THE INFORMATION PREMIUM IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS

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Abstract. Electricity is a commodity which is non-storable, and therefore difficult to move forward in time. Hence, forward looking information about market conditions is not necessarily incorporated in today’s prices, and the typical assumption that the information filtration is generated by the asset is fundamentally wrong. We discuss pricing of forward contracts in the electricity market based on an enlargement of the information filtration. The method is able to incorporate future information of the spot, which is not accounted for in the present spot price behaviour. The notion of the information yield implied from the introduction of an information drift due to knowledge about the future spot behaviour and the corresponding information premium are introduced, and we argue that significant parts of the supposedly irregular market price of risk in electricity markets is in reality due to information miss-specification in the model. Some examples based on Brownian motion and Lévy processes and the theory of initial enlargement of filtrations are considered, where we are able to shed some insight into the nature of the information yield and the information premium relevant for the electricity markets. The examples include cases where we take future temperature predictions and knowledge of the long-term level of the spot into account.

1. Introduction

In this paper we consider the role of forward looking information when pricing forwards in electricity markets, where the underlying spot is known to be a non-storable commodity. For non-storable commodities, the spot-forward relationship based on the buy-and-hold strategy breaks down. The theory of storage and convenience yield have been successfully applied to commodities like oil, but are not relevant for non-storable commodities like electricity. Instead, in incomplete markets like the electricity market, the forward price is usually defined as the expected spot price at delivery, conditioned on the filtration generated by the available information up to current time. The expectation is with respect to a risk-neutral probability. Further, the flow of information, even though referred to as the total available information in the market, is usually defined to be the one generated by the spot price. This underlying assumption that all market information is incorporated into the price behavior might be acceptable for traded assets (as is the case in financial

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markets). For markets with non-storable (and consequently non-traded) commodities like electricity, however, this assumption is fundamentally wrong.

Consider for example a planned maintenance of a major electricity power plant. Let us suppose that the power plant will be taken off the net the whole next month. In a properly working electricity market, this is known information available to the traders, and obviously this must affect the prices. However, today’s spot price and its information filtration do not necessarily take into account at all the planned outage. The market knows that for the next month the spot prices will increase by a certain amount since a significant part of the supply side in the market falls out. This again will affect directly forward contracts with delivery of electricity which includes the maintenance period. However, lack of storability possibilities imply that supply and demand up until today will not reflect the knowledge of future reduction in the supply.

Thus, the filtration generated by the spot price fails to take these forward looking events into account, and by basing the forward price on this information flow they will not be captured in the theoretical forward price either. The objective of this paper is to manifest the crucial role forward looking information plays in incomplete markets and to explicitly take future information into account when pricing electricity forwards. In the recent paper by Cartea, Figueroa and Geman [12], forward looking capacity information is directly incorporated into the spot dynamics. Our paper is based on the same idea of including future demand and supply information in the forward price formation, however, using a completely different approach.

In this paper, to explicitly take into account future market information, we enlarge the information filtration used in the derivation of forward prices. This approach is based on the theory for “enlargement of filtrations”, see e.g. Protter [30]. We define the notion of an information premium, being the difference between the forward price based on the enlarged filtration and the forward price based on spot price information only (see (2.7)). The information premium can be both positive or negative, effectively measuring the premium charged by either consumers or producers as a function of the market implications of the additional information. To the information premium, we can associate an information yield. The information yield plays the same role as the drift in the Girsanov transform when changing probability measure. It is possible to find a process which becomes a Brownian motion under the enlarged filtration, which can be represented as a drifted Brownian motion in the filtration of the spot. The effect of this change will be an additional drift term in the spot dynamics, which then can be interpreted in the same way as the “market price of risk” when changing probability measure.

The introduction of the information premium is also motivated through its interplay with the risk premium. The risk-neutral pricing probability introduces the so-called market price of risk (through a Girsanov transform, or more generally, an Esscher transform), which is closely linked to the risk premium. This approach is usually parametric, in the sense that the market price of risk is not explained, but simply given parametrically and estimated from market data. Following this approach, several studies (see e.g. [11], [14]) conclude that the market price of risk in electricity markets behaves rather irregular: it attains both positive and negative values, it varies with time to maturity of the forward contracts, and
it should be assumed to be random. We here argue that at least parts of this behavior is not due to irregular risk pricing of the market but due to information miss-specification in the model. When one does not include forward looking information for the non-storable components in the pricing model, the calibrated market price also has to capture the (possibly very irregular) information premium.

Using the enlargement-of-filtration approach, we derive forward prices for a specific arithmetic two-factor spot model, where the innovations are allowed to be Lévy processes. The information premium and yield are derived in some situations, in particular where we know the future long-term spot level. We also consider a situation where the electricity spot prices are correlated with temperatures, and where the market has available temperature predictions. In these cases we obtain expressions for the information premium and yield which provides an explanation for the difference between the forward prices and predicted spots observed in the market. For example, in the Nordic electricity market Nord Pool, where demand is temperature driven, we show an explicit premium in terms of the temperature predictions which is negative with increasing temperatures and positive with decreasing. Since in the Nordic region a large portion of the electricity production goes to household heating, this is in line with the expected behavior of the forward prices. The main result in this direction is the explicit expression of the information yield in terms of temperature forecasts.

Another situation we study is the pricing of CO2 emission rights and their effect on electricity prices. At the German market EEX, a large portion of the electricity production is coal and gas fired. Looking at the EEX electricity prices in the autumn of 2007, we observe a sharp increase in forward prices from December 2007 to January 2008. This increase is largely explained by the cost of emitting CO2, which are not effectively incurred on the market before 2008. This is known, of course, by the market participants. One can in the EEX observe how this market information is taken into account in forward prices, but not in the present spot prices. We discuss these effects in detail, and provide a framework for explaining the effect mathematically. This example is also a concrete market situation which clearly shows the need to incorporate forward looking information when calculating forward prices in electricity markets.

The rest of this paper is sectioned as follows: in the next section we discuss further our pricing approach, and define the forward price based on enlarged filtrations. Section 3 then moves on with a more detailed mathematical analysis, with some relevant examples where we can explain the risk premium in terms of information. Moreover, we also have give a foundation for understanding why the sign of the risk premium in the electricity market may change. Finally, we conclude in the last section with some indications on further research.

2. Forward pricing and information in electricity markets

In this section we motivate and introduce our proposed pricing framework for forward contracts in the electricity market. Our main focus is to argue for the relevance of forward
looking information market information to the formation of forward prices, leading to the notions of *information premium* and *information yield*.

2.1. **The pricing framework.** Let us start by recalling some standard theory of forward pricing as a foundation for our further discussion. Consider a spot with dynamics given by a semimartingale process $S(t)$, defined on a complete probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$ equipped with a filtration $\mathcal{G}_t$ satisfying the usual conditions. The filtration $\mathcal{G}_t$ models the flow of available information. If the spot can be traded without frictions, a forward contract delivering at time $T$ can be hedged perfectly by the buy-and-hold strategy, and in the absence of arbitrage, the price is expressible as (see e.g. Duffie [16])

\begin{equation}
 f(t, T) = e^{r(T-t)}S(t).
\end{equation}

Here, the risk-free interest rate is $r > 0$, assumed to be constant. Furthermore, the price can be expressed in terms of a conditional expectation under a risk-neutral probability (equivalent martingale measure) $Q$ by,

\begin{equation}
 f(t, T) = \mathbb{E}_Q[S(T) | \mathcal{F}_t].
\end{equation}

The basic ingredients here are the filtration $\mathcal{G}_t$, to which $S(t)$ is adapted, and $Q$, which turns the discounted spot price into a martingale (possibly local). In order to perform the buy-and-hold strategy, we must store the spot without costs, which is not feasible in electricity markets (except possibly using water reservoirs for hydro producers).

