Disarming & Reintegrating Female Ex-combatants
A Case Study of the Gender Mainstreaming of DDR in Liberia

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Master thesis

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UNIVERSITETET I OSLO

08.06.10
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Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost I want to thank my informants in Monrovia and Salala. I am grateful for your interest in being a part of this study and letting your voices be heard. Special thanks also to “Fritt Ord” for providing a stipend making the fieldwork possible. My stay in Liberia was an unforgettable “learning-by-doing” experience, giving me the opportunity to put into practice years of theoretical lessons. It was challenging, with moments of disillusionment and uncertainty, but truly exiting when meeting actors and participants whom by sharing their stories and opinions gave me insights no book could ever give. Thank you Paul and Laura for your hospitality, Emily for your remarkable inclusiveness, and Sam & Alfie for providing data and the right connections.

Moreover, I want to thank my supervisor Morten Bøås, the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies for excellent working facilities, and Narve Rotwitt for technical assistance. Stine Grøndahl and Cathrine Andersen, I am extremely grateful for all your help with proofreading and corrections in the finishing stage of writing this thesis.

A great thanks also goes to all my colleagues on the 9th floor, for inspiring lunches, never-ending quizzes and great fun!

Last but not least, thank you mum, for being such a strong, female role model!

Words: 34838
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## Acronyms and abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFF</td>
<td>Children Associated with the Fighting Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR(R)</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, (and Rehabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoL</td>
<td>Government of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGL</td>
<td>International Contact Group on Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTRAW</td>
<td>United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Implementation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWI</td>
<td>Liberian Women’s Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILOBS</td>
<td>UN Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDDR(R)</td>
<td>National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (and Rehabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OCHA  Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGA  Office of the gender advisor (UNMIL)
RRR  Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reinsertion
RUF  Revolutionary United Front
ULIMO  United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UN  United Nations
UNDDDR  United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre
UNDP  United Nations Development Fund
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM  United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOMIL  United Nations Observer Mission to Liberia
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WAC  Women’s Artillery Commandos
WAFF  Women Associated with the Fighting Forces
WIPNET  Women in Peacebuilding Network
WONGOSOL  Women’s NGO Secretariat of Liberia
1 Introduction

Participation in armed conflict is and always has been closely connected to the masculine, and throughout history and across cultures combatants in the world’s many conflicts have overwhelmingly been male. However, in a number of conflicts, women are associated with fighting forces in a variety of roles and are thought to constitute between 10 per cent and one third of fighting forces (Bouta, Freks & Bannon 2005). In spite of this, up until the 1990s women’s different experiences in conflict had in general not been perceived as central in the debates of international relations and security studies (Kennedy-Pipe in Collins 2007:78 and Steans 2006:1). However, through UN Security Council’s Resolution 1325 on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ adopted in 2000, women’s security situation was put on the agenda, and an objective of gender mainstreaming was institutionalised into all UN operations and work. The resolution acknowledges women’s special needs during and after conflict, and it recognizes the importance of women’s participation and contribution in all phases of conflict resolution and peace building. It further recognises that women also participate in combat, and that female ex-combatants have different needs than their male colleagues in post-conflict environments, needs that shall be addressed when implementing strategies for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In article 13 of the UN Resolution 1325, the Security Council:

Encourages all those involved in planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegation to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants; (S/RES/1325 (2000))

DDR strategies include strategies to break up military structures, remove weapons from the hands of combatants, return them to their villages and homes, and to help them integrate socially and economically into society. The formal objective of the process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin.

In the devastating and long-lasting Liberian civil war, which ended in 2003, women participated in every stage of the conflict, as combatants, supporters, wives, cooks, peace builders, and political actors. Numbers differ, but according to some estimates women
comprised between 30 and 40 per cent of the total number of Liberian combatants. (Amnesty International 2008:5). The official Liberian DDR policies were progressive and quested for a gender-mainstreamed programme through references to UNSC Resolution 1325, article 13. Accordingly, in UNIFEM’s extensive report on gender and DDR from 2004, “Getting it Right, Doing it Right”, Liberia is used as an example of progress when it comes to policy commitments to gender mainstreaming. Yet, despite an intention to ensure women’s participation and address their special needs, the literature and reports on the subject is unanimous in concluding that this was not adequately translated into action on the ground. Liberian female fighters did not take part in the DDR process in proportion to their participation in the actual fighting, and the participation rate was significantly lower then for the male ex-combatants. The dropout rates from the DDR program were also higher amongst the female ex-combatants, and the programme in many areas failed to address the different needs of women and girls (Amnesty International 2008, Jennings 2009a, Mazurana 2005 and 2004, Specht 2006, Specht and Attree 2006). As UNIFEM (2004:9) puts it: “Getting it right” does not automatically translate into “doing it right”. The challenges and obstacles to translating the policies into action can be numerous, and on this background the research question is specified to:

*What can explain the gap between the prescriptions of gender mainstreaming in the official DDR-policies and the action on the ground in Liberia?*

My intent with this thesis is to analyse why one did not manage to adequately implement the prescribed policies of gender mainstreaming in the DDR program in Liberia, using two different theoretical approaches. Through the theoretical approaches general challenges of implementing policies through the UN peacekeeping system will be identified, but also specific obstacles connected to implementing the policy of gender mainstreaming. In the following I will clarify the relevance and reasons for the choice of topic and case, briefly outline the theoretical approaches (which will be more thoroughly done in chapter 2), and specify the research design and its implications. First, there is a need to make some clarifications and operationalisations.
1.1 Operationalisation and clarifications

In order to answer the specified research question, certain operationalisations and clarifications must be made. First of all, the concept “gender mainstreaming” was first proposed at the 1985 Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, and has later been developed in the United Nations development community. There are different definitions of the concept, but the one most commonly used defines “gender mainstreaming” as:

the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality (ECOSOC 1997).

Through ECOSOC’s adoption, in 1998, of a resolution (1998/43) on mainstreaming a gender perspective into the policies and programmes of the United Nations system, the goal of gender equality became central in all activities. The adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 was a continuation of this development, emphasising the need to also include and address the needs of women in all areas related to peace and security. Article 13 of the resolutions thus constitutes the specified prescription of gender mainstreaming of DDR processes.

The foundation for the Liberian DDR process was the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) signed by the warring parties to the conflict in 2003. It requested the launching of the DDR programme and a deployment of an international peacekeeping force to take responsibility in the implementation of the programme. The CPA did not contain any specific policies on gender mainstreaming the DDR process, but the UN Security Council Resolution 1509, which appointed and mandated the UN Mission to Liberia (UNMIL), has prescriptions on the DDR process and handling of female ex-combatants that builds on UNSC resolution 1325, article 13. The “official DDR-policies” referred to in my research question is thus UNSC resolution 1325, article 13, applied to the Liberian context through UNSC resolution 1509, article 3(f). When discussing the implementation, references will for simplicity be made mainly to
resolution 1325, article 13. On the background of the ‘official DDR policies’ referred to being a UN resolution and the mandate of UNMIL, but also because they had the main responsibility in the implementation process, my focus will be on the role of the UN mission to Liberia. National actors, however, also took part in the complex process, and joint units of both international and national actors were created to have different responsibilities during the process (cf. 3.5). When talking of the “DDR authorities” I thus refer to the broad network of actors in the process, under the authority of UNMIL.

My dependent variable is how well one managed to implement the prescribed policies of resolution 1325, article 13, in Liberia during the official DDR programme. The research question builds on an assumption that this implementation was weak and resulted in a gap between the prescribed policies and the action on the ground. “Action on the ground” is understood as the content of the official, context-specific, DDR programs and the actual execution of these. This assumption is supported by a range of researchers (see Amnesty International 2008, Jennings 2009a, Mazurana 2005 and 2004, Specht 2006, Specht and Attree 2006), and in chapter 4 the performance on the dependent variable will be more closely discussed and outlined, focusing on the compliance between the stated goals of the policies and the local measures.

1.2 Why does it matter?

Does it really matter whether women did go through the DDRR or not?

Former UNDP Officer (2010 [interview])

Different arguments are used to justify the importance of including women in resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, but two main approaches can be identified; the instrumentalist and the normative. These approaches overlap in some areas, but have somewhat different aims, priorities and threshold for success. The instrumentalist approach is an apolitical, pragmatic approach where gender is seen as just another tool in the toolbox for achieving an overarching goal one has set, for instance ‘national security’. It is typically less concerned with attitudinal change than behavioural change in society and institutions, it is less about progressive transformation of gender roles than the pragmatic accommodation of specific groups (Jennings 2009b:2). The normative approach to gendering programmes builds on but
goes further than the instrumentalist approach. From this perspective the improvement of women’s well-being and fulfilment of their human rights has a value in itself, and the approach advocates a more thorough change in gender roles. *Gender equality and attention to gender issues are seen as ends in themselves, not means to an end* (Jennings 2009b:3).

Based in the instrumentalist approach successful inclusion of female ex-combatants in the DDR programme is important because it is necessary to reach the overarching goal of the process. According to UNIFEM (2004:9) the need to integrate gender perspectives to precipitate the degree of social change and transformation required to demilitarize a violent society is increasingly being recognised. Based in the fact that such a high percentage of the combatants in the Liberian civil war were women, the importance of including them successfully in the DDR program to ameliorate the security and stability in post-conflict Liberia should be obvious. On the other hand, the normative approach would regard the inclusion of female ex-combatants in the programme as vital because gender equality has a value in itself. Considering that women and girls were an integral part of the fighting forces, as combatants, workers, wives and supporters, a failure in DDR to reach them should consequently be taken seriously (Specht 2006:17). The unequal treatment of female fighters doesn’t only deprive them of the benefits given to male soldiers, but it has a signal effect to the broader society, and reinforces the traditional gender stereotypes (Jennings 2009a:489).

Regardless of whether the overarching goal is gender equality or if one “simply” wants to build peace in the most efficient way, it really matters whether women are included in the DDR strategies or not. Both from the instrumentalist and normative approach implementing resolution 1325 article 13 is vital, either as a means to an end or an end in itself. Analysing why the strategies targeting the female ex-combatants did not work in an optimal manner is thus highly relevant.

### 1.3 Why Liberia?

Often being depicted as a “poster child” when it comes to gender issues, and with the first female president of Africa, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf,¹ Liberia was chosen as a case from the

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¹ Ellen Johnson Sierleaf was elected president in 2005, making Liberia the first African nation with a female president
universe of DDR processes with gender mainstreaming included in their mandates, on the basis of its particular relevance and appropriateness. During the civil war, the country had a relatively high percentage of female participation, making it of higher substantial significance analysing the shortcomings of the process here. Moreover, UNMIL, who was formally responsible for the DDR process, was one of the first UN peacekeeping missions with a Gender Office (The Office of the Gender Advisor, OGA), and the country had an unusual level of collective female activism advocating for peace, and later for female inclusion in the DDR (Anderlini 2000:19-20, Fuest 2008:11, Puechguirbal 2004:53-54). These factors immediately seem to facilitate a successful implementation of UNSC resolution 1325, but seeing that there were still severe shortcomings in the implementation makes it particularly interesting to analyse the underlying causes for this.

1.4 Theoretical Approach

The gender perspective has to a large degree been missing in theoretical DDR research. The few contributions that exists are mainly grounded in a ‘feminist-security’ paradigm, in which traditional perceptions of security and gender roles is viewed as the main constraint to the inclusion of women (see for instance Barth 2002, Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008, and Specht 2006). Accordingly, Jennings (2009a) presents the so-called “securitization-hypothesis” about the DDR process in Liberia, which states that the female fighters were disregarded because the DDR in Liberia was driven and justified by a security imperative. This will be my starting point in the analysis. I argue, however, that this alleged prioritization of security is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the unsuccessful implementation of UNSC resolution 1325, article 13, in Liberia. This is based on an assumption that there is no inherent contradiction in the process being security driven and justified, and implementing resolution 1325 successfully. My findings also indicated that there were other relevant structural and institutional explanatory variables that need to be included in the explanation in addition to the security argument. To shed light on this I will take a different approach then the already existing literature and make use of the analytical framework of implementation theory, as the political phenomenon under scrutiny is an implementation of a policy.

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2 The concepts necessary and sufficient refer to the implicational relationships between statements. A condition can be either necessary or sufficient without being the other. A necessary condition of a statement must be satisfied for the statement to be true. A sufficient condition is one that, if satisfied, assures the statement's truth.
Implementation theory utilizes a range of structural and practical independent variables to explain why public policies often do not have the intended results, and the goals set at the outset rarely are fulfilled in practice.

The advantage of using implementation theory is that the analytical framework is very clear and precise, and though it is originally used to study the implementation of public policies at the national level it can provide insights also on implementation of policies on the international level. Though this exact theoretical approach has not (to my knowledge) been used to analyse gender mainstreaming of international policies, using insights from the field of ‘public policy and administration’ to shed light on issues in international politics is not a novel undertaking. I thus contend that the same variables identified as essential in the implementation of national policies, are also relevant when it comes to assessing the implementation of UN policies in peacekeeping operations. The clarity of the analytical model moreover facilitates the transfer from the national to the international level, which will be elaborated on in the theory chapter in the presentation of each of the relevant variables in the model.

1.5 Peacekeeping and DDR programmes

The number of United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world, and the breadth of their tasks, is unprecedented in the 21st century. Enormous resources are spent on stabilising fragile states, and activities ensuring security are promoted and developed (Muggah 2009:1). UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, which sets out the tasks that the peacekeeping mission are required to perform. The mandates differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents (UN 2008:16), but amongst the many activities undertaken in post-conflict societies are the DDR programmes. They are now considered complex but crucial parts of all peace building processes (Muggah 2009:1). More then 60 DDR processes have taken place around the world since the early 1990s, and over a million ex-combatants have participated. It is widely considered a growth industry, as the programs are getting broader and more long-term, in addition to an expanding caseload of beneficiaries. A wide range of both UN agencies and NGOs are usually a part of the DDR process, and they are frequently viewed as the major means of improving security after violent conflict
The disarmament and demobilisation phase are the most immediate ones, often implemented in connection with peace agreements. They are defined by the UN (2005) respectively as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population, and furthermore the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The reintegration phase is a more long-term process, defined by the UN (2005) as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.\(^3\)

The peacekeeping paradigm, and with it the DDR programmes, have in the last years experienced a shift from a limited and minimalist focus on maintaining stability between the parties to a conflict, to a more multidimensional and maximalist mandate of both military and civilian character (Muggah 2009:3). The security-first approach has shifted into a combined security- and development approach, as UN operations today are expected to both protect and empower the society through their interventions. Their mandates now usually consist of social welfare objectives in addition to the traditional military, policing and rule of law tasks in a peacekeeping operation (Muggah 2010:1-2).

### 1.5.1 The DDR beneficiaries

The main beneficiaries to DDR programmes have typically been “combatants”, understood in a narrow and traditional way as armed men. This definition has left the women and girls who have been part of armed groups on the sideline, less likely to be identified as beneficiaries to DDR processes because the majority of them have occupied non-fighting roles and do not possess weapons. Regardless of what role they actually played in the group, fighting or non-fighting, women are in this context usually classified as a “vulnerable group associated with armed movements”, signifying participation in armed groups in supportive roles (Amnesty International 2008:5, UNIFEM 2004:4).

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\(^3\) In the Liberian case one also operated with a “Rehabilitation” component. This component was, however, not clarified, and it’s specific purpose and expected outcomes remained blurred throughout the process. *The only tangible indication of rehabilitation appears to be the provision of a short session with a psychological counsellor during demobilization* (Pugel 2009:73). I will therefore in the following denote the programme as a DDR programme, and accordingly analyse only these 3 phases.
One of the developments seen in DDR policies the last years is that the admission criteria are broadened to include a larger group of beneficiaries to the programme. According to the UNDDR (2006) *all those who are found to be members of an armed force or group, whether they were involved in active combat or in support roles (such as cooks, porters, messengers, administrators, sex slaves and ‘war wives’), shall be considered part of the armed force or group and therefore shall be included in the DDR programme*. This substantially broadens the understanding of the term “combatant” in the context of DDR programmes, no longer solely denoting an individual carrying a gun but all members of armed groups, also the ones in non-fighting roles.

As we shall see, having *participated in the fighting or been part of a fighting force* was also formally the criterion for eligibility to the programme in Liberia (UNDDR 2006). In practice, however, the label ex-combatant was still mainly preserved for men. All the women going through the program were labelled “women associated with the fighting forces” (WAFFs) in the official statistics, even though a number of them had in fact been soldiers.

On the background of a somewhat inconsistent terminology, used differently in theory in practice, I have chosen to define “ex-combatants” according to the formal eligibility criteria set by the UNDDR (2006) above. “Female ex-combatants” is thus women who have been part of a fighting force, for a shorter or longer period, in a fighting or non-fighting role. Consequently, when speaking of WAFFs in the following, it denotes exclusively the women who have been part of a fighting force, for a shorter or longer period, in a non-fighting role.

### 1.6 Research Design

Studying the challenges in implementing UN resolution 1325, article 13 in Liberia has required a qualitative study. The qualitative approach has its clear advantages in fields that are theoretically underdeveloped and where the concepts are still vague (Ragin and Meur 2000:750). The body of literature concerning gender perspectives in DDR processes and peace operations is limited, and few attempts at developing theoretical frameworks exist. My approach in this thesis is partly theory testing and partly exploring. Most qualitative researchers utilize an inductive approach, in which theory is seen as something that emerges
from the collection and analysis of data. However, it is also argued that qualitative data can play an important role in testing theories (Bryman 2004:270).

The study is designed through a case study of the DDR process in Liberia, a design that is commonly defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin 2003:13). It is an advantageous design when a set of events, over which the investigator has little control, are examined, thus seeming appropriate when studying the Liberian DDR process. Conducting a case study moreover enables a thorough examination of the chosen case and the operation of causal mechanisms through looking at large numbers of contextual and intervening variables (George & Bennett 2005:21, Yin 2003:9).

One of the strengths of the case study is the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence (Yin 2003:97). My primary data collection method is one of the main research methods associated with qualitative research, namely qualitative interviews. This is based in an interpretivist epistemological position, in which one seeks to understand the social world through the interpretations of it by its participants (Bryman 2004:267-268). A field study with semi-structured interviews of key-actors has been conducted to obtain the required information. Also secondary sources has been used, including the DDR Strategic and Implementation Framework (2003), UNIFEM’s (2004) report on Gender and DDR, an UNDP evaluation of the DDR process (2006), Pugel’s (2007) survey of ex-combatants in Liberia, and the reports by Amnesty International’s (2008) and Specht (2006) on the experiences of women and girl ex-combatants in Liberia. In addition I have drawn on previous research on DDR processes, peacekeeping operations, and gender mainstreaming.

1.6.1 Validity and reliability

The intent of social science is to say something about causal relationships existing in the “real world”. This study takes a constructionist ontological position, acknowledging that social phenomena are outcomes of the interactions between individuals and exists as ideas and experiences, rather than phenomena ‘out there’ existing separate from those involved in its construction (Bryman 2004:266). Through the qualitative interviews, the study draws on the interpretations of key actors to say something about the social phenomena in question.
Providing valid and reliable explanations for causal relationships, concerning whether one event can be explained by another, requires that a number of research methodological principles are satisfied. I will start with assessing the validity of my research, which refers to the relevance of data in terms of how well they answer the research question. There are three specific types of criteria; internal validity, referring to the credibility of the causal conclusions, external validity, concerning to what degree it is possible to generalise from the findings, and construct validity, looking at how well the study measures what the researcher intended (Yin 2003:34).

Even though high internal validity is one of the strengths of qualitative methods there are some issues that can constitute a challenge. In case studies, especially problems of relevant third variables can threaten the validity of the causal conclusions (Yin 2003:36). It is in a non-experimental design impossible to isolate and control the different explanatory variables, making it impossible to exclude that other variables then the ones identified in the analysis can be relevant. However, using open-ended or semi structured interviews, interviews where the questioning takes the form of a conversation, and the questions and responses are less standardized, heightens the internal validity. It is through this method easier to discover variables and causal relationships one did not know on forehand as the interview object can point to variables the scientist might not have thought of (Aberbach & Rockman 2002, Berry 2002). In my interviews I had the opportunity to probe the issues of interest by adjusting the questions as I went along, asking follow-up questions and asking for explanations when things were not clear. This provided a broad basis of data, and made it easier to identify new relevant independent variables. Assessing the credibility of the causal conclusions, one also has to be aware of the possibility of biased responses from the informants, caused by different types of interview effects. Biases in the interview data also affects the reliability of a study, and my considerations on potential biases in my material will be evaluated closer in the section concerning reliability.

