in order to structure the empirical findings in a clear and constructive manner.

This thesis is empirical, descriptive and explorative in nature, and largely based on empirical material and findings. It analyses a policy in the making, thus necessitating a broad focus rather than a narrow one. Consequently, the aim is not to test hypothesis to explain a certain outcome. Rather, the study is guided by an eclectic theoretical and analytical framework which will be outlined in the following chapter, and from which a set of assumptions is derived. Firstly, based on MLG, the thesis assumes that in developing an EU Arctic policy, all three institutions, i.e. the Commission, the Council and the Parliament will have influence and powers in the policy-process. One way of assessing the roles of the institutions in the Arctic Policy process is to look at the issue of competences. Thus, a discussion of competences and the nature of Arctic issues will be provided in chapter three. Secondly, based on aspects of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism it is assumed that the three institutions will have slightly different approaches to Arctic issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. To this end, both internal dynamics as well as the relationship between the institutions will be analysed. The abovementioned assumptions will be addressed more thoroughly in the next chapter.

1.1 Objectives and limitations

The aim of this thesis is to highlight some of the most important challenges and opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent Arctic policy. Two further, but more implicit, objectives are to provide indications as to the future nature
of the EU Arctic approach as well as making suggestion as to the future research on
the EU and the Arctic. The nature of the study is explorative. Not only is the future of
the Arctic itself highly uncertain; there is not yet any fully developed EU policy to
study. European policy-makers do not know what the policy will comprise or to
whose competence it will fall. Yet, studying how a large actor such as the EU
addresses Arctic issues and aims for a standalone Arctic policy is interesting. It will
contribute to the literature on both the Arctic as well as EU foreign policy-making.
Firstly, looking at challenges and opportunities for a coherent EU Arctic policy will
provide knowledge about the EU as an actor in the Arctic. As mentioned earlier, the
actions of external actors related to issues such as resource extraction, shipping and
governance might have a potential impact on the region itself as well as the wider
international community. However, at this stage, very little research is yet available
on the external actors that take an interest in Arctic issues other than the “Arctic
Five”.19 Yet, as stated in the Norwegian High North Strategy, decision-makers in
various countries have discovered that “the importance of Arctic stretches far beyond
the borders of Norway” (Utenriksdepartementet 2006: 5). According to a report by
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009, the EU has evolved into a
regional and global actor to be reckoned with and the increasing attention to the
Arctic by EU institutions and member states involves both opportunities for
cooperation and challenges related to issues such as governance and fisheries
(Utenriksdepartementet 2009). Consequently, there is a need to acquire knowledge
about the EU’s approach to the Arctic.

Secondly, revealing and analysing the complex nature of creating coherent and
integrated foreign policies in the EU would further contribute to studies on European
foreign policy-making, particularly when it comes to policy areas which do not neatly
fit into any one pillar or conceptual framework. As the chapter on theory will suggest,
such policies are difficult to approach analytically. How to analyse EU policies on
which all three institutions seem to have some influence and which are neither purely
external, nor purely internal policies? Furthermore, with the entry into force of the

19 As on May 2010.
Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, studies of EU policy-making must be updated. Although the thesis will only briefly assess the implications of the treaty it nevertheless highlights potential questions and challenges that the new arrangements might entail. One important implication of the treaty is that the Parliament receives more power, and that consequently, it must be devoted more attention when analysing EU foreign policy than before, not to mention when studying cross-pillar issues such as the Arctic Policy.

The thesis does not, however, attempt to analyse possible implications of a coherent EU approach for the EU’s ability to influence Arctic developments as a foreign policy actor. Furthermore, nor does it attempt to analyse the various reasons for why the EU is developing an Arctic policy. Rather, the starting point is to note that the EU is devoting attention to the Arctic, whatever the reasons might be, and then proceed from there with analysing opportunities and challenges in the current process.

1.2 Organisation of thesis

The thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter two introduces relevant methodological issues, paying particular attention to the explorative nature of the thesis as well as to the most important sources of data; official documents and interviews. It also presents the analytical framework of FPA and MLG before explaining in detail the concept around which the analysis will be structured, namely the concept of institutional coherence in foreign policy making. Chapter three first describes the roles of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament in the policy-process and addresses the issue of competences. The second part is devoted to discussing the first assumption of this thesis, namely that the process of developing an Arctic policy is influenced by all three institutions. Chapter four and five analyse the second assumption, namely that the three institutions will have slightly different approaches to Arctic issues, something which might translate into challenges to a

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Note that due to the interconnectedness of the three concepts of coherence mentioned earlier, horizontal and vertical coherence will also be addressed and mentioned when considered relevant.
coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. However, before analysing inter-institutional relations, it is important to be aware of internal dynamics as these might affect the approaches of the institutions. Thus, chapter four assesses the internal dynamics of the institutions as well as their actions towards Arctic issues. Chapter five assesses the relationship between firstly, the Commission and the Council and, secondly, the Commission and the Council on the one hand, and the Parliament on the other. Finally, in the concluding remarks the potential lessons from this study will be added together before providing indications as to the current and potential challenges and opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent Arctic policy.
2. Methodology and Analytical Framework

2.1 Qualitative research design

2.1.1 Descriptive explorative case study

This paper sets out to study challenges and opportunities the EU is facing in developing a coherent Arctic policy by relying on documents and twelve in depth interviews. The study cannot be an explanatory thesis of causal relationships due to the fact that there is not yet any fully developed policy to study. Its aim is thus not to attempt to explain a certain outcome, or the lack of such. Rather, the subject is a policy in the making and the aim is to analyse the potential for and challenges to a coherent EU approach to the Arctic. This is what Yin (2003: 5) would call an exploratory research design. Such a design is often appropriate for questions focusing mainly on “what”, as opposed to explanatory studies asking “why”. It is typically used when a researcher examines a new interest or when the subject of study itself is relatively new (Babbie 2009: 92; Jacobsen 2005: 61). Although there is a substantial scholarly literature on the Arctic and on EU foreign policy-making respectively, very little research has been conducted on the relationship between the EU and the Arctic, and even less research has yet been done on the EU Arctic Policy specifically. An explorative design, however, does not preclude the presentation of theoretically founded assumptions based on the literature on European policy-making, nor does it preclude an analysis similar to one found in explanatory studies. The boundaries between explorative, descriptive and explanatory studies are, after all, blurred. One of the main differences between this thesis and explanatory studies, however, is that the conclusions drawn concerning the on-going policy-process must be regarded as tentative rather than assertive. Nevertheless, tentative conclusions based on existing literature, official documents and interviews may provide a valuable indication as to the actual and potential challenges and opportunities in developing an EU Arctic

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21 As of May 2010.
policy. This would thus ultimately contribute knowledge about the EU as an actor in the Arctic.

2.1.2 Questions of validity and reliability

In order to ensure the relevance and trustworthiness of the empirical information collected, four specific concepts commonly used in political science to ensure the quality of research will be been considered, namely construct validity, internal and external validity and reliability (Adcock and Collier 2001; Hoyle, et al. 2002; Yin 2003). However, because such methodological criteria must be adapted to the specific research in question, the following section will pay particular attention to questions of validity and reliability related to case studies and interviews.

Firstly, to ensure that the observations of the study capture the ideas contained in the concepts which it is attempting to measure, two steps have been taken (Adcock and Collier 2001: 529; Hoyle, et al. 2002: 33)\textsuperscript{22}: Firstly, concepts and terms used in the interviews have been explained and defined as it is imperative that the interviewees understand what is being asked of them (Yin 2003: 56). Secondly, findings have been based on a method of triangulation (Jacobsen 2005: 216; Yin 2003: 98). Indeed, a major strength (and necessity) of case study data collection concerning issues of validity and reliability is the use of multiple sources (Yin 2003: 97). The thesis is based on information collected from a combination of various primary and secondary sources such as speeches, political declarations, official EU documents, reports by non-state actors in the Arctic, and publications by independent research institutions.

Secondly, although one of the most common definitions of internal validity defines it as “the extent to which conclusions can be drawn about the causal effects of one variable on another”, descriptive or explorative studies need a different “test” of internal validity (Hoyle, et al. 2002: 32; Yin 2003: 36). Since such studies are not concerned with causal inferences, the concept of internal validity may rather be

\textsuperscript{22} For an excellent visual overview over measurement validation, see Adcock and Collier (2001: 531).
defined as the perceived correctness and trueness of the findings (Jacobsen 2005: 214-216). The latter kind of validity may subsequently be attained by asking a set of critical questions related to information and sources. Have the right people been interviewed, and have they been able and willing to convey accurate information? The interviewees chosen for this study are among those who know the most about EU-Arctic relations in the EU and in Norway. They are middle to high-level officials or senior advisors working within the EU system of governance or within the Norwegian Foreign Ministry who are accustomed to EU terms and language. However, considering firstly, the uncertainty surrounding a policy in the making, secondly, the complexity of the European system of policy-making, and thirdly, the uncertainty related to changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, it is possible that the interviewees have not been able to provide flawless information. In addition, as in political processes in general there may be political restraints which impede the interviewees from releasing sensitive information. An effort has been made to ask the respondents about processes in which they, themselves, have taken part in and about what they have heard and observed. Nevertheless, the fact that the respondents and informants are, among the few, foremost experts on EU-Arctic relations in the EU should increase the legitimacy of the study’s findings. Although there will be elements that could inflict upon the quality of the research in this thesis, much has been done to ensure its validity by critically scrutinising the sources from which the data has been derived.

Thirdly, external validity concerns the degree to which the findings of the study are generalizable (Cf. Ch. 2 in Hoyle, et al. 2002; Yin 2003: 38). Studying the EU Arctic Policy is ultimately a case of EU foreign policy-making, and more specifically, about coherence in European foreign policy making. However, there are issues with generalising from this study. It is not clear whether the EU Arctic Policy is representative of the “population” i.e. EU foreign policy. Arctic issues are mixed in nature, cutting across both internal and external policies as well as external relations
and CFSP. There are not many similar cases available. What is possible, however, is to use the findings of this case to say something about how new, and cross-pillar policy areas with foreign policy implications are handled by the EU.

Finally, to achieve a high degree of reliability, a common question to ask is whether a later researcher who did the same case study over again following the same procedure would reach the same conclusions (Jacobsen 2005: 230; King, et al. 1994: 25; Yin 2003: 37). Researchers should therefore be explicit about methods and procedures used to gather information (George and Bennett 2005: 106; King, et al. 1994: 27). The fact that, firstly, sources are consistently referred to in this thesis; secondly, that the methodology chapter thoroughly explains how the research has been conducted; thirdly, that official documents can easily be accessed online; and, finally, that interview guides are included and that interview notes are available upon request should provide a considerable degree of reliability.

2.1.3 Collection of empirical data

Considering that official documents and interviews with key informants constitute the most important sources of information, these two data sources will receive particular attention in the following two sections.

Document analysis

For the purpose of data collection, both primary and secondary documentary material has been central to this thesis. Moreover, since the focus of the study is the European institutions primary sources such as official statements, parliamentary session records and communications are considered particularly important. However, relying on documents to gather information in a manner that satisfies standards of validity and reliability requires attention to specific methodological issues. Although some of these documents offer quite transparent information, such as meeting minutes from parliamentary sessions, other documents may offer more limited information: On the
one hand, Council Conclusions or parliamentary resolutions only contain information
to which all parties could agree, thus providing a realistic perception of the
institution’s position on a topic. On the other hand, they offer little insight into the
internal dynamics in the process that led to the final documents, such as if there were
divisions and what issues, if any, caused disagreement. Consequently, it becomes
particularly important not only to focus on what is said in the document as what is not
said, i.e. gaps or omissions (Flick 2007: 111). In the words of George and Bennett
(2005: 100), every researcher analysing a document should consider “who is speaking
to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances” (emphasis in the original). For example, the Communication on the Arctic published by the Commission is a
public document and might convey a particular view of a situation, or institution in
question (Jacobsen 2005: 181). Considering that the Commission is a supranational
institution whose purpose is to push forward with integration it is possible that the
Communication might exaggerate the possibilities for EU cooperation on the Arctic
(Cf. European Commission 2007a). Therefore, to avoid mistaken assumption and
interpretations, information need to be cross-checked with secondary sources, such as
academic papers and newspaper articles. Although there is not much literature on the
EU and the Arctic, there has been written quite extensively on Arctic issues of geo-
political and environmental nature, not to mention on European policy-making in
general, something which provides a valuable understanding of the research topic. By
addressing the issues above, documents should constitute a good source of
information on which to base the study of the EU Arctic Policy.

**Interviews**

To accompany and supplement the use of documentary data, twelve semi-structured
in depth interviews with officials and diplomats in Norway and in the EU have been
conducted.\(^{24}\) Considering Norway’s particular competence on Arctic issues,
combined with the fact that the country has had a dialogue with the EU on such issues

\(^{24}\) According to Jacobsen (2005: 171) a respondent is someone who has direct knowledge about a phenomenon e.g.
someone having first-hand experience or being a member of the group being studied whereas an informant is someone who
does not himself or herself represent the phenomenon or group in question, but who possess extensive knowledge about the
topic. For the purpose of this thesis the word ‘interviewee’ will refer to both respondents and informants.
for at least the last three years, Norwegian officials working on Arctic issues could provide a valuable insight into the policy process (Cf. Støre 2008a, 2008b). In addition, such informants might provide an “outside” look on EU policy-making. The EU officials that were interviewed either work with Arctic issues on a daily basis or have extensive knowledge about the policy process. However, due to reasons of confidentiality, it is not possible to go into further detail about the identities of the informants and respondents.\(^{25}\)

Most interviews were conducted over a period of two weeks and lasted approximately one hour each. The respondents and informants spoke on behalf of themselves and who they represent. Consequently, it is not possible to know the extent to which their answers represent the institution in its entirety; however, that was neither the purpose. Each person was asked a set of standard questions about the EU Arctic Policy followed by specific questions depending on his or her post in the EU system, as well as his or her kind of expertise on the topic. Furthermore, new knowledge accumulated during the field work as well as the direction of each conversation also guided what questions were asked. Due to the fact that the policy is in the making and that some topics are therefore considered somewhat sensitive, most interviewees preferred not to have the conversation recorded. As it was vital to the study that the interviewees provided different information than was already published in official documents, the possibilities for attaining such information gained a higher priority than the issue of recording. Consequently, there are not transcripts from the interviews available. The interview guides, however, are included in the thesis, and the notes from the interviews are available upon request.\(^{26}\)

Although, according to Bryman (2004: 319), the interview is probably the most widely used method in qualitative research, important questions nevertheless need to be addressed, such as how to avoid posing leading questions and how to analyse the interview afterwards. Notwithstanding the existence of some methodological

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\(^{25}\) For more information, see appendix three with the list of informants.

\(^{26}\) Although the interview guides differed slightly from one interview to another due to reasons stated above, all questions have, for practical purposes, been included in two interview guides divided according to themes; one guide for Norwegian officials and one guide for EU officials.
guidelines, the qualitative interview as a method of collecting data lacks, as opposed to the quantitative interview, standard rules of procedure, hence the common denotations “unstructured” and “semi-structured” interviews. Indeed, while detailed interview guides were prepared for this thesis, a high degree of flexibility was necessary as it often turned out more relevant to speak about topics rather than asking specific questions. Furthermore, in relation to the interview as a source of information, Yin (2003: 92) points out that “it is subject to the same problems such as bias, poor recall and inaccurate articulation as other sources of evidence”. On a few occasions, an interviewee would point out that he or she was not sure about the correctness of a detail, thus making it important to get it verified by other interviewees and documents. In addition, considering that all of the interviewees were what Andersen (2006: 282) would call highly competent people with an excessive knowledge about the topic, measures were taken to avoid interviewees adapting conversations to their own agenda. In sum, by cross-checking the interviews with primary sources, such as official documents, reports, and public statements, it should be possible to reach valid and empirically reliable conclusions.