The theory of forward pricing in commodity markets extends the arbitrage-free relation (2.2) to include for storage and transportation costs, highly relevant for commodities like oil and metals (see e.g. Hull [22]). The underlying spot products (like oil, say), can be purchased and stored, and thus the buy-and-hold strategy is implementable, however at a cost of storage and transportation at delivery. In these markets, one also argues for the so-called *convenience yield*, which assigns a certain positive yield to holding the underlying commodity rather than being long a forward contract on the same asset (see Hull [22] for more details and references). All in all, the aspects of convenience yield and storage costs implies a modification of the spot-forward relation (2.1) based on arbitrage arguments as follows. For a constant yield $\delta$, the forward price is

\begin{equation}
 f(t, T) = e^{(r-\delta)(T-t)}S(t).
\end{equation}

The convenience yield is positive, while the storage and transportation costs incur a negative contribution to $\delta$. The relation (2.3) may be expressed in terms of a conditional expectation as well, by choosing appropriately a risk-neutral measure $Q$. There exists many extensions of the theory of convenience yield and storage, however, the basic underlying condition is the *storability* of the underlying commodity. Hence, in the case of electricity markets, this approach is inappropriate. The non-storability feature of the commodity also rules out the existence of a convenience yield (see Eydeland and Wolyenie [17] and Geman [18]).

For the case of electricity, the exact relation between the spot and forward is not clear. The usual approach is to resort to the general principle from no-arbitrage pricing theory and to define the forward price in terms of the spot as follows:
Definition 2.1. The forward price $f_Q^G(t, T)$ at time $t$ of a contract with delivery at time $T$ is defined as

$$f_Q^G(t, T) \triangleq \mathbb{E}_Q [S(T) | G_t]$$

where the filtration $G_t$ models the flow of the available information in the market. Furthermore, $Q$ is a risk-neutral probability.$^1$

There are a few things worth remarking to this way of defining the forward price. Since the spot is not tradeable, it does not need to be a (local) martingale under the risk-neutral probability. Hence, the risk-neutral probability $Q$ can be any (equivalent) probability, and we generally have a wide range of candidate probabilities to choose from. It is then by far not clear which one is the “correct” (if any). One usually selects $Q$ from a parametric class, essentially changing the drift of $S$ in the most frequently encountered models. Hence, the resulting risk-neutral forward dynamics has a parametric term coming from $Q$ which next can be estimated using historical forward price data. The drift is commonly referred to as the market price of risk since it is a crucial ingredient in measuring the deviation from the predicted spot at delivery

$$f_F(t, T) = \mathbb{E} [S(T) | G_t].$$

Definition 2.2. The risk premium is defined as the difference between the forward price $f_Q^G(t, T)$ and the predicted spot $f_G(t, T)$, denoted by

$$R_Q^G(t, T) \triangleq f_Q^G(t, T) - f_G(t, T) = \mathbb{E}_Q [S(T) | G_t] - \mathbb{E} [S(T) | G_t].$$

The market is in normal backwardation when the premium is negative, meaning that the forward price is lower than the predicted spot price. In backwardation, one interprets the risk premium as the additional fee speculators charge in order to take on the risk from producers, who, on the other hand, hedge their production. We refer to, e.g., Benth, Cartea and Kiesel [3] for a discussion of these issues in the context of energy markets.

Although the pricing rule in Definition 2.1 gives a market consistent way to derive a forward price dynamics, it seems to be difficult to apply in practice. The connection between spot and forward is not clear, and thus it is hard to find any reasonable measure $Q$ flexible enough to model the electricity forward in a sound way, and at the same time being feasible for analysis. In addition, the approach does not provide any satisfactory financial explanation for the formation of forward prices based on the spot. Several authors have studied the market price of risk and the implied risk premium in electricity markets and found a rather irregular and random behavior. Geman and Vasicek [20] find that the risk premium for forward contracts with short maturities is positive for data from the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) market. This can be explained by the consumer’s desire to ensure short-term delivery of electricity, and because of the big volatility, a positive premium is accepted. For longer-maturing contracts, the picture may change due to utilities that want to hedge their long-term production. Later studies by Longstaff and Wang [26] and

$^1$Electricity forwards deliver over a period rather than at a fixed future time. In this paper we ignore this fact to keep matters simpler.
Diko, Lawford and Limpens [14] have confirmed these results, and extended them to other markets and for longer maturities. Further references that confirm the irregular behavior of risk premia include Cartea and Figueroa [11]) and Lucia and Torro [28]. In this article we want to argue that significant parts of this behavior of the risk premium, or market price of risk, are due to information miss-specification. We propose to use the flow of information about future market conditions available to the participants as the key to understand how forward prices are formed.

The information flow $\mathcal{G}_t$ in Definition 2.1 should represent all available information to the market at time $t$, where forward looking events that the market has knowledge of are included (see e.g. Eydeland and Wolyniec [17]). As mentioned in the introduction, the usual assumption for traded assets in financial markets is that all information is incorporated in asset price behavior and that $\mathcal{G}_t = \mathcal{F}_t$, where $\mathcal{F}_t$ is defined as the filtration generated by the asset or its noise drivers. To the best of our knowledge, at least in concrete applications and calculations, this assumption is transferred to electricity markets without further considerations. However, as argued before, this presupposition is fundamentally wrong for non-storable assets like electricity. We propose to explicitly enlarge the information flow available at time $t$ in the market, to account for forward looking information like a planned power outage of a major supplier. This leads us to the introduction of the information premium.

**Definition 2.3.** The information premium is defined as

$$I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) \triangleq f_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) - f_{\mathcal{F}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{G}_t] - \mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{F}_t].$$

Here $\mathcal{F}_t$ is the filtration generated by the spot price, and $\mathcal{G}_t$ is the filtration representing all available information including forward looking events.

The information premium measures the added value in forward prices implied by the supplemental information contained in $\mathcal{G}_t$ compared to $\mathcal{F}_t$. Let us explain this in more detail: since $\mathcal{F}_t \subset \mathcal{G}_t$, the use of iterated conditioning implies

$$I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{G}_t] - \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{G}_t] | \mathcal{F}_t].$$

Hence, the information premium is the residual random variable from projecting $\mathbb{E}[S(T) | \mathcal{G}_t]$ on the space $L^2(\mathcal{F}_t, P)$. In this sense the information yield measures how much more information is contained in $\mathcal{G}_t$ than $\mathcal{F}_t$. As an immediate consequence, due to the orthogonality,

$$\mathbb{E}[I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) | \mathcal{F}_t] = 0,$$

for all $t \leq T$. Further, note that we get the decomposition

$$R^Q(t, T) \triangleq f^Q(t, T) - f(t, T) = f^Q_G(t, T) - f(t, T) = I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) + R^Q_{\mathcal{F}}(t, T).$$

Thus, if the risk premium $R^Q_G(t, T)$ is measured based on price information only, the effects of the information premium (under $Q$ and $P$) in addition to the true risk premium $R^Q_{\mathcal{F}}(t, T)$ are also captured due to the information miss-specification in the model. Also remark that
the forward price $f_G(t, T)$ defined according Def. 2.1 is a martingale process with respect to the filtration $G_t$, but not necessarily with respect to $F_t$.

In this paper, our main focus is on analyzing the structure and effects of the information premium where we concentrate on its contribution $I_G(t, T)$ under $P$ (the study of $I^Q(t, T)$ can be done in an analogue way). The general mathematical framework that provides the tools for our analysis is the theory of enlargement of filtrations which has been initialized in [24], [23], [25]. An application of this theory considered by several authors is to study insider trading in common stock markets (see [1], [9], [15] and references therein to mention only a few). We here argue for the use of this theory in pricing of non-storable assets.