In case study research there is a tension between achieving high internal validity and good historical explanations of particular cases versus making generalizations that apply to broader populations (George & Bennett 2005:22). External validity is seen as one of the weaknesses of case studies as one should not, and cannot, aspire to make claims that the
findings from one case are applicable and directly representative of a larger population (George & Bennett 2005:32). Yin (2003:37-38) nevertheless maintains that though not particularly suitable for statistical generalization, analytical generalizations can be done on the basis of case studies, in which the researcher strives to generalize a particular set of results to a broader theory. This signifies that although the results from my case study cannot be directly generalized to a larger universe or automatically valid in other cases, some of the mechanisms at play in the case of Liberia may be relevant in other cases as they are generalized to an “extended” implementation theory, including the securitization argument. Through replicating my findings in other cases where the theory indicates that the same results should occur can strengthen the validity of using implementation theory also on the international level on UN resolutions, and extending it with the security component, and thus be the new domain to which results could be generalized.

Construct validity is about making the concepts one wishes to examine measurable. The concepts under scrutiny in the social sciences are often complex and multifaceted, but the researcher must seek to operationalise them in a way that captures the full content of the concept, making it possible to measure and register the concept in a satisfying and reliable manner (Skog 2004:89-90). If not, there is a possibility that one measures something else then what one is actually after, and the basis for making causal assumptions accordingly becomes weak. This has been a challenge in my study, as a number of the relevant concepts have unclear definitions and can certainly be very difficult to measure adequately. Both my dependent and independent variables demands thorough operationalisation. In accordance with Yin’s (2003:36) recommendations I have thus attempted to counteract low construct validity by drawing on multiple sources when constructing a set of measures against which to evaluate the dependent and the various independent variables (cf. chapter 2).

The last methodological criterion is that of reliability, which concerns to what extent a study can be replicated. It is about the accuracy with which the data has been collected. The key question is: would we get the same results if the research had been carried out at a different point in time or by another researcher? This is a difficult criterion to meet in qualitative research, as it is impossible to “freeze” social settings and circumstances of an initial study to make it replicable (Bryman 2004:273), but the goal must be to minimize the errors and biases of the study (Yin 2003:37). As mentioned, the use of semi-structured interviews can be of
advantage when it comes to heightening the internal validity, however, the valuable flexibility of semi-structured interviews aggravate the reliability of the research because of difficulties coding and interpreting the information from these types of interviews. Subsequently, semi-structured interviews can be effected by so-called “interview effects”, which implies that the interviewer or the situation in itself brings about different answers from the person being interviewed than would normally come about. Keeping this in mind, when reviewing my interview data I have been aware of the possibility of systematic bias. I have especially been attentive when analysing the interviews done with the female fighters, which were of a sensitive character. Moreover, one of the conducted interviews done with the female fighters was a group interview, in addition to three other group interviews. Evaluating the data from these interviews I have been aware that group dynamics and the size of the group can affect the answers (Frey and Fontana 1991:185). In the interviews with UNMIL and UNDP actors, who were responsible for the DDR process, attention were paid to the possibility of the respondents portraying the gender mainstreaming as more successful then it in reality was. A way of heightening the reliability is to compare different sources describing the same event, through data triangulation. In addition to my own interview data I have therefore utilized relevant secondary literature, as well as public sources like UN reports and surveys to heighten the reliability level. This way it should be possible to discover contradictions, and avoid inconsistent results. Using and analysing multiple sources of evidence strengthens the validity and reliability of the research since it provides the research with multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin 2003:99). But drawing on the work of others, one also have to assess the validity and reliability of the sources, and keep in mind the context in which they came about. When assessing my secondary sources, I find no reason to doubt neither their validity nor reliability, as they are all conducted by serious actors, apparently in accordance with prevailing research ethics.

The possibility for replicating a study depends on documentation of the procedures, methods, considerations and steps taken throughout the research process. To heighten the reliability of my study I have thus carefully kept both recordings of interviews, transcriptions and notes from the interviews. In addition to the already discussed research design and data collecting method, the next paragraphs will furthermore examine the different steps of the fieldwork, challenges faced and considerations taken, further contributing to a heightening of the reliability of my study.
1.7 Conducting fieldwork

My field study was conducted in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, lasting for four weeks in February/March 2010. I conducted 28 interviews with 38 informants, through 24 individual interviews and 4 group interviews. The informants can be grouped in two main categories; ‘the DDR policymakers’ on the one side, constituting of representatives from the UNMIL, UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM, the National Commission on the DDR (NCDDR) and the Ministry of Gender and Development, and the ‘DDR beneficiaries’ on the other, which constituted of female ex-combatants. In addition three representatives from national women’s organisations, the WIPNET and WONGOSOL, were interviewed. The reason why the fieldwork was performed in Monrovia is primarily that the UNMIL headquarter is situated there, and the different UN agencies and NGOs all have their main offices in the capital. The interviews with female ex-combatants were conducted in Salala, Bong County, and in New Kru Town, one of the shantytowns at the outskirts of Monrovia.

1.7.1 Acquiring the informants

The main problem I faced when acquiring the informants was the fact that the official DDR programme in Liberia ended in 2009, and the DD-components as early as in 2004, so many of the UN officials and international NGO staff that worked with the DDR process were simply no longer in the country. This was reflected in some of the interviews I got with representatives for the ‘DDR policymakers’, where the respondents had not worked directly with the DDR process, or had worked with it from another professional position then they occupied now. Likewise, getting in touch with representatives from the NCDDR turned out to be difficult, as the commission ceased to exist in 2008, and the people who worked there now have other occupations. The time-gap also made it difficult when trying to get in touch with female ex-combatants to interview. By now, many of them have gone back to their communities, and are no longer identified as ex-combatants. Several of my respondents pointed out that the label ‘ex-combatant’ was not used anymore, and the number of projects targeting this group has decreased markedly, for the benefit of a broader reintegration

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4 The 4 groups interviews comprised of an interview with 7 women from a Red Cross reintegration program, an interview of 3 psychosocial counsellors from the Landmine Action Program, 2 DDR officers from the UNMIL RRR-section and lastly, 2 WIPNET officers. For more details, see the appendix with a list of interviews.
approach where “vulnerable groups” in general are targeted. However, there are still some projects that mainly or partly target ex-combatants, and the selection of female fighters that I interviewed, were drawn from groups of participants in two different reintegration and skills training programmes. These were both run by NGOs, respectively the Landmine Action; a UK-based NGO, and the Liberian National Red Cross Society.

Landmine Action, in collaboration with the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture, run the Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme situated in central Liberia in Salala, Bong County. The programme provides practical and technical agricultural training, to 400 ex-combatants and war-affected youth. Of the 400 beneficiaries currently enrolled in the programme, 44 are women, of which I interviewed 12. The Liberian National Red Cross Society runs a “Liberia Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women Project”, in two different areas in Monrovia, namely New Kru Town and Clara town. The program targets “vulnerable women” of different categories: there are street girls, sex-slaves, single mothers, illiterate women and female ex-combatants. Of the 100 participating women, roughly 8 of them are ex-combatants. I conducted a group interview with 7 of these women on a home visit in Central New Kru Town.

1.7.2 Interviews

The purpose of my interviews was in the case of the female ex-fighters to get information on their experiences in the war and with the DDR process, whether or not they participated in the programme (in one or more of the phases), the reasons for non-participation (or participation), and experiences in the program. The groups of female ex-combatants were not drawn in such a manner as to be representative of a bigger universe of female ex-combatants, as they were both from a limited geographical area and in a “special” situation, being part of ongoing reintegration programmes. An official at the Ministry for Gender and Development for instance underlined that the women participating in the Landmine Action programme were not representative, since they all had the possibility to leave their family and children for a period of 3 months to take part in the programme. Furthermore, none of the women at the Landmine Action programme had participated in the official DDR programme. Drawing on the information from these interviews I have thus taken this into consideration, and utilized them in an illustrative and supportive manner, rather then drawing conclusions based on them.
The purpose of interviewing the DDR authorities and women’s groups was both getting factual information on the organizing, designing and implementation process, but also the informants personal views on the (lack of) success of the process and the underlying reasons for the performance. The DDR policymakers and representatives from the women’s organisations were key-actor informants and hence not drawn to be a representative sample. As mentioned, all the interviews were semi-structured, based on a general interview guide, but at the same time open for changes and adjustment, follow-ups and additional questions.

1.7.3 Language

The official language in Liberia is English, so in the majority of the interviews there was no need for an interpreter. However, the Liberian English can be difficult to comprehend, especially spoken by people in the hinterland, but also amongst the people in the areas outside Monrovia. Therefore all interviews with the female ex-combatants were conducted with an interpreter. The interpreter was in both cases psychosocial counsellors working in the programmes in which the women were beneficiaries. Having a translator present can affect the interview situation and the validity and reliability of the data obtained in different ways. The apparent advantage of having a translator present when speaking to these women, that less information get lost or misinterpreted, thus had to be weighed up against the fact that having the counsellors present whilst conducting the interviews might have influenced the extent to which the women could speak freely. When it came to the personal opinions they gave me about the programmes they were currently a part of, I see as likely that they were restrictive in criticising them in front of staff member. However, when it came to the information that was most relevant for me; their experiences during the war, their participation in armed forces, and their experiences with the DDRR process, having the counsellors present seemed to make the respondents talk more openly about sensitive issues as the women had already gone through extensive counselling with the psychosocial counsellors in the programs, and seemed to be more willing to share their stories with me when assured by the counsellors that they could trust me.

1.7.4 Tape recorder and notes

In qualitative research, interviews with informants are often recorded. Recording interviews has the advantage that it corrects the natural limitation of our memories by allowing us to go
back and repeatedly examine the exact words of the respondent. In that way, it allows more thorough examination of what the respondent say, and counteracts the tendency we have to place glosses on what people say in interviews (Bryman 2004:330). It furthermore opens up the collected data to public scrutiny, and can counter possible accusations of bias from the researcher. However, using recording equipment may also come with a cost in terms of “disturbing” the interview by putting of the interviewees, making them more self-conscious or maybe alarmed at the prospect of their words being preserved (ibid.).

I conducted the majority of my interviews without a tape recorder; only 3 interviews were conducted with a recorder. In the RRR-unit in UNMIL I was not allowed to use the recorder because of restrictions from the employer. The choice not to utilise a tape recorder during the other interviews was based mainly on personal preferences and style, but also an assessment of the settings in which the interviews took place. When interviewing the female ex-combatants I considered the situation and the sensitivity of the topic to be of such a manner that using a tape recorder could limit their responses extensively. The interviews with the women took place respectively at the campus site of the Landmine Action project, and during a home visit in New Kru Town, and I assessed that using a tape recorder in these settings would be counter productive. The interviews with especially the national actors, WIPNET, WONGOSOL and NCDDRR, all had an informal character, accordingly my assessments were the same.

The problem with not recording the interview is of course that the information is less accurate. I could not through my notes from the interviews capture exactly how the respondents expressed themselves, their choice of words and their intonation. This problem was considered during the field study, and attempted counteracted by taking thorough and detailed notes during the interviews as well as complementing the notes immediately after the interviews were terminated, based on my recollections of the responses. When it comes to the recorded interviews on the other hand, de-contextualisation is a challenge one has to be aware of. I therefore tried to write down a contextualisation of all the interviews, shortly after I had conducted them: where and how long the interview lasted, the setting, my first impression of the informant and the responses that was given, and the credibility of the main findings.
Since my analytical approach to the gathered data does not demand detailed attention to language, such as conversation or discourse analysis would have, I do not think my analysis suffered substantially from the lack of recorded interviews. Furthermore, transcribing recorded interviews is both time consuming and it generates vast amounts of paper, which needs to be gone through when analysing (Bryman 2004:331-332). In light of the limited time I had to realize the research project, and the number of interviews conducted, this was also a factor when choosing to carry out most of the interviews without a tape recorder. Nevertheless, in the retrospective I recognise that my analysis could have gained somewhat from the use of tape recorder during the more formal interviews with the UN agencies, in terms of getting more detailed records of the interviews.

1.8 Research ethics

Throughout the research process, making ethical considerations have been of importance. In regards to the informants and the interview situation, getting the information needed has to be combined with being aware when asking sensitive questions. Especially in the interviews with the female ex-combatants, I anticipated that some of the topics touched upon could be painful for the respondents to talk about. For the purpose of the research it was not necessary for me to probe into the difficult issues. However, I attempted to make the interview setting more assuring by always having a psychosocial counsellor from the training programs present, which the women had already done extensive trauma counselling with. Moreover I assured them that their identities would not be revealed. Informing the respondents of the purpose of the interviews and the nature of the research (Wolvier 2002:677), in addition to getting their consent to use the information from the interviews is important. In regard to revealing the identity of the persons interviewed, the question of consent had to be considered, but also the principle of confidentiality, and whether it could have any consequences for the informants to be identified. Recognizing that the reliability of the study can deteriorate when the informants are not identified, but emphasizing the principle of ‘do no harm’ (Wolvier 2002:677), the female ex-combatants, and some of the other respondents are anonymous, while the others are presented by name.

Doing my fieldwork I also had to consider my role as a European, female student, and how the informants would react to me conducting research. First of all, considering the topic of my
research, I see as likely that my sex made it easier for me to get information from the female ex-combatants. They were all willing to talk to me, even though my intent with the interviews seemed somewhat difficult to understand for many of the women. It also turned out that the different officials in general were positive to speak to me, though a few expressed that they found my topic of research somewhat irrelevant, whilst others expressed a fatigue of being questioned about ‘gender issues’. However, people wanted to be part of the project, and seemed to talk openly about their experiences.

1.9 Outline

In the following chapter the theoretical framework for my analysis will be outlined, firstly Jennings’ “securitization-hypothesis”, and secondly, the implementation theory. A so-called top-down approach to implementation studies are chosen, and through a causal model six independent variables are introduced that can be relevant for the “performance” in the implementation process. Chapter 3 provides a brief historical overview of the civil war, and more thoroughly examines the role of women in the war. The underlying reasons for their participation and the different roles they occupied in the armed groups will be discussed, in light of prevailing gender roles in Liberia before and now. Lastly, the importance of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in gender mainstreaming will be commented on, and the DDR programme outlined in more detailed. This chapter is meant to contextualize the theoretical approach and provide the background knowledge necessary to follow the discussion. Chapter 4 is a discussion on the dependent variable. Based on my primary data, and with support in secondary sources and previous research, I conduct a detailed review of the theoretical and practical inclusion of female fighters in the process, and the actual measures taken to target their different needs, compared to the ones outlined in the policy prescriptions. Finally, in chapter 5, the two complementary explanatory models are used to analyse my data. I will discuss to what extent my findings support the “securitization-hypothesis”, and complement with an analyses of my findings through the analytical framework of implementation theory.
2 Theoretical approach

There is a rich body of literature on armed conflict and gender, though in most of it women are still perceived as inherently peace loving or as passive victims, placed in the role of rape victims, abandoned mothers, or mourning widows (Malkki 1995 in Coulter 2006:31), not as combatants and agents with their own agenda. Women who fight in armed combat, or have roles as cooks, nurses, domestics, sex-workers and willingly or unwillingly support combatants, are a group that do not fit the social stereotypes of the peaceful, nurturing and ‘good woman’, and the literature on female fighters have accordingly been limited. Where the first generation of DDR scholars focused on specific aspects of the DDR process, there is now moreover a focus on investigating the programme’s contribution to security and war non-recurrence, and the effect the programme has on the beneficiaries (Muggah 2010:6-7). This mirrors the fact that evidence of whether or not the programme has worked as intended has been lacking, in spite of it being viewed as some kind of “magic bullet” in peacekeeping operations (ibid.). There has also been a considerable expansion in terms of which disciplines the researchers on DDR represent, something that has resulted in new issues being included in DDR research. The topic of child soldiers has for instance been high on the agenda, but gender perspectives have to a large extent been absent. The studies that are done on this topic are mainly in the form of “best practices” and “lessons learned” documents. Through case studies, specific challenges when it comes to implementing resolution 1325 are pointed to, but they are usually not lifted up to a higher analytical level.

The few theoretical contributions on the topic are as mentioned positioned within a feminist-security paradigm. Specht (2006:58) for instance states that preconceived notions of women as peaceable, passive, and domestically oriented tend to influence assistance and support given to women and men in conflict contexts. Female ex-combatants are not accounted for by such preconceptions, and as a result often receive less attention in reconstruction processes than non-fighting or civilian women. Jennings’ (2009a & 2008) securitization argument follows this pattern, as it states that the female fighters were disregarded because the DDR in Liberia was driven and justified by a security imperative. Jennings’ main focus has been the reintegration phase of the programme, and her findings are based on general data collected on the DDR process.
There is, however, a need to expand the explanation by including other variables. Findings in my data, collected specifically to shed light on the disregarding of female fighters, points to other explanations for the gap. There is a need to study all the phases of the DDR programme, not merely the reintegration phase, as there are possible difference when it comes to relevant factors affecting the implementation process in the different phases, but also the fact that the phases are closely interlinked. Analysing the (lack of) participation of women in the reintegration programmes necessarily also demands analysing the disarmament and demobilisation phase, since registering in the first phase was mandatory for participation in later reintegration programmes.

Even if the process was security driven and justified, there is no contradiction between that and implementing resolution 1325 successfully, other factor must therefore influence the process. The political phenomenon under scrutiny is an implementation of a policy, and to frame the extended analysis outlined above, I will therefore make use of implementation theory. I contend that the two approaches are not only complementary, the security component can possibly affect both the “value” of some of the variables identified in the implementation theory, and conversely, the explanatory power of the security argument might be affected by the other variables. The assumptions in the security argument are necessary, but not sufficient explanations for the gap. By placing my findings in an implementation theory model, and drawing on the “securitization argument”, I can analyse the inherent challenges of implementing UN resolutions through peacekeeping operations, and the particular challenges of implementing resolution 1325, article 13. As Antonini (2009:208) puts it: \textit{The issue that may best exemplify the gap between prescriptions and accomplishments (…) is the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security.}

\section{2.1 The “Securitization” of DDR}

Even though there has been a paradigm shift in the policymaking on peacekeeping operations, in which they are now expected to both protect and empower, Jennings (2009a:475, 2008:165) argues that the policies and programming of the Liberian DDR were being driven and justified by a security-imperative. This caused the reintegration programme to overlook the female ex-combatants, as they in general were not seen as a threat to security. The main
Focus in the program was creating immediate security after a situation of war. This was obviously the priority in the demobilisation and disarmament phase which both had this as a stated goal, but also through the reintegration phase, which had as a stated goal to socially and economically reintegrate the ex-combatants into society. Jennings (2009a, 2008) claims that the reintegration phase was not driven by a long-term development perspective but rather had a short-term focus on creating jobs and offering skills training to keep the ex-combatants busy and thus preventing them from creating unrest. This becomes evident in the underlying illogic of a reintegration programme based on job training in a country where the unemployment rate is around 85 per cent.

Training thousands of people for non-existent formal jobs would be putting the cart before the horse, were it not for the fact that the development aspect of reintegration was not the key consideration driving reintegration programming. Instead, the point was to buy time for the transitional and newly elected governments – seemingly ignoring the predicament that without jobs the protection provided by training lasted only as long as the programming.

