Moved to Action

the political mobilization of Russian oppositional-minded diaspora in Norway in response to the invasion of Ukraine 24.02.2022

(a phenomenological case-study)

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Summary

Tilte	Moved to action: The political mobilization of Russian oppositional-minded diaspora in Norway in response to the invasion of Ukraine 24.02.2022
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Since February 2022, the Russian anti-war diaspora in Norway has politically mobilized in response to the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine by the homeland. A phenomenological case study has been conducted in order to indicate manifestations of the mobilization and lived experiences associated with this phenomenon. Such lived experiences included both the political emotions and various aspects of the anti-war community identity relevant for the mobilization process. The political emotions, the identity contents, and the mobilization manifestations constituted, in their conjunction, the essence of the mobilization phenomenon. Afterwards, the collective affective intentionality (CAI) account of political emotions has been applied to the description of the phenomenon's essence.

Three methods of data collection have supplied the research with partly corroborating and partly complimentary data: qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews with four members of the Russian anti-war community, surveys, and qualitative content analysis of social media profiles of the NGO "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia", the center of the Russian anti-war protest in Norway.

The analysis shows that the political mobilisation of the Russian anti-war diaspora has manifested itself in significant increase in topics, forms and directions of activities, as well as in growth in number of both registered and informal community members.

Diasporants have experienced the phenomenon of political mobilization as a complex set of negatevely valenced emotions, the nature and intencity of which can hardly be conveyed by words. Resorting to metaphors, the respondents sketch the feelings of despair, lostness, dying, catastrophe, apocalypse, collapse of their entire world. The flip side of the political mobilization phenomenon is, however, the joy of collective action for a cause. Besides, various contents of identity, such as, relational (the relation to Ukrainians, to pro-regime Russians), collective (national, diasporic, political) and individual contents (patriotic, cosmopolitan) play into the process of mobilization.

Russian diaspora political mobilization represents a dramatic intensification of the members' political stance, feelings, and actions. Though the intensity of feelings fades in time, the diasporants continue to speak out and act. "Moved to action" in a more disassembled way would read as "emotionally moved to political action".

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My motivation

Ironically, the full-fledged invasion caught me in the middle of a research project on democratic education. An hour after I read the news I was standing in a spontaneous protest in front of the Russian embassy in Oslo, holding a hastily made poster with one single word on it. Shame. There was much more inside.

Even if I tried to reflect over and bracket my own experience of those first days, weeks, months during my work on the actual master's thesis, it eventually coincided with the essence of the experience described in the analysis part.

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Figure 1. A visual model of the thesis's theoretical frame

Table 1. Summary table for the content analysis data (translated into English)

1 Introduction

"I awoke one night from a disturbing dream;
It felt as if a strange voice spoke earnestly,
Low as a faint, subterranean stream.
I arose and said: "What do you want of me?"

"You must not sleep! You must not sleep!
You must not think it was only a dream.
Picture the theme:
The gallows are built right here on the lawn.
The soldiers will fetch me to-morrow at dawn.

Awaiting our doom
The prisoners' cells are placed row by row
We lie in the terrible cold below
We are rotting alive in the wretched gloom.

Why we lie here waiting we do not know.
And who shall be the next one to go?
We sigh and we cry, can't you hear us weeping?
And can you do nothing? O, do not keep sleeping."

Arnulf Øverland «You must not sleep! » (1936)

 On February 24, 2022, the order was given to start the so-called "special military operation" in Ukraine. The world press that day was full of headlines that said in unison: Russia invaded Ukraine (Aladekomo, 2022, p. 2; Jan-Erik Lane, 2022, p. 259; Lichterman, 2022, p. 185). It soon became clear that Russian society was largely polarized in relation to that operation. Many Russians supported the aggressive politics, which was, however, served as protection and liberation politics in Russian media (Alyukov, 2022; Fortuin, 2022, p. 2; Haque, 2022, p. 155). The others, who were strongly against the war and considered it as a crime against humanity, were quickly suppressed and censured, called traitors, threatened with reprisals (Budraitskis, 2022; Tilly in Zhelnina, 2023, p. 73). Many of the Russians who were or were living abroad, and therefore in a relative safety, took a hard line against the war: they went to the ambassades and protested, signed open letters to ambassadors, donated money to human rights defenders, wrote anti-war posts on social media and learned to carry out anti-propaganda among the closest. Some of them used those instruments for the first time in their lives.

1.1 Theme and its limits

Who exactly are those Russians who have mobilized themselves? An interesting perspective can be found in the article written by associate Professor of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Amsterdam Anna Fenko and published in English by The Voice of Russia, one of the multiple internet platforms of the Russian opposition that have appeared since the 24th of February 2022. The article, titled "How to be Russian after Bucha", is about an identity crisis Russians face since February, and especially after the Bucha massacre ('Bucha Massacre', 2023) . Fenko writes about two clear groups of Russians, those who form a negative pro-regime Z-identity (where "Z" is one of the symbols of the "special military operation"('Z (Military Symbol)', 2023)) and those who "are lost" or show signs of a so-called diffused identity. She also mentions the third group – *"The pro-Ukrainian Russians who live abroad are also demonstrating their new identity — they hold rallies, meetings, and conferences, place the Ukrainian flag on their avatars and even introduced a new symbol of "good Russians" – a white-blue-white flag" (Fenko, 2022).* I would dare to suggest that all the three types of identities can be found both in Russia and abroad, among Russian immigrants, to differen extent. In my master's thesis, I am exclusively interested in those Russians who are located abroad, in this case in Norway, and have politically mobilized themselves against Putin's war and regime. It is namely the third group mentioned in Fenko's article.

In Norway, as well as in several other countries, the oppositional-minded community concentrated itself around an NGO, founded by some engaged activists (*Map of Peace*, n.d.). Some of such NGOs came into being even before the full-scale war. (Fomina, 2021) The first, sometimes spontaneous, rallies were held in 2021, in suport for Russian oppositional polician Alexey Navalny, well-known as the one who woke the Russian apolitical youth, organized the biggest protests in Moscow "for fair ellections" in 2011- 2012 (Clément, 2015, pp. 1–2; Zhelnina, 2023, p. 68) and "against corruption" in 2017-2018 (Dollbaum et al., 2018; Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk, 2018, pp. 196, 203–208), mobilizing the oppositional audience's emotion (Zhelnina, 2023, pp. 69–70). Navalny was poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok, spent over two weeks in koma and after reabilitation in Germany came back to Russia in January 2021, where he was imediately arrested right in the airport. The first wave of protests was followed by another one caused by the fact that Navalny did not get the medical help he needed and had the right to, and himself chose, hunger strike in prison. The story of Navalny,

who had always tried to show that the national politics was everyone's business, left few indifferent. Those first protests brought people together, the first chats were created, the first social media profiles registed, and then NGOs founded. This is also how "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia" came into being in Norway, out of some "few" registered members in 2021, and much over 100 in 2022 (and even more non-members showing active support), after the new war reality had roughly shaken the democratic world, Norway – Russia's neighbour- and pro-democracy, but rarely politically active, Russians living in Norway (*Foreningen SmåRådina*, n.d.).

That is what the founders themselves write on the official website, underling both the community members' emotional attachment to the homeland and their commitment to the democratic values (*Foreningen SmåRådina*, n.d.):

"After more people found their way to the group, the board took the initiative to found an association. It was named "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia". SmåRådina is a wordplay, where"rådina" means "homeland" in Russian and "små" means "small" in Norwegian, and together this stands for "a small homeland". Because many Russians, together with hopes for a democratic Russia, carry "the small homeland" in their hearts, and want to keep this part of their identity here in Norway."

The purpose of my master's thesis is to shed light on Russian diaspora members' transition from political apathy to the desire to take part and influence the politics they do not agree with- the process of political mobilization, which I approach through the lens of political emotions and identity aspects that diasporants themselves experience being a part of the community. This purpose is reflected in the thesis's title, "Moved to action", that, in a more disassembled way, would sound as "Emotionally moved to political action". Another interest of the thesis is the real-life manifestations of Russian diaspora's political mobilization. The case is also limited in time, the period I am interested in is 24.02.22-24.02.23.

1.2 Research problem and research questions

The following research problem and questions will structure the thesis and constitute its pivot:

What are the manifestations and lived experiences of the political mobilization of Russian oppositional-minded diaspora in Norway?

- What are the manifestations of the phenomenon in focus?
- What emotions lie behind the political mobilization of Russian oppositional-minded diaspora in Norway?
- What identity contents play into the diaspora's political mobilization?
- What does the CAI-account of political emotions show being applied to case in focus?

1.3   The thesis's relevance

The relevance of the master's thesis is multifaceted. Here below provided some of the relevance aspects.

1. The thesis touches on a topic that attracts the attention of, among others, sociologists, social phycologists, political scientists, linguists, philosophers of war and educational philosophers of today- the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a full-fledged war that few experts had expected (Kim, 2022; Wieviorka, 2022, p. 11; Yudin, 2022a, p. 1). Putin's seemingly unreasonable and unexpected decision to start the full-fledged war revealed "deficiencies in the established thinking on a range of subjects", starting from Russian politics (Yudin, 2022a, p. 1), and entailed the search for another logic that really lied behind the catastrophic event. Russian society, as a source of the politics legitimation (Yudin, 2022b, pp. 20, 31, 33), becomes one of the relevant inquiry objects. At the same time, many discussions about how reliable the data collected in authoritarian Russia of today emerge (Clément, 2015, p. 1; Kizlova & Norris, 2022). My master's thesis focuses on the reterritorialized members of Russian society, outspoken and politically active against the war, namely, Russian pro-democracy, and anti-war diaspora in Norway. Russian diaspora is then, on the one side, a part of a larger Russian society and a precious source of information about it. On the other side, for Norway, it is important to better understand the diasporic groups embedded in the national context.

2. The core of the anti-war community is represented by those between 20 and 40 years old, who grew up in the post-soviet Russia and then moved to Norway via studies, work, or family reunification. There are also some asylum seekers from Russia. The post-soviet Russia, as a

political system, is characterized by overwhelming powers of the president, lack of genuine electoral competition, attitude to voting and polling as acts of acclamation of the current leadership and its decisions (Yudin, 2022b, p. 33) , "manufacturing" a picture of popular support for Putin both for domestic and international use (Yudin, 2022b, pp. 20, 31), a strict separation of economy and politics. (Yudin, 2022a, p. 4) The post-soviet Russian society is usually described as depoliticized, politically apathetic or apolitical (Alyukov, 2022, p. 764; Dollbaum et al., 2018, p. 618; Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk, 2018, pp. 197–198; Prokop & Hrehorowicz, 2019; Zhelnina, 2020, 2023, p. 68,73), distinguished by high income and wealth inequality (Novokmet et al., 2018, p. 189), individualism and priority of material well-being above politics (Kosintseva et al., 2017; Yudin, 2022a, p. 4; Ильин, 2016) The post-soviet Russian civic education took a course towards the state cohesion and nation-building through promoting the patriotic agenda at the federal level, with such key objectives as "respect and understanding of state symbols and unconditional love and devotion to the Motherland". This is to the detriment of an education agenda promoting active citizenship and independent thinking. (Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007) It is therefore particularly interesting to investigate the phenomenon of Russian diaspora's political mobilisation, or, even more deeply, (re)politization ('Politicize', 2023), as transition from an apolitical state of mind to considering the political domain as an inseparable and indispensable part of one's life (Clément, 2015, p. 7; Dollbaum et al., 2018, p. 624). The thesis will hopefully contribute to this broader research interest.

3. The notions of political apathy and political participation, and the transition between the two, are highly relevant beyond the context of Russian-Ukrainian war. Democracies are dependent on political participation, the latter being an indispensable feature of the former (Jan W. van Deth, 2016, p. 1) Moreover, *"where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is"* (Verba & Nie in Jan W. van Deth, 2016, pp. 1–2) Such tendencies of the world of today as disenchantment and decline in democratic participation represent a threat to the democratic way of life (Martin in Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 22). Greg Yudin formulates an even tighter link between the case of Russian state system and any other liberal democracy: *"In many ways, Putin's Russia is not a deviation from liberal democracy, but a liberal democracy pushed to the limits of electoral fetishism. Thus his regime serves as a warning to democracy worldwide: The strength of Putin's regime lies in its radicalization of tendencies very much present in liberal democracies including depoliticization, public disengagement and resentment, technocratic*

rule, a weak public sphere, and popular desires for strong and resolute leaders." (Yudin, 2022b, p. 36) It is therefore a vital question and one of the challenges of the world of today to understand mechanisms lying behind political participation.

4. Last, but not least, the relevance of the master's thesis may reach the domain of democratic education. While there is increasingly more literature on political emotions, the notion itself is not implemented in the practice of democratic education. It has being however argued that education is one of the platforms that is to meet a society's need *"to acknowledge, admit and reflect on political emotions and their role for the political culture and the well-being of people and societies",* as Iida Pyy puts it. (Jackson, 2020, p. 215; Nussbaum, 2012, pp. 244–249; Pyy, 2022, p. 108; Zembylas & Schutz, 2016, p. 27). The political culture is shaped by our emotions, deeply connected to both our values and our motivation to act for causes (Pyy, 2022, p. 108). If the emotions are not embraced by the society, then *"people with less appetizing aims will monopolize these forces, to the detriment of democracy",* as Martha Nussbaum warns (Nussbaum, 2012, p. 250). Political emotions should however become the partner and the object of critical thinking within the context of critical education (Mehmet Melik Kaya, 2022, pp. 108–109; Nussbaum, 2012, pp. 245–246; Pyy, 2022, p. 103; Zembylas, 2013, 2014, pp. 1143–1145). The case illuminated in the current thesis will contribute to the extensive evidence of political emotions' many-sided role in political mobilization and participation, which is the cornerstone of a vibrant democracy.

1.4   Outline of the thesis

The current section (1) introduces the theme of the master's thesis (Russian diaspora political mobilization in Norway in response to Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022), its limits and relevance. The research problem and questions of the thesis are also given here. The next section (2) provides a theoretical frame for the research, encompassing literature review on both the study of diaspora, diaspora mobilization and political emotions. Besides, the section refers to the CAI account of political emotions as a theoretical tool that will later be applied to the case of Russian diaspora's political emotions. The following section (3) represents a justification of a composed phenomenological case methodology, encompassing three methods of data collection- qualitative semi-structured interviews, surveys, and

qualitative content analysis, followed by the descriptions of procedures and research ethics digressions. The 3 sections that follow (those are <u>section 4, section 5, and section 6)</u> reflect the research problem and questions and cover both the manifestations of Russian diaspora mobilization in Norway, diasporants' lived experiences of political emotions and identity contents relevant for the case, as well as the analyses of the case through the CAI account lens. The thesis ends with a list of outcomes of the research and its implications <u>(section 7),</u> appendices <u>(section 8)</u> and <u>bibliography.</u>

2 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of the thesis comprises literature review on both the study of diaspora, diaspora and patriotism, diaspora mobilization and political emotions. Besides, it takes up the CAI account of political emotions as a theoretical tool that will later be applied to the case of Russian diaspora's political mobilization and emotions that lie behind it. Here I also touch upon the key concepts, relevant for the research, such as diaspora, political participation and mobilization, political emotions, patriotism and its different types, political apathy, and political emotions.

Figure 1. A visual model of the thesis's theoretical frame

2.1 Diaspora as reterritorialized members of the homeland society

The current section consists of a literature review on the study of diaspora, including challenges of its defining, diaspora mobilization and patriotism.

2.1.1 The challenging study of diaspora

Mass migrations of the population caused by conflicts, ecological crises, natural disasters, poverty, underdevelopment etc., are the traits and challenges of the world of today. Such a trend is leading to the growth and strengthening of diasporas all over the world. The other reasons for the strengthening of diasporas are the increase in their economic resources and improved means of information and communication. Such changes provide diasporas with better possibilities to interact between the home and the host countries and eventually turn diasporas into political actors aiming to influence the development of their countries of origin (Baser & Swain, 2008, pp. 9, 13; Chander, 2001, pp. 1006, 1023–1024; Moss, 2019, p. 7). The described tendency got the name of "*diasporization*" of ethnic and religious groups. (Sheffer , Safran, Weiner in Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, p. 498) Interestingly enough for the actual master's thesis, "*diasporization*" may also mean a change in identity- creating or redefining a *transnational* identity- for groups who have not recently migrated and who do not explicitly position themselves as diaspora. (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, p. 498)

The notion of «*transnational*» (dimension, identity, sphere, space, project, community, practice of mobilization etc.) is frequently used when speaking about diaspora, meaning simultaneous embeddedness of national, ethnic and religious identities in more than one society. (Clifford in Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, pp. 498, 500–501) Diaspora resembles

transnational social movements and the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism overlap in many ways. (Bauböck & Faist, 2010, p. 7) However, the former is rather characterized by a particularistic (national) identity, while the latter is wider and grounded on a universalistic (global) identity. (Adamson, Faist in Haider, 2014, p. 211; Quinsaat, 2022, p. 2)

Considering the tendencies of diasporas' growth and diasporization, the increasing interest towards diasporas in such academic disciplines as, among others, anthropology, sociology, urban studies, cultural studies, international relations, does not seem surprising. Researchers are employing the notion of "diaspora" in order to challenge another notion, the one of "a nation-state". (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, pp. 502–503) "Diaspora" becomes a tool of creating conceptual links between sending and receiving countries, a tool of considering the interstices between them as transnational spaces and focusing on transnational activities. The latter may in its turn demonstrate how national identity articulations become embedded in transnational practices, and even how such practises contribute to reconfigurations in the relationship between "the state" and "national identity". (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, p. 504)

The term of "diaspora" can therefore be considered as a useful means to analyse changes in the relationship between states and collective identities under the conditions of globalization. State identities had traditionally been thought as national identities, the two notions were being used as synonyms. Such a relationship was called into question by the study of diasporic practices. (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, pp. 491–492; Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011; Ragazzi, 2014, pp. 75–76, 87) Though diasporas contain many of the identity components characterizing as well nation-states, they are at the same time different from the nation-state in terms of their organizational structure and spatial logic. (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, pp. 496–497) Diasporas as collective identities can be characterized as reterritorialized and network-based, which contrasts them with territorially defined and institutionalized collective identities of nation-states. (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, p. 491) Such a new perspective resulted in a change in the boundaries between states and national identities, that could no longer be used interchangeably. However, neither these two notions nor the notion of territoriality have become less important recently when it comes to political

identities in international politics. There still exists a symbolic link between national identity and a specific territory, but the practices, strategies, and policies which the homestate elites adopt towards their diasporas (and vice versa), connecting identity and territory, are themselves transnational and reterritorialized. National identity has recently also been differently articulated within the host countries, which is reflected in such processes as denationalization, pluralization or multiculturalism (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, pp. 492, 500, 502)

Another and more practical purpose to study diasporas is the host countries' need to better understand such groups inside their societies in order to prevent security threats they may pose, but avoid at the same time discrimination of such diasporic groups, which is, in its turn, a threat to the liberal values themselves. Some research on diasporas focuses therefore on diasporic identity and its vulnerabilities (the stress of assimilation that may result in identity crisis, the feelings of marginalization and social exclusion etc.) in correlation with some diasporants' motivation to engage in violent activities. (Arrowsmith, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2008, pp. 67–68, 70, 75; Koinova, 2018, p. 1252; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Such studies sometimes conclude with recommendations to the host countries about how to embrace the diasporic groups, so they act in more constructive ways. Among such suggestions are to ensure that diasporants are actually included in a constructive democratic participation, to support their motivation to participate as it reinforces both liberal values and the integrational process, to create an environment where a better quality of life is possible for diasporic groups, so the stakes for destructive activities are too high, to consider and treat diasporas as multivocal groups in terms of class, gender, age, generation, education, occupation, language, religion, political affiliations, cultural habits etc., avoid discrimination and injustice. (Brinkerhoff, 2008, pp. 83–86, 2011, p. 133; Haider, 2014, p. 212; Toivanen & Baser, 2020, pp. 54–56)

Another quite recently articulated, and also practical, reason that lies behind the increasing interest towards diasporas is their potential in conflict regulations and democratization processes. Being, to some extent, the outcome of conflicts, as mentioned above, the process of diasporization results at the same time in differentiating the nature of those conflicts. Most of

the conflicts nowadays are deterritorialized by involving diaspora groups. The role of the latter in the homeland conflicts is often considered as controversial. Diasporas can be criticized for promoting and financing the conflict in the homeland (diasporas as "peace-breakers"), but they can as well be seen as peacebuilders (or "peace-makers"), mediators aiming to resolve conflicts, engaging with the democratization of their homelands. (Baser & Swain, 2008, pp. 7–9, 12–13; Koinova, 2009, 2011; Toivanen & Baser, 2020) Diasporas' potential to positively influence the negotiations and the mediation in their homeland conflicts is based on the claim that they possess competences and concerns in regard of their home countries and may provide better insights on how to maintain a dialogue between the conflicting parties than the outside mediators. It's their position as those outside the conflict but at the same time not disconnected from it that turns diasporas into an important political factor, and might provide them with unique abilities as third-part actors in conflict regulations. (Baser & Swain, 2008, pp. 16–17; Brinkerhoff, 2011, pp. 116, 134–136; Moss, 2019, pp. 16–17)

Though the notion and the study of diaspora contribute significantly to the understanding of the relationship between the state and national identity and is of high practical interest considering the security threats to the host countries and homeland conflicts regulations, to study diaspora is, indeed, a complicated objective. There are, first of all, many different diasporas, considering their origins, generations of exit, cultures, religions etc. (Baser & Swain, 2008, p. 8; Brinkerhoff, 2008, pp. 70–71) Furthermore, as already mentioned, diasporas are heterogeneous in many ways, including the criterion of the members' identity: Do they identify with the home country? Host country? Both? Or none? (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, p. 3; Brinkerhoff, 2008, p. 70)

Such complexity of the diaspora-phenomenon results in difficulties of defining diaspora. The concept has become very popular since 1990s, but has been widened and therefore flattened since then, overlapping in many ways, as mentioned, with the concept of transnationalism. The myriads of different definitions seem to deprive the concept of some of its explanatory power. (Baubök & Faist, 2010, p. 7; Grossman, 2019, pp. 1263–1264) Jonathan Grossman has systematically analysed the most cited articles on diaspora with focus on its definition and listed up the features that appear in at least half of all definitions: dispersal or immigration, location outside a homeland, community, orientation to a homeland, transnationalism, and group identity. The six core attributes resulted in an integrated "clear, comprehensive, and

workable" definition of diaspora: *diaspora is a transnational community whose members (or their ancestors) emigrated or were dispersed from their original homeland but remain oriented to it and preserve a group identity*.

The author however underlines that the definition he suggests is not final, once and for all, but rather a contribution to the debate on diaspora and a step to a more structured conceptualisation of it. Still, he admits, more discussion is needed around the attributes he lists up as core. (Grossman, 2019) Diasporants, for instance, may relate to more than one homeland in cases when they have experienced more than one migration and belong to more than one diaspora. (Grossman, 2019, p. 1276) Moreover, "homeland" may be just a symbolic attribution, and not an actual homeland. What matters for being a part of diaspora is diasporants' attachments to that homeland, whatever it is, or according to Steven Vertovets , *"a consciousness of, or emotional attachment to, commonly claimed origins or cultural attributes associated with them"*. (Vertovec in Baser & Swain, 2008, p. 8). Anupam Chander, commenting the title of his article, "Diaspora Bonds", also points out at the figurative sense of sentimental attachments of the diaspora to its homeland. (Chander, 2001, p. 1013) Baser & Swain elaborate more on the emotional component of being diaspora, which is relevant for the actual thesis. They claim that it is namely emotional connection between the members of the same diaspora in different countries, and their emotional connection with the homeland, that lies at the basis of their mutual support and their empathy for the economic development of the homeland. The authors go on by claiming that exactly due to this sentimental connection diasporas gradually enter the realm of the political, being in the unique and crucial position between the receiving and the home country. (Baser & Swain, 2008, p. 8)

Other attributes of diaspora that have recently been mentioned are "a form of practice and a political stance" (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, p. 4). In other words, being diaspora comprises the ability to take collective action, to mobilize for a cause. This attribute is reflected in one of the most popular and widely used (Koinova, 2009, p. 45, 2016, p. 501; Koinova & Karabegović, 2017, p. 214) definitions of diaspora today, the one formulated by Adamson & Demetriou NAMES . They define diaspora as *"a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time to (1) sustain a collective national,*

cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links." (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, pp. 496–497)

Interesting in itself and relevant for the actual research is one of the early definitions of diaspora by Gabriel Sheffer that contained both the attributes of emotional attachment ("sentimental links") and collective action. The author defines diasporas as *"ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homelands"* (Sheffer in Brinkerhoff, 2008, p. 67)

All in all, on a more general level, there are two, though not mutually exclusive, approaches to the study of diaspora: when diaspora is treated as actors (or "diaspora as an essence") or outcomes ("diaspora as a practice"). Within the first and dominant one, immigrants or refugees are considered as diaspora by default, by the fact of crossing the state border. Such research focuses on the factors that impact the migrants' involvement in the homeland politics. The latter and more recent approach, considering diasporas as outcomes, focuses on the process of becoming diaspora through mobilization, the process of development of collective identities as a transnational community through activism, reflection and discussion. (Grossman, 2019; Haider, 2014, p. 211; Quinsaat, 2022, pp. 2–3; Ragazzi, 2012, pp. 1264–1265) Thus, within the second, increasingly popular approach, mobilization represent an essential component of what diaspora is, its other «bearing wall». This approach is also more relevant for the actual thesis, which I will try to justify in the analysis section. In the next section I will elaborate more on diaspora mobilization.

2.1.2 Diaspora political mobilization

The notion of "diaspora mobilisation" differs from author to author, shedding light on the same phenomenon but from slightly different angles. Some authors, for example, consider "diaspora mobilization" from the angle of political entrepreneurs' efforts to activate diasporic groups for a cause:

"Acts of mobilization involve the activation of individuals who have the motivations and predispositions to support a movement's goals and perform the prescribed activity (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986)." (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 26)

Other researchers employ the notion of "political mobilization" in vein with the notion of "political participation", where the two notions are interchangeable and focus on the set of tools of political action taken in use for a cause. Maria Koinova, for example, define diaspora mobilization as:

"the pursuit of claims and practices related to the original homelands through various trajectories— institutional or activist channels—and a variety of means, ranging from moderate ("contained") to more radical ("transgressive") politics or a combination thereof." (Koinova, 2013, 2017, p. 598)

One more angle of seeing "diaspora mobilization" catches a transition from a more politically passive state to a more active one (the example is about political mobilization in general, covering as well political mobilization of diasporic groups specifically):

"We understand political mobilization as an increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of intergroup conflict.15" (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009, p. 241)

Both the second and the third perspectives, covering the senses of "transition" and "assortment of means", seem relevant and valuable to my master's thesis. All the three definitions, implicitly presuppose the opposition of political activity/participation and political passivity, or apathy, understood as a lack of political participation. (Dahl et al. in Mahmud, 2022, p. 269) It is worth to note, considering the focus of the actual master's thesis, that political apathy is traditionally defined through a lack of feelings: "a loss or suppression of emotional affect with regard to, a listlessness, a loss of interest in, some issue, set of issues, or perhaps politics itself" (DeLuca in Bron Jr, 2005, p. 284), "a general indifference to politics" (Thompson & Horton in Mahmud, 2022, p. 269), "a lack of desire or motivation to interest in politics" (Fox in Mahmud, 2022, p. 269), "a particular state of mind wherein there is a lack of feeling, passion or interest" (Di Palma in Davis, 2009, p. 152). On the other side, the emotional component often appears in the work, considering political mobilization and its drivers, which I will discuss later in this section.