From a general perspective, one can define rather rich structures to model the information flow. However, from a more concrete viewpoint, the case of Brownian motion and more general Lévy process dynamics with certain types of information additions lead to explicit results where the effects of adding information may be understood in more detail. Hence, for the analysis in this paper we resort to models of the spot driven by Lévy processes, and to certain kinds of knowledge of the future spot.

In the same spirit as the risk premium is associated to an additional drift given by the market price of risk, the information premium is associated to an additional drift that we denote by information yield. We have the following definition

**Definition 2.4.** Let $L$ be a Lévy process with respect to the filtration $F_t$ and $F_t \subset G_t$. Assume there exists a $G_t$-adapted process $\theta(t)$ such that

$$U(t) - \int_0^t \theta(s) \, ds$$

is a $G_t$-martingale. Then we call $\theta(t)$ for the information yield.

Such a drift $\theta$ comes in as an additional yield implied to the forward price, which reflects to additional information. This defends the choice of terminology information yield, since it is the yield coming from the market's additional information. This is also in line with the notion of convenience yield, which is the additional yield coming from possession of the commodity. The extra information added to the filtration coming from knowledge of future states of the market leads thus to essentially the same result as changing a probability measure, namely introducing a drift. However, due to the orthogonality (2.8) of the information premium, the information yield has a character that is not achievable through a measure change, and thereby is a new class of drifts. In the next section we shall look closer into this connection for a simple arithmetic two-factor model.

The concept of information yield may be relevant in other markets as well. For example, weather derivatives often trades in forward contracts which are based on weather indices. These are obviously not tradeable, and therefore also not storable. Pricing of the contracts based on a conditional expectation of the future weather given current information $F_t$ may be wrong, because such a stochastic model do not take into account weather forecasts. Weather forecasts gives additional information that will be accounted for. Note that weather forecasts do not provide exact information about future weather conditions, but gives additional information about the future reducing the uncertainty. The markets
for gas may be another example where the information yield could be used. In the gas markets there are a lot of information about production plans and hub storage capacities available that will affect future transactions but not necessarily how the market operates today.

2.2. Some empirical evidence. To provide empirical evidence for the existence of an information premium, we discuss the influence of CO2 emission costs on electricity forwards. We consider a certain market situation in the German EEX market occurring in the autumn of 2007. The market knows that from January 2008 there will be an introduction of CO2 emission right costs, that will more or less directly influence the spot price of electricity. A significant portion of the electricity production in this market is coal and gas based, and the emission costs induced for these producers will be charged the consumers in the market. In the autumn of 2007, there is no such cost included in the spot prices, but the expectation is that around 60% of the CO2 emission price will be added to the electricity price. At the time, the CO2 price was 20 Euros, and thus an addition of approximately 12 Euros was expected for the spot price from January 2008.

![Figure 1. Monthly base load forward prices from the EEX](image)

In Fig. 1, we have plotted the monthly base load forward prices observed on the EEX on October 9 2007. The prices for the November and December contracts are significantly lower than the January and February 2008 contracts. We observe a large price increase from December 2007 to January 2008. The contract price increases from 47.2 Euro/MWh for the December contract, to 62.25 Euro/MWh for the January 2008 contract. The price raises by 15.05 Euro/MWh (about 32% increase). Some part of such an increase is naturally explained by the long Christmas holiday in December, and expected colder weather in January. However, the significant part of the price increase is due to the markets inclusion of CO2 prices. We see that this is not present in the November and December 2007 contracts.
To validate that the large price increase over the turn of the year has its origin in the introduction of CO2 emission cost, we turn our attention to the quarterly base load contracts for 2008 and 2009. In Fig. 2 we have plotted the prices of 8 quarterly contracts observed in the market on October 8 2007, starting with Q1 2008. Noteworthy here is the difference between Q4 2008 and Q1 2009. The price for Q4 2008 is 60.3 Euro/MWh, whereas the Q1 2009 contract costs 62.7 Euro/MWh, implying a price increase of 2.4 Euro/MWh. This clearly indicates that a large portion of the price jump observed for the monthly contracts from December to January is the market’s reflection of the coming CO2 costs. In conclusion, we have a situation where the market explicitly takes into account future information of the spot price behaviour when settling prices for forward contracts.

The EEX market does not have great flexibility in storing electricity to exploit higher prices. With such a flexibility, the spot prices would take the future costs into account and increase even before the CO2 emission costs have been introduced. To see this effect clearly, we look at the corresponding forward prices in the Nordic electricity market Nord Pool. The results we find here contrast clearly the difference between a market influenced largely by hydro power, and markets where electricity cannot be transported in time.

In the autumn of 2007, the water reservoir levels in the Nordic region were higher than average, and the producers had great flexibility in holding back their production to wait for the increasing prices expected in 2008. Looking at the monthly forward prices at Nord Pool on October 9 2007 reported in Fig. 3, we observe a very small price increase from the December 2007 to the January 2008 contract, relative to what we found at EEX. The prices were, respectively, 43.53 Euro/MWh and 49.9 Euro/MWh, leading to a price increase of 6.37 Euro/MWh (about 15% increase). Comparing this with the quarterly contracts (see Fig. 4), we find a mild increase from 2008 to 2009. In fact, the Q4 2008 contract costs 50.2 Euro/MWh and the Q1 2009 52.7 Euro/MWh, leading to an increase of 2.5 Euro/MWh.
The quarterly contracts show a price difference over these two quarters on the same level as in the EEX market. We conclude that the flexibility to postpone production in the Nordic market leads to an increase of prices much earlier, and the information effect is not so pronounced as in the EEX market, although observable.

There are other typical examples where it is natural to let $G_t$ be strictly greater than $F_t$. Weather forecasts are of course heavily used in the electricity market as a basis for price formations, since cold and warm weather affects the demand side. Further, weather predictions are also a fundamental input in production planning, for example for hydro
power plants. Also, production plans themselves are a crucial factor for the forward prices. Such information is available in the market, and obviously taken into account when prices for future delivery of electricity is decided. On the other hand, since electricity is not storable, there is no reason why today’s spot (and its information flow $\mathcal{F}_t$) should reflect these future events, since the spot today only is a result of today’s supply and demand situation.

Yet another example is the effect of political decisions. The electricity markets are still developing, and many political decisions are made concerning the legislation of these. For instance, the decision whether to build a new nuclear power plant within a market is not up to the producers alone, but also a political decision on national level. If a producer wishes to do so, the market knows immediately that the spot price may become significantly lower than the current expected level, since the supply side will be increased. On the other hand, if the application for building such a plant is turned down, this sends the price to higher levels. The same considerations hold for building connecting cables to other electricity markets, since this will alter the supply and demand side.

3. Forward pricing with future information

In this section we use the theory of enlargement of filtrations to derive forward prices in a concrete market model with future looking information. We consider a market where the spot price of electricity $S(t)$ evolves according to the following two-factor model:

$$S(t) = \Lambda(t) + X(t) + Y(t).$$

Here $\Lambda(t)$ is a deterministic seasonality function, and $X(t)$ respectively $Y(t)$ are mean reverting factors following the dynamics

$$dX(t) = -\alpha X(t) dt + \sigma dW(t),$$
$$dY(t) = -\beta Y(t) dt + dL(t),$$

with deterministic mean reversion parameters $\alpha, \beta > 0$. The processes $L(t)$ and $W(t)$ are independent, with $L$ being a square integrable Lévy process and $W$ a Brownian motion. Arithmetic multi factor models of this type are successfully capturing stylized features of electricity prices (see Meyer-Brandis and Tankov [29]) while at the same time they are more analytically tractable than alternative geometric models (see Benth, Kallsen and Meyer-Brandis [4]). In this setting, the base component $X(t)$ accounts for the long-term level of the price, while $Y(t)$ is the short-term spiky variations in the market. One could make the two sources of noise $W$ and $L$, dependent (or correlated for $L = B$ a Brownian motion), however, to keep matters simple we refrain from doing this.