(Jennings 2008:162)

Because of this security-focus the female fighters were overlooked, especially in the reintegration phase, as the underlying assumption was that the group constituting the biggest threat to security was the young idle men. This assumption builds on traditional gender roles where men are seen as inherently aggressive and violent and women are seen as peace loving and nurturing. Accordingly, young idle men, in this case the male ex-combatants, were linked to instability and unrest whilst young women were not seen as a threat to security in the same way. First of all, women are rarely allowed the “luxury” of idleness. Even though they do not have formal work or attend courses or training, since they usually have children or other family to take care of they are classified as caretakers rather then “idle”. This is a problematic simplification because it understates the complexity of women’s roles, and overlooks the fact that men to a certain extent are also caretakers. Secondly, female idleness is more often

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5 Two surveys done on Liberian ex-combatants (Boás & Hatløy 2008, Pugel 2007), and Jennings (2009a) qualitative study, find that also male ex-combatants have caretaking responsibilities. For instance, “protecting the family” is in both surveys one of the most prevalent reasons stated for joining an armed group (for both male
connected to increasing prostitution, not unrest. The instability created by prostitution, a so-called ‘normative instability’, is not prioritised by the securitization of the reintegration project thus making men’s participation in the reintegration much more important then women’s (Jennings 2009a:481, 487).

2.2 Implementing resolution 1325, article 13

The field of implementation studies has developed from the beginning of the 70s, studying why public policies often do not have the intended results and the goals set at the outset rarely are fulfilled in practice. Building on different perceptions of what ‘implementation’ really is, two schools of thought has emerged, in which most scientists in the field can be placed. The two approaches, the so-called Top-Down and Bottom-Up, have developed different analytical models but there is still a high degree of consensus on the basic issues in the field (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:131-132).

Even though the two approaches to a large extent agree on the basic issues in the field, their definitions and delimitations are still clearly different. The top-down approach is based on a narrow understanding of “implementation”, defining it as the phase between the decision made at the centralised level and the operationalisation of the decision at the local level. The starting point for the implementation process is a decision at the political level, in contrast to the down-up approach which sees the decision in itself as less important then the process that takes place around the decision and the social and economical conditions it seeks to change. The top-down approach is also reticent when it comes to evaluating the general outcomes of the policies, as it does not seek to measure the actual results of a policy in terms of changes in the social, political or economic situation, rather it simply focuses on the compliance between the stated goals of a policy and the local measures. The focus is on how effective administration can be achieved (Kjellberg and Reitan 1995:161-163).

My intent is not to make a contribution to close the gap of knowledge when it comes to whether or not the DDR programmes in fact work as intended or not, but rather an attempt to analyse why there is a gap between policy prescriptions and performance. I am moreover not

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and female ex-combatants in Pugel’s survey, while the data is not gender disaggregated in Bøås & Hatløy’s survey), something that Jennings (2009a:481) argues is an indication of perceived duty of care for the family.
interested in the processes around the adoption of Resolution 1325 and 1509, as they to my opinion are not particularly relevant to my research question. Furthermore, the general character of these resolutions, not addressing the particular subject of gender mainstreaming the DDR process on the ground in Liberia, but being more overarching, also makes the decision making process less relevant for my analysis. Thus, the Top-Down approach is the most suiting in terms of definitions and delimitations when analysing the implementation of UN resolution 1325 article 13, and furthermore the gender mainstreaming as laid out in resolution 1509. Within the Top-Down approach particularly two contributions have been important in developing an analytical framework and model for the implementation process. I will mainly utilise Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) model, as it is immediately clearest, supplementing with the insights of Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1980, 1986).

In their model Van Meter and Van Horn identifies 6 structural independent variables that they argue influence the degree of success in the implementation of a policy. The model both points to the relevant independent variables, and the possible relationship between them (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:462). Each of the independent variables is composed of a number of components. However, as the model is complex, Van Meter and Van Horn have summarized it and underscored the importance of especially three general explanations, that is the communication process, capability problems, and dispositional conflicts. This makes some of the components to the variables less important, and the focus will therefore be only on the components identified as most important to the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325. To I have furthermore chosen to make use of a simplified version of Van Meter & Van Horn’s model, developed by Kjellberg & Reitan (1995:143) that leaves out some of the possible relationships between the independent variables.
2.2.1 The Dependent variable

The dependent variable in the model is “Performance”, which assesses the extent to which prescribed policies are in fact implemented, and how well the implementation process is executed. To measure the performance, the extent of compliance between the stated goals of a policy and the local measures must be assessed.

As defined in the introduction, my dependent variable is the ‘performance’ of implementing UNSC resolution 1325, article 13, applied to the Liberian context through UN Security Council Resolution 1509, article 3(f). The resolutions are very general in form and content, making it difficult to measure the performance of their implementation. What does it in reality mean to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants? To be able to analyse this up against some set standards and indicators it has been necessary to draw on other sources. In addition to considering the limited policy implications of the resolutions, I have taken a starting point in the definitions of ”gender mainstreaming”, as this is what the UNSC Resolution 1325, article 13 implicitly are encouraging the DDR authorities to perform. Furthermore, the overall implications of resolution 1325 are taken into consideration, as it calls for equal participation and full involvement of women. Through this, two main principles are assumed, against which the performance of the implementation will be
measured. Firstly, there is the principle of “equal participation”, signifying that male and female ex-combatants should have the same possibility to participate in the program, both de jure and de facto. Secondly, the principle of “addressing the different needs”, signifying that all the programmes in the process should assess the needs of female ex-combatants.

2.2.2 The independent variables

The first two independent variables are characteristics of the policy in question, namely its goals and its access to resources. Four additional structural factors are subsequently included, which looks at how the policy, with its different characteristics, isfiltrated through the implementation process.

1. Standards and objectives

The first independent variable is a characteristic of the policy, as it elaborates on the overall goals of the policy decision and provides more concrete and specific standards for assessing program performance. Identification of so-called performance indicators is crucial as one assesses the extent to which the policy’s standards and objectives are realized and the implementation has been a success. In some instances these standards and objectives are self-evident and easily measurable, but in most cases it is difficult to measure the extent to which the policy in question is in fact being implemented due to its breadth and complexity of far-reaching goals (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975: 464). Variations here will be decisive for how the policy is being communicated and interpreted in the process of implementation. A clear objective provides both a standard of evaluation and an important resource for implementing officials (Sabatier 1986:23). The less clear a goal is, the greater are the chances of misconceptions and conscious distortions. Standards and objectives can not be carried out unless they are stated with sufficient clarity so that the implementors can know what is expected of them (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:466). To determine the standards and objectives of a certain policy, one can use the statements of the policymakers reflected in documents such as program regulations and guidelines, which set the criteria for implementation. In some cases the standards and objectives are not explicit, but must be deduced by the individual researcher (ibid:465).
As pointed to in the preceding paragraph on the dependent variable, the standards and objectives for implementing article 13 in Liberia are immediately unclear, as the resolution is very broad. This made it necessary to use other sources to deduce the implicit standards and objectives in the general policy implications of the resolutions. In the analysis it is thus necessary to assess the measures taken to translate the broad policy commitments of resolution 1325, article 13, into specific objectives and action on the ground, through the use of guidelines, “lessons learned”, “best practices” documents and policy statements. General UN resolutions that are being implemented through peacekeeping operations must be interpreted into context-specific policies, as context is a critical factor when shaping the design and implementation process, and for the outcomes of DDR (Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen 2009:273-277). I have also looked at the steps taken to adjust the mandate of gender mainstreaming to the Liberian context, and how one planned to reach and address the different needs of female ex-combatants. In addition to assessing the clarity of the standards and objectives as outline by the Liberian DDR authorities, it will be crucial to consider their compliance with the general goals of resolution 1325, article 13, and resolution 1509, article 3(f), defined in the preceding paragraph on the dependent variable.

2. Resources

It is not enough with clear objectives and standards. If financial resources are not made available to facilitate the implementation it will probably fail. Resources may include funds, but also other incentives that can encourage or facilitate effective implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:465). Analysing this variable includes looking at the general funding to the DDR programme in Liberia, the allocation of funding between the different phases of the programme, but also funding made specifically to facilitate the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325, article 13. What is central here is not whether the programme in general suffered from a lack of economic resources, something that would affect the efficiency of the whole process, but rather if this particularly affected the gender mainstreaming of the programme.

Van Meter and Van Horn also include access to human resources as a relevant component, but as it overlaps with one of the factors discussed under the independent variable “Characteristics of the implementing agencies”, it will be dealt with in that section.
3. Interorganizational communication and enforcement activities

This variable concerns the relationship between the central and local authorities, and the distribution of influence between the actors to the process. If the process is centralised, with a hierarchical institutional organising guiding the relations between centre and periphery, it may increase the likelihood that the implementers (the subordinates) will act in a manner consistent with the policy’s objectives. As orders are not self-executing, one needs the presence of an action-forcing mechanism, and while superiors cannot command obedience, they have substantial capacity to influence the behaviour of their subordinates. The more decentralised a system is, with independent actors and units, the more probable is an adaptation of the policies according to the interests of the actors (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:146, Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:466-467).

In addition to influencing the strength of enforcement activities, the institutional organisation also plays a role when it comes to the inter- and intra-organizational level of communication. The initial clarity of standards and objectives are of course important, but how the communication of these is conducted between or within the responsible organisations are also vital. If the goal and measures are unclear, different communicators can provide inconsistent interpretations of standards and objectives, making the implementation more difficult. But as communication is a complex and difficult process in which messages are inevitably distorted, both intentionally and unintentionally, the accuracy and consistency in communication strategies are vital in achieving a successful implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:465-466).

In the original context of the theory, the central and local authorities in question usually refer to the state-level versus the local level of districts and municipalities. Transferred to the international level and the case of implementing Security Council Resolutions, I argue that the “state-level” is the centralized UN apparatus with the Security Council as policymaker, and the “local” level is the UN peacekeeping missions, which is tasked with implementing the Security Council Resolutions. In the case of Liberia the local-level authority is thus the UNMIL. As peacekeeping operations are complex and broad programmes, there is in addition to the Missions themselves a range of national and international actors included in the direct implementation on the local level. Consequently, there is a need to analyse also the hierarchical structures on the local level. When discussing the inter- and intra-organisational
structures in Liberia, in accordance with Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), especially two types of enforcement of follow-up activities are important; the technical advice and assistance provided, both by the UN Security Council to the UNMIL, and by UNMIL to the other local actors in the process; and the Security Council and UNMIL’s possibility of sanctioning their “subordinates”. The level of inter- and intra-organisational communication, in terms of accurate and consistent communication of the standards and objectives of the gender mainstreaming of the DDR process, will also be discussed in the analysis.

4. Characteristics of the implementing agencies

The characteristics of the implementing agencies consist of a number of factors, both formal structural features and informal attributes of their personnel. It is difficult to determine an exhaustive list of characteristics of an agency that can influence the implementation of a policy, but Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) have identified some of the most central characteristics. Both the degree of hierarchical control of subunit decisions and processes, and the degree of “open” communication within the organization are pointed to as relevant. I consider, however, that these characteristics will be adequately analysed when discussing the previously outlined independent variable, and will thus not repeat the arguments here. This is in accordance with Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975:477) consideration of an overlap between the two variables on this point.

The other characteristics pointed to as vital for a successful implementation is the competence and size of staff. Human resources are naturally important, but also their skill in utilizing available resources is viewed as critical (Sabatier 1986:23). A mapping of the human resources deposited to the gender mainstreaming of the DDR program, and the gender-technical competence of the staff on the ground in Liberia will thus be conducted. This includes the technical capacity of the staff working specifically on gender issues, and the competence of the whole range of DDR staff, as gender mainstreaming a program demands considering gender implications in the planning, designing, and implementing.

5. Economic, Social and Political conditions

How will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by the implementation, and how does social, economical and political circumstances influence the implementation? It is argued that stable socio-economical and political conditions contribute to successful
implementation as changes can undermine the initial political support for the policy. Support of public opinion, elites, partisans (political/military), organisations, and private interest groups can also contribute to successful implementation (Sabatier 1986:25, Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:471-472). The support or lack of support from the transitional government, the underlying relevant ministries, the warring parties, NGOs and public opinion is of importance. Analysing the economic, social and political conditions in a post-conflict society like Liberia in detail is not a possible undertaking in this study. However, the conditions on the ground are seen as important in this respect only as far as they influence the capacity of the implementing agency (Van meter & Van Horn 1975:481). A thorough analysis is thus not required; an overview of relevant circumstances will be sufficient.

6. The disposition of implementers
The last independent variable is one that all the other variables are influenced by, and must be “filtered” through, namely the perceptions of the implementers. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) underscore three elements that affect the implementers’ ability and willingness to carry out the policy, that is their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy, their response to it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of the response. If the policies that are to be implemented contradict deeply cherished beliefs of individuals implementing it, they may attempt to alter it so that it better matches their convictions. They may also fail to execute policies faithfully because they reject the goals contained in them. Conversely, it may enhance the potential for successful implementation if there is widespread acceptance of the standards and objectives amongst the implementers (Sabatier 1986:23, Van Meters & Van Horn 1975:473). The attitudes of the implementers can come from the inter-organizational professional culture or from personal interests. A negative attitude can express a sincere believe that the policy to be implemented does not serve the purpose it is intended to (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:147).

Analysing the disposition of implementers in Liberia first of all demands a specification of what bureaucratic level one wants to look into. Different types of implementers are identified by the theory, for instance the so-called ‘street level bureaucrats’, which are the staff that are in direct contact with the beneficiaries, and the higher-level bureaucrats. As mentioned, “moving” the implementation model to the international level signify that the UNMIL are the main implementers of resolution 1325, article 13 in Liberia. In addition there are a number of
Street level bureaucrats responsible for the performance of the policies, both UNMIL staff, staff in specialized UN agencies, and NGOs. Since the UNMIL is the responsible body for the implementation, however, the main focus will be on the higher-level bureaucrats, both within the Mission, and other responsible actors to the DDR process.

2.2.3 Three General Explanations

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:478) identify a range of possible linkages between the variables, but especially three general explanations are proposed as instrumental for a successful implementation of a policy. First of all, an effective communication in the process is necessary, so that the implementers understand what they are supposed to do. This depends on the consistency and clarity of the standards and objectives; the institutional characteristics of the implementing organisation; the inter-organizational communication and enforcement strategies and the disposition of the implementers. Secondly, the implementing organization has to have capacity to do what they are expected to do, which depends on the access to financial and human resources, interorganisational communication and enforcement activities, the characteristics of the implementing agency, and the challenges and possibilities that lies in the political and social circumstances. Thirdly, the focus is on the disposition of the actors. If there is a lack of will to implement a policy among the implementers, it can make the other structural factor less important. However, all the other components of the model can also influence the disposition of the implementers (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:147-148, Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:478-480).

2.2.4 Limitations of the approach

Through applying this theory on many cases, one has found that having an implementing agency that is supportive of the policy has been one of the most important variables (Sabatier 1986:28-29). Most of the other variables have also turned out to be of substance, but the emphasis on clear and consistent goals has turned out to be excessive. Very few programs meet the criterion of clear and consistent goals, either because it is difficult to get the necessary consensus, or because the subject under discussion is too complex to define clear and consistent goals. This will be taken into consideration when analysing the implementation of resolution 1325, article 13 in Liberia, but I argue that analysing the translation of the broad resolutions into context-specific standards and objectives to be applied in Liberia is still of
relevance since earlier findings (see for instance Antonini 2008 and Raven-Roberts 2005) have shown that the lack of conceptual coherence has been a problem in the process of implementing gender mainstreaming.

The fundamental critique coming from the bottom-up approach has been that the model, through taking a starting point in the perspective of central decision-makers, tends to neglect other actors (Sabatier 1986:30). Implicitly arguing for a stronger hierarchical and centralised control, it emphasises the institutional aspects of the implementation process, and especially the superior control. An excessive focus on this can be misleading, as modern bureaucracies to a large extent has moved away from detailed control to more indirect forms of control and framework administering. It is an empirical question whether hierarchical control and a more distinct management lead to quicker and more efficient results than the more decentralised administration. Consequently, implementing policies often require making compromises both when it comes to defining the needs to be fulfilled (in a lack of clear and consistent goals) and when it comes to the degree of central control (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:164). The discussion on preferred institutional design, a centralised versus decentralised organising, can to some extent can be transferred to the situation of peacekeeping operations, seen for instance in the increased quest for local ownership. Applying the implementation model to a case of UNSC resolution implementation thus also demands consideration of this criticism.

2.3 Summary

Six structural and practical independent variables are through the analytical framework of the top-down approach to implementation theory introduced to complement the “securitization argument”, which explains the disregarding of female ex-combatants with the priority of the security goal rather then the development goal. Two characteristics of resolution 1325, article 13, the clarity of its standards and objectives, and the amount of resources it made available, affects the ‘performance’ through 4 other variables. Firstly, a poor communication process and few available enforcement activities within the DDR authorities are said to negatively affect the performance. Secondly, there is a need of competent human resources to gender mainstream the process. Thirdly, unstable economic, social and political conditions on the ground might challenge the implementation, and lastly, the disposition of the implementers to the prescribed policies of gender mainstreaming affects the outcome. The two theoretical
approaches are of different character, but complementary. The ‘priority of security’ component is an underlying and necessary variable that must be assessed together with the more structural variables. Moreover, there are possible linkages between the independent variables identified in the implementation theory and the security component. These possible linkages will be discussed through the analysis, and drawing on the framework of implementation theory the identified relevant components will in the following chapters be examined, along with the linkages between them and the dependent variable.
3 Women in War and Peace

The Liberian civil war started on Christmas Eve 1989 when Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded the country from Côte d’Ivoire on a mission to topple president Samuel Doe. There are different interpretations of the underlying causes for the outbreak of the civil war. A common perception is that it was deeply rooted in the history of Liberia, where the ‘war ‘ of identity, what it means to be Liberian, has been prevailing since the creation of the nation-state (Bøås & Hatløy 2008:34). Though a country of many ethnic groups, ethnicity has not been a conflict line in itself; rather it has been a component of the identity dimension. This is connected to the question of land ownership, and was socially constructed through the administrative boundaries laid by the True Whig Party (TWP), who governed the state for the first 110 years after its foundation (Bøås 2005:77). In combination with a struggle for resources, this lead to a series of local conflicts that got tangled up in each other and nationalised the conflict, ‘as Taylor’s rebellion against Doe’s dictatorship pushed the dysfunctional Liberian state over the edge and into abyss’ (ibid.).

By April 1990, the NPFL controlled approximately 90 per cent of the country, thereby forcing Doe’s U.S-backed regime to collapse. When the UN and the international community failed to act, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent an intervention force to Liberia, the so-called Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). However, ECOMOG failed to halt the conflict, and less than two weeks after their arrival, Samuel Doe was executed by a breakaway faction of the NPFL (Bøås & Hatløy 2008:34, Nichols 2005:111, Levitt 2005:206-207). In the following years fighting continued between NPFL and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a rebel group formed in 1991 by Liberian refugees in Guinea and Sierra Leone (Nichols 2005:111).

In September 1993, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission to Liberia (UNOMIL), but the war continued unabated between the ULIMO, NPFL and other warring factions. After 13 ineffective peace accords (from 1991-1996), the fourteenth made headway and led to an arguably genuine democratic election (Levitt 2005:210) in June 1997, where Charles Taylor was elected president. By then the ECOWAS

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6 The TWP was founded in 1870 by the so-called Americo-Liberians, which were originally freed American slaves who settled in and established the Republic of Liberia in 1847 (Levitt 2005)
had already launched Liberia’s first disarmament and demobilisation programme, and in September the UNOMIL forces withdrew from Liberia. However, Taylor’s victory signalled nothing more than a continuation of Liberia’s legacy of authoritarian rule (Levitt 2005:216).

The second phase of the civil war started in July 2000 when anti-Taylor groups, united in Liberians United for reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), invaded northern Liberia from Guinea. In March 2003 the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) emerged as a new rebel group, based in Côte d’Ivoire but closely linked to LURD. The final offensive against Taylor took place in Monrovia, July and August 2003. ECOWAS peacekeepers once again arrived in Liberia in August 2003, and through regional and international mediation efforts, 14 years of devastating civil war ended when the warring parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana, on the 18th of August. The CPA called for immediate ceasefire, the creation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and it requested the UN to deploy a force to Liberia to support the NTGL and assist in the overall implementation of the Agreement. Moreover, it called for the establishment of a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR), who were to supervise and guide the implementation of a DDRR program with the support of UN peacekeeping forces (Levitt 2005:228-237, Nichols 2005:111, UNDDR 2006, UNDP 2004:5).

On the 19th of September, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1509, which endorsed the peace agreement and established the United Nations’ second peacekeeping mission in Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Its main mandate was to support the transitional government in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ensuring security and keeping the peace (UNMIL 2010, Nichols 2005:109, 137, UNDP 2004:5).

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7 The official parties to the Liberian comprehensive peace Agreement were representatives from the Government of Liberia (GoL), The LURD, MODEL, and Liberian political parties.
3.1 The Women of the Liberian civil war

The association of women with fighting forces was a constant feature of the Liberian civil war. Their roles were multifaceted and varied from civilians, supporters and advocates of armed struggled, to spies, soldiers and rebels. It is, however, difficult to say exactly how many Liberian women who in one way or another where a part of an armed group. Some estimates say that women constituted up to 30-40 per cent of the fighting forces (Amnesty 2008:5). UNIFEM, in a 2004 report, operates with a number of women and children eligible for the DDR on up to 38 per cent of the total number of eligible combatants, which at that time was between 38.000 and 53.000. Conversely, in Pugel’s (2007:31) extensive survey, where a randomized sample is drawn from the universe of ex-combatants over 18 years old, only approximately 20 per cent of the sample is female.

Determining how many of the women who actually fought and how many that “just” served in supporting roles as cooks, cleaners, sex-slaves, spies and carriers, is another challenge. Of the female ex-combatants in Pugel’s survey (2007) as many as 70 per cent reported that their primary role in the armed group they belonged to was as combat soldier, compared to 87 per cent of the men. According to Specht (2006:60), the majority of the women between 15 and 24 who were part of armed groups did not take part in the actual fighting. Most of them occupied other roles, often as wives of the male fighters, with “normal” duties like cooking and cleaning, raising children and doing sexual favours. As Specht (2006:24) maintains that it was the older women who usually fought, whilst the younger girls more often served in supporting roles, the findings of Pugel and Specht are not as contrasting as first perceived. Pugel’s sample is of female ex-combatants over 18 years old, and one would accordingly be expected to find a higher percentage of women reporting that their primary role was being a soldier. Nevertheless, it is evident that the numbers and estimates on this matter are uncertain and varies depending on the source of information. It is important to note that the difficulties of estimating number of soldiers and camp-followers is not special for the women, this is a problem also when it comes to the male combatants, since the civil war had been long, with a character that made the lines between civilians and soldiers blurred.

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8 This is not to imply that the majority of women over 24 years were soldiers. The age group 15-24 years is simply the group under investigation in Specht’s (2006) report, and therefore the age group on which there are data.
It is, however, uncontested that a number of the fighting forces utilized women as soldiers or labour. A special feature of LURD for instance was that they had units wholly composed of girls and women, commonly known as the “Women’s Artillery Commandos” (WAC). The WACs were known for their fighting capacity and was integrated into military structures (Specht 2006:15, 23). Both Taylor’s NPFL, and later his Government Forces (GoL), also recruited women and girls, and had female commanders. The GoL had a WAC included in its military structure, however it appears that it played a less prominent role in the government forces than in the LURD. Some senior female commanders nonetheless took posts in Liberia's armed forces when Taylor won the presidency in 1997 (Specht 2006:23-26). Although all-female units existed it seems they never went on assignments and raids on their own, but always had male units accompanying them. According to Specht (2006:23-26) this was considered necessary, as women were still perceived as the weaker sex unable to go on assignments themselves. On the other hand, women and girls also seems to have been taken seriously when it came to fighting capacities, and they were moreover seen as an asset in terms of their ability to encourage the fighting men.

The reasons for women, as for men, to join armed groups were diverse. Some joined more or less voluntarily whilst others were forced (UNIFEM 2004:10). The practical boundary between voluntary and involuntary causes is, however, somewhat unclear. Specht (2006:10) underlines that the distinction is difficult to uphold in practice because recruitment that was at first depicted as voluntary at closer scrutiny can better be described as reasonable adaptive strategy or practical protection mechanism in situations of extreme danger or deprivation (West 2004:185 in Specht 2006:10). Bøås and Hatløy (2008) contend however, that although many of the combatants in Liberia were poor and had limited options prior to their joining fighting forces, they were not poorer or more marginalised than many of the individuals who did not join. The underlying premise is that even under some level of coercion individuals can have strategic or tactical agency, and the ability to make rational considerations when taking the choice of joining a fighting force. In their survey, Bøås and Hatløy (2008:38) find that

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9 ‘Strategic agency’, is *narrow and opportunistic, ‘exercised to cope with concrete, immediate conditions of their lives in order to maximise the circumstances created by their violent military environment’* (Honwana 2006:71 in Bøås and Hatløy 2008:37), while tactical agency is more long-term agency *based on some degree of the self*
many ex-combatants seem to have made tactical decisions, based on security considerations, when joining armed groups. Even though the overall majority of the ex-combatants in their survey were male, there is no reason to believe that the premise of tactical and strategic agency is not also present for women who joined the armed forces, even though their security considerations might have been somewhat different from those of their male colleagues.

Once again, the estimated number of women forcibly recruited to armed forces differs in the different sources. The estimate ranges from approximately a third of the female ex-combatants (Specht 2006:28), to more then half of them (Amnesty International 2008:5), somewhat depending on the age group in question, as younger women were more often victims of forced recruitment.

_The fighting forces killed the mother, brother, and pregnant sister of “Victoria” (2010 [interview]), 27 years old and mother of four, in a church were they were taking refuge. She fled from the fighting into the bush, where she stumbled into a group of LURD combatants. Their commander forced her to come with them and she was given ammunition. She stayed with the LURD in the bush, serving as a soldier, until ceasefire came._

Among the women who were not forced to fight the reasons given for joining the forces were diverse. Some took up arms to protect themselves and other women from especially sexual violence, or to revenge violence or killing of their family. The wish for equality with men was also in some instances a contributing factor (Brett & Specht 2004, Specht 2006:11, 30-32).

_When “Pandora” (2010 [interview]) was only 10 years old, she was raped by soldiers from one of the armed rebel groups. They also killed her brother in front of her, and “tied her mother down”. To revenge this, she joined the Government Forces and fought on the frontline for a couple of months until the ceasefire came._

For many women, joining armed groups was a means of survival. Economic motives, deriving from severe poverty or the wish for material goods drove women and girls into supporting...
roles in male units. A majority of the young women who fought in the civil war became involved through combatant “boyfriends” (Utas 2003:208 in Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008:16). Some women formed relationships with male combatants with power to protect them, because the situation for young women in the war zone was very unsecure. Without such protection these women were at immediate risk of being violated and raped. Thus, many chose to attach themselves to a fighter, and sometimes women even stayed with men that had raped them (Specht 2006:11, 30-32, Utas 2003:176 in Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008:16). Through bush marriages, where women and girls (forced or voluntary) married male fighters, they became dependent on the fighting forces, relying on them for protection and material welfare, acting as wives, delivering babies and supporting the fighting forces in various capacities (Specht 2006:12).

“Princess” (2010 [interview]) was during the war captured by a soldier from an armed group because he wanted a wife. She did not carry arms, but stayed with the armed group for over a year, cooking and working for them. She is still with the soldier that captured her, and he is the father of her two youngest children.

3.2 Changing gender roles?

There are claims that war and women’s participation in war can change gender roles and empower women, as armed conflict causes upheaval that leads to new responsibilities and gender relations (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008:30). Women are often pushed out of their traditional roles when men leave their family and communities to participate in warfare (Puechguirbal 2004:47). However, it is observed that changes in gender roles induced by war, have a tendency to backlash as the institutional framework restricts the opportunities of women (Barth 2002:2). Reforms meant to support women have been ignored in practice, and there is often a lack of support in the local authorities. Looking at the changing gender roles and relations in Liberia, some of these patterns can be recognised.

Prior to the civil war, the gender roles in the Liberian society were generally speaking of a “traditional” character. Fuest (2008:206) for instance find that the reproductive capacities and labour of Liberian women, according to the dominant cultural model, were subject to control by their elders and husbands. Many married young to much older husbands, in some instances
through arranged marriages (Specht 2006:59), and both offspring and property accumulated during marriage belonged to the lineage of the husband. Men were typically head of the household, making the major decisions and being economically in charge, whilst women cared for the children and ran the household (ibid:58). There were fewer opportunities in the formal economy for women, who instead employed informal strategies to generate income. Ideologically, women were considered to be inferior to men, and for instance not supposed to speak out in public fora (Fuest 2008:206-207). Subsequently, women, as a class, could not adopt public political roles. However, there also seems to have been unofficial “local institutions”, the so-called “Sande”, enabling especially elder females to accumulate resources and power, often based on claims to command esoteric skills and knowledge enabling them to control girls’ fertility and health (ibid.). Existing parallel to the traditional pattern of gender roles was also the Americo-Liberian culture, in which women had more extensive rights. Because of the rule of the Americo-Liberians, up until 1980, women to some extent occupied key offices in ministries, government, legislature, and university, as the Americo-Liberians tended to prefer their “own” women in high-level positions rather then Afro-Liberian men (ibid:209).

In accordance with the general findings, the war in Liberia seems to have increased the scope of economic activities performed by women, political positions held by women, and women’s organized action in general. Since a huge number of the men were involved in the war, women had to take on roles usually occupied by men, both in providing for and protecting their families from the combatants. The war thus increased economic, social, and political mobility for women. Observers have been impressed with the ‘emancipation’ that Liberian women seem to have achieved (Fuest 2008:223). Because of these changed gender roles, some women found themselves in a position of being the sole protector of the family, being forced to make strategic considerations on the security situation (ibid.). These considerations sometimes resulted in women taking up arms or joining armed groups in non-fighting roles, to protect their family or themselves from rape, murder, and harsh labour regimes. Even though the war might have empowered and emancipated some women, a number of researchers underline that it is important to nuance this in terms of the social position of the woman in question, or, when it came to the female fighters, the different roles they occupied in the fighting forces (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008:30, Fuest 2008:223, Specht 2006:12, 58-60). Involvement in fighting forces seems to have empowered some women but rendered some
even more inferior to men then before. The few women who held positions as commanders and high-ranking officers were the ones able to turn the war into a successful endeavour, building up business enterprises, gaining respect, responsibility and power (Fuest 2008:210, Specht 2006:12, Utas 2003:212 in Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008). Conversely, Specht (2006:12) argue that non-fighting young girls in the armed groups were considered inferior to all other members of the armed group (…) Such girls lost independence, rendering them more inferior to men than before the conflict.

Disruptions in gender roles that often follow prolonged conflict, can offer opportunities for reconfiguring those relations in post-conflict periods (Bauer and Britton in Fuest 2008:203). In Liberia, women from various sectors of the society assumed new roles and some could advantageously use openings provided to them by the war (Fuest 2008:211). Various analysts of recent history in Liberia (Dunn, Beyan and Burrowes 2001, Moran and Pitcher 2004, Ellis 1999) have noted that women’s ability to live independently and the extent to which they have assumed leadership roles in civil, political, and religious sectors have increased dramatically since the war (Fuest 2008:201-202). Though still a relatively low representation of women in legislature (15 per cent), the female political representation has increased since the end of the war (Fuest 2008:203). After the war there has been an increased focus on empowering women, securing their human rights, and women have been encouraged to participate in the military and police. Furthermore, a rise in the percentage of girls attending primary and secondary school can also be recognized. This points to a change in the recognition of women’s social, economic, and political achievements (ibid:216-217). Women have also legally strengthened their position through the passing of an inheritance law, regulating women’s marriage right, property rights and access to children after divorce or widowhood, and a “rape law” (passed in 2006), turning rape in to an unbailable offence (ibid:219).

Even though new roles seem to have emerged for women in Liberia after the war, it is more doubtful whether the patriarchal structures in society are changed. Some of the traditional structures of power and institutions, which have been dormant for several years, appear to be returning, though somewhat more contested then before (Fuest 2008:220). As war often opens up possibilities for women, and create changes in gender roles, the post-conflict situation, with its focus on restructuring and rehabilitation, can be misnomers in the case of women
When it comes to women’s roles in the peace building process; in spite of possibly changed gender roles during the course of a war, and very active women’s peace movements at the grass root level, when official peace negotiations start women are often excluded and their voices are rarely heard (Puechguirbal 2004:47).

3.3 Gender mainstreaming the peace building process – the CPA

The primary legal framework for all post-conflict peace building is the Peace Agreement.10 To facilitate a gender mainstreamed peace building process, in which the various DDR programmes is instrumental, resolution 1325 should be incorporated into the peace agreement, as the mandate in peace agreements provides the basis for future legal framework and constitutional requirements, and gives legitimacy to the actions of those implementing its measures (Chinkin 2004:28). If the peace agreement does not mention women, not only does it ignore the mandate of UNSC resolution 1325, it also perpetuates and institutionalises the marginalisation of women in the political processes after the conflict (Lyth 2003 in Chinkin 2004:29). Usually the existing provisions of gender mainstreaming in peace agreements are general, underscoring the importance of addressing the needs of women, but giving no guidance on how to do this, or more detailed answer to whom the responsible is. Also, in these provisions women are usually associated with the role of victim or part of a vulnerable group (Chinkin 2004:29). Depicting women solely as members of vulnerable groups, and victims in need of protection in peace agreements narrows the scope of their capacities in post-conflict situations and deprives them of their agency as vectors of change for peace (Puechguirbal 2004:47).

One of the ways recognized to facilitate the inclusion of gender perspectives in Peace Agreements is including women in the peace negotiations and in the making and mandating of peace agreements. As mentioned, women are usually excluded from the peace negotiations in spite of active women’s organisations and changes in the gender relations. In Liberia, the active women’s movement made tremendous efforts to get involved in the peace process and gain access to the peace negotiations table (Puechguirbal 2004:47). The Liberian Women’s initiative (LWI) was created in 1994, speaking out against the civil war, promoting peace

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10 Peace building can be defined as action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict (Chinkin 2004:27)
initiatives and the participation of women in peace talks. Their advocacy strategy was putting disarmament before elections, and having defined their mission the LWI initiated a programme to assist in the collections of small arms. A number of other women’s organisations were also created during the war, like WIPNET and WONGSOL, pressing for peace. In 2000 a regional women’s network was even created, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET), consisting of women’s organisations form Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. Amongst other things they advocated for the inclusion of women in peace negotiations, and in 2003 they were awarded the UN Human Rights Prize for having promoted human and women’s rights (Puechguirbal 2005:1).

Nevertheless, when the peace negotiations started in Accra in 2003, the women were not officially represented, but they were active in influencing and monitoring the peace process from “outside” (Anderlini 2000:19-20, Puechguirbal 2004:53). As a result the Liberian women’s movement appear to have achieved at least some influence in the national peace-building endeavours in spite of resistance from male politicians, and unlike women in other war and post-war situations (Fuest 2008:214). This can be seen in that the Liberian CPA, in spite of not having a general gender perspective, contains an article on the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups, namely women, children, elderly, and the disabled (Puechguirbal 2004:55). Compared to many other peace agreements, it was remarkable that the Liberian CPA contained gender-relevant policies at all, even though it was typically unspecified (Chinkin 2004), something that Fuest (2008:214) argue must be credited to influential women’s organisations lobbying for female representation in the peace-building process.

3.4 The Liberian DDR programme

The legal foundation of the Liberian DDR programme is to be found in the CPA, article IV and article VI, and in the UNSC resolution 1509, paragraph 3. In article IV(3) in the CPA the warring parties requests that an International Stabilization Force assists in the implementation of a DDR programme, and the organisation of the programme is outlined in article VI. As mentioned, the CPA did not have any references to neither women nor gender mainstreaming in the provisions on the DDR process. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, resolution 1509 and a number of other key documents laying the foundation for the DDR process did refer to the inclusion of women.
The DDR programme targeted the three main armed factions; GoL, LURD and MODEL (Nichols 2005:114), and the key objective was to *disarm and demobilize combatants (...) as well as to prepare for sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants in support of long-term peace and security in the country* (UNDDR 2006). According to article VI (8) of the CPA a National Commission on DDR (NCDDR) was set up, which comprised of representatives from the three armed factions, the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, the National Transition Government of Liberia, the European Commission, and the United States and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). The NCDDRR was responsible for providing the overall supervision and guidance of the programme (UNDDR 2006, Nichols 2005:137).

According to standard UN procedure, UNMIL was formally responsible for the DDRR process in Liberia. However, the mission in itself did not have all the capacity needed, so the work with the programme framework was in reality multi sectional. A number of the specialized UN agencies, the NTGL and national NGOs took part in the process and worked jointly, using their so-called comparative advantages to come up with solutions to the tremendous challenges faced by the war torn Liberia (Bose 2010 [interview], Aibinu 2010 [interview], Muriithi 2010 [interview]). Together with the NCDDR, UNDP and other partners like the World Bank, EU and USAID, the UNMIL composed the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU), who was responsible for the coordination and implementation of the DDR programme (Nichols 2005:114, UNDDR 2006). The different actors were responsible for specific units within the structure of the JIU. The UNMIL was responsible for the disarmament and demobilisation unit, whilst the UNDP was responsible for both the “monitoring and evaluation” unit, and the “rehabilitation and reintegration” unit (UNDP 2004b:12). According to several of my informants, the UNDP took strong leadership in the process, since they had been present in Liberia for a long time. They coordinated the work with both a Needs Assessment done amongst the ex-combatants prior to the launching of the programme, a Strategic and Implementation Framework that outlined the policies of the programme (Muriithi 2010 [interview](Aibinu 2010 [interview]). Inside the UNMIL it was the DDR-unit, which by the end of 2005 shifted into the RRR-section, who was formally responsible for designing the DDR programme and implementing the disarmament and the demobilisation strategies (Koliab 2010 [interview]).
“Women’s issues” were handled through the Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA) in the UNMIL, which was created in December 2003 (Koliab 2010 [interview]). The OGA in the United Nations Mission to Liberia was one of the first gender offices to be established in any UN Peacekeeping Operations after the passing of SC Resolution 1325. Its role in the UNMIL was advising and monitoring the implementation and inclusion of SC Resolution 1325 in all parts of the mission’s operations (Muriithi 2010 [interview]), and to facilitate this it collaborated with the Liberian Ministry of Gender and Development, NGOs, and counterparts in UN agencies (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The UN specialized agency responsible for women’s issues is the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Yet the UNIFEM did also cooperate with the UNDP and the Office of the Gender Advisor on DDR issues (Lincoln 2010 [interview]).

3.4.1 Disarmament and demobilisation

The official DDRR programme began on the 7th of December 2003 at Camp Scheffelin in Monrovia. Over 12,000 combatants, largely government soldiers and militias, presented themselves for disarmament, overwhelming the facilities (UNDDR 2006). Not only was the number of ex-combatants turning up much higher then expected, but because of inadequate information problems also arose over misunderstandings concerning the benefits the ex-combatants expected to get at the site. Widespread confusion, lack of food and water to the people waiting in line at the sites, combined with high expectations, lead to dissatisfaction and frustration amongst the ex-combatants. This resulted in riots at the cantonment sites, and due to the increasing threat of violence and general deterioration of security, the programme was suspended after only 10 days (Nichols 2005:109-113, UNDDR 2006). In January the UNMIL launched a nation wide DDR information campaign, to avoid unrealistic expectations, rumours and disinformation about the process, and the DD-programmes were resumed on the 15th of April 2004. The second phase of the disarmament and demobilisation targeted ex-combatants close to Monrovia, and 4 cantonment sites were set up around the capital. Later cantonment sites were established in more remote areas and pick-up points were also created to prevent overflows at the cantonment sites, and to stop combatants from travelling large distances with their weapons (UNDDR 2006, UNMIL 2010).
Only combatants presenting serviceable weapons or ammunition were eligible to participate in the DDRR programme and receive the immediate cash benefits of USD 150. An exception was made for child combatants and women associated with the fighting forces, the so-called CAFFs and WAFFs, and disabled or wounded combatants. These groups could go through a screening process conducted by UN Military Observers (MILOBs), who were staff from different national contingents taking part in the mission. Through a series of questions they decided whether the women and children had in fact participated in the fighting or been part of a fighting force, and was thus allowed to join the DDRR programme despite not being able to present a serviceable weapon (Nichols 2005:138, UNDDR 2006). Because of the somewhat unclear and complex admission criteria, the screening process was in many instances difficult. In addition, according to a former UNDP officer (2010 [interview]), many of the MILOBs who did the screening lacked the sufficient English skills, and struggled to communicate with the beneficiaries. Furthermore, the screening task was sometimes outsourced to local NGO-staff that lacked the training and authority to *effectively identify and reject illegitimate participants* (Nichols 2005:120). The relatively high amount of cash benefits given to the registered ex-combatants caused what one of my informants called the “benefit-syndrome”. To get these benefits, a lot of people who were not ex-combatants came to the cantonments sites and presented themselves as such, often with weapons or ammunition given to the from friends or relatives who had in fact been combatants (Koliab 2010 [interview], Rasheed 2010 [interview]).11 As a result, a lot of people who had not been part of any fighting forces, both men and women, took part in the process, and benefitted financially and through skills training offered them at a later stage (Nichols 2005:120).