Moreover, much can be done to facilitate a good interview beforehand. The aim of the data collection was to gather highly specialised information on several particular topics. Therefore, most interviewees were chosen on the basis of what kind of, and how good, information they were likely to provide, or as Bryman (2004: 334) would call it, on the basis of “purposive sampling”. In addition, the snowball sampling method, in which the informants and respondents recommended other possible interviewees, was occasionally used, particularly in the beginning (Jacobsen 2005: 174). Concerning ethical issues, the role of a researcher involves a scientific responsibility; a commitment towards independent research; and, lastly, a responsibility in relation to the interviewee (Kvale 1997: 69). Since the two former issues have already been dealt with in earlier sections, it suffices to mention that all interviewees were informed about the purpose of the study and why they were considered to be of interest. They also received a list of the topics to be covered
beforehand. The informants could choose between different degrees of anonymity, and were also given the opportunity to review their remarks. All but one of the interviewees expressed concerns about their anonymity and preferred to be referred to as “officials” or “advisors”, and a few asked to approve citations. Notwithstanding the potential loss of credibility due to the interviewees’ anonymity, valuable information should be possible to obtain from the twelve informants and respondents on the EU and the Arctic if addressing the issues discussed above pertaining to interviews as a source. To conclude this chapter thus far, the first section has accounted for the explorative nature of the study, questions related to ensuring valid and reliable research as well as presenting the main sources of information, namely documents and interviews. The last part of the chapter will provide an analytic and theoretical framework that should permit a structured understanding of the empirical findings of the study.

2.2 Analytical framework

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the main challenges and opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy by focusing on institutional coherence. The study is a highly empirical work of which the aim is neither to develop, nor test theory. This, however, does not alleviate the need to be precise about the analytical assumptions that are guiding the research, or the need to theoretically structure the analysis. For analytical purposes this thesis defines the Arctic Policy as European foreign policy and employs a Foreign Policy Analysis approach (FPA). FPA is then adapted to the study of European foreign policy (EFP), providing theoretical premises for studying the EU as a foreign policy actor. However, since FPA, like International Relations, can be studied from a variety of perspectives, and since “any discussion of European foreign policy, in short, is part of a wider debate about European integration”, the Multi-Level-Governance (MLG) perspective is employed. Furthermore, because MLG only says something about

27 See Kvale (1997: 66-71) on ethical issues related to conducting interviews.
which institutions will influence the policy-process, and not anything about their expected behaviour, MLG will be supplemented with elements from neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism (White 2004: 14). Finally, the concepts of coherence will provide a structuring tool with which to analyse possible challenges and opportunities in developing an EU Arctic policy.

The reason for applying such an eclectic framework is that the EU is arguably a unique actor in international relations. There does not seem to be any one particular model or theory that grasps the complex picture that this thesis is aiming to disentangle. The subject in question is neither a state, nor a federation. The issues in question, although defined as foreign policy, are not purely external foreign policy issues, nor purely internal EU issues. Furthermore, considering that the focus is on a policy in the making, it is not possible to “test” whether theories of European integration, such as neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism, is more suitable for explaining, or predicting, the coming into existence, or failure of the EU Arctic Policy. Rather, given that the aim is to address challenges and opportunities in an empirical manner, elements from both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism will be employed. This will arguably serve to better highlight different aspects of the challenges and opportunities in the policy process. The paper focuses on institutional coherence, including intra-institutional coherence, as well as referring to horizontal and vertical coherence. The rest of the chapter discusses the abovementioned theoretical aspects in chronological order, beginning with FPA, and ending with presenting the premises and assumptions underpinning the study.

2.2.1 Foreign Policy Analysis and European foreign policy

In the simplest terms, [FPA] is the study of the process, effects, causes, or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific manner. The underlying and often implicit argument theorizes that human beings, acting as a group or within a group, compose and cause change in international politics. (Foreign Policy Analysis Website)

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28 This study takes a broad view on foreign policy, adhering to the view of Christopher Hill (2003: 3) who defines foreign policy as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in IR”. As for the term ‘European’, it refers to the EU, not the whole of Europe. For a debate about EU versus European, see Brian White (2004).
Being a sub-field within International Relations (IR) since it emerged in the 1950s, the literature and debate on FPA is too rich to be adequately accounted for here. Suffice to say that firstly, it can be studied with a variety of theoretical approaches, and, secondly, the very nature of the approach as well as the extent to which it represents a field sufficiently distinct from IR to be considered a proper analytical approach is disputed (Steve Smith, et al. 2008: 3; Cf. White 2004).  

In line with Valerie Hudson’s conception of FPA (2007: 4-5), the focus of this thesis is on decisions taken by decision-makers with reference to, or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state. Such decisions may directly target external entities in the form of influence attempts, but they may also target domestic entities which could have ramifications for external entities. For example, it might be argued that the EU’s three objectives when it comes to the Arctic, namely protecting and preserving the Arctic; promoting sustainable use of resources; and contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance, seem to target both external and internal entities with implications for the Arctic (Cf. European Commission 2008e).  

However, using a FPA approach to study European foreign policy, involves addressing an important conceptual issue related to the explanandum; FPA was developed to analyse states. According to White (2004: 11), contrary to traditional foreign policy analysis and IR theory, EFP cannot be studied from a state-centric analysis with relatively clear boundaries between internal and external policy environments. The EU’s place in international politics is *sui generis* (Ginsberg 2001: 12). Indeed, in the words of Carlsnaes (2004a: 1); “what is often referred to as a distinctly complex and multilayered European foreign policy system, based not on traditional state boundaries but on a progressively robust form of transnational governance represents a novelty and a challenge to conventional foreign policy analysis”. Indeed, many scholars writing on EFP have explicitly rejected the “state-

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29 For a detailed overview over the history, debate and literature of FPA, see for example Hudson (2008) or Carlsnaes (2003).
30 For a short overview, see White (1999).
centric approach and narrow focus of traditional IR, with its concentration on the formal institutions and policy outcomes of CFPS” (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 12). Others on the other hand, such as Karen Smith (2003) and Hazel Smith (2002) do not see a problem with applying conventional FPA to EFP. They argue that the EFP indeed can be said to resemble the foreign policies of nation-states, thus rejecting the view that the EU is *sui generis*, basing their answer on “traditional conceptions of what -- at least in their view -- foreign policy analysis is all about” (Carlsnaes 2004b: 5). 31

As for the explanans, Carlsnaes (2003: 334) asserts that there have been two influential traditions in FPA; the first favouring state-centrist material systemic level factors in explaining foreign policy, and the second focusing on the linkages between actors, policy processes and policy outputs, i.e. emphasising the role of domestic factors. However, as Jean A. Garrison (2003: 155) argues, it is now broadly accepted that different levels of analysis such as individual factors, input into the decision-making process, and institutional factors converge to shape foreign policy outputs. Nevertheless, due to the particular nature of the EU, applying FPA to EFP also involve challenges related to the explanans. According to White, EFP necessitates different methods of analysis as it is a different subject matter than that dealt with by FPA in the past. What is needed is to combine the framework of FPA with theories of European policy-making, e.g. MLG.

To sum up the above discussion, the EU poses challenges to FPA both in terms of defining the explanandum and in terms of choosing the appropriate method for analysing the explanandum. However, if the above challenges are adequately addressed, FPA may provide two important premises for studying EFP. Firstly, the EU will not behave as a unitary actor, or state in the process of developing an Arctic policy. Rather it is a multilayered policy system which must reconcile the national with the supranational. This is important to keep in mind when studying the EU’s

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31 The scholars mentioned in the discussion, however, all agree that EFP must be defined in broader terms than just the CFSP. See for example Carlsnaes (2003, 2004a, 2004b); Ginsberg (1999); White (1999, 2004, 2001); Smith (2003) or Smith (2002) For a brief, well-structured overview over the conceptual difference between scholars of EFP, see Carlsnaes (2004b).
ability to develop foreign policies as opposed to nation-states. Secondly, EU foreign policy is more than the formal institutions and outcomes of the CFSP, thus requiring a broader definition of EU foreign policy and a more holistic analysis of the Arctic Policy, both when it comes to the actors and the policy process. However, as has been mentioned earlier FPA is a discipline; like IR it needs to be studied with a theoretical approach. Moreover, the unique nature of the EU implies a need to combine a FPA approach in the study of the Union’s Arctic Policy with theories of European studies. As White (2004: 14) points out; “the notion of a European foreign policy is a controversial idea subject […] to the same passions and emotions as the whole process of European integration evokes. Therefore, any discussion of European foreign policy, in short, is part of a wider debate about European integration”.

### 2.2.2 A Multi-Level Governance perspective on FPA

Until the Arctic appeared as a major factor in the context of climate change, it was individual member-states or interest groups in the EU that drove interactions with the Arctic region (Airoldi 2008: 13). However, Arctic issues have gradually received more attention by the institutions themselves in the EU as climate change has emerged as a global challenge (Airoldi 2008: 13). The Commission, the Council and the Parliament have all contributed to the process of developing an EU Arctic approach by promoting Arctic issues and issuing formal documents. Furthermore, as will be further elaborated upon in the next chapter, while the member-states without doubt remain the most important decision-makers, one cannot dismiss the influence and power of the Commission and the Parliament, even in foreign policy as defined in this paper, and particularly concerning cross-pillar issues. There are thus two major reasons why MLG is considered the most appropriate theory for studying the Arctic policy-process: Firstly, the aim of this paper is to address challenges and opportunities in developing an EU Arctic policy in an empirical way, and not whether or not, according to a specific theory or model, the policy is likely to be developed. Secondly, there will be varying degrees of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism depending on whether the Arctic issues in question are CFSP related or pillar one related. In other words, MLG allows for a more nuanced and
holistic approach to the issue of coherence in the EU Arctic approach than would
neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism alone.

Governance can be broadly defined as the authority to make, implement,
and enforce rules in a specified policy domain. Multi-level governance
refers to the sharing of this authority across an institutionalized,
hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of
unity/coherence, commitment to EU norms, and power resources.
(Michael E. Smith 2004: 743)

Multi-level Governance almost two decades ago, studies of the European Union had
been dominated by the grand theories of neo-functionalism and
intergovernmentalism. These theories sought not only to account for how the EU
functioned, but also sought to explain European integration. In contrast to
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, middle-range theories of governance,
such as MLG, do not primarily seek to explain the establishment or development of
the Community institutions, but rather aim to understand modes and process patterns
of European policy-making and explaining the EU as a political system already in
existence (Bache and George 2006: 22; Pollack 2005; Rosamond 2007: 121;
Schimmelfennig and Wagner 2004: 657). In other words, unlike integration theory
for which the shape of the EU-polity is the dependent variable, MLG considers the
EU-polity the independent variable (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 245). This is an important
benefit of the MLG perspective as it makes it possible to study challenges and
opportunities in the EU Arctic Policy process in terms of what is there and not why it
is there or should be there.

What spurred the development of governance theories is what Gary Marks (1993:
401-402), drawing on the policy network approach to domestic politics, initially
called “a centrifugal process in which decision-making is spun away from member
states in two directions, namely to the subnational as well as the supranational levels”

32 The roots of MLG are to be found in earlier neo-functionalist theories in the works of Earnst de Haas (1958) and Leon
Linbreg (1963), see Hooghe (1996).
Although central governments remain the most important policy-makers, a variety of actors at European, national and subnational level are now said to share decision-making responsibility. On an increasing amount of legislation, for example, the European Parliament now co-decides with the Council. Writings on MLG converge on the belief that the dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is both more efficient than, and normatively superior to, central state monopoly (Marks and Hooghe 2003: 3). MLG thus aims to consolidate several related strands of literature that regard European integration as a challenge to the role of the state, thus taking for granted a certain amount of supranational governance (Sandholtz and Sweet 1998: 2-3). It can therefore be considered an alternative approach to the state-centric model of intergovernmentalism (Bache and Flinders 2004b: 34).

MLG has increasingly been regarded as a useful perspective with which to study European foreign policy. The “value added” of the theory is that it explains how common general interests are defined, prioritized, and translated into concrete policy actions through institutionalized behaviours at the EU and domestic levels (Michael E. Smith 2004: 743). Whereas classical European integration theories consider the link between the EU and its external environment only to a limited extent, MLG makes it possible to focus on how the EU’s governance system affects its capacity to act towards the outside (Filtenborg, et al. 2002: 389). What characterises European foreign policy is, according to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 31), the interaction between the national and the European level, varying depending on the issue at hand. However, they continue, it is not simply a two-level game as policy-making does not exclusively occur at these levels (Cf. Putnam 1988). Indeed, EU foreign policy can be conceptualized as a complex multilevel foreign policy, with different actors at different levels having different competences and obligations related to different issues and policy frameworks. Michael Smith (2004: 741) has a

33 The two most relevant levels for this thesis, given the current progress of the process, are the national and supranational levels. It does therefore not consider sub-national levels or private actors.
34 There is no agreement, however, about how multi-level governance should be organized (Cf. Marks and Hooghe 2003). For information about type one and two of MLG, see Marks and Hooghe (2003).
similar view (although analysis CFSP only), arguing that the use of multi-level governance helps to avoid the pitfalls of intergovernmental approaches to EU foreign policy, such as two-level games or liberal intergovernmentalism (Cf. Moravcsik 1993). Allegedly, while these two approaches may be useful for analysing high-level negotiations about treaty reforms, they are problematic in describing normal policy outcomes. In fact, an apparent advantage of MLG is that it, in virtue of being a decision-making system, offers a useful and neutral characterisation of EFP, without having to debate whether the EU can have a FP and whether liberalism or realism is the right theory to use (Ginsberg 2001: 32).35

The main contribution of MLG to the study of the EU Arctic Policy is that firstly, it permits focusing on policy-making as opposed to European integration. Secondly, it provides a framework with which to analyse a complex policy issue which is subject to both supranational and intergovernmental decision-making. Finally, it assumes a role for other institutions than the Council, namely the Commission and the Parliament. This third contribution is, in fact, the first assumption of this thesis, namely that that all three institutions in the EU have influence and a role to play in developing the Arctic policy. However, whereas MLG permits making the important assumption that all three institutions are relevant actors, it does not say much about how they behave or relate to each other. Having assumptions about the roles and behaviours of the institutions during the policy-process is important when studying institutional coherence as it might reveal differences in the institutions’ approaches towards Arctic issues. Thus, MLG will, for the purpose of this thesis, be supplemented with relevant elements from the theories of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism36.

35 Note that MLG is a somewhat controversial approach and MLG theory building is not yet complete (Cf. Bache and Flinders 2004a; Piattoni 2009). According to Piattoni (2009: 165), for example, “The weapon that had allowed Marks to create a conceptual space for MLG (i.e. to say what MLG was not), that is, its ‘actor-centredness’, was not as useful in erecting the MLG construction (i.e. to say what MLG was)”.

36 For an overview of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, see Cini (2007a) and Bache and George (2006; 2007a). For selected pioneering works, see Haas (1958) and Moravcsik (1993). Furthermore, it might have been possible to use aspects of organisation theory to provide assumptions about institutional behaviour in general. However, considering how different the three institutions in question are (the units of analysis in the Commission are bureaucrats, the Council consists of member state representatives and the Parliament consists of politicians), it has been considered more appropriate to use
According to neo-functionalism, the European Commission is expected to act as a political entrepreneur and a mediator (Cf. Jensen 2007; Sandholtz and Sweet 1998). The ultimate aim of the Commission is to push the member states towards greater cooperation, leading to ever increasing supranational decision-making. The Commission can thus be expected to behave in a proactive and ambitious manner concerning the Arctic Policy. The European Parliament is considered an ally to the Commission; although consisting of nationally elected MEPs (Member of the European Parliament), it is expected to develop loyalties towards the EU and thus defend the European interest against national governments. The Parliament is thus also expected to favour a coherent and ambitious Arctic policy. It might thus also be possible to imagine that the Commission and the Parliament would pursue rather coherent approaches towards the Arctic. Concerning the Council, it is the institution where national interests are defended. It is therefore likely to be more cautious of an ambitious EU Arctic policy that could compromise national influence and authority, for example by including issues which are currently wholly or partly member state competence or issues which are perceived as nationally sensitive. However, neo-functionalism believes that national governments cannot manage to completely resist further pressures for integration.

Conversely, variants of intergovernmentalism consider the member states to be by far the most important actors; European cooperation involves at most sharing of sovereignty rather than any transfer of sovereignty from the national to supranational level (Cf. Cini 2007b). When the states find it in their interest to give certain regulatory functions to supranational institutions, they do so in order to make cooperation more effective. In fact, the intergovernmentalist view of the supranational institutions is that they are little more than the servants of the member states without being capable of playing an independent role within the process. According to such a view, the Commission and the Parliament do not really have that
much influence over the policy process and the EU Arctic Policy will not be any more ambitious than is accepted by the member states.

In order to assess inter-institutional relations, it is also necessary to have some knowledge about intra-institutional relations, or internal dynamics. Internal forces might influence on the institution’s external behaviour and its actions towards Arctic issues. In this regard, as will be discussed in more detail in the section about coherence, the institutions are not assumed to be unitary actors but rather expected to face internal divisions Christiansen (2001: 750). According to the neo-functionalist line of thought, it is possible to assume that components within the Commission and the Parliament, given that they are representing the interests of the Union, would be more internally coherent than the Council. The components of the Council, in line with intergovernmentalist ideas, represent national interests and should thus display more internal diversity.

