Faith-based Mediation?

Sant' Egidio's peace efforts in Mozambique and Algeria

Nikolai Hegertun

Master Thesis
Peace and Conflict Studies

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Summary

The objective of the study is threefold: first, to describe in what ways, if any, the Catholic community of Sant' Egidio contributed to the conflict resolution of the Mozambican civil war and the negotiation for the Algerian crisis in 1994-95. Second, analyze to what extent Sant' Egidio's contributions in Mozambique and Algeria were expressions of faith-based mediation. Finally, to analyze why this form of mediation worked in Mozambique and failed in Algeria.

The insights from theories and research on religious actors' potential and efforts in peacemaking indicate that these actors' views on how to reach an agreement differs from some of the traditional interest-based theories on negotiations derived from rational actor models. The faith-based approach emphasises the psychological factors of a conflict to a stronger degree than more traditional approaches, whose emphasis lies on the incompatible goals and issues of the conflict.

On the basis of the research question the thesis discusses two hypotheses: first, that the hallmarks of faith-based mediation were salient in the resolution of the Mozambican conflict and in the negotiations for Algeria. Second, that religion played a key role in the negotiation and that it played out positively for the mediators in Catholic Mozambique and negatively in Muslim Algeria.

The findings indicate that Sant' Egidio's contribution was limited, but important, in both cases. Further, certain of the hallmarks of faith-based mediation were present in both cases, thus the evidence supports the idea that faith-based mediation was salient for the negotiations. However, religion did not play a key role in either of the two cases. The outcome of both cases must therefore be attributed to causes beyond religious factors. Religion played a more indirect, albeit positive, role in both cases through the mediators and their approach, most explicitly seen in the initial phases of the negotiations.

Acronyms

AIS	Islamic Salvation Army
ANC	The African National Congress
ANP	The Popular National Army of Algeria
FFS	The Front of Socialist Forces
FIS	The Islamic Salvation Front
FLN	The National Liberation Front
FRELIMO	The Liberation Front of Mozambique
GIA	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria
IMF	The International Monetary Fund
JMC	Jeunesse Musulmane Contemporaine
LADDH	The Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights
MDA	The Movement for Democracy in Algeria
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PRA	The Party for Algerian Renewal
RCD	The Rally for Culture and Democracy party
RENAMO	The Mozambican National Resistance
ZANU	The Zimbabwe African National Union
UN	United Nations

Foreword

In what better ways can a student spend his formative years during one's education than to study conflict resolution? I consider myself fortunate to have had the opportunity to spend the most important weeks and months of my academic career scrutinizing and learning about how people can meet the appalling, but none the less, constant challenge of conflict.

The academic realm of conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation is a vast area of research. My modest hope was to find a small piece within this realm with aspects still uncovered, and nuances still worth analysing, in order to contribute to our knowledge in the field.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background and research questions

In recent years there has been a renewed interest in applying religion to peacemaking[1] efforts; this constitutes the fundamental strand of thought underlying this thesis. On a general level this thesis looks into the potential of implementing religion in negotiation and conflict resolution.[2] More specifically, it assesses the role of religious mediators and their strategies in two cases of conflict resolution.

In order to provide a greater understanding of the full range of human imperatives in war and peace, Douglas Johnston recognizes a need in the field of conflict resolution to implement factors such as religion, which traditionally have been left out of the policy-makers' calculus (Johnston 2003: xi-xii). Indeed, according to Harpviken and Røislien, religious peacemakers explore and apply new and different tools and opportunities that lie outside conventional diplomacy (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 1). This thesis explores one of the most successful and esteemed religious actors engaged in peacemaking, the Catholic lay-community of Sant' Egidio.

Sant' Egidio has been engaged in the resolution of several conflicts worldwide.[3] No organization had more success in negotiating peace during the 1990s (Appleby 2001: 829), and their role as mediators in the settling of the tragic civil war in Mozambique in 1992 earned them a reputation for being a «network of peace», as well as a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. However, despite the efforts of Sant' Egidio to bring the Algerian civil war to an end in 1995, the conflict continued in an intensified manner.

The aim of my thesis is reflected in my three research questions:

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[1] Peacemaking refers to the action taken to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 11).

[2] I wrote a term paper on the subject of religious peacemakers in PECOS 4100 in 2009. However, this thesis is based on new and independent research and none of the conclusions build on the term paper. Parts of the theoretical framework and empirical background may correspond.

[3] The community has since 1996 been engaged in peace negotiations in Guatemala, Albania, Burundi, Bosnia, Liberia, Togo, Northern-Uganda and The Ivory Coast. At the present they are engaged in Sudan, Guinea Conakry and Somalia (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010).

1. In what ways, if any, did Sant' Egidio contribute to the conflict resolution in Mozambique and the negotiations in Algeria?

2. To what extent were Sant' Egidio's contributions in Mozambique and Algeria expressions of faith-based mediation?

3. Why did this form of mediation work in Mozambique and fail in Algeria?

Apparent from these research-questions is the focus on the *mediator*. Many theories on mediation, both normative and descriptive, have centred on the different *parties* to a conflict: how they should act, how they act as rational actors, and how their actions influence the outcome of the mediation process (Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 2). Even though the acts and history of the belligerents will be illuminated in order to fully understand what shaped the outcome of negotiations, the unit of analysis here will be Sant' Egidio and their strategy of mediation.

In order to analyze the religious dimensions present and illuminate to what extent these dimensions were influential, there is also a need to see these dimensions in relation to the political backdrop of the negotiations. Faith-based mediators' ability to act and influence depend, in many cases, on the structural-environmental context of the conflict. Hence, to better understand the premises for Sant' Egidio's work, I am required to consider the historical, political and social context of the conflicts. The analysis will thus also point to forces outside the realm of religion, in order to better assess the effect of Sant' Egidio's efforts.

1.2   Literature review and knowledge-gaps

> As one looks to the end of the century and beyond, the challenges of preventing or resolving conflict are likely to prove even more formidable than they have in the past […] different approaches will be required – approaches that key to deep-rooted human relationships rather than to state-centred philosophies. Far greater insight into the human dimensions of the conflict and its resolution will be required on the part of foreign policy and religious practitioners than has been demonstrated to date. (Johnston 1994: 7).

Thinkers such as Comte, Durkheim, Weber, Nietzsche, Toennies and Voltaire all believed that religion – as the «basis for understanding and running the world» – would be replaced by the age of enlightenment (Fox & Sandler 2004: 10). Edward

Luttwak claims that the heritage from these writers and the «compelling fashion» of enlightenment prohibited all general and intellectual interest in religion and its institutions, even in secular affairs (Luttwak 1994: 9). Within the social sciences, the *modernization-theory* [4] in political science, and the *secularization-theory* [5] in sociology, imprinted the notion that the modern development inevitably would lead to more secular and rational societies (Fox & Sandler 2004: 10-12). In short, the emerging notion within the social sciences held that religious influence on the one hand, and the progress of knowledge on the other, were mutually exclusive (Luttwak 1994: 10). The influence of the *realist school* [6] and a Western-centric focus on international affairs consequently led scholars of war and peace to consider religion insignificant in the international arena (Fox & Sandler 2004: 26). According to Stanton Burnett, political realism is and always has been «dogmatically and unflinchingly secular» (Burnett 1994: 293): Its denial of human factors such as religion was only part of its extensive and coherent denial of all cultural influence on a state's behaviour (ibid: 292-293).

With its emphasis on the state as the basic unit in international politics, realism left no room for spiritualism or sacred values, Fox and Sandler claim (Fox & Sandler 2004: 29). Laustsen and Waever even assert that International Relations as a subject is, in part, founded on the belief that the era of religion as a cause of war is over (Laustsen & Waever, 2000: 706).

However, in spite of this historic trend, in recent years religion has re-emerged as a seemingly potent force in the international arena and hence achieved greater prominence in the political debate (Appleby 2001: 821-822, Rubin 1994: 20-24). This was the conclusion of a two-year study by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs

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[4] The theory posits that the process of modernization would lead to the demise of factors like ethnicity and religion (Fox & Sandler 2004: 10). In it's revised version, sketched out by José Casanova, it acknowledges that there has been a differentiation between religious and state-institutions, but there has not yet been a privatization of religion that has carried with it it's decline (Casanova 1994: 35-38, Appleby 2001: 821).

[5] The theory states in short that the modern state, built on rational and scientific principles, is legitimized by democratic institutions and «the will of the people», religion is no longer needed to legitimize the state and explain and interpret the world (Fox & Sandler 2004: 11).

[6] The traditional realist school regards the world as anarchy. The main actors, the nation-states, are constantly pursuing more power in competition with other states in order to secure their own sovereignty. International institutions, universal norms or individuals are not considered influential in a state's rational struggle for survival. The main means for usurping power is military might (Baylis et. al 2008: 2).

presented for the White House in February 2010. According to the report, religion is playing an increasingly influential role in the public sphere, both positively and negatively (Appleby et. al 2010: 5). Social sciences' inherent modus operandi of reflecting and interpreting the actual affairs and the development of *the world* may therefore carry with it a need for including religion.

The Iranian revolution, the radicalization of religious groups in the Middle East, the rise of Hindu nationalism in India and the continual threat of terrorism are some situations that have contributed to fixing the theoretical focus on religion's *deleterious* impact on political order and human rights (Appleby 2001: 821-822). In his assessment of these movements, Mark Juergensmeyer states: «First, they have all been violent – even vicious – a manner calculated to terrifying. And, second, they have been motivated by religion» (Juergensmeyer 2001: 4). No wonder contemporary Western societies have had a tendency of viewing strong religious convictions as constituting a negative force (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 352). According to Appleby, the «irony» is that religion is also the source of «nonviolent conflict transformation, the defence of human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and stability in divided societies» (Appleby 2001: 821).

Theoreticians mention several foundational attributes that give religion a unique potential in the work with peace and conflict resolution.[7] Johnston and Cox highlight four. First, religion represents a stable and pervasive influence in *local* communities (Johnston & Cox 2003: 13).[8] Theodore M. Hesburgh writes in the same mind that «peace is a universal hope, but begins as a local reality», and further asserts that no actors are more local – and trustworthy – than the leader of worship at a mosque, synagogue, church, or temple (Hesburgh 2000: ix). Second, Johnston and Cox underscore the idea that the reputation of religion as being an *apolitical force* derived

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[7] I have two caveats in relation to the theoretical framework, which will be more thoroughly presented in chapter 3. First, the authors and the theoretical framework in the field tend to emphasise the importance and peacemaking potential of religion to such a degree that they run the risk of developing an uncritical attitude that takes the importance of religion in conflict transformation for granted. Second, in my view, certain of the hallmarks of faith-based mediation are not necessarily exclusive for religious actors. Secular mediators and mediation theory in general applies many of the same tools. Aware of this, I nevertheless apply the current theoretical framework due to the lack of other options in this field.

[8] The report from The Chicago Council on Global Affairs on religion and U.S foreign policy also emphasise the influence of religious groups with newly won voices. One of the main reasons behind their growing influence in many areas of the world and the revitalization of religion is globalization, the report concludes (Appleby et. al 2010: 6-7).

from a respected set of values acquits it from charges of seeking power and influence. Third, they claim that religion holds a unique leverage for *reconciliation* and the reconstruction of healthy relations through its tenets of neighbour-love and forgiveness. Finally, religious leaders often have a wide network and the accompanying capability of mobilizing support for peace on all levels of society (Johnston & Cox 2003: 13-14). In addition to these factors, Fox and Sandler underscore the notion of *legitimacy* as another contributing aspect of religion. Many persons hold normative values, including religious values, as being an important factor in international relations (Fox & Sandler 2004: 163). They can be applied to justify and support some policies, and oppose others. From religion's dual nature, one can find support for violence and war on the one hand, and reconciliation and peace on the other (ibid: 35-40). A final aspect is that of *institutions*. The lack of other strong social institutions in weak states throughout the Third World makes the churches and the mosques important (ibid: 22). They serve the function of giving people social goals, defining values, and keeping relations to foreign networks. Politically they are important as one of the few functional dimensions of the civil society (ibid: 23-24). Thomson contends that none of the ideologies or belief-systems that African politicians historically have offered has ever superseded the notion of Christianity and Islam in African minds (Thomson 2004: 68).

Thus, the realities of ethnic and religiously inspired wars along with religion's seemingly continued pertinence have resulted in a different approach to conflict resolution: an approach that examines and applies the constructive elements of religion. Some have attempted to develop theoretical concepts to categorize these.[9]

In his influential book, «The Ambivalence of the Sacred», R. Scott Appleby labels the actors who seek insights and practices from their respected religions in order to limit deadly conflicts as «religious militants» (Appleby 2000: 6). No less passionate than their violent counterparts, Appleby claims that religious militants can play a critical and positive role in world affairs *not* when they moderate themselves, but when they

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[9] Considering the diversity of the field and the amount of articles and books approaching the theme from different angles I only seek to present a selection of influential writers that I find pertinent, in addition to the writers already mentioned.

remain as deeply religious as they are (ibid: 13-15). However, he emphasises that nonviolent religious militancy becomes politically effective over the long term «only when it spans a spectrum of actors at different levels of society, all of whom are working in collaboration for the nonviolent resolution of conflict and the building of stable political structures and social relations» (ibid: 122). Appleby explicitly refers to Sant' Egidio in his work and claims their role in the Mozambique negotiations was a success built on their integrity as a non-partisan actor and their fundamental apolitical nature which enabled them to cooperate with every actor in the local and global arena (ibid: 162-164). In the Algerian negotiations, however, he only skims the surface and states that the conflict continued due to the Algerian government's lack of cooperation (ibid: 291).

Johnston's book, «Faith-Based Diplomacy» from 2003 builds on Johnston's and Sampson's earlier work, «Religion – The Missing Dimension of Statecraft» from 1994. Building on the accumulation of knowledge and experiences from religious actors in conflict resolution, Johnston develops a theoretical framework from which he analyses the peacemaking tenets of religions and the roles of religious actors in several conflicts.[10]

In 2005, Harpviken and Røislien wrote the report «Mapping the Terrain: The Role of Religion in Peacemaking» in order to illuminate and map out theoretical insights and empirical findings of works done in this field of research, as well as to give some general recommendations.[11] In line with Appleby and Johnston they acknowledge the potential *and* neglect of religion in conflict resolution: «there is an inherent tension between features of religions and the orientation of traditional diplomacy» (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 28). In conclusion they assert that there is no clear blueprint for brokerage for religious actors. However, they argue that actors who engage in conflicts are in need of competence and sensitivity about the *cultural* and political settings of

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[10] I will draw on this in the theoretical discussion in chapter 3.
[11] In 2005 Tsjeard Bouta, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana and Mohammed Abu-Nimer also produced the report «Faith-Based Peace-Building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors» for Netherlands Institute of International Relations. I will also draw on some of their insights in the theoretical outline in chapter 3.

the conflicts, because: «religion is intimately related to the cultures and political systems within which they exist» (ibid: 27).

Thus, from the studies done in this field I have found three possible knowledge-gaps that the thesis sets out to fill.

First, the discussion of religion's potential in negotiation and conflict resolution is, according to Edward Luttwak, «a continuing project» with only «interim reports» (Luttwak 1994: 18). He asserts that International Relations' rational paradigm and traditional notions of diplomacy have led to a «secular reductivism» consequently leading us to ignore the phenomenon of religion in conflict resolution (ibid: 8-10). Thus the research on religion in peace and conflict remains under-documented or often considered as mere opinion as opposed to knowledge (ibid: 17, Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 222). Ingrid Vik claims that «more systematic and critical studies of the influence of religion in peacemaking are conspicuous by their absence» (Vik 2009: 20). Hence, there seems to be a *general* knowledge gap in the lack of studies carried out to map out how religion, that is, religious institutions, religious tenets, religious actors etc., actually function in the process of generating peace.

Second, a great deal of focus has been placed on religion's potential for reconciling belligerents in a *post*-conflict context (see Battle 1997, Chapman & Spong 2003, Johnston 1994, Helmick & Peterson 2001, Kaufman 2006). However, there seems to be a need for scrutiny on how religious actors may function as mediators in an *ongoing* conflict. This applies to conflicts that are secular as well as to those regarded as religious, or as having substantial religious undertones.

Third, the complementary potential for discussing and linking theoretical insights from the field of faith-based mediation to the conventional wisdom of traditional conflict-resolution theory is far from exhausted. The two areas of research should not remain isolated and unadjusted. My theoretical discussion and analytic approach tentatively attempts to discuss this. However, there is a need to point out areas where future research can develop a more profound interdisciplinary approach.

Even though the Mozambique case is discussed in earlier works, the negotiation on the Algerian case is not adequately covered.[12] In addition, a comparison of the two cases and their outcomes is also a field of research that has not been covered.

1.3   Research Method

I apply a qualitative research strategy based on an interpretive epistemological position where the emphasis is on knowing the world through examining «the interpretations of that world by its participants» (Bryman 2008: 366).[13] In the following I justify my use of case study as research method and elaborate upon the central methodological considerations and challenges in my approach.

1.3.1 Case Studies

The context and scope of the phenomena I scrutinized are complex. The dynamics of trust building, communication, and relations developed during negotiations are seemingly intertwined and difficult to distinguish. Case study research allows for the exploration and in-depth analysis of such complex issues and has a distinct advantage when «how and why» are asked about a well-defined historical episode (George & Bennet 2005: 18, Zainal 2007: 1-4). Considering this and the fact that many of the indicators of faith-based mediation (see chapter 3) are notoriously difficult to count or measure statistically, the case study's ability to give a «detailed consideration of contextual factors» (George & Bennet 2005: 19) equips this approach with the greatest potential of answering my research questions.

Through my analysis of Sant' Egidio I have not aimed at gaining external validity, as to the degree my findings can be generalized across social settings (Bryman 2008: 376). Rather I aim at *internal validity*: «a good match between the researcher's

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[12] Apart from the mentioned works that discuss the role of religion in peace processes, the negotiations of Mozambique are described by Cameron Hume (1994), Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca (2003) and Richard Edis (1995). Mario Giro and Marco Impagliazzo (1997) have documented the Algerian negotiations leading up to the Rome Platform.

[13] The ontological basis of qualitative strategies implies that social phenomena are results of the interaction among human individuals and not of some exogenous and separated system (Bryman 2008: 366). Considering the perspective of religion's impact on the human and relational aspects of the negotiations, I consider this basis of the qualitative strategy a profitable point of departure.

observations and the theoretical ideas they develop» (ibid: 376). The ability of achieving a high level of accordance between the concepts and research observations is one asset of the case study (ibid: 376).[14]

The qualitative case study approach is also a fruitful method of unveiling the *procedural* patterns in social life (ibid: 388). The setting of negotiations is in fact often characterized by individual and collective activities «unfolding over time in context» (ibid: 388). Case researchers may therefore be able to analyze how events developed (ibid: 388). I thus find the methods of case-research well suited in enhancing internal validity.

1.3.2 Qualitative interviews

My main source of data collection is a set of interviews.[15] The qualitative interview has a great advantage in reconstructing events (ibid: 466).[16] Interviewing makes it easy to be specific in one's focus and the potential breadth of coverage and the flexibility of the qualitative interview open up opportunities for exploring the details and underlying concepts of the participants' worldviews (ibid: 437, 470). This was important in the process of mapping out the thoughts and intentions the mediators from Sant' Egidio had during the negotiations, as well as the reflections they made several years later. The qualitative interview also reflects the nature of the research-object in a unique way by letting it speak. Hence, it bestows on the research-object the possibility of protesting against the researcher's assumptions, questions and interpretations, which happened more than once.[17]

My interviews were semi-structured. Hence I developed an interview-guide with fairly specific topics and lists of questions that were addressed (Bryman 2008: 438). I started off by letting the interviewees tell their stories and openly reflect on the cases.

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[14] A main preoccupation of qualitative research is «thick descriptions» (Geertz 1977: 6); namely, giving a rich account of cultural details (Bryman 2008: 378). The qualitative case-researcher's sensitivity to, and emphasis on, context is essential in producing correct descriptions that form the basis of the analysis of peoples' behavior and thinking (ibid: 380-387).
[15] The interviews were carried out in both Oslo and Rome.
[16] Johnston has also recognized the need for personal interviews as the most important source of mapping out the actions of religious actors in conflict resolution due to the limits of the written records (Johnston 1994: 259).
[17] This expresses loyalty towards the phenomena and consequently reflects the essential nature of the research-object (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 248-249).

Throughout the interviews I had to ask certain specific questions regarding my theoretical focus. The interviews often led to free discussions, however always within the scope of my focus.

My analysis of the transcribed interviews was that of a theoretical approach. Hence I attempted to interpret the statements from the points of view of the different theoretical propositions (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 241).[18]

The persons interviewed during the research were the following: Mario Giro, Head of the International Relations Department of Saint' Egidio and the organizer of the Algerian talks; Leonardo Emberti Gialloreti, Coordinator of the Ecumenical and Interreligious Department; Mario Raffaelli, former member of the Italian Parliament, Italy's former special envoy to Somalia and one of four mediators in the Mozambique-talks; Leone Gianturco, secretary of the Mozambique talks; John Pierre Entelis, author and professor of Political Science and Director of Middle East Studies Program at Fordham University; and Ingrid Vik, historian of religion, and special advisor of the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights.[19]

1.3.3 Triangulation

In addition to the semi-structured interviews, I drew on several other sources of data. Case study research usually implies collecting data from different sources to create a deeper and more accurate understanding for the problem complex to be analyzed (George & Bennett 2005: 5). Hence I collected data from several different sources, including peace agreements, official documents and reports, books, speeches, research articles, and the media. This application of more than one source of data in the study of a social phenomenon is often referred to as *triangulation* (Bryman 2008: 379).

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[18] In this tradition the researcher writes his or her interpretations without turning to specific tools of analysis; the theoretical insights derived from knowledge of the phenomena make the researcher capable of asking theoretically qualified questions (ibid: 242). This had obvious implications for the interview in that I included the theoretical perspectives already in the interview-guide in order to detect the desirable information and empiricism needed in the interviews.

[19] In addition to their unique competence and relation to the subject, Raffaelli, Entelis and Vik were also important in order to balance the data-collection with people *outside* Sant' Egidio.

1.3.4 Challenges

My case study was no different from others in terms of the inherent challenges concerning preconceptions and personal relations. Bryman asserts that the qualitative researcher's values can impinge on all aspects of the study, from the choice of research area and interviewees to the analysis and conclusions (Bryman 2008: 391). A specific challenge in my research may have been the relations I developed to the people and mediators of Sant' Egidio during the interviews.

Although the study of Sant' Egidio might in itself constitute a case, the focus of my research requires me to analyze Sant' Egidio's methods of mediation in practice. Thus, to adequately address the research questions I have chosen two actual peace negotiations in which they functioned as mediators.

1.4   Thesis Outline

While *Chapter 1* has given an introductory account of the thesis' focus and explored the methodological principles and reasons for choosing a qualitative approach with emphasis on the qualitative interview, *chapter 2* provides an empirical background by introducing Sant' Egidio and the two cases of conflict.

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical background and epistemological assumptions underlying the approach of faith-based mediation and eclectically develops the theory applied in the analysis. It also discusses faith-based mediation in relation to other approaches to mediation, in order to adequately reveal the complementary and unique potential of faith-based mediation. The chapter rounds up with two hypotheses that the following two chapters will revolve around.