Because the UNMIL had not gotten comprehensive lists of ex-combatants from the different armed factions, it was impossible to predict the number of ex-combatants that would take part in the disarmament. Coupled with the challenging screening process, this lead to an enormous increase in the number of ex-combatants, starting out with an estimated 38,000 combatants, a number that was based on discussions in Accra, and ending up with over 100,000 having gone through the programme (Muriithi 2010 [interview], Nichols 2005:109-120, Rasheed 2010 [interview]).12 The UNMIL continued to disarm ex-combatants largely without incident until

11 *Farzana Rasheed*, former reporting officer to UNDP officer (April 2004 – August 2008). Interviewed in Monrovia 02.03.10. *Nahataba Koliab*, DDR Officer in UNMIL. Interviewed in Monrovia 15.03.10

12 *James M. Muriithi*, Gender Affairs Officer in UNMIL. Interviewed in Monrovia 11.03.10
the DD programmes officially ended on 31st of October 2004 (Nichols 2005:109-114). The 3rd of November 2004, representatives from LURD, MODEL and GoL militias signed a formal declaration dissolving and disbanding their respective armed factions, which officially ceased to exist as military groups (UNDDR 2006, UNMIL 2004c in Nichols 2005:133). There was no doubt that at the time there were still a number of ex-combatants that for different reasons had not taken part in the programme and were not disarmed. The UNMIL therefore continued to conduct mobile disarmament operations in locations that were difficult to access for several weeks following the official closure of the DD-phase (Nichols 2005:134, UNDDR 2006).

After the official ending of the disarmament phase approximately 102.000 individuals had registered, of which 22.370 were women and 2.440 girls (UNDDR 2006). The number of ex-combatants that did not register is nowhere documented. Pugel (2009:80) has nevertheless developed a best-guess estimate through two nationwide random sample surveys in Liberia and findings by Humphrey and Weinstein (2004:30) in Sierra Leone, indicating that the non-participation rate was somewhere between 11 and 13 per cent. 27.804 arms were collected (UNDDR 2006), signifying that only 67 per cent of those who were disarmed and demobilized actually surrendered a weapon in order to qualify for the programme (Nichols 2005:114, UNDDR 2006). It is difficult to estimate how many per cent of the country’s arms were actually collected, but one estimate indicates that it constituted approximately 60 per cent of the total numbers of weapons in Liberia (Nichols 2005:125). The weapon-to-soldier ratio (0, 28) was one of the lowest recorded by a DDR programme, but this can at least partially be explained by the fact that the admission criteria allowed entry without serviceable weapons and ammunition (Pugel 2009:83)

3.4.2 Reintegration

The objectives for the reintegration strategy were twofold, first of all: facilitating the ex-combatants in reintegrating both socially and economically, and furthermore, contributing to national security, reconciliation and development of Liberia through economic self reliance, dedicated citizenship and proper conduct (UNDP 2004)

The first rehabilitation and reintegration programmes were launched in June 2004 open, only to the ex-combatants who had gone through the DDR process and thus received an ex-
combatant ID card. The official Reintegration programme was administered by the UNDP, but there were in addition parallel programmes run by the USAID and the European Commission. The main options available for the ex-combatants were formal education and vocational skills training, and some opportunities of apprenticeships and employment were also offered. The formal education took place in schools across the country and lasted for a period of three years. If attending this option, the beneficiaries were supported in terms of school fees, school uniforms and allowance during the two first years of education. The vocational training was offered in a variety of trades, such as carpentry, masonry, tailoring, auto mechanics, and agriculture. These courses were usually held by local partners (UNDDR 2006, UNMIL 2010). The reintegration programmes provided assistance to over 92,000 beneficiaries between 2004 and 2007, and an estimated residual caseload was addressed through the final phase of the official reintegration programme, which was terminated in 2009. This brought the total number of reintegration beneficiaries to over 97,000 (UNMIL 2010).

3.5 Summary

Somewhere around 30 per cent of the fighting forces were women, and they occupied a range of roles in the groups, both fighting and non-fighting. The reasons these women had for joining armed groups were diverse, and even though some of them were apparently forced to join, a number of them also made strategic considerations about joining. This was to some extent related to changes that occurred in the patterns of gender roles and relations as a result of the civil war, when women found themselves to be the sole protector and provider of the family and joined armed forces for security reasons. The traditional gender roles that prevailed prior to the civil war was challenged during the conflict, but even though some changes seems to sustain after the end of the conflict, there are also signs of setbacks. The women’s movements who had been active in promoting peace and advocating for the conclusion of women were for instance not included in the official peace talks, something that contributed to the absence of a gender mainstreamed DDR mandate in the CPA. Understanding the underlying reasons for women’s participation in the war, and the different roles they occupied in the forces, are vital when evaluating the strategies to target them in the DDR process, and this will thus be used as a contextual framework in the following analysis.
on the dependent variable. In addition the background on gender roles, women’s participation in the peace negotiations, and the DDR process will be drawn upon in the analysis.
4 The female ex-combatants & the DDR

My dependent variable is, as outlined in the theory chapter, the ‘performance’ of the implementation process, that is to what extent there was compliance between the stated goals of the resolutions and the local measures. The literature and reports on the subject is more or less unanimous in concluding that even though the policies in theory prescribed gender mainstreaming, they were not effectively translated into action (Amnesty International 2008, Jennings 2009a, Mazurana 2005&2004, Specht 2006, Specht & Attree 2006).

Through the interviews with key actors to the programme it became clear, however, that this “accepted truth” was somewhat more contested then expected. My informants had more nuanced views on both to what extent the local measures outlined complied with the goal of the resolution, and whether these were adequately translated into action. UNDP officers Rasheed and Aibinu (2010 [interviews]) both claimed that women’s needs were addressed and that they were dealt with separately in the policies, but none of them could remember what the policies in practice consisted of.13 My respondents from the UNMIL stated that efforts were made to ensure that the needs of women and men were met, and that the process took cognisance that gender was a crucial element in the programming. No separate DDR programs for women were according to them set up, but all the programs were encouraged to include a certain percentage of female beneficiaries. They admitted, however, that the gender mainstreaming goals weren’t fully reached, but maintained that women who had been close to the fighting forces and at the frontline, had benefitted from the process (Koliab 2010 [interviews], Muriithi 2010 [interviews]). Representatives from the Liberian women’s organisations WONGOSOL and WIPNET on the other hand did not agree that the programme was gender mainstreamed, rather they claimed that in the practical sense nothing specific was done for the female fighters (Danuweli 2010 [interviews], Garlo 2010 [interviews]).14

Although the existence of a gap between policy and action is an underlying assumption of my research question, it is necessary to look into how the female ex-combatants were in fact

13 Aderemi Aibinu, DDR Technical Advisor in UNDP. Interviewed in Monrovia 19.03.10
14 Cecilia Danuweli, Programme Officer in WIPNET. Interviewed in Monrovia 18.03.10. Cerue Garlo, Executive Director of WONGOSOL. Interviewed in Monrovia 18.03.10
included and addressed in the process to be able to adequately analyse the reasons for the gap. The discussion will be built around the two performance indicators identified in the theory outline, namely equal participation, in theory in practice, and the principle of addressing the different needs. Drawing on my fieldwork and existing literature, I will discuss why some women did not participate in the DDR, and the experiences and challenges facing the ones that did. To begin with I will look at if and how the resolutions and mandates of the DDR actors referred to female ex-combatants.

4.1 Gender sensitive policy prescriptions and mandates

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CPA did not have any references to neither women nor gender mainstreaming in the provisions on the DDR process. However, a number of references were made to gender mainstreaming in the resolutions and other key documents laying the foundation for the DDR process. In UNMIL’s mandate, UNSC resolution 1509, a general reference is made to UNSC resolution 1325 in article 11, reaffirming the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, in its article 3 (f), resolution 1509 applied the specific DDR prescriptions from resolution 1325 (art. 13) to the Liberian context. It states that the UNMIL shall have the mandate to:

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\text{develop (…)} \text{ an action plan for the overall implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants;} \quad (\text{S/RES/1509(2003)})
\]

The first Progress Report of the Secretary General on the UN Mission in Liberia stated that special measures should be taken to address the gender-specific needs of female combatants, as well as wives and widows of former combatants in the DDR programmes. It stressed the importance of recalling, in briefing, counselling and training programmes in the reintegration phase, the different experiences women and men had during the conflict (Amnesty International 2008:22, Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008:24). Additionally, both the “Strategy and Implementation Framework” (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003:64-67), the main document outlining the programme design, and the “Strategic and Operational Framework of
Reintegration Support” (UNDP 2004a:8), outlining the specific reintegration policies, included references and policy recommendations for the targeting of female ex-combatants.

4.2 Equal participation – in theory

Translated into action, the prescriptions in the resolutions, and the definition of gender mainstreaming first of all signifies that there should be equal opportunity of participation between the sexes. The female fighters had the right to participate in the Liberian DDR process on the same terms as their male colleagues, there was thus no ‘de jure’ exclusion of women from the programme. Looking at the wording in the Strategy and Implementation Framework (2003:64), the justification for a focus on women in the programme follows a normative line of argumentation (cf. 1.2), underlining that the DDR process must provide appropriate procedures and assistance [to female ex-combatants] on a basis of equality with male ex-combatants. Including women is depicted first and foremost as an end in itself, not a means to achieve national security, reconciliation and development.

Based on experiences from other DDR process, for instance the one in Sierra Leone, high admission criteria to the DDR programme usually leads to ‘de facto’ exclusion of women. Many of them have occupied other roles in the armed forces then merely the soldier role, and therefore do not possess a gun to hand in at the disarmament site. This ‘de facto’ exclusion of women from the process was addressed in Liberia, as the admission criteria were broadened before the re-launching of the disarmament phase in 2004. From having to present arms to be admitted in the program, one could now hand in only ammunition or even empty-handed go through a screening process to be identified as a WAFF or CAFF. Through this change of policy one to a larger extent reached the women who had cooked, worked, and been sex-slaves or in other ways were associated with the fighting forces. This lead to an increase in the number of eligible women from approximately 3,000 to approximately 22,000, constituting 25% of the total caseload of ex-combatants (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview], Muriithi 2010 [interview]). Compared to other countries that had conducted DDR programmes, the admission criteria in Liberia were liberal, making the number of women and girls registering for the programme extraordinarily high (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Jennings 2009:480).
4.3 Equal participation – in practice

Even though the broadened eligibility criteria to the program theoretically facilitated the participation of women, the subsequent question is to what extent one in practice managed to get women to participate. The number of women going through the disarmament in Liberia was high compared to other countries, but what proportion did the 24,810 women and girls that went through the process constitute of the total number of female ex-combatants in Liberia? And how specifically did one go about to get women to participate? Former UNDP officer Rasheed (2010 [interview]) claimed that there were no mechanisms to make sure that women participated, and critical voices say that the information targeting women was poor. The estimates and numbers on this are sparse and uncertain, but according to Specht (2006:82-83) there could be as many as 14,000 women between the ages of 15-24 who participated in the armed conflict but that for various reasons did not formally demobilize. Doing a rough estimate based on Pugel’s average general non-participation rate of 12 per cent (cf. chapter 3.3.1) and assuming that women constituted 30 per cent of the total number of ex-combatants, makes the non-participation rate of women as high as approximately 28 per cent.15

To design strategies that facilitate the participation of female ex-combatants, it is vital to understand the underlying reasons for their participation in the conflict, their different roles in the armed groups, and their post-conflict situations (Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen 2009:273-277, Specht and Attree 2006:219-220). The findings outlined in the following indicate that the reasons for female non-participation were diverse, and somewhat different than for the male ex-combatants, making special policies necessary. Shortcomings in the process of implementing the gender mainstreaming contributed, as we shall see, to some of these reasons

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15 When the DD phase of the programme ended in November 2004, a total of 101,495 people had gone through the process (UNDDR 2006). Using a non-participation ratio of 12 per cent makes the total number of ex-combatants approximately 115,335. Assuming that 30 per cent of these were women and girls, that is 34,600, of which 24,810 went through the DDR process, gives us a 28 per cent non-participation rate for women and girls. However, as there were many instances of people benefiting from the program even though they had not been ex-combatants, the absolute numbers in the calculation are probably not correct, yet the relative estimates should be valid. Considering that there, according to Nichols (2005:120) probably were more civilian women benefiting from the DDR, then civilian men, being that the admission criteria were lower for women, the non-participation rate for female ex-combatants may be even higher then 28 per cent.
for non-participation, whilst others were caused by the circumstances but was not addressed by the DDR authorities. Drawing on Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) framework, a lack of specified measures, characteristics of the implementing agency, and the disposition of the implementers all seems to have had influence on the ‘performance’.

4.3.1 Misinformation about the process

There was a lack of information and a number of misconceptions about the DDR programmes, especially on the broadened admission criteria, which lead many women to not take benefit of the DDR programmes (Amnesty International 2008:30). The perception amongst combatants, and even some of the UN staff, was that the DDR process was only open for people who had arms or ammunition to hand in. This was confirmed through my interviews with the female ex-combatants, as many of them stated as a reason for not participating in the programme that they didn’t have arms or ammunition. Consequently, the women that had not been fighting, but “merely” associated with the fighting forces, did not perceive themselves as a target for the DDR process.

The UNMIL, NCDDR, and NGOs all worked on spreading information about the process through all available media and traditional communications means (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003:28). Gender implications were according to some of my informants supposed to be considered when developing the information strategy, but what this meant in reality is nevertheless unclear. No specification on the matter was provided in the Strategy and Implementation Framework, or in official evaluations of the programme, making it difficult to specify how it was done and the challenges one met. RRR-officer Koliab (2010 [interview]) stated that it was difficult to get information out to the people on the ground, and as the widespread misconceptions show, it was apparently even more difficult to reach the women with the correct information. The NCDDR based their information spreading on ad hoc strategies to correct wrong information rather than on a comprehensive strategy, and when it came to women, no gender strategies were designed (Randall 2010 [interview]).

16 Even WIPNET and WONGOSOL mainly gave general info, but also tried to reach the women and

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16 Lawrance Randall, Former Senior Communications Officer NCDDR (April 2004 – February 2005). Interviewed in Monrovia 19.03.10
encourage them to take part in the process (Danuweli 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interviews]).

4.3.2 Deception by male commanders

As the misconceptions lead to a widespread belief that one had to have arms or ammunition in order to take part in the process, commanders and generals held a lot of power in terms of deciding who could access the programme. First of all the commanders were requested to generate lists of eligible combatants, giving them the opportunity to choose whom to register on the lists. Furthermore, the male commanders and generals were often trying to gain maximum benefit for themselves and their relatives, and thus either took arms from the female fighters, or refrained from distributing arms and ammunition to the women in their groups who had not held arms, and gave it to their relatives and friends instead so that they could collect the benefits (Amnesty International 2008:31, Danuweli 2010 [interview], Mazurana 2005:33).

“Victoria” (2010 [interview]), a 27 years old women who fought for the LURD in the last part of the war, said that when the ceasefire came and the disarmament started she was pregnant, and her commander took away her arms. Therefore she did not go through the DDR program.

4.3.3 Stigma

No matter how well done a DDR programme is there will always be a sizeable number of women who will not participate DD (sic!) because they simply do not want to be identified with the process.

(UNICEF officer in Amnesty International 2008:33)

Some women chose deliberately to not take part in the DDR programmes because they were afraid of repercussions and social stigma if they were identified as ex-fighters (Amnesty International 2008:18, Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008:24). There was a fear of what would happen to them when they came back to their community, and they were especially concerned that association with the DDR programme would prevent them from getting married.
(Amnesty International 2008:33, Danuweli 2010 [interview], Muriithi 2010 [interview]). This manifested itself in women holding weapons or ammunition not going to the disarmament site, but instead giving their guns to related men that had not been fighters so that they could collect the benefits at the disarmament sites.

The question of stigma, however, is a complex issue depending on a number of contextual factors. Ethnicity, which in general was decisive of what armed group one possibly joined, affected the level of stigma because there were different views within the various ethnic groups on whether or not one fought for a legitimate cause. There were moreover geographical differences, especially between urban and rural areas. Last but not least, the reasons for joining an armed group (Bøås and Hatløy 2008:49) and what role one occupied within the group were of importance. Based on the prevailing traditional view on gender roles in Liberia (cf. chapter 3.3) it seems that the problem of stigma was most severe for the women who for different reasons had joined voluntarily and been fighters (Lincoln 2010 [interview]), even though male ex-combatants clearly also faced stigma. The women, however, had to carry an additional burden of shame for having played roles or carried out acts that were seen as unacceptable for women by their society (Amnesty International 2008:5). Bose (2010 [interview]), senior Gender Advisor to the UNDP, underscored that there was more stigmatisation of women than men not only because they might have occupied non-feminine roles, but also because of what they had experienced in the armed forces in form of rape, sexual abuse, and pregnancies.

“Pandora” (2010 [interview]), who joined an armed group voluntarily and were a soldier in the group, said that her community did not know that she had been fighting; therefore she didn’t face any stigma. However, she expressed that she was afraid that they would find out, indicating that voluntarily being a soldier could cause stigmatisation. “Dekontee” (2010 [interview]) on the other hand said that she had not faced any stigma coming back to her community, because they knew that she had been forced to join and work as a cook for the group she was in.

17 Allen Lincoln, Programme assistant in UNIFEM. Interviewed in Monrovia 11.03.10
18 Shipra Bose, Senior Gender Advisor in UNDP. Interviewed in Monrovia 18.03.10
The complexity of the subject issue makes it difficult to say something general about the extent of the problem, however, there seems to be no doubt that stigma was indeed a problem for a number of women. Amnesty International (2008:6, 17) maintains that stigma had a significant impact on the female ex-combatants’ ability to reintegrate into society and underlines that it might have been a barrier to participation in the DDR programme. The DDR policymakers did, however, not acknowledge this possible problem and therefore nothing was done to address it (Amnesty International 2008:43), indicating both a possible lack of knowledge and a lack of commitment on the part of the implementers.

4.3.4 Geography and the burden of caretaking

The disarmament sites were concentrated in the more accessible areas of Liberia, and were supposed to cover huge geographical areas. This created problems for ex-combatants that had gone home to remote areas of the country, or that were situated abroad. Subsequently, as the time gap between the disarmament and reintegration phase was long, many ex-combatants went home to their communities after disarmament and found it difficult to return to go through the reintegration programmes (Amnesty International 2008:34-35, Specht 2006:91)

“Rita” (2010 [interview]) handed in a weapon at one of the cantonment sites, and were categorised a child soldier. However, by the time the reintegration programmes started, she had gone to Guinea to find her family, and it was to far for her to go back to central Liberia to participate in the skills training

These reasons for non-participation in the programme were obviously the same for both male and female ex-combatants. However, as women and girls were often sole caretakers in some form, either over children or parents, it was more difficult for them to leave their home to go through the programme far away (Amnesty International 2008:34, Lincoln 2010 [interview]). This was reinforced by the fact that very few programmes offered formal childcare. In some instances the women could bring their children to the programmes, but they nevertheless had the responsible of taking care of them. This lack of childcare prevented women both from fully participating in programmes and finishing the once they had started. Young women were accordingly at greatest risk of dropping out due to their inability to take care of both themselves and their children (Amnesty International 2008:6-7, 39-40). Unfortunately, women with children were also one of the groups struggling the most with being reintegrated.
Some of them were very young, and the children they had were often the result of rape. Many of these girls faced problems when returning to their home communities as their own parents often had problems accepting and feeling responsibility for their new grand-children (Clark (2010 [interview], Lincoln 2010 [interview]).