In sum, the main contribution of MLG to studies of European foreign policy is that it looks at how the EU’s governance system affects its capacity to act towards the external environment. The most important assumptions that can be derived from the above section are the following: Firstly, European policy-making involves more than one level and one set of actors; thus, developing an EU Arctic policy will involve the member states, i.e. the national level, on the one hand, and the Commission and the Parliament, i.e. the supranational level on the other. Secondly, the three institutions will have slightly different approaches to Arctic issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. Since in practice the Union strikes a balance between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, there will be varying degrees of supranational and intergovernmental elements and tensions depending on the particular Arctic issue at hand.  

More specifically, these elements of integration and intergovernmentalism

37 The “grand” debate in European studies is about whether the EU is, or should be, characterised by supranationalism or intergovernmentalism. The following definition of supranationalism is worth quoting in full; “Supranationalism is a method of decision-making in international organizations, where power is held by independent appointed officials or by representatives elected by the legislatures or people of the member states. Member-state governments still have power, but they must share this power with other actors. Furthermore, decisions tend to be made by majority votes, hence it is possible
imply that while the Commission is considered to act as a political entrepreneur, attempting to push forward with ever more integration in alliance with the European Parliament, the Council represents the intergovernmental aspects of European policy-making, supposed to safeguard national interests from too much integration. Furthermore, while a certain level of internal fragmentation might be expected within the three institutions, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism lead to assuming a greater level of internal coherence in the supranational institutions than in the Council. Hence the second assumption about possible challenges to a coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. The final part of this chapter will present the structuring concept of the thesis, namely the concept of coherence in foreign policy.

### 2.2.3 Coherence in European foreign policy-making

The aim of this thesis is not to assess the effect of coherence in EFP on the EU’s ability to influence developments in the Arctic. Moreover, the EU cannot really be considered state-like actor. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the rationale underpinning the concept of coherence in foreign policy is that it is a prerequisite for the ability of a state to assert influence abroad and protecting itself from unwanted influence at home (Ekengren and Sundelius 2004: 110). Put slightly differently, coherence is regarded as a necessary tool to achieve effectiveness in foreign policy outcomes (Portela and Raube 2009: 2). Moreover, as stated earlier, coherence has a particular meaning when it comes to European foreign policy, being both a political requirement and a source of concern to policy-makers and academics alike. However, there is not one definition of coherence and consistency, nor a single manner in which to employ it. Rather than accounting for the entire conceptual debate, consistency and coherence will be briefly discussed, defined and adjusted according to the purpose of this study. Whereas the two terms will be used interchangeably in the following
section, “coherence” will be the preferred term throughout the rest of the paper for the sake of clarity.

Often, whereas consistency refers to the absence of contradiction, coherence relates to the creation of synergies, added value or the construction of a united whole (Gauttier 2004: 23; Hillion 2008: 14; Missiroli 2001: 4). While consistency is quite straightforward to measure considering that a policy is either coherent or not, “it is quite conceivable that something is more or less coherent” (Missiroli 2001: 4). This thesis does not aim to assess coherence in absolute terms. Rather, the latter is used as a synonym for consistency and constitutes a structuring analytical tool with which to discuss challenges and opportunities in the EU’s approach to the Arctic. It denotes both “absence of contradiction” and, to a greater extent, “synergies” and a “united whole”. As Missiroli (2001: 4) argues, from a political and functional point of view, the difference between the two terms may not be so significant. Both concepts “hint at the need for coordinated policies with the goal of ensuring that the EU acts unitarily: all the more so when they refer to the Union’s external activities, which are inherently inter-pillar”.

According to Christiansen (2001: 747), consistency may be understood in terms of systemic outputs, meaning the way in which the content of different policies produced by the EU forms part of a coherent whole. Or, it may be regarded in terms of the institutional process by which policies are made i.e. in terms of the degree to which institutions operate a coherent and coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making. Since there is not yet an outcome to study, and since it is possible to imagine that challenges in the process might influence a policy outcome, the main focus of this thesis is on the policy process itself. Furthermore, Simon Nuttall (2005: 97) delineates three dimensions of coherence.\(^\text{38}\) Firstly, horizontal coherence refers to a lack of consistency between policies formulated across the EU’s policy-making system and particularly across policies developed through the various pillars. A possible example of horizontal inconsistency could be if the EU environmental policy

\(^{38}\) See also, Duke (1999: 30)
in the future called for the protection of the Arctic, while its external energy policy ensured oil supply from a very polluting source in the Arctic Ocean. Achieving horizontal coherence would be desirable for efficient policy making and for the credibility of the EU as an actor in international politics. However, considering the number of different policy issues that are Arctic relevant, both within and across pillars, this could turn out a challenging task. Due to lack of space, however, horizontal consistency, will not be devoted much attention. Secondly, institutional coherence is related to the above category and denotes the problem which may arise because the EU has chosen to handle the single policy sector of external relations by two sets of actors that approach the same problem with different procedures. Christiansen (2001: 748) adds a second category, intra-institutional coherence, regarding the possibilities for internal fragmentation. The Commission, the Council and the Parliament are frequently considered to be unitary actors. However, according to Christiansen (2001: 750) “all three institutions face numerous internal divisions. Depending on their seriousness, such divisions may translate into fragmented policy-making and thus undermine the coherence of EU governance”. Considering the above, it is thus possible to imagine potential differences, or even divergences, in how the institutions approach Arctic issues as undermining a coherent Arctic approach. Finally, vertical consistency is jeopardised if member states pursue national policies which are out of kilter with the policies agreed in the EU. Vertical consistency is ultimately about “how far the member states are prepared to bind their national foreign policies to the outcome of the CFSP or the EU’s other external relations policies, thereby strengthening the EU’s position as a force in international diplomacy” (Nuttall 2005: 106). Vertical inconsistency could potentially display itself if some member states found it impossible to follow an agreed course in the EU’s approach to the Arctic. For example, the fact that the UK and the Netherlands voted against an agreed common EU position on the proposed ban on blue fin tuna in April this year, thus risking being called to court by the Commission, would arguably constitute an example of vertical incoherence which may undermine common EU approaches and the perception of the EU as a coherent actor in international politics (Cf. Hickman 2009; Rankin 2010).
Thus, to summarise, firstly, for the purpose of this thesis, coherence is understood in terms of the institutional process by which policies are made and is defined as the degree to which the institutions operate a coherent and coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making. Secondly, institutional coherence is the main focus of attention; however aspects of horizontal and vertical consistency will be referred to. The former denotes consistency between policies formulated across the EU’s policy-making system. The latter is interpreted as how far the member states are prepared to bind their national foreign policies to the outcome of the CFSP or the EU’s other external relations policies. Given that the three categories seem to be interconnected, it does not seem fruitful to analyse the different categories in total isolation. For example, as will be argued in chapter five, intra-institutional dynamics in the Council affects both institutional consistency while also representing potential challenges for vertical consistency. Thirdly, as internal dynamics might influence the approaches of the institutions towards the Arctic, intra-institutional coherence concerning possibilities for internal fragmentation is also considered.

2.2.4 Implications of theory: Premises and assumptions

As stated earlier in this chapter, this thesis analyses a policy in the making. It is thus difficult to identify specific aspects of the Arctic policy that can be accurately measured. Consequently, rather than focusing on one issue or one institution, questions and assumptions will necessarily be general in nature. The aim is to analyse the challenges and opportunities that the EU is facing in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy by focusing on institutional coherence, guided by the analytical framework outlined above.

The thesis is guided by two underlying premises derived from FPA and aspects of the literature on EFP. Firstly, the EU should not be considered a unitary actor, or state when developing an Arctic Policy. Rather it is a multilayered policy system subject to increasing transnational governance. Secondly, EU foreign policy is more than the formal institutions and outcomes of the CFSP, thus requiring a broad definition of EU foreign policy and a more holistic analysis of the actors and the policy process.
More importantly, the theoretical framework has provided two assumptions about actors and the policy process. Firstly, according to MLG, all three institutions; the Commission, the Council and the Parliament have roles and powers in the Arctic policy-process. The claim will be assessed by looking at the nature of Arctic issues and to which of the institutions’ competence they are likely to fall. The intention is not to either verify or falsify the claim. This would not be possible by only looking at the issue of formal competences as there are many other ways that the institutions might have influence and powers over the policy-process. Nevertheless, assessing to what extent the three institutions have formal influence in the policy-process provides a relevant way to address the MLG theoretical assumption while at the same time providing important empirical information about the nature of the Arctic Policy. Secondly, the three institutions will have slightly different approaches to Arctic issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. These differences will presumable be a result of the different nature and purpose of the institutions according to whether they are characterised as supranational or intergovernmental. The institutions will have different internal dynamics and ambitions, both of which might have an impact on the inter-institutional relationship concerning Arctic issues. Firstly, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism imply that while the Commission is a political entrepreneur, attempting to push forward with ever more integration in alliance with the European Parliament, the Council represents the intergovernmental aspects of European policy-making, supposed to safeguard national interests from too much integration. In other words, while the supranational institutions are perceived to be the accelerator, the Council is the breaks. The Council is expected to be particularly sceptical to issues concerning foreign policy in pillar two or towards increasing Commission competences in areas considered member state domains. Secondly, according to the literature on intra-institutional coherence it is assumed that the EU institutions face internal divisions. However, based on the two abovementioned theories a greater amount of coherence is expected within the Commission and the Parliament than within the Council when it comes to the content of the Arctic Policy and the ambitions concerning an EU role in Arctic matters. While the supranational
institutions could be considered to have an “overarching agenda” which would constitute an incentive for cooperation, the Council is composed of 27 national governments that, although always attempting to reach consensus, nevertheless must defend the national interest. In sum, due to the factors above, the second assumption states that there will be a certain level of contrast between the institutions’ approaches to the Arctic issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach to the Arctic.

The aim of this chapter was to present an analytical framework for studying the EU Arctic Policy. To this end, four specific steps have been taken; firstly, FPA has been adopted and applied to European foreign policy; secondly, arguments have been presented for why a MLG perspective is the appropriate theoretical perspective; thirdly, elements of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism have been introduced; and lastly, the structuring concept of coherence has been presented, defined and explained. The structured framework here presented should facilitate the understanding of the different aspects of the analysis to follow.
3. EU policy-making and the nature of Arctic issues

This chapter will assess the MLG assumption that all three institutions are central to developing a coherent EU approach to the Arctic. Assessing the roles of the institutions will provide important information about the current and future policy-process. One way to proceed is to investigate the nature of Arctic issues in order to assess the formal influence of the institutions in the decision-making process. According to MLG, the institutions will have varying degrees of power based on the policy issue at hand. If Arctic issues are first and foremost CFPS issues, then the roles of the Commission and the Parliament will be significantly reduced. However, if the Arctic Policy is about pillar one external relations issues, or even internal issues, then the two supranational institutions have more influence, and the power of the Council is correspondingly weakened from deciding by unanimity to deciding by qualified majority voting. Such an assessment is, of course, not sufficient; institutions have other forms of influence than just decision-making powers. However, the above assessment nevertheless provides one useful way in which to study the roles of the institutions in developing an EU Arctic policy. Before discussing the nature of Arctic issues, however, it is necessary to briefly present the main actors in the EU policy-process here deemed relevant, namely the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Parliament as well as their roles, competences and influences in the general EU policy process. The second half of the chapter will then discuss the place of Arctic issues in the EU policy process, something which will provide knowledge about the roles of the different institutions in an EU Arctic policy.

39 Using the term ‘actor’ opens up for a debate about who participates and influence European policy-making. It is, of course, not only the Council, the Commission and the Parliament that are relevant and important actors. Indeed, it is common in the EU to consult a variety of stakeholders. However, considering how little the process has evolved, it makes sense to look at the main institutions only as others actors will not be fully associated until a later stage such as if the Commission decides to produce a Green Paper on the Arctic. Furthermore, although the former High Representative for CFSP and the Council Secretariat, and the new High Representative and the new European External Action Service played and are playing an important role in EU foreign policy, they will not be analysed separately as their contribution towards the Arctic Policy has thus far been limited compared to the other institutions.
3.1 EU politics: Actors and policy process

3.1.1 Main actors in the European policy process

Irrespective of theory, the main decision-making body of the EU is the Council of the European Union representing the member states (Cf. Council of the European Union Website). It is composed of ministers from national governments who currently meet in ten different configurations depending on the nature of the issues in question. For example, when the Council presented its Conclusions on the Arctic in December 2009, the document was drafted by the Foreign Affairs Council, consisting of the 27 foreign ministers. In practice, the Council in effect consists of a pyramid of meetings between permanent representatives and delegates of the member states, from working expert to ministerial level. The main coordinator is COREPER (the Permanent Representatives Committee) but the work of this Committee is itself prepared by more than 150 committees and working groups. For example, the Council Conclusions on the Arctic in 2009 was drafted by COEST, the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Informant B; Respondent H).

Furthermore, the Council is both an executive and a legislator, sharing such powers with the Commission and the Parliament respectively. It is the forum for negotiating and legislating on traditional Community issues, but also the main institution for discussing and deciding on “intergovernmental” issues related to the CFSP, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 1). The Council thus embodies the intergovernmental aspects of European policy-making.

The second institution, in the words of Morten Egeberg (2007: 140), “is to many observers […] a unique institution. It is much more than an international secretariat, but not quite a government”. Simply put, the Commission is composed of one

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40 The Lisbon Treaty split what used to the General Affairs and External Relations Council into two councils; the Foreign Affairs Council and the General Affairs Council.
41 The working groups are the last actual arbiters of Council negotiations of 70 per cent of the Council’s legislative output (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 14).
42 After the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESDP is called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Commissioner from each of the 27 member states, nominated by national governments. In addition, the Commission has a permanent civil service of approximately 38,000 staff (European Commission Website). The Commission has thus both a political executive wing providing political direction, notably the Commissioners, and an administrative wing; the civil service, which is divided into different Directorate General (DGs) that correspond to the national civil servant departments of state (Bache and George 2006: 261; Egeberg 2007: 140). An important feature of the Commission is that the Commissioners should be “completely independent in the performance of their duties [meaning] that they neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body” (European Commission 2007a: 2). Rather than advancing any particular national agenda, the role of the European Commission is to represent and uphold the interests of Europe as a whole by advancing the overall agenda. The extent to which the Commissioners are totally independent from their member state, is debated, however, addressing this issue is outside the scope of this paper (Cf. Egeberg 2006). The Commission presents proposals for European law, oversees the correct implementation of the Treaties and of legislation and carries out common policies as well as managing funds (European Commission 2007a: 2). Bearing in mind the debate about the independence of Commissioners, the Commission represents the supranational aspects of EU policy-making.

Finally, the European Parliament is the only directly elected European institution. It currently (2010) consists of 736 MEPs, divided between the member states on a basis that is approximately proportionate with the size of the population (Bache and George 2006: 295). The MEPs are nationally elected and their party delegations join together in multi-national party groups in the Parliament, based broadly around political ideology (Scully 2007: 180). Assessing the extent to which the MEPs vote along party lines or according to nationality is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that the Parliament, according to authors, such as Roger Scully (2007: 177) has

43 As of 2010.
proven a strong advocate for closer European integration and more powers for itself.\textsuperscript{44} The Parliament has currently twenty standing committees to prepare work for plenary sittings, divided into sectors such as foreign affairs, international trade and development. They undertake legislative work such as scrutinizing draft legislation and drawing up amendments. The committee system as a whole is widely regarded as the place where most of the Parliament’s serious work is done (Scully 2007: 182). Originally only a consultative body, the Parliament’s powers have increased substantially over the years, now including political, legislative and budgetary powers (Cf. European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication 2009). It is a key player in the process of making Community law, co-deciding with the Council on budgetary issues, on laws related to the freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital within the EU and on matters such as environmental protection. Its assent is required for any international treaty the EU signs up to as well as for any enlargement of the EU. Bearing in mind the debate about whether the Parliament represents national interests or the Union’s interests, it is regarded as a supranational institution in EU policy-making.

To sum up, the three most important actors in European policy-making are the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The institutions have different roles and powers in the process depending both on the issue in question. Whereas the first represents intergovernmental aspects of EU policy-making and integration, the two other are often considered supranational institutions, meant to advocate the Union’s interests and advancing integration and cooperation.