The main objective of *chapter 4* is to carry out the analysis as to what extent the hallmarks of *faith-based mediation* were present and influential in negotiations in the two cases. Here, I discuss the negotiations in light of the four hallmarks of faith-based mediation presented in the preceding chapter. The chapter is a discussion of my first hypothesis.

In *chapter 5* I set out to analyse and compare whether or not religion did play a key role in the two cases of negotiations. The chapter seeks to answer the second hypothesis that centres on this question and why the outcomes of the two cases differed.

Chapter 6 sums up my main findings and conclusions. The chapter also points at certain theoretical implications of the analysis and areas for future research.

2 Empirical background

2.1 Introduction

The chapter introduces Sant' Egidio's history, work and the ideas underlying their modus operandi. The chapter also highlights the essential course of events in the time leading up to Sant' Egidio's engagement in both Mozambique and Algeria. Thus, the chapter gives a preliminary answer to the first descriptive research question: in what ways, if any, did Sant' Egidio contribute to the conflict resolution in Mozambique and the negotiations in Algeria?

2.2 Sant' Egidio

In 1968, a few students of Rome's Virgil High School started a voluntary charitable community committed to social concern for the poor and interreligious dialogue. The eighteen-year-old Andrea Riccardi was one of its founders and became the first president of the Community, a position he still holds today. A few years after its formation, the community received the sixteenth-century convent of Sant' Egidio in the ancient Roman district of Trastevere as a donation from the Vatican. The Italian government subsequently renovated the convent, and transformed it into a modern complex of meeting rooms, offices and reception areas, after which the community took the name of Sant' Egidio (Appleby 2000: 154-155).

The community was created at a time marked by the profound internal revolution in the Catholic Church initiated by The Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965 (Hume 1994: 15).[20] Hence, through their diverse and wide social service network they work for the realization of a more just society and attempt to realize the words of Pope John XXIII: «The Church is for all, particularly the poor» (saintegidio.org).

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[20] During The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), Pope John Paul XXIII stated the famous words: «Let us seek what unites us, not what divides us». It thus revised the Church's position from Catholic exclusionism and the support of authoritarian regimes to one of embracing religious freedom, human rights and democracy – all justified on the grounds of multiple traditions within the church (Appleby 2000: 42-50). Hence, it updated its ancient and medieval teachings on the sanctity of human nature and embraced a principle «accepted by the common consciousness of men and civilized nations» (ibid: 48).

The religious and spiritual ethos is the foundation of its commitment to peace and justice «in solidarity with the poor, and in dialogue» (Appleby 2000: 156). Appleby asserts that their commitment must be understood as «inseparable from their identity as an ecumenical Catholic community of prayer and fellowship» (ibid: 156). Their perspective is both local *and* global: each local community aspires to serve the poor, while also expanding their contacts with other religious and political communities, as part of their «worldwide mission» (ibid: 156). The members work in regular jobs; they do not take formal vows, only promise to pray together, work for the poor and offer friendship to people of every faith or philosophy. This has led them to engage in political activities (Hume 1994: 17). Members of the community have extensive contacts with the Vatican, the Italian government and several other state leaders worldwide (ibid: 17, Appleby 2000: 156). Sant' Egidio believes that solutions to local problems are linked to regional stability and further enhanced by equitable social policies. This leads them to lobby and exploit their wide network of political leaders and decision-makers in resolving conflicts and providing humanitarian relief (ibid: 156-157, Johnston 2003: 26).

Leonardo Emberti Gialloreti and Mario Giro explain that Sant' Egidio emphasises above all personal human relations:

> This is why we are not an organization, we are a *community*. The word community stresses the human aspect. You cannot build a community of organizations; it must be a community of people. So all our work is based on this idea of personal relations. This aspect helps you to understand the reasons of the other. If there is no personal relation, you do not understand, deeply, what the reasons for the other peoples' actions are. (Emberti Gialloreti, 15.12.2009 it. added)

Sant' Egidio believes that inter-human aspects such as comprehension, personal knowledge of the grassroots, and better understanding of the other peoples' personal biography and feelings, are the only aspects they can add to the realm of international relations and realpolitik. This is especially important when interacting with political leaders, guerrilla leaders and decision-makers who have the power to alter a situation of conflict:

> One of the characteristics of realpolitik, any kind of it, is that realpolitik always leaves a vital part of the society behind, namely the people who suffer. Realpolitik is not concerned with people who suffer, and is not concerned about the questions that arrive from the people who suffer. This is something that we as community would like to add: the voice of the suffering people in each situation. In every political crisis,

economic crisis, wars etc. the first to suffer are always the poorest ones. And we want to add this voice. We try to bring their voice into the ears of the people who make politics. This is our work, the point with our community (ibid).

Hence, although mediation clearly is one of the eye-catching achievements of Sant' Egidio, it is certainly not its only core activity.

Almost all members spend some hours a week either helping the children of poor families with their homework, providing food to homeless people, or engaging in other similar efforts in order to help deprived people in need. The work with peace is only a natural continuation of their efforts to improve the lives of the poor. Thus, when summarizing his commitment to conflict resolution, the founder of Sant' Egidio, Andrea Riccardi, stated: "War is the mother of all poverty, which makes everybody poor, even the rich" (Marshall 2004: 256).
The community is currently present in over 70 countries and has approximately 50 000 members.

2.3   Mozambique

October 4, 1992, has been marked as the most important day of Mozambican history. A sixteen year civil war, which had left one million dead, was finally put to an end after 27 months of negotiations between the government and the insurgency. In a region torn by war and internal strife, the Mozambican peace is a ray of hope for many African nations.

2.3.1 Independence

Mozambique reached its independence in 1975, after ten years of fighting against the Portuguese colonial power who had had its armies there since 1498 (Hume 1994: 4). However, after the collapse of the Fascists in Portugal, Lisbon determined to grant the colony its independence. After 477 years of rule the Portuguese left in a hurry, and left the country deprived of most professionals, tradespeople, merchants and skilled workers (ibid: 6).

The «Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique» (FRELIMO) established a single-party regime in Mozambique. The new government initially enjoyed widespread support because of its independence struggle, reflecting the post-colonial political experience of numerous other newly independent African states (Manning & Malbrough 2009: 77). In 1975 Samora Machel was sworn in as the new country's first president, and two years later adopted a Marxist-Leninist platform.

The single most important security question facing Machel was the Rhodesian war regarding Ian Smith's white minority rule (Hume 1994: 9). In 1977 Smith's military intelligence started up a Mozambican insurgency movement that was supposed to spy on ZANU's [21] operations and pressure the FRELIMO government. The group eventually took the name «Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana» (RENAMO). When the initial leader of RENAMO, Andre Matsangaissa, died in fighting with the government in 1979, Alfonso Dhlakama became their leader (Hume 1994: 13-14). Led on by the Afro-Marxist government of Machel, Mozambique was heavily caught up in the geo—political situation in an unstable southern Africa: both the war of independence in Rhodesia and the growing contest between the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Defence Forces (Crocker 1994: ix-x).

However, by 1986 the RENAMO guerrillas had taken over most parts of Mozambique, to the extent that FRELIMO only controlled the cities. RENAMO had evolved into an independent war-machine capable of producing both food and arms. It was seeking to destroy the country's economy and the system of government in order to force FRELIMO to negotiate from a position of weakness (Rocca 2003: 43). That same year Samora Machel died in a mysterious plane crash in South Africa, and Joaquim Chissano, the minister of foreign affairs, took over as president. Perceiving RENAMO as a puppet for the South African government, Chissano continued his predecessor's hard line towards the insurgents and hence refused any direct talks or negotiations. Thus, Mozambique continued its path to destruction during 1986 and 1987.

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[21] The Zimbabwean African National Union was a militant organization that fought the white minority rule in Rhodesia.

Despite RENAMO's control and widespread activity, few really knew who they were and what they wanted. Even though some European analysts interpreted them as something more than criminal guerrillas, the most common conviction was that they were a savage military formation (labelled the «Khmer Rouge of Africa»), devoid of any political feature, who lived by waging war (Hume 1994: 14, Rocca 2003: 49). RENAMO's international connections were also a mystery. Many theories existed. The only reliable fact, however, was that South Africa *had* been sponsoring them, and even though they officially stopped this in 1984, it most likely continued (ibid: 50). Moises Venancio asserts that while many other African conflicts were products of the superpower rivalry and thus possible to resolve with the end of the Cold War, the nature of the Mozambican conflict had eventually become domestic and thus more complex. The fact that no one could pressure or manipulate the isolated and desperate insurgency of RENAMO complicated matters even further (Venancio 1993: 142).

2.3.2 African summits

However, towards the end of 1988, both parties were starting to rethink their options and were exploring the possibilities of reaching a settlement through dialogue instead of war (Hume 1994: 26). Under Chissano's leadership, Mozambique's path towards a more liberal policy and reformed economy, which had only just started with Machel, continued. It reached its peak on FRELIMO's fifth party congress in which the government affirmed its choice of implementing a multiparty system (Rocca 2003: 54).[22]

The first serious initiatives for peace were African, and the parties first considered the neighbouring states as mediators. In the summer of 1989 both President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Daniel Arap Moi from Kenya were asked by Chissano to function as mediators (Patel 1993: 120). Chissano also asked several Catholic and Protestant leaders to assist the peace process and even asked them to arrange a meeting in Nairobi. Sadly, the meeting failed. More, during the autumn of

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[22] This was, however, not well received by RENAMO because they were not let in on the process leading up to it, and were still considered «bandidos armadas» by the government (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

1989, the rest of the African summits went the same way. The only thing that came out of it was that the two parties made their own plans for reaching peace. However, the plans were mutually refuted. On December 8, 1989, the United States Chargé d' Affaires in Zimbabwe, Edward Fugit, also presented a 7-point plan to Dhlakama. The latter furiously refused (ibid: 121-124). The last effort from the African leaders, now seated in Malawi June 1990, ended the day it was supposed to begin (Hume 1994: 32). One of the main reasons behind the failure of the attempts was the lack of *bargaining space* [23] due to the parties' commitments to ostensibly irrefutable positions involving the lack of recognition of each other. FRELIMO and the US asked for recognition of the Mozambican government and a cease-fire. RENAMO saw the government as an illegal one-party state and wouldn't even consider giving up their only means of pressure: the fighting (ibid: 23, Rocca 2003: 98, Patel 1993: 122-123). RENAMO's political program was simple, but effective; they were punctiliously resistant about everything FRELIMO had done since the first day of independence (Rocca 2003: 53).

2.3.3 The Catholic Church

The Catholic Church also had its own initiatives in promoting peace in Mozambique. The Church's cooperation with the colonial power made it a first and obvious target for the independence movement (Venancio 1993: 143). However, as most of the white priests and bishops left the country during the time of post-independence persecution from the Marxist government, the Church started to transform and endorse the new values of independence. It ultimately legitimized its existence and presence in the country (ibid: 143). The church already had a relation to RENAMO. Many of the insurgents professed the Catholic faith, while others, like Dhlakama himself, were educated from a young age at Catholic missions (ibid: 144). This was important when the Church started voicing its call for peace based on dialogue in 1984 (ibid: 144). This was also the year FRELIMO started relaxing its relations to the Church: an obvious consequence of the struggle against RENAMO being more important than the construction of an exemplary socialistic country (Rocca 2003: 27).

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[23] *Bargaining space* refers to the range within which acceptable agreements may be reached (Hopmann 1996: 48).

The Church, who had placed itself in a unique position between the parties by refusing to alienate RENAMO and simultaneously seeking better relations with FRELIMO, posted the letter «A Paz Que O Povo Quer». It went far in implying that *both* parties had equal moral responsibility for the state of war (Venancio 1993: 144). Sadly, it only led to Chissano reemphasising the impossibility of negotiating with RENAMO (Rocca 2003: 48). However, the improved relations with the FRELIMO government allowed for a visit by Pope John Paul II in 1988, after which the government decided to return all the property it had expropriated from the church in the 1970s. The visit was, according to Venancio, the result of a long process started in 1984 at the headquarters of Sant' Egidio, where a series of meetings had taken place between representatives from the Vatican, the Mozambican clergy and FRELIMO (Venancio 1993: 145).

2.3.4 Sant' Egidio and Mozambique

The ties between Sant' Egidio and Mozambique started with the young Mozambican priest Don Jaime Goncalves, who joined the community while he was studying in Rome in 1976 (Hume 1994: 17). A year later he had become archbishop of Beira and was becoming a visible leader in the young nation. The reason for Sant' Egidio's first involvement with the country was the government's restrictive policy towards religion. The network and political comprehension of the community was fruitful as they facilitated a meeting between the trendsetting leader of the Italian Communist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, and Goncalves. After explaining to Berlinguer the situation for the religious institutions in Mozambique, Berlinguer used his position to persuade the FRELIMO government to remove the tight restrictions against religion (ibid: 17-18, Rocca 2003: 23-27). Sant' Egidio's work only increased after this. In 1984 they started sending both planes and ships with aid to the war-torn country (ibid: 28). During the African peace initiatives at the end of the 1980s the community kept on working with deepening its familiarity with the two sides to the conflict (ibid: 97). Through Goncalves they had established reliable contacts with RENAMO and Andrea Riccardi was actually attending FRELIMO's fifth party congress speaking about a potential peace in Mozambique (ibid: 70, 97, Hume 1994: 18). The community, who felt that

FRELIMO now wanted peace, later invited Dhlakama to Rome in order to insure themselves about his intentions. Despite his deep-seated distrustfulness towards FRELIMO, Sant' Egidio regarded him as a person willing to work for peace (Rocca 2003: 98-99).

After some to and fro between the parties and Sant' Egidio, the antagonists finally decided to send delegations to the community's headquarters in Rome July 8, 1990 (ibid: 103).

This marked the end of Moi's and Mugabe's roles as mediators and marked the start of a rather unforeseen path to peace. It was led by Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi from Sant' Egidio, Archbishop Goncalves, and Mario Raffaelli representing the Italian government, and supported by ten different governments in addition to the UN (Hume 1994: x). What followed over the next 27 months were eleven exhausting rounds of talks in which there were no «magical» solutions as some might have expected with the end of the Cold War rivalry (Rocca 2003: 6). The conflict was in many ways a typical African post-independence situation: FRELIMO wanted a ceasefire before agreeing on a moderate political reform, RENAMO on the other side wanted a completely new constitution before any talk of ceasefire. RENAMO would not yield an inch until their physical security, political life, and elections with free democratic competition were guaranteed (ibid: 5-6). A breakthrough regarding these positions was reached when they signed the *Preamble*. The Preamble was a document in which RENAMO committed to recognize the government under the current legal framework, and FRELIMO, on their part, recognized RENAMO's legitimacy as a political movement (ibid: 5).

The most important issues that followed were agreement on the presence and role of Zimbabwean forces in the country, arrangement of elections, and agreement on a joint military and the security police (SNASP) (Hume 1995: 88-95). Limiting the presence and activity of the Zimbabwean army within the Beira and Limpopo corridors and establishing a joint verification commission to monitor the agreement solved the first issue. Further on, the mediators finally got an agreement that both presidential and

parliamentary elections were to be held simultaneously within one year from the signing of a peace agreement (ibid: 93). Any constitutional questions had to be dealt with before the ceasefire, and the reassurance from the government that the Parliament would ratify all reforms and protocols from Rome was agreed on. Thus, by giving the negotiators the force of constitutional law, the negotiations slowly went forward (ibid: 97). With the legitimacy and authority that the presence of the two leaders, Chissano and Dhlakama, gave, in addition to the effort and help of observing governments, the last technical issues concerning a national army, the secret police and how to run the civilian administration between the ceasefire and the upcoming election were solved. These problems were mostly worked out by the establishment of commissions, composed of both sides in addition to the UN and other governments who monitored the transitional solutions, and joint governmental bodies (ibid: 99).

A long and troublesome path to agreement marked by seemingly intractable issues, several phases of impasse and many different actors involved, finally came to an end after a frenetic shuttle diplomacy by the mediators during the last 48 hours.[24]

The agreement was signed in the hall of Farnesina in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the morning of October 4. The war had taken almost one million lives and produced four million internal refugees and 1,7 million refugees abroad. 200 000 children had been orphaned and the infant mortality rate was 250 per 1000. The economy and infrastructure was in ruins (ibid: 216). After the signing of the peace agreement the papers were symbolically handed over by Matteo Zuppi to the UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The so-called ONUMOZ mission initiated six months later is today regarded as one of the UN's success stories on intervention in the 1990s (ibid. 221). Despite problems in the early phases of the democratic competition between the two former belligerents, the elections consolidated the peace

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[24] Up until the last hours Dhlakama was afraid he had not accumulated enough guaranties for RENAMO and was therefore hesitant to sign the agreement (Rocca 2003: 208).

to such a degree that Mozambique still today remains a nation at peace in a region of conflict (ibid: 227-229).

2.4 Algeria

Even though the region of Maghreb in general, and Algeria in particular, represents a rather different context than Mozambique in terms of religion, geography, culture and traditions, there are some similar traits: There is the long and costly fight for decolonization (1954-1962), hundred of thousands of colonists (the so-called *pied-noirs*) who left within weeks and the period of optimism and hope that ensued. Further there is the growing malignant form of authoritarian rule carried out by the liberators and the subsequent resistance and cry for democratic reforms and multi-party elections (Impagliazzo 2010: 1-2). In Algeria however, the resistance did not initially take the form of an insurgency movement. Rather, during the 1980s the «crisis of authoritarianism» was confronted with society-wide uprisings, strikes, upsurges in the civil society and a rise of populist political Islamic movements (Entelis 1997: x).

2.4.1 Algerian power structure

Ever since the war of liberation, the army had been considered the legitimacy-granting authority in the young nation. The army developed a clientelistic pattern of power in keeping control over the government (Addi 1996: 96). Relationships within the power structure, *Le Pouvoir,* were particularistic and based on tribal bonds or material interests. Hence, since 1962 there was a lack of formal institutions and independent judicial power. The visible civilian government whose legitimacy was drawn from the army maintained the prevention of an independent civil society. The army in turn controlled the government through the hidden and network-based system of power (ibid: 96). The fact that the army did not identify itself with the electorate (which did not exist in their eyes) but with the nation, revealed, according to Addi, its nationalistic ideology: political conflicts between Algerians did not exist in their view; all conflicts were between Algerians and foreigners, or traitors to Algeria and Islam (ibid: 96-98). A consequence was that the rule of law proved impossible considering that popular

sovereignty is its source. Because loyalty to the army was considered more important than doing a good job, misrule, poor distribution of the state's natural resources and widespread corruption was the result (ibid: 99-100, Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 10-11). The economic inequality and low oil prices in the 80s consequently led the country into more foreign debt and rapidly increasing poverty. As the opposition started to grow, the government found itself in a difficult situation without democratic, economic, cultural or religious legitimacy. The increasing portion of young Algerians among the population also deprived the army of its historic liberating legitimacy (Roberts 1995: 251).

The nationwide riot in Algeria in October 1988 is perhaps the best example of the reaction to this tendency (Entelis 1997: x). In Algiers, the riots took the increasingly illegitimate government by surprise. At a loss, the government decided to send in the Armée Nationale Popolaire (ANP), the symbol for their national independence, in order to re-establish order. The result was that the people's army for the first time attacked and fired at its unarmed population. A few weeks later, nearly a thousand people were killed (Addi 1996: 94). What followed was a brief period in which the government party, the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), ostensibly honoured the demands of the people. Under its current prime minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, they embarked on a series of constitutional reforms (ibid: 94, Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 13). The population began organizing and the first political formations were soon created. The Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA), formed by the country's first independent president, Ahmed Ben Bella while in exile 1984, emerged from the underground, as well as Ait Ahmed's Socialists Forces Front (FFS) who had fought for multi-party democracy since the 1960s (ibid: 13-14). Later the FLN separated itself from the State and the military in turn abandoned it. On September 14 1989 the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was founded. With its famous slogan «Islam is the solution» it soon became the main revolutionary spokesman for the majority of unsatisfied and oppressed Algerians. Algeria suddenly had nearly 60 recognized parties, and the political landscape of Algeria was in this manner far more complex than that of Mozambique. A simple dichotomy between the state and a revolutionary

movement didn't exist, and it was to become even more complicated (Roberts 1995: 251, Joffé 2009: 943).

2.4.2 Democratic reforms and coup d' état

In a referendum on February 23, 1989, 73,4 percent of the population approved a more democratic constitution. It involved a new legislative national assembly composed of freely elected members; independent judicial power, obliged to protect the freedom and fundamental human rights of each Algerian; individual rights to form political associations; and a new freedom of the press (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 15). The first free municipal elections were held on June 12, 1990. The FIS won a majority with 54,25 percent of the votes, followed by the FLN with 28,1 percent. The FIS soon assumed administration of almost all the Algerian cities and declared them «cities of Islam» (ibid: 19). In 1991 the government decided that the legislative elections were to be held in two rounds, coincidentally they also prohibited campaigning inside mosques and they declared new electoral precincts. The FIS perceived this as a favouring of the FLN. Together with many parties they expressed their opposition. However, uninfluenced by the protests, President Chadli Benjedid decided to hold elections on June 27. Under the leadership of Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj the FIS announced a strike on May 23, and went on to occupy whole squares and streets in Algiers. Somehow shooting began and the ANP started taking control over the streets again. Within weeks the situation deteriorated: Madani and Belhadj were on the verge of declaring a *Jihad* as a result of a growing manhunt of Islamists and the taking down of the inscriptions that declared many Algerian cities Islamic. They were, however, arrested before they could execute the order. With the two *shuyukh* in prison the already complex political assembly that the FIS represented started to break off in several factions, many of which later developed into militant and terrorist groups (ibid: 20-24). The military that by now controlled the government decided to postpone the legislative elections until December, seemingly confident that the FIS was no longer a threat. However, by the efforts of the only leaders left strong enough to hold the party

together, Abdelkader Hachani and his right-hand man, Rabah Kebir, the FIS announced its participation in the elections (ibid: 25).

The election result was as shocking for the government as for the FIS. The latter won with a majority of 47,5 percent, which also meant 188 seats in the national assembly. The military or *Le Pouvoir* acted swiftly: on January 4, 1992, they dissolved the National Assembly, and a week later the highest-ranking officer forced Chadli to resign. Both Hachani and Kebir were arrested. On January 14, a five-member Higher State Council led by the newly returned liberation-hero Mohammed Boudiaf took control of the state. The FIS was soon outlawed and all their regional authorities were dissolved (ibid: 29). The country leaped into a state of terror. Clashes between the «éradicateurs»[25] wing of the military and the violent and militant remnants of the FIS and other Islamist factions became tragically common. During the following three to four years more than 60 000 people lost their lives (Addi 1996: 94).

During the rest of 1992 and 1993 there were some tentative attempts at dialogue between the FLN and FFS and the «conciliators» in the state apparatus. They did not, however, lead to anything (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 29). On January 31, 1994, the newly appointed minister of defence, Liamin Zeroual, was, despite, and coincidentally *because* of, the absence of any institutional point of reference, upgraded to «president of the state» (ibid: 29). In spite of his attempts to *dialogue sans exclusive aucune* – to negotiate with all parties - real dialogue never began. Both the Islamic extremists and the eradicators of the military saw to this (ibid: 30, Roberts 1995: 257-259).

2.4.3 Sant' Egidio and Algeria

Sant' Egidio, who had nurtured their strong relations to the country and especially the Algerian Church since 1984, decided in 1994 to evaluate the possibilities for an Algerian peace initiative. This was the result of the tragic assassinations of two friends of the community working in Algeria, and an informal, but concrete proposal to the

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[25] The factions within the Algerian power structure that opposed dialogue with the Islamists and rather pursued a tactic of oppression or extermination were generally referred to as «éradicateurs» (eradicators).

community's leader, Riccardi, from some Algerian Muslims at an interreligious conference for peace in Asissi (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 49, Impagliazzo 2010: 6). The situation for both the civilians in general, and those who professed a different faith than Islam in particular, was at the time severely deteriorated. A group composed of Matteo Zuppi, Marco Impagliazzo, Mario Marazziti and Mario Giro decided to contact various members of the government and the most important parties representing the Algerian community (Giro 16.12.2009). Somewhat surprisingly, most of the parties accepted the invitation, even the FIS.

Thus, the first round of talks, *Colloque sur Algérie*, was held in Rome, at Sant' Egidio's headquarters, November 21-22, 1994. With the blessing of the two shuyukh, Madani and Belhadj, the FIS was represented by Anwar Haddam. In addition, the following were also present: the FLN secretary, Abdelhamid Mehri; the FFS president, Ait Ahmed; Ahmed Ben Bella for the MDA; Ali Yahia, lawyer and president of the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH); Abdallah Jaballa, the president of the movement Islamic rebirth Ennahada; Mahfoud Nahnah, the head of the Movement for Islamic Society-Hamas; Noureddine Boukrouh, the founder of the Party for Algerian Renewal (PRA); Ahmed Ben Mohammed for Jeunesse Musulmane Contemporaine (JMC); and finally, Louisa Hanoune, the only woman and the spokesperson for the Worker's Party (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 53, Impagliazzo 1998).

The interest in the talks and the future of Algeria was revealed by the fact that more than 250 international journalists gathered outside the headquarters on Piazza de Sant' Egidio. From the outset the community did not intend real negotiations (as they thought it ought to take place in Algeria), but merely a space for the parties to talk and discuss their different ideas on how to solve the situation (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 48-49). All of Algeria's major parties were invited and present, except for the government. It declined the invitation by strongly criticising the effort as an intervention in their country, and claimed that there actually was dialogue going on in

Algeria (though the last attempt on national dialogue had failed in October) (ibid: 55, Impagliazzo 2010: 7).

2.4.4 The Talks

During the discussions there seemed to be consensus on the condemnation of violence and the need for dialogue. In addition there were also concrete proposals on what would be needed in order to establish a democratic regime in the country. Outside, reactions were divided. The fairly positive reception from certain European countries was met with fierce criticism from the Algerian media and government. Government-controlled newspapers in Algiers (e.g. the *El Moudjahid*) labelled the participants *terrorists*, *traitors* and *mercenaries*. The event was frequently linked to both the US and the Vatican and ridiculed as a *Christian intervention* in an Islamic nation (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 78-82). When asked to give a statement by Italian journalists the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Sifi, declared: «Algeria is not like Haiti, the Algerians will never allow anyone to interfere» (ibid: 84). Aware of the criticism from the government and the state-controlled newspapers in Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella replied on the last day of the first colloque with these words: «The government has scolded us for coming to Rome "in the Vatican's shade". […] You have no right to suspect our patriotism. Ait Ahmed and I certainly cannot be accused of lacking in patriotism for Algeria. […] We have not come here to plot against someone, but because we believe in the necessity of dialogue, which we have not been able to establish for months» (ibid: 79).

The final communiqué that everyone signed, except the Hamas and the PRA, declared that there was a need to continue the discussion and receive free and constant access to information about the crisis. The communiqué also made a formal request to Sant' Egidio to persevere in its effort to offer a place for further dialogue when the conditions permitted (ibid. 79, Roberts 1995: 259).

As the terror continued to the brink of civil war in the weeks after the first colloque,

Ait Ahmed consulted with the other parties and requested another encounter in Rome to discuss a strategy that would lead to real negotiations (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 109). Mandani and Belhadj, signalled that they were in favour and were even willing to guarantee alternation of power, a multi-party system and certain other democratic rights.

On January 8, 1995, the Algerian political leaders met behind closed doors at a secret location in Rome. They immediately started to work on concrete political proposals in line with the expectations from their first encounter (ibid: 112). Even though the debate was sometimes animated and heated because of the wide span of political positions held by the actors, they all enjoyed equal stature around the negotiation table (ibid: 116). The first day they discussed how to assume further negotiations with the regime, its role in the future Algeria, the constitutional foundations for the new elections, and how to engage the civil society and a free press in the peace process (ibid: 114-119, Giro 16.12.2009). At the request of Sant' Egidio, Mandani and Belhadj sent a letter to map out the most important points for the FIS in the negotiations. The letter emphasised among other things that the illegal regime had lost both its revolutionary and constitutional legitimacy and that Europe now had the chance to end the war. It also listed several conditions that had to be met for negotiations to take place (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 121-123).

As the days went by and discussions moved forward, the FIS started to modify their conditions and accepted its position as being one faction among many. They eventually agreed on drafting a national pact that emphasised that no foreign entity would be asked to intervene in order to reach a pacific and democratic solution to the crisis. Sections B and C in the Rome Platform suggested a realistic step-by-step restoration of peace and order in addition to requesting negotiations rather than merely dialogue with the government (The Rome Platform). The document excluded no one in the political competition, which would ensue the agreement. Even though betrayed and cheated of the election victory in 1992, the FIS agreed that the group would not invoke punishment for the ones responsible for the coup d'état. They insisted on the

legal rehabilitation of the FIS, the release of the FIS leaders, and the annulling of the last election, as new elections would be worked out. In the end, the FIS accepted both democratic and human rights that had never been included as part of its program or tradition (ibid: 133-137, Roberts 1995: 261). The group also suggested a transitional legislation, a «National Conference» composed of members from both the regime and the political opposition.

On Friday, January 13, the group met with the international press for the signing ceremony (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 154). According to the FFS president, Ait Ahmed, he was sure that «our efforts will lead to peace» (ibid: 155). And even though the Platform secured major concessions from the FIS, did not pillory the current regime, and was praised by many European observers (ibid: 166-172), it stands today only as a «lost opportunity» (Entelis 02.12.2009). Despite their initial support the most important governments did not follow up on the initiative taken by the Rome group. The regime rebuked the effort and pressed on with its own presidential election as a way of disarming the democratic critique the Platform represented (Roberts 1995: 237). Coincidentally, the killings continued. To date, the army's lengthy efforts to marginalize the Islamist movements do not seem to mend their fundamental Achilles' heel, which is the unresolved conflict associated with the 1991-92 elections and their ongoing legitimacy crisis (Akacem 2004: 156).

2.5   Summary

The chapter presented the empirical background of the thesis. Sant' Egidio is a community of Catholics who through their emphasis on human relations and work with the poor have developed a wide network that proves fruitful in terms of working for peace. The story of Mozambique was also presented. The country was split by a terrible civil war between the FRELIMO government and the RENAMO insurgency. After many failed efforts, Sant' Egidio and certain helpful governments were able to bring the war to an end in October 1992. The Algerian case on the other hand did not end with peace. After the coup d'état in 1992, the country leapt into a state of terror

where civilians eventually became the main targets. Even though Sant' Egidio managed to bring all the most important opposition parties together, the effort did not bring the conflict to an end.

3   Theoretical background and new approaches

3.1   Introduction

The chapter provides a theoretical account of mediation and the hallmarks of faith-based mediation. It also discusses some of the ways faith-based mediation deviates from more traditional notions of mediation and negotiation, and how it concurs with other approaches. I also develop two hypotheses around which I will centre the two chapters of analysis. The hypotheses are a continuation of the research questions.

3.2   Mediation

Although conflict is, without doubt, one the most pervasive and costly of all social processes, it is also one of the most common and prevailing in all societies (Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 4, Moore 1996: 3). «Conflict is not necessarily bad, abnormal, or dysfunctional; it is a fact of life» (ibid: xiii). However, conflicts are not bound to follow a negative and violent course. Conflicts arise, according to Moore, when parties are engaged in competition to meet goals that are perceived as incompatible and when these divergent goals motivate our behaviour (ibid: 3, Bercovitch et. al 2009: 5). However, conflict can be solved if the parties are able to devise efficient procedures for cooperative problem-solving, lay aside distrust and animosity, and work for solutions that attempt to meet all the involved parties' interests (More 1996: xiii). This process in which the parties seek a relation with competing actors in order to achieve something they cannot obtain by other means, is the most regular way of reaching a solution and is usually referred to as *negotiation*.[26] Thus, there is always a combination of common and conflicting interests in that each party proposes different solutions to a common problem (Hopmann 1996: 25). The game-theoretic foundation of negotiations proposes two main points. First, each party will continue to negotiate and accordingly increase their joint payoffs until they reach the *Pareto frontier*. Second, at the Pareto

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[26] Parties in a conflict enter negotiations when they voluntarily join in on a temporary relationship «designed to educate each other about their needs and interests, to exchange specific resources, or to resolve less tangible issues such as the form their relationship will take in the future or the procedure by which problems are to be solved» (Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 8). In addition, negotiations are sought when both parties are aware that alternatives to a negotiated settlement do not appear as viable or desirable as a bargain that they reach themselves (ibid: 13).

frontier it is impossible for one party to improve its position without the other losing, the parties will thus bargain over which point on the Pareto frontier they will agree on (ibid: 46-47).

However, direct negotiations, in all levels of life and politics, may reach an impasse or even worse: not get started at all. Hopmann claims that in some cases a dispute may become so bitter that any solution becomes difficult to find bilaterally. An outside intervention might be fruitful for helping the negotiations along (ibid: 222). The situation in which the parties seek a third party for assistance in reaching a mutually acceptable solution is termed *mediation*. Jakob Bercovitch claims that negotiation and mediation are at last beginning to emerge as the most appropriate response to conflict in our diverse and constant challenge of building a more peaceful world (Bercovitch 2009: 353).

Mediation is, according to Moore, an extension of the negotiation process that involves intervention by an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power (Moore 1996: 8). Thus, mediation leaves the decision-making authority primarily in the hands of the parties to the conflict. «It is predicated on the need to supplement conflict management, not to supplant the parties' own efforts» (Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 5). The possibility of retaining the decision-making authority is what makes mediation especially attractive to many countries (Moore 1996: 18). The intervention is non-violent and non-binding and mediators enter a conflict in order to affect it, resolve it or influence it in some way (Bercovitch 2009: 343).

Bercovitch and Gartner assert that mediation is particularly fruitful in international relations when a conflict has gone on for some time and reached an impasse or stalemate: when neither party tolerates further escalation of the dispute, when they are prepared to meet directly or indirectly for dialogue and when they are prepared to accept external help and surrender some control over the resolution process (Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 6). In addition to the motivating factor of a mutually hurting stalemate, Zartman notes that *valid spokesmen* and a *perceived way* out are

important for creating optimism about a possible solution and incentives for accepting mediation (Pruit 1997: 237-238).[27]

3.3 Faith-based mediation

With the end of the Cold War and in the face of new types of destructive conflicts, the field of conflict resolution has expanded and developed. The attention given to non-governmental organizations and grassroots engagement has grown concurrently (Kriesberg 2009: 25). The theories on faith-based mediation erupted in this period as well. As pointed out earlier, this thesis' focus is on the practice of religious actors involved as *mediators* in conflicts. The focus does not restrict itself to only «religious» or «identity» wars (see point 3.3.2). Appleby asserts that the most direct and decisive involvement by religious actors in conflict resolution is when they started providing *good offices* and served effectively as *mediators* (Appleby 2000: 216). Historically, he claims, mediation also seems to be the most common form of religious intervention and perhaps the most productive (ibid: 239). Further, he asserts that just as insights from social psychology have strengthened the literature on mediation, the psychology of religion can also be drawn upon to solve conflicts: «faith can form a powerful connection between the adversaries or between mediators and one or more of the parties they seek to reconcile» (ibid: 218).

Vik and Appleby agree that the legacy of religious peacemaking is today both wide-ranging and complex (Vik 2009: 20, Appleby 2000: 5-6). A diversity of actors is working on different levels and with different goals.[28] Based on my eclectic discussion of the theories on the field, my tentative definition of faith-based mediation is «a process in which a religious third party applies elements and practices of religion in order to resolve a conflict».

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[27] Moore further elaborates on a conflict's ripeness for mediation and adds that it is likely when emotions are intense and are preventing a settlement, communication between the parties is poor in quantity or quality, misperceptions or stereotypes are hindering exchanges, serious disagreements over information or when there is no acceptable structure or forum for negotiations (Moore 1996: 13-14).

[28] Appleby mentions several actors: Christian ethicists attempt to implement the pacifist traditions in contingent political contexts; Muslim jurists working for just and stable Muslim societies; Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu scholars who «translate» the insights of their traditions to an accessible and common «second-order language» of dialogue; religious movements, NGOs and leaders who are engaging themselves in conflict transformation and reconciliation (Appleby 2000: 6).

Appleby defines religion in sum as «the human response to a reality perceived as sacred» (ibid: 8): it discloses and celebrates the transcendent source and significance of human existence. He states that religion implies a code of conduct that defines the explicit moral norms governing the behaviour of those who belong to the confessional community. «Thus, religion constitutes an integral culture, capable of forming personal and social identity and influencing subsequent experience and behaviour in profound ways» (ibid: 9). In my discussion I am concerned with the *functionalist* approach to religion: not what religion *is*, but what it *does* for a social group or individual (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 353).

One may define Sant' Egidio as a religious actor in that they have been formed by a religious community and are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or defend its values and precepts. All their work, both with the poor and with peace, is derived from their religious background (Emberti Gialloreti 15.12.2009). This also points to what Bercovitch asserts is a crucial and often neglected question in the field of conflict resolution: namely, the mediator's *motivation*, why mediate? (Bercovitch 2009: 345). Peacemaking and mediation are all about upholding Sant' Egidio's values. For them mediation is not about stabilizing the economy or a question of security. Their arguments are drawn from their community's sacred texts, precepts, and ethical practices. These in turn shape the concrete choices and behaviour of the members of the community (Appleby 2000: 282).

There are several aspects worth illuminating in the theoretical field of faith-based peacemaking; I have, however, demarcated it in four main hallmarks in order to emphasize the essential characteristics pertinent to mediation. My eclectic account of the theoretical propositions of faith-based mediation will also discuss traditional and new approaches to negotiation and mediation in order to illuminate the particularity of the approach.

3.3.1 *The new vision and increased common ground based on religious principles*

One of the faith-based mediator's unique ways of intervention is the encouragement of embracing a new reality and a new relationship with one another (Johnston 2003: 18).

The deconstruction of old hostile perceptions and the appeal to the transcendent dynamics of religious principles form a basis from which even the worst enemies may be reconciled by seeing the situation differently, claim Harpviken and Røislien (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 360-361, Johnston 2003: 18). The religious peace broker draws on normative rationales for restraining armed conflict in a manner that exceeds traditional diplomacy and implies long-term commitment (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 18). However, this is contingent on the parties' willingness to shift perceptions and their sense of dependence on religion (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 362). Building bridges for enhanced communication, establishing new common ground and forging unity out of diversity by appealing to the sacred texts and shared spiritual principles of religion is part of this first characteristic (Johnston 2003: 16-17).

This first point breaks with the traditional understanding of holding and keeping one's positions based on one's primary rational interests. The embrace of «new realities» based on normative rationales derived from sacred texts is unfamiliar to traditional diplomacy. Douglas Johnston, the President of the US International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy, asserts that the post-cold-war world is likely to see the composition of conflict change (Johnston 1994: 3). These new conflicts pose a challenge for the existing theories on conventional diplomacy, he adds. Traditional diplomacy involves measures that are suitable for power politics and tangible material interests: interests that are inherently divisible and subject to compromise (ibid: 3). Michael Banks asserts that the conventional models of conflict resolution, derived from the Cold War paradigm of international relations, tend to facilitate a status quo mentality that instead of promoting an impartial mediation conveys a partisan manipulation of conflicts (Banks 1986: 24).[29] Indeed, the fundamental assumptions underlying the theoretical framework of negotiations and mediation have, since the end of the Second World War, been dominated by «rational actor» models (Atran & Axelrod 2008: 224). Such models imply that the mediator can, by using various

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[29] Banks contends the international relations paradigm contains an inherent liability regarding conflict resolution. Diplomacy typically attempts to resolve conflicts according to a patent interest, not make concessionary adjustments wherever possible (Banks 1986: 24-25).

combinations of power, manipulate the range of possible agreements (Carnevale 1986: 42, see section 3.4.2). The termination of conflict is dependent on many things; however, Mitchell emphasises the parties' rational evaluation of their position of relative advantage in the ongoing conflict and the structure of the parties themselves (Mitchell 1981: 166). Following this, the process becomes a cost-benefit analysis in which the gains associated with continued fighting are compared to the gains associated with giving in, and the costs incurred through continuing the war compared to the suffering induced by compromise (ibid: 166-172).

Even though undeniably fruitful during the Cold War, these models reduced human reasoning to purely rational calculation where decision-making occurred in some calculated centralized manner (Johnston & Samson 1994: 27, Atran Axelrod 2008: 224, Mitchell 1981: 159).[30]

The logical result of this line of thought in an encounter with so-called «sacred» or «core» values, often related to religion, is *inaction* (Carnevale 1986: 51). Conventional wisdom, presupposing rational actors, suggests that the mediator either postpone the issue of sacred values, or bypass it with sufficient material incentives (Atran & Axelrod 2008: 223). However, actors influenced by these values often find the attempt to bypass them with material incentives offending, and it might decrease the possibility of achieving sustainable peace (ibid: 226).

Mario Giro, on the other hand, states that «when you are a believer you believe that a man can change. Even the worst of men has something good inside» (Giro 16.12.2009). Sant' Egidio understands war as a *human* question. War and peace are not automatic outputs of some mechanical equation or process (ibid.). Consequently the community believes that the decision to wage war can be reversed even if economic, societal and structural factors might ostensibly point to more war. As such, they believe more in humanity than in rational calculation. Even though they admit the importance of structural factors and that these also must be solved, they still hold that

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[30] Mitchell labels the analogy of the «rational actor» an «anthropomorphic metaphor» and notes that nowhere is it more applied than in international conflicts, and nowhere is it probably less appropriate (Mitchell 1981: 159). Nevertheless, the analogy still stands as a common metaphor and lies as a fundamental strand of thought underlying the traditional theory in the field of negotiations (ibid: 162).

the human level needs to be addressed first. Thus, they emphasise each guerrilla-leader's, president's or general's personal biography in order to understand the causes of war. The people who wage war must be addressed as human beings. And faith-based actors believe that one of the surest ways to the heart of people is through their faith (Johnston 2003: 3). If the decision-makers can change, Sant' Egidio believes that the seemingly mutually incompatible goals underlying a conflict may more easily be solved.

3.3.2 *The mediator's position and identity*

The mediator himself is an important asset to faith-based mediation. An aspect rarely acknowledged by secular Western mediators is that when mediating in deeply religious societies they are perceived primarily as Christians, even if they don't identify themselves as such (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 366). Faith-based diplomats, on the other hand, are extremely aware of their own role and identity, Johnston claims. The focus on exclusive and defining aspects of identity in ethnic and religious conflicts requires the awareness of identity and the quality of a pluralistic heart in the mediator (ibid: 363, Johnston 2003: 17). In addition, another traditional hallmark is the ability to persevere against overwhelming odds. This faith-based *motivation* stems from the fact that faith-based mediators perceive peacemaking as a deeply religious calling (Bouta et. al 2005: ix). Considering that faith-based mediators have no coercive or rewarding means to influence the parties, the time-aspect is even more important. In composition with a certain spiritual authority, the credibility of religious institutions and the legitimacy related to the humanitarian record of many religious institutions constitute the reason why their credibility surpasses that of secular diplomats, Harpviken and Røislien note (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 16-18). As Appleby states: «Their daily contact with the masses, long record of charitable service, and reputation for integrity have earned religious leaders and institutions a privileged status and an unparalleled legitimacy, especially in societies where religion enjoys a measure of independence from the state» (Appleby 2000: 8). Harpviken and Røislien deem this aspect within the organizational potential of religion. In many religious societies the

individual's dependence on different religious organizations and groups gives the latter a pervasive status and influence in the community and a unique leverage for reconciling conflicting parties, not to mention how their organizational structure enables them to draw on local, national and international support for peace-talks (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 21-22).

Religious actors' influence in society, wide networks and persistent attitudes make faith-based mediation pertinent not only in religious or ethnic conflicts (Bouta et. al 2005: 44-45). Harpviken and Røislien assert that faith-based mediation has proven itself pertinent in secular conflicts as well: by representing a new and alternative common ground, as touched upon in the first point (Harpviken & Røislien 1, 19, 24-25). Indeed, during the nineties, Appleby explains, there was an increasing diversity in the tasks religious actors conducted in the name of peacebuilding (Appleby 2000: 827-828).[31]

Giro stresses that a common phenomenon in Europe is to hide your own roots, be that socially, ideologically or religiously, because the display of them is seen as lack of respect for others' views (Giro 16.12.2009). In mediation the contrary is essential, he claims: «The other wants to know who you *really* are. Because identity is so important, please display your identity so I can understand who I am talking to» (ibid, it. added). He asserts that Sant' Egidio's unambiguous identity and the fact that they do not represent any other states or interests are very important in gaining belligerent parties' trust.

3.3.3 Healing of relationships and collective wounds

Faith-based mediators emphasize the relationship between belligerents as much as they value a successful settlement. Mediation is seen as a means to bring the conflict to an end, but also to resolve the underlying conflict caused by unhealthy relationships (Johnston 2003: 19). This includes healing the wounds of history inflicted by identity-

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[31] Appleby says of peacebuilding: «at the heart of peacebuilding is *conflict transformation*, the replacement of violent with nonviolent means of settling disputes.» (Appleby 2000: 212).

based suppressing institutions. As long as these wounds can give rise to stereotyping and demonizing of the perpetrators, conflict continues, Johnston claims. By what he labels «spiritual conversation» and the effort of bringing meaning and dignity to the parties' suffering, faith-based mediators are able to penetrate the heart of the conflict and uncover values that can form a basis for lasting peace (ibid: 19). In this manner faith-based mediators emphasise the altering of the belligerent's attitudes as more important than the parties' behaviour.

The parties' identities are potentially an essential element as well. Religion is in many cases the foundation underlying their identity, often intertwined with other distinguishing aspects such as ethnicity, class etc. (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 19). Harpviken and Røislien claim the religious mediator detects these inflammable religious differences and might even point out common values among the conflicting parties. They thus operate on different grounds than the traditional diplomats who, because of the secular premises underlying their modus operandi, often ignore this (ibid: 20).

3.3.4 Informal Track Two approaches

Finally, faith-based mediation is characterized by unofficial and informal talks, called *Track Two* (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 361). The aforementioned aspects of identity and position open up the possibilities for Track Two approaches. In *Track One* negotiations, the mediators are formally appointed by the parties and ought to be some kind of state representative or diplomat. However, informal contexts give the mediators more room to manoeuvre outside the limelight of media, and they might therefore find themselves better positioned to discuss innovative solutions (ibid: 361). As Harpviken and Røislien put it, «lack of official status, however, is not the same as lack of relevance» (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 23).

3.4   The «Human» approach

It is possible to demarcate certain distinct aspects of faith-based mediation by applying the triadic conflict structure from Mitchell that highlights the multiple nature of

international conflict. The conflict triangle distinguishes between three inter-related components of conflict: conflict situation; conflict behaviour; and conflict attitudes and perceptions (Mitchell 1981: 16).

3.4.1 Attitudes, perceptions and faith

While some mediators mainly pursue the conflict *situation*, which is any situation where parties perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals (based on conflicting interests), one can argue that faith-based mediators emphasise the psychological roots to a conflict: *attitudes*.[32] These are psychological states (fear, perceptions, anger, hostility etc.) that usually accompany situations of conflict and unhealthy relationships (ibid: 27). Even though the conflict situation may have changed, attitudes might still hinder peace-attempts. Just as faith-based mediators believe that people can change for the better in a situation of conflict, they believe repentance is still important in a situation in which the conflict has cooled down, because they believe conflict initially begins in the minds and hearts of people. On the other hand, Sant' Egidio also believes that even when the incompatibly of belligerents' goals persists, an alteration of attitudes during mediation may lead to a peaceful approach to these incompatible goals (Gianturco 05.02.2010). In either case, the way around attitudes and feelings, or the «human approach» as Giro labels it (Giro 16.12.2009), is the primary objective. Often, the incompatibility of goals and the psychological conditions are inter-related. However faith-based mediators have a point of reference that stresses the latter aspect. On this point faith-based mediation deviates from the traditional interest-based approach that mostly stresses the conflict situation as the generator of conflicting behaviour. Consequently, interest-based approaches emphasise that the alteration of the situation changes the incentives of conflict and the conflicting behaviour.

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[32] In this manner it can be argued that faith-based mediation is theoretically adjacent to psychology- and perception theories on conflict, as they emphasise and draw on similar theoretical notions and dynamics (see Mitchell 1981, part I and II). The emphasis on attitudes and relationships is also in line with John Paul Lederach's thesis of comprehensive peacebuilding (see Lederach 1997).

Indeed, Johnston and Samson claim that «identity-based» conflicts require a broader approach than conventional diplomacy has contributed: Mediators need to include perceptions, emotional stakes, and the party's respective interpretations of principles such as freedom, justice and self-determination; move beyond the state-centric focus of power-politics models; and reach into the realm of nongovernmental and individual relations (Johnston & Samson 1994: 3, 333).[33] Bercovitch claims that the end of the Cold War and the ever-increasing number of ethnic and internal conflicts proved the old techniques of deterrence and power-politics to be less relevant and simultaneously provided opportunities for a significant expansion in the use of mediation as a means for conflict resolution (Bercovitch 2009: 353).

Another idea behind religious peacemaking is its potential in those intractable conflicts often referred to as «identity-wars». Kaufman claims that the reason why traditional approaches to negotiations usually fail in the new types of wars is the mediator's disregard of how emotional, symbolic and religious dynamics influence the tangible and political issues (Kaufman 2006: 202-203). If the roots of a conflict do not revolve around material interests, but rather emotional or religious symbols, solutions to these are not to be found within the rational paradigm of realpolitik (ibid: 201, Johnston 2003: ix). Herein lies one of the assets and modus operandi of Johnston's *faith-based diplomacy*: When religion was perceived as an irrational phenomenon, it was outside the rational actor models, and thus outside the policy makers' calculus (Johnston 2003: xi). Johnston, on the other hand, asserts that religion is a strong motivating factor for human action, and that people may rationally try to pursue their religious interests. It thus represents an important factor in war and peace (Johnston 2003: x, 6-9).[34] Hence, adherents of faith-based mediation hold that faith is one of many important factors that drive action, and contrary to more traditional rational approaches, one can thus approach people in conflict through their faith (ibid: 3).

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[33] Identity politics is at the centre of what Michael Sheenan has labelled «postmodern war» (Baylis et. al 2007: 62). These wars are increasingly domestic and pursue ethnic cleansing or religiously constituted goals, so-called holy wars (ibid: 62, Fox & Sandler 2004: 63).

[34] In this manner faith-based mediators are «culturally sensitive» (Hopmann 1996: 143). Hopmann explains that «culturally sensitive» actors in negotiation are aware of the significance of religious and cultural beliefs held by other parties, and that the Western notion of «rationality» is itself a cultural-bound value that wont necessarily be easily transferred to other cultures (ibid: 143).

3.4.2 Lack of manipulative means

The traditional *interest-based* approach, mentioned in section 3.3.1, proposes that a solution depends on the parties' interests that may be sketched out along a single continuum with opposing positions at each end (Hopmann 1996: 76). Hopmann explains that throughout much of history, diplomats have generally followed their narrow national interests and emphasized bargaining-strategies for «winning» over the opponent (ibid: 28). This may lead to a conflict behaviour in which the parties, through different means of bargaining, threats and promises, attempt to make the other party abandon or modify its goals (ibid: 77, Mitchell 1981: 120). One party may try to put the other party «in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice we demand», to quote Clausewitz (ibid: 123). In such a situation mediators may play a role only when the time is right: when there is uncertainty concerning the relative power-balance. Because of the possibility of forcing the other party, few make any concessions from a position of strength. However, rarely is a concession given from a position of relative weakness, either, due to the fear of exploitation (ibid: 282). Hence, there are stages in any dispute where even the most beautifully handled mediation has little chance of being taken up. That is, unless you are in a position to manipulate the negotiations and create bargaining space by altering the incentives of the parties through offering or threatening with tangible tools like economic compensations or sanctions and military threats; *reward* power or *coercive* power, as Carnevale labels it (Carnevale 1986: 42, Mitchell 1981: 286). This thought of manipulation is in line with the traditional rational paradigm of negotiation (Beardsley et. al 2006: 64, Hopmann 1996: 241).

However, Mitchell acknowledges, this paradigm of «carrots and sticks» fails to account for the efforts in conflict mediation to influence not the behaviour, but the values underlying that behaviour (Mitchell 1981: 141). Conflict settlement that aims at altering the conflict *behaviour* (stopping the use of violence and coercive strategies) may shed little effort in altering the goals and attitudes of the adversaries. It may consequently leave the underlying problem unmodified (ibid: 275-276). The powerful mediators construct, or even impose, temporary settlements that hinge on the coercive

potential of the third-party: not the willingness of the parties. This is the inevitable conclusion of the underlying idea, namely that the mediator's interests clash with those of the parties because the parties are inherently reluctant to jeopardize their own freedom of action and pursue goals set by their own chosen means (ibid: 312).[35]

Hence, Mitchell envisages a new style of mediation in which the assumptions of the antagonistic nature of the parties' relationship and situation, let alone the pure bargaining approach which characterizes traditional mediation, is modified (ibid: 313). By low power and persuasion the mediator's function becomes one of education where the goal becomes to reconceptualise the parties' relationship and the problem so that it is regarded as a situation from which mutually beneficial solutions can be developed (ibid: 313).

Faith-based mediation follows the rationale behind this approach. Faith-based mediation relaxes the proposition about the non-interchangeability of the parties' evaluations of interests and outcomes. Where manipulative strategies downplay the dimension of *conversation*, like the non-violent philosophy of Ghandi and the «friendly persuasion» of the Quakers (Mitchell 1981: 141), faith-based approaches open up a new frontier by attempting to alter the values underlying the positions and interests: consequently widening the bargaining space in a new way. The Quaker international conciliation principle is illustrative: the Quakers attempt to penetrate the «belief-system» of the leaders of parties in conflict. By disrupting those images and attitudes the parties might be willing to *redefine* the situation sufficiently to permit some accommodation (ibid: 299). This does not however imply a «sudden and electrifying effect upon a conflict» (ibid: 300). Emberti Gialloreti emphasises that faith-based mediators whose primary aim is to restore healthy relationships take all the time needed, because they believe the *process* itself can be a contributing factor for altering a conflict situation (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010). Attitudes and perceptions

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[35] Mitchell states that in virtually all cases of mediation the mediator accepts the parties' own bargaining approach to their conflict and concepts of concessions. Coercion might change their behaviour, however, unaltered goals and attitudes will undermine these efforts, and the mediator will eventually be rejected (Mithcell 1981: 313). This is also confirmed by findings from Beardsley et. al: in the pursuit of long-term tension reduction and the healing of relationships, manipulation as strategy has a significant a poorer record of than that of more facilitative mediation strategies (Beardsley et. al 2006: 77-83, Carment et. al 2009: 233).

of others do not happen randomly, people actively organize them in a process of selection (Bercovitch et. al 2009: 8). The reversal of this takes time and effort. The process of building trust and deconstructing hostile attitudes is seen as more important than approaching the parties' initial positions based on their assessment of mutually incompatible goals (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010). Hence, the primary objective and fundamental question in any form of conflict transformation, how to alter «the mind» of the opponents (Mitchell 1981: 159), is approached in a different manner than in traditional interest-based approaches.

This fact makes the discussion of *faith-based* manipulation theoretically contradictory and even ontologically deviant. Indeed, as Harpviken and Røislien state: «Religious actors have few opportunities to introduce carrots or sticks in order to push negotiations forward, and if and when they do, there is always a risk that their fundamental credibility is undermined» (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 4). Historical cases of faith-based mediation have been located well within the realm of either *facilitation* or *formulation* (Appleby 2000: 217). By compensating for lacking information and applying an *integrative approach* [36] of cooperation the facilitators seek to estimate the range of mutually acceptable agreements (Beardsley et. al 2006: 63, 66).[37] Formulation can involve the actual proposal of new solutions to the disputants. The formulator controls the formality of the meetings in a higher degree and may also contribute to the negotiations by suggesting concessions (Beardsley et. al: 63-64, 66, Hopmann 1996: 237). These are the strategies Moore refers to when he claims that some types of mediation aim at establishing or rebuilding relationships of trust and respect in order to minimize costs and psychological harm in the long-term (Moore 1996: 15). Faith-based mediators follow these strategies in the way that they view the relationship as an underlying cause of conflict that must be approached.

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[36] The hallmark of the integrative approach is the cooperative nature of the negotiations where one's objectives are not in basic conflict and hence a mutually acceptable solution is both possible and desirable for both parties (Hopmann 1996: 47, 59-60)

[37] Hopmann also emphasises that the facilitator creates an atmosphere conducive to reaching an agreement. He also asserts that the facilitator may be a contributor to *cognitive change*: Instead of locking the conflict within their frames of references, the facilitator tries to change their preferences by viewing the problem in a new light (ibid: 234).

3.4.3 Contextual caveat

Finally, an important aspect to remember in analysing the role of the religious actors is taking the social, cultural and political context into account (Appleby 2000: 227). The range of choices for the religious leaders is often dictated by the structural-environmental condition of the society and conflict. In every society there is always an array of social, economic, and political forces that creates the structural environment for the conflict to play out in. This environment, Appleby asserts, constitutes «a set of constraints and opportunities for religious participation in conflict transformation» (ibid: 230). Bercovitch and Gartner underline the same element for all mediation: «the environment in which mediation and conflict management occur is critical» (Bercovitch & Gartner 2008: 11). In addition, any peacemaking effort, religious as well, is dependent on the parties' will to resolve the conflict. Without the commitment and a certain level of dependence from the parties the efforts are doomed to fail (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 18).

3.4.4 Hypotheses

Building on the theoretical discussion in this chapter and the empirical background in chapter 2, it is possible to state two hypotheses. The hypotheses are a continuation of the research questions and henceforth the analysis will revolve around these.[38] The first hypothesis centres its focus on the second research question, while the second hypothesis goes to the core of the third research question.

1. The four hallmarks of faith-based were salient features of the negotiations in Mozambique and Algeria.
2. Religion played a key role in both cases, both for mediators and the parties; it contributed positively in Mozambique, and negatively in Algeria.

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[38] Tor Egil Førland claims that for statements to become arguments they have to be related to a hypothesis. The research question is the basis for the research; however any analytical discussion needs to hold a position in relation to a hypothesis; no hypothesis, no discussion, states Førland (Førland 2007: 36-37, 42).

3.5 Summary

The chapter introduced and discussed my eclectic approach to faith-based mediation. The approach emphasizes the «human» aspect of conflict in terms of attitudes and relationships. Faith-based meditation differs from traditional notions of diplomacy in that it draws on and applies elements and thoughts from religion. Through their approach faith-based mediators seek to alter the persons responsible for, and engaged in conflict. Sant' Egidio «believe in human beings», and consequently view war as a human decision. Hence, the «human» aspect must be addressed first, and religion can help in this endeavor.[39]

In the following chapter I set out to describe and analyze how and to what degree the above-mentioned hallmarks were present and influential in the negotiations in Mozambique and Algeria.

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[39] The discussion also showed that faith-based mediation deviates from certain characteristics of the traditional interest-based approaches to mediation. On the other hand it does not appear far from the theoretical fields of perception theory and psychological approaches to mediation. See also footnote 6 in the introductory chapter.

4 Analysis of faith-based aspects

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a broader analysis of the efforts of Sant' Egidio in Mozambique and Algeria based on the theoretical perspectives presented in chapter 3. The chapter seeks to scrutinize the first hypothesis regarding the saliency of the four proposition of faith-based mediation. Thus, I do not aspire to cover all possible aspects of the comprehensive process of the peace initiatives; rather I seek to present and illuminate the central elements of faith-based mediation in order to assess its importance.

The chapter is divided into four parts discussing the four hallmarks of faith-based mediation from chapter 3. Each part discusses the presence and importance of one of these factors. At the end of each part I give a short summary of the findings.

4.2 The new vision and increased common ground based on religious principles

A first fundamental aspect to point out is that neither of the two conflicts had a religious core. Rather it is fair to categorize both conflicts as traditional post-independence struggles for democracy. Even though religion *had been* an aspect of the Mozambican conflict during the government's persecution of the Catholic Church, it was never a central issue. The parties were not dependent on religion and thus, the mediators could not forge unity out of diversity by appealing to sacred values. Mario Giro explains that Sant' Egidio rarely refers to normative religious values in their mediation:

> We generally do not appeal to religious values, even if I have a Catholic in front of me. It is not the point; religion was not a specific issue. The point is the human aspects. Religion *may* become pertinent. It depends. But in Mozambique this was not important (Giro 16.12.2009 it. added).

Harpviken and Røislien assert that Sant' Egidio's ethos became a shared normative ground in Mozambique. According to them, this illustrates the potential of religious normative systems as a common ground for belligerent parties (Harpviken & Røislien

2005: 19). However, my interviewees did not seem to support the idea that the *religious* normative system of Sant' Egidio was important in establishing common ground. The common ground was rather developed by a mutual shift in perception of the other party caused by an emphasis on the «Mozambican family». I will discuss this in section 4.4. However, in short, my material gives little evidence that Sant' Egidio's efforts in Mozambique can be explained by the first hallmark of faith-based mediators.

4.2.1 Religious legitimacy

Even though the Algerian conflict is also not considered religious, the conflict unquestionably had religious undertones. The emergence of radical Islamism during the seventies and the eighties and the creation of the FIS as the symbol of the revolutionary legitimacy (Joffé 2009: 943) clearly revealed the religious aspects of the conflict. Hugh Roberts claims that the radical Islamists' assertion of Algerians as Muslims above all was a «massively voluntarist affair» (Roberts 1993: 140). It represented an instrumental mobilization of religious sentiments that manipulated history and religious traditions in order to achieve political gain (ibid: 144-145). Nevertheless, the application of religious elements was important. Millions of people had given their votes to the FIS and most likely internalized an Islamic worldview with its normative implications. In particular, the younger generations in Algeria identified with a radical Islamic political viewpoint through which they could express their indignation with the economic crisis the country was in due to falling oil-prices. Frustrated with the injustice and the socio-economic models practically unreachable for the majority, they found motivation in their Islamic roots to fight the state (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 84-85).

An indicator of religion's pertinence in the conflict is the fact that the government-controlled newspapers in Algiers exploited sentiments of Islamic pride in their critique of the negotiations (ibid: 111). The *Liberté* labels the mediators «crusaders» and asserts that the «traitors» of the nation have not respected their holy religion Islam

when they turned to Sant' Egidio (Liberté 23.11.1994: last page).[40] According to Entelis, this was sheer propaganda:

> The faith-based criticism is bogus. The very nature of the political organizations that were willing to participate proves this. Even the Berbers and the worst Islamic groups did not think that the different faith would stop Sant' Egidio as serving as a mediator. In my view the criticism was a pathetic excuse (Entelis 02.12.2009).

However, the religious discourse and the government's critique along those lines only shows that the normative system of Islam was a pertinent rallying-point that both parties tried to exploit. The FIS, which according to Giro was the most important party in Rome considering its wide support in the 1990-91 elections, had far more weight than the government in questions of Islam (Giro 16.12.2009). This religious legitimacy seemed important, because it was the only thread of leverage the FIS had towards the upcoming armed Islamic groups in the country. One of the mediator's biggest fears was that the FIS would lose the influence it had over the «nebulous mass» of frustrated Algerians (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 106). There exists a telling example of how the mediation team sought to use this religious legitimacy of the FIS in order to defend their initiative. In response to the government's religiously colored attack, the FIS leader Belhadj turned to the Quran, and a paragraph where the prophet Muhammed permits his followers to seek refuge in Christian Ethiopia:

> The prophet Muhammed, on seeing Qoraich's determination in persecuting and torturing his companions, suggests that some of them take refuge in Abyssinia until God decides to intervene in their aid. «His lord, one of Jesus' disciples, is a good man and injustice does not exist in his kingdom», the prophet said (Belhadj, 20.01.1995 Résponse au porte-parole du Gouvernement).

Thus, when tortured and persecuted, Muslims may leave their homeland and seek the help of others, he concluded (ibid.). Following this fatwa of support, Rabah Kebir, a main figure in the FIS currently exiled in Germany, concluded that the colloque between Christians and Muslims was possible (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 121).

4.2.2 Preliminary findings

From this first point of analysis I find it reasonable to claim that the appeal to the transcendent dynamics of religious principles was not important in Mozambique.

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[40] Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 113.

Religion was not a central issue of the conflict and the parties did not have a sense of dependence on religion. The material, however, reveals that normative rationales from religion did play a certain role in Algeria, both in the government's critique of the negotiations and also in the defense of the credibility of the negotiations. This did not, however, lead to increased common ground between the government and the opposition parties in Algeria.

4.3   The mediator's position and identity

The identity of the mediators and the actors they engaged, along with the unique position and network of Sant' Egidio, were important for the negotiations in both cases.

Mario Giro emphasizes several aspects that he considers essential for their mediation, some of which other mediators cannot easily draw on. Their pluralistic attitude, which gives them a preserving optimism, stems from their interreligious work, he claims. Their interreligious work has given them a sensitive approach to religious identities. Further, he underlines their ability to draw on and engage, not just the Christian networks, but also the Muslim networks, as beneficial in Algeria (Giro 16.12.2009). Already mentioned is the valuable role of Belhadj and Mandani, not just as leaders of the political party FIS, but also as Muslim clerics. For Sant' Egidio, their work with peace is connected to their religious identity:

> I know we are considered an actor in the religious field, because one can never separate our interreligious work and our work for peace. The two areas are very much linked […] the fact that we are well known as organizers of interreligious dialogue helps us in the peace-mediation and vice versa. That is very important to understand. And that gives us legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy is connected to change. The legitimacy of religious actors is connected to integrity, foundation, worship etc. You remain. You will always be there: the same face, the same person (Giro 16.12.2009).

Giro underlines their role as organizers of interreligious dialogue in Algeria as one of the main reasons for the Algerian parties' acceptance of them as mediators:

> This meant a lot. The parties knew us; we had a good record of our presence in the country and most importantly our work with the interreligious dialogue. They told me that after I had invited them by phone, they had called others that knew us better and asked: how are they? And they received good inputs (ibid.).

In 1993 Hugh Roberts concludes that «it cannot be disputed that one aspect of the current crisis in Algeria is an identity crisis» (Roberts 1993: 138). He claims that the sensitive question of identity has complicated the already intractable conflict further, and that a resolution of Algeria's identity crisis may be required as a precondition before solving the crisis of the people's loyalty to the state (ibid: 139). Giro, on his side, compares Sant' Egidio's religious identity as a business card: they leave it around the world in order for people to know them (Giro 16.12.2009). And as stressed in chapter 3, their unambiguous religious identity gives them an advantage in societies where identity is important.

Sant' Egidio's identity is also inseparable to their engagement with the poor and needy in Rome and the rest of the world. This aspect offers us an understanding of the important question of *why* mediate. Emberti Gialloreti highlights two characteristics of their motivation:

> We only want peace. That's our motivation. We want peace, and we believe in peace because it is in the gospel. That's all. We have no further interests. In addition, we do not *have* to mediate. We have seen in Burundi and Darfur that mediators who mediate for a living can sometimes stretch the peace process, because if the conflict is resolved quickly, they are without jobs. Without conflict there is no need for them to exist. This does not apply for us. Peacemaking is not our primary goal. It is only one of the fruits of our work with the poor. Hence we will always have other things to do (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010, it. added).

This position makes Sant' Egidio *independent* in terms of outcome. They mediate for free and consequently do not have to answer to anyone. Giro believes the parties in both Mozambique and Algeria knew this, and due to this, trusted them in a greater degree than diplomats from other states. He underlines that the potential political or economic gain associated with a peace-agreement may cause so-called «professional» mediators to accept poor agreements.

> If you are hired only for the mediation, then you have to perform. You are obliged to succeed. When the parties understand this they may start to play strange games with you in order to exploit this. You can become their hostage. I believe the parties saw that we had other things to do. We told them if you want it, we can speak of peace, but if you don't, we have a lot to do. Nothing changes for us. In this manner, we are prepared to fail. The responsibility must lie with the parties (Giro 16.12.2009).

Their position in a global church gives them an additional global, but at the same time *local* and credible foundation. Emberti Gialloreti explains:

> We understand ourselves, not as a part of a city or a nation, but of the world. In fact the Church is one of the oldest globalized bodies. At the same time we believe that in order to be global you have to be very

deeply rooted in a local place. The local basis of an African Sant' Egidio community, gives also the people from Sant' Egidio in Rome credibility in that society (Emberti Gialloreti 15.12.2009).

Thus I agree with Harpviken and Røislien that Sant' Egidio used their religious identity to «demonstrate moral integrity, long-term commitment and an open-ended attitude to the conflict» that over time built confidence with both parties (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 25).

It is also fair to say that this foundation gave Sant' Egidio a deep empirical *understanding* of the dynamics of both conflicts. Leone Gianturco, the secretary of the Mozambique negotiations, holds this as a fundamental factor for understanding the Mozambican conflict (Gianturco 05.02.2010). As a response to a critical drought, Sant' Egidio started mobilizing aid for Mozambique in 1984. Gianturco asserts that their personal participation made them «perceive the Mozambicans as our brothers» (ibid.). They learned the language, got to know the people and eventually «reorganized our life for this, to get close with these people» (ibid.). From their engagement they soon understood that the country would need more than aid:

> We started to get to know the country, know the culture and develop a passion for it. During this time we saw that the country needed peace more than aid. Sadly, at the time the international society was still a bit backwards regarding the understanding of the situation. They did not see how Mozambique had changed during the eighties. They were still repeating the old story of how RENAMO was a puppet for Rhodesia and South Africa. They didn't understand that the conflict had become endogenous. The strings were cut. Thus, this perception was a constraint for peace, because it prevented them from searching for one of the actual party to the conflict: RENAMO (ibid.).

A key aspect in diagnosing and understanding a conflict situation is to know the parties to the conflict (Bercovitch et. al 2009: 4). Thus, it seems the international community could not grasp the situation, much less solve it, without this fundamental and local knowledge. Understanding that the conflict was domestic, the mediators saw that any solution had to be found in a new relationship between the parties, not in models of deterrence or power politics.

4.3.1 The Archbishop

However, the problem was still how to get to RENAMO, somewhere in the forests of Gorongosa. No one seemed to know RENAMO, and many of the ostensible «contacts»

proved to be fake.[41] After finally finding an Artur Da Fonseca, a valid representative who proved to have contact with Dhlakama, they were able to approach him. There were few better suited than Archbishop Goncalves, the same man who had first come to Rome and told them about the crisis in 1983, and who had been a friend of the community since 1976 (Rocca 2003: 26). The importance and utility of having the Archbishop of Beira as a member of Sant' Egidio would prove to be unquestionable.

Escorted by two strangers on a private plane and dressed in his full archbishop's regalia, Goncalves was taken into the jungle in the middle of the night at the end of May 1988 to meet Dhlakama. He became the second public figure ever to meet with the mythical and mysterious leader of RENAMO. The meeting, however, went well and Dhlakama affirmed that he wanted democracy and peace (Gianturco 05.02.2010, Rocca 2003: 73-74).

Contact was established. Mario Raffaelli underlines the role of Goncalves as one of the most important contributions from Sant' Egidio:

> Particularly the relationship to Goncalves was important. Through him we got the essential contacts with the RENAMO (Raffaelli 08.02.2010).

Giro confirms:

> He was instrumental to get in contact with RENAMO the first time, and to breach their initial suspicion. Both because he was of the same ethnic group as the guerrillas, but also the fact that Goncalves was a bishop: it gave him certain authority. He was no ordinary man (Giro 16.12.2009).

Further, Gianturco explains the role of Goncalves in the mediation-team as a «local guarantee»:

> Goncalves was like a guarantee, the Mozambican in the team. RENAMO was not being cheated as long as he was there. FRELIMO had a more tense relationship with him, they always had. But he represented in a way the Mozambican people. He didn't speak much. It was more a discreet presence. Goncalves did not present the Mozambican church that had failed in Nairobi; he was the people (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

Hence, based on this, it is fair to say that Sant' Egidio's local foundation and local network proved essential to the negotiations. Gianturco also explains that the mediation could not have worked if they did not have contact with the constituency.

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[41] Sant' Egidio checked the validity of the contacts by asking them to arrange for a kidnapped Catholic nun to be set free from the RENAMO headquarters.

FRELIMO had their chains of command that saw to this, but for the people in general, Goncalves' presence was instrumental (ibid.).

4.3.2 The Vatican and the time aspect

Sant' Egidio's international network on top political and religious levels was no less important. Apart from the meeting Sant' Egidio organized between Goncalves and Enrico Berlinguer, they also arranged for the parties to meet with the Pope. According to Giro, the position of the Pope in addition to the history of Rome had a somewhat subtle effect on both the Mozambican and Algerian negotiations:

> Of course there was some effect of our connections with Rome. The Pope, the ancient history of Rome and in particular the Vatican embeds us always with some respect. This is always a factor. Rome is a symbol, more than Geneva. It has an effect, but a silent indirect effect (Giro 16.12.2009).

Gianturco claims the Pope was essential for breaking the mistrust between the Marxist government and the Church – a breakthrough he considered important for Mozambique's future and the process of building confidence and acceptance for Sant' Egidio's effort of negotiating.

> Samora Machel once came to Rome, but he did not want to meet the Pope, because he did not want to ask for a visit, nor kneel to him. So we had to use all our Italian flexibility and arrange an invitation from the Vatican – something that is never done because of protocol – by writing an informal invitation on a letter. Eventually they met, and Machel was very happy for it. The Pope assured him that Machel was not a Marxist, but a nationalist like himself. As a Pole he knew the importance of the nation and independence. Machel was overwhelmed. This visit was important in unlocking and defusing the mistrust and hatred between FRELIMO and the Catholic Church (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

Another characteristic factor of faith-based mediators, which has not received the amount of attention it deserves in the literature, is the *time* aspect. In a war-torn country like Mozambique, 27 months is perhaps what it takes to break the deep-seated suspicion between the belligerents. All interviewees underlined the importance of Sant' Egidio's ability to take time. Mario Raffaelli asserts that this was one of the most important contributions of Sant' Egidio. The community provided a kind of mediation that shielded the parties from the pressure that normally comes with formal negotiations, which was important in order to transform the guerilla soldiers of RENAMO into politicians (Raffaelli 08.02.2010). Emberti Gialloreti explains:

> We have an advantage in that we don't have to show for results. By that I mean that governments, statesmen and NGOs that engage themselves in mediation have to show for results. For us that is not

necessary, and for that reason we are freer. Free to take the time needed and free to patiently work
through the process and build the necessary trust (Emberti Gialloreti 03.02.2010).

According to Gianturco, they could spend a whole day on discussing only one single word in the agreement text (Gianturco 05.02.2010). In addition to this, the fact that outside parties with interests had no place at the table, and that Sant' Egidio lacked manipulative means in their facilitation, contributed to increasing the parties' *ownership* to the agreement. Gianturco highlights this when discussing the time aspect:

> Contrary to a strong mediator who usually enters the negotiations with a preconceived draft and uses
> techniques of manipulation as leverage, we spend a lot of time letting them speak about details and take
> things step by step. You waste a lot of time, but we have a lot of time. The parties had more control, and
> the final agreement was their own sweat and blood, not imposed from anyone (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

Mario Giro claims that the possibility of using time was important. He asserts that the African and American mediation efforts previous to Sant' Egidio were not serious because they were mostly carried out within one week or a month in order to achieve immediate results (Giro 16.12.2009). Their own emphasis on time stems from their work with the poor, he continues. The ability to persevere in the work with the poor equips them with the patience mediation requires (ibid.):

> You must not lose your patience when trying to build up trust to the poor. They are people just as much,
> and people can be suspicious. When you understand what this patience cost, week after week, month after
> month waiting outside the door of some poor old lady in order to gain her trust so you could come in and
> help her, then you understand the patience and resilience needed to mediate. This is not a western
> thought. We westerners want solutions immediately. Threats or interventions are easy to turn to. But there
> is no such thing as an immediate solution in mediation (ibid.).

On another note, is should be mentioned that the ability to be patient and to spend time is not necessarily unique to Sant' Egidio. There are other mediators who have spent months and years as well, many of whom were not faith-based.[42] In some of these instances, like Norway's engagement in Sri Lanka, the patience and time-aspect did *not* help the situation. Claudio Betti from Sant' Egidio has also acknowledged the danger of lengthy processes. He claims that long processes of negotiations may acquire a life of their own, where one risks losing sight of the goal during the process (Betti 2004). On the other hand, he emphasizes that Sant' Egidio's patience is not inaction, but a «continuous and profound dialogue» accompanied by the awareness

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[42] E.g. Norway's role on Sri Lanka and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland.

that any moment lost is disastrous for the people who suffer and a consciousness about the potential harmfulness of a hurried solution (ibid.).

In the resolution of Mozambique's civil war, it seems this long-term commitment and patience was essential.

4.3.3 Preliminary findings

In sum, it can be argued that the position and identity of Sant' Egidio and the religious leaders they engaged were important in gaining the trust of the parties in both Mozambique and Algeria. In addition, the organizational structure and network, both on the local level and on the top political and religious levels internationally, appear to have contributed to the knowledge of the situation and acceptance of Sant Egidio as mediators. In Mozambique, the role of Goncalves was essential, from the initial phases of getting in touch with RENAMO, and all the way through the mediation process.

Even though Sant' Egidio did not have any base in Mozambique at the time of the mediation, their engagement from 1984 had given them a deep understanding of the conflict. Their ability to spend time, years if needed, was another essential part of the Mozambican resolution. Their faith-based approach prevented any manipulative pressure and enabled a greater ownership of the agreement. In Algeria, their interreligious work in the country from the 1970s and their mobilization of religious leaders seemed instrumental for receiving acceptance as mediators and for the mediation process.

4.4 Healing of relationships and collective wounds

Despite little reference to religious principles, the idea of embracing a new perception of the other party was important in the Mozambican talks. Cameron Hume states that the mediators in Mozambique were facilitating communication in a way that reformulated the parties' ideas into a non-threatening or neutral language (Hume 1994: 73). Indeed, Andrea Bartoli, a spokesperson for Sant' Egidio, said the essence of their

work was to find ways to express RENAMO's ideas in terms consistent with the overall goal of reconciliation (Bartoli 1992).

4.4.1 The Mozambican Family

Over the years of war, the mistrust and hatred between the parties had grown to the point that the word «negotiations» was banned in the country (Gianturco 05.02.2010). Giro claims that the distrust was so immense that there was no idea of anything in common; they were miles apart (Giro 16.12.2009). A letter from Matteo Zuppi to the Vatican dating from August 12, 1991 is telling for the situation:

> Above all, there was the mistrust. It is still enormous and mutual, but especially strong on the part of RENAMO, which sees pitfalls everywhere, and is afraid of falling into the trap of integration. […] The mistrust has led to our proposal being met immediately by a quasi-instinctive response of rejection and irritation, more or less as if we had asked them to commit suicide (Zuppi 12.08.1991).[43]

Because of this, Giro underlines that they actively had to try to change the pathological pattern of interaction and *re*define the situation and relationships (Giro 16.12.1009). In this manner they were more formulators than facilitators in important phases of the negotiations. In the opening speech of the Mozambique negotiations Andrea Riccardi was careful to emphasize what *united* the parties more than what divided them in order to create some common ground:

> We are aware that we have before us Mozambican patriots, truly African, without the presence of foreigners. Each of you have deep roots in the country. Your history is called Mozambique. Your future is called Mozambique […] what unites is not a little; in fact it is a lot. There is the great Mozambican family, with its history of ancient suffering during the unhappy colonial period and during recent years. The unity of the Mozambican family has survived this suffering. […] From family we know how the misunderstandings between brothers are sometimes the most painful because they bring into question the dearest things. Conflicts with strangers pass. Still, you always remain brothers […] this is the force that unites, being Mozambican brothers, part of one great family (Riccardi 08.07.1990).

By appealing to the metaphor of family and the struggle between brothers and referring to the colonial past as a common historic enemy, Riccardi attempted to lead the parties to embrace a new reality and heal the wounds of history and demonizing between the two parties. According to Mario Raffaelli this cognitive change was essential in getting past the most difficult issue in the beginning, the issue that all the other mediation attempts had stumbled on: recognition.

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[43] Cited in: Rocca 2003: 155-156.

This was very important. For the RENAMO, FRELIMO was not a legitimate government, and the government saw RENAMO as «bandidos armadas». And we lacked recognition, which is the condition for any kind of formal agreement. But we were able to overcome this by having this African, not formal recognition: as parties of the same «Mozambican family» (Raffaelli 08.02.2010).

The labels the two leaders applied to each other in their speeches at the signing ceremony, over two years later, may count as an expression of this change in attitude. Dhlakama referred to his earlier enemy Chissano as «my dear and esteemed brother, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, president of Mozambique» (Rocca 2003: 213). Chissano on his side, turned to «brother Dhlakama» and repeatedly called for national reconciliation for those gathered around the same Mozambican flag (ibid: 214).

This is not however a quality that needs religion or spirituality as such. According to Giro, «there is no such thing as a *spiritual conversation*» (see point 3.3.3). Although acknowledging their emphasis on the healing of relationships, he does not view it as a faith-based approach (Giro 16.12.2010). He underlines that any secular actor can do this, but stresses that the thinking behind it stems from their religious focus on humanity and attitudes (ibid.). Believing that war is the last resort of a human being, but, however, still a *human* decision, makes Sant' Egidio emphasize the alteration of a decision-maker's views on the world and others (ibid.). Gianturco explains how this idea of the changing of man can be fruitful in mediation, even if the initial incompatible goals remain:

Their lives were slowly changing. The guerilla leaders transformed into politicians, and later diplomats. It's not like a conversion, but the idea of change is what happened during the talks. We provided an enabling environment. Their goals remained the same, but the people changed. At the end they pursued the same goals but with peaceful means (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

Thus, the notion of eliminating *conflict* seemed futile, however, the elimination of its violent expression was both possible and realistic according to Sant' Egidio. The idea of «changed men» is also an example on how faith-based mediators depart from a rationalistic paradigm of negotiations. In traditional diplomacy one would perhaps emphasize the *agreements* as the guarantee that the parties will pursue their goals in a more peaceful manner, not the transformation of people. The default approach of interest-based negotiators would probably have focused on the conflict-situation and altered the premises of the incompatible goals first. My material does not in any way

suggest that Sant' Egidio neglects the conflict-situation, after all they claim to have understood this better than most because of their local engagement, but their focus is primarily on altering the parties and their attitudes.

Another feature that represents Sant' Egidio's somewhat different way of trying to reconcile the parties and change their attitudes was when in October 1991 they arranged for thousands of peace-cards to be sent from the people of Mozambique to the delegations in Rome. On the letters and petitions calling out for peace were long lists of signatures. The many illiterates had signed with their fingerprints. Domingos, the leader of the RENAMO delegation, was deeply moved when he saw that one of the letters was from his father, whom he had lost all contact with after having to go underground to fight FRELIMO. Gianturco said it was stirring to watch a guerilla leader like Domingos «cry like a little baby» (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

4.4.2 Uniting the diverse

On this third point the two cases disengage in a more distinct manner. The mere fact that the Algerian talks only lasted two weeks altogether and that the government did not attend makes the idea of reconciliation and healing of collective wounds more distant. However, the new opposition, which the Rome group represented, did not consist of good friends with close-lying ideological worldviews. Among the different factions sitting at the table were Islamists and Trotskyites, democratic movements and others representing a single-party regime. There was also enormous distance between ex-president Ben Bella and the man he personally condemned to death in 1962, Ait Ahmed. The mediators, however, made it clear that when in Rome, they all enjoyed an equal stature and nobody could consider himself or herself more Algerian than the other (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 116). Still, the FIS was the key party in the negotiations. They had won the elections and enjoyed both religious and political legitimacy, and many of the terrorists had come from their party. Giro sums up:

> Our idea was eventually to stop the development towards terrorism inside FIS, and re-implement FIS in a political framework with all the other parties. After this we would approach the government and offer the platform as a basis for negotiations. We convinced the other parties that it would be worth starting

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negotiations with the government even if they only accepted 30 percent of the platform (Giro 16.12.2009).

With reconciliation and democracy in mind, the mediators managed to convince the FIS to concede on several key areas that had been inconceivable coming into the negotiations.[44] However, it was only after «a lot of discussions», according to Giro, that they managed to convince the FIS that it had to downgrade its ambitions if they were to succeed (ibid.).

Before entering the second round of negotiations the mediators had requested a letter from the two leaders Mandani and Belhadj, in order to involve the highest level of leadership, stating the FIS' terms. In their letter Belhadj and Mandani postulated five rights: the peoples' right to free voting, the dismissal of the current «unjust» government, guarantees for individual freedom within the context of Islamic principles, the right to dismiss alliances established without the consent of the Muslim communities (the umma), and the elimination of the army's role in politics as confirmed in the 1989 constitution (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 123). The tone and rigidity of the letter revealed, according to Giro, the fundamentalist attitude the FIS entered the negotiations with (Giro 16.12.2009). These original points were, however, adjusted and almost «totally modified» during the course of the discussion over the next days (Impagliazzo & Giro 1999: 124). The FIS' attitude towards the other parties was altered as they eventually saw their role as one among many, with no particular preeminence. Concessions followed in the wake of this changed attitude:

> It was the first time in history that a fundamentalist group accepted democracy, and they never denounced it (Giro 16.12.2009).

The fact that the Platform also included a constitutional amendment that made it impossible for any party to abolish democracy after an election disarmed the government's concern that the Islamists' commitment to democracy was only one election deep (Acakem 2004: 166). This «major development» (Roberts 1995: 260),

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[44] As the first Arab Islamist movement the FIS had declared its full conversion to democratic principles, they did not request the punishment of the responsible behind the coup, they pledged to respect human rights, including religious freedom and free media, they committed themselves to constitutionally safeguard the future of free elections and not rule out elections once in power, they condemned violence against civilians, foreigners, public property and called for the cessation torture, death-penalty and extrajudicial killings (The Rome Platform section A and B).

where someone gathered all the most important opposition parties in the complex battle of Algeria and managed to make them concede to the point that they were united as one movement for peace, had never been done before, or after, according to Entelis (Entelis 02.12.2009).

4.4.3 Preliminary findings

The discussion in this third section illustrates the faith-based mediators' emphasis on relationships and the alteration of attitudes. Goals can remain the same, but the mediators believe that a changed perception of each other can lead to a peaceful pursuit of incompatible goals. My material illustrates that the embracement of a new reality was important to get the first piece of recognition in Mozambique. The idea of being brothers in the same «family» did not obstruct fighting; it made the fighting just more passionate. Still, from this perception of fellowship they managed to establish a cognitive shift and create common ground that lasted through the entire negotiation process.

In Algeria the notion of embracing a new reality where the parties saw each other in a different manner was not as explicit. The transformation of the FIS and the unification of the highly diversified opposition can still be viewed as a healing of relationships and shift in perceptions. On the other hand, the fact that the main opponent did not join the negotiations may have made this unification somewhat easier. Finally, the material does not give any indication that religion had anything to do with the unification in both cases. The mediators did not turn to religious normative imperatives when emphasizing and advocating the healing of the collective wounds. However, the mediators' focus on these matters stems from their worldview of highlighting human relations and alteration of attitudes in war. In this manner, it can be argued that religion had an underlying importance, but not a direct impact.

4.5   Informal Track Two approaches

One of the most difficult phases of negotiations is often the start. This is because it

concerns the question of the degree of status the parties stand to gain or lose by sitting at the same table (Hume 1994: 25). In such situations the third party may help in opening the talks.

4.5.1 The semi-formal compromise

In Mozambique, the RENAMO pursued international recognition and hence wanted a powerful intrusive third-party role. The FRELIMO government wanted to control the negotiations and wanted a weak mediator (ibid: 30). However, as the different attempts in Africa failed, Sant' Egidio asked both parties to come to Rome to discuss both the question of mediators and how to move forward. Thus, it was not a formal request of negotiations. Dhlakama, who by the invitation of Sant' Egidio had been in Rome in March 1990 and met with the Italian Foreign Ministry, had told the members of the community that he wanted a dialogue with the government. He asked Goncalves to mobilize the Mozambican bishops as mediators and arrange the talks. Chissano, on his side, opposed the idea of having the bishops as mediators due to the government's poor history with religious authorities (ibid: 30-31).

When the parties eventually met, it seems that Sant' Egidio was a well-suited mediator, as they could serve as a natural cross between state authorities and church authorities. With the presence of Mario Raffaelli, who represented the Italian government in the mediation, the team had enough political relations to ensure an official status in RENAMO's eyes. For FRELIMO, the team was neither the major intrusive third party that they feared, nor official representatives of the Catholic Church. Another aspect is that the parties came to Rome without any commitments. The ambiguous status of the talks and the lack of any clear mandate made the arrangement a freer affair. Gianturco underlines that they never planned to become mediators; it just so happened that they seemed tailored for the task.

> Who were we? We did not know what we were doing. We had never done this. But we eventually understood that not many people were capable of doing this. For example, when the US first entered the negotiations and met with RENAMO, they criticised Dhlakama and the meeting ended with RENAMO declaring war on the US as well, and sent the diplomat away shouting. Because RENAMO's mindset was so closed, it was not easy for the diplomats to deal with these people. At some stage it also became difficult to deal with the government (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

The fact that they never planned or envisaged themselves as mediators may have reinforced their credibility as neutral interlocutors. Gianturco asserts that when Britain and France later joined the negotiations on the question of the Mozambican military, they had clear national interests (ibid.)

> I understand that they had interests in this, because it was politics to them. But we had no interests and this weakness became our strength. But when the Italian Foreign Ministry felt we were too weak, they sent us Raffaelli. He was a great asset to the mediation (ibid.).

Another reason for both parties to choose track two was that the community had built relations to both sides since their engagement started. Through Goncalves they had established contacts with the RENAMO movement. However, trust was also needed on FRELIMO's part. Gianturco claims they were surprised by the apprehension and uncertainty of the government; they were not the experienced statesmen one could have expected (ibid.).

> We understood that we had to become personal friends with the government, and speak the same language. And we did this, in a very frank way. In a time marked by anxious post-colonial relations such as patron-client and donor-recipient, this was very easy for us. Of course we were Italian, but Italy was not a colonial power. And you have Rome, it is a special place: the Pope, the history. So we had more opportunities than many other people had. This was very useful in the initial phase (ibid.).

Because members from Sant' Egidio met with the government and even arranged several meetings with the Pope, they developed trust in the community. A proof of this friendship was seen when a Catholic priest was arrested in 1987 for having criticized the government in public. The community contacted the government and asked for his release. Later that same day, he was released (ibid.).

However, the Mozambican negotiations were not entirely track two. Even though Giro asserts in the interview that the mediation «was nearly completely track two», he also contests the idea of a complete track two explanation (Giro 16.12.2010).

> At a certain point we involved track one. We called to the table America, France, Portugal, South-Africa, yes even Apartheid. It is always better to involve all influential track one actors than having them outside as spoilers. The real solution was track one and a half. Synergy. Because, when you reach a solution, it has to be guaranteed and implemented by the international community. This was the case in Mozambique (ibid.).

In August 1991 the issue of transition until the election and the issue of the election system created an impasse over which the mediators could not reign. Cameron Hume,

who himself observed the negotiations on behalf of the US, asserts that the weak framework of the negotiations seemed exhausted. In order to sustain the talks and not get replaced by official outside parties with interests, the mediators confirmed US support (Hume 1994: 68).[45]

Raffaelli even claims the Mozambican negotiations were not any different from formal negotiation. Even though there was a division of labour, the formal track one actors were present and important throughout the whole process:

> If you look at the agreement, the implementation of the peace, the UN collaboration, the presence of the military experts in the last rounds, it was not a *different* approach. Zimbabwe was, for example, essential in the first important partial cease-fire in the corridors. The nations who joined the commission to monitor that agreement were important. Considering this, the agreement was like any formal agreement. But it was made up by a joint effort of actors from the civil society, like Sant' Egidio and institutions like the Italian government and the international community (Raffaelli 08.02.2010 it. added).

My material clearly indicates a fruitful *synergy* of forces. Sant' Egidio's informal track and role seemed essential in getting the parties to the table: both because they had the parties' confidence, and because of the convenient solutions this middle-way offered to the thorny question of recognition. However, the negotiations took a more formal turn as the process went along. This development is natural considering the importance of guarantees, the implementation of the agreement, and the transitional period until the election.

4.5.2 A solitary journey

The Algerian negotiations, although quite similar in the initial phase, took a somewhat different path. A striking similarity is that the parties were invited to Rome on the same non-committal premises. Giro explains:

> Our proposal was very simple: it was not possible to speak about peace publicly in Algeria. Come to Rome or Paris! We offer you the possibility to have a colloquium open with journalists, media etc. to speak openly, freely and authentically about the crisis in Algeria, and to try to find possibilities for a peaceful settlement. The only condition we put forward is that the talks will only be about peace; don't come to Rome to talk about war (Giro 16.12.2009).

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[45] Already after the failure of the Malawi talks, Chissano met with President Bush in Washington. At the departure ceremony Bush stated: «We urge all parties to talk at the earliest opportunity so as to avoid further suffering» (New York Times March 14, 1990). Thus, the helping hand of the US was present from the start and throughout the negotiations.

However, in Mozambique, Sant' Egidio was asked a few times before they organized their own initiative. In Algeria, no one asked them to mediate. The initiative was entirely track two, with all mediators from Sant' Egidio, and neither explicit nor implicit cooperation with governments. Apart from some verbal support from the US and tacit support from some European nations in relation to the first round of negotiations, Sant' Egidio operated alone (Raffaelli 08.02.2010). Mario Giro gives a simple answer as to why they were alone in this effort, and why they succeeded in gathering all the important parties, except the government:

> Because we *did* it. My impression is that no one really seriously tried to do this gathering, because others only wanted to gather a part of them: for example, not the fundamentalists. Really, no one wanted the whole picture (Giro 16.12.2009 it. added).

This track two approach was not, however, outside the limelight of the media at first, as the Mozambique negotiations had been. The presence of over 200 journalists saw to that. The second encounter in Rome on the other hand, was completely sheltered from media, and was important for the free and non-committal discussion to flow (ibid.).

Having tasted what could possibly come out of the talks, the Algerian parties themselves asked the community to facilitate the next gathering in January 1995. Again, the government refused, even though Sant' Egidio tried to include them every step of the way (ibid.). It quickly became obvious that the colloquium could not take the form of official negotiations, with neither the Algerian government, nor the international community on board. This was not Sant' Egidio's intention either. In fact, they had no clear idea of what the initiative would entail, however they felt obliged to try *something* (ibid.). A few days after the release of the Platform, the international community was still by and large hesitant, and the Algerian government rejected it. With no formal track one actor willing to drive the process, push the Algerian government and guarantee the agreement's future, it seems it was nipped in the bud.

4.5.3 Preliminary findings

In conclusion, it may seem that the informality of faith-based mediation in the

Mozambique negotiations was best seen in the initial phase. Despite the fact that Sant'
Egidio remained the main mediators together with Goncalves and Raffaelli throughout
the entire process, the process involved many official governments and institutions that
would prove crucial for the outcome. The process of implementing the agreement was
also completely official. This does not, however, deprive the community of its merit,
as they played a highly important role in getting the parties to the table and remained
both parties' trusted mediator throughout the process. The Algerian talks were track
two all the way, from start to finish. Hence, Sant' Egidio should have whatever merit
or shame the initiative produced. No governments or international institutions engaged
directly in the Algerian negotiations.

4.6   Summary

The chapter showed that certain hallmarks of faith-based mediation were characteristic
of Sant' Egidio's approach and important in certain phases of both cases of
negotiations. It thus gives support for the first hypothesis from chapter 3.

Their identity and position gave them a credible reputation, a way to reach the parties,
a unique knowledge of the conflicts and the patience necessary to reach agreements. In
both cases Sant' Egidio emphasized the restoration of relationships and healthy
perceptions of each other. This last factor was, however, more explicit in the
Mozambican case. Both cases started out as track two negotiations. While the Algerian
case remained track two, the Mozambican talks developed as a case of synergy and
were completely delegated to the formal track in the implementation phase. The final
hallmark, the appeal to sacred texts and normative rationales of religion, was observed
in the Algerian case, but not in Mozambique. Sant' Egidio does not seem to emphasize
this last hallmark in their mediation. Perhaps this only underlines the secular nature of
the conflicts, when a faith-based mediator like Sant' Egidio does not believe normative
rationales from religion can restrain the conflict.

The next chapter sets out to discuss the findings from this chapter and more closely

explore the role of religion. The discussion will go deeper into the question of which factors can explain the success of Mozambique and the failure of Algeria. The theoretical focus seeks to give some answers to the second hypothesis following the third research question.

5 Analysis of outcomes and the role of religion

5.1 Introduction

Based on the discussion of the presence or absence of faith-based aspects in the two cases of mediation, I now proceed by discussing the second hypothesis: *Religion played a key role in both cases, both for mediators and the parties; it contributed positively in Mozambique, and negatively in Algeria.* I seek to analyze research question three, why did this form of mediation work in Mozambique and fail in Algeria?

A natural point of departure can be to assess the difference in religious background and traditions in the two countries. The obvious fact that Sant' Egidio is a Catholic faith-based actor and hence professes a different faith than the parties in Algeria may entail complications and even decomposition of common ground between the parties and the mediator. Harpviken and Røislien also note that faith-based mediators who base their credibility in a normative and spiritual system that is not integrated in the parties' worldviews may reduce their credibility and ability to gain confidence (Harpviken & Røislien 2008: 370). After all, the name – faith-*based* mediators – begs the question: what faith? Thus, the line of reasoning behind the second hypothesis compels me to scrutinize these aspects.

In order to adequately assess the role and impact of religion for the outcomes, I also need to point to other relevant factors, factors that may underlie and differ from the faith-based elements discussed in chapter 4, and that ultimately may strengthen or weaken the hypothesis.

The chapter is divided into two parts that analyze each of the two cases. The first part discusses and assesses the importance of the Catholic background of Mozambique. I also critically consider the role religion played for the outcome of the negotiations. The second part asks the same questions for the Algerian negotiations. I wrap up each part with an individual summary of the findings.

5.2 Mozambique – track 1 ½

From the discussion in the previous chapter it seems fair to conclude that certain hallmarks of faith-based mediation were both present and influential in Mozambique. Most notably, Sant' Egidio's own identity, their link to the Vatican, and the identity of Bishop Goncalves, were essential in building confidence with both sides. The emphasis on restoring the relationship between the parties and creating common ground by overcoming hostile stereotypes seem to have played an important part in getting to some basis for recognition. The convenient middle-path that Giro labels as a «non-institutional, but still institutional path» (Giro 16.12.2009) that started as track two was important in getting the parties to the table.

Some of these factors can be linked to the long Catholic traditions of the country. Most apparent is the role of Goncalves. He was instrumental in getting in touch with RENAMO. In addition, his standing among the people ensured a «local» guarantee that, according to Gianturco, was essential in keeping the negotiations in tune with the constituency (Gianturco 05.02.2010). Indeed, John Paul Lederach has described the unique contribution and important link mid-level leaders, such as religious leaders, represent. Lederach claims that these «nested» leaders are especially important in the *implementing* phase of a peace-agreement (Lederach 1997: 38-43, Lederach 2001: 843-845, Appleby 2000: 18, 19, 241).[46] The Catholic «infrastructure» of churches and schools was also convenient when the community gathered all the letters and petitions for peace in October 1991.

Building on the discussion of the last chapter, it seems many of the important factors for solving the conflict were located well within the borders of Mozambique; however, these were not necessarily linked to the *religious* history of Mozambique. Rather, these factors were in a stronger degree connected to Sant' Egidio's religious background.

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[46] Gianturco also noted that this level was important in the local reconciliation ceremonies they had throughout the country in wake of the agreement (Gianturco 05.03.2009).

5.2.1 The religious factors of Sant' Egidio's approach

Gianturco emphasized Sant' Egidio's ability to understand the conflict as driven by domestic factors. This local understanding was important in an international environment pervaded by the notion of east-west rivalry and proxy wars. However, this local foundation did not lead them to devalue the importance of the regional factors, though they had to be portioned out:

> We had to avoid the wrong perceptions of solutions and reality, and the wrong avenues. For example, the regional mediators. The regional factors are important, but had to be handled in a proper way. The discussions with Zimbabwe were very useful, for example the agreements on the corridors. The discussions with Kenya regarding the passports were also important, also the observers from other African countries. They were good as inputs, in and out. But the parties did not want them as mediators. They wanted it in Rome. Because they felt more free and less pressured. So it was important that the regional factors did not become a part of the problem, but a part of the solution (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

Gianturco also illuminated the community's ability to build confidence on both sides. In a time marked by the trend of international actors choosing one or the other side of the Cold War rivalry, Sant' Egidio's religious imperative to never distinguish among people was fruitful in earning the trust of the parties (ibid.).

As mentioned, the weakness of the faith-based mediators eventually led to an extensive ownership of the agreement. This ownership proved highly valuable during the six months it took from the signing of the papers until the UN forces were stationed in the country. Under the headline «Still Waiting: Mozambique. UN peacekeeping force delayed», The Economist wrote in February 1993 that:

> Mozambique seems surprisingly normal. Cars and buses swarm along roads where travel was unsafe during 16 years of civil war. More than 100,000 refugees have come home from the neighbouring countries where they had sought safety. Families are getting together again. After two dry years, good rains have fallen, raising hopes of a decent harvest. But peace is far from assured. The rival forces of the government and the rebel Renamo movement muster 80,000-armed men between them (The Economist 06.02.1993).

Gianturco underlines the gravity:

> War could have blown up at any moment. But, it was a sustainable peace – it was their own (Gianturco 05.02.2010.).

Religion also seems to have played a part by convincing the parties of Sant' Egidio's neutrality. The gratuitous aspect of their mediation clearly stems from their religious

background and seemed important for the parties' trust:

> From a rational point of view we lost a lot! But it's a general factor of Sant' Egidio, there are no benefits. We have this from our Christian background: you receive for free, and you give for free. I think this was important that they knew we did not receive any salary. It's a part of the trust-building aspect. They saw this, and valued it. They understood that it was a commitment that went beyond the traditional diplomacy (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

Even though a *religious* factor, the gratuitous element of Sant' Egidio is still a characteristic related to the mediators, and not necessarily linked to Mozambique's catholic tradition.

On another note, it is safe to assume that the efforts of the Mozambican Catholic Church to start dialogue previously to Sant' Egidio's initiative could have functioned to break ground in the hostile environment between the parties. But Mario Giro repudiates this notion and claims these efforts only consolidated the impression of an «unsolvable» conflict:

> There was no platform we could build on. I remember in the beginning we had a tour to all the most important capitols to ask for help in the mediation. We did not think at that time that we could serve as mediators. But nobody wanted to engage. After all the attempts, the situation was considered hopeless (Giro 16.12.2009).

In addition, and contrary to my second hypothesis, the fact that Sant' Egidio was a *lay* organization, and not an official Catholic organization, was important. Considering the poor history between FRELIMO and the Catholic Church, the position of the community *outside* the Church, although still related to it, seemed ideal for FRELIMO who did not trust the Church, but eventually wanted to put the feud with it behind them.

5.2.2 *Non-religious factors*

There are also other important factors that had little to do with neither Sant' Egidio nor religion. Some of these factors that had an obvious positive effect on the outcome, and should be mentioned in order to correctly assess the impact and importance of religion are as follows.

First, although aware of the efforts of Sant' Egidio and the importance of certain

religious aspects, Mario Raffaelli asserts that the single most important factor for the success of the Mozambican peace agreement was the *external regional context*. As an experienced diplomat in an African context he brings up the political and regional aspects that so often seem intertwined.

> In my opinion the most important factor was the change in the regional political landscape and the international political landscape. This is something I've seen in several peace processes that I have been involved in. At the end of the eighties a lot of political elements were changing for the better: new dialogue between the US and USSR and the stop of the African proxy wars, the new situation in South Africa. […] All the elements that before had locked these conflicts and helped the Mozambican war along were changing. This is important because the first condition of successful dialogue is to have the concerned parties accept that a settlement is possible. Without this there are no mediators or miracle that can solve it (Raffaelli 08.02.2010).

Mario Giro also confirmes this regional aspect. He acknowledged the importance of including the neighboring states as partners, rather than risk having them as spoilers outside the peace process (Giro 16.12.2009).[47] In addition, President de Clerk of South Africa explicitly asked and encouraged Italy to do something for peace in Mozambique (Raffaelli 08.02.2010). Italy was the first country to recognize the new government in Mozambique and had a long-standing relationship and a history of cooperation with the young nation.

In addition the enabling *global community* was important. None of the documents or interviewees mentioned any nations that were opposed to the peace in Mozambique. From Zimbabwe to South Africa, from The Soviet Union and Europe to the US, they all supported it. Mario Raffaelli elaborates:

> I know that this is often labeled the Sant' Egidio process etc. but it is not necessarily so. It was a unique condition that gave us the possibility of moving several different institutions in the same direction: Sant' Egidio with the support of the Vatican, the Italian government with the support of the Italian civil society at large, in addition to the whole international society that was completely behind our efforts (Raffaelli 08.02.2010).

Raffaelli reveals that the mediators met with the US every two or three months to discuss the different possibilities and to receive support (ibid.). Raffaelli also met regularly with the ambassadors of the European Union in order to get the green light and later also extensive support (ibid.). The support of these international giants was

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[47] He especially brings forth the role of President Mugabe as contributing and important for the African legitimacy of the agreement (Giro 16.12.2009).

important in getting the old colonial power Portugal and South Africa behind the effort, Raffaelli explains (ibid.).

However, having mentioned this, Raffaelli goes on to describe Sant' Egidio's and Goncalve's unerring capability of building good relationships with both sides as an indispensible asset. The possibility of exploiting *all* these elements combined was the important key to the positive outcome of the negotiations, he concludes (ibid.). Thus, it seems clear that even though the conflict had become domestic, its resolution still needed external international assistance.

Second, the solution was *political*. Economic or ethnic determinants were not influential or interfering issues in the conflict. It was all about how to run the country; no one could, for example, buy the peace (Gianturco 05.02.2010). Even though not linked to religion, Gianturco links this point to the essential local understanding of the conflict, in which Sant' Egidio played an important role.

A third point is that the Mozambican conflict was only made up of *two parties*. This makes the issue of negotiations easier for any mediator. As Gianturco says: «we were lucky there were only two parties» (ibid.).

Fourth, the issue of *the past* was not influential. The mediators never indulged themselves with the past; they tried to avoid it:

> Justice and peace do not always go together. Today you have the trade-off between justice and peace. Peace to me is a greater justice, the ultimate justice. In South Africa they needed the truth and reconciliation commission. That would have been absurd in Mozambique. We did not concentrate on the past, but on the future. Horrible things had been done, but that was a part of the war. People just stopped fighting from one day to the next. We had local healing processes in the churches, but not in association with the agreement. We followed the Pope's suggestion: We sought what united the people instead of what divided them. When in Rome in July 1990, it could have been very easy and tempting to say: who killed this and that in 1979? And why did you do the massacre in 1983? We had to avoid the past. This was the choice of the parties and we followed it (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

A fifth point was *the military stalemate*. Neither of the parties was capable of restoring peace through a military victory that eliminated the other (Rocca 2003: 15). However, the experience of a military stalemate in Mozambique was a far cry from getting to peace. Giro acknowledges the convenience of a stalemate but denies that the parties wanted peace:

> No, in Mozambique, this was not true. They were exhausted with war, but that did not mean they wanted peace. The two actors could very well have waited for the situation to change and then gone beyond that stalemate (Giro 16.12.2009).

Thus, even though the stalemate was a fact, the parties were inclined to tolerate further escalation; the hostile stereotypes were intact, and they did not perceive an easy way out.

5.2.3 «A theory of the impossible»

Considering these factors it is fair to say that important elements to the conflict-resolution went beyond the issue of religion. This weakens the second hypothesis. Gianturco even claims that the issue of religion sometimes had to be avoided. Sant' Egidio was extremely sensitive and pragmatic in its approach to the potential explosive power of religion. Knowing this first-hand, Sant' Egidio's mediators sometimes had to dissociate themselves from Catholic missionaries in Mozambique.

> Religion can be ill-suited sometimes. Even though we are Christians we don't shout out that Jesus loves you on the bus. But we understood the missionaries' plight, even if we didn't agree at times. This was a division of labor: they did the advocacy-part; we did the negotiations (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

Thus, Sant' Egidio is far from ideological in its approach, rather, they appear to keep a pragmatic attitude that seems important when mediating.

Then how was religion important in Mozambique? First of all, the role of the archbishop of Beira, Goncalves, and his status throughout the country seemed essential. Religion also formed Sant' Egidio's fruitful method of mediating. Also important was Sant' Egidio's ability to draw on the Vatican, who, willing or unwilling, had a unique position in Mozambique after hundreds of years with Catholicism as the official religion. The Catholic «infrastructure» provided a somewhat local resource available to be activated. Sant' Egidio's religious background was not something foreign. All these elements were fruitful, even conditional at times. However, other factors seemed more influential. Hence, it would be an exaggeration to assert that the Catholic background of Mozambique and religion *per se* played a key role for the parties. Even though RENAMO ostensibly supported the Catholic Church in its feud with the Marxist FRELIMO government, they also kidnapped Catholic nuns. Thus,

their inconsistent approach to religion has to be understood in relation to their all-encompassing struggle with the government. It's likely that RENAMO's pro-religious approach was just another sting against the government. After all, Gianturco claims that if RENAMO had any political program at all, it was to do the exact opposite and destroy whatever policy the government followed (Gianturco 05.02.2010). Isolated and in need of international relations, it thus seem fair to say that RENAMO instrumentally used FRELIMO's aversion against religion to gain sympathy and support from the global Catholic Church.

However, religion was essential for the *mediators*. It is their sole motivation for working with the poor. And it was this concern for the state of the Mozambican population that led them into the work with peace. Following their impetus that «war is the mother of all poverty» Sant' Egidio found it reasonable to do whatever they could to stop the war. Their faith in peace as the ultimate goal for humanity gives their mediation another dimension. Gianturco claims their religious background gives them another «gear». Their strong conviction made them willing to sacrifice everything in the pursuit of peace. However, it does not entail naivety.

> It gives you the strength in situations where other people who do not have this point of view give up. Like a theory of the impossible. But it is not a naïve idea, out of the context, because we walk with the Bible in one hand and the newspaper in the other. This is the way we operate and live. I think it is like a conviction: a belief in that we can overcome the impossible. And peace in Mozambique was impossible. We spoke about dialogue, but it was a banned word. Because this faith makes you believe in humanity, you know that people can change. Another factor is the fact that a community backs us. In our church we had people praying. For two years, all over the world, communities of Sant' Egidio prayed for peace in Mozambique. This was in a way backing the whole effort, so that the people mediating did not feel alone in any way. Through prayer, everyone stopped and reflected over the people suffering in Mozambique. It builds a common strong optimism. Even martyrdom is a part of this. We have friends and members of Sant' Egidio that have died for the cause of peace. Martyrdom is just that you find something that is worth more than your own life. Developing this attitude can help you one day. To risk your life may save people (Gianturco 05.02.2010).

5.3   Preliminary conclusion

In sum, it is fair to argue that religion was *not* a central theme for the parties or influential for the outcome. Apart from the position of Goncalves, the Catholic tradition of Mozambique seems less important than other factors such as a simple

party-structure, an enabling international environment, the issue of the past, and the lack of ethnic or economic influence. But however marginal, the role religion *did* play was contributive. Religion seems important to the degree that it was linked to Sant' Egidio. The specific religious identity and the position of Sant' Egidio gave them credibility as mediators. Their modus operandi gave them the necessary knowledge of the situation and the patience needed to build confidence and alter the attitudes of the delegates. Their network, both locally and internationally, contributed. In addition, religion is Sant' Egidio's reason for mediation. In this manner, certain factors connected to religion and religious organizations played an indirect, but positive, role for the parties, but not religion *per se*. Considering these factors, it can be argued that the marginal role of religion contributed to the positive outcome.

5.4   Algeria: «try, and always try»

In a post 9/11-context, with the ominous prophecies of Samuel Huntington having continuous influence on the global discourse, one can easily fix one's focus on the ostensibly vast gulf between a European Catholic community and the war-torn Muslim society of Algeria. As touched upon in the introduction to this chapter, the potential inconsistency between the mediator's religious affiliation or identity, and that of the parties, may cause complications and even decomposition of common ground. Not surprisingly, critique along such lines was often heard in the period from November 1994 and up until the weeks after the signing of the Rome Platform (see section 4.2.1). This critique is important in order to assess and answer the second hypothesis.

5.4.1   *«Christianity has intervened»*

It would have been possible to rebuke the criticism as propaganda if its only source had been the government and the government-controlled newspaper in Algiers. They were opposed to the Platform and eventually rejected it. However, this was not its only source.

Franco de Courten, Italy's ambassador in Algiers, was also accusing the community for not understanding the fact that Algerians find it hard to accept the interference of a

Catholic organization in the internal affairs of a deeply Islamic country (de Courten 2003).[48] Even the archbishop Henri Tessier of Algiers, who initially supported Sant' Egidio, turned and started criticizing the whole idea of negotiations (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 91-92, *Famiglia Cristiana* 1995, nr. 2 pp. 24). Said Sadi, the leader of the Rally for Culture and Democracy party (RCD), one of two parties who declined the first colloquium and remained outside the process:

> The discussion in Rome is nothing more than a provocation, because it is impossible to be a fundamentalist and democratic at the same time. The worst part is that Christianity has intervened in order to help an ailing Islamism (Liberté 17.01.1995, pp. 3).[49]

Hence, important voices attacked the effort, claiming that the intervention of a Catholic community in an already tense and religiously colored nationalistic conflict in North-Africa would just add another fault-line and make the situation even more tense.

Giro also acknowledged the role of religion and underscored that Islam in Algeria was a strong social phenomenon that became the outlet for the frustration many people felt with the corrupt leadership and the misrule of the state (Giro 16.12.2009). Indeed, the meaning parties attribute to their experience and the choice of response when receiving conflict stimulus is a complicated output of each party's values, needs, historical experience, context and mode of attribution (Bercovitvh et. al 2009: 6). Thus, even though the conflict was initially secular, the very context of its display made the Islamic interpretation of it possible and added another level to it. In a broader sense, this could strengthen the argument of an ostensible Muslim reaction to the Catholic intervention as a reason for Sant' Egidio's failure and thus supported the second hypothesis. The fact that the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) during the night between March 26 and 27, 1995, kidnapped and later killed seven Trappist monks in Tibhirine close to Medea, invigorated the potential danger of religious fault-lines and could have given the argument even more weight.

From my material, however, it may seem that this argument only holds at face value.

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[48] Cited in: Sandro Magister (ed.) «St. Egidio and Algeria. An Ambassador´s Disturbing Revelations», in: chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it
[49] Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 189-190.

There are at least two reasons for this. First, as already touched upon in the last chapter, there is the *composition* of the Rome group. John Entelis, who dismisses the argument as propaganda, claims it was an after-the-fact criticism that lacked credibility:

> The critique of Saint Egidio being a foreign Catholic intervener is sort of after-the-fact analysis. The fact of the matter was that they were a lay organization that happened to have a faith-based character to it - Catholic. But they had been involved in previous negotiations, so it had an established record of acting as a neutral observer and negotiator. And all the parties to the Algerian conflict obviously found the organization credible, or they wouldn't have participated. And when you had everyone from the multitude of different tribes, the Berbers and the Islamist, and everyone in between attending, obviously they had no problem with it. I remember the government itself was attacking the Vatican for interfering in Algerian domestic politics and slandered the Church, and all kinds of nonsense, trying to bankrupt the approach (Entelis 02.12.2009).

Entelis supports Robert's argument that the mobilization around an Islamic identity should be considered voluntary and unhistorical, and that the core of the conflict was political. Entelis, for one, was surprised how little had changed in the Algerian municipalities after the FIS seized control in 1991; tourists were still allowed to wear bikinis and people still drank beer (ibid.).

> I was never convinced that this had to do with Islamic arguments. Everyone who knows Algeria knows the futility of imposing a theocratic state. Algeria is enormously diverse! After talking with these leaders I understood that they talked the talk, but it was really about governance, politics and power (ibid.).

The fact that the FIS conceded on several fundamentalist values, by accepting religious freedom and a moderate version of political Islam,[50] and the seemingly hitch-free cooperation between the different parties in opposition, may be an expression of religion's role as a *means* in a political game. When push came to shove, they managed to put away their religious differences in only two weeks in the pursuit of something greater, namely, the real conflict: how to legitimately run the country.[51]

The Vatican itself also denied the alleged connection the government-controlled newspapers in Algiers made between the Church and Sant' Egidio's initiative. To the

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[50] See footnote 43 in chapter 4.

[51] In his first speech as President in 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika spoke about the Rome Platform in a more favourable manner than any government representative before him: «The Rome agreement is not the Koran – there are passages that could be added or removed. But it's a bit like if I was feeling ill, and there was a pharmacy run by a Jew further ahead, I would keep walking until I got to the pharmacy with the medicine I need – regardless of who the pharmacist is» (cited in: Impagliazzo 2010: 15). The pragmatic nature of the quote indicates a clear shift in the government's approach to the Platform only four years after its rejection and may question the government's seemingly rigid commitment and attitude towards inconsistent religious identities.

Italian newspaper *Ansa*, the Vatican spokesman Navarro Valls affirmed that «Sant'
Egidio's initiative is autonomous and in no way linked to the Holy See» (Impagliazzo
& Giro 1997: 91).

Giro claims, contrary to the critique, that the clear religious identity of both Islamists
and mediators was important for the successful cooperation during the negotiations. As
noted, awareness and display of identity is a part of faith-based mediators' modus
operandi and is an important means in building confidence. The fact that the parties
came to Rome is «a strong argument against the clash of civilizations», Giro claims
(Giro 16.12.2009).

> It was very clear that they were Muslims, even fundamentalists, and we were undeniably Christians. It's
> as if the Irish people would have gone to Egypt for mediation, only the other way around. But, precisely
> the fact that we did not hide our religious roots behind something else was very important. In a time of
> globalization, our unambiguous Christian name left no doubt of whom we were to these people. […] A
> true paradox for us is that it is less of a problem for us to display our identity in the Muslim world, than in
> the European Union (ibid.).

Second, except for Iran and Libya, who condemned the efforts as a «Western
conspiracy» (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 188), few voices from the Islamic world
opposed the initiative. Sant' Egidio received support from several corners of the
Muslim world. In Morocco, the major opposition parties made a joint statement in
support of the Platform (ibid: 187). Fahmi Howeidi, the co-editor of one the most
important Egyptian newspapers, *Al Ahram*, made a problem out of Algeria's denial of
democratic opposition in his comment on the Rome Platform:

> Why has the third world in the last few years been governed by certain kinds of regimes which have never
> before existed, neither dictatorial nor democratic, which flaunt the symbols of democracy but continue to
> extend their hidden and tyrannical dictatorial activity (Howeidi 16.01.1995).[52]

Giro emphasizes that the true problems did not come from the Islamic world (Giro
16.12.2009). Their effort seemed to give them an esteemed status in Muslim countries:

> What we did in Algeria was very important for our record in the Muslim world as a whole. Everybody
> knows about it, from Marrakech to Bangladesh as they say, even in Indonesia. In the Muslim world, they
> knew about our attempt in Algeria and all the criticism afterwards. They know everything, because there
> is a unique method of passing of information in the Muslim world. And we are very much respected for
> this in the Muslim world, also at the extreme parts of the Muslim world e.g. fundamentalist groups. That
> is something that proves for us that we were on the right path (ibid.).

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[52] Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 177.

In addition, various Islamic fundamentalist movements condemned the GIA after the killing of the Trappist monks. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and even the pro-Iranian Hezbollah in Lebanon all condemned it as a barbaric act that broke with Islamic values (Imapliazzo & Giro 1997: 206-207).

5.4.2 Substantial weaknesses

Hence, one may argue that the inconsistency between the religious identity of the mediators and the country subject to intervention, was not the cause of Sant' Egidio's failure. On the contrary, it seems as though the religious identity of Sant' Egidio contributed in the establishing of the negotiations and in building trust. My material thus weakens the second hypothesis, but these findings do not, however, explain *why* the negotiations failed. What keys did the Mozambican case have that Algeria lacked, if the religious background and traditions of the party did not influence the negotiations and the mediators applied the same approach?

The answer to this question is composed of several interconnected parts, many of which further defy the argument of religion as a cause of the failure. The findings also reveal an essential weakness of faith-based mediators.

Walton and McKersie define negotiations as: «the deliberate interaction of two or more complex social units that are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their interdependence» (Walton & McKersie 1965: 3). Hence, a first and important flaw, also noted by Appleby (Appleby 2000: 291), was that the negotiations lacked the most important party: the government. Still, Entelis describes the time of the initiative as a time of hope and optimism:

> It was a remarkable situation actually. Everyone except the government was there: Looking back, all the great and most important parties were represented, it was absolutely hope. Virtually every political orientation of the country was gathered. The initial assumption was that the government would have representatives there. They probably thought that it would produce enough pressure on the government. It wasn't clear what the government or the army would do. Only afterwards it became clear that the army wouldn't give up everything. The government, and the army in particular, was the key party, and as long as it was unwilling to participate, it was doomed to fail. However, all the other parties across the table not only participating, but supported it. But as long as the military was unwilling to move in or compromise it was doomed from the start (Entelis 02.12.2009).

Giro explains that Sant' Egidio tried to involve the government at every stage.

> We called them. But they did not accept. But we were thinking that they could join at a certain point, because we sent them the protocols and the platform by fax. And before we presented it to the public we asked them for comments on it, but they didn't answer (Giro 16.12.2009).

Thus, from the abovementioned definition of negotiations, and the assumption that the opposition party and the government represented the two belligerents, one can say that the peace process in Algeria lacked one of the most fundamental attributions of negotiations.

Second, the party structure was far more complicated than in Mozambique. The opposition in Algeria consisted of several parties with several ideological preferences. In addition, you had the potentially explosive issue of the different parties' identities. Irrespective of the unhistorical nature of some of these identity categories, the differences between arabo-Islamism, berberism and Islamism, which Roberts reckoned as the most significant categories (Roberts 1993: 141-145), gave the already complex conflict another ethnic, linguistic and religious dimension. The fact that the opposition broke up into several competing extremist movements during the beginning and middle of the 1990s did not help. A few months after the signing of the Platform and the lack of an adequate response from the regime, the already complex and nebulous landscape of the violent remnants of the Islamist movement got even worse. A violent competition between the GIA and the Islamic Salvation Front (AIS), and a frequent change of leadership in the movements, reduced Belhadj and Mandani's influence, until there seemed to be no organic link between the FIS and the armed groups (Impagliazzi & Giro 1997: 127-133). As Akacem puts it:

> Even if the government were to embrace mediation and negotiation, bringing all of the groups into the process would be a difficult endeavour. As long as the GIA and others can sustain the armed struggle, they will continue to do so (Akacem 2004: 164).

Third, and most importantly, there was no coherent international community to back the mediation. As noted in chapter three, faith-based mediators are subject to the political and structural-environmental conditions of the society and conflict (Appleby 2000: 227-230). While the Mozambican conflict did not upset or bother any major international actor, and hence received adequate political support from a unified

international society, the Algerian conflict stirred up a lot of international trouble. As
Giro states it:

> In Mozambique there were no international ideas, pressure or interests at stake, in Algeria there was an
> international pressure against us (Giro 16.12.2009).

However, the international pressure was not completely partial in its criticism. Many
observers and journalists praised the initiative. Even the US praised it. An official
comment by the US State Department's spokesman the same day the Platform was
released read:

> The results of the St. Egidio reunion seem to be a serious attempt to help re-establish the process that can
> lead to a non-violent solution of the Algerian crisis. We hope that concrete steps will be taken by all sides
> to reduce the level of conflict (US State Department 13.01.1995).[53]

Le Monde wrote:

> Algeria seemed condemned to a state of impotence. Yet a handful of opposition parties of varying
> tendencies has given new life to the possibility of a peaceful settlement by proposing to the regime, in
> Rome on Friday, January 13, the idea of a national accord to save the country from the present situation
> of chaos […] The international community, and France in particular, cannot ignore this SOS (Le Monde
> 15.01.1995, pp.15).[54]

In the same vein *The Economist* said:

> The Algerians huff and puff about interference in their domestic affairs. It might be wise to listen.
> Algerian political leaders, including members of the FIS, spent this last week in Rome, thanks to the good
> offices of a Catholic group for peace called St. Egidio, and have come up with a peace prospect for their
> martyred country (The Economist 14.01.1995, pp. 42).[55]

However, there were strong forces working against the initiative. These forces are
fruitful to discuss in order to assess religion's potential role in the critique. According
to Giro the critique was both difficult and interesting, because it came from
unexpected authorities.

> We suffered a lot of attacks. In all the record of our mediation, and we have mediated over the entire
> world for many years now: Columbia, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, a lot of African countries, however; the only
> case in which we received a lot of attacks was Algeria. We were attacked by a huge part of the civil
> society – they accused us of negotiating with terrorists. That was the first line of attack. This was done
> through newspapers and media. Especially intellectuals in France and Italy used this argument. The
> second line of attack was the ones thrown at us by actors like de Courten, officials who tried to undermine
> our mode of mediation and get the political environment against us. Remember this was only during one
> month, it was straining. Every hour it was a new voice attacking us. Eventually, they tried to attack us
> through the Vatican. Some ambassadors from different countries went to the Vatican, the Algerian
> ambassador as well. He was received by the Vatican by officials from the Vatican, and he asked them to

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[53] From the Sant' Egidio Archive cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 187.
[54] Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 173.
[55] Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 174-175.

Even the UN general secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who two years earlier had praised their effort in Mozambique (Boutros-Ghali 19.09.1993), tried to dissuade them from continuing the Algerian peace process. He expressed his opinion clearly to Matteo Zuppi and Andrea Riccardi (Giro 16.12.2009, Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 123).

However, it was the European nations' and especially France's lack of support that was most detrimental to the negotiations. After the first encounter in December, England and Germany expressed only moderate interest in the initiative. They stated that with regards to Algeria they wished to act in unison with the rest of their European partners (ibid: 121-122). The most important actor in the Algerian crisis was in fact the European Union. With its substantial amount of economic aid, it exerted unique leverage on the Algerian government (ibid: 197). Clement Henry states that one of the last realms in which the Algerian government enjoyed a certain level of legitimacy was the economic one (Henry 1997: 183). However, with the collapse of oil and gas revenues in the mid 1980s the regime could no longer meet their population's expectations in the financial area either. Heavily indebted, the government cut down on imports instead of rescheduling its debt in exchange for agreeing to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) measures for stabilization and adjustment (ibid: 183). In a desperate financial crisis, Algeria finally decided to strike a deal with the IMF in April 1994. This was a move previous governments had systematically rejected for the sake of preserving Algeria's sovereignty (ibid: 186). Thus historically the Algerian government has rarely been as vulnerable to economic leverage as in these years. However, there was never enough consent in Europe to show such economic leverage.

After the signing of the Platform, other European nations awaited France's reaction, as they were seen as best positioned to promote a genuine transition in the country given

their historical relationship and their economic leverage (Akacem 2004: 157, Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 183). According to The New York Times, France played a crucial role in «propping up the Algerian government with its financial, intelligence and military aid» (New York Times 04.02.1995). According to Bruno Etienne, a French expert in Islamic Studies, the French government sold combat helicopters to Algiers less than a month before the Rome Platform was signed (Le Figaro 06.02.1995).[56] The Algerian crisis was a deeply sensitive issue to the old colonial power, and the French would go a long way to avoid allegations of intrusion in her old protégé's business.

Already on January 9, Ahmed Attaf, a government spokesman, claimed that they had proof that the Sant' Egidio initiative was in fact a cover up, behind which foreign forces hid (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 166). However, for some reason, the regime delayed their response to the Platform several days after the signing. In the meantime France's minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé, explicitly expressed that France supported any dialogue that could lead to a resolution of the crisis (ibid: 186). In a meeting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Juppé and Christopher agreed that they should «keep the pressure on to put an end to the violence» (ibid: 185-186). President Francois Mitterrand supported his foreign minister. Mitterrand actually suggested, in agreement with the German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, that the EU should organize an international conference to stimulate dialogue among the Algerians, building on the work done in Rome. This was a historic shift in France's policy towards Algeria. Until then, Paris had tacitly supported the government in its cancelation of the 1991-92 elections (Akacem 2004: 158, Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 196).

After five days, on January 18, the regime responded. Attaf described Rome as a «non-event» that attempted to interfere in the country's domestic affairs (ibid: 190-191). The regime followed up with several verbal attacks on France. President Mitterrand was accused of having hated Algeria ever since he was Minister of the Interior during the

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[56] Cited in: Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 197

Algerian war and also of seeking vengeance on the ex-colony (ibid: 197). The Algerian foreign minister, Gen. Abdelkader Taffar, warned the French ambassador that «the Algerian Government will accept no interference in its internal affairs» (New York Times 05.02.1995). The French support of Sant' Egidio's efforts would soon prove to be less wholehearted than first presumed.

5.4.3 Clashing interests

There seemed to be several reasons for the lack of political will to push the government in Algiers.

Firstly, the right-wing Minister of Interior, Charles Pasqua, was explicit in his support of the éradicateurs in Algiers. He viewed the return of the Islamists into power as a destabilizing factor that could throw the country into a state of panic. He also feared the contagious effects and how Islamists might spread to France (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 122-123). One of the fears of Pasqua and his fellow partisans on the right-wing side was that the Islamists would annihilate democracy when finally in power. However, as noted in chapter 4, both Hughs and Akacem dismiss this fear since the Rome Platform had established a constitutional amendment that made it impossible to abolish democracy (Akacem 2004: 166). Giro explains:

> Our aim was to re-include the FIS into the democratic game. This was very important, because the FIS were suspected not to want to play the real democratic game. Everyone thought they would win the election and then destroy the democracy; at least this was the idea. Then we intervened with them and tried to explain for them that the only possibility you have is to enter sincerely the game of democracy. Accept the fact that you must reach compromises. And that is what they did (Giro 16.12.2009).

Secondly, Giro also points to the economic interests that were at stake in the Algerian conflict. Algeria was and still is an important exporter of gas and petroleum to Europe. In fact gas, petroleum and hydrocarbons counted for more than 90 percent of all the country's exports (Ipagliazzo & Giro 1997: 225). As mentioned in chapter 3, the economy was centralized and income management was concentrated in the President's hands and his trusted circles. Further, both the President and his power structure were essentially composed of military officers. Thus, the army, the guarantor of the nation's stability, was completely involved in the management of the national economy (ibid: 220, Impagliazzo 2010: 1-2). Akacem, in commenting on Algeria's self-sufficient

identity that was severely injured by the falling oil-prices in the 1980s, states that:

> At each turning point in the country's history, the army has been involved as the primary political actor. Today – over 40 years after independence – the military is a political actor, indeed a political institution, making all major decisions, even when civilian leaders have nominal control. […] The army's political role is tied to its extensive involvement in and identification with its self-reliant approach to economic development. Oil revenues enabled the state, and thus the military, to maintain international autonomy and legitimacy for an extended period of time through state provision of education, employment and social services. Oil rents further entrenched the military, impeding the development of non-military political actors (Akacem 2004: 153-154).

Referring to this fact, Giro asserts that the existence of powerful lobbies and the web of interconnected interests between some of the European countries and the government-controlled economy of Algeria stood behind the massive critique of their effort:

> Franco de Courten was used or threatened by the Italian oil or gas industry that was against any agreement. Because they were deeply worried that the military government of Algeria would retaliate against Italy because we are Italian, and stop the oil and gas delivery from Algeria. When you fiddle with these things… During the fifteen days of the Algerian negotiations we had more journalists at our doors than in 27 months of the Mozambique negotiations. Why? Algeria is a strategic country because it's an oil producer. And the Italian national society of oil that is very much depending on oil, and particularly on gas from Algeria, was worried that Italy's role would come back on them. They were probably threatened by the military government of Algeria to push on Italian politicians and the Italian ambassador to stop us. The companies worked behind the scenes, and we received a lot of warnings from the political landscape of Italy, and also of France. De Courten was instrumental in Algeria for this. But he was far from the most important. And he was not the worst criticizer. For example Pasqua, the Internal Minister of France, was really against us, and did everything to stop us. It might have been for many reasons; the link between France and Algeria is very deep and historic. For them it was not just a question of trade, but of colonial history as well. In Italy on the other hand it was very clear that the issue was oil and gas. So the whole situation was highly political (Giro 16.12.2009).[57]

In addition, the Algerian government was about to have a meeting with the Steering Committee of Commercial Banks – known as the *London Club* – who was to have its discussion concerning rescheduling the country's debt to private creditors February 7 (Nashashibi et. al 1998: 61). The Algerian's creditors (mostly composed of French and Japanese banks) wanted to close a rapid agreement on the more than 3 billion USD the country had in debt (ibid: 61). According to Impagliazzo and Giro, the banks were forced to come to terms with the pressured Algerian government in order to recover their money (Impagliazzo & Giro 1997: 199). A breakdown of these negotiations would mean a severe cut in the importation of food and other consumer goods that primarily came from France. Mitterrand would face many complications and pleads

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[57] A third of Italy's gas demand at the time was covered by imports from Algeria (Impagliazzo 2010: 10).

from these negotiations if he were to force the government into dialogue with the Rome group.

Giro believes the French lobby's and the Algerian regime's joint efforts together with the protests from the right-wing side of the cohabitation government of France, were important causes of the withdrawal of Mitterrand's and Kohl's initiative for a conference only three days after its making (Giro 16.12.2009). Impagliasso and Giro assert that, due to the presidential elections that were coming up in May that same year, the president couldn't risk stirring up too much conflict between the right and the left, and France ended up dropping the issue (Impagliazzo & Giro 1995: 200). The New York Times wrote on February 9: «France appeared today to quietly shelve President Francois Mitterrand's idea for an international peace conference on Algeria» (New York Times 09.02.1995). The historical shift in France's policy towards dialogue in Algeria had proved only temporary (Roberts 2001: 314).

Entelis did not find this surprising:

> France's record of participating in the promotion of democratic outcomes in third world countries, especially in countries it has previously been involved in is poor, to say the least. They have always been more on the side of the status quo, in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. In that manner they were totally consistent. It would have been very surprising if they had acted otherwise (Entelis 02.12.2009).

Akacem sums up:

> While France has the ability to pressure Algeria to deal with domestic problems, its interests place limitations on how much it can accomplish credibly (Akacem 2004: 158).

A final reason for the lack of political will to support the mediation was the recurrent theme of terrorism. Sant' Egidio was repeatedly accused of working with terrorists (Giro 16.12.2009). Hence, another detrimental blow to the coherent international pressure against the regime in support of the negotiations was that GIA arranged a disastrous attack in front of the Algiers central police station on January 30. This attack threw the country back into the violent circle Sant' Egidio had hoped to end. It also gave the eradicator-wing of the government legitimacy and arguments for not participating in negotiations. When visiting the wounded, President Zeroual stated that «the whole world knows that the Algerian population will not bend before such barbarism […] and fight until these monsters are exterminated» (Zeroual cited in:

Impagliazzi & Giro 1997: 194). Not long after, the current NATO secretary general, Willy Claes, released a statement condemning Islamic fundamentalism, and counted it as a threat worse than communism during the Cold War (Williams 2003: 194). Claes concluded that the alliance had to pay more attention to the Mediterranean basin due to the enormous differences between the two shores. The statement caused widespread outrage in the Muslim world and the Iranian government accused Claes of being wrong (ibid: 194, Jansen 1997: 22). However, the alliance chose a strategy of containment and support of the current regimes in the Northern part of Africa. For Algeria, this meant that the extremists, who were close to being reabsorbed into the political framework, were now subject to an internationally backed military solution (Ipagliazzo & Giro 1997: 204-205).[58]

5.4.4 The marginal but contributive role of religion

According to Giro, many of Sant' Egidio's critics have withdrawn their accusations in retrospect. Many of them have admitted being pressured to oppose the initiative:

> Today, after 10-15 years time, all the people who attacked us at that time, one by one, including de Courten himself, have reached out to us and asked for forgiveness and told us that we were right [to pursue negotiations] (Giro 16.12.2009). [59]

Still, it seems that faced with political and economic forces like these, Sant' Egidio's ability to pursue the peace was considerably confined. One may also deduce from these findings that religion was most likely not the detrimental force as the second hypothesis suggests. A first argument that weakens the hypothesis is that, according to Giro, apart from the government, the worst obstruction did not come from Algeria in general, and at least not from the religious authorities in particular. Rather, the lack of a coherent track one, with the ability to apply sticks and carrots that could have forced the Algerian government to join the democratic efforts in Rome, seems a central cause. Indeed, Entelis states:

> The only possibility for Le Pouvoir to participate in the negotiations would have been for Paris and Washington to apply serious pressure including threatening sanctions if the government did not participate in the negotiations. At the time, and at least now, it seems as a very remote possibility (Entelis

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[58] This development was forcibly strengthened after September 11, 2001, when the US suddenly identified with Algeria's struggle against terrorism and even sought its assistance (Akacem 2004: 160).
[59] After several attempts of getting Franco de Courten's own views on the matter, he finally refused the request by email.

02.12.2009).

A second important and already mentioned factor was that most of the Muslim world did not condemn Sant' Egidio for their efforts.

Third, the elements of religion I found relevant for the negotiations actually contributed more than they spoiled. In Algeria as in Mozambique, religion played a role in getting the parties to the table and to build confidence. According to Giro, their interreligious work in Algeria had given them a much-needed credibility in order to function as an interlocutor. As in Mozambique, Sant' Egidio proved itself as one of very few who could actually manage to gather all the central factions. Entelis believes that this could not have been done by anyone else:

> I can't imagine that. People forget that this was the only organization that proved itself an honest broker to all the parties. Which is why they trusted it, and would have them serve as a mediator. I don't think any other party would have been trusted, whether it would have been a formal government or a private individual. Rather than despite its Catholic origin, it was *because* it was Sant' Egidio that they were willing to come together. I don't think the UN would have succeeded, because it has a too formal structure, and the Algerian state represented would have vetoed. So, no, I think it was the most appropriate instrument to try to negotiate. I know some of the actual parties to the negotiations, the Berbers and the FIS, and they were all pretty serious about this. This was not just a public relation stunt. It was because it was Sant' Egidio, viewed as a credible mediator, and because all the parties participated, and because it looked like it would come out with a viable outcome, that the military was so determined for it to fail. If this Catholic-based drawback was truly believed, and if the parties were kicking and screaming going to the negotiations, the government could have said: «ah, nobody is going to agree on that». But the fact that they were all willing, and that they felt that Sant' Egidio was the best agency for doing it, was the reason why the government said: «we can't let this go forward» (Entelis 02.12.2009, it. added).