4.4 Addressing the different needs of female fighters

In addition to letting and getting women to participate in the programme UNSC Resolution 1325 (art. 13) prescribes addressing the different needs of female fighters. It is however not immediately apparent what these different needs are, but as will be discussed in the next chapter, DDR guidelines and “lessons learned” were utilized to translate the general prescriptions into concrete measures on the ground in Liberia. The “DDRR Strategy and Implementation Framework” (2003:64-67) drew a rather detailed strategy on how to deal with the female ex-combatants. A number of broad objectives of the DDR programme for the female beneficiaries are outlined, followed by a specifying of the measures with which to reach these objectives. The main focus is on the reintegration process, but some measures are also to be taken in the DD-phase; separate areas for women in the cantonment camps, “specific assistance”, psychosocial support and training on issues like reproductive health and gender based violence, facilitated by a network of women’s organisations. In the reintegration phase, specific funding is to be allocated to promote the female fighters’ access to education, training, and childcare to facilitate participation. Measures are to be taken to initiate family reunification and raising community awareness on female fighters. Looking at the measures that were actually taken in the programme, in the following, the findings indicate that a lack of resources, capacity, and commitment amongst the implementers are decisive for the outcome of the implementation process.

4.4.1 The Disarmament and Demobilisation phase

To what extent the prescribed policies were implemented differed from facility to facility. In some of the cantonment sites there were female UN staff giving “specific assistance” to the female beneficiaries, ensuring that they were demobilised and catered for by women. Men and women were placed in different wings with separate water pumps, toilets and bathing

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19 Miatta Clark, Child Protection Officer in UNICEF. Interviewed in Monrovia 08.03.10

According to the women’s groups and the UNDP Gender Advisor, there were also deficiencies in the gender mainstreaming on the cantonment sites. There were usually no special health facilities made for women, who faced various physical problems connected to sexual violence, rape and fistula\textsuperscript{20}. There was a general lack of psychosocial counsellors, something that affected the male ex-combatants as well, but the brief counselling that was offered did not adequately address “women’s issues” like reproductive health and experiences with sexual violence (Amnesty International 2008:35-36, Bose 2010 [interview]). The issue of security was to some extent addressed through the separation of men and women. Specht (2006:95) argue that this excluded ‘fear for violence’ as a reason for non-participation amongst the Liberian female ex-combatants, something seen in other countries going through DDR process. Nevertheless, some female ex-combatants still experienced harassment and ridicule by men, especially when registering for the program (Amnesty International 2008:35, UNIFEM 2004:16). A few cases of sexual exploitation and abuse of women in the camps by the UN staff, allegedly also took place (Bose 2010 [interviews], Rasheed 2010 [interviews]) underscoring their exposed situation.

An underlying and vital reason for some of these shortcomings can be explained by a lack of an agency or institution that took care of and had responsibility for the female fighters in the camps. In comparison, the child soldiers had responsible actors in UNICEF, Save the Children and other NGOs working on children, but nobody had a special responsibility to look after the needs of the women (Garlo 2010 [interview], UNDP 2006:3).

\textbf{4.4.2 The Reintegration phase}

No separate programmes targeting women were set up. However, they were encouraged to participate in skills training programs, which were supposed to avoid reinforcing gender inequalities in terms of the roles and possibilities of the women. Courses in traditional trades

\textsuperscript{20} Fistula is a hole in the birth canal caused by either prolonged labour without prompt medical intervention (obstetric fistula), or sexual violence (traumatic fistula). The woman is left with chronic incontinence, nerve damages, and in most cases of obstetric fistula, a stillborn baby (Fistula Foundation 2010)
for women, like tailoring, cosmetology, hairdressing, and weaving were offered to the participants, but they were also given the opportunity to acquire skills like mechanics, carpentry, machinery, and construction; typically “male” skills. Traditional gender roles were attempted challenged, and both women and men were encouraged to choose untraditional skills training. The most important thing was not to choose according to your gender, but rather choosing something that would be sustainable in the community (Muriithi 2010 [interview], Rasheed 2010 [interview], Aibinu 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview]).

The problems in the reintegration-phase were twofold. A large number of the women that participated in the DD-phase did not participate in the reintegration phase, based on many of the same reasons as outlined above; fright for stigma, geographical difficulties and the burden of caretaking. The long time-gap between the disarmament and the reintegration resulted in a number of the women going back to their home communities, making returning difficult and a new fear of stigma prevalent. There was consequently an apostasy amongst women from the disarmament to the reintegration phase, as just over 50 per cent of women DDR participants eventually accessed reintegration programmes, versus almost 70 per cent of men (Jennings 2009:480). Additionally, the dropout rates amongst those who actually attended reintegration programmes were high, mainly because of lack of childcare, something that had severe consequences, as around 70 per cent of the women who went through the DDR had children (Amnesty International 2008:19, 37, UNDP 2004b:29). The male combatants thus progressed through the DDR process ahead of the females, as the females had a training completion rate of 10 per cent versus 18 per cent for the men (Pugel 2007:46-47).

In an evaluation done by the UNDP in 2006 some of these challenges were identified, and attempts were done to address them. In the second phase of the reintegration programme, childcare was to a larger extent provided and skills training courses were given both during the day and during the afternoon so that the women with children could choose the best time to attend the courses (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Lincoln 2010 [interview]).

In spite of some measures taken to address the different needs of the female ex-combatants, the main focus and a preoccupation amongst the implementers seems to have been the quantifiable measuring of the proportion of women participating in the different programmes and projects (Koliab 2010 [interview]). In all the programmes the UNMIL supported, also the
programmes contracted out to organisations or private partners, the mission encouraged that at least 30 per cent of the employees should be women, so that the women could benefit from these programmes (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The gender mainstreaming was thus limited to ensuring that a certain percentage of the participants were women, instead of ensuring that they benefitted from it through addressing their different needs.

4.5 Summary

The broadened admission criteria introduced in January 2004, clearly facilitated the inclusion of female ex-combatants, and made the number of participating women relatively high in Liberia. However, there was a lack of specific strategies to “recruit” women. Some of the reasons the female fighters had for not participating were reasons shared with male ex-combatants, but a number of them also specifically female connected to stigma, the burden of caretaking, and misinformation caused by a lack of gender sensitive information on the process. In the cantonment camps women and men were placed in different areas, but there were shortcomings in terms of inadequate psychosocial counselling and security for the women. The reintegration process suffered from lower participation rates of women, and the gender mainstreaming in this phase in general resumed to getting a certain percentage of women to participate in the programmes. The findings can be grouped into three underlying reasons for the shortcomings in the process, namely a lack of capacity on how to do gender mainstreaming, a lack of resources, and a lack of political will. These are partly in accordance with Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) three general explanations for an unsuccessful implementation; poor communication, lack of capability, and the disposition of the implementers.

The conclusion that the implementation performance was rather weak is thus based on assessment of the two performance indicators. Firstly, there was a lack of specified measures to ensure the participation of female ex-combatants, resulting in a lower participation rate and a higher drop-out rate amongst the female ex-combatants. Secondly, the specific measures outlined to address different needs of the female ex-combatants in the process were not adequately translated into action, especially in the reintegration phase of the program.
5 Explaining the gap

The shortcomings in the implementation process appear to be caused by a combination of factors of institutional, structural and personal character. Findings in my data point to the lack of resources, capacity and commitment as some of the most important explanations. The variables are interlinked; affecting both each other and the performance of implementing resolution 1325, article 13. To systemize and analyse these explanations, Jennings’ securitization argument is the point of departure, complementing with the implementation theoretical framework.

5.1 A Security-driven process?

Though having two official goals, a security and a development goal, Jennings (2009a, 2008) argues that the DDR process was security-driven and security-justified activity. The developmental goal was ‘instrumentalised’ in favour of a security agenda, causing a disregarding of the female ex-combatants as they are not seen as a severe threat to security. Informants from the UNMIL and UNDP clearly supported this perception, underlining that both UNMIL and the Liberian government were pre-occupied with security, seeing it as the main issue of the process (Koliab 2010 [interview]). Bose (2010 [interview]), the Gender Advisor to the UNDP, confirmed that security understood in a conventional manner, was the most important goal of the DDR process. Referring to human security, Bose elaborated on the security concept in question as an exclusive and “malestream” understanding of security, biased against women. Some of my other informants, on the other hand, maintained that the two goals were equally important, and moreover, closely interlinked, demanding a fulfilment of both to achieve success.

The main argument to support the securitization hypothesis is the lack of logic connected to the chosen form of reintegration programmes. The reintegration programme was not sustainable, and Jennings’ (2009a, 2008) thus assumes that the reason for launching it must have been something else then empowering the ex-combatants, namely creating security. The

21 "Malestream” refers to and plays on the concept “mainstream”, understood as the common current of thought of the majority, in this case the “traditional security concept”. Conversely “human security” is a broader security concept, focusing on individuals instead of states, and a broader range of threats then only war.
programmes were meant to temporarily give the ex-combatants something to do, removing idleness and preventing instability (ibid:477). Former UNDP officer Rasheed (2010 [interview]) referred to the reasoning behind the skills training in the reintegration phase being based on a security-driven assumption of idleness leading to unrest, in spite of the programme’s apparent civilian character, and a supposedly broader goal of empowerment and development. According to Aibinu (2010 [interview]) the reintegration was first and foremost about creating short-time jobs, and Rasheed maintained that the focus on job-emergency and training courses was an attempt to keep the ex-combatants busy so that the presidential elections could be held in 2005. Even the donors to the program allegedly expressed that this was the purpose of the reintegration programmes:

*What was the RR really, donors even said officially: “It’s just to keep people busy until we have the elections. It’s just to make people happy. We did something to keep the ex-combatants happy. We have grabbed all the guns; we managed to rehabilitate some ex-combatants. Now we can have elections.” The security-perspective was the most important, to keep these guys busy until we have elections.*

Rasheed (2010 [interview])

Interestingly, the wording Rasheed used when talking about the ex-combatants in this context was *“these guys”*, indicating a perception of male ex-combatants as being the primary security threat, not female ex-combatant. This also supports Jennings’ argument that there is a perception amongst the policy-making and implementing actors in the DDR process that idleness leads to instability and unrest, and that the male ex-combatants is the group most likely to create unrest if left idle. Seeing that the Liberian society, in spite of some changes caused by the war (cf. chapter 3.2), is still traditional when it comes to gender roles, a general perception of women as inherently peaceful seems plausible. I moreover argue that justifying the inclusion of women in the program based on a normative line of argumentation (cf. 4.2) implicitly acknowledge that this perception is prevailing also amongst the DDR decision-makers. When inclusion of women is “only” seen as important because equality of men and women is a goal in itself, not because it is vital to ensure national security, it clearly indicates that women are not perceived as a great threat to security.
Looking beyond the illogic of the reintegration programme, the distribution of funding and resources between the phases of the DDR points to a security focus in the whole programme. The disarmament and demobilization phase, which have an outspoken security-focus, got the highest funding. The financial resources were poured in at the beginning, but when the DD process was over and the reintegration process began with a two-fold goal of empowerment and security, there were less financial resources available (Rasheed 2010 [interview]). This was partly caused by the increased caseload of beneficiaries, an issue that will be discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter (cf. chapter 5.2.2), but was also a result of the general prioritization of security, as the initial funding was not followed-up by the donors in the reintegration phase.

Finding support in my data to the securitization argument and its underlying assumption, the priority of security will be drawn upon as an underlying variable when the importance of structural, institutional, personal and contextual factors in the implementation process is analysed through the analytical framework of implementation theory.

### 5.2 The Policy Implementation process

The policy implementation process, when the policy is an UN resolution, is argued to be very challenging because of the institutional structures, the circumstances on the ground, and the lack of resources. Implementing UN resolutions concerning gender mainstreaming is even more challenging, because an additional lack of conceptual coherence, technical capacity and a bias against gender equality in the UN system (Antonini 2009:208). Through the analytical framework of top-down implementation theory the reasons for the shortcomings outlined in the previous chapter can be systemized, examined and evaluated more thoroughly.

#### 5.2.1 Standards and objectives

The clearer and more consistent the goal of a policy prescription is, the easier it is to successfully implement it. Case studies of UN peacekeeping operations shows that one of the main challenges is the absence of a common understanding of the different mandates of a mission, resulting in difficulties in defining priorities, and a unified strategy (Antonini 2009:XXVIII). This is caused, amongst other things, by a legal framework that is very broad
and general, leaving it up to the UN peacekeeping authorities in the country in question to interpret the resolutions, and adjust them to the context on the ground. To facilitate this the implementers on the ground must use guidelines, “lessons learned” documents, and program regulations to make them explicit (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:465).

Researchers argue that there is no consensus on how one in practice should include women in DDR, as many of the UN agencies still lack precise operating standard procedures, frameworks, guidelines, and monitoring mechanisms. This makes the UN’s response to the issues that affect women in wartime ad hoc and patchy (Farr 2003, Raven-Roberts 2005:52-53). As discussed in the previous chapter the policy prescriptions in resolution 1325 art 13, and resolution 1509 art 3(f) are very broad and general, stating simply that when planning the DDR process one must respectively consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants, and pay particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women. The question is thus what the Liberian DDR authorities did to translate these broad policy prescriptions into action, and make them context-specific? Moreover, did they succeed in making the objectives and standards clear, and in compliance with the goals of the resolutions?

A so-called Draft Interim Secretariat was created in 2003 to have the main responsibility of designing the DDR programme in Liberia. The Secretariat composed of representatives from UNMIL, OCHA, USAID, and UNICEF, co-ordinated by UNDP (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003:2). A ‘Needs Assessment’ was done by the UNDP in 2003, which together with ‘lessons learned’ from other countries, especially Sierra Leone, was used to develop the ‘Strategy and Implementation Framework’. The Framework translated the general UN policies into the context-specific programme to be implemented in the Liberian context (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Bose 2010 [interview]). The needs assessment was done through an open, consultative forum where the UNDP tried to map the numbers and needs of the beneficiaries. It was however not an extensive, systematic or exhaustive report, but rather a brief overview based on information from meetings, consultations, and conversations with people, warlords, and the communities (Muriithi 2010 [interview], Aibinu 2010 [interview]). The problem with this exercise in terms of identifying clear standards and objectives for gender mainstreaming the DDR programme was, however, that the assessment did not focus on the differences between men and women.
Providing gender-disaggregated data and creating so-called combatant profiles in needs assessments are important,\(^\text{22}\) as it can help identify what the “different needs” of male and female ex-combatants are (UNDP 2005), and avoid homogenizing the beneficiaries. A successful gender mainstreaming, being more than simply an instrumental inclusion of women, depends on understanding the underlying reasons why women participated in the fighting forces, the diverse roles they occupied in the groups and the different consequences of their participation (Amnesty International 2008:11, Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen 2009:273-277, Specht and Attree 2006:219-220). Since no combat profiles or gender-disaggregated data were provided prior to the programming in Liberia, valuable information on the different needs of women was lacking, making it difficult to interpret the resolution 1325, article 13 into clear and consistent objectives and standards.

Consulting local and national women and women’s groups in the stage of programme design can facilitate the creation of clearer standards and objectives as they can provide specific information on the needs of women (UNDP 2005:36). The Liberian women’s groups were according to the Gender Office in UNMIL actively involved in the making up of the policies and also in terms of the interpretation (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). My informants from WONGOSOL and WIPNET did not quite share the same perception of the organisations participation. They asserted that they were not formally taken into the policymaking process, but that they were included by the UNMIL, after the policies were made, to help raise awareness and spread information about the policies (Danuweli 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview]). It is difficult to reveal to what extent women’s organisations and women were taken into the program designing, but according to information Nichols (2005:128) and Amnesty International (2008:22-24) have gotten from key-actors, they were not sufficiently involved in the planning and policy making process. Neither the UNIFEM, nor the Gender Office had come to Liberia when the needs assessment were undertaken, and could therefore not participate or advice the mission and UNDP on the designing of the programme.

In spite of these alleged shortcomings in the challenging process of translating the broad prescriptions into clear standards and objectives, the “Strategy and Implementation

\(^{22}\) According to the UNDP (2005:21) combatant profiles should illuminate factors like the combatants role in the forces, whether they have been part-time or full-time fighters, length of their stay in the forces, and to what extent they have been alienated from their traditional support network during the conflict.
Framework” (2003:64-67), outlines a rather detailed strategy on how to deal with the female ex-combatants, specifying the measures and objectives to address the different needs of female ex-combatants (cf. chapter 4.4). The problem is, however, that these are not fully in compliance with the overall goals of the resolutions, as they are defined in chapter 2.2.1 as equal participation in theory and practice and ‘addressing the different needs. When comparing the specific measures outlined in the Framework with these performance indicators, there are clearly some shortcomings. The main drawback is that the component of ‘de facto’ participation of women are overlooked. There are no provisions on how to reach female ex-combatants and make them participate in the DDR programme, and their different reasons for not participating in the process are not reflected upon. Seen in retrospect, such a specific strategy was apparently needed, as several of the reasons for non-participation were specific to the female ex-combatants. This shortcoming thus contributed to a much lower participation rate amongst female then male ex-combatants (cf. chapter 4.3).

5.2.2 Resources

In light of the development the last decade, where peacekeeping operations have become broader in terms of tasks and goals, Schori (in Antoninin 2009) argues that the UN peacekeeping mission are becoming overstretched and under-funded, leading to a gap between the “noble prescriptions” in the SC Resolutions and the possibility of action on the ground. Consequently, increased funding and resources should accompany the broadened tasks to minimize the gap between prescribed policies and results (Antonini 2009, Vignard 2003:2). A number of my respondents pointed to a lack of economic resources as a contributory reason for amongst other things not mapping the different needs of the female ex-combatants, not having a strategy for gender sensitized information spreading (Randall 2010 [interview]) and for the limited psychosocial component in all the phases of the program (Koliab 2010 [interview]). Closely interlinked with the actual funding is of course the equally important human resources specially deposited to facilitate the implementation. Though somewhat problematic to separate from economic resources, this issue will be dealt with under paragraph 4 in this section.

The DDR programme was a multi-lateral effort by a range of actors besides the UN, and the donors were also numerous. UNDP managed and administered the multi-donor Liberia DDR
Trust Fund, a fund where the key donors included the European Commission, USAID, in addition to other international and national implementing partners. All the military-related activities of the disarmament was financed by the assessed budget of UNMIL, whilst the civilian-related demobilisation activities, which included specific gender and children related services, and reintegration activities, were financed by the multi-donor Liberia DDRR Trust Fund (UNDP 2004b:6-8). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Strategic and Implementation Framework (2003:65-67) prescribes separate funding to support women’s access to education and training in the reintegration phase and their starting up of businesses. Determining if this earmarked funding was sufficient to start with is difficult, but according to some of my informants it was not adequate, and as we shall see, the general cause for funding shortage especially affected the female ex-combatants.

The greatest financial problems for the DDR programme in general resulted from the increased caseload of ex-combatants going through the DDR process. The planning and budgets of the programme were based on the first estimated number of beneficiaries, and when that increased, the DDR authorities soon found themselves in a funding shortage, leading to a bigger piece of the “budgetary pie” being spent on disarmament and demobilisation than initially planned. Many of the problems experienced later in the programme were a consequence of this. It was for instance necessary to shorten the length of the participants’ stay in the cantonment sites from 30 to only 5 days, and limit the psychosocial component (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview], Koliab 2010 [interview], UNDP 2006:12).