\subsection*{3.1.2 Institutional competences in European policy-making}

Although the Lisbon Treaty formally abolished the pillar structure when it entered into force in December 2009, there are two reasons why this thesis still refers to the pillar concept when discussing the role and powers of the different EU institutions in

\textsuperscript{44} Some authors, such as Scully (2007: 180; 183) argue that although the unity of a party group is often the result of compromises among different national viewpoints differences within the Parliament are structured far more often along party lines than national ones. Others, however, such as Bache and George (2006: 307) maintain that the Parliament is still dominated by national parties and that this constrains the MEPs from acting independently.
European foreign policy-making: Firstly, the new competence arrangements are still being debated as of May 2010; and, secondly, the focus of this thesis covers the last three years, two and a half of which were before the Lisbon Treaty. However, considering the Treaty’s significance for the future process towards an Arctic policy, the possible implications of the Treaty for an EU Arctic policy will be briefly addressed.

According to MLG, there will be varying degrees of supranational and intergovernmental elements depending on the Arctic issue at hand. While some of these policy areas belong to the sphere where the Commission and the Parliament have a significant amount of influence others are more intergovernmental in nature. From the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 until the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in late 2009, the EU legally consisted of three pillars, meaning that the roles and powers of the institutions depended on the policy area (Cf.Gateway to the European Union: Europa Glossary). The first pillar was the only pillar with a legal personality and represented supranational cooperation on matter such as agriculture, environmental law, trade, energy, research and the EU’s economic relations with third countries (European Navigator). Concerning matters within this pillar, only the Commission could submit proposals for legislation to the Council and the Parliament, and a qualified majority in the Council was sufficient for an act to be adopted. The European Parliament was actively involved through the co-decision procedure covering most policy areas (Gateway to the European Union: Summaries of EU legislation). This gave the Commission and the Parliament considerable powers vis-à-vis the Council.

The second pillar contained the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the third pillar was devoted to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (JHA). These two pillars essentially designated intergovernmental cooperation between governments, functioning according to the intergovernmental procedure where the Commission shared the right of initiative with the member states, and unanimity in

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45 See Appendix i for a schematic overview of institutional competences before and after the Lisbon Treaty.
the Council was generally necessary to adopt a decision, with the Parliament only enjoying a purely consultative role. The Commission was “fully associated with all aspects of the CFSP” meaning that it was represented at meetings of CFSP at all levels, from Council to the working groups (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 175). Furthermore, the economic means used in the conduct of foreign policy concerning issues such as financial assistance, embargoes and trade negotiations still lied within its responsibility (European Navigator). As for the Parliament, it was consulted, kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission about developments concerning the CFSP and could make recommendations to the Council. The Commission and the Parliament thus still played a role in foreign policy making, but it was significantly reduced, with the member states being at the hub of decision-making (Gateway to the European Union: Summaries of EU legislation). The pillar structure and the nature of competences were (and will be- the arrangements are still not settled as of May 2010) altered with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty last year. European policy-making will still be divided between the institutions. However, considering that some of the treaty changes are highly relevant to this study, the paper devotes a section to the Treaty’s main features.

3.1.3 Implications of the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1st 2009 (Cf. Fondation Robert Schuman 2009; Gateway to the European Union: The Lisbon Treaty). It removes the pillar structure and makes the Union into one legal entity with three categories of power: Firstly, exclusive powers where only the Union may legislate including policy areas such as the common trade policy; secondly, shared powers where the states may legislate on matters on which the Union has not made any legislation; and, thirdly, supporting competence where the Union may only support action by the member states such as for example providing funding.46

46 Before the Lisbon Treaty, the first pillar with community issues, was called the European Community (EC) and was the only entity with a legal personality in the EU. Considering that the Union in its entirety became a legal personality with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the term EC has been replaced with EU.
Other potentially relevant changes for the development of an EU Arctic policy include the increase in Parliament power and the new European External Action Service (EEAS). Firstly, the “co-decision procedure” has been renamed the “ordinary legislative procedure” and has been extended to several new fields where the Parliament before was only consulted or not involved at all. The Parliament now determines all expenditure together with the Council. In addition, its assent is henceforth required for all international agreements concluded in fields governed by the ordinary legislative procedure. The abovementioned changes provide a solid argument for why the Parliament must be taken into account when analysing the process towards an EU Arctic policy. In this regard, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty seems to increase the relevance of MLG as a theoretical approach to European policy-making.

Secondly, the new post of High Representative (HR) coordinates and represents the Union's CFSP. It wears “two hats”, being based in the European Commission but also chairing the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Union. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is in the process of being created and will serve under the HR as essentially a foreign ministry for the Union. The potential impact of the EEAS on the Arctic Policy was highlighted by several of the respondents interviewed for this study: Will there be competition or cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission on the Arctic Policy? Will DG Transport or EEAS take charge on issues related to transport in the Arctic Ocean? (Respondent F). How will the Lisbon Treaty affect the powers of the three institutions in general and foreign policy-making? Although an important topic, the main aim of this thesis is not to discuss the implications that the Lisbon Treaty will have on the EU Arctic Policy.

In sum, as has been demonstrated in the section above, the European institutions have different powers depending on the policy issues in question. Thus if Arctic issues are first and foremost CFPS issues, the roles of the Commission and the Parliament will be significantly reduced. However, if the Arctic Policy is about pillar one issues, or even internal issues, then the two supranational institutions have more influence, and the power of the Council is correspondingly weakened from deciding by unanimity to
deciding by qualified majority voting. It is important to note, however, that although the pillar structure helps appreciating the complex structure of EU policy-making, changes in the relationship between the pillars throughout the 1990s has made the boundaries between them blurred (Phinnemore 2007: 34). It is therefore difficult to accurately measure the role and the power of the institutions in EU policy-making, all the more so considering that the EU is currently moving from the old arrangements towards the new era of the Lisbon Treaty with the new structures still being debated. The next section debates the cross-pillar nature of Arctic issues. It addresses the MLG assumption that all three institutions have influence and power over Arctic issues by looking at their formal influence based on decision-making powers and the competence arrangements.

3.2 The nature of Arctic issues

Debating whether the EU Arctic Policy concerns Community or member-state policy, and to whose authority it falls, is a difficult task, and could constitute a research topic in itself. An initial observation suggests that Arctic issues at least concern matters which are external to the Union; the Arctic region and the Arctic Ocean is not European territory to the same extent as for example the Baltic Sea region. As a Danish EU official said, although emphasising that he was exaggerating; “it is just like an EU Latin-America Policy” (Respondent H). Furthermore, according to one Commission official, RELEX and External Affairs in the Council are taking the lead on the Arctic (Respondent A). It is worth noting that it was the Foreign Affairs Council that came with the Council Conclusions on the Arctic both in 2008 and 2009, rather than the General Affairs Council or environment or transport and energy. It is also DG RELEX that is in charge of the further work on the Arctic in the Commission, rather than DG MARE or DG ENV. In addition, the European Parliament also labels Arctic issues external relations and CFSP (European

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Even this, of course, is disputed. On the one hand, the Commission argues that the EU indeed has territories in the Arctic, pointing to Denmark (Greenland), Sweden and Finland (Cf. European Commission 2008e) On the other hand, others point to the fact that Greenland is the only EU territory with a coastal line in the Arctic and that the island has extensive type of self-government from Denmark and withdrew its EU membership in 1985 (Folketinget Webpage).
Parliament 2010b). However, a part from this observation, the question about the nature of the Arctic Policy becomes more complicated. Is the Arctic Policy a Commission policy, comprising internal or external relations in pillar one? Or is it a member-state policy subject to the decision-making procedure of the second pillar where the Council remains considerably more powerful than the Commission and the Parliament? Some informants and respondents interviewed in this study claimed that it is foreign policy referring to the CFSP. Others claimed it is first and foremost a Commission policy comprising pillar one issues. Yet others concluded that it is probably both and that it is too soon to know what, if any, parts of the Arctic Policy would fall within member state competences and what parts would fall to the Commission. Assessing the nature of Arctic issues is important for determining the formal influence of the institutions in the process towards an Arctic policy.

3.2.1 Member-state or Commission domain?

On the one hand, there are factors suggesting that Arctic matters are the domain of member-states and the Council, thus reducing the relevance of the Commission and the Parliament. One former Norwegian diplomat to the EU believes that a coherent EU Arctic Policy will be first and foremost a CFSP matter, which is ultimately decided by the member-states (Informant B). Indeed, one of the first official documents that mentioned the Arctic was the paper from the High Representative for CFSP, Mr. Javier Solana, and the Commissioner for external relations, Ms. Benito Ferrero-Waldner, to the Council in 2008. Apparently, what might have sparked Mr. Solana’s interest in the Arctic was the energy crisis that hit Europe, first, in 2006, then again in 2007 (Informant B; Cf. Euractive 2006; RT 2008). The Russian shutdown of gas supplies to Europe amply demonstrated the vulnerability of the EU when it comes to security of supply. The main concern of the paper was the impact of climate change on international security and that the geo-strategic dynamics of the region were changing with “potential consequences for international stability and European security interests” (European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP 2008: 8). However, the document also mentioned energy security. As one Norwegian regional government official working in Brussels put it; “If you choose to
wear *realpolitikal* glasses, it is ultimately about energy security” (Informant D). With “energy security [being] a major objective of the European Union to ensure its economic development and the well-being of its citizens”, the EU has an interest in the continued delivery from the Russia and Norway (European Commission 2008b: 19). However, as one Norwegian diplomat to the EU pointed out; “many people in the Parliament are concerned about energy security, but this is a member-state area of competence […] Security is a classic foreign policy issue” (Informant C). Thus, potentially Arctic relevant foreign policy areas concern various aspects of security, a clear example of Council competence.49

On the other hand, however, it might be argued that the Arctic Policy ultimately is about internal and external EU policies and actions, falling within pillar one where the influence of the supranational institutions are greater and where the power of the Council is somewhat less significant. Indeed, most policy areas currently mentioned in relation to a future EU Arctic policy and most of the current Arctic relevant EU policies are Commission policies. The EU policy sector which most directly targets the Arctic region is the EU’s research policy. According to the Commission’s Communication (2008e: 5) the past Community Framework Programmes (FP5 and FP6) provided support to more than 50 polar-related projects. The EU is thus the biggest single contributor to Arctic-related research in areas such as climate change, rising sea-levels and Arctic and boreal ecosystems (Borg 2009). Other Arctic relevant Commission policies include fisheries, tourism and partly environment (Cf. Airoldi 2008). Furthermore, although difficult to evaluate their direct relevance for the Arctic, the EU has various programmes within its cohesion policy that specifically target regions in the northernmost regions of the EU. These programmes are financed by the European Regional Development Fund or the European Neighbourhood Policy

48 In 2020, with “business as usual” the EU’s energy import dependence will jump from 54% of total EU energy consumption in 2008 to 65% in 2030 (European Commission 2007b: 3; Eurostat 2008). In 2008, the EU produced less than one fifth of its total oil consumption, with 33% of oil imports coming from Russia and 16% from Norway (European Commission 2008b: 9). Concerning gas, the EU produces about two fifths of consumption needs with gas the gas imported is coming from four big suppliers with Russia providing 42% and Norway accounting for 24%.

49 Note that the abovementioned factors provide merely tentative indications as to the CFSP foreign policy nature of Arctic issues and by no means represent an exhaustive analysis. At such an early stage in the policy process, it is not likely that the member states have fully developed positions on Arctic issues.
Instrument. In addition, Greenland, is considered an OCT (Overseas Countries and Territories) associated to the EU and receives a considerable amount of EU financial support (Informant A; European Commission Website). Thus, an EU Arctic policy will include several policies areas over which the Commission has influence.

3.2.2 The mixed nature of the EU Arctic Policy

As indicated above, Arctic issues may seem to concern both matters falling within CFSP i.e. member-state or Council competences and Community, i.e. Commission competences. This ultimately provides support for the MLG assumption that all three institutions matter, although they matter more or less considering the topic in question. Indeed, most interviewees believed Arctic issues to be mixed in nature and that this might potentially constituted a challenge to developing the policy. According to a Norwegian diplomat to Brussels; an Arctic policy would to a large extent concern the relationship with third countries, something which is clearly within the Council competence. However, the diplomat believed that there are many exceptions, as demonstrated in the Commission Communication (Informant C). In a similar vein, a Commission official argued that the Arctic Policy is both a Commission and a member-state issue, and thus less of an exclusive Commission policy (Respondent A). This view was supported by other EU officials who pointed out that the issue of competences really depends on the topic. For example, matters related to fisheries are an exclusive Commission competence. While environment and transport are mixed competence, meaning that both the Commission and member-states play a role, energy still belongs to the member-states’ domain (Respondent D; Respondent C; Respondent F). Indeed, as the Norwegian diplomat mentioned above noted; on the one hand the Commission’s Communication from 2008 includes different proposals for action of which some are within the Commission competence, such for example research and environmental protection (Informant C). These proposals are relatively vague and not very controversial. The

50 The issue of competences is particularly relevant in this regard as the EU will have to coordinate issues such as fisheries-a Commission policy and energy- a member state policy. Although this issue could constitute a topic of research in itself, it will not be given much attention in the remaining part of the paper.
Communication proposes for instance to assess the effectiveness of EU policies in responding to Arctic environmental challenges; reduce pollution of the Arctic, and develop further research programs and coordinate efforts in different research areas relevant to the Arctic such as environment, transport, and energy (Cf. European Commission 2008e). On the other hand, the Communication also points to policymaking in more controversial areas, which are outside the Commission’s competence, such as the governance issue. It claims that “the main problems relating to Arctic governance include the fragmentation of the legal framework, the lack of effective instruments […] and gaps in […] implementation and geographic scope”, suggesting that the EU should “assess the effectiveness of Arctic-relevant multilateral agreements to determine whether additional initiatives or measures are needed” (European Commission 2008e: 10-11). As will be discussed in more detail later in this paper, the issue of governance has proved a somewhat sensitive topic in the EU because the “Arctic Five”, including Denmark believe that the legal framework for Arctic issues is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and they therefore see “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” (Informant A; Informant C; Respondent H; Arctic Ocean Conference 2008: 2).

This chapter has addressed the MLG claim that all three institutions; the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, have formal powers in the process of developing an EU Arctic policy according to the nature of the Arctic issue in question. Although it is not possible at this stage to draw certain conclusions as to the nature of the Arctic Policy, preliminary findings nevertheless suggest that such a policy will be situated in the nexus between internal and external policies, and between external relations (pillar one) and CFSP (pillar two). The most important implication of the above for institutional coherence in the EU’s approach to the Arctic is that, in support of MLG, all three institutions matter and must be included in the analysis.51 An Arctic policy

51 Firstly, a potential conceptual implication of the findings in this chapter is to support the view that it is not sufficient to define EU foreign policy as CFSP in the traditional sense. Rather, the foreign policy of the EU must thus be defined as the ensemble of the EU’s external activities, combining both the CFSP and the activities of the Commission, often referred to as the EU’s external relations, falling within pillar one. See Karen E. Smith (2003: 2) for a similar definition of European
will not only be a matter for the member states, but will also be influenced by the Commission and the Parliament, all the more so after the Lisbon treaty increased the Parliament’s powers. Furthermore, the fact that all three have a role to play might pose a challenge to institutional coherence in that they all need to agree on the role of the EU in the Arctic. Considering the different nature of the institutions, such a coherent approach cannot be taken for granted. The next two chapters will therefore study internal dynamics within the institutions as well as the relationship between them in order to address the issue of coherence in the EU’s approach to the Arctic.

Foreign policy. However, more academic attention is needed to policy areas with clear foreign policy or external relations relevance, but which also involve internal policies. Secondly, although the cross-pillar nature of Arctic issues is likely to pose challenges to developing an EU Arctic policy in terms of issues of competences and coordination, this is outside the scope of this paper.
4. The EU and the Arctic: Actors, actions, and internal dynamics

In line with MLG, and as argued in the previous chapter, the Arctic is a cross-pillar policy issue that is not only CFPS related, but not only Commission relevant either. It is, in other words, a policy on which all three institutions have some form of influence and decision-making power. Considering that EU policy-making strikes a balance between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, it is assumed that there will be a certain level of contrast between the institutions’ approaches to the Arctic issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach to the Arctic. Since the internal dynamics of the institutions might influence their approaches and behaviour towards Arctic issues this chapter studies the internal dynamics and actions of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament respectively in relation to the Arctic Policy since 2007.52 It addresses the assumption derived from the literature on intra-institutional coherence about internal fragmentation within the institutions as well as the assumptions derived from neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism about the different behaviour and roles of the institutions.