We let $\mathcal{F}_t$ be the filtration generated by the two noise processes $W$ and $L$. Suppose now that the participants in the market have accessible additional information of the spot price behaviour at some future time $T_1$. For a traded financial asset, this information would have impact on the price of the asset today. Due to the non-storability of electricity, the today’s price of spot electricity, however, is unaffected by this information, and consequently the filtration $\mathcal{F}_t$ generated by the spot price factors misses to represent this essential part of information available to the market. In the following we are considering
two specific situations of forward looking information available to the market and analyze
the corresponding information premia (see (2.7) for definition). In the first situation the
market has some idea about the underlying driving jump noise \( L(T_1) \) at some time \( T_1 \), in
the second situation the market has knowledge about a third factor (temperature) which is
correlated to the base component \( X(t) \). Finally, we consider future knowledge of the base
component mimicking the situation of CO2 emission costs. Obviously, these considerations
are simplifications of the actual market situations, and we are unlikely to have as exact
knowledge as limitations for the price factors. However, these simple examples provide
some insight into how future information affect the price of forwards.

Before proceeding, let us include the predicted spot price under \( F \) for completeness.

**Proposition 3.1.** The predicted spot price based on \( F \) is given as

\[
f_F(t, T) = \Lambda(T) + X(t)e^{-\alpha(T-t)} + Y(t)e^{-\beta(T-t)} - \frac{i\psi'(0)}{\beta}(1 - e^{-\beta(T-t)}),
\]

with \( \psi(\theta) \) being the cumulant function of \( L(1) \).

**Proof.** We have that

\[
X(T) = X(t)e^{-\alpha(T-t)} + \int_t^T e^{-\alpha(T-s)} dW(s),
\]

and

\[
Y(T) = Y(t)e^{-\beta(T-t)} + \int_t^T e^{-\beta(T-s)} dL(s).
\]

Hence, by using measurability of \( X(t) \) and \( Y(t) \) to \( F_t \) and the independent increment
property of the Lévy process \( L \) and Brownian motion \( W \), the result follows. \( \square \)

**3.1. Future information about jump noise.** Let the filtration \( \mathcal{H}_t \) be defined as

\[
\mathcal{H}_t = \mathcal{F}_t \lor \sigma(L(T_1)) ,
\]

that is \( \mathcal{H}_t \) represents the complete knowledge about the value of the jump noise \( L(T_1) \) at
some future time \( T_1 \) in addition to the information contained in \( \mathcal{F}_t \). In this first situation
we assume the market has some information, not necessary complete, about the jump noise
\( L(T_1) \). That is the information filtration available to the market, denoted by \( \mathcal{G}_t \), is such
that

\[
(3.2) \quad \mathcal{F}_t \subset \mathcal{G}_t \subset \mathcal{H}_t.
\]

Note that \( \mathcal{G}_t = \mathcal{F}_t \) whenever \( t \geq T_1 \). Hence, the information premium is equal to zero for
all times \( t \leq T \) with \( t \geq T_1 \), natural in view of the fact that in this case the “additional”
information is no longer relevant.

**Proposition 3.2.** Suppose the market has available the information described by the fil-
tration \( \mathcal{G}_t \) in (3.2). If \( t \leq T \leq T_1 \), then the information premium is given by

\[
I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) = \frac{1}{\beta} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}[L(T_1) - L(t) | \mathcal{G}_t]}{T_1 - t} - (-i\psi'(0)) \right)(1 - e^{-\beta(T-t)}),
\]

(3.3)
with $\psi(\theta)$ being the cumulant function of $L(1)$. Furthermore, for $t \leq T_1 \leq T$ we get
\begin{equation}
I_G(t, T) = e^{-\beta(T-T_1)}I_G(t, T_1).
\end{equation}

Before we proceed to proof Prop. 3.2 we restate the following well known result about the information yield in this situation (see Thm. 3 on p. 356 in Protter [30] and Prop. 18 in Di Nunno et al. [15]):

**Lemma 3.3.** Let the filtration $G_t$ be as in (3.2). Then
\[ L(t) - \int_0^t \frac{E[L(T_1) - L(s)|G_s]}{(T_1 - s)} \, ds \]

is a $G_t$-martingale on $[0, T_1]$.

**Proof.** (Prop. 3.2) Let first $T \leq T_1$. Since $X(T)$ is independent of $L(t)$, conditioning $X(T)$ on $G_t$ coincides with $F_t$. Hence, by the definition of $I_G(t, T)$, we calculate,
\begin{align*}
I_G(t, T) &= E[Y(T) | G_t] - E[Y(T) | F_t] \\
&= E \left[ Y(t)e^{-\beta(T-t)} + \int_t^T e^{-\beta(T-s)} dL(s) | G_t \right] \\
&\quad - E \left[ Y(t)e^{-\beta(T-t)} + \int_t^T e^{-\beta(T-s)} dL(s) | F_t \right] \\
&= E \left[ \int_t^T e^{-\beta(T-s)} dL(s) | G_t \right] + \frac{i\psi'(0)}{\beta}(1 - e^{-\beta(T-t)}),
\end{align*}

where we have used $F_t$ and $G_t$ measurability of $Y(t)$ in the last equality. Now, by Lemma 3.3
\begin{align*}
E \left[ \int_t^T e^{-\beta(T-s)} dL(s) | G_t \right] &= E \left[ \int_t^T e^{-\beta(T-s)} \frac{E[L(T_1) \mid G_s] - L(s)}{T_1 - s} \, ds | G_t \right] \\
&= \int_t^T \frac{e^{-\beta(T-s)}}{T_1 - s} E[L(T_1) - L(s) | G_t] \, ds.
\end{align*}

By Proposition A.3, and Remark A.4 we compute with $g(s) = \frac{1}{T_1 - s}$ and $f(s) = 1$ ($t \leq s \leq T$)
\[ E[L(T_1) - L(s) | G_t] = \frac{T_1 - s}{T_1 - t} E[L(T_1) - L(t) | G_t]. \]

Thus
\begin{align*}
E \left[ \int_t^T e^{-\beta(T-s)} dL(s) | G_t \right] &= \int_t^T \frac{e^{-\beta(T-s)} T_1 - s}{T_1 - s} E[L(T_1) - L(t) | G_t] \, ds \\
&= \frac{E[L(T_1) - L(t) | G_t]}{T_1 - t} \int_t^T e^{-\beta(T-s)} \, ds \\
&= \frac{E[L(T_1) | G_t - L(t)]}{(T_1 - t)\beta} (1 - e^{-\beta(T-t)}),
\end{align*}
which proofs the result for $T \leq T_1$. If $T > T_1$ we decompose

$$I_g(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[Y(T_1) + \mathbb{E}[Y(T) - Y(T_1) \mid \mathcal{F}_{T_1}] \mid \mathcal{G}_t] - \mathbb{E}[Y(T_1) - \mathbb{E}[Y(T) - Y(T_1) \mid \mathcal{F}_{T_1}] \mid \mathcal{F}_t].$$

A computation yields

$$\mathbb{E}[Y(T) - Y(T_1) \mid \mathcal{F}_t] = Y(T_1)(e^{-\beta(T-T_1)} - 1) - \frac{i\psi'(0)}{\beta}(1 - e^{-\beta(T-T_1)}),$$

and thus,

$$I_g(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[Y(T_1)e^{-\beta(T-T_1)} \mid \mathcal{G}_t] - \mathbb{E}[Y(T_1)e^{-\beta(T-T_1)} \mid \mathcal{F}_t] = e^{-\beta(T-T_1)}I_g(t, T_1).$$

The Proposition follows. \qed

Let us consider the situation where the market knows whether the value of $L(T_1)$ is above or below a given threshold, say $K$. In this case, the filtration $\mathcal{G}_t$ is specified as

$$\mathcal{G}_t = \mathcal{F}_t \vee \sigma(1_{L(T_1) \leq K}).$$

where $1_A(\omega)$ is the indicator function in $\omega$ on a set $A \subseteq \Omega$. For example, the market may have the information that an important producer will have an outage (due to maintenance, say). The network will then experience a sudden drop in supply, which will lead to an increase in spot prices at time $T_1$. We can model such a situation by saying that $L(T_1) \geq K$. Another relevant situation is when a new transport line for electricity is opened. This will lead to an increase in supply, which we can model as $L(T_1) \leq K$, since the possibility for additional supply of electricity into the network will keep prices down. Similarly, the decision to build a new power plant will have the same effect.

Let us consider the information premium for this specification of $\mathcal{G}_t$. If $Z$ is a random variable with the same distribution as the increment $L(T_1) - L(t)$, we find

$$\mathbb{E}[L(T_1) - L(t) \mid \mathcal{G}_t] = \mathbb{E}[Z \mid Z \leq K - L(t)] 1_{L(T_1) \leq K} + \mathbb{E}[Z \mid Z > K - L(t)] 1_{L(T_1) > K}. $$

Thus, using the fact that $\mathbb{E}[Z] = -i\psi'(0)(T_1 - t)$, we find that the information premium can be expressed as

$$I_g(t, T) = \frac{1 - e^{-\beta(T-t)}}{\beta(T_1 - t)} \left\{ (\mathbb{E}[Z \mid Z \leq K - L(t)] - \mathbb{E}[Z]) 1_{L(T_1) \leq K} + (\mathbb{E}[Z \mid Z > K - L(t)] - \mathbb{E}[Z]) 1_{L(T_1) > K} \right\}. $$

If we know that $L(T_1) > K$, we see that the information premium becomes positive. On the other hand, the information $L(T_1) \leq K$ leads to a negative information premium. In both cases we have a quantification of the premium in terms of the information available and the model parameters. These conclusions are in line with the market heuristics, with the first situations comparing to a production outage with the consequence of lower supply, and the latter of the increase of supply through new cables connecting markets, say.

Note that the information premium tends to zero whenever $T \to \infty$ and $T_1$ fixed. This follows from (3.4). The impact of information at time $T_1$ on contracts maturing far in the future (with $T \gg T_1$) will be very small, which is natural from a practical point of view. However, the sign of the premium will remain the same for all contracts with $T > T_1$. 

If $L = \xi \tilde{W}$, with $\tilde{W}$ a Brownian motion and $\xi$ a positive constant, we can calculate the conditional expectations explicitly. In this case it follows that

$$I_G(t, T) = \frac{\xi (1 - e^{-\beta(T-t)})}{\beta \sqrt{T_1-t}} \phi \left( \frac{K - \tilde{W}(t)}{\xi \sqrt{T_1-t}} \right) \left\{ \frac{1_{\{\tilde{W}(T_1) > K/\xi\}}}{1 - \Phi \left( \frac{K - \tilde{W}(t)}{\xi \sqrt{T_1-t}} \right)} - \frac{1_{\{\tilde{W}(T_1) \leq K/\xi\}}}{\Phi \left( \frac{K - \tilde{W}(t)}{\xi \sqrt{T_1-t}} \right)} \right\}.$$  

Here, $\Phi$ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and $\phi$ its density. We note in this, and the more general expression above, that the value and sign of the information premium will vary stochastically with $L(t)$.

3.2. Future information about correlated temperature. Assume that the temperature follows a seasonal Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process

$$dZ(t) = -\gamma (Z(t) - \mu(t)) \, dt + \eta dB(t),$$

where $B$ Brownian motion, independent of $W$, and $\mu(t)$ is the deterministic seasonal level to which the temperature is mean-reverting with rate $\gamma > 0$. The temperature “volatility” $\eta$ is assumed to be a positive constant. In Benth and Šaltytė-Benth [7], it is shown that this model fits daily temperature observations in Stockholm, Sweden, reasonably well, especially with the volatility $\eta$ being a seasonal function (see also Benth and Šaltytė-Benth [6] and Benth, Šaltytė Benth and Koekebakker [8]). Here we suppose it to be constant for simplicity. Further, we assume that $\mu(t)$ is a bounded and continuous function.

The spot price is correlated with the temperature. More precisely, we here suppose that the base component $X(t)$ has a dynamics defined as

$$dX(t) = -\alpha X(t) \, dt + \sigma \rho dB(t) + \sigma \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} dW(t).$$

Observe that the base component $X$ of the spot price and temperature are correlated with a correlation coefficient $\rho$.

In the Nordic electricity market Nord Pool, where the main driver of electricity demand is temperature due to heating in the winter, it is to be expected that the correlation is negative, since lower temperatures implies higher prices due to increasing demand for heating. On the other hand, higher temperatures means that households are decreasing their demand for heating, meaning that prices should go down. For markets being dominated by high temperatures in the summer, and moderate in the winter season (like for instance in California), the correlation may be positive due to increasing demand for air conditioning cooling in warm periods.

Let us suppose that the market has accessible some future information about the temperature at time $T_1$. Again, complete knowledge of the temperature $Z(T_1)$ would correspond to the enlarged filtration

$$\mathcal{H}_t \triangleq \mathcal{F}_t \vee \sigma(Z(T_1)),$$

where we now let $\mathcal{F}_t$ be the filtration generated by $W$, $B$, and $L$. Since

$$Z(T_1) = Z(0)e^{-\gamma T_1} + \int_0^{T_1} \gamma \mu(s)e^{-\gamma(T_1-s)} \, ds + \eta e^{-\gamma T_1} \int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma s} \, dB(s),$$
we have that knowledge about \( Z \) is equivalent to knowledge about the stochastic integral part of \( Z \) and

\[
\sigma(Z(T_1)) = \sigma\left(\int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma s} dB(s)\right).
\]

We assume that the market has access to some information about \( Z(T_1) \) additionally to the information contained in \( \mathcal{F}_t \), that is, the information is represented by some filtration \( \mathcal{G}_t \) such that

\[
\mathcal{F}_t \subset \mathcal{G}_t \subset \mathcal{H}_t.
\]

We can now apply Thm. A.1 to identify the information yield for \( B \) and to construct a new Brownian motion with respect to the filtration \( \mathcal{G}_t \).

