

**Growing up and the World of the Child:
A Search for Theoretical Interpretants**

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(2023, with permission from Leif Ahnström's family)**

“Truth can never be dissolved into a variety of individual cases; or, if it could, it would have no meaning for us.”

Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, Vol III (p. 20)

“Occasionally I have ‘brilliant ideas,’ occasionally scientific thinking progresses easily in me, and broad horizons open up to me—at least I imagine they do.”

Edmund Husserl, *Ideas II*, (p. 288)

An explanatory note on this work

This monograph by Leif Ahnström was given to me in manuscript form when I was directing the research project *Tiny Voices from the Past: New Perspectives on Childhood in Early Europe* (2013–2017). The manuscript was in a nearly finished shape, but due to Ahnström’s death in 2005 (see the Foreword by Dagfinn Føllesdal), the process of finalizing the text came to a halt. I was asked to try to find ways to publish it. Due to the state of the manuscript, it turned out to be difficult to use an established publisher. Instead, the University of Oslo’s DUO system (<https://www.duo.uio.no/>) proved to be a very good alternative, as it is searchable both via Oria (the Norwegian Academic Libraries system) and international Open Access databases.

Since the manuscript lacked a final polish and was typed in an outdated word processor version, there are some remaining inconsistencies and lacunas in the present text. This is particularly visible in the partly damaged figures, which we moved out of the main text to a final chapter 11. In editing the manuscript, we have aimed at fixing and smoothing it out as far as we thought reasonable and expedient.

Without giving names, I want to thank several colleagues at the University of Oslo for their valuable input during the long process with the manuscript. Still, a special thanks goes to project coordinator Amalie Sofie Aune Bjerkem for her conscientious and very proficient work on the text; without this, it would probably not have been possible to publish it as a monograph.

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Reidar Aasgaard

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Foreword by Dagfinn Føllesdal

Leif Ahnström, who for several years was Professor of Social Geography at the University of Oslo, finished this book just one month before his untimely death in September 2005. The book springs from a research project on the process of "growing up" and provides a systematic philosophical background to the study of this process. It gives a clear and rich presentation of the *lifeworld*, which is of crucial importance for the study of social processes. The lifeworld is often talked about, but is seldom studied with the depth and thoroughness that one finds in this book. Ahnström did a great service to the profession by leaving us this remarkable work.

Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is the connecting link between the various chapters of the book, richly supplemented by ideas and material from other prominent 20th century thinkers who have been strongly influenced by Husserl, primarily Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, but also many others. The idea of the *lifeworld* is a core theme of the book. It is introduced and briefly discussed in the first chapter, as a setting for the child's process of growing up.

As a background for the discussion of the lifeworld, Ahnström gives in the second chapter a brief presentation of Aristotle's view on substance, potentiality and actuality, followed by a sketch of Leibniz's monadology, where the notion of a perspective plays an important role and also the conception of a "driving force." These ideas in turn became important for Husserl and Heidegger. The chapter ends with a sketch of Brentano's conception of intentionality, or directedness, as the characteristic feature of consciousness.

In Chapter 3, Ahnström goes more deeply into the notion of intentionality. He focuses on the notion of noema, which is the core of Husserl's discussion of intentionality. Two main ways of interpreting this notion have been proposed. Ahnström begins with the one proposed by Aron Gurwitsch and then goes on to discuss the second interpretation. He spends the rest of Chapter 3 going into the various features of the noema and especially how it relates to the notion of the horizon, which is of crucial importance for the lifeworld and therefore for Ahnström's project.

Chapter 4 is largely devoted to Heidegger's notion of world and the role that equipment and practical behavior plays in this connection. Gradually the discussion expands to include readiness-to-hand, Dasein, discourse, interpretation, disclosedness, resoluteness and the other basic Heideggerian notions, all of which are shown to grow naturally out of Heidegger's version of the Husserlian framework.

In Chapter 5, which focuses on language and the body, Merleau-Ponty is the central figure. Unlike Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty is quite open about his debt to Husserl. Starting in 1939 he read Husserl's manuscripts on this topic with great gratitude. This chapter brings out well how Merleau-Ponty deepens and expands Husserl's discussion of the body. In the latter part of the chapter Ahnström takes up Merleau-Ponty's views on language, in particular his observation that the child's acquisition of language depends on more than the sum total of morphological, syntactical and lexical meanings, but also involves crucially bodily gestures etc. These views, which are highly important for the study of the process of "growing up," are illuminatingly presented in this chapter.

The next chapter gives a full presentation of habitus and habituation, a central theme in Husserl's phenomenology. According to Husserl, almost all the anticipations that go into our lifeworld take place without our noticing them. They are largely due to sedimentations from past experiences that Husserl calls habitualities. Michael Polanyi's treatment of skillful performance and his notion of tacit knowledge were anticipated by Husserl. To elucidate the notion of habitus Ahnström again goes back to Aristotle, and this time also to Aquinas. Especially in their ethics habitus, or habit, plays an important role, and Aquinas has a very full discussion of this topic. Virtues and vices are habits, and building a good character consists largely in developing good habits. In the latter half of the chapter Ahnström compares their view to that of the 20th century anthropologist-sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and finds interesting similarities, which he in turn applies to the main theme of the book, the child's development.

Chapter 7, the largest chapter of the book, takes up one of the central topics in Husserl's phenomenology: intersubjectivity and its role in creating the self. In Husserl's collected works, *Husserliana*, three big volumes are devoted to intersubjectivity and they include only a small part of the thousands of pages Husserl wrote on this topic. Ahnström here makes extended use of the second volume of Husserl's *Ideas*, a work which was never finished, but

which was one of the main texts that Merleau-Ponty read in manuscript form. Merleau-Ponty is one of the philosophers Ahnström discusses in this chapter. As could be expected, he also devotes much attention to Alfred Schutz, who was one of the first social scientists to apply Husserl's ideas. The chapter also includes a discussion of Hegel and the mutual recognition of consciousnesses brought face-to-face. Heidegger and Sartre's views on our relation to others are discussed, and there are also brief discussions of Husserl's American contemporary George Herbert Mead and of Jacques Lacan, Paul Ricoeur, Ernst Tugendhat, Charles Taylor and David Carr.

The discussion of intersubjectivity continues in the next chapter, with focus on the social world and our use of language, signs and symbols. The whole chapter is centered around Schutz and his *Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie*, which appeared in 1932 and became very important for the development of a phenomenology-based sociology in the United States after it was translated into English in 1972 under the title *The Phenomenology of the Social World*.

Chapter 9 takes up a new topic, time. This is a central topic in Husserl, whose lectures on internal time consciousness is one of his main contributions to philosophy. However, Ahnström devotes even more space to Augustine's reflections on time and to Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Sartre. Heidegger's view gets extensive treatment, and Sartre's view is presented even more fully. Sartre's discussion of time is intimately connected with his view on freedom, a most central topic in his philosophy, and the chapter ends with a brief discussion of freedom.

The final chapter of the book, Chapter 10, is in its entirety devoted to the Japanese philosopher Tetsurô Watsuji (1891-1960). Watsuji, who has been little studied in the west, was inspired by Heidegger, in particular by Heidegger's discussion of the "world." However, Watsuji argued that Heidegger over-emphasized temporality and under-emphasized spatiality. Watsuji worked out the two notions, temporality and spatiality, in great detail and studied how we are born into an environment consisting of nature and of other people which shapes us and our lives. He studied the intricate system of relationships we have to our environment, to physical nature and climate as well as to our culture and to other human beings. Ahnström uses the last chapter of the book to present Watsuji's thoughts on this topic, and he works out its implications for the child's development and for our conception

of education and for what Werner Jaeger, following the ancient Greeks, called "paideia": the process by which a community preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual character.

Preface

This book emanates from a research project, *Growing up: Space of Experience—Horizon of Expectation*, at the *Department of Culture Studies*, The University of Oslo.¹ Common to the set of thematically related studies included in this project was that they would all deal with general or specific aspects of a process known to all human beings, that of ‘growing up’. They would do so from a historical and humanities scholarly perspective, it was emphasized in the application for funding by the Norwegian Research Council.² What does growing up, or ‘coming of age’, mean today? What did it mean at earlier times? The focus would be on the coming of age of individual human beings: How do children and young people (in the particular cultural context of Norway and other Scandinavian countries)—in the course of this process—form and develop their ‘space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’, to adopt the pair of notions developed by the German historian Reinhart Koselleck.³

In one of the included studies, *Growing up in Oslo 2000: Perspectives conveyed in personal talks and narratives*, some sixty in-depth interviews were carried out among children and young persons: What did these young people mean by that of being a child, an adolescent and an adult person? How did they experience their passing from being a child to being a teenager—with or without explicit reference to the social roles belonging to these phases of life as looked upon and communicated by other people (playmates, siblings, parents, grandparents or other grownups), i.e. conveyed through demonstrated lifestyles, or certain modes of comportment as well as outright teaching and instruction (‘what-is-done’, ‘what-isn’t-done’ when you are a child, or a teenager)? What did it mean according to these young people to be an adult person?⁴ By means of references to what was gathered in these talks,

¹ See *Å vokse opp: Barn og ungdom i skjøringspunktet mellom erfaringsrom og forventningshorisont*, Prosjektbeskrivelse, Institutt for kulturstudier, University of Oslo, 1999. [http://www.hf.uio.no/iks/forskning/vokse_opp/index.html].

² In the institutional context of Norwegian academic life this means that the participating researchers would have their background in one of the disciplines at *The Faculty of History and Philosophy* at the University of Oslo; they would represent ‘humanities’ (or ‘arts’), rather than ‘social-sciences’.

³ Koselleck, R. 1979, *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*. Frankfurt a.m. Suhrkamp. English translation: *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, translated by K. Tribe, Cambridge / Mass, MIT Press, 1985.

⁴ For the interview-work, carried out by A. Schanche Kristoffersen in 2001, see “10åringer om det å være et barn og bli større,” by A. Schanche Kristoffersen and L. Ahnström, “On ‘Growing up in Oslo’ and ‘the Life-world of

it would be possible, it was believed, to demonstrate how individual human beings make use of their life experiences in—and for—action, in deliberations implying responsibility for the course one’s own life, and in such instances taking into consideration both prevailing opportunities and constraints. With reference to the examples gathered in the field it would be possible to show how human individuals became acting subjects, how they acquire their particular life-world, adopt certain styles of life, develop an idea of themselves as ‘selves’. This book is not a report from this investigation properly speaking, although it was conceived in connection with the interview work. What will be accounted for in the subsequent chapters is an attempt at *theorizing* about the process of growing up—a search for some of its possible ‘interpretants’. Perspectives on the ‘coming of age’ will be presented. These are not those of some interviewees (young people), but all derive from reading what seems to be pertinent literature.

Koselleck assumes that historical experience—whether it be the experience of a society or any of its members—can be 'chartered' with respect to time and space⁵. There is no history, which can be constituted independently of the experiences of expectation of active human agents, he contends; all historic research implies people’s expectations concerning their future. (Ibid., p. 269) The former presupposes the latter, and vice versa. There is no expectation without experience, nor any experience without expectation. (Ibid., p. 270) Expectation (*Erwartung*) and experience (*Erfahrung*) are in fact woven into each other. As such they determine human action, all kinds making as well as doing. Hence, experience is present past, whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered: “Within experience a rational reworking is included, together with unconscious modes of conduct which do not have to be present in awareness.” (Ibid., p. 272) Though there is also “an element of alien experience contained and preserved in experience conveyed by generations or institutions,” that kind of experience we call history, and that is contained in history, as it has been understood since time immemorial. (Ibid., p. 272) Similarly with expectation—at once personspecific and interpersonal—“it takes place in the today; it is the future made present; it directs itself to the not-yet, to the non experienced, to that which is to be revealed.

the Child’ in *Bilder av den gode oppveksten gjennom 1900-tallet*, ed. by I. Markussen & K. Telste. Oslo, Novus Forlag, 2005.

⁵ Koselleck 1985, Translators Introduction. p. xiv.

Hope and fear, wishes and desires, cares and rational analysis, receptive display and curiosity: all enter into expectation and constitute it.” (Ibid., p. 272)

For any community as well as any of its individual members, there is a past, a present and a future. The past is a space, or terrain, surpassed and experienced (in the sense of being ‘lived through’ or *erlebt*). But this past is also a container of what one has learnt or experienced, or in (a wide sense this word) one has gathered over time. Here are knowledge, habits, beliefs, norms and values, but also memories, events and situations that can be recollected, recorded and accounted for as ‘history’ (a history of the community but also innumerable ‘personal histories’, or biographies, for instance that of a child). The future is what the community or individual is instantly moving into, with more or less foresight. Pictured as an horizon of expectation—a line of perception, imagination, interest and prevision, a mark of ‘beyond’—it seems to provide a stage for hopes and fears, projects and desires; it is what the individual or the community at any time ventures into. While the past is closed, the future is open. You do not know what will actually happen there, even if you have certain ‘expectations’. The present is a momentous but seemingly instant now, a sheer divide between past and future, something of a line or cutting edge that helps us take a stand on ‘before’ and ‘after’. In other words, in Koselleck’s scheme there seems to be no room for the *now*, even if he also reckons with a ‘today’—a now possibly occupied by an individual human being, a child or youngster in the process of coming of age.

In the following attempts at theorizing growing up, it is not Koselleck but a few phenomenologist philosophers, such as E. Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Alfred Schutz, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, who are invited to explicate the relation between past and future, a relation which necessarily implies a present, a present where experience is transformed into knowledge, where knowledge structures what is lived through, where it steers any action against the backdrop of expectations concerning the future.

It is assumed that taken together, and as supplementing each other, the chosen theoretical perspectives will provide for a frame of reference that helps interpreting any time-and-place specific, and documented, set of views gathered in the field. To the extent that the chosen theoretical interpretants in fact illuminate, or help identify crucial aspects of the process of

growing up (as accounted for by any persons interviewed), the reported research can be looked upon perhaps as a piece of ‘field-work in philosophy’, to talk with P. Bourdieu.⁶

In the search for theoretical perspectives, the book is most selective as to its choice of the consulted authors. The aim has not been to give a comprehensive account of the dealt with approaches, concepts and ideas, but to select, adapt and combine some seemingly pertinent views with hopefully some degree of coherence. The borrowed vantage points will be ‘shown’ rather than ‘discussed’, presented by means of processed excerpts from the selected works. Attempts are not made to account for what this or that one other scholar has said about the referred to works, or to summarize or evaluate the body of learned discourse they have created and kept alive. What is offered is perhaps in this sense a *Kollagen-Werk*, rather than a traditional academic treatise.⁷

If the referred to interviews with children and adolescents (*‘Growing up in Oslo–2000’*) represent ‘concrete research’, in the sense of dealing with geographically and historically confined pieces of composite and multifaceted reality, the research presented here is ‘abstract’. As such it is meant to offer concepts for interpretation of the process of growing up, a phenomenon known to all of us through our own personal experience and learning. The introductory chapter will hopefully make clear what’s actually at stake.

August 2005

Leif Ahnström

⁶ Ref. Bourdieu 1994, p. 3-33.

⁷ I here allude to Walter Benjamin’s unfinished *Passagen-Werk*. It has been said that Benjamin said of this project that ‘I have nothing to say, only show’. See Buck-Morss 1993, p. 314.

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Koselleck, R. 1979, *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*. Frankfurt a.m. Suhrkamp. English translation: *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, transl. by K. Tribe, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1985.

Markussen I. & K. Telste eds. 2005, *Bilder av den gode oppveksten gjennom 1900-tallet*. Oslo, Novus Forlag.

1. Theorizing Growing up

1.1 Introduction

‘Growing up’ is a proceeding, or process—a becoming, or ‘coming of age’, of a human individual. As such as it concerns the very functions of life and is thus *biological*; at the same time it is *social* as it involves other human beings. Though it is also a process of *acculturation*, the adoption of a certain style of life and ‘habitus’, the development of a life-world and a sense of self-identity, imageries and expectations concerning the world at large and the future brought to the fore in speech and other action as well as sheer comportment, for short a *personal* mode being and becoming developed in intercourse with other human beings. So, approximately, it seems can be taken for granted. But what is actually implied in such a statement? The subsequent chapters will offer some answers. More precisely: They will present ‘theoretical interpretants’ of this very process: concepts, in fact predications, which highlights crucial moments, or dimensions, of growing up. In this respect what is to be presented can be described as an attempt at ‘theorizing growing up’. The borrowed views, vantage points, theoretical perspectives derive mainly from 20th century phenomenologist philosophers and their predecessors, scholars such as E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, M. Merleau-Ponty, J.-P. Sartre, Aristotle and G.W.F. Hegel.

1.2 Theory

An attempt at ‘theorizing growing up’, it has been said. As H.-G. Gadamer (among others writers) reminds us, the word ‘theory’ is etymologically related to ‘theatre’, both words stemming from the Ancient Greek word for ‘spectacle, contemplation, consideration’ (Gadamer 1989, p. 454). Or, as he says in his “Lob der Theorie” (Praise of Theory): It seems helpful to remind ourselves of the original, Greek sense of the word theory, *theoria*. The word means to observe or to watch, for example a group of stars, to be an onlooker of spectacle, or to take part in a festival. It is not a sheer seeing which ascertains, or stores, the existing. So *contemplatio* does not dwell in a particular act of seeing, but seeing in a certain field or area. *Theoria* in this way does not refer to a position or state in which one occupies oneself. It is being there in the beautiful double sense, not only to be there, but as an onlooker to be entirely present. Such as is the participant in a ritual procedure or

ceremony, who gets absorbed, in the sense of ‘having participated in the same’. *Theorie* therefore does not first of all refer to a behaviour or conduct in which one seizes an object and disposes of it in an act of explanation. It has with quite another kind of kind of thing to do. (Gadamer 1987, p. 48)

Theorein thus, in Greek, means to see, and, as Bourdieu says: arming oneself with a theory well founded in reality is being able to impose a vision of divisions (Bourdieu 1994, p. 129). This ability to see things— ‘finding it worth while paying notice to them’—is related to language: the use of words and concepts. As Bourdieu puts it: our capacity to see (*voir*) is a function of our knowledge (*savoir*), of our concepts; that is, the words, that are available to name visible things, and which are, so to speak, our programmes for perception (Bourdieu 1984, p. 2). This capacity is something that we have or have not acquired—or have acquired to some extent—as researchers and / or ordinary observers of various phenomena; it is part of our dispositions as observers and writers. Theory inheres in our habitus, personal competence, or ‘know how’. (Wacquant 1992, p. 35).⁸ This is not the place to explicate the notion of habitus. Suffice it to say that the word derives from Lat. *habere*: to have (*haben* or *avoir*). Once the word also meant to be in a certain state. To have theoretical (or scientific) habitus is to be in the state of being able to see by means of words, and to give words to what one can see, to bridge the gap between perceiving and saying. The events, occurrences or happenings we observe—directly through our own seeing, or indirectly through accounts given by others—are things we talk about and try to conceptualize, what we try to grasp by means of words, with recourse to our acquired (professional or non-professional) language. Hence: What will be offered in the subsequent chapters are concepts representing possible ways of seeing, modes of interpreting the process of growing up. This is consistent with the aim of the inquiry: to search for theoretical interpretants of this very process. The allusion made to seeing in this respect—through reference to views, perspectives, vantage points, ‘words that makes us see’—is not accidental. It follows with understanding theory as akin to theatre.

⁸ Every act of research is simultaneously empirical and theoretical: it confronts the world of observable phenomena; it necessarily engages hypotheses about the underlying structure of relations that observations are designed to capture. (Ibid., p. 35)

1.3 Words, things concepts—'theoretical interpretants'

Looking for theoretical interpretants of the process of growing up necessitates a distinction between words, things and concepts—and a clarification of their interrelationships (e.g. between growing up as word, thing and concept).

Words relate to things and concepts. When we speak and talk about things, we make use of words. When we talk and write about things, in a deliberate, careful and systematic way, we contribute to conceptualization, or concept formation. Things ('what we talk about') are defined; their boundaries in relation to other things are spelled out by means of words.⁹ (Weitz 1977, p. 3-24).

Words represent things. Or, they 'appresent' things (to use a term used by Edmund Husserl): they make these things present to us. They bring them to our here and now. Not in a physical sense, of course. Though they makes us 'apprehend' them. In the words of Alfred Schutz (1962b, p. 297): they 'call forth', 'evoke' or '(a)wakens' things (the latter may be events, facts, objects, recollections, even fantasms or dreams).¹⁰ So, the relation between words on the one hand, and things and concepts on the other, is one of 'representation' or 'appresentation'.

Things are usually thought of as physical objects, bodies or entities, consisting of matter and occupying space. And this is, it seems, the way Morris Weitz conceives of 'things' (op. cit., passim). Another way of understanding things is suggested by Michel Serres. Things are what we talk about. Things are what we talk and write about—by means of words; they are topics of discourse. And these things all belong to the world. Some things we are able to perceive by means of our senses; some things we can also manipulate. But there are also topics of discourse present to us only in the sense that we think and talk about them.¹¹

⁹ Weitz, M. 1977, *The Opening Mind: A Philosophical Study of Humanistic Concepts*. Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press.

¹⁰ "Symbol, Reality and Society" in *Collected Papers*, Vol. 1.

¹¹ As pointed out by Serres (1987, p. 294), the word 'thing' is a cognate of 'ting' in the Scandinavian languages. It derives from the Old Norse 'thing', which referred to a public assembly for common decision-making and settlement of disputes. So, as did also German *Sache*, Dutch *zaak*, French *chose*, Spanish *cosa*, and Latin *causa*, the word 'thing' originally had a judicial meaning, relating to what was talked about in circumstances of public

Concepts are neither words nor things; they are intermediaries between words and things (Weitz, p. 8). They help us ‘grasp’ or ‘take hold of things by means of language. In this way things (‘what we talk about’) are also ‘defined’; this means, figuratively speaking, their boundaries in relation to other things (talked about) are, if not ascertained, at least suggested (by means of words).

Another way of explicating these interrelationships is to distinguish ‘signification’ from ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’. While words signify (i.e. aim at, ‘point out’, or indicate things), concepts convey meaning. They tell us what this or that one speaker intend to say, by means of a certain use of words. As conveyors of meaning, concepts are in this sense implied ‘statements’, or *predications*. Some of the things we represent (or appresent) by means of words are not directly perceivable, but nonetheless apprehensible and conceivable. We are able to ‘grasp’ them and detach them from other things; we can think and talk about them (although they often seem to elude our firm grasp or command). And we do so by means of concepts (i.e. implied predications). While signification resides in words, meaning belongs to speakers and writers, listeners and readers, in their capacity as word users.

According to Weitz some concepts in learned discourse are ‘closed’, but many, if not most, are ‘open’ (op. cit., p. 25-48). The basic difference between open and closed concepts is the absence, or presence, of sets of necessary and sufficient criteria for the use of the corresponding words, or terms. For open concepts it is not possible to agree upon a proper use of the term; rather they invite different approaches and explications; though there are in any instance definite criteria for the use of a word, “none of these criteria is necessary or sufficient and each is intelligibly rejectable” (Ibid., p. 31). The criteria for the proper use of the word can be debated, but is seldom totally agreed upon. It can be defined in various ways. In other words, the use one writer makes of these words is not accurately the same as that of other writers. But, as Weitz remarks (with reference to Wittgenstein), most definitions of open concepts show some ‘family resemblance’; there are nonetheless some similarities (Ibid., p. 37).

discourse. The same holds for Latin *rés*, literally affair, thing, case in law, lawsuit or cause. In the words of Serres (ibid.), the Law puts on the stage the identity of the word and the object, the subjective transference from the one to the other. A thing arises there, in the Court of Law.

Concepts seem to fulfil the function of *interpretants* in the semiotics of Ch. Peirce, who talks about ‘signs’ (or ‘representamens’), ‘objects’ and ‘interpretants: “A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign.” (Peirce 1960, p. 135).¹² As concepts do, interpretants offer meaning(s) to the word-thing relation of signification. And as ‘more developed signs’ created by words in the minds of some addressed readers / listeners, interpretants may be given the form of an icon or picture or ‘ideogram’, i.e. a non-verbal representation of the world in terms of which the sign-object (or wordthing) relationship is mediated. Paraphrasing Peirce’s definition of signs (or ‘representamens’) as related to interpretants, one can perhaps say that a ‘word’ is a sign which stands for a ‘thing’ in some respect or capacity to somebody; it creates in the mind of this somebody an equivalent sign, or a more developed sign, even a predication. The sign thus created (which may assume iconic or pictorial form) is the interpretant—the sense-giving concept or implied predication—of the first sign, the word. As conveyors of meaning (sense), interpretants can be looked upon as implicit statements or predications, what one wants to say about this or that thing, the chosen topic of discourse.

The inter-relationships between words (signs), things (objects) and concepts (interpretants) as ‘implied predications’—which are interrelationships of signification and meaning(sense)—is illustrated in Fig. 1:1. Words (signs) ‘stand for’, ‘represent’ or ‘appresent’ things (objects) ‘talked about’; the relationship between the former and the latter is one of signification. Concepts (interpretants)—as ‘implied statements’—refer to (or accommodate for) one or more relations of *signification*; as such they are carriers of *meaning (sense)*. While words represent things irrespective of what the speaker / writer wants to tell us—and irrespective of how what is said is interpreted—concepts as carriers of meaning are dependent on what the speaker / writer wants to tell us. He / she means, wants to say this or

¹² The sign, which it creates, is the interpretant of the first sign. “The sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea ... ‘Idea’ is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second ... it is the same idea.” (Ibid., p. 135)

that. While signification resides in words, meaning belongs to speakers and writers, listeners and readers, in their capacity as word users. What the speaker / writer wants to tell us, the implicitly expressed predications, reside in his / her use words to express what is meant, in what / he she wants to say about a chosen topic of discourse (such as in this case the process of growing up).

Fig. 1:1 - See attachment. Inter-relationships between ‘words’ (signs), things (objects) and concepts (interpretants) as ‘implied predications’: *signification and meaning—sense.*

In his context it seems appropriate also to consider the term ‘notion’. A notion, says the *Oxford English Dictionary*, is something ‘between a word and a concept’: ‘the meaning of a term’ and ‘the form in which anything is conceived’, alluding at the same time to ‘imagination’, ‘view’ or ‘belief’. Notions—which in this way implicitly refer to the semiotic inter-relationships depicted in Fig. 1:1—are usually starting points for any explication (or ‘exploration’) of concepts, the use of words, as well as the relations of words and concepts to things (perceivable as well as nonperceivable).

A search for theoretical interpretants of the process of growing-up — conceived of as a multifaceted process, the main dimensions of which are the body, social relations and acculturation—means looking for concepts, or interpretants, which uncover crucial implications of this very process from our chosen vantage points as observers, interpreters or researchers. The looked-for interpretants (or ‘concepts’) shall enhance our ‘understanding’ (or *verstehen*) of this thing in question, make it possible metaphorically speaking to move about it, contemplating it from the chosen angles, such that some of its implications are brought into light. The main purpose of such a search (or ‘research’) is not explanation in the sense of finding causes, or factors, affecting the growing-up process of individual human beings, but an ‘apprehensive coming to grips with’ growing up.

Explanation is not contradictory to understanding. On the contrary the two notions imply each other: Explanation and understanding are, as Ricoeur puts it, relative moments in an often complex process of interpretation (Ricoeur 1991, p. 126). Understanding calls for explanation when the dialogical situation of any talkers and listeners / writers and readers ceases to exist, when the play of questions and answers no longer permits the participants

to verify their interpretations as the dialogue unfolds. “When I do not spontaneously understand, I ask you [or myself] for an explanation: the explanation enables me hopefully to understand better. Explanation is here no more than an understanding developed through questions and answers, a dialogue or discourse (Ibid., p. 129) The reverse path is no less mandatory”, Ricouer says. There is no explanation that does not reach its completion in understanding. (Ibid., p. 130) Explanation requires understanding. Understanding often carries over into explanation. Understanding helps us ‘see’ what we implicitly mean as users of specific words, or other kinds of representations. Hence ‘to say—because one knows’, is ‘to see and thus to understand’. Providing, or suggesting, theoretical interpretations of growing-up— through acts of understanding—is explicating, or making clear, our talk about growing-up; it is to open it up for the critical eye.¹³

The connection between ‘understanding’ and ‘seeing’ is evident in common English language practice: To see is to discern by use of the eyes, to observe, to look at; or it is to have, or make use the power of such discerning. But it also means mentally to discern, and to understand (‘Now, I see what you mean, the point in what you are saying’). To understand is to apprehend the meaning, or the idea, of something, to comprehend by knowing the meaning of words, or to grasp something presented as a fact, to realize. However, it is also to take, interpret, or view in a certain way; and to recognize or regard as present in thought, though not expressly stated or mentioned. And what about understanding in the sense of apprehending the *idea* of something? It seems to be to grasp a general form, an archetype, a pattern, a plan, or a standard. (And as derived from the Greek word *eidos* this ‘idea’ is not seldom a figure, or image, existing or formed in the mind, a picture of something conceived.)¹⁴

¹³ “It has been rightly suggested,” Simmel says in *The Philosophy of Money*, “that theoretical notions ... are like a torch whose light does not become dimmer by igniting innumerable others from it.” (Simmel 1990, p. 438.)

¹⁴ Evidently both German ‘verstehen’ and English ‘understanding’ derive from *stehen* / to stand; ‘verstehen’ is (seeing) through ‘stehen’, while ‘understanding’ seems to convey the idea of a ‘standing beneath’. It is through the glimpse of the hidden underneath manipulator of Punch and Judy that ‘one understands’. Understanding / *verstehen* is uncovering, seeing.

Conclusion: Theory in this context means words, signs, statements / predications (allowing for various kinds of symbolic representation / apprehension) which enhance our seeing, the uncovering of crucial properties, relations and circumstances—as these ‘words’ (in a more or less strict sense) are developed into concepts, the spelling out of their interpretants. For short, theory is ‘notions that make us see’. As such theory belongs to ‘understanding’ (*verstehen*)—which is metaphorically speaking a standing in relation to an object, the thing talked about.

The thing in question (or ‘talked about’) is a phenomenon known to us all—as suggests Fig. 1:2: A Child is born. It grows. He / she learns to smile, to grip and grasp, to walk and talk, to count and read, to enter and entertain social relations, to vie for attention, to charm and deceive, to express love and hate, disdain and gratitude, to feel pride and shame, to act and judge. The Child ‘develops’ by actualizing in-born and acquired potentialities, compatible with an array of bodily, social and mental skills. Over time it has become, due to this *metamorphosis*, a grown-up man or woman, an adult person. He / she is a Child no more. What can be said of this process? What does it mean? No definite answers can be given to these questions, of course. The meanings of any speaker / writer are addressed (implicitly or explicitly) to some particular or imagined group of listeners / readers. Theorizing growing up is looking for concepts, interpretants, predications which ‘impose a vision of divisions’ from some chosen vantage points, those following with a chosen ‘universe of discourse’ (such is, this case, that of the mentioned and consulted phenomenologist writers).

As Heidegger reminds us with reference to Kant, concepts, however rigorous, are worthless if they are blind. To make something accessible and keep hold of it and adapt one’s concept-formation to what is thus held fast and seen—“this is the sober sense of the much ventilated so-called phenomenological *Wesensschau*.” (Heidegger 1982, p. 114) Once again we touch upon the ancient notion of *eidōs*, idea as form, *morphe*, *genos*, type or figure: “What determines the thingness, *Sachlichkeit*, in a being is its figure (*Gestalt*). Something takes this or that shape, it becomes such and such. The expression is drawn from the sphere of sensory intuition. Here we first think of a spatial figure. But the term *morphe* should be freed from this restriction. What is intended is not just a spatial figure, but the whole characteristic form impressed on a being from which we read off what it is. We gather from the shape and impressed form of a thing what the case may be with it. Forming and shaping lend its own peculiar look to what is to be produced and has been produced. Look is the ontological sense

of the Greek expression *eidos* or *idea* ... It is the figure that gives the thing its look.” (Heidegger 1982, p. 106)

In what Heidegger describes as the productive comportment of understanding one seems to make use of some material. This material is not produced but is already there. It is met with as something that does not need to be produced. “In production and its understanding of being, I thus comport myself toward a being that is not in need of being produced ... [But] productive comportment is not limited just to the producible and produced but harbours within itself a remarkable breadth of possibility for understanding the being of beings, which is at the same time the basis for the universal significance assignable to the fundamental concepts of ancient ontology.” (Heidegger 1982, p. 115-6)]

Or, lingering on this relation between saying and seeing: As Heidegger says in *History of the Concept of Time* concerning ‘categorical intuition’, i.e. apprehension, or simple seeing, of that which is conceptually grasped as a category, i.e. as ‘one of a possible exhaustive set of classes among which all things might be distributed’: “*Assertions are acts of meaning*, and assertions in the sense of a formulated proposition are only specific forms of expressness ... It is also a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already *expressed*, even more, are *interpreted* in a certain way... It is not so much that we see the objects and things but that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter ...” (HCT, p. 56) In other words, our comportments, lived experiences in the broadest sense, are expressed experiences. Even if not uttered in words, “they are nonetheless expressed in a definite articulation by an understanding that I have of them as I simply live with them without regarding them thematically.” (Ibid, p. 48) What we say about the matter decides how we look upon this matter.

1.4 Life-world—the World of the Child

In the following analysis the Child will be bestowed with what Husserl and his followers called a ‘life-world’, or ‘world’. In fact, this ‘world of the Child’ will serve as something of a ‘frame of vision’ in the attempted search for theoretical interpretants of growing up. A preliminary explication may be due as to this pivotal notion.

In the words of Alfred Schutz¹⁵, the life-world is our world of common sense, the sphere of daily life in which we as human beings among fellow beings experience culture and society, take a stand with regard to their objects, are influenced by them and act upon them; it constitutes what has proved valid thus far, and what we expect will remain so in the future, allowing though for the possibility that it can also at any moment be put into question (Schutz, 1964, p. 116). It is the world in which we find ourselves at every moment of our life. As such it extends indefinitely in space and time, and through space and time. It comprises natural material things and cultural objects, as well as other people to whom we stand in various relations. “Whatever activity we engage in, whether practical, theoretical or other, is pursued within the life-world, whose simple acceptance proves an essential precondition of every activity.” (Gurwitsch 1962, p. 52) The belief in this world is, as a role, *not formulated, but accompanies, pervades and permeates all our mental life, since it takes place within the world of common experience.*

The life-world accounts for ‘our horizontal structure of experience’. By virtue of this structure, every object (even a novel one) appears to have a certain familiarity, however dim and vague. It also presents itself in the light of a certain *typicality*: the objects we encounter and with which we deal do not present themselves as individual and singular things, but as things and creations of some kind. Such ‘typification’ is at the origin of any conceptual consciousness, if it is not in itself conceptualization in an incipient or germinal form.¹⁶ (Gurwitsch 1962. p. 54). The typification differs from society to society, however, and within the same society it varies throughout the course of its history. If we arrive in a strange society, or discover the material remainders of a civilization from the past, we are often at loss, we do not understand what we encounter and see. So the world in which we find ourselves is an interpreted world, but the interpretation is not of our own making. It has been handed down to us by our elders and has silently been accepted as a matter of course. People are not only born into a socio-cultural world, but also grow into it. Growing into a certain

¹⁵ What is here said about Schutz’s way of understanding ‘life-world’ is based on Schutz, A. 1964, “Some Structures of the Life-world,” in *Collected Papers III*. ed. by I. Schutz and with an Introduction by A. Gurwitsch, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, and Gurwitsch, A. 1962, “The Common-sense World as Social Reality: A Discourse on Alfred Schutz,” in *Social Research*, Vol. 29:1, p. 50-72, and Schutz, A. 1962, “On Multiple Realities” in *Collected Papers I*, ed. and introduced by M. Natanson, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.

¹⁶ For Schutz on (ideal) types and typification, see also Chapter 8.

world and society means that people acquire a certain *language* that embodies certain interpretations and typifications, their very vehicle and medium of expressive behaviour.

Along with language come rules for handling things, modes of conduct in typical situations, ideas which one apply in order to achieve certain ends. These constitute the stock of knowledge at hand—the sediment of a person's life-history (Gurwitsch 1962. p. 57). This stock of knowledge forms the frame of reference, interpretation, and orientation in our daily life, for our dealings with physical things, situations and other fellow beings. It is taken for granted. Other people are assumed to know certain things—such as we do—and their knowledge is substantially of the same kind as ours. (Ibid., p. 58) Although we perceive the same things from different angles, we experience normally a common world “comprising identical objects with identical qualities and properties, identically interpreted by all of us—‘identical’ to the extent to which such identity is required for practical purposes of cooperation and collaboration.” (Ibid., 62) The life-world is not experienced as a private world, but as a public world common to us all; it is intersubjective. “The overwhelming bulk of this knowledge is socially derived and transmitted to the individual in the long process of education by parents, teachers, teachers of teachers, by relations of all kinds, involving fellow-men, contemporaries and predecessors. It is transmitted in the form of insight, beliefs, more or less well founded or blind, maxims, instructions for use, recipes for the solution of typical problems, i.e. for the attainment of typical results by the typical application of typical means” (Schutz, 1964, p. 120)

The life-world is stratified in a spatio-temporal respect. There is a stratum of the experienced, or experience-able, world that is within our actual reach of hearing, seeing, manipulation, etc., a world we are able to perceive with or without the aid of instruments. We know that this world acts upon us, and that we can act upon it—with or without the aid of some instruments. (Schutz, 1964. p. 118). There is further a stratum within our potential reach, and potential, if not actual manipulation (‘where we neither am, nor have been, but I might go’). The social world within actual reach is the domain of direct social experience, and the subjects encountered in it are our fellowmen. With these we share a common span of time and a common spatial sector. This central domain is surrounded, as it were, by the world of contemporaries who coexist with us in time without, however, being within in reciprocal spatial reach. “Contemporaries know about one another in multifariously articulated typified ways, which admit of all degrees of fulfilment and emptiness, intimacy

and anonymity... [and] notwithstanding all social distance, contemporaries are in principle able to act on one another.” (Ibid., p. 119) It is also possible to bring in the aspect of time. We are aware of a world, which formerly was, but no longer is, a world we can only to some extent remember. And from a social point of view, there are in addition our contemporaries, “the world of our predecessors which acts upon us, while itself being beyond the reach of our action, and the world of our successors upon which we can act but which cannot act upon us.” (Ibid., p. 119) All these stratifications belong to our naive experience of the socialized world.¹⁷

The typifications on terms of which we distinguish the several strata of our social world—construe and interpret their contents, determine our action in it and upon it—“are predefined as unquestionably given by virtue of the socially conditioned schemata of expression and interpretation prevailing in the group to which we belong.” (Ibid., p. 119) In the naive attitude of our daily living there corresponds to this stratification of the world in the spatio-temporal respect, a differentiation of our knowledge about it; there is a comparatively very small sector of which everyone of us has thorough, clear, distinct, and consistent knowledge, not only as to what and how, but also as to the understanding of the *why*. But there is also knowledge which concerns only the *what*, and leaves the *how* unquestioned. “We assume that the apparatus, the procedure, the recipe, the maxim or our practical conduct will, in the normal course of things, stand its test in the future as this has thus far been the case, without our knowing why this is so and upon what this confidence of ours is based. (Ibid., p. 120) These zones of knowledge ... are surrounded by dimensions of mere belief which in turn are graded in multiple ways as to well-foundedness, plausibility, likelihood, reliance upon authority, blind acceptance, down to complete ignorance.” (Ibid., p. 121)

As an individual human being one always experiences oneself as being within a certain situation which one has to define. A principal component of this situation originates from the ontological structure of the pre-given world; but there enters also the actual biographical state of the individual, “a state which include his stock of knowledge in its actual articulation ... The biographical state determines the spontaneous definition of the situation within the imposed ontological framework.” (Ibid., p.122) The individual's stock of knowledge at a certain moment of time is nothing but the sedimentation of all earlier experiences, which

¹⁷ Those aspects of contemporaries and predecessors will be developed in Chapter 8.

might refer to the world in its previously actual, restorable, or obtainable reach or else to fellow-men, contemporaries, or predecessors. (Ibid., p. 123). If the elements of the stock of knowledge at hand in various gradations, or degrees of familiarity, suffice for the definition of the situation, then the definition takes place as a matter of course in the form of the unquestionably given. If, on the other hand, it becomes necessary to know more about these elements, new knowledge must be acquired; or the knowledge at hand must be transformed into higher degrees of familiarity. (Ibid., p. 124) The individual's stock of knowledge, in all its stratifications and available within certain limits, is an element of his / her biographical situation at any moment in question. It forms the unquestionably given background and the basis for the definition and mastery of the surrounding worlds of nature, culture, as society—articulated as different zones of reach. This world as a whole is, in principle opaque, as a whole it is neither understood nor understandable. (Ibid., p. 130)

It is an important task, Schutz maintains, to investigate to what extent the different forms of systems of relevancy in the life-world— motivational, thematical, and most, of all, interpretational systems—are socially and culturally conditioned. Already the typification of acquired knowledge is to some extent socio-culturally co-determined. (Ibid., p. 131) “Not only the vocabulary but also the syntactical structure of common colloquial language, ... contains the system of typifications and hence interpretational relevancies which by the linguistic community are considered as tested and verified, ... as given beyond question, as approved and valid until further notice.” In the process of learning and education these are transmitted to new members of the group. (Ibid., p. 132) The same holds for the several means which every culture makes available for the typical orientation in, and the mastery of, the life-world: tools, procedures, social institutions, customs, usages, symbolic systems. “All knowledge concerning those means determines the motivational, thematic, and interpretational relevancies which the individual member of a given social group inserts into his stock of knowledge as an unquestionably given background—imposed upon him or lying within his ability—for his individual definition of his situation in the life-world.” (Ibid., p. 132)

Any communication with other men in the life-world presupposes a similar structure of these relevancies. “This similar structure will occupy a privileged position within the domain involving fellow-men in face-to-face situations because the sector of the spatial life-world, common to the partners, by necessity makes some elements to be of equal thematic

relevancy for both partners, and furthermore because the body of the partner with his field of physiognomic expression, his gestures, his actions and reactions discloses an interpretationally relevant field which otherwise would not be accessible to the same extent. It is the task of philosophical sociology to study the modifications which these common or similar systems of relevancy pertaining to fellowmen in face-to-face situations undergo in the interpretations of the world of the predecessors and anticipations of the world of successors.” (Ibid., p. 132)

The world of everyday life is the scene of our actions and interactions, our 'world of working'. "Working ... is action in the outer world, based upon a project and characterized by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements. ... the wide-awake self integrates in its working and by its working its present, past and future in a specific dimension of time; it realizes itself as a totality in its working acts; it communicates with Others through working acts; it organizes the different spatial perspectives of the world of daily life through working acts." (Schutz 1962, p. 212) Schutz emphasizes the importance of our bodily movements for the constitution of the outer world and its time perspective. (Ibid., p. 215-6) "The place which my body occupies within the world, my actual Here, is the starting point from which I take my bearing in space ... Relatively to my body I group the elements of my surroundings under the categories of right and left, before and behind, above and below, near and far, and so on. And in a similar way my actual Now is the origin of all the time perspectives under which I organize the events within the world such as categories for fore and aft, past and present, simultaneity and succession, etc." (Ibid., p. 222-3)

As a whole, this world of working—which includes not only what we are able actually to perceive and to manipulate, but also potentially enter with our senses and actions—stands out as paramount over against many possible sub-universes of reality. "It is the world of physical things, including my body; it is the realm of my locomotions and bodily operations; it offers resistances which require effort to overcome; it places tasks before me, permits me to carry through my plans, and enables me to succeed or to fail in my attempts to attain my purposes. By my working acts I gear into the outer world, I change it ... I share this world and its objects with Others; with Others, I have ends and means in common; I work with them in manifold social acts and relationships, checking the Others and checked by them.

And the world of working is the reality within communication and the interplay of mutual motivation becomes effective.” (Ibid., p. 227)

The strata of actual and potential experiences of everyday life (in the ‘natural attitude’), which contain ‘the paramount world of working’, form the kernel of our reality. However, as Schutz demonstrates, in addition to these strata of potential perception and manipulation, it is also possible to conceive of a stratum of reality transcending the world of everyday life, of realities beyond any actual or potential perception and manipulation. ”All these worlds—the worlds of dreams, of imageries and phantasms, especially the world of art, the world of religious experience, the world of scientific contemplation, the play world of the child, and the world of the insane—are finite provinces of meaning” in the sense that it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of our surrounding physical objects which constitute them. (Schutz, 1962, p. 230-2) All of them have a peculiar cognitive style (which is not that of the world of working in the natural attitude). All experiences within each of these worlds are, with respect to this cognitive style, consistent in themselves and compatible with one another (but not with the meaning of everyday life). Each may receive a specific accent of reality (which is different from the accent of the world of working). The consistency and compatibility of the experiences subsist only within the particular province of meaning to which they belong. Their finiteness implies that there is no possibility of referring one of these provinces to the other by introducing any formula of transformation. To the cognitive style peculiar to each of these provinces belongs a specific tension of consciousness and a prevalent spontaneity, a specific form of self-experience, form of sociability, and time perspective. (Ibid., p. 232)

The reality of these finite provinces of meaning can only be apprehended by means of symbols. Symbols are, as Schutz puts it, entities within the reality of our daily life, which allow for transcendencies to other spheres of reality. They refer to realities beyond our actual and potential reach. Expressed in a more technical language, symbols are *appresentational references of a higher order in which the appresenting member is an object, fact, or event within the reality of our daily life, whereas the appresented member refers to an idea that transcends our experience of every day life.* (Schutz, C.P. I 1962, p. 331) By talking about appresentational references Schutz means that perceivable entities are not experienced as ‘selves’—but ‘as standing for’ something which are not given in immediacy to the experiencing subjects. There is a ‘pairing’ or ‘coupling’ between something ‘appresented’

and something ‘appresenting’. The latter ‘calls forth’ a physical event, fact, or object which is not perceivable to the subject in immediacy; or—as in the case of symbols—is something spiritual or immaterial.

How does it come that an object, event, or fact within the reality of our daily life is coupled with an idea which transcends our experience of our everyday life? The answer given by Schutz is that there are first sets of appresentational references which are universal and hence can be used for symbolization because they are rooted in the human condition. There are, secondly, particular forms of symbolic systems as developed by various cultures in different periods. (Ibid., p. 332). Our Western culture has developed several systems of symbols, such as science, art, religion, politics, and philosophy. The coexistence of several symbolic systems which are merely loosely, if at all, connected one with another, is the special feature of our own historical situation and the result of our attempt to develop an interpretation of the cosmos in terms of the positive methods of natural sciences (Ibid., p. 332). On the other hand, many investigations have shown that in other cultures, and even in earlier periods of our own culture, man experienced nature, society, and himself as equally participating in and determined by the order of the cosmos (Ibid., p. 333). Symbolization, hence, refers to an ‘appresentational reference of a higher order’, based on ‘preformed appresentational references’. (Ibid., p. 337). Each of the varying appresenting vehicles may be replaced by another, each appresentational meaning may undergo a series of variations and the principle of figurative transference pervades the whole appresentational structure. “All this explains the essential ambiguity of the symbol, the vagueness of the transcendent experiences appresented by it, and the difficulty of translating their meaning into discursive terms of more or less precise denotations”.¹⁸ (Ibid., p. 338)

The life-world can also be defined in terms of experience. As the world we approach in our daily dealings—the world of working—it is a world of *Erfahrung(en)* in the various senses connoted by this German word. It relates to the sphere of observation and acquaintance—facts and events; the world we encounter, move in (and into) in our practical pursuits, perceiving various objects and to some extent also manipulating them, describing and interpreting, counting and measuring them, reading them (figuratively or literally) and attributing to them a certain structure: a build-up that makes it possible to discern one or

¹⁸ Schutz’s way of understanding signs and symbols will be developed in Chapter 8.

more ‘wholes’, composed of parts that can be related to both each other and these wholes. As such it is also crucial for our expectations concerning the future, our *Erwartung(en)*, what we look ahead to, and into. But the life-world also relates to what we ‘live through’, which we experience in the way of feeling joy and anger, pain and pleasure, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, anxiety, fear, dread, for short, our *Erlebnis(se)*: what affects us, of what we go through, suffer or endure. As our ‘accumulated stock of knowledge at hand’, the life-world further refers to what we have learnt and gathered, our knowledge capital that we carry with us as *Erbgebnis(se)*; what has ‘been given to us’ through formal learning and direct observation of events, happenings and occurrences. In this way the life-world concerns our socialization, acquired in and through interaction with other human beings (society), and our practical and mundane acquaintance of physical objects and processes, including our own bodies (i.e. nature). It relates to our intersubjectively valid constitution of meanings, building on what is assumed (for the time being) to be true (i.e. culture). It is our subjective, and biographically formed world of ‘experience’ in the three mentioned senses of this word.

Applying the concept of life-world to the Child we get ‘the world of the Child’: There is for any Child a sphere of reality within actual spatial reach, and a sphere of reality within potential spatial reach, but also realities beyond both actual and potential reach, provinces of meaning which can be apprehended only by means of symbols. (According to Schutz dreams, narratives, sheer fantasies, and daydreaming, belong to this latter kind of reality-spheres). The relation between the Child and the various ‘things’ of these ‘realities’ is one of ‘intentionality’ (to use a key term of the mentioned phenomenologist philosophers); he / she is occupied with them, concerned with them, more or less curiously bent, or intent on them. These ‘things’ constitute the Child’s personal and private sphere of consciousness, a sphere of acts of saying-seeing, of ‘knowing’.¹⁹ The things of the Child’s physical environment detach themselves against the background of some horizons, horizons of perception, but also recollection and anticipation. The Child, as occupying a continuously changing present ‘interfacing’ with a past and a future, is drawing on an accumulated stock of knowledge at hand, on what he / she knows so far and can rely on in any practical or other

¹⁹ In other words, the term ‘things’ here stands for what the Child at any moment is able to talk about, ‘what it knows with oneself and together with others’, by virtue of its command of language.

pursuits. This knowledge at hand represents a past carried over into the present, and it forms the basis for any anticipation concerning the future, the Child's expectations.

The Child is always inserted into a society of other human beings and occupying some place within it; it is endowed with embodied experiences and knowledge—in command of some language competence and skills which secure access to a system of significance and meaning. But he / she is also 'contained' in these respects due to his / her *situatedness*: place of birth and upbringing, class and wealth of parents, prevailing aspirations, norms and values among those socially most close to the child, not to mention various *mediated* modes of conceiving and representing things in its immediate and not-so-immediate surroundings. Its acquired stock of knowledge at hand is socially derived and only a small part of it derives from his / her personal experience as an individual. Due to his / her acquisition of *particular* knowledge, the Child is 'informed' in the sense of given form, 'acculturated'. This holds not the least in respect of the access to language. With language there follows certain interpretations and expressive behaviour, as well as rules of handling things and modes of conduct. In the Child's daily environment there are physical objects as well as other human beings, presenting themselves with some familiarity, and in the light of some typicality—detach themselves against certain horizons, and in this way assume *specific* significance and meaning. The Child is personally situated in time and space. He / she occupies a present that extends into a re-collectable past, as well as into an unknown (but nonetheless anticipated, or fancied) future. He / she can be attributed 'a present of the present', a 'past of the present' and a 'future of the present'. The first is the time which the Child 'lives-through' (*erlebt*) at any now, a *here*. The second is the time of a past re-actualized as a present (i.e. the personally accumulated knowledge drawn upon in any 'now'); this time refers to a *there*, occupied by the individual once but no more. The third is the time of any present expectations, a '*where which is to come*': What is there waiting for me in this 'where', beyond this horizon I am on the move towards?

1.5 Contents

The idea of the life-world, or 'world' of the Child, will be further developed in the subsequent chapters by consulting Husserl himself and Heidegger. But first: What does it mean 'to become', to 'be coming of age'? And how is the Child in his / her becoming to be conceived of in terms of 'substance', that means: as the very object / subject of the inquiry?

The questions are raised in Chapter 2, which starts by visiting Aristotle. To grow up is to bring to the fore the *eidos*, or immanent form of an adult man or woman by ‘actualization of in-born and acquired potentialities’, through *energeia* and *dynamises*. It is ‘to become what you are’. By way of Heidegger’s reading of Leibniz’ (the Child as monad, ‘a living mirror of the universe, propelled by drive’) an alternative interpretation of the Child is suggested: he / she is to be conceived of as a ‘conscious human being bent on the things of the world’: a creature demonstrating what Husserl and his followers called ‘intentionality’. Growing up implies the development of ‘a world of significance and meaning’ and ‘a world of equipment, projecting and understanding’. How are these aspects more specifically related to the Child in his / her becoming? Chapter 3 and 4 consults Husserl and Heidegger respectively. The theme of Chapter 5 is learning to speak, the Child’s acquisition of language competence, as it has been explicated by M. Merleau-Ponty. To give sense to things in the physical environment by ‘saying’ is crucial— following the line of reasoning in the previous chapters—for the Child’s ability to ‘see’, discovering, taking notice of, perceive, as well the ability to judge and to communicate, for all learning *that, why* and *how*. But learning to speak is also an example of ‘habituation’, the development of a personal habitus, the Child’s acquiring of practical and instrumental knowledge by imitation, or ‘formative imagination’. Formative imagination—the Child’s taking on of the image of an Other, and making it an image of himself / herself—is the theme of Chapter 6, which consults Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas, Pierre Bourdieu and Michael Polanyi. An attempt is also made to relate imitation to consciousness and *noesis* (as that latter notion has been dealt with by Husserl). Does imitation contain, or does it not contain, elements of implicit discourse, a ‘knowing with Oneself and together with Others’, i.e. an implicit recourse to language? The topics of the following chapter, *Myself and Others*, are intersubjectivity, realization of Self, and ‘Selfidentity’. How can these notions be applied to the Child in his / her becoming? Several writers are consulted: E. Husserl, A. Schutz, G.W.F. Hegel and J.-P. Sartre; D. Stern, M. Merleau-Ponty, J. Lacan, G.H. Mead, H. Heidegger and E. Tugendhat; A. Giddels, P. Ricoeur, D. Carr and Ch. Taylor. Chapter 8 accounts for the way A. Schutz’s conceived of the social world in *Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt*, his treatise from the early 1930’s, and it develops his theory of signs and symbols. Chapter 9 relates growing up to time and temporality—temporality and freedom (by consulting Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Sartre). Chapter 10 presents Watsuji Tetsurō’s thinking concerning the social ‘in-betweenness’ (*aidagara*) which characterize all human beings (developed in *Rinrigaku / Ethics*), and his way of understanding ‘climate and culture’

(presented in *Fûdo*). With the help of Watsuji it also tries to take a stand on the meaning of growing up as *acculturation*: We are all ‘bred and born’ through a mutuality of constantly changing influences, conditioned by our spatial and social setting. The Child is situated and grows up ‘in-between his / her consociates, but also contemporaries and predecessors represented by messages and artefacts, traditions, accepted knowledge, for short some beliefs, norms and values, that means culture(s)’.

The over-all approach to growing up in the course of the presentation of the possible theoretical interpretants can perhaps be described as a ‘dramaturgical’: The Child, in his / her becoming-coming of age, will be put on stage. There he / she will be contemplated from different ontological points of view. There will be the Child as a ‘human subject’ or ‘subjectivity’, a conscious ‘being-for-itself’ (*être-por-soi*), to talk with Husserl and Sartre, but also as ‘Dasein the Child’, to apply the idiom of Heidegger, the Child as a ‘being simply being there’. In other words, the Child as ‘subjectivity’ will be accompanied by, and contrasted to, the Child as a mere ‘objectivity, a not grown-up human being, whose relations to the things of the world is not necessarily interpreted in terms of ‘consciousness’, who is not treated as ‘a meaning-giving transcendental subject’, not attributed some inner mental content in contradistinction to outer objects, and for whom the traditional opposition between immanence and transcendence does not always make sense.²⁰ The different approaches, which will be spelled out in the course of the following chapters, hopefully do not exclude each other, but require the reader / spectator to move between the assumptions of the consulted writers.

A recurrent notion in the following chapters will be ‘consciousness’. Some of the consulted writers, for instance Husserl and Schutz, talk about the ‘stream of consciousness’; others use the term simply to denote a ‘conscious human being’. In the course of the following chapters attempts have been made to take a stand on a relevant meaning of this word in this particular context. As applied to the Child it has been assumed that ‘consciousness’ implies ‘knowledge by saying’—acts of implicit or explicit talking to oneself and / or to others—

²⁰ See Dreyfus 1991. As Dreyfus observes, Heidegger “warns explicitly against thinking of Dasein as a Husserlian meaning-giving transcendental subject”. (Op. cit., p. 13) “The best way to understand what Heidegger means by Dasein is to think of our term ‘human being’, which can refer to a way of being that is characteristic of all people or to a specific person—a human being.”

and that consciousness is to be understood of as ‘knowledge with oneself and together with others’, by virtue of language. In other words: Consciousness is always *shared* knowledge, shared with the members one’s own speech community.²¹ As H. Arendts reminds us “... to be by myself and to have intercourse with myself is the outstanding characteristic of the life of the mind. The mind can be said to have a life of its own only to the extent that it actualizes this intercourse in which, existentially speaking, plurality is reduced to the duality already implied in the fact and the word ‘consciousness’, or *syneidennai*—to know with myself.” (Arendt 1978, p. 74) Consciousness (‘to know with myself) is the curious fact “that in a sense I also am for myself, though I hardly appear to me, which indicates that the Socratic ‘being one’ is not so unproblematic as it seems; I am not only for others but for myself, and in this latter case, I am not just one. A difference is inserted into my Oneness.” (Ibid. p. 183) Acts of consciousness, Arendt continues, have in common with sense experience the fact that they are ‘intentional’ and therefore *cognitive* acts, ... the thinking ego does not think something, but *about* something, and this act is dialectical: it proceeds in the form of a silent dialogue.” (Ibid., p. 187) Let’s add that any dialogue presupposes language. Consciousness belongs to the realm of saying, listening and understanding.

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²¹ As Rom Harré observes in *Personal Being*: “The ‘consciousness’ vocabulary in German, like the Italian from which the word-family built around ‘consciousness’ comes, ... treats conscious experience as a form of knowing. ... The German term that comes closest to ‘conscious’ is *bewusst*’.” (Harré 1983, p. 151) While it is known to etymologists that the Latin root ‘sci-’ in ‘conscious’ has the meaning ‘to know’, the average English speaker is surely not aware of this.

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German speaker however, the relation between 'wissen' ('to know') and 'bewusst'/'Bewusstsein'/'Bewusstheit' is still part of the sense of the word 'conscious'". (Ibid, p. 152)]

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2. Becoming—the Child as ‘Substance’

2.1 Introduction

If ‘growing up is a proceeding, or process—a becoming, or ‘coming of age’, of a human individual’, what does that mean? Etymologically, ‘becoming’ (fr. OE. *becuman*) means ‘to come to’, ‘meet with’ or ‘to happen’. And it seems to have kept these connotations. Though *what* is actually happening when one grows up? Perhaps Aristotle gives as a clue: Applying what he says in *Metaphysics* on ‘substance’, ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’: To grow up is to be in motion, movement or change (*kinesis*), from birth through childhood towards adulthood. But it is also to be in a state of ‘actualization’ (*energeia*): an actualization of one’s potentialities (*dynamises*), in-born, as well as acquired. As such it implies ‘substance’ / *ousia*, ‘essence’, ‘existence’. To grow up is to bring to the fore the *eidos*, or ‘immanent form’ of an adult person, a grown-up man or woman. For short: it is to ‘become what you are’. Let’s see how these seemingly strange notions could be pertinent to growing up, and then, how they can be supplemented by ‘drive’, a pivotal idea in the monadology of Leibniz. In this second part of the chapter we will seek recourse in Martin Heidegger’s reading of this philosopher and his predecessors, the scholastics of the Middle Ages. The theme of the third and final part is consciousness and ‘intentionality’ in the phenomenology of E. Husserl and his followers. Each of these parts will offer a possible interpretation of the child as substance: as the ‘what-it-was-to-be-that-thing of a thing’ (Aristotle), as monad attributed ‘drive’ (Leibniz), and as a conscious human being bent on the world, attuned to the world (Husserl). Visiting Aristotle it has also seemed proper to introduce another of his key notions, that of entelechy (*entelechia*), which appears in his treatment of the Soul in *De Anima / Psyche*.

2.2 Aristotle on substance, potentiality and actuality

An Aristotelian approach to growing up would be to maintain that among its possible theoretical interpretants are substance, potentiality and actuality, notions which all concern the unity of things, and which are elaborated by Aristotle in notably *Metaphysics*, Book *Zeta* and *Theta*. An attempt to be more explicit on these points will be made below by visiting the mentioned parts of *Metaphysics*. Doing so we will also encounter his not easily

comprehended (but in this context seemingly pertinent) remarks on *kinesis* and *energeia*. But first some words on potentiality and actuality.

In Book *Theta* of *Metaphysics*, potentiality and actuality are considered in respect of *process* or *change* and in respect of *substance*. Considering potentiality in respect of change, or potentiality for change, Aristotle starts by making some distinctions: one is between active and passive potentialities for change, an other between rational and irrational potentialities, a third between potentialities which are natural and those which are acquired. An agent of change has an active potentiality to change an object of change, it is said; an object of change has a passive potentiality to be changed by an agent. As Lawson-Tancred observes in his introduction to *Theta*, Book 1: “Both these potentialities are realized when the change takes place, and in a way they can be considered the same potentiality. But from the point of view of the agent and the object separately, they are, of course distinct.”²² Hence, some potentialities reside in the thing affected, while other potentialities reside in agents. Regarding the former, Aristotle says that the thing “is affected through containing a certain principle, and through its matter’s containing a certain principle such that different things are affected by different agents”. [*Meta.* 1046a]

As to rational and irrational potentialities for change, the former occur only in animate and rational beings, conspicuously in men, while irrational potentialities occur both in animate and inanimate beings. The salient difference between these kinds of potentialities is that rational potentialities (residing in the soul ‘and especially in the rational element of the soul’) can produce either of a pair of correlated opposites, “whereas, with potentialities without reason, each potentiality is the potentiality of a single thing only”. [*Meta.*1046b]

Aristotle also emphasizes that rational potentialities are different from irrational ones in that they are not automatically triggered by the bringing together of the active and the passive potentiality. The possessor of rational potentiality can decide not to use it even in circumstances in which it would be quite natural for him to do so. This is because rational choice is a condition for the development of a rational potentiality. The appropriate

²² Lawson-Tancred in Aristotle 1998 [hereafter referred to as *Meta.*] p. 253.

conditions are both necessary and sufficient for the triggering of an irrational potentiality, but only necessary for that of a rational potentiality.²³ As Aristotle says:

“ ... (S)ome things are such that their process-potential is conditioned by a rational account and their potentialities are supported by reason, whereas other things, being themselves non-rational, have correspondingly non-rational potentialities. Given this, it is necessary that potentialities of the former kind reside in an animate bearer, whereas those of the latter kind are to be found in both animates and in inanimates ... There is a further peculiarity of potentialities of the latter, nonrational kind, and it is this: whenever the potential active and the potentially affected items are associated in conditions propitious to the potentiality, the former must of necessity act and the latter must of necessity be affected. This is by no means the case with potentialities of the former kind ... “ [Meta.1048a]

As to rational potentialities their triggering must be under the control of something, and in saying this Aristotle has in mind *desire* or *rational preference*. “The arrangement is that selection of the two possible contrary effects is under the control of desire and takes place when the context is propitious to the potentiality and the agent is associated with the item affected by the potentiality ... “. The possession of a potentiality is the possession of a potentiality to act, and such potentiality is not unconditional but depends on the obtaining of propitious circumstances, “which include the satisfaction of a *ceteris paribus* condition.“ [Meta.1048a]

The distinction between natural and acquired potentialities coincides with the one he makes between irrational and rational potentiality. It is not possible to acquire an irrational potentiality, nor is it to have a rational potentiality inborn. The latter must be acquired by means of training, habituation and education. Potentialities as a whole, Aristotle purports, can be divided into the in-born, such as the senses, the acquired by practice, such as that for flute-playing, and those acquired by study, such as that for skills.²⁴ “The last two of these groups are to be had on the basis of previous actualization, the potentialities, that is, are

²³ Lawson-Tancred, in *op. cit.*, p. 263.

²⁴ The formulation ‘by study’—which is in conformance with the translation by H. Tredennick of 1961 and that by H.P. Apostle of 1979, see Aristotle 1961 and Aristotle 1979—has been preferred to Tancred-Lawson’s ‘by learning’.

conditioned by habituation and the grasp of an account.” [Meta.1047b] Further, a potentiality must have a determinate objective. And a potentiality is a potentiality for a determinate action in determinate circumstances: So, he concludes, “ ... the bearer of a potentiality has a potentiality *for x at time t and in manner m* (here insert all other qualifiers required by the definition)”. [Meta.1048a]

Potentiality is ‘potency, ‘power’, ‘capacity’ or ‘capability’. But “What is actuality?” and “What *sort* of thing is it?” These questions are raised in *Theta* 6. His answer to the first question is that *the actuality of an object is its very obtaining*. Or, in the words of Lawson-Tancred: : “A thing is actual when it has already become the thing that it is.” (Op. cit., p. 266) Concerning the second question Aristotle seeks recourse in cases (or analogues). “What we are getting at here will be clear inductively on a case to case basis”. (To which he adds: “It is not, in any event, right to seek a definition for everything—for some things an overview is to be had by analogy.”) He illustrates what sort of thing an actuality is by means of the example of a statue of Hermes which has been produced from wood rather than being still in the making, so to speak still ‘in the wood’. As Lawson-Tancred remarks: “A thing is actual when it has already become the thing that it is, having previously merely had a potentiality to be it.” (Ibid., p. 266)

Aristotle insists on the diversity of kinds of actuality and potentiality and illustrates them in detail. He also makes a distinction between process and mere activity, motion (movement / change) and ‘actualization’, between *kinesis* and *energeia*. What distinguishes the latter from the former is that it contains its purpose within itself, so to speak. While *kinesis* is incomplete, *energeia* is complete. To illustrate this difference Aristotle mentions the example of seeing and that of learning. “When I am seeing, I also, and at the same time, have seen ... [but, on the other hand] when I am learning, I am not also, and at the same, in a state of having learned.” The former is an activity, an example of actualisation, *energeia*; the latter is a process: a motion, movement or change towards some not yet achieved goal, *kinesis*.²⁵ Further examples of processes are walking [some distance] and building and coming into being. (“For it is not that at the same time one is walking [from A to B] and one has walked,

²⁵ As Tancred-Lawson remarks in his translation of *De Anima*: The literal meaning of *kinesis* is ‘movement’ and “it is often right to translate it so, but it has a much wider sense for Aristotle, denoting a process in general, sometimes distinguished from *energeia* as having an end outside itself.” (Aristotle 1986, p. 121)

is building and has built, is coming into being and has come into being ... “ All processes are incomplete (but such that they stop when their elements have reached their natural place).²⁶ How about living? Is it such that when I am living, then I have already lived? Yes, according to Aristotle. While the procedure of learning is a process, living is an activity, or functioning (normally accompanied with pleasure), i.e. the functioning of a capacity, its fulfilment and actualisation. [*Meta*.1048b] But, evidently, we may add, a functioning that suddenly can be interrupted.

Granted that these Aristotelian notions pertain to growing up, is it then to be looked upon as a process or mere activity, a motion or actualization, an example of *kinesis* or *energeia*, to apply this possible (if somewhat puzzling) distinction? As a matter of fact it seems to imply both *kinesis* and *energeia*, motion and actualization, process and activity: When one grows up one has entered on a motion (or movement) through childhood towards adulthood, a path that starts at birth and ends when one is no longer a child. As long as one is still that child, the motion entered upon is in-complete, it can be looked upon as a *kinesis*. Though it can equally well be said: When one *grows* one has already grown (to some extent), been ‘in work, or operation’, been *en-ergeia*. To cover these two aspects of growing up, one could perhaps use the word ‘performance’; with its allusions to form, to achievement, and, not the least, to play and stage acting—something that takes place in front of our eyes—it refers to both processes and acts.²⁷

To proceed on this path of reasoning: Growing up is, figuratively speaking, per-forming, a becoming, or coming of age, that we can ‘perceive’ (in the general sense of ‘being conscious of’) when we contemplate the actual passage in time of a human individual from birth—through childhood and adolescence—to the state of being an adult, in other words: an enacted achievement, which can be recounted. In retrospect it can assume the form of a

²⁶ See Peters 1967, p. 56. An other way of distinguishing *kinesis* from *energeia* is suggested by Tancred-Lawson in *De Anima*. The latter, but not the former is complete *at any given time*. This holds, for instance, for walking in an other possible sense of the word: If I am walking [‘keep going moving my legs’], ”then I am completely walking at any time during my walk, so that walking is an *energeia*. (Aristotle 1986, p. 248)

²⁷ According to Klein’s *Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, ‘perform’ derives from ME *perfourmen*, *performen* and OF *parfournir*, ‘to finish, accomplish’. But the English word was probably influenced by L. *performare*, ‘to form thoroughly’.

narrative, but as it evolves, is still uncompleted, we do not know how this narrative will end. What will this child be, we may ask, when he / she has become a grown-up person? We do not know, actually, though we may have some wishes, hopes, fears, or expectations.

“Aristotle most definitely holds that the chicken comes before the egg.” It does so in thought, in time and in substance. One cannot have a conception of a potentiality without already having a conception of the actuality; the reverse is not the case. At the level of the individual, the potential, the egg, must indeed precede the actual, the chicken, but this is according to Aristotle, a relatively trivial fact. We have here to do with the *substantial* priority of the actual which Aristotle defends in terms of the equation of actuality with form and thus with the principle and cause of a thing’s being, and the equation of potentiality with matter.”²⁸ In other words: Actuality is ‘prior’ to potentiality. One reason why it is so is that the *account* of the actuality is prior to that of the potentiality; the ‘knowledge’ of the former is prior to the account of the latter. That which is in actuality is produced from that which is in potentiality by the agency of something that is in actuality; and (drawing on his ideas of substances) every output of a production is produced from something, as something and by something. Whenever something *is* being produced, some part of it must always *have been* produced ... whenever something is undergoing some process, some part of it must already have undergone the process [*Meta.*1049b]

But there are also, according to Aristotle, *substantial* reasons why the actual has priority in respect of potentiality. One is that things posterior *in production* have formal / substantial priority. “A man has formal / substantial priority over a boy, and a human being has formal / substantial priority over a sperm. And the reason for this is that the man / human being already has its form, whereas the boy / sperm does not.” An other reason is that every output of a production *progresses* towards a principle, towards an end. “A principle is something for whose sake something else is, and an end is something for whose sake the a production occurs. But the end is the *actuality*, and it is for the sake of this actuality-end that the potentiality is brought in.” [*Meta.* 1050a]

We have now approached the idea of *substance*, essence / existence (*ousia*), a recurrent topic of discourse in the philosophy of Aristotle. In general terms substance refers to that which

²⁸ Lawson-Tancred in op. cit.. p. 272.

is not said *of* a subject or not present *in* a subject, but the subject *per se*, i.e. something that can be attributed qualities, which *is* such and such, a being. A particular man or a particular horse is, for certain, substance in this sense (this is admitted in *Categories*), but in *Metaphysics* it is used primordially with respect to species (*eidōs*). Substance, Aristotle contends in Book *Zeta*, is primarily ‘the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing’ of a thing, or, what amounts to maintaining the same, a species (*eidōs*) of a genus (*genos*).²⁹ Tracking his way of reasoning in broad steps:

“We began this discussion by distinguishing the various criteria by which we define substance. One of these we took to be the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing for something, and it is time that we took a look at this ... the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing is, for each thing, what it is taken to be per se ... the same sort of thing as a thing with thisness ... [Meta. 1029b]... [and as such it] only belongs to those things for whom an account just is a definition ... So the only things that will have a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing will be the species of a genus, species and nothing else whatever ... [Meta. 1030a] ... the particular thing itself and the what-it-was-to-be that-thing are non-accidentally one and the same, ... [and] knowledge of some particular thing is constituted by knowledge of the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing... [Meta. 1031b]... Our conclusion is as follows: with things that are primary and spoken of per se, the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing and the thing itself are one and the same.” [Meta.1032a]

As summarizes Tancred-Lawson in his Introduction to *Metaphysics*:

“the substances that underpin the world are not particular individuals, e.g. Socrates and Red Rum (as they are admittedly in *Categories*), but the species man and horse ...” (Aristotle 1968, p.xxv) What constitutes substance are some essential features, what Aristotle calls ‘thisness’, what “a thing has by dint of being determinate in a particular kind of way”. Tancred-Lawson: “If we are deciding, say, on the purchase of a pet dog, I can point to a breed in the catalogue and say, ‘I like this one’. ... my preference is clear. I am not indicating a predilection for the particular dog of the illustration, but for the no less determinate species to which it belongs.” (Ibid., p. xxxii) Species are entities unitary in a certain way, their

²⁹ As says Peters (1967, p. 150): To call an individual tree ‘an oak’ is more revelatory of what it is than to call it a ‘plant’.” And to stick to this example of the oak tree: it is an example of substance as *eidōs*, ‘the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing’ of an acorn.

essences exhausting their nature. Hence, Aristotle is equating the species to which an entity belongs with the form that is an ingredient in the composite nature of that entity. And if form is to be equated with species (they are often referred to by the same word in Greek, *eidōs*), then form is also to be equated with substance, its definable essence. (Ibid., p. xxxiii-xlvvii)

Substance is ‘form’, but substance and form are in fact also ‘actuality’, Aristotle maintains. And, as he emphasizes, actuality has substantial priority over potentiality: “one actuality always has priority over another, going back to that which always, and in a primary way, initiates process.” [Meta.1050b] And this has implications concerning both cause and discovery: Discovery takes place by the bringing of the things that are in potentiality to actuality. “And the cause consists in the fact that the thinking involved is the actuality. It is from the actuality that the potentiality is recognized ... ” [Meta.1051a] Substance is immanent form brought to the fore (or made apparent) in the course of a process of change, it is ‘the immanent formal cause residing in compound beings’.³⁰

“The claim that the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing of something is its substance is a classic piece of metaphysical reasoning”, remarks Tancred Lawson. (Op. cit., p. xxx) “It is deeply obscure and it is wholly natural to dismiss it, as many have done, as a piece of meaningless and scholastic mumbo-jumbo, a mere exercise in juggling with a barbarous and oppressive terminology. And yet it retains its fascination, such that all attempts to kill it off seem only to lead to its recrudescence. But let us begin with its obscurity. What if anything, does the phrase the ‘what-it-was-to-be-that-thing’ of something mean? This is a translation of an equally puzzling expression in Aristotle’s Greek, which could be translated just as ‘what it was to be’. It is as unnatural in Greek as it is in English ... The expression has been extensively analysed, but the key to its meaning seems to lie in the puzzling past tense embedded in it ... and it suggests the idea of what something was all along going to, destined to, become. Although Aristotle would have been aghast at almost everything written by the

³⁰ According to Aristotle there are basically four ways in which one thing can cause another. “It can be its cause by providing the form that it realizes, by being the matter from which it is made, by being the source of the process that leads to its coming to be or by being that for the sake of which the thing is produced.” Lawson-Tancred, op. cit., p.11. While the first refers to substance / essence (*ousia*), the second refers to matter / substrate (*hylē*), the third to that from which come the beginning of some change, and the fourth to the ‘wherefore’ (*telos*).

German Romantic philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, his only objection to that thinker's celebrated injunction 'to become what you are' would be that it is superfluous. It is the destiny of everything to become what it is, and it is that which it was all along destined to be that it most really is. The medieval philosophers coined the term *essentia* to pick out this key idea, and its value has secured its survival into the vernaculars of modern Europe."

Conclusion and implications:

1. Substance, potentiality and actuality, concern the unity of things as things. Hence these notions would also apply to individual human beings, a child, a youngster, a grown-up person.
2. Assuming that the Child in his / her process of growing up demonstrates what Aristotle meant by substance—and that growing up can be described (if not defined) in terms of potentiality / actuality— amounts to saying that growing up is also *kinesis* and *energeia*. It can be looked upon as a process, a motion or proceeding towards some not yet achieved goal (which ceases when the elements of the process 'have reached their natural place'). But as a 'be-coming' in this sense, it is also a demonstrated capacity to change, an example of *dynamis*, which (following Aristotle) cannot be defined but only illustrated by example or analogy. As a proceeding from potentiality to actuality, growing up is an actualization of one's potentialities, in-born or acquired, acquired through practice (doing) and / or by study ('skills').
3. What is actualized is a specific and immanent form: the *eidos* of an adult person. Substance merges with form to become 'formal cause'. In the vein of Aristotle's reasoning, growing up means 'becoming what you are', potentially, if not actually: a grown-up man or woman (demonstrating, presumably, a certain character, or 'personality').
4. While, following Aristotle, the Child *is* its own potentialities, the Adult is so only so far as his / her potentialities have been actualized.

Growing up is 'being on the move' and 'being at work', or, more precisely, on the move through being at work (in function or operation); as such it is also 'per-formance', a

manifestation of form, character, a certain personality. This possible explication of growing up is illustrated in Fig. 2:1a. What is brought to the fore, and which is the starting point for any (from hindsight) account of this process of growth, is a certain *eidos*, that of a grown-up human being (a man or a woman).

In such a scheme of actuality and potentialities is it possible to insert Child as ‘substance’: ‘what is was to be that thing of human being’, that means an Adult person, the *eidos* of a grown-up man or woman. This is illustrated in Fig. 2:1b. The Child, that little creature, was to become *that* particular man or woman. What-it-was-to-be-that-ting of human being, his / her character, we know, from hindsight. Alluding to recent biological thinking: the Child was ‘in-formed’, encoded to be that Adult.³¹ On the other hand: What any child as a child *is* to become in the course of its growth, we do not know. The per-formance is not completed.

This means: One cannot have a conception of the potentialities of growing up without already having a conception of its actuality, the grown-up person; the latter has substantial priority over the child and adolescent; the adolescent over the child. The notion of actualisation invites a backwards reasoning: from what *is* to what *was*, or happened in the course of a becoming. This way of backwards thinking follows if one regards any particular human being as what-it-*was*-to-be-that-thing of a thing. In other words: Growing up as motion / actualization does not tell us anything about this human being’s future, only his / her past and present. It invites an account of this person’s formation over time (or ‘life-performance’ according to some steadily uncoiling plot), but an account which starts from an actual state of being, and deducing from this state a set of in-born and acquired potentialities set in work as time passed, so to speak. But it does not inform us about this being in the future.

By way of this exercise we have got an opportunity to meet with the Ancient Greek notion of *eidos* (pl. *eide*), from which derives the word ‘idea’. According to Peters “*eidos* (in Lat.

³¹ For ‘formal’ similarities between Aristotle’s conception of change and contemporary ‘information-theory’ (e.g. the notion of DNA), see Campbell 1982. As Campbell observes, the word ‘information’ (from Lat. *informare*, to give form, to shape)—which today most often refers to news, intelligence, facts and ideas acquired and passed on as knowledge—in former times “was used also with a more active, constructive meaning, as sometimes which gives a certain form or character to matter, or to the mind; a force which shapes conduct, trains, instructs, inspires or guides.” (Op. cit., p. 15)

Species) was a well-established and fairly sophisticated term long before its canonization by Plato. Its first meaning, and the usage in Homer, is ‘what one sees’, ‘appearance’, ‘shape, normally of the body ... By the time of Herodotus *eidōs*, and its cognate *idea* that had come into use, had been broadened and abstracted into ‘characteristic property’ or ‘type’.” (Peters 1967, p. 46) Though, as demonstrated above, for Aristotle the *eidōs* is not (as in Plato) hypostasized into a separate subsistent, but a principle of complete substance. It is the formal cause of things, a correlative of matter in composite things, and the intelligible essence (*ousia*) of an existent. “*Eidōs* is, in brief, an actualization ...” (Ibid., p. 50) From a logical point of view, the *eidōs* of Aristotle is connected with ‘predication’ (i.e. statements concerning things). His conceptual *eidōs* “is the universal of predication and the subject of definition ...” (Ibid., p. 50) Its counterpart in contemporary sociology seems to be the ‘ideal social type’, as conceived of by Alfred Schütz.³²

2.3 Excursus: Entelechy—to be alive: perceive and desire

Considering substance in this way as cause—in the specific sense of ‘immanent form residing in compound beings’—it seems proper here to introduce a further of Aristotle’s key notions, that of *entelechy*. Entelechy is the guiding principle in *De Anima / The Soul*, where it stands for ‘intrinsic possession of end, completion or perfection’. As says Peters (1967, p. 57): “Although Aristotle normally uses *entelecheia* ... as a synonym for *energeia*, there is a passage in *Meta.* (1050a) that at least suggests that the two terms, though closely connected, are not perfectly identical.” They are related through the idea of the function of a capacity, its completion and fulfilment (*telos*). The state of functioning of the capacity ‘tends towards’ a state of completion, as it were. In Aristotle’s own words: “The fact is that a thing’s active function [or ‘performance’] is its end, and its actuality is its active function [‘performance’]. Hence, indeed, the very name actuality (*energeia*), has an account based in the active function, which is extended to the entelechy (*entelecheia*).” (*Meta.* 1050a)

A paramount example of entelechy is the soul. In *De Anima* Aristotle contends that soul (*psyche*) is ‘the first entelechy of a natural body which potentially has life’, i.e. any body that has organs (including plants). Hence, endowed with soul the living body is attributed ‘intrinsic possession of end, fulfilment, perfection’. As entelechy the soul is, as he says, the

³² See Chapter 8.

form of a natural body. To quote from *Anima* (412 b): “If then we must say something in general about all types of soul, it would be the first entelechy of a natural body with organs. We should not then inquire whether the soul and the body are one thing, any more than whether the wax and its imprint are, or in general whether the matter of each thing is one with that of which it is the matter.” (Aristotle 1986, p. 157)

How does this relate to the Child? If he / she is body *and* soul

(as Aristotle would maintain), it can also be attributed *entelechy*. Through its growth the child manifests such inherent possession of *telos*, which means *end*, completion, perfection: a (particular but typical) ‘form’ brought to the fore in the course a process, a ‘formal cause’ or substance.³³ The form brought forth is that of an adult person, a grown up man or woman, a male or female *eidos*.

Granting this substance of child *soul*—the first entelechy of a natural body—means: Growing up is being ‘alive’. And with being alive follow according to Aristotle the command of certain faculties of the soul, or ways of being alive: “We say that the thing is alive, if for instance, there is intellect or perception or spatial movement and rest or indeed movement connected with nourishment and growth and decay. [*De Anima*, 413a] ... the soul is the principle of these things that we have mentioned and is defined by these things, the nutritive, perceptive and intellective faculties and movement.”³⁴ [413b] Of these faculties Aristotle devotes by far most attention to perception, which he relates to thinking, imagination, and, not the least, desire, appetite, pain and pleasure: If some living things “have the perceptive faculty they also have that of desire. For desire is appetite, passion and wish ... [and] for that for which there is perception there is also pleasure and pain and the

³³ As Martin Heidegger remarks: A basic characteristic of any being is this *telos*, which does not mean goal or purpose, but end. “Here ‘end’ ... means completion in the sense of coming to fulfillment (*Vollendung*).” This is the key to understanding what Aristotle meant by *entelecheia*: “something’s holding-(or maintaining)-itself-inits-completion-(or limit).” (Heidegger 2000, p. 63)

³⁴ The faculties of the soul are presented by Aristotle as forming a clear hierarchy. As observes Tancred-Lawson in his introduction: “It is in virtue of the most basic faculty of the soul that a living thing has the ability to nourish and reproduce itself. The faculty next above this is that whereby it perceives, and that above this is the faculty whereby it thinks. If we accept imagination as closely connected with senseperception, these three faculties comprise all the activities of living things except those of spatial movement and purposive action or its motivation.” (Aristotle 1986, p. 72)

pleasant and the painful and for those for whom there are these there is also appetite, the desire for the pleasant.” [414b] In other words: “... where there is perception there is also pleasure and pain.” [413b]

Conclusion: If growing up is to be alive, it is also to perceive and to desire.

Further, according to Aristotle, desire is also inherent—by way of movement—in both thinking and imagination. In Chapter 10 he says that there seem to be two producers of movement: desire and intellect. Both these things are productive of locomotion. The latter (i.e. *nous*, ‘that whereby the soul thinks and supposes’) is that ‘which reasons for a purpose and has to do with action’. All desire is purpose directed. The point of departure for action, is the object of desire. [433a]

“Thus it is no surprise, that the two things that seem to be productive of movement are desire and practical thinking. It is because the movement started by the object of desire and that the thinking produces its movement, that which is desired being its point of departure. And even imagination, whenever it produces movement, does not do so without desire. Thus there is really one thing that produced movement, the faculty of desire.” [433a]

Both these producers of movement, desire and intellect, can be reduced, in fact, to desire. Hence, if growing up is movement in connection with intellect and imagination, its root is also in this respect desire. Desire to live, to have, to know, to find out, we may supplement Aristotle on this point.

2.4 Leibniz on ‘drive’—monads as interpreted by Heidegger

Treating any individual child in this way as substance, as a what-it-was to be that-thing of a thing—endowed with entelechy—means attributing to him / her an immanent form, brought to the fore in the course its growth, ‘an inherent formal cause residing in compound beings’. Is this a satisfactory (or sufficient) explication of growing up as ‘becoming’? For instance, what motivates this motion / actualization, keeps it going, moves it on, so to speak? Is one not obliged to look for an active element (residing in any human being) which accounts for the child’s acquiring of new (or modified) potentialities, its use of some acquired capabilities

to acquire further capabilities? To do and to learn, and to learn by doing? To walk and to talk, for instance. The questions suggest: there is in this substance of the child an embodied thrust or *drive*.

As Heidegger demonstrates in his interpretation of the monadology of Leibniz, by asking such questions—and by imputing to the growing child drive—we approach an old topic of scholastic discourse, the possible distinction between *potentia activa* and *potentia passiva*, *actus qua actio* and *actus qua forma*: act as acting and act as form (or ‘enactedness’). The distinction (attributable to among others Aquinas) reappears in Leibniz’ monadology, and here with reference to Aristotle’s notion of entelechy, i.e. the idea of inherent possession of end, fulfilment, completion.³⁵

For Leibniz ‘monad’—which derives from the Greek word *monas*, the simple, unity, the one, the individual, the solitary—means substance, emphasizes Heidegger, ‘individual substance’. (Heidegger 1984 , p. 70) As such it is ‘complete’, ‘perfect’: In the words of Leibniz (and as quoted by Heidegger): ‘it involves all its predicates, past, present, and future’. It is a subject ‘which is not in another subject, but others are in it’. ‘By substance, we can understand nothing else than the thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist’. ‘By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived by itself.’ Though: ‘... it is impossible to find the principles of a true unity in matter alone or in what is merely passive’. ‘The principle of unity is to be sought in what is itself positively unifying and thereby active’. What Leibniz is looking for (‘as positively unifying and thereby active’), he finds in the old scholastic notion of *potentia activa* as distinguished from *potentia passiva*, in act as acting in contradistinction to act as form.

In Leibniz’ monadology this *potentia activa* becomes ‘force’: Every independent being is endowed with force, he contends, and the nature of force must be understood by way of the problem of unity as it is inherent in substance (Ibid., p. 77). The concept of force or power, ‘which the Germans call *Kraft* and the French *force* ... brings the strongest light to bear on our understanding of the true concept of substance’. (Ibid., p. 79)

³⁵ What is here said of Leibniz’ monadology derives from Heidegger’s reading as presented in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, transl. by M. Heim, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1984, referred to as Heidegger 1984, p. 70-100.

Leibniz' idea of active force, seems to contain the Aristotelian notion of *entelecheia*, it is in fact defined by means of this word. It is described as midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself: it is a capability, but not a capability as rest; it implies 'to tend towards, to press or drive towards'; it implies, as Heidegger says, drive (*Drang*). With this neither a disposition, nor a process is meant, rather a taking it on, a taking it upon oneself, a setting-itself-upon. Heidegger quotes Leibniz saying that this power of acting inheres in every substance (constitutes its substantiality) and that some action always arises from it; it is productive, it leads forth, it comes out of itself and maintain the outcome in itself. (And this is a definition that applies also to 'corporeal substances'.) Every being has this character of drive and is defined, in its being, as having drive. No substance can confer its drive on other substances; it can merely impede or not impede. (Ibid., p. 83) When Leibniz defines *vis activa* with the help of entelechy, he points out that monads having in them a certain *perfectio* or completeness.

Hence the term 'power' (*vis, potentia*) has a twofold meaning, Heidegger concludes in his reading of Leibniz and the scholastics. It designates first the power to accomplish, the achieving itself, *actus* in the sense of action. The primary occasion for developing the concept of possibility stems from this phenomenon, the ability to accomplish. Power in the second sense is the capacity to undergo, to allow something to be made out of itself. Power in this sense is an aptitude (an inclination towards, a disposition, propensity, ability, or fitness). Its correlative term is *actus* in the sense of *forma*. 'Power' in this latter sense seems to be a derivate of the primary meaning of the term, 'to accomplish'. Concerning power in this second sense, to allow something to happen with itself, Heidegger emphasizes that it is dependent on some aptitude (of that which allows something to happen to itself). But the aptitude is distinct from that which is and which can come to be on the basis of the aptitude. The aptitude itself requires no actualisation. (Ibid., p. 80-1)

As Heidegger proceeds in his reading of Leibniz: "Of itself, drive characteristically leads into activity, not just occasionally, but essentially ... Drive is the impulse that in its very essence is self-propulsive. The phenomenon of drive not only brings along with it, as it were, the cause, in the sense of release, but drive is as such already released. It is triggered, however, in such a way that it is still always charged, still tensed. Drive correspondingly can be hindered in its thrust, but it is not in that case the same as a merely static capability

for acting. Removing the hindrance can nevertheless allow the thrust to become free. Drive, accordingly, needs not additional cause from outside, but on the contrary, needs only the removal of some impediment ... 'de-hindrance'." (Ibid., p. 82-3)

According to Heidegger we can find the metaphysical meaning of Leibniz' monadology only when we risk constructing essential connections and perspectives, and when we do so by following that which directed Leibniz himself. In his monadology he tries to clarify the being of beings. "Hence a paradigmatic idea of being must be obtained somewhere and it must be found where something like being manifests itself immediately ..." (Ibid., p. 85) And, if we look for this 'where: Can't our own being be a guiding clue. So it seems: One finds in Leibniz constant reference to one's own Dasein, says Heidegger, to the beingstructure and being-mode of one's own 'I'. Substance, regarded as comparable to the ego, is what provides Leibniz with the model of the 'unity' he attributes to every being. Beings are interpreted by analogy with the soul, life spirit. (Ibid., p. 85)

The ego is a unity that can be likened to an army or herd, to a pond of fish, or a watch made of springs and wheels. (Ibid., p. 86) And such a principle of activity (drive) is intelligible to us, says Heidegger, because it forms to some extent an analogue to what is intrinsic to ourselves, namely representing and striving. The definition of substance follows, first of all, by analogy with the 'I', and on account of this origin it possesses the highest degree of intelligibility. (Ibid. p. 86) It is the consideration of myself which provides me also with other metaphysical concepts. Leibniz' interpretation of beings is simply anthropomorphism, some universal animism by analogy with the 'I', Heidegger concludes:

1. If drive is supposed to confer unity insofar as it is a drive, then it must itself be simple. It must have no parts in the sense of an aggregate, a collection.
2. If substance is simply unifying, there must already be something manifold, which it unifies. For otherwise the entire problem of unification would be senseless and superfluous.
3. Inasmuch as what simply unifies is drive and only as executing drive at the same time carries within itself the manifold, the manifold must have the character of drive, must

have movement as such. But the manifold in motion must be the changeable and that which changes. (Ibid., p. 89)

4. There must be in drive itself a self-surpassing: change, alteration, movement. While drive is what itself changes in driving on; drive is also what is pressed onward.

Drive should in this way be unifying and both the origin and mode of being of the changeable. But the constitutive principle of unification must be prior to that which is subject to possible unification: “What unifies must anticipate by reaching beforehand toward something from which every manifold has already received its unity. The simply unifying must be originally in a reaching out and, as reaching out, must be *gripping in advance* in such a way that the entire manifold is already made manifold in the encircling reach.” (Ibid. p. 90) What unifies in this sense antecedently surpasses that which it unifies in its own developing. Drive is reaching out, is gripping.

How can drive—as modelled on the ego—be reaching out and gripping? Leibniz suggests: through a constant pre-hending, apprehending, *perceptio*, ‘a pre-unifying of the manifold in the simple’, and through *appetitus*, appetite, a tendency to overcome any momentary stage, an inclination towards transition. (Ibid., p. 91-2) And, in this way, as Heidegger says in his interpretation of Leibniz:

Drive becomes the nature of a being, the essence of substance.

Drive is primordially unifying; it is not unifying thanks to that which it unifies. It is not a conglomeration of what is unified. It is reaching out and grasping, through apprehension, *perceptio*.

But in this *percipere* [from Latin ‘to take’, ‘to grasp’] it comprises, and is oriented towards, a manifold which is itself already involved in drive and originates from it.

It is self-surpassing in its pressing on. It is a multiplicity of phases which are themselves always pre-hending.

Of its very nature, drive presses out to something; there is a selfsurpassing in it; it is *appetitus*, internal and constant tendency to change.

Drive is a *progressus perceptionum*. (Ibid., p. 94)

“In prehensive unifying there is a possession of unity in advance to which drive looks, as prehending and tending toward transition. In drive as prehending appetite there is a ‘point’, as it were, upon which attention is directed in advance. This point is the unity itself from which drive unifies. This attention point or point of view, view-point, is constitutive for drive. What is in advance apprehended in this viewpoint is also that which regulates in advance the entire drive itself. Insofar as drive as prehensive motion is always what is prehended in advance in the motion’s free moving, the drive is not pushed extrinsically. Perceptio and appetites are therefore determined in their drive primarily from the viewpoint.” (Ibid., p. 94-5)

As Heidegger remarks, in this way it refers back to Aristotle: his ideas of the basic faculty of *perception* and its implied *desire*.

Hence, what has drive—ego, Dasein, the monad—“traverses itself and is in a way open to itself. And it is open by its very essence. Because this dimensional self-openness, what has drive can therefore grasp its own self, can thus, in addition to perceiving, present itself at the same time along with perception.” (Ibid., p. 95)

Inasmuch as it unifies each monad individuates itself. And this is its essence. Yet in individuation—in the drive from its particular perspective—the monad unifies the universe prehended in advance, only according the possibility of this perspective. Each monad is this in itself a *mundus concentratus*. Every drive concentrates in itself, in its driving, the world in each case after its own fashion. (Ibid., p. 96)

This implies that the world belongs in each case to the monad in a ‘perspectival’ refraction. In every monad the whole universe is potentially present. The individuation, which takes place in drive as unifying, is always the individuating of a being that belongs to the world. Monads are not isolated pieces producing the world by their addition, but each monad, as drive, is, in its own way, the universe itself. Each presents the world from a viewpoint. (Ibid.,

p. 96-7) Each monad is, according to its particular level of awareness, a world-history making the world present. So, the universe is, in a certain sense, multiplied by as many times as there are monads, just as the same city is variously represented by each of the various situations of individual observers. The monad is a living mirror of the universe (Ibid., p. 97)

Fig. 2:2 presents an attempt to insert the child in such a scheme of reasoning. The Child—endowed with drive—grows by taking hold of, tending to, and desiring things of his / her physical *Umwelt*, those things or objects we usually conceive of as constituting ‘reality’. To be in the process of growing up is to take possession of, seize, stretch, extend oneself, direct one’s course, aim at, strive—by virtue of *perceptio* and *appetitus*. The child is monad, ‘a living mirror of the universe’.

By way of Heidegger’s explication of Leibniz’ monadology—the monad and the structure of its constituent, drive—it is possible to relate the growing child to the ‘world’, a pivotal topic of his own philosophy, and notably that of his teacher Husserl. Because this notion of world seems to be there, if not spelled out. As Heidegger says in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: “Leibniz already had in view, in a certain sense, this peculiar phenomenon of the world, but without fixing it as such. He says that every being, in its possibility, reflects the universe of beings in conformity with the various degrees of wakefulness of its representing.

Each monad, each individual being for itself, is characterized by representing, the possibility of mirroring the whole of the world. The monads need no window: they have the intrinsic possibility of cognising the world.³⁶ However great may be the difficulties of his monadology— principally because he embedded his genuine intuition in traditional ontology—nevertheless in his idea of the monad’s representation something positive must be seen that has hitherto hardly been worked out in philosophy.” (Heidegger 1982, p. 174-5)

³⁶ Or, as Heidegger observes further on with reference to Leibniz’ well-known proposition that the monads have no windows (Heidegger 1982, p. 300): They have no windows because they need none, have no need to look outside themselves as their possession suffices for them. Each monad is representational, as such in diverse degrees of wakefulness.

2.5 Intentionality

What has been treated as substance in the course of this interpretation of growing up as becoming—been ascribed ‘formal cause residing in complex beings’ and drive, and likened to this endlessly striving and gripping creature of the monad, which ‘represents to itself the universe of all beings’—is the child or adolescent, an individual human being ‘on the move’ which actualizes and demonstrates in the course of this move certain potentialities (in-born or acquired). Isn’t there a further possible, but perhaps more ready-hand designation of such an entity or being? Turning to the idiom of the 20th century phenomenology of E. Husserl and his followers: Cannot it be said that we here deal with ‘a human being and acting subject conscious of things in the accompanying environment’, intent on various objects in the *Umwelt*, and thus in a sense having—and continuously appropriating this things in the course of its growth. If so, it would be possible it seems to arrive at a third possible interpretation of the child as substance: a creature demonstrating the characteristics of what phenomenologists call intentionality.

Intentionality, in the sense of ‘being conscious of’, bent on something, tending to, intent on this thing (understood as ‘anything whatever’) is a dictum of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. As such it refers to ‘an immediate seeing’ (or ‘knowing’) and enters as the main constituent of what he called *the life-world*. In *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, Husserl describes intentionality as the “peculiarity of mental processes to ‘be consciousness of something’ ... a perceiving is a perceiving of something, perhaps a physical thing; a judging is a judging of a predicatively formed affair-complex; valuing of a predicatively formed value-complex; a wishing predicatively formed wish-complex; and so forth ...”³⁷ (Husserl 1983, p. 200)

As Heidegger tells us in *History of the Concept of Time*³⁸, the word ‘intentionality’ derives from *intentio*, a Scholastic expression which translates *directing itself toward*. The notion was introduced in European psychology and philosophy by Husserl’s teacher, Franz

³⁷ The concept of intentionality, “... as we have apprehended it, is a wholly indispensable fundamental concept which is the starting point at the beginning of phenomenology.” (Ibid. , p. 202)

³⁸ M. Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, transl. By T. Kiesel. Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1985. (Heidegger 1985)

Brentano. According to Brentano "each lived experience directs itself toward something in a way which varies according to the distinctive character of the experience." (Heidegger 1985, p. 22) This is his thesis of 'intentional in-existence', a point of view for treatment of psychic phenomena Brentano maintained was held already by Aristotle: In each lived experience 'in-heres' something 'objective'. (Ibid., p. 22)

Psychic comportment, which Brentano divides into representation, judgement and interest, love, emotion, always implies *directedness towards particular objects*. Representing is the foundational kind of such comportment. We can speak of a representing wherever something appears, wherever something is simply given and the simply given is perceived. "Representing in the broadest sense is the simple having of something." Every psychic phenomenon it itself either a representation or is based upon representation. This representing forms the basis of judging just as it does of desiring and every other psychic act. "Nothing can be judged, but also nothing can be desired, nothing can be hoped or feared, if it is not represented. Hence the simple having of something assumes the function of a basic comportment. Judging and taking an interest are possible only if something is represented, which gets judged, in which interest is taken." (Ibid., p. 22-3) Brentano discerned in intentionality, this directedness, the very structure which constitutes the true nature of a psychic phenomenon. Intentionality became for him the criterion for the distinction of psychic from physical phenomena.³⁹ (Ibid., p. 27) It was through Brentano that Husserl learned to see intentionality (Ibid., p. 28) Adopting the reasoning of Brentano: Intentionality is the structure of lived experiences as such. "Every lived experience, every psychic comportment, directs itself toward something. Representing is a representing of something, recalling is a recalling of something, judging is judging about something, presuming, expecting, hoping, loving, hating—of something." (Ibid., p. 29) It is not such that a perception first becomes intentional by having something physical enter into relation with the psychic, and "that it would no longer be intentional if this reality did not exist. It is rather the case that perception, correct or deceptive, is in itself intentional." (Ibid., p. 31) A perception is intrinsically intentional, regardless of whether the perceived is in reality at

³⁹ As says Heidegger, with Brentano, a completely new movement was initiated in psychology and philosophy, a movement which already had an effect upon American psychology at that time, upon William James, who gained influence in Germany and all of Europe, and from James back upon Henri Bergson, whose theory of the immediate data of consciousness goes back to the ideas of Brentano's psychology. (Ibid., p. 23)

hand or not. This is because perception as such is directing-itself-toward something. It is because intentionality constitutes the very structure of comportment itself, that there can be anything like deceptive perception and hallucination. Psychic comportment is in its very structure directing-itself-toward; the very being of comporting is a directing-itself-toward.⁴⁰ (Ibid., 31) The comportments of life are acts: perception, judgment, love, hate ... But what does ‘act’ mean here? Not activity, process, or some kind of power. “No, act simply means intentional relation. Acts refer to those lived experiences which have the character of intentionality.” (Ibid., p. 36)

By intentionality is not meant an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward. (Ibid., p. 37)

The perceived in the strict sense for phenomenology is not the perceived entity but the perceived entity as it is perceived, *as* it shows itself in concrete perception. (Ibid., p. 40)

Being-perceived and the structure of ‘perceivedness’ consequently belong to perceiving as such, i.e. to intentionality. (Ibid., p. 40)

For every *intentio* there is an *intentum*: an intended entity as intended, and ‘the how of its being intended’. Or, to use the terms preferred by Husserl: for every *noesis* there is a *noema*. Intentionality is constituted as a reciprocal belonging together of *noesis* and *noema*, *intentio* and *intentum*. (Ibid., p. 46)

Assuming that this kind of intrinsic togetherness also holds for the relationship between any subject and object: Why does a subject (as a perceiver) ‘require’ an object (as something perceived), and conversely? “Plainly, of course, only because what they mean does the requiring,” Heidegger says.⁴¹ (1988, p. 156). An object as something standing-overagainst,

⁴⁰ “What makes us usually blind to intentionality”, says Heidegger, “is the presumption that what we have here is a theory of the relation between physical and psychic, whereas what is really exhibited is simply a structure of the psychic itself. Whether that toward which representing directs itself is a real material thing or merely something fancied ... the first thing to see is this directing-itself-toward as such.” (Ibid., p. 35-6)

⁴¹ From M. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, transl. by A. Hofstadter. Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press 1988. (Heidegger 1988)

always stands-over-against a subject, *for* a perceiver. But is every being necessarily an object? Must natural events be objects for a subject in order to be what they are?" Plainly not. An entity becomes an object only in being objectified by a subject. A being is without a subject, but objects *exist* only for a subject that does the objectifying; the relating belongs to the ontological constitution of the subject itself. To relate itself is implicit in the concept of the subject. The subject is a being that relates-itself to. It is why that this essential determination of relating-itself-to, intentionality, can be thought of as a constituent of the subject. Its relation to an object is not something occasionally joined to it on the basis of a contingent presence at hand of an object. Intentionality belongs to the existence of the subject, of what Heidegger calls Dasein. To exist means, among other things, "to be as comporting with beings ... It belongs to the nature of the Dasein to exist in such a way that it is always already with other beings." (Heidegger 1988, p. 157) In other words (and without entering further into Heidegger's existential philosophy): The Dasein must be with things. The directedness of these comportments expresses a being *with* that *with which* we have to do, a dwelling-*with*, a going-along-*with* the givens (Ibid. p. 161). As Heidegger says: Being-in-the-world is an essential structure of the Dasein's being. (Heidegger 1982, p. 169)

If intentionality, as this intrinsic togetherness, in a most general sense is to be conceived of as a 'representing' or 'having', the ability of consciousness to entertain and hold before itself objects, there are for sure many different ways of 'having objects'. "There is *perceiving*, with is correlatively meant perceptual world; there is *imagining* and *supposing*, with their correlatively intended worlds; there is *remembering*; and there are all the various imperfectly distinguished *affective* ways of having objects (moods, emotions, feelings, evaluations)".⁴² (Edie 1976, p. 1)

Hence, the law of intentionality dictates that all experience is *experience of something*. Intentionality distinguishes conscious processes from all other kinds of processes in that they are always having objects. Since we have no access to being-in-itself except through the *phenomenon of being*, all being is objectified and endowed with a meaning and value responsive to our theoretical and practical aims, needs, interests, goals, intentions, desires. (Ibid., p. 7) Intentionality, in this phenomenological sense (developed by Husserl), is

⁴² J.E. Edie, *Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenology of Language*. Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1976

constitutive of the ever-experienced horizon of all the objectifying acts of consciousness, the experienced coherence of all the objects presented in a given ‘regional ontology’, perception, imagination, affectivity, embodiment, will, reason (Eidie 1976, p. 8)

How does that relate to growing up and the Child, assuming that he / he is a conscious human and acting subject, intent on the objects of its surroundings, the *Umwelt*, bent on it, as it were. Then growing up necessarily implies experiencing, apprehending, finding out, uncovering, disclosing, discovering a world, through acts of consciousness: perceiving, imagining, supposing, remembering and affective ways of directing oneself, which according to Husserl all are acts of worldconstitution. The world of the Child (as well as any individual human being) is constituted by way of this being ‘conscious of’, intentionality. This is illustrated in Fig. 2:3. Intentionality—this directedness towards, which means ‘being conscious of’—connects the Child to the various things encountered in his / her *Umwelt*; every its comportment of ‘being conscious of’ is a ‘representing-having’ of some object. But, as will be developed in the following chapter, according to Husserl this representing-having is always associated with an act of ascribing to these things significance and meaning. This holds not only for perceiving, but also all other ways of having objects: imagining, remembering, supposing (as well as moods, emotions, feelings, evaluations). The significance and meaning bestowed on objects are their *noemata* (or *intenta*): the intended entities *as* intended, or ‘their *how* of being intended’. In other words: the things of the *Umwelt* are always encountered as mediated by some *noemata* (*intenta*).

And, is it not such that this intentionality, constituting any human being, also constitutes this being as *substance*? If so, this means, to apply Aristotle’s criteria of substance: it makes it ‘what it is taken to be *per se*’, ‘a thing with *thisness*’, ‘something for whom an account just is a definition’, a thing which is ‘non-accidentally one and the same’. Paraphrasing Aristotle: Knowledge of this thing is constituted by knowledge of the what-it-is-that-thing of a thing: a being-cum-world.

And, if, in respect of growing up, substance, what-it-was-to-be-that thing of being, with some modifications translates into monad, an entity with ‘intrinsic possibility of cognizing the world’, it seems that this monad easily translates into ‘consciousness of’, a being intent on a world, attuned to a world. What Heidegger said of the monad can equally well be said of the Child (as any other consciousness human being): Is has no window, have no need for

window; as open to the surrounding world by virtue of perception and desire (*perceptio* and *appetitus*), this being *is* window.

Growing up seems to imply a world—'a world of significance and meaning, of being and becoming'. But how is such a thing of world to be conceived of and related to the becoming of the child as substance—this 'what-it-was-to-be-that thing of human being', conscious and intent on things in its physical environment, and propelled by 'drive'—the child as window? The subsequent chapters attempt to answer this crucial question by consulting the writings of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

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3. Life-world—Significance and Meaning

3.1 ‘I am conscious of a world ...’

World is a pivotal theme in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. As Husserl writes in *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and the Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*⁴³, with reference to an imagined ego:

“I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in time”. This signifies: “I find it intuitively and immediately, I experience it. By my seeing, touching, and hearing, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution “are simply there for me, ‘on hand’, ... whether or not I am particularly heedful of them and busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling, or willing”. Human and other animate beings are there for me too: “I look up; I see them; I hear their approach; I grasp their hands; talking with them I understand immediately what they objectivate and think, what feelings stir them, what they wish or will.” They are present in my field of intuition even when I do not heed them. But they are not necessarily found directly in my field of perception. “Along with the ones now perceived, other actual objects are there for me as determinate, as more or less well known, without being themselves perceived or, indeed, present in any other mode of intuition I can let my attention wander away ... out through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back ... to all the Objects I directly ‘know of’ as being there and here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness—a ‘knowing of them’ which involves no conceptual thinking and which changes into a clear intuition only with the advertence of attention, and even then only partially and for the most part very imperfectly.” (Husserl 1982, p. 51-2)

But not even with this domain of the *co-present*—which can be intuitively clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct—is this world exhausted, Husserl continues. In the manner peculiar to consciousness its field of order reaches into the unlimited. What is now perceived is penetrated and surrounded “by an *obscurely intended to horizon of indeterminate actuality*.” Sending regards of attention into this horizon, determining presentations—“obscure at first and then becoming alive”—haul something out for me. Through a chain of

⁴³ Hereafter referred to as *Ideas I*.

quasi-memories, the sphere of determinateness becomes wider and wider, perhaps so wide that a connection is made with my field of actual perception, my *central* surroundings. (Ibid., p. 52)

What holds for the world as existing in the order of the spatial present also holds for its *order in the sequence of time*. “This world, on hand for me now and manifestly in every waking Now, has its two-sidedly infinite temporal horizon, its known and unknown, immediately living and lifeless past and future. ... I can change my standpoint in space and time, turn my regard in this at that direction, forwards and backwards in time; I can always obtain new perceptions and presentations, more or less clear and more or less rich in content.” (Ibid., p. 52)

“In my waking consciousness I find myself in this manner at all times, and without being able to alter this fact.” My world remains one and the same, though changing with respect to its contents. “It is continually 'on hand' for me and I am a member of it.” This world is not only a world of mere physical things, but also one with objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I find the physical things in front of me beautiful and ugly, pleasant, agreeable and disagreeable. And physical things are there as objects of use. This applies not only to ‘mere physical things’, but also to humans and brute animals. They are my ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’, my ‘servants’ or ‘superiors’, ‘strangers’ or ‘relatives’. (Ibid., p. 53)

All that which holds for me, holds (as I know) for all other human beings present in my surrounding world. Experiencing them as human beings, I understand and accept each of them as an Ego-subject, and as related to his or her natural surrounding world. I take their surrounding world and mine as one and the same, a world of which we all are conscious, only in different modes. Each of us has a place from which to see the physical things present; accordingly, for each of us the fields of actual perception, actual memory, etc. are different (leaving aside the fact that we approach common objects of consciousness in different modes, different manners of apprehension, and different degrees of clarity). “For all that, we come to an understanding with our fellow human beings and in common with them posit an Objective spatiotemporal actuality as *our factually existent surrounding world to which we ourselves nonetheless belong*.” (Ibid., p. 56)

This is essentially Husserl's idea of *Lebenswelt*, or life-world, introduced in *Ideas I* (the first German edition of which was published in 1913), developed in *Experience and Judgment*, and reappearing as a central theme of Husserl's last work from the 1930s, *Crisis of European Sciences*.⁴⁴

Pivotal in Husserl's conceptualisation of the life-world is, as illustrated in the quoted passages, consciousness and intentionality, mundaneness and familiarity. As says Gurwitsch in his account of Husserl's way of making use of these notions: "At any waking moment of life, ... we live in a world which we accept as actually existing. Being awake means, simply having consciousness of the surrounding world and of oneself as situated in this region, circumscribed in a more or less indefinite way by the world which constitutes the environment of the conscious subject.": (Gurwitsch 1974b, p. 170) In these surroundings, we are presented with a great variety of objects, in relation to which we are not merely spectators. Usually we exist in a concrete situation in which we act, where the specific surroundings represent problems of a practical nature that have to be solved. This state of affairs is formed by the objects used or acted upon, looked upon in the light of their function in the given situation and the role they play in it. "The familiar objects of the surrounding world are not defined by what they are but *by the way in which they serve*, i.e. by what can be done with them." (Ibid., p. 171) The life-world, or *Lebenswelt*, is the world as it is encountered in everyday life and given in direct and immediate everyday experience—especially perceptual experience but also its derivatives, memory, expectation, and the like—and as such it is independent of and prior to any scientific interpretation. (Gurwitsch 1974a, p. 3) At every moment in our life, we find ourselves in this world of common everyday experience. We have a certain familiarity with it; with this world we pursue all our goals and carry out all our activities. As the universal scene of our life, "the soil, so to speak, in which all human activities, productions, and creations are cultivated, this world of common experience is the foundation of the latter as well as of whatever may result from them." (Ibid., p.3)

This chapter will highlight crucial moments of this philosophy of the life-world with the aim of suggesting further theoretical 'interpretants' of the process of growing up. It will rely to a large extent on explications offered by Gurwitsch. But other commentators, as well as

⁴⁴ Published posthumously in German in 1954, English translation 1970.

Husserl himself, will also be consulted in the course of the presentation of seemingly pertinent aspects.

3.2 Man is his own situation: Culture

Husserl stressed that among the things and objects encountered in the world of common experience, there are those essentially characterized by human significance in a pre-eminent sense: tools, instruments, utensils of every description, works of art, literary documents, objects of cultural value. Such objects refer to their having been produced and their being for use of human individuals. (Gurwitsch 1974a, p. 6) Man is encountered within the life-world *as inserted into it, among other human beings and a wide range of artefacts*. Consequently, one of Husserl's main concerns was the constitution of the cultural world—a world made of men by men [read: of men and women by women and men] in the various forms of their mutual cooperation and on whose objects sense and meaning are bestowed by virtue of intellectual and mental functions. In this sense his investigations pertain to a philosophy of culture rather than to a philosophy of human existence, as that term has come to be understood.⁴⁵ (. p. 7)

Man is to be considered with regard to his conduct in his environment, especially as confronted with his fellow men, and where he is confronted with certain situations of vital importance, situations in which he has to make decisions, to assume responsibilities, and to enter into communities. (Ibid., 7-8)

Man is planning his future and living towards it in his multifarious endeavours to realize his projects, on the scene of committed life (Ibid., 8)

Man is born into a certain cultural group whose language he speaks and whose interpretations of and outlook on the world has a matter of course. He lives in a particular society at a given period of its history. In this society he occupies a particular place, either

⁴⁵ “What in *Crisis* Husserl came to denote as the life-world has also been dealt with by writers, both German and French, whom it has become customary to classify as ‘existentialists’, namely Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.” (Ibid., p. 4) These writers ‘existentialism’, or ‘philosophy of human existence’, is “not so much an exploration of the life-world as it is a *philosophical anthropology* whose theoretical procedures have to a considerable extent been borrowed from Husserlian phenomenology” (Ibid., p. 9)

assigned to him by birth, as in a society of rigid social stratification, or defined by his profession, function, wealth, influence, etc. (Ibid., 8)

What are at issue here, concludes Gurwitsch, are not social and historical facts and the connections between them, but as they appear to and enter the consciousness (in whatever mode) of those whose historical and social conditions they defined and determine and who are involved in that situation: *Man (woman) is his (her) own situation*. (Ibid., 9) Every sociohistorical group has its cultural world, which appears to each of its members from a certain point of view, and from a special perspective related to that point of view. (Ibid., p. 23) Given a certain cultural world as the life-world of a socio-historical group, one has to find and lay bare the acts of consciousness, which (in their systematic concatenation and intertexture) make this specific world possible as their correlate.⁴⁶ (Ibid., p. 24)

The life-world can be defined thus as comprising all items and objects as they present themselves in pre-scientific experience. Though the things encountered are not adequately and certainly not completely characterized when they are described in terms of their primary and secondary qualities only. Things present themselves as suitable and serviceable for certain purposes, to be manipulated and handled in certain ways, as instruments and utensils, with reference to actions to be performed or performable on them. As Gurwitsch notes, we here meet as part of the life-world Heidegger's notion of equipment (*Zeug*) and 'readiness-to-hand (or 'availability'). And this equipment appears in the light of schemes of apperception and apprehension which belong to what Alfred Schutz, another of Husserl's pupils, termed the 'stock of knowledge at hand', and which comprises a set of more or less loosely connected rules and maxims of behaviour in typical situations, recipes for handling things or certain types so as to attain typical results.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ As Gurwitsch remarks, in this respect one cannot avoid the question whether the main, and perhaps, only task of philosophy consists in understanding and accounting for the various cultural worlds which have made their appearance in history. (Ibid., p. 24) Though whatever differences may obtain among the several cultural worlds and particular forms of conscious life, the task arises of setting forth and elucidating the universal structures of consciousness, which makes possible *any* cultural world. (Ibid., p. 25)

⁴⁷ See Schutz 1964, p. 123 ff.

The individual's stock of knowledge, in all its stratifications and as available within certain limits, is at any moment an element of his / her biographical situation. It forms the unquestionably given background and the basis for the definition and mastery of the surrounding worlds of nature, culture, as society—articulated as different zones of reach. The elements composing this 'stock of knowledge at hand' are socially approved and socially derived. Certain modes of conduct are tacitly and as a matter of course accepted and taken for granted as behaviour appropriate and, in this sense, 'natural' in typical situations. (Ibid., p. 19) The stock of knowledge at hand is socially derived, because only a comparatively small part of it originates in the personal experience of the individual, the bulk is transmitted to him by his parents, teachers, other persons in authority and by all kinds of associates. (Ibid., p. 20) The schemes of apperception and apprehension—inherent in this stock of knowledge at hand—play a determining role in and for perception; they contribute essentially toward making the things encountered such as they appear in perceptual experience; the things perceived present themselves as defined by the purpose they serve. Life-world is a world interpreted, apperceived, and apprehended in a specific way, it is a cultural world, one of a certain socio-historical group (Ibid., p. 20) We do not encounter our perceptual world as the same for all human beings and all socio-historical groups, we are confronted with *our* life-world, a world apperceived, apprehended and interpreted in a specific way. (Ibid., p. 22)

3.3 Experiences are interpreted experiences

In his respect Husserl emphasizes that the cultural sense of any instrument, or utensil, a machine, a garden, a building, a work of art, a literary document etc., is not externally attached to it as a mere corporeal thing. Rather its *sense* is incorporated into, impressed (*eingedruckt*) on, the object, and this proves to be a character proper to it. In this way, all cultural objects (as defined by the sense embodied and embedded in them) refer to mental life, to plans, projects, designs, intentions, and the life of makers and users. (Gurwitsch 1974a, p. 20)

Though this 'world of things' has priority with respect to the cultural world: the cultural world presupposes the thing-world as a *substratum*. It rises by virtue of specific acts of a 'higher order', which are founded on acts of 'pure' perceptual experience. (Ibid., p.21)

Hence, the phenomenological account of cultural objects takes its departure from the thing-world and traverses a path of abstraction. But in this way, we do not encounter *the* ‘perceptual world’, but a world apperceived, apprehended, and interpreted in a specific way. Experiences are ‘interpreted experiences’. (Ibid. p. 22)

Is it possible—Husserl asks—to establish a body of truths valid for all subjects, truths about which normal Westerners, normal Hindus, normal Chinese, can agree, all relativities and divergencies notwithstanding? In his attempt to answer this question, Husserl points to the possible universal and invariant structure exhibited by every life-world: spatial shapes, types, endurance in time, change (that can be faster or slower), and so on. (Ibid., p. 26) Every thing is encountered, he says, within a perceptual environment, a *horizon*, which is not delimited by fixed boundaries but continues indefinitely in both space and time. This spatiotemporal horizon defines the universal form of the perceptual world, an invariant structure of every life-world and cultural world (Ibid., p. 27) Things and their environments are subject to changes. Though there are also regularities, such as the alternation of day and night, the sequence of seasons, as well as causal connections in such regularities. (Ibid., p. 27) In other words: Is there an invariant categorical structure, or constitution, of the perceptual world?

That it is reasonable to take for granted such a *natiürlicher Weltbegriff* seems to be Husserl’s conclusion in *Crisis*. In the everyday surrounding world of life, where we are existing, as being here and there, as the egosubjects experiencing it, contemplating and valuing it, there are ‘presentifications’, and modifications of presentifications, that make us conscious of the modalities of time, e.g. not only that which *is-itself* there, but also that which *was-itself*-there, or that which *will-be-itself*-there. (Husserl, 1970, p. 104-5) Further, everything that exhibits itself in the lifeworld as a concrete thing obviously has a bodily character, even if it is not a mere body, even if it also has psychic or otherwise spiritual properties. The world can be looked upon as the universe of things, which are distributed within the world-form of space-time, and which are ‘positional’ in a spatial as well as a temporal sense (Ibid., p. 142)

The life-world is already there, existing in advance for us, as the ‘ground’ of all praxis. It is pre-given to us—the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects—not

occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as *horizon*. (Ibid., p.142-3)

The spatio-temporality of the world belongs to the world's ontic meaning as life-world. As Husserl says in *Crisis*: “The world exists as a temporal, a spatiotemporal, world in which each thing has its bodily extension and duration and, again in respect to these, its position in universal time and in space.” Perception is related only to the present. “But this present is always meant as having an endless past behind it and an open future before it.” (Husserl 1970, p. 160) Though, we soon see that this analysis presupposes in principle that of perception as the original manner of being conscious of the past, Husserl continues. Considering perception abstractly, by itself, “we find its intentional accomplishment to be presentation, making something present: the object gives itself as ‘there’.” (Ibid., p. 160) A focus on the world of perception gives us therefore, as far as the world is concerned, only the temporal mode of the present. But this mode itself points to its horizons, the temporal modes of past and future.⁴⁸ Recollection, the act of recalling in mind, remembering, exercises the function of forming the past, a present which has passed. Likewise, in expectation, or ‘anticipatory recollection’, understood as an intentional modification of perception, is found the meaning-formation of the future, a ‘present-to-come’.⁴⁹

3.4 Acts of Consciousness

For Husserl each object in this surrounding world—be it a physical thing, tool, value, work of art, historical fact, social institution—is accessible to us only by means of certain acts of consciousness. In these acts, which we are actually experiencing or which we can experience, “the objects presents itself from one side, now from another, now under one aspect, now under a different one; now we are consciousness of it in one way, now in

⁴⁸ The ‘now’, constituted through perception, is, however according to Husserl a ‘flowing-static’ present; it has a horizon with two structured sides, ‘known in intentional language as a continuum of retentions and protentions’. (Husserl 1970, p. 168, see also Husserl 1964, *passim*)

⁴⁹ This, in fact Augustinian, way of understanding ‘present’, ‘past’, and ‘future’, developed in *The Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness* (Husserl 1964), represents, in the words of Husserl, ‘the beginnings of new dimensions of temporalization, or time and time content’. It is through such an all-inclusive, universal synthesis which constituting the world that past, present and future come together synthetically into the unity of one time. (Husserl 1970, p. 168-9)

another.” It is through progressively experiencing these acts and coming back to those already lived through by connecting them with present experiences, that we successively grasp the moments, attributes, and properties, which pertain to the object and make up the unity of its nature. “This unity corresponds to and depends on the harmonious agreement among experiences, and it is in virtue of this unity that all those partial experiences join to form the whole experience of the object in question.” (Gurwitsch 1974c, p. 191)

It is by means of specific experiences relative to other objects and especially through meditations on these experiences that we are entitled to posit the object and bestow a determinate nature on it; “there is no access to any object except through the acts relating to it and in which its being is disclosed. An object can come under consideration only to the extent that it can be apprehended and insofar as its figures in these acts of apprehension.” (Ibid., p. 192)

This conception is not infected with subjectivism, Gurwitsch emphasizes. “One is justified in distinguishing between the subjective appearance and the being-in-itself of an object or in substituting ... the ‘true reality’ of an object for the object as it appears to our senses. Yet this objective reality refers us to the acts in which it is constituted, such being the acts into which the experience of the subjective appearance is integrated as a partial and one-sided experience ...” Following Husserl, it is perceptual experiences which serve as the basis for those constructive acts by which the physical object is conceived, “a construction guided by the perceptual experience such that the physical object qua object of a higher order is fashioned.”⁵⁰ (Ibid., p.192) As it is in acts of consciousness that the object unfolds and discloses itself, we may regard the object as the correlate of a group of acts, as *the equivalent of consciousness* of the object.⁵¹ (Ibid., 192) To conceive of the object as the correlative of acts, it is not reduce it to consciousness. “...what is grasped in any such act is not an aspect, a side, or any part of the object but, rather, the whole object appearing in a determinate way.”⁵² (Ibid., p. 193)

⁵⁰ Ref. *Ideas I* §§ 40 & 52.

⁵¹ Ref. *Ideas I*, p. 422.

⁵² Ref. *Ideas I*, p. 383.

The object appears before consciousness without being part of consciousness; the acts relating to it do not include it as an inherent part; the object remains identical over and against the many acts which relate to it; in all these acts the identity of the object is sensed and experienced. (Ibid., p. 194) But acts must or should be experienced in order for the object to exist and to be such as it presents itself. When one looks at a physical thing from the front, one may not know how it will present itself from the back. What is certain, however, is the fact that the thing may be seen from that side, and that the contribution of such acts will complete that or our present perception. The manifold of acts which relates to one and the same object are internally related: it forms an order, an organization, even a hierarchy. As supporting each other the acts form a system, which has a well-determined structure of its own and is regulated by a principle of unity. (Ibid., p. 196)

Since objects are constituted in conscious life, they depend on it in the sense that they need conscious acts to confer the nature, specific being, and veritable existence on them, and also in that they are to be regarded of the objective correlates of such acts.⁵³ (Ibid., p. 203) Consciousness, on the contrary, depends on no region of objective being, since it does not presuppose the existence of the universe of physical things. A dissolution of this universe is conceivable, provided that it would affect neither the existence of physical things as identical unities standing opposite the manifold acts pertaining to them, *even though the objective world qua constituted is in need of an actual and possible consciousness*, since its existence is only an existence for the consciousness constitutive of it. (Ibid., p. 204) Consciousness presupposes nothing, which exists apart from it; it owes its sense of being to nothing other than itself. (Ibid., p. 205) Though consciousness is not to be taken as part of the real world and as one reality among others. As Gurwitsch writes: “We have a right to characterize consciousness as absolute only to the extent that we conceive of it exclusively as a medium and, so to speak, as the theatre in which the constitution of all sorts of objects—including psychical and human realities, such as the soul, the mind, ego, the personality, our social and historical being, etc.—takes place.” (Ibid., p. 206)

We have here arrived at Husserl’s much discussed ‘phenomenological reduction’ (*epoché*), a radical modification of attitude, as Gurwitsch says, a suspending and parenthesising of the existential character of the entire world and of any objects belonging to every ideal region.

⁵³ Ref. *Ideas I*, § 47.

(Ibid., p. 206) Consciousness becomes manifest as a self-enclosed region of being which nothing can enter and from which nothing can escape. It appears as a domain, which is first in itself and prior to any other region.⁵⁴ (Ibid., p. 208) Though consciousness is then not taken as a totality or real psychical facts and events; it is rather, viewed from the standpoint whereby objects stand in front of, and exist for it. It is in and by conscious acts that objects are constituted such as they are for conscious life. (Ibid., p. 208) Hence, while consciousness depends on no region of objective being, according to Husserl *world* presupposes consciousness; it is constituted through acts of consciousness, ‘experiencing’. This is a corollary of the central dictum of his transcendental phenomenology, that of *intentionality*. Being conscious is ‘being conscious of ...’, bent on things tending to, intent on these things (understood as ‘anything whatever’). It is through acts of consciousness—intentionality—and through such acts alone, that what we deal with is given and presented and thus become accessible to us. In the case of the life-world and whatever it comprises, the acts in question pertain to perceptual consciousness in both its ordinary and derivative modes.⁵⁵ (Gurwitsch 1974a, p. 10)

Neither could one speak of somatic existence, Husserl contends, if it were not for acts of consciousness, acts through which we become aware of our being embodied in general and of particular postures, motions, motor tendencies and the like ... acts of consciousness are in play in all our conduct—in our doings, involvements, commitments, hopes, fears, actions and projects. (Gurwitsch 1974a, p. 12) The life-world and all that it comprises, man as a mundane existent, all his modes of existing and conducting himself in the life-world, reveal themselves as correlates of acts and operations of consciousness, and of multifarious concatenations, syntheses, and systematic organizations of those acts and operations. (Ibid., p. 13)

3.5 Noesis– noema–object

Husserl’s theory of intentionality is founded on his distinction between the *content* and the *object* of any act of consciousness, and his focus on the former, rather than the latter, as the determinant of an act’s intentionality. In the words of Smith & McIntyre: “... the object of

⁵⁴ Ref. *Ideas I*, p. 152.

⁵⁵ Ref. *Ideas I* § 99.

an act is distinguished from the act itself; not itself a part or constituent of the act, it is that toward which the act is directed. Additionally, the act's content is distinguished from its object: the *content (Inhalt)* of an act is that *in* the act that *accounts for* the act's being directed toward, or being of or about, its object; the content incorporates the internal (psychological and / or phenomenological) structure of the act in virtue of which the act is directed in a certain way. The distinction paves the way for a 'mediatortheory' of intentionality: *through* the content, the act is directed toward the object."⁵⁶ (Smith & McIntyre 1982a, p. 108-9)

The principle of Husserl's understanding of intentionality is thus that an act is directed toward its object 'by virtue of' its content. In *Logical Investigations* this content is taken to be an 'essence', a species or type ('the *intentional essence* of the act'). The intentionality of an act is its property of having a certain intentional 'quality' and presenting a certain sort of object. And it is this property which defines the intentional essence of the act *qua* intentional experience ("the intentional essence of my seeing of a black crow is simply the phenomenological type of the experience, its property of being a seeing of a black crow"). To say that an act is intentional 'by virtue of' its content is to say that the act's being intentional consists in its having a certain intentional essence or type. The relation of an act to its intentional content is that of *exemplification*⁵⁷; an act exemplifies, or instantiates, its intentional essence or type, its intentional content. (Ibid., p. 141) In *Ideas I* Husserl proposes a different entity to play this role of intentional content. "There is no reason to suppose he has ceased to believe an act has an intentional essence, or type, but he no longer simply identifies an act's intentional content with its intentional essence. The ideal content he now calls the act's *noema*, and he conceives it as a kind of meaning, a kind of abstract particular rather than an experience type."⁵⁸ (Ibid., p. 142) Though, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter it seems that Husserl in *Experience and Judgment* returned to the possibility of making types constitutive of such 'abstract particulars'. They form parts of the process of concept formation.

⁵⁶ Here Smith & McIntyre refer to Kasimir Twardowski' *On the Content and Object of Presentations* (Twardowsky 1977), which Husserl was thoroughly familiar with, but also criticised as being 'too psychological'.

⁵⁷ Italics L.A.

⁵⁸ Ref. *Ideas I*, § 88.

Summarizing Husserl's way of conceiving the relation between these components Smith & McIntyre say that the act *entertains* its *noema*, and specifically its meaning, or *Sinn*. "Further, a *Sinn* bears a characteristic relation to an object (to at most one existing object), inasmuch as it is the *Sinn*'s intrinsic nature to 'point to', to 'represent', to 'present' that object; let us say a *Sinn* *prescribes* an object." (Ibid., p. 143) The intentional relation of an act to object can thus be described as the composition of, in fact, two relations, the relation of act, or *noesis*, to *Sinn* (the 'entertaining' relation), and the relation of *Sinn* to object (the 'prescribing' relation):

An act intends (i.e. is directed toward, or is intentionally related to) an object if and only if the act (or its *noesis*) 'entertains' a certain noematic *Sinn*; it is that *Sinn* which 'prescribes' that object.

In this way, the noematic *Sinn* *mediates* the intention, and the act is directed toward its object 'by virtue of' its *Sinn* ('sense' or 'meaning'). (Ibid., p. 143)

Fig 3:1. See attachment. *Noesis, noema* and object: E. Husserl's understanding of Intentionality as 'state of being conscious of'.

This mediating function of the *noema*, and its simultaneous entertaining relation to the *noesis* and prescribing relation to the object in respect of perception is illustrated in Fig. 3:1. The relation between the perceiving subject (carrying out the noetic act) and the object as it is perceived is that of intentionality, 'a being conscious of'. Though, how is exactly this middle term of 'noema' to be understood? And what does this 'to be conscious of' actually mean?

All would agree, maintains Dreyfus, "that the perceptual noema is the intentional correlate of perceptual consciousness: it is neither a (*real*) physical object, nor a (*reell*) momentary act of consciousness, but rather a meaning, an ideal entity correlated with every act of perception, whether the object intended in that act exists or not." (Dreyfus 1972, p. 135)

Attempts have been made to translate this term of Husserl into other terms. While, for instance, Dagfinn Føllesdal seems to interpret the perceptual noema as a 'concept', Aron Gurwitsch takes it to be rather a 'percept', Dreyfus observes. Føllesdal traces the

development of the perceptual noema back to Husserl's adoption of Frege's distinction of sense and reference. Accordingly the perceptual noema becomes an 'abstract entity, in virtue of which an act of perception is directed toward its object'. The noema itself is never sensuously given but (as Woodruff Smith & Robert McIntyre also say) 'entertained' in a special act of reflection, i.e. the phenomenological reduction. (Ibid., p. 136) Gurwitsch, on the other hand, Dreyfus continues, has attempted to explicate Husserl's notion of the perceptual noema in terms of Gestalt theory. The perceptual noema is a concrete sensuous appearance, through which the object of perception is presented: it becomes interpreted as a 'Gestalt-contexture', the constituents of which are given in direct sense experience. "This noema is not, in a strict sense, perceived, since only a physical object can be perceived. It is, however, perceptually given and can be thematized in a special act of attending to the perceptual object." This is Gurwitsch's version of the phenomenological reduction, which in fact proposes to advance and further Husserl's view. It is taken for granted in the works of among others Schutz and Fink, "and it emerges, transformed into a criticism of Husserl, in the writings of Merleau-Ponty". (Ibid., p. 136-7)

Føllesdal presents his interpretations as a set of theses based on textual evidence from mainly Husserl's *Ideas I*: Noemata are abstract entities, Føllesdal concludes. Noemata are not perceived through our senses.⁵⁹ This view is not clearly expressed in any of Husserl's published writings. It is, however, "an immediate consequence of the thesis that noemata are abstract entities." Noemata are known through a special reflection, the phenomenological reflection, 'through the grasping of a Sinn' (Ibid., p. 685). This, in turn, follows from Husserl's linguistic approach to all acts of consciousness, his explication of intentionality in terms of significance and meaning: Objects as perceived talk to us ('signify')—by virtue of their mediating noemata—and as they talk to us they also can be attributed meaning, they can tell us something about themselves (in our own language).⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Føllesdal 1969, p. 684.

⁶⁰ As Husserl writes in *Ideas I*: "Originally, these words ['signifying' and 'signification', *Bedeuten* and *Bedeutung*] concerned only the linguistic sphere, that of 'expressing'. But one can scarcely avoid and, at the same time, take an important step, extending the signification of these words and suitably modifying them so that they can find application of a certain kind to the whole noetic-noematic sphere: thus application to all acts, be they now combined with expressive acts or not. Thus we have continued to speak of 'sense' (*Sinn*) in the case of all intensive mental processes—a word which is used in general as equivalent to 'signification'. For the sake of distinctness we shall prefer the term *signification* for the old concept and, in particular, in the complex

This linguistic (or ‘semiotic’) interpretation of the noema in Husserl’s writings—which seemingly makes it equivalent to a ‘concept’—is purportedly evidenced and commented upon by Smith & McIntyre. “Husserl’s metaphor of ‘giving meaning’ is to be taken quite literally: The meaning ‘given’ the uttered expression in a speech act *is* just the noematic Sinn of the ‘meaning-giving’ act that ‘underlies’ the speech act. In that underlying act—as in acts of consciousness generally—we intend a certain object or state of affairs.” (Smith & McIntyre 1982b, p 84) Hence we do not live in the acts, which constitute the expression as a physical object; we live in the meaning-giving acts: we are exclusively turned toward the objective appearing in these acts; we aim at it, we mean it. (Ibid. p. 84, based on *Logical Investigations* V, § 19)

As linguistic meanings hence are themselves noematic *Sinne* expressed, Husserl takes the noematic *Sinne* of acts and the linguistic meanings expressed in language to be same kind of entities. “But the main argument for identifying noematic *Sinne* with linguistic meanings lies with the thesis that the noematic *Sinne* of any act is in principle expressible in language.” (Ibid., p. 86)

For Gurwitsch the noema is more properly conceived of with reference to our perceptive attentiveness to the objects in our environment: “At every moment of conscious life, we find ourselves within the perceptual world, amidst things and objects of greatest diversity”, he reminds us in *Field of Consciousness* (Gurwitsch 1969, p. 161)⁶¹. “(N)atural objects as well as objects of value or cultural objects, inanimate things as well as animals, fellow-men to whom we are standing in various relationships. All these object, things, and animate beings appear and are accepted as real existents, pertaining to the *real* world encompassing all existents including ourselves.” With the sole exception of radical philosophical reflection, we simply accept this existential character with which the perceptual world and its constituents present themselves. (Op. Cit., p. 161) Although this existential belief is not permanently stated and formulated—and the existential character of the things and beings

locution of ‘logical’ or ‘expressive’ *signification*. We shall continue to use the word *sense* as before in the most all-inclusive range.” (Husserl 1982, p. 294) In other words: Every noematic act-sense is ‘conceptually’ stamped on the noematic correlate of the expressing. (Ibid., p. 295).

⁶¹ French edition 1957.

encountered is not always disengaged, rendered explicit, and posited— this belief is involved in all our activities, in an implicit and inarticulate form. (Op. cit., p. 160)

The required phenomenology of perception must begin with the thing perceived, exactly as it stands before the experiencing subject's mind in the mode of presentation in which it actually appears through perception. "The ultimate goal is to account for the objective real thing in subjective terms, in terms of perceptions and perceptual noema." (Ibid., p. 168)

Hence, according to Gurwitsch, Husserl's noema is a *perceptual noema*, and to be understood as "the perceived material thing as it presents itself through a given act of perception, in a particular manner of presentation." As this presentation is necessarily one-sided, the perceptual noema is the material thing perceived from a given stand-point, in a determinate orientation with regard to the perceiving subject, under a certain aspect. However, the perception implies references to aspects under which the thing might further appear, but under which it does not appear through the perception at the time being." (Ibid., p. 173) The noema can therefore be defined as "*the perceived thing exactly and exclusively as standing before the experiencing subject's consciousness through a particular act of perception.*" (Ibid., p. 174)

The perceptual noema is to be distinguished from the act of perception, which is a psychological event occurring at a certain moment in phenomenal time. Through each of a series of single perceptual acts, not only is the same thing given, but the thing also appears in the same manner of one-sidedness. A multiplicity of perceptual acts thus corresponds to one identical noema. Hence the latter cannot be identified with any of the multiple acts. Further, "whatever the relationship between an act of perception and the corresponding perceptual noema, the noema must not be taken for a part, element, or moment, that is, a real constituent of the act." If it were a real constituent of the act of perception, "it would involve all of its changes, appearing and disappearing simultaneously with the act of perception as the whole of which it is part." There would thus be as many noemata as there are perceptions of a certain kind. "In reality the same thing appears in the same manner of presentation through each one of the perceptions under discussion. All these perceptions agree in the mentioned respect. That to which a multiplicity of perceptions agree, cannot be a real constituent of any member of that multiplicity." (Ibid., p. 174)

The perceptual noema is neither identical with the perceived real thing. The real thing may possess properties and attributes which play no role in the one-sided presentation of the thing through a given perceptions. Assertions concerning the perceived thing as something really existing may thus be true, but false with respect to a certain noema. This holds despite the relationship between noema and thing, between on the one hand side the perceived thing as it actually appears through a given perception, and, on the other hand, the self-same perceived thing as it really is. "Through all these perceptions, the perceived thing presents itself as identically the same. Though the corresponding noemata may considerably differ from one another, still they refer to the same perceived material thing. Consequently, the thing cannot be identified with any *single* perceptual noema." Two multiplicities must be distinguished from one another, Gurwitsch emphasizes. On the one hand, the multiplicity of perceptions through which the identical thing appears under varying aspects; these perceptions differ from one another by their perceptual 'content', their corresponding noemata. On the other hand, an indefinite multiplicity of acts of perceptions, correspond to each single noema. Undoubtedly though, the acts of the latter multiplicity also refer to the perceived thing as real existent, "namely by virtue of the relationship between the noema which as identically the same corresponds to all the multiple acts in questions, and the thing perceived." (Ibid., 175) Gurwitsch' conclusion: the perceptual noema belongs neither to the domain of real objective things and events, nor to that of acts of consciousness, the psychological domain. (Ibid., p. 175)

While talking about the perceptual noema as 'the perceived as such' which must be taken exactly as it presents itself, Gurwitsch maintains, Husserl in fact defines the perceptual noema as a sense, signification, or meaning of perceptions (*Wahrnehmungssinn*). One is directed towards the thing perceived, has it in view, apprehends it, or, as one also can put it, "intends the thing in the special and privileged mode of perceptual and self-presentational apprehension." With regard to the appearance of the perceived thing in a specific and particular manner of presentation, the perceiving subject experiences a specific and determinate act of perceptual apprehension. "Sense, signification, and meaning do not denote real features or real constituents of the act of perception, but, on the contrary, an objective ideal unit, similar to the case of meanings of symbols." (Ibid., p. 176)

Usually the term meaning is confined to meanings of symbols, Gurwitsch admits. But he maintains that this use of the term in a broader sense is justified not only by his

characterization of perception as intentional act, but also by the arguments Husserl sets forth to establish meaning (in the narrower and proper sense) as an objective ideal entity applying to perceptual noemata as well. “In fact, our distinction between the perceptual noema and an indefinite multiplicity of perceptual acts corresponding the same perceptual noema, follows closely Husserl’s confrontation of the identical meaning of a proposition with the multiple acts of thinking, judging, and formulating, through which the meaning of the proposition is apprehended. The multiple acts may be experienced by the same person at different moment of time, or by several persons at either the same or different moments of time. By means of a specific act of logical reflection, which the subject is at every moment free to perform, the identity and the objectivity of the meaning may be rendered explicit and disengaged. It must be stressed that the objectivity and identity of meanings is disclosed, but not brought about, by logical reflection.” On the other hand, when distinguishing between perceptual noema and perceived thing, he points out the possibility of a plurality of perceptual noema which all refer to the same thing (the different presentations of the thing, when it is seen from different stand-points), he maintains he is in fact generalizing Husserl’s reasoning. (Ibid., p. 176-7)

The perceptual noema thus emerges as “an ideal unit with neither spatial nor temporal determinations, uninvolved in any causal relations; it pertains to the realm of meanings in the enlarged sense, a realm within which meanings in the more narrow or proper sense form a special domain.” (Ibid., p. 180)

Gurwitsch’s interpretation appears at first sight not to be compatible with that of Føllesdal, Dreyfus remarks, as the latter maintains that the noemata cannot be perceived through our senses, ‘they are abstract entities’. Though Gurwitsch, and those who believe that the noema is a sort of ostensible object—apparent but not necessarily ‘real’—would agree that this entity does not have the properties of a physical object but rather those of ‘a view of the object’. When Gurwitsch does contend that ‘the perceptual noema is sensuously given’, this does not mean that ‘the Sinn of the noema’ is perceived. Presumably he would agree that the Sinn is not perceived, such as it is contended by Husserl when he calls the Sinn ‘an abstract components in the perceptual noema’. Further: “Noemata are indeed known through a special reflection, but whether this is a special reflection on a conceptual entity, or whether it is a special way of regarding a perceptual object so as to describe only what is given in a particular act of perception, is unclear.” The main difference between the two interpretations

seems to be that for Føllesdal “the noema is given only in a special act of abstract reflection turned away from the object presented and toward the sense we give that presentation, whereas for Gurwitsch the noema is the object of presentation itself attended to in a special way so as to notice exactly what is presented.” (Op. cit., footnote 10, p. 129-30.)

Gurwitsch found that Gestalt psychologists had been at work describing ‘whatever is given to consciousness just as it presents itself in its phenomenal nature’, and set as his goal to ‘further certain phenomenological problems with the help of Gestalt-theoretical theses’. (Ibid., p. 151) According to the Gestalt psychologists and Gurwitsch what is presented in perception is ‘an incarnate form’. Gurwitsch introduced this perceptual gestalt, ‘the sense of what is experienced’ as a development of what Husserl calls the *Anschauungssinn* (‘the interpretive sense’). ‘Sense’ here does not refer to the meaning of a sign, but are to be understood as an ‘intuition’ (*Anschauung*). The perceptual noema is identified with this ‘intuitive sense’. As by ‘noema’ Husserl means the intentional correlate of any act, it follows that the perceptual noema must be a perceptual sense, the intentional correlated of an act of perception. Gurwitsch thus identifies Husserl’s perceptual noema with his own notion of a ‘percept’ or ‘perceptual gestalt’. (Ibid., p. 153) Gurwitsch agrees with Husserl that the noema is ‘what is intended’, but “his interest in Gestalt theory leads him to conclude that the noema is ‘the object *as* it is intended’ rather than the What of the intending. Thus Gurwitsch collapses the object *as referred to* with the *reference to the object*”, Dreyfus concludes. (Ibid. p. 155)

From the noema as ‘percept’, or ‘perceptual gestalt’, it is not a far cry to noema as *eidōs*, a certain characteristic and striking form, a type. According to Husserl, Gurwitsch observes, every thing perceived is encountered in the light of a certain typicality, “it presents itself as a thing of a certain kind or type which, however, is delineated and determined in a more or less schematic way—more correctly stated, along more or less generic lines. What is indeterminate is the special and concrete manner in which the type is realized.” (Gurwitsch 1974d) This observation is compatible with the description of the noema as ‘form’ offered by Føllesdal when comparing Husserl’s understanding of intentionality with that of Brentano: What happens when we experience and perceive, according to Husserl, is that some object impinges causally upon our sense organs. We then have some (what Husserl called) *hylé*, or ‘sense data’. These hyle are ‘animated’ by the meaning-bestowing *noesis*. “The noesis informs the hyle so as to give us an act that is directed towards the appropriate

object.” (Føllesdal 1982a, p. 40) Husserl in this way compared our sensory experiences to Aristotelian matter, Føllesdal notes, “which was not some object perceived, according to Aristotle, but nevertheless plays a role in our perception.” (Ibid., p. 41) What corresponds to Aristotle’s ‘form’, or *morphe*, is the noema. Granted that the noema is the ‘form’ of the matter (*hylé*), “the noesis is the informing part of consciousness, while the hylé is the boundary conditions which limit the range of noemata that we can have in a given case of perception.”⁶² (Ibid. p. 41).

As a matter of fact the notion of *eidōs*, or type, occurs recurrently in Husserl’s analysis of concept formation. In *Experience and Judgment* he states, concerning the contemplative perception of any object, that the object is taken as a whole. But in its apprehension it “is present from the first with a character of familiarity; it is apprehended as an object of a type already known in some way or other, even in a vague generality.” (Husserl 1973, p. 104-5) And, as he says, “the contemplation becomes a penetrating contemplation in which the perceptual interest is directed toward those ‘quiddities’, which are specially striking and characteristic.” (Ibid., p. 124)

The type, or *eidōs*, constitutes the ideality of concepts, and it enters as an element any concept formation, we are told. The universal in individually determined objects “appears as something standing out *in* them, as a concept dwelling in them.” (Ibid., p. 328) Yet, to every concept there belongs an infinite extension of ‘purely possible particulars’. (Ibid., p. 329) Concept formation founded on perception of such particulars requires likeness. “The possibility of the formation of general objectivities, of ‘concepts’, extends as far as there are associative syntheses of likeness. On this rests the universality of the operation of the formation of concepts; everything which, in some way or another, is objectively constituted in actuality or possibility, as an object of actual experience or of imagination, can occur as a term in relations of comparison and be conceived through the activity of eidetic identification and subsumption under a universal.” (Ibid., p. 329)

⁶² Or, as Føllesdal says in “Husserl’s Theory of Perception”: “The noesis ‘informs’ the hyle, so that this multitude of visual, tactile, and other data is united into a set of appearances of one object.” Evidently the term ‘inform’ is here used in its old sense of ‘giving form to’, a form which can be more or less perspicuous or notable to the perceiver. (Føllesdal 1982b, p. 93).

“The concept in its ideality must be understood as something objective which has a *purely ideal* being, a being which does not presuppose the actual existence of corresponding particulars. And if *there are* actual particulars, others like ones can just as well be taken in their place.”(Ibid., p. 329)

“All the concepts of natural life bring with them, without harm to their ideality, the composition of an empirical sphere in which they have the place of their possible realization in particulars. If we speak of animals, plants, cities, houses, and so on, we intend therewith in advance *things of the world* and in fact the world of our actual, real experience ... accordingly, we think of these concepts as *actual* generalities, that is, as bound to this world.” (Ibid., p. 330)

“The factual world of experience is experienced as a typified world. Things are experienced as trees, bushes, animals, snakes, birds; specifically as pine, linden, lilac, dog, viper, swallow, sparrow, and so on.

The table is characterized as being familiar and yet new. What is given in experience as a new individual is first known in terms of what has been genuinely perceived; it calls to mind the like (the similar). But what is apprehended according to type also has a horizon of possible experience with corresponding prescriptions of familiarity and has, therefore, types of attributes not yet experienced but expected. When we see a dog, we immediately anticipate its additional modes of behaviour: its typical way of eating, playing, running, jumping, and so on. We do not actually see its teeth; but although we have never yet seen this dog, we know in advance how its teeth will look—not in their individual determination but according to type.” (Ibid., p. 331)

Hence, every concrete real thing has its individual attributes, though at the same time they have their typical form. (Ibid., p. 331-2) And everything apprehended according to type can lead us to the general concept of the type in which we apprehend it. (Ibid., p. 332) To the type ‘dog’, to use Husserl’s example, belongs a stock of typical attributes with an open horizon of anticipation of further such attributes. One dog is like every other in such a way that the universal has already been prescribed as characterizing all dogs. (Ibid., p. 332)

“If we were to go along in experience ... we would in the end constantly discover ever new attributes, belonging not merely to *these* dogs but to dogs *in general* and determined by the typical attributes which we have ascribed to them up to that point ... Thus empirical concepts are changed by the continual admission of new attributes but according to an empirical idea of an open, ever-to-be-corrected concept which, at the same time, contains in itself the rule of empirical belief and is founded on the progress of actual experience.” (Ibid., p. 333)

Husserl here talks about ‘the method of essential seeing’, the seeing of generalities: “...for the acquisition of pure concepts or concepts ... the universal which first comes to prominence in the empirically given must from the outset be freed from its character of contingency. The modification of an experience or imagined objectivity can turn it into an arbitrary example which receives the character of a guiding ‘model’, a point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants. It is based, therefore, on variation. In other words, for its modification in pure imagination, we let ourselves be guided by the fact taken as a model.” For this it is necessary that ever new similar images be obtained as copies, as images of the imagination, which are all concretely similar to the original image, that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that an invariant is retained as the necessary general form, without which an object such as this thing, as an example of this kind, would not be thinkable at all. “While what differentiates the variants remains indifferent to us ... this form stands out ... as an absolutely identical content, an invariable *what*, according to which all the variants coincide, *a general essence*. ... The essence proves to be that without which an object of a particular kind cannot be thought, i.e. without which the object cannot be intuitively imagined as such. This general essence is the *eidos*, the *idea* in the Platonic sense, but apprehended in its purity and free from all metaphysical interpretations, [and] therefore taken exactly as it is given to us immediately and intuitively in the vision of the idea which arises in this way. Initially, this givenness was conceived as a givenness of experience. Obviously, a mere imagining, or rather what is intuitively and objectively present in it, can serve our purpose just as well.” (Ibid., p. 340-1)

“That the *eidos* depends on a freely and arbitrarily producible multiplicity of variants attaining coincidence, on an open infinity, does not imply that an *actual* continuation is required ... On the contrary, what matters is that the variation as a process of the formation

of the variants should itself have a structure of *arbitrariness*, that the process should be accomplished in the consciousness of an arbitrary development of ... just as each object has the character of exemplary arbitrariness, so the multiplicity of variations likewise always has an arbitrary character: it is a matter of indifference what might still be jointed to it ...” (Ibid., p. 342)

It is on the groundwork of the open process of the self-constitution of variation, with the variants actually appearing in intuition, that is grounded our ‘true seeing of the universal as *eidos*’. Preceding this seeing, there is a transition from the initial *example*—which gives direction and which works as a *model*—to ever new *images*. “In this transition from image to image, from the similar to the similar, all the arbitrary particulars attain overlapping coincidence in the order of their appearance and enter, in a purely passive way, into a synthetic unity in which they all appear as modifications of one another and then as arbitrary sequences of particulars in which the same universal is isolated as an *eidos*. Only in this continuous coincidence does something which is the same come to congruence, something which henceforth can be seen purely for itself. This means that it is passively pre-constituted as such and the seeing of the *eidos* rests in the active intuitive apprehension of what is thus preconstituted—exactly as in *every* constitution of objectivities of the understanding, and especially of general objectivities.” (Ibid., p. 342-3) “The multiplicity *as such* is present to consciousness as a *plurality* and never slips completely from our grasp. Otherwise, we would not attain the *eidos* as the ideally identical.” (Ibid., p. 343)

When speaking of an essential ‘seeing’, the seeing of generalities, Husserl emphasizes, he uses the expression ‘to see’ in “the completely broad sense which implies nothing other than *the act of experiencing things oneself*, the fact of having seen things themselves, and, on the basis of this self-seeing, of having similarity before one’s eyes ... This does not mean a *sensuous* seeing ... but the extension of the expression ‘seeing’ ... This is a seeing resulting from the actively comparative overlapping of congruence ... an intuitive apprehension of communalities and generalities, through where a pure *eidos* is to be seen as an *a priori* ...” (Ibid., p. 348)

There exists a hierarchical structure in the order of empirical generalities, rising from lower generalities to those ever higher, Husserl observes. (Ibid., p. 356) “The higher generalities are obtained by variation of ideas. This implies that the seeing of ideas is itself an analogue

of simple experience ... [And] the idea seen is called seen here because it is not intended or mentioned vaguely and indirectly by means of empty symbols or words but is precisely apprehended directly and in itself.” (Ibid., p. 359)

As demonstrated, when coping with such forms, or types, Husserl even likens the perceptual noema to an image (*Bild*): The tendency directed toward the one and identical object which presents itself in all its appearances also aims at transforming this something in the how of one mode of appearance to the same something in the how of other modes of appearance. “It aims at the ‘production’ of ever new modes of appearance, which we can also call ‘images’—a concept of image which naturally has nothing to do with illustration but one which is thoroughly customary in current speech: thus when we speak of the image which a person has of a thing, what is meant by this is precisely the way we see it, how it presents itself to us.” (Ibid., p. 83)

“In this sense, every object of external perception is given in an ‘image’, and the object is constituted in the synthetic passage from image to image, by means of which the images, as images (appearances) of the same object, come to have synthetic coincidence.” (Ibid., p. 83)

With these explications in mind, the ideogram of Fig. 3:1 can be read as follows: In the perceptive attentiveness to any object it is the *noema* that accommodates for the percept to be taken as *a certain kind* of object, a type. Doing so it at the same time imposes on the object *significance* and *meaning*. The thing perceived announces itself and speaks to the perceiver (with necessary recourse to his / her own language). ‘I am this or that kind of thing.’ The object is a sign of itself, and as presenting itself as this or that, it carries certain implications. ‘If this encountered thing is this or that, this means that ...’. Acts of *noesis*, acts of consciousness are acts of knowledge.

Conclusion: If the perceptual noema is to be understood as concept, due to its formation on perceived particulars, it is at the same time ‘percept’ and *eidos* / type. Percepts translate themselves into types / *eide*; types / *eide* translate themselves into concepts.

3.6 Inner and Outer Horizons

To any act of consciousness belongs an inner and outer horizon of the object intended. And to the analysis of the noematic *Sinn* (or meaning) bestowed on any object, there belongs an analysis of its horizon(s). In general terms, this horizon-analysis refers to the subject's other possible experiences and his / her basic conceptual scheme on the intention achieved in a particular act. These background experiences and beliefs are presupposed in the act and conceived of as having its genesis in the subject's life-history. (Smith & McIntyre 1982a, p. 227)

Once again drawing on Gurwitsch's explication in *Field of Consciousness*: Every perceptual appearance contains a nucleus consisting of what is given in direct sense-experience. "To this nucleus are attached references to what is not given in that privileged mode but nevertheless, essentially pertains to, co-constitutes, and co-determinates the perceptual appearance." (Gurwitsch 1969, p. 237) Hence, that which is given in direct sense-experience is situated within, or surrounded by, a *horizon* of greater or lesser determination. This is the *inner horizon* in Husserl's terminology. (Ibid., p. 237)

"However indeterminate and vague the perceptual inner horizon may be in a given case", continues Gurwitsch, "it is always delineated and specified along certain lines. Any indefiniteness affecting the inner horizon is bounded by, and contained within, lines of delineation and specification concerning typical and generic pattern and style." (Ibid., p. 242) This indeterminateness of the inner horizon carries some *ambiguity* concerning the *special and particular manner* in which a *certain style and type* is realized. The type is, perhaps, determined only in a more or less schematic way. Though, however ambiguous the particulars of the type in question may be, it is subject to the condition of being a *realization of this determined type*, that is, of keeping in line with the type's delineation and specification. Vagueness and indistinctness affect only the contents of a certain pattern, or framework. This pattern is defined as to certain more or less generic structural lines. "*Indefinite and vague as the contents to be comprised by a certain pattern or frame-work may be in every other respect, they are determined in that they must fit into the pattern and must conform to the structure and organization of the frame-work, to the extent to which the organizational structure of the frame-work is delineated.*" (Ibid., p. 242) Hence: the indefinite and indeterminate contents are subject to the condition of conformity with the

typical and generic specification and delineation the inner horizon presents in any given case.” (Ibid., p. 242)

The inner horizon has a noetic equivalent such that, at once with the given perception, there is experienced *expectancies and anticipations of perceptual appearances to be actualized in the future course of the process of perception*, expectancies and anticipations which are closely connected and intrinsically interwoven with the actual perception. “In accordance with the characteristics of the inner horizon, the expectancies are more or less vague and indistinct as to details of the anticipated appearances. Still those appearances are expected to conform to certain lines, generally and typically specified.” (Ibid., p. 244) The unity and identity of a material thing thus depend upon expectancies and anticipations involved in the given phase of the perceptual process and specified as to type, structure, and more or less general pattern, fulfilled in future phases of the perceptual process in the same way as such anticipations have been fulfilled in previous phases. (Ibid., p. 244-5)

“Because of the indefiniteness and indistinctness of the inner horizon, the perception to which the horizon belongs yields no clue as to the other qualities and attributes of the perceived thing which, at the moment are not given in direct sense-experience.” (‘The coastline may be a continent or an island.’) The perceiving subject has the freedom to imagine any of the possibilities as realized, and may in imagination substitute at will any possibility for any other. From a given perception, no valid reason may be derived for holding any possibility more likely than any other, although “it does not follow that all the possibilities obtaining in a given case present themselves as equally likely or unlikely.” (Ibid, p. 245)

The limits imposed upon the freedom of imagination is the delineation and specification as to type and structure which characterize the inner horizon and which confer upon it that qualification with which it plays its part in a given perception. The range itself is not undetermined, “but is defined with respect to the very specification of the inner horizon.” (Ibid., p. 247)

The term ‘outer horizon’ refers to the perceptual context enlarged beyond the perceptual field in the narrower and proper sense.⁶³ The outer horizon comprises things at the moment

⁶³ Ref. *Erfahrung und Urteil*, p. 28 ff.

not actually perceived be referred to as perceivable. They are referred to with greater or lesser distinctness and clearness as to their attributes, properties and details. “With the experience of pointing references to the outer horizon, we are at the phenomenological root and origin of the awareness we have of the world as a universal all-embracing back-ground, context, or horizon at every moment of conscious life. Whatever material object is chosen as our theme, we perceive it within that all-embracing horizon and as pertaining to the world. We are also aware of ourselves as existing within the world and being part of it, not differently in some respect and in a certain sense from a material object.” (Ibid., p. 369)

So, as say Smith & McIntyre, what Husserl calls the horizon of the object as it is intended *are the possibilities that the Sinn of a given act leaves open*, what remains indeterminate about the object as intended in the act: “This horizon we may think of as the circumscribed limits of the object’s further characterization and of its ‘constitution’ in consciousness. Corresponding to this horizon of the object as given in my perception, to what the *Sinn* of the act leaves open or unspecified about the object, it the set of *possible perceptions* that would, if they occurred, tend to complete my perceptual determination of the object.” In the words of Husserl himself, “[this indeterminacy] *points ahead* to possible perceptual multiplicities which, merging continuously into one another, join together to make up the unity of one perception in which the continuously enduring physical thing is always showing some new ‘sides’ (or else an old ‘side’ as returning) in a new series of adumbrations.”⁶⁴ These perceptions are co-directed with the original and their *Sinne* include predicate-senses that tend to complete the incomplete characterization of the object. (Smith & McIntyre 1982a, p. 229-30) In this reading of Husserl, his definition of the horizon of an act is taken to be “the set of possible acts whose *Sinne* are co-related with and compatible in its content with, but also more ‘determinate’ in content than, the *Sinn* of the given act.” (Ibid., p. 232)

3.7 ‘Functional intentionality’ and temporality

What Husserl calls intentionality is the formal expression of the subject’s property of always having an object confronting itself. At first sight this seems to mean only that consciousness is never without an object of which it is conscious. As hinted at when considering noemata, objects and horizons this consciousness is, however, at the same time

⁶⁴ Ref. *Ideas I*, p. 94.

consciousness of modes of consciousness, implied in the meaning of its objects, to use a formulation by G. Brand. And, as emphasizes this author, it is not a static consciousness of, but a dynamic process through which consciousness transcends itself. “Intentionality is not just being, but, rather functioning. That is why Husserl calls it ‘functioning intentionality’” (Brand 1967, p. 197-8) In each experience, intentionality functions simultaneously as implicit ‘pro-ject’ (*Vor-wurf*) and as ‘retro-spect’ (*Rückshau*). Consciousness is not a *tabula rasa* on which time and again new signs manifest themselves; on the contrary, *while consciousness forges ahead continually transcending new horizons, it already has consciousness behind it as well.*⁶⁵ The object is grasped in the pro-ject of its possible explanations together with the history sedimented in it. We cannot, therefore, speak simply of ‘consciousness of’ as consciousness of compact unities, the meaning of which emerges only at the moment one speaks of intentionality, while the object is grasped in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither’, consciousness-of-it turns to be the merging of many multiplicities of consciousness. (Ibid., p. 198)

“Initially the concrete real thing is merely straightforwardly self-given, grasped through one ray of consciousness; grasped already as what it is, but in such a way that its ‘quiddities’ are still wrapped up, not yet unfolded.” In our first grasp of a thing the horizon is already coperceived, but as ‘anonymous only’. As horizon is does not let itself be known immediately; the horizon lets itself be known only when, by explaining the being, we enter the horizon and it this way deliver it from its anonymity. When we are dealing with objects (in this natural attitude) the functioning intentionality is completely anonymous, it is functioning but as unknown. “When we uncover it, we deliver it from the state in which it is functioning was unknown. When this uncovering becomes a genuine explanation, intentionality is continuously further delivered from the anonymity characteristic of it as functioning, but it nonetheless remains anonymous. Functioning intentionality always transcends itself, and transcends that part of itself which is already explained and therefore delivered from anonymity, in the direction of the world in whose anonymity (as familiar foreign domain) it maintains itself.” (Brandt, op. cit., p 199) This functional intentionality, we may add, follows from the spatio-temporality of the world, which, Husserl emphasized, belongs to its ontic meaning as life-world. We live not only in the temporal mode of the

⁶⁵ Italics L.A.

present, but also a present-which-has-passed and a present-to-come; not only a worldly reality that can be perceived, but also one that can be recollected and anticipated.

The fact that every experience has its inner horizon, a fact which functions in the perception of the given, *is* intentionality itself, which functions in this perception, Brand emphasizes. The moment we recognize that the anonymous ego-like ‘doing’ [of projecting and retrospectively] that leads us towards the totality of our consciousness as world-experiencing, we recognize also that functioning intentionality is nothing but world-experiencing. “World-experiencing is anonymously functioning intentionality” (Ibid., p. 200)

In our natural life, oriented toward the world, in which we experience mundane things, and are occupied with this or that thing, we always experience beings exclusively, never ourselves as the ego that functions in its possessing of the world. The functioning of the functioning intentionality is concealed. (Ibid., 200)

What we experience is not opinions, meanings, references, insights, what we experience is being, something objective; and among these objectivities, we do not come across our functioning intentionality. However, although we do not experience things ‘as meaning(s)’, we nevertheless experience them ‘in their meaning’. “Whenever we experience an object, we experience it as what it is; and this object is what it is in the ‘whence’ and ‘whither’ of the functioning intentionality.” (Ibid., p. 201) That a being has meaning signifies that we understand it. This understanding can be made the subject matter of our investigation by thematizing the being itself. (Ibid., p. 201)

For Husserl such thematizing means explicating, disclosing, making clear, what is hidden. Because being has meaning and thus is already a possible theme, being itself, even taken in the way in which it is given in the simplest experience, always implies the demand of realizing this possibility, of delivering its meaning-horizon from anonymity. Making a being into a theme is unfolding its inner horizon. “There is no meaningless being just as there is no objectless meaning. That a being has meaning means that it is objective, given, is intuitable, but also that as such it *is* only on the basis of our functioning intentionality which gives it its ground.” This intentionality is continuously functioning, continuously self-transcending understanding in which the ego always is as world-experiencing life, in the actual movement of itself as self-alienation. (Ibid., p. 202) We do not have on the one side

simple being-a-hand and on the other an ego that bestows meaning upon it. “What *is* is being in its meaning; what is object, is objects in the tension of its property of having horizons, only on the basis of the functioning intentionality as possessing the world and as always transcending the object.” (Ibid., p. 203)

3.8 Child and Life-world—World Horizons and Language

In this scheme of the life-world the Child, this ‘what-it-was-to-be-that thing of human being’, conscious and intent on things in its physical environment and propelled by ‘drive’—the Child as window, easily finds its place. The ideogram of Fig. 3:2 is meant as a clue.

In the course of growing up the Child encounters various objects, things in its *Umwelt*. This happens in and through *noesis*, acts of perception, recollection and anticipation. The objects are experienced as mediated by *noemata*: percepts, *eide* and concepts; they are recognized as particular items (‘this or that’), as things of a certain type or kind, as things with names or designations. With names and designations follows an ability to judge, to account for things, to understand. By virtue of these *noemata* the encountered objects are bestowed significance and meaning. They present themselves with an inner and outer horizon; there are further possible aspects of the object, something beyond. In this way is constituted, by the Child and for the Child, a personal but steadily developing life-world. The world of the Child, it can be maintained with reference to Husserl’s way of understanding consciousness and intentionality, is constituted by those horizons which things in the *Umwelt* detach themselves against— and must detach themselves against—in order to speak to the Child by means of his / her own language. That means, the Child interprets, is reading, the objects / things of the physical *Umwelt* against the backdrop of these horizons. Objects are ‘things talked about’. Corollary: Acts of consciousness are acts of knowing, which means acts of saying on the part of the Child.

Fig. 3:2. See attachment. Child, *noemata*, world—*noesis*, objects, horizons.

Child, *noemata*, world. *Noesis*, objects, horizons. These are two related and essential triads involved in this attempted Husserlian approach to growing up.

Growing up into a world of objects is metaphorically speaking a ‘faring’, or progressing, compatible with the Aristotelian notions of *energeia* and *kinesis*.

Growing up as faring implies ‘experience’ (*Erfahrung*), and a temporalization (or ‘division’) of experience: what has been acquired, gained or given in the past so far through faring, what is in this faring at any present ‘experienced’, or lived through, what is at this present expected concerning the future, the present-to-come. This possible temporalization of growing up and experience—which can also be defined in terms of recollections, perceptions and anticipations, implying respectively a past, a present and a future—is illustrated in Fig. 3:3.

Fig. 3:3. See attachment. Child and World: Temporal aspects of intentionality and experience— past, present and future.

An other word for ‘experience’ is ‘knowledge’, in this perspective of the life-world knowing *that* and knowing *why*: an ability to recognize things and persons, a familiarity with everyday items and the immediate social world, a faculty to translate percepts into types / *eide*, and types / *eide* into notions or concepts, for short, command of language, mastery of designations, and meanings of designations, the usual naming of things and the common meaning of these designations as applied to things. Growing up involves languages skills, in fact it requires language skills: This is a dog, a flower, a car, a Dalmatian not a German sheepdog, a rose not a tulip, a Mercedes not a Toyota; ‘If so, that means that ...’. Experience, world horizons and language merge into ‘knowledge that’ and ‘knowledge why’. Let’s add that knowledge through saying is always *shared* knowledge, in respect of the Child it is knowledge shared with the members of his / her speech community. Actually, it seems that this fact follows with Husserl’s understanding of intentionally as ‘being conscious of’. To be ‘conscious of’ is ‘knowing’ with one-self and together with others’. In other words: Consciousness on the part of the Child (interpreted in this way as a necessarily requiring recourse to language) is always knowledge shared with the members his / her speech community.

Applying the metaphor of theatre (See Gurwitsch 1974, p. 206 and above), the Child’s sphere of consciousness would be the auditorium, while the acting area, or stage, represents his / her spheres of observed reality. ‘Objects’, which occupy the middle position between

auditorium and area of action, are what at any time is happening on the stage. As such they connect the auditorium (with spectator / audience) and the area of action. Intentionality, which in this context means ‘being conscious *of*’, is attending (together with others) this theatre where things are constituted, against some backdrop (horizons), through acts of speaking, which are at the same time acts of interpretation and understanding.

The experience, or knowledge, acquired through growing up as ‘faring,’ is a *potentiality* in the Aristotelian sense of this word, a capacity, or power, acquired through doing and / or learning, and functioning as a capacity for further doing and learning, the further assignment of significance and meaning to things. Knowledge is accumulated. For the Child, there is at any time an ‘accumulated stock of knowledge at hand’, an acquired potentiality to understand by virtue of language.

Growing up in—and into—this world of things, can also be described as a process of ‘beholding’, of coming to see, observe.⁶⁶ This beholding is imbued with a desire to see, curiosity, a drive to know. The Child—intent on things encountered—asks questions: What is this? And if this is that, what does that mean? He / she is an explorer.

Hence, growing up is a process of learning to see, driven by a desire to name what can be seen, and imputing sense to what can be seen and named. This seems to be a main implication of the dictum of intentionality adopted by Husserl and his followers, that of being bent on the things of the *Umwelt*: perceiving them, directly but also indirectly, as remembering, expecting, imagining, fantasizing, judging, fearing, desiring.

World is also Horizon, it has been said. In this respect growing up is moving into a horizon of possible structures of significance and meaning, a process associated with the development of language competence and skills. It is (as the ideogram of Fig. 3:2 is meant to suggest) a venture into something at the same time known and unknown, a world-horizon of both gained experiences (knowledge) and open (not already known) possibilities. With perceptions and recollections follow anticipations.

⁶⁶ See Dreyfuss 1991., p. 247.

This horizon of the world, the all-inclusive framework, within which objects and people, social contexts and landscapes are encountered and experienced—and within which we carry out, in terms of a spatiotemporal dimension, all our activities—emerges as the most fundamental, and yet most elusive structure of the child's (and any human being's) experience in general. As emphasizes Guiseppina Chiara Moneta, this horizon of world is not an object of experience. It is rather a presence, lived in the form of implicit awareness of something at large, an aspect of the life of consciousness functioning in a hidden and anonymous way. In order to dispel its anonymity it is necessary to reveal its function, the constitutive role it plays in the activities of consciousness founded upon it. The world horizon is an originary structure of the life of consciousness, tacitly operative within all our experiences. In order to bring to light the operation of this structure, one must lay bare its intentional sense, and to do so one must thematize that which is grounded in this structure, the experience of individual objects. The awareness of the world horizon seems to be prior to the experience of these objects. Actually, however, no priority can be claimed. Awareness of the world and the experience of objects within it are concomitant events. No experience of the particular can take place without the implicit awareness of the world horizon as a constitutive feature of that experience. This is the interlocking relation binding together the experience of the individual object and the world horizon. (Moneta 1972, p. 172)

Every civilization has its horizon. "It is precisely to this horizon of civilization that common language belongs," says Husserl in *The Origin of Geometry*. "One is conscious of civilization from the start as an immediate and mediate linguistic community. Clearly it is only through language and its far-reaching documentations, as possible communications, that the horizon of civilization can be an open and an endless one, as it always is for men." (Appendix VI in Husserl 1970, p. 358) Civilization is, for everyone whose we-horizon it is, a community of those who can reciprocally express themselves, normally in a fully understandable fashion; as a member of this community everyone can talk about what is within the surrounding world as objectively existing. "Everything has its name, or is nameable in the broadest sense, i.e. linguistically expressively. The objective world is from the start the world for all, the world which 'everyone' has a world-horizon. Its objective being presupposes men, understood as men with a common language." Hence language is related correlatively to the world, the universe of objects which is linguistically expressible in its *being* and its being *such*; world and language are in-separately intertwined, and one is always certain of their inseparable relational unity in the manner of horizon, Husserl

concludes. (Ibid., p. 359) He also emphasizes the function of written, documenting linguistic expression making communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address. (Ibid., p. 361)

This means: The Child is its own situation, inserted into a society of other human beings and occupying some place within it, endowed with certain language skills and knowledge—with access to a system of significance and meaning—but also contained in this respect due to his / her situatedness: place of birth and upbringing, class and wealth of parents, prevailing aspirations, norms and values among those socially most close to it, not to mention various mediated modes of conceiving and representing the world. Its acquired stock of knowledge at hand is socially derived and only a small part of it derives from his / her personal experience as an individual. Due to its access to a *particular* system of knowledge *that* and knowledge *why*, the Child is ‘informed’ in the sense of given form, ‘acculturated’ through its adopted, shown and specific language competence and skills. Let’s conclude this chapter with a closer look on the way Husserl conceives of the horizon of the world in relation to language.

The world as horizon enters Husserl’s explication of the intricate relations between perception and judgment, perception and knowledge, perception and experience. As Moneta summarizes her reading of *Experience and Judgment*: The pursuit of knowledge as a concrete activity of an ego-subject consists in the progressive determination of that which we try to grasp in a cognitive sense in our predicative acts of judging, or reckoning giving an account for this or that. Such judging presupposes experience of a lower order. It is rooted in, and to that extent derived from, a *pre-predicative* sphere of experience. At the same time, however, the activity of predication is ‘originary’ in the sense that it is productive of the categorical object, the object as predicated being so and such. And, says Moneta: “The autonomy of this activity resides in the fact that the ultimate object of the predicative experience as experience in the pursuit of knowledge is an object of the will.” (Moneta 1972, p. 171) But how can one account for experiences which are founded, and therefore derivative and, simultaneously, assert the spontaneity of such experiences?

The being-there of the world is passively accepted and endorsed by consciousness, Moneta continues. Thus this acceptance is not articulated in any explicit acts of consciousness; it constitutes rather an unreflective state, the intentional character of which is a *belief-in the*

world within which consciousness [read: ‘that of being conscious’] finds itself. Such belief is the most original mode of consciousness, a taking-for-granted of an existing reality, and as such it is not the result of any specific operation; it is rather a primordial response to that which consciousness encounters in a passive mode. (Ibid., p. 173) Experience of the individual object is a seizing upon, and grasping in the light of evidence borne by the act itself. The object is not only given to consciousness, but given in a certain mode that plays a constitutive role in the formation of any predicative judgment. Predicative experience is essentially perceptual experience, maintains Husserl. It is of the nature of perceptual consciousness to encounter things a self-given, and of the nature of things to appear and give themselves in ‘presence’.

There is a self-giveness pertaining to the perceptual object. The self-given object, however, is encountered by consciousness in a certain mode: a ‘how’. And it is this *mode of how* which constitutes the primary structures of predicate experience where things and people, institutions and social events, exist and present themselves as self-given. *This self-giveness is an implicit structure of these experiences.* It is through the how-things-appear that their being-there is retrieved. If we make a distinction between ‘how’ and ‘that’ in relation to objects: objects are the ‘how’ of things as they appear in consciousness. (Ibid., p. 174) And we cannot experience ‘that’ things are, without this ‘how’ in which they present themselves. The ‘how’ is the access to the ‘that’, the door which intentionality opens to the being-there of things. It is the act of consciousness ‘disclosive’ of the how of things that accounts for the experience of the object as it is intended and indirectly meant.

This experience presupposes the being-there of the object, the ‘that’ as the necessary ground and foundation of all experience. It is a foundation, however, which is not a ‘given’ of experience but rather one functioning as an implicit structure of experience. The being-there of things is not a matter of experience on the part of consciousness, but rather one of encounter. *Encounter with things is the necessary condition for the experience.* Things as self-given are prior to our apprehension of them as objects meant and intended. This level of self-giveness, as encountered in a mode of belief, can be brought to light only through the explicitly intentional level of experience, the experience of how things appear; disclosure of sense is the revelation of the foundational character of an activity of consciousness (Ibid., p. 175) An analysis of experience which aims at accounting for that experience in terms of this foundation, as well in terms of its genetic formation, must proceed by pursuing two

difference activities of conscious life: the implicit and the explicit, the ‘silent’ and the ‘vocal’.

The implicit and silent operation of consciousness can be disclosed only through the analysis of that which is founded upon it. Through this disclosure we learn that operations which function *incognito* in the life of consciousness have their roots and foundation in two of its components, an attitude of ‘that’ and one of ‘how’. The distinction between ‘that’ and the ‘how’ corresponds to two different attitudes of consciousness. Or, to put it differently: perceptual consciousness has its roots and foundation in consciousness of belief. Both modes of consciousness, of belief and perception, exemplify the implicit and explicit levels of pre-predicative experience. The experience of the object which is prior to our predicating anything about it is, as Moneta says, *the ‘discourse’ that ‘the object makes of itself’ through the particular mode in which it presents itself*—a discourse which must be distinguished from that ‘about’ this same object. (Ibid. p. 176)

The foundation of pre-predicative experience is not another experience but rather a primordial ground of our implicit awareness. Experience of the individual object presupposes, and is guided by, a ‘contemplativeperceptual’ interest directed towards what Husserl calls the inner horizon of the object’; yet it operates within it in a tacit way. This interest constitutes the implicit and un-thematized moment of the perceptual process, silently at work in the unfolding and development of the process itself. (Ibid., p. 177)

Contemplative perception is the most rudimentary form of perception: the object is grasped in a mere ‘looking-at’, without our full attention engaged in it. “It may be a mere wandering of the eye or the ear while we are pursuing, at the same time, a certain line of thought. We are referring here to a twilight zone, as it were, which defines verbal description, since it is a moment of perception known only to the senses. If we interrupt our ‘contemplation’ in order to pay full attention to that at which we are looking, there is an effort of concentration. We need to bring our lenses into focus, as it were. In doing so, our ‘looking-at’ the object becomes a ‘seeing’ in the full sense. To experience an object in the plenitude of the perceptual grasp is to make present to oneself the distinctive marks which characterize it.” (Ibid., p. 178)

Through the act of ‘holding under grasp’ there is experienced an enrichment of sense, a thematic increase of sense. The perceived object acquires a new sense, its predicative sense. The perceived object has now become the subject of predicable properties (Ibid. p. 179) The crucial element in the formation of the categorical object is the activity of keeping in one’s grasp the ‘originary’ object sense and the explication of this sense. In the predicative synthesis ‘S is p’, the object as perceived— as an ‘as’ or a ‘how’—has become the object as the subject of predicative properties, something which ‘is’—a ‘that’. (Ibid., p. 180) This new sense has been produced by the specific activity of predication. (Yet the ‘is’ at the predicative level performs the same function as the ‘as’ at the prepredicative level of experience.)

In what way is the judging consciousness in general related to consciousness of belief?
Answer: Things as self-given, prior to their being objects of experience, and prior to their being judged about, are encountered by consciousness in a mode of *belief* (as Husserl says, the *Urform* of consciousness itself).

There is according to Husserl a perpetual interest permeating the perceptual process, the productive activity of consciousness in pursuing knowledge: “To pursue knowledge is to make of the object of knowledge an object of the will. To know is to will to know.” (Ibid., 183) The commitment of the ego engaged in the cognitive pursuit consists in positing the goal of this pursuit, which is also inclusive of the future behaviour of the ego in its progress toward the attainment of that goal (Ibid., p. 183-4).

The everyday mode of our waking life is characterized by an unreflective assent to, and belief in, a world in which things, people, and social events present themselves and in reference to which we pursue our practical and theoretical aims. (Ibid., p. 184-5) ‘Thematization’ of the particular (which aims at understanding and explication) discloses the universal soil on which the experience of that particular has its roots. The natural attitude expresses the fundamental orientation of consciousness toward the world in which we live. Rather than being oriented toward the world *in* which it finds itself, consciousness is directed towards *how* it lives in that world: a world revealed by the constant as well as exclusive interest in the how of its appearing to the experiencing consciousness. (Ibid., p. 185) While in the natural attitude we are absorbed in the world, in the thematic attitude we free ourselves from this absorption and retrieve the authentic sense of the originary encounter, by laying

bare its intentional constituents. “It is only thus we can speak of experience in the phenomenological sense.” (Ibid., p. 185)

What motivates the transition from the natural to the thematic consciousness, the transition from the natural to the phenomenological standpoint? Answer: The will. The act of volition inherent in the contemplative and perceptual interest, permeates the entire range of the activity, the enduring engagement of the ego (Ibid., 186-7) Here it is possible to talk about a *drive* pertaining to perceptual consciousness which animates an open-ended process. It is this drive of will which motivates and promotes that operation of consciousness in virtue of which the object of the most originary moment of perception, the contemplative moment, is brought to the plenitude of its givenness. This volitional constituent—or drive to know—is a basic feature of pre-predicative experience permeating the acts of consciousness towards the full disclosure of the object. A volitional feature of consciousness constitutes in this way any object of knowledge (Ibid., p. 189) So, the Child in its becoming is propelled by drive to know, to understand, to explicate the things of the world, by means of language. This requires a pre-predicative belief in this world and familiarity with the encountered objects (their ‘hows’). Language belongs to world, and *vice versa*.

As summarizes Lothar Eley Husserl’s way of understanding world (in his ‘Afterwords’ to Husserl’s *Experience and Judgment*):

Given the fact that language remains in the background in determining an object, in predicating, and that the horizon of language remains mute, it is precisely this horizon, as sense of sense, which comes to be expressed in language. Language is not only elucidation and communication, but also that horizon in which sense is reflected as sense; the horizon of language remains in the background in predicating (although it remains mute), but in such a manner that it becomes a *guiding principle* in reflection. Predicating is carried out in the *horizon of language*, even though, in predicating, this horizon remains in the background; predicating is, as such, pre-linguistic; language is used only as a means of elucidation and communication. (Husserl 1973., p. 403)

The form of any judgment is apparently to be based on the world. “But in the same context ‘world’ means two things: first, the world as referential context; every experience already presupposes a worldhorizon.” But when Husserl introduces ‘the totality of objects of

experience in general' he has also introduced world in a second meaning: To World as referential context, is added world as the totality of objects of experience in general. (Ibid., p. 412)

“Cognition, action, all *cogitations*,” Eley continues, “already presuppose as a matter of course a world. This demonstrates a *third* determination of the world. And when Husserl understands original life in the world as ‘belief in the world’, the world is *fourth*, the ground of the universal passive belief in being. “ The world is appearance. (Ibid., p. 424)

But for Husserl the world is not only appearance, and as appearance a referential context: The world is rather the general thesis, already coposited in any particular thesis. How is the world already co-positing in any thesis? The world receives its determination from the horizon (of the world). The horizon of the world is what allows reference; it is the guiding principle of appearance, in that appearance is made perennial through it. “The world is a world in becoming. The horizon of the world is the horizon of language.” (Ibid., p. 425) And, we can add, it is *for* the Child in his / her becoming, when growing up, that the world as the horizon of language is becoming.

Language and the Child will be further considered in a subsequent chapter. But, first, another and supplementary approach to world and knowledge, that of Martin Heidegger.

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4. The World of Being and Becoming: Equipment—Projecting—Understanding

4.1 Introduction

‘World’ is also a pivotal notion in Martin Heidegger’s early philosophy, his ‘phenomenological analysis of Being’, presented in *Being and Time*, but also *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, an other early work of his which will be visited in this chapter.⁶⁷ World is explicated by Heidegger with reference to ‘Dasein’, the kind of Being that we are ourselves, you and me, here and there as ‘existing’.⁶⁸ The expression ‘world’ Heidegger reserves for ‘that *wherein* a factual Dasein as such can be said to *live*’. This amounts to, as he says: World is *what Dasein is not*; it is Dasein’s *mode of Being*. This is stated in *Being and Time*, Chapter III, “The Worldhood of the World”.⁶⁹ (BT 93/ 65) In the final chapter of the book he concludes: “Dasein *is* its world existingly.” (BT 416 / 364) How are these statements to be understood? And how can they be related to the Child in his / her becoming, the process of growing up?

As answers to these questions, the following slightly modified extracts from the mentioned writings of Heidegger are meant to supplement what has been said about Child and world in Chapter 3, particularly in respect of ‘knowledge’. This means, the criteria for their inclusion have been their seemingly pertinence to the process of growing up conceived of as ‘the actualization of innate and acquired potentialities’ (to speak with Aristotle). The

⁶⁷ *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*), here referred to as BT, first appeared in 1927 in the *Jahrbuch für Phenomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung*, ed. by E. Husserl and a simultaneous special printing. Page numbers will here refer to the English translation by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Oxford, UK & Cambridge, USA, 1962, as well as the Seventh German edition. *Basic Problems* (below referred to as BP) is the text of a lecture course given by Heidegger at the University of Marburg in 1927.

⁶⁸ As says Heidegger in his characteristic idiom: “For us ... the word Dasein does not designate ... the way of being of natural things. It does not designate a way of being at all, but rather a specific being which we ourselves are, the *human Dasein*. We are at every moment a Dasein. This being, like every other being, has a specific way of being. To this way of the Dasein’s being we assign the term ‘Existenz’, ‘existence’” (BP, p. 28)

⁶⁹ The derivative form ‘worldly’ he applies to “a kind of being which belongs to Dasein, never to a kind which belongs to entities present-at-hand in the world”. These latter entities are, as he says, ‘belonging to the world’ or ‘within-the-world’ (*weltzugehörig* or *innerweltlich*). They do not constitute ‘world’ as Heidegger understands this notion. (BT 93 / 64-65)

chapter will first consider Dasein's practical dealings and familiarity with things of the *Umwelt*, what Heidegger calls equipment (*Zeug*), and which carries over into signs, reference, involvement and 'worldhood'. By way of a summary of his way of conceiving world related to environment, a short note on Dasein's being with Others, and an inserted hypothetical Dasein-as-Child, it will then move on to what he looks upon as crucial issues of 'Being-in-as such', understanding, projection, interpretation, authentic and inauthentic existence, the Self and transcendence. Finally, an attempt will be made to show how his phenomenological analysis of being pertain to the Child in its becoming, its self-understanding in terms of 'I have been'—'I can be', 'I know how'—'I can do', crucial potentialities to be actualized in any process of growing up.⁷⁰

4.2 Umwelt—Equipment—Circumspection

The issue of *Being and Time* is 'being-in-the-world', and the world itself, "considered within the horizon of average everydayness, the everyday Being-in-the-world". (BT 94 / 66) Heidegger starts his analysis by considering what is closest to everyday Dasein, our *Umwelt*, environment or milieu. It is on the assumption of the 'existential character of Being-in-the-world' that his analysis takes its course towards the idea of 'worldhood' in general, the meaning of which he seeks by way of an 'ontological interpretation' of those entities within-the-environment which we encounter closest to us.⁷¹ (BT 94 / 66)

The '*Umwelt*-environment' contains in the 'environ-um' a suggestion of spatiality. "Yet the 'around' (*Umherum*) which is constitutive for the environment does not have a primarily 'spatial' meaning. The Being of those entities, which we encounter as closest to us, can be exhibited phenomenologically only if we take as a clue our *dealings in* the world, and *dealings with* entities within-the-world. (BT 95/ 67) This dealing implies "not a bare

⁷⁰ As to the rich literature commenting on Heidegger's early philosophy, I want to mention particularly Dreyfus 1991 (*Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*), which has helped my reading of his works in respect of *knowing how*, so-called 'tacit knowledge'. (See Dreyfus, op. cit., Chapter 4.)

⁷¹ By using the term 'ontological' Heidegger wants to distinguish 'the way of being of entities', from their mere presence-at-hand, their 'occurrence' (*Vorhandenheit*). As merely occurring the entities of our environment belong to the world in an 'ontic' sense: We can enumerate and depict such entities (houses, trees, people, mountains, stars), and account for their 'occurrence', but they do not make up world in the 'ontological-existential' sense, in respect of Dasein's mode of Being. (BT 95 / 64-5)

perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use, and this has its own kind of ‘knowledge’. The phenomenological question applies in the first instance to the Being of those entities which we encounter in such concern.” Hence, “the spatial character which incontestably belongs to any environment, can be clarified only in terms of the structure of worldhood.”⁷² (BT 94 /66)

The entities, which Heidegger takes as his theme are those showing themselves in our *concern* with the environment. “Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing the ‘world’ theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets produced, and so forth.” As entities encountered, they become the preliminary theme for the purview of a certain kind of ‘knowing’. The entities—those used, or which are to be found in the course of production—“become accessible when we put ourselves into the position of concerning ourselves with them in some way.” (BT 96 / 67)

Equipment, and the equipmental character of our environment, form the core of his analysis. Though, taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment, Heidegger maintains. “To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which this equipment is that it is.” (BT 97 / 68) Equipment is essentially ‘something-in-order-to (*etwas um-zu*). A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the ‘in-order-to, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In the ‘in-order-to’ there lies an *assignment*—or *reference*—of something to something (*Verweisung*). Equipment always is as belonging to other equipment. “These ‘Things’ never show themselves as they are for themselves.” (BT 97-8 / 68). For instance, what we encounter closest to us is the room; and we encounter it not as something between four walls, but as equipment for residing. Out of this an ‘arrangement’ emerges, and it is in this that any individual item of equipment shows itself. But *before* it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered. (BT 98 / 68-9)

Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings. But in such dealings entities are not *grasped* thematically as mere occurring (‘being out there somewhere’), nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. In dealings—when something is put to use—our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to, constitutive as it is for the

⁷² For Heidegger on spatiality, see *History of the Concept of Time* (Heidegger 1985, p. 223-34).

equipment we are employing at the time. The kind of Being which equipment possesses—and in which it manifests itself—is its *availability* ('readiness-to-hand' or *Zuhandenheit*). If we look at the outward appearance of items just 'theoretically', we can get along without understanding this availability ('this being there at our disposal'). We do so only when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them. This activity is not a blind one; "it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulating is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinates themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to.'" This requires what Heidegger calls *circumspection* (*Umsicht*), a kind of sight, which makes that pieces of equipment accommodate, offer or suggest themselves to us in our various pursuits.⁷³ (BT 98 / 69) That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves, as Heidegger puts it. That with which we concern ourselves primarily is the *work* that is to be produced at the time. This work bears with it a referential totality within which the equipment is encountered. But the work to be produced is not merely usable for something.

The production itself is a using of something. In the work there is also a reference or assignment to 'materials'.⁷⁴ (BT 100 / 70) Any work with which one concern oneself is available not only in the domestic world of the workshop. It is so also in the public world. Along with the public world, what Heidegger calls the enviroing Nature (*die Umweltnatur*) is discovered and accessible to everyone:

"In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature has having definite direction. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an installation for public lighting takes account of the darkness, or rather ... the absence of daylight—the position of the sun. In a clock, account is taken of some definite constellation in the

⁷³ "Practical' behaviour is not 'a-theoretical' in the sense of 'sightlessness'. The way it differs from theoretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical behaviour one observes, while in practical behaviour one acts ... and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not to remain blind; for the fact that action has its own kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action as its own kind of sight. Theoretical behaviour is just looking, without circumspection ... the fact that this looking is non-circumspective does not means that it does not follow rules: it constructs a canon for itself in the form of method." (BT 99 / 69)

⁷⁴ "Under simple craft conditions it also has assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his figure; he 'is' there along with it as the work emerges. Even when goods are produced by dozen, this constitutive assignment is not lacking; it is merely indefinite." (BT 100 / 71)

worldsystem. When we look at the clock, we tacitly make use of the 'sun's position', in accordance with which the measurement of time gets regulated in the official astronomical manner. When we make use of the clock-equipment, which is proximally and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, the environing Nature is ready-to-hand along with it. Our concerned absorption in whatever work-world lies closest to us, has a function of discovering. ... and ... those entities within-the-world which are brought along ... in the work and with it ... remain discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness and with a varying circumspective penetration." (BT 101 / 71)

The kind of being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand, *availability*. But this is not to be understood as merely the way of taking them. To lay bare what is just occurring and no more, cognition must first penetrate *beyond* what is available in our concern. Yet only by reason of *occurentness* is there anything available. (BT 101 / 71) The world itself is not an entity within-the-world; and nonetheless it is so determinative for such entities that only in so far as 'there is' a world can they be encountered and show themselves as entities which have been discovered. (BT 102 / 72)

To the everydayness of being-in-the-world there belong certain modes of concern. These permit the entities with which we concern ourselves to be encountered in such a way that the worldly character of what is within-the-world comes forth. We discover the un-usability [of a certain tool] not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. When its un-usability is thus discovered, equipment becomes 'conspicuous'. This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. (BT 103 / 73)

In our concerned dealings we not only come up against unusable things within what is available already; we also find things which are missing— "which are not only handy but not to hand at all." To miss something in this way amounts to coming across something un-ready-to hand, not available. "The more urgently we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to hand, all the more obtrusive does that which is ready to hand become ... The helpless way in which we stand before it is an deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at hand-and no more of something ready to hand." (BT 103 / 73)

In our dealings with the world it happens that we sometimes encounter something, which stands in the way of our concern. Anything which in this way disturbs us enables us to see the obstinacy of that which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else. With this obstinacy, the presence-at-hand of the ready-to-hand makes itself known in a new way, as the Being of that which still lies before us and calls for our attention. Conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of the occurring in what is available. But the available is not thereby just observed and stared at; it is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. (BT 104 / 74)

How far does this clarify the phenomenon of the world? Heidegger's answer is that readiness-to-hand shows itself, and it is precisely here that the worldly character of the ready-to-hand shows itself too. The structure of the being of what is available as equipment is determined by references or assignments; the Things closest to us are 'in themselves' and they are encountered as such in the concern, which makes use of them without noticing them explicitly. But when an assignment has been disturbed then the assignment becomes explicit. (BT 105 / 74)

Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, this makes a *break* in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and we now see for the first time what it was ready for. The environment announces itself afresh. (105 / 75) It is itself inaccessible to circumspection, so far as circumspection is always directed toward entities, but in each case it has already been disclosed for circumspection. 'Disclose' and 'disclosedness' are in this way used by Heidegger as technical terms, signifying 'to lay open', and the characteristics of 'having been laid open'. (BT 105 / 75)

That the world does not 'consist' of the available shows itself in the fact that whenever the world is lit up in the modes of concern, the available comes to the fore. (BT 106 / 75) As long as we take our orientation primarily and exclusively from the occurring (the present-at-hand), the 'in-itself' can by no means be ontologically clarified. Only on the basis of the phenomenon of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world be grasped ontologically. But if the world can, in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be *disclosed*. And *it has already been disclosed beforehand whenever what is available to hand within the*

world is accessible for circumspective concern. The world is therefore something ‘wherein’ Dasein as an entity always “already was, and it can never do more than to come back to this world.” Being-in-the-world “amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness to hand of a totality of equipment. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with the world. In this familiarity Dasein can lose itself in what it encounters within-the world and be fascinated with it.” (BT 107 / 76)

4.3 Signs—reference—involvement—‘worldhood’

In the structure of Being belonging to the ready-to-hand, the available equipment, the phenomenon of reference or assignment become in a sense constitutive for ‘worldhood’. (BT 107 / 76) Therefore Heidegger pursues an ontological analysis of the kind of equipment “in which one may come across references in the sense of ‘equipment in signs’.

The word ‘sign’ designates many *kinds* of things: not only may it stand for different kinds of signs, but Being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a *universal kind of relation*, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological clue for ‘characterizing’ any entity whatsoever. (BT 108 / 77) *Signs are themselves items of equipment whose specific character as equipment consists in showing or indicating.* “We find such signs in signposts, boundary-stones, the ball of the mariner’s storm-warning, signals, banners, signs of mourning, and the like. Indicating can be defined as a ‘kind of referring’, a *relating*.”⁷⁵ (BT 108 / 77) To signs belong symptoms, warning signals, things that have happened already, signs to mark something, signs by which things are recognized; these have different ways of indicating, regardless of what may be serving as such a sign. (BT 108 / 78) As an example Heidegger mentions motor cars, “sometimes fitted up with an adjustable red arrow, whose position indicates the direction the vehicle will take.”⁷⁶ (BT 109 / 78)

⁷⁵ Every reference is a relation, Heidegger says, but every relation is not a reference. Every ‘indication’ is a reference, but every referring is not a relation. Every ‘indication’ is a relation, but every relation is not an ‘indicating’. (BT 108 / 77)

⁷⁶ From ‘signs’ in this sense, are to be distinguished traces, residues, commemorative monuments, documents, testimony, symbols, expressions, appearances, significations. (BT 108 / 78)

An entity may have serviceability without thereby becoming a sign. A piece of equipment is constituted by serviceability, but this does not make it a sign. “Indicating, as a ‘reference’, is a way in which a ‘towardswhich’ of serviceability becomes ontically concrete; it determines an item of equipment as for this ‘towards-which’. This is an accident of its equipment-constitution as such. (BT 109 / 78) A sign lets some context of it become accessible in such a way that our concerned dealings take an orientation and hold it secure. But a sign is not a Thing which merely stands to another Thing in the relation of indicating. It is rather an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the available announces itself. (BT 111 / 80) “In a symptom, or a warning signal, what is coming indicates itself, but not merely in the sense of something merely occurring ... ‘what is coming’ is a sort of thing which we are ready for, or which we ‘weren’t ready for’ if we have been attending to something else.” Signs always indicate primarily ‘wherein’ one lives, where one’s concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something. (BT 111 / 80) Signs also arise when one takes as a sign something that is ready to hand already. In this mode, signs get established, indicating a ready-to-hand equipment totality, and even the environment in general, establishing a sign can, above all reveal.⁷⁷ (BT 111 / 80)

Hence, indicating, as a way whereby the ‘towards-which’ of serviceability can become concrete, is founded upon the equipmentstructure as such, upon the ‘in-order-to (assignment)’. As indicating the sign has an equipmental character of something ready-to-hand, and as such it belongs to a totality of equipment, to a context of assignments or references. (BT 114 / 82) This referential totality has its bearing on the worldhood of the world. In anything available (ready-to-hand) the world is always ‘there’. “Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been discovered, though not thematically. But it can also be lit up in certain ways of dealing with our environment.” The world is that, in terms of which the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand. (BT114 / 83) This implies that the character of Being belonging to the ready-to-hand is an *involvement*. (BT 115 / 84) That, in which Being is involved, is the ‘towards-which’ of serviceability, and the ‘for-which’ of usability. (BT 116 / 84) Letting some equipment be involved means that within our factual

⁷⁷ “For primitive man, the sign coincides with that which is indicated. Not only can the sign represent this in the sense of serving as a substitute or what it indicates, but it can do so in such a way that the sign itself always *is* what it indicates.” (113 / 82)

concern we let something available and ready-to-hand “*be so and so as it already is, in order that it be such.*” (BT 117 / 84)

To Dasein’s Being as involvement belongs understanding. Any understanding (*Verständnis*) has its Being in an *act* of understanding (*Verstehen*). (BT 118 / 85) In such an act the entities and their relations to which Dasein assigns itself must have been previously disclosed: “the act of understanding holds them in this disclosedness. It holds itself in them with familiarity; and in so doing, it holds them *before* itself, for it is in these that its assignment operates. The understanding lets itself make assignments both in these relationships themselves and of them.” The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, is one of *signifying*.” (BT 120 / 87)

The ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this ‘wherein’ is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world. (BT 119 / 86) The ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ signifies an ‘in-order-to’; this in turn, signifies a ‘towards-this’; the latter signifies an ‘in-which’ of letting something be involved; and that in turn, signifies the ‘with-which’ of an involvement. “These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality they are what they are as this signifying (*Be-deuten*) in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the world as something to be understood. The relational totality of this signifying we call *significance*. This is what makes up the structure of the world—the structure of that wherein Dasein already is.” (BT 120 / 87) Dasein, in so far as it *is*, has always submitted itself already to a world which it encounters and this *submission* belongs essentially to its Being. (BT 121 / 88)

Hence, Heidegger emphasizes the necessity to distinguish between readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand and ‘the worldhood of the world’, that means, respectively between (1) the Being of those entities within-the-world which we proximally encounter, (2) the Being of those entities which we can come across and whose nature we can determine if we discover them in their own right by going through the entities proximally encountered and (3) the Being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be discovered at all. This third kind of Being gives us as an *existential* way of determining the nature of Being-in-the world, that is, of Dasein. The other two concepts of Being are

categories, and pertain to entities whose Being is not of the kind possessed by Dasein. (BT 121 / 88)

4.4 World—Environment: Résumé

What then is ‘world’ and how does it relate to environment, our *Umwelt* of things occurring? As Heidegger says in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: Existing in an environment, we dwell in an intelligible functionality whole. We make our way throughout it. As we exist factually, we are always already in an *environing* world, or *Umwelt*. (BP, p. 164) This surrounding world is different for each of us, and notwithstanding we move about in a common world. (BP, p. 165)

This common world is not Nature, and it is certainly not the sum of encountered entities, any more than the whole of all the things surrounding us. Nature, the universe, animals, plants, and humans, too— all these entities taken together—are not the world (viewed philosophically).

The world is not the sum total of ‘things being out there’. It is, quite generally, not ‘out there’ at all. World is rather a determination of being-in-the-world, a moment in the structure of the Dasein's mode of being. The world is something Dasein-ish. It *is da*, there-here, like *Dasein*, the being-*da* (*das Da-sein*) which we ourselves are. The world is not out there, but rather it exists, it is Dasein's mode of being. (BP, p. 166)

The *nearest things* surrounding us is for Heidegger *equipment*. And what is given to us primarily is the unity of an ‘equipmental whole’, a unity that constantly varies in range, expanding or contracting, and that is expressly visible to us for the most part only in ‘excerpts’. The view, in which this equipmental contexture stands at first, completely unobtrusive and ‘unthought’, is the view of practical *circumspection* of our practical everyday orientation. ‘Unthought’ means it is not thematically apprehended for deliberate thinking about things; instead, in circumspection, we find our bearings in regard to them. Circumspection uncovers and understands beings primarily as equipment. An equipmental contexture environs us. (BP, p. 163) “Each individual piece of equipment is by its own nature *equipment-for*—for travelling, for writing, for flying. Each one has its immanent reference to that *for which* it is what it is. It is always something *for*, pointing to a *for-which*.”

The specific structure of equipment is constituted by a contexture for the what-for, in order-to.” (BP, 163-4) Each particular equipmental thing has as such a specific reference to another particular equipmental thing; every entity that we uncover *as* equipment has with it a specific functionality, an In-order-toness (a *Bewandtnis*). (BP, p. 164)

World is not something that we calculate as a result from the sum of all beings. “The world comes not afterward but beforehand, in the strict sense of the word. Beforehand: that which is unveiled and understood already in advance in every existent Dasein before any apprehending of this or that being, beforehand as that which stands forth as always already unveiled to us. The world as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact specifically occupy ourselves with it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-evident, so much matter of course, that we are completely oblivious of it.” (BP, p. 165) World is something already unveiled and from which we return to the beings with which we have to do and among which we dwell. “We are able to come up against intrawordly beings solely because, as existing beings, we are already in a world. We always already understand world in holding ourselves in a contexture of functionality. We understand such matters as the in-order-to, the contexture of in-order-to or being-for, the *contexture* of significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*) (BP, p. 165)⁷⁸

4.5 ‘Dasein is its world existingly’

“Circumspective concern includes the understanding of a totality of involvements, and this understanding is based upon a prior understanding of the relationships of the ‘in-order-to’, the ‘towards-which’, the ‘towards-this’, and the ‘for the same-of’.” (BT 415/364) These relationships are interconnected through ‘significance’. “Their unity makes up what we call ‘world’.” How is anything like the world in its unity with Dasein possible? In what way must the world be, if Dasein is to be able to exist as Being-in-the-World? Heidegger answers: “Dasein exists for the sake of a potentiality-for-Being of itself. In existing it has been *thrown*; and as something thrown, it has been delivered over to entities which it needs in order to be able to be as it is, that means *for the sake of* itself. In so far as Dasein exists

⁷⁸ Or, as Heidegger says in *History of the Concept of Time*: The world shows itself in Dasein’s everyday concern. It presents itself in the character of as ‘serving to’, as ‘conducive to’, as ‘relevant to’. “The worldly is encountered as itself always *in and as a reference to another*.” (Heidegger 1985, p. 186)

factually, it understands itself in the way its ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’ is thus connected with some current ‘in-order-to’. *That inside which existing Dasein understands itself, is ‘there’ along with its factual existence. That inside which one primarily understands oneself has Dasein’s kind of Being. Dasein is its world existingly.*” (BT 416 / 364)

4.6 ‘I my self’ with Others’

Who is Dasein in its everydayness? Occupied with this question Heidegger brings into view a broader phenomenological domain of Dasein’s everydayness: Being-with Others (BT 149 / 114) In this kind of Being is grounded the mode of everyday Being-one’s Self.

“Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine”. This tells us that this entity is in each case an ‘I’—not Others. The ‘who’ is what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its experiences and ways of behaviour. As ‘something selfsame in manifold otherness’, it has the character of *Self*. Dasein is in this case positing something, which retains the meaning of something present-at-hand. “Yet presence-at-hand is the kind of Being which belongs to entities whose character is not that of Dasein.” So, it could be that the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein is not just the ‘I myself’. (BT 150 / 114-5)

In fact, Others are there too, ‘encountered’ in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment. And as such they are not just in some way added on in thought to some Thing which is proximally available. On the contrary, “they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that *they are there too and there with it.*” (BT, p. 154 / 118) By ‘Others’ Heidegger does not mean everyone else but me—but rather those from whom I do *not* distinguish myself—those, among whom Dasein is with and too. ‘With’ and ‘too’ are to be understood *existentially*, not categorically. By reason of this *with-like* Being-in-the world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a ‘with-world’ (*Mitwelt*). Being-in is ‘Being-with’. (BT 155 / 119)

Heidegger’s assertion that ‘Dasein’ is essentially ‘Being with’ has an existential-ontological meaning. Being-in-the-world is essentially constituted by Being-with. Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factually no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing

only *in* and *for* a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-of with. (BT 156-7 / 120)

Being-with Others is, like concern, a Being-towards entities encountered within the world, but these entities are not associated with concern, but rather solicitude, the giving and taking of Solicitude]. As examples of solicitude (*Fürsorge*) Heidegger mentions provision of food and clothing, the nursing of the sick (but also the ‘being against one another’, ‘passing another by’, ‘not mattering’).

4.7 Dasein—The Child

Assume the Dasein is Child (is ‘you or me as child’). Then the Child *is* its world existingly, Heidegger would say.

In its everyday being it is involved in a particular *Umwelt* as concernfully dealing with equipment, a coping with things in various pursuits or ‘in-order-to’s, a dealing which takes place against the backdrop of a totality of equipment constituted by various kinds of in order-to.

Fig. 4:1. See attachment. Dasein-The Child and the worldly character of the available.

This ‘worldly character of the available’ related to the Child is illustrated in Fig. 4:1. Pieces of equipment accommodate themselves to the child through circumspection, a sight offering these pieces of equipment for use. In the various kinds of ‘in-order-to’s there lie assignments, of things ‘as referring to something else’. In this way the worldhood of the Child is constituted through signs, equipment as signs and signs as equipment, items for doing and making things, items of signification. The spoon is for eating, the pencil for drawing, the books is for reading. The ball is for kicking or throwing, in the order of getting one or more goals. Green is for crossing, red is for waiting. All these things and their kinds of ‘in order to’ are there with the Child, for the Child, at the Child’s disposal.

The Child is playing, for sure. But this is earnestly doing and making things: Building with Lego-blocks, playing with a Game Boy gadget, occasionally, even playing the game of solicitude (‘you are my little child, I am your mother’). Playing is learning by doing and

making, an acquiring of potentialities for further doing and making. Manipulating things and putting them to use, requires its own kind of *knowledge*, a knowing that certain tools and devices (within the Child's *Umwelt*) are for *this* or for *that*. However, (as will be developed below) a requirement for the acquiring of such *instrumental* knowledge is that the appropriate tools and devices 'are taken out of their hiddenness', discovered with respect to their conduciveness.

As existing the Child has been 'thrown-in-to-the world', and as thrown it is delivered over to those items, which it needs in order to be able to be as it is. But in this its thrownness there are also other human beings. Involvement in the *Umwelt* is involvement with Others (parents, siblings, peers, other grown up persons). With this being-with Others follows Solicitude, generally a caring for, but also 'not mattering', 'being indifferent to', a 'passing each other by'. The Child is taken care of, but also as it happens passed by.

After this presentation of the stage of Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein', let's turn to Dasein's Being-in-as-such, to some crucial parts of what he says on what it *means* to be in the world, to 'exist' (and with the aim of ending up with 'becoming-in-the-world', growing up).

4.8 Understanding—Projecting

If the world belongs to Dasein, the Being that I myself in each instance is, then it is something subjective, Heidegger concludes in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. (BP, p. 167) And to say that the world is subjective is to say that it belongs to Dasein so far as this being is in the mode of being-in-the-world:

"The world is something which the 'subject' 'projects outward', as it were, from within itself. But are we permitted to speak here of an inner and outer? What can this projection mean? Obviously not that the world is a piece of myself in the sense of some other thing present in me ... Instead, the Dasein itself is as such already projected. So far as the Dasein exists a world is cast-forth with the Dasein's being. To exist means, among other things, to cast-forth a world, and in fact in such a way that with the thrownness of this projection ... extant entities are always already uncovered." (BP, p. 168)

The structure of being-in-the-world makes manifest this essential peculiarity of the Dasein, that of projecting a world for itself, and it does this not subsequently and occasionally. Rather, the projecting of the world belongs to the Dasein's being. "In this projection the Dasein has already *stepped out beyond itself*, it ex-sists, it *is in* a world. Consequently, it is never anything like a subjective inner sphere." (BP, p. 170) The reason why he reserves the word *existence* (from Lat. *existere*, 'to stand forth') to denote this Dasein's mode of being, lies in his contention that being-in-the-world as constantly 'standing beyond itself' belongs to Dasein's very being.

Projecting is understanding for Heidegger, and *vice versa*; understanding is projecting. This holds for all kinds of understanding, practical as well as cognitive. To exist is for Heidegger essentially, even if not only, to understand. "As existent, the Dasein is free for specific possibilities of its own self. It is its own most peculiar able-to-be." (BP, p. 276) Heidegger reminds us that in German *verstehen*, 'to understand something', means literally, to stand 'in front of or ahead of' this something, to stand at its head, administer, manager, preside over it. This is akin to saying that anyone understands something in the sense of being skilled or expert at it. To understand oneself (as a human being) means to project oneself. Or more precisely: *to project oneself upon a possibility*, and to keep oneself in this *projection* at all times, in this possibility as in Heidegger's words a *can-be*. "The character of this possibility *becomes* manifest and *is* manifest only in projection, and so long as the possibility is held fast in the projection." (BP, p. 277) If Dasein projects itself upon a possibility, it is projecting itself in the sense that it is *unveiling itself as this can-be*. Though this becoming manifest to one self is not a selfcontemplating. Rather, the projection is the way in which Dasein is its own possibility. Since projection unveils without making what is unveiled as such into an object of contemplation, there is present in all understanding an insight of the Dasein to itself. "Understanding as the Dasein's self-projection is the Dasein's fundamental mode of happening". (BP, p. 277) It is the authentic meaning of action. It is in and through such understanding that the Dasein becomes what is; "it *is* always only that which it *has chosen itself to be*, that which it understands itself to be in the projection of its own most peculiar ability-to-be." (BP, p. 278)

Because being in the world is essentially a being with others and a being among and towards intrawordly beings, Dasein's projection of its possibilities unveils in every instant a possibility of being in the world *with* these others, and a particular possible being *towards*

these things. (BP, p. 278) Factual Dasein in this way understands itself primarily via intrawordly beings which it encounters. So, it can let its existence be determined primarily not by itself but by things and circumstances and by others. This is the understanding that Heidegger calls ‘inauthentic understanding’. But, on the other hand, projection can also be accomplished from “the freedom of our most peculiar Dasein and back to it, as authentic understanding”. (BP, p. 279)

Hence, with the term ‘understanding’ Heidegger has in mind a fundamental *existentiale*, which is neither a definite *species of cognition* distinguished from explaining and conceiving; nor is it any cognition in the sense of grasping something thematically. Understanding constitutes rather the Being of the ‘there’ in such a way that, on the basis of this understanding, a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of sight, of looking around (*Sichumsehens*) and of just looking. “In all explanation one uncovers understandingly that which one cannot understand; and all explanation is thus rooted in Dasein’s primary understanding.” (BT 385 / 336).

Circumspective concern, which belongs to Dasein’s mode of being, includes the understanding of a totality of involvements, and this understanding is based upon a prior understanding of the relationships of every ‘in-order-to’, ‘towards-which’, ‘towards-this’, and ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. It is, as we have seen, the interconnection of these relationships which Heidegger treats as significance. It is their unity which makes up what he calls the ‘world’. (BT 415 / 364)

4.9 Interpretation

Understanding implies interpretation. That means, the projecting of understanding has its own possibility—that of developing itself (*sich auszubilden*). ‘Interpretation’ is this development of the understanding. “In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.” (BT 188-9 / 148)

To say that ‘circumspection discovers’ means that the ‘world’, which has already been understood, becomes interpreted. The ready-to-hand comes *explicitly* into the sight, a sight which understands. “In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we ‘see’ as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge.” (BT 189 / 149) That which is understood gets, as Heidegger says, articulated “when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking our clue the ‘something as something’; and this Articulation lies before [*liegt vor*] our making any thematic assertion about it ... [and] this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible.” (BT 190 / 149)

When we have to cope with things, “the mere seeing of Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp something *free*, as it were, *of the ‘as’*, requires a certain readjustment. When we mere stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understanding it any more. This grasping which is free of the ‘as’, is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one *merely* understands.” (BT 190 / 149)

In interpreting, continues Heidegger, we do not “throw a ‘signification’ over some naked thing which is present-at-hand ...but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which get laid out by the interpretation.” The available (‘ready-to-hand’) is always understood as a totality of involvements, a totality which does not need to be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. (BT 191 / 150)

Interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance—in *forehaving*:

“When something is understood but is still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an act of appropriation, and this is always done under the guidance of a point of view, which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted. In every case interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance—in a fore-sight ... Anything understood which is held in our fore-having and towards which we set our sights ‘foresightedly’, becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation.” (BT 191 / 150)

The interpretation is grounded in something we grasp in advance—in a *fore-conception*.

When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein—when they have come to be understood—one often says that they have meaning (*Sinn*), Heidegger notes. But that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but an entity or Being. For Heidegger meaning is ‘that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself’—‘that which can be articulated in a disclosure by which we understand’:

“Meaning is the ‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception.” (BT 193 / 151)

In other words, meaning is not a property attaching to entities, lying ‘behind’ them, or floating somewhere as an ‘intermediate domain’. It follows with human existence. “Dasein only ‘has’ meaning ... only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless (*sinnvoll* or *sinnlos*).”

To lay bare the ‘upon-which’ of a projection, amounts to disclosing that which makes possible what has been projected. To lay bare in this way requires methodologically that we study the production (usually a tacit one) which underlies an interpretation. Taken strictly, ‘meaning’ signifies the ‘upon-which’ of the primary projection of the understanding of being. All experience of entities is based upon projections of the Being of the corresponding entities—projections which in every case are more or less transparent. But in these projections there lies hidden the ‘upon-which’ of the projection; and it is on this, as it were, that understanding of Being nourishes itself. To say that entities ‘have meaning’ signifies that they have become accessible in *their Being*. (BT 371 / 324) “Entities ‘have’ meaning only because, as Being which has been disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the production of that Being—that is to say, in terms of the ‘upon-which’ of that projection.” (BT 372 / 324)

4.10 Assertion—discourse—language

Interpretation is grounded on understanding, and *meaning* is that which has been *articulated* in interpretation and sketched out as articulable. For sure, any assertion or judgment (*Aussage / Urteil*), grounded on understanding and interpretation ‘has’ a meaning. “Yet this meaning cannot be defined as something that occurs ‘in’ a judgment along with the judging

itself.” (BT 195 / 153-4) The meaning must be articulated through *assertion*, and as asserted it must have been *expressed*: pointed out, predicated and / or communicated. Assertion is for Heidegger the “letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character. “ The ‘letting someone see with us’ is sharing with an Other that which has been pointed out. “That which is shared is our Being towards what has been pointed out—a Being in which we see it in common.” (BT 196-7 / 154-5) Hence, assertion is defined as a ‘pointingout’ which gives something a definite character and which communicates. “The pointing-out which assertion does is performed on the basis of what has already been disclosed or discovered circumspectively. (BT 199 / 156)

Any assertion requires a fore-having of whatever has been disclosed; and this is what it points out by way of giving something a definite character. Thus when an assertion is made, some fore-conception is always implied; but this remains for the most part inconspicuous, because language hides in itself a developed way of conceiving. “Like any interpretation whatever, assertion necessarily has a fore-having, a foresight, and a fore-conception as its existential foundations.”(BT 199 / 157) When an assertion has given a definite character to something present-at-hand (occurring), it says something about it *as* a ‘what’; and this ‘what’ is drawn from that which is present-at-hand (occurring) as such. (BT 200 / 158) Every assertion, whether it affirms or denies, is *synthesis* and *diairesis* equiprimordially: “To exhibit anything is to take it together and take it apart.” (BT 201 / 159) Something is understood with regard to something: it is taken together with it, yet in such a way that this confrontation which understands will at the same time take apart what has been taken. Binding and separating may be formalized to a further relating. (BT 202 / 159)

In clarifying assertion as communication, Heidegger is led to the concepts of ‘saying’ and ‘speaking’. The fact that language here enters as a theme indicates that it has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness. The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk. (BT 203 / 160) “Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called ‘meaning’. That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the ‘totality-of-significations (*Bedeutungsganze*). This can be dissolved or broken up into significations. Significations, as what has been Articulated from that which can be

Articulated, always carry meaning ... The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world ... *expresses itself in discourse.*" (BT 204 / 161)

In both ordinary and philosophical thinking, Heidegger reminds us, man's Being is defined, in fact, as that living thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse: *Rede*, talk, *Logos*.⁷⁹ (BT 47 / 25)

"The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. Language is a totality of words—a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' being of its own ... Language can be broken up into words-Things which are present at hand." (BT 204 / 161)

"Discursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world." (BT 204 / 161)

"Talking is talk about something." (BT 204 / 161)

"Even a command is given about something; a wish is about something." (BT 205 / 162)

"What is talked about in talk is always 'talked to' in a definite regard and within certain limits." (BT 205 / 162)

To discursive speech belong the possibilities of hearing and keeping silent. (BT 204 / 161)

"Communication is never anything like a conveying of experience, such as opinions and wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-ofmind and a co-understanding. In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' shared; ... it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated."(BT 205 / 162)

In talking, Dasein, expresses itself. *"Not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as something 'internal' over against something outside, but because as Being-*

⁷⁹ *Logos*, Heidegger points out, is derived from the same root as *legen*, 'to talk', 'to hold discourse', which he identifies in turn with *noein*, to 'cognize', 'be aware of', 'to know'. (BT 47 / 25)

in-the-world it is already 'outside' when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this Beingoutside ... Being-in and its state-of-mind are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of the talk, 'the way of speaking'. In poetical discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence." (BT 205 / 162)

"In discourse the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world ... is articulated according to significations and discourse is this articulation. The items constitutive of discourse are: what the discourse is about (what is talked about); what is said-in-the-talk as such, the communication; and the making-known." (BT 206 / 162)

Constitutive for discourse is hearing: *"Listening to ... is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being ... Dasein hears, because it understands. As a Being-in the world with Others; a Being which understands, Dasein is 'in thrall' to Dasein-with and to itself ... Being with develops in listening to one another ... which can be done in several possible ways; following, going along with, and the private modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away."* (BT 206-7 / 163)

When we are explicitly hearing the discourse of another, we proximally understands what is said; we are already with him / her, in advance alongside the entity which the discourse is about. (BT 207 / 164) Only he / she who already understands can listen. (BT 208 / 164) Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse. (BT 208 / 164) Speaking at length about something does not offer the slightest guarantee that thereby understanding is advanced. (BT 208 / 164) He / she who never says anything cannot keep silent in any given moment. Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. (BT 298 / 165)

Discourse expresses itself for the most part in language, and speaks proximally in the way of addressing itself to the *Umwelt* by talking about things concernfully; because of this, *making-present* has a *privileged* constitutive function. (BT 400 / 349) Discourse 'lets something be seen'; *what* is said is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication makes manifest what it is talking about, and this makes it accessible to the other party. In concrete performance discoursing, the letting something be seen, assumes

the form of speaking (*Sprechens*), a vocal proclamation in words. But any vocal utterance contains something that can be seen, Heidegger contends with reference to Aristotle. (BT 56 / 32-3, Heidegger 1985, p. 84) The entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness, one must let them be seen as something unhidden, they must be *discovered*. (BT 56-7 / 33) They are discovered through discourse, acts of saying.⁸⁰

“In speaking about something, the Dasein speaks itself out, expresses itself, as existent being-in-the world, dwelling with and occupying itself with beings ... Insofar as what is understood, something of the nature of significance-contextures is articulated by means of this understanding. These contextures are potentially expressible in words. It is not the case that first there are the words, which are coined as signs for meanings, but just the reverse: it is from the Dasein that understands itself and the world, from the significance-contexture already unveiled, that a word accrues to each of these meanings.” (BP 208-9)

4.11 Disclosedness—Discoveredness

By way of projection and understanding, interpretation, assertion and discourse Heidegger arrives at his crucial notions of ‘disclosedness’ and ‘discoveredness’: the laying open of the world, and the pointing out of things in it.

Circumspective concern, or even that concern in which we tarry and look for something, uncovers entities within-the-world. The entities become those which have been uncovered. But the uncoveredness of entities within the world is *grounded* in the world’s disclosedness, the laying bare of what was earlier hidden. Disclosedness pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self. (BT 263 / 220) It embraces the whole of that structure-of-Being which has become explicit through the phenomenon of care. (BT 264 / 221) In the state of thrownness, as constitutive for Dasein’s disclosedness, is revealed the fact that in

⁸⁰ As Heidegger says in *History of the Concept of Time*, our comportments, lived experiences in the broadest sense, are expressed experiences. Even if not uttered in words, “they are nonetheless expressed in a definite articulation by an understanding that I have of them as I simply live with them without regarding them thematically.” (Heidegger 1985, p. 48) See also what he says on ‘categorical intuition (op. cit. p. 56, and Chapter 1.3 above).

each case Dasein is already in a definite world, and alongside a definite range of definite entities within–the-world. (BT 264 / 221)

To Dasein’s disclosedness belongs essentially *discourse*. Dasein as a ‘Being-towards entities’ *expresses* itself—as a Being-towards which uncovers. And in assertion it expresses itself as such about entities, which have been uncovered. Assertion communicates entities in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness. This uncoveredness is preserved in what is expressed. *What is expressed becomes, as it were, something available within the world, which can be taken up and spoken again.* Dasein needs not bring itself face-to-face with entities themselves in an original experience. In a large measure uncoveredness gets appropriated not by one’s own uncovering, but rather by hearsay of something that has been said.” (BT 266 / 224) “The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as if ... That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised.”⁸¹(BT 265 / 222)

In this analytic of understanding and the disclosedness of the ‘there’, Heidegger also talks about Dasein’s ‘clearing’(*Lichtung*)—with allusion to the word’s sense of ‘area in the forest cleared for cultivation’, a glade.⁸² However: “Being-in-the-world is cleared (*gelichtet*) in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing.”

4.12 Curiosity

“Projection always pertains to the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. As potentiality-for-Being, understanding has itself possibilities, which are sketched out beforehand within the range of what is essentially ‘disclosable’ in it.” (BT 186 / 146) And in understanding the world, Being-in is always understood along it, while understanding of existence as such is always an understanding of the world. In this projective character, understanding makes up existentially what Heidegger calls Dasein’s ‘sight’. With the disclosedness of the ‘there’, this sight is of an existential character; and Dasein *is* this sight equiprimordially in each of

⁸¹ Assertion and discourse are topics particularly dealt with in BT §33 and 34.

⁸² As the translators of BT tell us in a note on page 171: *Lichtung* is customarily used for a ‘clearing in the woods’, not for a ‘clarification’.

those basic ways of Being, "as the circumspection of concern, as the considerateness of solicitude, as that sight which is directed upon Being as such." (BT 186 / 146) 'Seeing' here does not mean just perceiving with the bodily eyes, "but neither does it mean pure non-sensory awareness of something present-at-hand in its presence-at-hand." (BT 187 / 147)

The basic state of sight shows itself in a peculiar tendency of Being which belongs to everydayness, curiosity (*Neugier*). Heidegger notes that this was acknowledged at an early date in philosophy: Cognition was conceived in terms of 'desire to see' (*Lust zu sehen*). He refers to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the opening sentence in Book Alpha [*Meta* 980a], usually translated as "By nature, all men long to know." This Heidegger interprets as: "The care for seeing is essential to man's Being." (BT 214-5 / 170-1) He elaborates this source of exploration by bringing in Parmenides: "Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding." (BT 215 / 171)

Curiosity as 'desire to see' enters Dasein's Being as proximally absorbed in the world of concern, a concern guided by circumspection, which discovers the available and preserves it as discovered. "Whenever we have something to contribute or perform, circumspection gives us the route for proceeding with it, the means of carrying it out, the right opportunity, the appropriate moment. Concern may come to rest in the sense of one's interrupting the performance and taking a rest, or it can do so by getting it finished. In rest, concern does not disappear; circumspection, however, becomes free and is no longer bound to the world of work." (BT 216 / 172) When circumspection has been set free, there is no longer anything which we must concern ourselves with bringing close. Dasein seeks what is far away simply in order to bring it close to itself and in the way it looks. Dasein lets itself be carried along solely by the looks of the world. (BT 216 / 172) "When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen ... but *just* in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty." In this kind of seeing lies the possibilities of Dasein's abandoning itself to the world. Therefore curiosity is characterized by a specific way of not tarrying along-side what is closest. It seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters. "Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere." (BT 216-7 / 172-3)

4.13 Dasein's Temporality

For Heidegger Dasein's Being is 'care', as we have seen. The ontological meaning of 'care' is temporality. It is temporality which constitutes the disclosedness of the 'there'. The unity of significance is likewise grounded in temporality. The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon.

"The schema in which Dasein comes towards itself futurally, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the 'for-the-sake-of-itself. The schema in which Dasein comes towards itself in a state of mind as thrown, is to be taken as that in the face of which it has been thrown and to which it has been abandoned. This characterizes the horizontal schema of what has been ... The horizontal schema for the Present is defined by the 'inorder-to'." (BT 416 / 365)

As emphasizes Heidegger, the term 'ecstatic' as it is here used, has nothing to do with ecstatic states of mind and the like. Like the common Greek expression 'ekstatikon' it means stepping-outside-self. And as such it affiliated with the term 'existence'. "It is with this ecstatic character that we interpret existence." (BP, p. 267)

The unity of the horizontal schemata of future, present, and past ('of having been') is grounded in this ecstatical unity of temporality:

"With one's factual Being-there, a potentiality-for-Being is in each case projected in the horizon of the future, one's 'Being-already' is disclosed in the horizon of having been, and that with which one concerns oneself is discovered in the horizon of the Present. The horizontal unity of the schemata of these ecstasies makes possible the primordial way in which the 'in-order-to' are connected with the 'for the-sake-of. This implies that on the basis of the horizontal constitution of the ecstatical unity of temporality, there belongs to that entity which is in each case its own 'there', something like a world that has been disclosed." (BT 416-17 / 365)

“Just as the Present arises in the unity of the temporalizing of temporality out of the future and having been, the horizon of a Present temporalizes itself equiprimordially with those of the future and of having been. In so far as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world is too. In temporalizing itself with regard to its Being as temporality, Dasein is essentially ‘in a world’ ... The world is neither present-at-hand, nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality ... If no Dasein exists, not world is ‘there’ either.” (BT 417 / 366)

“The world is already presupposed in one’s Being alongside the ready-to-hand concernfully and factically, in one’s thematizing of the present-at-hand.” (BT 417 / 365)

“Having its ground in the horizontal unity of ecstatical temporality, the world is transcendent.” (BT 417 / 366)

Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is itself an issue. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-Being *before* going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it reveals itself as something ‘which has been thrown’:

“It has been thrownly abandoned to the ‘world’, and falls into it concernfully. As care—that is, as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown—this entity has been disclosed as a ‘there’. As being with Others, it maintains itself in an average way of interpreting—a way which has been Articulated in discourse and expressed in language. Being-in-the-world has always expressed itself, and as Being alongside entities encountered within-the world, it constantly expresses itself in addressing itself to the very object of its concern and discussing it. The concern of circumspective common sense is grounded in temporality—indeed in the mode of a making-present which retains and awaits. Such concern, as concernfully reckoning up, planning, preventing, or taking precautions, always says (whether audibly or not) that something is to happen ‘then’, that something else is to be attended to ‘beforehand’, that has failed or eluded us ‘on that former occasion’ in something that we must ‘now’ make up for.” (BT 458 / 406)

In the ‘then’, concern expresses itself as an awaiting; in the ‘on that former occasion’ as a retaining; in the ‘now’ as a making present. (BT 458 / 406) The horizon for the retaining

which expresses itself in the ‘on that former occasion’ is the ‘*earlier*’; the horizon for the ‘then’ is the ‘*later on*’ (that which is to come); the horizon for the now is the ‘*today*’.

(BT 409 / 407)

4.14 Resoluteness

For Heidegger the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being is temporality: Being can be understood and conceptually comprehended only by means of time. This is emphasized and repeated in *Being and Time* and his other phenomenological writings. But *how* is temporality this ‘condition of the possibility of understanding’?

When answering this question, Heidegger reminds us of his crucial distinction between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ existence. (BP, p. 286) Authentic existence is, as we have seen, existence “in which the Dasein is itself in and from its own most peculiar possibility, a possibility that has been seized on and chosen by the Dasein itself.” (BP, p. 287) His name for authentic existence is *resoluteness* (*Entschlossenheit*). Resoluteness has its own peculiar temporality. In resoluteness, understanding is primarily futural, but “the Dasein comes back to that which it is and takes itself over as the being that it is. In coming back to itself, it *brings* itself with everything that it is *back again* into its own most peculiar chosen can-be.” (BP, p. 287) The temporal mode in which Dasein is as what it *was* means repetition, a bringing-back-again. “Repetition is a peculiar mode in which the Dasein *was, has been*. Resoluteness temporalizes itself as repetitive coming back-toward-itself from a chosen possibility to which the Dasein, coming-toward-itself, has run out in front of itself [preceded itself].” (BP, p. 287)

In the unity of this ‘repetitive self-precedence’, in this past and future, there lies a specific present: The present that belongs to resoluteness is *held* in the specific future (self-precedence) and past (repetition) of resoluteness. The present that is held in resoluteness and springs from it is the *instant*. The instant is “an *enpresenting* of something present which, as belonging to resolve, discloses the situation upon which resoluteness has resolved.” (BP, p. 287) In the instant the existent Dasein is carried away, as resolved, into its current factually determined possibilities, circumstances, the contingencies of the situation of its action. “The instant (the *Augenblick*), the twinkling of an eye] is that which arising from resoluteness, has an eye first of all and solely for what constitutes the situation

of action. It is the mode of resolute existence in which the Dasein, as being-in-the-world, holds and keeps its world in view.” (BP, p. 287) The now, that arises from this instant, the twinkling of the eye, most expeditiously manifests its full structure precisely where the Dasein as resolute enpresenting expresses itself by means of the now. (BP, p. 288)

In inauthentic, irresolute existence the Dasein understands itself at first and usually from things. The others, the fellow humans with whom we have to do, are there too, even when they are not found in the immediate tangible proximity. In the way they are there with the Dasein, they are also jointly understood with it via things, and even without any explicit existential relation of one Dasein to others. (BP, p. 289) To understand oneself from the things with which one is occupied means to project one's own ability to be upon such features of the business of our everyday occupation as the feasible, urgent, indispensable, expedient. The Dasein understands itself from the ability to be that is determined by the success and failure of its commerce with things. (BP, p. 289) This inauthentic self-understanding by way of things has the character of coming-toward-itself, of the future, but this is an inauthentic future, which Heidegger characterizes as expecting; the Dasein is expectant of its can-be, as coming from the things it attends to and cares for; and only because of this expecting can it anticipate, await something from things or wait for the way they run off. But expecting must *already beforehand have unveiled a sphere* from which something can be awaited. “Expecting is thus not a subspecies of waiting for or anticipating but just the reverse: waiting for, anticipating, is grounded in an expecting, a looking forward to.” (BP, p. 289) When in our commerce with things we lose ourselves in and with them, we are expectant of our can-be in the way it is determined via the feasibility of the things with which we are concerned. But we do not expressively come back to ourselves, do not repeat the thing we have been, do not take ourselves over in our facticity. What we are lies in some way behind us, *forgotten*. This forgetting is not the absence and failure to appear of a recollection. It is rather a peculiar mode of temporality. “The characteristic of forgetting is that it forgets itself ... it not only forgets the forgotten but forgets the forgetting itself ... Understanding oneself by way of feasible and directly encountered things involves *self-forgetting*.” (BP, p. 290) Because the Dasein is expectant of itself by way of the feasible, that with which it is dealing at the moment is in its present. Self-understanding in inauthentic understanding is an enpresenting. “the present of inauthentic understanding does not have the character of the instant ... it has the character of *forgetful-enpresenting-expectance*.” (BP, p 290-1]

4.15 Selfhood and Transcendence

World exists, Heidegger emphasizes, only if Dasein exists, only if there is Dasein. Only if world is there—and only if Dasein exists as being-in-the-world—is there understanding of being, and only if this understanding is there are intraworldly things unveiled as extant and handy: as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand, as occurring and available “World-understanding as Dasein-understanding is self-understanding. Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein-Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being in the world. Only because the ‘subject’ is determined by being-in-the-world can it become, as this self, a thou for another. Only because I am an existent self am I a possible thou for another as self.” (BP, p. 297) Self and world belong together, and as belonging to the unity of the constitution of the Dasein they determine the ‘subject’. ”In other words, the being that we ourselves in each case are, the Dasein, is the *transcendent*.”(BP, p. 298)

To ‘transcend’, reminds us Heidegger, signifies literally to step over, pass over, go through, and occasionally also to surpass. And when delineating the transcendence concept, we have to keep in view the basic structures already exhibited of the constitution of the Dasein’s being. (BP, p. 298) In the popular philosophical sense of the world, the transcendent is the being that lies beyond, the otherworldly being. Frequently the term is used to designate God. In theory of knowledge the transcendent is understood as what lies beyond the subject’s sphere, things in themselves, objects. In this sense the transcendent is that which lies outside the subject. (BP, p. 298-9) The overstepping as such, or that whose mode of being must be defined precisely by this overstepping, is the Dasein. And the world is the truly transcendent, that which is still further beyond. At the same time this beyond is, as an existent, a basic determination of being-in-the-world, of the Dasein. “If the world is the transcendent, then what is truly transcendent is the Dasein.” (BP, p. 299) The transcendent is that which oversteps as such and not that toward which one steps over. The world is transcendent because, belonging to the structure of being-in-the-world, it constitutes stepping-over-to as such. “The transcending beings are not the objects—things can never transcend or be transcendent—rather it is the ‘subjects’—in the proper ontological sense of the Dasein—which transcend, step through and step over themselves.” (BP, p. 299)

“Because the Dasein is constituted by being-in-the world, it is a being which in its being is out beyond itself.” (BP, p. 299)

“This transcending does not only and not primarily mean a self-relating of a subject to and object; rather, transcendence means to understand oneself from a world.” (BP, p. 300)

“The selfhood of the Dasein is founded on its transcendence ... The ‘toward-itself’ and the ‘out-from-itself’ are implicit in the concept of selfhood ... This selfhood, founded on transcendence, the possible towarditself and out-from-itself, is the presupposition for the way the Dasein factually has various possibilities of being its own and of losing itself. But it is also the presupposition for the Dasein’s being with others in the sense of the I-self with the thou-self.” (BP, p. 300)

Existence always means to step beyond, or, better, having stepped beyond. “The Dasein is the transcendent being.” (BP, p. 300)

4.16 Becoming-in-the-world: The Child

By way of Heidegger’s two modes of self-understanding (‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ existence), we have arrived at two modes of becoming, it seems; two modes of unity of the structure of growing up-in-the-world; two modes of actualization of potentialities. Dare we say ‘authentic and inauthentic *energeia*’?

While authentic self-understanding is an actualization of the Child’s ‘own most peculiar and chosen I can-be’, inauthentic self-understanding is the actualization of its proper and discovered ‘I can do’. These two modes of actualization of any Child’ potentialities are illustrated in the ideograms of Fig. 4:2 a & b.

Fig. 4:2a. See attachment. The Child and in-authentic self-understanding: ‘I know how—I can do’.

Fig. 4:2b. See attachment. The Child and authentic self-understanding: ‘I have been—I can be’.

In both cases actualization (*energeia*) is to be understood as a projecting into the future, the world as cleared, which implies a simultaneous understanding: in the former case as ‘I have been’, in the latter case as ‘I know how’.

In what Heidegger calls in-authentic self-understanding, the Child discovers itself in circumspective interpretation of the available (equipment), from the things with which it is occupied, the success or failure of its commerce with things, in the light of its potential (and understood) ‘know how’.

In authentic understanding it discovers it-Self in (probably some quite rare) instants of resoluteness, and in the perspective of its potential understanding as ‘having been’.

In either case growing up means transcendence: the process of becoming is a process of projective understanding, and as such it follows the schema of what Heidegger conceives of as temporality: a horizon of now or ‘today’, which is at the same time that of ‘on former occasions’ and a ‘then’, later on.

Growing up, as overstepping oneself in projection and understanding, implies interpretation through discourse and articulation: What is expressed by the Child (‘I know how / I can do’, ‘I have been / I can be’) becomes something available within the world, which can be taken up by the Child and spoken of again. The Child is aware of its ‘can do’ and ‘can be’.

As a beholder of its own potentialities—as constantly beyond itself, overstepping itself—the Child lets itself be carried along by curiosity (‘lust to know / lust to see’ to keep with Heidegger’s reference to Aristotle). Growing up as becoming is discovering, but a discovering which needs the prior disclosing, a clearing: The laying open of the world is a requirement for pointing out of things in it, and for discovering oneself as Self in it.

A requirement for the Child’s discovering things in the environment, and the simultaneous disclosedness of world, is discourse: *Rede*, talk, *logos*. The Child needs access to language, must learn how to speak, it seems. In discourse the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world is articulated according to signification, and discourse is in fact such articulation. Constitutive for discourse is hearing. When the Child is listening to the discourse of another person, it

proximally understands what is said. He / she is with the Other, ‘in advance alongside the entity the discourse is about’. Discourse allows for something to be seen. The things talked about is taken out of their hiddenness, such as they can be discovered, pointed out, predicated and communicated against the backdrop of a totality of relations of significance and reference, *das Welt*. It is by acts of saying that things are discovered, perceived, taken notice of, seen. In fact, Heidegger seems to contend as well that it is through acts of saying that things are put to use, discovered as appropriate tools in any dealings ‘in order to’. Seeing by saying is a requirement for the Child’s acquiring of the type of instrumental knowledge that *this is for that*.

If the Child is its world existentially’, it is also its world ‘becomingly’, and in his / her becoming—with and alongside equipment and other human beings—the child is due to enhance its ability to handle things in its ‘circumspectively’ interpreted environment: to develop competence, know-how, the ability to accomplish task and commitments, in the idiom of Aristotle in this way actualizing inherent and acquired potentialities.

Following Heidegger it is possible to relate these potentialities to either in-authentic or authentic existence. But is it possible to draw a line, so to speak, between inauthentic and authentic self-understanding? You can be what you are not for the time being by becoming a singer, a professional football player, an engineer or a lawyer, a gangster or a mobster. But any such chosen and peculiar ‘I can be’ requires actualization of some defined ‘I can do’. Becoming any such ‘can be’ requires ‘learning how’, how to do things to be this chosen being.

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5. Speech—language—body

5.1 Learning to speak: M. Merleau-Ponty

To grow up implies learning to speak, the acquisition of language competence, an ‘ability to say’, which according to phenomenological thinking is an ability to ‘see’: giving sense to things in the physical *Umwelt*: being aware of, naming, expressing oneself, making judgments and communicating. And, if saying is seeing—in the sense of discovering, taking notice of, perceive—then, following the thread of reasoning in the previous chapters, it must be such that learning to speak is an avenue for the Child to knowledge *that, why and how*, in fact *is* learning that, why and how. Concerning this crucial aspect of growing up—which offers an example of actualization of innate and acquired potentialities to adopt the mode of thinking of Aristotle—this chapter will consult the French phenomenologist philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

When trying to account for pertinent parts of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy—which in respect of *language and speech* involves primordially *the body*—the chapter will draw on, in particular, his lecture course on ‘child psychology’ of 1949-1950 at the University of Sorbonne, later published in English as *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*. But his other, and more widely known, works will also be visited.

According to James M. Edie (1976)⁸³, the development of Merleau-Ponty’s teachings on language, i.e. human communication in a general sense (*langage*), and the system of expression of a given speech community (*langue*), can be divided into three periods. The first culminates in the chapter entitled “The Body as Expression and Speech” in *Phenomenology of Perception*, the second comprises the mentioned lecture course; the third Edie attributes to his later, partly posthumous works, published in English as *Signs, Primacy of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible* (Edie 1976, p. 75 ff).

⁸³ “Merleau-Ponty’s Structuralism,” in *Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenology of Language*, Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press. 1976, a slightly modified version of which appears as Foreword to the English translation of the mentioned lecture course.

The following presentation of Merleau-Ponty's language philosophy will be structured according to this periodization. After some concluding remarks as to the alleged pivotal role of body and perception in language and speech, attempts are made to relate his theses to what has been said in the earlier chapters on the Child as substance, intentionality and world. What does it mean that the Child speaks? How can it be that the Child's learning to speak enhances 'seeing', provides for his / her access to this structure of references and assignments, which Heidegger calls *das Welt*? That it allows for an opening to those horizons of significance and meaning which following Husserl constitute the Child's personally acquired life-world? Tentative answers will be suggested.

5.2 The Body as Expression and Speech

In Merleau-Ponty's early work language appears, as Edie says, only as "an adjunct to his phenomenology of perception, the thesis that among the various phenomenologically distinguishable modalities of experience, the structures of perception are the most fundamental and paradigmatic whose analogues or derived equivalents reappear at all other levels." (Edie, op. cit., p. 76) Language is used to illustrate his ideas concerning the origin of meaning within our texture of experience. "Language, as a system of words that make up our vocabulary and our syntax, is one of the 'stores'... of the multitudinous sources of meaning through which men, through time and conjointly with one another, give to nature a human signification; language gives us not nature as it is in itself, but the 'world according to man'" (Edie, p. 76) Merleau-Ponty therefore contends that acts of speaking find their place within a framework of more fundamental, pre-linguistic and non-linguistic articulations of the experienced world. Perception, gesticulation, the dance, the chant, which precede and accompany speaking, in fact produce an actively preconstituted world whose contents and articulations are equivalent to 'thought' in language. Words are continuous with the primordial acts of giving meaning to things, which the human body accomplishes in its active, motile, affective perceiving of objects. "Words, in short are gestures." (Edie, p. 76)

Hence, Merleau-Ponty is occupied with "the role that speech-acts play in the bodily and perceptual constitution of our lived-world, of how the structures of speaking are related to, embedded in, and affect perception. He sketches a 'gestural' theory of expression, where speaking is "but the refinement, specification, and extension of preverbal behaviours which already bestow a human sense on the world." (Edie, p. 77-8)

It is the expression of our mental states in gestures, expressions of desire, frustration, concern, anger, which gives us the paradigm notion of the 'sign'; the expression of meaning is inseparable bodily expression, Merleau-Ponty contends. The bodily expression signifies itself. "It is the physical appearance of meaning." (Edie, p. 78) The linguistic meaning cannot be found or investigated but through a study of the words in which this meaning is fully incarnate; word and meaning presuppose body. As he says in *Phenomenology of Perception*⁸⁴:

"I become involved in things with my body, they co-exist with me as an incarnate subject ... I do not understand the gestures of others by some act of intellectual interpretation; communication between consciousnesses is not based on the common meaning of their respective experience, for it is equally the basis of that meaning." (Ph P, p. 185)

"It is through my body that I understand other people, just as it is through my body that I perceive 'things'. The meaning of a gesture thus 'understood' is not behind it, it is intermingled with the structure of the world outlined by the gesture, and which I take up upon my account." (Ph P, p. 186)

Verbal 'gesticulation' ... aims at a mental setting which is not given to every body, and which it is its task to communicate. But here what nature does not provide, cultural background does. Available meanings, in other words former acts of expression, establish between speaking subjects a common world, to which the words being actually uttered in their novelty refer, as does the gesture to the perceptible world. And the meaning of speech is nothing other than the way in which it handles this linguistic world or in which it plays modulations on the keyboard of acquired meanings." (Ph P, p. 186)

We find in these writings of Merleau-Ponty the notion of a level of *meaning* in speech, which is more fundamental and more primitive than that of translatable conceptual thought, and a primitive phonemic process which terminates in the production of *words*. (Edie, p. 82)

⁸⁴ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962), *Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by C. Smith. London. Routledge. Here referred to as Ph P.

“If speech presupposed thought, we could not understand ... why the most familiar thing appears indeterminate as long as we have not recalled its name, why the thinking subject himself is in a kind of ignorance of his thoughts so long as he has not formulated them for himself, or even spoken and written them, as shown by the example of so many writers who begin a book without knowing exactly what they are going to put into it ... we present our thought to ourselves through internal or external speech ... The denomination of objects does not follow upon recognition; it is itself recognition. When I fix my eyes on an object in the half-light, and say: ‘It’s a brush’, there is not in my mind the concept of a brush, under which I assume the object ... but the word bears the meaning, and, by imposing it on the object, I am conscious of reaching the object.” (Ph P, p. 177)

And, as Merleau-Ponty says with reference to Piaget: *“for the child the thing is not known until it is named, the name is the essence of the thing and resides in it on the same footing as its colour and its form ... the word, far from being the mere sign of objects and meanings, inhabits things and is the vehicle of meanings.” (Ph P, p. 178)*

There is in speech a taking up of others’ thought, a reflection in others, an ability to think according to others, which enriches our thoughts, “the meaning of words must be ... induced by the words themselves, ... their conceptual meaning must be formed by a kind of deduction from a gestural meaning, which is immanent in speech”; and it is a certain ‘style’ of this speech which provides the first draft of its meaning. Thought is in speech, in listening and reading, as well as in speaking and writing. (Ph P, p. 179) The orator, for example, does not speak before speaking, nor even by speaking; his speech is his thought. And generally, the word is part of the speaker’s equipment and it has a certain location in his / her linguistic world; there is only one means of representing it, just by uttering it; just as the artist has only one means of representing the work on which he is engaged: By doing it. (Ph P. p. 180)

Hence, speech is not the ‘sign’ of thought, as smoke betraying fire; the sense is held in the word, and the word is the external existence of the sense. Word and speech become the presence of thought in the phenomenal world, not as its clothing but as its token, its body. (Ph P, p. 182) “Thought is no ‘internal’ thing, and does not exist independently of the world, and of words. What misleads us ... and causes us to believe in a thought which exists for itself prior to expression, is thought already constituted and expressed, which we can silently

recall to ourselves, and through which we acquire the illusion of inner life.” (Ph P, p. 183)
Thought and expression are constituted simultaneously.

“The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture contains it. This is what makes communication possible ... What I communicate with primarily is not ‘representations’ or thought, but a speaking subject, with a certain style of being and with the ‘world’ at which he directs his aim.” (Ph P, p. 183)

The spoken word is a gesture, and its meaning, a world. (Ph P, p. 184)

The relation of the word-sound to the meaning cannot be purely ‘conventional’: Language practice is conventionalized, but conventions are a late form of relationship between men. (Edie p. 80) Different languages can speak the same things; yet there always remains, beneath these patterned sounds enabling one to think conceptually, “an untranslatable, primitive level of meaning distinctive of that language and expressive of its primordial melody intonation and poetic ‘chant’”. (Edie, p. 81)

Every language is equally ‘natural’ and equally conventional; “it is natural to man to speak, but no particular use of speech apparatus, no particular natural language is inscribed in human nature”. What distinguishes one language from another occur on a deeper level than that of vocabulary and syntax. One cannot learn a language by looking up the meanings of words in a lexicon, for the simple reason that one must already know the meanings of words in order to begin to use a dictionary. A child does not learn words one by one, and the adult speaker does not use words to ‘translate’ his clear and distinct interior thought into an external representation of it. (Edie, p. 82)

“We may speak several languages”, Merleau-Ponty says, “but one of them always remains the one in which we live. In order completely to assimilate a language, it would be necessary to make the world which it expresses one’s own, and one never does belong to two worlds at once.” (Ph P, p. 187) The term ‘world’ here, he emphasizes, is not a mere manner of speaking: “it means that the ‘mental’ or cultural life borrows its structure from natural life and that the thinking subject must have its basis in the subject incarnate.” (Ph P, p. 193)

“The meaning of the word is not contained in the word as sound. But the human body is defined in terms of its property of appropriating, in an indefinite series of discontinuous acts, significant cores which transcend and transfigure its natural powers. This act of transcendence is first encountered in the acquisition of a pattern of behaviour, then in the mute communication of gesture; it is through the same power that the body opens itself to some kind of conduct and makes it understood to external witnesses.” (Ph P, p. 193)

It might be said that languages, i.e. constituted systems of vocabulary and syntax, empirically existing means of expression, “are both the repository and residue of acts of speech, in which unformulated significance not only finds the means of being conveyed outwardly, but moreover acquires existence for itself, and is genuinely created as significance.” (Ph P, p. 197) But, in the last analysis, it is the body, which becomes the thought, or intention, that signifies for us: “it is the body which points out, and which speaks; so much we have learnt in this chapter.” (Ph P, p. 197) The body is not an object: “I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess my experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a ‘natural subject’, a provisional sketch of my total being.” (Ph P, p. 198)

In this way Merleau-Ponty discovers and pays attention to, in the words of Edie, “what no philosopher from Plato on down ever had any interest in, namely, the level of meaning which exists just on the level of the phonemic patterns that are capable of being accepted ... by that language’s native speakers.” (Edie, p. 83)

Let these statements serve as a preamble to the lecture course of 1949-50.

5.3 The Child’s Acquisition of Language

The mentioned Sorbonne-course, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language* (CAL)⁸⁵ represents, according to Edie, an important step in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about speech and language. “While it is itself the culmination of a number of courses and preparatory studies which led up to it, it introduces themes which will be taken up one by one in later, more detailed studies. It presents us with the program for research in the philosophy of

⁸⁵ For French edition, see “La conscience et l’acquisition du langage,” in *MerleauPonty à la Sorbonne: Résumé de cours 1949-1952*. Grenoble, Cynara, 1988.

language which he was to prosecute from this time onward until his death.” (Eddie in Foreword CAL, p. xii.) He addresses himself to the development of the child’s speech, such as it was documented by psychologists at the time of his lecturing (Gustave Guillaume, Jean Piaget, William Stern, Kurt Goldstein and others), but interprets these psychological studies in the perspective of his phenomenological conception of language and speech in general.

During its first months, the child cries, makes expressive movements, utters sounds. It begins to babble. “One must consider this babbling as the ancestor of human communication (*langage*)”, Merleau-Ponty maintains. (CAL, p. 11) It exhibits an extreme richness and diversity and comprises phonemes of every conceivable variety, many of which do not exist in the language that is spoken in the child’s *Umwelt*. It is a polymorphous and spontaneous form of communication, in which all the natural possibilities of the human organism are used to make sounds. It reaches its culmination between the age of six and twelve months (and exists to some extent even in deaf-mute children). To the extent that it can be qualified as imitation, it remains rudimentary, as the child does not grasp the meaning of that which is imitated.⁸⁶ When, at the age of two, the child moves from babbling to gradually learning to say its first words, it first of all picks up the peculiar intonations, the conversational tone, ‘the melody of the phrases’. The child tries, as it were, to speak ‘in general’. The number and quality of the phonemes the child is capable of uttering, and the rhythm and frequency with which they are used, is greatly restricted, however. (CAL, p. 11)

From these observations Merleau-Ponty draws some conclusions: “Language is the indissoluble extension of all physical activity, and at the same time it is quite new in relation to that physical activity. Speech emerges from the ‘total language’ as constituted by gestures, mimicries, etc.” But speech transforms; the organs of phonation are used for a function unnatural for them. In effect language has no organs. All the organs, which contribute to language already have another function. “Language introduces itself as a superstructure, ... as a phenomenon that is already a witness to another order. The problem is to know how it has passed from a quasi-biological activity to one which is non-biological, but which nevertheless presupposes a whole movement, or activity that has integrated in into dialogue.” (CAL, p. 12) The facial expressions of the very young child are quite

⁸⁶ The same relationship exists, says Merleau-Ponty, between babbling and language as between scribbling and drawing.

precocious, Merleau-Ponty notes; it laughs and smiles, demonstrates satisfaction, but also answers the smile of those around it. “This already presumes a relationship with others, which precedes the language that will appear in this context.”⁸⁷ This is why it is artificial to consider the first words as spontaneous. Long before they appeared, there were in the child attitudinal responses. There is, from birth, a capacity for relating to the external world that grows during the first weeks of life. The ability to mimic is considerably enhanced, as is hearing and vision. (CAL, p. 12-13)

Does the appearance of the first word signify the sudden consciousness of the assign-signified relationship? There are several reasons why this seems to be difficult to accept. The child is far from possessing the idea of the sign in the way an adult understands it. “For the adult, the sign is a convention. For the child, up to six or seven years old, it is a property, a quality of the thing.” (CAL, p. 18) The child’s first words are often distinct from adult words. Often they are uttered according to their onomatopoeic value. Often a single word will designate a group of things (for example ‘music’ not only for music, but also military, and soldiers). Neither does the child make any generalizations. Though child possesses a ‘syncretic’ view of the situation, which allows it to assimilate things in some order. (CAL., p. 18)

One must be wary of all artificial divisions into ‘successive stages’, Merleau-Ponty maintains. And it appears that, “from the beginning, all the possibilities are inscribed in the expressive manifestations of the child. There is never anything absolutely new, but there are anticipations, regressions, and retentions of older elements in new forms. This development, where on the one hand, everything is sketched out in advance, and which, on the other hand, proceeds according to a discontinuously progressive series, denies intellectualist as well as empiricist theories.” (CAL, p. 21)⁸⁸

Merleau-Ponty approaches language (*langue*) at the level phonemes: Phonemes are elements of language, by themselves deprived of signification and meaning, which differentiate one word from another. But that they have no signification by themselves does not mean that

⁸⁷ “The Child’s relation with Others” (*Les relations avec autrui chez l’enfant*) was a separate theme dealt with in the Sorbonne lecture course. For English translation, see also Ph. P., p. 3-51.

⁸⁸ See also Ph. P., p. 3-51.

they are insignificant. (CAL, p. 22) On the contrary, the phonemic system is an irreducible but indispensable element of language. This becomes clear in the transition from babbling to the articulation of words. Suddenly,

The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, ed. by J. E. Edie. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1964 and the French edition in *Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne: Résumé de cours 1949-1952*.

Merleau-Ponty says (with reference to Roman Jakobson), the richness of babbling disappears: the child loses not only ‘the unused languages in his language, but also many of those that would be useful’. From the moment phonemes serve to differentiate one word from another, the child manifests a need to appropriate their new value, to gradually acquire their system of opposition and of original succession. The child’s capacity to pronounce depends not on its capacity to articulate, but on the acquisition of phonemic contrasts and their significative value. (CAL, p. 23)

The phoneme is, according to Merleau-Ponty, neither something physical, nor a psychological, but a value with an abstract and fictive importance comparable to that of money.⁸⁹ It is the phonemic system that make the language of a particular human community possible, that accounts for the style of this language, and as such it can be defined neither by words nor by ideas; its signification is not direct but oblique, working in a roundabout way. “Reflection on the phoneme allows one to surpass the distinction between sign and concept. Such a reflection allows one to determine the order (neither intellectual nor imitative) to which language acquisition belongs.” (CAL, p. 22) It permits one to characterize languages, just as it is possible to characterize authors by reference to the style of their works. (CAL. p. 31)

It is by way of the phonemic style that Merleau-Ponty understands imitation: How is the child able to take any gesture or word as a *model* and produce an equivalent gesture or word? He answers his question by saying that the phonemic system is like a register of scales for

⁸⁹ By comparing the phoneme to money, Merleau-Ponty seems to say that it is a ‘token’, functioning, for instance, like a Bankcard giving you access to your cash deposits, provided you know your personal pin-code.

the child. What it hears and reproduces is not a perceptual performance, but a particular usage of scales determined by the surrounding phonemic possibilities. The child reproduces these scales without analyzing them. Analysis comes much later. (CAL, p. 32) Merleau-Ponty thereby seems to contend that it is intentionality, our directedness towards objects in the physical *Umwelt*—and ‘desire’ for these objects—that provide the key to imitation: “Before making a movement, we do not represent this movement to ourselves; we do not envision the muscular contractions necessary for effecting it ... Rather, there is a certain attraction exercised by the object: the goal that we fix for ourselves.” We represent for ourselves not the movement toward an object but the desired object itself. Similarly, when speaking, we do not represent the sentences to ourselves before pronouncing them. “It is either the words of the interlocutor or our own words that call up what follows. (CAL, p. 32) Imitation (of others and of oneself) is founded on something besides the representation of movements, Merleau-Ponty presumes.

“However, what is the intermediary between the perception that we have of ourselves and the visual perception of others, if it is not this representation of movements?” (CAL, p. 33) Struck by (as he says) ‘a profound and fertile idea’, he contends that we are conscious not of our own body but of things; that we are almost ignorant of the modalities of our actions. But our bodies move towards things. From this follows that imitation must be understood as an encounter of two actions around the same object. “*To imitate is not to act like others, but to obtain the same result as others.*”⁹⁰(CAL, p. 33) As to speech imitation aims at the global result of any gesture, not the detail of the gesture. It arises from the child’s directedness towards things, when circumstances make it turn to look in the same direction as the adult.⁹¹ When the child turns its head in the same direction as the adult, this movement is different from that of the adult in view of their different positions in relation to the same object. Though the adult’s look indicates a goal that the child adopts in turn. (CAL, p. 34) Merleau-Ponty reminds us that we make use of our body as a means of systematically going towards objects: Imitation can be explained to the extent that other people utilize the same bodily means as we do in order to obtain the same goal; it cannot be explained otherwise. It is from this imitation of ‘results’ that subsequently the imitation of Others becomes possible.

⁹⁰ Italics L.A.

⁹¹ Merleau-Ponty notices that such instances of imitation can even be observed in dogs accustomed to their master.

Little by little in the child's development, the adult becomes the most imposing element in the world, the measure of all things. He / she represents for the child its most essential self (*moi*). By imitation, in this sense of 'sharing intentionality' with other persons, of joining their directedness towards things in the *Umwelt*, the child 'takes up particular representations on its own'. It recognizes other people in himself / herself. Other people are the universal intermediaries between the world and the child. Imitation in the sense of 'intentionally sketching out a gesture with one's body, is, according to Merleau-Ponty, a delayed function. It places in question not the object itself but rather a *sign*, an expression of the object. In such imitation, other people are first considered not as body but as behaviour. (CAL, p. 35) When, at this later state in its development, the child imitates the acts of other people, it experiences its own body as 'a permanent and global power' capable of realizing gestures endowed with a certain meaning. Imitation, conceived of in this way, presupposes the apprehension of a behaviour in other people and, on the side of the self, a non-contemplative, but motor subject, an 'I can' Merleau-Ponty says (with reference to Husserl). The perception of behaviour in other people and the perception of the body itself by a global *corporeal schema*, are two aspects of a single organization, which realizes the identification of the self with others.

The role of imitation is primordial. In effect, the self and others are entities that the child dissociates only belatedly. The child starts out in terms of a total identification with others. (CAL, p. 36) The child is completely oriented toward others and toward things; it confuses itself with them. With his exclusive interest in the external world, it takes even that which exists only for itself as reality. It is other people who occupy the principal position for the child. The child considers himself only as 'another other'. The centre of his interest is other people. Other people are essential for the child. They are the mirror of the child, and that to which its 'self' is attached. (CAL, p. 37)

The child's egocentrism manifests itself in the development of language: There is a total lack of division between self and others, but if one of these had a privileged signification, it would probably be others. (CAL, p. 37) The first words of the child concern other people, as much and more than himself ... his consciousness is consciousness not for the self (*pour soi*), but rather with others. (CAL. P. 38) The delayed appearance of the use of his own name indicates the primordial importance of other people. It is used much later than the names of

people in the child's surroundings. When it finally makes use of its own name, it is above all to mark its place besides others. The evolution of pronouns is equally tardy, marking the persistence of the confusion between self and other people. (CAL, p. 38)

The child finally passes from imitation of acts, or results, to the imitation of other human beings, their total behaviour or way of being: When taking on the behaviour of others, one is obliged to take on the total *attitude* corresponding to that behaviour. One automatically takes on the voice of the person whose gesture one is imitating, 'the style' of this person. Imitation permeates beyond conscious limits and becomes global. It is a kind of superceding that permits the appropriation of new comportment structures, including that of language. (CAL, p. 40) In order to understand the acquisition of language, Merleau-Ponty summarizes, "we have studied imitation only to discover that imitation is not preceded by a coming to consciousness of other people, and an identification with them; it is on the contrary the act by which identification with other people is produced." (CAL. P. 50)

Concerning language, consciousness and thought Merleau-Ponty contends that it is language, as a phenomenon of expression, which constitutes consciousness. From this perspective, to learn to speak is to coexist more and more with the environment. It is living in this environment, which incites the child to take on language and thought for his own means. Thus, acquisition of language does not resemble the decoding of a text for which one possesses the code and key; rather, it is a deciphering where the decipherer does not know the key to the code. The decipherer helps himself by means of an 'internal critique', an apprehension of the frequency of certain signs, their arrangements, words, if there are any, that is, its structure, but also an external criticism, the apprehension of the situation of its putting into circulation, and the situation of the speaker (*l'émetteur*). (CAL, p. 50-1) There is always an intuitive element that intervenes in this operation. It is a creative operation: the child, the decipherer, goes beyond the given elements and grasps the significance of the whole. This is the moment the totality of signs, the style of what has been emitted can no longer mean anything but one single thing, when *it tends toward signification*. The child learns to speak because the surrounding language calls up its thought, because it is enticed by its style until a single meaning emerges from the whole. Meaning is immanent to living speech as it is immanent to the gestures by which we point out objects. (CAL, p. 51) Language is pregnant for the child when it hears it used. "Hazy at first, the signification

articulates itself and becomes more and more precise. It is not a question of a phenomenon on the level of pure thought or understanding. It is the *value of use* that defines language. Signification is preceded by instrumental usage. (CAL. P. 52) The child amuses itself by its ability to produce and verify the signification of a word by repeating it. As with play in general—which consists of adopting different roles—language as play allows the child to gain access to more and more numerous situations. By repeating the word, the child extends its own behaviour, by utilizing language as a manifestation of its imaginary life. (CAL, p. 53)

Granted that language (*langage*) has the threefold function of representation, of expression and of appealing to other people, it allows also for self-expression: The child's movement toward speech is a constant appeal to others. The child recognizes in the other another one itself. Language is the means of effecting reciprocity with the other. This is a question of vital operation and not only an intellectual act. The representative function is an aspect of the total act by which we enter into communication with others. (CAL, p. 31) As such language represents a surpassing—a transcending—operated by the subject on the significations at its disposal, and stimulated by the usage made of words in the environment. One cannot consider it simply as a container for thought; it is necessary to see language as an instrument for conquest of self by contact with others. (CAL, p. 63)

All speech is a double action. When I listen to another speak, I am not silent; already I anticipate his spoken words, and I already have my answer, at least in outline form. Inversely, for the person who is speaking, there is an implicit belief in my comprehension. A 'field of individually spoken words' establishes itself between us. The function of language is only a particular case of the general relation between self and others, which is the relation between two consciousnesses, of which each one projects *itself in the other*. Speech must be considered as a total structure, a system by which one can attain communication with others. I exist through language in a relationship with others. (CAL, p. 68)

In his attempt to understand how thought inhabits language, how the meaning inhabits the word. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the 'productivity' of language as a totality of instruments for our relationships with people. It reflects to what degree we are capable of inventions. It

is a manifestation of the link that we have with other people and with ourselves. (CAL, p. 73)

The internal structure of a particular language carries with it its signification. It is a system of a limited number of unities serving to express an unlimited number of things. The totality of meaning is never fully rendered; there is an immense mass of implications, even in the most explicit of languages; or rather, nothing is ever completely expressed, nothing exempts the subject who is listening from taking the initiative of giving an interpretation. (CAL. P. 29)

The word is like a tool (he says with implicit reference to Heidegger), defined by a certain usage even though we are unable to give an exact conceptual formula to its usage. (CAL, p. 86) But the totality of words of a given language is not comparable to that of hammers and other tools with finite number of uses. It should rather be likened to a piano “out of which one can draw an indefinite number of melodies.” The language of a given peach community is not made up of words, each of which is endowed with one or several meanings. Each word has its meaning only inasmuch it is sustained in this signification by all the others. The only reality is the *Gestalt* of language. In order for a word to endure in respect of its meaning, it must be supported by others. (CAL. P. 92)

In language, the consciousness of signification is not exhaustive; it is less behind the sign than mixed up with it. Every isolated word presupposes a present state of dialogue. Each sentence is the modulation of a total, commonly held power of expression. To know how to play the piano consists not of being able to execute some pieces but of having a general means of translating written notes into music. To know how to speak is not to have a finite number of pure signs and pure significations at one’s disposal. As one speaks of the exchange-value of a coin, one could speak of the value of words; each word can be exchanged for an infinite number of objects. There is a ‘polysemy’ of words as there is a plurality of possible usages of the same piece of money. At each moment, the meaning is an element of a total configuration. In this light, one can consider language as an aspect of what ‘cultural’ sociologists call ‘culture’. (CAL, p. 96)

Language is wholly the will to understand and to be understood. As such it is not a transcendent reality with respect to all speaking subjects; nor is it a phantasm formed by the

individual. It is a manifestation of human inter-subjectivity. (CAL. P. 97) One cannot absolutely distinguish language from the speaking subject. The function of language is to reveal thought, not to serve as a material means for the expression of thought; language and thought are only two moments of one and the same reality.

(CAL, p. 99)

We are thrown into language (*langue*), situated in language (*langage*), and engaged by it (*langage*), in a process of rational explanation with other people. (CAL, p. 102) Language makes thought, as much as it is made of thought. Thought inhabits language and language is its body. This mediation of the objective and the subjective, of the interior and of the exterior, we find in language when getting close enough to it. (CAL, p. 102)

Summarizing, with the help of Eide: The child learns a language as an adult learns the style of a hitherto unknown work of art or of music. Speaking originates in a personal affective and emotive gesticulation, which only little by little, through a play of diacritical oppositions sufficient to distinguish one phoneme, one sound, one word from another, begins to take on an increasingly explicit and determinate sense. It is through the most global and generic categories that one begins to think, and, through these, one descends only gradually to the clear and distinct ideas of a fully reflexive language. (Eide, p. 86-7)

Learning a language is grasping a language as a whole, as a style of expression which imposes itself and which contains an 'inner logic' that is grasped by an *esprit aveugle* prior to any ability to conceptualize the meanings for which it stands or which enables us to express. Beneath the level of *words*, and beneath the level of *sentences*, spoken language is a coherent system of phonemic variations, which render the existence of words and phrases themselves possible. