

Mechanisms of Movement Emergence and Sustainability in Russia

*A Case Study of the Shiyes Protests in
Arkhangelsk Region, 2018-2020*

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Abstract

In the wake of the predominantly Moscow-centered protests in 2011-2012 against the falsification of the 2011 parliamentary elections, a wave of protests in the Russian periphery of the “silent majority”, widely assumed to underpin President Putin’s political power, erupted. Using one of the largest regional protests in modern Russian history as a case – the protest movement in Arkhangelsk region against the planned construction of a landfill near the abandoned railway station Shiyes – this thesis investigates mechanisms triggering protests in Russia in which an understudied section of the Russian society participated.

Moving beyond the cause-effect model of studying protests in Russia which implies that contentious actions starts with a “spark”, this thesis examines the complex interactions between the Russian authorities and the Shiyes social movement through the conceptual lens of poststructuralism. Under the difficult structural conditions in Russia, this thesis demonstrates that there are social structures that constitute social life, such as a dominant emotional regime, that may serve as a mobilizational opportunity. Examining successive interactions between the Russian authorities and the Shiyes social movement using contentious episode analysis and cultural frame analysis on articles covering the protests and protest groups in VKontakte, this thesis suggests that the authorities’ continuous efforts to engineer desired expressions of emotions regarding the Shiyes construction project in public created mobilizational opportunities for the protest movement. Rather than employing harsh repression, this thesis demonstrates that the authorities attempted to contain the protests by engineering and sustaining a pluralism of emotional management styles sending mixed messages and attempting to discourage escalation. These state-led efforts were then perceived by the movement and successfully framed as a problem that needed fixing and, thus, a cause for protesting. These findings change the way we understand protest mechanisms and regime repression in Putin’s Russia.

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As the saying goes, “it takes a village to raise a child”. Yes, it is a cliché but my personal experience of writing this master’s thesis truly reflects that saying. First of all, many thanks are due to my supervisor Geir Flikke at the University of Oslo, Institute for literature, area studies, and languages for seeing potential in the thesis idea and for encouraging me through this process. Being one of the few experts on Russian protest movements in Norway I felt very lucky to have had you as my supervisor.

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Writing on a topic related to Russia in times of Putin’s full-scale war on Ukraine has not been easy. The war came as a shock and struck hard both mentally and physically. Having relatives in Ukraine and Russia, I felt concerned about their lives and well-being. Writing about a regional protest in the Russian woods did not seem relevant to the new reality that was dawning on Europe. However, with the so-called annexation of the four Ukrainian regions and the “partial” mobilization in September 2022 in which Putin’s regime made desperate efforts to engineer very specific forms of support for their actions, I realized that maybe this thesis was not a completely waste of time after all.

Keeping my spirits up, cooking dinner, and showering me with love and care through tough times, Egil has been by my side. Thank you!

Daniella Slabinski

Oslo, November 2022

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1 Introduction

In 2018 sweeping mass protests erupted in the northern city of Arkhangelsk at a scale that the region had never seen before. At its apex, an estimated 25,000-30,000 people protested the planned construction of a 5,000 acres landfill deep in the forests of Arkhangelsk region near the abandoned village of Shiyes to accommodate excess waste from overfilled landfills in Moscow (Nilsen 2018; Dobrynin 2018). After more than two years of sustained protests across the entire region from the two large cities Arkhangelsk and Severodvinsk to rural cities and settlements, the Governor of Arkhangelsk region, Igor Orlov, was forced into resignation and the construction of the landfill was successfully stopped. To this date, the events in Arkhangelsk region constituted one of the largest mass protests in the wake of the Moscow-centered 2011-13 “For Fair Elections” protest cycle against the falsification of the 2011 legislative election results – a benchmark moment in the modern history of mass protests in Russia. The Arkhangelsk protests caught many observers by surprise, not least because of their unexpected mobilizational success, outcome, and geographical location in the Russian “periphery”.

The puzzle of the mass protests in Arkhangelsk region is emphasized by their mismatch with prior expectations on protest potential in the Russian regions. In fact, several scholars hold that the lack of positive effects of modernization in the Russian regions disincentivize people from protesting; the “poor” people of the regions fear that protests will only lead to societal destabilization and economic dislocation as experienced in the 90s (Kramer 2013; Busygina and Filippov 2015, 214). In the same vein, emphasizing conflicting interests between the modern metropolises and the backward regions, Mikhail Dmitriev and Daniel Treisman argue that the periphery outside Moscow and St. Petersburg “have no appetite for the noisy street politics” and “even less desire to join them” rendering it unlikely for large protests to occur in the regions. Others, such as Natalia Zubarevich (2013), see protest potential in the Russian regions but only under certain structural conditions.

Based on the agglomeration effect, in which, the size of a city accelerates modernization processes, she identifies four different Russias, each coupled with a distinct set of factors that could trigger public unrest. While she expects a higher likelihood of mass protests in large

cities with a population larger than 500,000 (First Russia) in favor of institutional changes prompted by fear of societal stagnation, smaller cities with a population between 50,000 and 250,000 (Second Russia) are more likely to see mass protests in demand of socio-economic changes in times of economic crises. In areas dominated by rural villages and settlements, (Third Russia) she sees minimal protest potential as barriers to modernization are too great. And lastly, she places the underdeveloped republics of North Caucasus and South Siberia (Fourth Russia) into a separate category where the agglomeration effect has less explanatory power. In this part of Russia, social problems are so severe that the regions will remain a constant source of instability (Zubarevich 2013). With a population of a little under 350,000, Arkhangelsk belongs somewhere between the First and Second Russia. However, the timing of the protests did not coincide with a sudden economic downturn and the demography of Arkhangelsk does not consist of a population typically associated with the urban middle class in favor of societal modernization. Yet, a sudden upsurge in protest activity in Arkhangelsk region still materialized despite its socioeconomic status as a predominantly industrial region dominated by blue-collar workforce with little recent protest experience as compared to the metropolises of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

The fact that the emergence and sustainability of these protests have not been sufficiently explained, other than as “nonpolitical conflicts” (Kolesnikov 2019), illustrates that protests beyond the metropolises is an understudied research field and demands further inquiry. Traditionally, research on protest activity in Russia has been centered around the two urban metropolises of St. Petersburg and Moscow despite empirical evidence from 2018 showing that a majority of protest activity actually take place in the regions (Lankina 2018; Lankina and Voznaya 2015). A notable example includes the extensive research on the protest movement “For Fair Elections” (2011-2013) (Smyth 2020; Greene 2013; Alyukov et al. 2014; Oates 2013; Koesel and Bunce 2012; Robertson 2013; Chaisty and Whitefield 2013). As valuable as this research has been for scholarly literature on protests and social movements in Russia, it has inadvertently crystallized the idea of urban protests belonging to the reform-hungry, politically conscious urban middle class, while the Russian regions are perceived as the home of the “silent majority” – the new electoral base underpinning President Putin’s political power (Matveev 2014, 187). A “center-centered” research focus on protest events in Russia, thus, reproduces and reifies the subordination of the Russian periphery to the

metropolises and is less useful when trying to understand why the “silent majority” is not so silent anymore.

In this sense the Shiyes protest movement is an interesting case for the study of protest emergence and sustainability in Russia. Its supporters and participants may be understood as representatives of the “silent majority” and the geographical focal point of the protest is in the Russian heartland – also known as the periphery. Moreover, of all the regional grassroots protest movements in Russia since the “For Fair Elections” movement in 2011 – 2012, the Shiyes protest movement is in the top tier as to the number of participants and duration exemplifying an “extreme” case – it shows unusual values of certain defined variables (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 297), see table 1. Being an extreme case, the Shiyes protests should provide higher degree of empirical variation which, in turn, should allow for causal patterns to be made more clear (Levy 2008, 7).

Table 1. List of largest and longest grassroots protests in the Russian regions after 2011.

Year	Region	Topic	# Protesters	# Months
2018 – 2020	Arkhangelsk	Construction of Shiyes landfill	25,000-30,000	24
2019	Sverdlovsk	Protecting green spaces in Yekaterinburg	3,000-5,000	3
2020	Bashkortostan	Protecting Kushtau sacred hill from mining activity	3,000	1
2020-2021	Khabarovsk krai	The arrest of Governor Sergei Furgal	30,000-35,000	14

Source: Girsh, Artem, Anastasija Reutova. 2019. “Protivniki hrama obustrajvajutsja v skvere.” *Kommersant.ru*, 15.05.2019. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3968897>. Varenik, Yaroslav. 2018. “Organizatory Dnja protestov: v Pomor'e na mitingi vyshlo okolo 30 tysjach chelovek.” *29.ru*, 02.12.2018. <https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/12/02/65691161/>. Zurman, Oleg. 2019. “Bez «Sodovoj», pozhalujsta. Kak jekoaktivisty otstojali shihan Kushtau.” *Mediazona.ru*, 17.08.2020. <https://zona.media/article/2020/08/16/kushtau>. Novaya Gazeta. 2020. “V Habarovskom krae prohodjat mnogotysjachnye akcii v podderzhku arestovannogo gubernatora Furgala.” *Novaya Gazeta.ru*, 11.07.2020.¹ <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/07/11/162938-v-habarovskom-krae-prohodyat-aktsii-v-podderzhku-arestovannogo-gubernatora-sergeya-furgala>.

¹ Transliterations from Russian to English follow the standard format of GOST 7.79 B. Shiyes follows an atypical transliteration since the standard format does not account for the “ye” sound in word. Other words with an already established format of transliteration, such as Arkhangelsk, will follow the most common transliteration in the English language.

To reach to the core of how the Shiyes protest movement came to be in the first place and how it grew so large, I will investigate its emergence and sustainability by combining two strands of theoretical frameworks in a new and novel way: social movement theory and the sociological concept of emotional regimes. This choice was made due to two considerations: the unique features of the Russian authoritarian regime and the inadequate explanatory power of traditional social movement theory on the magnitude of the Shiyes protests. A common critique of social movement theory is its “democracy bias” due to its assumption that successful mobilization is contingent on the ability of social movements to garner as many scarce mobilizational resources as possible in a “free and competitive market” (Warkotsch 2014, 28). In the Russian authoritarian regime, which throughout this thesis will be understood through Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way’s (2010) conceptualization of competitive authoritarianism where the incumbent’s abuse of the state apparatus places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents, an unproportionate amount of resources and access to the political and economic elite is controlled by the incumbent. Moreover, repressive measures are put in place to restrict civil society from challenging the regime. The uneven playing field between the incumbent and any challenger, necessitates a framework that may account for this.

When explaining protest emergence, social movement theory is interested in illuminating the triggering factors or conditions. Some scholars emphasize the role of cognition in the way injustice in our surroundings are being perceived (Gurr 1970) or in the way certain “injustice frames” redirect and guide our way of judging certain social issues and appeal to certain emotions (Gamson 1992, 7; Jasper 1999, 91) as a catalyzing factor driving collective action. Others, such as Zubarevich (2013), stress the role of modernization in changing people’s values and expectations towards governance and their state leaders. And lastly, political process theorists emphasize the importance of mobilizational resources (dense social network, material resources) and political channels of influence (elite allies, elite divisions) to grow a social movement (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Beissinger 2002; Tarrow 2011; Koesel and Bunce 2012). Although all of these factors are important ingredients in movement emergence, their explanatory power stops once the movement has taken off.

To be sure, events during the life cycle of a movement must be of some importance to its emergence and sustainability, particularly the reactions of the opponent the movement is challenging. To be able to explain the unique intensity and length of the Shiyes protests, I draw from the interactionist approach as conceptualized by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly in the seminal volume *Dynamics of Contention* (2001) and further developed and operationalized by Hanspeter Kriesi, Swen Hutter and Abel Bojar (2019; Bojar and Kriesi 2021). They study collective action through the optics of “contentious politics” which addresses the interactive relation between social movements and state actors. What the scope of conventional factors of protest or movement emergence does not cover, is the close description of successive actions and reactions during contentious episodes that trigger new sequences of actions and reactions, see figure 1 for a schematic model. But while McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly focus on uncovering and mapping common processes and causal mechanisms across different types of contentious episodes (ethnic mobilization, revolutions, wars and social movements etc.) and Bojar and Kriesi (2021) zoom in on the strategic choices of governments’ and challengers’ action repertoires, I have adjusted their theoretical concepts in a novel way that allows for an examination of the way complex contentious interaction between the Russian regime and a popular challenger, the Shiyes protest movement, create a stream of new mobilizational opportunities. I argue that in the absence of material, social, and political resources, the Shiyes movement was able to mobilize and sustain itself due to mobilizational opportunities that were created as a result of successive interactions with the authorities. Specifically, it was the manner in which the authorities tried to manage public unrest by disengaging people from challenging the authorities that created these opportunities.




Figure 1. Schematic example of interactive model.

The interactive approach allows for a new and more nuanced examination into the common way of thinking about regime responses to protest emergence in Russia. Although more recent research has expanded our understanding of the regime’s action repertoire towards emerging protests, for instance by consciously seeking to mobilize Russians in support of regime objectives through state-mobilized movements (cf. Greene and Robertson 2020), a common outlook on protests in Russia and other authoritarian regimes is that they are met with efforts to prevent any public displays of protest and to quell them when they occur (Robertson 2009; 2010). This way of interpreting protest dynamics in Russia is informed by the nature of authoritarian regimes themselves; any signs of public unrest might question the invincibility of the regime. Although repression is a key element of state response to protests, the magnitude and length of the Shiyes protest movement and its ability to diffuse repressive measures calls for a deeper dive into the regime’s action repertoire.

As Elena Chebankova (2011, 320) argues, a central part of disengagement strategies in Russian state-society relations is the instrumentalization of the public space where the state creates a certain climate of public opinion, “establishing ‘appropriate’ behavioral patterns and influencing people’s preferences”. Sociologist William Reddy (2001, 129), one of the representatives of the “emotional turn” in the social sciences, have conceptualized engineering of the public sphere by approaching the matter from the angle of emotional regimes – “[t]he set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and ‘emotives’ that express and inculcate them”. Through social interaction, individuals and collectives adapt norms of emotional expression. Each society is governed by one (or more) emotional regimes (Reddy 2001). However, certain utterances or practices may alter the dominant emotional regime. Building on the work of Reddy, I argue that the authorities, during the course of the Shiyes protests, became increasingly involved in directing people into “appropriate” norms of emotional expression in public settings by way of their statements and actions, i.e. airing grievances in public. Specifically, I argue that the Shiyes protests were triggered by the Russian regime itself by its efforts to redirect Russians into desirable ways of expressing discontent in public, thus changing the emotional regime, and creating mobilizational opportunities for the protest movement. The state-influenced changes to the emotional regime were then perceived by the movement and successfully framed as a problem that needed fixing, ultimately creating new opportunities for mass mobilization previously non-existent or unperceived.

This thesis will investigate *how emotional regimes can be studied as a mechanism triggering the emergence and sustainability of social movements in Russia* using the Shiyes social movement as a case study.

Accordingly, it answers the following two sub-questions:

- How did changes to the emotional regime trigger protest mobilization in Arkhangelsk?
- How were changes to the emotional regime framed in a way that triggered and sustained protests in Arkhangelsk?

These questions will be examined through a multi-method approach in two steps. First, to trace changes in the emotional regime I will employ the method of contentious episode analysis (CEA) as developed by Hanspeter Kriesi, Swen Hutter, and Abel Bojar (2019). I

introduce the concept of emotional regimes to CEA in a way that allows for a novel way to analyze the Russian regime's repression repertoire. Government actors' statements and actions – what Reddy (2001) calls “emotives” – related to the protest movement will be systematized and coded to reveal causal chains of interaction between state actors who express certain emotives and the reactions of the Shiyes movement. This way, CEA combines quantitative and qualitative elements in a new and robust way to reveal mechanisms leading up to the emergence of the Shiyes movement.

The second step of the multi-method approach, answering the second sub-question, entails a cultural frame analysis of how changes to the emotional regime were strategically framed to mobilize Russians to the Shiyes protest movement both during the emergent stages of the movement's life cycle and during periods of heightened repression. I introduce a poststructuralist outlook on the mediated features of emotional regimes between government actors and the movement, and the way frames define changes to the emotional regime as a problem and a cause for mobilization. A selection of four protest events based on the mapping of the interaction between the Russian regime and the protest movement in the first step will be the object of the frame analysis.

I will proceed by first outlining the gaps within research of protests and social movements in Russia in chapter 2. Chapter 3 details the need to adjust social movement theory to the context of the Russian authoritarian regime and develops a theoretical framework for studying social movements in Russia with an interpretative lens drawn from the tradition of poststructuralism and combining the concept of emotional regimes and an adjusted version of cultural frames. Before moving on to the empirical two-step analysis of the Shiyes protests in chapter 5, the methods of contentious episode analysis and cultural frame analysis will be introduced and operationalized to the study of changing emotional regimes. Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the analysis, discusses how the thesis contributes to the literature and reflects on its implications for future research.

2 Literature Review

Studies of protests and mass mobilization has generated a vast body of literature which has distinguished numerous conditions needed for the emergence and sustainability of collective action. The most commonly defined conditions in the literature are the existence of objective grievances in the form of high and rising economic inequality (Opp 1988); subjective grievances that emerge when there is a gap between expectations of future economic wellbeing and actual economic achievement (Gurr 1968; 1970; Finkel and Rule 1986); material and social resources that can be used to expand the movement and garner support from bystanders (McCarthy and Zald 1977); political opportunities (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996a; Tarrow 1996); and lastly, a diffusion of modern values in which people start placing greater emphasis on political participation and civil rights (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Way 2008). These generally defined conditions have by various authors been adjusted to the Russian context to elucidate protest in Russia. Yet, for various reasons they do not sufficiently explain the emergence of the Shiyes protest nor provide a robust model on the mechanisms leading up to protest in Russia – gaps in the literature that this thesis aims to fill.

Centering the focus on the importance of grievances (both objective and subjective), a common approach to the study of mass protests within a Russian context is through the assumption that a set of “social contracts” govern state-society relations rather than democratic institutions ruled by rule of law (Greene 2017; Zubarevich 2013; Dmitriev and Treisman 2012; Lipman 2011). These must not be mistaken for the Hobbesian or Rousseauan social contracts which seek to explicate the willingness of the “free” man of nature to subjugate himself to the authority of the state in return for certain political rights and obligations (see Hobbes 1996; Rousseau 1996). To quote Alexey Makarkin (2011, 1461), “the social bargain [...] [*sotsial'nyi kontrakt*] has a predominantly socio-economic character, and unlike the classic ‘social contract’ [*obshchestvennyi dogovor*] does not directly concern political questions”. In the Russian context, the social contract generally refers to a bargain between the powers at be and the citizenry in which the former promises to tolerate bad governance, corruption, and limited formal political rights in return for social security and a certain level of quality of life. The main argument is that violation of a “social contract” that might cause a damaging effect on people’s welfare by the authorities or big businesses associated with them, destabilizes the state-society equilibrium, and might set in motion efforts to mobilize collective resistance.

Samuel A. Greene (2017) distinguishes between three such sets, each with the aim of pleasing a defined social group: the elite (centered around rent distribution), the urban middle class (centered around the provision of liberal modernization), and lastly, the broad masses (centered around a promise of “non-interference” and guarantees of economic and social stability in exchange for ceding unchecked authority to the Kremlin). Relevant to the question of the emergence of mass protests driven by regular Russians are the “social contracts” regulating the relationship with the broad masses and the urban middle class. Proponents of this approach operate within a dichotomy between the two social classes: the broad masses engage in collective action when the authorities cause “bread-and-butter” grievances, i.e. by “disrupt[ing] the social and economic conditions to which citizens have become accustomed to” (Evans 2012; 2018), while the urban middle class is galvanized into mass protests when the authorities fail to fulfill promises of delivering political reforms (Robertson 2013; Greene 2013; Volkov 2012; Alyukov et al. 2014). Although these findings seem to fit a pattern of protest potential in Russia and might even echo what many Russians themselves believe, they do not fully explain protest movements with a diverse set of claims, such as the Shiyes protest movement.

First of all, the construction of the landfill is not a typical “bread-and-butter” grievance, nor a typical civic or political issue. To be sure, the landfill would impact the lives of the nearest villagers by destroying hunting and picking grounds and contaminating the soil. However, the villagers had other huge land areas they could hunt and pick from and the social impact from the landfill over 500 km away from the city dwellers in Arkhangelsk and Severodvinsk was less obvious. On the other hand, although the protest could be labeled as an environmental movement, it quickly developed into an anti-regime protest, and in some instances even included demands for dignity and participation in local political processes – characteristics often attributed to the urban creative elite. The “social contracts” presuppose that it is possible to place anyone into a social category, and vice versa, that each and every one identifies with one particular social class. Thus, the weakness of the grievance approach is its reliance on normative labels that can lead to label-stretching and, in worst case, poor understanding of the real conditions for the emergence and sustainability of protests in Russia. Moreover, the approach does not account for the compounded combination of grievances and claims as a feature that needs to be understood and studied on its own terms, neither does it adequately explain why protest does not emerge in the numerous instances where these social contracts were violated.

The second common approach to studying mass protests in Russia is closely related to social movement theory (which will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter). This approach examines mass protests from the vantage point that all protest actors have agency and seek the most efficient ways to reach certain strategic goals. Whether a social movement succeeds in mobilizing people into collective action is dependent on the political, social, and cultural environment it operates in – it can either be conducive to mass protests or unfavorable to it. For instance, some scholars like Laura Henry (2010; 2006), Jan Matti Dollbaum (2020) and Vladimir Gel'man (2015) argue that the ability of social movement organizations (SMOs) to mobilize people into collective action in Russia is contingent on structural openings in the political system which are perceived by SMOs. While appreciating the agency attributed to the SMOs and the importance of opportunities in building sustainable organizations that are able to stay true to their mission in the *longue durée*, these studies do not explain the emergence of mass mobilization where more or less formalized social movement organizations are not the driving force behind it. If we are to understand the rise of grassroots movements, I argue that an account of mass mobilization of “apolitical” Russians – a term often used by Russians themselves to delimit the boundary between involvement in the personal and the public spheres, in which the apolitical relates to the aversion of involvement into what is perceived to be political (cf. Zhelnina 2014) – should turn to the mechanisms leading up to their transformation into civically conscious citizens engaged in collective claim-making.

To underscore my point, studies based on social movement theory approach this question as a “black box” where protest emergence constitutes the output and political opportunities and resources are input factors. As an example, Gel'man (2015) emphasizes the importance of movement leaders to perceive openings in the political environment. However, for someone to first perceive an opportunity opening and then to seize it, conditioning or politicization of the individual prior to the opening is necessary. In examining the conditions for the diffusion of national social movements to local groups outside the metropolises, Dollbaum's (2020) findings reveal that the existence of local organizational entities in the regions constitutes a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a social movement. And lastly, Henry's (2010; 2006) research on patterns of organizational forms of environmental NGOs in Russia shows that even though exogenous factors, such as the level of repression, elite access and availability of organizational resources (skilled manpower, money, social network, etc.) are decisive in the choice of organizational form to overcome specific external challenges and in

the success of connecting to the broad masses, the overall mobilizational level across the regions remains low. This suggests that the road to mass mobilization in Russia remains somewhat unexplored. Firstly, even though an SMO has the resources and the opportunities to mobilize support for its claims they do not automatically lead to protest emergence. Secondly, the approach does not zoom in on the processes occurring in the “black box” in which a movement and its leaders somehow break through to the broad masses and engage them.

A frequent response to this, is to focus on politicized events that spark protests. In ethnographic studies of how ordinary Russians become involved in activism or protests in an “apolitical society” some of the protest literature points to how “moral shocks” or feelings of indignation – a concept first coined by the sociologist James Jasper denoting the effect of sudden or gradual events that may be so emotionally moving or morally reprehensible that people feel they must join in collective claim-making (Jasper 1999) – triggered by events in people’s immediate environment constitutes a critical factor for the formation of activist initiative groups and social movements (Clément 2013; 2015; 2019; Gabowitsch 2017).

Related to this approach, Geir Flikke, in examining what jolts people into participating in mass protests, has contributed to the literature on Russian protests by emphasizing how government modernization processes can spark contentious action and framing processes—the meaning-making work of social movements which draws from culturally specific symbols and references that redefine the lens through which the world is interpreted (2021). Studying the “rubbish protests” in the regions of Moscow and Arkhangelsk, he finds that the power of framing processes lies in the way they challenge the dominant reality that they operate in (greatly aided by social media), and thus, can create new mobilizational opportunities in contexts with less-conducive environments for mass protests and few mobilizational resources. Such events may, or may not, be political; an emotionally striking and absurd frame that resonates with potential protesters may compel them to adopt contentious repertoires, such as with the monstrations—youthful protest events that took place every May in Russia (Flikke 2017). Furthermore, in his work on the movement led by Alexey Navalny, Flikke demonstrates that social media frames also have the power to challenge the dominant mainframes in a game of cat and mouse with the authorities (2020).