**Proposition 3.4.** Let the filtration \( \mathcal{G}_t \) be as in (3.2). Then

\[
B(t) - \int_0^t a(s)E\left[ \int_s^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) \big| \mathcal{G}_s \right] ds,
\]

is a \( \mathcal{G}_t \)-Brownian motion on \([0, T_1]\), with

\[
a(t) = \frac{2\gamma e^{\gamma t}}{e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma t}}.
\]

**Proof.** With the notation of Thm. A.1, we find with \( U(t) = B(t) \) and \( G = \int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma s} dB(s) \)

\[
\rho(t) = E\left[ B(t) \int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma s} dB(s) \right] = \frac{1}{\gamma} (e^{\gamma t} - 1),
\]

and

\[
\tau = E\left[ \left( \int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma s} dB(s) \right)^2 \right] = \frac{1}{2\gamma} (e^{2\gamma T_1} - 1).
\]

Furthermore, for \( 0 \leq s \leq T_1 \)

\[
b_t(s) = \gamma e^{\gamma s} \int_s^{T_1} \frac{2\gamma e^{\gamma v}}{e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma v}} dv = \gamma e^{\gamma s} \int_s^{t} a(v) dv.
\]

From Thm. A.1 and Prop. A.2 we have that

\[
B(t) - \int_0^t b_t(s)B(s) ds - \int_0^t a(s)[E[G | \mathcal{G}_s] - \rho(s)B(s)] ds.
\]

is \( \mathcal{G}_t \)-Brownian motion. We investigate the two last terms in more detail:

Consider the first integral: Since \( b_t(t) = 0 \), it holds that

\[
\int_0^t b_t(s)B(s) ds = \int_0^t b_t(s)B(s) ds + \int_0^t \int_s^t \frac{\partial b_s}{\partial s}(u) B(u) du ds
\]

\[
= \int_0^t \int_s^t \frac{\partial b_s}{\partial s}(u) B(u) du ds
\]
\[ = \gamma \int_0^t a(s) \int_0^s e^{\gamma u} B(u) du \, ds. \]

By Itô’s Formula, we find

\[ e^{\gamma s} B(s) = \gamma \int_0^s e^{\gamma u} B(u) du + \int_0^s e^{\gamma u} dB(u), \]

and therefore the first integral term becomes

\[ \int_0^t b_t(s) B(s) ds = \int_0^t a(s) \left( e^{\gamma s} B(s) - \int_0^s e^{\gamma u} dB(u) \right) \, ds. \]

We find the second integral to be

\[ \int_0^t a(s) \left( \mathbb{E}[G \mid \mathcal{G}_s] - \rho'(s) B(s) \right) \, ds = \int_0^t a(s) \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) \mid \mathcal{G}_s \right] - e^{\gamma s} B(s) \right) \, ds. \]

Collecting terms, we end up with

\[ B(t) - \int_0^t a(s) \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_s^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) \mid \mathcal{G}_s \right] \, ds. \]

Thus, the Proposition is proved. \( \square \)

We have in this case an expression for the information yield defined in Def. 2.4, which can be directly read off the result in the Proposition above as

\[ \theta(t) = a(t) \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right]. \]

Observe that it is not \( \mathcal{F}_t \) adapted since we condition on the bigger filtration \( \mathcal{G}_t \). Hence, we cannot associate this information yield to any equivalent measure change. Since

\[ \int_t^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) = \frac{1}{\eta} \left( e^{\gamma T_1} Z(T_1) - e^{\gamma t} Z(t) - \gamma \int_t^{T_1} \mu(u) e^{\gamma u} du \right), \]

we have that the information yield in (3.11) can be expressed as

\[ \theta(t) = \frac{a(t)}{\eta} \left( e^{\gamma T_1} \mathbb{E}[Z(T_1) \mid \mathcal{G}_t] - e^{\gamma t} Z(t) - \gamma \int_t^{T_1} \mu(u) e^{\gamma u} du \right). \]

Thus, the information yield depends (not surprisingly) on the temperatures at time \( t \) and \( T_1 \) (the latter conditionally on \( \mathcal{G}_t \)), in addition to the speed of mean-reversion \( \gamma \), the temperature “volatility” \( \eta \) and the weighted average of the seasonality function \( \mu \) up to time to information \( T_1 \).

Having identified the information yield, we are now able to determine the corresponding information premium.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose the market has some information at time $t$ about the future temperature $Z(T_1)$ represented through the filtration $\mathcal{G}_t$ in (3.9). If $t \leq T \leq T_1$, the information premium is given by

$$I_g(t, T) = V(t, T) \left( e^{\gamma T_1} \mathbb{E}[Z(T_1) | \mathcal{G}_s] - e^{\gamma t} Z(t) - \gamma \int_t^{T_1} \mu(u) e^{\gamma u} \, du \right),$$

where

$$V(t, T) = \frac{2 \gamma \sigma e^{\gamma T} (1 - e^{-(\alpha + \gamma)(T-t)})}{\eta (\alpha + \gamma) (e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma T})}.$$

For $t \leq T_1 \leq T$ we get

$$I_g(t, T) = e^{-\alpha (T-T_1)} I_g(t, T_1).$$

Proof. Consider first $T \leq T_1$. Since $Y$ is independent of $B$, we get as before by the definition of $I_g(t, T)$,

$$I_g(t, T) = \mathbb{E} [X(T) | \mathcal{G}_t] - \mathbb{E} [X(T) | \mathcal{F}_t]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[ X(t) e^{-\alpha (T-t)} + \sigma \rho \int_t^T e^{-\alpha (T-s)} dB(s) + \sigma \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} \int_t^T e^{-\alpha (T-s)} dW(s) | \mathcal{G}_t \right]$$

$$- \mathbb{E} \left[ X(t) e^{-\alpha (T-t)} + \sigma \rho \int_t^T e^{-\alpha (T-s)} dB(s) + \sigma \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} \int_t^T e^{-\alpha (T-s)} dW(s) | \mathcal{F}_t \right]$$

$$= \sigma \rho \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T e^{-\alpha (T-s)} dB(s) | \mathcal{G}_t \right],$$

where we have used $\mathcal{F}_t$ and $\mathcal{G}_t$ measurability of $X(t)$, the independence of $W$ and $B$, and the $\mathcal{F}_t$-martingale property of $B$ in the last equality. Now, by Prop. 3.4

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T e^{-\alpha (T-s)} dB(s) | \mathcal{G}_t \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T a(s) e^{-\alpha (T-s)} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_s^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_s \right] \, ds | \mathcal{G}_t \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T a(s) e^{-\alpha (T-s)} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_s^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_t \right] \, ds \right].$$

By Proposition A.3 with $g(s) = a(s)$ and $f(s) = e^{\gamma s}$,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_s^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_t \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_t \right] e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma s}.$$ 

Thus,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T e^{-\alpha (T-s)} dB(s) | \mathcal{G}_t \right] = \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_t \right]}{e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma t}} \int_t^T a(s) e^{-\alpha (T-s)} (e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma s}) \, ds$$

$$= \frac{2 \gamma \rho \sigma \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{T_1} e^{\gamma u} dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_t \right]}{(\alpha + \gamma) (e^{2\gamma T_1} - e^{2\gamma t})} e^{\gamma T} (1 - e^{-(\alpha + \gamma)(T-t)}).$$
which, after appealing to (3.12), proofs the result for $T \leq T_1$. If $T > T_1$ we decompose as in the proof of Prop. 3.2

\[
I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[X(T_1) + \mathbb{E}[X(T) - X(T_1) \mid \mathcal{F}_{T_1}] \mid \mathcal{G}_t] \\
- \mathbb{E}[X(T_1) - \mathbb{E}[X(T) - X(T_1) \mid \mathcal{F}_{T_1}] \mid \mathcal{F}_t].
\]

We compute

\[
\mathbb{E}[X(T) - X(T_1) \mid \mathcal{F}_{T_1}] = X(T_1)(e^{-\alpha(T-T_1)} - 1),
\]

and get

\[
I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E}[X(T_1)e^{-\alpha(T-T_1)} \mid \mathcal{G}_t] - \mathbb{E}[X(T_1)e^{-\alpha(T-T_1)} \mid \mathcal{F}_t] \\
= e^{-\alpha(T-T_1)}I_{\mathcal{G}}(t, T_1).
\]

Hence, the proof is complete. \qed

If we assume that we have an exact temperature forecast for time $T_1$, i.e. $\mathcal{G}_t = \mathcal{H}_t$, then the information premium depends explicitly on the temperatures at time $t$ and $T_1$:

\[
I_{\mathcal{H}}(t, T) = V(t, T)\left(e^{\gamma T_1}Z(T_1) - e^{\gamma t}Z(t) - \gamma \int_t^{T_1} \mu(u)e^{\gamma u} du \right).
\]

We next investigate the sign of the information premium using (3.16).

First, observe that the sign of $V(t, T)$ in (3.14) is completely determined by the correlation coefficient $\rho$. In the Nord Pool market, we expect $\rho$ to be negative, and hence $V$ becomes negative as well. In electricity markets where demand for cooling in the summer is high, like the Californian market say, we expect $\rho$ to be positive. In this case $V$ is positive. Assume now that the weather forecast predicts a temperature decrease, in the sense that,

\[
Z(T_1) < e^{-\gamma(T_1-t)}Z(t) + \gamma \int_t^{T_1} \mu(u)e^{-\gamma(T_1-u)} du.
\]

Such a knowledge of the future temperature will imply a negative information premium in the Nord Pool market. This is in line with the economical reasoning that consumers will hedge the expected future price increase due to increasing demand, and thereby willing to pay a premium to the producers. The situation is turned around if the temperature is forecasted to increase. In that case the producers face declining prices, and will be willing to pay a premium for hedging their future production, thus implying a negative information premium. We have an explanation of the stochastic change of the sign of the information premium in terms of temperature forecasts, that is, demand forecast.

If we are in (the more realistic) situation of having temperature forecasts at several future time points $T_1 \leq ... \leq T_m$, we can use Prop. 3.5 recursively to determine the corresponding information premium. Let us introduce the notation

\[
\mathcal{H}_t \triangleq \mathcal{F}_t \vee \sigma(Z(T_1), ..., Z(T_m))
\]

\[
\mathcal{H}_i \triangleq \mathcal{F}_t \vee \sigma(Z(T_i)), \quad i = 1, ..., m.
\]
Proposition 3.6. Suppose the market has available at time \( t \) temperature forecasts for \( Z(T_1), \ldots, Z(T_m) \) represented through the filtration \( \mathcal{H}_t \) in (3.17). Then the information premium is given as

\[
I_{\mathcal{H}}(t, T) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} I_{\mathcal{H}_j}(T_{j-1}, T_j) + I_{\mathcal{H}_1}(T_{i-1}, T_i); \quad T_{i-1} \leq T \leq T_i; \quad i = 1, \ldots, m.
\]

\[
I_{\mathcal{H}}(t, T) = e^{-\alpha(T-T_m)} I_{\mathcal{H}}(t, T_m); \quad T_m < T.
\]

where we set \( T_0 := t \) and where \( I_{\mathcal{H}_j}(T_{j-1}, T_j) \) is the expression for the information premium in Prop. 3.5 with \( \mathcal{G} = \mathcal{H}^j, t = T_{j-1}, \) and \( T = T_j \).

Proof. For notational simplicity we only consider the case \( m = 2 \). The general proof follows analogously.

First, note that due to (3.8) we have

\[
\mathcal{H}_t = \mathcal{F}_t \cup \sigma \left( \int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma s} dB(s), \int_0^{T_2} e^{\gamma s} dB(s) \right)
\]

\[
= \mathcal{F}_t \cup \sigma \left( \int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma s} dB(s), \int_{T_1}^{T_2} e^{\gamma s} dB(s) \right),
\]

and

\[
\mathcal{H}_1^i = \mathcal{F}_t \cup \sigma \left( \int_0^{T_i} e^{\gamma s} dB(s) \right), \quad i = 1, 2.
\]

Recall from the proof of Prop. 3.5 that the information premium is given as

\[
I_{\mathcal{H}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E} \left[ X(T) \mid \mathcal{H}_t \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[ X(T) \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right].
\]

For \( t \leq T \leq T_1 \), the stochastic integral \( \int_0^{T_1} e^{\gamma s} dB(s) \) is independent of \( X(T) \), and hence \( \mathbb{E} \left[ X(T) \mid \mathcal{H}_t \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ X(T) \mid \mathcal{H}_t^1 \right] \). Therefore, using Prop. 3.5, it follows that

\[
I_{\mathcal{H}}(t, T) = \mathbb{E} \left[ X(T) \mid \mathcal{H}_t^1 \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[ X(T) \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] = I_{\mathcal{H}_1^1}(t, T).
\]

Next, assume \( T_1 \leq T \leq T_2 \). Then

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ X(T) \mid \mathcal{H}_t \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ X(T) \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ X(t) e^{-\alpha(T-t)} + \sigma \rho \int_t^{T_1} e^{-\alpha(T-s)} dB(s) + \sigma \left( \int_0^T - e^{-\alpha(T-s)} dB(s) \right) \mid \mathcal{H}_t \right]
\]

\[
- \mathbb{E} \left[ X(t) e^{-\alpha(T-t)} + \sigma \rho \int_t^{T_1} e^{-\alpha(T-s)} dB(s) \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right]
\]

\[
= \sigma \rho \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{T_1} e^{-\alpha(T-s)} dB(s) \mid \mathcal{H}_t \right] + \sigma \rho \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T e^{-\alpha(T-s)} dB(s) \mid \mathcal{H}_t^1 \right] \mid \mathcal{H}_t
\]

where in the second to the last equation we have used the independence of \( \int_t^{T_1} e^{-\gamma(T-s)} dB(s) \) and \( \int_0^{T_2} e^{\gamma s} dB(s) \) together with observation (3.20) for the first term, and the fact that
$\mathcal{H}_{T_1} = \mathcal{H}_{T_1}^2$ for the second term. The last equation follows from Prop. 3.5. Finally, from expression (3.13) and again observation (3.20), it follows that $I_{\mathcal{H}_T}(T_1,T)$ is $\mathcal{H}_t$ measurable and $\mathbb{E}[I_{\mathcal{H}_T}(T_1,T) | \mathcal{H}_t] = I_{\mathcal{H}_T}(T_1,T)$.

For $T_2 < T$, the reasoning is as in the end of the proof of Prop. 3.5.

Indeed, by considering different maturities $T$, we can obtain a change in sign of the information premium based on temperature (that is, demand) forecasts.

### 3.3. CO2 emission prices and electricity

Let us return to the case of CO2 emission cost and the effect on electricity prices at the EEX as we discussed in Section 2. We consider again the spot model in Subsect. 3.1. One way to interpret the effect of CO2 emission costs to electricity spot prices is to assume that it influences the stochastic mean level $X(t)$.