Here, a short note about political participation, a concept that I operationalize and take in use in the survey, should be given. Political participation, *"loosely defined as citizens' activities affecting politics"*, has rapidly expanded in recent decades and continues to expand in terms of available forms of participation, as a result of *"the growing salience of government and politics for everyday life, the blurring of distinctions between private and public spheres, the increasing competences and resources (especially education) of citizens, and the availability of an abundance of political information"*, as well as reduced costs of digital online forms of participation. (Jan W. van Deth, 2016, p. 2,5) This process demands new ways of conceptualizing "political participation", covering not only traditional, easily distinguishable as "political", modes of participation such as casting a vote, supporting a candidate, contacting public officials, signing a petition, joining a demonstration, attending party rallies etc., but also newer and more ambiguous modes of participation, such as volunteering in a hospital, being a member of a sports club, posting a blog, political consumption, street parties, guerrilla gardening, so called "clicktivism", to mention only some. (Jan W. van Deth, 2016, pp. 1–6; de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela; Gibson & Cantijoch in Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 21)

Jan W. van Deth has developed a conceptual map systematically covering the broadest spectre of participation forms under the concept "political participation", though dividing it hierarchically into 5 modes. Each mode should correspond to totally 4 "rules", or definition components. There are three basic "rules" any type of political participation is grounded in: it is an activity or action, it is voluntary and it is conducted by non-professionals. Five more "rules" are interchangeable in a hierarchical way and include, in a descending hierarchical order, the following conditions: the activity is located in the sphere of government/state/politics, the activity is targeted at the sphere of government/state/politics, the activity is aimed at solving collective or community problems, the activity is placed in a political context, the activity is used to express political aims and intentions. This kind of conceptualisation, though at the price of a single encompassing definition, is developed to encompass all the complexity and diversity of political participation forms existing today. (Jan W. van Deth, 2016)

Lilleker & Koc-Michalska state that new forms of political action that came together with the process of digitalisation (the growth of social media, for instance) make it possible to create

or join communities transcending state boundaries, engage not only in national politics, but also in transnational and global organizations and campaigns (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, pp. 21–22) Digitalisation is therefore beneficial for transnational communities, such as diasporas, in the times of their political mobilisation. Indeed, diasporants, being embedded in minimum two national contexts, may take advantage of both traditional and less conventional tools of political participation, as well as other actors on the national levels. However, in diaspora studies they try to highlight interventions specifically characteristic for diasporas mobilized in regard of their home counties. Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff lists several most noticeable diaspora interventions in the homeland: economic remittances, philanthropy, human capital and political influence (including international advocacy and participation in peace processes). (Brinkerhoff, 2011, p. 119) Dana M. Moss, in her study of diaspora mobilisation during the Arab Spring, emphasises a somewhat similar, but differently accentuated list of contributions or roles —broadcasting, representing, brokering, remitting, and volunteering on the front lines (Moss, 2019, p. 8, 2020, p. 1680). The survey, composed for the actual research, is focused on a broader spectrum of activities than those that are characteristic to diaspora mobilisation according to the corresponding literature. Such an operationalization decision will be elaborated on and justified in the methodological section of the thesis.

However, diasporas do not exceptionally mobilize in relation to homeland causes, which is of interest in the actual thesis, but they may as well mobilize towards (and the results of such mobilization can be felt in) the host lands and the third lands or parties. (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, pp. 500–501; Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, p. 3; Koinova, n.d., p. 1298; Quinsaat, 2022, p. 1) From the point of view of the homeland there can be two modes of diaspora action: a *conflictual* one (for example, protests, forming governments in exile, putting pressure on the home state for policy change on certain issues) and a *complementary* one (for example, soft power and public diplomacy framework, with diaspora-or sections of it- following the home state agenda to strengthen national interest driven images and ideas abroad). From the side of the host lands, there can be three ways to approach diaspora activism on their territory: *enabling, passive and hindering*. The host land's attitude is of high importance for the diaspora mobilization. (Haider, 2014, pp. 222–224; Toivanen & Baser, 2020, p. 52) Diaspora's position in relation to certain home-oriented goals depends on its linkages to certain host land's political contexts (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007b; Koinova, 2012). For instance, diaspora embeddedness in a pluralist interest representation system is to a

higher extent correlated to lobbying than diaspora embeddedness in a corporatist interest representation system.(Koinova, 2017, p. 603) However, how exactly host land political processes influence diaspora mobilization remains understudied. (Koinova, 2016, p. 512)

I will now go over to another question of high interest concerning political mobilization of different groups, including diasporic ones, that reads as: What drives political mobilization? There have been attempts to approach the problem from very different perspectives, many of which contain the emotional component.

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, considering diaspora mobilization in regard of both the home country and host country, highlights two important underlying factors, motivation and psychological empowerment. In case when diasporants consider the cost-benefit rational of mobilization as reasonable (are motivated to mobilize) and at the same time believe that they have both material and non-material recourses to achieve the goals, feel positive emotions and self-efficacy (are psychologically empowered), they are more likely to mobilize. (Brinkerhoff, 2008, pp. 77–78) (Diener & Biswas-Diener, Bandura, Esman in Brinkerhoff, 2008, pp. 77–78)

That kind of driving force, also known as intrinsic motivations, presupposes freedom of choice and self-regulating behavior. People, according to that understanding, are more motivated to act when they evaluate the activity to be enjoyable, personally satisfying, personally useful or valuable. (Ryan & Deci in Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 22) Unlike selfish intrinsic motivations, extrinsic motivations suggest lower levels of freedom of choice and that people conform to social norms when making behavioural decisions (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 23) , seeking approval and rewards from others. (Deci in Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 23) According to this understanding, there is more likelihood of action when the perceived or actual reward, for example, positive feedback from peers or earning social capital, is evaluated as high enough. (Deci et al. Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 23) Besides, highly beneficial combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, when an expectation of rewards makes the activity personally fulfilling, take sometimes place.

(Ryan and Deci in Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 23) Darren G. Lilleker and Karolina Koc-Michalska claim that when it comes to political participation (on the material of a survey conducted on a representative sample of the U.K. electorate in the time of elections and high politization) it is namely such a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that lies behind. The last ones, however, are the most significant drivers of participation, be it offline or online spheres of activity, which the authors explain by a prosocial nature of the political activity: "driven by a desire to have an impact as well as gaining rewards and recognition". (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 34) The authors still admit, that motivation can predict willingness to participate, which is however a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the action itself. (Chen & Tung, 2014)." (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 26)

Maria Koinova and Dženeta Karabegović consider several underlying rationales of diaspora mobilization causal mechanisms, namely: cognitive, symbolic/value-based, strategic, networks-based and, at last, emotional. The authors underline that the mechanisms are not isolated from each other, but rather complete each other in a way that domino pieces do – that is, sequentially. Emotional mechanism, for instance, should only be studied in contexts, and even being a dominant one in a particular context, it cannot be considered in isolation from other rationales. (Koinova & Karabegović, 2020; Nikolko, 2019, p. 1879)

The emotional is an essential factor within the social movement theory and its attempt to explain political mobilization by group identification. Group identification is "the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the individuals". Group identification suggests "caring about the outcomes of a group" and being able to mobilize in support of the group. Group identification is considered to be a significant force, determining behaviour. The stronger the identification with a group is, the more commitment is required in the name of the group, the greater the personal satisfaction (or disappointment) with the outcomes of the group. (McCauley, Fisher&Wakefield, Simpson et al., Griffith, Eighmey, Tilly, McAdam et al., Gamson in Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009, pp. 243–244) Group identification theory echoes in some way the CAI account of political emotions theory that I will elaborate on in the next section of the thesis and base my analysis on in the main section of the thesis.

Dana M. Moss, in her tern, focuses on more "external" factors driving mobilization and enumerates four important (but not exhaustive) specific conditions, that may have a greater or lesser impact on mobilisation, namely, the needs of the home country rebellion, the degree of geopolitical support from the host country and third parties, activist resources and access to the front lines. (Moss, 2020) She also indicates two main obstacles to diaspora mobilisation, the lack of geopolitical support, for example the host countries' policies that restrict diasporas' possibilities to make remittances to their homelands, (see also the above-mentioned enabling, passive and hindering approaches to diaspora activism) and transnational repression. Both the former and the latter turn transnational activism into a high-risk enterprise. (Moss, 2016, 2019, pp. 7–8, 12–17)

Moss calls the host lands on to support the diasporas in their fight against authoritarism in their homelands. The means she suggests, along with the protection from transnational repression, are in vein with the ways of reducing diasporas' involvement in violent activities in host countries (see the previous section), namely fighting discrimination of diasporic groups and incorporating them in the decision-making process in a representative way, so diasporas are treated as heterogeneous multivocal groups. (Moss, 2019, pp. 16–17)

A call to consider diasporas as multivocal groups (Hall and Kostić in Brinkerhoff, 2011, p. 133; Moss, 2019, pp. 16–17) echoes in some way Koinova's call to "unpack" the concept of diaspora and overcome both the understanding of diaspora as a monolithic entity and the triangular relationship between diasporas, home states and host states. Koinova highlights such agents within diaspora as individual actors, institutions, and network. She argues that multiple linkages those diaspora agents have to different context both in home- and host-countries and beyond them (for example, international organizations) structure (though not determine) their global relationship and behaviour. (Koinova, 2017, pp. 597–598, 601, 615, 2018, p. 1263)

Other notions relevant to the analysis of diaspora mobilization regarding the home country are that of diaspora's loyalty towards the home country and the kind of patriotism that lies behind the diasporants' actions.

2.1.3 Diaspora, loyalty, and patriotism

"But in what way will in our time be expressed the patriotism of an Irishman in the United States, who by his faith belongs to Rome, by his nationality to Ireland, by his state allegiance to the United States?"

L.Tolstoy "Patriotism and Christianity" (1894)

The processes of diasporization and growth of literature on diasporas, as it was mentioned earlier in the section 2.1.1, challenge the notion of a nation-state. (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007a, pp. 491–492, 496–497; Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011; Ragazzi, 2014, pp. 75–76, 87) This implies, in its turn, calling into question the notion of loyalty, that is a traditional attribute of one's belonging to a state. Nation-state is a «speaking name», meaning that a national belonging represents the key source of loyalty for states. National belonging is traditionally expressed through citizenship. Citizens are then expected to show loyalty to their states in exchange for state rights, security and protection. (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, pp. 1–2)

Globalization, international mobility and mass migrations of the world of today, often resulting in the incongruence of residence, nationality, and citizenship, gave birth to "shades of citizenship", both in terms of legal status (for example, multiple citizenship, denizenship, residence permits, and domicile status) and in terms of understanding of loyalty as a marker of citizenship (a gradual acceptance of "divided loyalties"). (Altikulaç, 2016, p. 28; Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, pp. 3, 7–8; Chander, 2001, pp. 1005, 1007–1008, 2001, p. 1054; Gándara, 2018, p. 32)

Loyalty is also traditionally considered as a "bearing" component of patriotism (Bar-Tal & Staub, Hurwitz & Peffley, Spinner-Halev &Theiss-Morse; Sullivan, Fried & Dietz in Altikulaç, 2016, p. 27), which has however recently been called into question. There appeared

such distinctions as obedient versus disobedient patriotism, imitational versus innovator patriotism, ignorant versus oppositional patriotism, irrational versus rational patriotism, supposed versus genuine patriotism, shallow versus deep patriotism, strong versus moderate patriotism, extreme versus moderate patriotism, authoritarian versus democratic patriotism, blind versus constructive, critical and even unpatriotic patriotism. (Morray, Adorno; Schatz, Staub & Lavine; Staub in Altikulaç, 2016, p. 27; Schatz , Staub, Mehmet Melik Kaya, 2022, pp. 103, 105; Westheimer in Parkhouse, 2018, p. 36; Wellenreiter, 2021, p. 3; Vincent, Kodelja, Kahne, Ellen in Zembylas, 2014, pp. 1145–1146, 1151) Though the criteria that lie in the ground of these oppositions are slightly different, the notion of loyalty is always in the core of them. Blind patriotism is characterized by dogmatic acceptance and unconditional loyalty towards the politics and actions of the state. Any criticism towards the state can be considered as a threat within this kind of patriotism rhetoric, which is conservative and status quo protective. (Schatz & Staub in Altikulaç, 2016, p. 27; Finn, Westheimer in Parkhouse, 2018, p. 35; Wellenreiter, 2021, p. 3) The alternative "constructive" patriotism is a more democratic version, implying critical approach, political action, status quo challenging and social change. Patriotism, in terms of love of a country, manifests in this case through improvement upon faults. (Staub, Yazıcı & Yazıcı in Altikulaç, 2016, pp. 27–28; Wellenreiter, 2021, p. 3) It is being argued that the emotional attachment to one's country is coerced in case of a blind patriotism, and freely given in case of the constructive one (Merry, 2020, p. 3). It is further being claimed that this second variant of patriotism, restricted from the point of view of the loyalty shown towards the state, is not only possible, but beneficial and even necessary to a democratic state. (Altikulaç, 2016, p. 32; Mehmet Melik Kaya, 2022, p. 103; Merry, 2020, p. 8; Nussbaum, 2012; Parkhouse, 2018, pp. 36, 44; Primoratz, Merry in Zembylas, 2014, pp. 1146, 1151)

Along with loyalty such characteristics of patriotism as love and individual's desire of being a part of a community are emphasized . (Bar-Tal & Staub in Altikulaç, 2016, p. 27; Nussbaum, 2012, p. (Nussbaum, 2012, pp. 217–218; Nathanson in Zembylas, 2014, p. 1145)). It is natural that humans show compassion towards the place and other humans they love and belong to, however this ability is restricted. (Rapoport in Altikulaç, 2016, p. 27; Merry, 2020, pp. 4–5; Nussbaum, 2012, p. 219; Nussbaum in Parkhouse, 2018, p. 36) Some thinkers consider it to be a reason why global citizenry, cosmopolitanism, equal caring of citizens for all other citizens is still quite utopic- it is too abstract and "watery" to satisfy humans' restricted altruistic concern and search for belonging. (Altikulaç, 2016; Chander, 2001, pp.

1047, 1049–1050; Cyprian & Krauss, 2011; Nussbaum, 2012) Patriotism they find to be a more particularistic and therefore viable alternative. (Nussbaum, 2012, pp. 218–220)

Marianna Papastephanou is however critical to such a dichotomy of patriotism and cosmopolitanism and suggests to consider inward and outward patriotism (another binary opposition), where the latter is compatible with cosmopolitanism, and even conductive it. (Papastephanou, 2013, p. 20) Both patriotisms can be critical, but while the inward patriotism's critical energy is entirely directed at domestic issues, the outward patriotism comprises a consciousness of how one's collectivity relates to outsiders in terms of inter-state and of inter-human relations and expectations for the collectivity to reach higher standards in relation to what lies outside. (Papastephanou, 2013, p. 29) Papastephanou provides an example of compatibility of an outward patriotism and cosmopolitanism: *"Love of one's country may mean high ethico-political expectations about how others are treated and shame about failures of the loved community to reach the ethico-political standards that it should be capable of."* (Papastephanou, 2013, p. 27)

Patriotism is another notion that is interesting to apply to the study of diasporas, though the literature on the intersection of the two notions is quite poor: Google Scholar gives, as of 2.09.2023, 48 results to the search "diasporic patriotism" and 30 results to "diaspora patriotism", most of which only tangentially touch on the subject. Diasporas of today are often considered by the home countries as a sphere of their influence, and the latter want the former to show loyalty. (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, p. 2) Diasporas, however, may choose any stance between a wholehearted support to the home countries and its policies and resistance to the current regime. (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, p. 8; Chander, 2001, p. 1019) Diasporants may, in terms of patriotism, opt between loyal patriotism and critical one. As for such options as "being apolitical" or "being global citizen", they are not given to diasporas. According to the approach that understands diaspora as outcomes or practice, being diaspora necessarily implies political stance and action (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, p. 4; Grossman, 2019; Haider, 2014, p. 211; Quinsaat, 2022, pp. 2–3; Ragazzi, 2012, pp. 1264–1265), hence those who are both indifferent and inactive towards the homestate cannot be considered as diaspora members at all.

Given diasporas are not monoliths, but multivocal groups (Brinkerhoff, 2008, pp. 83–86, 2011, p. 133; Haider, 2014, p. 212; Toivanen & Baser, 2020, pp. 54–56), I also argue that diasporas, in the same way as those who live in the territory of the home country, can be

divided, and even polarized by the kind of patriotism they show. The recent examples of such polarization are numerous cases of clashes between anti- and pro-regime sections of Eritrean diaspora abroad. (Norway, Sweden, Israel) (NRK, 2023; Sandven, 2023; Staff, n.d.; Tjørhom, 2023) Anti-rallies are neither an unusual form of protest among Russian diasporants. (Glimstad, 2022) I will elaborate more on it in the analysis section, on the material of the actual case. Loyal and critical diasporas, or sections of a diaspora, do presumably correspond to the two above-mentioned types of relations between diasporas and home states, namely complementary and conflictual ones. (Toivanen & Baser, 2020, p. 52)

Both loyalty and patriotism are emotions, that can, according to the Nussbaum's definition, be considered as political: they are directed to the political domain, and "*take as their object the nation, the nation's goals, its institutions and leaders, its geography, and one's fellow citizens*". (Nussbaum, 2012, p. 217, 2013, pp. 1–2) The next section of the thesis presents an overview of the existing literature on political emotions that goes over to the theory, that emphasize as relevant for the actual research, the CAI account of political emotions.

2.2   Political emotions

«We have to get our hands dirty by entering the feared emotional terrain. »

M. Nussbaum "Teaching Patriotism: Love and Critical Freedom" (2012)

Emotions have come their way from being seen as a purely psychological phenomenon to being acknowledged as a "glue" that connects us as members of a society. The current section briefly describes emotions' long way to the political domain and provides one of the multiple theories about how this kind of glue- political emotions- works.

2.2.1 Emotions: from psychological to the political domain

Emotions are a product of a complex synergy of different kinds of logical forces - cultural, structural, cognitive and neurological. (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 9) Therefore, the study of emotions is carried out across multiple disciplines, such as biology, neurobiology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and political science. (Leach, 2010, p. 1828) (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, p. 10) Such a multifaceted nature is an evident reason for the difficulty in defining emotions. Definitions of emotions include several components that may vary according to the theoretical perspective and the needs of the research. Engelken-Jorge (2011) enumerates the elements of emotions that Turner and Stets (Turner & Stets, 2005, pp. 2–10) elaborate on: "the biological activation of key body systems," "cultural definitions and constraints on what emotions should be experienced and expressed," "the application of linguistic labels (...) to internal sensations," "the overt expression of emotions through facial, voice, and paralinguistic moves," and "perceptions and appraisals of situational objects or events." (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, p. 11) However, Aurelio Arteta (in Engelken-Jorge, 2011, p. 11) argues that there are only three necessary aspects of emotions: their valence (positive / negative); their cognitive components, and their motivational force. Nussbaum's set of components defining emotions is more complex, but in her turn she claims that bodily states and processes do not need to be included in the definition, because there is no constant correlation between certain emotions and their bodily manifestations, due to the plasticity of the human body. (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 58–59)

Such a multivocal discussion is quite new to the topic of emotions. Just half a century ago they were disregarded in the realm of the political study and under-theorized by sociologists due to then existing in the classical liberal tradition dualism "reason versus emotion". Within this dual framing of the concept, emotions are perceived as a threat to a rational society. (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, p. 7) A new field of inquiry, the sociology of emotion, emerged in 1970s and challenged the reason/emotion dualism through many new theoretical approaches, such as dramaturgical, cultural, ritual, exchange, structural, evolutionary theories, to mention only some. The sociology of emotions has made a remarkable progress over the last decades. Emotions are considered today as "the glue binding people together" and sociologists wonder how they and their predecessors could have overlooked the significance and role of emotions in the social science. (Turner & Stets, 2005, pp. 23–25)

It is worth to notice that feminist sociologists were among the first who put in use brand new lenses to investigate emotions. Arlie Hochschild, for instance, in her publication "The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling" (Hochschild, 1983) elaborates on such new concepts as *the emotional labor* and *feeling rules* on the example of women employed by the airline industry. (Boler, 2015, p. 1492)

Another example is the feminist politics of emotions, Megan Boler's approach that she first applied in her emblematic book "Feeling Power: Emotions and Education" (Boler, 1999). Such an innovative approach contributed to the radical shift in both the field of emotions and that of education. Boler herself mentions two reasons why she then chose the feminist politics of emotions. The first one was the paradoxical contradictory traditional association of emotions with women, who were, on the one hand, considered "naturally" too emotional, and thus too irrational, to participate in public or political life. On the other hand, women had further to cultivate their emotionality in order to play their roles as mothers and teachers and in order to train the upcoming generations in proper emotions and values. The second reason for adopting the approach was that no one dared to discuss emotions as a scholarly topic, as knowledge, at the time. (Zembylas & Schutz, 2016, pp. 18–19)

Boler's innovative epistemology and methodology that took its starting point in the slogan of second wave feminism, the "personal is political", reinforced the understanding of emotions as an inextricable part of the socio-political domain. Both Hochschild's and Boler' works, though focusing on different areas of social interaction, are among feminist writings that have fueled a perspective on emotions as collectively and socially produced experiences, that can only be understood through culture and ideology. (Zembylas & Schutz, 2016, pp. 17–18)

Despite the pathbreaking significance of the feminist intervention in the issue of emotions, philosopher Miranda Fricker criticizes feminists for perpetuating the same false polarisation of reason and emotion. Feminists' fight against the dominant mode of reasoning that is seemingly supportive of men's interests at the cost of women's perception of the world resulted, quite understandably, in the distrust of reason itself as a tool of patriarchal oppression, and in the superiority of emotion in the feminist thought. Such a one-sided position prevented feminists from integrating themselves in the contemporary philosophy. Fricker elaborates on a more balanced model of reason and emotion, characterized of alignment rather than opposition, where emotion and reason are interdependent and mutually constitutive.(Fricker, 1991, pp. 14–15)

"Neither reason nor emotion is independent from the other, but nor is either reducible to the other. Reason presupposes emotion since what is rational depends on emotional preferences about different possible conclusions or outcomes; and emotion presupposes reason since our emotions require rational interpretation if they are to come above ground. [...] I hope that the recognition of how each presupposes the other, and an emphasis on how both are simultaneously learned through culture, provides such a [mutually constitutive] model." (Fricker, 1991, p. 19)

Fricker thus call on feminists to take on a less categorical stance towards reason. At the same time, she aligns herself with feminists in linking emotions to the social context that conditions not only emotional responses deemed appropriate in given situations but also the ways they are expressed. The social system also serves as a filter through which both emotions and reason are formed and acquired simultaneously, which renders them interdependent and presupposing one another. Prioritizing the context in studies of emotions, the author argues, would help to avoid further dichotomies within the initial emotion/reason opposition, such as, for instance, the "sensation/judgement" false dichotomy. (Fricker, 1991, p. 16)

Neurological studies very soon proved the interconnected nature of reason and emotions. Experiments showed that if the part of the brain responsible for consciousness, awareness and cognition (cerebral context) was disconnected from the emotional centres of the brain, individuals' ability to make rational decisions suffered and the decisions made under this condition varied from irrational to sub-optimal. (Damasio, 1994) From yet another perspective, sociologist Randall Collins (1993) also challenges the rational choice theory by putting the concept of the emotional energy in the centre of rational action. There are several facts that make him come to a hypothesis that choice is not exclusively guided by the rational element: 1.some classes of behaviour appear to escape from cost/benefit analysis (emotional behaviour, altruism, and morally or value-motivated behaviour generally); 2. there is no common metric that would make it possible for actors to compare cost and benefits among different spheres of action (how to compare life, power and honour?); 3. There is much evidence that individuals in natural situations do very little calculating (is the concept of "rational choice" more a metaphor than an actuality?). By using the term "emotional energy" Collins discusses how emotion drives behaviour. (Collins, 1993, pp. 203–205, 226) This very function of emotions to mobilize, to order subjective experiences, to energize and direct

responses - the motivational function in a word (Turner & Stets, 2005, pp. 10–11) -renders emotions a highly relevant topic within the social and political science.

Another theory that emerges by the turn of this century and echoes somehow the concept of the emotional energy but goes both deeper, beyond the limits of the human consciousness, and wider by transcending the limits of the human body, is the theory of affect. The so called "affective turn" that draws on both psychoanalytic and philosophical works such as Silvan Tomkins', Baruch Spinoza's, Gilles Deleuze's, and Brian Massumi's, is another more recent radical shift in understanding emotions. Affect is a non-conscious experience of intensity, a moment of unformed and unstructured potential, that cannot be fully realised in language, and is always prior to and/or outside of consciousness (Massumi, 1995, in Boler, 2015, p. 1493) "Affect is the body's way of preparing itself for action in a given circumstance by adding a quantitative dimension of intensity to the quality of an experience." (Shouse, 2005, in Boler, 2015, p. 1493) Affect can pass between bodies like a current of electricity, which renders the distinction of the individual from the environment problematic. (Brennan, 2004, in Boler, 2015, p. 1493) Emotions, within the affective theory, are considered as qualified intensities, affective intensities, captured by language, culture, and discourse. Affects, unlike emotions, are claimed as "autonomous" and "asocial". (Massumi, 1995, in Boler, 2015, p. 1493).

Boler, the author of feminist politics of emotions, criticizes the theory of affect for the recolonization of emotions, because the affect theorists consider such powers as language, culture, and discourse as "delimiting the radical potential of affects by rendering them static and fixed". The ability of affects to escape capture renders them more promising in the eyes of the adepts than already named and coded emotions. Among other points of criticism that Boler addresses to the popular affective theory is not paying tribute to its historical feminist predecessors, who arguably laid the groundwork for the most recent radical turn in the study of emotions, as well as being too poetic and little applicable in the classroom and other spheres of social interaction. Boler questions the potential of the "asocial" affect to face the multiple contemporary social challenges. (Boler, 2015, p. 1493) (Zembylas & Schutz, 2016, pp. 23, 25)

And though some authors of the affective turn are trying to explore the political, economic and cultural tendencies of the world of today (the three dimensions that are dubbed as "social" in conjunction) (Clough & Halley, 2007), it is still obvious that "language, culture, and discourse" that capture emotions represent at the same time the mediators through which the

phenomenon of emotions can be gripped. The tools of studying emotions are multiple and accessible and the focus is more socially specific, which renders emotions (and political emotions in particular) a more relevant object of inquiry, than affect, within the actual master's thesis, aiming to embrace both the phenomenon and the context.

Points of intersection of politics and emotions are becoming increasingly multiple. Among such areas where politics and emotions meet and where both studies and debates have recently emerged are, to mention some, conflict and post-conflict situations, social movements, political campaigning and communication, the processes of governance and policymaking, humanitarian impulse in politics and international relations. In fact, political discourse, narrative and rhetoric are generally very linked to the emotions. (Hoggett & Thompson, 2012, pp. 4–7)

The relationship between emotions and the political sphere is interestingly investigated by Miranda Fricker by means of the rationality concept. Rationality as opposed to logic is grounded in priorities, aims, interests, values as well as emotions, and is therefore quite flexible. Due to its flexibility, it serves the current political system, for example, by regulating the codified emotional responses within society. Fricker argues however that emotions are characterized by a degree of autonomy and their expressive power cannot be reduced to that of rational judgement. Thus, so long as we listen to each other attentively, draw the subterranean emotions to the surface, articulate them, share them, give them enough space, discuss their political significance as well as the suitability of the current accepted rationality, we may allow a not yet sanctioned or codified emotion to reform, in its turn, what is deemed rational. In other words, emotion can become a force for political change, Fricker argues. (Fricker, 1991, pp. 17–19)

In the introductory chapter of his book «Politics and emotions: The Obama phenomenon», published in 2011 Marcos Engelken-Jorge still avoids speaking about «political emotions» (the word combination is only used once, when referring to *typically* political emotions), but elaborates on different ways to integrate the concept of emotions into political analysis. (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, p. 14) He summarizes the main controversies about emotions in political analysis and lists up four points, outlining the nature of challenges related to such research. As a master student, whose interest of inquiry lies in the intersection of the political and the emotional, I do face all of these challenges and, by answering these questions, have to assemble my own research design.

1. Should an author strive to strictly distinguish between such similar and overlapping phenomena as emotions, moods, feelings, bodily appetites (following McDermott and Hall) or should he or she avoid «excessive rigidity or definitional dogmatism» (following Nussbaum, as well as Connolly, Verhulst, Lizotte)? Should a s/he go beyond the boundaries between the phenomena and rather speak of, for example, «affect» or «enjoyment», referring to a kind of «existential electricity» or «affective energy» that can help to explain motivational aspects relevant in political analysis (following Slavoj Žižek, Jason Glynos, Glyn Daly, Yannis Stavrakakis, Daly, Clough, Lacanians, Howarth)? (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, pp. 11–13)

2. Should an author classify emotions according to the classical valance-based typology (positive vs negative emotions) (following Hobbes, Spinoza, Turner and Stets) or go beyond this conceptualization to a more differentiated set of emotional and behavioral responses (following Huddy, Lerner, Keltner, Lazarus and oth.)? Another solution is to focus on typically political emotions, a list of which, however, varies from author to author (Schmitt, Laclau, Mouffe, Arteta and others)? (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, pp. 14–15)

3. Should an author, investigating emotions and their political effects, pay more attention to personality traits (following, for example, Civettini, Gould, Leach) or the context (following, for example, Spinoza and Goodwin)? Or perhaps both to the same degree? (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, p. 15)

4. Should an author take into account only intersocietal variation of emotions that, according to Nussbaum, can be based on the physical conditions, the metaphysical, religious and cosmological beliefs held by a social group, certain social practices, language and social norms? Or should an author go further and also take into consideration intrasocietal variations, that, according to Craig Calhoun, can be explained through the notion of "emotional habitus" that varies over time and from individual to individual within a society? Another way to tackle the issue is to distinguish between primary emotions (more natural, such as happiness, fear, anger, or sadness) and secondary, or higher-order emotions (combinations of primary emotions, more socially constructed)? The distinction is still not unproblematic according to Turner & Stets and Goodwin. (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, pp. 15–16)

Indeed, researchers did not dispose a ready-made set of tools to approach political emotions but had to adopt both a theoretical perspective and a methodology every time they tried to grasp the nature of the phenomenon. The methodological possibilities were broad: from individualistic methodology to a contextual analysis of emotions, from quantitative to qualitative approaches, from focus on beneficial to ambiguous and complex effects of certain emotions on politics. (Engelken-Jorge, 2011, p. 8)

The methodological challenges of approaches to political emotions are still here today in 2023, but the concept itself has been paid much more attention to since 2011. Impressively enough, a Google search gave 18,900 results for 'political emotions', and 8,470 for 'political emotion' on 10 January 2013. On 15 February 2020 the figures totaled 160,000,000 and 132,000,000 respectively. (Demertzis, 2020, p. 12) Today, three years later, on 11 January 2023 the same search results are already 552,000,000 and 266,000,000 respectively. A note should be made here that on a more recent occasion in 2023 the search results were lower than in 2022, still higher than in 2020 and much higher than in 2011. Such variations presumably depend on Google algorithms and the device settings. The numbers, however, are high enough to justify a consideration of the notion of political emotions "a litmus test" indicating the remarkably increasing interest towards the emotional within the political, and the role the former plays within the latter. (Demertzis, 2020, p. 12)

However, the definition of the concept "political emotion" is going gropingly and differs from theory to theory. Like emotions generally, political emotions lack a well-established definition. Each author choosing political emotions as a field of inquiry has to answer at least two questions. First, what emotions are political? For instance, those politically contextualized, "placed" and "known"? (Griffin, 1982, in Fricker, 1991, p. 18) Or those directed at public objects, such as nations, their leaders and institutions? (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 1–2)) The second question is about the degree of collectiveness of political emotions.

Thomas Szanto and Jan Slaby, authors of the theory of political emotions grounded in their collective affective intentionality give elaborate answers to both questions, as well as methodological recommendations to further studies on political emotions. Besides, their use of "affective" is rather synonymous to "emotional" than opposed to it, as within the affective turn theories. In the following section, I will provide a detailed description of the theory, followed by some more justification of the CAI account's relevance for the actual research.

2.2.2 The collective affective intentionality (CAI) account of political emotions

Affective intentionality is the understanding of emotions as constituted by two intrinsically linked components: intentional evaluation and affective import. Emotions are then seen as "feelings-towards" (Goldie, 2000, in Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 481), or "felt evaluations" (Helm, 2001, in Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 481). The approach has recently been applied to collectives, which resulted in the emerging of a collective affective intentionality (CAI) account (Schmid, 2009; Guerrero Sánchez, 2016; Thonhauser, 2018, in Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 481) Thomas Szanto and Jan Slaby go further and suggest to apply the CAI account to political emotions, warning at the same time against considering the last merely as "cognitive appraisals or evaluations of import in the service of political judgment". (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, pp. 481–482) Political emotions are rather experienced, felt in certain ways by individual group members (Guerrero Sánchez's "feeling-towards together") and do not require a supra-individual subject, a collective emotion bearer. Applying CAI account to political emotions however presupposes that the latter must be jointly felt, which goes beyond affective interactions between citizens and is rather formulated by authors as "affectively shared evaluations that disclose concerns of political import". (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 482)

Szanto & Slaby have developed three subsidiary criteria, considered as necessary and in conjunction sufficient, that can be applied in order to define emotions as political in the robust sense. (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 482):

1. The members' emotions have a double affective-intentional focus: (a) a focus on the same matter of political import and (b) a background focus on the political community itself.

2. Members implicitly or explicitly claim public recognition of the emotions and their import for the polity.

3. There are certain reciprocal relations between the community's emotional outlook and that of the members: The very shared nature of political emotions must feed into the individuals' felt experience, or their affective concern for the polity, and it must have normative impact on their emotion regulation, their political motivation and comportment and on the appropriateness of their emotions. Thus, there will be an affective and normative integration of the members' emotions.

The authors also argue that it is necessary to differentiate not only between individual and shared political emotions, but also between different levels of emotional sharing, and they suggest to distinguish at least three such levels (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, pp. 484–485):

a. Weakly shared political emotions; at this level, sharedness is based on social appraisal or on the socio-communicative sharing of information. An individual's emotional appraisal of a political fact or event is influenced and modulated by relevant others' appraisals (Rimé, 2007, in Szanto & Slaby, 2020, pp. 484–485), as for example when individuals' xenophobic fears are reinforced by polarized peer-discussions.

b. Group-based political emotions; here, political emotions are based on individuals' self-categorization as members of a political community and their concomitant group-identification. In addition to their appraisal of certain political facts or events, such emotions also re-evaluate one's relation to the (putative) group, and typically serve as "amplifier" of the emotion (Halperin, 2016 in Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 485) Think of feeling guilt, shame, or indignation "in the name of" one's group.

c. Finally, we have more or less diachronically robust, public, and properly speaking collective political emotions. These are precisely based on a shared and jointly felt evaluation of the target in light of the community's concerns. This level requires actual interaction between community members in shared public spaces.

It is worth noticing that, unlike many other accounts of political emotions, the CAI theory doesn't consider those emotions that have a politically relevant focus but are in no way relevant to a political community, as "political emotions" properly speaking, but rather as "politically focused emotions". (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 485) To compare, properly speaking both political and politically focused emotions fall under Nussbaum's definitions of political emotions, that is those that "do with political principles or the public culture", "take as their object the nation, the nation's goals, its institutions and leaders, its geography, and one's fellow citizens seen as fellow inhabitants of a common public space". (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 1–2) The CAI account's clearness of the phenomenon boundaries, delimiting it both from non-political emotions and political emotions not relevant for collectives, provides more theoretical rigor and can therefore be beneficially applied to the current research.

Several more points can be enumerated to support the argument for the potential fruitfulness of the theory for the Russian diaspora mobilization case.

- The definition of political emotions, adopted within the CAI account of political emotions, emphasizes their collective nature in a sense that they are "jointly felt" by the members of a collective, which however does not turn the collective into the bearer of the emotions experienced- they are still felt by individuals. Such a balance between the individual and the collective will in the best possible way illuminate the nature of the phenomenon in focus- political emotions emerged within the collective of the Russian anti-war diaspora.

- As political emotions are jointly felt by individual members of the community, and not by a collective, the authors call on the researchers to adopt phenomenological tools of investigation. The members' lived experiences, they argue, should therefore be in the focus of inquiry. (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, pp. 481–482) Such a phenomenological methodological directionality may be a promising tool for catching the very essence of the phenomenon.

- The subsidiary criteria the authors develop in order to define emotions in a more precise and easy way as properly speaking political lie beyond the purely emotional realm (they are directed to the community where those emotions emerge) and have clear boundaries. (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 482) Such tangible criteria turn the theory into an easy-to-apply tool. The theory also provides researchers with an additional and likewise clearly formulated classification, namely, that of the levels of sharing of the emotions, which represent an additional attractive theoretical tool.

- Another justification for the choice of exactly CAI account of political emotions is that the theory itself is quite new and requires more empirical research to be confirmed, challenged or extended. (Yin, 2014, p. 51)

I will therefore dedicate one of the subsections in the main part of the thesis to the analysis of the political emotions, underlying the political mobilization of the Russian diaspora in Norway through the lens of the CAI account of political emotions.

3 Methodology, broad philosophical assumptions, and quality of the research

The thesis adopts a research design that combines phenomenological study and case study: *phenomenological case study*.

Phenomenological study is a research design aiming to describe the "essence" of a phenomenon, to grasp the very nature of it. Phenomenologists collect data from the individuals who have themselves experienced the phenomenon of inquiry, e.g. grief, insomnia, anger, being left out, and on the ground material of several lived experiences they develop a description of the common meaning, or essence, of the experience for all the participants. (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 75; Dalland, 2012, p. 49; Spinelli, 2005, p. 9; Van Manen, 2016, p. 10) Some authors argue, however, that the unique and minority themes and individual variations are important as counterpoints and should also be taken care of. (Groenewald, 2004, p. 51; Hycner, 1985, pp. 292–293) The ultimate description of the phenomenon answers the questions about "what" is experienced and "how" it is experienced. (Moustakas, 1994 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 75; Spinelli, 2005, p. 131) The most characteristic method to collect material within phenomenological study is interviewing. However other sources of data, such as poems, observations, and documents, can also be used. (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 77)

Phenomenology has philosophical roots. A definition of "phenomena", generally accepted among philosophers, sounds as "the appearances of things, as contrasted with the things themselves as they really are". Immanuel Kant, for example, argued that our mind cannot ever know the thing itself, the true nature of reality, but can only know it as it appears to us- the phenomenon. (Spinelli, 2005, p. 6) Kant was one of the first philosophers who employed the term "phenomenology". The term was, however, reinvented and supplied with new meaning by another German philosopher and mathematician Edmund Husserl. He founded phenomenology as the science of phenomena, the science about how objects present themselves to our consciousness". (Spiegelberg, 1982 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 75; Spinelli, 2005, p. 6) Alfred Schutz was the first thinker who introduced phenomenological ideas to the social sciences. His position on the necessity to apply a more relevant approach to the study of the social reality than that which is well applicable to the world of nature is reflected in the following famous passage (Schutz, 1962 in Bryman, 2016, p. 27):

"The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not "mean" anything to molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist—social

reality—has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these thought objects of theirs which determine their behaviour by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men [and women!], living their daily life within the social world."

Since then, phenomenology has turned into a popular approach within, among others, sociology (applied by Borgatta & Borgatta, Swingewood), psychology (Giorgi, Polkinghorne, Wertz), nursing and the health sciences (Nieswiadomy, Oiler), and education (Tesch, van Manen). (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 75)

The authors who have adopted the phenomenological approach have some common philosophical assumptions, such as: it is a study of the lived experiences of persons; the experiences are conscious; and the study implies the development of descriptions of these experiences' "essences" (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 75; Spinelli, 2005, pp. 20–21) However, beyond these basic assumptions, phenomenology nowadays is not a clear-cut tool. Its philosophical arguments vary from author to author, as well as its analysis techniques. John Creswell and Cheryl Poth (2018) highlight two significant types of the approach. The first type is *hermeneutic phenomenology* (Van Manen, 1990, 2014 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 77–78; Van Manen, 2016), oriented towards lived experience and interpreting its meanings, "the texts" of life. The second one is so called *empirical, transcendental, or psychological phenomenology* (Moustakas, 1994 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 77–78) that is focused on describing participants' life experiences, rather than interpreting their meanings. The last approach provides a researcher with both systematic algorithms of data analysis and guidelines for producing descriptions, which renders it a better applicable tool. I will therefore adopt the empirical approach to phenomenology in my present master's thesis. The approach's major procedural steps, according to Moustakas, are the following (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 79–80):

1) Determine if the research problem is best examined by using the phenomenological approach.
2) Identify a phenomenon of interest to study and describe it.
3) Distinguish and specify the broad philosophical assumptions of phenomenology.
4) Collect data from the individuals who have experienced the phenomenon by using in-depth and multiple interviews.
5) Generate themes from the analysis of significant statements.
6) Develop textural and structural descriptions.
7) Report the "essence" of the phenomenon by using composite description.
8) Present the understanding of the "essence" of the experience in written form.

A phenomenological study design has recently been quite often combined with a case study design, forming a phenomenological case study. (DeFeo & Caparas, 2014; Imbody, 2019; Nielsen, 2006; Sumsion, 2002) Google Scholar gives about 5,740 search results for "phenomenological case study", around 200 of which were published before the year 1999 and well over 5000 were published after the year 2000, data as of April 3, 2023. Without paying much attention to exact numbers, I would like with this example to stress researchers' interest in this composite design. It is however necessary to first characterize its case study component briefly before I proceed to highlight the advantages and relevance of such a combination.

A case is a system bounded, for example, by time and place, a system, that has some concrete manifestations and is studied in-depth within a real-life context. (Yin, 2014, p. 34) It can be a concrete or less concrete entity, such as a small group, an organisation, a partnership, as well as a community, a relationship, a decision process, a specific project. (Yin, 2014 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 96) A case study may be an option when examining contemporary events (which embraces the present or the recent past (Yin, 2014, p. 24)), provided that the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated.(Yin, 2014, p. 12) While some authors argue that a case study is just defined as a fact of setting boundaries around the area in focus (Stake, 2005, Thomas, 2015 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 96), others consider it as a full-fledged

methodology, a comprehensive research strategy. (Denzin&Lincoln, 2005, Merriam&Tisdell, 2015, Yin, 2014 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 96). As a methodology the case study approach involves multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audio-visual materials, documents, reports). It also presupposes a case description and case themes.

Researchers distinguish between single-case studies and multiple-case studies (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 96–97); holistic case-studies (a single unit of analysis) and embedded case-studies (multiple units of analysis) (Yin, 2014, p. 50); explanatory, exploratory and descriptive case studies (Yin, 2014, pp. 8–11, 19); case studies using quantitative or qualitative evidence or both. (Yin, 2014 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 97; Gerring, 2007, pp. 10–11; Yin, 2014, p. 19) According to the criterion "intent of conducting" two types of a qualitative case study can be distinguished, an *intrinsic case*, a unique case that needs to be described and detailed, and an *instrumental case*, selected to shed light on a specific issue or problem. (Stake, 1995 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 98) Case study can be combined with other types of qualitative research, such as basic study, ethnography, grounded theory and phenomenology. (Merriam, 1998, p. 12)

The following procedures are identified for conducting a case study (Stake, 1995, Yin, 2014 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 99–102):

1) Determine if a case study approach is appropriate for studying the research problem.
2) Identify the intent of the study and select the case (or cases).
3) Develop procedures for conducting the extensive data collection drawing on multiple data sources.
4) Specify the analysis approach on which the case description integrates analysis themes and contextual information.
5) Report the case study and lessons learned by using case assertions in written form.

Some of these procedures echo the steps of the phenomenological approach: determining if the approach is appropriate to the study, identifying the focus of the research, preparing to,

and conducting data collection, interviewing as a possible and often preferable alternative of receiving data, generating themes and rich descriptions, writing up summary and conclusions. Another common ground of the two approaches is the inseparable nature of the phenomenon/case units and the context, and the need to take the latter into account. (Yin, 2014, pp. 16–17) (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 33) (citation check) Such similarities render the two designs well compatible, which is presumably the reason for the relative popularity of the composite phenomenological case study design in recent years. There are however some significant differences between the two components, the phenomenological and case study designs, as the former looks deeper inside a specific phenomenon, trying to grasp its invariant nature, while the latter looks wider within the boundaries of a case, aiming to grasp the interplay between sometimes multiple elements and contextual details within boundaries. In contrast to phenomenology, which is always descriptive and qualitative and originally atheoretical (individuals' lived experience is in focus of inquiry) (Spinelli, 2005, pp. 20–21), a case study allows the use of multiple data sources, possibly encompassing both qualitative and quantitative data, and the employment of a theoretical framework. (Yin, 2014, pp. 17, 19, 41) Due to these differences the two designs have a potential to enrich each other within the composite phenomenological case study. Such a combination creates an attractive zooming-in and zooming-out effect, enabling the researcher to see the phenomenon at both micro and macro levels.

Here are some of the reasons why I find phenomenological case study a fruitful design. I will later in the section 3.1 elaborate on why I find the design relevant for exactly my topic and my purposes. In order to provide my current master's thesis research with a clear structure and a robust pivot, I have combined the algorithms of phenomenological and case studies, that echo each other in many ways, and sketched a composite list of procedures of conducting a phenomenological case study. I have moved the reflections about philosophical assumptions to the end of the algorithm and also added reflections on the quality of the research as a separate step. I place the two at the end, though (and because of the fact that) they both rather have a pervasive nature and permeate in a way the whole research process.

Here is the new composite algorithm of conducting a phenomenological case study:

Step 1. Determine if the combined phenomenological case study research is appropriate for studying the research problem.

Step 2. Identify a phenomenon of interest to the study and boundaries of the case that the phenomenon is imbedded in.

Step 3. Develop procedures for and conduct data collection drawing on multiple data sources, including in-depth interviews with individuals who have themselves experienced the phenomenon.

Step 4. Generate themes from the analysis of significant statements.

Step 5. Generate descriptions of the essence of the phenomenon: its manifestations and lived experiences.

Step 6. Write up summary of the study, eventual and outcomes implications.

Step 7. Distinguish and specify the broad philosophical assumptions of the research.

Step 8. Reflect on the quality of the research.

The rest of the methodological section of the thesis will be organized according to the above algorithm. I will go from point to point elaborating on the different sides of my master research project.

3.1 Determine if the combined phenomenological case study research is appropriate for studying the research problem.

The research problem that I have an ambition to shed light on in the current study is *"What are the manifestations and the lived experiences of the political mobilization of Russian oppositional-minded diaspora after the invasion of Ukraine 24.02.22?"* Phenomenological case study, or more specifically, *phenomenological instrumental single-case study of a mostly*

descriptive nature, with however some exploratory and explanatory elements, I argue, is a relevant methodological approach for my current master research project. The phenomenon I am interested in here is "political mobilization" and the main concept I put in use as a theoretical lens is "political emotions". Authors of the collective affective intentionality (CAI) account of political emotions, a theory that provides both a robust definition of political emotions and a classification of them by levels of sharing, call on the researchers to adopt phenomenological tools of investigation. They emphasize that one of the main characteristics of political emotions is that they are jointly felt by individual members of the community. The members' lived experiences should therefore be in the focus of inquiry. (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, pp. 481–482)

Methodological tools, provided by the case study component, also represented a significant contribution to the research problem coverage. Multiple data sources and methods of data collection, providing both qualitative and quantified evidence, ensured data and methodological triangulation. (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 2) It was done by completing and confirming the data on the phenomenon various manifestations, as, for example, community members' various contents of identity and tools of political participation. The possibility to employ a theoretical frame, also provided by the case study design, resulted in a better understanding of the phenomenon in light of an elaborate theory of political emotions. Another benefit of such a methodological choice is the development of the theory itself.

A phenomenological case study is thus a relevant approach to grasp the phenomenon of the political mobilization at both micro level (the lived experiences) and macro level (through its external manifestations and the collective affective intentionality-CAI- account of political emotions), the ambition that is reflected in the research problem.

3.2 Identify a phenomenon of interest to the study and boundaries of the case that the phenomenon is imbedded in.

I consider the phenomenon of interest, "political mobilisation", as embedded in a case, bounded by time, place, as well as other criteria. To specify, this is the case of political mobilization of Russian oppositional-minded diaspora (diasporic identity and political views criteria) in Norway (place boundary) during the first year after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian Federation (time boundary). As for the time boundary, all the data were collected right before (the pilot respondent) or after (three other respondents) the anniversary of the invasion. I consider it as a good timing, because on the one hand the memories of the lived experiences are still quite fresh, on the other hand it is already possible to register some changes in the participants' emotional state and activity level through the time. Besides, anniversary, with all the multiple demonstrations around the world (*Victory for Ukraine! Freedom for Russia!*, n.d.), is a symbolic enough date to resurrect in memory and heart those first days of invasion.

An additional sampling criterion was the age of moving abroad from Russia. I wanted to interview the antiwar-community members who grew up in the post-soviet Russia and were a part of its largely apathetic society and patriotic (in sense of a loyal patriotism) educational system, in hope to grasp the transition between political apathy to political participation.

In the text of the actual thesis I speak interchangeably about "Russian antiwar community", "pro-democracy community", "Russian oppositional-minded diaspora", "anti-war diaspora" meaning the group of Russian-speaking people, living or temporally finding themselves abroad (in Norway in this case), who have any kind of connections with Russian Federation, who do not support Russia's official politics (the full-scale war in Ukraine in particular) and have been outspoken and politically active in this regard since 24.02.2022. I will touch on the problem of the definition of the community as diaspora in the data discussion section.

The next section is dedicated to the data collection procedures, starting with the justification of the three methods put in use, moving forward to discussion of each of the methods and rounding off with some ethical and language issues.

3.3 Develop procedures for and conduct data collection drawing on multiple data sources.

Both the theoretical frame of the research the methodology that derives to some extent from the theory, and the research problem *("What are the manifestations and lived experiences of the political mobilization of Russian oppositional-minded diaspora in Norway?")* implied the use of *qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews*, aiming to get the lived experiences of the phenomenon. *Surveys* focusing on the political participation tools were a subsidiary method that resulted in a quantified data. (Bryman, 2016, p. 631) The data have eventually contributed to the answer to the first part of the research problem, namely manifestations of the political mobilisation. Manifestation can be defined as "the act of becoming manifest, becoming perceptible to the senses". ('Manifestation', 2023) Another dictionary defines it as "an event, action or thing that is a sign that something exists or is happening; the act of appearing as a sign that something exists or is happening." (*Manifestation Noun - Definition, Pictures, Pronunciation and Usage Notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.Com*, n.d.) A phenomenon can manifest itself, appear, become perceptible by kind and degree, both qualitatively and quantitively. Political mobilization, for example, may manifest itself by foundation of a political association or by increased number of members of an already existing association. I argue therefore that the quantification of some of the data in my current research is justified. The numbers received have besides enhanced the claim itself that the members of the community of interest were politically mobilized.

In addition to the two first methods, I decided to conduct *qualitative content analysis* of several social media and the official internet site of the nongovernmental organization "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia", where most information about the political activity of the oppositional-minded Russian diaspora in Norway is concentrated, both reports, news, projects, plans, campaigns, investigations, and discussions, to mention some. This last method has provided the research with evidence, contributing to the discussion of the phenomenon manifestations, the tools of political participation, and also triangulated (confirmed or completed (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 2)) some identity contents reported by the respondents themselves.

The research project as an example of mixed methods research

The current master's thesis research applied a method consisting of three components- a qualitative interventionist one (interviews) , a quantitative interventionist one (surveys) and a qualitative noninterventionist one (content analysis), and can therefore be considered as a mixed methods research. (Bryman, 2016, p. 635; Lund, 2012, p. 156) The quantitative component is embedded in the qualitative one and aims to enhance the qualitative approach by triangulating it through both completing the data and confirming it where it overlaps. The completeness is needed to better cover one of the research questions, namely the question on manifestations of the political mobilisation phenomenon, and to arrive at a more comprehensive account of the phenomenon of inquiry. The surveys that have resulted in quantified data were conducted simultaneously with the qualitative interviews of the corresponding respondents. The noninterventionist qualitative content analysis of several relevant social media sites and an internet site was conducted afterwards, which represents a sequential phasing of data collection. (Bryman, 2016, pp. 639–641)

I will now elaborate on how the procedures for each of the methods were developed and how the data collection was conducted for all the methods applied. I will first describe the method of qualitative interview, then surveys and qualitative content analysis at last.

Interviews

Qualitative in-depth interviewing is a method of data collection, generally accepted among phenomenological researchers. To get access to the "essence" of the phenomenon researchers pose questions to those who themselves have experienced the phenomenon. The types of interview phenomenologists practice are usually defined as semi-structured or unstructured, they want respondents to speak spontaneously and in detail about their experiences.

Interviews can however not be so unstructured that they miss the focus. (Bryman, 2016, p. 470) To focus my interviews, I listed up several concepts on the base of the research questions and, to some extent, the theoretical framework of the thesis. Those concepts, that I build my interview guide on, are: "political emotions", "patriotism", "diasporic identity", "political participation". To ensure a degree of phenomenological freedom and spontaneity I posed mostly open-ended questions and did not ask at all about specific political emotions, allowing the respondents themselves to verbalize different sides of their emotional experience (please, read the section *"The list of emotions"*, where I justify the use of a broad range of emotions in form of cards as a visual support during the interviews). I also avoided leading questions. The interview guide (please, see Appendix 8.4) is divided into two main blocks, the block of political emotions and that of identity contents. The third final block contained questions of structuring type, a kind of rounding off.

Process of interviewing

Four semi-structured interviews were conducted in total and they from 2 to 3 hours each. Two of them took place in public libraries, at quiet and private locations. The two others took place in preordered colloquium rooms at university campus, where full privacy and good sound conditions were guaranteed. The conversation started each time with an introduction, where I talked about the procedures concerning sound recording, the themes of the interview and the data protection issues. I partly repeated the information indicated in the information letter that all the participants had received in advance. We usually had some snacks and drinks on the table. The atmosphere was relaxed, friendly, trustful, warm. Such an atmosphere can mostly be explained by the fact that both I and each of my respondents represented the same community and my respondents were aware of my position, though it wasn't prominent during the interview itself. We had met each other before mostly in connection with the community issues (e.g., protests, charity concerts, lectures) and the topic of the interview was of high importance for both my respondents and me. It was not problematic at all to recruit respondents, none of those whom I asked to take part in the project refused. All of them found two hours for the interview in their timetables and did it promptly. One of them answered: "Yes, if it helps!" to my invitation to talk about the political mobilisation. I can assume that

the fact itself of participation in the project was experienced at least by some of the respondents as a tool of political participation. I have, however, not received more evidence concerning this assumption.

The type of the questions I asked varied. There were introducing, follow-up, probing, specifying, direct and indirect, structuring, and interpreting questions. The set and order of questions could vary according to the natural flow of the conversation. Silence was another way to give the respondents the opportunity to amplify their answers. (Bryman, 2016, pp. 472–475) My main job in the process of interviewing was however to attentively listen and to carefully correct the direction of the conversation, without however leading it to some desirable outcomes- quite a challenging task for a fresh interviewer. An interviewer should be active, attuned and responsive to what the interviewee is saying and doing, without, however, being too intrusive. (Bryman, 2016, p. 475).

Sampling of participants

I had several approaches to sampling of participants (Bryman, 2016, p. 409):

- typical case sampling approach, as I was interested in interviewing typical representatives of the community of interest- somehow connected to Russia (from their own perspective), oppositional-minded, outspoken, and politically active in this regard;

- criterion sampling approach, as I was interested in interviewing individuals who met the criterion of having grown up in Russia;

- maximum variation sampling approach (an implicit one), as I tried to select respondents of different age (about 10 years difference between the youngest and the eldest), gender and occupation.

The information letter says the following to the participants themselves (please, see the Appendix NN for the full text):

"Why are you being asked to participate?

I ask you to take part in the project because you have grown up in Russia, you represent Russian diaspora in Norway, you have been outspoken about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and you have expressed your disagreement with the Russian official politics by means of different political tools."

Sample size is an issue that always provokes much discussion. According to the methodological specificity of the research, namely phenomenological research that is supposed to look in depth (Bryman, 2016, p. 418), I have landed on a sample of 4 respondents. The number also corresponds with recommendations found in methodological books for phenomenological studies. To explore a phenomenon a heterogenous group of individuals who have themselves experienced it should be identified. The group may vary in size from 3-4 to 10-15 individuals, according to Creswell & Poth (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 76), or 3-10 participants according to Dukes. Some authors however recommend larger sample sizes for phenomenology. (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 159) The scope and limits of a master dissertation made me follow the recommendation of a quite small sample size.

A list of emotions

In the first part of the interview, covering the block of political emotions, I used cards with emotions as visual support. I decided to provide the respondents with such a visual support for two reasons. Firstly, an interview that is being audio recorded might have been perceived as a stress situation. It is also a situation limited in time. It would have been easy to miss or forget

something important. The second reason for using a list of emotions as a support is to try to avoid social desirability bias, distorting answers to conform to social norms. (Neuman, 2014, p. 330) A kind of a social norm among Russian oppositional-minded diaspora in Norway was condemning Russia's both international and domestic repressive politics. As an insider of the community, I witnessed prevalently negatively tinged discussions on all physical as well as virtual platforms of the community. There was a risk that my respondents would exclusively focus on the negative sides of their experience, not because the positive ones were nonexistent, but because it was not normal to speak about the latter, to verbalize positively valanced emotions among the members of the group. My concerns would be justified later, which I come back to in the section NN. However, to provide the respondents with a well-balanced list of emotions of both valences looked like a face-saving strategy, a signal that it was possible and normal to also talk about the positive. (Neuman, 2014, p. 330) This second reason to use the visual support was however a later insight, that I got already during the pilot interview. As I was a representative of the group, my initial list of emotions was quite biased by the negative valence and consisted mostly of negatively tinged emotions. Only 7 (belonging, calm, compassion, contentment, empathy, gratitude, interest) out of in total 35 emotions were conditionally positive. My pilot respondent was however quite inclined to speak about the positive sides of experiencing the phenomenon of political mobilization. I therefore adjusted the list after the pilot interview and added 6 more positively tinged cards: solidarity/cohesion/unity (all in one), trust, love, relief, joy, and pride. I also changed surprise to shock and expectations to expectations/hope, as two more relevant «hooks», and interest to interest/curiosity, in order to specify. Besides I deleted "hurt" as being too general and unspecified, and "overwhelmed" because of some difficulties of translation to Russian, when the Russian most popular equivalent does not convey the nuances and connotations of the English most popular meaning. As experiencing the "overwhelm"-emotion is partly covered by other emotions from the list, as well as by a number of emotions experienced simultaneously, I decided to delete it throughout, instead of dealing with translation difficulties. I elaborate more on the language issues later in this section.

The initial list of emotions, that I wanted to be a visual support for the interviews, was developed on the ground of Brené Brown's "Atlas of the heart: mapping meaningful connection & the language of human experience". Brown's approach seemed relevant to apply

in the thesis because of its exhaustive outlook and the interconnections between emotions, experience, and language that phenomenology itself is so interested about. The book draws on the author's extensive research into the emotions and experiences that "make us who we are" and define what it means to be human and cultivate new meaningful connections. (Brown, 2021) (*Atlas of the Heart*, n.d.) Brown explores eighty-seven emotions that she defines as layers of biology, biography, behaviour, and backstory, and sorts into 13 different "places" on her "map" (*Atlas of the Heart List of Emotions - Brené Brown*, n.d.), places we go (when):

- things are uncertain or too much
- we compare
- things don't go as planned
- it's beyond us
- things aren't what they seem
- we're hurting
- with others
- we fall short
- we search for connection
- the heart is open
- life is good
- we feel wronged
- to self-assess

I picked one or several emotions/experiences from each "location" to ensure my list represents "a wide geography" of emotions, or, in other words, a wide spectrum of emotions, and does not lead the respondents to one of the "locations" in particular.

Survey

The survey form consists of a list of political participation instruments (the first column) and three columns marking some time periods: when living in Russia, when living in Norway (before 24.02.22.) and when living in Norway (after 24.02.22.). The column devoted to the instruments of political participation, contains a broad spectrum of tools from properly speaking political to politically motivated (Jan W. van Deth, 2016, p. 12), some of which are

nationally specific (for example, sitting in the board of housing associations in Norway actually implies work aimed at solving community problems and can therefore be considered as political participation, according to van Deth's conceptual map (Jan W. van Deth, 2016, p. 9)) and some that do not relate to the war (and diasporas activities?) The main purpose of this list is not to classify activities relevant to the mobilization, and even not to list up activities that each of the respondents adopts within the mobilization (though both of the research questions are relevant and partly illuminated by the survey-result), but rather to catch the participants' inner transition from the passive, apathetic state to the active, mobilized, engaged state.

Respondents were instructed to tick the fields according to their individual political participation experience- which tools and in which periods of time did they use. Some lines were intentionally left empty, and respondents were instructed to fill in the lines if some tools, important from their perspective, were missing. The data received were supposed to be quantified to demonstrate the dynamics of political participation for each respondent from period to period, and especially on the border of the 24th of February 2022. Please, read more on the quality of the quantified data in the section 3.8.

The survey also contained a question on the respondent's age when s/he moved from Russia, according to the criterion sampling approach, where my criterion was "grown up in Russia". The survey has resulted into a bar chart and a summary table of the participants 'answers.

Both the survey form, the bar chart and the summary table can be found in the Appendices, 8.3, 8.7 and 8.6 correspondingly.

Pilot interview and survey

I have already mentioned some adjustments resulting from pilot interviewing. Both interview guide and survey were pilot tested by the means of a technique called "cognitive

interviewing". According to the technique, pilot respondents were asked to verbally report the thinking process during the data collection session. The technique opens up a window into the respondent's thinking and the problems (e.g., of interpretive character) they may face during interviewing or filling out the survey. The information received from the respondents is then used both to refine the questionnaires and the process itself of data collection. (Neuman, 2014, pp. 358–359)

I implemented the technique with my first respondent. The instruction was given to "think out loud" while answering both the interview questions and the survey questions, to give comments on the questions, formulations, order of questions, whether it was difficult to interpret some of the questions, etc. The technique turned out to be quite informative and fruitful. First of all, as I mentioned above, the list of emotions (in form of visual support cards) was adjusted after the pilot interview. Secondly, both interview guide and survey were slightly adjusted too. The question that was added to the final block of the interview reads as follows: *«Could we have had the same conversation in English or Norwegian, not Russian? Would the language have changed something? »* The survey became longer with a "political participation tool" line, namely, *"taking part in seminars/lectures/other educational events on social and political issues"*. Though such activity is not purely speaking a tool of political participation, my pilot respondent insisted that individuals' interest to such a kind of educational events may be an important manifestation of political participation. Last, but not least, I could evaluate an approximate time needed to conduct the data collection and cover all its blocks in a normal tempo.

I would underline that both the list of emotions in the interview and the list of political participation tools in the survey represented rather a visual support and were individually adjustable. The respondents were instructed that they could as well talk about other emotions, ones they didn't find on the cards, and write in other political participation tools in empty lines of the survey, ones that were more relevant for the respondents themselves and that I didn't include in the list. Such flexibility of the surveys could not damage the quality of the research, I knew, considering my techniques and purposes. (Please, see the corresponding section on quality of the data quantified.)

The data collected during the pilot interviewing and survey conduction seemed to be very useful and valuable from the phenomenological point of view, especially some formulations and metaphors received from the pilot respondent. I took therefore a decision to include these data in the data analysis process. All the necessary GDPR and methodological procedures were followed, in addition to an oral permission for me from the pilot respondent to analyze and store the audio-recorded data.

Qualitative content analysis

Quantitative content analysis typically entails applying predefined categories to the sources being analysed. (Bryman, 2016, pp. 557–559) sources I have decided to focus on were the main website and several social media profiles of the nongovernmental organisation "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia", the sites where news, reports, discussions, plans, projects etc. of Russian oppositional-minded activists from diaspora are concentrated. The sections I was particularly interested in were: *the title of the group, "intro" and/or "about us"- sections, when the first post was published, the number of followers, projects and/or events.* The data collected were filled in the Table 1. After that I systematically looked through the titles and descriptions of the events, news, projects, and other happenings in order to sketch the spectrum of both *activity forms* and *topics in focus* of the community- the two main categories of my inquiry. The Articles of organization (*Formål og vedtekter*, n.d.) and step-by-step description of how the organization came about (*Foreningen SmåRådina*, n.d.), both given on the main website, provided me with data not only relevant to the "manifestations"-section, but the "identity"- section as well, as a source of triangulation.

Language issues

Phenomenologists are after experiences that can not be fully channeled into what is "formulated in language". Though phenomenology is bound to language as the main tool of communicating experiences (along with such non-verbal mediums as gestures, facial expressions, painting, music, dance, visualization), the medium of language inevitably distances the researcher from the experience itself. The original experience can be distilled or enhanced by means of language. The researched should desirably have an elaborate language competence, that allow them to precisely and in detail formulate their experiences. (Eberle, 2015, pp. 565, 576–577; Gallagher & Schmicking, 2010, p. 46; Hycner, 1985, p. 295; Van Manen, 1984, p. 43,54, 2016) Conversely, language itself, belonging to a single socio-cultural context, limits our experiential possibilities. There are things that can be expressed in one language, and cannot be said in another one. (Van Manen, 2016, p. xiii)

Two languages are used in the data collection procedures. English is the language of the surveys, the information letter and consent form. I have however chosen Russian as the language of interviews, which implies both advantages and disadvantages for the research possess and quality. Russian language is both my native language and the native language of all my respondents, all of whom have excellent native language skills, both general and academic. All my respondents approved my choice, answering one of the concluding questions of the interview and saying that a conversation in Russian is more nuanced, meaningful, and richer in the sense of vocabulary. One of the respondents mentioned that different parts of his identity function in different languages, so to talk about his Russian identity Russian was, indeed, the right choice.

Besides, Russian is the main language of the communication between the members of the community of interest. It is also the main language through which the participants experience their protest. Speaking Russian during the interviews was therefore natural and presumably more fruitful than speaking any other language. The interviews in our common native language and a language, discredited in some way by the aggressive politics, bordered on therapeutic conversations and gave rich descriptions of the lived experiences.

However, managing data in other languages than the language of the thesis, indeed, involved some challenges. The biggest one concerns translation difficulties. It is not always easy to find precise equivalents and formulations, verbose explanations are sometimes needed. Emotions, for example, do sometimes have connotations that vary from language to language. If the accuracy of translations is not taken into account, the experience as such may become even more inaccessible to the researcher. The other challenge, interconnected with the first one, is that such translation procedures are quite time consuming.

It also needs to be mentioned that all the translations are conducted by the master student.

Ethical issues

To ask the others to participate in a qualitative study, to reveal what goes on behind the scenes in their everyday lives, even to share the intimate details of their lifeworlds is to ask a lot. Researchers are then responsible to ensure that the individuals they study are treated with fairness and dignity. (Hatch, 2002, pp. 65, 69) Ethical issues can arise at different phases of the research process. They can occur prior to conducting the study, at the beginning of the study, during data collection, in conducting data analysis, in reporting data, and in publishing the study. (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 53–54; Dalland, 2012, p. 165)

My master research project implies collecting, analysing, and storing sensitive, or so called "red", data. What makes my data sensitive, according to the classification generally accepted at the university, is information about the ethnicity and political views of the respondents.

It is interesting to note here that all the respondents demonstrate both their ethnic background and political views openly on different offline and virtual platforms, being outspoken and politically active concerning the war in Ukraine. A category of data that is more vulnerable

than the two mentioned above, and really sensitive in this case, is emotional experience, a topic almost bordering on (mental) health information.

The University of Oslo works together with Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research (Sikt) on questions concerning GDPR. (Dalland, 2012, pp. 169–170) It is where I had to send an application, followed by a detailed data management plan, as well as copies of the information letter and the consent form for participants, the interview guide and the survey drafts, the research project draft and a confirmation from my supervisor that collecting sensitive data was necessary for my master's thesis. After I have received positive feedback (equals approval) from Sikt, I could create a TSD account. TSD is the University's service for collecting, managing, and storing sensitive data.

The next step was the data collection itself. The participation in the project was informed and voluntary (please, see Appendix NN and Appendix NN for the information letter and the consent form). The invitation to take part in the project was made in person several weeks in advance to the data collection itself. The potential respondents then received a copy of the information letter. The consent process was clearly communicated both in written form and orally. The participants were assured that their participation was voluntary, and they had right to withdraw from the study anytime. The purpose of the study was as well disclosed to participants in both written and oral forms.

The data were collected with the help of a Dictaphone-application that was sending the data directly to the sensitive data storage. Surveys were conducted on paper, then pseudonymized and also imported to TSD. All the manipulations with the raw data (transcribing, coding, generating themes, etc.) were conducted directly in the TSD-service.

According to my data management plan, only anonymized parts of the data could be exported from TSD. Any information that could directly or indirectly lead to identification of the

participant had to be avoided in the final dissertation text. I therefore developed composite descriptions of the phenomenon (instead of descriptions based on data received from one respondent) not to place participants at any undue risk.

3.4   Generate themes from the analysis of significant statements.

The analysis will represent a composed algorithm deriving from both phenomenological and case study methodologies. I will first go through the data collected by means of the qualitative interviews, keeping the research problem and questions in mind, and highlight so-called "significant statements"- pieces of text that provide an understanding of how the participants experienced the phenomenon. (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 79) . So called horizontalization is an important rule of the phenomenological analysis, meaning that the researcher should avoid any initial hierarchical assumptions with regard to the items of descriptions and consider them of equal value and significance. (Moustakas in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 79; Spinelli, 2005, p. 21) The significant statement will be then united into clusters of meaning and themes.

The other methods of analysis, applied to the survey data and quantitative content analysis data, are briefly described in the corresponding subsections within the previous part of the section. The data, collected from the internet platform will then feed into some of the significant themes, confirming them. The same data, together with the surveys' results, quantified and analyzed by means of descriptive statistics, will constitute the undersection on the phenomenon manifestations.

3.5   Generate descriptions of the essence of the phenomenon: its manifestations and lived experiences.

In this section I will provide a description of the essence of Russian diaspora's political mobilization phenomenon. An ultimate description of the phenomenon essence should encompass "what" was experiences and "how" it was experiences. *"[T]he researcher develops a textural description of the experiences of the persons, "what" participant experienced , a structural description of the experiences, "how" they experienced in terms of conditions, situations, context, and a combination of the textural and structural descriptions to convey an overall essence of the experience."* (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 78) The textural description (the "what" of the phenomenon) will be fed by significant themes generated from the analyses of the qualitative interviews data and, at some extent, the quantitative content analysis data (as a source of corroboration). The textural description will be divided into two undersections, one covering the respondents' experience of political emotions and another one touching on their experience of some relevant identity contents. The structural description is (the "how" of the phenomenon) will constitute a separate undersection on manifestations of the phenomenon in focus fed mostly by the qualitative content analysis data, corroborated by the data acquired by means of surveys.

Somewhat separate section, "CAI account of the Russian anti-war diaspora in Norway" will represent an analysis grounded in both textural and structural descriptions of the phenomenon, seen through the lens of the CAI account of political emotions.

3.6 Write up summary of the study, eventual outcomes, and implications.

This is the last section, that should be written-up within the phenomenological research, according to Moustakas, that echoes the last section of a case study sounding as "Report the case study and lessons learned by using case assertions in written form." (Stake, 1995, Yin, 2014 in Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 99–102) The longer summary is, however, placed above the table of contents, according to the formal requirements for the master's thesis. A short summary will precede the list of outcomes of the research and its eventual implications for future studies. (Moustakas in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 239)

3.7 Distinguish and specify the broad philosophical assumptions of the research.

As the actual thesis combines both qualitative and quantitative, numerical, data (though the latter is of a subsidiary value), it can be considered to use a mixed methods design (Bryman, 2016, p. 635; Lund, 2012, p. 156), usually facing some philosophical challenge. Such kind of design does not fin the traditional division of qualitative and quantitative studies, each associated with a specific philosophical paradigm. Gert Biesta (Biesta, 2010) criticizes such "cluster", or "container", concepts as paradigm, positivism, as well as the notions themselves of qualitative research and quantitative research (Biesta, 2010, pp. 4–7) and suggest disassembling the clusters of assumptions and separately discuss different components of philosophical foundations. Such a discussion would create a more precise picture of strengths and weaknesses of a mixed-method study. (Biesta, 2010, pp. 5–7, 10) I will now very briefly touch upon such components, emphasized by Biesta, as data, methods, design, epistemological and ontological assumptions, and purposes of the research.

In my project I combine numbers and text (data) and make use of 3 different methods of data collection, qualitative interviewing, qualitative content analysis and survey (questionnaire), which result in mixing of interpretation and measurement. Both interventionalist (survey, interview) and noninterventionalist (qualitative content analysis) strategies, partly concurrently and partly overlapping (both qualitative interviews and content analysis provide data about the community members' identity and political views), which in the latter case results in the methodological triangulation (Arksey & Knight, 1999; Bryman, 2016, pp. 384, 386, 643)

Another component, Biesta lists up, is epistemological assumptions, assumptions about how knowledge is generated. The actual research is based on both qualitative and quantitative data, but it is not possible to combine different epistemological positions within one study.(Biesta, 2010, p. 10) The quantitative element of the current research is however of a subsidiary nature. The data received with surveys were quantified and represented by means of

descriptive statistics (a bar chart). The numbers are used to numerically describe how the respondents have become more politically active through time. The numbers then stand for qualities and play a purely descriptive function, which perfectly corresponds with the research's main purpose, namely, to describe. (Howitt & Cramer, 2017, p. 24,26)

Still, neither epistemological nor ontological assumptions of a phenomenological research are not clear-cut. Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann put forward a miner-metaphor for a researcher, who, as a miner, retrieves the hidden valuable metal, dig up the nuggets of gold, the knowledge, that is always there and waiting to be discovered that. The authors argue that the metaphor does not only stand for positivistic or empirical data collection, it can for example also stand "to some extent" for Husserl's search for phenomenological essences. The nuggets of gold, that are always there and are just waiting to be extracted, do not only represent objective facts, but also essential meanings. (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, pp. 67–68) The epistemological foundations of phenomenological research therefore lie somewhere between constructivism and positivism.

Ontological positions determine what kind of knowledge we are looking for. Discussion on the ontological ground of the phenomenological research is interlinked with the above-mentioned epistemological challenge. Phenomenological research "lies somewhere on a continuum between qualitative and quantitative research", between the subjective and objective ontologies. The lived experiences, from this point of view, consist of both subjective component and the objective one, that is in common with other people, the essence of the phenomenon. (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 76)

My master's thesis research thus lies in the domain of social ontology, or more specifically phenomenological ontology that gravitates to some extent towards objectivism. The thesis's main purpose derives mostly from the phenomenological methodological component and is to describe the essence of the central phenomenon, namely the political mobilisation phenomenon. Description is the first step towards both explaining and understanding. (King et al., 1994, p. 34)

I will now go on to the last step of my phenomenological case study algorithm and try to elaborate on the quality of the current research.

3.8 Reflect on the quality of the research.

When it comes to assessing the quality of the the mixed method research, Alicia O'Cathain highlights three different approaches: the generic research approach, the individual components approach and the mixed methods approach, where the last represents a more specific for the research type and detailed framework developed by the author herself (O'Cathain, 2010) . Taking into consideration a quite limited scope of my master's thesis, as well as a secondary nature of its quantitative component, I find the second option, considering mixed methods research as the sum of its qualitative and quantitative components, relevant for this case. I will thus first assess the main qualitative component of my research, applying to it the trustworthiness-criteria, developed by Egon Guba and Yvonna, and then provide a brief notion about the quality of the quantified insertion at the end of the section. (Bryman, 2016, p. 631)

Trustworthiness is made up of four subcriteria, each of which has an equivalent criterion in quantitative research (Bryman, 2016, pp. 384–386; Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 255–256; Spinelli, 2005, p. 130):

1. credibility, which parallels internal validity.
2. transferability, which parallels external validity.
3. dependability, which pedal is reliability.
4. confirmability which perils of objectivity.

Credibility is the assessment of the research findings, their acceptability by others. (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). Establishing the credibility entails, among other things, a reflection over the interplay of different elements of the research design. The literature review and theoretical frame provides a broad focus to the research. I had at the same time to ensure a high degree of freedom and spontaneity during the qualitative interviews, according to the principles of phenomenology. That is why, although the questions of the interview guide partly derived from the theory, they were mostly open and presupposing long and reflective answers. While asking about political emotions I avoided questions concerning specific emotions. Any kind of leading questions were as well avoided. The research questions give the direction to the research and justify the adequacy of the methods put in use. In this case, there are three different methods, qualitative interviews, qualitative content analysis and surveys. Data received from different sources and with different methods partly overlap, which results in the triangulation effect. Triangulation, methodological and data triangulation in particular, is one of the techniques to ensure the credibility of the research (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 2, 1999; Bryman, 2016, pp. 384, 386, 643; Yin, 2014, pp. 119–122) Another way to establish a better credibility of the research is a so called respondent validation of data, *"submitting research findings to the members of the social world who were studied in order to obtain a confirmation that the investigator has correctly understood that social world."* (Bryman, 2016, pp. 384–385) I have not conducted such a validation of descriptions or conclusions for two interconnected reasons: the limitedness of the time resources at my disposal and the sensitivity of data received. This type of data cannot be sent to respondents via e-post or usual messengers, so such kind of validation would have implied a new round of physical meetings with all the respondents, which I could not afford considering the date of thesis submission. However, the weakness was partly compensated by a frequent use of interpretive questions in the process of interviewing, aimed to verify my interpretation by tentative summaries and inviting participants to challenge or confirm my understanding. (Bryman, 2016, p. 475)

The criterion of transferability is an assessment of whether the research findings can be generalized, or transferred, to other contexts. According to Lincoln and Guba, whether findings "hold in some other context, or even in the same context at some other time, is an empirical issue". As a deep and intensive study of a bounded case, my research is rather oriented to the contextual uniqueness of a case being studied and aims to produce so called

thick descriptions of the case. Such rich and detailed accounts of the case provide others with a kind of a database, that they can use for making judgements about the possible transferability of findings to other milieux. (Lincoln&Guba, 1985 in Bryman, 2016, p. 384) Besides, such descriptive contextual data is necessary to understand behaviour of members of social groups, as it can only be studied in context. (Bryman, 2016, pp. 394–395)

Lincoln and Guba suggest that the merit of <u>dependability</u> can be ensured by the "auditing" approach. According to it, a researcher is supposed to keep an "audit trail", which means to keep complete records of all phases of the research process in an accessible manner. (Yin, 2014, pp. 48–49) A kind of an audit trail of my thesis research is spread between two locations: a Teams-group, where I collect and keep all the drafts of the research project, multiple notes on different sides of the thesis (so called memos), supervision sessions reports, literature search protocols, a copy of the information letter and consent form for participants, some anonymized notes made right after the interviews; and a TSD account, where I keep and analyse all sensitive data, such as interview audio recordings, transcripts and surveys, consent forms undesigned, data analysis procedural notes. Two weaknesses can be mentioned concerning accessibility of my data, both raw and under analysis, for peers. According to the data management plan, I am not allowed to take my sensitive data out of the TSD storage in a unanonymized condition. Another kind of barrier for audition by peers is the row data language, Russian. However, the row data are still there in TSD until the thesis is evaluated, and necessary data can be extracted, if the assessment demands it, with the exception of the information that may lead to the respondents' identification. Another way to enhance the dependability criterion when writing up the research is to demonstrate a high degree of methodological and philosophical reflectivity (Bryman, 2016, p. 388) on different choices done, to both reveal them to the reader and provide justifications for the decisions. I have tried to actively use this technique in the text of my current dissertation.

<u>Confirmability</u> implies acknowledging that research cannot be value-free and attempt to restrain the incursion of values in research by the means of self-reflexivity. (Bryman, 2016,

pp. 34–35, 2016, pp. 384–386; Dalland, 2012, pp. 60–61) Again, reflexivity arises as a tool of ensuring the quality of research, but this time such a reflectivity is directed towards the researcher's position in the research. Some authors, such as Guba, Lincoln, Denzin, Berger speak about the axiological philosophical assumption in qualitative research. *"[T]he inquirers admit the value-laden nature of the study and actively report their values and biases as well as the value-laden nature of information gathered from the field. We say that researchers "position themselves" by identifying their "positionality" in relation to the context and setting of the research."* (Berger in Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 21)

I consider myself and I am perceived by respondents as an insider of the group that is in the focus of the current research. We belong to the same generation and share a similar social status: well-integrated Russian immigrants. Besides, we share our political position in relation to the war. We met at anti-war protests and other thematic events, physical as well as online, which gives a strong feeling of identification with each other as a group. I also suppose that, as a researcher, I stand at the same power positions with my respondents, considering the fact that both me and them have an academic background, are acquainted with the interview method and perceive each other as of the same social status. So as an insider I have access to the meanings of the group. However, an insider position can also involve some disadvantages (Merriam et al., 2001, p. 411):

"It has commonly been assumed that being an insider means easy access, the ability to ask more meaningful questions and read non-verbal cues, and most importantly, be able to project a more truthful, authentic understanding of the culture under study. On the other hand, insiders have been accused of being inherently biased, and too close to the culture to be curious enough to raise provocative questions. The insider's strengths become the outsider's weaknesses and vice-versa. The outsider's advantage lies in curiosity with the unfamiliar, the ability to ask taboo questions, and being seen as non-aligned with subgroups thus often getting more information."

Both advantages and disadvantages of such a position were taken in account and reflected on during all the phases of the research process.

A brief note on the quantified data

The data resulted from the surveys were quantified and represented in form of a bar chart. I highlighted three categories ("When living in Russia", "When living in Norway before 24.02.22", "When living in Norway after 24.02.22") for the variable "Political participation". Each category got a score, depending on how many tools of political participation were put in use by each respondent during a definite time period. (Howitt & Cramer, 2017, pp. 25–26)

The data is only representative for single participants and cannot be used to compare individuals or to put them together in a sample in order to then statistically generalize the results to the whole populations of the group. The reason for this is that the sample of four is too small to be statistically significant, (Howitt & Cramer, 2017, pp. 7–8) the reason for the former is the calculation method itself for the variable "political participation". I initially listed up 30 tools of political participation, 4 more were added resulting from the pilot survey and in the process of filling out the surveys (please, read more on the data collection methods in the section 2.3) Each tool was assigned one score. Such a method is however not accurate enough, as tools extremely vary due to different characteristics, such as time consumption, level of responsibility for the others, risks, etc. To repost political art in social media is very different from organizing a rally, and to assign each of them one score is a high level of approximation. The instruments also vary in how political they are, which is reflected in the hierarchical conceptual map of political participation developed by van Deth. (Jan W. van Deth, 2016, p. 12) It would therefore be impossible to apply this method of calculation if one aims to compare the levels of political participation between individuals. One tool might outweigh several others considering the characteristics of the tools. Besides, within the current research, the participants are not asked about how often or how many times they have used each of the instrument.

I still argue that the data I have received with the help of the method is representative enough for single individuals. The bar chart (see Appendix 8.7) illustrates a significant growth in political participation for most of the participants after the full-scale war start. The number of tools increased in such a way that new tools were added to the arsenal of already known ones. However, another weakness of the survey is that it does not reflect the dynamics of participation level through the first year of the full-fledged war.

To conclude, I would like to stress once again that that the numerical insertion is a product of the descriptive statistics. The function of the last is, by definition, to describe in a more illustrative way the qualitative component of the research. The numbers stand for qualities and enhance the fact that the respondents were, indeed, politically mobilized in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. (Howitt & Cramer, 2017, p. 24)

The next three sections of the thesis reflect the research problem and the list of research questions, indicated in the introductory section. I will first elaborate on the manifestations of the political mobilization phenomenon, and then go over to the lived experiences of the phenomenon in focus, emphasizing separately the facet of political emotions and that of identity contents experienced. The last analysis section represents an outlook on the same phenomenon through the lens of CAI account of political emotions, a theoretical tool at the intersection of the abovementioned domains, political emotions and community identity.

It should also be mentioned here that a similar case study, exploring Russian migrants' engagement in pro-democratic transnational activism in Denmark and Norway and attempting to understand the role of emotions and group solidarity in collective action, has recently been published by Katrine Stevnhøj. (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 44) I will occasionally refer to Stevnhøj's research within the analysis and outcomes sections in order to mutually emphasize or- very rarely- question certain assumptions.

4 Manifestations of the Russian anti-war diaspora political mobilization in Norway

All the three methods of data collection, both qualitative content analysis, survey and- to a lesser degree- qualitative interviews, shed light on manifestations of the Russian anti-war diaspora mobilization in Norway. Interviews were formed to catch respondents' internal experiences of political mobilization. Sporadic and accidental mentions of some of its external manifestations are of a corroborating, and not complimentary, character. I will therefore not use the data collected by means of the interviews in this section, but focus mostly on the data acquired through the method of qualitative content analysis, triangulated by the survey results (in the end of the current section).

Qualitative content analysis's object was internet documents, namely SmåRådina's different social media profiles and the main website. SmåRådina, as it was mentioned in the introductory sections, is a nongovernmental organization in Norway, that has gathered together oppositional-minded Russians, be it official members of the organisation or unregistered like-minded, and turned into the centre of, at first, pro-democracy and, later, anti-war activities of Russians in Norway.

During the analysis I paid particular attention to sections such as: the title of the group, "intro" and/or "about us"- sections, when the first post was published, the number of followers, projects and/or event. After that I systematically looked through the titles and descriptions of the events, news, projects, and other happenings in order to sketch the spectrum of both activity forms and topics in focus of the community. The Articles of organization (*Formål og vedtekter*, n.d.) and step-by-step description of how the organization came about (*Foreningen*

SmåRådina, n.d.), both given on the main website, provided me with data not only relevant to the "manifestations"-section, but the "identity"- section as well, as a source of triangulation.

Table 1. *Summary table for the content analysis data (translated into English)*

	Website	Facebook (Norwegian)	Facebook (Russian)	Taplink	Instagram	Telegram (private group)	Telegram (public channel)	YouTube
Title:	SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia	SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia	Non-indifferent in Norway	SMÅRÅDINA	Foreningen SmåRådina	Non-indifferent in Norway	Currants | SmåRådina	SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia
Number followers:	-	1100	**2280**	-	942	201	275	26 (802 views)
Date of 1st publication:	26.03.2022	17.04.2021	4.02.2022	-	21.04.2021	27.02.2022	27.04.2022	28.12.2021
Intro:	"SmåRådina is a place for everyone who cares about Russia and the development of democracy in Russia."	"SmåRådina is a place for those who care about Russia and Russia's democratic development."	"For your and our freedom."	"We are for democracy in Russia and against the war in Ukraine!"	"Community for change for the better✌"	"You are not alone" (profile picture text)	«SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia»	-
Add. text:	"We in SmåRådina are against the war in Ukraine. The bombing must be stopped now!"	"Support our work. Become a member."	-	"Join and read smaaraadina."	"Russians in Norway against the war 🕊"	-	"Russians in Norway. We are against war and for democracy in Russia."	-
Link:	https://smaaraadina.no/nb/	https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=494989138969572&set=g.4660815910722 61	https://www.facebook.com/groups/for.frihet	https://taplink.cc/smaaraadina	https://instagram.com/smaaraadina?igshid=MzRlODBiNWFlZA==	Private, no link available.	https://t.me/smaaraadina	https://youtube.com/@smaaraadina?si=GVE-_TgVfaAHg-vm

All the platforms partly differ from each other in terms of functionality, purposes pursued and the target audience. The platform itself determines to some extent both the target audience (Norway or Russian community in Norway) and the dominant language (Norwegian or Russian). Telegram-messenger is popular among Russians, the target audience of both the group and the channel are mostly Russians who live in Norway. The public channel represents a kind of newsfeed stream, directed from the organization to the audience, while the private group (a group chat) implies multiple users sending messages to the entire group. The group is divided into several branches: the main one, "chatting and memes", "news and analytics", as well as branches named by Norwegian cities – Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim, Bergen and Tromsø- and intended for discussions relevant for the corresponding cities. Instagram is also mostly oriented to the Russian-speaking audience, with a profile header and publications in Russian. There are in total 118 post as of 24.02.23, and 10 highlights with saved stories, all concerning the community's multiple activities (I will later list up both the forms of activities and the topics in focus). Two more internet platforms aimed to Russians, with Russian as a dominant language, are the (sub)group on Facebook, called "Non-indifferent in Norway" (orig. "Неравнодушные в Норвегии") and YouTube channel "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia" (orig. "SmåRådina: for demokrati i Russland"), with in total 10 video-reports published starting from December 2021.

The three last internet platforms, namely the website "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia" (orig. "SmåRådina: for demokrati i Russland"), Facebook-group of the same name and Taplink landing page represent more official sources of information about the organization and- broader- the community. The dominant languages of the platforms are, correspondingly, Norwegian, Norwegian, Russian.

Website "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia" consists of 4 sections: *"current affairs", "projects", "about us", "support us".*

Current affairs:

- <u>News</u> (11 publications as of 24.02.23)

- <u>Events</u> (7 events as of 24.02.23)

- <u>SmåRådina in media</u> (29 links to Norwegian media as of 24.02.23, including 1 published before 24.02.22)

- Press releases (1 publication)

Projects: 3 projects published

About us:

- Completed projects (10 projects published as of 24.02.2023, mostly pre-war ones)

- Annual meetings (1 presentation from a meeting in PDF-format)

- The Articles of organization <u>(including, among others, purposes of the organization)</u>

The Articles of organization (*Formål og vedtekter*, n.d.) and the history of its foundation (*Foreningen SmåRådina*, n.d.), provided in the section, are both sources of data on external manifestations of the phenomenon in focus. They comprise, among other things, the information on the growth of the number of activists from "few" before the war outbreak on 24.02.22 ("the turning point") to "well over 100" (the number meaning official members of the organisation).

Support us: requisites for donations and information about membership.

<u>The main Facebook community</u> "SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia" is interlinked with 64 events as of 24. 02.22 (including 3 events before the invasion) where SmåRådina was either organizer or co-organizer. The group is following "Antikrigskommittén i Sverige Russians Against War" (a similar NGO of Russian diaspora in Sweden) and "Belarusisk Forening i Norge RAZAM" (a similar NGO of Belarusian diaspora in Norway).

Taplink contains the links to the membership form, solidarity foundation support page, upcoming events (tickets if relevant), information about asylum in Norway and links to the organization's other social media profiles.

The information on SmåRådina's different social media platforms has a partly overlapping and a partly complementary character. Several forms of activities (also operationalized as "instruments of political participation" in the survey) can be emphasized based on data received: *interviewing passers-by in the street, rally and anti-rally, protest march, protest speech, signature campaign, petitioning, fund-raising campaign, humanitarian aid collection, Nobel Peace Prize torchlight parade, condemnation, sending a letter to the officials, contacting media, showing concern about a report, written statement, support/charity concert, anti-war theatre play, meeting with experts, online meetings, writing letters to political prisoners, informal meeting of the community members, panel discussion, film screening, laying flowers and candles, memorial event, solidarity fest, starting solidarity foundation, corruption investigation, expression of support.* Such a wide spectrum of activities is also confirmed by Stevnhøj's research. (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 49)

The following topics of interest can be emphasized based on the content of SmåRådina's social media profiles: *war in Ukraine, genocide in Ukraine, "referendums" in Ukraine's occupied territories, violation of international law, tragedy in Bucha, Ukrainian children, refugees, Putin's regime, imperialism, mobilization in Russia, the border at Storskog, political prisoners, Navalny , the murder of Nemtsov, undesirable organizations, foreign agents, freedom of speech, media and propaganda, independent journalism in Russia, sanctions, Western extremists, Nobel Peace Prize, democratic development and human rights, peace and democracy in solidarity with Ukraine, anti-war initiatives, grassroots organizations, volunteering/activism and mental health.*

Both the list of activity forms and topics cover the period from 24.02.22 till 24.02.23. Speaking about the pre-war period, when SmåRådina already existed, it would be possible to supplement the lists with such activity forms as *street performance and election observation* and such topics as *Duma elections, changes to the Russian constitution and domestic violence*

in Russia. However, neither the enumeration of activity forms, nor the topics list are exhaustive, though both are extensive.

Most of the social media profiles analyzed have a currants-emblem in the profile picture (as SmåRådina means currants in Russian) and a white-blue-white design, referring to the Russian anti-war protest flag. ('White-Blue-White Flag', 2023)

Qualitative content analysis of the social media profiles turned out to be a fruitful tool illuminating the history of Russian pro-democracy community emergence and the creation of an organization on its basis, the first pre-war stage of activism and a significant increase in supporters and activity since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. The analysis not only shows the topical and instrumental diversity of activities, but also their multidirectional character: condemning the war in Ukraine, working for a "better" democratic future for Russia, supporting Russian political prisoners and Russian independent journalists, detecting and fighting Putin's propaganda, cooperating with similar organizations and grassroot initiatives in other countries as well as supporting similar organizations from Belarus, cooperating with the Nobel Peace Center and Norwegian Helsinki Committee, providing humanitarian assistance to Ukrainian refugees in Norway, initiating a discussion about the situation in Russia and nuancing the image of Russia in Norway, creating a pan-European platform for Russian diasporas (*Free Russians Network*, n.d.) as well as providing the community members themselves with the opportunity to come together and speak out on the basis of a safe platform.

The results of the content analysis are triangulated (confirmed) by the data resulting from the survey-method and showing an increase in such activities (operationalized as "instruments of political participation") as *signing up for a political organization, volunteering for a political organization, taking part in a (social media) political campaign, making and reposting political art in social media, writing letters and petitions to political decision-makers or opinion-shapers, contacting media, writing debate posts for media, being interviewed on political issues, organizing or taking part in political flash mobs, donating money to human rights organizations, political organizations and/or independent media, humanitarian donations in a political context, organizing and taking part in rallies.*

The survey also shows a sharp increase in activity after the full-scale war start for 3 of 4 participants. One of the participants report high level of participation even before the war,

within the community's pro-democratic activities in 2021. Two of the participants, who left Russia in their 20s, report some level of political participation already in Russia. The two others left Russia at the age of 15 and 18, they were quite young to politically participate and report law level of political activity.

The other thought-provoking numbers, discovered during the content analysis, are the number of SmåRådina's registered members ("much over 100") and the number of the organization followers on different social media platforms (from 26 to maximum 2280). Compared to the official number of Russian immigrants in Norway, that is much over 10000 (*KommuneProfilen. Statistikk Og Nøkkeltall Om Antall Og Andel Innvandrere Etter Land Og Landbakgrunn i Kommuner Og Fylker.*, n.d.), these data may serve as an impetus for further research. This is who Stevnhøj also calls on the researchers to pay their attention to- namely Russian immigrant who do not belong to the activists' communities. (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 57)

The current section, touching on the external manifestations of the Russian anti-war diaspora mobilization in Norway, is grounded in the data collected by the methods of qualitative content analysis of internet documents and the survey-method. The next analysis undersection, concerning Russian diaspora's lived experiences of political mobilization, is mostly based on the qualitative interviews data, partly corroborated by content analysis data.

5   Diasporants' lived experiences of the political mobilization phenomenon

The current section is divided into two parts, touching on two different sides of the phenomenon experienced: relevant political emotions (section 5.1) and identity contents (section 5.2). The analysis here derives mostly from the data collected by means of qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews.

5.1 What political emotions lie behind Russian diaspora political mobilization in Norway?

"Acts of barbarity can happen fast and on a large scale not when more people turn immoral or evil, not necessarily, but when more people become numb. When we are indifferent, disconnected, atomized. Too busy with our own lives to care about others. Uninterested in and unmoved by someone else's pain. That is the most dangerous emotion- the lack of emotion."

E.Shafak "How to stay sane in an age of division" (2020)

As an attempt to give an answer to this research question, several topics will be emphasized within the current section, constituting its structure. The first one will shed light on the diversity and complexity of the respondents' emotional experience.

5.1.1 A flammable cocktail of emotions

When asked what emotions the respondents experienced in the first days and weeks after the war started, they all answered with long enumerations of diverse emotions. What particular emotions they experienced, and the intensity of their experiences varied somewhat from respondent to respondent. The following emotions were however mentioned at least twice each and by different respondents. All the positions in the list are accompanied by 1-2 citations from the interviews.

<u>Anger:</u> *"I felt angry. [...] It was probably very strong anger" "I was angry for the first week."*

Anxiety: *"Is it anxiety? It was constantly in the background." "I probably had some degree of anxiety."*

Betrayal: *"[...]I felt that I was betrayed by the Russian government." "The feeling that all the cultural foundation, all the basis that there was in my life, betrayed me, seemed to disappear."*

Cognitive dissonance: *"In my eyes, Russia had been increasingly adopting Western values, caring about human rights. [...] And it was very strange to see how all this was just thrown back... Of course, there was cognitive dissonance."*

Despair: *"... Despair too." "It's still difficult for me to think about this, I have despair, shock, depression, precisely from the understanding of what fate befell my parents, and I cannot digest it, survive it."*

Disappointment. *"The main disappointment is in the people, in your country, in the people you know. [...]" "I actually hoped and thought that in Russia the people would somehow realize what was happening and would do something. But it went by pretty quickly. And when it passed, a feeling appeared... a disgusting feeling. This, I don't know... complete disappointment."*

Fear: *"Just fear for the development of events, what will happen next. But it was not the key emotion." "Fear came later, it came along with the laws enacted... when the word "war" became illegal. When you could be imprisoned for an anti-war post[...]."*

Frustration: *"The first week I definitely had some kind of frustration."*

Grief: *"There was grief... It was as if someone had died, it felt like that. It really seemed like mourning. It was as if something incredibly difficult had happened. Something just died, turned over, changed so much that you understand that it will never come back." "Grief for the country, for its people, for the Ukrainians."*

Guilt: *"At first there was a feeling of guilt, but then it went away." "At first there was definitely a feeling of guilt, because I realized that people in Russia don't [protest]. [...] A lot of Ukrainians expected that any day now the Russian people would come out and say no to this war..."*

Hatred and contempt: *"Maybe they are the most [strong] because hatred and contempt are the most directed at someone, as opposed to just anger. In relation to those who started the war." "That is, I still feel hatred, just not as strong. That is, it is strong at its core, but I do not experience it constantly, as a feeling. But I hate Putin, and not only Putin, but all his nits, that's for sure."*

Helplessness: *"There was a very strong desire to help and do something, if not stop... well... do SOMETHING. The desire to release this feeling of helplessness, probably... the feeling when you are lifted up on a wave and carried along, and you can't do anything about it."*

Humiliation: *"I thought damn, what the hell! [...] I can't just go there, and it seemed to me, to some extent this was a humiliating situation in general, in principle, and I probably still think so. [...]"*

Humility: *"[...] I had to give up the idea, the thought that Russia was a great country, that I was part of some great power, not that I was particularly committed to this, but this was our history, imperialist, probably, as I understand it now..."*

Indignation: *"Indignation has already passed. No, of course it was there. From the very beginning." "There was also indignation[...]. We were indignant at the putinists. This was our common feeling."*

Loneliness: *"I can say that I felt loneliness, but when I found the anti-war community, on the contrary, I felt that finally I was not alone. There were people who also wanted to speak out."*

Regret: *"There was some regret that I supported Putin a long time ago. It seemed that it meant that I had a hand in this after all, since I hadn't seen a bloodthirsty monster in him."*

Resignation: *"And when this happened, the first emotion was resignation, when the horrors of this war were not yet visible, but the fact itself had happened, and probably this can also be called a kind of* interest, curiosity, *maybe about what's next? A new stage for all of us and how we will be in it. Kind of acceptance of the fact, and non-acceptance of that this is possible at all."*

Sadness: *"[...]it was not just such sadness, very strong sadness, but such ordinary sadness, it came later." "Well, sadness, it was definitely always there, throughout this year."*

Shame: *"I was ashamed, embarrassed, very embarrassed." "Well, I felt such shame... of belonging to what is happening now. It seemed to me that I was a part of something shameful, well, that is, for me it was a shame to attack a neighboring country, and since I felt part of, well, Russia..."*

Shock: *"I was very shocked. The first feeling was like... Well, I didn't agree to this, I didn't give consent, this is horrible, surreal, God, how can I continue to live with this?" "Shock mixed with horror, because it really happened, it was no longer a theoretical possibility, these were real bombs flying at real people... it seems to me that these were the strongest emotions."*

Stress: *"Of course, it was stress...that is, what, how could this be? What will be next? Well, it seemed like the world was going somewhere…" "Stress is always there, for the first six months, definitely, all the time."*

Speaking about the first weeks after the war started, respondents note a feeling of hope, expectation that the war should end.

Hope, expectation: *"Expectation and hope that something would change now. This is such an impossible situation. [...] There was a feeling that now even more people would come out, even more people, there was a feeling that now this should stop for some reason." "I probably had expectation and hope for the first week, by the way, I actually hoped and thought that in Russia the people would somehow understand what was happening and would do something. But it went by pretty quickly."*

Among conditionally neutral or even positive emotions, respondents also mention surprise and gratitude towards Ukrainians.

"I was surprised at the reaction of the Ukrainians, surprised that they still communicate with us. On the very first day it seemed to me that they would immediately distance themselves from us, instantly, and I was surprised that they did not do this."

"[...] absolute gratitude towards the Ukrainians, my friends, who did not turn away, but on the contrary, very actively communicate with us, well, with me, and it seems that in some ways our friendship has become even greater. [...] a feeling of gratitude and love for them that they did not stop being people, did not become bitter, and did incredible work on themselves to disconnect me from my passport and background."

In relation to Ukrainians, all respondents experienced strong <u>sympathy, compassion, empathy.</u>

"[...] in the first days there was especially strong compassion, even now, but in the first days, I just wanted... to cancel everything, to save all Ukrainians, it seems to me that everyone had this feeling, no one knew how to do it, what kind of button should I press to stop all this...", *"Here, naturally, well, I immediately felt sorry for the people in Ukraine.",* *"yes, there was empathy with the people who were living this, because you try it all on yourself, and I think it caused much anxiety."*

But there was also compassion for the Russians who remained in the country:

"I saw how many Russian people came out in the first days of the war, I still have compassion for them.", *"But for some reason I also wanted to understand them, I didn't want to hate people, I understood that they were also hostages of this story, they had been brainwashed for so many years.",* *"I can't hate these people, because they didn't have the opportunity to go*

abroad, study and experience the world, and we have such different lives with many of them [...]. By the way, compassion probably describes it to some extent...", "I have a lot of friends there who understand with their heads that what's happening is not good at all, with their heads and hearts, I'm sure that they are kind, that they don't want to kill people, they don't want to be involved in this, but at the same time they don't I have enough courage probably... well, I don't think that they are to blame."

Each respondent experienced a "cocktail of emotions", but the composition of this cocktail had some individual variations. Sometimes respondents pointed out at an emotion from the list above and said that they absolutely did not experience it.

"I didn't feel any hatred.", "By the way, I haven't experienced loneliness.", "I didn't feel despondent, it seems to me that it's such a passive feeling [...] in this situation I had all very active feelings...", "Well, that is, I didn't have the feeling that it was my fault, I didn't have the feeling that I was doing this [...] I definitely didn't feel resignation.", "Despair is when you give up, no, probably, I don't have these memories."

At the same time, respondents also tend to attribute most of the emotions that they themselves experienced to other members of the anti-war community, although allowing for some variations.

"I was in shock... like everyone else.", "I think for many people the guilt was the same.", "There was hope that the war would end. I think others hoped too.", "I think in general all the emotions were common, we all experienced all the emotions, some to a greater extent, some to a lesser extent.", "I suspect that a lot of what I listed here was also experienced by other people. [...] it seems to me that some of my friends who are in Russia felt a very strong feeling of pity towards Russians. It seems to me that I had less such pity, at the beginning I

was very sorry for them, but I didn't have the feeling that they are poor unfortunate people, they have always suffered, and now they are suffering again, I don't have that feeling."

Though I had chosen to not include <u>overwhelm</u> in the list of emotions (as visual support) because of some translation challenges, the complexity and intensity of the respondents' experience can be quite precisely describe by the word "overwhelm" in a sense of something that is too much and too intensive to deal with.(*Overwhelm*, 2023)

"There were a lot of impressions at the same time.", "Because I had some pictures, some texts that I read, I just didn't understand how this could happen and how I could stop it. What could I do. Feeling of absolute... overload..."

"Definitely, when we started going to rallies there was anger, rage, indignation, simply because some people ruined the lives of a huge number of other people, confusion, cognitive dissonance along with shock, this is probably what is called non-acceptance, when you can't digest it with your brain. Acceptance of the fact and rejection of the possibility of such... suffering that has already lasted a year, and it is impossible to understand why, why. Hatred for the people who made this decision, frustration because... for many reasons, because I thought that there was some hope. [...] an expectation... hm, this is so strange now... that if we went out enough times, if we posted more..."

While I attempt to disassemble the cocktail into ingredients, Stevnhøj in her study adopts a concept, conveying the nature of those ingredients in their conjunction- "moral shock", a concept introduced by James M. Jasper and relevant to the study of social movements. According to Jasper, moral shock occurs when individuals face unexpected events or information, that either shake the person's worldview or are perceived as "the final straw" and may play an important initial role in mobilizing collective action. (Jasper in Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 47) Indeed, experienced simultaneously and with high intensity, those above-mentioned

emotions acquired some new quality, turned into something new, which all the respondents describe as a feeling of the collapse of their world and try to convey with the help of metaphors.

5.1.2 "Endlessly falling into the blackness that suddenly opened under my feet." Metaphor as an attempt to express the inexpressible.

Metaphors can be defined as data-reducing and pattern-forming (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 290) comparisons, that help to see things in new ways. (Bailey, 1996, pp. 98–99) A metaphor is "a device of representation through which new meanings may be learned". (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 85) So a metaphor is a tool that help to convey what cannot always be conveyed literally. All my respondents intuitively resorted to this tool in an attempt to convey the meaning and intensity of their experiences: feelings of despair, lostness, dying, catastrophe, apocalypse, collapse of their entire world.

"It's just a break in all patterns, I didn't understand what was happening at all. And of course, the realization that the world was collapsing, had collapsed. Then I was simply overcome by the feeling that something was happening that shouldn't be happening, the feeling that all that cultural foundation, all that basis that was in my life, betrayed me, seemed to disappear, the feeling that the ground was disappearing from under my feet, and that I was endlessly falling into the blackness that suddenly opened under my feet. And there was nothing I could do about it."

"Russians, citizens of Russia, found themselves in some unique situation […] just like Ukrainians. Nobody understands how Ukrainians feel. […] But also what Russian citizens are going through... who seem to be taken hostage on a sinking ship, which is at the same time attacking other innocent people, and you can't do anything about it."

"For the first three weeks I was shaking every day. I never had anything like this, I woke up like this, I cried every two hours, I couldn't communicate with my colleagues, I didn't work. [...] In English there is such a phrase, probably in Russian too, "tear me apart", this describes it very well, it's tearing me apart, this situation was tearing me apart."

"There was a feeling... I don't even know, despair? When everything goes against your will. [...] I visualize the picture, I really loved the cartoon "Aladdin" when I was a child, and there was such a situation... the good Genie was given the task that to kill Aladdin, and he loved him very much, but he could not resist his magical power, he needed to kill Aladdin... he was always so blue, and that time he was so red, he raised his hand... as if closing, covering his face, because he has to kill his best friend, and he raises his hand and tries to, like, shoot him with some kind of wave or lightning or something like that. And I had the same feeling as if a crime had been committed on my behalf."

"There was an incomprehensible state in general, what next, there was a feeling of such a blind cat that was walking, and it was not clear where it would come..."

"[It is like] you are playing some kind of board game, and someone grabs the table and throws it. It's not fear, but falling into such endless blackness, in which there is nothing. [...] Well, it's like death, I guess. [Death] describes it most closely... because a part of you dies. Well, it's like going through the process of death of a part of you. While you yourself are alive."

In the first days and weeks after the war started emotions reached their maximum painful peaks, impacting the physical condition of the respondents and their ability to work. However, at the same time, participants realized that right now there are those nearby who are much worse off, "the real unfictional victims of the war". My respondents did not allow themselves to talk about their emotions, share them, acknowledge them, live them.

5.1.3 "It's not about us now."

Speaking about their emotions, members of the anti-war community are wary of superlatives and too much emphasis on themselves, they always make remarks that they remember that Ukrainians have it much worse, as if they do not give their feelings the right to exist. They belittle, diminish their emotions, comparing them with what Ukrainians are going through: *"a little hell", "a grief of a different quality", "a nightmare and horror that we cannot imagine", "we are not the center of everything", "such a micro-trauma".*

"We are in solidarity, but at the same time I like that we are not the center of it all. All our conversations are aimed at Ukraine or Russia..."

"They go through a nightmare and horror that we cannot imagine because we are not in this situation."

"When you also worry, when you empathize, when you too are in pain, when you are going through some kind of your own little hell […]"

"Grief, yes, probably... Thank God, we are not under bombing, I understand that this grief may be of a slightly different quality, not quite grief... I understand that if someone next to me died, or if I was sitting there myself under the bombings, I would have had much more grief, thank God, everyone is alive... but you can probably call it grief. Grief for the country, for its people, for Ukrainians."

The respondents remark that this is actually not about them now, and their trauma is micro, compared to something incomparably more enormous.

"You couldn't speak openly, you couldn't tell everyone. Plus, when you experience your shock, which is completely incomparable to what people who are bombed experience... And you understand that you cannot talk about your feelings, that are actually many, you cannot share them on social media, you cannot openly talk about these feelings of yours, because now it's not about you, now you need to talk about the pain of other people, but your pain has no place now... yes, there was empathy with people who are living this, because I try it all on myself, and it seems like there was a lot of anxiety from it. When I read a material, it's very easy for me to imagine myself in the place of another person, and all this has a great impact on me, for me it's trauma... such a micro-trauma."

At the same time, respondents also speak hesitantly about positively valenced feelings, as if they do not understand whether they have the right to experience joy in the current situation.

There was also a feeling of belonging, that you had found some kind of social group of your own, the joy from this was definitely, to some extent, it was joyful to see people.

"[...] to actually get acquainted with a huge number of people who eventually go out [to protest], and you come to new rallies, you see people you know, and it was very nice. I don't know if that was joy-joy... I'm grateful for that too."

"This is actually a very special feeling, and I would define it as pleasant, oddly enough. The context is unpleasant, but the feeling of cohesion with a group of like-minded people is a pleasant feeling."

"And there is a feeling that it's very cool for me to understand... <u>well, it's not cool to understand that this is a situation in which people need to become active</u>, but it's cool for me to realize that there are a lot of people around me who care, who want to change something."

However, the joy of finding a community of like-minded people and acting together with them became the emotional flip side of Russian diaspora's mobilization.

5.1.4   Redesign of social connections and the joy of coming together in grief

After the outbreak of the full-scale war oppositional-minded Russians had to revise and redesign the whole network of social connections. The first and most painful stage of this process was the realization that many people from their usual network supported the war and that these established social connections were not possible anymore. The respondents felt the need to sever or at least pause such connections. This resulted sometimes in a deep feeling of loneliness.

"I realized that I immediately began to really push away people who, I felt, found an excuse for this, I was in a state of shock that someone was starting to justify it right now. [...]"

"I don't want to throw people out of my life for their position, but I understand that it would be difficult for me to communicate with them, and I understand that we may not have had that conversation yet, after which the break will be complete and final."

"I was constantly posting something on my Stories until my last Russian friends unfollowed me, it's true."

The position regarding the war in Ukraine has divided families.

"Many people had a contradictory situation when a family supported the war, believed Russian propaganda, which separated families. […] It's so strange to realize that you seem to be close people, and you are so different. You see life so differently. And some strangers whom you met yesterday share the most important values with you."

"From my family, my father is in a position, you know, "it's not so black and white". In position, you know, if Russia had not attacked Ukraine, then in five years there would have been... and so on. […] I speak with him radically less."

"I love my dad very much, he loves me very much too, and he was never this hurrah-patriot, and for the last 10 years he has spoken out against Poo [Putin] and so on, and for me it was just a shock that he could find some kind of justification […] for the first time in our lives we began to quarrel."

One of the respondents felt that she also was in a sense cut off from the Norwegian society by this new painful experience:

"Norwegians […] could not understand why I looked at the screen and couldn't work […] in fact, I could not tell them how I actually felt... It was a feeling of such loneliness that we are cut off from the world, our experience has now separated us from everyone, the only one with

whom you can discuss your feelings... who will truly understand you is another person from Russia who doesn't support the war."

One of the respondents says that a feeling of loneliness and a very strong sadness made her write to the psychological support hotline for the first time in his life.

"I had no one to talk to that day. That night. [...] I just wrote [to the hotline]. And I say, like, my family, I say, they took the wrong side, and I don't even know who to talk to about this. It was such a sadness, a very strong sadness, an ordinary one came later."

However, the flip side of the social connections redesign turned out to be more constructive and joyful, something that "feels good", as also one of Stevnhøj's respondents puts it. (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 56) It turned out that there were people around with similar views and values, who felt in the same way and wanted to act likewise.

"And then at some point I remember we were sitting in a cafe with the guys after the rally, we started getting acquainted, talking, and we understood that we could trust each other, there were like-minded people. It was definitely the feeling of relief because you were not alone, and there was some kind of feeling of unity, that there was a group of people who looked at these things like I did, felt horror and shock, felt loneliness, felt the need to do something, solidarity, cohesion. There was also a sense of belonging, that we had found some kind of social group of our own, there was definitely joy because of this."

Speaking about the community, the respondents place special emphasis on the feeling of unity and the desire to act.

"[...]the feeling of cohesion with a group that is your like-minded, it's a pleasant feeling, it's some kind of adrenaline rush, and unity, a feeling of unity. And readiness for action. That is, you are inspired...inspiration. It motivates you."

"When we rallied, [...] on the contrary, our energy seemed to rise, we wanted to fight or something, such a state appeared, to go protest together..."

"Yes, we said that it is such a strange feeling that you understand the other thoroughly [...] you experience exactly the same emotions. [...] especially at the beginning. I have never felt such unity in my life, such unity."

"[...]the intensity of these feelings was so high that we resonated with each other, strongly, because when you say, I can't work, then they say, I can't work."

"There is a certain state where we are one single organism in some way, we think alike, and at the same time everyone is busy with their own business."

Perceptions of the degree of unity, however, ranged from *"like a single organism"* to *"friendship and such intellectual unity"*.

"I can't say that I feel unity with all Russians, but I feel friendship and such intellectual unity with the people who are here from Russia. [...] it's great for me to realize that there are many such people around me [...] they want to change something, I feel grateful and even joyful from this. »

Thus, belonging to a new community and connections with people who resonated with the participants on the issue of the war have mixed in the cocktail of emotions such ingredients as *cohesion, solidarity, joy, inspiration, gratitude*, which have replaced the feeling of loneliness when it was experienced. Another round of inspiration came with the realization of the protest movement scale. (*Victory for Ukraine! Freedom for Russia!*, n.d.)

"I see a large mobilization of the Russian diaspora and Russian communities aimed at maintaining civil society, at opposing the war, I saw it [...] now on February 24 [...] 45 countries, 120 cities, 130 actions, but that is, this is really a lot, there are a lot of people who are united by some common values. And it's encouraging, [...] It really helps me move on."

In addition to a similar composition of the emotional cocktail, the respondents had an alike understanding of responsibility and ascribed this responsibility to themselves.

5.1.5   Liability or responsibility? The same word in Russian.

The discussion about the responsibility of Russians is complicated by the discrepancy in the meanings of the word "responsibility" in English and Russian. In English, along with the meanings *"a duty to deal with or take care of somebody/something, so that you may be blamed if something goes wrong"* and *" blame for something bad that has happened"* , there is also a meaning with more positive connotations, namely *"a moral duty to do something or to help or take care of somebody because of your job, position, etc."* (*Responsibility Noun - Definition, Pictures, Pronunciation and Usage Notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.Com*, n.d.) The Russian equivalent of the word does not possess this last sense of "moral duty", most of its meanings implying, instead, a nuance of negative consequences of something and a blame for those. ('ответственность', 2019) Besides, the same lexeme in Russian conveys also the meaning of "legal responsibility for something", that has a separate lexeme in English, namely "liability". (*Liability Noun -*

Definition, Pictures, Pronunciation and Usage Notes | Oxford Advanced American Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.Com, n.d.) These semantic mismatches result in a more negative set of connotations of the Russian word "ответственность" (responsibility) and may also cause misunderstandings when discussing responsibility of Russians in relation to the war context.

"So, I realized that people in Russia, from Russia, perceive the word responsibility differently than I do, in general. That is, for me the word responsibility means the awareness that you have some kind of field in which you can do something and change something, but this does not mean criminal liability. I understand that for many Russians, even my peers, the word responsibility evokes fear, that something falls on their shoulders, something huge. […] I had more people [around me] who perceived the word responsibility in terms of criminal liability, as something negative, that they were personally condemned, these were more often people who had recently moved from Russia..."

It is noteworthy that even in the answers of individual respondents the different meanings of "responsibility" can be mixed: *"the word responsibility means the awareness that you have some kind of field in which you can do something and change something"* and *"but I understand that the sanctions that are now against Russia, they also harm me, and this is my responsibility […] this is like a responsibility that we bear as citizens."*

Some of the respondents answered that they only had the feeling of responsibility, and never the feeling of guilt, others reported that the feeling of responsibility has supplanted a destructive feeling of guilt.

"I don't think that feeling guilty, despite the fact that I haven't done anything wrong, is some kind of positive and constructive emotion. […] well, that is, sprinkling ashes on one's head - there is nothing constructive in this, it's like a slow suicide, and it does no one any good […]

I simply replaced the feeling of guilt with a sense of responsibility. That is, I do feel responsible, that I have to do something, […] because I feel that I belong to Russia."

"Well, that is, I didn't have the feeling that it was my fault, I didn't have the feeling that I had done this, I had the feeling that I had to do something with it myself."

Another interesting characteristic of responsibility that respondents talk about is that they do not choose it, it simply exists. They can't help doing "something".

"That is, instead of guilt, I simply began to understand that I had to do something, because I had no right to do nothing."

"I believe that everyone from Russia bears responsibility, and responsibility is often not something you choose, it's just there. For example, I didn't choose to be born in Russia, and I didn't choose to grow up there, I didn't choose any of this, […] No one will ask me, dammit, whether I want this or not. This is the rule of the game."

One of the participants perceives responsibility as something that, by definition, can be chosen, and therefore explains his activity not by responsibility, but by something else - energy? -that it was impossible to choose or not to choose, it just was there.

"For me, responsibility is when you feel that you are being pulled in this direction, you know? That you have a choice. I didn't feel like I had a choice. I had a feeling of anger, a feeling of hatred, a feeling of disgust for what was happening, and those feelings gave me strength, well, like, gave you energy that could be directed to different things. […] Responsibility? No,

I did what I had to do, I had no other choice, I couldn't help but do it, for me this was not an option, well, that's how I can't help but breathe, I can't help but drink, I can't help but eat...”

Regardless of whether respondents explain their activity by a sense of responsibility or something else, everyone agrees that they had no choice not to do so- both my respondent and at least two of Stevnhøj's. (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 53)

“There were specific actions that you could join, for example, go to a rally, and you do it because you can't do otherwise, you can't help but join […] you're constantly looking for... At least I was constantly looking within myself, what can I do, what can I do, what can I do?”

“There was a very strong desire to help and do something, if not stop... well... do SOMETHING.”

However, emotions lose their intensity over time, fatigue accumulates, which also affects the level of activity.

5.1.6 From apathy to apathy?

Accumulating fatigue and the lack of visible results from the community's activities led to an emotional decline:

“I just fell into some kind of despondency, it turned into a very “viscous” [sticky] state, from such a shock, where you are shaking, it turned into this, probably, depressive state.” “Then

the feeling came that all this was useless. No matter how I tried to talk to them, I had this feeling of weak legs like made of cotton" "I just felt like it was useless. It's like I can't influence anything." "There was a feeling... a disgusting feeling... I don't know... complete disappointment. The feeling of powerlessness was there at the beginning, but it reached its peak when I began to understand that people were not going to do anything. […] In short, I had disappointment, very strong, huge. Well, that probably was a feeling of broken hopes […]" "In general I have the feeling that I'm very tired of all this."

For one of the respondents, such a lack of understanding of what to do, a feeling of fatigue led to what is described as a deep disappointment and apathy.

"We went to rallies, wrote letters, and the visible result was zero... […] At some point, I no longer understood why [to do that]. There was a feeling of apathy. […] The six months' rally, it was still important to participate, it was impossible not to come, there was still an emotional component there. In the autumn and especially in the winter, I seemed to be turned off, as if I had been cut off, I stopped reading [the news], I probably resigned myself to some extent […] I collected warm things at work [for refugees], but again rationally, not emotionally, it is necessary to help, it's terrible […] I think I've probably run out of a little bit of strength, and I don't understand what I can do, honestly, I absolutely don't understand now."

Another respondent said that, despite fatigue, he had even escalated his activities over the past year.

"Well, I'm escalating it, I'm making it more and more large-scale, let's say. I try different forms…. […] I mean that I am starting to work not only for Norway […] I still have a feeling of progress…What keeps me motivated is that I see some prospects for development, I see directions of activity, I see new challenges […]"

All respondents report that in this new stage they rely more on awareness of the importance of such an action and are less driven by feelings. Such a pattern has earlier appeared in, for example, Koinova's research. (Koinova, 2013, p. 450)

"You come out because you kind of have to, you have to show that you exist. At first you couldn't help but go out, because everything inside called for you to act, but then when your actions didn't show results, then you went out because logically you know that this was important, no longer for you, maybe, for you in the longer term perspective, but it was important to show the Ukrainians that we existed, that there are Russians [who are against the war], as if to defend our honor and dignity or something."

"I can't say that I have such a protest motivation, but I have this sense of duty. […] Because I still understand that I still need to do this. […] I must allow myself to live and enjoy life. But at the same time, […] it's important to continue to express my point of view, to show that it does not change."

All the respondents, to one degree or another, share the position that it is important to continue to act, albeit not globally, but locally, in small steps, sometimes taking breaks.

"And I havn't lost the feeling that something can be changed, not at the global level, but at the local, small one, something can be done, maybe somewhere something can be changed at least a little. […] I believe that everything that happens to us affects us. And little by little some baggage in one's life accumulates. Well, that is, I think we can give some kind of impetus to make something happen further, to start some kind of chain reaction. And it definitely makes sense. […] No, it does worth it very much... hundred percent."

"[...] we still need to fight, churn this cream so that there is butter, [...] We need to do something to change the situation for the better, although I understand perfectly well that Russia is now moving at full speed into dictatorship and totalitarianism, and I don't know that it's difficult to stop this train, but at least do something."

"We probably all understand perfectly well that this will not stop the war, but there is still a feeling, well, that we are doing something, and somehow it should be able to. [...] influence the course of events."

"[...] I don't think that a temporary retreat is a permanent retreat; taking a break is normal."

A belief in the possibility to make a difference if one just continues (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 55) to do something also emerges during Stevnhøj's interviews with her respondents. An important factor that makes people continue to act even after a year is that the war goes on.

*"They are still bombing my friends, f*** them. There's no reason why they need to stay there! Go away. I might have had less protest motivation if there had not been a war..."*

"But even now I understand that I can't just go and give up [...] While the war is going on, I will have to go out [and protest]."

Indeed, there is something beside the emotional factor that impacts political mobilization. The next section is dedicated to the participants' experience of certain identity contents, "bricks", relevant for their political mobilization in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

5.2 What identity contents play into the diaspora political mobilization?

This undersection is substantially grounded in the data acquired by the qualitative interview method, though in places triangulated by the content analysis results, and touches on various contents of Russian diasporants' identity, be it individual, relational or collective contents. (Schwartz et al., 2011, p. 3)

5.2.1 "Diaspora? Wait, I google it."

When asked whether respondents consider themselves as a diaspora, people had difficulty in answering. Respondents search in their heads for the definition of diaspora. One of the respondents even googled the word right during the interview. Respondents pointed out at different components of the definition as the main one, and in accordance with these, they either consider themselves to be a diaspora or not.

One of the respondents identifies "weak integration into the host country society" as the main component of the diaspora-notion.

"No, I really don't consider myself a member of diaspora, because I feel very well integrated into Norwegian society, I don't plan to move anywhere. [...] That is, I was always interested in living in Russia, but I never had a desire to return for permanent residence."

Another respondent, in addition to the lack of integration and a feeling of isolation from the host society, identifies the component of close, even blood, ties between diaspora members.

"Good question, it seems to me that diaspora is kind of a "forced" word to briefly describe ourselves. When someone says diaspora, for example, I have a strange association, firstly with some kind of blood ties or mafia connections, this must be a very dense group of people who... express an opinion. Plus, it is still not integrated; the diaspora is a certain degree of isolation in society. Therefore, it seems to me that the diaspora is not exactly how I would like to describe myself."

Other respondents emphasize political views and activism as essential components of being a diaspora:

"Well, I started calling us diaspora. But again, probably with those people with whom I have similar political views. I want to use the word diaspora when I think about them, when I communicate with them. It seems to me that the diaspora is something quite tight. I mean, people who are strongly connected to each other. I am not connected with people, Russians, who support the war."

"Diaspora is probably people who actively relate to their cultural code, where they probably come from. […] I think that if we are talking about the anti-war community of immigrants from Russia, then of course. Because if people are from Russia and they oppose the war, then they are actively related to this part of their identity, and then I would say that they are part of the diaspora."

The community came into being one year before the war outbreak, as a reaction to the arrest of Russian oppositional leader Alexei Navalny. This is how the history of the community emergence is described on SmåRådina's official website:

"SmåRådina's story began in January 2021. Dozens of people who were upset and angry after the illegal sentence against Alexei Navalny met in front of Stortinget to speak out. Soon after, a Facebook group was created where people of Russian origin and interest in Russia, as well

as democratic values, could find like-minded people and talk together. Several support events followed […]" (*Foreningen SmåRådina*, n.d.)

One of the respondents took part in the group's activities already in 2021 and describes that how the Russian state treated Navalny was "the final straw" for her- the metaphor that also Stevnhøj adopts in here research referring to Jasper. (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 53)

"A year before that there were protests for Navalny, we didn't know about each other, and suddenly we all went to rallies together […] people came out for Navalny, because that was already the final straw. It was so disgusting, somehow unbelievable, that a person could be poisoned and then imprisoned, and all that corruption... In general, it seems to me that people came out for Navalny not because they loved his political platform so much, but because they rather united "against" [the current regime]."

It is noteworthy that before the protests of 2021 and 2022, respondents, in their own words, had not had a wide circle of Russian-speaking acquaintances, having no need for it, and sometimes even avoiding the Russian-speaking environment.

"There were some acquaintances, but I didn't have, it seems to me, any obvious need to have a Russian-speaking circle of acquaintances."

"I had a couple of friends from Russia, one or two. All the rest were from Ukraine or Belarus."

There was no need to be among Russians. […] And I even tried to avoid Russian society a little. I had some Russian friends, and it was enough to me. And I was pleasantly surprised

when I met SmåRådina. […] In some ways I realized that they were just as integrated here in Norway as I was."

"I think for many, not just me […] it was the first experience of finding Russians who shared their values... before that I essentially didn't have Russian acquaintances in Norway who shared my values."

When asked what binds members of the community, respondents answered that it is *"the rejection of the war," "the desire to stop the war,"* the desire to support Ukraine, *"ideas about good and evil, justice, honesty",* Western values, the value of freedom , the desire for Russia to become a free country, *"where people live freely, speak out openly, are not afraid to think, are not afraid to move along the street", "love for Russia and patriotism, but a peaceful patriotism"*, desire for change, *"desire for the existing system to change "*, *"acceptance of the primacy of human rights"*, active position.

When asked what binds them to Russia, the respondents answered that Russia is their background and their past, *"it's like a house, my first home, the place […] where the foundation was poured"*. Respondents also mentioned understanding of the processes in the country, relatives, and close friends they have there, some of whom risk mobilization at the moment, a common cultural background, language and literature, love for Russia and desire to travel back there.

At the same time, respondents who have lived in Norway for a long time realize that they are different from Russians who live in Russia.

"But at the same time, of course, I realize, I cannot fully understand how people living in Russia feel and think in this situation. But I still feel my right to speak out about the future of my country; I have no other country."

"How to say, I absolutely understand that I am Russian, but at the same time, perhaps I am not quite the Russian who just arrived from Russia [...] That is, I have the feeling that I seem to think differently."

Speaking about what distinguishes the anti-war diaspora from pro-regime Russians in Norway , respondents mention the absence of imperialist rhetoric *("we are great, Russia is a great power- I have never heard this")*, a more critical view of the situation (*"When I listen to people who support Putin, they all speak in memorized phrases"*), a look into the future (*"they have some understanding of a needs to move forward, because the system does not function as it is."*).

The data deriving from the interviews are confirmed by the qualitative content analysis of the community social media platforms, where the community nature is sketched by the following statements: *"for democracy in Russia", "Community for change for the better ✌️", "We are for democracy in Russia and against the war in Ukraine!", "For your and our freedom", "people of Russian origin and interest in Russia, as well as democratic values ", "a small homeland" , "since both several Russians with hopes for a democratic Russia carry a small homeland in their hearts and want to keep this part of their identity here in Norway", "Against Putin and his regime", "people with democratic values who believe that a better future for Russia is possible", "stands against the war", "respect for individual, human life and rights in Russia", "people in Norway with connections to Russia".*

A critical look and a desire for change in the future also characterize the patriotism that the community members show towards Russia (see the next section). As for the possibility of

defining the community as diaspora, it would be impossible to do within a more traditional approach to the study of diaspora," diaspora as an essence", without placing the anti-war community in the same group with pro-regime and "silent" apolitical Russians in Norway. The community is however an ideal example of a diaspora within the second approach, "diaspora as a practice", that focuses on the process of becoming diaspora through mobilization. (Grossman, 2019; Haider, 2014, p. 211; Quinsaat, 2022, pp. 2–3; Ragazzi, 2012, pp. 1264–1265) It could therefore be possible to define the Russian anti-war diaspora in Norway based on the 6 core components of any diaspora indicated by Grossman -dispersal or immigration, location outside a homeland, community, orientation to a homeland, transnationalism, and group identity- and then, in addition to these, another "bearing wall", that of mobilization, implying both political stance, emotional stance and increase in activity, three features, regularly attributed to diasporic groups in the relevant literature. (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011, p. 4; Vertovec in Baser & Swain, 2008, p. 8; Chander, 2001, p. 1013)

Besides, taking into account the analysis results from the section on emotions, the reported feelings of collapse of the world, kind of dying, grief, and mourning, severing social connections, betrayal, cognitive dissonance, stress, shock, overwhelm in reaction to the invasion, it would presumably be fruitful to apply the notion of "a conflict-generated" diaspora also to the newly emerged Russian anti-war diaspora. Conflict generated diasporas are grounded in a traumatic identity (Koinova, 2016, p. 501), a sense of trauma that binds three actors – diaspora, host-state, and home-state. (Koinova, 2016, p. 503)   The notion usually refers to forced immigrants (Haider, 2014, p. 207), however "voluntary" immigrants may also suffer from violence and war and experience concern for the home country. (Haider, 2014, pp. 211–212) The fact that the Russian anti-war diaspora actually emerged as a reaction to the violence committed by the home country first towards its own citizens and then towards the citizens of the neighboring country, also entails the question about the relevance of the notion, "conflict-generated diaspora", for the actual case.

Another "brick" of some diasporants' identity is their patriotism, that is, as it was mentioned in the previous abstract, distinguished by a critical look and a desire for change.

5.2.2 "Yes, I am a patriot! And... a global citizen."

Every time I asked my respondents whether they considered themselves patriots of Russia, the first thing I heard in response was laughter. It was caused by some paradox that lay in the question and the answer. The expression "patriot of Russia" has recently acquired strong militaristic associations, but three out of four respondents gave a positive answer- yes, they were patriots.

"Oh, this is such a difficult question now, it sounds so strange, because it feels like a patriot of Russia is a dirty concept. If you are a patriot of Russia, then you automatically support the war and automatically participate in all this obscurantism. [...] Before the war, for example, I had no doubt, I sincerely consider myself, within myself, a patriot of Russia."

A typical "Russian patriot" is described by respondents as a "loyal" or "blind" patriot. (Schatz & Staub in Altikulaç, 2016, p. 27; Finn, Westheimer in Parkhouse, 2018, p. 35; Wellenreiter, 2021, p. 3) Such patriotism is characterized by *"inadequate expression of love for the motherland," "blind commitment",* boundless loyalty to the government, even *"a sign of equality between the government and the country" ("that is, if you don't like Putin, it means you don't love Russia," "no matter how difficult times may be, you still shouldn't turn away from Russia, your country, otherwise you're not a patriot ")*, support for the war *("some of them sincerely think that this war is right. [...] or they think [that they] need to stick with the authorities, since the authorities said they are afraid of the collapse of Russia...")*, a feeling of belonging to something great *("if I'm from a great country, then that means I'm great")*, they also want the best for the country, but they have a *"different information environment"* and other ideas about goodness, *"they associate this goodness with a single authority"* and *"they are probably afraid of some European values."*

For such "blind" patriots, the name "hurrah-patriots" has taken root. Hurrah-patriots are those *"who are chasing greatness or some status, who care about something external, rather than how people live in the country", "they beat on the chest and say that "we are a great nation", because we conquered someone or brought the West to its knees", "such a thieves' style, we are strong, therefore we are cooler."*

There are Russian patriots of the "blind", loyal type not only in Russia itself, but also abroad, among the Russian-speaking population of Norway. (Glimstad, 2022) These are two sections of the diaspora, reflecting complementary and conflictual relations with their home country. (Haider, 2014, pp. 222–224; Toivanen & Baser, 2020, p. 52) Members of the anti-war community in Norway counter this "loyal" patriotism with their own "critical" or "constructive" patriotism. (Staub, Yazıcı & Yazıcı in Altikulaç, 2016, pp. 27–28; Wellenreiter, 2021, p. 3)

Such patriotism is also based on an emotional attachment to the territory *("I suppose I miss the landscapes of Russia very much", "I really wanted this [style of life] to be extrapolated to all of Russia, so that every corner of Russia looked like this, alive, active", "this is childhood, every tree , every home, for me this is very valuable and important")* and to people *("these are incredibly diverse people, with such different talents, with endless energy, very complex, in a good way, reflective", "I'm very sorry for the people", "Plus, of course, I have parents there, and I feel very sad for them… that they will have to live in this country"),* and also on the desire for the best for the country, but this best is seen in a radically different way. Respondents want to see Russia *"happy", "peaceful", "non-aggressive", "democratic", "free", "friendly".* Patriotism for them is associated with a sense of responsibility *("that is, I understand: who, if not me"),* the desire to create *("It also seems to me that the point is in creation, our goal is to create, not to destroy", "if you are a patriot Russia, then you are a patriot of your business")* and a better life for people in a practical, tangible sense *("People should live better, then this is a good country").* Three out of four respondents spoke about their pre-war plans to work in Russia *("And I wanted to come back and build something new and cool," "although I don't live there, but before the big war started, I thought that I would at least work there", "I even filled out an application to transfer to the Moscow office").* This

kind of critical patriotism is disloyal to today's government, to the country's politics and requires a serious refocus.

One respondent noted that she felt that loyal patriotism had been inculcated in Russia, and that in the eyes of loyal patriots she now looked like a traitor. This effect may be explained by a so-called "coerced emotional attachment" characteristic for the "blind" patriotism. (Merry, 2020, p. 3).

"When I lived in Russia... I was always put a feeling into me, I don't even know through whom, that the worst thing you could do was to betray your homeland, under no circumstances should you betray it. And this feeling sat in me quite deeply. It's like being a rat, it's like being not quite a human, a subhuman. [...] in someone's eyes I turned out to be a traitor, someone told me that, why are you betraying your country?"

Another respondent also reports similar difficult inner dialogues on the topic of betrayal.

"From some kind of identity as a patriot of Russia this really worries me, that I am a traitor, I'm staying here for my jeans, you know? That is, for money, for peace of mind, and that I have no desire to lay down my life for the good of my country. I don't want to, I understand that the risks have increased, and that in fact I don't want to engage in heroism."

But all the same, a critical patriotism seems to be the true one to respondents.

"And I think that I am a true patriot, although I live far away, but I am more of a patriot, because they support what is destroying Russia."

"I think I'm a patriot, if a patriot is still love for the motherland, that's how I understand it, and I'm a patriot, because I worry about what's happening with Russia, I'm angry at those who support Putin's regime, because I think that they are behaving unpatriotically."

Thus, the respondents' patriotism is distinguished by a critical look towards the homeland. Besides, in their statements on patriotism there are signs of what Papastephanou calls an outward patriotism, signs of a consciousness of how one's homeland relates to the rest of the world in terms of inter-state and of inter-human relations and expectations for the homeland to reach higher standards in this sense. (Papastephanou, 2013, p. 29) Such patriotism manifests itself in the aspiration for a

"non-aggressive", "democratic", "free" and *"friendly"* Russia.

Patriotism seems to relate to the home country through national identity, not through official citizenship or residence. The question about which country the respondents felt they were citizens of is a badly operationalized question about national identity. However, such an unsuccessful formulation reveals once again the discrepancy between nationality, territory, and the official status.

"If you asked me if I am Russian or Norwegian, it would be easier for me to answer. And when you ask – citizen, it's a little different. I am a citizen of both countries, Norway, and Russia. [...] This is a very unexpected question. I said before that I was Russian, I feel Russian, but in terms of citizenship..."

Among the respondents there are citizens of Russia only, Norway only and the two countries. Even those who are not citizens of the Russian Federation report to have a Russian national identity, a feeling of being Russian.

"I am a citizen of Russia. When I left Russia, I felt it even more. That is, in Russia I have no Russian identity."

"I have not been a Russian citizen for several years now, but I identify myself equally as a Russian and as a Norwegian, I cannot say that my Russian part is bigger, or my Norwegian part is bigger."

"But the fact that I am a citizen of Russia, now it has become even more acute, because I experience this as a citizen of Russia, these events, and not in a vacuum, and not as a citizen of the world, and […] it concerns me very much, absolutely directly."

The last answer contains the opposition of a particularistic patriotism and vacuum cosmopolitanism. (Nussbaum, 2012, pp. 218–220) However, other respondents confidently identify themselves as world citizens, in addition to national identity, but not instead of it:

"Definitely, a citizen of the world. Definitely, yes. But if you choose between a Norwegian citizen and a Russian citizen, for now I feel more Russian."

"In my ideal world, the world should be open, without borders, and I want to come, hug a cat, do a project there, or here if I want, I'm cosmopolitan in very many ways."

"At the same time, I have something of a citizen of the world, I'm used to thinking of myself as, for example, a patriot of human rights. […]in the context of the war, I realized that the value of human life is higher than my patriotism."

Here again, I need to resort to the notion of an outward patriotism, that is compatible with cosmopolitanism, and even conductive to it. (Papastephanou, 2013, p. 27) In the example where the respondent calls herself "a patriot of human rights", the last may namely stand for the meeting point of cosmopolitanism and patriotism. As for the national identity, respondents note that after the annexation of Crimea, and especially after the start of the war, it became difficult to talk about it.

"It's difficult for me to say it now, well, I want to apologize, or joke, or say that I'm from Russia and say something else so that people understand that I'm from Russia, but at the same time I'm against the war."

"It's difficult for me to say that I am from Russia, of course. Still, though it's now easier. [...] this is not about nationality, this is declaring that I am from a country that attacked another country and, on top of that, threatens the whole world with nuclear weapons."

"Well, I was worried about it, but I got a lot of support from the people around me [...] What was especially important for me was that I received only support and only positive questions at work."

"Putin took away from us the proud phrase "I love Russia". [...] Yes, after our Crimea [...] it was already awkward to say that you were from Russia because, in fact, you were from a country that had taken a piece of land from another country. Russia stank, it seems to me."

This may be considered as what Papastephanou associates with a shame caused by the fact that the homeland has failed "to reach the ethico-political standards that it should be capable

of." (Papastephanou, 2013, p. 27) Such a shame is one of the manifestations of the outward patriotism.

One of the respondents, who is not a citizen of Russia and does not plan to return there, still notes the role of national identity for his activities. However, it is difficult for him to call himself a patriot, since he, unlike other participants, firmly associates the concept of patriotism with the territory of the country.

"Patriotism is like loving the brand of shoes you wear. You wear "Ecco", you like "Ecco", not because it's a good thing, but because you use it. You live in Norway; you are a Norwegian patriot. You live in Russia; you are a patriot of Russia. […] I feel that what I do is because the part of my identity that is connected to Russia, but I cannot say that I am a patriot of Russia."

Thus, most of my respondents show and report a kind of patriotism towards their homeland, that can be characterized as outward and critical, despite of fact they grew up in a system that brough them up as loyal patriots. (Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007) One of the respondents however denies being a patriot. What all the participants share is the evolution of their political views and where they have come to.

5.2.3   Formation of the diasporants' political identity

"When talking about the evolution of their political views, respondents tell different stories. Looking far back, everyone notes the role of the family in their initial views: someone was close to the circle of human rights activists, had family members who suffered for the truth and had no illusions about the political system or was interested in public life."

"I was always conscious [of how the regime works] I watched from the sidelines for a very long time. [...] A lot of people in my inner circle [...], they seemed to be actively involved in human rights protection in the Soviet Union."

"That is, I was always interested in talking at least with my closest ones about what was happening in the world, that's for sure. That is, I was not politically or socially uninvolved. [...] "

Some note the "influence of family", as well as the lack of personal awareness and immaturity of views at that time.

"Because there was still no awareness of the acquired information. I remember that I repeated it, from mouth to mouth, what I call folklore."

"To be honest, at that time I was under the great influence of my relatives, and I was well aware that this was complete bullshit, and that this [annexation of Crimea] should not be done."

"But I understand that I was not quite an adult then. I can't honestly say that I was against [the annexation of Crimea] because I was very much influenced by my family."

How and why the political position of the participants changed is a difficult question for everyone. For some, the turning point was the arrest of Navalny, who returned to Russia after the poisoning, and at the same time, *"packets of anti-constitutional laws being adopted."*

"And when all this started happening to Navalny, then I wrote my first post on Facebook. Although I am usually silent […]. But there was such a desire to support him […]. This was the first time I was like, "damn, I'm outraged.""

"Naturally, I followed how he was poisoned, then how he returned from Germany, then how he was tried illegally, then how the laws began to change, I just began to pay even more attention to those laws that were changing, not only related with Navalny, but also other laws, such as the law on punishment for domestic violence, for "gay-propaganda", everything changed very quickly."

Others even earlier- apartment bombings in Moscow, protests of 2011-2012 [('1999 Russian Apartment Bombings', 2023; '2011–2013 Russian Protests', 2023)] - began to observe the degree of madness, its increase, but then they "didn't want to lay down their life for the truth."

"[…]and that I have no desire to lay down my life for the good of my country. I don't want to, I understand that the risks have increased, and that in fact I don't want to engage in heroism."

"So, I observed similar dilemmas quite closely, but I did not take part in it, partly this was my motivation for leaving for Norway. So as not to be this generation that lays down its bones for the truth […], my well-being was more important to me, now this point of view has changed."

One of the respondents notes the annexation of Crimea as the turning point, after which it became clear that the path to democratization was closed for Russia and that Putin himself would not leave.

"I remember in 2014 I had crisis[...]the annexation of Crimea was a signal for me that we had no other way [...] there was no way of democratization, there was no way of changing power [...], then it was very important for me to try to show my friends that this was real aggression [...], Russia was invading the territory of another country, which was terrible in itself."

They also note the role of education in the evolution of their political views.

"[Before receiving my education in Norway] I was, one might say, more hypnotized by Russian propaganda."

After the start of the war, everyone took a clear and active political position, the majority felt regret and guilt because they had not said and done enough before.

"And I had a huge regret because I hadn't continued to talk about it then, I hadn't taken that feeling seriously and hadn't continued to say how important democracy was, how important participation was, how important it was to end this regime, to find some new ways of thinking, and that I hadn't resisted all those changes enough."

However, the annexation of Crimea was bloodless, almost peaceful, which three out of four respondents indicate as the reason that they did not react sufficiently and did not resist it enough.

"And since it was quite peaceful, without war, they showed that people were happy, they came out to celebrate, I didn't resist too much. Therefore, I feel like an accomplice in this war, in some sense, that I once didn't directly oppose, although I understood that it was illegal to take away someone else's land, at least in our time."

"Crimea was quite bloodless, there was no shock of war, no horrors of war."

"I remember my reactions, but not my emotions. I remember that there were no strong emotions."

In this sense, the attack on Ukraine in February 2022 was perceived completely differently - the new stage of the war was bloody, the "degree of madness" was off the charts.

"The number of corpses and the degree of madness that flows from everywhere, well. But on the other hand, the degree of madness seemed to have grown gradually, but I think that the main thing here was precisely the number of corpses of people you empathize with. [...] Perhaps this was because people's deaths were so visible, and how similar these people were to you."

It was not only the scale of the madness that had a mobilizing effect, as respondents reported, but also the fact that this madness was directed at people, very close not only geographically.

5.2.4   In relation to Ukrainians

All the respondents identify themselves "in relation to" Ukraine, Ukrainians or the Ukrainian. Some have Ukrainians in their family (which is a very typical situation), everyone has Ukrainian friends and acquaintances. Respondents respect the right of Ukrainians to self-determination; at the same time, they point out at the interconnectedness of neighbouring peoples. This proximity makes the war situation even more unbearable for the respondents.

"But I especially thought about my friends. Well, I just have, like... childhood friends plus another friend there, an acquaintance, I once had a Ukrainian boyfriend, my grandfather is from Ukraine... Well, there is a connection with Ukraine and there have always been very warm relations and feelings towards it."

"And how is this even possible because Ukraine is a neighboring country, that is, whether Ukrainians like it or not, but I couldn't say for sure who is Ukrainian and who is Russian, and it still seems to me that I can't. That is, I accept and respect that they feel like a separate nation, and that's how it is. It all took a very long time for us to understand, apparently... And yet our peoples are intertwined, that is, most of Russian citizens have some Ukrainians in their family, there are plenty of Ukrainians with a Russian surname, there are plenty of Russians with a Ukrainian surname."

"Therefore, when this happened in Ukraine, for me it was not only geographically, but also spiritually, emotionally close, so I react to it."

Three of the respondents speak of gratitude to their Ukrainian friends for not turning away from them after the war, and of friendship itself as a motivating factor in clearly expressing their anti-war position and participating in anti-war activism.

"I had much gratitude to my Ukrainian friends, who hadn't turned away from me, although I'd had such a direct fear that all my friends would turn away from me."

"Yes, I just realized that I'd rather try to do something, take a clear position, show it. In fact, I saw that it was my Ukrainian friends who reacted most to the fact that I went out to protest. I understood that this was important to them, they needed it, and they wrote, well, this support really warmed them."

"Because my friend is from Ukraine, she is from Kyiv. Kyiv is the capital, I'm from Moscow. [...] in an upside-down world, by my association, Moscow was bombed. [...] Metro, associations with the Moscow one. Would I also hide in the subway? Outskirts... I remember watching these shots I didn't understand how people didn't see this horror and didn't feel the need to come out and say something."

"And I absolutely have love and gratitude towards the Ukrainians, my friends, who haven't turned away, but on the contrary, very actively communicate with us, well, with me, and it seems that in some ways our friendship has become even greater. Even stronger. And I definitely have a feeling of gratitude and love for them, that they haven't stopped being humane, haven't become bitter, and have done incredible work on themselves to disconnect me from my passport and background."

At the same time, during the year of war, the anti-Russian position of the Ukrainian community has clearly emerged, seeing no difference between anti-war Russians and pro-regime Russians. For example, Russians anti-war activists were asked not to take out anti-war flags during demonstrations on 24.02.23, and in some cities they were asked not to participate in demonstrations at all. Respondents try to accept and respect this attitude of the Ukrainian community. At the same time, they emphasize the illegality of such demands.

"I think this is wrong, because we live in a free country, and everyone has the right to express their opinion. No one can stop me from going out; this is my right as a human to freedom of speech. It is illegal. But on the other hand, I understand that going when you were asked not to go is also a kind of aggressive action. It can be read by the Ukrainian side as aggression… even here. They have the right to ask, we have the right to refuse... People will not stand next to the Ukrainians, but they will still organize some kind of action."

In addition, speaking of emotions, it is difficult for Russians themselves to remain indifferent and cold to such an attitude on the part of the Ukrainian community.

"I think this is even mean, to be honest. Ask not to come here because we are Russians. When one is also worried, empathetic, when one is also in pain, when one is going through some kind of little hell of his or her own, and they kick us just because... No one chooses where to be born, or maybe one even loves Russia, but doesn't love Putin. We want a free Russia; we want a friendly Russia [...]. Moreover, we live in Norway and according to Norwegian laws, which must be respected."

"I understand that this is fair, but at the same time, the way they treat Russians causes a feeling of bitterness and in relation to some people it turns into a feeling of anger, not towards all Ukrainians."

Both relational contents of identity (the relation to Ukrainians and to pro-regime Russians), group contents of identity (national, diasporic and political) and individual contents of identity (patriotic and cosmopolitan) play into the mobilization process. My respondents quite clearly sketch the multiple facets of the identity, they have put on. The last is however not strictly determined. The trickster of this identity constructure is information flowing around.

5.2.5   On the other side of the barricades or the quicksands of information

A short note on the role of information and information bubbles should be made in connection with the case of Russian diaspora mobilization in Norway. The respondents are aware of the common narrative they share, the core of which is that there is nothing that can justify the invasion. This is, in the eyes of the respondents, also the difference between the anti-war community and those who support the Russian politics, the loyal patriots, who are on the other side of the barricades and who find different justifications of the war: "But they bombed Donbas for eight years!", "Why USA are allowed and we are not? ", "They wanted to attack us!", "They want to destroy Russia!", "It's not so black and white…".

The members of the anti-war community surround themselves by media that feed into the (liberal) narrative they are adepts of. The respondents list up such sources of information as

Russian independent media ("Novaya Gazeta", "Meduza"), Ukrainian media, American liberal media, Norwegian media ("NRK", "Morgenbladet", "Dag og Tid" , "Klassekampen", "Dagens Næringsliv"), "YouTube" (Shulman, Dud' and "all these" [popular anti-war bloggers and experts]), "Instagram", "Telegram" (reports from the front, current news, channels for diaspora's international coordination), social profiles of anti-war initiatives ("Memorial", Belarusian "Viasna", Ukrainian "Centre for Civil Liberties"), reading and analysing history.

It is noteworthy that when talking about where they get information from, respondents sometimes talk about it not as something that they actively choose, but as something that simply exists, flows around them, lives its own life, reveals itself to them: *"I may read or hear"* [not: listen to], *"I actually take a lot of things from the environment", "people around", "Instagram also sometimes slips something in", "from where it always came from", "Probably... honestly, I don't even know, it's a difficult question.".* I will later in this section come back to the nature itself of the information.

Talking about their friends or people who live in Russia, who support another narrative, my respondents tend to show compassion. Those people are then seen as victims of the regime, manipulating them by means of information.

"There was outrage at the beginning. But for some reason I also wanted to understand them, I didn't want to hate people, I understood that they were also hostages of this story, they had been brainwashed for so many years."

"It seems to me that they have powdered the brains of a lot of people, they started to [...] shove this into the throats and into the brains, I don't know what to call it, yeah, poison, slag, hatred [...] to cram it into the brains, and it decomposes them. Therefore, I had compassion that people began to fall into this hurrah-patriotism, they began to support [...] some peasant in the village began to say "Eh, go, Russia!" against the background of ruins of some kind, instead of houses."

"It's not like I lost my dad [...] But a strange idea has taken possession of his mind, and he refuses to believe in anything else."

The respondents are aware of the role of the information bubbles for political views and try to use this knowledge in their fight for friends and relatives.

"But I always try to tell him something, for example, I don't hide it when I meet with Ukrainians, well, with my friends [...], about the interview about political prisoners in Russia, and I try somehow all the time to expand his horizons, his information field."

"And it seemed to me that people would see this destruction, that these were real people, Bucha was like, "Oh, these are mannequins," and I was on "Instagram" using tags to look for different pieces to prove that these were different people filming from different cameras. That this is all real, and if people believe and see that this is real, then they will change their minds, come out against the war, or speak out..."

The respondents also show surprising sincerity when they (3 of them) give a positive answer to the question: *"Could you imagine yourself on the other side of the barricades"*.

"And I thought that if I've lived in Russia, then, quite possibly, I would've supported the regime. Perhaps they could've convinced me too."

"Yes, very easy. I realized this when I found out that my dad supported it. I think that if my dad had raised me, I might have been on the other side of the barricades."

One of the respondents turns it up down and says that he absolutely couldn't, it would be another person then, which may be interpreted that he would be another person if he was on the other side of the barricades- the same physical person with a very different identity.

"Well, noooo, no. Well, it's like saying you're not you, well then, it's not me."

Information bubbles are then seen as something that can form views and even identities. The notion "bubble" emerges also in Stevnhøj's study in regard to the anti-war community itself.(Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 54) Speaking about such dividing, polarizing properties of information bubbles, one of the respondents takes a critical look at her own feelings and

admits that she is afraid of becoming arrogant and vain, and to feel on the good side, and that it is important to continue talking, to conduct a dialogue.

"It's very easy to feel like you're on the side of good. I'm very afraid of this feeling of vanity. […] most ordinary people wish good […] we only see good and bad from different angles […]. It seems to me that it is very important not to become arrogant about your own goodness or correctness and so on. Because if you become arrogant, you will no longer want to communicate with anyone. You will no longer want to have a dialogue."

The respondents are thus aware of how dividing information bubbles work and some of them are looking for the ways to mix the bubbles or expand the opponents' bubbles through dialog. Information itself, by its nature, is described as flowing, "quicksand", unstable, complex, immense, hostile.

"It's just about how unstable everything is, how complicated everything is, how confusing everything is, how much you don't know how complex systems actually work […]. And this is this constant feeling of unsteadiness, uncertainty in anything, there is confidence only in the most basic things now, and even in them confidence disappears, like such ripples, quicksand. It's as if you are in them and you need to constantly move, and constantly search, and there is a fear that you will begin to fall into some kind of conspiracy theory. I've been having this thing lately that I don't need to immerse myself in, I don't want to immerse myself in any topics, because it seems to me that I'll get sucked in, and I don't want to fall into any specific patterns so that you can't be labeled or something. I want to stay in this. But this is such an uncomfortable state, but when you don't ossify or something... And the limitations of your own brain, too, when you understand that you can no longer realize, understand, analyze all this. As if on your own, you yourself begin to spit out some kind of propaganda."

The others also talk about the insidious nature of information.

"Such things generally scare me. It's scary that you can succumb to someone else's influence, someone else's opinion, that there are authoritative people, you somehow, willy-nilly, begin to obey them, you begin to be afraid [...]. I'm afraid that someone would brainwash me...if the TV drummed it into me for ten-fifteen years that someone wanted to destroy Russia..."

"I also made Stories to remember [...]. I wanted to remember everything so that later such a moment would not happen that I suddenly went crazy and started loving Putin...Ha-ha! So that I could see what happened before, or even if I went crazy and started loving Putin, so I could analyze how I had come to this."

One of the respondents talks about the doubts that arose in her, that everything began to seem very complicated and that she wanted to distance herself from the war.

"She asked me questions that I couldn't answer, and for me it was like... it destabilized me, and I began to understand that maybe everything was wrong... that everything was more complicated. [...] war is, indeed, a huge horror, but this narrative "it's not black and white" politically, geopolitically, it unfortunately began to seep into me in some way, and it was actually very difficult for me. And now I have a feeling that I can't, that I want to isolate myself from everything connected with the war. And this feeling, doubt, whether I understand the situation correctly. Absolutely depressing. This is a complete disorientation."

And again, she tries to understand the people on the other side of the barricades.

"And this the same feeling that the people who are for the war cannot let into themselves. They cannot suddenly admit that they are mistaken, this is a terrible feeling. [...] It's a feeling

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that one is falling, one is constantly falling, when one doesn't have a clear idea, here it's white and here it's black."

Another respondent tells something similar about his father, who perceives the situation as so complicated that he does not consider it possible to form any point of view on this matter.

"I have the impression that he doesn't care, he gave up, the fighting is over, that he no longer has an opinion, and that the people around him shouldn't have an opinion either or should sort of understand some fantastic things first to be able to have one [own opinion]."

Information, that I earlier called the trickster of identity constructure, is thus able to impact one's identity not only by sucking a person into a certain bubble, but also by instilling uncertainty. The first option seems to have a more mobilizing potential, the second one seems to demobilize.

The next section is an outlook on the Russian diaspora political mobilization phenomenon through the lens of the CAI account of political emotions.

6 The CAI account of political emotions: Emotional content of the Russian anti-war community identity

"Once we have witnessed the suffering, the injustice, the immorality, what do we do next? Do we tell our eyes to forget what they have seen, tell our mouths to not whisper a word, tell our hearts to go numb, slowly? Or do we choose to speak up, speak out, connect, organise, mobilize, and demand justice until justice is served?"

E.Shafak "How to stay sane in an age of division" (2020)

One of the proposed components of diaspora definition, which I would adopt for the case of the Russian anti-war diaspora in Norway, is the emotional component. Community members hesitantly label their group as "diaspora", but what they do not doubt is the emotions that they themselves experience as a part of the group, while attributing a similar set of emotions to other members of the group. This emotional component, which lies at the foundation of the community, is also confirmed by the qualitative analysis of social media profiles: *"non-indifferent", "a better future for their homeland", "a small homeland in the heart", "love is stronger than fear"* (name of one of the support rallies), *"SmåRådina is a place for everyone who cares about Russia and the development of democracy in Russia", "Community for change for the better ✌", "you are not alone" "for our and your freedom", "people who were upset and angry" , "need to show their disgust", "hope for democratic Russia"*. Members of the community identify themselves as a part of this community, among other things, by the criterion of experiencing certain emotions. In order to illuminate this content of the participants' identity, directly related to their political mobilization, I have adopted the CAI account of political emotions and justified my choice in detail in the corresponding theoretical section.

According to the CAI account, the emotions that lie behind the political mobilization of the Russian anti-war diaspora in Norway represent "political emotions" in the robust sense of the word. They are not non-political, because they are focused on "a matter of political import". Neither can they be seen as "politically focused" because they are relevant to a political community, and not a single individual. Three additional, necessary and in conjunction

sufficient, criteria can be applied to the community in the focus of inquiry in order to define these emotions as properly speaking political. (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, pp. 482, 485):

According to the first criterion, "the members' emotions have a double affective-intentional focus: (a) a focus on the same matter of political import and (b) a background focus on the political community itself." (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 482) The Russian anti-war diaspora's case does absolutely fulfil the criteria, representing an example of not even a double affective-intentional focus of the member's emotions, but a multiple one. The emotions are directed both outside the community (Russian state, Russian society, pro-regime Russians in Norway, Norwegian state and society, Ukrainian community, Ukrainian refugees and asylum seekers from Russia, political prisoners in Russia, similar Russian anti-war diasporas in other countries and similar non-Russian pro-democracy diasporas in Norway, to mention the most essential) and inside the community itself, as all the respondents point out at their desire to support the fellow-activists ("I do this and for their support...I definitely have the feeling that we help each other"), as well as at a therapeutic effect of gathering together ("going to rallies was such therapy, seeing people who were going through the same things as you"). Such a multidirectional character of affective-intentional focus is well conveyed in the following citation.

"The goal is to declare and show our position, to show that not all Russians support the war. Support Ukrainians. […] Our goal is to raise funds for Ukrainians, to help refugees […] perhaps to convince people who are on the other side […] to fight for a different Russia, for a different system. This is also a fight for the homeland, this is also patriotism. The goal is also to help people who were illegally imprisoned in Russia […] To constantly be on the move, to continue doing something, because the situation is changing all the time. There is also a personal goal- therapy. You just go out to protest for yourself because it makes you feel better. The goal could be to somehow motivate those who agree with us to become more active."

According to the theory's second criterion, which is also fulfilled in the current case, "members implicitly or explicitly claim public recognition of the emotions and their import for the polity" (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 482). As it was shown in the sections on diaspora's political mobilization manifestations, the community has put in use a wide spectrum of activity forms, such as rally and anti-rally, protest march, protest speech, signature campaign, petitioning, fund-raising campaign, humanitarian aid collection, to mention only some key

ones. The claims in the heart of those activities may have different focus (see the previous abstract) and either an explicitly or implicitly expressed emotional component (rallies "Love is stronger than fear", "You are not alone" versus "No to mobilization! No to war!").

The third criterion is about "certain reciprocal relations between the community's emotional outlook and that of the members", "an affective and normative integration" of the community members' emotions. (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 482). Data from the interviews provide enough evidence of such a reciprocity. According to the analysis conducted, the shared nature of pollical emotions:

- feeds into the individuals' felt experience and concern for the policy ("*the intensity of these feelings was so high that we resonated with each other", "well, it's as if through such a community a feeling of empowerment appears", "go protest for a new dose of cohesion"*);
- have normative impact on individuals' emotion regulation ("*I collected warm things at work [for refugees], but again rationally, not emotionally, it is necessary to help… it's terrible*"- the respondent says "*terrible"* without longer experiencing all the intensity of all that terror, rather knowing that it should still be there because the war is not over");
- have normative impact on individuals' political motivation and comportment ("*at first you couldn't help but go out […], then you went out because logically you knew that this was important", "while the war is going on, we will have to go out"*- the respondents understand that the reason for the intensive emotions they experience in the first stage- the war- is still there, and even if they are no longer driven by the emotions themselves, they continue to protest);
- have normative impact on the appropriateness of their emotions (for example, respondents hesitate, speaking about the joy of coming together, they kind of wonder if it is appropriate, normal to experience anything positive, and accompany their revelations be remarks about the negative context: "*and I would define it as pleasant, oddly enough. The context is unpleasant, but the feeling of cohesion with a group of like-minded people is a pleasant feeling"*).

Applying Szanto & Slaby' classification of different levels of emotional (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, pp. 484–485) to the case of the Russian anti-war diaspora in Norway results in conclusion that the community is characterised by a high level of sharing of political emotions. The latter represent, as the authors put it, *"more or less diachronically robust,*

public, and properly speaking collective political emotions", that are *"precisely based on a shared and jointly felt evaluation of the target in light of the community's concerns"*, where the main target is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This level of emotional sharing requires *"actual interaction between community members in shared public spaces"* (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, pp. 484–485), which is also relevant to my case. The Russian anti-war diaspora members interact in a number of both physical and virtual spaces, corresponding to the broad spectrum of activity forms, sketched in the section on the diaspora mobilization manifestations.

All in all, a conclusion can be drawn that the emotions the members of the Russian anti-war community experience, as a part of this community, constitute, according to the CAI account of pollical emotions criteria, highly shared political emotions in the robust sense. (Szanto & Slaby, 2020, p. 482) They relate to the collective in a way that they are jointly felt, still felt in various ways by individual members and not the whole group as an organism. Though one of the respondents describes her experience in exactly this way (*"a certain state where we are one single organism in some way")*, attributing precisely the same emotional experience to the other members, the data from qualitative interviews show that even if the core of the emotional experience is common , there are still variations both in quality of the emotional cocktail- which emotions are mixed in- and in the quantity of the ingredients, or the intensity of different emotions.

Such an outlook on the political emotions entails understanding of the last as one of the various contents of the Russian anti-war community identity, namely the emotional identity content of a collective nature. Even if some of the emotions from the set were not reported by single participants, the other participants mostly attribute their own set to all the members of the community and expect the others to jointly feel even the emotions they might not experience. However, such variations are insignificant, and it can be argued that the core set of emotions constitutes one the community identity contents.

7   Outcomes and implications

A composite methodological algorithm has been applied to the case of Russian diaspora political mobilisation in Norway in the period from 24.02.22 to 24.02.23 in order to indicate the real-life manifestation of the mobilization and the lived experiences of the phenomenon, comprising both the political emotions and identity contents that lie in the ground of the community. As the next step, the CAI account of political emotions was applied to the description of the phenomenon's essence. Besides the thesis refers to a similar and recently published case study investigating Russian migrants' engagement in pro-democratic transnational activism in Denmark and Norway through the notion of moral shock (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 44)

Here below I will list up several outcomes of my master's thesis research followed by its eventual implications.

Outcomes of the research

1. The phenomenon of Russian diaspora political mobilization in Norway in response to the outbreak of the full-fledged war in Ukraine, has manifested itself in a sharp growth in a number of registered members of the NGO "*SmåRådina: for democracy in Russia*" (from "a few" to "much over 100") as well as a sharp growth in the community activities, both in terms of their number, topics, activity forms and directions. The data also show a significant increase in the personal assortment of activity forms (or instruments of political participation) for 3 of 4 respondents after 24.02.22. One of the respondents was active within SmåRådina's pro-democracy agenda already in 2021 and the set of activities remained the same rich. Howerer, compared to the official number of immigrants with Russian background in Norway, which much is over 10000, the number of community members (not only registered ones, but also those following SmåRådina's social media profiles, that is up to 2280) does not seem large. All my respondent and presumably most of the community participants are Russian immigrants allready well-integrated in the Norwegian society.

2. The phenomenon of Russian diaspora political mobilization is an interplay of multiple factors such as among others: political views, democratic values, national identity, critical outward patriotism and cosmopolitanism, interpersonal relations and, indeed, emotions. 3 of 4 respondents report that they had not been indifferent to social and political issues when living

in Russia, the 4th one claims having become attentive to the political since the poisoning and arrest of Navalny in 2021, that is also before the full-fledged war. Political mobilization they have experienced is then defined as an increasing intensity of political stance, feelings, and actions (especially actions), that however- to a much lesser extent- already existed before the war. The initial point of my respondents was not purely "apolitical", the study thus has not grasped a dramatic transition from political apathy strictly speaking to considering the political as an inseparable part of one's life, but rather mobilization in sense of a dramatic intensification.

3. Political emotions, underlying Russian diaspora political mobilization are distinguished by the following treats: they are multiple and extremely intensive, most of them constitute the core of the experience that is "jointly felt" by all members, there are some variations in the set of emotions and the perception of their intensity, however the respondent tend to attribute a similar set of emotions to the other community members. The first stage of the emotional experience is predominantly negatively valenced, here the reported emotions reach their extreme peaks and impact not only participants' mental, but also physical state and their ability to work. Such an intense and painful experience may be partly conveyed by the word "overwhelm", but words are however not an adequate enough tool to express the experience's nature and degree and the respondents therefore resort to metaphors, all sketching the feelings of despair, lostness, dying, catastrophe, apocalypse, collapse of their entire world. At the same time, the respondents do not afford living those feelings, being aware of the Ukrainians' "unfictional" tragedies. The flip side of the phenomenon turns out to be more positively valenced: there are feelings of cohesion, solidarity, joy, inspiration, gratitude in connection with finding a community of like-minded people and acting together. Beside the initial overwhelm and the joy of finding each other, another thing in common was, though slightly differently defined, a sense of responsibility that is impossible not to choose, a kind of civic moral duty that is just there and "a rule of the game". To satisfy this sense of responsibility the participants cannot help but take action. However, the intensity of emotions fades in time and due to the lack of visible results. Someone of the respondents feels deep apathy, some is even more motivated by the scale of the pan-European and global cooperation of the Russian anti-war community. All report the need to continue to act, little by little, and the belief in changes. But in this new stage the participants take action not because they emotionally cannot otherwise, but because there are still a lot of reasons to act that they find relevant, the still ongoing war is the number one reason.

4. What I have approaches by the help of the political emotions notion and attempted to disassemble to atoms, Katrine Stevnhøj in her recently published research (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 44) has approached through the notion of moral shock, a compact concept already comprising both a sudden trigger, a set of negatively valenced emotions, the potential to gather and mobilize communities, as well as feeling the impossibility not to take part and feeling good of acting collectively for a cause- among other components. My findings mostly confirm Stevnhøj's ones: her respondents also report the feeling of the "last straw", the emotional overwhelm, the impossibility to remain passive, the therapeutic effect of collective action, to mention something. Stevnhøj comes to a conclusion that "participation in transnational activism can be considered a strategy that helps the activists cope with sudden and traumatic political developments in their homeland", to cope with the moral shock caused by the last. (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 44) This claim could as well be argued for within my research. The only "mismatch" I can see in the two studies' findings is that while Stevnhøj considers fear either demobilizing or mobilizing emotion in application to her case, my respondents clearly report the insignificance of this, though slightly present, emotion for mobilization- "it wasn't a key emotion". Whether it was the key one for those who remained passive is beyond my research.

5. The CAI account of political emotions has also turned out to be a fruitful lens to apply to my case. Beside demonstrating a robust nature of Russian diaspora community political emotions and their high level of sharing, the theory offers an answer to why the community continues to exist even if the intensity of the fundamental emotions fades in time- robust political emotions have normative impact on the participants, they kind of regulate and reproduce themselves within a community and may turn the community itself into a diachronically sustainable collective. The current case, in its turn, contributes to the CAI account development by demonstrating that the political emotions in the ground of a community may represent an extremely complex and multidirectional set of emotions, that possess not even a doble, but a multiple affective-intentional focus.

6. The Russian anti-war community in Norway can be defined as "diaspora" within the traditional- "diaspora as essence"- approach, being in this case placed in one basket together with the pro-regime and "silent" Russians in Norway. The more recent- "diaspora as outcomes"- approach represents a sharper tool of defining diaspora, allowing to set boundaries around namely the anti-war community, that has emerged through the process of

mobilization. In this latter sense, the wording "diaspora mobilization", used throughout the thesis is not correct, as there was no diaspora before the mobilization and it would be more precise to say "diaspora emerging" or "diaspora formation through mobilization", meaning Russian pro-democracy and anti-war diaspora in Norway. However, the diasporants themselves hesitate to take in use the word, many different and vague connotation coming to mind. Some do it anyway, as a "forced" option, because there are no other compact ones. The community members report such identity "bricks" (contents) relevant for their political mobilization, as democratic values and political views, the value of freedom, primacy of human rights, rejection of the war (all), kind of outward and critical patriotism (most) and cosmopolitanism (some), close relations with Ukraine and Ukrainians (most). The trickster of this identity constructure is information. Information bubbles are extremely polarizing, even if most of the participants admit that they could, on certain conditions, have ended up in the other bubble- on the other side of the barricades. The unstable, "quicksand" nature of information itself is demobilizing.

7. It may carefully be stated as an outcome of the thesis, that learned political apathy and loyal patriotism, reported by some of my respondents for their younger age, are not a sentence. A certain information and political environment may stimulate political participation, the process and the role of political emotions in it are however understudied. It may also be relevant to mention here, that the respondents mostly feel compassion to the Russians living in the RF territory, even to those who allegedly support the so-called special military operation, considering them as victims of the regime who never even had a chance to see another life and truth. Another life could have been possible for them, they believe.

8. The last outcome of the research is the methodological tool developed in the corresponding section. A composite algorithm of the phenomenological case study can be adopted and applied to other somehow similar cases.

Implications of the research

1. As, indeed, only a relatively small number of Russian immigrants in Norway became outspoken and active after and in connection with the outbreak of the war, I adjoin Stevnhøj's recommendations for researchers to pay attention to those neutral or not outspoken Russian immigrants. I do also agree with the need to look at the phenomenon from the other angles

and illuminate the political opportunity structures and the mobilization of resources that play in transnational mobilization processes. (Stevnhøj, 2023, p. 57) Besides, as I suggested earlier, taking into account a traumatic nature of diasporants' emotional experience in reaction to the invasion of Ukraine by their homeland, it would presumably be fruitful to apply the notion of "a conflict-generated" diaspora (grounded in a traumatic identity) also to the newly emerged Russian anti-war diaspora. I give more arguments for the suggestion in the analysis section. Another fruitful research direction can be also mentioned here. Russian anti-war communities emerged all over the world after 24.02.22 provide unique possibilities for investigation of how the political contexts of the host lands, that the diasporas are embedded in, impact the political mobilization of the latter. It would, from this point of view, be interesting to compare, for example, Russian diasporas in Norway, Kazakhstan, Poland, Serbia, USA. Besides, it would be possible to zoom out and observe the mechanisms of pan-European and global- supranational- structures of Russian pro-democracy diaspora. Such processes started already during 2022 are gaining momentum today. Zooming back in, more phenomenological research could be done on the understudied intersection of diaspora and patriotism. Twice my respondents reported the feeling of being a traitor in the eyes of their inner younger and more loyal self, so a transition from the learned post-soviet loyal patriotism to its critical and outward alternative is an interesting focus here.

2. More attempts may be made to catch a more dramatic transition from robustly apolitical state right before the war outbreak to considering the political as an inseparable part of one's life. This would become possible with the help of structured surveys applied to a large sample of Russian diasporants, followed by interviews with those participants who have reported being apolitical as of start of the year 2022.

3. The implications of the thesis may reach the domain of civic education. The case illuminated in the current thesis is a contribution to the understanding of political emotions' many-sided role in political mobilization and participation, which is the cornerstone of a vibrant democracy. Several authors point out to the role of education when it comes to acknowledgment and discussion of political emotions in the society (see the introductory section of the current thesis). It can be argued for implementation of the concept of "civic emotional competence", looking beyond the role of emotions in the interpersonal relations, both in the theory of citizenship education and its practice. It can besides be particularly emphasized the importance of a critical approach to teaching patriotism within the course of civic education.

8 Appendices

8.1 Appendix: Information letter for data collection

<div align="center">Information letter for data collection</div>

Purpose of the project with the working title "From political emotions to political participation"
I invite you to participate in my master thesis research project where the main purpose is to qualitatively investigate how political emotions, national identity and patriotism can stimulate the use of multiple tools of political participation.

Which institution is responsible for the research project?
University of Oslo (UIO) is responsible for the project (data controller).

Why are you being asked to participate?
I ask you to take part in the project because you have grown up in Russia, you represent Russian diaspora in Norway, you have been outspoken about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and you have expressed your disagreement with the Russian official politics by means of different political tools.

What does participation involve for you?
If you choose to take part in the project, this will involve that we meet physically. The meeting will last around 1,5 hour and consist of 2 parts.
1. You will be asked to fill in a survey form called "*Political participation*", where you are supposed to tick the tools of political participation you personally have used. The form is on paper.
2. You will be asked to answer interview questions, that are divided into two blocks, "*Political emotions*" and "*Identities and patriotism*". The answers will be recorded by means of a Dictaphone-APP, that will then automatically send the recordings to the university personal data storage, TSD.

Participation is voluntary
Participation in the project is voluntary. If you chose to participate, you can withdraw your consent at any time without giving a reason. All information about you will then be made anonymous. There will be no negative consequences for you if you chose not to participate or later decide to withdraw.

Your personal privacy – how we will store and use your personal data.
I will only use your personal data for the purpose(s) specified here and I will process your personal data in accordance with data protection legislation (the GDPR).

All personal information collected will be as soon as possible placed in TSD, a service for collecting, managing and storing personal data in accordance with GDPR. The interview recordings will automatically be sent to TSD. The signed consent letter and the filled in survey form will be scanned with a UIO approved scanner and sent to TSD. The paper versions will be shredded right after that. The consent letter will be kept separately from the survey form and the interview recording (both pseudonymised) to minimise the risk of leaking of identifying information.

Basically, only the master student has access to the personal data. But my two master thesis supervisors can also get the access if it is necessary for the research. I will then ensure that only anonymized data, not containing directly or indirectly identifying details, is taken out of TSD.

It will not be possible to recognize you out of the master thesis text. Only anonymised pieces of data will be used in discussion part of the thesis. No personal identifying data will be published.

What will happen to your personal data at the end of the research project?

The planned end date of the project is 30.06.2023 All the collected data will be deleted from TSD storage by the date.

Your rights
So long as you can be identified in the collected data, you have the right to:
- access the personal data that is being processed about you
- request that your personal data is deleted
- request that incorrect personal data about you is corrected/rectified
- receive a copy of your personal data (data portability), and
- send a complaint to the Norwegian Data Protection Authority regarding the processing of your personal data

What gives us the right to process your personal data?
We will process your personal data based on your consent.

Based on an agreement with UIO, Data Protection Services has assessed that the processing of personal data in this project meets requirements in data protection legislation.

Where can I find out more?
If you have questions about the project, or want to exercise your rights, contact:
- UIO via Inga Bostad (master thesis supervisor) inga.bostad@iped.uio.no or Tatiana Surina (master student) tatiansu@uio.no
- Our Data Protection Officer: Roger Markgraf-Bye personvernombud@uio.no

If you have questions about how data protection has been assessed in this project, contact:
- Data Protection Services, by email: (personverntjenester@sikt.no) or by telephone: +47 53 21 15 00.

Yours sincerely,

_____   _____
Master student   Master thesis supervisor

8.2   Appendix: Consent form for data collection

Consent form for data collection

I have received and understood information about the project with the working title *"From political emotions to political participation"* and have been given the opportunity to ask questions. I give consent:

- ☐ to take part in the survey "*Political participation*"
- ☐ to take part in the interview, consisting of two blocks of questions, *"Political emotions"* and *"Identities and patriotism*"

I give consent for my personal data to be processed until the end of the project.

Date   Full name and the signature of the participant

8.3 Appendix: Survey form

Part 1. Survey form "Political participation"

I left Russia at the age of 15-23.

I used these instruments of political participation at least once (put a mark):

	When living in Russia	When living in Norway (before 24.02.22)	When living in Norway (after 24.02.22)
starting a political organisation			
signing up for a political organization			
volunteering for a political organisation			
suggesting a candidate in elections			
standing as a candidate in elections			
voting in elections			
starting a (social media) political campaign			
taking part in a (social media) political campaign			
taking part in public organisations, such as professional and housing associations			
taking part in the board of those organizations or elections to the board			
donating money to political organisations			
donating money to human rights organizations			
donating money to independent media			
humanitarian donations in a political context			
organising strikes			
taking part in strikes			
organising rallies			
taking part in rallies			
contacting officials			
writing letters and petitions to political decision-makers or opinion-shapers			
signing letters and petitions to political decision-makers or opinion-shapers			
contacting media			
writing debate posts for media			
touching on political issues in social media			
being interviewed on political issues			
appear on tv in connection with political issues			
making political art			
reposting political art in social media			
organizing political flash mobs			
taking part in political flash mobs			
taking part in seminars/lectures/other educational events on social and political issues * (added after the pilot survey)			

If you now think of some other important instruments of political participation that are not mentioned in the lines above, so feel free to use free lines to add instruments and put marks in the corresponding columns.

8.4 Appendix: Interview guide

Part 2. Interview guide.

Block 1. Political emotions.

1. Please, talk about the first day of the war. How did you know the news? What was your reaction?
2. Look at these cards with emotions in front of you. Could you pick the emotions that filled you the first days of the war. Talk about each.
3. Which of them were most intensive? How have they evolved during the last year? Have they become even more or less intensive? Have some vanished?
4. Did you feel that to act, to do something about this war is your responsibility? Why/not? Do you still feel this way?
5. Which of the emotions do you think the other members of the anti-war [pro-democracy] community have shared with you. How does it feel to stand in protest together with other members of the anti-war [pro-democracy] community?
6. What risks does your political activity involve for you, if any? Are you afraid?

Block 2. Identities and patriotism.

1. Do you identify yourself mostly as a Norwegian citizen, a Russian citizen or a global citizen? Please talk about this part of your identity.

2. Do you consider yourself as a Russian patriot? What does it mean for you to be a patriot? The representatives of the pro-regime community in Russia and abroad think that they are the real patriots. How is their patriotism different from your one?

3. Do members of the Russian anti-war [pro-democracy] community abroad define themselves as diaspora? Had you been acquainted with each other before the war start? What binds you together? What binds you to Russia? What differs you from the Russians that support the invasion? Could you imagine a situation where you are on the other side of the barricades?

4. When did you become politically active? Have you been politically active against other attacks of one country by another? If not, what makes this case important enough for you to get mobilized and to protest? Could you remember your attitude and your emotional reactions to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Did you protest then? Why/not?

5. What are the demands of the Russian anti-war [pro-democracy] community? What is your goal? Do you believe that this work can bring change? If not, why do you choose to act anyway?

6. Did you participate in demonstrations, organized by Russian anti-war [pro-democracy] community on the 24th of February, exactly one year since the invasion of Ukraine? How? Some representatives of Ukrainian community in Norway and abroad were against any kind of Russian demonstrations on the 24th of February. What is your response to such an opinion?

7. How do you manage to keep the protest motivation after a whole year of the war? Would you go to an anti-wat concert organized by the community even if you have never listened to that kind of music? Why/not?

8. What worries you most?

Block 3. Final

1. Why have you agreed to participate in my project?
2. What do think about our conversation? Do you want to add something?

8.5   Appendix: List of emotions

- Anger
- Anxiety
- Belonging
- Betrayal
- Calm
- Cognitive dissonance
- Compassion
- Confusion
- Contempt
- Contentment
- Despair
- Disappointment
- Disconnection
- Empathy
- Expectations, hope
- Fear
- Frustration
- Gratitude

- Grief
- Guilt
- Hate
- Humiliation
- Humility
- ~~Hurt~~
- Insecurity
- Interest, curiosity
- Loneliness
- ~~Overwhelm~~
- Regret
- Resentment
- Resignation
- Sadness
- Shame
- Stress
- ~~Surprise~~ shock

- Solidarity, cohesion, unity
- Trust
- Love
- Relief
- Joy
- Pride

● The initial list, unchanged

● Deleted or transformed after the pilot interview

● Added to the list after the pilot interview

Part 1. Survey form "Political participation" (filled out by 4 respondents)

I left Russia at the age of 15-23.

I used these instruments of political participation at least once (put a mark):
(marked by ☐ one ☐ two ☐ three ☐ four respondent/s)

	When living in Russia	When living in Norway (before 24.02.22)	When living in Norway (after 24.02.22)
starting a political organisation/association	one		one
signing up for a political organization			three
volunteering for a political organisation			four
suggesting a candidate in elections		one	
standing as a candidate in elections			
voting in elections	two	three	two
starting a (social media) political campaign			
taking part in a (social media) political campaign	one		two
taking part in public organisations, such as professional and housing associations		three	three
taking part in the board of those organizations or elections to the board		three	three
donating money to political organisations	one	one	two
donating money to human rights organizations		three	four
donating money to independent media		three	four
humanitarian donations in a political context	one	two	three

organising strikes			
taking part in strikes			
organising rallies			
taking part in rallies			
contacting officials			
writing letters and petitions to political decision-makers or opinion-shapers			
signing letters and petitions to political decision-makers or opinion-shapers			
contacting media			
writing debate posts for media			
touching on political issues in social media			
being interviewed on political issues			
appear on tv in connection with political issues			
making political art			
reposting political art in social media			
organizing political flash mobs			
taking part in political flash mobs			
taking part in seminars/lectures/other educational events on social and political issues * (added after the pilot survey)			

If you now think of some other important instruments of political participation that are not mentioned in the lines above, so feel free to use empty lines to add instruments and put marks in the corresponding columns.

8.7 Appendix: Bar chart for the survey results

Dynamics of respondents' political participation

Political participation- Number of tools put in use

	Left Russia at the age of	When living in Russia	When living in Norway before 24.02.22.	When living in Norway after 24.02.22.
Respondent 1	15	0	7	15
Respondent 2	18	1	5	12
Respondent 3	23	10	16	22
Respondent 4	22	6	17	17

8.8 Appendix: Summary table for the content analysis data (in original languages)

	Website	Facebook (Norwegian)	Facebook (Russian)	Taplink	Instagram	Telegram (private group)	Telegram (public channel)	YouTube
Title:	SmåRådina: for demokrati i Russland	SmåRådina: for demokrati i Russland	Неравнодушные в Норвегии	SMÅRÅDINA	Foreningen SmåRådina	Неравнодушные в Норвегии	Смородина | SmåRådina	SmåRådina: for demokrati i Russland
Number followers:	-	1100	**2280**	-	942	201	275	26 (802 views)
Date of 1st publication:	26.03.2022	17.04.2021	4.02.2022	-	21.04.2021	27.02.2022	27.04.2022	28.12.2021
Intro:	«SmåRådina er en plass for alle som bryr seg om Russland og demokrati-utvikling i Russland.»	«SmåRådina er en plass for de som bryr seg om Russland og Russlands demokratiske utvikling.»	«За вашу и нашу свободу.»	"Мы за демократию в России и против войны в Украине!"	"Сообщество за перемены к лучшему👌"	"Ты не один" (текст на картинке профиля)	«SmåRådina: for demokrati i Russland»	-
Add. text:	«Vi i SmåRådina er mot krigen i Ukraina. Bombingen må stoppes nå!»	«Støtt arbeidet vårt. Bli medlem.»	-	"Вступайте и читайте smaaraadina."	"Россияне в Норвегии против войны✌"	-	"Россияне в Норвегии. Мы против войны и за демократию в России."	-
Link:	https://smaaraadina.no/nb/	https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=49498913896957 2&set=g.4660 81591072261	https://www.facebook.com/groups/for.frihet	https://taplink.cc/smaaraadina	https://instagram.com/smaaraadina?igshid=MzRlODBiNWFlZA==	Private, no link available.	https://t.me/smaaraadina	https://youtube.com/@smaaraadina?si=GVE_TgVfaAHg-vm

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