Christiansborg on the Gold Coast

Analysis of Danish Fort Diplomacy in West Africa, 1694-1735

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Abstract

This thesis concerns the Danish slave fort Christiansborg in the early 18th century, and is primarily oriented towards the different means in which the administration attempted to maintain amicable relationships with local African states. Long-term diplomatic relations are the primary focus, although certain crises and incidents of the time period are also discussed. The thesis discusses and analyses these diplomatic methods or tools thematically and within the larger context Christiansborg and its administration found themselves in. The diplomatic methods are divided into three broad categories of economic, social and military methods. These diplomatic methods are then viewed and discussed through the actions of some select governors as well as comparatively with other European slave trading forts.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

For a solid two centuries, forts and trading posts were operated by Danes and Norwegians on behalf of different charter companies and the Danish state. Most significant of these forts was fort Christiansborg located by Accra in what is now south-eastern Ghana. This area was at the time referred to as the Gold Coast, Guinea or occasionally as the Coast. The Danes joined a trend and mercantile effort already spearheaded by Portuguese traders; the purchase of gold, ivory, shells and most tragically, human beings. This thesis deals with the complex interaction between fort Christiansborg and the local communities, polities and states they traded with in what is now south-eastern Ghana in the period 1694-1735.

Tens of thousands of Africans were purchased, confined, transported, and sold to plantations in the Danish west-Indian colonies over the course of the Danish involvement in the Atlantic slave trade, and much has been studied and written on the often-lethal voyages for crew and human "cargo". This thesis does not deal with the transport itself, but rather with Christiansborg and its leadership's entanglement in the local communities and polities of West-Africa, where the slave trade is a pressing but not omnipresent consideration. I would like to state firmly that the slave trade was a horrific, dehumanizing and callous trade, with sweeping ramifications for those directly bought and sold, their descendants, the communities they were taken from and the communities they would form on the other end of the Atlantic world. These concerns will not be dealt with in any detail in the thesis proper, where the topic is far more specific than the great consequences this trade would have well past their abolition.

The 1694-1735 period was one of great change in Christiansborg and the area around it. It saw the zenith and fall of the Akwamu Empire, which dominated trade on the gold coast until 1735. Gradually a more standardized method of administering Christiansborg itself developed, local alliances were in tatters after significant events, and the growth of a Euroafrican population which would permanently alter how Christiansborg functioned as both a trading and a political entity. This thesis focuses in particular on the governorships of Erich Lygaard, Franz Boye and Andreas Wærøe, who administered for a sufficient period to attribute policies to their decisions. All three governors had a background in the slave trade before their terms as governors, Lygaard and Boye as staff at Christiansborg itself and Wærøe as captain on several slave ships. These governors will be described in more detail in chapter 4, but will also be mentioned at times in chapter 3. They were chosen due to the

length of their governorships, and that they all dealt with the relationship between Christiansborg and the Akwamu Empire in different ways and in different situations. Other governors in the period either served for shorter times, or had less direct interaction with Akwamu. The 1694-1735 period is also well-documented, and relatively easily accessible when Covid-19 travel restrictions were in place, from scanned copies from the national archive of Denmark.

Thesis question

The primary thesis question is "What methods were available and used by the leadership of fort Christiansborg to maintain amicable long-term relations with local African states necessary for the slave trade?", and secondly and more broadly "How did the relatively small and weak Christiansborg persist through the slave trade and the changing political climates?"

This question is being asked because much of the historiographical focus of historians and researchers have oriented themselves towards other aspects of the trade, such as the middle passage itself, the plantation economies, the social history of Christiansborg and local communities, or the profitability of the slave trade. The forts would often exist as political and economic entities far removed from their overseers in Copenhagen, who would often need to act with some degree of autonomy. In matters of diplomacy, less research has been made of the long-term effects of various relationships and economic entanglements, than of wars and the more sudden shifts. This is not to say that no research of this nature has been done, such as by Hernæs, Justesen and others, but as far as I have found an analysis of the tools available to the administration of Christiansborg in maintaining their local alliances has not. Of particular interest is that of the Opperhoved/Governor of Christiansborg, and the Secret Council, who were empowered to make day-to-day decisions in line with the instructions from the company directors.

A natural way to limit the scope of the thesis is to limit the timespan considered. While the Forts existed under Danish control for two centuries (from the 1650s to their sale to the United Kingdom in 1847) this thesis primarily deals with the 1694-1735 period, although stretching somewhat beyond 1735 when it comes to the matter of marriage with local Africans, as the scope and practice evolved throughout the period. This was a period of rebuilding, consolidation and relative stability, barring the 1730s which was one of the more dramatic periods for Christiansborg and the Gold Coast at large.

Historiographical overview

There is a limited but still well-established scholarly literature on the Danish forts in West-Africa. The works of P. Hernæs and other Norwegian and Danish historians oriented around the slave trade in the late 20th century up until 2017 has been of particular inspiration for this thesis. Especially the comprehensive Vestafrika: Forterne på Guldkysten (Hernæs et al, 2017), The Rise of the Akwamu Empire (Wilks, 1957), Danish Sources on the History of Ghana (Justesen, 2005), The Danish Slave Trade and its Abolition (Gøbel, 2016) and Daughters of the Trade: Atlantic Slavers and Interracial Marriage on the Gold Coast (Ipsen, 2015) have been invaluable for the writing of this thesis, but Hernæs most of all. Hernæs' works have emphasized the importance of viewing the forts through the lens of a cultural and social meeting between Europe and Africa. Instead of the more traditional and Eurocentric lens marked by previous specialists in the field, where the profitability of the trade and the trade as an European venture in itself has been the prime focus, a tradition Hernæs has described as a 'Danophilic' tradition.[1] The debate between these two traditions is largely a phenomenon of the historical literature on the subject since the latter 20th century, as written history before the latter 20th century was often marked by colonial and outright racialist attitudes. Hernæs' works have also emphasized the diplomatic entanglements of Christiansborg at various points, often with a focus on incidents and policies of both local states and the Danish governors. This thesis is also oriented towards these themes, but with a focus more on the analysis of the methods Christiansborg had at its disposal and how they were used to maintain long-term relationships. These methods, or tools, will be described in greater detail, but have been grouped into economic, military and social tools of diplomacy.

Ghanaian research on the field, such as the works of Adu-Boahen and more generally through the journal of the Historical Society of Ghana, often adopts a more post-colonial lens where the slave trade's effect on particular local communities is often the focus, as well as linking the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism and the remembrance and memory of these in modern Ghanaian society. Ghanaian researchers in general still utilize much the same sources as the European historians have, the archive material from the Forts and trade companies being the main sources that have been utilized regardless of tradition or lens, but how the sources have been analysed have varied over time and over regions.

[1] Hernæs, «Dansk kolonihistorie Og Afrika», p. 71-73

Sources

The sources used for this thesis are predominantly from Rigsarkivet in Denmark, and cosists of a variety of archive materials, primarily the court protocol of Governor Franz Boye's trial, the instructions of the company to the secret council and governor, the travel diary of Johannes Rask who served as Chaplain of Christiansborg, the books of Johannes Rømer who served as clerk at Christiansborg, and both individual and general letters from the governors of Christiansborg in the period. The letters have used the translated works of Justesen and Manley, while the others have been accessed from the scanned and available documents at Rigsarkivet. The sources being all from the Danish-Norwegian 'side' somewhat limits the extent to which the thesis can discuss the motivations and actions of the African actors in the trade, a subject of relevance but where I will primarily rely on literature and interpretation of the European sources.

The sources will be discussed individually later, but on the whole they have been selected based on relevance to the thesis question, and literature to provide further information beyond the scope of the thesis, such as the Dutch and English forts in the region, and for discussion on the diplomatic tools at Christiansborgs disposal.

Methodology

The thesis has been written based on interpretation of archival sources, exclusively from the National Archive of Denmark. The archive material used has primarily been letters from Christiansborg to the directors of the West-Indian and Guinea Company, both general letters written by the governor and secret council at the time, and direct correspondence between the governor and the directors directly. The books of Ludwig Ferdinand Rømer on his experiences in Christiansborg (written in 1756 and 1760 respectively, about his experiences in the 1740s) and Johannes Rask's book Ferd til og Frå Guinea (his diary published in 1754, about his experiences on Christiansborg 1708-1713) has also been used for views on how the daily affairs of diplomacy was undertaken. Debt books and ledgers have also been analysed for portions of the thesis.

Danish Sources for the History of Ghana (2005) by Ole Justesen (editor) and James Manley (translator) has also been used extensively to find sources with information on the topic this thesis covers. The collection is extensive and curated. The collection of translated sources,

and especially its gathering of topics to particular letters, has served to find the letters dealing with the issues of diplomacy that was only on occasion a topic of the letters.

The analysis of letters, books and ledgers have been supplemented with literature as mentioned previously. Literature has been used for several purposes in the thesis. One use of literature has been to provide an overview of areas beyond the immediate scope of the thesis that are still useful to provide context, such as the organization of Dutch and British slave trading operations and the overarching slave trade and its history both in relation to Denmark-Norway and internationally outside of the 1694-1735 period. Literature has also been used to supplement discussion and analysis of the sources.

Avoiding excessive eurocentrism has been an ambition for this thesis, although to an extent it is still oriented towards the actions and reactions of European actors rather than local actors. This is in part due to the sources used, which allows a more grounded analysis for the actions of the Europeans who wrote them than the locals they were interacting with. No firm theory has been utilized beyond analysis of the archival sources in relation to what they can say about the diplomatic tools used by Christiansborg, and how the trade interacted with these as both a tool and a goal.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided into five chapters not including the bibliography. In chapter 2, I will provide a largely literature-derived overview of the slave trade and the fort's chronological history, a brief description of the political situation on the coast both in terms of prominent African states and actors, non-Danish European companies, and the institution of slavery as it existed and developed among the Ga and Akan peoples around Christiansborg. Chapter 3 is structured around analysing source material and supplementing with literature to discuss the different diplomatic 'tools' employed in further detail. Chapter 4 discuss these tools on the whole, their interaction, purpose and uses, as well as the autonomy of the governors of Christiansborg in using these tools to maintain the trade, amicable relations and in the ultimate sense, the very existence of Christiansborg and Danish presence on the Gold Coast. It will also analyse and discuss the actions of the governors Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe in relation to the Akwamu Empire, and how these governors used the diplomatic tools at their disposal. Chapter 5 is a conclusion drawing on the topics discussed in the other chapters to answer the thesis question.

Figure 1: Map of Danish possessions in West Africa, drawn 1802 by P. Thonning. While later than the focus of the thesis, Christiansborg and nearby forts are visible. From Rigsarkivet.

Chapter 2: Overview

Historical context: the Transatlantic Trade

Denmark-Norway played a relatively small role in the total transatlantic slave trade, as during its existence from roughly 1660 until the abolition went into effect in 1803, Danish ships transported at least 86,000 enslaved people from West-Africa to primarily the Danish colonies in the Caribbean. This accounted for a bit less than one percent of the total transatlantic slave trade, and a bit more than two percent of the slave trade going to the Caribbean at large.[2] This trade in human beings supplied Danish plantations with forced labour to sustain the small, but far-reaching, colonial trade of the kingdom, the plurality of slaves used by the Danish plantations being transported by ships flying Danish colours.[3] The trade forts in West-Africa, such as Christiansborg by Accra, played a vital role in the continuation of the trade. Christiansborg was responsible for maintaining trade relations, purchasing slaves from local states and traders, and theoretically keeping people imprisoned for ease of shipping when Danish ships did arrive, although as we will discuss further in the thesis, this was difficult for the forts to achieve in practice for a variety of reasons.

This trade in humans was part of the triangle trade or Trans-Atlantic trade, a larger trade network that existed along the Atlantic. In simplified terms, the triangle trade consisted of European goods, weapons and cowries, sold in primarily West-Africa for primarily slaves, gold and ivory. The enslaved people bought in West Africa shipped over the Atlantic in horrendous conditions were utilized for plantation and mining in the Americas, exclusively plantations in the case of the Danes, and goods such as sugar, tobacco and cotton produced by the enslaved people were shipped to the colonial centres in Europe. This trade has been described as one of the earlier globalized trade networks and relations in the early modern period. It provided the background for an Atlantic world of disparate communities, traders, soldiers, African kingdoms, slave communities in the Americas and to a lesser extent its influence in Europe. In total, roughly twelve and a half million people were shipped along the hazardous and deadly journey from West-Africa to the Americas.[4]

The Danish trade specifically can be viewed as a microcosm of the larger trade, never matching the scale of the British, French, Portuguese or Dutch, but with a similar

[2] Gøbel, "Slavehandelen under Dannebrog", p. 184-185
[3] Gøbel, "Slavehandelen under Dannebrog", p. 185
[4] Gøbel, "Slavehandelen under Dannebrog", 185

geographical reach. Denmark-Norway maintained its trade forts in what was then called the Gold Coast, in what is now southern Ghana, of which Christiansborg became the most prominent. Christiansborg maintained close relations with the nearby Ga city-states such as Accra, the Kingdom of Akwamu and the Kingdom of Ashanti as well as sometimes amicable, sometimes hostile, but competitive relations with the Dutch and English/British forts in the same area during times of peace. Portugal and France, while prominent in the trade overall, were less so in in areas and time of Danish trade in terms of permanent forts. Denmark-Norway maintained colonies in the Americas, such as the islands of St. Thomas and St. Croix, now the US Virgin Islands. In addition, Denmark-Norway even maintained a presence in India, through its trade port and colony of Trankebar. In many ways, the Danish attempt at empire had a similar geographical reach to the larger European empires, but far less of a scale. Roughly a hundred thousand Africans were shipped off from Danish forts throughout their existence, mainly on Danish ships but also a significant number of ships of other nations.[5]

Chronological description of Christiansborg and the other Forts of Denmark-Norway

Denmark-Norway was one of the last European powers to establish themselves in the slave trade, and the first to abolish it. Denmark only established themselves in West-Africa around 1660 (a good century after the first Atlantic slave voyages by Portuguese merchants). Its abolition came into effect in 1803 after a ten year grace period after the trade's official declaration of abolishment in 1792. Slavery itself persisted in Danish colonies in the Caribbean until the system began to be phased out in 1847 over a twelve year period.[6] The establishment of the trade was a chaotic period, marked by frequent take-overs of trading forts by other Europeans and local African states, rampant death and disease amongst the soldiers, traders and functionaries of the forts, and infrequent shipping. Christiansborg, which became the seat of the later seven Danish forts along the "Coast of Guinea", was first established in 1652 by the short-lived Swedish Africa Company. Christiansborg was conquered by Dutch merchants under commission of Denmark-Norway who began establishing trade relations with local African states in 1658 of gold, ivory and indeed humans as the Danish Africa Company.[7] The Portuguese briefly took over the fort in 1680

[5] Gøbel, «Slavehandelen under Dannebrog», 185-186
[6] Gøbel, *The Danish Slave Trade and its Abolition*
[7] Svensli, "Evil-Disposed Netherlanders", p. 331-332

after a mutiny by the Danish soldiers, but abandoned it in 1682 following another mutiny, with the Danes returning in 1683.[8]

The fort was again briefly lost in 1693 when the local Kingdom of Akwamu conquered Christiansborg following a conflict with the Ga-townships of Lesser and Greater Accra where the Danish forts had sided with and aided the Ga who ultimately lost the war, but Akwamu sold it back to the Danes a year later in return for a payment of gold.[9] Despite this rough start, marked by conflict and the frequent deaths of fort governors, the trade began in this period and would grow, and the forts would only grow more intermingled with local African (particularly the Ga) societies and states. It was also in this period that Christiansborg became the centre of Danish-Norwegian influence in the region, after the governor's seat was moved following the loss of fort Frederiksborg in 1685.[10]

A periodization of the Danish-Norwegian trade forts can roughly be grouped into 1660-1671 (establishment), 1671-1754 (the West-Indian and Guinea Company period), 1754-1792 (the state-run slave-trade period), 1792-1803 (the grace period of abolishment and free trade) and the 1803-1847 (the post-slave trade period). Between 1671 and 1754 the forts and the slave trade were operated by the *Vestindisk-guineisk Kompagni* (West-Indian and Guinea Company), a charter company with a monopoly on Danish trade in the Danish colonies in the Caribbean and the Forts along the Gold Coast. While the company would later be abolished by the Danish crown, with the forts temporarily under the direct authority of the Danish *Rentekammer* (state department responsible for economic and material matters of the Danish crown), a state-run enterprise would resume trade with limited private investment in the latter period. In the Company period, administration of the Caribbean colonies and the forts were linked directly, nominally administered from the imperial seat of Copenhagen. In practice most decisions had to be made by the governors in the West-Indies and West-Africa respectively. As a phrase from the time had it, "Heaven is high above, and Europe is far away",[11] making the local administrators akin to lords ruling their own fiefs on behalf of the company and generally following the instructions periodically received, although in cases

[8] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 74-76
[9] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 90-93
[10] Hernæs, "En kamp om fodfæste», p. 83
[11] Ipsen, *Daughters of the Trade*, p. 24

such as Governor Frans Boye there were consequences for acting outside of the instructions of the company.[12]

Due to the limited scale of Danish trade in comparison to other European states, on occasion it would take years before a Danish slave ship would arrive on the coast, while in other years there were several.[13] In the 1698-1734 period which roughly involves the period this thesis covers, only twenty Danish slave ships departed from Christiansborg, one of the lowest points of the trade.[14] Especially early in the period, this resulted in part the chaos of conquests and mutinies, and on occasion the decimation of the European soldiers and staff of the forts due to diseases that the Danes, Norwegians and other European fort staff were ill-suited to handle. During this establishment and in the early period of the company, any claims of a Danish monopoly anywhere in the Gold Coast would be optimistic at best, but during the 18th century the forts were able to maintain a stable presence, relations and trade in which to give them a limited, but fragile and temporary, trading monopoly with their closest local partners in the far east of West-Africa. Relative power between the Danish-Norwegian traders and that of the local Africans is also an important point of note. The Danish Forts were all on de facto leased ground from local noblemen and Kings, and in this local sphere early in the trade, it was the Ga, Akwamu and other local states, kings and traders who tolerated, allowed and engaged in the trade.[15] While the power dynamics would increasingly become in European favour later in the trade, for a multitude of reasons well outside the scope of this thesis, the importance the governors and company placed on maintaining amicable trade- and diplomatic relations with the local states cannot be overstated. Christiansborg itself was gradually expanded through land leases and construction during the trade, expanding its warehouse, barracks, residences and physical defences.

The governors (generally referred to as *Opperhoved* a loanword from Dutch that was used interchangeably with *Gouverneur*) had responsibility for day-to-day affairs, from trade, maintaining relations with local African states and the other forts as well as managing the forts themselves. Some governors lasted years, while others barely lasted one (including one governor who died twelve days after his arrival at the fort). Christiansborg itself generally had a European staff of between twenty and forty, barring periods where significant numbers

[12] Rigsarkivet, V.g-K, d. 1717-1718. Den Særlige Ret i Sagen mod Fhv. Guvernør Frans Boye.
[13] Green-Pedersen, *Scope and Structure of the Danish Negro Slave Trade*, p. 30
[14] Gøbel, «Slavehandelen under Dannebrog», p. 185
[15] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 72-73

of new arrivals died to diseases, which was a common issue for Danish and other European forts. The forts often had a similar number of fort slaves who would tend to construction, repairs, translation and other duties. The number of fort slaves relative to European soldiers and staff would grow over the period.[16] The governors answered to the Company in Copenhagen primarily, and in day-to-day affairs to the Secret Council, consisting of the governor and four other senior staff at the fort, generally including the bookkeeper and merchant as well as senior administrators. The priest was also a theoretically powerful figure in the fort who was on paper second only to the governor and operating outside of the regular hierarchy of Christiansborg. The relationship between the secular administration and the priest was often fraught and tumultuous, which is something that will be further discussed in chapter 3 and 4.

After the abolishment of the slave trade in 1792 and before the end of the grace period of 1803, the operation and importance of the forts grew substantially before becoming largely a burden on Danish-Norwegian finances after the end of the slave trade. A full quarter of all slave transport under Danish flags happened in the 1792-1803 period, as during the grace period free trade was instituted.[17] While generally in the total period of Danish-Norwegian Atlantic slave trade men were preferred over women by the forts, this was reversed in this period as the end of the trade did not mean an end to slavery. The forts were maintained for more than forty years after the end of the trade, involved in trade of goods such as gold and ivory, before they were sold to Britain in 1849.[18] The shadows of the slave trade and Danish forts persist all the way to the modern day.

Political situation on the Gold Coast

Christiansborg and its governors operated within the context of the larger Atlantic world, but also in the far more local context of the gold coast. The English Fort James and the Dutch Fort Crèvecœur were located and operated in the same area as Christiansborg and the other smaller Danish forts who dotted the shoreline around Accra. Each of the three European forts by Accra; Christiansborg, Fort James and Crevecoeur, had their own small towns develop around them which were part of Accra but also the most intimately linked to the trade itself.[19]

[16] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 226-227
[17] Gøbel, *The Danish Slave Trade and its Abolition,* p. 151-165
[18] Justesen, «Et koloniprojekt der mislykkedes 1826-50», p. 350-351
[19] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 73-74

Conflicts in Europe had repercussions for the Danish forts, although in times of peace social visits and exchange of information was commonplace. Of equal, and perhaps more, importance was the local political and diplomatic situation with the various African states, of which the Ga townships/city-states (among them Accra and Osu, the latter being the small town which grew around Christiansborg), the Kingdom of Akwamu and the Kingdoms of Akyem would be of particular importance to the continuation of trade and a perpetual concern for the governor and secret council. Friendly relations had been quickly established with the Ga people, the King of Accra having leased out the land on which Christiansborg had been built on in 1661 and sought to profit from European trade.[20] In the local context, the Forts could not hope to dominate the local states in the Company period, with their scant few men, long distance from any aid from the homeland and very limited staff. Both the Europeans and the Africans were keenly aware of this, and as will be discussed later it affected several of the methods in which Christiansborg's governors maintained the Company's trade in the region.

Dutch and English Trading Companies

The Danish fort, even in the relatively confined geographic region of the Gold Coast, was a junior rival to the larger English and Dutch trade companies. Indeed, the earliest Danish presence in the region consisted largely of disaffected Dutch merchants who sought commissions from Sweden and Denmark-Norway to operate trade in the area outside of the jurisdiction of the Dutch West-India Company as the short-lived 'Swedish Africa Company' and 'Danish Africa Company' respectively.[21] Particularly the early rivalry between the Dutch West India Company and the Danish Africa Company, where the crown of Denmark-Norway itself was only marginally involved, paved the way for the future relationships the governors of Christiansborg would attempt to nurture and sustain with local states. Denmark-Norway had in this early period little capacity to protect the overseas ventures in the region, forcing the Danish Africa Company to rely largely on the assistance of local states for protection against the Dutch.[22]

This was particularly evident in the early establishment of Danish presence in Akong in the Kingdom of Asebu west of Accra, where the Danish Africa Company sought the protection of powerful figures within the nominally pro-Dutch Kingdom. Asebu saw value in not relying

[20] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 78-79
[21] Svensli, «Evil Disposed Netherlanders», p. 327-328
[22] Svensli, «Evil Disposed Netherlanders», p.332-333

on one trading partner exclusively, which hobbled the Dutch West India Company's efforts at maintaining their monopoly.[23] Another important element that had a vital role on Christiansborg's diplomatic and trade relations later in the period can also be derived from this, the fact that the local African states were the most powerful in the regional dynamics of West Africa. European trade companies could not at this time simply enforce their demands by military power or threats, but navigating the local politics, struggles and alliances was of vital importance so as not to be evicted.

While the Danish-Norwegian forts can be considered minor relative to the Dutch, both would also prove to be minor in comparison to the English and later British trade forts in the region. While Denmark-Norway accounted for roughly 0.8% of total the trans-Atlantic slave trade, while the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal were far more significant traders on the middle passage during the time period of active Danish slave trade (1650-1807).[24] While Portugal remained the most prominent slave trading nation in the Atlantic world in this time period, they were not as prominent in the context of the Gold Coast and the concerns of Christiansborg. How the governors of Christiansborg navigated these relations with other European companies, often with only minor intervention from their respective imperial capitals, is a subject we will return to in limited form, as it is largely outside the scope of this thesis.

Especially as the slave trade grew before and during Denmark-Norway's involvement, the importance of firearms as a traded good to the local African states created a cycle that has been dubbed the 'gun-slave hypothesis' or the 'gun-slave cycle' (sometimes also grouped with the 'horse-slave cycle'). According to Whatley this hypothesis in essence argues that, with the growth of the export of firearms as part of the slave trade in the 17th and 18th centuries, it created a cycle in which slave traders would buy firearms from European forts for slaves, and with those be able to capture more slaves for sale in war.[25] A more extreme version of this hypothesis argue that West African states would wage wars to capture slaves as a primary aim, rather than their stated reasons and causes of the war, competition for land and resources, or the rivalries between opposing powers. The hypothesis also postulates that this left the local states in a dilemma, where not joining the trade would remove the primary method of attaining firearms, rendering them more vulnerable to their neighbours who did, as

[23] Svensli, "Evil Disposed Netherlanders", p. 327-328
[24] Gøbel, "Slavehandelen under Dannebrog", p. 185
[25] Whatley, "The gun-slave hypothesis and the 18th century British slave trade", p. 80-84

Whatley describes it creating a prisoner's dilemma situation.[26] This hypothesis is not without its critics, arguing that the hypothesis puts too much emphasis on the role of Europeans in the transformation of West African polities in the 16th to 19th centuries towards larger and more centralized, but also militarized, structures such as in the case of Asante and Akwamu, in the process removing agency from African actors. An econometric analysis of the trade conducted by the United Kingdom in the 18th century did find strong correlation between larger shipments of gunpowder and firearms, and ensuing purchases of enslaved Africans.[27]

While the question on whether the trans-Atlantic slave trade caused wars in West Africa is disputed, that it affected how they were fought is less so. The introduction of matchlock muskets and other firearms (the earlier flintlocks not being traded to a large extent, because they were not particularly effective in the local climate) did change tactics and how the wars were waged and were highly sought after by local traders and states. Denmark-Norway itself became involved in the trade just as this gun-slave cycle is hypothesised to have begun with the growth of firearms as a good to use for purchasing people and other African goods. Considering Denmark-Norway's limited role in the overall trade, if this cycle occurred then it was a result of the overall slave trade committed by Denmark-Norway, the Netherlands as well as England and later the United Kingdom, among others. Evident from the sources and as will be discussed in greater detail later, firearms was one of the most consistently valuable goods for Christiansborg to use for trade.

In terms of military power, especially naval power, the Danish-Norwegian companies were far outmatched by both the Dutch and the English companies operating in the region. The Dutch company had a small fleet in West-Africa in the time period,[28] while the English also maintained a military presence. In contrast, Denmark-Norway had little military presence beyond Christiansborg itself. This enabled the Dutch and English companies to engage in more risky behaviour in the trade than was possible for Christiansborg, a topic that will be discussed further in later chapters.

[26] Whatley, "The gun-slave hypothesis and the 18th century British slave trade", p. 83
[27] Whatley, "The gun-slave hypothesis and the 18th century British slave trade", p. 84-102
[28] Hernæs, "Guld, slaver og kolonisering", p. 25-30

African polities

The Gold Coast was politically fractured during most of the time period of the Danish forts and trade in the region, ranging from townships such as Accra, to more expansive inland Kingdoms such as Akwamu, the different Akyem kingdoms and Asante. When Christiansborg was founded, the local societies had already become centralized and militaristic states, with power centres generally further inland from the coast itself.[29] Christiansborg needed to maintain amicable relations with the geographically nearest and most powerful of these states to maintain their presence and mercantile efforts in the region, much like the other European companies operating in the area.[30] The methods used to maintain these relations will be more extensively discussed and analysed in chapter 3, but the purpose was always primarily to maintain the trade, of which the slave trade was the most vital for Christiansborg, followed by gold and ivory. Of these polities, the Accra (both the Kingdom of Accra before its fall to Akwamu, and the Ga people of Accra afterwards), the Kingdom of Akwamu and later in the period the Kingdom of Asante, were particularly important to Christiansborg, as trading partners, allies and occasionally enemies.[31] While I will focus on Christiansborg's relationship with Accra, Akwamu and the Akyem in this thesis, these are by no means the only, nor only significant, polities the fort needed to consider.

By physical proximity, the relationship between the Ga of Osu and Accra and the governors of Christiansborg were the longest lasting and most frequently tended to by the Danes. The history of the Ga people before contact with Europeans is carried from oral traditions, and while such sources have their issues in terms of distortion over time, the fact of most importance for the purposes of this thesis is that this was the history of their people as they believed, and no other source is available to verify or discredit it. The Ga held that they arrived in the Accra area during the 16th century, and had migrated from the east and established townships structured around a king and a council of noblemen, among them Accra and Osu.[32] The Ga were structured around patrilineal clans, organized into male and female compounds,[33] and the specifics on their family structure will be more important and detailed when discussing the marriages between Danish-Norwegian functionaries and local

[29] Hernæs, «Det første fremstød», p. 42
[30] Hernæs, «Det første fremstød», p. 43
[31] Hernæs «Det første fremstød»
[32] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 83
[33] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca 1700-1850», p. 244-245

women. The Ga states of Osu and Accra were the first permanent trading relations Denmark-Norway established in Guinea (and preceded further west in Fetu as the first)[34], and they would remain close for most of the Danish-Norwegian presence in the region. The building of Christiansborg itself was requested by the King of Accra, that is for the Danes to establish a fortified compound in Osu during the Akwamu-Accra war, and became the seat of Danish mercantile efforts and the company's administration in West Africa.[35]

The Kingdom of Akwamu, sometimes also written as Aquamboe among other alternate spellings, would become a significant factor in the operations of the Danish trade forts especially in the earlier period of Danish presence. The Kingdom of Akwamu was already an expansionist power by the time of the first Danish Africa Company operations in the region, with a core of territory around the capital of Nyanaose, located north-west of Accra and Christiansborg.[36] According to Wilks, already in 1661 when Danish mercantile interests were established by Accra during the conflict with the Dutch West Indian Company, Akwamu and the Ga of Accra had disputes over the flow of trade from the interior of modern-day Ghana into Accra. Accra, in many ways, served as a trade hub with several European trade companies (English, Dutch and Danish, and formerly Portuguese, and later Brandenburger) operating on the coast, and interior trade of gold, slaves and ivory reaching the city by land and river. Akwamu controlled most of these routes, imposing tolls and applying pressure on Accra, which culminated in the Akwamu-Accra war of 1677-1681, seeing the inland capital of Great Accra sacked, but remnants of the Accra government seeking shelter in the coastal towns and villages, including Little Accra by the Dutch Fort Crèvecœur and Osu where Christiansborg stood. Christiansborg sided with Accra in this conflict and aided in repelling an attack upon Osu during this war.[37] It was during the Akwamu-Accra war that the garrison of Christiansborg mutinied, and the remaining forces of Accra fell in the ensuing years. This lead to the Ga consisting of a series of semi-autonomous polities under Akwamu, who now profited directly from the Accra trade.[38] While peace was made between the Danish Company and Akwamu, Akwamu attacked Christiansborg in 1693 and occupied it for a year, in which the trader Asameni was the Akwamu governor of Christiansborg, flying an Akwamu flag depicting an African warrior on a white background. Akwamu control of Christiansborg

[34] Hernæs, «Det første fremstød», p. 51-52
[35] Hernæs, "En kamp om fodfæste», p. 82-84
[36] Wilks, "The Rise of the Akwamu Empire", p. 26-27
[37] Wilks, "The Rise of the Akwamu Empire", p. 31-35
[38] Wilks, "The Rise of the Akwamu Empire", p. 35-37

ended only with an agreement between the Company and Akwamu, where rents had to again be paid to Akwamu, for the company to renounce any claim to assets lost with the fort, and to pay 50 marks of gold.[39]

Until its decline in the 1730s, Akwamu would be the primary African state Christiansborg had to maintain amicable relations with to ensure not only the trade, but the physical presence they had in the region. While Akwamu conquered Accra, it remained populated by Ga people, who would continue to be the main cultural link between Christiansborg and their local trading partners. This demonstrates that Danish presence, especially in this early and chaotic period, was at the mercy and often behest of local African rulers who themselves had their own reasons for desiring trade with the Europeans.

Slavery on the Gold Coast

Slavery existed in West Africa well before the establishment of Portuguese trading forts on the regions' coastline and already had a more organized nature when the Danes established themselves in the mid-17th century.[40] But the institution of slavery changed with the increasing intensity of the slave trade that grew substantially from the 16th century and until its abolition in the 19th century.

When Denmark-Norway established itself in the region, international trade in gold and slaves already existed in West Africa. Portugal, and to a lesser extent Spain, had begun the established trade two centuries before the establishment of a single Danish fort, while the trans-Saharan trade routes also transported slaves over its existence since the 6th or 7th century. But the slave trade along the trans-Saharan route never matched the trans-Atlantic route in terms of intensity, transporting a similar and likely fewer amount of people over the course of ten to twelve centuries which the trans-Atlantic slave trade did in four.[41] By the time of Danish establishment, however, this trade had paved the road for the trade in humans as a commercial activity, by both other Europeans and traders from North Africa. The Danish trade coincided with an intensification of the trans-Atlantic slave trade which would have wide-ranging demographic, economic, political, and cultural ramifications for the peoples of

[39] Wilks, "The Rise of the Akwamu Empire", p. 46-47
[40] Hernæs, "Det første fremstød", p. 42
[41] Collins, "The Asian Slave Trade", p. 228

West Africa, both the ones who remained and the ones who were forcibly shipped across the Atlantic ocean.

Of note is also the institution of slavery that existed in West Africa before and during the trans-Atlantic slave trade and Denmark-Norway's involvement in it. While this is a generalization of an institution that took many different forms across the many different cultures of West Africa, it does apply to most of the peoples whom Denmark-Norway primarily traded with. According to Adu-Boahen, these societies generally divided between different categories of unfree persons, not all of whom were considered to be for sale to European traders. The most privileged of these unfree persons who were still considered slaves, were the royal slaves bound to royal households, such as the kings of Akwamu and Accra. These were 'public' slaves, owned by the kingdom, and served as symbols of the wealth of the king and by extension the kingdom, serving domestic and ceremonial tasks. A second group of slaves were private slaves, owned by a family (although not legally an individual within the family) who would usually work and live with the family who owned them. Manumission of this latter category was not uncommon, and this group of slaves could become so as a result of a family repaying a debt, restitution for criminal acts and captives in war. This system of slavery was widespread but did not itself lead to slave economies or societies, with the majority of the labour of a household or village being free or non-slave forms of unfree labour.[42]

Adu-Boahen mentions one exception to slaves being relatively uncommon and generally integrated into the larger family unit did emerge shortly before the expansion of trans-Atlantic slavery, namely the system of slave villages used for the mining of gold that grew around the 14th and 15th centuries. This itself can be viewed as laying one of the foundations for the development of the later intense and international period of slave trade. The main 'source' of slaves in West African societies that were 'eligible' to be sold to European forts were captives of war, with a smaller number in the form of tribute and repayments of debt, although the latter category was generally only enslaved until the debt was fulfilled and only rarely traded.[43] Domestically, slavery intensified with the increased commercialization along the coasts, as European demand for human chattel was coupled with demand for gold, ivory

[42] Adu-Boahen, "The Impact of European Presence on Slavery in the sixteenth to eighteenth century Gold Coast", p. 168-173
[43] Adu-Boahen, "The Impact of European Presence on Slavery in the sixteenth to eighteenth century Gold Coast", p. 170-176

and other traded goods. According to Adu-Boahen, this led to an increasingly exploitative system of slavery in the region, where slaves were used actively in the commercial ventures both in production, transportation and indeed, as some of the 'goods' of the increasingly commercial ventures.[44]

Denmark-Norway thus not only tapped into an existing institution of slavery, but also existing trade networks, customs and relations that not only eased the process yet also means that there were several other actors in the area that made it more difficult to establish a lasting presence. Christiansborg would grow into the main trade fort and centre of Danish administration, maintaining their fragile monopoly in Osu and their fragile position in the greater Accra area, and by extension the Gold Coast.

[44] Adu-Boahen, «The Impact of European Presence on Slavery in the sixteenth to eighteenth century Gold Coast", p. 178 and 193-194

Chapter 3: Tools of diplomacy

Diplomatic relations and interpersonal relations sometimes amounted to the same thing when it came to Christianborg's relationships with African states and powers. Christiansborg had at its disposal several 'tools', or methods, in which the fort placed itself within the greater framework of West African politics, conflicts, alliances and groups. Maintaining relations with local powers was a significant focus for Christiansborg. The relationship with other European companies was largely handled through personal meetings although conflicts emerged as well. This chapter is primarily concerned with Christiansborg's methods of maintaining relationships with local states, rather than with the Dutch and English Forts.

In the previous chapter, the larger historical, political and economic situation the Dano-Norwegian forts found themselves in as they engaged in the transatlantic world were discussed, while in this chapter I will explain what I argue to be the primary tools of diplomacy available to, and used by, the governors and secret council of Christiansborg. This is based on selected sources from the national archive of Denmark (Rigsarkivet) and a body of literature drawn from scholarly research. The chapter will be divided into six sections, or subchapters: the hierarchical structure of the forts, and then the function of treaties, gifts, trade, marriages and military force respectively as they were used and considered by Christiansborg in their attempts to maintain and develop local alliances and trading relations. In this chapter, these 'tools' of diplomacy will be considered individually, while Chapter 4 will discuss how they were interlinked and under how much autonomy the secret council and governor could operate. The focus of this chapter is on the tools of diplomacy utilized to establish and maintain long-lasting relationships with local actors and states, not necessarily within the context of a significant event, conflict or crisis.

Figure 2: Drawing of Christiansborg and the surrounding town of Osu. Undated and no artist stated. From Rigsarkivet.

3.1: The hierarchy and instructions of Christiansborg

For the time period discussed in the thesis, Christiansborg was operated by the West-India and Guinea Company (hereafter referred to as the WIGC). The Danish Africa Company operated on the Gold Coast previously, and it was merged with the West-India Company in 1671, and in 1754 by the Danish *rentekammer* and shorter-lived companies after the West-India and Guinea Company was dissolved in 1776.[45] The governor answered to the board of directors based in Copenhagen, whose main source of information for the progress and situation of Christiansborg came from the governors themselves, who simultaneously would describe the situation and justify their decisions and actions in response to local situations. The governors themselves were also appointed by the King of Denmark, although generally this was a formality after the decision of the board. The WIGC did, as their name implies, not

[45] Hernæs, "Konturerne af et Dansk Guinea 1770-1800», p. 159

only operate the forts in "Guinea", but also the Danish colonies in West-India, such as St. Thomas and St. Croix.[46] While shipping and the plantations in West-India are outside of the scope of this thesis, it is noteworthy that the forts were organized within the larger structure of the trans-Atlantic trade rather than operating as its own entity. Christiansborg and the forts in West Africa were not the most highly sought-after destination in the burgeoning Dano-Norwegian colonial empire. West-India and Trankebar seemed to be preferred to the governorship of Christiansborg and trade in West-Africa, as can be seen in the lateral promotion of the relatively successful governor von Suhm to a deputy position in West-India.[47]

Christiansborg usually consisted of a hundred individuals in the relevant period, out of which four to five were part of the Secret Council in addition to the governor, who ultimately had the control of the political and diplomatic actions of the fort and by extension the WIGC on the Gold Coast. The Secret Council consisted of the over-assistant, merchant and bookkeeper of Christiansborg, as well as factors of other prominent Danish forts outside of the time-period discussed.[48] The Secret Council's responsibilities concerned the fulfilment of the WIGC's instructions, decision-making and providing advice to the governor. The governor was the person who bore the ultimate responsibility and authority on the coast, and was supposed to be appointed by the WIGC in Copenhagen. In practice, acting governors were common throughout the existence of Christiansborg, both due to unforeseen death and the ousting of appointed governors by the Secret Council or by court order from Copenhagen, such as in the cases of Governors Boye and Lygaard.

Two senior figures at the fort who did not sit in the Secret Council were the chaplain and military commander, barring the early period of the fort when the sergeant or military commander and the bookkeeper were the two positions in the fort the governor needed to consult with before the standardization of a Secret Council, and the military commander sat in the secret council until the instructions of 1711.[49] The chaplain's responsibilities were tending to the congregation of Europeans at the fort, but not proselytization. Only individuals who in some way were responsible for maintaining, conducting or recording the matters of trade sat in the Secret Council after 1711. This included the head merchant, the bookkeeper

[46] Gøbel, "Slavehandelen under Dannebrog", p. 186
[47] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, p. 321, footnote
[48] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, p. xiv-xvi
[49] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, p. xv-xvi

and senior assistants, and when the WIGC had more than one fort in West Africa, the factors of junior forts.[50] The chaplain was also responsible for the fort school for Eurafrican children established in the 1720s, a topic which will be discussed later in the chapter. Justesen describes the formation and gradual strengthening of the Secret Council between the 1680s and the 1720s as an attempt to limit the power of the governor, with increasing requirements for decisions to be undertaken collectively by the Governor and the Secret Council, and further requirements for documentation be sent and signed by all members.[51]

The remaining European population of the fort was divided between the assistants and functionaries who aided the work on trade and accounting and the small number of soldiers under the commandant or governor who maintained order in the dungeons and defended the fort in times of war, with the soldiers also typically serving as skilled labourers ranging from coopers, smiths, masons and more. In total these accounted usually for another 15-30 individuals at Christiansborg at most times in the period this thesis covers, although often the fort was not fully staffed due to disease, other deaths and even desertion.[52] At its lowest points, especially during the 1680s, the total number of Europeans on the fort could number significantly fewer, at one point as few as two.[53] Starting in this period, and growing ever more prominent towards and into the 19th century, Euroafricans would serve a wider variety of roles at the Fort, but chiefly as soldiers and workers.[54] The remainder of the population consisted of fort slaves, who had no direct influence over the decisions of the fort, and did most of the unskilled physical labour needed on the fort. One group of fort slaves had greater autonomy and influence than the rest, named remidors. The remidors were fort-slaves whose primary responsibility was the transport of slaves from the fort to waiting ships, and they received a salary for their services.[55]

These were more ideal numbers and structures than what always existed in reality. Especially in the early and more chaotic period of Christiansborg, the population of Europeans were frequently decimated by disease, internal intrigue and faulty judgements when it came to Christiansborg's diplomatic position regarding the local states and other companies, such as the support for Accra during its war with the ascendant Akwamu in the late 18th century.[56]

[50] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana,* p. xiv-xv
[51] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, p. xiv-xvii
[52] Weiss, "The European and Eurafrican Population of the Danish Forts", p. 43-44
[53] Hernæs, «Det første fremstød», p. 68
[54] Justesen and Ipsen "Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 236-239
[55] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca 1700-1850», p. 230-232
[56] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 85-88

Diseases, such as malaria, yellow fever and typhus, accounted for the majority of deaths among Europeans at the fort,[57] with almost three-fifths of new arrivals dying within the year (although the likelihood of survival increased after the first year).[5859] In this same period, support from Denmark-Norway proper was infrequent and often insufficient, leading to long periods without company ships for resupply and trade.[60] Nevertheless, the core structure of the forts remained, even if in the early period it could not be fulfilled for practical reasons of simply not having the manpower, and no Eurafrican population to draw staff and soldiers from locally.

The most direct influence the West-India and Guinea Company had on the day-to-day activities of their forts was through instructions to the Secret Council and the Governor, which consisted of a variety of articles detailing their responsibilities, autonomy and directions. These entailed the make-up of the Secret Council, significantly the structure of trade, what goods to prioritize and what goods should be transferred directly to the WIGC (largely gold). Ivory and slaves were the other two highly sought after goods per the instructions, of which the slave trade carried far more direct regulations from the WIGC to the forts than ivory, the continuation of the slave trade being explicitly stated to be the core aim of the forts in all its activities, diplomatically and commercially. The forts were tasked with maintaining amicable relations, both towards the local states and towards other European forts, and the instructions carried explicit regulations for collateral, credit and regulations on commercial behaviour towards local states, largely in the articles detailing the activities of the Secret Council which tended to be more extensive than the regulations placed upon the governor. Only a few articles can be considered diplomatic regulations (the rest being commercial, military and administrative regulations), and of note is that these are the broadest articles in the instructions. Only the matter of lending on credit is explicitly outlined in detail in the instruction after the period the thesis largely covers. In the instructions of 1761 the King of Asante was the only local power mentioned specifically (the largest local power in the vicinity of Danish forts at the time), but otherwise the secret council and the governor were instructed to use all possible means to maintain friendship with all local powers, and to avoid antagonizing the WIGC forts and ships of other nations. On the question of maintaining these friendly relations, significant autonomy was granted to the administration of

[57] Hernæs, "En kamp om fodfæste", 85-86
[58] Weiss, «The European and Eurafrican Population of the Danish Forts", p. 43-44
[59] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 85
[60] Gøbel, "Slavehandelen under Dannebrog», p. 185

Christiansborg. The explicitly stated goal of maintaining friendships with the local nations was maintaining the trade, a topic that will be discussed in more depth later in the chapter.[61]

An important change that began in the period discussed, but which would only grow until the abolition of the slave trade in 1802 and the sale of the forts to the United Kingdom in 1847, was the growing Eurafrican population. This population was largely descended from Danish staff and local Ga who lived both in Osu by Christiansborg, and in Greater and Lesser Accra, who increasingly in the period assumed greater responsibilities and autonomy both within the forts and in the larger trade networks. Eurafricans would serve as waged soldiers and assistants at the fort, as well as intermediary merchants who purchased goods and slaves in the north, and selling it to Christiansborg and other forts.[62] Unlike European soldiers and assistants, these men were resistant to local diseases, spoke both European and local languages and occupied a social role in Osu and Christiansborg outside of, but still partially within, both the European and African social spheres. This point will be elaborated on further in the chapter.

Other Europeans: Organization and Activities

The Danes, as latecomers to the Atlantic slave trade and the overall trade in West-Africa, did not operate in a vacuum and their organization in comparison to that of the Dutch and the English in particular, due to their proximity to the main Danish efforts in Accra, is of interest.

The English and the Dutch organized their overall trade in West-Africa in distinctly different ways towards the mid-18th century. The Dutch trade was organized under a charter company, the Dutch West India Company, which initially divided its holdings in Africa in two separate structures, the commandment of Elmina in Guinea (which Fort Crèvecœur belonged to) and the commandment of Luanda (administering Dutch holdings in southern Africa). The Dutch loss of Luanda in 1648 to the Portuguese left them, like the Danes, with influence only in Guinea and West-Africa, even if the Dutch holdings were by far more significant and prominent than that of Denmark-Norway. The Dutch structure of the forts and their administration bears many similarities with the Danish organization, or more accurately the Danish administration was similar to the Dutch organization. According to Feinberg, the

[61] Rigsarkivet, KGG, SRC. Instruktion for det Sekrete Råd på fortet Christiansborg
[62] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca 1700-1850», p. 236-241

Dutch forts were led by the Director-General of Elmina, with a council similar to the Danish Secret Council to serve as advisers, daily administrators and checks on the Director-General's actions. The exact make-up of the Dutch council varied over time, but generally consisted of the Director-General, the senior merchant of Elmina, on occasion the bookkeeper, and the factors of prominent forts along the coast.[63] One difference in its administration was that between 1746 and 1768, the Dutch council also included a military commander, which the Danish council usually did not. In other respects, the administration of Dutch and Danish forts, both individually and the larger organization in Guinea, was very similar.[64]

The structure of British affairs in Guinea, in contrast, grew to be more distinct from the Dutch and Danish administrations. England and the United Kingdom had several charter companies operating in Guinea from the 1660s. The first, the Royal Africa Company, mainly existed during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars and had a relatively restricted charter granting it monopoly over English trade and the establishment of a few forts. The Royal Africa Company of England, established in 1672, had a more extensive charter and led a build-up of new English forts and trading relationships with local states.[65] The domestic political situation in England in the 1680s and 1690s led to the end of the monopolistic venture however, and unlike the Dutch and Danes, England opened up for any English traders to operate in Guinea at the cost of a ten percent levy (giving English independent traders the name 'ten-percenters').[6667] Despite losing their monopoly on trade, the Royal Africa Company continued to operate the English and later British trading forts until its final disestablishment in 1750 but already in the 1720s the company was unable to turn a profit due in part to the abundance of private traders.[68] The forts were transferred to the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa in 1750, who consisted of merchants from London, Liverpool and Bristol. It was not a joint-stock company, with its council not able to regulate trade but serving a purely administrative function of the forts themselves, under the authority of the English Parliament.[69]

Administration of the forts themselves bore similarity to the Dutch and Danish systems, with a governor with overarching responsibility and a council of factors and important positions.

[63] Feinberg, "Africans and Europeans in West Africa", p. 31-35
[64] Sutton, *Competition and the Mercantile Culture of the Gold Coast,* 44-55
[65] Pettigrew, *Freedom's Debt*, p. 11-12
[66] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 242-243, (VI.8) V.-g.K; 121
[67] Pettigrew, *Freedom's Debt*, p. 12-16
[68] Mitchell, "Legitimate commerce", p. 567-571
[69] Martin, «The English Establishments on the Gold Coast", p. 170-172

But in comparison to the Dutch and Danes the governor wielded more authority compared to the council, while the council was relatively unimportant due to the role of the Royal Navy in diplomatic matters, and the importance of the Governor.[70] The position of Governor was also more often appointed from the factors of junior forts (rather than direct appointees from Europe arriving as governors which was frequently the case in Christiansborg), the English operating with a more meritocratic system.[71] This had the benefit of more stability, as unlike the Danes who more often sent a new governor unacclimatized to the environment and diseases of West-Africa, English and later British governors more often had already endured West African diseases.

These similarities between the Danish organization of their forts and the Dutch are not surprising. The early Danish Africa Company itself consisted of people like Jost Cramer, Dutch-born governor of the Danish Africa Company who secured the first treaty with Accra. These men were Dutch merchants who avoided the monopoly of the Dutch West-India Company by leading the formation of companies under the protection of Denmark-Norway, and whose initial organization of the Danish forts can be surmised to have been based on the Dutch organization. In contrast to the English, the Dutch and Danes operated under a more traditional joint-stock charter company a goal of which was the monopolization of trade, which the English gradually abandoned in the time period the thesis primarily interacts with from 1694 to 1735, even if the total abandonment was after the end of this period. However, Denmark-Norway was neither in a position to "copy" the English developments, reliant on the Royal Navy to overtake the English Company's diplomatic position, as the navy of Denmark-Norway could not maintain a steady presence in West-Africa, and in relation to both the English and the Dutch did not wield influence in as significant a territory as the other European slave-trading states. The Danes, largely with Dutch-inspired organization, focused their efforts in what is now south-eastern Ghana, the easternmost point of what was considered to be the coast of Guinea. The governor and the council continued to be responsible for establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations with the local African states, per the instructions.

[70] Martin, "The English Establishments on the Gold Coast", p. 176-180
[71] Martin, «The English Establishments on the Gold Coast", p. 178

3.2: Autonomy of the Fort

Christiansborg and its Governors and Secret Council acted as part of the West-Indian and Guinean Company in the period discussed, a charter company ultimately accountable to the Danish Crown. The Danish kings had a marginal role in the direct running of Christiansborg, primarily by formally appointing Governors suggested by the directors of the WIGC. Even then as can be clearly seen from the governors of the 1694-1735 period, often the Governors were not appointed, but could function as interim governors for years before a governor could be appointed by the WIGC, especially when they opted to appoint a new person for the role instead of someone already at the fort.

As previously discussed, the main method the WIGC influenced the daily operations of Christiansborg was through the instructions. These instructions were mainly oriented towards how the trade should be run, as well as the duties and powers of the Governor and Secret Council. While the governors were supposed to adhere to the instructions, as the cases of Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe shows in chapter 4, a governor could flaunt parts of these instructions for years before the WIGC learned of it, and then usually only when other staff at Christiansborg reported on the incident. Therefore, it is useful to distinguish between the *de jure* and *de facto* autonomy Christiansborg enjoyed against the WIGC directors in Copenhagen.

De jure the Governors still enjoyed significant autonomy, with little in the way of detailed instructions outside of the trade itself. While they were instructed to maintain friendly relationships with other nations, both European companies and local states, they had freedom in how to go about this. On occasion the WIGC would get involved, such as in the ultimately failed attempts to prohibit the staff of Christiansborg from having sexual relationships with local women in 1711 to the early 1720s, but these efforts were stymied by a lack of willingness to enforce it in Christiansborg itself and eventually abandoned.[72] Other significant areas where the WIGC in Copenhagen managed Christiansborg were generally at the request of staff at the fort, such as deciding on the Fort School in 1724.

De facto the Governors enjoyed more autonomy than they were supposed to. The most significant factor that contributed to this was the sheer distance and travel time involved between Christiansborg, located by modern-day Accra in Ghana, and Copenhagen in

[72] Justesen og Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 241-242

Denmark. In ideal circumstances, with minimal travel time, no shipwrecks losing letters and information, and no planned voyage to the West-Indies, a ship would leave Christiansborg, resupply along the way in both West-Africa and in Europe, and arrive in Copenhagen with the needed information. The WIGC Directors would come to a decision and either wait for the voyage of the next planned ship or outfit a new ship carrying goods and instructions, and the ship would then need to make it to Christiansborg in good time. In ideal circumstances, this would take roughly a year, and in less ideal circumstances could take several years.[73] By that time, such as can be seen from Christiansborg's difficulties in carrying goods in demand domestically, the situation could have changed entirely. In practice, this meant that for immediate concerns, the Governors and Secret Council were empowered to make their own decisions. However, this was not absolute, as the directors would send responses and instructions on prolonged events, as will be demonstrated in the case of Governor Boye in chapter 4. Punishment for not following the instructions, as well as embezzlement and illegal private trade, was another factor that limited governor autonomy.[74] Many governors saw the end of their governorships end in trial and disgrace as a result.

The other effect of this is that Christiansborg could operate wildly out of bounds with WIGC instructions, and it would take significant time before any official action could be taken. Another aspect of this *de facto* autonomy was that the primary source of information the WIGC had were the governors and the Secret Council itself, and barring that, reports from Captains and other literate staff at the fort. This can be seen from among others Rømer's letters to the directors from the late 1730s and 1740s regarding his perception of Governor Billsen as cruel and incompetent,[75] and Elias Svane decrying the wanton immorality he perceived at Christiansborg.[76] In most circumstances, the governors were free to both explain the situation and why they undertook a particular action, at which point it was presented in such a way that the governor's action appeared to be the only possible and gainful one for the WIGC to undertake.

The same applies to the decisions of Christiansborg in relation to local actors and states. Who received costume, who received gifts, who Christiansborg supported or opposed and their responses to the changing political environment of the Gold Coast, were all decisions first

[73] Gøbel, «Slavehandelen under Dannebrog», p. 206
[74] As seen in the cases of Lygaard and Boye which will be discussed further in chapter 4.
[75] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 635-650, (XI.38) V.-g.K; 189
[76] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 300-308, (VIII.11) V.-g.K; 122

undertaken by the governors. Only with prolonged situations could the WIGC make a policy for Christiansborg to follow, but any upset such as the Akwamu War in 1730 had to be handled by the governor, as waiting for instructions from Copenhagen would take too much time to respond in time to developments. In other areas, Christiansborg could call on the Company in Copenhagen, mainly with regards to conflicts with other European companies and Forts. As a rule the WIGC fully expected the governors to keep the peace on their own and not drag in the European states proper into disputes, as can be seen from among others Governor Wærøe's correspondence when he has to raise the issue in 1732 .[77]

This does not mean, however, that the directors of the WIGC only periodically set the overall instruction and only responded when the governors and Secret Council explicitly sought their input. Governor Boye was ordered to make sure he maintained friendship with Akwamu after his earlier confrontation,[78] as will be discussed in chapter 4. Further instructions were dispatched on incidents locally although often only received after they had been resolved one way or the other. Ultimately it was the directors of the WIGC who were the highest authority of Christiansborg, barring the King of Denmark and Norway himself.

That three out of four long-lasting governors in the 1694-1735 period were all ousted and put under criminal charges by the WIGC also shows that autonomy only went so far. While these charges regarded profiteering, private trade and embezzlement,[79] and never directly on diplomatic mishandling, they do show that there was a limit to how far the governors could push their autonomy. Lygaard and Boye were both ousted by staff returning to Copenhagen reporting on them (indeed, Boye was on both sides of such an ousting) and information on neglect and mismanagement would eventually reach the directors. On the diplomatic level, however, the directors did not replace governors for their handling of relationships, only sent further instructions when concerned about developments such as in the case of Boye, or asked to weigh in on a matter. Even Wærøe, who miscalculated the Akwamu War and risked the fort in the process, received no repercussions from this, maybe in part because Christiansborg was able to salvage the situation intact, which will be discussed more in Chapter 4.

Autonomy was also a concern raised in letters from the governors, asking for permission to attempt to undertake new measures without approval, and not risk punishment if these caused

[77] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 450-451, (IX.32) V.-g.K; 123
[78] Hernæs, "I Akwamuimperiets vold", p. 114
[79] Will be elaborated on in chapter 4.

a financial loss for the company.[80] Financial loss was the area in which the directors maintained the most central control and oversight, while maintaining friendly relationships was vague and overarching and generally left to the governors' inclinations. While the instructions explicitly regulated the trade and lending practices, other aspects of Christiansborg's daily attempt to establish and maintain relationships had much more discretion for the governor and the Secret Council.

3.3: Treaties, tribute, gifts and loans

From the very beginning Christiansborg sought varying methods of establishing and maintaining formal and informal relationships with local states, prominent merchants and noblemen. This took the form of treaties and the payment of tribute and rent, formalized agreements where both parties had expectations of each other, informal gifts which still carried a significant element of expectation on the side of the recipient of the gift, and lending goods and gold to prominent figures.

Treaties

The first treaties were signed well before Christiansborg came into Danish possession and became the center of Danish influence on the coast. In 1659, Governor Joost Cramer negotiated a formal treaty with the Kingdom of Fetu (in modern-day central Ghana, west of what would become the West-India and Guinea Company's main operations in what is now eastern Ghana). The treaty involved a payment of gold for land in which to build a fort, permission to operate a lodge further inland, Fetu's obligation to aid in defending the fort from both Africans and Europeans, and a clause on a joint attempt at seizing land from a third-party, the Kingdom of Sabue. Of note is that the treaty explicitly mentions that in addition to being signed and sworn, the participating parties also swore by 'eating fetish', a ritual which varied in nature across areas, but which was viewed as more sacred than a signature.[81] The WIGC would also later use this practice both when making treaties, as well as in judicial disputes and when swearing in fort slaves and staff. Joost Kramer would make a similar treaty with Okai Koy, King of Great Accra, in 1661, which only involved a payment

[80] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 286, (VIII.3) V.-g.K; 121
[81] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 8-11, (I.4) V.-g.K; 77

of gold for land rights, Accra's obligation to protect the WIGC's operations not only in the area sold, but also in all lands under their control. Like the treaty with Fetu, this treaty was also both signed and sworn by 'eating fetish'. Some treaties later in the period, such as the 1727 treaty with Akwamu, do not explicitly state they 'ate fetish', but others such as a secret council resolution of the 4th of December 1731 state that it was "sworn in the local fashion".[82] The 1731 treaty regarded the building of a lodge in Ada further inland by the Volta. This latter treaty has quite distinct provisions than the treaties regarding the coastal forts, including provisions for safety of travel over land, and the responsibility of the locals to capture any escaped slaves, while not including provisions of bringing trade as this seems to be assumed.[83] The topic of the inland lodges is something I will return to later in this chapter.

The main purpose of these treaties was not only to acquire land in which to build trading posts and forts, but also to attain military or other protection for them from local powers. The forts, as formerly described, had a limited garrison and had little capacity to defend themselves against significant assaults or prolonged sieges without outside support. The lodges had even less, sometimes being staffed by just a single man. This is a subject I will discuss in greater detail later in the chapter.

Of particular note is the terminology used, as the treaties themselves, and the governors in their letters to the directors of the WIGC in Copenhagen, almost generally referred to the polities they regularly interacted with as kingdoms. These treaties were on the Danish side signed by the governors, on behalf of the WIGC and the Kingdom of Denmark and Norway[8485]

Tribute and costume

Another formal method of establishing and building relationships was the payment of regular tribute, dues or salaries. The primary form of formalized and regular payment is referred to as a 'costume', written often as 'kustyme', although with other spellings by different officials referring to them. These payments were valued to riksdaler, and consisted of imported goods

[82] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 449-450, (IX.31) V.-g.K; 881
[83] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 449-450, (IX.31) V.-g.K; 881
[84] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 8-11, (I.4) V.-g.K; 77
[85] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 12-13, (I.5) V.-g.K; 12

from the fort or gold. The recipients were generally foreign kings (especially Akwamu, Ashanti and Accra) and to prominent noblemen known to the Danes as cabuceer.

The term cabuceer is used in the sources in different contexts, sometimes to refer to the heads of prominent families in nearby Osu, other times to Royal officials of Akwamu or members of the royal house, and occasionally to important merchants. Johannes Rask in his account explains cabuceer to mean nobility, such as high-ranking servants of a king,[86] although the WIGC also used it for people in their service such as many of the Tete family in Osu. In general, the term seems to refer to any man of influence Christiansborg wanted to be amenable and friendly disposed towards them, in addition to their preferred partners in Osu and 'their' territories. It was also used to refer to local individuals in the service of other states, both in the service of other European companies and prominent kingdoms like the Akwamu. The costume had an element of reciprocity as the WIGC expected services to be rendered in return for the monthly costume. In a Secret Council resolution of the 1st of January 1727, the leader of Osu Kwaku Kansiang was given a costume both because of his earlier friendly actions and words towards Christiansborg, that the King of Akwamu granted Osu to him, the expectation of aid in the future during conflicts and disputes and other services. The resolution also states the costume is only to be paid as long as Kwaku Kansiang remains loyal and obliging to the WIGC and keeps the promises he made.[87]

The monthly costume could be significant but generally less than the value of gifts and one-time costumes, such as the costume paid to cabuceer Kwaku Kansiang a value of eight riksdaler a month, comparable to the salary of an experienced fort soldier. This was greater than the decision to pay the caboceer Neute Akum of Osu three riksdaler and another caboceer in Osu, Ante, two riksdaler, according to a Secret Council resolution of the 8th of January 1736, after the Akwamu War which will be discussed further in the chapter.[88] The costume paid to kings was more significant, with Governor Schielderup (1735-1736) and the Secret Council outlining the monthly costs paid to locals by Christiansborg in a general letter to the directors of the WIGC on the 15th of April 1736. The monthly cost was divided into thirty-two riksdaler paid to the King of the Akenists (Akyem), five riksdaler to the caboceers in the surrounding town of Osu, four riksdaler to the Fort's messengers and nearly sixty-

[86] Rask, *En kort og sandferdig Rejse-Beskrivelse,* p. 86-87
[87] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 352, (VIII.32) V.-g.K; 880
[88] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 507, (X.5) V.-g.K; 881

seven riksdaler paid to the fort slaves and remidors. The annual expense of the costumes in 1736 amounted to four-hundred and forty-four riksdaler.[89]

The costume was expected and regular, often on the same day of the month. This can be seen from the journal of bookkeeper and later governor Sverdrup where the costume is always mentioned to be paid on the 11th, the same date as the fort slaves were given their upkeep, and two days after the soldiers received their payment.[90] These payments were expected by both parties, but there were also expectations Christiansborg had of the recipients in turn, largely to remain friendly to the WIGC, to see to it that trade arrived at the fort, and to serve as allies in armed conflicts as will be discussed later in the chapter. Both military protection and providing trade to the fort are frequently mentioned in the letters as what Christiansborg expected in return for these monthly costumes.