These findings show that framing is a central condition for mass protests in the Russian regime and an area of contestation in opposition to a dominant mainframe. However, frame analysis has certain limits. In itself frame analysis is inadequate in explaining the process

leading up to and sustaining mass mobilization: it is not adequate in studying the steps leading from aggravation to collective action. Nor is it in itself sufficient to analyze the complex, interactive game between contentious events and the authorities' attempts to contain protests, which is not limited to coercion only.

An interesting effort to explain the dynamics of protest in Putin's Russia is that of Mischa Gabowitsch in his monograph *Protest in Putin's Russia* in which he examines the emergence and specific features of the "For Fair Elections" movement in 2011-13 (2017). Trying to connect the importance of "emotional shocks" and feelings of anger to the central place that framing held in the strategic effort to mobilize public support, Gabowitsch argues that the movement was shaped by the emotional regime established under Putin's rule (2017, 68). Not only was the movement an attempt to manage the emotions of an aggrieved group of people into political forms but it was just as much "a challenge to the emotional regime established under Putin" (Gabowitsch 2017, 68). This was, among other things, reflected in the slogans and framing of the movement which tapped into the dichotomy between the "public" and "private" spheres challenging the notion of feelings of indignation and frustration as purely private affairs. Moreover, many of the slogans were not strictly related to election fraud but were combinations of many different grievances. As suggested by Gabowitsch (2017), the magnitude of the "For Fair Elections" movement, was not strictly a result of Russians being preoccupied in electoral fraud, but because they were fed up with the emotional regime enforced by the political regime of Putin and internalized by the society restricting social norms of emotional expressions of certain grievances in public.

Similar observations could be made at the Shiyes protests and several other protests in Russia: people often target different problems and air a variation of grievances at public protests suggesting that a key to understanding protest in Russia is by understanding the role of emotional regimes as an object of contention. But where Gabowitsch's application of the concept is limited by the scope of his examination, namely to move beyond journalistic clichés and answer the question of what the protests were *really* about applying emotional regimes as a cultural-structural condition fixed in time, I suggest approaching the concept of emotional regimes as a condition shaped through a dynamic process. As socially constructed norms of emotional expressions in public, emotional regimes are constantly changing in mediation between (among others) state actors and civil society broadly understood. The

dynamism of emotional regimes is, thus, an understudied dimension of Gabowitsch's application of the concept that this thesis will explore.

To sum up, framing processes are central in jolting people into collective action by providing them with an alternative interpretation of the reality that challenges the dominant mainframes in society, while emotional regimes serve as an important condition for any engagement in collective claim-making forming its shape and acting as both an impediment and an opportunity for protests. What ties these two concepts together is the notion of interaction and contention. While framing processes presuppose a dynamic between the social movement and the authorities in which the formulation of new frames are done in opposition to counter frames, emotional regimes entail reactions to social challenges that question the dominant social norms that govern society. The former is commonly applied to analyze social movements, the latter has, within the Russian context of mass protests, been applied to study the challenge posed by Putin's regime to social movements. However, neither is sufficient by itself in explaining the emergence and sustainability of mass protests in Russia, such as the Shiyes protests.

My approach will demonstrate that both frameworks are needed to explain mass mobilization in Russia. To explore how framing processes and emotional regimes join in the process of contention, the thesis will combine the two frameworks in a way that has not been done before. Building on the dynamic presupposition embedded in them, I believe a more comprehensive picture will emerge by examining the interplay between the actions of the Russian regime and the Shiyes social movement. Although Flikke (2017; 2020) has touched upon the dynamic between the authorities and the challengers, the game of cat and mouse between the authorities' efforts to contain mass protests and the innovative way the movements overcome these efforts by reframing their repressive actions as an opportunity for collective claim-making, the mechanisms and processes that connect the two in a contentious episode is left unspecified. My contribution to the literature on social movements in Russia will thus be to systematize this interaction in a rigorous model, where the cause-effect model implied in suggestions that contentious action starts with a "spark" is replaced by a complex interaction between authorities and challengers.

Finally, this thesis will contribute to more knowledge on protest potential in Russia by also examining the dynamics of collective action past the emergence of a movement. While social movement theory is mostly preoccupied with studying the emergence of social movements,

this thesis will also extend to the study of their sustainability in the context of the Russian regime's efforts at disengaging people from participating in the Shiyes protests. However, Guobin Yang (2005, 79) argues that protest sustainability should be studied as a separate field of study because they involve a different set of causal dynamics than in their emergence. His argument is supported by one of the leading scholars on social movement theory, Doug McAdam (1982, 53–57), who holds that movement emergence should be analyzed as “the end product of a specified causal sequence”, while the core aspect of studying movement sustainability entails how the movement itself affects the external factors that first made emergence possible. This thesis will demonstrate that a sharp distinction between the two is artificial: both movement emergency and movement sustainability involves contention and interaction with the authorities. In addition, such a sharp distinction necessitates a clear definition of the “outbreak moment” of a movement – the point in which the movement is no longer in its natal stage but in a process of sustaining itself. In an authoritarian, Russian context, where efforts of public disengagement by the regime is an ongoing process, I argue that movement emergence and sustainability are two intertwining and simultaneous processes – to the point where it may not be effective to sharply distinguish between the two.

3 Theoretical Foundations

To what degree is social movement theory able to explain movement emergence and sustainability in an authoritarian context such as Russia? In this chapter I will introduce the most common approaches to studying social movements and argue that an adjustment of existing theory is necessary for an authoritarian context. I suggest that an innovative combination of two theoretical frameworks, cultural frames, and emotional regimes, provide a fruitful outlook on emergence and sustainability of protests in Russia. Before introducing this new framework for studying protests in Russia, I will start by defining the Shiyes protests as a social movement.

3.1 Defining a Social Movement

Throughout the first two chapters, the unit of analysis of this thesis has gone under several names: mass mobilization, mass uprisings, mass unrest, mass protest, protest movement, collective action, social movement, protest etc. The term “social movement theory” indicates that the unit of analysis is a social movement. However, within the research field of social movements, a variety of different terms accompanied by a diversity of definitions have traditionally been in use such as “social movement”, “social movement organization”, and “challenging group” (cf. Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 2011). Common to many of these terms is that they seek to capture the phenomena of “joint action of individuals that does not take place regularly, whose aim is to achieve goals by putting pressure on third parties” (Opp 2009, 36). To delineate from individuals that join in contentious politics that one normally does not associate with social movements, such as political parties or lobby groups, Sidney Tarrow (2011, 6) stresses that the object of study is a phenomena in which “ordinary people try to exert power by contentious means”. The Shiyes movement is clearly a social movement phenomenon in which individuals come together to oppose the construction of the Shiyes landfill by putting pressure on third parties, such as the construction company and the Russian authorities. Throughout the thesis, the term “social movement” will be used to avoid confusion.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that social movements are “not well-bounded phenomena” (Oliver and Myers 2006, 4). Moving beyond a strictly “positional approach” in which social movement are understood as consisting of a cohesive unit with its own internal

processes, identity, and strategy, I will draw from a relational approach that studies social movements as social networks sharing a common identity (Saunders 2007, 227; Isa and Himelboim 2018, 4; Diani 1992). A social network is formed when social actors connect with each other by sharing information, opinions, feelings, and act together (Isa and Himelboim 2018, 4). In practice, this means that a social movement may consist of different social groups connected through both formal and informal ties such as groups of friends, family, like-minded individuals on social media, formal organizations, neighborhood cooperatives etc.

The question of who to include as a unit of analysis is closely related to the question of what to analyze. What kind of actions should be included in the analysis of the Shiyes movement? A common way of delineating actions typically associated with social movements is to exclude any formalized complaint-making or contention such as voting or political negotiations between political parties or parliament members. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, 11) suggest to only include contentious actions or “sustained campaign of collective claim-making” outside institutional settings. Or as Gamson (1975, 3) would say, “politics by other means”.

However, as is alluded by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly specific forms of contention are highly shaped by the political system it emerges in. As Lynette J. Chua (2012, 714) notes, “[c]ompared to more democratic and rights-friendly environments, the state [in authoritarian regimes] plays a more pronounced role in influencing movement strategy and tactics (...)”, rendering the traditional separation between institutionalized and extra-institutionalized forms of contention less useful in authoritarian regimes. One important example is the role of the legal system and complaint-making to administrative services (*zhaloby*) as an arena of contention in the Russian society (Henry 2012). The function of the legal system is dualistic: on the one hand, new authoritarian systems are more likely to resort to the law “rather than simply violence, to coerce and constrain” protest, while Russians often pursue social rights through litigation or by lodging complaints against authorities as “litigation is a way to make political claims in a nonpolitical way” (van der Vet 2018, 307; Hendley 2015, 547). A tendency in which social movements mobilize law as a resource to advance claims is not necessarily unique in authoritarian contexts but seems to be more pronounced since legal constraints in such political systems shape social movements. Drawing on this insight, I will include both extra-institutional and institutional forms of collective claim-making in my analysis of the mechanisms driving the emergence and sustainability of the Shiyes movement.

3.2 Social Movement Theory (SMT)

A common theoretical framework for studying social movements is through social movement theory which first emerged in the 1960s as a result of a pan-disciplinary effort by sociologists and political scientists to understand the US civil rights movement and the student protest movement in Europe. It was formulated as a direct criticism of previous efforts at explaining mass mobilization which rested on a notion of it being a result of socioeconomic decline and social disintegration. Great societal transformations, such as modernization and industrialization, would create grievances in certain segments of the society that were not compensated for by new mechanisms of social integration (Johnston 2014).

In his conceptualization of “relative deprivation”, Gurr (1970) proposed that perceived discrepancy between what people think they should achieve and what they indeed have achieved is translated into psychological mechanisms in which deprived men, lacking political influence, riot. Since then, the study of social movements has developed, and new explanatory models have come to the fore and merged into what is today labeled as social movement theory. Not being a full-fledged theoretical framework, it rather consists of several theoretical perspectives that each in its unique way illuminate different dimensions integral to a social movement: its rise and fall, how it defines and makes its claims heard by its opponents, the formation of a collective identity, and the formulation of a new vision for the future. A synthesis of these sub-frameworks can be summarized in what has been called the ‘political process model’ as spearheaded by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald in their seminal edited volume *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (1996). As shown in Figure 2, the model suggests that political opportunity structures, mobilizational structures, and cultural frames influence the emergence of social movements and the way they take action.




Figure 2. Schematic representation of the political process model of social movement mobilization adapted from McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Note that the model does not indicate a unidirectional causal chain of factors enabling mass mobilization. As McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996b, 8) stress, “their effects are interactive rather than independent”. Nevertheless, for the sake of being able to dissect the model, the factors will be analyzed in a simplistic light. In the following section, this thesis will briefly present the factors in Figure 2, political opportunity structures, resource mobilizational structures, and cultural framing processes, as they have been defined in the scholarly literature on social movement theory. Then, this thesis will discuss their applicability to the authoritarian system in Russia.

3.2.1 Political Opportunity Structures

Theorists of political opportunity structures emphasize the influence of larger developments in the society on the emergence and decline of social movements. The idea, which was first introduced by Peter Eisinger (1973, 11–12) proposes that certain configurations in the

political environment may either create an opening for social mobilization or a closing. In his study of protest mobilization in American cities, he found that neither fully closed nor fully open opportunity structures generated the best environment for mobilization (Eisinger 1973, 26). He terms these external conditions structures of political opportunities and they include elements such as “the nature of the chief executive, the mode of aldermanic elections, the distribution of social skills and status, (...) the degree of social integration, (...) the climate of governmental responsiveness, and the level of community resources” (Eisinger 1973, 11). The examples listed by Eisinger point to an understanding of the opening and closing of political opportunity structures as objective shifts that have a direct causal impact on social mobilization.

In 1978, Charles Tilly developed a concept of political opportunity structures which departed from the strictly objective view to a more subjective one. He conceptualized structures of political opportunity as contingent on the actors’ perceptions (Tilly 1978). Opportunities and threats that were objectively existing, did not carry any real meaning, and thus, had no direct influence on social mobilization unless it was perceived as an opportunity or threat by the actors involved which shaped their responses (Tilly 1978). Tilly advanced an understanding of structures of political opportunity as situated *within* the strategic interaction between the challengers and the challenged. In short, they are situational, not structural.

Another departure from the classical school of thought on political opportunity structures is represented in an effort in the 1980s to differentiate between long-term and short-term processes that either enable or inhibit mass mobilization. Representing a new generation of theorists of political opportunity structures, Doug McAdam (1982, 41) posited that longer-term processes such as industrialization did not have an immediate effect on mass mobilization as proposed by the “classical theorists” but an indirect one “through restructuring of existing power relations”. Events directly facilitative of mass mobilization entailed anything possible of reducing power discrepancy between the challenger and the challenged: changes in elite access, elite divisions, elites turning to garner public support (elite allies), changes in media openness, variable enforcement of policies, and variable strategies of social control (McAdam 1982). However, for these short-term processes to be exploited by the challengers McAdam (1982, 43) argues that they need to mobilize their resources. In other words, immediate effects of political processes on mass mobilization are not the result of political opportunity structures objectively “being out there” but of

mobilizational structures enabling the challengers to create and seize opportunities. In this regard Sidney Tarrow (1996, 54) viewed political opportunities not as permanent, formal structures but rather as “consistent (...) signals to social actors or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements”. Later he took it even further by adopting an understanding of political opportunity structures as nothing more than resources employed to take advantage of broad cleavages in the society (Tarrow 2011, 29). In both conceptualizations, culturally sensitive interpretations of the political environment is necessary. The framework of mobilizational structures and cultural framing, respectively, will be dealt with in the next sub-chapters.

3.2.2 Resource-Mobilizational Structures

While theories of political opportunity structures relate to exogenous factors enabling mass mobilization, theories of mobilizational structures, also known as theories of resource mobilization (RMT), concern endogenic factors internal to the social movement. RMT represented a shift in social movements studies from a structural perspective to a perspective that acknowledged the agency of a social movement. Movement actors were considered rational but lacking conventional access to political decision-makers. To influence political outcomes, they are dependent on employing limited resources in the most strategic way.

RMT emphasizes the importance of organizational and economic influence on social movement mobilization. Proponents of RMT, such as John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977, 1216,1218), argue that the decisive factor explaining social movement mobilization is the ability of social movement to aggregate resources for collective purposes. The definition of resources was later contemplated in an article by McCarthy (1996, 141) where he referred to any “mobilizing structures” that will heighten the likelihood of a movement to successfully mobilize participants and to have an impact on public opinion. McCarthy defines these structures as both formal and informal social networks (1996, 141). In contrast to former ideas of social movements as consisting of alienated, atomized men (cf. Gurr 1970), RMT argues that the better the integration into and interconnectedness with existing social networks through which material and organizational resources and support can be generated, the better the chances of mobilization.

Social networks, which can take various forms from informal friendship networks to formal “social movement organizations (SMOs)” and everything in between, function as the

infrastructure of a movement. Depending on the type of organizational form movement leaders have to make tactical choices on how to best utilize its infrastructure to “mobilize supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers (...)” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1217).

3.2.3 Cultural Framing Processes

The emphasis on culture and framing processes in the study of social movements grew out of criticism towards theories of political opportunity structures and resource-mobilization structures. While the abovementioned theoretical frameworks study the emergence of social movements by looking at the influence of macro-level processes on micro-level processes, theorists of cultural framings suggest that micro-level processes, such as the cognitive processes of movement actors, can spark mass mobilization. Social movements are carriers and agents of ideas and values that mobilize proponents and bystanders into action (Benford and Snow 2000, 613). They employ collective action frames that, to quote the notable framing theorists Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000, 614), are defined as “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movements organizations (SMO)”. But more than carrying and formulating ideas, frames can be contentious in the sense that they involve a dynamic process of generating interpretations of the world that challenge existing ones (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). In the words of Erving Goffman (1974, 21), they enable activists “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” events in their lives and to see them in a new light. The emphasis on culturalist dimensions of social movements has been widely acknowledged and generally accepted by proponents of the political process model (cf. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996b, 8). A social movement is thus as much a product of social interaction as of structural processes.

According to proponents of framing approaches an important precondition for any collective action to take place, no matter whether political opportunities have opened or the abundance of resources garnered by a movement, is the perception of injustice or moral wrongdoing that will make people inclined to participate in political action (cf. Gamson 1992, 7). This argument is closely related to the classical idea of grievances or politicized events as a factor causing social unrest. However, for aggrieved people to take part in concrete collective action, theorists of cultural framing argue that three interpretative processes must occur (Snow and Benford 1988). First, movement actors must identify the source of the injustice or who to

attribute blame and responsibility (diagnostic frame). Secondly, a proposed solution to the problem – what is to be done – must be articulated (prognostic frame). Finally, movement actors must provide a “call to action”, a reason for engaging in making something better (motivational frame). Adherents of the political process model view the choice of a collective action frame as a strategic, rational choice. The effectiveness of a collective action frame is, therefore, dependent on its “resonance” to the audience it seeks to mobilize. Snow and Benford (2000, 624) hold that movement actors are posed with the strategic effort to align their interpretative frames with those of potential and actual constituents and bystanders.

3.3 Adjusting Social Movement Theory For an Authoritarian Context

How can social movement theory explain the emergence of mass protests in Arkhangelsk? Or, put differently, to what degree are the theoretical frameworks described above applicable to the Russian authoritarian context? Theories on political opportunity structures and resource-mobilizational structures claim to be universally applicable to any political or social context. Yet, as Jeff Goodwin, James J. Jasper and Jaswinder Khattri (1999) contend, the explanatory power of the political process model is weakened by its bias in favor of a structural approach to the causal mechanisms of its factors. In this section, I will examine how the structural bias emphasizes some dimensions of the context in which a social movement operates in more readily than others and how it affects the applicability of the political process model. After the examination, I will suggest how the model can be adjusted to yield a more fruitful analysis of what caused the rise of mass protests in Arkhangelsk.

First, if we are to envision political structures of opportunity and resource-mobilizational structures as stable, objective structures, which is how they are visualized through the terminology of “structures”, then the Russian modern context represents few such opportunities. Any changes to elite constellations, elite access and media regulations have marginal chances of opening possibilities for collective action since such channels of influence are to a large extent subjected to Putin’s power vertical – commonly understood as a monolithic centralization of power in which decision-making as well as law enforcement in politically sensitive cases are subjected to Kremlin’s grip (cf. Sakwa 2010; Ledeneva 2013; Bækken 2018). Moreover, objective organizational resources are relatively scarce with the power vertical controlling organizational resources. Low levels of domestic resources and,

particularly, restricted access to project funds for public and private NGOs critical of the regime, have hampered movement mobilization. While foreign funding has helped boost Russian civil society initiatives, it became increasingly difficult after 2012 with the tightening of regulations on civil society resulting in atomization and alienation of initiatives receiving foreign funding.

Such alienation has been vital in weakening the social networks that are the main arteria of the resource-mobilizational structures. During the last decade, Russian authorities have developed a set of strategies to contain unwanted protest activity. They have taken shape in the form of repressive responses and broad legislative and discursive backlashes to 1) demotivate potential mobilizing efforts; and 2) obstruct any efforts by movement actors to mobilize resources (cf. Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, and Henry 2018). A stark example of that is the adoption of draconian laws restricting the NGO sector. Introduced in 2012, the law on “foreign agents” required any NGO receiving foreign funds to register as a foreign agent and conduct strict and quarterly reporting. Failure to register or to report is punished with high fines, enforced dissolution, and, ultimately, imprisonment. In reality, the law has been arbitrarily enforced to target NGOs that are perceived as a threat to Putin’s regime. Starting from 2015, the law on “undesired organizations” allows the authorities to register any foreign NGO operating in Russia as and “undesired organizations” and disband its operations. Moreover, homegrown organizations cooperating or affiliated with such organizations may be punished with fines and jail terms. Those organizations that still manage to function, albeit under burdensome restrictions, also struggle with effects of marginalization and delegitimization— the term “foreign agent” is especially charged with associations of treason and espionage for foreign powers. According to data from the Russian Ministry of Justice, civic and political organizations including independent media outlets, pollsters, and human rights organizations with ties to Western countries or with an ideological alignment with ideals of Western democracy constitutes the largest group that has been targeted by these laws (Russian Ministry of Justice 2022).

Other strategies entail what Robert Horvath (2011, 2) calls “the pacification of the political landscape” which involves cooptation or neutralization of oppositional forces. Examples of such practices include the creation of “clone” or “spoiler” parties that are meant to divert votes that would go to real oppositional forces and support to state-mobilized movements such as the youth movements *Nashi* and *Idushhie Vmeste* intended to “co-op disaffected youth

and diminish the ranks of a future insurgency” or a so-called color revolution (Horvath 2011, 16). Furthermore, copycat movement, that is movements that first start as local events and subsequently copied by others who may not be associated with them, are used to redirect grassroots grievances into less threatening forms of contention. A prime example of that is Immortal Regiment, a yearly war commemoration procession during the Victory Day celebrations on May 9 launched in Tomsk in 2012. Although the initial rationale behind the movement was critical of state practices, regime representatives were quick to jump in on the procession. In 2015 President Putin joined with a portrait of his father who had served in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War and Putin’s power party, United Russia, promoted the event with their logo on promotional material for the Moscow procession (Gabowitsch 2018). Also, strategies directed at the ideational sphere, including formulation of the outlines of a state ideology of “sovereign democracy” first articulated by the founder of *Nashi* and former deputy head of the presidential administration Vladislav Surkov in 2006 depicting the Russian form of “managed” democracy as an alternative to Western liberal democracy, have delegitimized any voices or activities critical of the regime and portrayed them as a revolutionary threat concocted and controlled by the West (Horvath 2011).

Secondly, by only recognizing structural factors that may trigger movement emergence, non-structural factors have been either neglected or analyzed as though they were structural factors. This point is important because, as demonstrated above, structural factors alone prove to inhibit movement and protest emergence in Russia. One crucial example of how non-structural factors have been subsumed under structure may be seen in the way proponents of the political process model theorize framing and culture. Although culture is recognized as an important element of social movements and movement mobilization by isolating it as a separate entity under framework of cultural framing processes, it is still theorized through a structural imagery. The task of a movement is simply to “tune into” the frame which will resonate the most with its audience (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra 1999, 47). This notion is confirmed by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald who themselves see culture in narrow terms as the self-conscious activities of social movement participants, namely their strategic choices (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra 1999, 48). They make the connection between culture and framing by defining framing as “the conscious, strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996a, 6). Culture is thus limited to a

movement's internal culture such as collective identity, grievances, shared goals, and strategic choices.

What Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra (1999, 52) refer to as “conceptual stretching” of structural factors may be explicated through the underlying epistemological idea of the political process model. It builds on a combination of structuralist ideas of science and rational choice theory. Structures are conceived as real matter which constitute people and shape their actions (Benton and Craib 2010, 164); structures may thus either inhibit or allow movements from mobilizing participants to public protests as we have seen in the preceding discussion on political opportunity structures. The structuralist view, then, dismisses the significance of the acting subject in shaping these structures and concentrates on the ontological research-matter of external objects and its relation to other objects (Benton and Craib 2010, 164–65). Under this lens, culture with its malleable and ubiquitous characteristics is difficult to place. Recognizing that culture, indeed, is affecting movement mobilization but struggling to make it fit with the ontology of the political process model, its proponents, as Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra (1999) argue, have reduced culture to framing. Rational choice theory, then – a theory which assumes that social life is constructed by the “rational” choices of actors and that people will act in a way that bring them benefits and avoid acting in a way that does not bring them benefits (Benton and Craib 2010, 68, 86) – necessitates the “tuning” activity of social movements. Here the rational choice model and structuralist ideas intersect: frames that resonate the most with people are those that tap into people's attitudes, values, and worldviews which are shaped by structures that exist independently of a social movement and that constitute our social life.

However, embedded into the understanding of frames as strategic mobilizational tools, but not theorized to its full capacity, is the recognition that social movements, indeed, can influence people's understanding of the world through language. This is precisely what McAdam (1982, 48) is referring to when he speaks of “cognitive liberation” and the ways in which frames generate a cognitive process in which a person comes to realization that she needs to break out of old ways of thinking and participate in public protests. Conversely, external structures in the structuralist sense, may affect our repertoire of possible frames that we may choose from when mobilizing supporters that goes to show that frames are not always a product of calculated strategy. Goodwin, Jasper and Khattrra (1999) dissect an example by McAdam in his seminal book *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930 – 1970*

who argued that Martin Luther King Jr. employed Christian themes in a way that was highly successful in building the civil rights movement in the 1950s. They ask whether McAdam truly believed that this was part of a strategic effort, or whether perhaps King was simply formulating ideas and a worldview that was part of the cultural context he was operating in (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra 1999, 49).

A new generation of social movement theorists, such as Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, are critical to the understanding of cultural frames as either successful or unsuccessful in resonating with supporters and constituents. Similar to political opportunity structures and resource-mobilizational structures, cultural frames also either enable or inhibit collective action in ways that are not always intentional or instrumental (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra 1999, 48). Thus, without explicitly making mention of it, they point to a post-structuralist understanding of what constitutes social life. Namely, the way language and the activities of people define our (external) world and constitute structures that inhibit or engender our actions (Benton and Craib 2010, 168, 133) – an understanding which this thesis will center on.

Consequently, as also Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra (1999, 52–53) note, frames are shaped by their cultural context and the interactions between a social movement and other social actors such as the state. But while the sociologist Francesca Polletta (1999) and Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra (1999, 48) limit their understanding of the impact of culture, which they define in its larger sense as “traditions, ‘common sense’, material artefacts, idioms, rituals, news routines, know-how, identities, discourse, and speech genres”, on framing processes to the ways in which culture is embedded in mobilizational structures in the tradition of structuralism, I argue that in the context of the Russian authoritarian system, frames are best studied as discursive tools shaped by the dynamic interaction between social agents. In this way frames are constantly consolidated, adjusted, and transformed through the activities of social agents (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattrra 1999, 53). More importantly, they have the power to reframe and redefine the external world.

It is, however, important to note that this does not mean that the other factors in the political process model do not have any influence on the emergence of social movements in Putin’s Russia whatsoever. Social movements are multi-dimensional and dynamic phenomena that operate in a complex political and social context. While resources and political opportunity structures are to a large extent controlled by the regime, the process of meaning making, or

the generation of collective frames, is a tool that can never be fully controlled by the regime. Thus, following the interpretive lens of post-structuralism, I argue that social movements that are sensitive to the cultural context they operate in can create new possibilities for claim-making in environments with few structural opportunities. By shaping the perception of constituents and bystanders, framing itself can create new mobilizational opportunities for collective action previously unavailable or unseen to them. Opportunities are what movement actors make of them.

To sum up, a post-structuralist perspective to framing processes equip social movements with a possibility of altering the socially constructed reality created by its social agents and defining new possibilities. But what socially constructed reality are they working against? Next section will turn to the concept of emotional regimes as a cultural, but structurally embedded factor, specific to the authoritarian Russian regime. Here, I will introduce its role in containing protest and triggering movement emergence – an understudied aspect in the movement literature.

3.4 Emotional Regimes

The context in which a movement emerges influences its rise and development. As established in the preceding chapter, I suggest examining movement mobilization through the lens of post-structuralism and its ideas of social structures – as opposed to underlying “hard” structures – being constituted by and constitutive of social agents. Social life and society is then an outcome of individual agency and, vice versa, individual social agents are shaped by society (Benton and Craib 2010, 133). Context-specific characteristics of the environment in which movements emerge and develop, such as culture in its wider sense, imbue social life. Although theorists of the political process model have long been aware of the importance of culture and contextual factors, they have been criticized (as seen in chapter 3.3) for insisting on universal models in which underlying structures impact social movements. Despite this thesis’ criticism of structures, it is important to note that I do not dismiss structures as such. Social structures are also “structures” in the sense that they provide an interpretative lens through which individuals organize their knowledge of the world, sort out, classify and define subjects, and are maintained through the activities of social agents in virtue of their beliefs about what they are doing (Benton and Craib 2010, 134). Emotional regimes are one such

context-specific factor that shapes the dynamic of social movements that this thesis will explore further.

The concept of emotional regimes was first introduced by the historian William Reddy (2001) to describe ways in which societies construct and enforce emotional norms. His research is indicative of “the affective turn” in the social sciences which traditionally have given supremacy to empirical science while leaving emotions and internal processes of the body to the biosciences and psychology. “The affective turn” sets a new research agenda in which affect is recognized as an all-encompassing part of social life (cf. Clough 2007; Bakko and Merz 2015; Gregg and Seigworth 2020). As Clare Hemmings argue (2005), one of the many proponents of “the affective turn”, not only is the social world shaped by affect, but social life mediates affect – an aspect that Reddy is preoccupied with.

An emotional regime shapes and reflects socially constructed expectations of what emotional expressions are appropriate in which settings. Reddy (2001, 129) defines an emotional regime as a “set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime”. He establishes emotions as “largely (but not entirely) learned” (Reddy 2001, xi). “Largely” because his framework leaves room for cultural variation and “not entirely” because the concept of emotional regimes is designed to be universally applicable. Moving beyond the general examination of emotional regime and applying it to understand its role in social movement emergence and dynamics, the sociologist Helena Flam (2005, 19, 36) argues that emotions as “social, cultural and political constructs” are important because they “uphold social structures and relations of dominations”. How?

Drawing on anthropological studies, Reddy (2001, 55) suggests that one of the universal functions of a community is to construe emotions as a domain of effort, meaning that correct emotional expressions are mastered and emotional norms are conformed to as opposed to being innate and inherent. All communities “provide individuals with prescriptions and counsel concerning both *the best strategies* for pursuing emotional learning and *the proper end point or ideal* of emotional equilibrium (Reddy 2001, 55 emphasis as in original). Thus, all emotional regimes consist of (1) a set of collectively shared goals to strive for; (2) a set of instructions on how to obtain mental and bodily control (a code of conduct); and lastly (3) a set of ideals concerning the relation between the individual and the collectivity (Reddy 2001, 61; Jantzen et al. 2012, 140–41). In this way emotional regimes contribute to stabilizing the

relationship between the individual and the collectivity by grounding common causes and goals for acting in the world (Jantzen et al. 2012, 141). Consequently, communities including political regimes prescribe specific emotional styles “consisting of norms, ideals, rituals and vocabularies (Flam 2013, 364). Those who exhibit the expected emotions in the right settings receive formal and informal appraisal, while non-compliance may lead to stigmatization and punishment (Flam 2013, 364). When authorized emotions are expressed, imitated, and enforced they reproduce and reflect power structures (Carlström 2021, 191).

A central mechanism in which social interactions may shape individual’s feelings, thoughts and desires is through “emotives”. With emotives Reddy (2001, 105) refers to speech acts, gestures and practices that express and shape emotions. They are “themselves instruments for directly changing, building, hiding, intensifying emotions, instruments that may be more or less successful” (Reddy 2001, 105). For an utterance or a gesture to qualify as an emotive, Reddy (2001, 100–102) defines three features. It must have (1) a descriptive appearance but the statement is impossible to verify (e.g. “I am angry”); (2) a relational intent (e.g. “I am afraid of you” which may be a way of refusing to cooperate with someone or a request for a change in the relationship); and (3) a self-exploring or self-altering effect (e.g. the statement “I love you” might have been said to find out if it is true, and the “truth” or “falsehood” of the statement depends on its effect on the speaker). Such emotives can induce specific emotions into individuals and stable patterns of such expressions can induce these emotions to an entire collectivity. In this sense, emotives actually shape the world through the ways we interpret it.

Official rituals and practices may have the same function as emotives. Although Reddy does not make further inquiries into the precise nature of such rituals and practices, other students of emotional regimes drawing on the works of the well-known sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild have elaborated on the role of official rituals and practices in contexts spanning from ritual sectarian practices (Mermelstein 2016) to classroom practices (Zembylas 2017). Just like emotives, official practices can construct emotions by virtue of their relational intent and self-altering features. Such practices reflect the worldview of those who practice it and their place in the world, particularly a collective’s “social structure, relations with outsiders, or collective memory (...)” (Mermelstein 2016, 495). Furthermore, official practices evoke certain emotional dispositions that teach the members what emotional responses are required to a specific context (Mermelstein 2016, 496). Taken together these two features inform “self

and others about commitments, beliefs, and values of the participants” (Mermelstein 2016, 495) .

For the study of social movements, emotional regimes represent an overlooked and dynamic condition shaping the interaction between social movements and the state (in which the former often is the generator of dominant emotional regimes). Governments, no matter their political ideology, want to avoid uncontrollable public unrest. In liberal democracies, besides the availability of political access to decision-makers through politicians, lobby groups, labor unions and institutionalized forms of claim-making such as voting and public hearings, governments allow, and even encourage, public expression of grievances anchoring such events discursively as a matter of political checks and balances. Conversely, in the fear of becoming a lame duck, leaders of authoritarian regimes are concerned that protests and oppositional forces may threaten the perception of the regime’s invincibility (Hale 2014; Robertson 2009). More than in liberal democracies, such perceptions may be life or death for an authoritarian ruler – by the time a major challenge arrives in the form of public unrest, he may be playing a losing hand (Robertson 2009, 531). In the quest for avoiding the emergence of protests, authoritarian regimes employ a sophisticated set of tools to discourage them altogether. For instance, a far less costly and more efficient mean of keeping expressions of grievances away from the public sphere than repression, is to depoliticize and pacify the public by organizing it around certain normative goals and norms – the consolidation of a dominant emotional regime. For instance, as Gabowitsch (2017, 71) points out, ever since Putin’s first presidential term in 1999 the political regime has shaped and consolidated a perception of politics as “dirty” and an insult to “national unity”. Moreover, critique and discontent regarding the authorities’ policies are rarely tolerated in public. Thus, an emotional regime may take the function of sophisticated repression that inhibits the emergence of social regimes.

Just as an emotional regime may inhibit collective action, it may also trigger protests. As normative feeling rules that are continuously shaped by multiple social actors, an emotional regime consolidates certain expectations and images of how a collective functions, its members (those who exhibit the correct emotional expressions are worthy members), and its outsiders (those who deviate from expected social emotional norms) (Carlström 2021, 191). Reddy (2001, 122) calls this process “navigation” – emotives can either drastically change an emotional regime or make “constant corrections in order to stay on a chosen path”. At

government level an emotional regime may, thus, reflect and manifest a specific representation of the collective self. When faced with a specific challenge, the authorities can either align with prevailing norms of self-expression or reshape the emotional regime by creating new expectations on acceptable conventions of emotional self-expression in the public sphere. The gap that may arise between a political regimes' self-representation through its normative consolidation and its practices has the potential to cause "emotional suffering" and defiance (Flam 2013, 365). Yet, non-compliance with a new style of an emotional regime or a new direction might be costly (Flam 2013, 365). It is when a challenger manages to define alternative ideational resources and emotional norms as superior to those of the power holders that they are willing to risk collective action (Flam 2013, 365).

3.5 A Symbiosis of Emotional Regimes and Cultural Frames

The main take away from the preceding discussion is that there is a need for a context-sensitive sensitive, yet rigorous approach to the study of movement emergence and sustainability in Russia. I suggest that a combination of the theoretical frameworks of emotional regimes and cultural framing can help us understand this phenomena by allowing for the examination of how context-specific structures influence movement emergence and the way social movements frame this influence as an opportunity for collective claim-making. The discussion on emotional regimes touched upon the concept's function as a collectively created and carried structure. I will build on this insight: an emotional regime is functioning as a structure as long as it is perceived by people to be more or less permanent and stable. As shown in the discussion, an emotional regime establishes a predictable set of rules and expectations regarding public "feeling rules" that guide every-day life and political action. In other words, an emotional regime provides a stable pattern of expectations on emotional expressions in public and anticipated reactions. What is more, it may also manage individuals and collectives into desired behavior.

When power holders make changes to the dominant emotional regime by breaking prevalent expectations on acceptable conventions of emotional self-expression in the public sphere, a rupture between the collectively shared self-representation and real-life practices may arise. The feeling of defiance and frustration that this might cause, is not sufficient to trigger movement emergence and public protests. It is when these feelings are being channeled into

real-life action by culturally sensitive frames that define a changing emotional regime as a problem and generate counter-norms of emotional self-expression that protests are triggered. Frames can, thus, target socially constructed norms and reshape potential protestors' interpretation of their role in inhibiting or encouraging certain behavior. In other words, frames can influence the perception of how individuals relate to socially constructed norms such as those governing expectations regarding emotional responses in certain contexts (Jasper 1998, 404). The ability by movements to perceive transgressions of "feeling rules" and to define them as a problem is what constitutes a mobilizational resource and opportunity for collective action in the context of authoritarian systems like Russia.

What becomes apparent is that both an emotional regime and cultural frames have the power to shape, reinterpret and manifest individuals' new ways of thinking and acting. Both frameworks relate to an interpretative approach to social life. What sets these two frameworks apart? For the purposes of this thesis, I will employ the concept of emotional regimes as an overarching social structure that governs social life, and which is reproduced and maintained by social agents. Changes to the dominant emotional regime may or may not be intentional, while cultural frames are assumed to have a particular strategic and, thus, calculated function. For instance, an emotional regime might change due to large societal upheavals or new ideas resulting from globalization but it could just as well alter due to a successful reframing that changes individuals' and group's social practices.

To tie these two frameworks together in a cohesive manner when studying protest emergence and sustainability, I suggest that they should be studied through the lens of dynamic contention. To account for the way an emotional regime is continuously shaped in mediation between government actors and social movements, and the way the latter respond to a changing emotional regime, I argue that this process should be theorized as a dynamic, interactive mechanism as opposed to a static condition. As Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly convincingly argue in the seminal volume *Dynamics of Contention* (2001), contentious collective action must be analyzed in relation to the antagonist which is usually a power holder. While proponents of the political process model tend to zoom in on only one social actor, such as a social movement or an organization, I hold that the unique features of the Russian regime necessitates that the interactive relation between social movements and state actors is addressed.

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, 24) advance an approach that seeks to shift away from general models associated with the political process model discussed in chapter 3.2 and move towards uncovering causal mechanisms. Mechanisms are defined as “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 24). Mechanism based accounts of social movement emergence and sustainability do not uncover laws of nature, hence the emphasis on “or closely similar ways” in McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s definition of mechanisms. Rather, they suggest that the identification and elaboration of recurring causal chains is a useful way of organizing empirical knowledge and showing how they produce different effects in various contexts (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 86–87). For instance, similar mechanisms figuring in movement mobilization might have different outcomes depending on the context that might lead to either mobilization or de-mobilization (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 86). Nevertheless, singling out mechanisms that produce certain features of a social phenomena hold value in that it provides detailed information about the event at hand as well as other related events.

By focusing on mechanisms McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly go beyond the narrative approach associated with the political process model. The narrative approach is interested in explaining the meaning of an event by placing it temporally in a sequence of events (Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar 2019, 252). Instead of comparing entire narratives, Kriesi, Hutter and Bojar (2019, 252), suggest a strategy in which narratives are broken down into their component elements to systematically analyze the mechanisms leading up to the events under examination. This thesis will build on their approach, although with certain modifications which presents a novel way of examining data related to a poststructural ontology, especially changes to the emotional regime. The empirical data used in the approach developed by Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar is comprised of observable actions such as adopting a policy proposal and violent mobilization. Although McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly do not specify the details of what “elements” and “relations” that together make up a mechanism which develops into an “episode” are this thesis will translate “events” into actions and “elements” into actors (individual or collective actors). Since social movement actors are rarely unitary entities but an amalgamation of different social actors with overlapping values and identity they will be treated as stylized, idealized actors. “Episodes” then are composed of “individual actions” by an “idealized actor” (2019, 252).

4 Research Design

To examine and elucidate socially constructed structures made up by emotional regimes mainly defined by the state and how they, not only, trigger movement emergence but also sustain it through continuous social interactions, I ask the following sub-questions:

- How did changes to the emotional regime trigger protest mobilization in Arkhangelsk?
- How were changes to the emotional regimes framed in a way that triggered and sustained protests in Arkhangelsk?

The questions will be answered, respectively, in a two-step process combining two different methods in a complementary way. Contentious episode analysis (CEA) will be employed to answer the first sub-question by examining changes to the emotional regime. A more detailed introduction to CEA follows in chapter 4.2. At this point, however, it is worth mentioning that it has an interactionist dimension which allows for an examination of the changing behavior of actors involved in a contentious episode. Consequently, it offers the opportunity to pinpoint watershed moments during a contentious episode. A turning point, or a watershed moment, will be defined as the point where changes in the emotional regime is accompanied by a distinct hike in the number of participants to the protests organized by the Shiyes movement. Specifically, it allows for the tracing of changes in the type of emotives employed by the authorities concerning the actions and claims of the Shiyes movement and the movement's reaction to these changes (e.g. changes in the number of participants to the protest, changes in the rhythm and intensity of protest).

The second step, answering the second sub-question, entails a cultural frame analysis to study how the Shiyes movement was able to translate frustration concerning changes to the emotional regime into action – first by inspiring Russians into public protests, then by sustaining protest activities despite the authorities' efforts at suppressing them. In this step the two methods will also be seen in relation to each other where they intersect. This includes watershed moments, that is moments that stand out due to markedly high values in either number of mobilized people or repressive emotives adopted by government actors, distinguished using CEA. These will function as focal points around which a frame analysis will be conducted.

The following section will first present the geographical boundaries of the Shiyes movement case. The second half of the section is dedicated to a more detailed presentation of the methods and data sources that were used to answer the sub-questions.

4.1 Geographical Boundaries

Although the abandoned village and railway station of Shiyes is located in the southeastern part of Arkhangelsk region, the movement was also active in the Komi Republic. This may partly be explained by the fact that Shiyes is located only 4 km from the border to the Komi Republic, see figure 3.




Figure 3. Illustration of the location of Shiyes near the border to Arkhangelsk region and the Komi republic. Source: Vasil’eva, Anna. 2019. «Eto tajga, a ne Manezhnaja ploshhad'.» *Kommersant.ru*, 01.06.2019. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3983427>

Several protests were held in Syktyvkar, the capital of the Komi Republic, either in coordination with the organizers behind the protests in Arkhangelsk or independently. Nevertheless, for practical reasons this thesis focuses on the parts of the Shiyes social movement that took place in the Arkhangelsk region.

Although there might have been important synergy-mechanisms and cooperation at play between the protesters in the Komi Republic and in Arkhangelsk region, for instance in shaping movement frames, choosing movement tactics and shaping a movement identity, the focus of this thesis lays on the interplay between government representatives and the Shiyes social movement. Necessitated by the the scope of this thesis and its practical limitations, I have chosen to focus on one set of government actors – those related to the movement located in Arkhangelsk region. While there are some overlaps between government actors related to the movements located in Arkhangelsk and the Komi Republic, there are also some that have been left out, e.g. local government representatives in the Komi Republic (a detailed overview of government actors to be included in the analysis will be provided in the next section). This choice leads to the advantage of approaching the case in a way that can develop an “in-depth understanding of historical processes and individual motivations” (della Porta 2008, 202). Treating the protests in Arkhangelsk and Komi as a unitary movement would risk masking considerable differences between the regions.

4.2 Contentious Episode Analysis (CEA)

To study changes in the emotional regime, I have examined how the Russian authorities interacted with protesters using various emotives. To record and analyze the usage of emotives, I have employed the method of contentious episode analysis (CEA). CEA is a kind of content-analysis that combines both quantitative and qualitative elements. It allows for a systematic mapping and reconstruction of processes of contentious episodes to identify mechanisms between the dependent and independent variable (Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar 2019, 252) – in this case the rise of the Shiyes social movement and changes to the emotional regime. While the more common choice of method among researchers of social movements, protest event analysis (PEA), focuses on mapping the occurrences and characteristics of contentious episodes on an aggregated level, CEA offers the advantage of looking inside them and to discern how the actors involved interact (Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar 2019, 252). Although I have conducted a single-case study of the Shiyes social movement, CEA allows for a systematic comparative analysis of causal patterns. Thus, the application of CEA leaves open future possibilities to use data collected in a comparative manner.

CEA builds on the understanding of collective action as contentious politics as presented in the programmatic *Dynamic of Contention* (DOC) (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). To be

able to analyze the protests in Arkhangelsk as contentious politics, some operationalization of DOC's most central terms is needed. As mentioned in chapter 3.5, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001, 24) define mechanisms as "a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations". For the purposes of this thesis, I have translated "events" into "actions" and "elements" into "actors". The range of mechanisms have thus, been narrowed down to focus on actions that have an impact on the relations among certain specified actors.

DOC focuses on the interaction between governments and their challengers, although, admittedly, there may be third parties involved in contentious episodes as well, such as intermediaries or other public authorities involved in institutionalized forms of contention (such as representatives of the court system, Attorney General, labor unions etc.). For the purposes of this thesis, I have focused on the dual relation between the government and the Shiyes movement. However, accounting for the ubiquitous structure of what Henry Hale has termed Putin's "power vertical" where the judicial powers, federal and regional branches of various ministries, the police forces, and even private businesses of strategic and/or political importance to the stability of the regime are dependent on rent distribution from the top of Putin's hierarchy and, thus, seek to please the state leader by following "signals" from the top (see Hale 2014; Bækken 2018), I define the stylized category of "government" as any actor that represents the interests of the regime. Recognizing the consequences of such simplification, such as downplaying the agency of public authorities and private businesses, I have made a distinction between all governmental representatives on local, regional, and federal level that have participated in the contentious episode.

Any social movement or protest group that has made any claims on behalf of the interests of the government such as copy-cat movements, has not been included in the analysis out of practical reasons. As briefly discussed in chapter 3.1, a social movement is according to the relational definition usually comprised of a great number of various social groups, including formal and informal groups. The Shiyes social movement is not an exception – it is not a unitary actor. However, for the purposes of CEA, any mentioning of an activist or a group of activists in media reports and activist-based Internet sources advocating for claims associated with the "Shiyes social movement" has been included in the stylized challenger actor of "Shiyes social movement". The various actor categories are summarized in table 2.

Table 2. Actor categories.

Actor Types

Government

Federal

Regional

Local

Shiyes social movement

As for “actions” that have an impact on the relations among the government and the Shiyes social movement, I have conceptualized the action repertoire separately for the two stylized actors. In the case of the government actor, I draw from the approach by Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar (2019), which builds on the assumption that the government initiates a contentious episode by launching a policy proposal, which in turn prompts a reaction from the challenger. The government is then left with three ways in which it can react. Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar (2019, 262) distinguish between three different reaction repertoires of which the first has been modified for the purposes of this thesis: muting, facilitation, and repression. By muting the government reaffirms its support to the policy by disregarding any questions or criticism to it. Facilitation refers to an adjustment of the government policy to meet the claims of the challenger or to initiate a dialogue with them. Lastly, repression includes “proactive attempts to undermine the effectiveness of protest” (Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar 2019, 262).

Considering the authoritarian nature of the Russian regime, I have supplemented the understanding of “repression” as also referring to any preemptive repressive actions seeking to subvert mass mobilization before it explodes into street protests. Such actions might be impeding public access to information vital to an informative public discourse and measures aimed at subverting democratic processes of challenging and shaping public policy. For the purpose of this thesis, I have added an additional reaction repertoire: rejection. It refers to abandoning, renouncing, or disagreeing with the policy in question or any involvement with the decision-making process leading up to the public policy. Being the central mechanisms for shaping an emotional style of a regime, emotives such as official utterances, rituals, practices and actions were aggregated and coded for muting, facilitation, repression, and rejection.

For the stylized category of the “Shiyes social movement”, I have distinguished between seven different actions based on the challenger action repertoire defined by Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar (2019). The challenger, i.e. the Shiyes social movement, might constitute itself through a public announcement, announce disruptive mobilization, mobilize in a disruptive manner, stop an action, signal readiness to initiate dialogue with the government, negotiate with the government through a dialogue, or give up unilaterally. To meet the specificities common to many Russian protests where contestation often moves into the court room with great consequences for subsequent reactions and movement life, I have added an additional action category of “formal disapproval”. This action type refers to a formal disapproval of a public policy by challenging it through institutionalized means (for instance through the judicial system or in the parliament). A summary of the coding categories can be seen in table 3.

It should be reminded that since the main purpose of applying CEA in this thesis is to trace changes in the emotional regime as practiced by the government, the identification of movement actions mainly serves the purpose of contextualizing government reactions and to identify moments of heightened contention in a sequence of actions. To trace the moment when changes to the emotional regime was instrumentalized by the movement resulting in mass protests, I have coded the occurrence of protests and the number of protesters. A summary of the coding categories can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Action codes.

Government	Shiyes movement
Utterances, official rituals, practices (emotives)	Action repertoire
<p><i>Muting</i> Reaffirming public policy.</p> <p><i>Facilitation</i> Adjustment of policy to meet the claims of challenger, initiate dialogue.</p> <p><i>Repression</i> Undermining the effectiveness of protest and protest mobilization.</p> <p><i>Rejection</i> Abandoning, renouncing, or challenging the policy, as well as any involvement with the decision-making leading up to it.</p>	<p><i>Constituting themselves</i> Publicly announcing formation of movement.</p> <p><i>Announcing mobilization</i> Publicly inviting people to participate in collective action, threatening to mobilize.</p> <p><i>Formal disapproval</i> Contestation of public policy through institutionalized means.</p> <p><i>Mobilization</i> Disruptive collective action.</p> <p><i>Stop action</i> Interrupt disruptive action.</p> <p><i>Signal readiness to negotiate</i> Publicly announce willingness to have a dialogue with government and to adjust claims.</p> <p><i>Negotiate</i> Meeting government representatives to agree on a compromise.</p> <p><i>Give up unilaterally</i> Publicly announce defeat or victory, disband.</p>
	Occurrence of protest
	<i>Number of participants</i>

Lastly, all actions identified as “mobilization” were categorized into eight mobilization repertoires to highlight mass protest when identifying heightened moments of contention: protest, one-man picket, sit-ins, procedural challenges, bessrochka (directly translatable into “termless protest” or “undisrupted protest”), petitions and open letters, religious proceedings, action/performance, see Table 4.

Table 4. Mobilization codes

Code number	Mobilization form
1	Protest
2	One-man picket
3	Sit-ins
4	Procedural challenges
5	Bessrochkha (termless protest)
6	Petition and open letters
7	Religious procession
8	Action/performance/flash mob

For each media report or news article (the selection of which will be introduced below in chapter 4.2.2) I identified an actor in one of the two categories: government and social movement. After assigning a government actor to an article, I proceeded to identify one of the three subcategories of government actors: local, regional, and federal, see Table 2. Each action was then assigned a unique action ID in chronological order. Moreover, the date of the action was identified. Usually the date of the action and the publication date of the article coincided, or the date of the action was explicitly mentioned in the article. To avoid temporal clustering of similar actions, I aggregated identical events carried out by the same actor during a week, into one action. Then I identified which, if any, action/event had triggered the current event stating the trigger action's action ID. If no actor-specific event had triggered the action in question, I assigned it code 0. Furthermore, I indicated the code categories in Table 3 to identify the actor's action or reaction. For my inquiry, I took the main action, reaction, or the main message from each news article as my unit of analysis. In those instances where two or more actions or messages relevant to the Shiyes case were reported in an article, I coded them separately. Once a movement action had been assigned to "mobilization" a mobilization code was also indicated. To ensure transparency of the way I had assigned each event an action code, a short description of each event was provided. In total 340 action sequences were coded (see Appendix 1).

To make the information in the codebook more accessible, a visualization of the action sequences was created. A presentation of the visualization will be introduced in chapter 5.

4.2.1 Delimitations

The CEA was restricted to a defined time interval based on the specific interaction between the authorities and the social movement. Often a social movement emerges as a reaction to “threat-induced challenges” launched by a government initiative (Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar 2019, 262). In the case of the Shiyes social movement, the decision to construct a landfill was not initially announced publicly until the ongoing construction was accidentally discovered by people living in Urdoma, a settlement located near the railway station. Following the discovery of the construction work, discussions on the Russian social media platform equivalent to Facebook, VKontakte (VK), erupted and the group “MY PROTIV SVALKI V LENSKOM RAJONE” for frustrated and angered local inhabitants was established (“Shiyes: Hronika protesta — STOP SHIYES!” n.d.). Seeing that micro-mobilization was initiated as a result of the discovery, I have defined the start date and starting point for the CEA as July 26, 2018.

The end point of the movement can be identified as the moment when local activists in Urdoma declared victory in January 9, 2021. By that time the governor of Arkhangelsk, Igor Orlov, had stepped down from his position and the construction of the landfill had been declared illegal by the local Arbitration Court of Appeal and officially stopped by the Arkhangelsk regional administration. No new protests occurred after the activists had signaled the end of the construction initiative.

July 26, 2018 and January 9, 2021 are clear markers of the movement’s life cycle.

4.2.2 Sources

To conduct a CEA, a data base tracing the events related to the Shiyes protests during the movement’s life cycle was created (see Appendix 1). The Shiyes protests were covered by many sources, including activist-based Internet sources such as stopshies.ru and activatica.ru, and news articles from both regional and federal online news outlets, such as kommersant.ru, rbk.ru, novayagazeta.ru meduza.io, zona.media (Mediazona), and 7x7-journal.ru (now semnasem.org) to mention a few. To reduce the number of news articles to collect and archive, while at the same time maintaining a sufficiently large database that covered almost all the events related to the Shiyes protest, I decided to narrow down the scope of sources to mainly one news outlet: the regional “city portal” 29.ru. In few cases where the news articles

were mentioning or referring to events that were covered by other sources, the data base was supplemented with those sources (mainly activist-based website stopshies.ru, news outlets novayagazeta.ru, fontanka.ru, kommersant.ru and the Arkhangelsk branch of the tabloid news outlet Moscow Komsomolets arh.mk.ru).

The data collection process started by searching all news articles in 29.ru that contained the word “Shiyes” during the movement’s life cycle – in total 938 articles. Op-eds, articles that summed up the most memorable or most-read pieces, certain photo reportages, articles about media figures not belonging to either a government actor nor the social movement commenting on the protests, articles about the movement located in the Komi Republic, articles where celebrities located in Moscow showed support to the movement, and articles where Shiyes only served as contextual information were omitted. In the end, a total of 405 articles were archived and coded (see Appendix 1).

4.2.3 Limitations

As mentioned above, limiting the scope of the data collection to mainly one news outlet presents a limitation that might have some effect on the analysis. Firstly, the selected news outlet might have been guided by market logic in prioritizing which aspects of the Shiyes case to cover. For instance, federal processes might have been less prioritized than local ones. Additionally, sensational aspects might have been chosen for publication more often than coverage of legal or political processes. Secondly, although 29.ru is privately owned, it does not present itself as an independent news outlet on a par with *Novaya Gazeta* or *Meduza*. An authoritarian bias can thus, not be ruled out. To overcome these limitations to an acceptable degree, a preliminary screening of the main news outlets covering the case was conducted. 29.ru was often referred to by the activist-based Internet sources and by various VK groups associated with the Shiyes social movement. Moreover, in many instances 29.ru covered the Shiyes case almost daily, not leaving out information that might be unpleasant for the decision-makers. Regardless, it is likely that the news coverage by 29.ru did not give a completely comprehensive account of the Shiyes case since any newsroom is limited by its work capacity.

Another limitation is the one presented by the coding process. Although a description of each action is indicated in the dataset, the assignment of codes remains a highly subjective process that might encompass biases or inconsistencies. Due to the practical limits of this thesis, my

main measure to counter this is by including the dataset in the thesis as an appendix and to be as transparent as possible about the choices I have made.

4.3 Cultural Frame Analysis

To study how the Shiyes social movement has framed the government-led changes in the emotional regime and its own worldview to trigger and sustain protest, cultural frame analysis was employed. Frame analysis is an analytical tool born out of social movement theory, particularly the framing process approach. Its main purpose is to analyze how particular ideas are used to deliberately mobilize supporters towards a particular goal (Lindekilde 2014, 199). It is worth mentioning that frame analysis shares common ontological and epistemological assumptions with discourse analysis. They both deal with how different actors' interpretation and meaning-making of the world construct certain ideational patterns that inform our actions (Lindekilde 2014, 196). However framing analysis differs in that it assumes a higher degree of strategic rationality ascribed to the actors and focuses on their strategic use of these ideas (Lindekilde 2014, 196). But more importantly, where discourse analysis aims at uncovering how meaning-making brings a concept or an "object" into being by filling it with meaning, cultural frame analysis gives us the tool to uncover how existing "objects" are framed by bending their meaning in certain directions (Lindekilde 2014, 200).

As a second step to the two-pronged analysis of the Shiyes protests, the number of protest events under examination for a frame analysis were narrowed down to four protest events. This was done to ensure feasibility of the cultural frame analysis. The selection of the four protest events which were chosen for cultural frame analysis were made along two axes: (1) marked hike in numbers of Russians participating in protests and (2) intensity of the contentiousness between the Shiyes social movement and the government indicated by a significant number of government actions, particularly actions coded as "repression". These selection criteria reflect the sub-questions of these thesis and will serve as focal points for the frame analysis. For the first axis, two protest events that fulfill the selection criteria were selected to answer the question of how the Shiyes social movement framed changes in the emotional regime in a way that triggered mass mobilization. And for the second axis, another two protest events were selected to examine the question of how the Shiyes social movement sustained mobilization despite governmental repression and efforts at disengaging the public by framing new mobilizational opportunities. The selected protests will be presented in more

detail in chapter 5 in connection with the results from the CEA. But for the determination of social movement actors to analyze for the frame analysis, the protests are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. List of selected protest event for frame analysis.

Date	Location	# of protestors
26.08.2018	Urdoma	1,000
02.12.2018	Arkhangelsk region	30,000
19.05.2019	Arkhangelsk city	7,000
15.03.2020	National	2,700

4.3.1 Determining Social Movement Actors

The Shiyes movement is not a unitary movement with a fixed organizational form. Instead it is better understood as a loose network of different actors; some more fixed and institutional, others purely informal. A comprehensive study of all actors involved in the Shiyes social movement would, thus, not be feasible. While some social movement actors are easier to identify due to their organizational form or degree of formalization (i.e. dedicated website or group site/chat on social media platforms coordinating collective action and spreading information related to the movement), others are less identifiable. Some may be consisting of informal groups such as a network of friends or neighbor collectivities, which are best identified through ethnographic interviews and *in situ* observations such as focus group interviews and participant observation. Considering the possibility to collect data post factum and from a geographical distance, as well as the abundance of data available, I will focus on social movement actors with a clear presence on social media platforms.

This thesis will employ a flexible approach in determining its unit of analysis. The digital era, in which social media has become one of the most important channels of communication and exchange of ideas, necessitates this approach. Besides the fact that the Internet has made it possible for individuals, networks and organizations with few resources to overcome the gatekeepers of formal media outlets, social media has also shaped social movement features by making them more informal and virtual (Isa and Himelboim 2018, 3). This pertains especially to online grassroots groups on social media that take the role as central nodes of communication, sharing links from other groups and individuals and coordinating protests. In

this thesis, I have focused on the role of such online groups in producing cultural frames (cultural frames have been dealt with in more detail in chapter 3.3.3).

Being the most popular social media platform in Russia during the existence of the Shiyes social movement, next after YouTube, the native equivalent to Facebook, VKontakte (VK), has served as a starting point for narrowing down the selection of social movement actors to analyze for the cultural frame analysis (Prins n.d.). The focus on social media platforms is substantiated by them allowing for real-time many-to-many communication. In authoritarian regimes where mass communication channels like newspapers, television, or radio are often controlled by governments that use a combination of censorship and intimidation to prevent any negative information about their performance or calls for oppositional collective action from reaching a larger audience, social media platforms represent a unique mobilizational resource for social movements (Weidmann and Geelmuyden Rød 2019, 26).

A comparison of some of the most active groups on VK related to the Shiyes protests shows that the most popular public group on VK was “Pomor'e - ne pomojka” (in English: Pomor’e is not a dump, Pomor’e referring to the historical lands on the coast of the White Sea where the Pomors – an ethnographic group descending from Russian settlers – settled in the 10th centuries, henceforth called PNP) and “URDOMA Online”, see Table 6. It is important to note that there is an overlap in posts shared and active members on these sites. Moreover, while “URDOMA Online” has significantly higher number of posts than “PNP”, the former does not mainly function as a group dedicated to the Shiyes movement. It was created in 2013, many years before the Shiyes protests, and is mainly a place where the inhabitants of Urdoma share news about events in their city which explains the high number of posts and followers. However, during the years of the Shiyes protests a good portion of the posts were also related to them.

Table 6. List of VK groups associated with or posting information about the Shiyes protests. Data collected from VK on April 2022.

Name	Organizational form	# of followers	# of posts
Pomor'e - ne pomojka	Grassroots movement	30,568	4,333
URDOMA Online	Informational board for inhabitants of Urdoma	25,219	22,222
MY PROTIV SVALKI V LENSKOM RAJONE	Grassroots movement	11,820	5,040
Chistyj sever 29	Grassroots movement	8,749	4,605
Arxangel'skaja EkoBessrochka	Grassroots movement	4,264	4,907
EkoBessrochka Arxangel'sk	Grassroots movement	1,900	4,558
Chistaya Urdoma	Grassroots movement	1,050	1,257
Svobodnyj Sever	NGO	530	520
Koaliciya "Stop-Shiyes"	Informal inter-regional coalition of grassroots movements and NGOs	2,507	1,426

Table 6 does not show an exhaustive list of groups or pages on VK associated with or supporting the Shiyes social movement, but it aims to show some of the most popular ones. Furthermore, some groups were blocked, particularly those specifically created to mobilize around specific protest events. Some of the groups listed in Table 6 were also blocked but reappeared as new groups keeping the original group name. Most of the groups were blocked some time in late 2018 and reappeared in spring of 2019. This also pertained to “PNP”, the largest, most active group, as well as “MY PROTIV SVALKI V LENSKOM RAJONE”. The fourth largest group “Chistyj sever 29” was not blocked but was not even created until February 2019. For the framing analysis of the four protests presented in Table 5, “URDOMA Online” was selected as the object of analysis for the two first protest events in 2018 (26.08.2018 and 02.12.2018), while “PNP” was selected for the other two protest events (19.05.2019 and 15.03.2020).

4.3.2 Sources and Methods

Community posts in the selected VK groups “URDOMA Online” and “PNP” served as primary sources for the framing analysis. Community posts differ from regular posts in that they are generated by the administrators of the groups only. Posts by members of the group were, thus not included. I decided to only collect community posts because they are specifically targeted at mobilizing people. Both textual statements and photos in the form of slogans on posters were collected. To make the data collection process more feasible, community posts were collected seven days (one week) before each of the four protest events, the day of the protest event, and one day after the protest event. The distribution of days was determined by the assumption that the most intensive mobilizational efforts would occur shortly before the protest event and during. The post-protest event day was included under the assumption that some information from the protest day would be delayed. Posts containing information irrelevant to the thesis such as birthday wishes and local sales offers, were excluded. A total of 202 community posts were collected for the framing analysis: 43 connected to the first protest, 51 to the second protest, 64 to the third protest, and 44 to the fourth protest. To ensure sufficient data for the day of the protest events, additional data was collected from photo features by 29.ru. In total 122 slogans were collected.

For the framing analysis itself, the unit of analysis composed of single sentence statements. Both complete and fragmented sentences, and in some instances more than one sentence, were included as long as they conveyed a comprehensive message. Each sentence was then coded in accordance with a codebook (see Appendix 2) in which the codes were developed during the collection of statements and the analysis. A starting point for the subsequent refinement of codes was Snow & Benford’s (1988) typology of frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frame. As the collection and analysis progressed, I divided these categories into sub-categories, distinguishing between different problems, solutions or strategies, collective identities, and definitions of the Other. Although I have not explicitly included the analysis of how the Other is framed into my research question or into my sub-questions, definitions of the Other is an essential part of how activists engage in “boundary framing” (Benford and Snow 2000, 616). This entails a process in which certain attributes delineated along the axis of “good” and “evil” are used to construct movement antagonists and protagonists (Benford and Snow 2000, 616). This process is a central part in framing the problem (diagnostic framing process).

4.3.3 Limitations and Ethical Considerations

As argued by Hank Johnston (2002, 87), the greatest source of error in frame analysis is most likely to be incorrect or biased coding. This concern is linked to the increased risk of producing non-replicable results. Johnston suggests that this can be mitigated through the adoption of the simplest possible coding strategy. In my analysis, I have strived to define clear sub-codes and to make sure that the codebook provides enough information to compensate for some of the limitations of verification related to frame analysis. Moreover, I have used NVivo software to reduce the risk of incorrect coding.

Selecting only one VK group for each protest presents some limitations connected to representation. One critical example of this concern is the selection of the local VK group “URDOMA Online” for a frame analysis of the regional protest on December 2, 2018. It may involve the risk of local concerns and local framing strategies dominate the analysis, pushing a broader framing strategy in the background. One way of overcoming the representational bias could be by increasing the number of VK groups for each protest event. However, for the purpose of this thesis, I will have to be mindful of a possible representational bias when conducting the framing analysis.

Collecting data from VK groups involves some ethical considerations related to the sensitivity of the information collected, the vulnerability of the post authors and the accessibility of the VK groups and posts in the public. Even when a statement is published in a public group on a social media platform it does not necessarily mean that the author intended the post to be widely used (for instance in a research project). To avoid indiscriminate collection of sensitive information, or statements of a more private nature, I have restricted the data collection to community posts published by anonymous administrators of the VK groups. Also, I have excluded the comment fields in the data collection. Compared to statements posted in the comment field or in regular posts by private users, the information in the community posts are of a more general nature aimed at mobilizing a wide audience. The public function of the VK groups is underpinned by the fact that local and regional media outlets, 29.ru included, widely published community posts from several of the VK groups in table 6 and photographs from the protest events on a regular basis. In some instances, community posts were regarded as a form of press release when announcing new protest event dates, informing the public about the arrest of activists and other information of interest to the public. To ensure that personal and sensitive data was collected in a way that respected

the interests and the rights of the individuals involved in the VK groups, the collection method was sent for approval by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.

5 Analysis: Shiyes Social Movement

Before moving on to the two-pronged analysis consisting first of a contentious episode analysis of changes to the emotional regime followed by a frame analysis on the basis of the findings from the contentious episode analysis, it will be useful to provide some contextual background to the Shiyes case. The purpose of this is to situate the Shiyes case in a chronological order, demonstrating that the delineation of the Shiyes case as a separated event from events elsewhere in Russia is a conscious choice. Another purpose is to place the Shiyes case into a broader context which may have impacted the decision to construct the landfill at Shiyes and the movement's framing strategies. This background information will be important in the subsequent analysis of the changing emotional regime and framing process.

5.1 Situating the Shiyes Social Movement: the Russian “Rubbish Protests” and the 2019 “Waste Reform”

The Shiyes social movement can be seen as being part of a broader protest movement spread over different places in Russia labeled the “rubbish protests” (*musornye protesty*) (Flikke 2021). The protests started in small towns in the Moscow region in 2017 that spread to several other Russian regions where problems with waste management, overfilled landfills and planned construction of landfills had been prevalent. The first surge in waste-related protests emerged in June 2017 when residents of the small town Balashikha located near the Kuchino dumping site in Moscow region lamented to President Putin in one of his annual live broadcasts, “Direct Line” (*pryamaya liniya*) of nausea and reduced quality of life and asked him to solve the waste problem (1tv.ru 2017). As a response to the complaints a number of dumps in the Moscow region were closed down in the summer of 2017, including the Kuchino dump site (Raibman 2017). However, the clean-up operation turned out to be short-lived. The closing-down of landfills caused illegal dumping of household waste in non-regulated territories while the few existing landfills still in operation were filled to maximum capacity leading to a new wave of discontent (Flikke 2021). The protests intensified in March 2018 when, during the presidential election campaign, 20,000 residents of Volokolamsk took to the streets to protest the over-filled Yadrovo landfill (Flikke 2021). Earlier that month 200 school children had been rushed to the hospital, suffering from respiratory problems –

presumably from poisonous gas emissions from the landfill (Berg 2018). By the end of March 2018, the rubbish protests had diffused to several other cities in Moscow region. With the trust in the authorities' ability and promises to solve the waste problem on a low, demonstrations were organized in locations where there were concerns about planned relief dumps and excessive dumping in existent landfills (Flikke 2021). To alleviate the pressure on landfills in the Moscow region, plans were made to construct new ones outside the region. Shiyes was one of the planned sites for the construction of a new landfill for Moscow waste. But similar construction plans were also made in other regions such as Vladimir and Kaluga in which construction was finalized in 2020 (Tumakova 2020).

To respond to public resistance from local protest movements affected by the growing waste problem, the 2019 waste reform was launched as part of President Putin's "Ecology program" in the National Projects Plan (*Prioritetnye Nacional'nye Proekty Rossii*). The reform initiative was meant to clean up the political mess and envisioned a new direction in waste management. The number of illegal landfills were to be reduced, the proportion of waste recycled raised to 36% by 2024, and regional authorities were to be given the mandate to oversee waste management by giving local waste operators exclusive rights to handle municipal waste (Tóth-Czifra 2020). Due to the monopolistic nature of the new waste market, the immediate effect of the reform was a huge hike in waste collection fees by 50%. Moreover, many of the waste operators with political connections named a higher price for their services than what would normally be expected (Tóth-Czifra 2020). In the meantime, plans for new incinerators and landfills were drawn up across the country (Tóth-Czifra 2020). In turn, new concerns and dissatisfaction with waste management in several Russian cities emerged causing some residents and businesses to refuse paying waste collection fees (The Moscow Times 2019).

Another dimension to the waste reform, revealed by the investigative online media platform Important Stories (*Vazhnye Istorii*), is its function as a milking cow for businesses with connection to the political elite (Anin 2020). The investigation revealed that the majority of the tender winners for the local waste operators were owned by Khartiya (*Хартия*), the state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec (*Ростех*), Ecoline (*Эколайн*), and Upravlenie Othodami (*Управление отходами*) of which, respectively, Sergey Chemezov, Igor Chaika, Arkady Rotenberg and Yury Kovalchuk are majority stakeholders (Anin 2020; Kozlovsky and Kiseleva 2020). All of these names are associated with president Putin's trusted circle of





friends (Anin 2020; Kozlovsky and Kiseleva 2020). In sum, the investigation confirmed people’s concerns regarding the interwoven connections between the ruling powers and the local waste operators.

5.2 Contentious Episode Analysis and Changes in the Emotional Regime: Analysis

How do changes in the emotional regime trigger mass mobilization? Or, in other words, how do these changes create mobilizational opportunities for collective action? In this chapter I will examine how a changing emotional regime shaped by the Russian authorities created opportunities for not only the Shiyes social movement to emerge, but also to sustain itself by keeping on giving new mobilizational opportunities that initially were non-existent.

In figures 4-6 a visualization of the entire action sequence of the Shiyes protests is presented. These figures demonstrate the causal chains of the contentious interactions between the three stylized “government” actors (GF = federal government, GR = regional government, GL =local government) and the “challenger” actor, the Shiyes social movement” (C = challenger). The “government” actor is visualized as a square, while the “challenger” actor is represented as a triangle. But important to this thesis, the figures illustrate government representatives’ use of emotives during the Shiyes protests. The visualization of emotives is summed up in Table 7.

Table 7. Symbols representing government representatives' emotives

Action code	Symbol
1, Muting	
2, Facilitating	
3, Repressing	
4, Rejecting	

Each government action is also indicated by its unique Action ID number which corresponds to that indicated in Appendix 1. An Action ID number is also indicated in the challenger triangles in addition to an action code and a mobilizational code, see Table 3 and table 4 in the sub-chapter on contentious episode analysis. To ensure visibility of protest events that represent mass protests, a star encircling the protest event and the number of protesters participating in the protests have been indicated.

Figure 4. Action sequence visualization July 2018 – Jun 2019.




Figure 5. Action sequence visualization July 2019 – June 2020.





Figure 6. Action sequence visualization July 2020 – January 2021.



As seen in figures 4-6, there are in total twelve protest events where mass protests occurred (star-circled triangles). Of the twelve protests, two were selected for the sudden hike in protest participants (protest on August 26, 2018 coded as C9-4-1 and protest on December 02, 2018 coded as C52-4-1) and another two were selected for a significant intensification in contentiousness measured through a significant increase in the number of government actions taking place, particularly actions coded as the emotive “repression” (protest on May 19, 2019 coded as C130-4-1 and protest on March 15, 2020 coded as C285-4-1). The following section will proceed by an examination of the emotional regime prior to the four protest events, specifically how the emotional regime changed in way that created a mobilizational opportunity.

5.2.1 Protest in Urdoma on August 26, 2018

From the time construction work was first discovered by local residents (coded as action 1) to the first protest by the Shiyes social movement in Urdoma (C9-4-1) few actions were taken by government representatives, see Table 8. Of the few actions that were initiated, a gap between local government representatives and regional representatives may be detected. The former, in the capacity of the Urdoma municipality (GL-2) and parliament (GL-5) rejected the construction work, claiming they had no knowledge of any plans to build a landfill in their municipality. They even sided with the Urdoma residents by seeking more information from the governor of Arkhangelsk, Igor Orlov, and demanded that he took measures to stop the construction (GL-5). With the local government actor showing the public its unawareness of the plans at Shiyes, space for the civil society to fill a function emerged – that of an information seeker. An open letter to several public authorities, such as the governor, heads of nearby raions and settlements, Rospotrebnadzor (the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing), the Procurator’s Office, and the Investigative Committee, were sent to require answers from the responsible parties (C4-4-6).

Table 8. Action typology and distribution of emotives among federal, regional, and local government actors between July 26, 2018 and August 26, 2018.

Action type	Federal		Regional		Local	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Rejection	0	0	2	50	2	100
Muting	1	100	1	25	0	0
Facilitating	0	0	1	25	0	0
Repressing	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1	100	4	100	2	100

In this context two actors stick out: the deputy head of Arkhangelsk Administration, Evgeny Fomenko (GR3), and a United Russia regional MP (GR7). As soon as the construction work at Shiyes created a buzz on social media among people living in Urdoma, he visited the settlement on what resembled a press tour. He confirmed the plans to build a landfill at Shiyes and that it would receive household waste from Moscow. The next week, the United Russia MP traveled to Urdoma to visit the construction site where he tried to reassure the residents that he had been told by undisclosed sources in Moscow that the transportation of waste from Moscow had been delayed. Fomenko’s reluctance to abandon the construction plans and the United Russia MP’s effort at de-escalating the conflict by trying to meet some of their concerns, gave the impression that the regional government were informed about the construction plans and that it had the situation at Shiyes under control.

As a whole, the muting and facilitating reactions are ways of disengaging the residents in Urdoma from taking any further actions. Their reaction juxtaposes the local government actors’ active rejection of the construction work, almost siding with the residents. The inconsistent reaction by the local and regional government actors created an opportunity for the Shiyes social movement to challenge the construction work as highly problematic. Confusion was even further exacerbated by Fomenko’s sudden turn when he denied any involvement or responsibility for the construction work sending the residents mixed messages (GR8).

5.2.2 Regional Protest on December 2, 2018

The belief that the use of democratic tools to gain attention and demand answers from the authorities starting with the open letter sent to various public authorities by the residents in Urdoma continued in the period leading up to the all-regional protest on December 2, 2018.

On October 12, a group of engaged residents of Arkhangelsk announced that they were collecting signatures from their fellow residents to force the regional authorities to hold a referendum on import of Moscow waste to Shiyes (C22-3-4). The announcement was made in a non-disruptive, matter-of-factly way and without police forces sweeping in and arresting the group behind the initiative. This might indicate that they were doing it with the expectation that their case would be fairly processed and that their grievance was legitimate – one might even say that it was to a certain degree aligned with the interests of the local and regional authorities. This development is also supported by the local government actors filing a lawsuit against RZhD, the Russian Railways, that leased the territory on which the construction work had started (GL-46).

However, the data shows two trends of changing emotional regimes that is meant to disengage any further use of such tools. First of all, government actors employed repressive means of reactions for the very first time during the contentious episode. The regional election committee rejected the referendum initiative on poor grounds (disapproval of signatures) (GR-44), the deputy head of the regional administration, Evgeny Fomenko, tried to keep the Shiyes construction out of media's attention by requiring that the Shiyes question was not brought up in an interview on the radio station Ekho Moskvyy (GR-12). Other repressive emotives included a strategy of downplaying the scope and severe consequences of the landfill. This time federal government actors were involved; the Federal department of housing and communal services confirmed it was considering Shiyes as a prospective site for a landfill and that current construction work was only for doing tests (GF – 13). Moreover, from working towards the same goals as the Shiyes social movement the local government actors chimed in on the repressive means of reaction. Applications to organize local protests on several locations in the region, Arkhangelsk city, Severodvinsk and Shiyes included, were denied by local administrations (GL-24, GL-18).

Although one could characterize the abovementioned development as a repressive turn, the second trend demonstrates a far from unison direction in the way the Russian authorities dealt with the public. Table 9 demonstrates the wide distribution of emotives employed by all of the government actors.

Table 9. Action typology and distribution of events among federal, regional, and local government actors between October 20, 2018 and December 2, 2018.

Action type	Federal		Regional		Local	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Rejection	1	25,0	1	6,0	3	42,0
Muting	1	25,0	6	35,0	2	29,0
Facilitating	1	25,0	5	29,5	0	0,0
Repressing	1	25,0	5	29,5	2	29,0
Total	4	100,0	17	100,0	7	100,0

Besides using repressive means, less politically costly measures such as simply ignoring any complaints and sticking to the construction plans, were increasingly employed. Regional government actors were starting to take ownership of the construction plans by confirming some of the rumors surrounding them (GR-16). But instead of using that as a vantage point for clear and strategic communication, the muting reaction was sending a message that there was no need for the public to get involved now that the authorities were dealing with the issue. As an example, the Arkhangelsk city parliament voted against an initiative by the Urdoma municipal parliament to appeal to the regional parliament to stop import of waste from Moscow (GL-50) and the mayor of Arkhangelsk refused to meet with protestors on a protest against the Shiyes landfill (GL-31). By holding on to the plans for Shiyes, the government actors in Arkhangelsk inadvertently set up a wall between the public and the authorities.

Moreover, in addition to keeping the public at a distance, a concerted effort was made to also redirect the public into desired forms of non-disruptive interaction. The regional government actor took a leading position in this process; Fomenko signaled readiness to meet with activists to discuss the landfill (GR-49), a public press conference where detailed plans for the construction would be presented was suddenly announced (GR-15), and a separate public orientation meeting was also planned for the residents in Urdoma (GR-37). Yet, at the same time the information given at the press conference was severely insufficient, raising more new questions than answering old ones (GR-21). The presentation was held behind closed doors (GR-26) and the organizers had refrained from inviting representatives from the settlements and cities near Shiyes (GR-28). Lastly, the regional administration of Arkhangelsk rushed to secure the future of the project by granting it status as a prioritized investment (GR-25, GR-27, GR-29) while transfer plants for the waste were under construction in Moscow (GF-38).

In other words, what were made to look like genuine efforts at facilitating a dialogue between the public and the authorities, was revealed to be “dialogue from the top”.

Ultimately, these two trends indicate that the authorities were balancing between shutting down any attention regarding the construction at Shiyes and reassuring the residents of the region that the situation was under control. The combination of these reactions gave the impression of inauthenticity and desperation. And most importantly, a mobilizational opportunity was created by the possibility of civic participation in the decision-making process regarding the landfill. However, the authorities quickly revealed that these efforts were a mere smokescreen and seemed to be an outlet for pacifying the harshest critics of the landfill construction.

5.2.3 Protest in Arkhangelsk City on May 19, 2019

The protest on May 19, 2019 was selected for the contentious episode analysis on the basis of its occurrence deep into the protest episode and what it can tell us about sustaining protests, particularly under a repressive atmosphere. A noticeable change in the action sequence of the Shiyes episode around the time of the protest in May 2019, is the distinct increase and intensity of repressive emotives, see figure 4. While regional government actors stood for a majority of repressive emotives in the two past protest events, this protest event marked a shift towards a transfer of repression from the regional to the local government actor, see Table 10. Public protests were no longer tolerated as much; large local police forces started to accompany protest events intimidating people and disbanding protests and *bessrochkas* (GL-93, GL-96, GL-110), police forces detained activists before, during, and after protests based on surveillance data and photographs taken during the protests (GL-91, GL-97, GL-107, GL-109), and a significant concentration of police brawls and arrests can be seen on the construction site at Shiyes (sequence starting from the point in which construction workers from “Ekotekhnopark” injured an activist on site, GF-76).

Table 10. Action typology and distribution of events among federal, regional, and local government actors between April 4, 2019 and May 19, 2019.

Action type	Federal		Regional		Local	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Rejection	2	13	3	12	2	10
Muting	2	13	6	23	0	0
Facilitating	6	40	9	35	1	5
Repressing	5	33	8	31	17	85
Total	15	100	26	100	20	100

Perhaps, as a continuation of the efforts to redirect discontent launched during the protest on December 02, 2018, regional government actors pursued an informational campaign about the construction plan, but only to a targeted audience. While the governor of Arkhangelsk, Igor Orlov, denounced the general public as “low lives” (“*shelupon*”) that weren’t able to grasp the complexity of the Shiyes case (GR-90, GR-102) and who were guilty of “politicizing” the matter (GF- 88) as well as stirring up “societal disorder” (GR- 60), efforts were made to make sure a certain segment was informed: the residents in Urdoma and the “systemic” eco-movement. Representatives from the regional Ministry of Construction and Architecture visited Urdoma to present the new urban site plan at Shiyes (GR-66). The residents were not included in any formal processes though. The visit could, thus, be interpreted as a way of quelling local frustration and, potentially, a new protest wave. The second group, the “systemic” eco-movement, understood as the segment of the Shiyes social movement funded by presidential grants and granted administrative resources by the regional administration, were invited to an eco-forum organized by the regional Public Chamber in the midst of a period of heightened tension with the governor Igor Orlov giving the key note speech (GR-71).

Another trending continuation of past strategies were reassurances of the public. But while the message in the past was centered on the regional authorities being in control of the situation at Shiyes, the message ahead of the protest in May, 2019, had shifted towards normalizing the construction as a process bound by legal procedures and due diligence. The construction was no longer an *impromptu, ad hoc* event, but part of a long-term strategy, thoroughly regulated by law which the authorities intended to follow. It is along these lines that Governor Orlov suggested that an eco-monitoring system should be installed at the construction site (GR-73) and that before further construction could continue the construction project should undergo a

technical state examination (*Gosekspertiza*) (GR-114) while at the same time insisting on the legality of the project (GR-128).

Contrary to these developments, the federal government actor signaled a possibility that the construction might be illegal, giving hope to the Shiyes social movement that the federal authorities would stop the construction and listen to the concerns of the people. Federal expert organs such as the Public Directorate, Rosvodresursoy, confirmed that a landfill on Shiyes would risk contaminating the soil and water resources in the region (GF – 99). But most welcoming of the concerns of the residents of Arkhangelsk region was the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights. The Council stepped into the Shiyes case as a mediator and point of contact for local and regional activists. Representatives from the Council even went to see the construction site and conducted an open meeting with the residents of Urdoma and supporters of the Shiyes social movement (GF-67). After a couple of days, they published a recommendation to the Arkhangelsk Procurator’s Office to fight the project in the court system (GF-69). Essentially, the federal expert organs were agreeing with “*shelupony*”, opening up a battle of who ruled the law – the power holders or the people.

5.2.4 National Protests on March 15, 2020

The emotional management style of the Russian authorities ahead of the national protests on March 15, 2020 marked a stark shift towards a repressive style. What is more, while most repressive emotives in the run up to the previous protests had been dominated by regional and local government actors, all government actors were now heavily involved in such expressions, see Table 11.

Table 11. Action typology and distribution of events among federal, regional, and local government actors between September 22, 2019 and March 15, 2020.

Action type	Federal		Regional		Local	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Rejection	4	29	3	18	1	5
Muting	1	7	2	12	0	0
Facilitating	0	0	2	12	3	14
Repressing	9	64	10	59	18	82
Total	14	100	17	100	22	100

Notably, federal government actors were participating more actively in repressive ways of reacting to the Shiyes protests than before, ultimately rolling back mobilizational opportunities previously created by themselves. As an example, President Putin expelled four prominent members of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, one of which had visited Shiyes and fiercely advocated against the construction of the landfill (GF-218). Moreover, in a long-lasting struggle to convince Arkhangelsk Election Committee to approve the activists' initiative to hold a referendum on the import of waste from other regions that first started in October 2018, the Supreme Court finally put the final nail in the coffin and banned the referendum initiative (GF-229). The informational space was also subjected to repressive reactions. On July 23, 2019, President Putin decreed that the administrations in Moscow and Arkhangelsk should work out a way to include the residents' opinions regarding the construction at Shiyes. However, when an MP to the Moscow parliament and fellow countryman of the region inquired to see documentation on the progress of the process, the Presidential Administration refused to release it on the grounds that they had been classified (GF-267).

Besides arrests, moving protest events to unfavorable locations and organizing competing state-funded events on protest days on a local government level (GL-226, GL-210, GL-250, GL-259, GL-243, GL-283, GL-281), regional government actors were shaping a repressive public sphere by delegitimizing and humiliating movement activists. During a youth-conference organized by governor Orlov, movement activists were frisked by police officers and told that they would be kicked out the moment they opened their mouths (GF-260). While at the conference, Orlov took the opportunity to discredit the movement by arguing that its members did not contribute to a constructive solution (GF-261). On another occasion he announced that the movement should not doubt the work of the regional administration regarding the issue at Shiyes; after all he had a track record of success in the improvement of welfare services in the region, heavily referencing the "social contract" that supposedly dominate Russian state-society relations (GF-236). Lastly, he lamented that he had done everything in his power to facilitate dialogue with the Shiyes social movement and in stopping the construction, but simple people were willing to be riled up by populist slogans (GF-254).

Despite continuous repressive means of controlling the public sphere, a few, but powerful, actors on federal governmental level sent contrary signals. They are powerful in that they are

associated with the federal governmental level and in their then-established integrity throughout the protest episode. Firstly, the Presidential Administration's Special Representative on Environmental Issues and Transportation recommended that there should not be any construction at Shiyes before an environmental impact assessment had been conducted (GF-233). Secondly, the chairman of the Presidential Council on Civil Society and Human Rights criticized the Russian authorities for the repressive ways they had managed public discontent in Arkhangelsk region (GF-263). These statements speak in direct opposition to both the policy on Shiyes and their treatment of movement activist that could fuel sufficient frustration at the repressive reactions of the authorities that are seen as highly illegitimate. In this regard, the "repressive turn" could be a mobilizational opportunity in itself – a notion that will be examined through frame analysis in chapter 5.4. To underpin that interpretation of the interaction between the authorities and the social movement ahead of the protest, could be that the, surprisingly, lacking government reactions on the movement's announcement to run in the gubernatorial election (C268-3-4) reinforced a belief that the democratic tools of the Russian society were made for the people and not for the protection of power-holders.

5.3 Discussion

A major caveat of the preceding analysis is that the data used for the contentious episode analysis is limited. The number of events collected to trace changes in the emotional regime is low. Although relatively low numbers of events are not, admittedly, sufficient to generate conclusive findings, certain trends do stand out from the contentious episode analysis.

When tracing changes in the emotional regime, the wording "changes" implies a mode shift from one mode to another, from one emotional management style to another. However, the findings demonstrated that the changes were not occurring in an exclusively linear direction from one mode to another prompted by a major event, nor in a unison process where all government actors were coordinated in a joint response to the Shiyes social movement. Rather, the findings support that the government actors employed an array of different emotives, sending a mixed message to the public sphere as to what norms of public display of behavior is accepted and expected. I argue that it is the polyphony of emotives that created mobilizational opportunities for the social movement to exploit.

Certain conflicting messages from different sets of government actors are particularly prominent. During the entire protest episode, there is a noticeable incongruence in reaction types between the federal and the regional government actors on the one hand, and the regional and local government actors on the other. Starting with the first set, the federal government actor was less involved in the protest episode (particularly during the two first protest events) than was the regional government actor, which could point to the federal authorities not wanting to be associated with the protests. The clearest example of that was manifested through Putin's claim that he had not noticed a banner that was revealed by employers at Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk during a live stream with him on April 24, 2019 where they were begging the President ("*Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin*") to remove Governor Orlov from his post (GF-112).

In those instances when the federal government actor still did get involved, it promoted itself as one of either two things: a facilitator of dialogue or a line of direct communication with the power holders, or the guarantor of the rule of law. The president's Direct Line live streams (*Prjamaja Linija*) particularly generated significant attention from the Shiyes social movement (GF-144). Even government expert authorities that questioned the legality of the construction project and the authorities' way of managing public dissent did not garner as much attention from the movement than did the presidential live streams. This could suggest that the President was perceived to be the key to the solution rather than the problem. Moreover, just the mere existence of direct communication lines with the head of state signaled a green light for the public from all over Russia, regardless of social classes, to engage in the public sphere – a contrast to the regional actor's approach. Also, whenever Putin appeared in press conferences or interviews, he would promise to "clean up" the mess. For instance, at his annual press conference he promised to stop illegal landfills and commission sorting plants (GF-56), at an interview he condemned the way the authorities treated the activists and promised to talk to the regional governors (GF-129, GF-159), and, lastly, when public unrest in Arkhangelsk region did not subside, he instructed the governor to take into account the opinion of the residents in handling the Shiyes case (GF-176).

The regional government actor, on the other hand, more often than not, tried to coerce the public into trusting the regional authorities – a move that often had counterproductive results. As already mentioned in the analysis, the governor of Arkhangelsk would often refer to the, so-called, "non-interference pact" between state and society. The pact points to an imagined

social contract in which the society refrains from meddling into politics in return of the state providing welfare goods/services to the society and a general positive economic development in the country. Regional government actors decried politicization of Shiyes, claiming that those who participated in the protests were deviants and a threat to the stability of the society which the authorities so carefully had established. Furthermore, the Governor and other regional authorities organized (online and offline) platforms and forums for dialogue. However, activists from the Shiyes social movement were never invited and the public was never given a real voice in the discussions. In fact, the events resembled a monologue given by regional representatives, more than a dialogue.

Keeping the reaction of the regional government actor in mind, the local government actor represented a contrasting approach. In the first phase of the protest episode, local actors were acting in alignment with the interests of the Shiyes social movement, creating a space for exploration and dissent. Sometime before the protest event on May 19, 2019, the role of the local government actor drastically shifted into a repressive law enforcer. Particularly brutal was the use of force by police officers patrolling the Shiyes camp site. The intensity of the quashing of activist camp sites and activist flash mobs is clearly seen in figure 4 (see action sequence on the lower right section of the figure starting from GF-76). This suggests that most of the repressive functions were delegated to the local government authorities from the regional and, particularly the federal government actor, strengthening the findings that the federal government actor wanted to disassociate itself from the protests and give the impression that law and order would be restored for any compliant Russian.

In this regard, as figures 4-6 and tables 9-11 illustrate, use of repressive measures to disengage the public from taking part in the activities of the Shiyes social movement were limited. Despite the hike in repressive reactions around April 2019, the number and intensity of mobilizational activities and protest events did not decrease. As a matter of fact, it increased. These findings indicate that that the repressive capacity of government actors, even the local government actor was limited. However, figures 4-6 also show that a great proportion of measures taken to stop the Shiyes social movement were done through actions not coded as “repression” but through other emotives, such as “facilitation” and “muting” – the purpose of which were to disengage the public from taking part in “politics”. An inadvertent result of this strategy may have actually been the creation of mobilizational spaces.

One such central strategy was the abovementioned effort at facilitating dialogue with the public. The findings suggest that these arenas of communication were meant to redirect disruptive actions into non-disruptive forms of contention where public grievances can be aired. They are means of managing the public, but they do not provide any real possibilities of changing the policy regarding regional waste management. An estimation of the number of times “facilitating” emotives were employed by the government actors on all three administrative levels show that 78% were triggered independently of any preceding actions by the Shiyes social movement. Of the major arenas for interaction, such as President Putin’s and Governor Orlov’s live streams (GF-144, GR-127) and the regional eco-forum (GR-71), none were initiated as direct responses to movement activities, at least not explicitly. This finding is indicative of the authorities’ efforts at disengaging people while also displaying its attributes of a democracy to the public.

Another notable example of disengagement efforts is demonstrated through legal and administrative-procedural battles: the legal-procedural process over the right to hold a referendum on import of waste from other regions and construction of the landfill at Shiyes (starting in October 2018 at C22-3-4 and continuing through to October 2019 at GF-229) and the lawsuit between the municipality of Urdoma and RZhD/Ekotekhnopark (starting in November 2018 at GL-46 and continuing through to October 2020 at GL334). Since purely repressive measures are politically costly, less risky, and softer measures were taken to stop these processes. Whereas administrative resources were used to impact the decisions in favor of the regional administration, a combination of “small wins” in favor of the municipality and the defendant’s consistent motions to appeal them presented an opportunity to politically capitalize on the process depending on the outcome of the Shiyes protests. By letting the municipality win, the authorities could frame the court ruling as a demonstration of justice and the rule of law prevailing in Russia, and by letting RZD/Ekotekhnopark continue to appeal the court decisions (even after Governor Orlov resigned and the new Governor promised to stop the construction and start recultivating the site – GR-290, GR-319) the final question regarding Shiyes could be put on hold until the situation cleared up. In any case, these processes presented latent opportunities for the authorities and careful ways of disengaging the movement.

5.4 Cultural Frames: Analysis

In the second step of the analysis cultural frame analysis is employed to investigate the second sub-question: how are changes in the emotional regime framed by the Shiyes social movement? The analysis will proceed by examining the same four protest events as in the last sub-chapter on contentious episode analysis. It is worth repeating that data for frame analysis was collected for one week prior to the protest event, at the day of protest, and one day after the protest event wrapped up. Each protest event is analyzed with an eye on diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames employed by the Shiyes social movement.

5.4.1 “URDOMA Online” – Protest in Urdoma on August 26, 2018

Besides the landfill at Shiyes, the main problem as framed by the Shiyes movement is the notion of an invasion by aliens from the outside. War metaphors directly urging people to defend Shiyes and save the North is often used (“*Otstoim Shiyes, spasem Sever*”). The anti-fascist slogan famously used in the Spanish Civil War by the republicans “No pasaran”, or “They shall not pass” is widely used in mobilizational material together with reassurances that victory will be theirs (“*Pobeda budet za nami*”). At this early stage of the protest episode, the enemy invading the protesters is not clearly defined. Sometimes RZhD (Russian Railways) is blamed and sometimes it is an undefined group of wealthy, powerful “fat cats” (“*zhirnye koty*”) that make money on Shiyes with no consideration for the Northerners (“*severjane*”) living there.

In any case, the problem of attributing blame on a defined antagonist is solved by blaming it on a general informational vacuum regarding the construction plans. The movement targets the inconsistency of what is being said by local and regional administrations and the realities on the ground as the main problem. The posts on VK lament regional and local administrations’ trivialization of the construction at Shiyes by promising that if something indeed is under construction, the public will be informed and included in public hearings and roundtables. Neither do local and regional TV announce any construction work on Shiyes. Information is shared on VK from the guards operating at Shiyes who confirm that a landfill is under construction. Several VK posts voice the concern that the tempo on site indicates that the construction is, indeed, planned, agreements have been signed and that any government promises about public hearings and expert assessments will be nothing but a smokescreen. Moreover, local and regional government actor’s lack of knowledge regarding the

construction work is framed as problematic, blissful ignorance that is meant to string people along until it is too late to reverse the construction.

Perhaps in opposition to the motionless reaction of the regional and local administrations, the social movement formulates a collective identity of what I have labeled “responsible, visible citizens” understood as individuals and collectives of people publicly denouncing the construction. Explicitly referring to themselves as “we”, “I”, “Tyva” or “Kholmogorsky raion” it is as if they are stepping out from the opaque, nameless, silent “grey mass” and into the public sphere. As some of the posts say, if the regional power holders do nothing to cast light on the truth, we will!

The latter goes hand in hand with the movement’s prognostic framing – what to do? In addition to joining protests where protesters are encouraged to express their opinions and make their voices heard, the solution is also framed to force the authorities to take responsibility by spreading information on social media about the inconvenient truth of what is really going on at the Shiyes site. Several posts make it a point that it should be made impossible for the local and regional authorities to stay in blissful ignorance. Another popular prognostic frame I labeled “civic responsibility”, which includes a duty to inform yourself, take conscious choices and to participate in the public sphere, urged people to take control over their own faith instead of letting someone else do it for them (as they have done until now) (“*Skazhi net!*”).

Lastly, the motivation to join the movement is framed along two related dimensions. The first motivational frame centers on the power of numbers, the power of solidarity, of which I have coded as “People power”. People power is understood here as political pressure exercised through collective public demonstrations of one’s political opinion. The more people are mobilized to demonstrate their public opinion, the greater legitimacy they have as a collective and the greater pressure they can exercise. Several posts contain the affirmation of the power in numbers (“*Nas mnogo!*”, “*Vmeste my sila!*”) and a show of solidarity (“*Komi s nami!*”). The second motivational frame stresses the effect of collective action (coded as “Proven results”). This frame elaborates on the success of other local anti-waste protests, such as the one in Chelyabinsk, that have proven to fend off any landfill plans. Also, the frame emphasizes the positive effect of the Shiyes movement’s own “wins” during its short life, namely the outpouring of outrage and frustration on social media regarding the landfill which, supposedly, was the main reason the import of waste to Shiyes had been delayed.

At this time, the problem is chiefly framed as a local issue and blame is attributed to principally to a small circle of local and regional government actors. The mixed message generated by local and regional administrations claiming they either do not have any information, reveal some but not all, admit that there is a construction plan but reassure that legal procedures will be followed dominates the diagnostic framing. Even though these government reactions fuel mobilization and cause an even greater mistrust in the local and regional administrations, the movement invites decision-makers to make things right. If they do, they will be forgiven. In other words, the movement is leaving an opening for a de-escalation of the conflict.

5.4.2 “URDOMA Online” – Regional Protest on December 2, 2018

A noticeable shift in cultural frames employed by the movement in connection with the protest event on December 2, 2018 is its significantly widened scope of diagnostic frames. The landfill continues to run as a central node but is now joined by frames concerning the opposition to import waste from other regions and Moscow waste. Moscow is repeated in numerous connections: framing the import of waste from Moscow as treating people as cannon fodder (“*Moskva - my tozhe ljudi!*”, “We wont [sic] to live”) and framing the construction at Shiyes as an elaborate scheme to trick the residents (“*Shish vam a ne Shies*”). Moscow is generally framed as flexible alien antagonist. It seems to include anything, and anyone related to foreign elements but also to its proximity to the federal government. In this light, it is possible to interpret the broad representation of both regional government actors, such as Governor Orlov and the regional administration, Moscow-based corrupt bureaucrats and the flexible category of scavengers (“*pomojshhiki*”, “*musorshhiki*” – a timely pun) and waste mafia, as the movement’s interpretation of the composition of a circle of friends or a chain of command.

This interpretation is underpinned by the prognostic frame coded “informational vacuum”. Condemnation is attributed to the regional administration’s dialogue efforts. The movement stresses how some information was revealed by the regional authorities’ outreach attempt, promises of recycling at Shiyes were not followed up with details on how they would go about it, and information about the promised expert assessment has yet to be announced. Stories about deputy head of Arkhangelsk administration, Evgeny Fomenko’s, visit to Urdoma ending up in him telling that the construction is a pilot project, and Governor Orlov’s

saying that Shiyes will be limited to a temporary storage facility are repeated in the VK posts together with ridicule of a video in which the Arkhangelsk head of administration poses with a portrait of President Putin telling that Shiyes will be a recycling plant and that agreements have been signed with some of the best European companies in this field. In these posts, the administrators are speculating whether the regional heads are forced to play for the gallery by federal powerholders who have struck a deal with Governor Orlov. The frame coded “theft of local land”, which was referenced several times, also supports this interpretation. Here, Governor Orlov is guilty of land theft (“*My RODINOJ ne torguem*”, “*Gubernator, ty nam ne rodstvennik, prodaesh' ty nash kraj gektarami*”).

Identity bordering is also important when defining your own collective identity – often in opposition to the antagonist, the “Other”. In this instance, the framing of a collective identity has split into two groupings. The first is denoted by a unity of three elements: the unique Northern landscape, the Russian spirit embodied by the simple, innocent Russian people, and the Russian spirit embodied through the holy Russian nature. The second grouping, which is slightly more pronounced, builds on the “responsible citizen” label. Together with two new categories of “the people” (“*narod*”, “*narodnyj protest*”) and “Pomors, Pomor’e” focus is made on a proactive part of the society that become part of the civil society and which believes in its own power. The addition of the two latter framing categories may especially point to the collective as identifying itself as an opposition to the “alien” Governor Orlov. And now that the “alien” has sold the land of Pomor’e, a realization kicks in that only the pomors will take responsibility of its own land.

The findings from the frame analysis, thus shows that the movement did frame the mixed message of the authorities’ sticking to their policy and managed dialogue as a problem that was used to mobilize people. The regional authorities’ repressive reactions were also named several times in the VK posts. For instance, frames highlighting the hypocrisy of the Governor reassuring that Shiyes is under control while local and regional administrations impede sanctioned protests is mentioned quite a few times. Also, statements by the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights on the illegality of the construction were often referenced. As a reflection of the abovementioned, in addition to joining the protests, the resignation of Governor Orlov constituted the most referenced solution to the problems.

5.4.3 “PNP” – Protest in Arkhangelsk City on May 19, 2019

The two identity nexuses mentioned in the preceding sub-chapter, chapter 5.4.2., are still active. The civic nexus is strengthened by a new category though, that of “activists”, which may suggest a certain politicization of the Shiyes movement. The high number of frames referencing what I have labeled “bulldozing”, which is meant to denote government actions directed at continuing the construction plans, may explain the shift towards greater politicization of the movement. While this category soared in number of references, the frames regarding the informational vacuum¹ that previously had been relatively high, had dropped to none. The label includes frames referencing continued construction despite promises to halt construction work, opposition to sending hordes of law enforcement officers to Shiyes, and the regional authorities insisting on the gains and technologic innovation of the construction project. These frames are placed in the context of the repressive ways of the local government actors – they are ways of “cleaning out” the problem at Shiyes and of restoring silence and order (“*zachistka*”). Meanwhile, the condemnation of continued construction is referenced in relation to people lamenting the smokescreen of the legal-administrative processes that were initiated by the regional administration.

Legal problems are also often cited in relation to the local government actor and reflects the turn to repressive reactions directed at the Shiyes social movement. Unlawful detainments and unlawful use of administrative resources to either not sanctioning protests or organizing state-led events at the time of planned protests. The moral aspect of this is demonstrated through the movement’s framing of the unfair treatment of people as criminals while real crime prevails. The hypocrisy of such treatment by local government actors, reflect the conflict between bulldozing and disengagement of the public from participating in the movement.

These new realities of the movement’s life are also manifested in how it frames its antagonists. From certain categories standing out in the previous two protest events, the number of references mentioning a particular out-group is low. Meanwhile, new categories emerged, such as the city administration, local authorities, Procurator’s Office, and the security structures – an echo of the regional authorities bulldozing and crackdowns on protest participants. Instead, a higher number of frames were registered in the category “legal problems”, which resounds the movement’s concern with a gradually closing public sphere.

A commonly referenced prognostic framing is to lead by example by promoting environmentally friendly lifestyle. A related, but separately categorized frame is the prognostic frame of “legal measures”; they are low in numbers per sub-category, but relatively evenly distributed. One of these sub-categories is the call to act in accordance with the law and to be respectful of the law. Although this appeal might seem futile, might have a performative value. When maintaining respect of the law at protests surveilled by law enforcement officers, the performance turns into contentious battle over appropriate ways of behaving in public and towards each other as a collective. The performance is meant to ignite a cognitive dissonance in the way law enforcers should treat protestors and how they are actually being treated.

Another contentious performative action regarding emotional expression norms, is reflected in the civic responsibility frame. As many of the VK posts urged people to voice their opinion on the Shiyes case, they also included declarations of distrust in an orderly and a matter-of-factly manner (“*My publichno vyrazhaem neuvazhenie gorodskoj administracii*” and “*(...) my budem vyrazhat' svoe mnenie o proishodjashhem v nashej oblasti*”).

5.4.4 “PNP” – National Protests on March 15, 2020

The framing of the movement as representatives of common people, responsible citizens were moved to the forefront in the mobilizational work of the protest leaders. This shift might have reflected Governor Orlov’s efforts to delegitimize the movement. The continued emphasis on framing the protestors as “responsible, visible citizens” in combination with “the people” and the regional identity frame of “pomor” might have been an attempt at a normalization of normal people being politically or civically engaged.

As in the previous protests, the landfill remained a symptom of a more rooted problem – the ignorance of authorities, and their attempted silencing of protests. However, the issue of the Shiyes landfill is now interpreted into a broader context of waste management in the region and the national waste reform launched in spring 2019. Moreover, they are framed as a connected problem forming a triadic node. Dissecting the latter two categories, the movement disapproves them as rotten scams created by a Moscow elite to make money (“*musornaja reforma uzakonennyj grabezh*”). In general, an elite – people antagonistic axis is accentuated in the framing work of the movement. The powerful elite is robbing the people (“*sortiruj, ne sortiruj, vse ravno poluchish' ... schet!*”), public policies are not aimed at the common good of

the society and the public authorities ignore the people. The framing of the out-group substantiate this; the movement no longer chiefly focuses on Governor Orlov, but also include administrations on local and regional level, regional waste operator, Ekotekhnopark, and the “waste mafia” – in essence anyone thought to make profit from the Shiyes landfill and who either are intrinsically corrupt (such as the waste mafia, regional waste operator and Ekotekhnopark) or who have betrayed the people of Arkhangelsk (regional and local administrations).

Although the movement did succeed in connecting the repressive actions of regional and local government actors to the issue of profitability and corruption in the waste business, the number of protesters were significantly lower than in the other three. This must be taken into consideration when the data indicate that most prognostic frames were centered around either legal measures or demands for sound waste management. Some of the VK posts on particularly the latter topic might have veered too much into “expert talk” and resonated with a niche tier of the movement. Many of the problems mentioned in the posts touched upon poor organization of regional waste management and unreasonably high municipal tariff prices for managing household. As a solution to this, prognostic frames are supplemented in the same direction as the diagnostic frames, demanding the authorities introduce separate waste collection and decommission or reject plans to build waste incinerators (“*net’ opasnomu szhiganiju v cherte nashego goroda*”).

5.5 Discussion

A common assumption is that frames will crystallize throughout the course of a protest episode, especially the diagnostic frame. As more information is disclosed and the antagonist becomes more involved in the contentious episode, the clearer the responsible party and the problem of the conflict emerges. The findings from the cultural frame analysis partly disproves this assumption. While, indeed, motivational framing and the frames presenting the landfill as a consistent node in the diagnostic frames, the antagonist and various dimensions of problems related to the landfill change throughout the four protest events. Frames referencing the out-group shift from being centered on actors in geographically close proximity to the landfill (such as RZD) to regional and local administrations assumed to have had the power to stop the construction, finally, to actors believed to have profited from the export of Moscow waste – often related to power-holders in Moscow – to the prospective

landfill. Similarly, the core problem of the conflict goes through different stages of first being centered on an intentional information vacuum and fear of alien powers meddling in the day-to-day life of the region, to frames voicing the dignity of the “*severyane*” and Pomors, followed by frames centered on the repression of residents and a narrowing of the public space for civic participation. Seeing these shifts in tandem with findings during the contentious episode analysis, they reflect the mobilizational spaces created due to changing emotional regimes, as well as parallel emotional regimes contradicting each other.

Further underpinning the role of changing emotional regimes in movement mobilization, it is worth looking at how decision-makers or power-holders responsible for the Shiyes landfill are framed. As also Kirill Chmel, Aigul Klimova, and Evgeniya Mitrokhina (2020, 91) note, the idea of the powerful antagonist is sometimes quite abstract, and certainly not institutionally defined. Instead the image of the power-holder resembles a dark hole where interests are mixed and everyone is guilty (Chmel, Klimova, and Mitrokhina 2020, 91). The findings from my cultural frame analysis partly supports this; the antagonist responsible for the problems is half of the time framed in categories such as “Moscow”, “corrupt bureaucrats”, “people betraying the interests of the common good”, “scavengers”, “waste mafia”, “the power vertical”. Such framing speaks into the notion of politics as dirty and something common people should stay away from – an echo of the regime’s time-long depoliticization efforts.

However, the empirical findings of my frame analysis nuance this interpretation. Indeed, the antagonist shifts throughout the course of the protest episode, but not necessarily due to the inability to formulate a clear antagonist or due to internal disagreement on who to attribute blame. Instead, the findings indicate that there is a correlation between the government actor responsible for interacting the most with the movement as well as exhibiting most varied emotives and frames formulated by the movement. When government involvement into the Shiyes case was limited during the first protest event on August 26, 2018, the prognostic framing was centered on the information vacuum which should be solved through active citizenry. Frames targeting the hypocrisy of the regional government actor’s banning of protests against the landfill and fragmented information about the status of the landfill during the second protest event on December 2, 2018 coincided with the government actor most interacting with the movement and exhibiting a greater variation of emotives – namely the regional government actor as seen in Table 9. Similarly, during the third protest event on May 19, 2019 frames attributing blame to particularly local and regional authorities reflect the

distribution of interaction between the local and regional government actors. While the local actor was increasingly involved in repression, the regional actor insisted on sticking to the construction project and attempted to convince the residents of the gains of the project. Lastly, the overall repressive reactions across the three government actors during the last protest event on March 15, 2020 was reflected in the prevalence of frames targeting the national waste reform as a backdoor for powerful elites across the power vertical to enrich themselves at the expense of regular Russians. The point is that the movement was not struck by inertia. On the contrary, it was able to stay flexible and to continuously pick up on the changing emotional regime and the government actor responsible for these changes.

Whether conscious or not, I argue that this strategy was central in the movement's ability to emerge and sustain for such a long time. As the frame analysis illustrates that traditional mobilizational opportunities, such as access to political channels or elite allies, were unbelievably scarce to the Shiyes social movement and presumably many other social movements in Russia. Mobilizational opportunities, such as elite deviation, were not available to the movement and yet it became one of the largest movements in Russia. These findings, on the other hand, support that mobilizational opportunities were created due to the authorities' engineering and manipulation of the public sphere using conflicting emotives to manage public dissent and the movement's ability to frame these efforts as a mobilizational opportunity. As the frame analysis have shown, these efforts were named illegitimate by the movement and in opposition to the protestors' perception of norms of emotional expression.

For the protest to have grown this much in magnitude, the movement's framing of its expectations regarding norms of emotional expression and appropriate behavioral patterns in the public sphere must have resonated with the residents of Arkhangelsk region to some degree. The frequent references to "pomors", "Pomor'e", "(Russian) North", "northerners", "the people" and "visible, responsible citizens" may point to an effort to solidify a sense that these expectations were not imported from a Western ideational script but are, in fact, normal and intrinsic to the Russian society. Labeling the movement as a "Russian 'bunt'", Flikke (2021, 475) emphasizes the difficulty of which the authorities had in dealing with a movement that presented itself as a "Russian movement" in contrast to a movement inspired by Western-sponsored color revolutions or Navalny-style intentions of disrupting rent-seeking structures. The cost of brutally tightening the screws, as has been done in relation to Navalny's political movement and any "non-patriotic" display of public dissent after spring of

2019, was, presumably too high. President Putin still depends on the regional electorate to win elections, especially the public sector workers who might have found resonance with the Shiyes social movement.

The Shiyes case is to a little degree framed as a purely environmental issue or as a strictly political problem. The landfill is indeed at the core of the issue but protection of the nature's intrinsic value, health of the people or consumer patterns are not the most prevalent concerns of the movement. Instead elements regarding illegitimacy of the construction plans, unfairness, lack of respect to the residents, and dignity of the people frequently appear in various movement frames. This feature of the movement may signify that the protests were tapping into the moral problem of social engineering and the negative effect it had on the public domain by changing the emotional regime.

6 Conclusion

This thesis has shown that resources, modern values, grievances, and political opportunities alone could not, to a sufficient degree, have accounted for the development of the Shiyes movement. Conclusions from the contentious episode analysis and cultural frame analysis illustrate the significance of interaction and social structures in contentious episodes in authoritarian political systems like Russia. Although strong discontent regarding the import of Moscow waste to the landfill at Shiyes did fuel the residents of Arkhangelsk region with frustration, changes to the emotional regime were a key component in the mechanism driving and sustaining the Shiyes social movement. Interestingly, as conclusions from the framing analysis show, the lengthy life cycle of the movement was not necessarily inevitable, on the contrary, the protestors were willing to forgive the mess if the authorities were willing to make things right. However, signals “from above”, as the movement implied, did not allow it.

The concept of emotional regimes proved to be a valuable framework for explaining the mechanisms triggering movement emergence and sustainability. Findings from the contentious episode analysis and cultural frame analysis suggest that changing emotional regimes indeed trigger counter-reactions and create mobilizational opportunities that the Shiyes social movement successfully were able to frame in a way that resonated with people and galvanized them into joining the movement. As the analysis have illustrated, the shifts were not directly switching from a “soft” emotional regime to a “harsh” one. Rather the thesis support that government actors attempted to engineer and sustain as many emotional management styles as possible in the public domain sending mixed messages, causing confusion and disillusionment. In the words of Chebankova, government actors were acting as “principal agenda-setters” and creating a “manageable and engineered form of pluralism in the public domain” (2011, 324).

But where Chebankova points to pluralism in especially ideational forms, for instance the creation of a wide array of television programs, channels and media outlets in which Russians can engage with contentious ideas in a non-disruptive way (2011, 327), my findings demonstrate that said pluralism may also manifest in the authorities’ diverse action repertoire towards containing protest activities. The thesis illustrated that state-led repression in Russia comes in many forms and not necessarily in “hard” forms. Throughout the Shiyes protests, the Russian regime employed every tool in its toolbox to shape the public domain and signal new

expectations to how discontent should be expressed in public. In some instances, people were expected to blindly trust the authorities, in other, to be convinced that the planned construction was part of the political regime's modernization efforts. Those who wanted to feel reassured the authorities shared their environmental concerns could read about the region's eco-forums, roundtables, and Q&A's with the governor. And in yet other instances, the regime defined the core of the movement as marginals who caused disorder and who needed to be put in place. Not only did this pluralism of action repertoires restrict and limit the public domain, but it also seemed to aim at fragmenting the movement and creating a polarized public sphere. Those who wanted to see a certain reaction from the authorities, especially those were not heavily involved in the movement such as bystanders and supporters, could feel appeased by some of these initiatives, while hard core activists were detained and delegitimized in public by the authorities.

Could such engineering have been avoided, and thus, deescalated the conflict? After all, as the framing analysis demonstrated, the Shiyes social movement pulled heavily on framing the movement as a normal Russian movement that should not pose a real threat to the authorities. As implied in the paragraph above, the regional authorities might have been instructed to stick to the construction plans and to diffuse any negative attention. However, disengagement tactics are a necessary, but troublesome feature of a competitive authoritarian regime. As Levitsky and Way (2010, 5) argue, regime survival is dependent on skewing the playing field to avoid any challengers from destabilizing the regime and taking the throne. Perhaps, as Geir Flikke (2021) argues, the reaction of the authorities can be better explained as a way of protecting the system of rent distribution among the federal elites and breaking the system would be punished by its stakeholders.

As the thesis demonstrates, the movement was able to sense these attempts at managing discontent in the public sphere and to frame them as mobilizational opportunities. This shows that at the core, the protests were rooted in a deeper discontent with the way the authorities handled people's concerns. This was especially reflected in the wide array of slogans employed at protest activities and in VK ranging from calls for dignity to calls for awakening and participate in civic education. In itself, one could argue that the emphasis on changing emotional regimes is an "apolitical" way of protesting in Russia since which, besides functioning as mobilizational opportunities, may have also been one of the causes it succeeded in attracting thousands to protest. Avoiding voicing traditional political issues, the

movement was able to distance itself from becoming associated with “dirty” politics, which in turn may have made it more appealing for opponents of the landfill to join the movement. On the other hand, by allowing changing emotional regimes to be the driving force of the movement its trajectory was restrained to the authorities’ own responses.

The essential role of emotional regimes and disengagement that has been illustrated in this thesis, have implications for how we understand protests in Russia. Strategies of disengagement and repression are often associated with a passive citizenry that Russians, and especially Russians living in the regions, have been labeled. To some degree this notion is reproduced by the Russians themselves. A distinct proportion of frames engaged with narratives running along the axis of city – periphery and corrupted power holders – simple, innocent people of the Russian soil. Although the latter axis disappeared in the background after some time at the expense of a “politically awakened citizenry” identity, references to and symbols from archaic archetypes and practices from the Muscovite era were employed on a regular basis. The juxtaposition of a dark despot ruler and poor farmers having to pay tributes to the ruler contributed to reproducing ideas of the Russian people as yet another victim to historical events. The Shiyes protests disprove the narrative of the “silent majority” as a subdued citizenry. On the contrary, attempts at disengaging Russians may, in fact, mobilize people as seen in this thesis.

This begs the question of how one should understand regime stability in today’s Russia. One of the most entrenched tenets among scholars of Russian politics is that social contracts constitute one of the central pillars of stable state-society relations, see the literature review in chapter 2. They build on the idea of self-restrained “non-interference” in socio-economic terms in exchange for ceding authority to the Kremlin (Makarkin and Oppenheimer 2011). The case of the Shiyes protests underpins the findings of emergent literature on how the political regime increasingly seeks to engage its citizens emotionally and ideationally breaking its own paternalistic “non-interference” pact as the regime is no longer able to provide wealth to its citizens under the economic downturn of the last 10 years (e.g. Østbø 2017; Sharafutdinova 2014; Smyth, Sobolev, and Soboleva 2013)). Ironically, efforts of engagement or actions that look like engagement are meant to disengage (e.g. Østbø 2017). As this thesis have shown, such interference might backfire and produce sharp conflict and alienate its citizens. In the context of complex and acute social challenges, such as Russia’s

full-scale war on Ukraine in February 2022, this trend seems unlikely to change and might lead to a new cycle of defiance and conflict.

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Appendix 1: Dataset – Contentious Episode Analysis

Action ID	Date	G-Local	G-Regional	G-Federal	Description	Challenger	Protest repertoire	Trigger	# protesters	Source
1	26.07.2018				Inhabitants of Urdoma discovered construction work at Shiyes. Construction workers confirmed they were building a landfill and that they were hired by Moscow ministry of housing and communal service.				0	https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/08/08/77437-esli-zasoritsya-unitaz-vy-v-gostinoy-ubornuyu-soorudite ; https://stopshies.ru/history/
2	26.07.2018	4			Urdoma municipality had not given permission to the construction work.				1	https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/08/08/77437-esli-zasoritsya-unitaz-vy-v-gostinoy-ubornuyu-soorudite ; https://stopshies.ru/history/

3	07.08.2018		1		Deputy chairman of ARX oblast, Evgeny Fomenko went to see civil society actors in Urdoma, confirmed construction plans.			1	https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/08/08/77437-esli-zasoritsya-unitaz-vy-v-gostinoy-ubornuyu-soorudite
4	08.08.2018					4	6	3	https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/08/08/77437-esli-zasoritsya-unitaz-vy-v-gostinoy-ubornuyu-soorudite
5	14.08.2018	4			Urdoma MPs send an open letter to the governor asking him to cancel construction.			3	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/08/14/65267251/
6	16.08.2018		4		Communist party faction in regional parliament ask the prosecutor's office to assess the legality of the construction			3	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/08/17/65279441/
7	20.08.2018		2		United Russia MP visits Urdoma, construction site, announced that waste to Shies postponed to a later time.			3	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/08/20/65287771/

8	22.08.2018		4	Deputy head of ARX regional administration Evgeny Fomenko denied taking any responsibility for construction and plans at Shiyes.			3		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/08/22/65298481/
9	26.08.2018				4	1	3	1000	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/08/26/65311091/
10	30.08.2018			Rosprirodnadzor claims the construction is illegal.	4		4		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/08/30/65329681/
11	13.09.2018		2	Regional transport prosecutor's office will assess legality of construction.			6		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/09/13/65384921/
12	18.09.2018		3	Deputy governor of ARX requires that Shies is not discussed on Ecco of Moscow.			3		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/09/18/65404261/
13	21.09.2018			Federal department of housing and communal services confirms that they consider Shies a prospective site. But current construction is only for doing tests.	3		4		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/09/21/65417381/
14	26.09.2018	4		Lensky raion Department of Domestic Affairs			4		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/09/26/65433711/

					initiated a criminal case against the felling down of trees at the construction site.					
15	28.09.2018		2		Administration of ARX oblast are preparing a press conference that will reveal details about the construction.			0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/09/28/65443841/
16	02.10.2018		1		Regional transport prosecutor's office confirm that there are plans to transport waste from Moscow to Shies.			11		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/02/65457031/
17	04.10.2018		4		Regional branch of Rosprirodnadzor publish findings from a control visit to Shies and claim there are grounds for administrative penalties.			10		https://29.ru/text/economics/2018/10/04/65467311/
18	05.10.2018					2	7	3		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2018/10/05/65471441/
19	07.10.2018	3			Representatives of Lensky raion Department of Domestic Affairs and head of Urdoma	4	7	18	31	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/10/07/65474841/

					administration warned that the procession had not been sanctioned by the local authorities.					
20	09.10.2018					4	2	3	2	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/09/65485131/
21	11.10.2018		2		Governor of ARX announces that details for the construction will be published in one week.			15		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/11/65491961/
22	12.10.2018					3	4	3		https://29.ru/text/business/2018/10/12/65498781/
23	12.10.2018					2	1	3		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/12/65498661/
24	12.10.2018	3			Local administrations do not authorize the protests.			23		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/12/65498661/
25	17.10.2018		1		Regional administration presses for changing status of the landfill into a prioritized investment project.			0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/17/65514741/
26	18.10.2018		1		"Ekotekhnopark" presented its plans for Shiyes.			21		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/10/18/65519001/

27	18.10.2018		1	Regional commission for investments and competition gave the project plans status as a prioritized investment project.			25		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/18/65517751/
28	18.10.2018		3	Regional administration denied local administration of Lensky raion attendance at the presentation.			26		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/18/65517751/
29	18.10.2018		1	Governor of ARX confirms the status of the construction project as a prioritized investment project.			27		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/10/18/65519001/
30	20.10.2018				4	1	23	400	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/10/20/65525671/
31	20.10.2018	1		Mayor of ARX invited by activists to participate in upcoming protests, he denied.			23		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/10/20/65526051/
32	21.10.2018				4	1	23	560	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/10/21/65527861/
33	22.10.2018				3	6	0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/22/65531761/

34	24.10.2018		3	Governor of ARX introduced a bill on curtailing the authority of local administrations in urban planning and authorizing site plans. The bill was approved in the regional parliament in its first hearing.			0	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/10/24/65540771/
35	25.10.2018				3	4	22	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/10/25/65546331/
36	29.10.2018				3	6	0	https://29.ru/text/culture/2018/10/29/65558771/
37	07.11.2018		2	A representative from the regional administration prepares a public orientation to the citizens of Urdoma.			28	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/11/07/65591121/
38	07.11.2018		1	Construction of transfer points for Moscow waste to other regions started in Moscow.			0	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/11/07/65592801/
39	07.11.2018				3	6	0	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/11/07/65592761/

40	07.11.2018					2	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/11/09/65601771/
41	09.11.2018		3		ARX administration rejected application to organize a protest in ARX.			40		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/11/09/65601771/
42	09.11.2018					3	4	33		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/11/09/65600531/
43	12.11.2018	4			Communist party MP and deputy head of ARX city Duma advocates against the import of waste from other regions, reaches out to ARX governor and regional parliament.			3		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/11/12/65610781/
44	14.11.2018		3		Regional electoral committee rejected request by civil initiative to conduct referendum against the import of waste from other regions.			22		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/11/14/65617791/
45	16.11.2018					2	1	44		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/11/16/65627851/
46	23.11.2018	4			Urdoma administration files a lawsuit against RZD in			3		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/11/23/6565901/

					the hope for the construction to stop.					
47	26.11.2018		1		ARX governor insists that the landfill will be a high-tech facility.			48		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/11/26/65667921/
48	26.11.2018			2	Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights invited civil society actors for a meeting to discuss the Shiyes landfill.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/11/26/65667921/
49	28.11.2018			2	Deputy governor of ARX oblast Evgeny Fomenko signals readiness to discuss Shiyes with activists.			45		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/11/28/65676231/
50	28.11.2018	1			ARX city дума voted against appealing to the oblast дума for banning import of waste from other regions.			43		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/11/28/65676931/
51	01.12.2018					3	6	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/12/01/65689591/
52	02.12.2018					4	1	45	30000	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/12/02/65690801/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/12/02/65691161/

53	04.12.2018			2	Press-secretary Dmitry Peskov, protestors' demand of ARX governor's resignation will be presented to President Putin			52	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/12/04/65699071/
54	12.12.2018		3		Chairman of the regional parliament removed for consideration bill on import ban of waste into ARX oblast.			0	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/12/12/65730431/
55	12.12.2018		3		Regional electoral commission rejected new bid for referendum			44	https://29.ru/text/politics/2018/12/12/65730431/
56	20.12.2018			2	Putin at annual press-conference promises to solve the waste problem in Russia, remove illegal landfills, commission sorting plants.			0	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2018/12/20/65764251/
57	10.01.2019	4			Urdoma administration files a second lawsuit against RZD and "Ekotechnopark" in ARX Arbitration court			46	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/01/10/65825141/
58	14.01.2019			1	ARX governor claims he has seen documents that show			0	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/01/14/65836041/

					sound technical solutions for the construction at Shiyes.					
59	18.01.2018					2	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/01/18/65852951/
60	24.01.2018			3	ARX governor announced that a planned protest against the construction in Shiyes will disturb societal order.				59	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/01/24/65874981/
61	03.02.2019					4	1	59	25000	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/02/03/65911651/
62	06.02.2019			4	Regional branch of Rostekhnadzor declares construction at Shiyes illegal				57	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/06/65925281/
63	07.02.2019			1	ARX Arbitration Court rules that there are no grounds for discontinuing construction at Shiyes.				62	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/07/65928361/
64	08.02.2019			1	ARX Administration prepared new site plan for the construction at Shiyes.				34	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/08/65931421/

65	12.02.2019					2	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/12/65944561/
66	16.02.2019		2		Two representatives from ARX Ministry of Construction and Architecture visited Urdoma and presented the new site plan for the construction at Shiyes on outdoor-stands for a day.			64		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/16/65959841/
67	18.02.2019			2	Representatives from the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights visited Urdoma and Shiyes, conducted a session with activists.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/18/65966481/
68	19.02.2019					3	4	55		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/19/65971631/
69	22.02.2019			2	Commission on environmental rights of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human rights recommends visiting activists in ARX, recommends the ARX Procurator's			67		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/22/65983321/

					Office to file a lawsuit against the construction at Shiyes.					
70	24.02.2019					4	1	0	2000-12000	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/24/65989201/
71	26.02.2019		2		Public Chamber of ARX region organized an environmental forum to facilitate dialogue between the government and civil society.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/26/65998041/
72	26.02.2019			3	CEO Federal expert group "Region's Club" call activist "misbehaving children" who "politicize" waste problems in the region.			71		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/26/65998041/
73	28.02.2019		2		ARX governor suggested an eco-monitoring system should be installed at Shiyes.			71		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/02/28/66001390/
74	06.03.2019		4		Regional branch of Rostekhnadzor challenges the construction at Shiyes			63		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/03/06/66008071/

					in ARX Arbitration Court					
75	13.03.2019		1		ARX Arbitration Court ruled the construction at Shiyes to be legal.			74		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/03/13/66015772/
76	15.03.2019			3	Employees from "Ekotekhnopark" tore down activist wagon post at Shiyes, one person injured.			0		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/03/15/66018121/
77	18.03.2019		2		ARX governor orders an investigation of the incident at Shiyes (tearing down of wagon post).			76		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/03/18/66021253/
78	18.03.2019			4	Federation Council aware of situation at Shiyes but claimed they have no information or involvement in decision-making. They promised to monitor the situation.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/03/18/66021511/
79	20.03.2019					2	1	70		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/03/20/66023704/
80	22.03.2019	2			Police initiated a criminal investigation into the incident at Shiyes.			77		https://29.ru/text/criminal/2019/03/22/66026989/

81	27.03.2019	4			Savelovsky raion court ruled an administrative penalty against one of the companies leasing property on the construction site for failure to provide Rosprirodnadzor required documents in connection with their investigation into the legality of the construction.			17		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/03/27/66033178/
82	30.03.2019	3			Police arrested activists present at the incident, claims he injured Shiyes worker contrary to witness statements and videos from incident.			80		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/03/30/66037084/
83	30.03.2019	3			Police refused to start a criminal investigation into Shiyes worker who injured activist at the incident.			80		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/03/30/66036937/
84	31.03.2019					4	3	76		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/03/31/66037288/
85	31.03.2019	3			Police confiscated camping equipment and photo and video			84		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/04/01/66038971/

					material from activists camping at Shiyes.					
86	01.04.2019					4	2	82		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/01/66038728/
87	05.04.2019	3			ARX court doubles administrative penalty fee of prominent activist.			70		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/05/66044380/
88	05.04.2019			3	ARX governor in annual press-conference claims activists "politicize" question of waste management in ARX, mislead people and impede correct information from the government from reaching the public.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/05/66044167/
89	05.04.2019	3			Police officer breaks activist arm that blocked road to Shiyes.			85		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/05/66044719/
90	05.04.2019			3	ARX governor calls citizens opposing the landfill at Shiyes "low-lives" and that he doesn't "f*****" care that his ratings are below legal threshold for			0		https://arh.mk.ru/social/2019/04/05/gubernator-orlov-o-svoikh-kritikakh-vsyakaya-shelupon-

					competing in governor elections.					kotoraya-zdes-nikto.html
91	06.04.2019	3			Police arrested protest organizers ahead of announced mass protest on April 7.			79		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/06/66045109/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/06/66044941/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/07/66045793/
92	07.04.2019					4	1	79	3,000 - 7,000	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/07/66045472/
93	07.04.2019	3			Large police presence oversaw the protests, formed human chain, used force to disband protest.			92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/07/66045472/
94	07.04.2019	3			ARX administration organized a festival celebrating a healthy lifestyle on planned site for protest.			92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/07/66045472/
95	07.04.2019					4	5	92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/07/66045646/
96	07.04.2019	3			Police confiscated activist tents for bessrochka.			95		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/07/66045646/

97	08.04.2019	3			Police started mass arrests of activist leaders after April 7 protest			92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/08/66046648/
98	08.04.2019			3	Member of Federal Council representing ARX claimed public protests create instability, causes for provocations and terrorism.			92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/08/66047113/
99	08.04.2019			4	Rosvodresursov confirmed landfill on Shiyes will contaminate soil and water resources			69		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/04/08/66047086/
100	09.04.2019		1		ARX governor supports construction and import of Moscow waste. Relocation of landfill to other regions unlikely.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/09/66048508/
101	09.04.2019					3	6	92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/09/66047677/
102	10.04.2019		3		ARX governor claims authorities have done everything in their power to inform and engage the public in the construction plans. Laments			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/10/66049660/

					public's inability to grasp complex information, protests fueled by ignorant people.				
103	10.04.2019			3	Private security officers hired by the construction company violent against activists at Shiyes, confiscated journalists' cameras.			89	https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/04/10/66049177/
104	11.04.2019			1	ARX governor reaffirmed intention to allow construction at Shiyes despite no information on technology of landfill and commission time.			92	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/11/66051256/ ; https://www.fontanka.ru/2019/04/11/084/?fbclid=IwAR0QeZ3xAIM0xL4vd3BCkylqXz3KMs7UAN2seQfvPctqnQGYDBau_z7EjLg
105	11.04.2019			3	ARX governor deemed it useless to initiate dialogue with activists who disagree with the policies of the regional administration regarding waste and Shiyes.			92	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/11/66051271/

106	12.04.2019	3			ARX city administration denies eco-NGO to organize annual separate waste collection event.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/12/66052162/
107	15.04.2019	3			Activists arrested after April 7 protests, court ruled administrative fees.			92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/15/66055555/
108	20.04.2019	3			Police sealed protest camps at Shiyes, denies activists to enter.			103		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/04/20/66061939/
109	21.04.2019	3			More activists arrested after April 7 protests, court ruled administrative penalties.			92		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/04/21/66062638/
110	23.04.2019	3			City removed benches in city square used by activists standing in bessrochka.			95		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/04/23/66064927/
111	24.04.2019					4	8	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/24/66066973/
112	24.04.2019			1	Press-secretary Dmitry Peskov, Putin did not notice banner at live stream demanding resignation of ARX governor.			111		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/24/66066973/

113	25.04.2019		4	Regional court ruled the regional parliament's rejection of a referendum on the import of waste to the region illegal.			55		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/25/66068413/
114	30.04.2019		2	ARX governor, future of Shiyes depends on assessment from governmental concept selection investigation, open to give up Shiyes			111		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/30/66075049/
115	30.04.2019		2	Secretary of regional chapter of "United Russia" and MP in regional parliament initiates dialogue with activists.			95		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/04/30/66075028/
116	30.04.2019	3		ARX city administration denied organizers behind Shiyes protests to form an alternative column of the May 1 procession			0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/04/30/66075088/
117	01.05.2019				4	5	116		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/05/01/66075325/
118	07.05.2019		3	Activists' appeals to remove administrative penalties for			92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/07/66080623/

					participation in April 7 protests denied by regional court.					
119	07.05.2019			1	Chairman of Committee on agricultural and food policy, Federation Council assured that situation at Shiyes under control.			78		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/07/66081031/
120	08.05.2019			2	ARX Arbitration court granted Urdoma administration an expert examination of the legality of the construction at Shiyes.			75		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/08/66082804/
121	10.05.2019			3	Private security officers hired by the construction company violent against activists at Shiyes, police did not interfere.			108		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/05/10/66084304/
122	12.05.2019	3			Police threatens to open criminal cases against activists blocking landing site for helicopters at Shiyes.			121		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/12/66085342/
123	13.05.2019					2	1	0	3500-7000	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/13/66086593/

124	13.05.2019		2	ARX Administration allowed mass protest in the city but assigned it to a smaller square off the city centre.			123		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/13/66086593/
125	14.05.2019		2	Presidential Administration decided to halt construction at Shiyes until an expert assessment of the environmental consequences and public hearings has been conducted.			0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/05/15/66089776/ ; https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2019/05/15/801415-poligona
126	15.05.2019				3	4	113		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/15/66089560/
127	16.05.2019		2	ARX governor invited citizens to a live stream on his VK account where they could ask him questions.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/16/66091153/
128	16.05.2019		1	In his live stream ARX governor insists that the construction is legal, confirms opening day of landfill.			127		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/16/66090859/

129	16.05.2019			2	President Putin emphasized that waste management in regions should not cause problems for their citizens, issue should be solved in dialogue with citizens, promised to talk with regional heads.			125		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/16/66091222/
130	19.05.2019					4	1	123	7000	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/05/19/66093934/ ; https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/05/19/66094147/
131	19.05.2019			3	Government-initiated events occur in central spaces at the same time as the concert organized by Shiyes activists.			130		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/05/19/66093934/
132	19.05.2019		3		Big police attendance at peaceful concert, several participants detained			130		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/05/19/66093934/ ; https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/05/19/66094072/
133	27.05.2019			3	Police detained activists at the Shiyes construction site and in ARX city			122		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/05/27/66103549/ ; https://29.ru/text

											/politics/2019/05/27/66103399/
134	27.05.2019			3	Private security officers hired by the construction company violent against activist, two injured					133	https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/05/27/66103549/
135	27.05.2019	3			Octyabrsky raion court prolonged house arrest for Shiyes activists					82	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/27/66104260/
136	28.05.2019						4	1		133	300 https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/05/28/66105781/
137	28.05.2019	3			Activists detained, injured and fined administrative penalties.					134	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/28/66105229/;https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/06/04/66113782/;https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/05/29/66106693/;https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/05/31/66110131/;https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/05/30/66108349/https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/05/29/66107275/

138	29.05.2019	4			ARX city дума decided to support the legal fight of fellow MPs from districts near Shiyes to retain authority over local urban planning.			34		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/05/29/66107047/
139	04.06.2019	3			Activists fined administrative penalties for participation in April 7 protests.			92		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/04/66113737/
140	05.06.2019	3			Activists fined administrative penalties for "insulting" the authorities when criticizing treatment of activists.			103		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/05/66115414/
141	06.06.2019	3			Activists detained and fined administrative penalties.			134		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/06/06/66116446/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/06/66116764/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/07/66118477/
142	07.06.2019				Arrested activist declared hunger strike.	4	8	134		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/07/66117616/

143	08.06.2019	2			City administration approved application to hold protest on June 16.			0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/06/08/66118813/
144	10.06.2019			2	Putin announced a live stream where the audience can send in questions on all matters. Question related to Shiyes voted top question on live stream platform.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/10/66120139/
145	10.06.2019	3			Police detained activists at the Shiyes construction site, activist restrained from visiting Shiyes and participating in future protests.			141		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/10/66120895/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/10/66120085/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/15/66126637/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/14/66125356/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/13/66124021/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/12/66123247/
146	13.06.2019	3			Police detained activists in ARX region.			136		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/13/66124615/ ;

										https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/15/66126553/
147	15.06.2019	3			Court extended term of imprisonment for Shiyes activist.			142		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/15/66126304/
148	15.06.2019					4	6	144		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/15/66126610/
149	16.06.2019					4	1	143	4000	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/16/66127210/
150	18.06.2019	3			Kotlas court ruled administrative penalty to activist at Shiyes.			137		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/18/66129712/
151	18.06.2019					4	6	144		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/18/66129514/
152	19.06.2019					4	8	0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/06/19/66130813/
153	19.06.2019					2	1	144		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/06/19/66131248/
154	19.06.2019					4	8	144	600	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/06/19/66131248/ ; https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/06/19/66131251/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/20/66131851/

										https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/20/66131827/
155	20.06.2019			3	Former promises of sending a TV crew on behalf of President Putin to connect activists at Shiyes to Putin's live stream were broken. Rumours of a TV crew 40 km from Shiyes in a nearby settlement.				154	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/06/20/66131860/
156	20.06.2019			3	Question related to Shiyes was not brought up or mentioned by President Putin at his live stream.				144	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/06/20/66131911/
157	20.06.2019					4	5		156	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/20/66132658/
158	20.06.2019	3			Police forces tried to block cars from nearing bessrochka to "honk" their support to the activists.				157	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/20/66132658/

159	20.06.2019			2	When asked about the application of a law on "disrespect for authority" in several Shies activist cases in live stream, Putin admitted that the law was incorrectly applied and that criticism directed at the authorities should be allowed.			144	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/06/20/66132259/
160	21.06.2019	3			Police detained activist at Shiyes.			150	https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/06/21/66133378/ ; https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/06/27/66141376/
161	25.06.2019	3			Police detained activist participating in besrochka.			157	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/25/66137725/
162	25.06.2019			3	Supreme Court of RF ruled decision by ARX regional court regarding the legality of a referendum on the import of waste void.			113	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/25/66138091/
163	26.06.2019	4			ARX City Duma ignored protests from Procurator's Office regarding Duma's solidarity stand with			138	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/26/66139444/

					Dumas in Urdoma and Kotlas regarding local authority in urban planning.					
164	28.06.2019	3			Activists fined administrative penalties for "insulting" Putin on social media, detained. Criminal cases filed for other activists.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/28/66142054/ ; https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/06/30/66143866/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/26/66139150/ https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/30/66143710/
165	28.06.2019	4			ARX City court ruled in favour of ARX city дума related to their decision to support their colleagues in Kotlas and Urdoma in their fight to keep local authority over urban planning.			163		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/28/66142525/
166	28.06.2019			3	RZD removed Shiyes from list of train stations along route to Vorkuta.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/06/28/66142693/
167	01.07.2019			1	ARX governor ignored people who wanted his resignation and			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/01/66145144/

					who criticized his waste policy at public event.					
168	04.07.2019	3			ARX city removed billboards purchased by Shiyes activists with Shiyes slogans.			0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/07/04/66149467/
169	08.07.2019		2		ARX Administration published call for suggestions to new territorial scheme. Citizens invited to post suggestions.			34		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/08/66153595/
170	10.07.2019	3			Activists fined administrative penalties.			121		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/10/66156661/ ; https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/07/14/66160483/
171	11.07.2019	3			Kotlas administration denied activists access to main square for protest. Local court upheld decision.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/11/66158026/
172	15.07.2019	4			Case against activist dropped.			164		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/15/66161995/
173	17.07.2019	3			Procurator's Office in Plesetsk called billboards in support of the Shiyes case "terrorism", forces company owning			169		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/07/17/66162556/comments/

					billboards to remove billboards.					
174	18.07.2019			3	Private security officers destroyed camping sites at Shiyes.			170		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/18/66165256/
175	22.07.2019	3			Activist at Shiyes detained and sent to psychiatric examination.			145		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/22/66169330/
176	23.07.2019			2	President Putin instructed ARX oblast' to take into account the opinion of the ARX region inhabitants when deciding on the construction of the landfill at Shiyes.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/23/66170968/
177	23.07.2019		2		ARX regional administration plan to include the opinion of the inhabitants of ARX in a public hearing.			176		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/23/66171214/
175	26.07.2019					4	8	0		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2019/07/26/66174877/
179	28.07.2019					4	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/28/66176908/

180	30.07.2019					4	6	0	https://29.ru/text/ecology/2019/07/30/66178540/
181	30.07.2019	3			Activist fined administrative penalty.			179	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/07/30/66179770/
182	01.08.2019			3	"Ekotekhnopark" installed surveillance cameras at Shiyes construction site live streaming every move.			175	https://29.ru/text/ecology/2019/08/01/66182635/
183	02.08.2019		3		ARX governor ridiculed and belittled Shiyes solidarity campaign.			178	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/02/66184015/
184	02.08.2019			2	ARX governor confirmed that there will be a public hearing where the inhabitants' concerns regarding the construction at Shiyes will be invited and taken into account.			177	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/02/66184270/
185	02.08.2019					2	5	0	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/02/66184228/
186	05.08.2019	4			Case against activist dropped.			160	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/05/66186367/

187	06.08.2019			3	Private security officers injured activist at Shiyes.			182	https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/08/06/66187741/
188	13.08.2019					2	8	0	https://29.ru/text/culture/2019/08/01/66182692/
189	13.08.2019			3	Regional Procurator's Office threatened with legal action against planned festival at Shiyes.			188	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/08/13/66196336/
190	14.08.2019			3	Supreme Court of RF ruled referendum initiative by activists illegal.			162	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/14/66197521/
191	14.08.2019	2			Kotlas court dropped a case against activist on "insulting" a government official.			141	https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/08/14/66197077/
192	15.08.2019					4	8	188	https://29.ru/text/culture/2019/08/16/66200965/
193	17.08.2019			3	Local police with assistance from private security officers and OMON - federal riot police - detained leading activist figures at Shiyes.			188	https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/08/17/66201799/?shareRecordImage=07d2ef00a5702881fd64cd3bd66e8e04&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=6620179

										9; https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/08/17/66201568/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/18/66202003/
194	19.08.2019	3			Local court filed administrative penalties against detained activists.				193	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/19/66203617/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/20/66205024/
195	19.08.2019	2			Police released activist due to medical reasons.				193	https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/08/19/66202756/
196	21.08.2019	3			Criminal case against leading activist figure proceeded.				194	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/21/66206344/
197	22.08.2019					2	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/22/66207874/
198	22.08.2019	3			Court extended term of restraint for Shiyes activists. They are not allowed at the construction site, nor physical contact with each other.				82	https://29.ru/text/criminal/2019/08/22/66207769/
199	29.08.2019					4	6	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/08/29/66216115/

200	04.09.2019		3	Mayor of Moscow allegedly requested head of Lensky raion administration to sign an agreement regarding import of waste in contradiction with the wish of the majority of Lensky parliament.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/16/66273514/?shareRecordImage=d3fb97112f03d4ed4a65a1e1b4a095ef&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=66273514
201	09.09.2019	2		ARX administration approved application to hold mass protests in the city.			197		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2019/09/09/66227500/
202	10.09.2019		3	Federal Anti-Monopoly Service decided it would fine the owner of billboards with Shiyes slogans since the information on the billboards are not advertisements.			173		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/09/10/66228994/
203	22.09.2019				4	1	197	2000	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/09/22/66243517/
204	22.09.2019				4	8	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/09/22/66243301/
205	22.09.2019	3		Police detained activists at September 22 protests despite it			203		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/09/22/66243679/

					being approved by ARX administration.					
206	24.09.2019	3			Local court extended house arrest/restraining order for leading Shiyes activists.			198		https://29.ru/text/criminal/2019/09/24/66246616/
207	05.10.2019	3			Activists fined administrative penalties and penal work.			199		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2019/10/05/66260422/
208	12.10.2019			3	Private security officers at Shiyes injured activists.			187		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/10/12/66268648/
209	12.10.2019					1		0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/12/66268858/
210	14.10.2019	3			Police executed razzias at Shiyes activists included movement's lawyer which was charged with possession of porn and journalist of 29.ru.			0		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/10/14/66270034/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/17/66273700/
211	14.10.2019					4	1	210		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2019/10/14/66270715/?shareRecordImage=f5768f4bfa30cf3b41a20ca2854b30e9&utm_source=sharephotoprevie

										w&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=66270715
212	14.10.2019		2	ARX administration announced when pressed by Severodvinsk journalists that area leased by "Avtomobilnye dorogi" at Shiyes must be recultivated.				0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/17/66274927/
213	15.10.2019					4	6	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/15/66272239/?shareRecordImage=682d69d0a8b97c4c4b322dfad729be2e&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=66272239
214	16.10.2019					4	6	200		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/16/66273514/?shareRecordImage=d3fb97112f03d4ed4a65a1e1b4a095ef&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium

										=29.ru&utm_campaign=66273514
215	17.10.2019					6		212		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/17/66274927/
216	19.10.2019					2	5	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/19/66276919/
217	21.10.2019					4	5	216		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/21/66278053/
218	22.10.2019			3	Four prominent members of the Federal Council for Human rights were expelled by president Putin. One of them had advocated against the construction at Shiyes and had visited the site.			69		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/22/66279286/
219	22.10.2019	3			Police, instructed by the mayor of Kotlas, demanded that activists removed tents at bessrochka.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/22/66280354/
220	22.10.2019	3			Urdoma administration pressed Ekotekhnopark to remove construction			120		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/10/22/66279769/

					at Shiyes in regional Arbitration court.					
221	23.10.2019	3			Police conducted razzia in the home of activist.			145		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/10/23/66281068/
222	29.10.2019	3			Police detained activists' wagon at Shiyes protest camp.			208		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/10/29/66288475/
223	03.11.2019	3			Police officer search cars entering Shiyes, searching for "extremist" literature.			222		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/11/03/66294505/?shareRecordImage=83eea71849692e646c555103f6059107&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=66294505
224	04.11.2019					4	6	221		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/04/66295174/
225	04.11.2019					4	1	0	400	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/04/66294967/
226	07.11.2019	3			Police instructed activists to remove protest camp site at Shiyes.			215		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/07/66299650/

227	08.11.2019			4	Rosleshoz refused to lease property at Shiyes to Ekotekhnopark.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/08/66301153/
228	11.11.2019	2			Velsk administration approved application to organize mass protest in support of Shiyes.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/11/66343600/
229	13.11.2019			3	Supreme Court banned for the third time activists to hold a referendum.			190		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/13/66347992/
230	14.11.2019	3			Activist detained at Shiyes.			223		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/14/66350050/
231	17.11.2019					4	1	0	50	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/17/66353164/
232	18.11.2019					4	6	0		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2019/11/18/66355222/
233	21.11.2019			4	Special presidential representative on environmental issues and transportation commented that there should not be any construction at Shiyes before an environmental impact assessment has been conducted.			125		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/21/66361606/

234	22.11.2019					2	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/22/66363883/
235	26.11.2019		4		Arbitration Court banned construction at Shiyes based on expert opinion.			120		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/26/66369481/
236	26.11.2019		3		ARX governor argued that inhabitants of ARX region should not doubt the work of the administration regarding Shiyes since they have a track record of success in the field of improving welfare services in the region.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/26/66369694/
237	26.11.2019		3		Activist fined administrative penalty for singing Russian national anthem at protest.			234		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/26/66368500/
238	27.11.2019			4	First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on State Construction and Legislation called for amendment in law on use of national symbols.			237		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/27/66370867/

239	27.11.2019					2	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/27/66371737/
240	29.11.2019	3			Kotlas court ruled community service to activist.			133		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/11/29/66375910/
241	30.11.2019					4	1	0	100	https://29.ru/text/ecology/2019/11/30/66376288/
242	01.12.2019					4	1	0	150-180	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/01/66377200/
243	04.12.2019	3			Kotlas administration sanctioned protest in unfavorable place, while planning events in favorable places at date of protest.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/04/66382327/?shareRecordImage=2a7245ecc668468550b437b21c8878ba&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=66382327
244	04.12.2019					2	1	243		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/04/66382327/?shareRecordImage=2a7245ecc668468550b437b21c8878ba&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=66382327

										m=29.ru&utm_campaign=66382327
245	06.12.2019	4			Severodvinsk court fined deputy head of Severodvinsk administration an administrative penalty for the failure to provide an alternative site for a protest as proscribed by regional law.			30		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/06/66386491/
246	08.12.2019					4	1	0	4000-5000	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/08/66389302/
247	09.12.2019					4	8	90		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/09/66390376/
248	10.12.2019					4	1	0	30	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/10/66392785/
249	10.12.2019		1		Ekotekhnopark filed an appeal challenging the claim of Lensky raion administration that the construction at Shiyes is illegal.			235		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/10/66393256/
250	11.12.2019	3			Activists denied access to local hotel and restaurant for a meeting discussing Shiyes. Facilities			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/11/66395215/

					occupied by local youth organization despite the fact that activists had made a reservation.					
251	11.12.2019					2	8	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/11/66395074/?shareRecordImage=73e741213ebde49f54a670828b2e22f4
252	12.12.2019		4		Arbitration Court rejected appeal from Ekotekhnopark.			249		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/12/66397546/
253	12.12.2019	3			Local court rejected appeal from activist who was charged with an administrative penalty for hanging up Shiyes positive banners on billboards across Plesetsk town.			202		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2019/12/12/66397015/
254	13.12.2019		3		ARX governor complained to Russian news agency RIA Novosti about the little willingness of the inhabitants of ARX region to trust the regional authorities. Claimed the administration has			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/13/66399313/

					done whatever it can to stop the construction, although no real efforts at including the inhabitants into political decision-making has been implemented.					
255	14.12.2019			3	Well-known oppositional politician Evgeny Roizman was not allowed on flight en route to Shiyes to participate in a civic forum at Shiyes.			251		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/14/66400225/
256	16.12.2019			2	Moscow administration published their urban site plan for waste management facilities in which shipment of Moscow waste to Shiyes was not mentioned. However, the site plan indicated shipment to other regions.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/16/66401431/
257	18.12.2019			3	Head of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights claimed that there would be			251		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/18/66407140/

					no resolution to the Shiyes case if activists were to politicize the matter.					
258	19.12.2019			3	President Putin did not take questions regarding Shiyes in his annual press-conference.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/19/66408973/
259	20.12.2019	3			Activist detained at train station in ARX on his way to Shiyes to participate in a meeting with the coalition of protest movements called "Stop Shiyes". Fined an administrative penalty.			139		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/20/66411169/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/22/66412930/
260	20.12.2019			3	Activists harassed by police upon entry into ARX governor's annual youth conference. Allowed entry under condition of good behavior.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/20/66410920/
261	21.12.2019			3	ARX governor discredited Shiyes activists, claimed they do not contribute to a practical solution.			260		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/21/66411805/

262	22.12.2019					4	1	0	100	https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/22/66412747/
263	27.12.2019				4			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/27/66423067/
264	27.12.2019			3				0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2019/12/27/66423502/
265	09.01.2020			4				252		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/01/09/66435637/ ; https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/01/20/66453580/
266	10.01.2020			1				248		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/01/10/66438406/

267	14.01.2020			3	Presidential Administration classified documents related to the inquiry of ARX and Moscow administration to work out a way the inhabitant's opinions on the construction at Shiyes could be taken into account as secret. Presidential Administration prolonged deadline for responding to the inquiry until March 20 2020.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/01/14/66442525/
268	20.01.2020					3	4	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/01/20/66452170/
269	21.01.2020			1	ARX governor announced that the fight for the legality of the construction at Shiyes in the courts is not over since the court decision is not final.			266		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/01/21/66455134/
270	23.01.2020					2	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/01/23/66459532/

271	28.01.2020		3	ARX regional court rejected appeal by person who hung up Shiyes posters on billboards in Plesetsk.			253	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/01/28/66466456/
272	30.01.2020		3	Ekotekhnopark filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals in Vologda challenging the decision by the ARX Arbitration court that ruled construction at Shiyes illegal.			265	https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/01/30/66471523/?shareRecordImage=243f1cdb05e7a4d0c3e7b69c8b5a3c00&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=66471523
273	30.01.2020				3	4	233	https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/01/30/66471838/
274	02.02.2020				3	4	268	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/02/02/66475378/
275	04.02.2020				2	1	0	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/02/04/66478279/
276	09.02.2020				4	1	0	1000 https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/02/09/66486577/; https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/02/09/66486949/?shareRecordImage

										=fa46c6fdf45a6a8b22a2e673b5d9e eb4
277	11.02.2020	3			Activist at Shiyes detained.				230	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/02/11/66490927/
278	14.02.2019					3	4		274	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/02/14/66495010/?shareRecordImage=1d16fd3d230d80309818a21cd45e1295
279	19.02.2020	2			Activists that had been charged with a restraining order and communication ban for incident at Shiyes March 14 and 15 2019, was changed into a milder charge of ban on entering Shiyes.				206	https://29.ru/text/incidents/2020/02/19/67619266/
280	28.02.2020					2	1		0	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/02/28/68990017/
281	03.03.2020	2			ARX administration allowed protest along the sidewalk of the river Dvina.				280	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/03/03/69013975/

282	04.03.2020		3		Regional Ministry of Natural Resources required activists on Shiyes to remove camp site.			0		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/03/04/69016099/?shareRecordImage=1c3fc94e8f03460658e7957a672e31be&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=69016099
283	14.03.2020		3		ARX Administration decided to arrange two events (exposition of municipal technical road equipment + celebration of anniversary of "Crimean Spring") on one of the inquired protest sites in the city at the time of the announced protest.			275		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/03/14/69031177/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/03/15/69031423/
284	14.03.2020					4	1	0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/03/14/69030994/
285	15.03.2020					4	1	280	2700	https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/03/15/69031699/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/03/

										/15/69031858/; https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/03/15/69031423/
286	15.03.2020	3			Police brawled with activist, one person detained.			285		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/03/15/69031639/; https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/03/15/69031576/
287	16.03.2020			3	Ekotekhnopark appealed decision of ARX Arbitration court on the illegality of the construction to the Vologda Arbitration Court.			265		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/03/16/69033094/
288	02.04.2020					4	5	0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/04/02/69068209/
289	02.04.2020	3			Activists detained and fined an administrative penalty.			288		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/04/02/69068257/; https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/04/02/69068209/
290	02.04.2020			4	ARX governor announced his resignation			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/04/02/69066505/
291	05.04.2020					4	6	290		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/04/05/69072721/

292	06.04.2020	3			Oktyabrsky court fined an administrative penalty to an activist participating in bessrochka for violating rules of conduct in emergency situations (Covid-19 restrictions).			289		https://29.ru/text/health/2020/04/06/69074446/
293	07.04.2020					4	5	288		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/04/07/69075832/
294	17.04.2020		4		Interim ARX governor criticized and renounced construction at Shiyes.			291		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/04/17/69098131/
295	20.04.2020		4		Interim ARX governor announced beginning of recultivation of the construction site at Shiyes.			294		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/04/20/69102382/
296	20.04.2020					4	8	295		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/04/20/69103165/
297	24.04.2020			3	Private security officers brawled against activists at Shiyes.			296		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2020/04/24/69112348/
298	28.04.2020		1		Interim ARX governor insisted that the recultivation process			296		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/04/28/69231139/

					would begin, but process would take time.					
299	28.04.2020		1		Interim ARX governor reaffirmed that a distinction between protestors and inhabitants celebrating Easter should be made when enforcing corona restrictions during protests.			289		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/04/28/69231391/
300	28.04.2020		2		Interim ARX governor met activist that picketed outside administration building to discuss his demands. They found some common ground.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/04/28/69231763/
301	03.05.2020					4	8	298		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/05/03/69239587/
302	12.05.2020		4		Deputy head of ARX administration, Evgeny Fomenko, will step down from his position.			0		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/05/12/69253528/
303	14.05.2020	3			Local police detained activist for violation of corona restrictions			299		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/05/14/69260032/?shareRecordImage

					and election campaign formalities.					=877e0cbfc78c9a33d13aeb9b15e3ad95&utm_source=sharephotopreview&utm_medium=29.ru&utm_campaign=69260032
304	27.05.2020	4			ARX city дума requested that ARX governor would recultivate Shiyes, remove Shiyes from urban planning site and remove it from prioritized investment list.			298		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/05/27/69283036/
305	09.06.2020		4		ARX minister of economic development informed that Shiyes is removed from list of prioritized regional investments.			304		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/06/09/69306511/
306	13.06.2020	4			Police published result of investigation into illegal felling of trees at Shiyes, criminal case will be opened against the defendants.			14		https://29.ru/text/criminal/2020/06/13/69313126/

307	17.06.2020			1	Ekotekhnopark's request to conduct a new expert assessment of the nature of construction at Shiyes was approved by Vologda Arbitration Court.			287	https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/06/17/69319603/
308	22.06.2020					3	4	274	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/06/22/69328990/
309	30.06.2020	3			Vilegodsky court ruled activists to serve probation time.			206	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/06/30/69342757/
310	30.06.2020	4			Vilegodsky court acquitted two activists.			309	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/06/30/69342757/
311	09.07.2020		4		Interim ARX governor confirmed that the construction site at Shiyes is under recultivation in a press-conference with ARX journalists.			304	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/07/09/69358393/
312	17.07.2020					3	4	308	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/07/17/69369874/
313	30.07.2020	3			Vologodsky court changed composition of judges contrary to the law and approved Ekotekhnopark's request to replace the			307	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/07/30/69395611/

					company conducting expert assessment of the nature of construction at Shiyes.					
314	04.08.2020		3		Election committee rejected Oleg Mandrykin's registration to the gubernatorial election. Election committee disapproved signatures from MPs and heads of municipal parliaments required to qualify in the gubernatorial elections. Claimed that some of the MPs had already given their support to other candidates.			312		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/07/69409366/
315	04.08.2020					3	4	314		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/04/69404137/
316	05.08.2020	3			Vologda Arbitration court approved Ekotekhnopark's suggestion of company to conduct new expert assessment at Shiyes.			313		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/08/05/69406090/

317	07.08.2020		3	ARX Election Committee rejected validity of Oleg Mandrykin's candidacy to the gubernatorial elections. Mandrykin claimed administrative pressure was applied to ensure his failure to register.			314	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/07/69409366/
318	17.08.2020				3	4	317	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/17/69426598/
319	26.08.2020		2	Interim ARX governor went on a tour to settlements and cities neighbouring Shiyes. Confirmed that he will make sure that Shiyes will be closed and the area recultivated.			0	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/26/69443062/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/26/69443080/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/26/69443533/ ; https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/26/69443524/
320	26.08.2020		2	Interim ARX governor promised to return authority over urban planning sites to the municipalities of the region. Transfer of			319	https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/08/26/69443236/

					authority to the region allowed for the construction at Shiyes.					
321	26.08.2020			4	Supreme Court overruled administrative penalty given to Shiyes activist. Decision of ARX regional court reversed.			164		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/08/26/69443779/
322	28.08.2020			4	ARX region redefined area at Shiyes from commercial site to residential area stopping any further construction.			305		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/08/28/69447385/
323	02.09.2020			1	ARX regional court rejected appeal by activists sentenced to imprisonment and compensation fees. Activists charged for incident at Shiyes March 14 and 15 2019.			309		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/09/02/69453259/
324	03.09.2020			2	Interim governor confirmed again that there will be no landfill at Shiyes.			322		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/09/03/69454201/

325	07.09.2020		4	Interim ARX governor discussed possibility of reopening train station at Shiyes with Minister of transport.			324		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/09/07/69458899/
326	07.09.2020		4	Federal agency for railway transport reopened Shiyes train station along route to Vorkuta.			325		https://29.ru/text/transport/2020/09/07/69459079/
327	12.09.2020		4	ARX Administration signed agreements with contractors for the preparation of urban site plans and land development in the municipality of Urdoma. New plans will make sure there will be no construction of landfill at Shiyes.			322		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/09/12/69465401/
328	15.09.2020		4	Interim ARX governor regretted little progress of recultivating Shiyes.			319		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/09/15/69468413/
329	16.09.2020		1	Interim ARX avoided taking a firm position on questions related to acquitting activists who were charged with imprisonment and administrative			299		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/09/16/69470159/

					penalties for protesting.					
330	28.09.2020		4		Interim ARX governor announced that technical recultivation will be finished by end of year.			328		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/09/28/69485239/
331	03.10.2020			4	New expert assessment said that the purpose of technical installations at Shiyes clearly for facilitating waste. Conclusion speaks to the illegality of construction.			316		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/10/03/69491975/
332	11.10.2020			4	Ekotekhnopark announced discontinuation of plans to construct landfill at Shiyes.			0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2020/10/11/69500547/
333	12.10.2020			4	ARX administration announced it would allow the camp site at Shiyes to remain during recultivation process.			332		https://29.ru/text/politics/2020/10/12/69501613/
334	26.10.2020	4			Vologda Arbitration Court rejected claim by Ekotekhnopark			331		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/10/26/69517415/

					that the construction was legal.					
335	04.11.2020					5	3	0		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/11/04/69528285/
336	15.11.2020					4	6	332		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/11/15/69547063/
337	26.11.2020	4			A commission established by Urdoma administration reported that no recultivation had taken place at Shiyes.			336		https://29.ru/text/ecology/2020/11/26/69579633/
338	18.12.2020			3	Ekotekhnopark requested activists to remove camp site claiming it was disturbing recultivation.			337		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2020/12/18/69639396/ ; https://29.ru/text/incidents/2021/01/08/69683801/
339	09.01.2021	3			Police visited activists at Shiyes to investigate illegal felling of trees.			338		https://29.ru/text/incidents/2021/01/09/69685301/
340	09.01.2021					9		0		https://29.ru/text/gorod/2021/01/09/69685236/

Appendix 2: Codebook For Vkontakte Posts

Code	Description	26.08.2018, # of references	02.12.2018, # of references	19.05.2019, # of references	15.03.2020, # of references
		N=289	N=491	N=386	N=266
1. Diagnostic framing	What is the problem? Who is to blame? Who are we?				
1.1 Collective identity	Framing the in-group, creating collective identity as opposed to the antagonist				
Activists		-	-	10	-
Anti-waste movement		-	-	1	
Civil society		-	-	1	-
Countrymen		-	-	2	1
Defenders of Shiyes		-	-	2	-
Dignified people		-	-	-	3
Eco-defenders		-	-	1	-
Friends		-	-	1	1
Grey mass		1	-	-	-
Inhabitants of green, idyllic, pastoral, holy land		1	12	6	1
Morally superior, uncorrupted people treasuring simple pleasures in life		-	5	2	-
Normal people		2	1	-	-
Northerners (severyane), inhabitants of the North		22	9	6	5
Pomors, inhabitants of Pomor'e		-	18	11	8
Inhabitants of a remote corner of Russia (medvezhij ugol)		1	3	-	-
Responsible, visible citizens		10	22	8	8
Inhabitants of the Russian North		5	17	6	1
Russian people		1	2	1	-
Subjects of the governor		-	-	1	-
The people (narod)		4	4	2	8
Underestimated natives (tuzemcy)		2	-	-	-
Vigilantes, heroes on the frontline		-	-	4	1
1.2 Problems	Framing issues				
1.2.1 Bulldozing					
Construction continues despite promises to halt it		-	-	6	-
Fatalistic direction, regional administration insistent on benevolence of construction project		-	8	3	-
Regional and raion authorities trivialize, sweep problem under the rug		7	11	-	1

Code	Description	26.08.2018, # of references	02.12.2018, # of references	19.05.2019, # of references	15.03.2020, # of references
		N=289	N=491	N=386	N=266
	Regional authorities claim they are following legal procedures	-	3	-	-
	Strengthening security at Shiyes, clearing off and intimidating activists	-	-	10	-
	1.2.2 Economic problems				
	New workplaces at landfill will be given to Moscow people	2	-	-	-
	Construction project not profitable or an effective solution to waste problem in Moscow	1	-	-	1
	Real estate in nearby areas will devalue	1	-	-	-
	1.2.3 Environmental problems				
	Closure of waste sorting facilities due to waste reform	-	-	2	-
	Construction of landfills for regional waste	-	6	3	3
	Contamination of the region's water bodies	1	1	-	-
	Destruction, contamination of Russian nature, representation of Russian spirit	-	1	-	-
	Ecological disaster	4	4	7	1
	Genocide	1	3	4	2
	Import of waste from other regions	1	10	3	2
	Landfill at Shiyes	23	21	14	8
	Moscow waste	10	27	15	5
	Unhealthy and hazardous ecological environment	7	3	2	-
	Radiation, accident at Nyonoksa	-	-	-	1
	Waste management in the region	4	1	3	17
	Waste reform	-	-	1	6
	1.2.4 Informational vacuum	20	12	-	1
	1.2.5 Invasion from outsiders	23	27	14	2
	1.2.6 Legal problems				
	Construction in violation of law	5	9	3	2
	Decision-makers do not include the public in decision-making processes	-	3	3	2
	Deployment of National Guard and police forces at Shiyes unlawful	-	-	1	-
	Legal nihilism	-	2	-	-
	Non-interference by police not protecting activists	-	-	4	-
	Unlawful detainment, arrests of activists	-	-	8	1

Code	Description	26.08.2018, # of references	02.12.2018, # of references	19.05.2019, # of references	15.03.2020, # of references
		N=289	N=491	N=386	N=266
	Violation of legal-administrative procedures, use of administrative resources	-	9	9	4
	Legal-administrative violations regarding referendum initiative	-	-	2	-
	Preemptive intimidation, interrogations of activists ahead of protests	-	-	2	-
1.2.7 Moral problems					
	Authorities mistreat Mother Nature	-	-	-	1
	Authorities treat people like animals, inhumane policies	-	1	-	-
	Construction project immoral, a wrongdoing	-	2	3	1
	Construction thought-through scheme to trick inhabitants and force through construction	3	8	2	1
	Fear of environmental contamination for future generations	-	-	-	2
	Governor insulting, humiliating inhabitants of Arkhangel'sk regions	-	2	-	1
	Lack of responsibility, respect for your neighbor	13	29	16	7
	Law only protecting the powerful	-	-	-	2
	People treated as cannon fodder	1	7	7	3
	People treated as criminals by authorities while real crime prevails	1	1	8	-
	Police corruption	-	-	-	1
	Powerful elite exploiting riches in the region for personal gain	5	1	-	-
	The powerful elite robbing the people	-	-	3	5
	Theft of local land, regional elite sell-out	4	8	1	-
1.2.8 Political problems					
	Authorities escalate conflict at Shiyes	-	-	1	-
	Public authorities ignore activists and protests, not heard	-	-	1	4
	Constitutional amendments	-	-	2	-
	Local authorities not proactive, not attentive	1	-	-	-
	Public policies not aimed at the common good for the people	-	-	-	6
	Pull-back on authority on territorial planning	-	-	1	-

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	sites from municipal authorities				
	Putin's usurpation	-	-	1	-
	Urban construction plans only the elite can afford	-	-	-	2
	1.2.9 Political-administrative problems				
	Legal and political processes delayed, dragged out	-	-	-	1
	1.2.10 Socio-political problems				
	Large social differences between Moscow and the rest	-	-	-	1
	Moscow lives off of taxes from the regions	2	-	-	-
	No trust in decision- makers	-	3	-	-
	Power vertical constructed to protect certain power structures creating a gap between people and power	2	3	-	4
	1.2.11 Spiritual problems				
	Construction at Shiyes cause spiritual pain	-	-	1	1
	Waste as evil	-	-	-	1
1.3 The out-group	Defining the out-group, the antagonist				
	1.3.1 Government bodies				
	City administrations	-	-	2	3
	Governor of Arkhangel'sk	-	11	3	2
	Local authorities	-	-	1	3
	Ministry of natural resources	-	-	-	1
	Moscow administration	-	1	-	-
	Power party, United Russia	-	1	-	1
	President Putin	-	-	1	1
	Presidential administration	-	1	2	-
	Procurator's Office in Arkhangel'sk	-	-	1	2
	Regional administration	2	8	-	4
	Regional parliament	-	2	-	2
	Regional parliament dominated by United Russia	-	1	-	-
	Security structures	-	-	1	-
	1.3.2 Government-affiliated bodies				
	OOO Ekotekhnopark	-	-	-	3
	Regional waste operator	-	-	3	2
	RZD	7	2	-	-
	1.3.3 Personal vices, characteristics				

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	Alien elite living in the region	1	1	-	-
	Aliens	1	-	-	-
	Corrupt bureaucrats	2	2	2	1
	Corrupt bureaucrats in Arkhangel'sk region	-	2	1	1
	Corrupt bureaucrats in Moscow administration	1	4	-	-
	Moscow	-	7	-	1
	Non-Russianness, the bastardization of Russianness by Moscow	-	1	-	-
	People betraying the interests of the common good, shtrejkbrexery	2	3	1	-
	Scavengers, pomojshhiki, musorshhiki	-	4	2	1
	Thieves, swindlers	-	-	1	-
	Wealthy, powerful strata, zhirnye koty	4	1	-	-
	1.3.4 Waste mafia	-	4	3	6
2. Prognostic framing	What is the solution to the problem? What is the strategy?				
2.1 Building a sustainable civil society					
	Lay the foundations for a vibrant civil society and civic initiatives	-	-	1	-
	Show solidarity to other social movements in Russia	-	-	1	-
	Solidarity and support within the movement	-	-	2	1
2.2 Expose wrongdoing by decision-makers, exert public pressure					
	Defend Shiyes at camp site	-	-	5	-
	Ensure media preserves its watchdog function	2	-	-	-
	Join bessrochka	-	-	6	-
	Join protests	10	18	27	26
	Make authorities take responsibility, posting revealing information in media	5	3	2	1
	Participate in legal sessions against fellow activists	-	-	1	5
	Rebel	-	-	-	1
	Recruit more activists, mobilize more people	-	-	1	-
	Revolution, fundamental societal changes	-	1	-	-
	Satirize, laugh at the power holders	-	-	-	1
	Show Shiyes to as many people as possible	1	-	-	-
	Submit questions to live-streams	-	1	-	-

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2.3 Lead by example as a collective					
	Dialogue, willingness to forgive wrongdoing by power holders	3	1	1	-
	Peaceful means of protest, non-violence	-	-	2	3
	Promote an environmentally friendly life style	-	-	8	3
2.4 Legal measures					
	Arrest members of regional administration	1	-	-	-
	Criminal investigation into the Shiyes case	1	-	-	-
	Go through legal system to stop construction	2	1	2	1
	Initiate referendum on waste-related questions	-	-	1	-
	Monitor and report violations at Shiyes	-	-	1	-
	Referendum demanding governor to put all waste-related questions to a referendum	-	-	1	-
	Report violations to the police	-	-	2	-
	Respectful of the law, use the law as a tool, take back the law	3	4	7	5
2.5 Personal responsibility					
	Avoid persecution and surveillance, use secure messaging platforms	-	-	1	-
	Civic responsibility, raising political awareness, awaken	6	5	7	5
	DIY, create solutions yourself	-	-	1	1
	Follow news from the legal processes	-	-	-	4
	Participate in public hearings	-	3	-	2
	Repost, spread information about Shiyes	1	2	6	1
	Support local businesses that work for the common good	-	-	-	1
	Take effective action	5	1	-	-
	Volunteer to help victims of unlawful detainment	-	-	2	-
	Volunteer to organize protests	-	-	2	-
	Vote no to constitutional amendments	-	-	1	-
2.6 Political measures					
	Ban import on waste from other regions	1	-	-	-
	Call for broad political support from all political parties	1	-	-	2
	Demand inclusion of the public in decision-making processes	-	1	1	-

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	Demand recycling, separate waste collection and for incinerators and landfills to be decommissioned	-	2	4	5
	Demand that police and OMON (riot police) be pulled back from Shiyes	-	-	1	-
	Give municipal bodies back control over urban site plans so that they can decide themselves whether or not to initiate projects such as the Shiyes landfill	-	-	1	-
	Immediate halt in construction at Shiyes	-	5	2	1
	Require that the regional authorities take situation at Shiyes under control	2	-	-	-
	Resignation of Arkhangel'sk governor	1	14	1	2
	Resignation of decision-makers	1	1	-	-
2.7 Seek external help					
	Attention and help from president Putin	2	2	-	-
	Call for help from international organizations	1	-	-	-
	Sign petitions, open letters to public authorities	2	3	1	3
	Write letters to Presidential Council on Human Rights and Civil Society	-	1	-	-
2.8 Spiritual measures					
	Pray for the ecological disaster to go away	-	-	1	-
3. Motivational framing					
	Why should anyone participate in collective action to solve the problem?				
	The belief that justice prevails	3	6	4	1
	Duty to protect Motherland, Mother Russia	1	2	1	-
	Duty to protect Motherland for future generations	-	3	-	-
	Love for your birthplace	3	4	2	-
	Not taking action now, will only lead to graver problems in the future	-	-	-	-
	People Power, solidarity among people united in working for the common good	11	27	18	16
	Proven results, the work of the movement has made it more difficult	5	2	1	-

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	for the elite to proceed with its plans				
	Save the environment	-	-	1	-
	To stay on the right side of history, right side of good and wrong	3	3	1	1