Though being a general problem in the DDR process, numbers indicate that the lack of financial resources affected the implementation of resolution 1325, article 13 disproportionately. An even grosser under-estimate of eligible women than men to the programme, made the funding allocated to cover female beneficiaries inadequate (Amnesty International 2008:23). The initial target was set at 2000 female ex-combatants to be demobilized, and though this measure marked an improvement from other DDR processes it did not at all reflect the actual proportion of female ex-combatants in the Liberian conflict (UNIFEM 2004:12). Looking at the numbers it is startling how much lower, in relative terms, the estimate of female ex-combatants were compared to the estimate of the male ex-combatants. The initial estimate of 2,000 constituted only 9 per cent of the final number of
women going through the process (22.370), while the initial estimate of male ex-combatants was approximately 35 per cent of the actual number going through the program. This under-estimation was surprising as the Sierra Leonean DDR experience had shown that women were associated with fighting forces to a far greater degree than was originally estimated. Considering that one drew extensively on the lessons learned from the DDR process in Sierra Leone, this is an insight that could have and should have been incorporated when planning the DDR in Liberia (UNIFEM 2004:13).

In addition to influencing the implementation process directly, making it more challenging, the lack of financial resources makes prioritizing goals even more important, as it influences the capacity of the implementing organization (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:478-480). Prioritizing necessarily involves identifying some goals as primary, others as secondary, and perhaps ruling out others entirely. Assuming that the security factor was the main focus of the programme, a lack of resources would necessarily reinforce this focus and further downgrade the goal of ‘gender mainstreaming’, as one did not have capacity to sufficiently address all the goals of the programme.

5.2.3 Inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities

The level of accurate and consistent inter- and intra organizational communication, and the availability of enforcement mechanisms, influences the implementation of a certain policy. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:466) claim that successful implementation often requires institutional mechanisms and procedures whereby higher authorities (superiors) may increase the likelihood that implementors (subordinates) will act in a manner consistent with a policy’s standards and objectives. Especially two types of enforcement and follow-up activities are important, namely technical advice and assistance, and the possibility of sanctioning the “subordinates”. The extent to which these activities can be performed depends on characteristics of the implementing agencies; the degree of hierarchical control of subunit

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23 The initial estimate of ex-combatants was between 38.000-53.000, comprising of 2.000 women and approximately 9.000 children and disabled (UNIFEM 2004:12). It is however, somewhat unclear what the initial estimate of child combatants and disabled were but choosing the lowest denominator, 38.000, when calculating to some extent equalizes this possible rise in number of children and disabled, making the calculation valid and useful to my analysis in spite of uncertainties.
decisions and processes within the implementing agencies. Transferring the implementation model from the national to the international level, the Security Council is the centralised “state-level”, while UNMIL is the “local” implementing level. There is, however, a need to analyse the hierarchical structures also on the implementing level. My intent is not to map all the organisational and institutional characteristics of the peacekeeping operation, but I will make some general consideration of the relationship between the nature of institutional arrangements and level of communication and enforcement mechanisms.

Taking a starting point at the Security Council level, one of the problems identified by researchers when it comes to accountability is that the Security Council often share or even transfer their responsibility and support for Missions on the ground to other important international actors, multinational forces or powerful states. The arrangements to direct and manage the UN peacekeeping operations are moreover distinct from those of other organizations, due to the fact that the operations have evolved into complex and multi-dimensional enterprises, involving personnel from a wide range of nationalities, disciplines and professional cultures pursuing multiple lines of activity (UN 2008:66). The operations are usually set up alongside a range of external actors, with widely differing mandates, agendas and time horizons. The challenge of managing an integrated mission is thus further compounded by the need to ensure that there is some degree of coordination between the United Nations and the range of non-United Nations actors who are often present in conflict and post-conflict settings (ibid:67). As a result, the hierarchical control and responsibilities in United Nations peacekeeping operations is less clear-cut (UN 2008:66), and enforcement activities, monitoring and communicating become significantly more challenging. Moreover, the Security Council’s ability and willingness to steer and orient the implementation of its resolutions and mandates often depends on the changing priorities of member states and what political issues that are high on the international agenda at the time (Antonini 2009:197).

On the “local” level UNMIL was the highest responsible UN actor, but a range of other actors also had responsibilities in the process, and the day-to-day work with the process was multi sectional (cf. chapter 3.5). In addition, a number of local and international NGOs took part in the process through the mission’s outsourcing of practical tasks throughout the programme (Rasheed 2010 [interview]). The Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA) in the UNMIL had the specific responsibility to make sure that resolution 1325 was implemented throughout the
mission, and in the DDR programming. The OGA did not have executive power, so in order to facilitate the implementation of the resolution, it based its work on follow-up activities; awareness raising, training and capacity building, technical advise, and monitoring. Through these measures the OGA worked to ensure that the staff in the Mission had skills and knowledge to understand and address gender issues (UNMIL 2010). Everyone who came to work within the mission was trained in SC Resolution 1325, and in how gender should be implemented in the mission. Interestingly, the so-called introduction training only lasted for one hour, and the so-called contingents, the groups sent specifically from nation-states to support the mission, were not trained by UNMIL (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The military observers (MILOBS) that worked on the ground, for instance with the screening process in the disarmament camps, came from these national contingents and consequently did not receive formal training on gender from the UNMIL. Another problem was that the Gender Office didn’t have staff in all the counties DDR programmes were set up. Other sections of the mission therefore had to be responsible for monitoring and advising the government and NGOs on gender mainstreaming in those counties (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). Two apparent problems can thus be identified. Firstly, the range of actors, especially actors who were not from within the mission or the UN, made it difficult to reach everybody with technical advice and training in gender mainstreaming. Secondly, the Office of the Gender Advisor, the only unit in the mission specifically tasked to implement resolution 1325, was a very small office, lacking human resources. To be realistic when it comes to issues of integrating gender, the mission and the UN itself must also ensure that there is capacity to integrate gender in the DDR process (Muriithi 2010 [interview])

The action-forcing mechanisms available and different possibilities “superiors” have of sanctioning their subordinates if they do not implement the prescribed policies, depends on how the implementing process is organised. When the implementation process takes place within an organization, the mechanisms are usually more efficient and broad. Specifically HR policies of recruitment, relocation, promotion, and dismissal are in use, in addition to budgetary allocations, reducing or inflating funding to units and field offices (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:466). In the context of inter-organizational relations, many of these mechanisms are absent and the responsible organisation has to use other, less efficient, action-forcing mechanisms, taking form of socialization, persuasion, and cooptation of other actors by the responsible organization. Using funding as an incentive or as a threat is also common.
However, recognizing the problems with efficient action-forcing mechanisms, employing reliable forms of monitoring and surveillance becomes important (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:467-469).

Implementing the gender mainstreaming in the Liberian DDR must be said to be both an intra and inter-organizational task, and a range of different enforcement activities were available. However, some central challenges must be pointed to. When it comes to the important tool of HR policy, the system is somewhat different in the UN then in other, national level organisations. There is a formalized system of recruitment, but also other informal mechanisms that play a role when it comes to getting and keeping a job. Political appointments, donor and national government influence makes the general job insecurity high at all times among the UN personnel (Raven-Roberts 2005:55-56). In emergency and peacekeeping situations, like the one in Liberia in 2003, there is usually urgency in setting up a program and getting the right personnel, and established recruitment and evaluation procedures are overlooked (ibid.). This unstable system indicates that the action-forcing mechanisms of human resources policies, which might be very influential in “traditional “ organisations, may not be as effective in the UN.

Monitoring is important in the context of the inter-organizational relations, but monitoring and holding staff accountable in the DDR process was challenging, as the range of actors taking part in the process was broad. The Gender Office cooperated with NGOs to monitor the process of gender mainstreaming, because there was not sufficient capacity in the office (Muriithi 2010 [interview]), but there does not seem to have been a coherent and effective system of monitoring. When work was subcontracted out to national and international NGOs, with different guidelines and operating procedures, the monitoring was made even more difficult. This is in accordance with other findings arguing that making sure that principles and guidelines are followed and monitored in UN programmes is a major challenge, since the number of actors is high (Raven-Roberts 2005:53). There is a lack of effective systems of management and evaluation to appropriately standardize principles of programming, monitor programs, and hold staff accountable for adhering (or not) to practices and overall United Nations goals (Raven-Roberts 2005:44)
The initial clarity of the standards and objectives is important for the implementers to know what is expected from them, but the accuracy of the communication and the consistency with which the standards and objectives are communicated are also vital (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:466). A range of independent actors and units makes the communication more complex and difficult, and in this context the policies are more likely to have been adapted to the interests of the actors. Having a Gender Office in the mission that took part in all committees and groups working in the DDR decision-making body to make sure the gender perspective was taken into account was a strong starting point for an effective communication process (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The same problem as seen in the monitoring and follow-up activities are nevertheless seen here, as a high number of actors involved in the process, and a Gender Office with limited resources, made the communication process challenging. Accordingly, my findings indicate that both the inter- and intra organisational communication process had shortcomings. In spite of the rather clear standards and objectives laid out in the Strategy Framework, there is evidence of lacking conceptual coherence among staff implementing these measures. This is illustrated by the substantially different opinions my informants from the UNMIL and UN agencies had on whether or not the DDR program was gender mainstreamed and their difficulties with identifying specific policies targeting women. This indicates an inconsistence and ignorance in the judgment amongst the actors on what the gender mainstreaming consisted of. Another illustrative example is that some of the officials I spoke to, even the officials from the DDR-unit in UNMIL and UNIFEM, were unaware of the lowered admission criteria for women to the program. This points back to a poor communication process that seems to have been unable to adequately communicate to the relatively clear and consistent policies of gender mainstreaming to the broad range of actors involved in the program.

5.2.4 Characteristics of the implementing agencies

Lack of human resources and staff with adequate technical capacity on integrating gender has been pointed to as one of the biggest challenges in gender mainstreaming DDR processes (see for instance Antonini 2009, UNIFEM 2004). This was also a problem in the process in Liberia, both within the mission, in the specialized UN agencies, and in the national agencies (Amnesty International 2008, Bose 2010 [interview] and Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The Gender Advisor to the UNDP, Bose (2010 [interview]), commented that gender equality is
supposed to be done in the UN, so therefore people “do it”, even though they might not know how, or even think that it is important. But the intent in it self is not enough (Bose 2010 [interview]).

As pointed to, the fact that the UNMIL had a specialised Gender Office (OGA), one of the first Gender Offices in a UN peacekeeping operation, was a clear advantage. They had specified technical capacity on gender issues, but a small staff, and contributed as much as they could in increasing the gender capacity in the mission through training. The OGA, however, lacked a dedicated agency with capacity and resources on gender to collaborate with. UNIFEM came to Liberia in November 2004, when the disarmament was over, and the reintegration had started, and was not extensively involved in the DDRR process. This was mainly because of their late arrival, but also because of a somewhat different policy focus. In 2005 their main priority was the legislative and presidential election, working for female participation and political empowerment, and especially the presidential campaign of Ellen Johnson Sierleaf. UNIFEM did not play the same important role in ensuring the rights of the female ex-combatants in the process as the UNICEF did to the child soldiers (Lincoln 2010 [interview]). In that respect, the progressive and positive dedication of human resources to a Gender Office in the mission was to some extent levelled out by the lack of participation from the UNIFEM. One of OGA’s key national partners, and another actor working specifically on gender issues, was the Liberian Ministry of Gender and Development. The Ministry was established in 2001, and according to Bose and Muriithi (2010 [interview]) it was functional and very active in the DDR process. The Ministry, however, also struggled with a lack of human resources, but the limited staff that handled the ministry, and especially the minister, allegedly had the necessary competence on gender issues (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). Consequently, the pattern seems to have been that the units with the technical capacity on gender in general lacked the sufficient human resources, whilst it seems to have been vice versa in the executing units of the UNMIL.

Drawing on experiences from other efforts to gender mainstream peacekeeping missions, it is underlined that for the implementation to be efficient all agency personnel must be exposed to and familiar with these guidelines, whether they are men or women and whether or not they are directly or indirectly involved in program implementation (Raven-Roberts 2005:53). The general lack of training and consequently of capacity on gender in Liberia was visible both in
the planning, implementing and evaluation phase of the process. In the designing phase, it was one of the underlying reasons for the shortage of adequate gender analysis, as one lacked people that could execute them (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). UNDP’s Gender Advisor argued that the needs assessment performed by the UNDP tried to take gender into consideration and adequately gather information, but because one were short of people with the right skills, the result was not satisfying (Bose 2010 [interview]). In the implementation phase one of the areas where the lack of training was visible was amongst the military observers (MILOBS) that were responsible for registering the ex-combatants at the disarmament sites. As mentioned, they not included in the “gender training” that was performed by the UNMIL. Even though they had the responsibility on the ground, based on their lack of training and their background in traditional military cultures, there is reason to doubt that they had the prerequisites to understand the importance of including women, or the knowledge of how to do it. In the NCDDRR there were also capacity problems, especially in the management structures, with a limited staff, with limited competence on gender issues. As discussed in chapter 4, the NCDDR ran information campaigns on the DDR programme, but partly because of a lack of capacity, they did not contain strategies to reach female ex-combatants (Randall 2010 [interview]). In the evaluation phase neither the OGA nor the UNIFEM did evaluations and reports on the program, because of the limited resources. Such evaluations could have provided important “lessons learned” specifically on the gender mainstreaming aspect, for instance on the issue of getting women to participate in practice, which the other general evaluations done by UNMIL did not provide.

5.2.5 Economic, Social and Political conditions

The economic, social and political conditions on the ground in post-conflict societies are usually extremely challenging and unstable, and the post-conflict environment in which the UNMIL was implementing the DDR programme was no exception (Pugel 2009). In a country that had been devastated by 14 years of violent conflict, the international ´aid and security architecture´ had approximately four months to define a strategic plan that provided for national security, disarmament of tens of thousands of combatants, the return and settlement of hundreds of thousands of displaced citizens, massive humanitarian aid operations, and the establishment of conditions for free and fair elections. All of this was to be done without causing unintentional harm and preventing Liberia from sliding back into protracted warfare.
The scale of challenges for the UNMIL, international actors and the National Transitional Government was simply breathtaking. 50 to 80 percent of the infrastructure was destroyed, leaving the majority of the country inaccessible. Under these circumstances the actors had to plan the long-time reintegration of not only ex-combatants, but also internally displaced people and refugees (Pugel 2009:76).

Attempting to include gender issues and gender mainstreaming the DDR process when the general challenges are so massive, have proven very difficult. Several arguments oppose focusing on gender issues in these circumstances. There is for instance a view that in emergency contexts there is “no time” to do gender work, as what is needed is rapid action, lifesaving food, and material distribution. Performing nuanced analysis and targeting change is too cumbersome, complex, and time consuming, indeed downright harmful to the “real work” of saving lives (Raven-Roberts 2005:57). This argument was also used in Liberia. UNDP Gender Advisor Bose (2010 [interview]) argued for instance that creating combatant profiles in the needs assessment was not even a question. In her opinion, the main question of concern at that time was rather how quickly things could be done and the DDR process commenced, because there was general unrest in Monrovia, and both male and female fighters were showing their discontent protesting in the streets (Bose 2010 [interview]). The feeling in the Mission of being “in a hurry” is also apparent in the fact that the first phase of the DDR program was commenced very quickly after the peace agreement was reached, some say premature. The launching of the first disarmament phase in December 2003 started before the sufficient numbers of UN personnel had had the time to come to Liberia, and with no monitoring system in place (Jennings 2007:208, Nichols 2005:110). It is assumed that this was driven by both donor pressure and as a response to threats from armed factions (Nichols 2005:113). Through conversations with informant, my clear impression was also that the UN Special representative of the Secretary General to Liberia, Jacques Klein, rushed the launching of the programme.

It is challenging to provide thorough data and conduct detailed needs assessments when the time is short, and once you start the process, you can’t stop it to undertake new needs assessments, because it can create unrest (Bose 2010 [interview]). Hence, the paradox and problem of DRRR program designing in unstable circumstances is that the mappings and assessments that needs to be executed for the program to be efficient and successful has to be
done quickly, because of the security situation (Bose 2010 [interview]). When the circumstances are of an unstable and unsecure nature, and the human resources are scarce, the need to prioritize again becomes more apparent. Building on the necessary condition of security being the main concern, limited time and resources thus reinforces this focus and provoke a choice of “either or” rather then facilitating a parallel focus on both security and gender mainstreaming.

Looking at the support, or lack of support, of a policy amongst national interest groups, can shed light on how the policy was received on the ground. If there is support from national actors and interest groups it can positively affect the implementation of a policy (Sabatier 1986:25). The so-called “cultural inappropriateness” argument assess that international organizations have to be careful not to impose their ideologies on the communities they are working in, assuming that feminism and gender equality are western constructions (Raven-Roberts 2005:57). UNDP Gender Advisor Bose (2010 [interview]) pointed to this argument having been prevailing in the Mission to Liberia. This indicates a general judgment in the Mission of the Liberian society as having a traditional view on gender roles (see chapter 3.3), not one in which gender equality was a deeply embedded value. This can be identified when looking at one of the vital national actors, namely the armed groups. One of the factors pointed to as a reason for low female participation in the DDR program, was ‘manipulation, corruption, and deception on the part of male commanders’ (cf. chapter 4.3.2). Though it is argued that some women through participation in an armed group challenged the traditional gender roles and managed to benefit from the participation, most of the female fighters filled traditional roles and were subordinates in accordance with traditional gender roles (cf. chapter 3.3). There is thus nothing signifying that the traditional views on women that were prevailing in Liberia weren’t also the attitudes of the male commanders, generals, and soldiers. Furthermore, in accordance with the UNIFEM (2004) “lessons learned”, Koliab (2010 [interview]) argued that one of the reasons for women’s perspectives and needs not being taken into consideration, was that they did not hold high positions and leading roles in the armed groups. In dealing with the armed factions the DDR authorities talked to the male generals, which were at best indifferent to the inclusion of women, not reflecting on their different needs, but at worst opposed to it, deliberately deceiving the female fighters in their groups and depriving them the benefits of DDR participation. These attitudes manifested themselves when the warring parties agreed on and adopted the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, which did not include gender mainstreamed policy prescription for the DDR programme.

The National Transitional Government of Liberia was created through the comprehensive peace agreement, and mainly consisted of representatives from the three main factions in the war; GoL, LURD and MODEL, in addition to some individuals from business and civil society. The members with power in the NTGL were however the representatives from the former warring parties (Bøås 2009a:1334-1335, 2009b:8), bringing into the government the traditional attitudes towards women pointed to above. Looking at the gender distribution, the transitional government consisted mainly of male representatives. One of the ‘lessons learned’ from previous DDR processes is the importance of female participation in policy-making bodies for both the support for and commitment to gender mainstreaming (UNIFEM 2004:4). Women’s participation has value added as it is shown that women raise issues of relevance to women, and set other priorities for the post-conflict peace building (Bouta, Frerks and Hughes 2005:16). The lack of female participation in the transitional government thereby underpins the perception of the NTGL as not particularly committed to gender mainstreaming the DDR process.

An apparent group of supporters for the implementation of resolution 1325, article 13, was women’s NGOs, like the LWI, WIPNET and WONGOSOL. The women’s movement in Liberia was active, and as discussed in chapter 3, during the war they pressed for peace through for instance ‘sit-down actions’. In Accra, during the negotiations on the Peace Agreement, they moreover lobbied strongly to make the CPA include a gender perspective (Danuweli 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview]). Through the so-called “Golden Tulip Declaration”, issued by representatives of women’s groups during the negotiations, they demanded amongst other things participation of women in the DDR programs, making references to resolution 1325 (Puechguirbal 2004:54). Even though their level of formal participation in the designing and implementation of the DDR is somewhat contested (see chapter 3.4), there is no doubt that they strongly supported the gender mainstreaming of the DDR process.