Not all payments of costume were monthly however, as sometimes Christiansborg and WIGC officials needed to pay costume to brokers and others in relation to individual trading arrangements. These costumes tended to be more significant. In 1733, Wellemsen (former governor and bookkeeper, merchant at the time the letter was sent) reported to the directors of the WIGC and proposed for two ships to be dispatched to trade along the coast and pick up slaves at the fort, unlike their previous practice of one. His proposal sets aside 400 riksdaler for the payment of costume to brokers and middlemen, in addition to gifts for the local Kings, just slightly less than the annual costumes paid by Christiansborg in 1736.[91]

Gifts

A semi-formal method Christiansborg used to maintain its relations with local states was in the form of gifts. Unlike the tribute or 'rent' paid to states and the costume paid to cabuceers and brokers, gifts were not regular but sporadic. Despite this, gifts were often just as expected as the costume and other regular payments. Failure to provide a suitable gift could sometimes have severe consequences, such as outlined in Governor Lygaard's (1705-1711) letter to the directors on the 1st of September 1705, that the King of Akwamu felt the gifts he had received had been of a lesser quality, and that the roads and trade would be closed until he received

[89] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 508-513, (X.7) V.-g.K; 123
[90] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 189-190, (IV.10) V.-g.K; 884
[91] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 474-475, (IX.40) V.-g.K; 187

better gifts.[92] These gifts could sometimes be significant, occasionally in the hundreds of riksdaler worth when it came to visits by local kings to the fort itself, to lesser gifts to cabuceers, and to even larger groups such as the town of Osu receiving gifts upon new years. While these were less formalized than the costume, rent and tributes to Kings, caboceers and brokers, they were a significant expense to the WIGC. Failure to provide an adequate gift often had dire consequences to the fort such as the closing of roads and trade. At times failure to provide adequate gifts even resulted in local kings closing the fort off from buying food and water from the locals, as mentioned in Governor Sverdrup's (1704-1705, who served as bookkeeper beforehand) personal journal on the 23rd of October 1703. King Aqvando of Akwamu felt the gifts had been poor, and demanded a gift of artillery instead, laying siege to the fort and preventing even water from being brought in.[93] The matter was resolved on the 27th of October, with Christiansborg providing a gift for the King, his brother and retinue, as well as a personal gift from the governor himself, although no artillery was given.[94]

The distinction between the gifts and the irregular payments of costume, seem to be in the form of the expectation Christiansborg had in return for them. While the payments of costume were always with an expected immediate reciprocity in the form of brokers and middlemen of the trade as well as promises of military assistance from caboceers and Kings, the gifts had a less immediate expected return. The gifts were important, as can be seen from the consequences when gifts were poorly received or not given when expected, and was a necessary semi-regular method to maintain amicable relationships.

The gifts themselves were often in the form of particular goods, and would sometimes be ordered and paid for by Christiansborg or the governor personally, but there were also cases of gifts for particular kings being sent to the fort by the WIGC in Copenhagen. This is one example of the directors also involving themselves to an extent in maintaining friendly relationships with the locals, which they otherwise left to the decisions of the forts themselves and their governors.

The practice of gift-giving as a way to maintain relationships was far from unique to Christiansborg and the local states, as is the case with the other tools of diplomacy in a grander sense. Even when only considering the imperial ventures of Denmark-Norway, conflicts with the barbary corsairs in Algiers and the maintenance of Trankebar in India as

[92] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 198-200, (V.4) V.-g.K; 121
[93] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 183-185, (IV.10) V.-g.K; 884
[94] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 185-186, (IV.10) V.-g.K; 884

examples, gift-giving was a vital tool in every diplomatic toolbox. It was not just the material value of the gift and how it could help the recipient, but also as a show of respect and understanding, and as a way to solidify an informal relationship. Disagreements on how valuable a gift should be to show proper respect was a point of contention between Akwamu and Christiansborg, and when gifts should be given between Christiansborg and the directors of the WIGC in Copenhagen, but the practice itself was not controversial.

The payment of gifts, tribute and costume was a significant expense for the Fort, sometimes amounting to thousands of riksdaler a month. Still, this was a vital tool of diplomacy as can be seen from the consequences when payments were not given, or were considered by the recipient to be less than they felt they were owed.

Loans

Christiansborg practiced an extensive lending practice throughout the period discussed, both small loans to company staff, fort slaves and locals, as well as more extensive loans to cabuceers and local Kings. The practice surrounding lending and debt varied over time, by governor and by different directives from the WIGC directors in Copenhagen, who were generally reluctant to agree to excessive lending or sale of goods on credit. In Governor Rost's (1718-1720) and the Secret Council's general letter of the 19th of March 1718, they argue it was impossible to ensure good trade without lending on credit to a number of prominent caboceers and the King of Akwamu, and assured the directors that such loans would not be to the detriment of the WIGC.[95]

The loans and debts of Christiansborg varied significantly in who they were lent to and in amounts. In the debt book of the 21st of March 1724, everything from fort slaves to the King of Akwamu are listed, divided between debts owed by people on the fort and people outside of the fort. Of interest is that the caboceers Tette, Jan Sager and the Akwamu caboceer Qvacu Kansiang in Osu are grouped with the debts owed by people in the fort, showing an understanding of the surrounding town of Osu as being linked with Christiansborg itself. The most significant debt, valued at 3974 riksdaler was owed by Aqvando, King of Akwamu, followed by Christian Pettersen Witt (a Euroafrican soldier at the fort) at 1120 riksdaler and a person named Aiku in Tubercku at 522 riksdaler. No other individual debts were valued at

[95] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 265-268, (VII.3) V.-g.K; 121

above 500 riksdaler. The total sums owed to the fort were 6758 riksdaler by people in the fort (largely fort slaves, in particular remidors, as well as caboceers in Osu and a few Euroafrican soldiers) and 13031 riksdaler owed by people outside of the fort. These debts are listed at as low as 2 riksdaler, but of most interest is to whom more significant loans have been given. In addition to King Aquando with his substantial debt, his nephew Ensangvau is listed as owing 146 riksdaler and 48 skillings. Two of the caboceer Jan Sagen's sisters, Qvacu Kansiang's son, one of Caboceer Tette's sisters and another Tette in the English town, and four more caboceers with their location but not always their name are listed. Of the thirty-eight people listed as owing debts to the company outside of the fort, ten are explicitly stated to be powerful figures or their close relatives. Of the remaining twenty-eight debtors outside of the fort, some are stated to be Euroafricans and others to be servants or otherwise affiliated with staff at the fort, such as the wife of the fort's smith, but largely are only listed by name and location.[96]

Governor Syndermann's (1723-1724) debit ledger of 1725 tells much the same story. This ledger divides the debts between Africans in Osu, in the Dutch town, in Akwamu, and in the smaller towns. Among the debtors to Syndermann's account are caboceers Tette and Jan Sager in Osu; in the Dutch town, caboceer Amo and his son Jan are listed as well as a grande (term meaning lesser noble) named Boij and a relative with the same family name; in Akwamu the caboceer Kvaku Kansiang; and other caboceers who are listed in the smaller settlements.[97] Other debt books from the period, such as Christiansborg's debt books from 1726 have much the same contents, with Christiansborg and the governors' lending practices being oriented towards relatively privileged fort slaves, caboceers, local Kings, locals with affiliations to staff or caboceers, as well as smaller debts intended to be collected in full.[98]

While one purpose of the loans are the obvious, that they were intended to be collected in full, the loans to Aqvando and the caboceers can be viewed alongside the gifts and tribute as another part of how Christiansborg sought to strengthen their relations with local states. While the directors of the WIGC were unhappy with many of Christiansborg's lending practices, as many debts were never repaid or only repaid in part, they still left exceptions even in the instructions to otherwise stringent requirements when it came to dealing with important kings and caboceers. The individuals who owed significant debts to the company

[96] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 318-320, (VIII.13) V.-g.K; 122
[97] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 337-338, (VIII.24) V.-g.K; 880
[98] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 347-351, (VIII.30) V.-g.K; 122

generally being royalty or caboceers indicates that this was part of their efforts to bind local noblemen's interests to their own. In the trial of Franz Boye in 1717, he explicitly states in his defense on accusations of reckless lending, that this was a necessity to maintain friendship with the King of Akwamu and confirmed by the witness Claus Fedders, one of the few times lending and diplomacy are directly linked in the sources.[99]

These direct monetary ties, whether by tribute, gifts or loans, together served as one of the key ways in which Christiansborg leveraged their economic power into connections and ties with locals in order to both attract trade, but to be able to summon military strength from their allies as the treaties show. A distinction between formal and informal existed, but in practice by the 1694-1735 period, the distinction between the formal tributes and informal gifts had all but vanished, as the gifts were expected and the lack of one, or one found to be lacking in quality, was construed as an insult.

3.4: Trade as a diplomatic tool and goal

The trade itself was the purpose of the existence of Christiansborg as well as other Danish forts and lodges, and the purpose of the officials of the Fort's efforts to maintain amicable relations with local powers. Yet, the trade was also a tool to maintain these amicable relationships with local kings and caboceers in furtherance of Christiansborg's safety and future trade. The trade was not something only the WIGC was interested in and profited from, but also to their local African trading partners and states who saw the trade as a boon to them and their influence. Disruptions to the trade were frequent, from failures of Christiansborg in using their other tools of diplomacy, to a lack of goods whether from Europe or locally brought on by war, changes in supply or demand.

European goods and local trade

While the goods the WIGC were interested in purchasing from locals were largely the same until the abolition of slavery, namely slaves, ivory and gold (although in the earliest period of Danish trade in West-Africa, gold was the primary motivator rather than slaves), as well as fresh water, food and construction materials for both the upkeep of the forts and to supply ships, local demand could change drastically during the period. One key aspect in the letters

[99] Rigsarkivet, V.-g. K, D. 1717-1718. Den Særlige Ret i Sagen mod Fhv. Guvernør Frans Boye, p. 9-10

from the governors and Secret Council are informing the WIGC of what goods are in demand, and which are not, to ensure a better access to slaves and goods. This did sometimes have issues due to the sheer distance involved, which could mean that what was in demand when the WIGC had time to receive a letter, outfit a ship, and for the ship to arrive in West-Africa, this information was at least a year, sometimes several years, out of date.[100] Complaints about Christiansborg being unable to sell goods that have been lying in their warehouse are frequent while they lack the goods that are easily sold, as local demands had changed, or other European Companies had by then flooded the market to bring the price down to the point of being less than the WIGC paid for them in the first place. Competition between Christiansborg, the English Fort James and the Dutch Fort Crevecoeur was at times fierce, and Christiansborg was in the junior position between the three. These goods primarily consisted of cowrie shells, flintlock pistols and muskets, gunpowder, beads, brandy, textiles and metal products, and to a lesser extent of other goods.[101]

This competition, while a frequent headache for the Governors of Christiansborg, was exactly what local African kings and states wanted. While Christiansborg to a lesser extent, and the Dutch and English to a greater extent, desired to establish regional monopolies with individual states (Christiansborg only being able to briefly establish one with the Kingdom of Accra in the early period discussed, although this monopoly was fragile and frequently violated by interlopers), local states preferred to have multiple forts from different European companies in which to sell their goods and buy imported goods from.[102] They were well-aware that this gave them a greater bargaining position, and complaints of local 'disloyalty' when traders went to the English or Dutch Fort when Christiansborg did not have goods to offer at similar prices are frequent. While costumes and gifts were used to attempt to draw more trade, the King of Akwamu as an example took costume from all three forts before Akwamu's fall from the coast in 1730.

One of the most significant shifts in local demand arose after the Akwamu War, when Christiansborg became unable to sell brandy at the same price as before. In 1727, Governor Pahl requested brandy as an easily sold and profitable good,[103] and on the 23rd of January 1728 Wellemsen stated in a letter to the directors of the WIGC that only brandy, flintlocks,

[100] Gøbel, «Slavehandelen under Dannebrog», p. 206
[101] Gøbel, «Slavehandelen under Dannebrog», p. 187-192
[102] Hernæs, «Det første fremstød», p. 55-63
[103] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 357-358, (VIII.36) V.-g.K; 122

gunpowder, cowries, tallow and iron could be sold at a profit.[104] Even on the 16th of May 1730, Governor Wærøe and the secret council requested more brandy to be brought to the fort, along with iron, flintlocks, textile sheets and calicos.[105] By the report of Governor Wærøe and the Secret Council to the directors of the WIGC of 27th of February 1733, they insist that no more brandy should be sent, and that their warehouse already contains too much brandy that they are unable to sell. This they claim because the Achenists, victors of the Akwamu War, did not buy brandy at all.[106] In his account of his time in the coast, Ludewig Rømer claims that the Akenists (Akyem) do not drink alcohol apart from when offered as a gift, and had no interest in it as a trade good.[107] While this is an unusually abrupt example, as the collapse of demand from brandy was brought on by the Akwamu Empire's defeat and retreat from the coast and Akan kings becoming the dominant political and trade power locally, this does show the difficulty the fort could have in maintaining valuable goods in which to trade. Prices were volatile, and flintlocks is one of the few goods that seem to have always been in demand.

The significant diplomatic risk Christiansborg faced in relation to their trade was that they could quickly lose allies and partners if they were unable to engage in trade when the locals desired so. While at times it is mentioned they were able to convince partners to wait for shipments from Denmark, at other times they simply went to other European forts or interlopers. The most significant risk would be failure to trade with local states controlling Accra, or other places the WIGC established forts and lodges, as this could result in attempted seizures or conflicts. This was particularly prominent in the early period of Danish activity on the coast before 1694, the 1694-1735 period also saw a relative dearth of Danish ships on the coast compared to what would be seen in later periods.[108]

Trading lodges

The 1694-1735 period saw a growth in the number of trading lodges maintained by Christiansborg, with some establishments being in Lai (1722, abandoned a few years later

[104] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 372-374, (VIII.46) V.-g.K; 122
[105] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 398-404, (IX.10) V.-g.K; 122
[106] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 469-470, (IX.37) V.-g.K; 886
[107] Rømer, *Tilforadelig Efterretning om Kysten Guinea*, p. 129-131
[108] Gøbel, «Slavehandelen under Dannebrog», p. 185

due to conflict)[109], Ningo (1734)[110] and Ada (1731).[111] These lodges were typically only manned by a single official of Christiansborg, on occasion by two or three, and many were located away from the coast itself to better secure access to the trade routes, and were often closed and re-opened as circumstances dictated. They were outfitted with goods from the warehouse in Christiansborg, and engaged in trade locally.

These lodges were far more vulnerable than Christiansborg itself, often consisting just of a stone house and a small warehouse. In the treaty concerning the establishment of the lodge in Ada in 1731, the locals made promises not only for the lodge's protection, but also to capture runaway slaves and to make sure the goods belonging to the company are not stolen either in the lodge or on the road.[112]

Danish presence in the lodges was unlike Christiansborg far from permanent. Lodges were abandoned not only due to conflict (or potential conflict, such as the closure of the lodge in Ponny in 1727),[113] but also due to staffing issues such as can be seen from Governor von Suhm and the Secret Council's general letter to the directors of the WIGC on the 15th of August 1724. The letter referenced several lodges that had to be closed down due to there not being enough soldiers and officers to staff both them, and Christiansborg, fully.[114] In such cases, lodges would be closed to assure the continued running of Christiansborg rather than to maintain these smaller trading posts. Purchasing slaves especially, but also to a lesser extent gold and ivory, was of greater risk in the lodges than in Christiansborg, as they then had to be transported to the fort. Different methods are described, in which securing the assistance of the locals was one, as the risk of slaves running away was significant due to the limited staff and open ground. While Christiansborg had a dedicated basement, that with further construction in the time period became a dungeon, within the walls of the fort to imprison purchased slaves, the lodges were not so well outfitted. The lodges along the coast, such as the one in Keta, were less risky endeavours for Christiansborg as a result.

Establishing these lodges were not always on the initiative of Christiansborg, and frequently in governor's letters when they plead for further supply of trade goods from Denmark, they mention locals in different places asking them to establish a lodge. While these lodges were

[109] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 292-293, (VIII.5) V.-g.K; 121
[110] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 489-490, (IX.41) V.-g.K; 189
[111] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 446, (IX.28) V.-g.K; 881
[112] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 446, (IX.28) V.-g.K; 881
[113] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 361-362, (VIII.39) V.-g.K; 122
[114] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 323-325, (VIII.19) V.-g.K; 122

beneficial to Christiansborg, securing more of the trade for their own, they were of greater benefit to the locals who could acquire imported goods without making the journey to the coast itself.

The nature of trade for Christiansborg when it came to their efforts to maintain relationships with local states is an interesting one, as the trade was both a means and a goal. The purpose of Christiansborg, and the purpose of their local alliances, were to sustain the trade in gold, ivory and humans, yet at the same time trade was utilized as a way to maintain those same relationships.

While rare, Christiansborg did at times refuse to trade with locals as a way to pressure them, such as Governor Boye's response to Akwamu blockading the roads by embargoing Akwamu traders. This, however, was only possible when Fort Crevecoeur and Fort James did likewise. Christiansborg had no monopoly, outside of some of their lodges, and an embargo from the Europeans could only work if all three forts, and no interlopers or ten-percenters, violated it. This indeed was conscious on the side of Accra, Akwamu and other African states, and their frequent desire to have multiple forts within their territory and as trading partners. This prevented monopolization, such as occurred further west around Elmina, where the European slavers could more readily set prices to their own benefit. The primary method they used trade diplomatically, was instead by favourable pricing. Christiansborg paid more for Akwamu slaves than other African traders, both to garner more trade from Akwamu who was in the early 18th century the largest provider of war-captives to be sold into slavery, but also to maintain a positive relationships with the Akwamu Kings.[115]

The lodges are another aspect of the trade where it was both a method to establish and maintain relationships, and serve the ultimate goal of Christiansborg itself. As previously discussed, the lodges were sometimes on the request of the locals further inland, who could otherwise seek trade in other forts, and through the lodges Christiansborg secured information, military assistance and another avenue of trade. The cost was the risk of the lodges, often only staffed by one or two Europeans, without defences, and all profit had to be transported back to Christiansborg. These lodges were not permanent, and could be closed due to trade drying up, conflicts with the locals, or staffing issues due to the high mortality of Danes on the coast.

[115] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 198, (V.3) V.-g.K; 121

3.5: Marriages and Eurafricans

The men who lived and worked in Christiansborg existed in the broader context of both the transatlantic world, but more intimately within the coast of Guinea and among local Africans, especially the Ga people of Accra and surrounding townships. As it was vitally important for the fort to maintain amicable relations with its neighbors, as evident from the instructions, this did not only take the form of financial and trading relations, but also in the form of personal relationships between the soldiers and staff of the fort, and locals great and small.

Personal relationships

In Ludewig Rømer's account of life on the coast from 1760, detailing his stay in Christiansborg as assistant and later merchant in the 1730s and 1740s, he makes a general statement of how new soldiers and staff acclimatize to the fort. Where he describes that someone fresh of the boat usually struggles, and receives aid in using their salary to buy food and other essentials from older soldiers and staff at the Fort, an acclimatization occurs where they learn enough of the local language or the variant of Portuguese used as a trading language throughout the coast between the Forts and local traders. Rømer does put a caveat that this is assuming they survive the first year, which seems to have been roughly half of new Europeans stationed at the Fort, the rest perishing to chiefly disease. In addition to the language, what Rømer states is a clear sign that someone has fully acclimatized is when they make friends in Osu, both for business and company.[116] These personal relationships between soldiers and staff, and locals, further cemented Christiansborg's position on the very local level.

Cassar marriages

One tool of diplomacy and establishing relationships between groups evident from different eras and different areas is that of intermarriage to bind groups together with familial bonds. This was no different in Christiansborg and the surrounding Ga people, where ties by marriage would prove to be an important factor in the Fort's position in the greater West African context. Evidence of these marriages are commonplace in letters from the governors

[116] Rømer, *Tilforladelig Efterretning om Kysten Guinea*, p. 235-237

of Christiansborg and other documents, even though not all were approved in the Fort's chapel, and the West-Indian and Guinean Company in Copenhagen had varying views on the practice over time, and over time the practice resulted in a significant Eurafrican population around Christiansborg, the Ga-Danes.[117]

These marriages were referred to as Cassar-marriages by the Danes, and the practice of the fort's staff marrying locally was referred to as 'cassaring' the woman, a loanword from Portuguese meaning to marry (literally from casa, a house).[118] These marriages typically involved following the local marriage customs, as described by among others the chaplain of Christiansborg Elias Svane in 1724, and in this period usually did not involve the couple moving in together. The family practices of the Ga people eased this practice of the staff and soldier remaining at the fort, while their wives remained with their families, as this was fully in line with the Ga practice of families having male and female compounds/houses and remaining with them even after marriage. Children lived in their mothers' household, boys only leaving for their fathers' household after puberty, leaving these relationships relatively easy to integrate into the pre-existing system.[119] Ritually, these marriages were also done in the vein of Ga and Akan marriages, using local rituals such as the practice of swearing with a fetish. These marriages, unlike European ones, then also did not entail a transfer of private property (apart from wedding gifts from the husband to the wife's family), as inheritance among the Ga followed either the female line or male line of the family (that is, property owned by a woman would be inherited by her daughters, and property by a man to his sons), and land itself was owned by the larger kinship group communally rather than individually.[120] This caused relatively little friction when these marriages were entered into between the staff at the fort and local women, as inheritance was no concern, no new household was formed, and the Europeans at the fort (with the notable exceptions of the chaplains) had little concerns with integrating themselves into the local system of marriage and kinship alliances, as this was in fact one of the reasons to enter these marriages for the Europeans. These marriages were generally viewed as temporary, lasting as long as the husband lived on the coast, and ended when they left.[121]

[117] Ipsen, *Daughters of the Trade*, 9-10, 20 and 30-32
[118] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca 1700-1850», p. 239-242
[119] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca 1700-1850», p. 244-246
[120] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 244-246
[121] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 246

Some marriages were also sanctified in the Fort's chapel, particularly as a result of the chaplains' various objections to these marriages, primarily the women being "heathens", the abandonment of a marriage, the ritual elements being drawn from the local rituals, and the abandonment of children. According to Ipsen, pressure from the chaplains resulted in the couples who had their marriages sanctified in the church to also swear that, should the woman wish to, that the man was obligated to bring her with him back to Denmark and live as fully married couples. According to Ipsen, this never happened.[122] Why these marriages remained temporary despite this option for permanence is something I will return to in this subchapter.

The attitude towards these marriages by the West-Indian and Guinean Company shifted, with early attempts to ban the practice, and occasional significant resistance from the chaplains of the forts, giving way to acceptance and outright support for the practice later in the period, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. This was a process that occurred during the 1694-1735 period this thesis is focused on, as while cassaring was practiced in Christiansborg and other European forts before this period, the WIGC in Copenhagen did not involve themselves in the practice. The WIGC mainly attempted to ban the practice in the early-mid period discussed, along with European soldiers and staff at the fort engaging in sexual relations with local women in general, during the governorships of Erik Lygaard (1705-1711) and Franz Boye (1711-1717) and more sporadically afterwards.[123] This is evidenced by directions to the governors, and their responses, in which case Franz Boye's response to the directors in a general letter dated to the 3rd of April 1714, the governor wrote that enforcement of the ban would lead to too many issues, as he equated it to forbidding the soldiers to leave the fort during their time off.[124] On the 19th of march 1718, the new governor Knud Røst (1717-1720) mentioned the practice again, and pledged to the directors that they would enforce the order to punish soldiers who entered into relationships with local women.[125]

Yet, despite these assurances the chaplain Elias Svane wrote to the directors of the WIGC on the 15th of March 1724, that the practice of local marriage was widespread, claiming that seven men on the fort had local wives, the governor, four of the Secret Council, an assistant

[122] Ipsen, *Daughters of the Trade*, p. 66-68 and 92-95
[123] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 241-242
[124] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 247, (VI.12) V.-g.K; 121
[125] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 267, (VII.3) V.-g.K; 121

and a soldier. The chaplain's complaints involve what he refers to as a custom by this point, that when the men leave the fort, they also leave behind their wives and children, as well as objecting to the marriages being done in the local customs. Svane went so far as to propose that it would be better for the men to marry slaves, as then they could bring them back to Denmark without consequence and instruct them in Christianity, or even better to bring wives from Denmark (even as he admits that many would perish to illness upon arrival).[126]

Svane had by this point also operated a school with the permission of Governor Herrn (1722-1723) for Eurafrican children, which after two years already had twenty pupils of various ages, ranging from 22 years to 6, although these ages were based on estimates and their height according to Svane.[127] Even as the WIGC ordered an end to these relationships in the early 18th century, Eurafricans were born, and the cassar-marriages were kept by several of the governors and many in the secret council.

While it is evident that the practice of cassaring was not greatly inhibited by the orders of the directors of the West-Indian and Guinean Company, later letters indicate that the practice was no longer prohibited either. Governor Pahl (1727-1727) asked for the WIGC's orders in regards to a conflict with chaplain Heiggard, whom the governor states have forbidden the staff at the fort with local wives to take the sacrament, and states that there is no prohibition in the law or church ritual against the practice nor a requirement for marriage to be required.[128] Governor Wærøe (1728-1735) in turn responded to the WIGC that the soldiers and staff with local wives would begin to set aside part of their salary for their wives' and children's upkeep, and their complaints at this measure.[129] This shows that already by the 1720s, the WIGC had abandoned any attempts to ban the practice in favour of regulating it, which would expand to limiting who in the fort were permitted to marry locally later beyond the period this thesis is concerned with. The practice of cassaring was therefore a practice that was still being established in the earlier period discussed, and in this period saw the key features that persisted for the remainder of the forts' existence in how they were handled, such as the fort school and the "poor mulatto chest" the married men needed to pay into, to fund the school and pay for the upkeep of the children in particular, but also their wives.

[126] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 300-303, (VIII.11) V.-g.K; 122
[127] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 309-310, (VIII.11) V.-g.K; 122
[128] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 365, (VIII.39) V.-g.K; 122
[129] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 394, (IX.7) V.-g.K; 122

One important aspect to discuss are the reasons these marriages were entered into, on both the side of the European men and the local (whether African or later Euroafrican) women. The promise of sexual relations may have played a part, although as Svane puts it in his complaints, and evident from other statements on 'lechery' committed by soldiers in the surrounding town of Osu, if sexual intercourse was the primary motivation for the men, then they had other options for it. Ludvig Rømer made the observation that the locally married men made 'something like a family' through these local marriages, and a safety for the men were that when they were married, their wives and their wives' family would tend to them when sick (a very common cause of death for new soldiers and staff) and provide food when the fort itself ran out of supplies (a frequent occurrence in this period).[130] Ludewig Ferdinand Rømer, who served as assistant and later merchant in Christiansborg, made observations on this practice in his account of the coast published in 1760. Rømer writes that the Europeans who married, tended to have been on the coast for a few years and acclimatized to the situation on the Fort, and the climate, and describes them having affection for their wives. More than anything, Rømer attributes it as a way to cope with the stress of their circumstances, although he blames living in a "heathen culture" more than the stress of the slave trade which he alludes to in other parts of his account.[131]

The local women who entered into these marriages with soldiers and staff at the Fort, gained preferred access to imported goods from the fort, as well as payments from the "poor mulatto chest" later on in the period. It is noteworthy that many women would enter into marriage with another from the Fort, maintaining the alliance between her kinship group and the Fort. Both African and Euroafrican women married with staff at the fort even later in the period, although the latter often had an advantage in attracting the attention of the European staff at Christiansborg.

Euroafricans on the fort – soldiers and staff

A natural result of the cassar marriages over time, was a growing population of Euroafricans. The Euroafricans had one foot in both worlds of the trade, and references to them become increasingly common over the course of the period. One of the earlier references to Euroafricans born from fathers of Christiansborg is in the daybook of Governor Fensmann

[130] Rømer, *Tilforladelig Efteretning om Kysten Guinea*, p. 238-239
[131] Rømer, *Tilforladelig Efteretning om Kysten Guinea*, p. 238-239

(1688-1691) from the 9th of August 1688, that a local cabuseer who had married the wife of a fort soldier wanted a son of that relationship to be taken in by the Fort, in which Fensmann wrote he decided to apprentice the boy to the mason so that he could be used by the WIGC as a soldier.[132] This was representative of the often ad hoc decisions that was made in the period discussed as well, where Euroafrican boys would be taken in as apprentices to learn a craft and have the opportunity to serve as soldiers. While they were relatively few in number in the 1694-1735 period, the number grew and would outnumber Europeans on the fort in later periods.[133] These decisions, early on at the request of the locals, was in line with the Ga practice that children grew up in their mothers' compound but were then sent to their fathers' upon reaching puberty. In many ways, Christiansborg itself functioned like a kinship group within the context of Ga, and general West African, relationship and political dynamics.

One key development that represented a change from ad-hoc apprenticeships in the fort and WIGC's attitude towards the Euroafricans, was the earlier mentioned establishment of the Fort School. Chaplain Elias Svane was a leading figure in its establishment, with the Chaplains after him also taking on the role of teachers, and its intended purpose was teaching Christianity and the Danish language to Euroafrican children, male and female. While Svane admitted this resulted in learning little more than simple or biblical phrases for most pupils, it did bind the Euroafricans closer to the Fort, and many of the male pupils would also serve as soldiers on the fort. Serving as a soldier on the fort did not only mean military training, as Christiansborg with its limited staff also had the soldiers engage in a trade, from masons, to coopers, to carpenters and more. These Euroafrican soldiers would not only become part of the European world either, as they maintained their family ties locally in addition to being on the WIGC's payroll.[134]

But it was not only as soldiers Euroafricans periodically served in Christiansborg. In 1726, two Euroafricans from Christiansborg, Frederik Petersen Svane and Christian Jacob Protten, who had been taught at the Fort School were sent to Copenhagen to receive a higher education. Svane became employed at Christiansborg in 1736 as a clerk and catechist with a special responsibility for the Fort School, while Protten would return to the fort much later in 1757 to be employed in the same position.[135][136] A trickle of Euroafricans would in periods

[132] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 89, (II.17) V.-g.K; 120
[133] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 227
[134] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 236-238
[135] Ipsen, *Daughters of the Trade*, p. 36-38
[136] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca 1700-1850», p. 238-239

continue to be sent to Copenhagen to receive higher education, and serve the WIGC in civic functions in Christiansborg and West-India. Euroafricans in these positions tended to have a lower salary than Europeans who had the same responsibilities, with Euroafricans in civic professions earning between ten to twelve Riksdaler a month, while Europeans received twelve to sixteen.

A similar disparity in salary is found among soldiers at the fort, where Euroafricans would earn six to seven Riksdaler a month, while European soldiers earned seven to eight Riksdaler a month. For comparison, in the same period a miner in Norway would earn roughly four riksdaler a month,[137] meaning that being a soldier at the fort was relatively well-paid.[138] After the period this thesis is concerned with, there would be no wage disparity between regular Euroafrican and European soldiers, as the WIGC and later the Danish state would stop sending Europeans to serve as regular soldiers, the fort being entirely garrisoned by Euroafricans in the lowest position, and a mix of Euroafrican and Europeans in ranking positions, and the last European common soldiers arrived in the fort in 1793.[139]

The loyalty of the Euroafrican soldiers was on occasion viewed as questionable by the governors of Christiansborg and the Secret Council. In a general letter to the directors of the WIGC, Governor Wærøe (1728-1735) and the Secret Council complains that most of the Euroafrican soldiers at the fort have left to serve on the English Fort James, because Fort James paid them ten riksdaler instead.[140] The Euroafrican soldiers while employed by the WIGC and forming its own distinct socio-political group in Osu knew their opportunities in other Forts, and as long as Fort James was willing and able to pay more than Christiansborg for their services they were willing to leave.

Euroafricans outside the fort – traders and wives

While Christiansborg and other forts offered employment, pensions, preferential access to foreign goods and salaries to male Euroafricans, the daughters of Danish staff and soldiers did not have the same opportunity, and not all male Euroafricans decided to take up employment on the fort. The Euroafricans would grow to be more prominent in Osu and

[137] Johannesen, Finn Erhard in conversation during thesis advisement.
[138] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 236
[139] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 236-237
[140] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 496-497, (IX.43) V.-g.K; 123

other areas surrounding the fort, and over the period carved out a separate identity for themselves, not African nor European. Most of the Euroafricans affiliated with Christiansborg were Ga-Danes, and took on aspects of both cultures according to Ipsen. Euroafrican women as preferring to dress in European clothing, but using keys as jewelry and adorned in gold.[141]

While the governors and Company had a clear idea of what they would do with the Euroafrican boys, they were less sure about what to do with the girls. This is evident in Governor von Suhm's (1724-1727) letter to the directors of the 5th of march 1727 (shortly before his service was over and he went to St. Thomas in West-India) where he informs the WIGC that four of the Euroafricans have 'come so far' that they could be baptized, all boys, of which he will bring one with him to St. Thomas to continue his education, while the other three were to serve as soldiers at Christiansborg. Von Suhm mentions it is more difficult with the girls, and that he will see if there is any opportunity for employment for them at St. Thomas, and in the meantime continue their schooling at the Fort School.[142]

What became of some of the Euroafrican women, but not all, was that they too would become wives of Christiansborg's officials and staff. These Euroafrican women were still part of their mothers' family, and these marriages continued to bring trade alliances between Christiansborg and local families, while still being Euroafrican or Ga-Danish.[143]

Some male Euroafricans did not take up employ at Christiansborg and other Danish and European forts, but instead became traders and brokers. While this would be much more prominent in the late 18th and early 19th century than the 1694-1735 period this thesis mainly concerns itself with, some early examples of this can be seen in the sources when references are made to local brokers with Danish names. Another position Ga-Danes could take outside of the fort was as messengers or emissaries, including being Christiansborg's representative in the Osu council (the governing body of the surrounding town of Osu, consisting of local cabuceers and grandes), through their unique position as both European and African. This was not only done by Euroafricans who did not take permanent employ at the Fort, as Euroafrican soldiers were also often used for this purpose, such as in 1725 when the Euroafrican soldier Christian Pettersen Widt (who had a long career in Christiansborg and is frequently attested to in the sources) to Akwamu with gifts to negotiate opening the roads that

[141] Ipsen, *Daughters of the Trade*, 164-165
[142] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 356-357, (VIII.35) V.-g.K; 122
[143] Justesen and Ipsen, «Fortsamfundet ca. 1700-1850», p. 246-247

had been closed for trade, which was successful after a further payment in gold.[144] Their mother tongue was Ga, more rarely Akan, and became a boon to Christiansborg through this hybrid identity. While this was more prominent in the latter period of Christiansborg, the factors that led to this development was formalized in the 1710s to 1730s through the Fort School and more intentional integration of the children of cassar-marriages. Not all the diplomatic tools at the disposal of Christiansborg were intentionally pursued, like the economic tools such as gifts and costume, but developed from the meeting between the Danish and Ga culture. While the Euroafricans would become an increasing boon to Christiansborg's efforts to maintain local relationships, this was not an intentional policy behind the marriages. Intentionality can be argued for the establishment of the fort school in the 1720s, as the WIGC and Christiansborg sought ways to 'make use' of the Euroafricans.

3.6: Violence and force

While slavery is an inherently violent institution which entails the brutalization and commodification of humans, Christiansborg had limited capacity to employ violent and military means in the context of the diplomatic and political situation on the Gold Coast in the 1694-1735 period. Christiansborg had a relatively small presence on the Gold Coast compared to most other European powers engaged in the trade, of which Britain and the Netherlands is the most relevant comparison due to the proximity of the English Fort James and the Dutch Fort Crevecoeur to Christiansborg. The British Royal Navy periodically frequented West Africa, and was periodically the military superior among the Europeans especially when larger detachments were sent. The Dutch maintained a small fleet of smaller ships on a permanent basis, and were militarily superior whenever the Royal Navy only had a small presence.[145] In contrast, Christiansborg was often without even a token force on the sea, and the Danish ships that did arrive were generally slave ships and other merchant vessels rather than warships. With regards to the local states on the Gold Coast as well, Christiansborg had little opportunity or ability to levy any significant military coercion in the 1694-1735 period. Still, as this subchapter discuss, the military element was still a factor in Christiansborg's ability to survive and maintain amicable relationships with its neighbors in the Gold Coast.

[144] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 334, (VIII.22) V.-g.K; 880
[145] Hernæs, "Guld, slaver og kolonisering", p. 25-30

However, when it involved the Fort's diplomatic relationships with local African states, the use of force was restrained and limited out of practical considerations. For most of the period, the European staff at the fort consisted of between twenty and thirty men, by 1750 there were also ten Euroafricans permanently employed as soldiers, and nearly a hundred fort-slaves who could rarely be relied fully upon in defense of the fort. Communication with Denmark was slow, and when the fort became involved in local conflicts, aid from Copenhagen was far away and unlikely to arrive in time, if at all. Christiansborg was not in a position to leverage military power against local states like Accra, Akwamu and Assante in the 1694-1735 period, and at best could hold the fort against invasion and siege. In a letter to the directors in 1725, Governor von Suhm stated that he was unable to use force outside of the area of Christiansborg, and even within it had to use force sparingly.[146] Few incidents make this more clear than when Christiansborg actually was taken by Akwamu in 1693, and had to be bought back in 1694.[147] This incident among others set the mentality for Christiansborg in when and how they leveraged their military power, such as it were, and is the reason the thesis chronological scope begins in 1694.

What Christiansborg had were thick stone walls, cannons and muskets, enough to adequately defend the fort in most circumstances. Their other source of strength were alliances forged from trading relations, treaties, debts and bonds of marriage, and at times could raise a significant force through these alliances. The Dutch and English maintained similar alliances in which to raise forces in addition to their own greater military force in the region, and in the military incidents in the 1694-1735 period, African allied forces played a prominent role as will be evident in the following examples.

Governor Wellemsen (1727-1728, interim governor after the death of Governor Pahl) in a memorandum dated the 2nd of May 1729 explained the reasons and conclusion of an armed struggle with the Dutch Fort Crevecoeur, which the Secret Council resolutions of the 18th, 20th-21st and 22nd of September 1728 also verify. According to Wellemsen and the Secret Council resolutions, the conflict began over the deceased Governor Pahl's local wife, Auchue, who had been born in a town under the protection of Fort Crevecoeur. After Pahl's death, an Akwamu nobleman had tried to first propose and when refused, to kidnap her, on which Achue had sought the protection of Christiansborg. Auchue then married a Sergeant at the Fort, Carl Minche, but the issues emerged over accusations of cheating that were resolved

[146] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 339, (VIII.25) V.-g.K; 122
[147] Wilks, "The Rise of the Akwamu Empire", p. 47

using local rituals of drinking Adom and the usage of oaths by fetish and trials of ordeal, as local law required according to Wellemsen. It developed into an armed struggle when Auchue sought the protection of the Dutch Fort Crevecoeur after being released, after promising to pay Sergeant Minche half of what he had given her while they were married. Negotiations between Christiansborg and Creveceour failed, and escalated from kidnappings of Auchue by Christiansborg and Wellemsen's servant and messenger Noyte or Notey (the son of Cabuseer Tette in Osu) by Creveceour, to raising an armed force over the issue. African allies of Creveceour, armed with flintlocks, arrived to besiege the town of Osu surrounding Christiansborg in September 1728. In response, Christiansborg fired its cannons at the Dutch-aligned force, causing them to retreat with plunder and kidnapped women from Osu. The Secret Council then resolved to ask an Akwamu cabuseer with ties to Christiansborg by the name of Qvacu Kansiang to send 20-30 soldiers to defend Osu, in addition to giving the residents of the surrounding town of Osu eighteen flintlocks and fifty pounds of gunpowder. The issue was resolved by Wellemsen reporting the incident to the Dutch governor on the brewing conflict between Christiansborg and Creveceour.[148]

What the incident does showcase is the role Christiansborg played in these military conflicts, and just how interwoven local and European conflicts were. In any conflict between European forts, their local alliances played a key role in the outcome and how the conflict was waged. Creveceour did not send its own garrison or call for support from the Governor-General in Elmina to harass Osu and Christiansborg, but called upon their local allies, while Christiansborg itself did the same to defend Osu, in addition to using the fort's cannons in a similar way that they had in the war between Accra and Akwamu. Of interest is also Wellemsen's decision to call on an Akwamu cabuseer, as 1729 would be the beginning of a war between a coastal alliance including Accra with support from Fort James and Fort Creveceour, in rebellion against the Akwamu Empire, a topic I will return to in the next chapter. The military force and leverage Christiansborg brought to these alliances, involved the static defense and cannons of the fort itself and the supplies and arms they could bring to their local allies. In addition, the fort could provide safety to the civilians of their local allies during conflict. The power balance was in the 1694-1735 period still locally in the favor of African states, even though this would change over time until colonization and conquest of the 19th century.

[148] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 388-392, (IX.4) V.-g.K; 122

Ludewig Rømer in his account from 1760 of the situation in the 1730s and 1740s also makes more general statements on Christiansborg and military conflicts and the use of force, and provides a good example of why Christiansborg usually did not use force to enslave locals or subjugate local states. Rømer describes Osu, Labode and Tessing as towns 'belonging' to Denmark and the Fort, which in the case of Osu can more accurately be described as a long-term alliance and trading relationship between the Tette family especially and other nobles, and Christiansborg. Rømer claims that Christiansborg often had to shelter the inhabitants of these towns from local conflicts and raids, presumably only after the expansion of Christiansborg in the early 1700s, another way Christiansborg participated in conflicts.[149] A noteworthy incident Rømer described and which gives an indication of the consequences of acting with impunity against local states, is his description of a conflict between the Dutch and locals during his stay in Christiansborg. Rømer claimed that the Dutch factor by Temma enslaved a hundred Africans who sought shelter there by force, leading to their local town leaving for other places, and how the factor would engage in raids rather than trade to acquire slaves. According to Rømer, these raids were led by a man named Adam Holland, a Danish deserter. In turn, the roads to not only Creveceour, but also Christiansborg and the English Fort James, were closed, meaning an embargo they could do little to resist. Rømer claimed both Christiansborg and Fort James sent emissaries to local states in response, pledging to kill any European raiders who sought refuge among them, and promises regarding trade to open up the roads and trade again. Rømer claimed that the issue was only resolved when the Dutch factor was killed, after several months of failed negotiations.[150] While the validity of Rømer's claims is somewhat questionable, his antipathy towards the Dutch being quite evident throughout his account, aspects of his explanation of events such as the closure of roads in response to these conflicts which effectively drained the forts of resources and trade, and these conflicts largely being resolved by negotiation and payments, is evident from other incidents as well. Another is his views on using raids and violence to acquire slaves in general that is evident from his account, referring to it as madness, whether or not the incident did actually occur as he describes, it does provide an explanation for the rarity of accounts of Europeans and especially the relatively weak Danes, capturing slaves by arbitrary force.

[149] Rømer, *Tilforladelig Efterretning om Kysten Guinea,* p. 209-210
[150] Rømer, *Tilforladelig Efterretning om Kysten Guinea*, p. 221-223

Chapter 4: Christiansborg and the Akwamu Empire

The overarching question this thesis seeks to answer, is 'how did Christiansborg survive and to an extent thrive?' leading to 'how did Christiansborg establish and maintain relationships with local states and actors?' In the previous chapters, I have outlined the overarching history of Danish involvement in the slave trade, comparisons to English/British and Dutch involvement, and the diplomatic tools at the fort's disposal in not only the day-to-day affairs of Christiansborg but also during diplomatic crises. One important consideration is that Christiansborg did not operate as the sole actor in their area, with them more often needing to respond to developments, incidents and conflicts locally rather than instigate any themselves. This is true whether those conflicts were initiated by the Dutch Fort Creveceour or British Fort James, or as this thesis concerns itself with, the changing political alignments of city-states, kingdoms and empires in the Gold Coast itself.

In this chapter I will discuss five core themes and questions: the governorships of Lygaard (1705-1711), Boye (1711-1717) and Wærøe (1728-1735), and their different postures and interactions with the Akwamu Empire. I will also discuss the relative importance of the diplomatic tools outlined in Chapter 3, the autonomy of Christiansborg's governors and secret council in establishing and maintaining these relationships. Finally I will discuss the overarching accommodation Christiansborg made towards local culture, religion, social groups and political actors. These have been selected because they, in different ways, showcase and explain why these bilateral relationships between Christiansborg and its staff, and the local states and groups, were essential towards the survival of the WIGC in the Gold Coast in the 1694-1735 period and how it was carried out in practice. The governorships of Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe will be discussed in further and chronological detail with an emphasis on their interactions and policies towards the Akwamu Empire, in order to analyse and discuss in further detail why they had such different policies and the consequences thereof. This will serve as a basis for how the diplomatic tools outlined in the former chapter worked in practice by using these governors as cases. Due to the sources used and the scope of the thesis, the agency and policies of the Akwamu Empire and by extension other local states, will only be discussed briefly, intermittently and only in their interaction with Christiansborg and the WIGC.



Figure 3: Ground plan for Christiansborg from 1731. No artist stated. From Rigsarkivet.

4.1: The Governorships of Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe, in the shadow of the Akwamu Empire

From regaining Christiansborg from Akwamu until 1735, Christiansborg had a total of seventeen governors who were sworn-in at the fort itself (some individuals, like Andreas Jørgensen, had been appointed, but did not survive the journey to Christiansborg). Of these only four lasted more than four years as governors at the fort. These were the governors Johan Thrane (1698-1703), Erich Olsen Lygaard (1705-1711, who had also served as interim governor in 1698), Franz Boye (1711-1717) and Andreas Petersen Wærøe (1728-1735). Of the remaining governors the majority died in Christiansborg.[151] While the Governorships and policies of Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe were all marked by Christiansborg's relationship with the Akwamu Empire, and the local smaller states subservient to the Akwamu at the time, they pursued wildly different policies in the balancing act between these relationships.

Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe are interesting examples both due to the length of their governorships (that they all dealt with the same balancing act between local allies and the relationship with the powerful inland Akwamu Empire) and also their similarities. All three men had experience with the slave trade before being appointed governors. Both Lygaard and Boye had been at Christiansborg for years before their appointments, Lygaard even serving as interim Governor in 1698, while Wærøe had experience aboard slave ships, both as a sailor and captain. Another similarity is that all three men lost their position due to accusations of violating the instructions of the directors of the WIGC. This was embezzlement in the case of Lygaard, and illegal trade in the cases of Boye and Wærøe, as will be discussed further in the subchapters on each individual governor.

One important reason that these three governors lasted much longer than some other appointed governors was that they had already been years in contact with West African diseases and survived the experience. The WIGC would often otherwise appoint governors with little to no experience in West Africa, although this was no firm rule. Only half of those sent to Christiansborg survived their first year, and only a third survived their first three years. But after this ordeal, immunity to local diseases meant a much higher degree of survivability.[152] This also meant that the Governorships of Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe saw consistent policies with regards to the political and diplomatic situation on the Gold Coast.

[151] Hernæs, «I Akwamuimperiets vold», p. 112
[152] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 85-86

This contrasts with periods when interim governors were frequent and short-lasting such as 1717-1728 which saw eight governors with different views and policies,[153] or the 1740-1746 period which saw seven governors.[154] This latter period of rapid change in governors, an attempted mutiny and general disarray at Christiansborg occurred,[155] unfortunately for the WIGC, in a period which also saw the rise of the Ashanti Empire on the Gold Coast. During this rise Christiansborg was too busy with internal concerns to act in response to the development, unlike the fall of Akwamu in 1730. The latter is a topic I will return to and the former unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.

Other governorships could have been used as examples for the same purpose, to showcase the diplomatic entanglements and attempts by the governors to use the means at their disposal to safeguard Christiansborg and maintain amicable relations with local states both within and outside of the time period the thesis covers. Joost Platfues (1746-1751) was, like Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe, governor for an extended period with experience as staff at Christiansborg. However, the political situation on the Gold Coast was quite different in Platfues' governorship, the Akwamu Empire having lost all influence at the fort, and the power-struggle between Akyem states in the wake of Akwamu's fall raged. Even then, Governor Platfues encountered many of the same dilemmas that vexed Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe, and indeed most governors of Christiansborg in their balancing act between local powers. Other governors like Henrik von Suhm (1724-1727) and Knud Rost (1717-1720) dealt with the same issues as Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe, and while they lasted longer than most governors of Christiansborg, they did not last long enough for a clear policy to be discerned for their diplomatic actions. A general statement can be that the governors of Christiansborg faced similar challenges in navigating the relationships between local states, whether the dominant power was Accra, Akwamu, Akyem or Ashanti. The means at their disposal, relative power and how volatile the situation was, and which goods became easier or more difficult to trade with, could change, but not the core element of needing to maintain amicable relationships.

The governors Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe navigated Christiansborg's relationship with the Akwamu Empire as well as their local Ga trading partners and often allies in the Accra area. The Akwamu Empire dominated the areas of Danish trade between its rise to prominence on the coast in the mid- to late-17th century, after instability and civil war in Accra resulted in

[153] Hernæs, «I Akwamuimperiets vold», p. 112
[154] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 560-693, time period of the collection shows seven governors
[155] Hernæs, «Afrikansk magtkamp», p. 142-143

Akwamu, a former tributary, to exert increasing demands and eventual military conquest of the Accra Kingdom. Christiansborg's decision to side with Accra in this conflict, even temporarily driving Akwamu away from Little Accra in the 1677,[156] led to resentment that ended in the loss of Christiansborg to Akwamu in 1693. According to P. Hernæs, one key motivation for Akwamu to seize Accra in addition to its historical role as overlord of Akwamu, was control of the European trade on the coast.[157] While Christiansborg was bought back from the Akwamu Empire in 1694, the Akwamu Empire remained in control of the trade in gold, ivory and slaves from the interior towards Accra and the European forts until the 1730s. At the same time the Ga people in Accra were relegated to a sometimes directly run subservient territory, the same people which Christiansborg and the WIGC until then had primarily focused on with regards to maintaining trade. This dichotomy between the local Ga in Accra conquered by Akwamu, and the powerful inland Akwamu Empire controlling the sources of gold, ivory and access to slaves, became the primary challenge of Christiansborg in the governorships of Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe.

In very simple terms Lygaard's policy can be called pro-Akwamu, Boye's as pro-Local and Wærøe attempting mercantile neutrality. These are simplifications of course, as Lygaard could not ignore their local allies providing them with food, water and whom the staff at Christiansborg lived so intimately with, while Boye's attempted hard-line against Akwamu had consequences forcing concessions. Wærøe's neutrality as well was interpreted as pro-Akwamu due to the specific situation surrounding the Akwamu-Akyem War in the 1730s, as will be discussed. The motivation of all three men in carrying out these policies were, despite their different policies, motivated by securing as much trade as possible for Christiansborg (and themselves), and maintaining Christianborg's safety in the sometimes volatile political situation surrounding them, only matched by the volatility of their internal intrigues.

[156] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 82
[157] Hernæs, «En kamp om fodfæste», p. 91-82

4.1.1: Governor Lygaard: Appeasement to the Akwamu Empire

Erich Olsen Lygaard was already an experienced slave trader when he became Governor of Christiansborg, by royal affirmation on the 2nd of December 1704 after being commissioned in October of the same year, and in practice in May 1705 when news of this reached Christiansborg along with Lygaard on the ship *Kronprinsen*. Lygaard also had experience as Governor, after a brief tenure as interim governor between June and December 1698, just five years after Christiansborg was regained from the Akwamu, and had experience from the shipping between Guinea and Denmark.[158] His arrival was fortunate, as his predecessor Peter Sverdrup died the very month of his arrival, with Peter Pedersen only having a few weeks of his interim governorship before Lygaard's arrival with royal affirmation.

Like most governors of Christiansborg, his first reports to the directors of the WIGC complained about the poor state of the trade and the poor handling his predecessor had made of the fort and trade. Lygaard's first letters referred to Akwamu in two ways. First was that Christiansborg had to pay a slightly higher price for slaves from the Akwamu than they were able to get from other traders (36 riksdaler for a male slave from Akwamu, and 34 riksdaler from other African traders), and that the King of Akwamu demanded further and higher quality presents. Lygaard responded to this request by sending further gifts of two guns, brandy and a knife, given from his personal property according to Lygaard, and requested specific gifts to be sent with the next ship.[159] His letters stated several times that Aqvando, King of Akwamu, visited the fort on multiple occasions in the first years of his governorship, which was also attested to from other letters and not unusual in itself. Aqvando would visit not only Christiansborg, but also the British Fort James and the Dutch Fort Crevecoeur to receive a welcome and discuss trade.

Of interest is also Lygaard's complaint in a letter dated to January 1707, nearly two years after his arrival as appointed governor, that the WIGC had yet to respond or send him any letter, showing again the slow pace of information.[160] The response of the WIGC was on its way to Christiansborg at the time, and arrived just a month later after having been written in November 1706. The directors had decided not to send King Aqvando any gifts until Akwamu had provided substantial trade to the fort. Lygaard objected strongly to this decision, argued that the Akwamu, as they had done in Thrane and Meyer's time, would

[158] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana 1657-1754*, p. 99 & 196
[159] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 197-198, (V.3) V.-g.K; 121
[160] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 204, (V.7) V.-g.K; 121

block the roads and prevent trade if not satisfied. Lygaard also cited the instructions, that friendship is to be maintained through gifts. It is the fear of reprisals which formed the basis of Lygaard's argument. He mentioned that Akwamu had taken Christiansborg once and may do so again, in addition to closing off trade by blocking the roads to traders.[161] The gifts early in his governorship is also representative of Lygaard's response whenever Aqvando made demands for gifts or prices from Christiansborg; namely, to acquiesce. Another point of interest to this exchange, is that it showcases the different perceptions of the directors and the governor. The directors sought to use gifts to accomplish a specific task, to secure trade, while Lygaard sought to use gifts to maintain an amicable relationship in general.

It is evident that Lygaard's "pro-Akwamu" policy was not driven out of any particular sympathy to Aqvando or the Akwamu, or even a belief that Akwamu provided good trade to the Fort. In a letter to the directors of the 14th of July 1708, Lygaard reported on the course of a war between the Akwamu and other inland states, which to his knowledge had recently gone poorly for Akwamu after a lost battle. He speculated on potential profit to be made from selling weapons to Akwamu, as he heard they were raising another army to seek revenge after their loss. But more tellingly, he also speculated that should Akwamu lose the war, then the Akyem could come to the fort and sell gold directly. This gold trade was forbidden by the Akwamu due to their conflict with the gold-producing Akyem. Lygaard further stated that he believed the trade would become much better if Akwamu would lose the war.[162] His analysis of the situation was that the Akwamu Empire's actions were detrimental to the trade, but he sees no other option than to comply with their demands due to fear of reprisals.

In a letter dated to the 3rd of May 1709, he describes how Aqvando and his army had camped out in Accra for the winter, and sacked four towns, including Osu by Christiansborg. Even then, Lygaard stated the war was no concern of Christiansborg and continued to sell guns to Akwamu as much as they were able. Lygaard mentioned in the same letter that some of the company officers, and the other European forts, had reacted negatively to this. Lygaard stated that the Dutch and English forts had stopped all trade of firearms to the Akwamu in response to the war. Lygaard in the same letter also begged for a replacement, as the locals and his own officers were displeased with him, and that his term was coming to an end.[163] In his last letters, even when calling Akwamu's demands to pay a costume of 8 riksdaler to his

[161] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 207-209, (V.10) V.-g.K; 121
[162] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 213-214, (V.16) V.-g.K; 121
[163] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 215-217, (V.18) V.-g.K; 121

messenger, among other demands, as unreasonable, he still stated he complied with the demands. Lygaard remained at Christiansborg until his death in 1711, before a trial could be completed in which he was accused of, among other things, embezzlement.

Of interest here is that Lygaard himself stated that his appeasement of King Aqvondo and the Akwamu were unusual relative to other European forts and were unpopular among the locals (understandable enough considering their towns were sacked when Akwamu camped in Accra for the winter) as well as his own company officers. Indeed, already in 1708 he suspected Franz Boye of conspiring against him and sent Boye back to Copenhagen after he questioned his decisions regarding the Akwamu.[164] Boye may or may not have conspired to lead a mutiny (Lygaard certainly believed so). Lygaard attempted to exclusively use financial and economic means to maintain friendship with the Akwamu Empire, primarily gift-giving, accepting higher prices for slaves and continuing to sell weapons and powder. This even after other European Forts had stopped trading with the Akwamu after they faced several defeats in battle. It is not only important to consider that Lygaard was concerned with the power Akwamu had to not only stop the trade, but it is also how recently the Akwamu had seized Christiansborg, something Lygaard himself brought up several times in his correspondence with the directors of the WIGC. Another important consideration when comparing Lygaard's actions to the other European forts, was that Christiansborg was alone as the sole Danish fort at the time, while the English and Dutch had many along both the Gold Coast and in the rest of West Africa. This might have enabled them to tolerate greater risks than Lygaard could afford, Christiansborg stood alone with little hope of aid from Denmark-Norway itself.

4.1.2: Governor Boye: Confrontation and Friendship with the Akwamu Empire

Franz Boye was, like Lygaard, an experienced slave trader by the time of his appointment as governor in 1711. Boye had first arrived in Christiansborg as a soldier in 1699, promoted to chief-assistant in 1705 and shortly thereafter served as bookkeeper. He was, compared to Lygaard, much more closely linked to the local Ga through his cassar marriage to Kaakoe, daughter of the caboceer Tette in Osu surrounding Christiansborg, as well as his claim that he spoke the local language fluently and that he was knowledgeable about local customs. Boye also had sought ties with English merchants, and the Dutch and English factors in their Forts

[164] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 217-222, (V.19) V.-g.K; 121

in Accra, and could safely be considered a very well-connected man even before he became Governor, both to locals and other European traders.[165]

Boye's first reports, like most new governors, started by complaining about his predecessor Lygaard, although in far greater detail and vitriol than most, likely due to their personal conflicts. In particular, Boye mentioned Lygaard's failure to defend the locals in Osu against Akwamu, even before he complained about the poor trade. Boye went so far as to describe, albeit succinctly, how locals went to Christiansborg's walls for protection and were massacred before their eyes. Boye seemed to view this as a fundamental betrayal of their local trading partners and allies. Some of Boye's first actions as governor were to reverse some of Lygaard's staff decisions, such as reinstating Johannes Rask as chaplain of Christiansborg, and began a trial of Lygaard for embezzlement that was never completed due to Lygaard's death of illness on the 13th of November 1711. As mentioned earlier, Boye objected to the new order to prevent staff at the fort from having relations with local women and argued that keeping the men at the fort at all times would be detrimental to morale and trade.[166]

Boye already claimed to have confronted King Aqvando of Akwamu in his first extensive report to the directors of the WIGC. King Aqvando threatened to close the roads over a woman the king had left in Lygaard's care. The woman claimed that Lygaard had slept with her. Boye responded with a threat to close off trade to Akwamu, in line with what the Dutch and English forts had already done. When Aqvando sent men to close the roads, Boye stated he responded by threatening to make an example of them as soon as they attempted to stop traders from reaching the fort, and drove them off from the road to Christiansborg by force. After recounting the incident, Boye again condemned Lygaard's policy, and claimed the deceased governor had allowed the Akwamu to do as they willed and accommodated their every request. This description of Lygaard seems to match his own statements to the WIGC. Boye claimed his confrontational policy was successful in this case, and that Aqvando opened the roads and regularly sent messengers promising trade as soon as Christiansborg was resupplied.[167]

This is a good section to discuss the sources used for these accounts, which is primarily the letters sent from the governors and the secret council to the directors of the WIGC. Franz

[165] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 234
[166] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 235-236, (VI.2) V.-g.K; 121
[167] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 237-238, (VI.2) V.-g.K; 121

Boye, and all governors of Christiansborg, were in a situation where their reports on the situation, their responses to them and the effects thereof were the primary means of information on the state of Christiansborg the directors had. They had a clear motivation to exaggerate local challenges and their own results, decry their predecessor as having left them in a very difficult situation, and portray the situation in the best possible light for themselves to justify their own actions. While the governors were not the only source of information for the directors, other staff)especially the chaplains and the secret council) also sent reports. Discharged staff returning to Denmark and reports from the captains of company ships were also alternate sources of information, and these letters from the governor and general letters by the governor and secret council were the main source of information for the WIGC. The motivation of the governors to distort the reality of the coast to portray themselves in the best possible light is clear and needs to be taken into account. These have still been used more extensively than other sources due to their insight into the thought-processes of the governors of Christiansborg, which can at best be inferred from ledgers of sale, debt and salaries, and the detail they go into when discussing Christiansborg's relationships with local rulers and states.

Boye, after his confrontation with King Aqvando, in a letter of the 29th of April 1712, stated that no further claim had come from the Akwamu and that the roads to Christiansborg remained open, but that Fort James had been prevented from trade due to not paying the costume to King Aqvando. Boye stated in his letter that he would do his best to live in friendship with the Akwamu onwards in response to the directors most recent instructions.[168] Already by the 21st of July however, the Akwamu had closed the roads to both Christiansborg and the Dutch Fort Crevecoeur, trying to pressure them into aiding the Akwamu in collecting costume from Fort James. Boye made only a general statement to the directors of the WIGC, namely that he would do his best to open the roads again as soon as possible. In relation to the Akwamu in the same letter, Boye also complained about their 'constant' wars with other locals from the trade's initial location.[169] This complaint is reiterated in his report next the year, on the 30th of May 1713, where he claimed the Akwamu was blockading the roads to traders from the nations they were at war with, which limited the trade substantially.[170] In a general letter from Boye and the Secret Council on the 3rd of April 1714, they assured the

[168] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 238-239, (VI.3) V.-g.K; 121
[169] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 240, (VI.5) V.-g.K; 121
[170] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 242-243, (VI.8) V.-g.K; 121

directors that they would obey the WIGC in ensuring friendly relationships with the surrounding nations and in particular the King of Akwamu. In the very same letter however, the governor and the secret council also stated that they refused a request from King Aqvando to raise his costume, unless he repaid the costume he had been paid when there was no trade.[171] This did seem to hold true per a letter from Boye to the Directors of the 1st of November 1715, where Boye claimed that friendship is maintained with the King of Akwamu by frequent gifts, and the surrounding nations (likely referring to the Ga of Osu and Accra, and possibly the Dutch and British forts) by good relations.[172] No further statements on conflicts with the Akwamu are reported by Boye, unlike Lygaard who had issues with them throughout his governorship, barring Boye's reports on the stalemate in the war between Akwamu and Akyem.