4.1 The European Commission

According to neo-functionalism, the Commission is to be considered a political entrepreneur, striving to develop new policies and activities for the Union (Cf. Jensen 2007; Sandholtz and Sweet 1998). Although the Parliament also has pushed for an EU Arctic policy, there is no doubt that the Commission has been proactive in support of increased EU activity related to Arctic issues. As one Commission official pointed out, although there were individual MEPs in the Parliament involved in Arctic issues before 2008, “the first coherent policy document came from the Commission” (Respondent C). The Arctic as a policy area was first mentioned in its

52 For the sake of clarity and space, the focus in the following analysis will be on the period since 2007 as a basis from which to make tentative projections about challenges and opportunities in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy. The reason for this choice is that the call for an Arctic Policy first appeared, albeit implicitly, in an official document in 2007, namely in the Integrated Maritime Policy (Cf. European Commission 2007c). Note that it was the first call for an Arctic Policy in an official document, not the first call for a policy as such.
Integrated Maritime Policy in 2007 and in the Marine Strategy Directive, which was finalised in June 2008. However, it was the Paper on Climate Change and International Security published jointly in March 2008 by the High Representative at the time, Mr. Solana, and the Commissioner for external relations, Ms. Ferrerow-Waldner, that officially launched the idea of an EU policy for the Arctic (Cf. European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP 2008). As mentioned in the introduction, the paper highlighted both challenges and opportunities in relation to developments in the region and explicitly called for a standalone policy.

The Commission started working on the Communication in the spring of 2008 (Informant B; Respondent A; Respondent D). There was no standalone department dealing with Arctic issues in the Commission, rather DG RELEX took the lead in close liaison with DG MARE and created an inter-service group including representatives from nine to twelve DGs of which the core group currently consists of DG RELEX; DG MARE; DG Research; DG ENV; DG CLIM (created in 2010), and DG MOVE (Informant B; Informant C; Respondent A; Respondent C; Respondent D).53 According to two Commission officials, DG RELEX took the real lead and did most of the drafting (Respondent A; Respondent D). With RELEX and MARE at the wheel, there was one direction towards foreign policy and another towards maritime policy. The Commissioners for RELEX and MARE in association with DG ENV presented the Commission’s Communication on the EU and the Arctic in November 2008 (Cf. European Commission 2008e).54 The document was meant as a first layer of an Arctic policy for the European Union and set out EU interests and proposed action for EU Member States and institutions. It included three main policy objectives; firstly, protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population;

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53 According to Informant B there were seven DGs involved in the inter-service group that drafted the Communication in 2008: DG RELEX, DG MARE, DG ENV, DG TREN, DG Research, DG Enterprise and AIDCO (the EuropeAid Cooperation Office). Respondent A believes there are currently 10-12 DGs in the inter-service group. Furthermore, note that Respondent D does no include DG CLIM in the core group and that Respondent A, contrary to the others, includes DG ENER.

54 The next document which is expected from the Commission will be a status report on Arctic issues and is not due until 2011.
secondly, promoting sustainable use of resources; and finally, contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance.

According to writings on intra-institutional coherence, the Commission should not be regarded as a unitary actor. Indeed, according to Christiansen (2001: 751), the “very nature of the Commission- a single institution encompassing large and relatively self-contained DGs- is a recipe for fragmentation and internal division”. Although this thesis focuses on the DGs, i.e. the bureaucratic units, only, thus avoiding potential division between the bureaucratic and the political wing, a certain amount of inter DG divisions should therefore nevertheless be expected. Indeed, some of the interviewees believe that there was a certain amount of internal struggle within the Commission concerning the drafting process (Informant A; Informant B; Respondent F). According to a Norwegian government official, although there was not outright tension, there was great prestige associated with taking the lead, and there was a struggle for influence all the way (Informant A). The result was a compromise text where the representative for “user-interests” in the Arctic i.e. DG MARE and the “protectors” i.e. DG ENV achieved some of their objectives, while RELEX managed to include aspects of foreign policy (Informant A). Other Commission respondents, however, supported the idea of internal struggle to a lesser extent and believed that there was not much disagreement at all. According to one official, it was “fairly clear that it would be RELEX that would take the lead as it was RELEX that had looked after northern issues before” (Respondent D). Furthermore, there was supposedly little disagreement related to the content of the document; rather there was a question of adjusting details and wording (Respondent A; Respondent D).

In the end, the distance between the two abovementioned perceptions might not be so great after all. It is not surprising that institutions often experience a certain amount of internal fragmentation, or what Christiansen (2001) might call threats to intra-

55 The term “user” refers to having an interest in exploiting the Arctic region in economical terms.
56 Note that normally, before a Communication is adopted it is sent to an inter-service consultation and then, when approved, it is passed on to the Commissioners for approval. If there is disagreement at this level, the Communication will be discussed among the cabinets of the Commissioners concerned. It is unknown whether there was disagreement among the Commissioners during the approval of the 2008 Communication (Respondent D).
in institutional coherence. While, according to neo-functionalism, the different DGs, in virtue of being part of a supranational institution, could arguably be expected to advocate integration and thus promote as extensive an Arctic policy as possible, they still represent different groups and interests within the Commission. Whereas DG ENV is supposed to look after the views of environmental groups within the Union, DG MARE represents “user interests”, e.g. the interests of fishermen, shipping companies and so forth. DG ENER would naturally be concerned with security of supply as the Arctic might become a future source of energy. As one EU official pointed out, the sectoral DGs have their own objectives to pursue, and although they might not go in totally opposite directions, it is the responsibility of RELEX to ensure coherence (Respondent B). Although a certain amount of internal division and competition among the different DGs must be expected, interviews with Commission officials nevertheless suggest that levels of incoherence are not that significant at this stage.

Furthermore, there are indications suggesting that for the time being, the inter-service group cooperates in a relatively coherent manner. Of course, one should not underestimate the immense challenge related to horizontal coherence that the Commission will be facing in coordinating between the different sectors and policies, ranging from fisheries to tourism. As Alyson Bailes (2009) points out,

The Commission's proposed strategy limits itself to eight main headings (environment, climate change, indigenous peoples, research, energy policy, sustainable exploitation, transport and tourism), but just addressing those would mean coordinating between dozens of different offices scattered through all the EU’s bodies.

Yet, at such an early stage where the number of actors and agencies are still limited, preliminary findings, albeit based on limited data, suggest that the Commission works in a relatively coordinated manner in relation to Arctic issues. There are a limited and hence arguably acquainted number of people in the different DGs working on Arctic issues, sharing speeches and informing each other about policy positions (Respondent C). Furthermore, through the inter-service group, they share information, both formally and informally, and have pre-meetings in which they discuss agendas and
what positions the Commission should take before sending representatives to meetings and seminars on Arctic issues with other stakeholders (Respondent D). To sum up, there does not seem to be much internal fragmentation in the Commission’s work on Arctic issues even if this could be expected based on literature on intra-institutional coherence. The DGs also seem to be taking measures to ensure that cooperation in a coordinated manner. A coherent approach at this stage of the policy-process, however, is no guarantee against internal fragmentation as the process evolves and becomes more complex. Nevertheless, at this stage, preliminary findings suggest a relatively high level of internal coherence and coordination in the Commission. As will be argued below, the Council inhibits rather different internal dynamics.

4.2 The Council and the member states

Whereas the Commission, as stated in chapters two and three is a supranational institution meant to encourage ever more integration in the EU, the Council represents the interests of the national governments. It is therefore possible to expect the Council to have different internal dynamics, ambitions and objectives when it comes to an EU Arctic policy. Perhaps most importantly, since it is a far less internally coherent player than the Commission, it is presumably more challenging to achieve consensus on Arctic issues within the Council. Moreover, the Council is also expected to prevent the Commission from developing a too ambitious EU Arctic policy that would pose a risk to national authority. The differences in the nature and approaches of the two abovementioned institutions serve to illustrate the tensions between the supranational and the intergovernmental in the Union.

The contribution of the Council towards an EU Arctic policy has been more modest than that of the Commission. As has been mentioned earlier in this paper, the High Representative, together with the Commission wrote a paper to the European Council

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57 Of course, there is great variation among the member states in terms of whether they favour more integration or less. Traditionally, whereas for example France and Germany have been seen as advocates of closer cooperation, other, such as the UK and Denmark have been considered more sceptical.
i.e. the heads of state in 2008, calling for an Arctic policy (Cf. European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP 2008).\textsuperscript{58} That paper is the only official proposal presented by the Council concerning the policy. Since then, the Council has officially responded to a Commission proposal, which is a normal procedure. The Council gave a rather short response to the Communication in its Council Conclusions in December 2008, but provided a much more detailed response one year later (Cf. Conseil de l’Union Européenne 2008; Council of the European Union 2009).

The drafting of the Conclusions in 2009 was chaired by the Swedish Presidency (Cf. Swedish EU Presidency Website 2009). The Council working party responsible for Arctic issues is COEST, which did the actual drafting after receiving statements and comments from the other groups (Respondent H; Informant B). The document welcomed the gradual formulation of a policy on Arctic issues, presenting twenty-three points in order to take a next step towards the formulation of an overarching approach to EU policy on Arctic issues (Cf. Council of the European Union 2009). With the Conclusions, the Council has played the ball back into the Commission’s court asking for a progress report to be submitted by 2011.

Whereas the Commission has clearly demonstrated an interest in an Arctic policy for the Union, it is more difficult to assess how interested the Council as an institution is in seeing the EU develop such a policy. On the one hand, there does not seem to be much interest in the Arctic among member states as there are other topics that receive more attention. As a Norwegian regional government official working in Brussels bluntly put it; “the Arctic as an issue is not at the top of anyone’s agenda” (Informant D). On the other hand, another EU official, working for the Commission, claimed that the Arctic is very much of interest to the Council considering that three members are Arctic states, six members are observers to the Arctic Council and one member state,

\textsuperscript{58} The post of the High Representative was meant to give the CFSP diplomatic weight and continuity. The position was combined with that of Secretary-General of the Council. The HR assisted the Presidency in formulating policy and he also acted on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties. Javier Solana held the post from it was created in 1997 until it was replaced by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the Lisbon Treaty. The new post is currently held by Catherine Ashton.
Italy, has applied for such status (Respondent A; Cf. Arctic Council Website). In
addition, the official pointed out that also other smaller states are interested, such as
Estonia, which has run expeditions to Russian areas for years (Cf. Estonian Ministry
for Foreign Affairs 2009; European Science Foundation 2010). Another EU official
argued in a similar vein, claiming that the Arctic is “a hot issue”, obviously for the
Arctic states, but also beyond, leaving just a small minority to remain indifferent
(Respondent B). Yet a third EU representative, working for the Parliament, noted that
even if a country is not particularly interested, such as Austria, it is nevertheless
aware that in the EU, the member states have to make a deal (Respondent F).

However, if the Council seems to express a certain level of interest for Arctic issues,
this interest varies greatly within the institution, mostly due to inherent characteristics
of the member states and their relationship with the Arctic region. Perhaps most
importantly, member states have different status according to UNCLOS and the
Arctic Council (AC). Denmark is an Arctic coastal state and hence enjoys particular
rights and obligations according to UNCLOS. According to the Danish Foreign
Policy Yearbook 2009, “the Arctic is likely to become an important new arena for
Danish foreign policy, causing a considerable drain on resources” (Petersen 2009:
10). As will be discussed below, Denmark is in a particular position when it comes to
the EU Arctic Policy. Finland and Sweden, while being Arctic states without a coast
bordering the Arctic Ocean and thus not affected by UNCLOS in their Arctic
territories, they are also full members of the AC. Finland is about to finalise its own
Arctic strategy and aims to get more involved in the Arctic (Respondent G; Ministry
for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2010). The UK is a permanent observer to the AC, and
has longstanding interests in the region. It has for years been engaged in the
exploration, mapping and control of the Arctic region, the latter in which it continues
to have economic, environmental and research interests (Archer 2010: 1; Global
Biodiversity Sub-Committee 2008). Germany cooperates closely on energy with
Norway and Russia and is also involved in Arctic research (Informant A; Utenriksdepartementet 2007). Furthermore, France, although having a minor
presence in the region compared to Germany, has a long tradition of Arctic research
and conducts some twenty research programs (Informant A; Gaudin 2007). It has
even appointed an ambassador to the Arctic, the former Prime Minister and MEP, Mr. Michel Rocard (Le Figaro 2009). In addition to the abovementioned member states the Netherlands, Spain and Poland are permanent observers to the Arctic Council (Arctic Council Website). Of the EU member states, the abovementioned arguably constitute a core group to which Arctic issues could be expected to be considered particularly relevant. In sum, it might therefore be argued that, although the Council has been less active than the Commission in promoting an Arctic policy, there are at least indications of a certain level of interest from some of the member states in the Council.  

According to literature on intra-institutional coherence, the Council, similarly to the Commission, could be expected to face internal fragmentation. Moreover, adding the fact that it represents member states and the intergovernmental aspects of EU policy-making, the potential for internal fragmentation might arguably be considered higher than in the Commission. Indeed, a Council interest in Arctic issues does not equal support. Support for an EU Arctic policy from the Council as an institution is not uniform and is influenced by the different member states relationships with the Arctic as well as their positions and interests. Although it is too soon to conduct an extensive study of member state interests and positions concerning Arctic issues, preliminary findings suggest that, as predicted by Christiansen (Cf. 2001) there are indications of some internal fragmentation within the Council. There seem to be strong national interests at play, or at least member state positions and responsibilities that the Council must take into account when deliberating upon the Arctic Policy and producing policy statements. Of course, it is important to note that the Council aims for consensus and attempts to avoid having to put matters to a vote (Cf. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are no incidents of disagreement or different positions before reaching a decision; internal differences that are likely to influence the final policy output and which may have implications for the institutional relationship in developing a coherent EU Arctic

59 Italy has applied for permanent observer status.
60 The reason for why the Council has not promoted an EU Arctic policy might also, of course, be due to other reasons, such as member states’ views and positions, something which will be discussed below.
policy. The section below provides a preliminary discussion of internal dynamics in the Council related to developing an EU Arctic policy.

On the one hand, concerning the drafting of the Conclusions in 2009; “all 27 member states are on board and in favour of an Arctic policy as they supported the Conclusions” (Respondent D). After all, the final document could only contain points on which all states were able to agree. On the other hand, preliminary findings suggest that the drafting process in 2009 was characterised by, if not divisions, then at least strong positions and views. According to some interviewees, Denmark was quite proactive during the Council process in 2009 (Respondent G; Respondent H). Similarly to Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the latter holding the Presidency of the Council, were also engaged in the drafting process, albeit due to partly having Arctic territories, and not being coastal states such as Denmark (Respondent G). Indeed, according to one EU official working for the Commission, the Arctic members wrote a large part of the Conclusions (Respondent C). However, whereas one Commission official believed the Nordic countries to a large extent agreed during the discussions, another EU official, working for the Parliament, had the impression that Denmark had thought Sweden and Finland would be natural allies, something which turned out a mistaken belief (Respondent C; Respondent F). Indeed, whereas Finland and Sweden are said to have been generally positive to the Conclusions, Denmark is considered by many interviewees to have been somewhat cautious, aiming for a “suitable level of ambition” for the EU in the Arctic (Informant C; Respondent D; Respondent G; Respondent H). Two EU officials would even argue that Denmark is blocking the EU from taking any role in the Arctic due to fears over Greenland; others stated that Denmark was sceptical because it considers the EU a competitor and thus would like to limit the Commission’s competence (Respondent E; Respondent F; Respondent G). In fact, Denmark is in a quite particular situation something that could have implications for the content of the future EU Arctic policy.

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61 Informant A believed that there is a division between Norway and Denmark on the one hand, and Sweden and Finland on the other, something which means there are limited possibilities for Nordic cooperation in the Arctic. Another informant (Informant C), did not know to what extent the Nordic countries have the same approach, but was of the opinion that the Nordic countries cannot be perceived as one bloc.
On the one hand, Denmark, a member of the EU since 1973, would like to appear loyal to the EU as the latter brings the member state with its liberalised economy great benefits (Informant A). Indeed, in the preliminary Danish Arctic Strategy from 2008, it is stated that Denmark should work to ensure that the EU develops a standalone Arctic policy rather than a policy that is part of transport, energy, climate or fisheries policies (Udenrigsministeriet 2008: 6). On the other hand, there are several factors that complicate the relationship between Denmark and an EU Arctic policy. Firstly, Greenland poses challenges, particularly when it comes to Arctic issues. The island would like independence, and has its own oil and gas deposits (Cf. Telegraph 2009). If Denmark were perceived to defend Arctic coastal states on the issue of resources too eagerly, it risks upsetting Greenland. Secondly, being a coastal state and thus a “user” state, Denmark might have difficulties participating in an EU policy were it to emphasise protection over exploitation. For example, the strong EU promotion of protection of indigenous people’s rights is a sensitive issue as Denmark cannot provide the population on Greenland with indefinite rights (Informant A). Thirdly, and conversely, if the EU were to go too far in exploiting the Arctic, for example when it comes to fisheries, that would also constitute a problem to Denmark because of the need to protect Greenland fishing resources.

