U.S. interests between needs and deeds

A Case study of the United States’ Foreign Policy toward Pakistan
under President George W. Bush 2001-2009

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Abstract

The U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan under President Bush can be classified to have reflected a *weak-con* attitude up until the terrorist attacks on Washington D.C. and New York on September 11, 2001. Pakistan was subject to a variety of sanctions due to proliferation-, democracy-, and economy- concerns. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the Bush administration moved from a conditionality focus on aid toward an approach that did not seem to condition U.S. support to Pakistan either on Pakistan’s performance in countering terrorism or Pakistan’s performance in the areas of civil liberties, respect for the rule of law or conduct of elections. The U.S. Congress gave President Bush authorities resembling a carte blanche, which in effect resulted in approximately U.S.$15 billion in foreign assistance to Pakistan between fiscal year 2002 and 2009 (including the Coalition Support Funds).

This study explores three hypotheses derived from realist-, liberal- and constructivist perspectives in the study of International Relations and Foreign Policy, in order to explain the *strong-pro* attitude of the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan in the wake of September 11. Based on interviews with U.S. and Pakistani officials and policy analysts, in addition to studies of official documents, news articles and reports from various sources; I argue that security interests motivated the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan under President Bush. Short-term security concerns seem to have topped the political agenda and received priority above the stated idealist agenda of spreading liberal values like economic and political freedom. The strategic significance of the Afghan-Pakistani border and the U.S. need for supply lines for its operations in Afghanistan served as necessary factors for the Bush administration’s policy toward Pakistan, and perhaps even sufficient factors to explain the policy shift from a *weak-con* attitude to a *strong-pro* attitude in the after math of September 11, 2001.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the political section at the Norwegian embassy in Washington D.C. for giving me the opportunity to learn more about U.S. politics and U.S. foreign policy as their intern in 2008. I had to decide the theme for my thesis, at the time when the Pakistani military went into the Swat Valley to fight the Taliban in the spring of 2009. Large amounts of U.S. aid had been channeled to Pakistan and my curiosity to understand the rationale behind the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan grew. I hope that a better understanding of the past can make us better equipped for making policies which contribute to a peaceful Pakistan in the future.

I would like to thank the Freedom of Expression Foundation (Fritt Ord) Oslo, for granting me a scholarship, and thus enabling me to conduct a field trip to Washington D.C. to collect data for the thesis. I am grateful to those who helped me arrange the interviews, and to the U.S. and Pakistani officials and policy analysts who served as my informants. The key information obtained through the interviews made the process of writing the thesis exciting. I would also like to thank my friends in Washington D.C. for their hospitality. I am grateful to all my friends, family and fellow students who have encouraged me during the process of writing of this thesis.

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Oslo, May 2010
Reidun Bolsø
# List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Coalition Support Funds</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>United States Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter Service Intelligence</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<td>NRO</td>
<td>National Reconciliation Order</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy of the United States of America</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
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<td>PMLQ</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League-Uqaid-e-Azam</td>
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<td>ROZ</td>
<td>Reconstruction Opportunity Zones</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USTR</td>
<td>Office of the United States Trade Representative,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Executive office of the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Research question .................................................................................................................................. 2
1.2 Initial remarks on the choice of theoretical perspectives ...................................................................... 4
1.3 Conceptual clarifications ....................................................................................................................... 7
1.4 Remarks on research design .................................................................................................................. 9
1.4.1 The case study: What it can do and what it does not pretend to do .................................................. 9
1.4.2 Methods for gathering of empirical data ........................................................................................ 11
1.4.3 Methods for the analysis of data ..................................................................................................... 15
1.5 Structure of the study ........................................................................................................................... 16

2 United States Foreign Policy toward Pakistan (2001-9) ................................................................. 18
2.1 U.S.-Pakistani relations – historically speaking .................................................................................... 18
2.2 U.S. Pakistan-policy: From President Bush’s inauguration and until September 11, 2001 ................. 19
2.3 Post- September 11 reversal of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan .................................................. 21
2.3.1 Pakistan as a front-line state in the fight against terrorism ............................................................ 22
2.3.2 A shift away from the conditionality focus on U.S. aid to Pakistan .............................................. 25

3 Theoretical Approaches to the study of Foreign Policy ...................................................................... 31
3.1 Political realism ..................................................................................................................................... 31
3.1.1 Waltz’ structural realist perspective .............................................................................................. 32
3.1.2 Political realism: Deducing hypothesis and operationalizing key variables ............................... 33
3.2 Liberal approach to foreign policy ...................................................................................................... 35
3.2.1 Liberal theory according to Moravcsik ......................................................................................... 36
3.2.2 Commercial liberalism: Deducing hypothesis and operationalizing key variables ....................... 39
3.3 Constructivist approaches to foreign policy ........................................................................................ 41
3.3.1 Constructivism applied: American exceptionalism ................................................................. 42
3.3.2 Republican liberalism and constructivism: Deducing hypothesis and operationalizing key variables ...................................................................................................................... 44
3.4 Hypotheses summed up ..................................................................................................................... 47

4 Empirical mapping of independent variables (Xn) ............................................................................. 48
4.1 Empirical mapping of the security variable (X₁): U.S. policy statements and actions ....................... 48
4.1.1 Estimating the terrorist threat ........................................................................................................ 48
4.1.2 U.S. cooperation with Pakistani authorities .............................................................................. 51
4.2 Empirical mapping of the economy-variable (X₂): U.S. policy statements and actions .......................................................... 55
4.2.1 The Bush administration’s policy statements on economy ..................... 55
4.2.2 United States’ foreign direct investment and trade with Pakistan ................ 57
4.2.3 Trade policy in practice: tariffs, quotas and free trade agreements ............ 59
4.3 Empirical mapping of the democracy promotion variable (X₃): U.S. policy statements and actions .......................................................... 63
4.3.1 The Bush administration’s policy statements on democracy promotion .......... 63
4.3.2 U.S. democracy promotion: concepts and strategies ............................... 64
4.3.3 U.S. Democracy and governance assistance to Pakistan in numbers .......... 67
4.3.4 Facing the political situation in Pakistan ................................................ 71
4.4 Empirical findings along the dependent variable and the independent variables .... 74
5 Empirical analysis: Explaining U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan .......... 76
5.1 To what extent and how has U.S. security interests influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan? (hypothesis 1) ........................................ 76
5.2 To what extent and how has U.S. economic interests influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan? (hypothesis 2) ............................... 80
5.3 To what extent and how has the wish to promote democracy in Pakistan influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan? (hypothesis 3) ............................... 85
5.4 Final comprehensive analysis: Towards the construction of a credible narrative of the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan (2001-2009) ........................................ 90
6 Concluding remarks ................................................................................. 96
6.1 Research question, research design and main findings ................................ 96
6.2 Limits of the study; further study ............................................................ 97
References ................................................................................................. 99
Appendix .................................................................................................. 109
List of tables and figures

Table 1 Classification of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan 2001-2009.............................. 29
Table 2 Hypotheses and sources of empirical evidence.............................................................. 47
Table 3 Empirical findings of the case along the dependent variable and the independent variables ................................................................................................................................. 75

Figure 1 U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Pakistan FY 2000-2008......................... 28
Figure 2 U.S Trade in goods with Pakistan from 2000-2009...................................................... 58
Figure 3 Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan FY 2000-1 to 2008-9............................................. 59
Figure 4 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan in FY 2001 to 2008.............................................. 68
Figure 5 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan by Sector in FY 2008 to 2009......................... 70
1 Introduction

A reversal of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan took place in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. President Bush gave the world an ultimatum: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 2001). General Musharraf declared Pakistan an ally in the fight against terrorism (Kronstadt 2008:45), and in a short period of time, proliferation-related, democracy-related and debt-related sanctions toward Pakistan were eased or lifted. All of a sudden the United States found itself to be allied with Pakistan, whose democratically elected government had been overthrown by a military coup in 1999. Pakistan emerged as a major recipient of American foreign assistance.

With its border to Afghanistan, Pakistan is one of the most important conflict zones in the world today. The situation in Pakistan has an extended effect on the stability of both its surrounding region and larger parts of the world due to the security threat of international terrorism. The political situation has been characterized as a “permanent state of crisis” (Rahman 2009:39), and there is a need to ensure control with Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal, in addition to combating poverty and terrorism among other challenges. ¹ Pakistan has received approximately U.S.$15 billion in security-related and economic-related assistance from the United States between fiscal year (FY) 2002 to 2009 (Kronstadt 2010), but the security situation remains critical. This study examines the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan under President George W. Bush 2001-9. I intend to unravel some of the factors that influenced the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan, believing that a better understanding of past U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan is important because so many factors are at stake.

1.1 Research question

The Bush administration has through its foreign policy statements expressed wishes to fulfill many different objectives. Two idealistic goals have been to defend liberty and justice: “America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property” (NSS 2002:3). Declaring its idealistic intentions, the Bush administration also acknowledged that: “the first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been: to protect the American people and American interests” (NSS 2006:18). However, observers have disputed what the national interests of the United States really consist of, and how they come into being. Arriving at a policy mix toward Pakistan that best advances the United States’ values and interests probably involved trade-offs: between short-term goals and long term-goals, and between bare-boned security interests and more idealistic interests like democracy and human-rights issues:

“The United States will stand with and support advocates of freedom in every land […] As we consider which approaches to take, we will be guided by what will most effectively advance freedom’s cause while we balance other interests that are vital to the security and well-being of the American people” (NSS 2006:6).²

Different types of constraints limit policy makers in the conduct of foreign policy. Understanding U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan requires paying attention both to the intentions of the executive and the structural constraints that have limited or facilitated various policy actions. Lack of accordance between general policy statements and real policy actions may reflect the prioritizing of some objectives over others, the inclination in politics to hide real motivations, or weak coordination between the many policy makers and civil servants. This study will focus on the political, economic and military aspects of the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan.

² It is not necessary fruitful to juxtapose security concerns and democracy concerns since the democratic peace literature suggests that enlarging the democratic zone will increase the security of states. However, several democracy promotion strategies are possible, and promoting democracy might lead to trade-offs between stability (status quo) and uncertainty (democratic transition).
The research question and guiding compass of the master thesis is thus as follows:

What characterizes the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan in the George W. Bush presidential era, and how can this policy be explained?

The research question is two-dimensional. The first part: “What characterizes the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan during George W. Bush’s presidency?” is of a descriptive character. The description of the foreign policy of the United States toward Pakistan is based on what I consider as key events in the bilateral relationship, which can represent continuity or rupture in the American foreign policies toward Pakistan. I will attempt to describe, conceptualize and classify the main features of the Pakistan policy. The second part of the research question holds an explanatory ambition: “How can the Bush administration’s foreign policy toward Pakistan be explained?” I do not aim to give an all-embracing description of the different aspects of the foreign policies, but rather try to map some of the most important policy statements and actions, which together can serve to map and conceptualize the Pakistan policy during the period when Bush was the executive (January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009).

I will investigate three hypotheses derived from realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives, and investigate empirically the possible enabling and motivating factors behind U.S. policies toward Pakistan. The hypotheses of this case-study are not tested in a controlled sense of the word. Rather, the hypotheses are perceived as (i) a deductive and particular extension of the theoretical insights this study build upon; (ii) a heuristic device leaving no doubt as to what are the main foci of the study; and (iii) an analytical tool directing the attention toward which empirical facts – circumstantial evidence or smoking guns – support or speak against the explanatory candidates under consideration. The final narrative (or narratives) on the rationale for the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan 2001-9 should thus be evaluated in terms of it providing a credible interpretation of the empirical evidence presented and the theoretical insight
provided in the proceeding chapters, rather than being understood as the result of a scientifically controlled test procedure.

1.2 Initial remarks on the choice of theoretical perspectives

With limited amount of time and resources available, theories can help serve as a starting point for the analysis, and give an idea of where the researcher could focus attention. I agree with theoretical pluralists who emphasize the importance of considering several theoretical perspectives when studying a phenomenon that exists in the connection between domestic politics and international politics. Theories are useful in the process of identifying promising explanatory factors, whether they relate to agency (actors) or structure (framework conditions such as e.g. power-distribution, international norms, configurations of interests etc.). The complexity of foreign policy makes it difficult to develop a single overarching theory that can explain all foreign policy behavior (Schmidt 2008:8).

I have chosen to use three theoretical traditions serve as the theoretical foundation for the analysis, some of which are theories of international relations. A theory of international relations (IR) aims to explain general patterns of interaction between states. A theory of foreign policy, on the other hand, attempts to explain the foreign policy and behavior of a particular state. Different theories emphasize different social values. In order to capture different sources of American foreign policy making, I rely on three theoretical approaches, and four theoretical perspectives, each suggesting variables of influence on the formulation of foreign policy.

When Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) appeared as a field of study in the 1960s, the analytical priority that had been given to the international level in studies of IR came under scrutiny. FPA scholars began to argue for an approach that did not treat states as black boxes. Alternate frameworks of analysis developed, opening up the study of the potential influence of a variety of different factors on foreign policy behavior. (Guzzini & Rynning 2002: 2). For instance did Graham T. Allison propose to study foreign policy as a decision-making process, challenging the view of the state as a
unitary actor in his conceptual model named bureaucratic politics (Guzzini & Rynning 2002:2, Allison 1969:707). 3

Theories in the study of foreign policy can be divided into those that accentuate internal or domestic factors versus those that favor external or systemic factors (Schmidt 2008:10-11). Those that argue from an inside-out-perspective highlight the influence of the domestic environment on a state’s foreign policy. Liberalism, Marxism and cognitive theory are examples of domestic theories that understand pressure from within the state as a determining factor in the nature of the state’s foreign policy (Hill 2003:31, Rose 1998:163, Schmidt 2008:13). 4 An analysis from an inside-out perspective is either on the individual and/or group level, or on the state level. A state-level analysis focuses on the how the policy making takes place within the context of a political structure. Seen from this perspective, the foreign policy can be influenced, for example, by a country’s type of government or its foreign policy-making actors (Rourke 2007:76,79). Domestic politics and domestic institutions can thus work to broaden or limit the policy maker’s scope of action. Those who favor analysis at the individual-level emphasize the human beings behind the policy. This level of analysis views the decision making process as influenced by cognitive, emotional, psychological and biological factors, as well as by rational calculations (Rourke 2007:63).

Those who argue from an outside-in perspective understand foreign policy as primarily shaped by the external environment. The emphasis of the analysis is therefore on the system level. In the United States, for example, a systemic constraint is external to the country itself, and can be defined as “a property of the international system that restricts freedom of action by forbidding, or raising the costs of, certain kinds of actions, or compelling other kinds of actions” (Brooks & Wohlforth 2008:4).

3 Based on his study of the Cuban missile crisis, Allison noted that: “The leaders who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group (…) What the nation does is sometimes the result of the triumph of one group over others. More often, however, different groups pulling in different directions yield a resultant distinct from what anyone intended” (Allison 1969:707). This analytical framework is an alternative to the realist approach that assume that the state is a rational, unitary actor.

4 Some strands within the liberal camp can also be classified as using an outside-in perspective, such as for instance liberal institutionalism.
Examples of external restraints in foreign policy making can be the international system’s structural characteristics, its power relationships, its economic realities, and its norms (Rourke 2007:88).

Not all theories fit into the theoretical divide between inside-out and outside-in perspectives. The structural realist Kenneth Waltz, often termed a neo-realist, argues in his theory of international relations that foreign policy is driven by both internal and external factors, but assumes that foreign policies that are not rational from a structural realist’s view are characterized by “irrationality” at the domestic level. Ideology is seen as one important source of irrationality, for example (Guzzini & Rynning 2002).  

Understanding the complexities of foreign policy requires the researcher to pay attention to the intentions of the foreign policy makers, as well the internal and external framework conditions that enable or restrict the foreign policy makers to act on their intentions (enabling and limiting factors). Motivating factors are the intentions of the actor when taking into account the actor’s interests and preferences. The executive branch’s interests and preferences are shaped within the external and internal framework conditions that exist. However, the executive branch of the U.S., which for instance is limited internally by the laws of the U.S. Congress, can also to a certain degree exceed some influence on Congress to change the internal framework conditions, and thus work to enlarge the president and the administration’s scope of action. I will make a distinction between motivating and enabling factors, in my attempt to explain U.S. foreign policy. Potential contributory-, necessary- or even sufficient factors in the causal relationship between the dependent and the independent variables will also be sought identified.

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5 It is implicitly assumed that states ought to be security maximisers. States who live up to the realist maxim of securing state survival will adhere to an approach called Realpolitik. See Chapter 3 for an explanation.
6 The notion of a state preference will be explained later in Chapter 3.
7 I lay John Gerring’s notion of a causal relationship to the ground here. Gerring defines a causal relationship as “a relationship where- minimally- a causal factor (X) may be said to raise the probability of an effect occurring (Y)” (Gerring 2007:212). When I use the terms variable and factor, this notion is general, and does not presume statistical analysis. A contributory factor raises the probability of an effect occurring (Y). A deterministic way of arguing would be to say that a factor is necessary or sufficient to produce a specific outcome (Gerring 2007:212-3).
1.3 Conceptual clarifications

Foreign policy can be defined briefly as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (Hill 2003:3). The above-mentioned definition is broad enough to include the external behavior of actors such as the European Union, or a multinational corporation. The official external relations of the United States can – according to this notion of the term ‘foreign policy’ – consist of everything that a given actor generates officially at the international level (Hill 2003:4). In an effort to specify what foreign policy consists of, it is common to emphasize the political aspects of the activity, meaning the “actions, statements and values relating to how the actor wishes to advance its main objectives and to shape the external world” (Hill 2003:4). The focus of this study will therefore be on the actions, statements, and values of the Bush administration in its relationship with Pakistan.

The United States has different foreign policy tools at hand in order to achieve its many objectives. The main available tools are diplomacy, military force, economic sanctions, public diplomacy and foreign aid.8 “Foreign aid is probably the most flexible tool – it can act as both carrot and stick, and is a means of influencing events, solving, specific problems, and projecting U.S. values” (Tarnoff & Nowels 2004:1). The limits of American power are widely debated among scholars. Some argue that the United States, because of its unique power composition, is free from many of the constraints that other states confront, and can thus act unilaterally on many issues, triumphing its will on the international arena.9 Others tend to stress the multipolar structure that is developing in the economic area, emphasizing the effects of a globalized economy and the increasing number of states possessing significant economic power. The power of a state may be defined as the resources a state possesses relative to other states, such as territory, population, natural resources, political stability, military force, economic strength and so forth (Nye 2002: 548).

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8 The term public diplomacy refers “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television” (U.S. Department of State 1987:85).
9 See Brooks and Wohlforth (2008) for an elaboration on the topic.
Even though the United States is powerful with regards to its resources relative to other states, the threat of international terrorism demands that the United States must cooperate in some ways with other states in order to protect its citizens. Possessing resources does not necessarily automatically translate into the ability to obtain the outcome a country wants. A broader definition of power is thus: “the ability to influence others to produce outcomes one wants” (Nye 2008:58). This definition of power assumes that power can only be effective in certain situations.

In the foreign policy-making process of the United States, one can distinguish between the official “makers” – such as the president, the bureaucracy, and Congress – and the non-official “shapers,” such as interest groups and the media (Ginsberg & Lowi 2002: 363-368).\(^\text{10}\) Foreign policy decisions can be made without the president’s approval, but all decisions are made and implemented in the name of the head of state (Ginsberg & Lowi 2002:364). As head of state, the president is commonly viewed as the most important decision maker in the United States’ foreign policy. Key advisors among the White House Staff help the president make policy decisions. Secretaries of the department of State, Defense, and the Treasury, in addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCOS) and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are regarded as the “key players” of the foreign policy establishment (Ginsberg & Lowi 2002:365). Congress has increased its role in foreign policy making due to the increasing number of foreign policies that require financial approval by Congress. “The open structure of Congress and its frequent elections provides access to individuals and groups that seek to affect foreign policy” (Deudney & Meiser 2008:29). A joint congress has the authority to revoke the executive agreements of the president.\(^\text{11}\)

Foreign policy analysts have disputed the degree of influence that different actors have on foreign policy decisions, but it is safe to say that the influence will vary with the case at hand, and the different conditions and constraints that may exist: “even though

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\(^\text{10}\) The Congress consists of two chambers: The House of Representatives and The Senate. “Interest groups are groups of individuals that share a common set of goals and have joined together in an effort to persuade the government to adopt policies that will help them” (Ginsberg & Lowi 2002:307).

\(^\text{11}\) An executive agreement is an “agreement between the president and another country, which has the force of a treaty but does not require the Senate’s advice and consent” (Ginsberg & Lowi 2002: Appendix 33).
foreign policy making in non-crisis situations may more closely resemble the pluralistic politics of domestic policy making, foreign policy making is still a narrow arena with few participants” (Ginsberg & Lowi 2002: 368).

1.4 Remarks on research design

The study of U.S. foreign policy under President Bush requires a case study approach. The case study approach is not a choice, but follows from the formulation of a particular research question. A case can be defined as “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring 2007:19). The United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan during President Bush constitutes the case that is to be studied. There are a variety of ways to define and apply case studies, but I find John Gerring’s definition useful due to its openness to the analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data.12 Gerring defines the case study as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)” (Gerring 2007:20). The U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan is part of a larger class of cases – more specifically, the United States’ foreign policy toward all countries.