Just as Boye accused Lygaard of embezzlement and mismanagement, Boye himself was removed from his post after accusations of embezzlement, falsifying ledgers, trading with English and other foreign goods, as well as private trading, by Peder Østrup after the latter's dismissal by Boye. Unlike Lygaard, Boye lived through his trial but eventually escaped to work for the English Company on the coast. A point of interest from the protocol of Boye's trial is Boye's defense of his actions. While he did not deny having traded with foreign goods (an accusation he himself had self-reported to the directors in letters), he argued this was the only way to secure trade. One example was a shipment of alcohol from Barbados, which had been used as gifts to locals to lead them to trade with the fort. Akwamu was also discussed in the trial. Witnesses described how Akwamu merchants brought slaves to the fort in repayment of goods lent on credit. Boye defended his granting of goods on credit during the questioning of the merchant Claus Fedders, by asking him to testify on whether or not lending on credit to Akwamu is necessary so they do not take their trade to other places.[173] The witness, Claus Fedders, stated that "…if the commander of this place wishes to keep the King of Akwamu and his caboceers as friends, (he will have to) lend (to) and supply them…"[174][175] This is one of the few direct statements that lending and debts also had a motive to secure alliances and friendships. Boye was not the only one making the claim either, but an otherwise relatively hostile witness responded by agreeing on that point. The

[171] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 246-249, (VI.12) V.-g.K; 121
[172] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 254-255, (VI.17) V.-g.K; 121
[173] Rigsarkivet, V.-g.K., D. 1717-1718. Den Særlige Ret I Sagen mod Fhv. Guvernør Frans Boye. p. 9
[174] «…at dersom dend Comanderende herved Stæd vill have Kongen af Agvambo med sine Cobuseerer til venner fornødentlig maaa laane, og borge dem…»
[175] Rigsarkivet, V.-g.K., D. 1717-1718. Den Særlige Ret I Sagen mod Fhv. Guvernør Frans Boye. p. 9-10

exchange also shows how interlinked trade, debts and diplomacy was in the minds of at least some of the fort staff. Another point of interest is that on the accusations of risky lending, there was included in the court protocol the responses of the Secret Council when Boye wished to lend further goods to locals in order to secure more trade. The responses of the members of the Secret Council were that using company goods for this would be a violation of the instruction, but if Boye used his own goods at his own risk then this could be of benefit to Christiansborg.[176] The court protocols contain insights into the daily operations of Christiansborg beyond these points of interest, but for the purposes of this thesis these are the main points that serve the analysis.[177]

Governor Boye also seems to have been one of the governors most integrated with local affairs and customs. Not only did he claim to know several of the local languages well enough to negotiate and trade, the Chaplain Elias Svane claimed in 1724 that Frantz Boye was the most sinful governor to have held the post. Svane claimed Boye not only lived openly with his local wife and children, but also befriended locals, used local medicine and healers when sick, used protective fetishes, and would sleep with other women.[178] While Svane's account might be exaggerated, similar statements were also made in the court protocols regarding his trial. This might further explain his willingness to engage more actively against Akwamu, as Boye viewed the alliance with the locals as more important than Lygaard, or, as we will discuss, Wærøe.

While I have named Boye's policy towards the Akwamu Empire confrontation, this is only evident in the first years of his governorship in response to King Aqvando's claims and his attempts to close the roads to Christiansborg. This is much less evident in the latter half of Boye's governorship. There are several possible reasons for this, one being the order from the directors to follow the instructions and ensure friendship with the Akwamu who controlled the coast. The other is that Boye only needed to confront Akwamu claims a few times to show that he was willing to do so, unlike Lygaard, and King Aqvando responded by not making as frequent demands as he did to Lygaard. More likely it is a combination of the two, and it is telling that there is not nearly the same frequency of reports of King Aqvando being

[176] A small point of interest that is only vaguely related to the topic of the thesis, is the lack of standardization in Christiansborg over titles. While the official title of the governor was 'Opperhoved', a loanword from Dutch, many witnesses and members of the Secret Council use 'Opperhoved', 'Kommandør' and 'Gouverneur' interchangeably to refer to Boye, although the same individuals use one of the three. Indeed, Gouverneur is used more frequently than Opperhoved, despite the latter being the official title.
[177] Rigsarkivet, V.-g.K, D. 1717-1718. Den Særlige Ret i Sagen mod Fhv. Guvernør Frans Boye.
[178] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 304-305, (VIII.11) V.-g.K; 122

displeased with gifts and closing the roads on a whim as is evident from Lygaard's reports. This could indicate Boye's policy was more successful in having a stable relationship with the Akwamu. As a counter, Hernæs states that the early conflict with Akwamu and Boye refusing the initial peace offerings after his confrontational stance yielded results, led to dramatic loss in trade for the fort. According to Hernæs, this is what prompted the directors of the WIGC to directly order gifts for the King of Akwamu and reiterate that the governor had a duty to maintain friendship.[179]

Boye's policy is only confrontational relative to Lygaard, as it seems his policy was more in line with that practiced by Fort James and Fort Crevecoeur at the time. Boye did not seem to have been as confrontational when Akwamu blocked the roads in 1712 to put pressure on Fort James, and pressure on Christiansborg and Fort Crevecoeur to aid in collecting the costume. Another context to this event is that Fort James at the time kept possessions of former Governor Lygaard which Boye sought to collect, and therefore the second road blockade might have given Boye an opportunity to collect on these possessions. On the whole, Boye's change of policy from overt confrontation to cooperation with Akwamu can be attributed both to pressure from the directors of the WIGC, and that Boye might have gained what he desired from the earlier confrontation. The argument has also been made by Hernæs that the road closures in 1714, the middle point of Boye's governorship, and other negative effects from the confrontational policy forced this change.[180] I would still argue that there had been a beneficial development in Christiansborg's relationship with Akwamu from the former's perspective that led to the remainder of Boye's governorship to be less confrontational. Boye having shown willingness to confront Akwamu once, even if he eventually had to soften his stance, seemed to have stabilized the relationship somewhat more favourably to Christiansborg afterwards.

4.1.3: Governor Wærøe: Neutrality as Akwamu falls

Anders Pedersen Wærøe was also experienced with the slave trade when he was appointed Governor of Christiansborg on the 14th of April 1728, taking up the post with his arrival on the 24th of December 1728. Unlike Lygaard and Boye Wærøe had experience with the middle passage and shipping exclusively, and had not formerly served as staff on Christiansborg. He

[179] Hernæs, «I Akwamuimperiets vold», p. 114
[180] Hernæs, «I Akwamuimperiets vold», p. 114-115

had served on ships frequently from 1706 as an officer, and from 1717 at least twice as captain. Unlike previous governors, he also brought his family with him to Christiansborg)two daughters and his fiancée). Although he was an experienced slaver, his background meant that he did not have the same long-term ties to locals as Boye did, nor experience running the slave trade from the fort itself as Lygaard and Boye did.[181]

In the eleven years between Franz Boye being ousted as governor and Wærøe arriving at the fort, Christiansborg had had a total of eight governors, only two of which were appointed by the WIGC. Death was the main cause of the frequent changes of governors, contracts ending being the second-most common. Wærøe took over just a year after the conflict with Fort Creveceour that had escalated into a battle in Osu and kidnappings under interim Governor Wellemsen, as described in detail in the previous chapter, before the Dutch Governor-General could put a stop to the escalation. Wærøe's arrival was more dramatic than most governors, as he had received secret orders from the company (the details of which I have not found, but can be inferred from his report). Wærøe made sure to arrive at the fort overland a day before the ship was due to arrive, took all the keys in the fort and made a full inventory. During this process he locked the staff away from the warehouse and their own writing desks, journals and books.[182] It seems the Directors of the WIGC suspected yet more private trading, embezzlement and corruption from the staff, and had sent Wærøe to sort it out. The situation on the coast was volatile, even moreso than during the governorships of Lygaard and Boye, despite the wars between Akwamu and their neighbors. The situation had reached an entirely new level of severity for Akwamu as Wærøe arrived, and Akwamu would, at the end of his governorship, be entirely driven out of Christiansborg's surroundings.

One of Wærøe's first actions after the thorough search of the fort, was to travel Akwamu to present the king with the gift sent from Copenhagen. Wærøe stated that due to the current conflict the king was unable to travel to Christiansborg to receive it. Wærøe claimed the meeting went well, with assurances given, and that Wærøe was given one of the wives of the king to take care of the new governor. Unlike most new governors, Wærøe did not spend significant time criticizing his predecessor Wellemsen (who only served as interim governor for a year) in his first letter, but did state that the trade was poor and volatile, with supply and demand seemingly changing month to month.[183] On the 20th of May however, Wærøe

[181] Justesen, *Danish Sources for the History of Ghana*, p. 386
[182] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 396-397, (IX.8) V.-g.K; 122
[183] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 386-387, (IX.2) V.-g.K; 122

formally charged Wellemsen and sent him back to Copenhagen, since the fort had made a loss of 3000 riksdaler in 1728,[184] and Wærøe made further accusations of Wellemsen selling Christiansborg's gold to English interlopers in later letters in early 1729.[185] That these accusations came later, seems to indicate that Wærøe was not aware of them in his first reports. The changes in attitude to the local cassar marriages was evident from Wærøe's first statement on the practice on the 28th of May 1729 in a general letter from himself and the Secret Council. He stated he had put restrictions on the practice due to the conflict Wellemsen experienced but was not about to end the cassar marriages already in place and would not for the time being approve of new ones. The same general letter also reported on significant rebellious sentiments among the locals against the Akwamu, but that Christiansborg would not act upon it until they reconciled, or the conflict ended in one conquering the other.[186]

Wærøe's more dramatic governorship continued from there. On the 16th of May 1730, a full year since his last report, he stated the reason for the lack of reports sent to Copenhagen was the unfolding war between the locals of Accra and the Akwamu Empire. Accra had closed the roads immediately after the Danish ship had left. Wærøe accused the Dutch Fort Crevecoeur of supplying the rebels on loan and with assurances that any slaves they take will only be taken to the Dutch Fort. Wærøe stated that he refused to get involved when a caboceer named Amoe approached him. Wærøe believed that Amoe, not the Dutch factor de la Planqve, was the mind behind the war. The locals of Osu also joined the war according to Wærøe, who reported that he told them that Christiansborg would not be getting involved in the war on the Akwamu. This decision, per Wærøe's own report, led to resentment from the Accrans and Christiansborg's local allies, especially after they suffered an initial defeat in September 1729. After which the Accrans threatened to seize Christiansborg by force after Akwamu had been dealt with. Later that year, Christiansborg was besieged by Accrans of 'the Dutch town' and Wærøe called for Akwamu for military assistance, which Christiansborg received to lift the siege and defeat the assailants. At this time, the King of Akwamu was Ensangvau, who had taken over after Aqvando. Wærøe and the Secret Council in this report consequently referred to the rebels and attackers as 'Dutch (locals)' and viewed the rebellions as being orchestrated by the caboceer Amoe with assistance from the overly ambitious Dutch factor.

[184] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 392-393, (IX.6) V.-g.K; 122
[185] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 393, (IX.7) V.-g.K; 122
[186] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 393-396, (IX.7) V.-g.K; 122

The cause of the war, as Wærøe reported it, was that a relative of the King of Akwamu was kept at Fort Crevecoeur had been killed. However, while Wærøe ultimately viewed the war as Dutch-fomented, the individual he blamed was the local caboceer Amoe. According to Wærøe he was the one to forge the alliance between the Accras, and went to a people Wærøe only referred to as 'mountain (locals)' to join the war.[187]

Even as the war intensified in autumn 1730, Wærøe maintained a policy of neutrality. This neutrality was clearly perceived as siding with Akwamu by the Accrans, the Dutch and their other allies. Wærøe in his report on the second time the alliance tried to secure Christiansborg's support, was indignant that a local would give him orders, as he perceived the request to be. Wærøe seemed to consider Christiansborg as operating entirely outside the local political situation, unlike Lygaard and Boye, and seemingly believed that Christiansborg could remain neutral even as their old allies went to war with each other. In the process of attempted neutrality, he had antagonized the Accrans, making Christiansborg struggle to acquire food and clean water in 1730. Even Osu and the Caboceer Tette joined the war, despite Wærøe's attempts to dissuade him. From his letters, it is also evident that Wærøe viewed the caboceers as being subjects or employees rather than partners.[188]

The general letter of 18th of November from Wærøe and the Secret Council makes it evident the war had definitely turned against the Akwamu. The letter stated the Akwamu had been driven off from the coastline by the alliance of Accra and the Akyem, and that Christiansborg was far more vulnerable as a result, as they could no longer call on Akwamu for any military assistance. The long-standing relationship and friendship with Accra seemed entirely in ruins by Wærøe's account, accusing them of spreading lies to Akyem. Christiansborg was able to convince Frempung, King of Akyem Kotoku (one of the Akyem states) that Christiansborg had not sided with Akwamu. According to Wærøe this prevented yet another siege of the fort through dispatches of messengers carrying gifts to the most prominent Akyem lords, and were quick to congratulate them on their victory.[189] By March 1731, Christiansborg had also begun paying a monthly costume to Frempung of Akyem Kotoku.[190]

The remainder of Wærøe's term as governor was dedicated to trying to repair local relationships, establish a new trading relationship with Akyem, and resume the trade. In 1735

[187] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 398-404, (IX.10) V.-g.K; 122
[188] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 406-420, (IX.14) V.-g.K; 122
[189] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 424-426, (IX.17) V.-g.K; 880
[190] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 441, (IX.24) V.-g.K; 122

Wærøe, like Lygaard and Boye before him, was ousted after accusations of embezzlement and private trading, in the form of not accounting for ivory bought by the fort and using them for private trade instead.[191] Wærøe had some difficulty adjusting Christiansborg to the sudden change from a coast dominated by Akwamu, to one dominated by the Akyem states. Where one of the methods of maintaining the relationship with Akwamu had been gifts of liquor and serving alcohol to the Akwamu kings during their visits to Christiansborg, the Akyem reportedly did not consume much alcohol and only one of the Kings, Bang, enjoyed it.[192]

Neutrality cost Christiansborg dearly, and the relationship with Accra would take a long time to fully repair. Unlike Lygaard and Boye, Wærøe seemed to have the perception that Christiansborg could function as merely a trading post and not get involved in the local conflicts. This perception was something the local Accrans, Akyem and Akwamu did not seem to agree with. When Christiansborg under Wærøe refused to aid the war-effort, despite their most local of allies in Osu doing so, this was viewed as a betrayal of their alliance and in practice support of the Akwamu. That the Akwamu was called to Christiansborg's aid when the fort was besieged, and an Akwamu and Danish force defeated an Accran force, likely did not help this perception.[193] Still, Wærøe responded promptly once it was evident that Akwamu was losing the war and had lost Accra in 1730, rapidly establishing gift-giving and payment of costume to the victorious Akyem. If not for this, it is very likely that Christiansborg would have been lost as well after Wærøe's attempted neutrality in a conflict where the participants would not accept neutrality. To briefly engage in contrafactual history however, if Akwamu had emerged the victor in the most recent conflict, as they had several times before, then Wærøe's policy might have been prudent. A victorious Akwamu would likely have attempted to punish Fort James and Fort Crevecoeur for openly siding with Accra and Akyem, while Christiansborg as a 'neutral' fort would likely have been spared. None of this thought process is evident from Wærøe's reports to the WIGC however, as he did not argue for neutrality out of any political or diplomatic aims, but rather seemed to not consider this a situation relevant to Christiansborg's mercantile efforts in the first place.

The differing policies of Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe can be argued to result from their own different backgrounds in the slave trade. Lygaard was governor not only at the zenith of Akwamu's power in Accra, but also just shortly after Christiansborg's fall to Akwamu in

[191] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 508-509, (X.7) V.-g.K; 123
[192] Rømer, *Tilforladelig Efterretning om Kysten Guinea*, p. 129-131
[193] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 402-403, (IX.10) V.-g.K; 122

1693, and his reports indicate a fear of Akwamu reprisals that caused him to acquiesce to their demands time and time again. Boye, on the other hand, was far closer to their local allies subjugated and even attacked by Akwamu in Lygaard's time, considering his marriage to the daughter of Caboceer Tette in Osu, and his accusations against Lygaard being as much of the betrayal against Christiansborg's local allies as his mishandling of trade. Wærøe, while an experienced slaver on the ships making the middle passage, was not experienced in regularly dealing with the local states or the importance in maintaining the long-term relationship with the Accrans. While he was caught between the two sides, his orders being to maintain friendship with both the local Accrans and the Akwamu Empire, his attempted neutrality did not seem to be strategic but rather a belief the fort could continue to trade with and support both. Instead of supporting Akwamu fully with what guns and powder he had, he did not give Akwamu any particular aid outside of the relief force that rescued Christiansborg in 1730, and only after Akwamu being driven from the coast did Wærøe seek out the victors with gifts, costume and assurances. Wærøe especially shows that in times of war and events that unfold quickly, the biases, knowledge and decisions of the governor played an enormous role.

4.2: Diplomatic Tools: Military vs Economic vs Social

For the purposes of this discussion, I group the diplomatic tools of the fort into three categories; Military (gifting and trade with guns, Christiansborg as a force multiplier and defensive installation, military alliances), Economic (gifts, costume, debts and the trade itself) and Social (marriages and informal relationships). These categories are broad, and do intersect, but the analysis serves to illuminate a potential answer on how Christiansborg survived that I initially dismissed out hand. Initially the hypothesis was that whatever military might Christiansborg could muster could not and would not be an important diplomatic tool due to the sheer imbalance of military strength between the small Danish-Norwegian garrison and the West-African states, particularly the regional powers of Akwamu and Akyem. However, there is more to the military tools at the disposal of Christiansborg than engaging in battle or waging war directly.

The economic tools are the most evident in the sources. Gifts, regular costume and debts appeared frequently in the records of Christiansborg. This in itself is not evidence of their importance to the relationships, however, as the nature of Christiansborg as a slave fort responsible for trade means that every gift, every costume and ever loan had to be accounted

for in the books. While the books were not always kept fully, this tended to result in governors being ousted if they lived for long enough, as can be seen from Lygaard, Boye and Wærøe. But while frequency of mentions is not inherently evidence of their importance, the reports surrounding them are. Lygaard maintained Christiansborg's relationship with Akwamu almost exclusively through these economic tools, offering gifts and yet more gifts in any dispute with King Aqvando of Akwamu, offering better prices in the trade. This, while he did not dare to use any military strength he had at his disposal, even as Osu was being outright attacked by Akwamu. While the garrison of Christiansborg couldn't hope to defeat Akwamu in battle, even in the vicinity of the guns of the fort, Lygaard also refused to give shelter to the people of Osu. Boye and Wærøe as well used gifts and costume actively to maintain friendship with Akwamu, and in Wærøe's case Akwamu's 'replacement' as dominant powers on the coast the Akyem kingdoms.

Yet the military tools at Christiansborgs disposal were also important, and of more importance than I assumed when I started writing the thesis. While Christiansborg was not in a position to use military power to subjugate the local states in the early 18th century, this was not how the governors in the 1694-1735 period used their military leverage to maintain relationships. Of greatest importance was Christiansborg itself when it came to their relationship with Osu and other Accran settlements. Christiansborg was a safe haven for the locals in times of war, and indeed Lygaard's refusal to protect Osu within the walls of Christiansborg when Akwamu attacked, was perceived as a betrayal not only by Osu, but also the Danish officers at Christiansborg including Boye. Boye described utilizing the military force of Christiansborg, as localized as it might be, to confront Akwamu when the roads were closed and drive off the small group (described as 6-7) Aqvando had dispatched to enforce his compensatory claim.[194] Even then Boye limited the response, and assured Aqvando that it was exclusively due to the claim on compensation Christiansborg was embargoing the king and acting against the closing of the road. Boye still utilized the economic tools at his disposal to maintain friendship, such as it were, with Akwamu, through gifts. This combination is also evident from some shorter-lived governors, such as Wellemsen, but they were not governors for long enough to attribute any coherent policy to their decisions.

Wærøe fundamentally did not seem to view Christiansborg as a political actor within the Gold Coast and attempted neutrality and trade with everyone, even as the conflict between

[194] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 237, (VI.2) V.-g.K; 121

Accra and Akwamu, as well as the Akyem on the side of the Accrans, reached a point where neutrality was no longer possible. Unlike Lygaard's response to a similar situation (which could be called pro-Akwamu or rather appeasement and taking a side), or Boye's (which was to follow the policies of the other European forts and bar Akwamu from the trade), Wærøe only responded with diplomatic overtures and using the means at his disposal once the situation had grown out of control. Of interest is what Wærøe did when he realized that Akwamu had lost and was no longer a power on the coast. His first move was to seek out one of the victorious Akyem kings, shower him with gifts and tell King Frempung his version of events. This new bond was then solidified by regular payment of costume to Frempung in return for protection and trade.