According to a Norwegian government official with contacts in the Swedish Presidency, Sweden and Finland are in a different situation, arguably more likely to argue that the Arctic is a “common issue” within the EU (Informant A). However, due to limited data on Sweden’s position on Arctic issues, Finland receives more attention. Finland might have an incentive to making the Arctic a common policy, namely its powerful neighbour, Russia. In order to not having to confront northern issues alone, Finland might consider it preferable if the new High Representative, Ms. Catherine Ashton, fronted it (Informant C). According to two interviewees working

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62 Although purely speculations, it is worth noting that Greenland has begun a plan to reduce its financial dependence on Denmark, while still receiving as much money from the EU as if it were a region (Respondent A; Telegraph 2009). Some might consider it beneficial both for the island and for the EU if Greenland became totally independent and renegotiated a membership with the Union on different terms (Greenland voted to leave the EU in 1985).
for different institutions in the EU, Finland is actively seeking to obtain the planned Arctic information centre within the EU (Cf. Informant D; Respondent E; Barents Observer 2010). In fact, there are indications suggesting that Finland, about to finalise its own Arctic strategy, would like to see the Northern Dimension become the EU’s ticket of entry into the Arctic, rather than a new EU policy (Respondent E; Respondent G). The Northern Dimension, however, is very different from an EU policy. Whereas the latter allows to Union to pursue its objectives alone, the former is a common policy between the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland where the EU is only one of four members (Respondent B). As one Commission official pointed out, however, Finland is not likely to be radical in its claims, as it takes a particular interest in the Northern Dimension, and would like to keep the latter on the EU agenda (Respondent A). Investigating such indications is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that Finland and Sweden seem to have a somewhat less complicated approach to the Arctic and that the Nordic countries arguably cannot be considered to form “one bloc”.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to investigate the positions of all the member states during the drafting of the Conclusions. For the sake of space, three of the member states often considered influential in EU policy-making, notably the UK, France and Germany will briefly be mentioned. These are states of considerable weight in international relations and EU policy-making. They are also among those states in the EU with a stated interest in the Arctic. If they were to have strong positions regarding Arctic issues, it is possible to believe that this could potentially influence the EU’s policy. However, contrary to what one might perhaps have expected neither the UK, nor Germany allegedly got significantly involved in the discussions (Respondent G; Respondent F). The UK, together with Spain advocated the importance of opening up new fishing territories. Germany, on the other hand, according to a German EU

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63 Note that the Finnish Foreign Minister, Mr. Stubb (2010), in a speech on the 17th of June 2010 informed that “Finland will act to convert the indisputable Arctic vocation of the EU into a more specific and stronger EU Arctic policy”. Whether he has the Northern Dimension in mind or the Arctic Policy, is unclear.

64 Although it must not be forgotten that Spain has a huge research program on the Arctic (Respondent A), Spain and Portugal are primarily known for their interest in fisheries. Consequently, if there continues to be a problem with over-
official, proposed the ban on new fisheries in territories not yet governed by an international fishing scheme in the Conclusions (Respondent F). Surprisingly, France was the most engaged of the three member states, indeed said to have been the one putting forward the initiative to make the Conclusions (Respondent D; Respondent G). Due to limited data, this study cannot set out to provide a full analysis of the Council drafting in 2009. This is neither the aim. The main objective of this chapter is to provide an insight into the internal dynamics of the three institutions as well as their actions before assessing the relations among them in the following chapter. The above section has provided indications suggesting that the Council is a less coherent actor than the Commission, mostly due, of course to its intergovernmental nature. Although there do not seem to be divisions as such, some member states have stronger positions than others concerning an EU Arctic approach.

4.3 The European Parliament

Although the Parliament is not considered a political entrepreneur in the same way as the Commission, it is still perceived to be a supranational institution in favour of more integration likely to increase its powers. Considering that the Commission proposal includes quite a large number of proposals concerning policy issues which would imply the co-decision procedure, it should therefore be in the interest of the Parliament to promote a broad Arctic Policy. Indeed, there seem to be clear indications that the Parliament has actively promoted Arctic issues since 2007. In fact, one Commission official noted that the Parliament has significantly contributed to raising the attention about Arctic issues in the EU through pushing the Commission and the Council to have an Arctic policy and thus supporting the MLG claim that all institutions matter in the process (Respondent D). In effect, as will be discussed in the following chapter, there are even indications suggesting that the Parliament desires an even stronger role for the EU in the Arctic than what is favoured by the Commission and the Council.

capacity in the EU fishing fleet, Spain and Portugal could run counter to Denmark on this issue, the latter which have rights and obligations related to the Arctic Ocean (Informant A).
The Parliament presented a resolution on Arctic governance on the 9th of October 2008, a few weeks before the Commission introduced its Communication on the EU and the Arctic (Cf. European Parliament 2008a). It stressed the need for a standalone EU Arctic policy and urged the Commission to get actively involved in the Arctic beginning with obtaining a permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. The Resolution further stated that the geopolitical importance of the Arctic region is growing and highlighted its concerns over the ongoing race for natural resources in the Arctic, which may lead to security threats for the EU. It urged the Commission to propose joint working procedures for the EU and the Arctic countries in the fields such as sustainable development, security of energy supply and maritime safety. It also focused considerably on the issue of governance, claiming that the Arctic region is currently not governed by any specifically formulated multilateral norms and regulations, and that the Commission should open international negotiations to adopt an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic, based on the Antarctic Treaty. The Parliament prepared another resolution in the spring of 2009 which reiterated the need for the Council and Commission to initiate negotiations on the abovementioned Arctic Treaty (Cf. European Parliament 2009h). The joint motion for a resolution also called on the Commission and Council to work towards establishing a moratorium on the exploitation of geological resources in the Arctic for a period of 50 years. However, the Parliament withdrew the Resolution to a large extent due to pressure from the Commission and Arctic states (Informant B; Respondent A; Respondent C). The most recent Parliament contribution to the policy process is the Parliamentary debate in March 2010 with the High Representative, Ms. Ashton (Cf. European Parliament 2010a). The Parliament is expected to produce an own initiative report on Arctic issues in the fall of 2010 as well as hosting the biannual meeting of parliamentarians of the Arctic region in September 2010 (European Parliament 2010a).

Note that some MEPs in the Parliament have been engaged in Arctic issues long before the 2008 Resolution. In the areas where the treaties give the Parliament the right of initiative, its committees may draw up a report on a subject within its remit and present a motion for a resolution to be adopted in plenum. They must request authorisation from the Conference of Presidents before drawing up a report (European Parliament Website).
To what extent has there been internal fragmentation within the Parliament when it comes to deliberating Arctic policy initiatives? As with the Commission and the Council, the official documents are signed and accepted by all parties to the deliberation process. However, as has been demonstrated when it comes to the two abovementioned institutions, this may not necessarily mean that the process was free from discussion and different objectives. Preliminary findings suggest that the Parliament of 2004-2009 seems to have conducted a fairly coherent process concerning the first and the second resolution. However, when it comes to internal coordination, the second resolution was arguably not as coordinated as the first. Furthermore, there are indications that the new Parliament 2009-2014, which replaced the old one in June last year, is somewhat less coherent. However, due to insufficient data, this last point will not be discussed in detail at this stage.

When studying internal coherence in the Parliament, one way to proceed is to look at party groups, parliamentary debates and votes as these may reveal potential disagreements and divisions. Following the debate which took place during the sitting of 8 October 2008, the Parliament adopted by 597 votes to 23 with 41 abstentions a resolution on Arctic governance (European Parliament 2008c). Considering how almost 600 out of the then 732 members, supported the resolution, the latter seemed to have caused relatively little controversy. Of course, there were disagreements about amendments and wordings, both within and among party groups. For example, five members of GUE/NGL (European United Left/ Nordic Green Left), three of whom were from Nordic countries, did not support the resolution and stated that; “We believe that the starting point for all talks and initiatives concerning the Arctic area must be the respect of the sovereign territory of the Arctic nations and equally the inclusion of all the peoples of the Arctic area as equal partners” (European Parliament 2008b). Nevertheless, according to a Norwegian government official, the Parliament 2004-2009 had a strong environmental protection profile cutting across the different party groups (Informant A). Similarly, a Parliament official believes that there was more of a cooperative spirit in the former Parliament than in the current (Respondent E). Considering that the Parliament is often perceived as “greener” than the Commission and the Council, and that the most important focus of the resolution
was the protection of the Arctic, it is arguably not so surprising that the resolution gained large support among the MEPs (Respondent C). As for the resolution in 2009, a political advisor working in the Parliament believes that not all party groups agreed on the content, particularly not the moratorium, and that if it had been put to a vote, it would probably not have passed (Respondent G). This might be true, particularly after the Commission appeared before the Parliament, resulting in the EPP (Christian Democrats), the ALDE (Liberals and Democrats) and others wanting to postpone the resolution (Informant B). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that six of seven party groups drafted their own motion for a resolution and all the six groups called for an Arctic Treaty. Four of the six groups also wanted a moratorium on the exploitation of geological resources (Cf. European Parliament 2009f, 2009e, 2009d, 2009c, 2009i, 2009g). The joint motion for a resolution called for both; however, as has been mentioned, the vote on the resolution was postponed indefinitely.

The drafting of the resolution in 2009, however, was arguably not as coordinated as it was coherent. Indeed, according to a Commission official, the second resolution was prepared in an uncoordinated and unstructured way (Respondent C). Normally, when a resolution is adopted, one of the 20 committees in the Parliament has prepared work for plenary sittings according to the topic to which the issue belongs e.g. foreign policy or internal marked. All MEPs are members of one or two such committees, and everything that is passed through the Parliament is based on what has been drafted in the committees. Cases are divided among parties depending on the issue in question and the size of the party. One important feature of the Parliament system is that it allows for individual parties to bring forward drafted proposals and even individuals to have a significant amount of influence. This might make Parliament policy output more unpredictable than Commission or Council output. Within each committee, cases are divided among the members. For each new issue, whether coming from the Commission or the Parliament itself, a rapporteur is appointed. It

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67 For a list of committees, see European Parliament Website (2010).
68 A rapporteur could perhaps be viewed as the "liaison officer" of a committee. The rapporteur "reports" the findings of the European Parliamentary committee to the plenary. In that capacity their opinion carries a lot of weight (European Law Monitor)
is possible for an MEP to convince a committee to make a report about an issue and become rapporteur. If there is a majority in favour for a report within the committee, it goes to plenary session. According to a Norwegian diplomat to the EU, this is not very different from the procedure in the Norwegian Parliament, however, because there is no position and opposition in the European Parliament, the outcome is less predictable (Informant C). As pointed out by the diplomat, however, there is a system of checks and balances; a case does not go from a rapporteur to plenum without passing through a committee. Nevertheless, these checks and balances are exactly what two EU officials working for the Commission believe failed in 2009. The two officials believe that there was never appointed a rapporteur for the 2009 resolution; it did not go through any of the committees but was presented directly in plenum (Respondent A; Respondent C). As will be discussed later, the resolution in 2009 was not appreciated, neither by the Commission, nor the Council. To conclude this section, indications suggest that the Parliament 2004-2009 was quite coherent in its actions related to the Arctic, but that its actions were not always the product of a coordinated process.

Furthermore, concerning the current Parliament, findings are ambiguous. On the one hand, there have been indications since 2009 suggesting that the Parliament is abandoning its strong position on an Arctic treaty and a moratorium. This might have something to do with the elections in June 2009, which changed the political composition of the institution. Apparently, the new Parliament is less “green” than the former and also less internally coherent (Respondent E). Without going into detail, the fact that none of the motions for a Resolution on the EU and Canada in April 2010 put forwards by the different party groups contained a call for an Arctic Treaty and a moratorium, except the one from the Verts/ALE Group (Greens), might be an indication in support of the above claim (European Parliament 2010a, 2010d, 2010e; 2009). On the other hand, there are indications suggesting that the Parliament, or at least different forces within it, have neither given up on contributing to developing the EU’s role in the Arctic, nor on the issue of governance. Parliamentarians are investigating the possibilities of using the Northern Dimension as a vehicle for developing the Arctic Policy (Respondent G). Furthermore, a
Parliament official mentioned an alternative to the broad Arctic Treaty, namely a narrower Arctic Convention. Apparently, this kind of an agreement could be easier to accept as it would pragmatically break down the Arctic into policy areas, making it possible to cover solely those issues that would fall within the Commission’s competence (Respondent F). Although investigating such indications is outside the scope of this paper, it nevertheless serves to highlight that the Parliament might prove important to institutional coherence in developing an EU Arctic approach in the future.

To sum up this chapter, the aim of the above analysis was to address internal dynamics within the Commission, the Council and the Parliament as the first step in addressing the second assumption of the thesis, namely that the institutions will have slightly different approaches to the Arctic, something which might translate into challenges in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy. Preliminary findings support the neo-functionalist assumption that the Commission would act as a political entrepreneur, and actively promote the EU Arctic Policy. However, contrary to expectations about internal fragmentation, there did not seem to be a high level of division or disagreement among the involved DGs, thus suggesting low levels of intra-institutional incoherence. Furthermore, the DGs seemed to work in a fairly coordinated manner. As for the Council, it is expected, based on intergovernmentalist aspects of EU policy-making, to defend the interests of the national governments and prevent the Commission from becoming too ambitious. Although further inquiries should be conducted, findings support perceiving the Council as favouring an Arctic policy for the Union, yet remaining cautious. This is arguably due to internal dynamics; there are at least some member states that have strong preferences when it comes to Arctic issues. Referring to Christiansen’s (2001) assumption about internal fragmentation, this, in turn, suggest that the Council is a less internally coherent actor than the Commission. Concerning the Parliament, although not expected to be a political entrepreneur in the same way as the Commission, has nevertheless engaged quite actively in promoting Arctic issues, well in line with the neo-functionalist view of supranational institutions. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the Parliament is perhaps the institution that has pursued the most ambitious agenda for EU
involvement in the Arctic. When it comes to intra-institutional coherence, the Parliament of 2004-2009 seems to have conducted a fairly coherent approach, albeit not always coordinated. In short, whereas the internal dynamics of the Council seem to have confirmed both assumptions regarding internal fragmentation and the nature of the Council’s approach to Arctic issues, the internal dynamics of the two supranational institutions seem to have confirmed the assumption about expected approaches, but not the one about internal fragmentation. These findings should not, however, be interpreted in absolute terms. The last chapter before the conclusion analyses the extent to which the differences in the institutions’ approaches accounted for in this chapter represent challenges in developing a coherent EU Arctic policy. It addresses the relationship between firstly, the Commission and the Council, and secondly, between the Commission and the Council on the one hand, and the Parliament on the other.
5. Institutional relations and the Arctic Policy: On the same path?

The previous chapter provided an insight into the internal workings of the institutions, something which revealed important information about their approaches towards the Arctic Policy and the differences between them. The focus is now directed at inter-institutional relations; to what extent have the institutions, e.g. the Council, the Commission and the Parliament operated a coherent and coordinated process of deliberation on Arctic issues since the desire for a standalone Arctic policy became a reality? To what extent have the differences in their approaches translated into possible challenges to a coherent process of deliberation? This chapter analyses the relations between firstly, the Council and the Commission, and secondly, the relations between the Council and the Commission on the one hand, and the Parliament on the other hand by drawing on the information provided in chapter four. Underpinning the study are the assumptions derived from neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism about the different nature and purpose of the institutions. Central is also the assumption that the supranational institutions will pursue similar approaches. The ambition is not to argue that the EU institutions are torn by issues of incoherence when it comes to the Arctic Policy. One would probably not find that the EU policy process is either coherent or incoherent; rather EU policy-making is normally characterised by elements of coherence as well as potential threats to coherence. The following analysis will highlight some of these nuances and thus provide knowledge about challenges and opportunities the EU is facing in developing its Arctic policy.

5.1 The Commission and the Council

Given that the EU strikes a balance between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in policy-making it is assumed that there will be varying degrees of supranational and intergovernmental forces at play depending on the Arctic issues at hand. Furthermore, as was argued in the former chapter, the
institutions are seemingly pursuing slightly different approaches to the above issues, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent institutional approach.