Suppose that complete knowledge of the mean level $X(T_1)$ would correspond to the enlarged filtration

$$\mathcal{H}_t \triangleq \mathcal{F}_t \lor \sigma(X(T_1)) ,$$

where we now let $\mathcal{F}_t$ be the filtration generated by $W$ and $L$. Since

$$X(T_1) = X(0)e^{-\alpha T_1} + \sigma e^{-\alpha T_1} \int_0^{T_1} e^{\alpha s} dW(s) ,$$

we have that knowledge about $X$ is equivalent to knowledge about the stochastic integral part of $X$ and

$$\sigma(X(T_1)) = \sigma \left( \int_0^{T_1} e^{\alpha s} dW(s) \right) .$$

We assume that the market has access to some information about $X(T_1)$ additionally to the information contained in $\mathcal{F}_t$, that is, the information is represented by some filtration $\mathcal{G}_t$ such that

$$\mathcal{F}_t \subset \mathcal{G}_t \subset \mathcal{H}_t .$$

We can now basically follow the derivations in Subsect. 3.2, which indeed is analogous to the situation we are in. The information yield (see Prop. 3.4) becomes

$$\theta(t) = a(t) \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{T_1} e^{\alpha u} dW(u) \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] ,$$

where

$$a(t) = \frac{2\alpha e^{\alpha t}}{e^{2\alpha T_1} - e^{2\alpha t}} .$$

Likewise, we can represent the information yield in terms of the level $X$,

$$\theta(t) = \frac{a(t)}{\sigma} \left\{ e^{\alpha T_1} \mathbb{E} [X(T_1) \mid \mathcal{G}_t] - e^{\alpha t} X(t) \right\} .$$

Furthermore, a similar calculation as in Prop. 3.5 gives the information premium

$$I_{\mathcal{G}}(t,T) = e^{\alpha (T_1-T)} \frac{e^{2\alpha T} - e^{2\alpha t}}{e^{2\alpha T_1} - e^{2\alpha t}} \left\{ \mathbb{E} [X(T_1) \mid \mathcal{G}_t] - e^{-\alpha (T_1-t)} X(t) \right\} ,$$
for $T \leq T_1$. If $T > T_1$, we have $I_G(t, T) = e^{-\alpha(T-T_1)}I_G(t, T_1)$.

Knowing that the CO2 emission prices will affect the spot price of electricity can be modelled as knowing the stochastic mean level at time $T_1$, corresponding to complete information. Thus, if we are at time $t$ before the emission prices has come into play, we know that $X(T_1) > X(t)$, and therefore we get a positive information premium. This is indeed what we observed in the EEX market (recall the discussion in Sect. 2).

Alternatively, we may interpret the introduction of CO2 pricing as the knowledge that $X(T_1)$ is above a level $K$. This will lead us back to similar considerations as in Subsect. 3.1. We leave the details to the reader.

4. Conclusions and future research

Electricity is a non-storable commodity, and the spot-forward relation breaks down. We have demonstrated that the usual approach to price forwards (and other derivatives) that bases the derivation of forward prices in electricity markets on the information generated by the spot price only are fundamentally wrong. For non-storable assets, this approach is unable to take into account forward looking information, typically being weather forecasts, outages and new market constraints like the introduction of CO2 emission fees. In this paper we explicitly include such information in the forward price.

We introduce the notion of information premium as the premium charged for including forward looking market information. When measuring the risk premium, which is the difference between the forward price and the predicted spot price, under the wrong information assumption, the information premium will be one component in the risk premium. Thus, supposedly irregular behavior of measured risk premia might in reality be due to information miss-specification in the model. In this sense, we show in some relevant examples that the information premium can for example explain a sign shift of the risk premium. We apply the theory of enlargement of filtration, providing a tool for quantifying the information premium for given filtrations strictly bigger than the one generated by the spot price.

In practice, the forward looking information available to the market is most likely very complex, and the concrete situations considered here is not able to fully account for this. Future investigations will focus on more sophisticated models for information flow relevant to the electricity market, which better explain different market situations. Furthermore, a study of the effect of a settlement period rather than a fixed maturity time in combination with enlarged filtrations and risk-neutral probabilities will be analyzed. Finally, more empirical studies of the electricity markets to reveal the stylized facts of risk premia are called for.

Appendix A. Initial enlargements of filtrations

The following theorem is due to Hu and Øksendal [21], and describes explicitly the nature of a Brownian motion with respect to an initial enlargement of filtration (see also Jeulin [24])
**Theorem A.1.** Let $U(t)$ be a standard Brownian motion for $t \in [0,T]$, and let $G$ be a centered (mean zero) Gaussian random variable. Assume that

$$\mathbb{E}[U(t)G] = \rho(t), \quad \mathbb{E}[G^2] = \tau.$$  

Define the filtration

$$\mathcal{H}_t = \sigma(G,U(s); 0 \leq s \leq t).$$

Assume that $\rho(t)$ is twice continuously differentiable. Define

$$a(s) = \frac{\rho'(s)}{\tau - \int_0^s (\rho'(u))^2 du}, \quad 0 \leq s \leq T,$$

and

$$b_t(s) = \rho''(s) \int_s^t \frac{\rho'(v)}{\tau - \int_0^v (\rho'(u))^2 du} dv, \quad 0 \leq s \leq t \leq T.$$

If $a(s)$ and $b_t(s)$ are integrable with respect to $s$ for all $t \leq T$, then

$$\tilde{U}(t) := U(t) - \int_0^t b_t(s)U(s) ds - \int_0^t a(s)(G - \rho'(s)U(s)) ds,$$

is a $\mathcal{H}_t$-Brownian motion.

Thm A.1 can easily be extended to a situation where the filtration is contained in $\mathcal{G}_t$. The proof is analogous to Proposition 18 in Di Nunno et al. [15].

**Proposition A.2.** Let $U(t)$ be a standard Brownian motion with $\mathcal{F}_t$ being its filtration. Further, let $G$, $\mathcal{H}_t$, $a(s)$ and $b_t(s)$ be as in Thm A.1, and suppose that $\mathcal{G}_t$ is a filtration such that $\mathcal{F}_t \subseteq \mathcal{G}_t \subseteq \mathcal{H}_t$ for all $t \leq T$. Then

$$\tilde{U}(t) \triangleq U(t) - \int_0^t b_t(s)U(s) ds - \int_0^t a(s) \{\mathbb{E}[G | \mathcal{G}_s] - \rho'(s)U(s)\} ds$$

$$= U(t) - \int_0^t (b_t(s) - a(s)\rho'(s))U(s) ds - \int_0^t a(s)\mathbb{E}[G | \mathcal{G}_s] ds,$$

is a $\mathcal{G}_t$-Brownian motion.

The following Proposition will help us to calculate information premia in certain situations.

**Proposition A.3.** Let $t_0 \leq T \leq T_1$ be given time points, and $f$ and $g$ deterministic continuous functions on $[0,T_1]$. In the setting of Proposition A.2, assume the information drift is of the form

$$\theta(t) = g(t)\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{T_1} f(u)dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_t \right],$$

that is, $B(t) - \int_0^t \theta(s) ds$ is a $\mathcal{G}_t$-Brownian motion. Then

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_s^{T_1} f(u) dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_t \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^{T_1} f(u) dB(u) | \mathcal{G}_t \right] e^{-\int_s^t g(u) du}, \quad t \leq s \leq T.$$
Proof. We have
\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{E}\left[ \int_s^{T_t} f(u) dB(u) \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] - \mathbb{E}\left[ \int_s^{T_t} f(u) dB(u) \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] &= -\mathbb{E}\left[ \int_s^{T_t} f(u) dB(u) \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] \\
&= -\mathbb{E}\left[ \int_s^{T_t} f(u) g(u) \mathbb{E}\left[ \int_u^{T_t} f(v) dB(v) \mid \mathcal{G}_u \right] du \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] \\
&= -\int_s^{T_t} f(u) g(u) \mathbb{E}\left[ \int_u^{T_t} f(v) dB(v) \mid \mathcal{G}_u \right] du.
\end{align*}
\]
Thus \( Y(s) \triangleq \mathbb{E}\left[ \int_s^{T_t} f(u) dB(u) \mid \mathcal{G}_t \right] \) fulfills the integral equation
\[
Y(s) = Y(t) - \int_t^s f(u) g(u) Y(u) du,
\]
whose solution is given by
\[
Y(s) = Y(t) e^{-\int_t^s f(u) g(u) du}, \quad t \leq s \leq T.
\]
This proves the Proposition. \( \square \)

Remark A.4. Note that we can substitute Brownian motion \( B(t) \) in Prop. A.3 with any Lévy process \( L(t) \) if \( L(t) - \int_0^t \theta(s) ds \) is a \( \mathcal{G}_t \)-martingale.

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