1.4.1 The case study: What it can do and what it does not pretend to do

What are the merits and limitations of a case study-approach in constructing (or producing) knowledge? Traditionally the case study has been ranked low by positivist-oriented scientists because it limits the ability to develop generalizing theories through the testing and falsification of statements that could improve the social scientist’s capacity of prediction (Knutsen & Moses 2007:8-9, Lijphart 1971).13 I agree that by studying only the foreign policy toward Pakistan will make it impossible to know what is specific for the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan, and what is general for the U.S. foreign policies toward all countries. However, when the nature of the studied phenomenon makes it impossible to make before-after comparisons where one

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12 The term qualitative refers to few observations analyzed with words. The term quantitative refers to many observations analyzed with numbers (statistically) (Gerring 2007:216).

13 Knutsen and Moses use the term naturalist to give a more neutral an descriptive term of the essential characteristics of what is known as the positivist-, empiricist-, behavioralist- methodology (Knutsen & Moses 2007:8)
variable changes - or when it is impossible to control for all the variables that might have influenced the outcome – a favorable solution is a research design based on reasonable interpretations of empirical data. A case study has a delimited empirical focus, which allows us to pay much more attention to context than is possible in high N studies. Sometimes it is useful to seek an understanding of the whole, by focusing on some of its key parts and investigating the particular (Gerring 2007:1). When analyzing one case as opposed to several cases, the scope of the causal inferences one can make tend to be deep rather than broad (Gerring 2007:49).14

There are many challenges when it comes to interpreting the sources and causes of foreign policy decisions. George and Bennett point out how academic scholars tend to assume “an orderly and more rational policymaking process than is justified” (2005:98). The authors warn against “the common cognitive bias toward univariate explanations which there appears to be a single clear and dominating reason for the decision in question” (George & Bennett 2005:98). I will draw upon realist, liberalist and constructivist variables within the framework of a case study. By including variables from three different theories, I have tried to live up to their appeal to be sensitive to the possibility that several factors might have motivated a specific decision. The theoretical perspectives offer different descriptions of the world (ontology), and are epistemologically different.15 An elaboration on this topic will be found in the theoretical chapter. What influences the scope of analysis is not as much the theoretical choice, but the fact that this is a case study, with the limits and options that come with it. I find it important to clarify that the aim of this study is not to assess how much a variable mattered, but rather to assess whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome. This type of analysis is precisely one of the strong points that can be attributed to the case study as a research design (George & Bennett 2005:25).

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14 The study of a sample of cases is termed *cross-case studies* by John Gerring. “The fewer cases there are, and the more intensively they are studied, the more a work merits the appellation *case study*” (Gerring 2007:20).
15 Ontology is the “theory of being: what is the world made of? what objects do we study?”, epistemology is the “theory of knowledge: how do we come to have knowledge of the world?” and methodology is the “theory of methods: what methods do we use to unearth data and evidence?” (Kurki and Wight 2007:14).
1.4.2 Methods for gathering of empirical data

“The most important rule for all data collection is to report how the data were created and how we came to possess them” (King, Keohane & Verba 1994:51).

Studying contemporary foreign policies can be challenging due to the somewhat limited access to relevant data. The studied phenomenon here is recent in time, and some of the information is classified because of security concerns. I have sought to find empirical evidence that can either strengthen or weaken the different empirical propositions. The historical method has been utilized to gather information for the analysis, meaning that when I have gathered empirical evidence I have aimed for primary sources when possible, but included secondary sources when I have found it necessary. 16 I have gathered data that I have found to be important to shed light on the research question, and tried to rely on historical accounts from authors and interview subjects with different backgrounds, as much as time and resources have allowed me.17 Government documents like Congressional decisions, speeches, and press releases from the American government are examples of primary sources. I have also used secondary sources like articles, books and reports written by academics, journalists, politicians and Non Governmental Organizations. In addition, I have conducted interviews with people who have been involved, or are currently involved, in the decision making or the execution of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan, or Pakistan’s foreign policy toward the U.S. I spent one week in Washington D.C. in February 2010, but I did not aim to get interviews with the most central policy makers during Bush. However, when I was in Washington I realized that it was easier to get interviews than I had thought beforehand. I was lucky to get interviews with six people, including the former United States’ ambassador to Pakistan (2001-2), officials currently working for the U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of Defense, staff for Congress, and the

16 A primary source is closest to a specific event both in time and space (Kjeldstadli 1992:169), including eyewitness accounts and for instance original documents (Knutsen & Moses 2007:120-1). Historical studies investigate and “build cases around evidence. The core of the historical method is to probe the evidence in order to ascertain if it is solid” (Knutsen & Moses 2007:117). Limiting the empirical exploration by deducing hypotheses, however, is not a technique that historians usually limit themselves to (Knutsen & Moses 2007:117).

17 I have focused the data collection around events and features of the foreign policy, that I and the interviewed informants see as key to understand U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan. I have read several general reports on U.S. Pakistan-relations, and had to use a variety of sources in my attempts to verify the stories and claims made by the informants.
Embassy of Pakistan in Washington D.C. I also conducted an interview with a Pakistani political and strategic analyst Shuja Nawaz. Mr Nawaz is the Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center in Washington D.C., and comments to the media on U.S. Pakistan-policy, and testifies in the U.S. Congress on U.S.-Pakistan relations frequently. Ambassador Chamberlin can serve as primary source for the period when she was ambassador, but she continued being an active part of the U.S. think-thank community in Washington when she came back from Islamabad. I informed the informants that I was a student, and asked if it was alright that I quoted them. Moreover did I ask them specifically if could refer to them by their name. Policy analyst Shuja Nawaz, and the Ambassador Chamberlin will be identified by name. See appendix 3 for information about the informants, and details on Chamberlin’s period as ambassador.

The rest of the interviews were conducted on background, meaning that I could use the information but the sources could not be identified by name. Due to the politically sensitive case at hand, many of the sources wanted to be anonymous in order to provide candid assessments. Some of the anonymous informants were close to central agents in the U.S. foreign policy making toward Pakistan, which potentially makes them easy to identify. It has been challenging to refer to them, and at the same time make sure that their identity is not revealed in the text. To quote them without jeopardizing their anonymity was sometimes impossible.  

Nearly all allowed me to use a tape recorder. I questioned the informants about their background in order to know which time periods and policy fields they could speak of as an authority. I found my interview objects to be quite open about the limits of their knowledge with regard to time period, access to central policy makers, and issues at hand. When I have had doubts about their proximity to the political process, I have been reluctant to give their

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18 The complete transcription of the interviews, as well as notes from the interviews conducted without a tape-recorder, is with the author.
19 The Congressional staffer asked me not to use a tape recorder due to the office policy. I did not use a tape recorder during the interview with the official from State Department either because the interview took place in a noisy restaurant. When quoting the official from the State Department and the Congressional staffer, these quotes are based upon my own recollection, with the limitations that come with it. The notes that were taken during the interview were rewritten immediately afterword while my memory was still fresh.
statements much weight. However, it is important to note that though the informants sometimes do not speak of an issue with first-hand knowledge, they posit extensive knowledge on U.S.-Pakistan relations, and can provide empirically informed analyses that also can be of interest. I cannot go into details on their background without jeopardizing the anonymity they have requested. I understand that this gives the reader a limited capability to judge the weight that should to be put on a source’s information. I have tried to confront this challenge by relying on multiple sources.

The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that I had already made an interview guide with questions that were somewhat related to my hypotheses (see appendix 1 for the interview guide). I always started the interview with what James Spradley (1979) calls a “grand tour question, meaning that the questions are open-ended, inviting respondents to give a verbal tour on an area they have knowledge on” (Spradley 1979 referred to in Leech 2002:665). I asked follow-up questions during the interview, and when I sensed that the interview wasn’t helpful in a particular area, I tried to “move more quickly to questions that might have a higher payoff” (Berry 2002:680). The respondents were not always asked the questions in the same order, because I found a conversational flow to “outweigh the disadvantages of inconsistent ordering” (Aberbach & Rockman 2002:674). However, I made sure to ask grand tour questions before I moved on to the more specific one.

I managed to set up the interviews through a variety of contacts. The diplomats at the Norwegian Embassy in Washington D.C. invited me to join in on two separate meetings with officials from the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Department of Defense. I set up the meeting with policy analyst Shuja Nawaz and Ambassador

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20 The interview with the Congressional staffer is less quoted in the text because I found the informant to be very biased with regards to party affiliation; which could jeopardize the informant’s anonymity, and reduce the reliability of the data. The informant asked me specifically not to provide information on neither party affiliation nor Committee that the informant worked for.

21 The Norwegian diplomat left before I began the interview with the official from the State Department. In the case of the interview with the senior official from the Department of Defense, a Norwegian diplomat joined in on the meeting that was set up only for the interview. I have no reasons to believe that the presence of the Norwegian embassy personnel limited the informant in any way. The Bush-era is over and there seemed to be a relaxed atmosphere in Washington with regards to the airing of critical statements about the Bush-period.
Chamberlin independently of others.\textsuperscript{22} A Norwegian official based at the Ministry of Defense in Norway provided me with a contact in Congress, resulting in an interview with a Congressional staffer. The interview with the Pakistani diplomat working at the political section at Pakistan’s embassy in D.C. was a chance encounter set up through the neighbor of my hosts in D.C.

Data on U.S. military and non-military assistance to Pakistan has been gathered from the database of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), named USAID’s Greenbook. It proved difficult to obtain data that was both detailed and comparable for the whole period (FY 2001-9). The database of USAID only accounts for assistance data throughout FY 2008, and it has not been possible to obtain complete data on the total numbers or the allocations of the democracy and governance assistance throughout the studied period.\textsuperscript{23} A non-public factsheet on U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan in FY 2008 and 2009 by sector, was given to me an anonymous official working at the State Department (se appendix 2). However, I did not get any response on my request for detailed information about the data, such as whether the data were in constant dollars or in historic dollars, or if I could get information for the whole Bush-period. The assistance data from USAID are in constant dollars, meaning that it is inflation-adjusted and thus allows “for comparison of levels of assistance in different time periods” (USAID Greenbook 2010). Data on U.S. direct overt aid and military reimbursements (Coalitions Support Funds) to Pakistan for the whole period has been prepared by Alan Kronstadt for the Congressional Research Service based on data from U.S. Departments of Defense, State, Agriculture as well as USAID. The data presented by Kronstadt allow for a complete overview of the whole period, but are not is not as detailed, and will therefore be used mainly to distinguish between security-related and economic-related

\textsuperscript{22} But it was one of the Norwegian diplomats that made me aware of that Shuja Nawaz was situated in D.C. and not in Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{23} The U.S. fiscal year “is the accounting period for the federal government which begins on October 1 and ends on September 30. The fiscal year is designated by the calendar year in which it ends; for example, fiscal year 2006 begins on October 1, 2005 and ends on September 30, 2006” (U.S. Senate 2010).
assistance, as well as for the provision of numbers on military reimbursements to Pakistan (CSF) (Kronstadt 2010). 24

1.4.3 Methods for the analysis of data

This thesis will be written within an interpretative framework where the majority of the data will be qualitative. 25 I will read texts, interpret the material and make inferences about the connections in the empiric material. 26 I will try to employ “careful source criticism”, meaning that I seek to question the motives of my informants and of those who have written the texts that I am reading. Attempting to pay attention to the context that the data were produced in, as well as seeking to explore how the specific data “relate to other documents on the same subjects” (Evans 1997:19 cited in Knutsen & Moses 2007:121). Analyzing the data I have tried to keep in mind that “it is not the obligation of a subject to be objective and to tell us the truth” (Berry 2002:680). In order to minimize this problem, again, I tried to rely on multiple sources of data.

When drawing inferences from policy statements, it is important to be aware that states do not necessarily want others to know their intentions. Nicholas Onuf describes the observer challenge well: “As observers look more closely, they discover that many policy statements are fictions, and that many agents are not talking. The closer they look, the less they find” (Onuf 2001:90). This difficulty is often due to the strategic situations that states find themselves in. A strategic situation is when “an actor’s ability to further its ends depends on the actions that others take” (Lake & Powell 1999:8 cited in Onuf 2001:78). Statements of intentions might contain lies, bluffs and threats, and one can question whether they should constitute a legitimate unit of analysis in this study. I concur with Onuf when he concludes that “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, highly formal policy statements, as declarations of intentions, are policies” (Onuf 2001:79). However an understanding of the administration’s

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24 See Kronstadt (2010) for specifics on which programs he lists as security related and economic related. The numbers for FY 2009 are not totally clear yet, but the U.S. Congress appropriated 1.2 billion for FY 2009.
25 Interpretivism can be defined broadly as “study of human beings and intentions”: Hermeneutics is a near-synonym to interpretivism (Gerring 2007:214).
26 Objectivity is a hard attainable goal in social science, but it is nonetheless always an ideal that I have strived towards in my research.
foreign policy toward Pakistan requires that general policy statements should be viewed within the context of the more specific policies the administration has issued. Speeches and declarations made by government representatives, as well as evidence of real policies, will compose part of the data I will analyze.

My epistemological focus is on constructing probable explanations (narratives) of American foreign policy toward Pakistan, which account for both motivational and enabling factors. Additional data that challenges my data might exist in public, or be made available with time. The explanations (narratives) offered in this study must therefore be understood to be of a temporary character (such as with all other research). Criteria for evaluating the reliability and the validity of this study will involve an evaluation of the empirical analysis.\(^\text{27}\) I have tried to make it easy for others to investigate my sources so they can interpret the empirical material for themselves. The analysis should be evaluated based on whether I succeed in making credible and reliable interpretations of the empirical material.

1.5 Structure of the study

I will attempt to answer the two-dimensional research question in four stages. Prior to the theorizing and empirical mapping of explanatory dimensions of the study (the independent variables), I will first give a brief introduction to the history of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, and map and conceptualize the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan under the leadership of President George W. Bush (the dependent variable) in chapter 2. The foreign policy toward Pakistan

\(^{27}\) Donald Campbell has made a distinction between internal and external validity. The suggested definition of internal validity was; the “appropriate validity with which we infer a relationship between two variables is causal”. External validity was understood as “the approximate validity with which we can infer that the presumed causal relationship can be generalized to and across alternate measures of the cause and effects as well as across different types of persons, settings and times” (Cook & Campbell 1979:37 cited in Knutsen & Moses 2007:296). Case-studies are generally “weaker with respect to external validity than its cross-case cousin” (Gerring 2007:43). According to Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, reliability means “that applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure” (1994:167). However, the conducted interviews were unique in their context and cannot be replicated. Moreover does the subjective element of this interpretative case-study make it more difficult to produce “the same measure”. To confront this challenge, I have tried to account for how I obtained my data and shared my reflections about the process of gathering and collecting data. I have tried to make my interpretations as transparent as possible, by including many quotes by the informants.
during Bush’s presidency will be divided into two phases, based upon what I find to be variations in the direction (pro or con) and the strength (weak or strong), in the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan. The direction of the American executive’s Pakistan policy is understood as the administration’s general attitude toward Pakistan. Has the general attitude of the American executive been pro-Pakistani, or of a more critical nature? The strength refers to the force that has followed the attitude. Has the American executive put pressure behind its attitude toward Pakistan? The dependent variable “United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan” will thus have four categories: weak pro, strong pro, weak con and strong con. The theoretical perspectives that will be applied in this study will be presented in chapter 3, followed by the deduction of hypotheses and operationalization of key variables. The empirical mapping of the hypotheses will take place in chapter 4. The first part of chapter 5 will contain an empirical analysis of each hypothesis. The second part will consist of an evaluation of the different hypotheses in relation to each other. In this final comprehensive analysis I attempt to explain the U.S. foreign policy by presenting a credible narrative of the dynamics of the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan during President Bush. Chapter 6 will contain some concluding remarks.

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28 This categorization is inspired by Anne Lise Aastad’s classification of the United States’ foreign policy toward Israel (2007:10).
2 United States Foreign Policy toward Pakistan (2001-9)

Prior to the theorizing and empirical mapping of explanatory dimensions of the study (the independent variables), I will first give a brief introduction to the history of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, before I continue to map and conceptualize the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan under the leadership of President George W. Bush (the dependent variable). A table that portrays the classification of the dependent variable will be found in the last section of this chapter.

2.1 U.S.-Pakistani relations – historically speaking

A historic perspective shows that U.S. - Pakistani relations during the last half century have been tumultuous. When Pakistan received its independence in 1947, it needed an ally to safeguard against India’s territorial ambitions. The United States found Pakistan attractive with its proximity to the Persian Gulf and borders with India, China and Afghanistan. The Pakistani leadership promised to assist in the battle against communism, and contribute with troops to safeguard the Middle East’s oil resources (Nawaz 2008:92-98). Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement with the United States in 1954 and subsequently began to receive U.S. military aid (Nawaz 2008:118, 131-6). In the late 1970s, as Pakistan’s nuclear program and armed conflicts with India caused rising concern, the United States cut off assistance to Pakistan. However, the American policy of prioritizing nuclear proliferation concerns did not last for long. In the end of the 70s, the U.S. foreign policy was quickly reversed when Pakistan gained strength as a strategic asset to the United States, serving as a base for the U.S.-supported Islamic extremists (mujahedin) who fought against the Soviet in Afghanistan (Cronin, Kronstadt & Squassoni 2007:102, Hadar 2002:8, Musharraf 2008:208). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) provided the mujahedin with U.S. weapons and assistance (Katzman 2009:2). Pakistan focused on preventing an India-friendly-regime in Kabul, and therefore it made sense for Pakistan to support the mujahedin and the “Indian-hating Taliban” (Rashid 2009:110).
A new shift in American policy toward Pakistan came when the Cold War ended in 1989. Pakistan’s continuing efforts to enhance their nuclear weapons capability made the country subject to sanctions (Cronin, Kronstadt & Squassoni 2007:102). Further economic sanctions were imposed on both India and Pakistan after the countries tested nuclear explosive devices in May 1998. By the time George W. Bush took over after President Bill Clinton, some of the proliferation-related economic and military sanctions toward India and Pakistan had already been lifted or eased, and the president had been granted authority to remove the rest of the restriction (Rennack 2001:1). Pakistan, however, was subsequently made ineligible for most forms of U.S. foreign assistance for two other reasons: (i) General Musharraf’s overthrow of the democratically elected government in 1999 and (ii) Pakistan’s failure to service its debt to the U.S. (Rennack 2001: 5).

2.2 U.S. Pakistan-policy: From President Bush’s inauguration and until September 11, 2001

“When President Bush assumed office, I’d say Pakistani relations were at the very vigor. Pakistan was under pressure of sanctions so our relations were at the floor; they were very bad. We had cut off USAID assistance (…) but what was worse was that we had a decade of severing of military to military training liaison work, which meant that a whole generation of Pakistani military officers had missed out in having personal relations with our military officers” (Chamberlin 2010).

The quote from the interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, indicates that the relationship between the United States and Pakistan was quite chilly in the first months of Bush’s presidency. However, cooperation in some areas still existed. Prior to September 2001, Pakistan had only received aid to counter-narcotics and food assistance, which together totaled U.S. $5.4 million in FY 2001 (Lum 2002:21). Due to the sanction regime, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) did not have its own mission in Pakistan (USAID 2007). “The intelligence relationship between our CIA and their ISI was strained,” said Ambassador Chamberlin, but she confirmed that there was a connection: “Yes, we had ties” (Chamberlin 2010). Asking my informants to comment on the intelligence cooperation between the CIA and the ISI did not yield much information. The State
Department official responded bluntly: “I can’t comment on the CIA; even the CIA can’t comment on the CIA”.

Before September 11, according to Ambassador Chamberlin “only three nations in the world had ties with the Taliban: UAE [United Arab Emirates], Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. So we were pressing them [the Pakistanis] hard” (2010). According to President Pervez Musharraf’s auto-biography, Pakistan was “the only country maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taliban and their leader, Mullah Omar” up until the terrors attacks on September 11, 2001 (Musharraf 2008:200). In addition to urging Pakistan to end its relationship with the Taliban regime, policy analyst Shuja Nawaz said that the United States

“was pressing them [the Pakistanis] on Kashmir and on India, and on support for the jihadi groups in Kashmir (…) There had been a fair amount of consternation in the U.S. about Musharraf’s role vis-à-vis India about Kargil. The fact that he was still an autocrat, the U.S. was dealing with him, but it did not obviously prefer to deal with him. Bush inherited this kind of cool atmosphere from Clinton” (Nawaz 2010).

Nawaz refers to the tension between India and Pakistan due to the conflict over Kashmir, and the United States’ efforts to avoid more violence. Ambassador Chamberlin said she thought that the Bush administration came in wanting to resume ties with Pakistan in various ways, to get around the nuclear-related restrictions, because they obviously were not working “if the objective was to keep them from developing the bomb, they’d had it for a decade” (Chamberlin 2010). On my follow-up question as to whether the Bush administration recognized early on that the democracy-related sanctions were not working, and if the administration was thinking of easing up on those restrictions as well, Chamberlin responded:

“I'm not so sure. I can remember being in the State Department when Musharraf took over in 1999. And even then, even then, we regretted the democracy sanctions. I mean the State Department had to impose them because it was the law, but we didn’t impose them with a vengeance against Musharraf, because even then it was a – in the Clinton administration, an acknowledgement that the political leadership was horribly corrupt. There was a reason, there was a semi-legitimate shift. So yeah, they weren't adamantly opposed to Musharraf [my italics]” (Chamberlin 2010).
In a study of the attitudes underlying U.S. policy toward Pakistan from January 2000 to July 2009, James Clarke found that President Bush made no substantive reference to Pakistan between the inauguration in January 2001, and up until the terror attacks on September 11, 2001 (Clarke 2009: 26-7). I argue that the Bush administration up until September 11, 2001, had a weak-con-attitude toward Pakistan. Sustained diplomatic contact, and provision of U.S. assistance in areas like narcotics control and agriculture (food aid), in addition to the existence of intelligence cooperation between the ISI and the CIA, makes it unreasonable to claim that the U.S. policies reflected a strong-con-attitude. Meanwhile, the critical stance of the Bush administration with regard to the Pakistani support of the Taliban, and possible support for infiltrators in Kashmir, as well as the U.S. emphasis on lack of democracy in Pakistan, does not favor a claim that the policies of the Bush administration reflected a pro-Pakistan attitude.

2.3 Post-September 11 reversal of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a congressional authorization granted the U.S. president the power to:

“use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons” (Senate Joint Resolution 23/2001 cited in Ginsberg & Lowi 2002:364).

The resolution refers to the right to self-defense against a violent threat to national security, contributing to the common understanding of the American president as the “epicenter” of U.S. foreign policy (Ginsberg and Lowi 2002:364). On September 22, 2001, President Bush exercised the authority granted by Congress in 1999 to waive the sanctions that were imposed on India and Pakistan due to their development and

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29 Clarke notifies that he searched for the term "Pakistan" on the U.S. Government Printing Office’s website where one can find access to all public presidential statements, ranging from formal speeches to improvised comments to journalists (Clarke 2009:26-7).
testing of nuclear weapons in the late 90s. The express rationale of the Bush administration for this shift was that it was “no longer in the national security interest of the United States” to uphold the sanctions which barred economic and military assistance (White House 2001a; Wagner 2001a; Wagner 2001b). However, the coup-related and loan-related sanctions still prohibited the executive from providing much of the assistance that was necessary to support Pakistan in the fight against terrorism. Congress took action and submitted a bill that authorized the president to “waive sanctions against Pakistan through fiscal year 2003” (White House 2001b). Signed by the president on October 27, 2001, the bill allowed for exemptions from the restriction against giving direct assistance “to a country whose duly elected head of government was deposed by decree or military coup” (Senate bill 1465/2001). Direct assistance could now be given to Pakistan if the president certified that it “(A) would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan; and (B) is important to United States efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism” (Senate bill 1465/2001). President Bush ultimately used this annual waiver authority six times (Kronstadt 2009:90).

2.3.1 Pakistan as a front-line state in the fight against terrorism

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was held responsible for sponsoring and giving shelter to the al-Qaeda leaders behind the September 11 attacks, and a campaign was executed to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in October 2001 (Deudney & Meiser 2008:40). Ambassador Chamberlin described her negotiations with General Musharraf in the days after September 11, 2001, in these terms

“He had concerns that he’d share and I had concerns. He didn’t take all of my concerns and I didn’t take all of his concerns. For example one of his concerns was he didn’t want to have American air plane bombers flying into Afghanistan over Pakistan from Indian bases. Ok. I took that. And another one of his, he wanted us to intervene on behalf of the Indians to resolve Kashmir. I said no. This was not about Kashmir. So, give and take basically (...) here is what I delivered to him; we immediately lifted sanctions, we started a USAID assistance program, we provided within weeks a 600 million dollars in grant, aid, means dollars, which at that point was huge, it was the largest ever, anywhere (Chamberlin 2010).
In a joint statement on the occasion of President Musharraf’s visit to New York in November 2001, President Bush recognized “Pakistan’s role as a front line state in the global campaign against terrorism and expressed gratitude for Pakistan's vital support in the international campaign” (White House 2001c). The two presidents welcomed the revival of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and according to the White House Press Office both presidents: “underscored the importance of Pakistan to have a successful transition to democracy in 2002” (White House 2001c). Musharraf expressed commitment to hold elections in October 2002, while Bush confirmed that the United States would extend its support to Pakistan so the country could be better equipped to respond to its economic challenges. According to the joint statement, Bush and Musharraf “discussed ways to make good on the enormous potential for increased trade and investment between” the U.S. and Pakistan (White House 2001c). The joint statement moreover noted that “Bush undertook to consider ways to respond to Pakistan’s market access expectations” (White House 2001c).

Entering the alliance with the United States was a balancing act for Musharraf. He became subject to several assassination attempts (Kronstadt 2009:50), and faced “a complex game of cooperating with the United States on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constituency at home” (Nye 2004: 257). The October 2002 elections in Pakistan were the first elections in the country since 1997. The pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League-Uqaid-e-Azam (PMLQ) got the plurality of votes, but observers complained that the elections were flawed (Kronstadt 2004:11).

The independent organization Freedom House rated Pakistan as “not free” in 2003 (Freedom House 2003). According to Alan Kronstadt, a researcher working for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to provide information and critical analyses to the representatives of the U.S. Congress, 2003 was the 11th consecutive year that Pakistan had been judged as violating the political rights and the civil liberties of its citizens. In annual reports on U.S.-Pakistan relations, Kronstadt observed that the United States after the 2002 elections both praised the “electoral exercises as moves in the right direction” as well as “expressed concern that seemingly non-democratic developments may make the realization of true democracy in Pakistan more elusive”

Ambassador Chamberlin, who was appointed by President Bush, identifies a shift of attention in the Bush administration in December 2001:

“They did very much embrace Musharraf, but they decided early to go to Iraq. Although it was all about al-Qaeda and Pakistan and Afghanistan, they started shifting their resources and their best planners in the military over to the Iraq quite early, in December 2001, very early. The best people, the best military planners were on way to Iraq. And they downgraded the Afghan effort” (2010).

In 2003 the United States invaded Iraq. In a radio address President Bush stated that “our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people (Bush 2003). The senior official I interviewed from the Department of Defense (DoD) described the time period from 2002 to 2007 in these terms:

“people thought that Afghanistan was so-called slam dunk, something easy, so the focus of the White House shifted away, beginning in 2002, from Afghanistan to Iraq. And we really – the insurgency in Afghanistan was pretty low level with the defeat of the Taliban, and then began to heat up in 2005-06, so people within the U.S. government began to pay more attention to it and therefore more attention to Pakistan. But still, the main focus was in Iraq. During that period though, say from 2002 to 2006 and 2007, we were nonetheless having a lot of interaction with Pakistan”.

An article in the Washington Post supports Chamberlin’s and the DoD-official’s impression of the Bush administration’s early focus shift toward Iraq. Flynt Leverett, who worked as senior director for Middle Eastern affairs on President Bush’s National Security Council in 2002, commented to the Washington Post on the special mission units withdrawal of most of their troops from Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan that

"There is a direct consequence for us having taken these guys out prematurely (...) There were people on the staff level raising questions about what that meant for getting al Qaeda, for creating an Afghan security and intelligence service [to

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30 The “White House” is the name for the residence of the U.S. president, but is commonly understood to mean the president’s administration, executive office and presidential advisers.
help combat jihadists]. Those questions didn’t get above staff level, because clearly there had been a strategic decision taken.” (Gellman & Linzer 2004)

President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. in June 2004 (Kronstadt (2008:45). James Clarke’s study of President Bush’s comments on Pakistan between 2002 and 2007 shows that Bush used a consistently positive tone when speaking of Musharraf and Pakistan’s support in the fight against terrorism (Clarke 2009:34). According to Clarke, Bush signaled that he gave Musharraf the benefit of the doubt when it came to controversial issues, choosing not to question Musharraf’s commitment to the war on terror publicly. “Spare references” were made to the people of Pakistan, and Clarke indicates that Bush appears to have regarded “Musharraf and his army as a bulwark against a population vulnerable to extremism” (Clarke 2009:32).

2.3.2 A shift away from the conditionality focus on U.S. aid to Pakistan

In January 2007, the House of Representatives “set out to place conditions on continued U.S. support to Pakistan, calling for greater oversight on Pakistan's actions against insurgents based in Pakistan and progress on holding free elections” (Heller, Fort & Guevara 2007). The White House allegedly opposed the restrictions suggested in the House of Representatives (Heller, Fort & Guevara 2007). On the issue of civil unrest in Pakistan due to Musharraf’s enforcement of emergency rule in November 2007, Press Secretary Morell at the Department of Defense commented that:

“President Musharraf has been a steadfast ally in the war on terror since 9/11, and we at this point are not stemming the flow of any of our military aid to Pakistan that goes to war on terror operations. That's not to say it's not under review, but the flow of that aid has not stopped, due to the fact that we do not want to do anything to imperil our own citizens or the citizens of Pakistan, for that matter” (DoD 2007).

The press secretary at the Department of Defense moreover confirmed that “75 percent of all of our supplies for our troops in Afghanistan flow either through or over Pakistan, including 40 percent of all fuel, which comes from Pakistani refineries” (DoD 2007). The U.S. security related aid to Pakistan increased in FY 2008 (Kronstadt
Despite the great flow of aid into Pakistan, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of July 2007 stated that:

“Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious threat to the Homeland (…) We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership” (NIE 2007:6).

In 2008, Democrats in the U.S. Congress began to question the U.S. aid to Pakistan (Flaherty 2008). According to a May 2008 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. and Pakistani government officials had began to “recognize that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of a safe haven in the FATA” (GAO 2008:2). About 96 percent of the assistance to FATA had been directed through Coalition Support Funds (CSF) (GAO 2008:1). The CSF is not included in the database of the USAID as assistance to Pakistan, which reflects that the U.S. government does not consider CSF as aid, but as Department of Defense-funding to “reimburse Pakistan for its support of U.S. military operations” (Kronstadt 2010).32 The CSF money made Pakistan “the third largest recipient of all U.S. military aid and assistance in the three years after 9/11; it trailed only Israel and Egypt” (Heller, Fort & Guevara 2007). According to Ambassador Chamberlin, the CSF-mechanism originated from Vice president Dick Cheney’s office in 2002: “Dov Zakheim, the comptroller from DoD [U.S. Department of Defense] came out and negotiated that deal.” On the question of whether it is traditionally the State Department’s role to provide the guidelines for military assistance, Chamberlin responded:

“It should have been. This was another one of those crazy new things. This is another example of how diplomacy became militarized. And Department of Defense had all the money, and it was off budget (…) It was designed to get around oversight, and to get around the State Department (…) I don't know how they got the money forwarded or counted for. But it was very strange” (2010).33

31 I assume that the numbers are in constant U.S.$ 2010 (Kronstadt 2010).
32 In this thesis I often refer to CSF as “aid” or “assistance” due to the great size of this entry.
33 For details on the lack of oversight and accountability for the CSF to Pakistan see the GAO report “Combating Terrorism. Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds”, published in June 2008.
The Congressional staffer that I interviewed confirmed that there was a movement of “traditional State[Department of State] responsibilities to DoD [Department of Defense] (…) there were created different DoD authorities that were hard to track”.\textsuperscript{34} In the wake of the GAO-report from 2008, Senator Joe Biden and Senator Richard Lugar introduced legislation in 2008 that called for a substantial increase in long-term assistance to Pakistan, as well as tighter monitoring of the military assistance (New York Times 2008).\textsuperscript{35}

Legislative elections were held in Pakistan in February 2008, ending a three-month state of emergency Musharraf had imposed (U.S. Department of State 2009). The supporters of Musharraf lost the parliamentary elections. U.S. official announcements welcomed the Pakistani transition to democracy, and the Bush administration determined that a democratically elected government had been restored. The coup-related aid sanctions were removed permanently (Kronstadt 2009:90). Giving in to democracy, the Bush administration was concerned, however, about the direction that newly elected coalition leaders could take in Pakistan. Indications that the new leaders were reviewing Pakistan’s role in the war on terror and expressing desire to negotiate with militants caused particular concern (Pant 2008).\textsuperscript{36} Musharraf had been elected president in the elections, but he “resigned on August 18, as the Parliament prepared for impeachment proceedings” (U.S. Department of State 2009).

Clarke identifies a cooling in Bush’s attitude toward Pakistan in the aftermath of the Pakistani parliamentary elections in February 2008: “Bush’s tone was colder towards the new government and he was firmer and blunter in criticizing its ineffectiveness, a trend that increased following Musharraf’s replacement in September” (Clarke


\textsuperscript{35} Appendix 2 shows that the assistance to Pakistan increased under the next president, Barack Obama in FY 2009. The large increase can be attributed primarily to the U.S.$700 million that went to the new Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). The PCCF was passed in the House of Representatives as well as the Senate in May 2009 (Ackerman 2009).

\textsuperscript{36} The new leaders were Nawaz Sharif, former Pakistan Prime Minister, representing Pakistan Muslim League (N) and Asif Ali Zardari, representing Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).
2009:35). As an example of the new tone, Clarke highlights Bush’s remark to journalists when Musharraf supporters had lost the parliamentary election

“And so it's now time for the newly elected folks to show up and form their Government. And the question then is, will they be friends of the United States? And I certainly hope so” (Clarke 2009:32 quoting Bush 2008).

According to the Department of Defense official I interviewed, there were

“uneasy walls between the U.S. and about what is Pakistan really doing, are they still cooperating in some fashion with the Taliban in addition to us? It’s a little hard to get precise information about that because it’s all very sensitive.”

Figure 1 below depicts the total military and economic assistance that has been designated as overt foreign assistance to Pakistan in FY 2000-2008 (does not include the CSF). FY 2000 is included here to give a better illustration of the increase in aid that took place during Bush. The size of the covert aid is unknown.

**Figure 1 U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Pakistan FY 2000-2008**

![Graph showing total military and economic assistance to Pakistan from FY 2000 to FY 2008.](source)


There was a significant rise in the level of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in 2001-02, but a drop in aid took place in 2003-04. The drop might have been related to the fact that the amount of aid in 2001-02 was very high, but other explanations are also possible. The interview data indicate that a focus shift toward Iraq, with less attention toward
Afghanistan and Pakistan, could be a plausible explanation.\(^{37}\) The assistance then rose and remained quite stable in FY 2007-08.

The main impression is that of stability in the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in 2001. The foreign policy can be characterized as having a *strong-pro* attitude toward Pakistan until Bush left the presidency. This attitude is reflected in the easing or lifting of nuclear-, debt related and democracy-related sanctions, and the great amount of aid that was provided to Pakistan. The U.S. military assistance sustained despite Musharraf’s imposition of martial law and a state of emergency in November 2007. Suggestions to make continued support to Pakistan conditional on Pakistan’s performance in the war on terrorism and conduction of elections met opposition from the White House.\(^{38}\)

**Table 1 Classification of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan 2001-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Argument for the suggested classification of the foreign policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to September 11, 2001</td>
<td>Con</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>- Provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan in only a few selected areas due to the sanction regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Post September 11, 2001 and until January 2009 | Pro       | Strong   | - Easing or lifting of nuclear-, debt related and democracy-related sanctions  
- An unconditional aid-approach. Pakistan becomes a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance |

\(^{37}\) When the CSF reimbursements are included into the picture, the impression of this drop in “assistance” is weakened (see Chapter 4).

\(^{38}\) Critics could, however, argue that the classification “pro-Pakistan” has a weakness, because it does not separate between being pro in terms of support for the Pakistani *people*, or pro in terms of support for the leaders of the Pakistani *government*. In a country that has seen several democratic governments be overthrown by military coup, this distinction could have been useful to include as well.
In chapter 5, I will attempt to explain the causes of both the continuity of and changing agility of the Bush-administration’s support of Pakistan 2001-2009. Prior to this, it is necessary to present the theoretical approaches used as basis for deducing explanatory hypotheses (ch. 3), and the factual basis (ch. 4) for the subsequent empirical analysis.
3 Theoretical Approaches to the study of Foreign Policy

In this chapter, I will present liberalistic, realistic and constructivist perspectives on international relations and foreign policy, which will serve as the analytical starting point for exploring the second part of the main research question. Assumptions about state motivations can be derived from theories of international relations which is useful for the analysis of foreign policy. First, I will unveil the core assumptions of each chosen theoretical approach. I will continue with a short introduction to the chosen theoretical perspectives that will be applied in the study, deducing one hypothesis based on each perspective, followed by the operationalization of key variables. The first hypothesis is derived from political realism and second one from commercial liberalism. The third and last hypothesis will have theoretical backing from both republican liberalism and insight from the constructivist school of thought. The theoretical framework invites hypotheses both on external and internal influences on U.S.-Pakistani foreign policy.

3.1 Political realism

Leading realists in the past and in the present share some basic ideas and assumptions about the nature of international politics, which in turn have implications for how they interpret the foreign policies of states. Scholars writing within the realist tradition share a materialistic understanding of what constitutes the world. According to realists, the prime interest of a state is to provide security for itself. States are seen as unitary actors that aim to maximize their interests on the international arena. States are viewed as the most dominant actors in international politics, and different states are assumed to be similar units with respect to function, differing in capabilities but not ends (Doyle 2002:24 referring to Waltz 1979:96-7).

International politics is understood to take place in a condition of anarchy due to the lack of a central power regulating relations between states. The anarchic structure of the international environment leads realists to emphasize the fear that states experience when they cannot be sure if other states have peaceful intentions or not (Doyle 1997:27). The world’s scarcity of resources, and the corresponding lack of certainty,
leads realists to assume that world politics is a struggle among states for material power and security. World politics is therefore seen as a zero-sum game where states aim to maximize their interests. A state’s achievements on the international arena are considered relative to what other states achieve, and no gain is absolute (Doyle 2002:26-7). War and conflict is seen as an ever-present possibility, and states are driven to play power politics – meaning that states will increase their military capabilities, join forces, and establish alliances in order to preserve their independence (Schmidt 2008:12).

Political realism is a theoretically broad category that encompasses numerous variations and distinctions. A distinction can be made between offensive and defensive realists. Offensive realists argue that states first and foremost are power maximizers, and thus try to “expand” rather than just “balance” – meaning that states seek to gain more power relative to other states (Schmidt 2008:13). According to offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, the best way for states “to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system” (Schmidt 2008:13 referring to Mearsheimer 2001:33). The terrorist attacks on September 11 demonstrated that the United States, one of the most powerful states in the world, was still not safe against all threats. I will use a defensive realist’s perspective – more specifically Kenneth Waltz’ version of structural realism, also called neo-realism – as the theoretical foundation for the hypothesis that will be based on the realist school.

### 3.1.1 Waltz’ structural realist perspective

Waltz argues that states “are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (Waltz 1996:311). According to realists like Waltz, states are defensive and tend to “balance” their power in a system where the power is unequally distributed (Guzzini & Rynning 2002:1 referring to Waltz 1979). This balance-of-power theory is based on the assumption that states are first and foremost security maximizers, or in Waltz’s own terms: “The survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured” (Waltz 1996:309). Offensive and defensive realists disagree on how much power a state should seek. Defensive realists are known to advocate a prudent
foreign policy, since they fear that an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy can create counterbalancing coalitions (Schmidt 2008:11-2). Waltz argues that the “political structure” of the international political system tends to be the most important determinant of foreign policy behavior. By using an analogy from economic theory, Waltz claims that international political systems and economic markets alike “are formed by the coactions of self-regarding units” (Waltz 1996:309). These two systems are “formed and maintained due to the principle of self-help that applies to the units". According to the Waltzian logic, the lack of a world government provides states with incentives to strive for greater efficiency in providing security for themselves (Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009:4). The theory aims to explain what is termed as the “recurrent formation of balances of power”: “Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive” (Waltz 1996:312). Waltz acknowledges that much of his theory is not a comprehensive description of all the impulses that “[lie] behind every act of state” (Waltz 1996:309). States may have a variety of motives and may pursue many goals simultaneously. He also recognizes that the goals of a state can be vaguely formulated and even inconsistent – goals can “fluctuate with the changing currents of domestic politics (…) and are influenced by the outcomes of bureaucratic struggles” (Waltz 1996:311). However, Waltz’ main emphasis is on the international structure characterized by anarchy and decentralization, often tend to influence states to strive to ensure for state survival. 39

3.1.2 Political realism: Deducing hypothesis and operationalizing key variables

Waltz’s image of international relations portrays states as security oriented, nervous and mistrustful of each other. What does a Waltzian perspective lead us to expect in the specific case of United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan? 40 Waltz notes that

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39 The international system is described as decentralized and anarchic in the sense that: “Formally, each [state] is the equal of all others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey” (Waltz 1996:307).

40 One could criticize the use of Waltz’ structural realist perspective in this study of foreign policy, since his theory is not a theory of foreign policy. However, it seems like the normative implication of his theory is that it is rational to prioritize national security goals in the conduct of foreign policy (Guzzini & Rynning 2002). On this backdrop, I find the structural realist perspective to be of relevance for this study.
it should not be assumed that all states strive relentlessly to increase power, but he points out that the fear that other states might use force “make it difficult for them to break out of the competitive system” (Waltz 1996:311). The lack of central authority and law leads us to expect that states that live up to the realist maxim of securing state survival will adhere to an approach called *Realpolitik*. Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon are famous for their attempt to manage the United States’ relations with the Soviet Union based on realpolitik. In practice this meant hailing dictatorial Third-World regimes as key allies in the fight against the Soviet threat. Foreign policy based on realpolitik is commonly termed *amoral due to its exceedingly pragmatic relationship to human rights and democracy* (Mead 2002:63,75), where ideological principles are sacrificed for practical considerations. Assuming that the state has a strong survival motive makes it reasonable to formulate a hypothesis based on one of the core threats toward U.S. national security during the Bush presidency, namely terrorism. Realism is known as a state-centric theoretical approach, but since “security problems [are] at the heart of the realist approach” (Jackson & Sørensen 2007:254), international terrorism is likely to force a reaction from decision makers who practice realist principles.