One the one hand, some interviewees claimed that there were tensions between the Council and the Commission during the process of drafting the Conclusions in 2009. According to a European Parliament political advisor, this might have been because one member state, namely Denmark, had its own agenda, something which it not unusual in Council discussions (Respondent G). As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Council is not an entirely coherent actor, but rather face, if not divisions, then at least clear member state positions. It is also possible to put it slightly differently, however, namely that the Commission might have put forward proposals in its Communication that caused some member states to worry. Indeed, some interviewees even suggested that the Arctic Policy is about the Commission expanding its competences, beginning with the Blue Book on Maritime affairs in 2007 (Informant D). According to such views, in line with the neo-functionalist view of the Commission as a political entrepreneur, the underlying ambition for the Commission is to become a central player when it comes to the future of the Arctic (Cf. Informant A; Jensen 2007). Whether or not this is the rationale behind the Commission’s Communication, there are indications suggesting that a few Commission proposals were too ambitious for the Council, causing concern among some member states. The Council, in line with its intergovernmentalist purpose, thus exercised its responsibility to protect national interests and to ensure that the Commission did not launch too an ambitious role for the EU in the Arctic.

One of the most importance issues in this respect was what the Commission considered as a need for enhanced governance, expressed in the preamble as one of the three main policy objectives (Respondent H). While the Commission (2008e: 9-10) recognises UNCLOS as the main legal instrument in the Arctic, and encourages “the full implementation of already existing obligations, rather than proposing new legal instruments”, the Communication nevertheless highlights problems relating to Arctic governance including “the fragmentation of the legal framework, the lack of effective instruments, the absence of an overall policy-setting process and gaps in
participation, implementation and geographic scope”. Hence the third policy objective; “Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance”. Apparently, the need for enhanced governance particularly worried Denmark. According to a Danish EU official, Denmark (together with Norway) believed that the wording was too strong as there is already a legal structure in place, notably UNCLOS (Respondent H). In general, Denmark (and Norway) feel the need to emphasise that firstly, cooperation in the Arctic is not something new; secondly, that the Arctic Council is the most important organ; and thirdly, that there is already a legal structure in place, well suited to handle potential disputes (Respondent H; Informant A, Informant C). This might be have been the reason why the objective of “Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance” in the Commission’s Communication was changed to “Contributing to enhanced governance in the Arctic through implementation of relevant agreements, frameworks and arrangements, and their further development” in the Council Conclusions. In EU policy-making such subtle changes are arguably more significant than they appear to be. By adding a few words, the Council ensured that member states’ interests were taken into account while providing an indication as to how ambitious a role for the EU the Commission could expect to achieve.

Furthermore, to Denmark and the UK, the right to govern over resources is also an important issue alongside the international legal issues. As a Norwegian diplomat in Brussels put it; they are not anxious to see the EU meddle in resource management or the establishment of management structures or institutions (Informant C). The diplomat continued pointing out that it is the member states that are parties to agreements; not the Commission. For example, according to a Danish EU official, Denmark and the UK are supporters of the IMO concerning transport at sea. They would like the EU to remember that it will never take the seat of the member states in this organisation (Respondent H). A Parliament official argued in a similar vein, stating that the EU as such is not likely to get a membership in the IMO as rules regarding the IMO are member state competences (Respondent F). Furthermore, although the Commission aims to strengthen the EU’s international presence through measures such as a permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, the member states would never accept that the Commission took over the seat of the Arctic
member states (Respondent C). Therefore, possibly in order to give the Commission a gentle reminder of the Council’s position, Denmark, and probably others, managed to include “while recognising the member states’ legitimate interests and possibilities in the Arctic” in the preamble of the Council Conclusions; “the Council welcomes the gradual formulation of a policy on Arctic issues to address EU interests and responsibilities, while recognising Member States’ legitimate interests and rights in the Arctic” (Informant C). Furthermore, the Council statement of 2009 echoes what was explicitly stated in the 2008 Conclusions, namely that “the particular positions and interests of the Arctic regions of the three Arctic member states, including the regions of one of the member states that enjoy the status of Overseas countries and territories (OCT) […] should be duly taken into account” (Conseil de l’Union Européenne 2008: 1). These two examples are particularly interesting in that they clearly illustrate the inherent differences in the nature, purpose and ambitions of the Council and the Commission; between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. While the latter institution promotes ambitious plans for the EU, the former puts the breaks on. They also provide clear indications as to the level of ambition that the Commission may pursue in the further development of the Arctic Policy.

Contrary to the assumption that there would be, if not tensions between the institutions, then at least contrasts in their approaches, others argued that the Council and the Commission are pursuing a rather coherent approach towards Arctic issues. According to an EU official working for the Commission, there is no political difference between the Council and the Commission perceptions on the EU and the Arctic; rather the documents are worded slightly differently with the Council giving more prominence to the Arctic states (Respondent C). Another EU representative argued in a similar vein, saying that the Council Conclusions were very much in line with the Commission Communication. Apparently, the former only really added two accents; firstly, member states have to be taken into account; and secondly, the EU

69 No English version of the Council Conclusions of 2008 seems to be available. I take all responsibility for any mistakes during translation. Original quote: “À cette fin, il convient de prendre dûment en considération la position et les intérêts particuliers des régions arctiques des trois États membres arctiques, y compris des régions d’un État membre qui bénéficient du statut de pays et territoires d'outre-mer et de liens contractuels particuliers avec l’UE”.
needs good relations with third countries (Respondent A). Furthermore, it is important to note that Denmark is not opposed to an Arctic policy. Indeed, as the Danish EU official emphasised; Denmark hopes that the Arctic Policy will be substantial (Respondent H). It supports that the Commission gets a permanent observer status in the Arctic Council as it believes that both the Commission and the EU can contribute in a positive way. However, although Denmark agrees with the Commission’s idea of a broad engagement of the EU in the Arctic, it remains cautious. The point that Denmark would like to make is that the EU must act with respect; it does not have any territories in the Arctic (Respondent H). Furthermore, concerning the changing of the wording in the Council Conclusions by Denmark, the Danish official argued that it did not cause much controversy between the Council and the Commission as there was not that strong a support for the wording within the Commission anyhow (Respondent H). The official continued stating that the Commission and the Council are cooperating to find common ground, which means that everybody must listen.\textsuperscript{70} Indeed, it must not be forgotten that the two institutions do not work in total isolation from each others. According to several interviewees, the Commission consulted, although informally, with certain Arctic states and member states when drafting the Communication (Respondent A; Respondent C; Informant B). Likewise, the Commission was represented during the Council Conclusions by DG RELEX. The latter would bring comments from the other DGs to the Swedish Presidency, which would in turn take account of the comments to the working groups (Respondent D). In sum, on the one hand, the Commission proposed an Arctic policy that was too ambitious for the Council. The latter reiterated the member states’ authority on the issues of governance and external representation as well as emphasising the rights of the Arctic states. On the other hand, there are indications suggesting that the two documents were not that politically different, and that issues were mainly related to wording. As will be illustrated below, however, the Parliament

\textsuperscript{70} The Commission must evidently be particularly attentive towards the Council as it needs member states support for its initiatives to be adopted, particularly when it comes to foreign policy and external relations, thus illustrating the continued intergovernmental influence in EU policy-making.
seems to have pursued an ambition for the EU in the Arctic that is not welcomed by neither the Commission, nor the Council.

5.2 The Commission, the Council, and the Parliament

The Parliament’s contribution to the role of the EU in the Arctic has generally been appreciated by the Commission and the Council. As Ms. Ferrero Waldner (2009) said to the Parliament in 2009; “I would like to thank Parliament for its interest in the Arctic and also say how much we appreciated your resolution on Arctic governance last October. It gave political impetus to the Commission’s own work on the communication”. Furthermore, a Commission official recognised that the Parliament has made quite a large contribution about raising awareness about the Arctic issue in the EU (Respondent D). However, there are indications suggesting that the Parliament’s perceptions of a suitable level of ambition for the EU in the Arctic and of the content of an Arctic policy have not always been in line with the views of the Commission and the Council. While it is, perhaps not surprising that the Parliament’s approach would differ from that of the Council, it is more surprising that the Parliament would pursue an approach relatively out of line with the approach of the other supranational institution.

It is particularly the calls for an Arctic Treaty and the moratorium that seem to have clashed with the approach of the two other institutions. As has been mentioned earlier, the Parliament called for an Arctic Treaty in its 2008 resolution and reiterated the call in the abandoned 2009 resolution the latter in which it also called for a moratorium on the extraction of resources in the region. However, already days before the Parliament adopted its first resolution in 2008, Commission representative, A different issue, the seal ban advocated by the Parliament in 2008, is perhaps the best example of how the Parliament has actual power over the EU’s approach to the Arctic, and thus supporting the MLG assumption that all institutions matter. It also illustrates divergences in the institutions’ approaches. However, it will not be discussed in this thesis, first and foremost due to lack of space, but also because the seal case is not really part of the Arctic policy process, but rather a normal legislative initiative that happened to have a quite negative impact on how the EU is perceived in relation to the Arctic. See for example European Parliament (2009b); Brennan (2009) and CBC News (2009).

Note that the Council has supported a moratorium on fisheries in areas not yet covered by an international legal framework, and that according to a Norwegian government official, at least France, Germany as well as the Commission are leaning towards it (Informant A).
Špidla (2008) addressed the question about an Arctic Treaty by informing the Parliament that “it seems that the conditions are not yet in place for a binding legal framework specifically designed for this region”, and that the EU should rather advocate the use of the extended legal basis established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other interventional conventions. The Parliament nevertheless continued to promote an international treaty, re-launching the idea in its 2009 resolution and adding the call for a moratorium. Whereas a Commission official believed the 2008 Parliament resolution, with some exceptions, was helpful to the Commission’s drafting of the Communication, the 2009 resolution was different. Apparently, the Commission and the Council were in opposition in quite an unusually strong way. The official further believed that it was unfortunate that the Commission and the Council had to disagree to such an extent (Respondent A). He continued pointing out that the event did not take place behind closed doors, but rather in full glare of the public. Consequently, there has been a problem with external partners of the EU believing that actions of the Parliament equal actions of the EU, something which is not correct (Respondent A; Respondent C; Respondent E). The disagreement made the EU look fragmented in its approach to the Arctic.

Indeed, in addition to Canada and Norway lobbying to avoid the resolution being adopted, both the President-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Vondra (2009), and the Commissioner for External Relations at the time, Ms. Ferrerow-Waldner (2009), appeared before the MEPs and argued against the 2009 resolution. Mr. Vondra (2009) reiterated that neither the Commission’s Communication, nor the Council Conclusions expressed any support for the specific idea of an international treaty. Furthermore, Ms. Ferrerow-Waldner (2009) informed that:

[…] the idea of establishing a binding legal regime specifically designed for the Arctic is, unfortunately, difficult, because none of the five Arctic Ocean coastal states – Denmark, Norway, Canada, Russia and the United States – is in favour of such a regime. I therefore fear that such a proposal would at this stage not only be ineffective but could prove to be detrimental to the EU’s role and credibility in overall Arctic cooperation.

Note that Informant B did not mention Vondra; rather, see Vondra (2009) and the European Parliament debate (2009a).
According to the Ilulissat Declaration signed by the “Arctic Five” in May 2008, “the five coastal states are in a unique position to address […] possibilities and challenges” by virtue of their “sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean”, further pointing out that UNCLOS, “an extensive international legal framework” applies to the Arctic Ocean (Arctic Ocean Conference 2008: 1). According to a Commission official and a Norwegian government official, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner wanted to make the point that firstly, the resolution might damage the Commission’s application for an observer status in the Arctic Council, secondly, it might damage the Union’s credibility as an actor in the Arctic, and, finally, such a move would possibly backfire on the both the Parliament and the EU (Informant A; Respondent C). The Commission official pointed out that it is perceived as rude in international relations to make statements about someone else’s territory (Respondent C). As for the moratorium, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner (2009) argued that “it is not realistic to propose an international moratorium on the extraction of Arctic resources” as the bulk of the estimated reserves of minerals, oil and gas are either on the sovereign territory of the Arctic states or in their exclusive economic zones, and some of them have far-reaching plans for further exploration activities”. Thus, neither the Commission, nor the Council supported the Parliament’s desire for an international treaty or a 50 year moratorium in the Arctic. In the end, the Parliament came around and withdrew the resolution. In sum, on the one hand, the Parliament has contributed to raising awareness about Arctic issues in the EU, something which has been appreciated by the Commission and the Council. On the other hand, it seems rather clear that the Parliament has pursued an approach towards the Arctic which has been somewhat out of kilter with the approaches of the other institutions. It is particularly the issue of the Arctic Treaty and the calls for a moratorium that has caused controversy.

This chapter has addressed the second assumption of this thesis, namely that the institutions will have different approaches to the Arctic, something which might translate into challenges to a coherent EU approach. The following section will not be able do justice to the various implications of the above for developing a coherent EU Arctic policy. Suffice to mention two particularly interesting examples of
potential challenges to a coherent EU Arctic policy. The first is related to vertical coherence and concerns member state positions related to Arctic issues. Indeed, the Council changed the wording of “sensitive issues” in the 2008 Communication into more “intergovernmental friendly” language in the Conclusions on several occasions, demonstrating the tensions between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in EU policy-making. Although the political difference between the Commission and the Council might not be significant, it seems evident that the Commission will have to pay attention to issues of vertical coherence in further promoting and developing the EU Policy. Some member states, particularly Denmark, have clearly indicated that certain issues are, and should be, outside the competence of the EU, such as issues of governance and resources management. Consequently, if the EU were to develop an Arctic policy that was considered too ambitious to certain member states, the EU runs the risk of vertical incoherence in the case where a member state is no longer able to follow the agreed content of a policy. As has been mentioned before, this happened last year when the UK and the Netherlands voted against an agreed common EU position on the proposed ban on bluefin tuna, thus risking being called to court by the Commission (Hickman 2009; Rankin 2010b).

Furthermore, findings also suggest that inter-institutional relations have represented a challenge to institutional coherence. It may seem as though the Parliament has pursued a more ambitious approach to Arctic issues than what has been preferred by the two other institutions. One implication of this was the dispute concerning the 2009 resolution. It made the EU look institutionally fragmented in the face of the world, something which represents a risk to its credibility as a coherent actor in international politics. Again, the issue of vertical coherence was relevant in that the issues that caused controversy were the same as the ones that lead the Council to make changes to the Communication during the drafting of the 2009 Conclusions. However, the Parliament’s calls for an Arctic Treaty and a moratorium also seemed to have posed a challenge to inter-institutional coherence in that the Commission, and not only the Council, strongly opposed the resolution. This might seem somewhat surprising considering how it was assumed in the beginning of the thesis that the supranational institutions would be likely to pursue similar approaches.
Consequently, there is perhaps a need for a different, or additional theoretical approach in order to account for the behaviour of the Parliament. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that in the end, the Parliament withdrew the resolution. Although part of the damage had already happened, this might actually indicate possibilities for institutional coherence in EU policy-making; the Parliament listened to the other two institutions and realigned with their approaches. However, the uncertainty as to whether the current Parliament has realigned with the two other institutions, or whether it is still pursuing an ambitious role for the EU in the Arctic, confirms the continued potential for institutional incoherence.
6. Concluding remarks: Towards a coherent EU Arctic approach?

Coherence is not a problem. Everybody would support coherence. The problem is that nobody wants to be the subject of it. Who would take the lead?

European Parliament official (Respondent F)

This thesis has studied the European Union’s approach to the Arctic. As was explained in the introduction, developments in the Arctic region is attracting the attention of external actors about which little research has yet been conducted. Considering the potential impact of these external actors on the future of the region, it is important to increase knowledge about stakeholders and interests. The EU is a potentially significant actor in international politics that has clearly stated its interest in the region. Since 2007, EU institutions have devoted attention to Arctic issues and officially called for a standalone EU Arctic policy. There has been emphasis on the need for a more coordinated and coherent approach to the region. It is believed that coherence ensures more efficient foreign policies and increases the EU’s credibility as an actor in international politics. Coherence in EU foreign policy-making, however, is a well known issue, both theoretically and empirically. Considering the desire for a coherent policy and the challenges often related to achieving such policies, this thesis asked what main challenges and opportunities the EU is facing in developing a coherent Arctic policy. The main focus has been on institutional coherence, both within and between the institutions, taken to mean problems which may arise because the policy sector of external relations is handled by two sets of actors having different approaches to the same problem (Nuttall 2005: 97). It has also been defined to involve problems which may arise if the institutions have different objectives and perceptions concerning Arctic issues, which would impede a “coherent and well coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making” (Christiansen 2001: 747). Given that institutional coherence is closely linked to vertical and horizontal coherence, it was necessary to also address aspects of the two latter types.