However, even though it was a unique gathering of the most important opposition parties and a serious attempt from all sides, it may look as though the negotiations were doomed from the start when the government did not join:

> The Mozambique parties were actually interested in a way out of the conflict; the Algerian military had just staged a coup. They were calling the shots, what interest was this to them – to accept any kind of negotiations that did not have them on top? On the face of it, this was a party that if it had to, actually was willing to give up power and compromise in the name of democracy. But by the very fact that it was, one: the army, two: they had just staged a coup, and three: overthrown a democratic process, - why would they accept a negotiation that was democratic, non-violent, when they had come to power for the opposite reasons? They acted totally in line with a rational actor model, they weighed the costs and benefits to participate or not participate in terms of where they stood. There was no reason in the world for them to participate (Entelis 02.12.2009).

Giro on the other hand, disagrees. He claims the government was not necessarily acting rationally, because the response of the international society was so ambiguous

in the initial phases. He claims the government's uncertainty and internal strife on how to respond was the reason for their delayed answer to the Platform. In addition, the power-balance between the government and the violent Islamists was not completely clear either.

> After five days of waiting the government decided to turn it down. Today we know that it actually was tough discussions inside the government and the military power, the current president, Bouteflika, told us years after. At the time he was not the president, but a prominent personality, and he supported the platform. He told Zeroual to go for it: start from the points you agree on. Thus it was not completely rational. First, they were not sure whether the international society and the important governments would accept the military coup. At the time, Mitterrand for example, was against. And he was important. But Mitterrand was not alone in power; there was cohabitation with the political right. The prime minister was from the right. So, the government was not sure about what the final outcome would be. They were accusing the West for negotiating with terrorists, because they were not sure what would happen. Second, and more important: they were divided internally. Hence it was not clear in 1994-95 what would happen in the Algerian case. It was a bet, not a rational decision. It was not that simple. Third, in the Algerian case it was not true that the opposition parties thought they would be militarily defeated. Because when you start with terrorism you do not believe that you will be militarily defeated. In fact, it is very difficult to defeat terrorism. You accept that you will not win, but you also rule out defeat. It is a middle situation (Giro 16.12.2009).

Thus, it might seem that Sant' Egidio was closer in getting the government on board than Entelis thought. In any case, the effort reveals just how vulnerable faith-based mediators are to the structural environment in which they operate. Without the international community backing their efforts, they were still a far cry from establishing a sustainable peace in Algeria. From the experience in the Mozambican case, it can be argued that the international community would have had to be included in several phases of the peace process in Algeria: first, in pushing the government to the table, second, in driving the negotiations, and finally, in guaranteeing the peace in the implementation phase.

The West's ambivalence in relation to democratic processes that could lead to unwanted majorities (Islamists) also shows that the secular international society had more problems with Islamism than Sant' Egidio. Akacem claims that while some important external nations may have stressed the need for the government to sit and negotiate with the opposition, their tacit and active support of the government contradicted their statements and prolonged the status quo (Akacem 2004: 164-165). In a unique moment in time when the legitimate domestic parties were united in the

pursuit of democratic reforms, the international society was not.

> In any case, an alternative path could not have been considered without more active and creative engagement by external powers, or at least active condemnation of Algeria's actions. Given Algeria's concern for its international image and leadership role, such condemnation may have had a positive effect. The lesson from Algeria should be a simple one: do not embark on a democratic process unless there is a commitment to see it through. The international community should seek ways to help fledgling democracies and back these commitments with credible institutions (Akacem 2004: 165-166).

Mario Raffaelli also emphasizes the importance of track one:

> This is the essence of what I was trying to say: The strength of Sant' Egidio is that they have the knowledge of the situation, good relationships with the players and the confidence. Without this you cannot do the job, no matter where you come from. But if you go alone you cannot do the job either. The important lesson from both cases is that you can reach the point if you have a joint effort. Civil society alone cannot do the job. Institutions alone cannot do the job. They have different qualities, but both are crucial (Raffaelli 08.02.2010).

Consequently, *religion* does not seem to be a central factor to Sant' Egidio's failure in Algeria. Neither the Islamists, nor Sant' Egidio, seemed to have any problems with the divergent religious identities. The most striking observation is the faith-based mediators' frailty in regards to the lack of synergy with track one.

However, as in the Mozambican case, religion can explain why Sant' Egidio engaged themselves in the first place, and why they tried, despite the difficult political context. The fact that few other actors would interfere in a conflict with massive international interests at stake had little relevance for the faith-based mediators of Sant' Egidio:

> Everybody was frozen. With the Algerian negotiation what was very clear was that the big powers were completely immobilized. They were immobilized because in every country there was a faction *for* the military power in Algeria, and a faction *against*. Because of the questions related to oil and interests. And this was also the reason for our intervention. We intervened *because* of this. There were killings and nobody acted. And we were upset by this fact. But when we intervened we were scandalized (Giro 16.12.2010 it. added).

Giro himself does not believe in only track two approaches, and claims that half of his job as mediator is trying to involve track one (ibid.). Still, in Algeria they were unable to succeed in this. The way Giro explains their decision to intervene clearly reveals a similarity to Mozambique and the faith-based character of their engagement:

> When we decided in September that we were to do something, to try something, we had no clear idea of what we could achieve at that moment. This is another important aspect with our mediation. Try, and always try. Even if you don't have the whole program clear in your mind. Because things can be created on the spot (ibid.).

They intervened because people were suffering and dying. Their concern for the poor

seemingly trumped the pessimistic prognosis of realpolitik. The fact that they had no clear idea of what to do, and no preconceived program, also shows their strong belief in the power of procedural dynamics in mediation.

5.5   Preliminary Conclusion

The Algerian case differs from the Mozambican case in several ways. From my analysis it seems fair to argue that the inconsistency between the mediators' religious identity and that of the country they intervened in is not a correct explanation for the failure of Sant' Egidio in Algeria. Thus, the second hypothesis is also weakened by the findings in the case of Algeria.

Like in the case of Mozambique, some of the factors of religion that were present in the negotiations were connected to the mediators. First, their Catholic identity made them trustworthy to the parties: it seems the parties valued Sant' Egidio's unambiguous Catholic identity. Second, in some ways, Sant' Egidio had more faith-based strings to play on in Algeria than in Mozambique: their interreligious work in the country had given them a good reputation and was essential in the beginning of the negotiations. In Algeria they had already *established* networks on both Christian and Muslim sides, and religion had a more visible role in the Algerian conflict. Third, religion gave Sant' Egidio the reason for intervening. They engaged because people were suffering in a country they had historic relations to and engagement in, in other words: to uphold their religious values.

Based on my findings it also seems as though Sant' Egidio was capable of exploiting these aspects in a fairly fruitful manner. Thus the failure is better explained by the lack of support from the formal track one, because of the conflicting interests of these actors. In order to establish a sustainable peace in Algeria, these formal actors must

have joined. Sant' Egidio, who in Mozambique managed the inclusion and synergy of the political forces, was not able to play that game in Algeria.

In short, a formal institutional effort may not have gotten the trust and concessions from the religious FIS. On the other hand, it seems only a strong institutional pressure could have elicited concessions from the government.

Harpviken and Røislien point to the failure of the Oslo accords as an illustration of how a peace agreement can be undermined by neglecting informal religious parties in a conflict. Secular actors conducted the Oslo accords, and religious parties were never involved or consulted. Later, these groups have opposed and violated the accords with reference to their exclusion (Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 23-24). In a conspicuous way, the Algerian process represents the reverse rationale. Even though Sant' Egidio had the confidence of religious groups and the competent knowledge of involving them, they had neither the means nor the leverage to bring the political leadership, the government, into the negotiations. The result was just as detrimental for peace. As Gianturco sums up:

> Sometimes the failure is that you have failed to involve people and actors that are part of the problem and that should be part of the solution. We are aware of the existing power-balance, which sometimes is very strong and hard to change. Christian faith gives us a humbleness that urges you not to give up, but also accept your weaknesses. We know that sometimes the power of evil is too strong. But you have to keep the hope and the belief in humanity that it will change. That is what we hope for Algeria. When the president of Algeria in 1999 said that the Rome Platform is the basis for the political discussion now, we understood that the power balance has changed (Gianturco 05.02.2010).[60]

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[60] See President Bouteflika's statement in footnote 50 (point 5.4.1).

6   Conclusions: reflections on faith-based mediation

6.1   Summing up

> Our experience is that there is no model to universally apply to conflict, not even those that may appear more similar. I have often been thinking about the development of models, but in my experience we can talk of lessons learned, not of models. In most cases (I say this in order not to give a model) models can be drawn after the mediation and not before (Betti 2004).

Compared to other areas of conflict resolution, faith-based mediation remains relatively unexplored. The comparative approach and analysis of this thesis may contribute to tell us *something* more about strengths and weaknesses of faith-based mediation in two African post-independence conflicts, and if and how this can explain the different outcomes in Mozambique and Algeria. This chapter focuses on lessons learned and gives some tentative implications the findings have for the theoretical framework I have used.

The thesis has considered three research questions: first, in what ways, if any, did Sant' Egidio contribute to the conflict resolution in Mozambique and the negotiations in Algeria? Second, to what extent were Sant' Egidio's contributions in Mozambique and Algeria expressions of faith-based mediation? Third, why did this form of mediation work in Mozambique and fail in Algeria?

By comparing the efforts of Sant' Egidio in Mozambique and Algeria I was able to point to some similarities and differences that were influential for the different outcomes of the two cases of mediation.

In this and the next sections I will sum up each chapter and then illuminate some findings and main conclusions regarding Sant' Egidio's approach in the conflicts in Mozambique and Algeria. In section 6.3, I will briefly reflect on the theoretical implications my findings have for the strengths and shortcomings of faith-based mediators.

In *chapter 2* I provided some historical background on both cases and the community of Sant' Egidio. I also briefly described some of the different efforts aimed at resolving the conflicts and how Sant' Egidio contributed. In *chapter 3* I discussed the theoretical framework underlying the thesis. I gave an eclectic definition of faith-based mediation and discussed the hallmarks of the approach in relation to more traditional theories on conflict resolution. The chapter also developed two hypotheses that the analysis in chapters 4 and 5 revolved around.

Chapter 4 analyzed the saliency of the elements of faith-based mediation in Mozambique and Algeria. Finally, chapter 5 discussed if religion did play a key role in the two cases of mediation, and comparatively scrutinized why Sant' Egidio succeeded in Mozambique and failed in Algeria. In particular, the chapter analyzed if the Catholic mediators had more constraints in Muslim Algeria than in Catholic Mozambique.

6.2   Main findings and conclusions

My analysis has led to the following main conclusions:

1. As we have seen in chapter 4, my material confirms the presence of certain important hallmarks of faith-based mediation, thereby supporting the first hypothesis that stressed the saliency of the faith-based mediators' qualities.[61]

The *identity* and *position* of both Sant' Egidio and the religious actors they engaged in the process were important in both conflicts. Sant' Egidio's *disinterested and independent*, but not indifferent, stand in regards to the mediation outcome was important to build confidence as a neutral interlocutor. Their local presence and *engagement prior to the mediation* is descriptive of Sant' Egidio's work in both cases. This local foundation endowed Sant' Egidio with a deeper *understanding* of the conflict situation and its causes. In addition, their independent background also

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[61] The qualities and hallmarks of Sant' Egidio were useful in both fairly non-religious conflicts. Although it can be argued that the African context of Mozambique and Algeria is prone to religious influence due to the relatively weak secularization in the countries, the core of the conflicts was secular. Thus, Sant' Egidio was not only targeting their own believers, but also beneficiaries from different religious communities and secular ones. On the other hand, one may deduce from this that the hallmarks of faith-based mediation, and Sant' Egidio's approach in particular, is not as contingent on religion as the theoretical framework suggests. This is in accordance with my caveats raised in footnote 6.

enabled them to spend as much *time* as they felt they needed. Because Sant' Egidio had no need to show results, the parties were prevented from exploiting the mediators. Sant' Egidio's *lack of leverage* and manipulative means increased the parties' ownership of the final agreement. Their *network* and relations to Archbishop Goncalves, the Vatican and the Pope, in addition to their close links to the Italian government and other international bodies, were essential.[62] The faith-based mediators' belief in the alteration of human beings in order to pursue their incompatible goals in a peaceful manner, and the emphasis on *restoring healthy relationships* between belligerents was affirmed in both cases. Moreover, their engagement was mostly unofficial and thus characterized as a *track two*. This, however, was most explicit in the Algerian case, where they operated completely alone. In Mozambique, their initial engagement was sheer track two, but was soon reinforced by the presence of Mario Raffaelli as one of the four mediators. In addition, in order to drive the negotiations forward, formal track one actors such as the UN and other governments played an increasingly important role as the negotiations dragged on. A rather unexpected finding was that spiritual authority or *religious normative rationales* were not a major part of their mediation efforts in any of the cases.[63]

2. The second hypothesis, that religion played a key role in both cases, both for mediators and the parties, and that it contributed positively in Mozambique and negatively in Algeria, was not supported.

Although certain aspects connected to religion were present in the negotiation process in Mozambique, most of them were linked to the mediators. The Catholic tradition of the country was not a major contributor during the talks. Apart from certain of the faith-based factors of Sant' Egidio's approach, religion did not play a key role in the resolution. Other factors, both characteristics of the mediation – that any secular mediator could have applied – and structural forces were more important than religious factors.

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[62] In Algeria the time aspect, the parties' ownership to the agreement and the international network were less present. However, as mentioned, Sant' Egidio's moral authority and position were, according to Entelis, the reason why all the different parties in opposition joined the effort, an achievement he believes few others would have been able to accomplish.
[63] Although the efforts in Algeria were subject to theological defence by a prominent religious leader, this was not a matter in the concrete negotiations among the parties in Rome.

An unanticipated observation in the Algerian case was that despite the critique, the inconsistency between religious identities did not impair the negotiations. Even though religion was instrumentally applied for propaganda purposes in a stronger degree than in Mozambique, religion, all in all, was not essential to the conflict. Rather, religion was indirectly pertinent both in shaping the mediators' approach and in giving Sant' Egidio their motivation and reason for intervening.

Consequently, Sant' Egidio's most prominent weakness, and the most likely cause of the failure of the Algerian talks, was revealed when the realities of the great powers' interests overtook Sant' Egidio's initiatives. In Algeria it seems clear that the terms of a faith-based mediator – even a well-connected one like Sant' Egidio – rests at the mercy and goodwill of the actors of realpolitik. The structural environment trumped in this manner all of the above-mentioned strengths of the faith-based mediators. When Sant' Egidio ventured alone, and when there were interests at stake for track one actors, the community's limitations were disclosed. Without the support and guarantee of the international community, they could not move the Algerian government. With the unique enabling international context of Mozambique, this weakness was never revealed. Thus, the faith-based mediation of Sant' Egidio seems inadequate when undertaken in isolation. Just as track one actors might need the informal approach of track two mediators such as faith-based mediators, the latter needs the formal track as well. Sant' Egidio's efforts in both cases were in other words salient, but not sufficient for establishing a sustainable peace.[64]

These conclusions provide us with certain answers to the research questions raised in the first chapter:

First, chapters 2, 4, and 5 showed that Sant' Egidio contributed in several ways both in the resolution of the Mozambican conflict and in the negotiations in the Algerian

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[64] Many of the strengths I have noted on Sant' Egidio's mediation is supported by several theoreticians in the field (see Bouta et. al 2005, Harpviken & Røislien 2005 & 2008, Johnston 2003, McGuire 2002). My emphasis on faith-based mediators' weaknesses in my comparative analysis does not find the same resonance and approval. However, the insufficiency of faith-based mediation when facing the reality national interests and issues of traditional statecraft is also recognized by Bruce Nichols in his assessment of religious actors' mediation efforts in Nicaragua (Nichols 1994: 82-83). Johnston also acknowledges this weakness especially in conflicts that are «superficially about religion» (Johnston 1994: 263). Based on my analysis it can be argued that the Algerian conflict fits this categorization.

conflict. However, most explicitly they served as facilitators and formulators in the way they took initiative and shaped the negotiations in both cases. In sum, Sant' Egidio played an important, although limited role in both cases.

Second, chapter 4 clearly revealed that many of the factors involved in Sant' Egidio's mediation can be characterized as faith-based mediation. Certain of these factors were salient in building confidence and getting the parties to the table in both cases.

Third, the findings rebuke the notion that religion played a key role in the two cases and that it was the cause of Sant' Egidio's failure in Algeria. In addition, the analysis attributes significant parts of the reason for Sant' Egidio's success in Mozambique to several non-religious causes, which further demarcates the role and influence of religion. Consequently, both the success in Mozambique and the failure in Algeria should, in large part, be attributed to causal mechanisms that go beyond religion and faith-based mediation. Thus, the reason for Sant' Egidio's failure in Algeria was most notably because of the lack of pressure and involvement from the formal and influential governments and institutions. This conspicuous lack of support was further caused by a complex set of diverging interests, both political and economic.

My material thus suggests that religion played an *indirect* role in both peace processes: as the sole motivation for the mediators and as values that shaped the way Sant' Egidio approached the parties and the act of mediating. Even though few of the parties in both conflicts were dependent on religion *per se,* it seems they appreciated many of the positive hallmarks that often accompany religious organizations.

6.3 Theoretical implications

If we look beyond the narrow focus of the thesis, the material allows for some reflections on the theoretical implications my conclusions have. These implications revolve around some of the possible strengths and shortcomings of faith-based mediation.

A first aspect worth mentioning is that the apparent weaknesses of Sant' Egidio, and strengths of formal actors, may be considerably modified in conflicts with a stronger religious element. After all, the thesis analyzes the role and functions of a faith-based mediator in fairly *secular conflicts*. Even though Sant' Egidio succeeded in exploiting several of their faith-based strengths in these conflicts, it was far from sufficient. However, when confronted with the ostensibly irrational nature of ethnic-religious conflicts, the influence-balance between the faith-based mediator and the formal traditional diplomat may be altered. In such instances the leverage of official track one actors may decrease. Consequently and contrary to my findings, the first hallmark of faith-based mediation, where the normative rationales of religious texts and traditions are applied, may also be more pertinent (see Kaufman 2006 and Atran & Axelrod 2008). This will be important to consider in diagnosing a conflict.

Further, Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer found in their report on faith-based peace-builders that there is a continuous risk of proselytization and lack of focus on results and professionalism (Bouta et. al 2005: 43-44). From my material I did not find evidence for this weakness. Sant Egidio's careful and thorough work in both cases, especially in Mozambique, but also in their efforts of uniting the Algerian opposition parties behind a serious agreement, can hardly be categorized as unprofessional. In addition, Sant' Egidio did not appear ideological in their approach; rather they seemed pragmatic in relation to other views and religious affiliations, and sincere in their pluralism in the way they abstain from ideological advocacy and proselytization. Perhaps a clearer distinction may have to be drawn between external religious actors like Sant' Egidio, and local religious leaders who may have stronger interests in conflicts. This fact begs the question if Sant' Egidio is representative for religious peacemakers in general? Can such generalizations be made? After all, the ability of Sant' Egidio to understand the political game is probably not a widespread characteristic for religious actors. If the findings of Bouta et. al characterize faith-based mediators, Sant' Egidio is not representative of their peers. However, deeply religious as they are, they are characterized by many of the same hallmarks. Perhaps it only comes to show the diversity of the field of faith-based peacemaking. Perhaps it

also tells of the strenuous efforts it must take to map out a coherent theoretical framework that embraces all the different nuances.[65]

Another interesting tendency in both cases is that Sant' Egidio's effort and their archetypal faith-based qualities (e.g. local knowledge network, neutral position, and confidence building) seem most important in the initial phases of the mediation. As far as my material goes, it seems that the importance of their contribution decreases as the eventual need for international guarantees and the implementation of peace calls for the involvement of track one actors. On the other hand, the local religious leaders, often engaged by the faith-based mediators, may prove essential in the implementation of the peace. In order not to lose contact with the constituency and include them, these mid-level leaders seem important.

Finally, as touched upon earlier, many of the strengths of faith-based mediators are not exclusive for them. Time, local knowledge, integrity, perceived neutrality, independence and gratuitousness, could all, in theory, be the characteristics of any secular actor from the civil society. Thus, these qualities may not seem as *new* and *different* as theoreticians would have them be (see Harpviken & Røislien 2005: 1). However, these hallmarks may be more available to religious actors and organizations because of the established records of aid, religious infrastructure, and faith-based motivation of religious people. However, the question still stands: is the religious aspect over-emphasised by the theoreticians? After all, it seems Goncalves' significant role in Mozambique was important because of the traditional and general status he enjoyed in the society at large, not because of religion *per se*. Should not the same then go for journalists, teachers or artists? It seems important that the role and influence of religion and faith-based actors must be assessed in the diagnostic phase of the mediation and not be taken for granted. Vik correctly points out that Sant' Egidio is clearly most effective in cases where they have an established presence on the ground, and personal relations to the parties (Vik 24.11.2009). Underlying their often time-

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[65] After all, there were certain faith-based aspects of Sant' Egidio that proved important, but that were not covered adequately or made sufficiently explicit in the theory. For example, the interviewees' emphasis on Sant' Egidio's *independence* in terms of outcome and financing and the ability of external actors like the Italian members of Sant' Egidio, to travel to a conflict and engage themselves to the point that they obtain knowledge that is considered «local» is also a factor not fully recognised by the theoretical framework. I consider these important for the success of the negotiations.

consuming and comprehensive approach with emphasis on the human aspects of attitudes and perceptions, are personal relations and confidence, thoroughly developed over the years.

In order to fully assess the potential of faith-based mediators many questions remain. First of all, there seems to be a need to analyse faith-based mediators' record and efforts in more religiously inspired conflicts. Perhaps other qualities than the ones illuminated by me will be pertinent. Perhaps faith-based mediators possess more leverage and influence in such conflicts?

Second, based on my theoretical discussion and analysis (and as pointed out in chapter 1) there is a need to link insights from faith-based mediation to traditional conflict-resolution theory. My tentative attempt to discuss this revealed that the two fields might have more in common than some might think.

Furthermore, increased focus should be centred on the incidents where faith-based mediators fail. My analysis uncovered *some* of faith-based mediators' shortcomings. Perhaps this will be confirmed by other studies, perhaps there will be other weaknesses revealed.

Further research also needs to include the parties' own reflections and response to the faith-based mediators. I was not in a position to interview the different parties' delegates in the two cases analysed. Consequently, the conclusions in my work, and in much of the literature on the field, are to a significant extent, based on the mediators' own reports.

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