The first hypothesis is derived from the security-oriented focus of the realist school, and the expectation that security is the first priority in the foreign policy of the United States:

\[ \textbf{H}_1: \ U.S. \ policy \ toward \ Pakistan \ is \ aimed \ at \ supporting \ the \ fight \ against \ terrorism, \ and \ in \ particular \ the \ fight \ against \ the \ Taliban \ regime \ and \ al-Qaeda. \]

Terrorism can be defined as the “unlawful use or threatened use of violence against civilians, often to achieve political, religious or similar objectives” (Jackson & Sørensen 2007:250). International terrorism “involves the territory or the citizens of more than one country” (Jackson & Sørensen 2007:250) Countering terrorism can be done by military means and normal police techniques, in addition to being addressed as a “medical problem with underlying causes and symptoms” (Lutz & Lutz 2007:291). Empirically investigating the first hypothesis, I will study if the Bush
administration’s actions, statements and values in its relationship with Pakistan have aimed to fight terrorism, and the Taliban and al-Qaeda in particular. Official documentation on policy statements of the administration and newspaper articles will constitute part of the empirical material. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the U.S. executive were made official in 2002 and 2006. These central documents in addition to National Intelligence Estimates will shed light on this issue. In addition will assistance data provided by the U.S. Department of State and USAID’s Greenbook, official reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) also work to inform the analysis. The interview data provides key information to inform the analysis of H1’s credibility.

3.2 Liberal approach to foreign policy

Liberalism as a political ideology stresses the rights and liberties of individuals (Schmidt 2008:14). Values commonly associated with liberalism are individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity (Doyle 1997:206-7). Many different theoretical traditions of liberalism exist, and despite the critics who accuse liberalism of lacking coherency as a theory, liberal theoreticians share some common denominators with their realist colleagues. Like the realists, liberals have a materialistic understanding of the world, and they recognize the anarchical structure of the international environment. The liberal view of world politics differs from a realist view, however, in the different assumptions liberals tend to make about international structure, domestic society, and human nature. Liberals stand out as more optimistic about the likelihood for human progress – in terms of modernization, enhanced cooperation, and prospects for peace. 41 Another important distinction lies in the liberal interpretation of the consequences of international anarchy. States are believed to be influenced by domestic demands for resources, and are more likely to value absolute gains above relative gains. When a state is concerned with absolute gains, it does not primarily focus on competing with other states

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41 The term “modernization” is here understood as the movement toward a “modern state”. A modern state can be defined as a “valuable place that provides for the good life of citizens, including security, their freedom and their welfare” (Jackson & Sørensen 2007:271).
(Jackson & Sørensen 2007:119). An example can be when politicians prioritize increasing the national income and securing low unemployment rates, rather than comparing their country’s gains with the gains of other countries (Keohane & Nye 1973:161). Liberals believe that security dilemmas can be improved with a stable transition into a more liberal world order, meaning a world with more democracies, more international institutions, and a higher level of mutual dependence between states (Doyle 2002:28).

While the realists regard states to be similar units that differs in capabilities, not function, liberals regard states as inherently different units, due to their varying concepts of individual rights (Doyle 2002:28). A liberal state – founded on principles of equality before the law, freedom of speech and other civil liberties, private property and elected representation – is believed to have an interest in protecting and promoting individual rights. This is a broader understanding of the aim of the state, going beyond the realist’s notion of states as security- and power-dominated.

3.2.1 Liberal theory according to Moravcsik

In the famous article “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics” (1997), Andrew Moravcsik argues for the existence of a coherent liberal theory of international relations. Realists analyzing international politics tend to emphasize the importance of power distribution in terms of state capabilities. Moravcsik tries to unify liberal theories, claiming that the configuration of state preferences is what matters the most for liberals (Moravcsik 1997:513). The concept of state preferences is understood as “a set of fundamental interests defined across states of the world [my italics]” (Moravcsik 1997:519). Preferences can be distinguished from strategies or tactics, with the assumption that preferences constitute the underlying social motivations for future strategies and tactics. The importance of state-society relations is central in Moravcsik’s version of liberal theory. He argues that for liberals, the exercise of foreign policy becomes more a question of the strength

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42 The concept of the security dilemma is a paradox in the state system which describes how states which try to enhance their security, at the same time might increase the insecurity of other states (Jackson & Sørensen 2007:312).
of state preferences, rather than the realist question of relative capabilities. Strong preference for a specific issue can override weak capabilities (Moravcsik 1997:524).

Resting on three core assumptions, Moravcsik’s version of liberal theory constitutes a social theory that specifies the nature of societal actors, the state, and the international system.43 His first assumption is that individuals and private groups are the fundamental actors in international politics. Rejecting the notion of an automatic harmony between the interests of individuals and groups, Moravcsik argues that a multitude of different interests arise from material scarcities, value conflicts and variations in societal influence (Moravcsik 1997:517). Secondly, Moravcsik assumes that the state or other political institutions represent some subset of domestic society. State officials who have the role of defining state preferences are under continuous pressure from individuals and private groups to pursue policies that are consistent with their preferences (Moravcsik 1997:518). Government policy is thus understood to be constrained by the “underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus)” (Moravcsik 1997:518). The liberal framework therefore allows for the possibility that policy can become biased, as a result of a governing coalition’s or a powerful domestic group’s successful efforts at capturing the state. This element can lead to rent-seeking, resulting in policies that do not necessarily produce gains for the society as a whole (Moravcsik 1997:530-1). The third core assumption is showcasing that liberal theory does not ignore the influence of the international environment on foreign policy behavior: “The configuration of interdependent state preferences determine state behavior (…) each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states” (Moravcsik 1997:520).

When state officials have defined the state preferences, they are assumed to act rationally, estimating costs and benefits, and to purposively pursue state preferences. The complex web of mutual dependency that exists between states creates what Moravcsik calls policy interdependence, defined as “the set of costs and benefits

43 Look to Moravcsik (1997:516-522) for a complete description of the three core assumptions.
created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences, that is, the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes” (Moravcsik 1997:520).

To formulate hypotheses on liberal factors that might have influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan, I will use some specific variants of liberal theory. Moravcsik would have agreed to this approach, because he describes the three core assumptions as “relatively thin or content free” (Moravcsik 1997:524). I have chosen to use commercial liberalism and republican liberalism as liberal theoretical perspectives to examine potential liberal sources of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan.

Writing within what can be termed the republican liberal tradition, Immanuel Kant argued in the essay “Perpetual Peace” (1975) that some conditions must be met in order to expect a stable peace among states. Together the conditions constitute a liberal republic. Kant’s three conditions are, as rephrased by Michael Doyle: i) Representative government – an elected legislative, separation of powers and the rule of law, ii) Respect for human rights and iii) Social and economic interdependence. Trade and social interaction is thought to produce material incentives for enhanced cooperation (Doyle 2002:31-2). The central argument within the democratic peace literature is that democracies do not fight each other because “liberal democracies are more peaceful and law-abiding than are other political systems” (Jackson & Sørensen 2007:111). Republican liberalism has strong normative elements, with some viewing it as their responsibility to promote democracy worldwide based on the optimistic belief that democratization will lead to a more peaceful and cooperative world (Jackson & Sørensen 2007:113). Those who advocate an internationalist approach, which in this case means active engagement in world affairs to spread democratic values, can be termed liberal internationalists.

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44 The different strands of thought within liberal the liberal tradition can be classified in various ways. Moravcsik classifies liberal theory in ideational liberalism (partly drawing on constructivist thought, though it’s not mentioned explicitly), commercial liberalism, and republican liberalism.

45 Look to Keohane & Nye (1973:160-1) for two different ways of defining the term interdependence.
Commercial liberals highlight the impact of economic incentives of individuals and groups in a society, stressing opportunities for transnational economic interchange and their impact on state behavior (Moravcsik 1997:515). Commercial liberals, also called commercial pacifists, tend to argue that global democratization and capitalism have a pacifying effect. The implication is that the extension of democracies and capitalism can serve as the best route to peace (Doyle 2002:29-30). Commercial liberals like the economists Adam Smith and Joseph Schumpeter argued that if citizens elect their governments, war can become less attractive – because the citizens are the ones who bear the burdens of war (Doyle 2002:29). Yet though free trade and a peaceful foreign policy tend to be rational for the majority in a capitalist society, we have come to see that liberal states nevertheless often engage in wars with non-liberal states and pursue protectionist economic policies. In the reformulation of liberal theory, Moravcsik points out that commercial liberalism as a theory of international relations, not a political ideology, “does not predict that economic incentives automatically generate universal free trade and peace” (Moravcsik 1997:528). Free trade can be an efficient way to accumulate wealth, but states might also have incentives to start wars, threaten with sanctions or use other coercive means, – for instance, in order to establish control over international markets (Moravcsik 1997:530). Using a commercial liberalist perspective to study American foreign policy directs the attention towards market structure as a factor that can create incentives for both openness and closure (Moravcsik 1997:529).

3.2.2 Commercial liberalism: Deducing hypothesis and operationalizing key variables

A commercial liberalist perspective can be used to direct the focus toward economic interests as a source and explanation of United States’ foreign policy. Has the policy toward Pakistan been formulated to block or facilitate economic exchange? Have American individuals or private groups been able to influence the state, and make the Bush administration form foreign policies that protect their own economic interests?
Hypothesis number three is based on expectations derived from Moravcik’s interpretation of commercial liberalism (as a theory of international relations), emphasizing domestic influence as a potential source of foreign policy:

\[ H_2 \] U.S. policy toward Pakistan is geared toward benefiting the economic interests of American citizens and corporations.

I will study official policy statements from official strategy documents, in my efforts to map the foreign policy intentions of the Bush administration in the economic area. I will look to reports and notes from multiple sources like GAO, CRS, and the U.S. chamber of Commerce and U.S.-Pakistan Business Council, CIA World Factbook and the U.S. Department of State, for information about the economic relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Data on trade and U.S. foreign direct investment in Pakistan is provided by U.S. Census Bureau and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Given that more than U.S. $ 6.5 billion in overt assistance was channeled to Pakistan in the period between 2001 and 2008 (excluding the Coalition Support Fund), it could also have been interesting to look at how this aid was used, and whether there were requirements for tying aid to be spent on U.S. goods and services (Carothers 2009:20), which in turn would open several possibilities for influence of the economic interests of American citizens, corporations, and even NGO’s. There are limitations to the collection of data that could be done resource wise for this thesis, so I have chosen to focus primarily on the trade with goods between the United States and Pakistan. I will limit the focus of this investigation to the main economic interests which American citizens and corporations might have in relation to Pakistan. The main emphasis has been put on the United States’ protective interests in relation to Pakistan, which is related to the textile sector. I will very briefly look into U.S. export interests, limited to the weapon industry. News articles and data from the interviews I have conducted are also central to the analysis of H2’s credibility.

As demonstrated below, the third and last hypothesis has backing from several theoretical traditions. In addition to republican liberalism, the last hypothesis can also
be supported by arguments derived from constructivist thought, more specifically from what has been termed American exceptionalism.

3.3 Constructivist approaches to foreign policy

It is quite misleading to speak of one constructivism when so many different strands of thought exist within this camp. Constructivism provides an analytical framework to study the influence of culture, norms and state identity on foreign policy. I understand constructivism to be more of an approach than a theory of international relations or theory of foreign policy. As Robert Jervis and many others have commented, constructivism: “does not, by itself, tell us anything about the expected content of foreign policies or international relations” (Jervis 1998:976). That said, this does not mean that the approach is not useful. Constructivist perspectives on foreign policy and international politics can provide insight into the processes at work in political life, and help identify the distinctive features of the United States foreign policy.

A constructivist perspective on international relations is characterized by an emphasis on the ideational aspects of international politics, rather than a pure focus on the material aspects. Constructivists argue that the world is either partly or wholly socially constructed. This ontological position influences their epistemological position. Positivists strive for objective knowledge, and thus try to minimize the influence of value-biased judgments. Constructivists on the other hand recognize that it is not possible to produce statements that give a complete and accurate account of how the world is, and instead work to map shared intersubjective perceptions. Constructivists try to remove bias, but at the same time they recognize their own role in creating knowledge. For constructivists, “knowledge claims are intersubjective agreements as opposed to empirical evidence” (Kurki and Wight 2007:19). They negotiate within the scientific community in order to gain support for their claims (Kurki and Wight 2007:18-9). Constructivists understand international politics and foreign policy as dynamic concepts, due to an emphasis on the social relations its actors engage in. Constructivists argue that interests are largely a function of ideas and identities (collective self-conceptions). Unlike realist theories, interests are not understood to be a mere function of material capabilities (Schmidt 2008:16). Constructivists commonly
reject the realist notion that the interests of states are unlikely to change. Mainstream constructivists have introduced the term *identity of states*, stressing a shift away from the heavy emphasis on states’ material capabilities as a factor in their foreign policy. In addition to the material security environment, constructivists also emphasize the importance of the cultural and institutional environment in which states are embedded (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996:33). They argue that the cultural environment can affect “the basic character of states,” which also can be termed “identity” (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996:33). An identity is believed to emerge by differentiating oneself from others (Schmidt 2008:16).

Arguing that ideas and identity play a major role in foreign policy suggests an analytical shift in the study of international politics and foreign policy. The emphasis has been moved from “what states can do because of their position in a structure, to what they want to do because of how they see themselves in relation to others” (Kubálková 2001a:33). A constructivist understands interests to derive from identity and culture, and an identity has the potential to change because it is socially constructed. A constructivist perspective can therefore be useful in explaining sources of change in foreign policy. Constructivists emphasize “the social context within which agents find themselves and set the limits within which agents exercise judgment” (Kubálková 2001b:56). While realists tend to argue that the lack of a world government dictates certain behavior by states, the constructivist Alexander Wendt is famous for claiming that “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992, 1995). A rational choice in a situation is not determined purely by the structural conditions that an actor is embedded in, but is rather dependent on what is socially constructed to be rational.

### 3.3.1 Constructivism applied: American exceptionalism

I have chosen the article “City upon a hill” to serve as an example of a constructivist understanding of American foreign policy specifically. The article highlights the

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46 State interests are believed to derive from a state’s collective identity. According to Peter Katzenstein (1996:24), *identity* is shorthand for varying constructions of nationhood and statehood (national ideologies, collective distinctiveness, and purpose) (Kubálková 2001a:34).
influence of an internal factor like *domestic self-image* to explain the formulation of American foreign policy. By introducing the term *American exceptionalism*, the authors argue that Americans “tend to construct a national identity out of beliefs in their own uniqueness” (Davis & Lynn Jones 1987:21). The uniqueness is attributed to the fact that the nation was founded unlike any other, and that its democratic institutions were quite unique at the time of their creation (Davis & Lynn Jones 1987:22).

The belief in the moral superiority of the United States has been used to justify the spread of American ideals around the world. “The sense of mission is expressed both in declarations that the United States must convert the world to its values by serving as an example and in a more activist crusading spirit” (Davis & Lynn Jones 1987:23). Jonathon Monten echoes this interpretation of U.S. foreign policy in the article “The roots of the Bush doctrine,” stating that “democracy promotion is not just another foreign policy instrument or idealist diversion; it is central to U.S. political identity and sense of national purpose” (Monten 2005:113). Americans have been convinced that the United States as a democracy could aspire to the “moral regeneration of humanity” (Davis & Lynn Jones 1987:24). A crusade to “destroy democracy’s enemies,” therefore, can be one possible justification and motive for the United States’ engagement on the international arena, in times when isolationism and neutrality aren’t possible (Davis & Lynn Jones 1987:24-5). A realist might argue that such exceptionalist rhetoric is of no importance to the conduct of the United States’ foreign policy. Politicians inspired by realist tradition, like Henry Kissinger, would argue that American foreign policy should be conducted by realist maxims, prioritizing the defense of material power and security, which often results in a pragmatic relationship to human rights and democracy (Mead 2002:63,75).

The implications of exceptionalist beliefs, though, are not straightforward: “Ironically, exceptionalism can stimulate both crusading interventionism and complacent withdrawal from world affairs” (Davis & Lynn Jones 1987:21). In isolationism, a nation seeks introverted non-involvement, while in internationalism, an extroverted approach, a state seeks to make the world more like itself (Deudney &
Meiser 2008:35). The struggle between an isolationist approach and an interventionist approach continues to be relevant in the conduct of American foreign policy.

### 3.3.2 Republican liberalism and constructivism: Deducing hypothesis and operationalizing key variables

Exceptionalist ideas and republican liberalist ideas both inspire the formulation of a hypothesis based on the United States’ motivation to promote democracy in Pakistan. It could be argued from a constructivist perspective that central values like democracy and liberty are part of the American identity, and therefore form the basis of the United States’ *national interest*. Viewing U.S. foreign policy through the prism of exceptionalism would focus on democracy promotion as a primary motivation: What is more vital and important to defend in foreign policy than the collective self-conception of the society the state is responsible for? Yet this core value is not reflected in the realist school’s conception of the national interest. Theoreticians who identify themselves with republican liberalism argue that the presence of representative governments is one of several important conditions that must be met in order to expect a stable peace among states. Liberal internationalists, with ideas derived from republican liberalism, tend to argue that Unites States’ foreign policy should seek to promote individual liberty across the globe (Schmidt 2008:14). Brian Schmidt writes that the *liberal internationalist grand strategy* “calls on America to actively promote the spread of democracy and liberty around the world” (Schmidt 2008:20). This strategy is supported by arguments claiming that it is a moral duty to spread liberty, and that it will increase the United States’ security (Schmidt 2008:20). With this backdrop, the following hypothesis may be deduced:

**H₃:** *U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan is aimed at promoting democracy in Pakistan.*

I find it important to note that even though the hypothesis has been derived from liberal and constructivist thought, which focus on democracy promotion abroad, the hypothesis could also be supported within the realist school, albeit for different reasons. Realists are skeptical to the liberal democratic peace thesis, but some more
than others. Defensive realists agree that the openness of political processes that characterizes liberal democracies might lead to better transparency of state motivations, and hence contribute to conflict avoidance (Schweller 2002:42-3). However, the realist support for democracy does not need to be linked to the want for peace and stability. Emerging democracies are often characterized by lack of stability, or even chaos. The structural realist Randall Schweller notes that realists assume that war is a mechanism of change.47 A realist’s support for democracy promotion abroad therefore becomes a question of how much he or she values the status quo (Schweller 2002:53,60), which in this case would require evaluation of whether the status quo in Pakistan (as a democracy or as a non-democracy) can be seen to benefit the United States’ national interest.

With backing from several different theoretical traditions (mainly liberalism and constructivism), the above hypothesis offers a legitimate starting point. Were the goals of spreading democracy communicated through the Bush administration’s policy statements toward Pakistan? If so, was this value an actual motive behind the Pakistan policy, or did it merely serve to justify actions to the American or international public? By looking conceptually at the themes in foreign policy statements, one can question whether the emphasis on democratic values might just be a means of achieving a goal (Deudney & Meiser 2008:38). H₃ proposes that the Bush administration has had an intention to promote democracy through its foreign policy toward Pakistan – whether the rationale for this is best argued in constructivist, liberalist or realist terms.

In order to evaluate whether democracy promotion has received high priority, a conceptualization of democracy is needed, as well as information on how the U.S. works to promote democracy. Democracy has been a highly contested concept through time, and various practices can be associated with it (Dunn 2005:20, Held 2006:1). I will study the Bush administration’s general policy statements on democracy promotion as well as statements that specifically address democracy promotion in

47 Randall Schweller is also called “neoclassical realist” by Gideon Rose (1998). Neoclassical realists are known for their explicit incorporation of internal and external variables as drivers of foreign policy (Rose 1998:146).
Pakistan. Official strategy documents like the NSS of 2002 and 2006 will work to inform the mapping of the *democracy promotion-variable*. Data gathered through my interviews, as well as articles and books written by journalists and academics, and reports from several hold, including the independent organization Freedom House, will also shed light on this issue. I aim to define the Bush administration’s notion of democracy, given that such an understanding is a requirement before studying the administration’s effort to promote democracy. I will study data provided by USAID on the funding of democracy and governance-related projects and programs, in addition to data from the foreign assistance-office in the U.S. Department of State, obtained from an anonymous Department of State-official.
### 3.4 Hypotheses summed up

In the table below are the hypotheses summed up, in addition to the sources of empirical evidence for each variable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Sources of empirical evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_1$ - U.S. policy toward Pakistan is aimed at supporting the fight against terrorism, and in particular the fight against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda.</td>
<td>NSS 2002 and 2006, NIE 2006 and 2007, reports by CRS, books, articles in the New York Times and magazines. Statements by the Bush administration in Congressional testimonies, magazines, and press releases. Assistance data provided by the U.S. Department of State and USAID Greenbook. Interview data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Empirical mapping of independent variables (Xn)

This chapter will consist of the mapping and classification of the three independent variables which are included in the three hypotheses. The mapping and classification will occur according to the specified procedure (operationalization) in the previous chapter.

4.1 Empirical mapping of the security variable (X₁): U.S. policy statements and actions

Hypothesis 1 relies on the assumption that the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan was security driven, and motivated by the aim to fight terrorism, and the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda in particular. In this section, the task is – as a fact-finding precursor to the empirical analysis in chapter 5 – to unravel information that can reveal the extent to which the Bush-administration perceived al-Qaeda as serious terrorist threat, and accordingly developed a counterterrorist strategy that required and - and in fact included - cooperation with Pakistani authorities.

4.1.1 Estimating the terrorist threat

Journalist Bob Woodward described the Taliban regime as “an extreme Islamic fundamentalist militia group” (Woodward 2005:32). The regime’s strict interpretation of Islamic law makes it “fundamentalist”. The Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, and represented a security threat toward the United States due to the regime’s willingness to harbor al-Qaeda (the Base), an international terrorist group best known for its attacks on New York and Washington D.C. in September 2001. Al-Qaeda can be classified as a terrorist organization that is part of a larger jihadist movement, urging men and women to join international jihad. The term international jihad can be defined as “a holy war waged by Muslims against infidels” (Miller 2009). According to Woodward, CIA director George Tenet presented the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, as “one of the three top threats to the United States” in the secret briefing of

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48 The term jihad can also be defined in a more peaceful way, as “a holy struggle or striving by a Muslim for a moral or spiritual or political goal” (Miller 2009).
George W. Bush and Vice president-elect Dick Cheney one week upon the inauguration on January 21, 2001. The two other top threats Tenet presented were allegedly “the increasing availability of weapons of mass destruction (…) and the rise of Chinese power, military and other” (Woodward 2005:34-5). The Northern Alliance, described by Woodward as a “loose confederation of various warlords and tribes in Afghanistan that opposed the Taliban regime,” had supposedly received funding through a covert CIA program for some time at that point. According to Woodward, however, it was not until September 4, 2001 that the deputies’ committee of the State Department made the decision to approve and recommend a plan “that would give the CIA $125 million to $200 million a year to arm the Alliance,” in a serious effort to destabilize the Taliban regime (Woodward 2005:35-6).

The National Security Strategy of the United State of America (NSS) of 2002 and 2006 held many central policy statements that in addition to speeches and policy actions by the Bush administration, have been taken to constitute the foundation for a notion of the Bush doctrine. The NSS of 2002 stated that: “Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances” (NSS 2002:5). Despite encouraging regional partners to isolate the terrorists, the Bush administration also became known for its statements on the necessity of acting unilaterally at times: “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists” (NSS 2002:6).

According to an article in the Washington Post in 2004, CIA director Tenet identified publicly in February 2003, some factors that contributes to recruitment to jihadist movements

"the numbers of societies and peoples excluded from the benefits of an expanding global economy, where the daily lot is hunger, disease, and displacement – and that produce large populations of disaffected youth who are prime recruits for our extremist foes” (Gellman & Linzer 2004).

According to the authors of the Washington Post-article, many interviewed officials said that Bush and his most influential advisers “do not see those factors – or U.S.
policy overseas as primary contributors to the terrorism threat. Bush's explanation, in private and public, is that terrorists hate America for its freedom” (Gellman & Linzer 2004). The American professor of International Affairs, Robert Jervis interpreted Bush’s war on terror in these terms:

“Bush’s response to September 11 may parallel his earlier religious conversion and owe something to his religious beliefs, especially in his propensity to see the struggle as one between good and evil (...) the war on terror has become, not only the defining characteristic of his foreign policy, but also his sacred mission” (Jervis 2003:379).

The declassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2006 concluded that al-Qaeda still remained “the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization” (NIE 2006: 1). According to Stephen Biddle, senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, the single greatest U.S. interest in Afghanistan is “to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear-armed sanctuary there” (Biddle 2009:7). This reading coincides with the conclusion in the NSS of 2006: “There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD” (NSS 2006:18). For the future, the NSS stated that “We are committed to keeping the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people” (NSS 2006:19). Furthermore the NSS introduced a distinction between long-term and short-term strategies in the fight against terrorism:

"In the short run, the fight involves using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of support. In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent victims”(NSS 2006:9).

Elaborating on the topic of long-term strategies, the NSS of 2006 suggested that “The advance of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational terrorism of today” (NSS 2006:11).
4.1.2 U.S. cooperation with Pakistani authorities

U.S. military and law enforcement personnel were engaged in a “direct, low profile effort to assist the Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory” from the spring of 2002 (Kronstadt 2008:45-6). The official from the Department of Defense that I interviewed spoke of U.S. policies toward Pakistan in these terms:

“in essence, we are paying them money and in return they are turning over a number of al-Qaeda types (…) I don’t think this could have been done without their cooperation (…) we were also giving money to their military to conduct military operations in the North-West Frontier Province”.

About 700 al-Qaeda suspects are estimated to have been captured or killed in Pakistan, a number that as of February 2009, according to the Congressional research writer Alan K. Kronstadt “has remained unchanged since 2004” (Kronstadt 2009:9). However, it is difficult to find a reliable source on these numbers, given that it is hard for independent organizations and journalists to get access in the tribal areas of Pakistan to verify the casualty figures on al-Qaeda suspects as well as civilians (BBC News (2007). Despite the short-term strategy of trying to deny safe haven for terrorists in any nation, the National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 assessed that al-Qaeda had “protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership” (NIE 2007:6). The official at the State Department said that Pakistan has seemed overly focused on India, and not fully committed to closing the border with Afghanistan to ensure that al-Qaeda and Taliban-fighters cannot operate from their country

“We have tried to convince the Pakistanis that they should focus on their western border and not put all the FMF [Foreign Military Financing] on the Indian border, that they would lose a conventional war with India. They have already lost three wars, but no, they will not listen”.

Observers have questioned whether rogue elements within the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) – or maybe even President Musharraf – have played on both sides “to hedge the bets, to stay friendly with the Taliban for the day that the Taliban returns” (Chamberlin 2010). Chamberlin believe that Musharraf stayed friendly with
the Taliban “I believe all along that the ISI was part of the army and thus the army policy, but it was the policy of the army, and it was the policy of Musharraf all along to play both sides” (2010). An article in the New York Times from September 2008 claimed that

“One of the Bush administration’s biggest complaints about the Pakistani government has been its reluctance to sever its ties with Taliban militants like the Haqqanis. Pakistan has continued to regard the Taliban as a valuable force for protecting Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan in the event of an American withdrawal” (Perlez & Shah 2010).

Despite the charges that Pakistan has not been fully committed to the fight against terrorism, the State Department official I interviewed emphasized that Pakistan did protect the supply lines for the war effort in Afghanistan, even though “Pakistan also maintained relations with militant groups like the Haqqani network, which interfered with our operations in Afghanistan.” The DoD official I interviewed said that the drone attacks aimed at the Haqqani network in Pakistan in September 2008 was “probably designed as a signal to the Pakistanis as much as anything else.”

Nicholas Burns, U.S. Under secretary of state for political affairs, confirmed in his prepared Congressional testimony on July 25, 2007, that Pakistan was an indispensable ally due to the United States’ need for support in the Afghanistan war, and its quest for stability in an important region:

"Pakistan, one of our closest partners globally, has been indispensable in our world-wide struggle against radical Islamic terrorist groups. As Afghanistan’s most influential neighbor, Pakistan plays a pivotal role in the prosecution of our war effort. Pakistan is also, of course, a leading Muslim country, whose future will be decisive in the search for stability in South Asia – a region of vastly increased importance to the United States” (Burns 2007).

Afghanistan is a landlocked country, a factor that has provided the United States and the coalition forces in Afghanistan with limited possibilities for bringing in supplies. All of my informants confirmed the important role that Pakistan has played in securing the supply lines for the operation in Afghanistan. Speaking of the importance of control with the supply lines and the leverage it gave Pakistan, Ambassador Chamberlin said “That’s still true” (Chamberlin 2010). The State Department official I interviewed described the U.S.-Pakistan relationship as a transactional one: ‘‘70 to 75
percent of the coalition’s supplies in Afghanistan go through Pakistan. There are no other options. We cannot go through Iran and it is too costly from the north. Pakistan is well aware of this. Under secretary of state, Nicholas Burns argued along the same lines in his Congressional testimony:

“Without Pakistani support and cooperation for our current military operations, we would face severe difficulties in supplying, reinforcing, and protecting our troops and those of our allies who are defending the democratically elected Afghan government” (Burns 2007:2).

The State official said the United States has been fully aware that not all the Foreign military financing (FMF) went to counter-terrorism efforts:

“It was the prize you had to pay. It kept the military happy (…) The Pakistanis are notorious for having wish lists. Large parts of the money went to buying weapons that were better-suited to fight states (…) conventional weapons for a war with India”.

Figure 1 in Chapter 2 illustrated the total military assistance to Pakistan from FY 2000 to 2008. The overt U.S. military assistance was quite stable after the major increase in FY 2002. However, FY 2004 represented a rupture in form of a steep decline, from approximately U.S.$300-350 million the previous two years, to approximately U.S.$95 million in FY 2004. The graph in Figure 1 did not include the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) which accounts for a large part of the U.S. payments to Pakistan. The CSF totaled approximately U.S.$3.1 billion between FY 2002 and FY 2004 (Kronstadt 2010). The total amount of CSF Pakistan received from FY 2002 to FY 2009 was approximately U.S.$6.5 billion. The total security related U.S. assistance to Pakistan in this period, including the CSF, was approximately U.S.$10 billion. U.S.$4.6 billion could be traced as assistance to economy-related programs, making the grand total U.S. assistance in this period approximately U.S.$15 billion. Development assistance and funding to democracy and governance programs and projects falls under economy-related assistance (Kronstadt 2010). Ambassador Chamberlin described the CSF as rent:

49 The interviewed Congressional staffer said that the Obama administration was exploring the possibilities for diversifying the supply lines.
“[The U.S.] felt they had a good military partner in Musharraf, so they rented him. And the Coalition Support Fund, which came quite early, early in the 2002, was rent. We rent the Pakistan army. We'll give you this money. You go up there and plog the border with Afghanistan and fight the terrorists so that we don't have to” (Chamberlin 2010).

Nawaz agreed with Chamberlin’s description, saying that when Pakistan agreed to accept the CSF money they “instantly made the Pakistan army an army for hire, which was not a role that they liked to be in [my italics]” (2010). Nawaz pointed out that it was the Pakistani leaders – including Musharraf, who was never known as a collegial leader – who accepted this deal. Nawaz argued, in my interview, that he thought Musharraf managed to play the Americans extremely well. On the question of why the United States was so easy to play, Nawaz responded:

“Because it was in their interest not to jeopardize the relationship. I mean, he [Musharraf] knew, and they [the United States] knew that he knew, that they were totally dependent on Pakistan for supplying Afghanistan. If that pipe line was shut down they would have three weeks of supply. The war would come to a grinding halt” (Nawaz 2010).

The Pakistani diplomat I interviewed claimed that the highest prioritized foreign policy goal in the studied time period was “basically national security, on both sides”. Chamberlin said that “it was all about terrorism” (2010). The policy analyst Shuja Nawaz said he thought in current times (February 2010), “it is still hugely driven by Afghanistan.” Speaking of the George W. Bush presidency, he stated that “it was all driven by Afghanistan.” (Nawaz 2010). The interviewed Department of Defense official did not think there was any clear shift when U.S. started to think of Pakistanis as two-faced

“I think they always kind of thought that. Whatever hostility there was, was counterbalanced by Bush’s positive fuse towards Musharraf, and just the political reality of having to deal with whatever government is there. I think probably yes, the decision to use drone for the first time is pretty important, but I wouldn't say there was a huge 180 degree shift. The executive branch has always wanted economic assistance for instance; it’s the best way to get them to cooperate.”

Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State from 2005 to 2009, stated in an article in the magazine “Foreign Affairs” in 2008 that it had been a necessity to strengthen the relationship with Pakistan: “Following years of U.S. neglect of that relationship, our
administration had to establish a partnership with Pakistan’s military government to achieve a common goal after September 11” (Rice 2008:16-7).

The State Department official I interviewed argued that toward the end of the Bush period there was some recognition that the dynamic in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship had to change: “The U.S. had to ensure that Pakistan’s security was not reliant on such proxy fighters [like the Haqqani network]. The realization came so late that it did not result in any real changes in policy, it took too long to, but it did result in more calls for democracy.” A national intelligence officer for transnational threats, Ted Gistaro, assessed in August 2008 that al-Qaeda had strengthened its safehaven in the FATA, “by deepening its alliances with Pakistani militants and pushing many elements of Pakistani government authority from the area” (Gistaro 2008). The New York Times wrote on the occasion of Gistaro’s public assessment that there was a growing recognition (in August 2008) among senior officials “that the Bush administration for years did not take the [al-]Qaeda threat in Pakistan seriously enough and relied on President Pervez Musharraf to dismantle networks of militants there” (Mazzetti 2008).

4.2 Empirical mapping of the economy-variable (X_2):
U.S. policy statements and actions

Hypothesis 2 is based on expectations from commercial liberalism which point to domestic influence on U.S. foreign policy, and the economic interests of American citizens and corporations. First I will look at some general statements on economy by the Bush administration, followed by data on trading with goods between Pakistan and the United States, as well as data on the U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Pakistan. Finally news articles and data from my interviews will be used to shed light on the economy variable.

4.2.1 The Bush administration’s policy statements on economy

According to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, free market and free trade were key priorities of the Bush administration. Trade and investment were understood to be the “real engines of economic growth”, so expanding the flow of trade and investment was critical (NSS 2002: 22-3). The administration stated that “Even if
government aid increases, most money for development must come from trade, domestic capital, and foreign investment. An effective strategy must try to expand these flows as well” (NSS 2002: 22-3). The concept of free trade were not just understood as a pillar in economics, but also as

“a moral principle (...) If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a living. (NSS 2002:18)

The Bush administration expressed an intention to move “ahead with bilateral free trade agreements” and emphasized the importance of promoting “the connection between trade and development” (NSS 2002:18). President Bush’s 2002 speech at the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, expressed belief in the impact of trade rather than aid

“When nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no amount—no amount—of development aid is ever enough. When nations respect their people, open markets, invest in better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively.” (Quote by George W. Bush cited in NSS 2002:21).

The National Security Strategy of 2006 emphasized that too many nations in practice “hold fast to the false comforts of subsidies and trade barriers” and this tended to happen despite the “appeal of economic liberty” (NSS 2006:27). Among the many challenges that remained ahead, the security report identified “protectionist impulses” that “put at risk the benefits of open markets and impede the expansion of free and fair trade and economic growth” (NSS 2006:27). The NSS of 2006 furthermore stated that the United States had worked “to open markets and integrate the global economy” through its negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), putting forward “bold and historic proposals to reform global agricultural trade, to eliminate farm export subsidies and reduce trade-distorting support programs, to eliminate all tariffs on consumer and industrial goods, and to open global services markets” (NSS 2006:25). The Bush administration expressed that the United States was advancing this

50 The conference took place on March 22, 2002.
agenda, and in the talks ahead, the United States continued to “lead the world in advancing bold proposals for economic freedom through open markets” (NSS 2006:25).

The expressed rationale behind the U.S. economic policy was mixed. It was stated that the United States wanted its allies “to have strong economies for their own sake, for the sake of the global economy, and for the sake of global security” (NSS 2002:18). It was also stated that free trade agreements can “create new opportunities for American farmers and workers” (NSS 2006:25). It becomes important to point out that the Bush administration expressed a strong belief in the link between economic liberty and political liberty: “Greater economic freedom is ultimately inseparable from political liberty. Economic freedom empowers individuals, and empowered individuals increasingly demand greater political freedom” (NSS 2006:25).

4.2.2 United States’ foreign direct investment and trade with Pakistan

Pakistan is described by the CIA World Factbook as an impoverished and underdeveloped country that has “suffered from decades of internal political disputes and low levels of foreign investment” (CIA 2010). However, Pakistan managed to achieve economic gains from 2002-2007. In this period the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had an annual growth averaging nearly 7 percent (U.S. Chamber of Commerce & U.S.-Pakistan Business Council 2009:5). The World Bank noted in 2009 that while poverty in Pakistan had declined, income inequality had increased. To explain the economic growth, the World Bank pointed to economic reforms that were launched in 2000, as well as external influences like “interest rates, abundant liquidity, and robust external demand (…) increased levels of concessional external assistance (…) and debt restructuring” (World Bank 2009). The increase in remittances and additional external support from the United States after 2001 “has helped increase the cushion of external reserves” (World Bank 2009). Despite economic gains in Pakistan’s economy in FY 2002 to 2007, “the country slid into a severe economic downturn in 2008,” with a crisis in the balance of payments and the government’s inability to secure lending and development aid (U.S. Chamber of Commerce & U.S.-Pakistan Business Council 2009:5).
The figure above shows the increase in both U.S. import and U.S. export of goods to Pakistan from 2000 to 2009.\(^{51}\) The data from the U.S. Census Bureau show that U.S. import of Pakistani goods increased under President Bush, and reached a peak in 2006. The phasing out of the quota system could be a possible explanation for the increase in imports after 2005. However, the increase actually started earlier than 2005, which indicates that there might be other explanations. After 2006 the import declined somewhat. The decrease that took place in 2008-9 could possibly be attributed to the worsening security situation in Pakistan, the financial crisis, or other factors. The agricultural sector dominates the Pakistan economy, but the textile sector dominates Pakistan’s exports (Bolle 2009:3, CIA 2010). The graph below shows that the total amount of United States’ direct foreign investment in Pakistan increased in Pakistan’s fiscal year 2000-1 to 2008-9.\(^{52}\)

\(^{51}\) I assume that the data are U.S. inflation-adjusted.

\(^{52}\) FDI can be defined as “Foreign Direct Investment, a component of a country’s national financial accounts. Foreign direct investment is investment of foreign assets into domestic structures, equipment, and organizations. It does not include foreign investment into the stock markets” (Meyer 2005).
The graph portrays a steady increase, with a steep rise in 2005-6, and almost an equally steep decline in FY 2008-9. According to a 2009 report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-Pakistan Business Council, “security concerns and the deterioration of law and order in Pakistan have deterred FDI” (2009:6). The report urged the new Obama administration to cut tariffs on Pakistan’s textiles because “American tariffs on Pakistan’s leading exports average approximately 10%, about four times the average U.S. tariff rate on imports from other countries (…) Pakistan also loses out to competitors from other developing countries that benefit from U.S. tariff-reducing preference programs [my italics]” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce & U.S.-Pakistan Business Council 2009:9).

4.2.3 Trade policy in practice: tariffs, quotas and free trade agreements

When I asked my sources about the United States’ economic interests in Pakistan, they all emphasized the textile industry as the most powerful interest. Several news articles in the New York Times and The New Republic magazine support the impression that

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Figure 3 Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan FY 2000-1 to 2008-9

![Graph showing Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan FY 2000-1 to 2008-9.](image)

Source: Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan (U.S. Chamber of Commerce & U.S. Pakistan Business Council 2009). Pakistan’s fiscal year run from July 1 to June 30.
the United States saw a threat in the Pakistan textile industry, which influenced the
Bush administration to uphold the textile tariffs and the textile quotas to limit imports
Bush administration was considering cutting tariffs on goods from Pakistan in October
2001, the European Union had already reduced tariffs (Kaufman 2001a). Domestic
importers, retailers and manufacturers favored reducing tariffs, arguing that it would
lead to more business, but the textile industry opposed it. Members of the industry,
largely situated in the Southeast U.S., feared that reduced tariffs would lead to fewer
jobs in the American textile industry (Kaufman 2001a). Franklin Foer addressed this
issue in his article “Fabric Softener. The textile lobby v. the war on terrorism” in 2002.
According to Foer, President Musharraf allegedly asked for “the suspension of U.S.
tariffs and quotas on Pakistani textiles.” Foer opines that the Bush administration
should have thanked President Musharraf for his support in the war on terrorism by
granting him this favor (Foer 2002). Foer identifies the U.S. textile lobby and its
victories in Washington as the reason for why no such shift in trade policy took place.
The textile industry:

“has similarly helped squash proposals to grant trade benefits to Turkey,
Uzbekistan, and Tadzikistan—all key allies in the war on terrorism. In other
words, the protectionist lobby of a dying industry has quietly become arguably
the most effective domestic opponent of American foreign policy” (Foer 2002).

Foer criticized the *quota system*, which according to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) was established to limit “imports into countries whose domestic industries
were facing serious damage from rapidly increasing imports” (WTO 2010). Foer
argued in his article that the textile lobby had “spent millions of dollars and interfered
with wartime foreign policy to prolong a protectionist regime that’s already slated for
imminent extinction” (Foer 2002). Foer referred to the fact that the quotas on Pakistan
exports to the United States was to be phased out in 2005, according to the agreements
in the 1994 Uruguay rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(Foer 2002, WTO 2010).

My sources confirmed that Pakistan asked for concessions on trade – in the form of
raised quotas, lower tariffs, or even free trade agreements – but that the United States
had its concerns. The Pakistani diplomat said that the trade issue was the source of a great debate during the studied time period

“Pakistan wanted a free trade agreement; we still want a free trade agreement (…) the issue was in fact discussed, but the United States was not very positively disposed towards it. They said as a first step the two countries should have a Bilateral Investment Treaty, BIT (…) No progress has been made on it yet”.

The Congressional staffer I interviewed underscored that Colombia and South Korea, which has had a stronger relationship with the United States in the recent past, have not managed to get free trade agreements yet, suggesting that Pakistan could not expect this process to go at the speed they wanted. The DoD official I interviewed had attended some meetings in Washington about how to help the Pakistanis economically to encourage their cooperation in October 2001. The official mentioned that President Musharraf himself had raised the issue in a meeting with Vice president Dick Cheney and Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin in 2002, but that there was some opposition to the free trade agenda in the U.S. Congress

“You had all these domestic – you know, you had the domestic textile industry (…) We tried to provide them [the Pakistanis] with some inducements, but it was difficult with Congress. Textile’s – it’s kind of, one of their last bastions, especially in Carolina (…) This may be a seeming side issue, but it is important, it’s important for the Pakistanis. It shows that the U.S. can use its markets, or try to make them more open to reciprocal cooperation from other countries”.