The paper was explorative in nature, studying a policy which is currently in the making. Two sets of premises and assumptions have guided the analysis. The
premises were derived from FPA of which the first stated that the EU should not be seen as a unitary actor in foreign policy-making. Indeed, as has been demonstrated, the Arctic Policy is relevant to all three institutions, albeit having different levels of influence, not necessarily sharing the same objectives. As was pointed out in relation to the Parliament’s quest for an Arctic treaty, it is important to be aware that the actions of one institution do not necessarily represent the entire Union. The second premise concerned how to approach the study of European foreign policy and implied that EFP has to be defined more broadly than just the CFSP of the member states. While providing support for such an argument the study has also introduced a further challenge, namely how to study issues which are of an external nature, but which, in addition to external relations and CFSP also include internal policies.

The analytical approach of MLG provided the first assumption, addressed in chapter three, which stated that all institutions would matter in the policy process. In order to provide support for the claim, the discussion had to demonstrate that Arctic issues were not only CFSP matters over which the supranational institutions had reduced influence. Indeed, the findings showed that, although nothing is yet settled, the Arctic Policy will most likely by cross-pillar in nature, comprising both internal and external policies on the one hand, and both CFSP and external relations on the other. Although the member states remain the most important actors in the process, the Commission clearly plays an important role in terms of producing initiatives related to Arctic issues. Furthermore, it is possible that the Parliament will have considerable influence over issues subject to the co-decision procedure and some, albeit lesser, influence, on foreign policy issues, such as the conclusion of international agreements. One implication is that all three institutions should be taken into account when studying the EU Arctic Policy. This might, in turn, pose challenges to institutional coherence in that it seems to increase the potential for diverging objectives and ambitions, something which was addressed in chapter four and five. The second assumption was somewhat more complex. It was based on elements from both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism about the purpose and behaviour of each institution, and stated that they would have different approaches to the Arctic, something which could potentially pose challenges to institutional coherence, or the coherent process of
deliberation and decision-making. Chapter four provided an analysis of intra-institutional dynamics, an issue that was important to address before looking at the relationship between the institutions. It found that the Commission and the Parliament were more internally coherent than the Council when it came to Arctic issues. It also found indications, however, suggesting that the Parliament might have been less internally coordinated than the Commission in developing Arctic policy-outputs. Furthermore, the Commission and the Parliament, in line with neo-functionalism, appeared to actively promote the Arctic Policy. Conversely, the Council supported it, but remained more cautious as expected based on its intergovernmental nature.

The final chapter analysed inter-institutional relations. It found that, while the approaches of the Commission and the Council did not seem to be that different, there appear to be some strong member state positions on Arctic issues in the Council. Consequently, the Commission will have to take vertical coherence into account in the EU’s approach towards the Arctic in order to ensure a coherent EU policy. There are clearly limits as to how far Denmark and others would like the EU to go. Issues related to governance and resources management, for example, are considered outside the competence of the EU. Consequently, if the EU were to develop an Arctic policy that would be considered too ambitious to certain member states, the EU runs the risk of vertical incoherence if a member state is no longer able to follow the agreed content of a policy. Findings also suggested that the Parliament has pursued a somewhat more ambitious approach to Arctic issues than what is supported by the two other institutions. Again, the issue of vertical coherence is relevant in that the issues that caused controversy were the same as the ones in the Communication that lead the Council to make changes. However, the Parliament’s calls for an Arctic Treaty and a moratorium also seemed to have posed a challenge to inter-institutional coherence in that the Commission seemed to be in as much opposition as the Council. It is worth recalling what Ms Ferrero Waldner (2009), representing the Commission, stated to the Parliament in 2009, namely that the proposed legal framework “could prove to be detrimental to the EU’s role and credibility in overall Arctic cooperation” as neither the Arctic states, nor the Commission or the Council wanted it. This is a powerful message about what the
Commission and the Council believe to be an appropriate level of ambition for the EU in the Arctic, and a clear indication of differences in institutional approaches. Furthermore, the fact that there is uncertainty concerning whether or not the current Parliament has truly realigned with the two other institutions, or whether or not it is still pursuing an ambitious role for the EU in the Arctic, confirms the continued potential for institutional incoherence.

The thesis has indicated that the institutional relationship towards Arctic issues has not been entirely free from potential challenges to coherence, due to the different approaches of the institutions. Indeed, the EU is facing significant challenges in developing a coherent Arctic policy. There will be challenges related to coordinating between various policy areas, i.e. horizontal coherence, which has not received much space in the paper. Furthermore, the fact that all three institutions are likely to have influence over the policy, combined with the inherent tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in EU policy-making, arguably serve to increase the risk of incoherence in the institutions’ common approach to the Arctic. Finally, there are clear indications of potential issues related to vertical coherence in that some member states, particularly Denmark, have interests and obligations in the Arctic, which might clash with EU ambitions. Despite these potential challenges, however, it is important to note that EU policy-making is likely to always display elements of incoherence, simply as a result of the nature of the policy-system. This, however, does not mean that the Union will not succeed in developing an Arctic policy. It means that it is important to be aware of how the dynamics at play in EU policymaking, particularly cross-pillar foreign policies such as the Arctic, affect the ability of the EU to develop and produce coherent policies. It is, in other words, important in order to understand the current and possibly future EU approach to the Arctic region.

Although this thesis was explorative in nature and relied on general assumptions, it has arguably contributed both to increased knowledge about the EU as an actor in the Arctic as well as about EU foreign policy making in general. Concerning EPF, the study has illustrated the complexity of policy issues which are both internal and
external in nature, further concerning both external relations and CFSP. It has provided support for the use of MLG as an analytical approach in that it has allowed to analyse the EU Arctic policy-process in terms of what is there using elements from neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, rather than why based on any of the above theories alone. The thesis has also contributed to knowledge about the EU as an actor in the Arctic. It has provided support for arguing that all three institutions matter when it comes to complex policy areas such as the Arctic Policy. In other words, the Arctic Policy outcome is likely to be influenced, perhaps mainly by the Council, but also by the Commission and the Parliament. As has been demonstrated, their perceptions influence on the EU’s approach. Furthermore, the study has reveal information about internal dynamics within each of the three institutions as well as their actions and approaches to the Arctic. Of particular interest are the, albeit not fully developed, member state positions in the Council. Finally, it has analysed inter-institutional relations, identifying issues which have arguably posed challenges to institutional coherence as well as indicating implications for the future.

The study should therefore provide a good foundation for further research on the EU and the Arctic as the policy process evolves. Several interesting questions need to be addressed: What will the implications of the Lisbon Treaty be on the Arctic Policy? Equally interesting, what will the impact be of Iceland’s access the EU? Will Iceland align with Denmark? How will member states relate to the Arctic region as they develop clearer positions and interests? Will they consider the policy CFSP or will they prefer it to be developed within the Commission’s competence? What role will the Commission take on; a political entrepreneur or a mediator between the Council and the Parliament? Even more importantly, what will happen in the Arctic region? There are many issues yet to be explored concerning the EU and the Arctic. However, this thesis has arguably provided a solid base from which to proceed.
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## Appendix i: Institutional competences in the EU

### Figure: Competences before and after the Lisbon Treaty

#### Maastricht Treaty 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Pillar: European Communities</th>
<th>Second Pillar: CFSP</th>
<th>Third Pillar: Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community method of decision-making</td>
<td>Intergovernmental method of decision-making (Cooperation, common positions and joint actions)</td>
<td>Intergovernmental method of decision-making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **European Community (EC):**
  - Customs union & Single market
  - EU competition law
  - Economic and monetary union
  - Common Agricultural Policy
  - Common Fisheries Policy
  - Research
  - Environmental law
  - Regional Policy
  - Education and Culture
  - Trans-European Networks
  - Healthcare
  - Social policy
  - Asylum policy
  - Schengen treaty
  - Immigration policy

- **European Coal and Steel Community** (until 2002)
- **European Atomic Energy Community**

#### Lisbon Treaty 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusive competences in areas where the Union legislates alone</th>
<th>Shared competences between the Union and Member States, with the States exercising their competence if the Union is not exercising its own</th>
<th>Support competences Areas where the Member States have exclusive competence but in which the Union can provide support or co-ordination</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Customs Union</td>
<td>- Internal market</td>
<td>- Protection and improvement of human healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishment of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market</td>
<td>- Social policy with regard to specific aspects defined in the treaty</td>
<td>- Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Monetary policy for Member States which use the euro as legal tender</td>
<td>- Economic, social and territorial cohesion</td>
<td>- Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conservation of the biological resources of the sea as part of the common fisheries policy</td>
<td>- Agriculture and fisheries except for the conservation of the biological resources of the sea</td>
<td>- Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Common trading policy</td>
<td>- Environment</td>
<td>- Education, professional training, youth and sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The conclusion of an international agreement when this is within the framework of one of the Union's legislative acts or when it is necessary to help it exercise an internal competence or if there is a possibility of the common rules being affected or of their range being changed.</td>
<td>- Consumer Protection</td>
<td>- Civil protection</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Trans-European Networks</td>
<td>- Administrative co-operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Area of freedom, security and justice</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Joint security issues with regard to aspects of public health as defined in the Lisbon Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Research, technological development and space</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Development cooperation and humanitarian aid.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix ii: Interview guides

Interview guide: Respondents and informants from the EU

1. Current position
   1.1 Title/rank
   1.2 What is your current job/occupation?

2. Personal background
   2.1 What is your professional background?
   2.2 In what ways have you worked, or are you working with Arctic related issues?
   2.3 In what ways does your DG/unit work with Arctic issues?

3. The Commission’s Communication 2008
   3.1 Could you tell me about the process within the Commission that led to the adoption of the Communication in 2008?
      3.1.1 Which DG’s were involved?
      3.1.2 Were some DG more active than others?
      3.1.3 Which DG was in charge?
      3.1.4 How did you decide on which DG was to take the lead?
   3.2 What role did your DG play in the process?
      3.2.1 Which issues or interests did your DG think particularly important to include in the Communication?
      3.2.2 How did the others respond?
      3.2.3 Did any issues cause particular discussion?
      3.2.4 What do you think about the final communication?
   3.3 In more general terms, could I just ask you to briefly explain your unit/ institution/ DG’s views concerning
      3.3.1 Arctic governance
      3.3.2 The proposed Arctic Treaty
      3.3.3 The proposed moratorium on oil and gas
      3.3.4 The sealing issue

4. Commission internal coordination of Arctic issues
   4.1 How does the Commission coordinate its work on the Arctic?
   4.2 Would you say that the Commission has a well coordinated approach to Arctic issues today?
   4.3 How would you picture the coordination within the Commission with an Arctic policy?

5. The European Parliament
   5.1 What do you think about the Parliament’s engagement towards the Arctic so far?
   5.2 In what ways have the Parliament contributed to the process?
   5.3 Does the Parliament have influence over the development of an EU Arctic policy? If yes, in what ways?
   5.4 Could you think of other concrete policy areas where the Parliament would have co-decision powers in the future?
   5.5 Could you tell me about the process leading to the Resolution in 2008?
      5.5.1 What party group came up with the idea?
      5.5.2 To what extent did the views of the different party groups converge on the content?
      5.5.3 What did you think were the most important issues to include in the document?
      5.5.4 Did any issues cause particular discussion?
   5.6 In what ways was the Resolution in 2009 different from the one in 2008?
      5.6.1 Who pushed for the Moratorium and the Arctic Treaty?
      5.6.2 Was there a uniform wish within the Parliament to push for the Moratorium and the Arctic Treaty?
   5.7 Why was the 2009 Resolution postponed?
   5.8 Would some parties still like to see an Arctic Treaty and a moratorium?
   5.9 What else is happening in the Parliament now concerning Arctic issues?

6. Member states and the Council Conclusions
6.1 What have you heard about the member states’ views on the Arctic and the EU Arctic Policy?

6.1.1 Finland has been eager to develop the ND. What is Finland’s position on the EU’s proposed Arctic Policy?

6.1.2 How would Denmark like the EU Arctic Policy to be?

6.3 Could you tell me about the process leading to the Council Conclusions of 2009?

6.3.1 What countries were actively engaged in the drafting? Who remained passive?

6.3.2 Did particular issues cause debate?

6.3.3 Could you say something about the views of Denmark, Sweden and Finland? To what extent did they converge?

6.4 What do you think about the Council Conclusions? To what extent does it correspond to the view of your unit/ institution?

6.5 Did the Commission have influence over the drafting process? How did you make your voice heard?

7. Competences

7.1 Is the Arctic Policy foreign policy? Or internal EU policy?

7.1.1 Is the Arctic Policy first and foremost a Commission policy that will encompass only policy areas where the Commission has competence, or will it include areas that are under member state competence, such as energy? What about issues of mixed competence?

7.2 If the EU is to develop a policy on the Arctic, will this entail developing legal measures, such as directives etc.?

7.2.1 Do you think that the EU Arctic Policy will be such a policy, or will it be a guiding framework that does not necessitate any legislative actions?

8. Other

8.1 From whom did the idea of an EU policy come from? What institution has brought the Arctic issue onto the agenda?

8.2 Is the ND foreign policy?

8.2.1 In what ways is it relevant for the Arctic?

8.2.2 What are the differences between the ND and the Arctic Policy?

8.2.3 What role have the ND played in the process of developing a more coherent EU approach to the Arctic?

8.3 Is there anything I should have asked you that I did not?

8.4 Do you have anything to add?
Interview guide: Respondents and informants from Norway

1. Current position
   1.1 Title/rank
   1.2 What is your current job/occupation?

2. Personal background
   2.1 What is your professional background?
   2.2 In what ways have you worked, or are you working with Arctic related issues?
   2.3 In what ways do your department/ unit work with Arctic issues?

3. Norway, the Commission and the Arctic
   3.1 Janos Herman, the EU Ambassador to Norway has claimed that the EU has a very good
dialogue with Norway on Arctic issues. Could you tell me about how the Foreign Ministry works
with the EU in relation to the Arctic?
      3.1.1 Who do you work with within the EU?
      3.1.2 What issues are on the agenda?
      3.1.3 Is the contact official?
   3.2 Is it correct that the European Commission consulted Norway when it developed its
Communication in 2008?
   3.3 Could you say something about the process within the Commission at the time?
      3.3.1 When did it start and how long did it last?
      3.3.2 What DGs were in charge of formulating the document?
      3.3.3 What other DGs were represented?
   3.4 Could you describe the relationship between the DGs present?
   3.5 Did particular issues cause debate? If yes, what issues?
   3.6 What are your thoughts about the final document regarding its content?
   3.7 I have also heard that the Commission is planning on consulting Norway further on in the
process towards the EU Arctic Policy, is this correct?
      3.7.1 How will this consultation take place?

4. The member states
   4.1 Could you say something about your impression of the member states’ views on the Arctic
and on the EU Arctic Policy?
      4.1.1 Are some countries more engaged than others? If yes, what are their views?
   4.2 Have you heard anything about the process ahead of the Council Conclusions in 2009?
      4.2.1 What countries were actively participating in the drafting and the discussions?
      4.2.2 What countries viewed an EU Arctic policy positively?
      4.2.3 What countries were sceptical?
      4.2.4 Did any particular issue cause debate or disagreement?

5. The European Parliament
   5.1 What is the opinion of the Parliament as regards the role of the EU in the Arctic and the
proposed Arctic Policy?
      5.1.1 Have you got the impression that the Parliament presents a unified position, or are there
variations between the different party groups?
   5.2 Does the Parliament have influence over the process? If yes, what kind of influence?
   5.3 How is the Parliament’s engagement towards the Arctic received by the Commission and the
Council?

6. Other
   6.1 How would you characterise the EU’s engagement towards the Arctic so far?
   6.2 What challenges would you say that the EU has faced?
   6.3 What challenges would you say the EU will face in developing its Arctic Policy?
   6.3 Is there anything you would like to add?
Appendix iii: List of informants and respondents

Informant A    Norwegian Government Official
Informant B    Former Norwegian Diplomat
Informant C    Norwegian Diplomat to the EU
Informant D    Norwegian Regional Government Official

Respondent A   EU Commission Official
Respondent B   EU Official
Respondent C   EU Commission Official
Respondent D   EU Commission Official
Respondent E   European Parliament Official
Respondent F   European Parliament Official
Respondent G   European Parliament Political Advisor
Respondent H   Danish EU Official