Boye's embargo of Akwamu and refusal to sell weapons, as well as Christiansborg at other times giving weapons away or selling weapons on credit to African states, is also a tool of diplomacy that can be grouped under military tools. While Christiansborg could not act aggressively outside the immediate area of the fort, they could supply their allies with weapons they had no other local access to, barring the Dutch and English forts. With Osu in particular, Christiansborg was a weapon supplier whenever the town was under attack, outside of Lygaard's fear to act against Akwamu or Wærøe not viewing Osu affairs as any of Christiansborg's responsibility or interest. When Osu was attacked in 1727, Christiansborg gave Osu guns and powder free of charge and allowed the inhabitants to seek shelter within the fort itself. The failure to engage with these military tools of diplomacy, can be argued to be a reason for Lygaard's struggle with Akwamu's frequent demands and requests, and Wærøe's more serious miscalculation in the face of the latest and greatest Akwamu War.

In addition to the economic and military tools, there are also those that can be referred to as social tools. These are less concrete methods in which Christiansborg maintained its relationships with local actors, marriage and informal relationships and meetings. The cassar marriages were often controversial on the side of the Danes, particularly among the chaplains, but provided significant benefits. While some of these benefits for the men involved were not directly related to the diplomatic efforts of Christiansborg, such as comfort and treatment when sick, these marriages also allowed Christiansborg to directly become part of the intricate network of kinship groups bound by marriage in Accra. Governors such as Franz Boye married relatives of local nobles, as did other staff at the fort, especially the high-ranking members of the Secret Council. This was beneficial to nurture long-lasting relationships with important local families.

The other benefit of the marriages to the fort was the growing number of Euroafricans with ties to Christiansborg. Beginning in the early 18th century, an increasing number of soldiers and staff at Christiansborg would not arrive from Europe, but be hired locally. The Euroafricans had one foot in the West African world, and another in the larger Atlantic world. This provided Christiansborg with an increasing number of staff who were well-acquainted with both the local political and economic situations, and who could also serve as better emissaries than Europeans, and more loyal ones than locals. While this benefit of the marriages was by no means planned by the ones who first engaged with them, already by the 1720s there is a coherent plan to utilize the Euroafrican boys in this role. The establishment of the school in Christiansborg, and reports even before the 1720s, has governors and the Secret Council view the Euroafricans as a potential boon. While this was in part due to Euroafricans likely surviving their first three years in service, unlike Europeans, their local ties were also both a concern and a perceived benefit. While the main benefit of this was not seen until the latter 18th century, the process began in the early 18th century. Examples of this include Christian Pettersen Witt, a Euroafrican soldier, being sent with gifts to the King of Akwamu in 1725 to try to settle the most recent diplomatic incident Christiansborg had with the Akwamu Empire.[195] This was successful and works as an example of how Euroafrican soldiers were used in the period, as emissaries to local rulers. The alternative was to send a European, who more likely than not would need an interpreter, and would not be as familiar with local customs as the Euroafricans who grew up in both societies.

The other major social tool was establishing and maintaining informal relationships with local actors. When Akwamu ruled, all governors of Christiansborg would need to become personally familiar with their king. Meetings were relatively frequent even unrelated to trade negotiations, although one can assume that trade was also discussed even when not explicitly mentioned in the reports. While meetings with the Dutch and English factors of Fort Crevecoeur and Fort James respectively are mentioned much more frequently, the visits of King Aqvando of Akwamu were also a regular event, where it was important for Christiansborg to serve the Akwamu king good food, good drinks and have gifts ready. Similar, but less extensive, meetings were also held with local nobles, such as the cabuceer Tette of Osu. The informal relationships also extended to local traders and chosen emissaries/representatives, and of the three governors discussed in detail, Franz Boye was particularly prone to this type of diplomacy. These relationships were useful, both the high-

[195] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 334, (VIII.22) V.-g.K; 880

ranking ones which could affect in the most severe circumstance the future of the fort itself, but also the relationships built locally. The locals were the main source of information most governors had on what was going on inland. The world of Christiansborg was quite limited to the surroundings of the fort itself, as well as the sporadic lodges built to engage in trade elsewhere. It was these sorts of relationships that gave Wærøe word that Akyem was planning on attacking Christiansborg, believing the Danes to be allies of Akwamu due to Wærøe's attempted neutrality.

Considering these three categories, of most interest is how they interacted with each other. While the economic tools, especially costume and gift-giving, can be called the most important ones, they were not always sufficient in and of themselves. This can be seen from Lygaards difficulties with Aqvando, where gift after gift was refused for being insufficient, and threats to bar Christiansborg from trade was frequent. Especially in Lygaards period (1705-1711), Christiansborg could almost be viewed as a subject of Akwamu in the local context of the Gold Coast, a comparison made by Hernæs.[196] Franz Boye in contrast to his predecessor, utilized every tool at his disposal This included military force to break the first road-blockade in his governorship, threatened to cut off the arms trade, used the ties he gained from his cassar marriage, and very actively sought out local trade-partners. Judging by their reports, this could have had a better effect than relying exclusively on gift-giving and the payment of costumes. However, as Hernæs points out, Boye pushed the conflict to a blockade that harmed both sides, until the directors of the WIGC intervened with direct orders to maintain friendship and gifts.[197] If Boye had not pushed the issue to the extreme that he did, it might have yielded better results. Still, Christiansborg did at times function by relying almost exclusively on these economic tools, and at no point did they refrain from it. While gift-giving and costumes were necessary and the most important aspect, it was not always quite enough on its own. As a political and economic entity in a relatively weak position, Christiansborg relied upon a host of diplomatic tools to remain safe and maintain amicable relationships with their neighbours.

[196] Hernæs, «I Akwamuimperiets vold», p. 115-116
[197] Hernæs, "I Akwamuimperiets vold", p. 114

4.3: The accommodation of Christiansborg with local culture, religion and expectations

One aspect that is very evident in the sources, is that Christiansborg went far to accommodate local demands, expectations and requirements in pursuit of the trade. This can be grouped both into accommodation directly related to the trade, such as establishing trading lodges when the stockpile was decently full and locals outside of their immediate area requested it, as well as the attempt to supply goods in demand for a profit, social, cultural and even religious accommodation also played a role. Christiansborg was not in a dominant position, nor even a particularly powerful one, in the period discussed. The Danish-Norwegians were the weakest of the three European Forts on the Gold Coast. The Royal Navy patrolled semi-regularly, and the Dutch had access to lighter vessels to quickly reinforce each other. The scale of their operations was also much greater, with more forts, more men and more equipment. Setting aside the other Europeans active on the coast, Christiansborg could also not compare to the states operating in the area. The Akwamu Empire far surpassed anything Christiansborg could muster even with their local alliances, and the same goes for the Akyem who overtook them, and the Ashanti after that. Where Christiansborg had some very limited hard power was the fort itself as a defensive structure. While Christiansborg began as more of a stone house with very limited lodging and storage, it would keep being improved and built up, armed with cannons. This became a formidable fortification capable of enduring sieges from both land assaults and from the coastline. Still, this at best gave Christiansborg aggressive hard power over Osu, and whenever Christiansborg attempted to use this they would quickly find Osu's townsfolk leaving for other towns.

Accomodation was key. Accomodation in this case refers to several distinct aspects of the interaction between the Europeans of Christiansborg, and the significantly larger local states. This ties into the diplomatic tools as discussed earlier, where the governors would use financial incentives, meetings and the opportunity to get modern firearms to keep relations steady. But it also refers to the willingness of the leadership of Christiansborg to accommodate and adapt local customs. A very clear example of this was over the use of fetish-oaths to swear in not only new fort slaves, but also in criminal proceedings. This was not without controversy, as several chaplains objected strenuously to the practice, dubbing it a heathen ritual. The argument between the chaplain Elias Svane, and Governor Herrn (1722-1723) and Governor Syndermann (1723-1724), is an example of this that needed settlement by the directors of the WIGC. Herrn outlined the argument in a direct letter to the directors of the WIGC on the 20th of April 1722. Elias Svane had condemned the use of fetish-oaths,

openly defying Herrn from the pulpit, and while Herrn admits it went against Christian teachings, he maintained that the practice was necessary.[198] Chaplain Svane proceeded to send his own account on the 15th of March 1724, decrying not only the practice of fetish oaths, but also the cassar marriages, and other perceived vices the staff at the fort engaged in such as drunkenness and leaving behind their Euroafrican children. Svane particularly objects to the fetish oaths being sworn within Christiansborg among Christians. He proposed instead to have them swear by the Bible, or the 'living God', and in part trust providence to make sure slaves did not escape, and to pay them in goods they wanted rather than "tainted" goods. For free locals when they make their oaths, he again proposed using the bible.[199] Governor Syndermann and the secret council also raised this issue in their general letter of the 21st of march 1724, which presumably arrived in Copenhagen at the same time. They stated that the chaplain Svane had caused much disturbance over the fetish-oaths, condemning the governor and secret council for tolerating it. Yet, they argued that it was a necessity because the locals would not swear falsely on a fetish, which they could on a Bible that meant nothing to them.[200] Fetish oaths continued to be used for this reason, practicality, despite objections by the chaplains.

This can be seen as an accommodation with local practices, out of practicality and that Christiansborg was a trading fort. They were not concerned with spreading Christianity, and adapting to local culture and practices provided practical benefits to the fort in dealing with locals. While the discussion that took place was primarily on the use of fetish-oaths in relation to new fort-slaves, particularly privileged remidors who had a much easier time escaping if they wished to, it also extended to maintaining relationships with local rulers and cabuceers. The cassar marriages can also be viewed as an accommodation, although one that also had benefits to the fort beyond Christiansborg integrating into local customs. The reason why the governors and secret councils of Christiansborg did opt for this policy and these practices were the nature of the trade and their role. It was beyond them to enforce their own practices on the locals. Accommodating and integrating local practices into their tool set was a net gain for the running of the fort itself, and to maintain amicable relationships so necessary to the survival and trade of the fort.

[198] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 293-294, (VIII.5) V.-g.K; 121
[199] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 303-305, (VIII.11) V.-g.K; 122
[200] Justesen, *Danish Sources*, p. 316, (VIII.12) V.-g.K; 122

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Christiansborg was often in a precarious situation, not having the regular shipments their English and Dutch rivals in Fort James and Fort Crevecoeur possessed, their naval presence nor a sufficient network of forts that they could readily reinforce each other. This meant that the survival of the fort was contingent on navigating the complex politics of Accra, Akwamu, Fetu, Akyem, Assante and other states. Despite Christiansborg only directly interacting with a fraction of the kingdoms, city-states and peoples of West Africa, there were plenty of dangers in the relatively small area the West-India and Guinea Company had limited themselves to. Christiansborg and the Danish slave trade survived because Christiansborg was generally able to navigate these relationships with the tools at their disposal. In the 1694-1735 period, a dramatic change occurred when Akyem and Accra, supported by the Dutch and English companies, defeated the Akwamu and drowe them from the Gold Coast. This could very well have ended with the fall of Christiansborg, if not for their diplomatic entanglements, and the general preference of African states to have more European forts to trade with in order to strengthen their own bargaining position.

One aspect of Christiansborg's position relative to these greater powers, whether the English and Dutch companies, or the Kingdoms of Akwamu and the Akyem states, is that for the larger incidents, Christiansborg played a reactive role. Christiansborg did not in the 1700-1750 period initiate these changes, but responded to the political situation as it unfolded. Indeed, it was Akwamu, Akyem and Accra who most often forced Christiansborg to react, which many of the governors were slow and reluctant to do, preferring to focus exclusively on the trade. King Aqvando of Akwamu, who reigned until 1725, was one of many locals who initiated incidents and situations that forced Christiansborg to react. The cabuceer Amoe played a vital role in gathering the alliance that would see Akwamu fall, and Achue, the cassar widow of Governor Pahl, would instigate a conflict between Christiansborg and Fort Crevecoeur in 1728. The agency of Africans was an important reason that Christiansborg often struggled with maintaining the delicate balance of power their position and trade relied upon.

Understanding the diplomacy of Christiansborg therefore requires understanding of the local states, cultures and actors they engaged with. While slaver kingdoms like Akwamu and Assante benefitted from the trade, gaining not only wealth but weapons and ridding themselves of potential enemies from war-captives and criminals, other African states were

more reluctant and hostile to the trade. Christiansborg, like the British and Dutch forts, also served to strengthen the slaver kingdoms at the cost of their neighbours. The slave trade strengthened the military aggressors and slavers, leading to more slaves for the slave forts. While intentionality behind the gun-slave cycle, the selling of weapons to militaristic states who would use them in war and sell the captives as slaves bound for the plantations and mines of the Americas can be disputed. An awareness that wars led to slaves can be seen in the sources. When wars break out, it disrupted the trade, but Christiansborg expected a good return on their investment when selling powder and guns. In West Africa, this was disastrous. Millions were shipped off, and the threshold for going to war reduced as it could be a substantial benefit if you won. While Christiansborg and Denmark-Norway only played a small part in this larger trans-Atlantic slave trade, they still played their part in it.

The tools at their disposal were multifaceted, and some were directly employed in order to establish and maintain relationships, such as the treaties, the payment of costume and gift-giving, while others were inherent to their activities such as long-lasting trade relationships. Yet others were more informal but contributed to the maintenance of these relationships, such as the marriages between staff and local women, the employment of Euroafrican children of these marriages, lending and debts, and interpersonal relationships. Not all these tools were consciously used by various governors, but all served to integrate Christiansborg within the political framework between local states on the Gold Coast. Of these gift-giving was paramount, especially in the short term, as can be seen by the hasty and urgent attempt by Governor Wærøe to appease King Frempung of Akyem Kotoku after the victory of the Akyem states over the Akwamu Kingdom. In many ways, Christiansborg acted as a kinship group or small power in relation to these local states, even though several governors would rather keep more distance between themselves and local kings and cabuceers.

How Christiansborg behaved and what policies they pursued would also vary substantially. Some of this was a result of changing instructions from the Directors of the West-India and Guinea Company, but this was limited to long-term developments. The information delay between Christiansborg and Copenhagen meant that whenever Christiansborg had to react to developments, the governor and secret council had to make the decision. The various biases of the governor could play a major role in how Christiansborg acted and maintained these relationships, and which tools were more commonly used, as can be seen from the differences in Lygaard and Boye in dealing with King Aqvando of Akwamu. The practice of lending also varied substantially, both due to the governors' differences and the directors' involvement.

While lending did have a purpose in eventually regaining the debt, several governors also used it to establish and maintain connections and ties with local powers. Gift-giving as well was an area where the governors usually wished to employ it to a greater extent than the directors did, viewing it as a way to not only gain trade, but also to prevent conflict and gain local alliances.

Willingness to use the limited military power which Christiansborg did possess could also vary substantially, although in the 1694-1735 period not even the more confrontational governors like Boye would engage in an outright battle. The only cases where Christiansborg did it in this period, was in limited scope conflicts primarily with other European forts, such as the conflict between Christiansborg and Creveceour in 1728. Both before and after the period this thesis is concerned with, Christiansborg engaged in military adventurism to a greater extent, but the lesson of the loss of the fort to Akwamu in 1694 led to restraint. The fall of Christiansborg to an African power was frequently used as justification, especially by Lygaard but also others, for why Christiansborg was reluctant to fully support particular sides in conflicts. This was in contrast to the Dutch and English, who were more willing to do so in the period discussed, but also had more military power and support from the homeland in which to do so. Christiansborg behaved like a weaker power, balancing their relationships with other Europeans, strong local states like Akwamu, Akyem and Assante, and even Accra in the earlier period, to strengthen their own position and maintain the trade.

When Christiansborg did respond to local situations, their long-term diplomatic tools gave them more flexibility in how to deal with them. While the relationship ended up fracturing during the Akwamu-Akyem War in the 1730s due to Wærøe attempting neutrality, their long position as friends with Accra provided Christiansborg with local allies against the Dutch. Akwamu provided Christiansborg with allies when Christiansborg itself was threatened by Accra. These long-lasting relationships were forged from treaties, costume, gift-giving, interpersonal relationships, bonds of marriage, and long-standing trading relationships. These alliances could not be developed by the signing of a single treaty, a large gift or only trading. These alliances were nurtured over a prolonged period of time, utilizing the tools of diplomacy Christiansborg had at its disposal.

However, a weakness in Christiansborg's structure when long-term alliances were this important, was the relatively low life expectancy of its governors. Even in ideal circumstances, a governor only had a term of some five to six years. In practice, most

governors lasted anything from a few weeks to a couple years, some appointed by the directors of the WIGC, and many more interim governors elected by the fort staff when a governor died. King Aqvando of Akwamu in his reign from 1702 to 1725, dealt with twelve different governors of Christiansborg, Lygaard and Boye among them. While long-term relationships was the intent, the fact of the matter was that the governors personally could only partially maintain this. Christiansborg as a political entity could and would do this, and many staff served for longer times than any one governor, and some governors were promoted from the staff. These tended to last longer, but also understood the local situation better, than the ones appointed without a background from Christiansborg and the slave trade on land. Even Wærøe who was an experienced slaver, but from the ships and not the forts or lodges, misjudged the situation. Although, in Wærøe's case, while neutrality did end up being the wrong move in hindsight, if Akwamu had won then Christiansborg stood to benefit from not having been involved. The lesson of 1693, when Christiansborg fell after the fort had picked the wrong candidate in a succession dispute in Akwamu, and supported Accra against Akwamu openly, also played a role in their decision to stay neutral when it was in practice not a tenable position to hold in 1730.

A comparison to the Dutch and English companies is also prudent, as there are just as many similarities as differences, and the key difference was the scale of the operation. The Dutch, English and presumably other European traders in West Africa used much the same means as Christiansborg to establish and maintain relationships. Cassar marriages were originated by the Portuguese, the costume was well-established by the mid-17th century and Christiansborg's founding, gift-giving was a near-universal practice in these mercantile and diplomatic settings, and the trade being both a method of maintaining relationships and the goal of having those relationships was also the case in other European mercantile endeavours in the Trans-Atlantic Trade. None of these individually are unique to Christiansborg.

However, Christiansborg was in a very different situation to the Dutch, the English, the French and the Portuguese forts, and more comparable to the short-lived Swedish and Brandenburger ones. In the 1694-1735 period, Christiansborg was the sole Danish fort, and while others had preceded it, and others would be founded later, Danish presence was always small and tenuous relative to other European companies. This coupled with their lack of military strength, meant that Christiansborg had to be much more careful than any single fort operated by the larger European companies. While Fort Creveceour and Fort James could engage in greater risks as can be seen in the Akwamu war during Wærøe's governorship,

Christiansborg had to be cautious and the importance of the alliances they did have was a great concern to them and relatively more important to the WIGC than for larger European companies. Christiansborg was both in a position where they did not have the power to engage in these riskier ventures, and that the consequence of them failing would be relatively far more devastating. While the Dutch and English would not be driven from the coast from losing a single fort, the loss of Christiansborg in this period would have meant the end of Danish presence in West Africa.

The task put upon the staff of Christiansborg was a complicated one in practice. The only aspects the directors of the West-India and Guinea Company considered, was how many slaves could the fort acquire in its dungeon for the ships, how much gold and ivory could they trade using European goods, and how solvent the operations of the fort were. In reality, the governor and secret council of Christiansborg was also tasked with surviving with little to no help from Denmark-Norway in a region of tight competition with other European companies and African powers who either used the trade to their own advantage or sought to end it. The means they had at their disposal were a few dozen European soldiers, European goods in their warehouse and infrequent resupply from Copenhagen, a stronghold with cannons, and the relationships they established and maintained with local states. The latter was vital. Christiansborg had fallen to an African power in 1693, and this shaped their diplomatic entanglements for several decades to come. But this fall was only a proof of the situation that existed since the establishment of the Danish-Norwegian slave trade in the 1650s. They were a weak power, and needed to maintain friendships, as they called it, to survive.

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Short forms used (archive and printed sources):

V.-g.K.: Vestindisk-Guinesisk Kompagni (West-Indian and Guinea Company)

V.-g.K., D.: Vestingisk-Guinesisk Kompagni, Direktionen (West-Indian and Guinea Company, Directorship)

K.G.G.: Det Kgl. Guvernement på Guineakysten (The Royal Government of the Coast of Guinea)

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Figures:

Figure 1:

Rigsarkivet i Danmark, Rentekammeret: Kort og tegninger (1600-1920), Vestindien. 337 704 Kort over de danske besiddelser i Guinea samt allierede afrikanske nationer 1802, tegnet af P.

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Figure 2:

Rigsarkivet i Danmark, Rentekammeret: Kort og tegninger (1600-1920), Vestindien. 337 714 Tegning af Christiansborg Udateret, tegner uoplyst. Accessed digitally https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=20104124#283215,55099248, last accessed 11.11.2022

Figure 3:

Rigsarkivet i Danmark, Rentekammeret: Kort og tegninger (1600-1920), Vestindien. 337 725 Plan over Christiansborg, projekt Ca. 1731, tegner uoplyst. Accessed digitally https://www.sa.dk/ao-soegesider/da/billedviser?epid=20104124#283214,55099247, last accessed 11.11.2022

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