The Pakistani diplomat I interviewed claimed that the United States continues to be protective of its textile industry, pointing to evidence from recent American legislation. In 2008, legislation was introduced in Congress that aimed to provide economic incentives to address poverty and unemployment in Pakistan – factors believed to “provide fertile ground for violent extremism in Afghanistan and the border region of Pakistan” (GAO 2009:40) Two bills providing for duty-free treatment of certain Pakistani textile and apparel products, as well as non-textile and non-apparel products, were introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate. The duty-free treatment was to be limited to products that were produced in “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZ). The U.S. president would be allowed the authority to
designate ROZ’s in the entire territory of Afghanistan, and on the border region of Pakistan. The bills were not passed (Bolle 2009:2, GAO 2009:40).\textsuperscript{53}

Trade policy analyst Daniel J. Ikenson, associated with the liberal think tank the Cato Institute, wrote in a 2003 Washington Post article that the Bush administration’s proposal “to increase U.S. market access for Pakistani apparel exporters as compensation for lost business associated with the war on terrorism was abandoned at the insistence of the textile lobby” (Ikenson 2003). He argued that the protection of the U.S. textile and apparel industries created a cost that was borne “disproportionately by poorer Americans, who spend relatively higher amounts of their earnings on clothing”. In the article, which criticized the U.S. textile policy for perpetuating the underlying conditions of “economic stagnation and hopelessness in poor countries”, Ikenson concluded that the Bush administration

“claims to recognize the nexus between economic stagnation and the potential for extremism to take root and flourish. Accordingly, it should seek to coordinate its trade and foreign policy objectives. Depriving developing countries of opportunities to trade their most important products is a shameful and dangerous failure of leadership” (Ikenson 2003).

The State Department official I interviewed mentioned that other than the textile industry, which is the most important, several energy corporations are working in or would like to engage with Pakistan. With policy analyst Nawaz, I also discussed the influence of the U.S. weapon industry on foreign policy toward Pakistan. He said that “it does always have an influence because they have people on the Hill. The military-to-military relationship always ends up being the more powerful relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, than the civil relationship” (Nawaz 2010). According to a Congressional Research Report, the United States has provided Pakistan with a base program of U.S.$300 million per year beginning in FY 2005. “These funds are used to purchase U.S. military equipment “ (Kronstadt 2008:53). Aircrafts and machinery, as well as arms and ammunition, were among the top U.S. export categories to Pakistan in 2008 (USTR 2010). In the interview with Nawaz, I asked why the United States

\textsuperscript{53}Afghanistan- Pakistan Security and Prosperity Enhancement Act, H.R. 6387, 110\textsuperscript{th} Congress, and Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act of 2008, S. 2776, 110\textsuperscript{th} Congress.
agreed to sell weapons that were better equipped for a conventional war with India rather than for counter-terrorist operations. Nawaz responded that “the U.S. agreed to all these purchases, because many of them were made from the U.S.” (Nawaz 2010). He underscored that Pakistan’s purchase of American weapons not only benefitted both the U.S. weapon industry, but ensured a long-term relationship: “It gives the U.S. a hold. And it’s not the sales of the weapons where the money is, it’s the maintenance and the spare parts and the servicing. That’s really the longer-term benefits to any exporter” (Nawaz 2010).

4.3 Empirical mapping of the democracy promotion variable (X₃): U.S. policy statements and actions

The next sections will look at the variable of democracy promotion. I will introduce some of the Bush administration’s notions and policy statements on democracy and democracy promotion, as well as the administration’s related strategies. Then I will move on to an empirical mapping of the Bush administration’s democracy and governance assistance to Pakistan in numbers. Finally will be a brief description of the political situation in Pakistan from 2001 to 2009 and the United States’ response be presented.

4.3.1 The Bush administration’s policy statements on democracy promotion

In the National Security Strategy of 2002, the Bush administration stated that the U.S. strategy would be based on “a distinctly American internationalism” (NSS 2002:1). In the National Security Strategy of 2006, President Bush indicated an intention to use foreign policy as a tool to change the world: “We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy” (NSS 2006: Introduction by President George W. Bush). The role of the United States on the international arena is presented as active: “America cannot know peace, security, and prosperity by retreating from the world. America must lead by deed as well as by example” (NSS 2006:49). In the pursuit of different goals, the administration highlighted that “the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere (NSS 2002:3). Those statements
reflect a belief that liberty and justice are universal values. In addition to policy statements on the *moral imperative* of promoting democracy, other statements suggest democracy promotion as a means of enhancing the security of the United States:

"The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people" (NSS 2006:1)

Specific policy statements on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship can be found in both the National Security Strategy documents from 2002 and 2006. In 2002, the security document stated that the bilateral relations with Pakistan “have been bolstered by Pakistan’s choice to join the war against terror and move toward building a more open and tolerant society” (NSS 2002:10). The NSS of 2006 mentioned that the U.S. was "eager to see Pakistan move along a stable, secure, and democratic path"(NSS 2006:39). However, the declassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on global terrorism trends of 2006 suggested that there could also be risks associated with supporting democratic transitions, because they could entail instability:

“If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit“ (NIE 2006:2,3).

**4.3.2 U.S. democracy promotion: concepts and strategies**

The Bush administration stated that it would “stand with and support advocates of freedom in every land”, but that the approach would vary

“Though our principles are consistent, our tactics will vary. They will reflect, in part, where each government is on the path from tyranny to democracy. In some cases, we will take vocal and visible steps on behalf of immediate change. In other cases, we will lend more quiet support to lay the foundation for future reforms (NSS 2006:6).

In order to investigate U.S. democracy promotion in Pakistan, it is necessary to try to understand which meaning the Bush administration ascribed to the concept of democracy. Deriving from greek, *demos* means people and *kratos* means rule. If the
people are to rule, some questions arise: Who are to be considered as the people, what should be the scope of their rule, and how should they participate in the decision-making processes? (Held 2006:1-3).\(^{(54)}\) No definition of the word democracy can be found in the two National Security Strategy documents that I have investigated. However, the NSS of 2006 expressed that the United States was committed to promoting effective democracies. Defined by four elements related to the function of a democracy, effective democracies:

“1) Honor and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly association, and press; 2) are responsive to the citizens, submitting to the will of people, especially when people vote to change their government; 3) Exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law, and resist corruption; and 4) Limit the reach of government, protecting the institutions of civil society” (NSS 2006:4).

Commenting on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in July 2007, Nicholas Burns, Under secretary of state for political affairs, gave a Congressional testimony that was more specific about which values, rights and institutions must be in place to bring this lasting freedom in Pakistan:

“But we in the U.S. also know that democracy means more than just holding elections. It means building the foundations of sustainable democracy: a free and vibrant press, the right to free assembly, an independent legislature and judiciary, active civil society organizations, and broadly participative and internally democratic political parties” (Burns 2007:7)

Burns noted that there might be some disagreement on how to proceed in building the foundations of Pakistan’s democracy:

“Pakistanis should be assured that we will be a good and reliable friend. But, as a good friend, we will speak frankly and sometimes disagree on vital issues such as the best way to defeat terrorist groups, and the right way to build a democratic state” (Burns 2007).

Burns furthermore stated that the partnership with Pakistan would contribute to the goal of restoring Pakistan as a democratic state on the long term: “Our partnership with the Pakistanis gives us an opportunity to support the long-term objective of

\(^{(54)}\) See Held (2006 ) for an elaboration on different models of democracy.
Pakistan’s transformation to a modern, democratic state, a moderate voice in the Islamic world” (Burns 2007:6-7). Burns said the aim of the governance and democracy assistance programs toward Pakistan was set up with “an eye to bolstering Pakistan’s civil institutions and long-term political stability” (Burns 2007).

It is widely disputed whether a country can contribute to democratization in another country through foreign aid, and how democratic forms of government come into being (Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen & Halloran 2006, Knack 2004). Undersecretary Burns emphasized that promoting democracy can be achieved through technical assistance in electoral processes, and contributions to the strengthening of legislative and judiciary power, civil society and the free press. Stephen Knack, economist in the World Bank’s research department and public sector governance department, has identified two additional means of promoting democracy, through improving the educational standard and the level of economic growth, and also through *conditionality*. (Knack 2004: 251). Grants and loans could be conditioned on “performance in the areas of civil liberties, the conduct of elections, and respect for the rule of law,” Knack wrote. However, he noted that “studies generally find that conditioning aid on reform in recipient nations is generally ineffective” (Knack 2004:252 referring to Collier 1997, Crawford 1997, Dollar and Pritchett 1998). The potential undermining effects of foreign aid could be: (i) a recipient government that is more dependent on aid than “its citizenry for tax revenues”, (ii) a strengthening of the government sector’s role in the economy relative to the private sector, or (iii) the idea of government control as “a more valuable prize” (Knack 2004:253, 262 referring to Grossman 1992, Karl 1997:57,190, Moore 1998, Friedman 1958). Knack classifies “literacy and increased income” as features of modernization that many believe can increase the demand for democratic government (Knack 2004:252 referring to Lipset 1959, Almond & Powell 1965). This implies that aid to Pakistan could be used as an award for many purposes, but could potentially “promote democracy indirectly by modernizing societies” (Knack 2004:252). The intention here is not to study the effectiveness of the U.S. democracy and governance aid to Pakistan, but rather to map how it has been conducted, which I will proceed with in the following section.
4.3.3 U.S. Democracy and governance assistance to Pakistan in numbers

USAID, U.S. Department of State, and the non-governmental nonprofit organization National Endowment for Democracy (NED) can be said to serve as the main funders of the United States’ democracy assistance worldwide. In addition, other efforts to support democratic institutions and practices abroad can be traced to different parts of the U.S. government, such as the Department of Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the Department of Justice (Carothers 2009:4). I have not found any data that shows funding of projects or programs in Pakistan through MCC (MCC 2010a, MCC 2010b) or the Department of Justice. Complete and detailed data on the U.S. democracy and governance assistance has not been made available for the whole period of study. The graph below portrays the U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan from FY 2001 to 2008, based on the numbers from the USAID.

55 At least I have not been able to obtain it. I have contacted both the USAID and the U.S. Department of State.
Figure 4 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan in FY 2001 to 2008

Funding to the NGO National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the State Department’s Democracy Fund amounted to approximately $U.S. 12.6 million (constant 2008 dollars), that is 0.19 percent of the total overt assistance in this period (excluding the covert aid and the CSF).\(^{56}\) It is difficult to estimate how much of the

\(^{56}\) My calculation based on the numbers from USAID Greenbook (2010).
total assistance that actually went to democracy and governance programs or projects. A press released from USAID in August 2006 stated that the United States and Pakistan had “signed a $22.1 million agreement to strengthen parliamentary institutions, improve electoral processes and advance Pakistan’s devolution process” (USAID 2006). This indicates that assistance to democracy and governance programs and projects has been directed through other entries than NED and the Democracy Fund. The news published on the official USAID website for democracy and governance programs in Pakistan, tend to emphasize that their projects aim to improve the electoral rolls system, as well as the launching of websites for Pakistani assemblies or committees that aiming to help citizens better understand how their representatives work (USAID 2006, USAID 2007b, USAID 2008a, USAID 2008b, USAID 2008c, USAID 2008d). Funding earmarked “Transition Initiatives, International Program” went to the USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which according to their website:

“supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by helping local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis. Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs [my italics]” (USAID 2010).

Less than 0.03 percent of the total U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan in the studied period went to OTI – and the number will be considerably smaller if we include the Coalition support funds into this picture. It is difficult to estimate how much of the foreign assistance has been directed to democracy-related projects, not only because I lack the complete data, but also because I would have to make controversial choices about what should be defined as contributing to democratization. Based on the fact sheet provided to me by an official at the State Department (appendix 2), I see that the State Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance did not mark all of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) as democracy and governance assistance. Based on this data, I have made a figure below, which provides a somewhat more detailed overview of the U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan in FY 2008 and 2009.

57 My calculation based on the numbers from USAID Greenbook (2010).
The figure shows that, according to the State Department, approximately $U.S.40 million went to democracy and governance in Pakistan in FY 2009.\textsuperscript{58} The total amount of foreign assistance increased in FY 2009, but the assistance to democracy and governance remained stable in percentage of the total overt assistance to Pakistan (excluding the CSF). According to the State Department’s own categorization, $U.S.6.3 million of the Economic Support Fund went to democracy and governance in FY 2008. I have no such detailed data for the period from FY 2001 to 2007. According to the fact sheet, U.S. democracy and governance funding to Pakistan made up approximately 5 percent of the total U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan in FY 2008, as well as FY 2009.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{58}I assume that the numbers are in constant 2010 $ U.S.
\textsuperscript{59} My own calculation based on the numbers derived from appendix 2.
4.3.4 Facing the political situation in Pakistan

A report on the status of political and civil rights in Pakistan, produced by the independent organization Freedom House, ranged Pakistan as Not Free in the period between 2001 and 2007 (Freedom House 2009a).\(^60\) Though elections were held in 2002, when General Pervez Musharraf became president, the electoral rules were changed “to the detriment of the opposition parties” in the 2002 Legal Framework Order, according to Freedom House. In 2004 Pakistan’s National Security Council was established, which according to Freedom House contributed to solidifying “the military’s role in government” (Freedom House 2009a). Despite Freedom House’s classification of Pakistan as military-rulled country from 2001 to 2007, the U.S. Department of State contended that the elections resulted in “handover from military to civilian rule with parliamentary elections in November 2002, and the appointment of a civilian prime minister” (U.S. Department of State 2009). However, the 2009 background note from the Department of State on Pakistan also mentioned that “Having previously promised to give up his army post and become a civilian president, General Musharraf announced late in 2004 that he would retain his military role” (U.S. Department of State 2009).

The Freedom House report furthermore states that President Musharraf used corruption charges frequently “to punish opposition politicians or induce them to join the progovernment PML-Q party” (Freedom House 2009a).\(^61\) The National Reconciliation Order (NRO) that was passed ahead of the presidential election in October 2008 allowed the opposition candidate Benazir Bhutto to run for office (Freedom House 2009a).\(^62\) However, a political crisis escalated throughout 2007 due to president and Army chief Pervez Musharraf’s suspension of the chief justice of the Supreme Court. This crisis culminated in Musharraf’s reelection as president in October, and his imposition of martial law and a state of emergency in November 2007. Bhutto was assassinated in late December 2007 (Freedom House 2008).

\(^60\) See Freedom House (2009b) for what the designations of Free, Partly Free, and Not Free are based on.
\(^61\) PML-Q is short for Pakistan Muslim League-Uqaid-e-Azam.
\(^62\) The NRO “provided an automatic withdrawal of all corruption cases filed against public official prior to 1999” (Freedom House 2009a).
Freedom House notes that the parliamentary elections in 2008 “marked a distinct improvement over those held in 2002,” but claims that they were not “completely free and fair.” Pakistan’s rating in 2008 improved from Not Free to Partly Free “due to the end of military rule, parliamentary elections that propelled an opposition coalition to power, and the election of a civilian president” (Freedom House 2009a). In a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Freedom House and 11 U.S. human rights organizations urged the United States to take a more active stance toward Pakistan during the political crisis in late December 2008:

“The Assistant Secretary Boucher’s letter notes that the U.S. government has called for the end of martial law and the release of detainees. But the letter’s language lacks urgency when discussing judicial independence, stating only that the U.S. encourages an independent judiciary as a significant part of any democracy. Our organizations have heard consistently from colleagues in Pakistan that they cannot understand the silence of the U.S. government on the necessity of an independent judiciary and an unwavering commitment to the rule of law” (Freedom House 2007).  

The statement above indicates that the Bush administration had expressed their concerns about the political situation in Pakistan, but that some actors pushed for the United States to put more pressure on Musharraf. The Pakistani diplomat I interviewed said that the Bush administration

“found President Musharraf a good partner to work with. While the United States kept saying that it wanted to promote democracy in Pakistan, it was not averse to working with President Musharraf also, and accommodate his point of view of what Pakistani democracy should be like. Eventually however, that did not work”.

Musharraf abandoned his military command in late 2007 (Kaufman 2008), and resigned as president mid-August 2008 “just days ahead of impeachment in parliament over the U.S. ally's attempts to impose authoritarian rule on his turbulent nation” (CBS News 2008).

In a 2008 article in “Foreign Affairs” magazine, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, addressed the need for the U.S. to cooperate with non-democratic countries on security issues. She wrote that the United States had been advocating for reform and supporting

63 The italics indicate a quote from Assistant Secretary Boucher’s letter.
“indigenous agents for change” in Pakistan, and thus been able to “balance these concerns [security and democracy] in our relationship with Pakistan” (Rice 2008:16).

According to Rice, the United States had strengthened its relationship with Pakistan:

“knowing that our security and that of Pakistan ultimately required a return to civilian and democratic rule. So even as we worked with President Pervez Musharraf to fight terrorists and extremists, we invested more than $3 billion to strengthen Pakistani society—building schools and health clinics, providing emergency relief after the 2005 earthquake, and supporting political parties and the rule of law (…) we pushed President Musharraf to take of his uniform and hold free elections” (Rice 2008:17).

The Pakistani diplomat I interviewed commented that the Bush administration wanted elections to be held in Pakistan

“but they also wanted Musharraf to continue to play a role (…) And I think that they tried probably behind the scenes, I have no proof, they tried to help reach an agreement between some political parties in Pakistan and President Musharraf, to find a way how democracy could come to Pakistan but at the same time a role could be found for President Musharraf”.

Political analyst Shuja Nawaz did not seem to think the Bush administration’s foreign policies toward Pakistan reflected the goal of promoting democracy:

“The only attempt was when they put pressure on Musharraf to make a deal with Benazir Bhutto and allow her return, and that backfired, because the moment she came here [Washington D.C.] before going back, and the U.S. was seen as blessing that agreement, it was like putting a target on her. All the anti-American forces then saw her as embodying U.S. interference in Pakistan politics. And we saw the tragic results of that” (Nawaz 2010).

Ambassador Chamberlin asserted that the Bush administration “personalized everything,” that President Bush, Vice president Cheney and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte (later Deputy Secretary of State) “all loved Musharraf” (Chamberlin 2010). According to Chamberlin, democracy promotion was not a high priority for the Bush administration in its policies toward Pakistan “It was just talk,” she said. Asked whether different U.S. agencies had different perceptions on the issue, Chamberlin acknowledged that the State Department began to understand that Musharraf was “terribly unpopular and that our relationship was stronger and couldn’t

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64 The media has aired accusations that official representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States played lead roles in brokering a deal for Musharraf’s resignation (Nelson & Siddiq 2009).
be sustained with a relationship that was based only on Musharraf” (Chamberlin 2010). Chamberlin claimed that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice started to change, emphasizing that the U.S. relationship was with the people Pakistan, but that “the White House was still hard over anti-democratic. Musharraf was our guy till the very end” (Chamberlin 2010). Senator Joseph Biden urged the Bush administration to “move from a Musharraf policy to a Pakistan policy” in 2007 when he was chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (CBS News 2007). The Pakistani diplomat I interviewed said hypothetically that “if the United States realized, say in 2004, that the democratic government in Pakistan would be a much better partner in the fight against terrorism, they would have dumped Musharraf much earlier.” The diplomat said the Bush administration thought Musharraf’s regime was “stabilizing, and Musharraf tried to give that impression. He still is trying to give that impression. He tried to scare them.”

According to an article by Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bush administration provided aid to Pakistan (and Afghanistan) with few strings attached, and largely assumed that the U.S. role should be to “enable the host government to realize its own best interest by making itself into a legitimate defender of all citizen’s well-being” (Biddle 2009:8). Because many see Musharraf as a leader “who put his own tenure first and real legitimacy second,” according to Biddle, many have emphasized the need to make aid more conditional, “to encourage behavior that broadens a host government’s legitimacy and weakens the insurgency” (Biddle 2009:8).

4.4 Empirical findings along the dependent variable and the independent variables

The results from the empirical mapping of the dependent and the independent variables are briefly portrayed in the table below. The empirical findings serve as a starting point for the analysis in the next proceeding chapter, where I estimate if and how the empirical findings on the independent variables support the hypotheses deduced in Chapter 3.
Table 3 Empirical findings of the case along the dependent variable and the independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Main Empirical findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan Phase 1: Pre-September 11, 2001 (weak con)</td>
<td>- Provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan in only a few selected areas due to the sanction regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan Phase 2: Post-September 11, 2001 (strong pro) | - Easing or lifting of nuclear-, debt related and democracy-related sanctions.  
- An unconditional aid-approach. Pakistan becomes a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Main Empirical findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| $X_1 : Security interests$ | - The Bush administration’s expressed goal to fight terrorism and al-Qaeda and Taliban in particular.  
- Security related assistance (including the Coalition Support Funds) constitutes the major part of the U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan.  
- Strategic significance of the Afghan-Pakistani border  
- U.S. need for supply lines through Pakistani |
| $X_2 : Economic interests$ | - The Bush administration’s expressed goal to promote free trade and free markets.  
- Increase in trade with goods between Pakistan and the U.S., and increase in U.S. foreign direct investments in Pakistan  
- No substantial trade benefits granted to Pakistan in the textile sector |
| $X_3 : Democracy promotion$ | - The Bush administration’s expressed goal to promote democracy in Pakistan.  
- Easing of democracy related sanctions while Pakistan was run by an unelected military general.  
- Questionable whether the Bush administration pressured Musharraf $hard$ to give in to democracy.  
- U.S. short-term security concerns as a potential obstacle for democracy promotion |
5 Empirical analysis: Explaining U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan

This chapter will explain the main features of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan under President George W. Bush on the basis of the theoretical insights and empirical data presented in previous chapters. For all practical purposes, the hypotheses deduced in Chapter 3 will be juxtaposed with the empirical data from the preceding chapter. The foreign policy of the Bush administration was classified as being dominated by a weak con-attitude up until September 11, 2001. The foreign policy as of post-September 11 was found to be dominated by a strong pro-attitude.