When it comes to public opinion, understood as the aggregate of individual attitudes or beliefs held by the adult population, it is difficult to disclose any general response to the policy, as
the data on the issue is very scarce. Nonetheless, the traditional view on gender roles and a hesitation to regard women as fighters, implies a resistance towards implementing resolution 1325, article 13. The problem of stigma when female fighters returned to their communities (see the discussion under chapter 4.3.3) supports this conclusion, indicating that they were a rather marginalised group. In accordance with this general impression Koliab (2010 [interview]) and Muriithi (2010 [interview]) maintained that the traditional gender roles and socio cultural issues thoroughly founded in the Liberian society played a part, making it difficult to implement something “new” and challenging in terms of gender roles. Concluding, both the difficult circumstances on the ground, especially the time-problem, and the lack of substantial support from relevant groups, seem to have affected the performance of the implementation process negatively.

5.2.6 The disposition of implementers

The sixth variable, which all the other variables are affected by, is the disposition of the implementers. This signifies their perception of the policy, the direction of their response to it and the intensity of that response. The implementers are the ones who concretely express either a will or resistance to implementing a policy, so if there is a lack of political will and active commitment on the ground, the gender sensitive mandates in resolutions often do not translate into action (Antonini 2009:210). There are implementers on different levels, but my focus will be on the ‘higher-level’ bureaucrats.

First of all, the implementers’ comprehension of the intent of the specific standards and objectives of the policy are relevant to their disposition. There is again reason to point to the substantially different responds my informants gave when assessing whether or not the implementation had been successful (cf. chapter 4.0). In my view some of these differences are caused by diverse perceptions on what the concept of gender mainstreaming means in reality and what the objectives of the implementation were. This can be caused both by conceptual incoherence and poor communication, but also different personal convictions.

The direction of the responses to the resolution was obviously divided, as the individual actors working with the implementation were a diverse group, both nationals and internationals, representing a range of different organisations and interests. Raven-Roberts
(2005:44), however, claims that there is a bias against gender equality within the United Nations system, which is a function of the myriad of identities and associated “baggage” the staff bring to their jobs.

*Staff members represent a plethora of political, religious, social, and ethnic organizations and identify with many kinds of associations based on class, race, gender, professional, community, or kinship affiliations. This can bias interpretations of rules, regulations, and policies when staff struggles to reconcile their cultural values with the official cultural ethos of the United Nations* (Raven-Roberts 2005:54)

The traditional views on gender roles that were prevailing in the Liberian society (see chapter 3.3) were also seen in the UNMIL and other DDR authorities. In spite of a development when it comes to acknowledging that women occupy other roles then merely the “victim” role during wartime, there was a hesitation in implying that all women or girl combatants should be considered soldiers, *a hesitation that does not exist with respect to male ex-combatants, even though some men and boys also fill support rather than combat roles* (Jennings 2009:482). It is startling to notice that in the official UNDDR (2006) statistics, all the women who took part in the DDR programme are referred to as WAFFs. Not one of the women is registered as a combatant. This stands in stark contrast to Pugel’s (2007:31) findings that as many as 71 per cent of the female ex-combatants reported their primary role in the armed forces to be a “combat soldiers” (versus 87 per cent of the male respondents), and Nicholas (2005:120) moreover, who claims that of the 33,241 women and children processed, 13,891 brought weapons and ammunition with them.

When the commitment to gender mainstreaming in general are low, the presence of strong advocates for the cause becomes more important. A challenge that has already been mentioned in relation to the process of designing the programme, and the lack of human resources, was the absence of a dedicated agency that could be responsible for female fighters. The UNIFEM did not come to Liberia until November 2004, a year after the launching of the programme, and were neither part of the Draft Interim Secretariat that defined the concrete standards and objectives in the program, nor extensively involved in the execution of the programme later on. Looking at the work done to address the different needs
of child combatants, UNICEF had a strong presence and was responsible for making a separate framework for child combatants in cooperation with the Liberian Ministry of Education, based on the Convention on Children’s Rights, education policies, and lessons learned from earlier DDR processes. Unlike the UNIFEM, they were represented in the Draft Interim Secretariat, and a “Child protection Network” comprising of 32 INGOs, plus national and local NGOs, took part in the process of designing the DDR guidelines (Clark 2010 [interview]). Special information and “recruitment” strategies were moreover made to target child combatants. In their evaluation UNDP (2006:3) states that there was no pro-active network of partners working around the women’s issue or the reintegration in civil society as there were for children. Though not opposed to the implementation of the resolution, it does not seem to have prioritized by the UNIFEM. The commitment to facilitate a successful implementation of resolution 1325, article 13, was consequently absent in the specialized UN agency for women.

In spite of all this Muriithi (2010 [interview]) maintained that the situation in Liberia was unique because there was a political will to integrate gender. The rather “liberal” step of lowering the admission criteria to the program (cf. chapter 4.2) expresses a will to include women in the program, and had positive consequences in terms of increasing the participation rate for women. The success of the change was however contested amongst some of my informants, and in an UNDP Activity Report (2004:47) the lowered admission criteria are criticised of being too “loose”, resulting in an admission of a high number of civilians. The problem with this was that such loose acceptance criteria leads to the waste of very limited financial resources (UNDP 2004:47). The DDR authorities thus seem to have had the choice between two evils, choosing to facilitate the inclusion of women. Pugel (2009:83, 96) argue that there was a general consensus in UNMIL that the DDR programmes should be accessible to the broadest possible population, and that it was UN senior staff that had recently participated in the DDR in Sierra Leone that recommended the change. Some of my informants on the other hand claimed that the change came from external pressure, especially from the women’s organisations that pressed the UNMIL to take into consideration the women who had occupied non-fighting roles in the armed forces. The timing of the change of policy, between the first problematic start of disarmament in early December 2003 and the resuming of the program in April 2004, makes it questionable whether this was an expression of a general political will within the UNMIL to include women, or simply a case of giving in
to pressure. Had there been a clear policy of female inclusion within the UNMIL, these policies would have been in place from the very beginning. The pressure might, as suggested, have come from external actors, but there is also reason to believe that the Office of the Gender Advisor had influence on the decision, as it was set up exactly around the time of the policy change, in December 2003.

The impression I got in some of my interviews with UN staff, and which some of them expressed explicitly, was that they found my topic of research irrelevant, or that they were “tired of” being questioned about gender issues. The issue of gender mainstreaming the DDR process was apparently not regarded as particularly important. Since the main goal of the process was creating security (Bose 2010 [interview], Jennings 2009a and 2008, Koliab 2010 [interview], Rasheed 2010 [interview]), and the female fighters in general were not regarded as a threat to peace, the whole issue of gender mainstreaming seems to have become secondary. Not only in the reintegration phase, as Jennings´ (2009a) points to, but also partly when it came to getting women to participate in the disarmament and demobilisation phase, as the broadening of admission criteria was not accompanied by practical strategies to reach the women.

### 5.3 Three Expanded General Explanations

To conclude on and summarize the findings, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) suggest three general explanations for unsuccessful implementation, which summarize their model and sheds light on the most relevant linkages between their independent and dependent variables. As my argument has been that the securitization hypothesis represents a necessary but not sufficient condition, an expanding of these explanations are required, assessing also the relation between the securitization variable and the other variables.

The first general explanation for the gap between the prescribed policy and the action on the ground in Liberia was the poor communication in the implementation process. Even though the policy expressed in resolution 1325, article 13, is broad and general, the context-specific measures and objectives outlined in the Strategic and Implementation Framework (2003:64-67) were both clear and consistent (cf. chapter 4.4). The problem was, however, that the specific measures were not in full compliance with the general resolutions. The important
component of getting women to participate was partly overlooked, with a lack of strategies to reach and “recruit” women to the program. Nevertheless, taking a starting point in the standards and objectives that were present, the findings point to a fragmented communication process within the mission and between the mission and other actors. The institutional structure and range of actors involved in the process greatly challenged the communication process, and the standards and objectives were not clearly and consistently communicated throughout the decision making body. In lack of a clear perception amongst many of the implementers of what the gender mainstreaming really signified, the immediately unclear “addressing the different needs” was partly sacrificed for the benefit of the clearer objective of getting a certain percentage of women to participate in the programmes. Paradoxically, this was the area in which the Strategy Framework did not specify any concrete measures, making it difficult to translate into action. It is thus clear that the poor communication process contributed to a gap between the prescribed policies and the action on the ground, as the standards and objectives of the specified policy was not clearly and consistently communicated to the implementers.

The second explanation is that of capability problems. To successfully implement the gender mainstreaming, the UNMIL has to have the capacity to do what it is expected to do. This is related to having sufficient financial and human resources, the characteristics of the implementing agency, and the economic, social and political circumstances (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:480). The financial problems in the DDR process were apparent, and though it had consequences for all the beneficiaries in the program, the findings indicated that the consequences were worst for the female ex-combatants. There was moreover a lack of human resources dedicated to the implementation of the resolution, and the technical capability throughout the mission was scarce and inadequate, making gender mainstreaming at all levels challenging. The absence of a dedicated UN agency with particular capacity and responsibility for women were especially decisive for the poor implementation. In the designing phase of the programme this lead to a lack of much-needed analysis of the specific situation of female ex-combatants, as there was no staff with the technical capacity on gender. I argue that this contributed to the failure to fully comprehend the range of the general resolutions and deciphering the “different needs” of female fighters, in addition to the failure to create specific measures to get women to participate in the program. The high number of actors and the unclear hierarchical strategies moreover lead to a fragmentation of
responsibility, as everyone were supposed to include gender strategies but no-one had the absolute responsibility. This made having a dedicated agency taking the over all responsibility even more important.

The challenging circumstances apparently reinforced the problems with limited human resources and capacity. Specifically the “state-of-emergency” argument, in which the gender perspective is sacrificed because there is no time to consider it, affects the capability. Interestingly, it seems like this was not a prevailing problem when it came to making a separate framework for the child combatants. UNICEF was extensively involved in the DDR process, unlike UNIFEM, and made both separate recruitment strategies and programme designs. This indicates that the deficiency to gender mainstream the framework was more a result of lacking political will, a dedicated agency taking responsibility for women, and shortage of resources, rather then a result of the difficult circumstances.

The third explanation regards the disposition of the implementers, and implicitly involves all the other independent variables in the model. Both the communication of the policy, training and follow-up can affect the dispositions of the implementers (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:475), by increasing their understanding of the importance of implementing the policy in question. Analysing the disposition of the implementers, there were no unambiguous findings pointing to a resistance against including women amongst the implementers, the problem was rather that the issue was seen as unimportant. The inadequate training and unclear communication process in Liberia lead to a lack of understanding of what the gender mainstreaming in reality was, and why the inclusion of women was important, something that seems to have resulted in an indifference to the whole question. The type and extent of resources made available can also affect the disposition of the implementers, as vast funding or human resources can make the implementers view the program with added favour. The opposite was the case in Liberia, with both a funding shortage and scarce human resources, indicating that the policy was not particularly important. The circumstances on the ground are of importance. Implementers’ desire to minimize public hostility or their ideologically based inclination to be responsive to public wishes may influence their behavior, even though it may be inconsistent with their own preferences (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:477). In general, traditional gender roles were prevailing, and some of the most important national interest groups were rather indifferent to the policy, making it challenging to implement.
UNIFEM (2004:9) claims, as pointed to in the introduction, that the need to integrate gender perspectives to precipitate the degree of social change and transformation required to demilitarize a violent society, an instrumentalist line of argumentation, is increasingly being recognised. At the higher level in the UN, seen in resolution 1325, an inclusion of women in DDR is advocated from both a normative and an instrumentalist view. However, on the lower level in Liberia, none of these approaches seems to have been prevailing. There rather seems to have been an attitude that gender was only another issue to be checked off the list, and the implementers considered ‘gender issues’ simply because they were supposed to.

The necessary and underlying condition of the process being security-driven and justified had linkages to some of the variables in Van Meter and Van Horn´ s model, both affecting them and being affected by them. My argument for the need to include other variables was that there is no inherent contradiction in security being the main priority and successfully implementing resolution 1325, article 13. However, as the human and financial resources were scarce in the Liberian DDR programme, and one did not have the capacity to address all the different goals of the DDR, the consequences of prioritizing security equals a disregarding of gender issues, strengthening the explanatory power of Jennings’ argument. Moreover, as security is seen as the most important, the commitment to gender mainstreaming in general becomes smaller.

5.4 Summary

My findings supported the main component of Jennings’ securitization argument, that the main goal of the DDR process was security. An extended explanation was given through the implementation framework, in which the most important explanations for the gap between the prescribed policies and action on the ground were a lack of resources and technical capacity on gender, poor communication, weak enforcement mechanisms, and the absence of a dedicated agency with responsibility for the female ex-combatants. The securitization-argument in some instances reinforced the problems created by structural, procedural and capacity problems.
6 Summing up

Women are not only victims, or survivors of war. They are also actors, sometimes participants in conflicts, and have different needs in the DDR process. DDR processes have become a crucial part of all peacekeeping operations, offering an opportunity for combatants to become civilians, and contributing in the transforming of war-torn communities. *To leave women and girls behind in such a crucial moment is not only to violate their right to participate but also to undermine the very objectives of DDR, namely sustainable and equitable development* (UNIFEM 2004:1)

This thesis has aimed to explain the reasons for the gap between the prescribed DDR policies of gender mainstreaming and the action on the ground in Liberia. The DDR process that was launched after 14 years of devastating civil war in 2003, intended to include and address the different needs of a high number of women who had participated in the conflict. The intent was however not adequately translated into action, as there was a lower participation rate and a higher drop-out rate amongst the female ex-combatants, and in a number of instances the DDR authorities failed to address the different needs of women. The research question was approached through a case study, in which semi-structured interviews with key-actors was the main method of data gathering. In opposition to previous research, the focus have not been only on the explanations based in a feminist-security paradigm, in which traditional gender roles and security perceptions are seen as the reason for this gap. Rather relevant variables of a structural, institutional and personal characteristics have been included in the explanation through the analytical framework of implementation theory. The assumption of Jennings‘ so called securitization argument however, was treated as an underlying variable.

The main findings in the thesis can be grouped in accordance with Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) three general explanations on the performance of an implementation process, namely the ‘communications process’, the ‘capability problem’, and the ‘disposition of the implementers’. First of all, the institutional structure of the peacekeeping mission, with a range of different actors, made the inter- and intra organisational communication more difficult. This resulted in an inadequate communicating of the standards and objectives of gender mainstreaming to the staff. Lacking a thorough understanding of the policy, the program thus became more about getting a certain percentage of female ex-combatants in the
programmes, then actually addressing their different needs. Secondly, the gap was caused by a lack of human and financial resources dedicated to the implementing of the gender mainstreaming. Combined with a lack of technical capacity on gender throughout the mission, this created capability problems. Moreover, the absence of UNIFEM in the process was decisive, as the institutional structure created a fragmentation of the responsibility on gender. There was therefore a need of a dedicated agency to monitor, advise and follow-up on the implementing process, to make sure that the needs of women were being catered for. Because of this lack of financial and human resources, the DDR-authorities were moreover forced to make priorities on the goals of the process. Security was the prioritized goal in the process, and as women based on traditional gender views were not seen as a threat to security to the same extent as men, they were disregarded. Thirdly, the commitment to gender mainstreaming amongst the implementers was rather low. There were no clear indications of negative responses to the policy, but rather an indifferent attitude, contributing to the policies not being adequately implemented.

The findings show that there are some inherent challenges in implementing resolutions through peacekeeping operations, as the actors are numerous, resources scarce, and circumstances in which the policies are implemented, unstable. Implementing policies of gender mainstreaming through these missions are even more challenging, as there is a lack of conceptual coherence in the field, lack of staff with capacity on gender, and a general bias against gender equality.

One of the challenges of using the implementation theory framework has been its comprehensiveness, demanding a lot of data. There has thus been a lack of sufficient reliable data when it came to considering “values” on some of the independent variables in the analytical framework. Not being able to measure all of the variables in detail, both because of lacking data, but also because of the wide scope of it, some general considerations have been performed instead. To perform a thorough analysis, illuminating all the different aspects of the implementation process, a much broader gathering of data would be necessary. My intent was however not to map the implementation process, but rather point to some of the more general challenges, and for that purpose the framework have been appropriate.
This analysis should not be seen as a thorough test of the theoretical arguments presented, they are rather used in a pragmatic manner, focusing on shedding light on the Liberian case. My thesis can contribute by providing new theoretical insights, having used a different approach then is usual, and applied the implementation theory to the international level.
**Literature**


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Fuest, Veronika (2008). “This is the time to get in front: Changing roles and opportunities for women in Liberia”, *African Affairs* 107 (427): 201-224


Appendix I – List of Interviews

United Nations Mission to Liberia (UNMIL):

RRR-Section:
Koliab, Nahataba
DDR Officer- Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Recovery, Civil Affairs Section – United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).
Personal Interview in Monrovia, 15.03.10

Associate DDR Officer- Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Recovery, Civil Affairs Section – United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).
Personal interview in Monrovia, 15.03.10

Office of the Gender Advisor:
Muriithi, James Mugo
Gender Affairs Officer – United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).
Personal interview in Monrovia, 11.03.10.

National Commission to the DDRR (NCDDRR)
Randall, Lawrence
Former Senior Communication Officer, NCDDRR (April 2004 – February 2005). Now works as Executive Director of Liberia Media Center.
Personal interview in Monrovia, 19.03.10

Former agent, NCDDR (2003).
Personal interview in Monrovia, 08.03.10
UNICEF
Clark, Miatta A.
Child Protection Officer at UNICEF.
Personal Interview in Monrovia, 08.03.10

UNIFEM
Lincoln, Allen
Programme Assistant – UNIFEM
Came to UNIFEM in August 2005.
Personal interview in Monrovia, 11.03.10

UNDP
Aibinu, Aderemi
DDR technical advisor, UNDP.
Personal interview in Monrovia, 19.03.10.

Bose, Shipra
Senior Gender Advisor UNDP – Liberia.
Personal Interview in Monrovia, 18.03.10

Rasheed, Farzana
Former Reporting Officer, UNDP (April 2004 – August 2008).
Personal Interview in Monrovia, 02.03.10.

Former staff member, UNDP
Personal interviews in Monrovia, 24.02.10 and 26.02.10

Gender Ministry
Representative from the UN Government Joint Program on SGBV.
Personal interview in Monrovia, 15.03.1
WIPNET/WONGOSOL

Danuweli, Cecilia
Programme officer – WIPNET
Personal interview in Monrovia, 18.03.10

Officer assistant – WIPNET
Personal interview in Monrovia, 18.03.10

Garlo, Cerue
Co-funder of WIPNET, worked there from 2002-2005.
Executive director of WONGOSOL from 2005-2009.
Personal interview in Monrovia, 18.03.10.

Non Governmental Organisations:

Landmine Action

Goll, Boima
Project manager, Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme, a reintegration project for ex-combatants.
Personal interview in Salala, Bong County, 10.03.10

Hopkins, Will
Programme Officer, Landmine Action Liberia
Personal interview in Monrovia, 01.03.10

Psychosocial counsellors at the “Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme”, a reintegration project for ex-combatants.
Group interview in Salala, Bong County, 10.03.10

International Committee for the Red Cross:

Psychosocial counsellor at the ”Women’s integration project” – a training programme for vulnerable women.
Personal interview in Central New Cru Town, Monrovia, 11.03.
Female ex-combatants:

Participants in the “Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme”, a Landmine Action reintegration project for ex-combatants.
Personal interviews conducted with translator (psychosocial counsellor in the program) in Salala, Bong County, 10.03.10.

1- “Benita” 38 years old
2- “Dekontee” 28 years old
3- “Josefine” 28 years old
4- “Marie” 25 years old
5- “Marthaline” 21 years old
6- “Mona” 27 years old
7- “Pandora” 19 years old
8- “Princess” 30 years old
9- “Rita” 25 years old
10- “Rose” 19 years old
11- “Roseline” 26 years old
12- “Victoria” 27 years old

Participants in the Red Cross Women’s integration project, a training programme for vulnerable women. Group interview conducted with translator (psychosocial counsellor in the program) in New Kru Town, Monrovia, 17.03.10.

1- “Bendu”
2- “Ellen”
3- “Elletha”
4- “Florence”
5- “Lorpu”
6- “Musu”
7- “Victoria”