At first, I will assess whether and how each one of the independent variables seems to have mattered to the foreign policy. A separate analysis will look at each independent variable’s influence on the dependent variable. Based on the separate analyses of each one of the hypotheses, I will analyze the whole set of hypotheses together to construct a credible narrative of the rationale behind the Bush administration’s foreign policy toward Pakistan. A distinction will be made between enabling, motivating, necessary and sufficient factors in the arguments about what can explain the U.S. foreign policy shift. By moving ahead in this way, I seek to unravel some of the internal and external conditions that could explain the administration’s priorities, policy statements and real policies. Finally, conclusions about the driving forces and mechanisms in U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan will be presented.

5.1 To what extent and how has U.S. security interests influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan? (hypothesis 1)

To what extent is there factual support for the hypothesis that U.S. policy toward Pakistan was supporting the fight against terrorism, and in particular the fight against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda?

Kenneth Waltz’s assumption that the survival motive drives states’ action on the international arena (Waltz 1996:309) made up the theoretical foundation for this hypothesis. Waltz portrayed states as unitary actors that first and foremost are security...
maximizers in a system “formed and maintained due to the principle of self-help that applies to the units” (Waltz 1996:309). The hypothesis pointed to the security interests of the United States as a source and explanation of its foreign policy toward Pakistan.

Several sources, including Ambassador Chamberlin, said that the Bush administration was urging Pakistan to cut off its ties with the Taliban regime in the period before September 11. As a response to the terror attacks on U.S. soil, the U.S. initiated a campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Bush administration has referred to Pakistan as an “indispensable ally” (Burns 2007), and a “front line state” in the global campaign against terrorism (White House 2001c). The empirical mapping indicates that the U.S. perceived al-Qaeda as a serious terrorist threat (Gistaro 2008, NIE 2006, NIE 2007, NSS 2002, NSS 2006), and pursued a counter-terrorist strategy that included cooperation with Pakistani authorities. Officials that were interviewed in the Washington Post claimed that President Bush’s perception of the terrorist threat could be attributed to his belief that “terrorist hate America for its freedom” (Gellman & Linzer 2004). Such a perception of the terrorist threat make a constructivist understanding of U.S. foreign policy, and the emphasis on what states “want to do because of how they see themselves in relation to others” (Kubálková 2001a:33) highly relevant.

Press Secretary Morell’s statement on behalf of the Department of Defense on the occasion of the 2007 emergency rule in Pakistan, and the following decision not to stop the flow of military aid, support the hypothesis that security was a high priority: “we do not want to do anything to imperil our own citizens or the citizens of Pakistan, for that matter” (DoD 2007). A wide array of data indicates that the strengthening of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan was motivated by U.S. security concerns (Burns 2007, DoD 2007, NSS 2002, NSS 2006, Rice 2008). Evidence also suggests that the Bush administration argued in idealistic terms to justify the policy shift: “With Pakistan, our bilateral relations have been bolstered by Pakistan’s choice to join the war against terror and move toward building a more open and tolerant society [my italics]” (NSS 2002:10).
The empirical data collected on the U.S. counter-terrorist strategy in Pakistan are ambiguous and may inspire different interpretations of how U.S.-Pakistan relations evolved throughout the eight years of the Bush administration. By the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel were assisting Pakistani security forces capturing fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory” (Kronstadt 2008:45-6). The interview data and the statements from Flynt Leverett, however, indicated a focus shift toward Iraq in 2002. The Department of Defense official I interviewed said that the low level of insurgency in Afghanistan in 2002 with the defeat of the Taliban gave the White House the impression that the Afghanistan campaign was a success. In the case of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan, the focus shift did result in lower military and economic assistance to Pakistan in FY 2003 and 2004. However, if we include the CSF money, the picture is different, and the security-related assistance to Pakistan will generally look more stable in the period between FY 2002 and 2007, with an increase in security-related spending taking place in FY 2008-9.65 There were some annual differences, but the main impression is that the security-related assistance in total (including the CSF) remained high after September 11, 2001, and until the very end of the Bush presidency (Kronstadt 2010). These data strengthen the view held by my informants, namely that of the Bush administration’s strong security focus and general will to pay the Pakistani government to ensure logistical and military support of U.S. military operations. Senior officials commented to the New York Times in August 2008 “that the Bush administration for years did not take the Qaeda threat in Pakistan seriously and therefore relied on President Pervez Musharraf to dismantle existing militant networks (Mazzetti 2008). The data implied that an initiative in one of the U.S. Congress’ two chambers, namely the House of Representatives, sought to place conditions on continued U.S. support to Pakistan in 2007, “calling for greater oversight on Pakistan’s actions against insurgents in Pakistan and progress on holding free elections” (Heller, Fort & Guevara 2007). The White House opposed such restrictions. It must be noted that the strong anti-American

65 The security related assistance including CSF was U.S. $3.669 billion in total for FY 2002-2004 and U.S. $3.7 billion in total for FY 2003-2007 (Kronstadt 2010).
sentiments in Pakistan, and Musharraf’s probable concerns over sovereignty, served as an obstacle for the U.S. to engage in more high-profile operations in Pakistan. If there was no tacit agreement with the Pakistani government beforehand, the September 2008 U.S. drone attack at the Haqqani-network on Pakistani soil can be seen as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The interviewed official from the Department of Defense interpreted this specific drone attack as a symbolic act, initiated to press the Pakistani government to strengthen its counter-terrorist efforts. The drone issue can also be interpreted as an indication of the self-help system portrayed by Waltz – a system where every unit cannot fully rely on others and has to strive for greater efficiency in providing security for itself.

Some officials in the Bush administration seemed to claim that the shift to Iraq was a premature move, signaling that it could have consequences for the fight against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (Gellman & Linzer 2004). The data from the empirical mapping indicated that the terrorist threat from al-Qaeda sustained throughout Bush’s presidency, and thus contributes to support Hypothesis 1 (Gistaro 2008, NIE 2006, NIE 2007).

All my informants seemed to agree with the picture that Ambassador Chamberlin painted that the Bush administration’s simply found Musharraf “a good partner to work with” (Chamberlin 2010). According to the Department of Defense official, “Whatever hostility there was [in U.S.-Pakistan relations], was counterbalanced by Bush’s positive fuse towards Musharraf, and just the political reality of having to deal with whatever government is there.” My informants seemed to interpret the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan from a realpolitik perspective, emphasizing the U.S. priority of its security concerns. This impression is backed by the total security-related assistance to Pakistan from FY 2002 to 2009 (including the Coalition Support Funds) which amounted to approximately U.S.$10 billion out of a grand total of approximately U.S. $15 billion (Kronstadt 2010). The Pakistani diplomat, for instance, maintained that if the Bush administration had believed a democratic government in Pakistan would have been a better counter-terrorist partner, the administration “would have dumped Musharraf much earlier.”
Several of the interviewed informants held a view of the U.S.’s role as an outsourcer, a role that implied that the U.S. rented the Pakistani army to secure the borders with Afghanistan. Some of my sources emphasized Pakistan’s suspected connections to Islamic militant networks – and the possibility that Pakistan in some ways would benefit from cooperation with Taliban – as a potential explanation for the Pakistani government’s alleged lack of will to pursue a more active counter-terrorist strategy. What made the White House oppose the suggested restrictions to make U.S. aid to Pakistan conditioned on Pakistan’s counter-terrorist performance? One explanation can be that the executive did not understand a conditionality focus to be effective. I favor the interpretation that the Bush administration simply could not afford to jeopardize the protection of the supply lines for the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan, which appears be the most plausible explanation. The invasion of Iraq probably made the U.S. need for stability in Pakistan even more acute. Not enough relevant data have been collected to provide a detailed overview of where the United States focused its efforts during the Bush period, whether it was focusing mainly on al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters, or both equally at all times. However, the data collected is by far sufficient to claim support for the hypothesis that the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan was aimed at supporting the fight against terrorism, and in particular the fight against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda, after the terrorist attacks on September 11.

5.2 To what extent and how has U.S. economic interests influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan? (hypothesis 2)

To what extent is there factual support for the hypothesis that U.S. 2001-2009 policy toward Pakistan was geared at benefitting the economic interests of American citizens and corporations?

Moravcsik’s reformulation of liberal theory, supplemented by expectations derived from a liberal commercial perspective, made up the theoretical foundation for this

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66 The Pakistani diplomat commented that Pakistan has been active in its counter-terrorism efforts. The diplomat checked the numbers on Pakistani casualties and mentioned that from 2001 to February 2010, 2307 had been killed and 6573 had been wounded out of Pakistan’s military and paramilitary personnel. The numbers were said not to include civilian casualties. I have not managed to get the numbers confirmed.
hypothesis. The hypothesis pointed to the economic interests of individuals and groups as a source and explanatory factor of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan.

Data from the U.S. Census Bureau in the previous chapter showed that the total amount of U.S. imports of Pakistani goods and U.S. exports to Pakistan increased between 2001 and 2009, and that U.S. foreign direct investments (FDI) in Pakistan increased as well (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). These facts might lead us to suggest that the Bush administration pursued an effective and comprehensive strategy of expanding the flow of trade between the U.S. and Pakistan, in addition to increasing U.S. FDI in Pakistan. Some of the collected data provide grounds for such an interpretation, but other data suggests a more nuanced picture.

The Bush administration stated in the NSS of 2002 that trade and investment were understood to be the “real engines of economic growth” (2002:22-3). It emphasized free trade as important not only for moral reasons but also for more interest-based reasons like American job creation – as well as the benefit of having allies with a strong economy because it would be good for the “sake of global security” (NSS 2002:18). The motivations to promote free trade thus seem to have been present in the Bush administration.

The World Bank acknowledged that the United States’ increase in remittances and additional support had helped increase Pakistan’s external reserves (World Bank 2009), and thus contributed to strengthening Pakistan’s economy. However, as Bush himself said, he was convinced that “when nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no amount – no amount – of development aid is ever enough.” (Quote by George W. Bush cited in NSS 2002:21). NSS 2006 identified protectionist impulses as a challenge that “put at risk the benefits of open markets and impede the expansion of free and fair trade and economic growth” (NSS 2006:27). These statements lead us to expect that the U.S. would pursue its free trade agenda actively in its relation with Pakistan.

Musharraf’s request for the suspension of U.S. tariffs and quotas on Pakistani textiles did not result in any major changes in U.S. textile policy, except from the automatic
suspension of quotas in 2005, as a consequence of the phase-out negotiated through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 (Altman 2003, Foer 2002, Kaufman 2001a, Kaufman 2001b, U.S. Chamber of Commerce & U.S.-Pakistan Business Council 2009:9, WTO 2010). What factors allowed the trade barriers to remain sustained, despite the executive’s stated preferences for free markets and free trade? The liberal theoretical framework provided by Moravcsik opened for the possibility that policy can become biased when a powerful domestic group manoeuvres successfully to capture the state. The exercise of foreign policy, according to Moravcsik’s reformulation of liberal theory, is mainly a question of the strength of state preferences. Moravcsik emphasized that state officials are under continuous pressure from individuals and private groups to pursue policies that are consistent with their preferences (Moravcsik 1997:518). The empirical mapping indicated that there was a conflict of interests between the United States’ wish to maintain employment in its textile industry versus its wish to promote free trade. The interview data, as well as articles in the New York Times and The New Republic, indicate that suggested initiatives like the reduction of tariffs on textile imports from Pakistan, the increase of quotas of permitted imports from Pakistan and the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones-legislation were difficult to get through Congress.

One of the consequences of a private group’s successful efforts at capturing the state is, according to Moravcsik, that the resulting foreign policy does not necessarily provide gains for the society as a whole (Moravcsik 1997:530-1). In a globalized market economy that can be characterized as a complex web of mutual economic dependency between states, Moravcsik’s concept of policy interdependence becomes relevant. Moravcsik defined policy interdependence as “the set of costs and benefits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences” (Moravcsik 1997:520). The assumption that free trade and free markets are the engines of economic growth, make it reasonable to address poverty and unemployment as underlying causes behind violent extremism and international jihadism (GAO 2009:40) through increased trade. Pakistan could suffer from that the U.S. retains trade barriers since recruitment to international jihad takes place within its
population (Ikenson 2003). The causes of terrorism and international jihadism are multifaceted, but if one assumes that poverty and unemployment truly are some of the underlying causes, some policies could better stem the problem than others. For instance the World Bank observed that rising social inequality in Pakistan took place despite the economic growth that Pakistan experienced between 2001 and 2007. According to my reading of the NSS of 2002 and 2006, the Bush administration did not seem to focus on a need to establish mechanisms for national redistribution of wealth. The World Bank’s observation of rising social inequality in Pakistan might suggest that such mechanisms deserve some attention.

Pakistan’s use of military aid to purchase U.S. military equipment (Kronstadt 2008:53) opens for the possibility that the U.S. weapon industry also might have helped shape U.S. foreign policies. Given that weapons were a large part of the U.S. export during this period, it was surprising that none of my informants highlighted that industry’s possible influence on the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan. The State Department official I interviewed was quick to mention that the U.S.’ protective interests were related to the textile industry, but the official did not answer my question about the influence of the weapon industry. It is quite obvious that the Pakistani military needed weapons and other equipment to pursue the short-term strategy of killing or capturing al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. The question remains whether the sale of weapons and aircrafts to Pakistan had an additional motive – meaning, whether the U.S. policy shift toward channeling large amounts of aid to Pakistan was in fact a result of the weapon industry’s success at capturing the state. The data from the previous chapter neither strengthen nor weaken an empirical proposition about the weapon industry’s possible influence on U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan. The jury is still out on this, due to lack of evidence.

I have found no indication that the Bush administration took concrete steps to change the trade policy before September 11, 2001. Some of my informants indicated that there were discussions of change in the India policy, but not much emphasis on
As Wendy Chamberlin put it, “the mood in the nation” (2010) changed after the terrorist attacks, and created an anxious climate in which all actions to prevent further terrorists attacks were considered justified, or at least had a shot at getting passed in Congress. Assuming that Moravcsik is right in his assumption that the configuration of state preferences determines state behavior, and that state preferences are constrained by the preferences of other states (Moravcsik 1997:520), the Bush administration’s awareness of the preference of states other than Pakistan might have contributed to the decision to deny substantial trade benefits to Pakistan. It is likely that such a policy shift would have resulted in more requests for equal behavior from other states. Moreover, the risk of alienating one’s own constituency before elections could perhaps be considered a possible explanation for a protectionist textile policy. The collected data indicate that the executive was constrained by domestic groups and opposition in the U.S. Congress when it sought to pursue a foreign policy based on free trade with Pakistan in the area of textiles.

President Bush’s stated belief in trade rather than aid did not dominate the policy toward Pakistan. As Moravcsik underscored, a commercial liberalist perspective looks at market structures as a factor that can create incentives for both openness and closure (Moravcsik 1997:529). In the case of U.S. textile policy, market structures seem to have led to closure, or maintained trade barriers with Pakistan. Though the administration practiced a general openness in other situations with Pakistan, the failure to grant trade benefits in the export category that mattered most to the Pakistanis, strengthens the hypothesis that U.S. foreign policy to some extent was geared toward benefitting the economic interests of American citizens and corporations.

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67 Chamberlin, the interviewed official from the State Department, and Shuja Nawaz indicated that the Bush administration was eager to change the India policy.
5.3 To what extent and how has the wish to promote democracy in Pakistan influenced U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan? (hypothesis 3)

To what extent is there factual support for the hypothesis that U.S. policy was aimed at promoting democracy in Pakistan?

The conceptions of American exceptionalism and republican liberalism served as the theoretical foundations of this hypothesis. The American exceptionalist perspective pointed to the United States’ collective self-conception as a democracy. Within this perspective, defending and spreading liberal values like democracy was understood as a basis of the U.S. national interest. Therefore, democracy promotion in foreign countries could serve as a source and explanation of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan. The democratic peace-proposition, based on republican liberalist ideas, pointed to the spread of democracy and liberty around the world as a moral duty, due to the optimistic belief that democratization would lead to a more peaceful world. It was noted in the theoretical chapter that a realist’s possible support for democracy promotion abroad is more pragmatic, and necessarily involves an evaluation of whether the status-quo can be seen to benefit a security-dominated definition of the national interest (Schweller 2002:53,60, Waltz 1996:309).

Several statements in the NSS of 2002 and 2006 indicated that democracy promotion was seen as a moral imperative, which are liberally grounded statements. Bush’s introduction to the NSS of 2006 indicated a liberal worldview, with Bush stating that the United States should “seek to shape the world” and “to influence events for the better” (NSS 2006: Introduction by President George W. Bush). The statement could be interpreted as a sign of an optimistic belief in human progress, commonly associated with the liberal tradition in the study of international relations. Seen from an American exceptionalist perspective, this statement could indicate that the U.S. is charged with a task to spread American values like democracy. The American exceptionalist perspective provides a framework to understand this socially constructed sense of mission. Making democracy promotion part of U.S. foreign policy goals is a projection of the nation’s own self-conception. This is often portrayed
as an idealistic impulse, but it could be argued that identity projection also could be included in a realist’s notion of the security interest. What is more realpolitical than to project an image of the national self-conception and its undermining key values upon the foreign policies of the state? At the least, defense and projection of collective self-conception are on par with the defense of territory and political independence of the state.

The Bush administration also argued for democracy promotion on a utility-based ground claiming that democracy promotion was the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability and countering terrorism (NSS 2006:3). It was noted that the American people would be more secure if the U.S. worked to create a world of democratic states (NSS 2006:1). The collected empirical data suggested various rationales for the U.S. strategy of pursuing democracy promotion. There is good empirical backing for claiming that, on the face of it, motivational factors for promoting democracy worldwide – and therefore in Pakistan – existed in the Bush administration.

Musharraf was still an unelected military ruler at the time when the democracy-related sanctions were eased in 2001. This raises the question of whether the U.S. policy shift reflected a true shift in democracy promotion strategy, or simply a pragmatic approach to cooperating with Pakistan on security issues. What made the executive branch shift from a weak-con to a strong-pro attitude in its relation with Pakistan? The U.S. Congress authorized the president to make exemptions from the earlier restrictions that prevented direct assistance to Pakistan because Pakistan’s elected head of government had been deposed by a military coup (Senate bill 1465/2001). President Bush certified that direct assistance to Pakistan could be given because it: “(A) would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan ; and (B) is important to United States efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international terrorism” (Senate bill 1465/2001). This policy shift could reflect a change in democracy promotion strategy – reflecting a new belief in openness and the importance of providing economic and military support to promote democracy. A modernizing theory of democratization can support such an argument, because contributions to economic growth and economic freedom can be
seen as ultimately promoting political freedom. A strategy of making aid less conditional on Pakistan’s performance falls in line with studies Stephen Knack refers to that “generally find that conditioning aid on reform in recipient nations is generally ineffective” (Knack 2004:252 referring to Collier 1997, Crawford 1997, Dollar and Pritchett 1998).

To argue that the policy shift after September 11, which made foreign assistance conditional on promises of change, rather than concrete results; reflects democracy promotion as a highly prioritized goal in U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan raises several questions. It becomes relevant to ask why the terrorism-related precondition had to be included in the waiver authority in the first place. One could also question why the Bush administration did not proceed fully with this unconditional aid approach to democracy promotion in Pakistan prior to September 11 – or for that sake, in its relations with other states led by authoritarian leaders (like Iran, Cuba, Burma, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iraq).68

Moreover, the notion of the United States “facilitating the transition to democratic rule” deserves some attention. What does it mean in practice when the president certified that U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan would facilitate the transition to democratic rule? Such a certification would ideally require a concrete definition of what the president understands as “democratic rule,” and a prescription of which factors are believed to contribute to such a condition of state. When I did not find a precise definition offered by the president himself, I had to look to other sources. The NSS of 2006 stated that the U.S. was “eager to see Pakistan move along a stable, secure, and democratic path” (NSS 2006:39). Four preconditions of an effective democracy were enumerated. Part of the third precondition was that effective democracies had to “exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their borders” (NSS 2006:4). Following this line of reasoning, President Bush could argue

68 In the NSS of 2006, however, these nations were described as tyrannies, combining “brutality, poverty, instability, corruption, and suffering, forged under the rule of despots and despotic systems” (NSS 2006:3), which could serve as a possible justification of a more conditional approach to bilateral aid.
that all security-related assistance would help Pakistan gain control over its territory (specifically in the FATA) and thus facilitate a transition to effective democratic rule.

On the other hand, the provision of foreign assistance to Pakistan under Musharraf’s rule would to some extent strengthen the Pakistani military’s role in relation to Pakistani civil society. High levels of foreign aid could make Musharraf’s regime less dependent on tax revenues, and could also increase the value of controlling a government in a country with high levels of corruption. One could therefore question how Bush could be assured that the U.S. assistance to Pakistan would not actually end up threatening the transition to democratic rule. An alternative interpretation of the U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan can therefore be suggested – emphasizing democracy promotion as a means of legitimizing cooperation with military rule on security issues. The lack of conditionality-based aid to Pakistan could indicate that democracy promotion was actually not a first-order goal of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan during this time, when the more immediate security concerns of the war against terror topped the political agenda.

The empirical mapping of the democracy promotion variable indicated that the U.S. did urge Musharraf to hold elections, step down from his military position as army chief, take off his uniform, and end the state of emergency in 2007. However, some independent organizations, including Freedom House, expressed concerns that the Bush administration did not put enough pressure behind some of these requests (Freedom House 2007). Ensuring control with Pakistan’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and securing Pakistan’s support in the fight against terrorism constituted part of the United States’ national security interest. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2006 warned that “attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit [in Muslim countries]“ (NIE 2006:2,3). That warning can be interpreted to strengthen the argument that the U.S. could not afford the risks of democracy promotion in time of war. The statement suggests that support for an immediate democratic transition in Pakistan could potentially jeopardize U.S. security interests in the short term.
Estimating the size of the U.S. democracy-related and governance assistance to Pakistan during the Bush administration proved to be difficult, given the limited amount of detailed data available in public. Another challenge was that such an estimate depends greatly on how democracy assistance is defined. The data provided to me by the State Department official (see appendix 2) indicated that according to the State Department’s own categorization, only 5 percent of the total overt assistance to Pakistan in FY 2008 and 2009 went to democracy- and governance-assistance programs or projects. If I include the Coalition Support Funds into this calculation, the amount would be considerably smaller than 5 percent. This finding can make it difficult to argue that democracy promotion was a high priority in the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan in the last years of the Bush administration. The U.S. FY 2008 begins on October 1, 2007, and 2007 was a crucial year when elections were set to take place in Pakistan. This context would favor a greater emphasis on democracy- and governance-assistance programs during this year. The low numbers, however, tend to support the view of Ambassador Chamberlin, who said in the interview that democracy promotion in Pakistan during the Bush administration “was all just talk”. Chamberlin claimed that “the White House was still hard over anti-democratic. Musharraf was our guy till the very end” (Chamberlin 2010). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed that the U.S. did push Musharraf to take off his uniform, which he eventually did in the end of 2007, after several years of not honoring his early promises. I have not found any data that indicate how the U.S. pressured Musharraf to comply with the Bush administration’s requests in the area of civil liberties, respect for the rule of law and the conduct of elections. This lack of evidence might help confirm Freedom House’s suggestion that democracy promotion played a minor role in Bush’s foreign policy toward Pakistan, perhaps even suggesting that talk of democracy promotion was only paying lip service.

Two competing narratives can be constructed from the analysis above, based on the empirical mapping of the democracy promotion variable. The two narratives diverge in their support for the hypothesis that U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan was aimed at promoting democracy. One interpretation favors a narrative that understands the U.S.
foreign policy to reflect the wish to promote democracy and thus strengthens the hypothesis. Within this narrative, the shift from a conditional to an unconditional aid approach that took place after September 11 can be interpreted as motivated by a strong belief in the positive effect of direct assistance on a transition to democratic rule. The competing narrative understands the policy shift as driven by the much more important bare-boned and short-term security interests. This interpretation – in which the unconditional aid approach reflects a reality where the United States had to cooperate with Pakistan on security issues, leading to a pragmatic approach to democracy promotion – weakens the hypothesis. I favor the latter narrative, because I find the realist perspective best suited to explain the variation of intensity in the United States’ efforts to promote democracy worldwide.

5.4 Final comprehensive analysis: Towards the construction of a credible narrative of the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan (2001-2009)

What is the best explanation for the policy shift from a weak-con to a strong-pro attitude – reflected in a move from a conditional to a seemingly unconditional aid focus of the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan during President George W. Bush after September 11? All of the three independent variables contributed separately to explain, to some extent, some parts of the military, economical and political aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan before and after September 11. The question remains how the variables interacted to motivate and enable the shift to a strong-pro nature of the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan post-September 11, 2001.

The U.S. Congress’ vague formulation of the waiver-authority bill enabled President Bush in the wake of September 11, 2001, to waive the coup-related restrictions toward Pakistan (Senate Bill 1465/2001), despite no clear sign of improved performance on Pakistan’s behalf in areas of civil liberties, respect for rule of law and the conduct of elections. The lack of a strong push from the U.S. Congress for conditionality-focused aid to Pakistan served to delimit the internal constraints on the executive, increase the Bush administration’s scope of action, and thus enable a seemingly unconditional and pragmatic approach to democracy promotion in Pakistan. It is possible that the policy
shift was motivated by the Bush administration’s wish to promote democracy in Pakistan, and its belief that an unconditional aid approach, reflecting openness rather than closure, was favorable. If that was the case, it would have been easy for the Bush administration to argue that the security-related part of the U.S. assistance to Pakistan, would “facilitate a transition to democratic rule in Pakistan” (Senate bill 1465/2001), because it would make Pakistan better equipped to maintain control over its territory and thus exercise more effective sovereignty, which the Bush administration understood to be a precondition for an effective democracy (NSS 2006:4). 69 The Bush administration did communicate that it was “eager to see Pakistan move along a stable, secure, and democratic path” (NSS 2006:39), so on the face of it, it would seem that the desire to promote democracy was a motivating factor behind the policy shift. However, I have not found any evidence that the Bush administration explicitly argued that the security-related assistance was motivated by democracy concerns. Likewise, the data I found do not indicate that funding to democracy and governance programs and projects in Pakistan constituted a major part of the U.S. assistance to Pakistan (Kronstadt 2010, USAID Greenbook 2010, U.S. Department of State 2010). The most plausible interpretation seems to be that the move to support Pakistan was primarily motivated by the “all about terrorism”-thinking that dominated the Bush administration (Chamberlin 2010).

The interview data, articles and reports collected for the empirical mapping of the economy variable indicated that a continuance of protectionist U.S. textile policies took place during the whole Bush presidency (Altman 2003, Bolle 2009:2, Foer 2002, GAO 2009:40, Ikenson 2003, Kaufman 2001a, Kaufman 2001b, U.S. Chamber of Commerce & U.S.-Pakistan Business Council 2009:9). Seen from an inside-out perspective, the U.S. textile industry was able to heavily influence the U.S. Congress and the Bush administration to pursue a trade policy that favored the industry’s interests. The economic interests of the U.S. textile industry, however, cannot be identified as a motivation for the shift toward a strong-pro nature of U.S. foreign

69 The numbers include the CSF.
policy toward Pakistan post-September 11. The textile industry did not benefit specifically from the policy shift, and the openness toward Pakistan was probably viewed as a threat to the U.S. textile industry more than anything else. There is also not much firm evidence collected to suggest the economic interests of the weapons industry motivated the policy shift, even though that industry ended up benefiting financially from the shift.

The Bush administration claimed that the bilateral relation between Pakistan and the U.S. was “bolstered by Pakistan’s choice to join the war against terror” (NSS 2002:10). The statement can be taken to confirm that an outside-in perspective with a focus on U.S. security concerns is critical to understanding and explaining the policy shift that took place. However, the Bush administration also argued that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was strengthened because Pakistan made a choice to “move toward building a more open and tolerant society” (NSS 2002:10). Statements that support that line of reasoning, however, can from a realist perspective, be interpreted to indicate that the executive branch had to frame its preferred policies in terms of how they fostered American values (Deudney & Meiser 2008:38) to appeal to the American constituency. An approach based on pure Realpolitik would sacrifice ideological considerations for practical considerations, and cooperate with any outside government if it was believed to serve the national interest. Drawing on the theoretical insights from realism makes it even more possible that the democracy rhetoric in the U.S. was just a substituting argument – used to reduce the political costs of cooperating with a military regime.

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice wrote in an article that the Bush administration “had to establish a partnership with Pakistan’s military government to achieve a common goal after September 11[my italics]” (Rice 2008:16-7). It is implicit in this statement that countering terrorism is the common goal the two nations are believed to share. The security cooperation thus seems to have been a necessary factor for the U.S. policy shift. One could perhaps also question whether it was a sufficient factor for the policy shift. Given that as much as 75 percent of the supplies to the war in Afghanistan went through or over Pakistani territory (DoD 2007), and other supply routes were
politically or economically too costly at that time, the picture of the United States as dependent upon Pakistan in its initiatives to fight terrorism in Afghanistan is striking.\textsuperscript{70} The U.S. needed Pakistani cooperation to prevent al-Qaeda fighters and their affiliates from operating freely in the Afghan-Pakistani border area to avoid attacks on U.S. troops. One could question why the U.S. did not press harder for Pakistani progress in the area of counter-terrorism, given that the large amounts of security-related aid to the Pakistani military did not succeed in preventing al-Qaeda and its affiliates to establish safe havens on Pakistani territory (Gistaro 2008, Kronstadt 2010, NIE 2006, NIE 2007). According to the interviewed official from the State Department, the U.S. was fully aware that large amounts of U.S. assistance to Pakistan were used to purchase military equipment that was better fit for fighting a conventional war with India. What can explain the lack of effective U.S. efforts to make Pakistan align its military spending with U.S. security goals? One reasonable interpretation can be that the Bush administration’s scope of action was constrained by the external environment; the administration was not in a position to set restrictions given its need to protect the supply lines for U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan. It is easier to use a conditional aid approach toward a country when your own country is not dependent on it for cooperation on security issues. It should be noted that Pakistani security concerns over India’s territorial ambitions – and the Bush administration’s lack of will to address these concerns effectively – somewhat contributed to reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. counter-terrorist strategy. It should also be noted, again, that the U.S. weapon industry benefited from Pakistan’s purchase of weapons (Kronstadt 2008:53), whether they were intended for counter-terrorist operations or a conventional war with other states.

On the face of it, it seems like the Bush administration always wanted to promote free trade and democracy (NSS 2002, NSS 2006), but the protectionist U.S. textile policy toward Pakistan and the allocations of U.S. foreign assistance and (military) reimbursements to Pakistan (Kronstadt 2010) can be considered evidence that short-

\textsuperscript{70}These numbers were also confirmed by the interviewed officials at the Department of Defense, Department og Defense, and the Congressional staffer.
term security concerns received the highest priority. That said, there might have been some positive effects brought forward by the aid that went to democracy and governance assistance. Whether these positive effects can compensate for the potential undermining effects, such as granting legitimacy to the idea of rule by a military regime, is a question that remains unanswered. In the end, Pakistan did experience a move toward a more democratic rule in terms of an “end of military rule, parliamentary elections that propelled an opposition coalition to power, and the election of a civilian president” (Freedom House 2009a). However, it’s unclear whether the transition to a more democratic rule took place despite the U.S. foreign policy, rather than because of it. Intentions do not always translate into coherent policy, due to a variety of constraints facing policy makers.

It seems like the time ran out before the Bush administration fully realized that the dynamic in the U.S. relationship had to change. Senator Joseph Biden captured the essence of the foreign policy under the Bush administration when he described it as more of a “Musharraf policy” than a Pakistan policy (CBS News 2007). It seems that protecting U.S. supply lines under for countering terrorism in Afghanistan perhaps received priority over efforts to combat terrorism more effectively within Pakistan. However, the U.S. strategy of (reluctantly or not) leaving it to the Pakistani military to secure the border with Afghanistan and prevent al-Qaeda from establishing a safe-haven in Pakistan, did prove out to be an effective counter-terrorist strategy on the long term.71 Giving in to democracy in Pakistan was probably viewed as risky, because it could bring new leaders to the negotiating table who perhaps would not be as U.S.-friendly and committed to protecting the supply lines for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Moreover, a democratic transition could potentially be exploited by jihadist groups, causing instability in Pakistan, a country that possesses nuclear weapons. The White House seems to have relied primarily on President Musharraf and the Pakistani military to secure its security goals in Pakistan. A long-term strategy of countering terrorism by addressing the underlying causes of it – through provision of

71 Chamberlin said in the interview that it was for a red line for President Musharraf to allow U.S. combat troops on Pakistani soil (2010).
large amounts of democracy-related, governance or development assistance, or
granting trade benefits to reduce poverty – does not seem to have been dominant in
U.S. policies (Kronstadt 2010, USAID Greenbook 2010, U.S. Department of State
2010).

I find it difficult to argue that interests beyond short-term security interests formed the
driving forces behind U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan during Bush. The strong
support for Pakistan under the military rule of General Musharraf, as well as the
protectionist U.S. trade policy, suggests that short-term security concerns were valued
above the idealist agenda of spreading liberal values like economic and political
freedom. The strategic significance of the Afghan-Pakistani border and the U.S. need
for supply lines for its operations in Afghanistan served as necessary factors for the
Bush administration’s policy toward Pakistan, and perhaps even sufficient factors to
explain the policy shift from a weak-con attitude to a strong-pro- attitude of the U.S.
toward Pakistan.
6 Concluding remarks

In this chapter I will recapitulate the research question of the study, as well as the chosen research design that has been used. Main findings will be presented, and finally, I will comment on some of the limits of this study, and introduce some suggestions on what I find to be inviting avenues for further research.

6.1 Research question, research design and main findings

The research question of this study was two-dimensional: What characterizes the United States’ foreign policy toward Pakistan in the George W. Bush presidential era, and how can this policy be explained? In the first stage of the study, I described, conceptualized and classified the main features of the U.S. Pakistan policy. The period between January 2001 to January 2009 was divided into two phases: pre- and post-September 11, 2001. I relied on theoretical perspectives from realist, liberal and constructivist approaches to the study of international relations and foreign policy to deduce three hypotheses including explanatory variables related to U.S. security-, democracy- and economy- concerns. The hypothesis derived from realist thought focused on the external influence on foreign policy (outside-in perspective). The two hypotheses derived from liberal and constructivist thought emphasized the importance of domestic influence (inside-out perspective) in the understanding of U.S. foreign policy. An interpretive case-study approach in addition to careful source criticism, commonly denoted as the historic method, was used in this study. The empirical data consisted of primary and secondary sources, such as interview data, official documents, articles and reports. The empirical analysis which focused mainly on the group-level and the state-level, analyzed first each of the three explanatory variables separately. Finally, a comprehensive analysis examined how the independent variables interacted to enable and motivate the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan. The comprehensive analysis presented a final narrative on the rationale for the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan 2001-9.

The U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan before September 11, 2001 could be classified to reflect a weak-con attitude due to the U.S. sanction regime caused by 96
security, democracy and economic concerns. However, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in September 2001, the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan shifted to reflect a *strong-pro* attitude that did not condition the support to Pakistan either on Pakistan’s progress in countering terrorism, or on Pakistan’s performance in areas of civil liberties, respect for the rule of law or conduct of elections. The U.S. Congress delimited the internal constraints on the executive, thus serving as an enabling factor for a seemingly pragmatic approach to democracy promotion in Pakistan.

I have argued that the Bush administration probably wished to promote democracy in Pakistan, but was constrained in its scope of action. It is quite likely that the Bush administration’s democracy rhetoric was used to legitimize the large amounts of aid to Pakistan – aimed at reducing the political costs of cooperating with a military regime. Security concerns seem to have been the motivating factor behind the policy shift, and short-term security concerns seem to have driven the policies. The strategic significance of the Afghan-Pakistani border and the U.S. need for supply lines for its operations in Afghanistan served as necessary factors behind the Bush administration’s policy toward Pakistan, and perhaps even sufficient factors to explain the policy shift from a *weak-con* attitude to a *strong-pro* attitude of the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan.

### 6.2 Limits of the study; further study

What are the most evident limitations of this study, and the most inviting avenues for further research? My sources are predominantly American, but have I tried to make up for this bias by interviewing a Pakistani diplomat, and the native Pakistani policy analyst Shuja Nawaz. I hope that this bias can be justified since the phenomenon of the study is the United States’ foreign policy. Moreover, the study is limited by the choice of theoretical perspectives and subsequent formulation of hypotheses, which allow for restrictions that effectively limit the data collection process. The statement by the interviewed official from the Department of Defense on Bush’s positive fuse toward Musharraf, and Robert Jervis’ claim that Bush had a *sacred* mission to fight terrorism (Jervis 2003:379), indicate that a stronger emphasis on the impact of individuals on the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan could have been fruitful. Including perspectives...
from cognitive theory could have been useful in this sense (Rose 1998:163, Rourke 2007:63). Data from the interviews with Ambassador Chamberlin and policy analyst Shuja Nawaz indicate that there might have been some conflicting views between different agencies within the U.S. government (U.S. Departments of Treasury, State and Defense), which establishes grounds for questioning the traditional realist assumption of the state as a unitary actor, and encourages a research design that systematically addresses this topic. Broadening the theoretical foundation to include Graham T. Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics model (Allison 1969) could therefore be useful for other researchers who intend to study U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan. The interviews also indicated that the Bush administration early on wanted to change its foreign policy toward India. This study has not looked into how the United States has had to balance its foreign policy in relation to other countries in the South Asian region. More emphasis on the nuclear weapons issue – as well as for example the United States’ relations to Pakistan’s neighboring countries, as well as Russia and China – might have been interesting to investigate further.
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102


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Appendix

Appendix 1  Interview Guide

Interview guide
Washington D.C. / February 2010

Characterization
Looking at the military, political and economical aspects of US foreign policy, How would you describe (characterize) U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan in the George W. Bush era?
a) From January 2001 and until September 11?
b) Post- September 11, 2001?

Priority of foreign policy goals
Which foreign policy goals have been prioritized in the U.S. policy toward Pakistan during the Bush administration?

Identifying policy shifts
Any substantial changes in the policies after 9/11? If not, how come? If so, which circumstances provoked / influenced these changes? (domestic / external factors, key events)

Military aspect
Military to military relations. Changes in the way that the United States has viewed Pakistan's role in the fight against terrorism? Policy shifts?

Democracy promotion
Would you say that the goal of spreading democracy was reflected in the foreign policy toward Pakistan? If so, then how? Did the US strategy for democracy promotion change during the Bush-period?

Economic interests
Which economic interests does the United States have vis-á-vis Pakistan? Have these economic interests influenced the US-Pakistan policy within in the 8 year-period?

The role of Congress
Which role has Congress played in the shaping of the U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan (2001-2009)?
### Appendix 2  U.S. Department of State: Foreign Assistance to Pakistan by Sector

**PAKISTAN**

**Foreign Assistance by Sector**

($ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>FY 2008 Total</th>
<th>FY 2009 Total</th>
<th>FY 2010 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Foreign Assistance</strong></td>
<td>738,0</td>
<td>2,305,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Non-Military Assistance</strong></td>
<td>438,3</td>
<td>1,303,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy/Governance</strong></td>
<td>40,8</td>
<td>117,1</td>
<td>164,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>24,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law (INCLE)</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law (ESF)</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>9,7</td>
<td>22,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy/Governance</strong></td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>97,4</td>
<td>60,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Competition</strong></td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>15,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Society</strong></td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>15,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Communications</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investing in People and Economic Growth</strong></td>
<td>318,1</td>
<td>897,6</td>
<td>885,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>87,5</td>
<td>120,6</td>
<td>181,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>245,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>1st Year</td>
<td>2nd Year</td>
<td>3rd Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>153,2</td>
<td>205,0</td>
<td>335,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Economic Services and Protection for Vulnerable Populations</td>
<td>8,6</td>
<td>129,0</td>
<td>95,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>11,9</td>
<td>240,8</td>
<td>55,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/ Food</td>
<td>18,2</td>
<td>112,6</td>
<td>81,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>38,6</td>
<td>79,6</td>
<td>138,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Border Initiative</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Assistance</strong></td>
<td>79,3</td>
<td>288,9</td>
<td>165,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>49,6</td>
<td>189,6</td>
<td>15,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Security Program</td>
<td>16,5</td>
<td>38,2</td>
<td>52,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement Reform/Police</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>44,3</td>
<td>69,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>7,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terroism</td>
<td>9,7</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>22,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Assistance</strong></td>
<td>299,7</td>
<td>002,3</td>
<td>243,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing (FMF)</td>
<td>297,6</td>
<td>300,0</td>
<td>238,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Military Education &amp; Training (IMET)</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>5,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700,0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(PCCF)

*Total non-mill assistance allocated to Pakistan in FY 2010 is $1.5 billion. As required by the 2010 appropriation bill, $2 million in ESF has been transferred to the State Inspector General to monitor assistance. The Inspector General is funded via State Operations, not Foreign Assistance, and is thus not represented on this chart.
Appendix 3 Information about the interview objects

Anonymous
Congressional staffer in the U.S. Congress
Senior official at the U.S. Department of Defense
Official at the U.S. Department of State
Diplomat at the political section of Pakistan’s embassy in Washington D.C.

Chamberlin, Wendy
Former ambassador to Pakistan. Chamberlin was in Islamabad in the summer of 2001, but did not present her credentials until September 13, 2001. Ambassador Chamberlin left the post on May 28, 2002, to be with her young daughters in the U.S. Back from Pakistan she continued to work for USAID, and retired in the foreign service in 2004 because she could not support the policies of the administration, mentioning specifically the Iraq war (Chamberlin 2010). She has been the president of the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C. since March 2007 (Middle East Institute 2010).

Shuja Nawaz
Washington-based political and strategic analyst with a native background from Pakistan. Nawaz currently works as the Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center in Washington D.C. “He has worked on projects with RAND, the United States Institute of Peace, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Atlantic Council, and other leading think tanks on projects dealing with Pakistan and the Middle East” (Atlantic Council 2010).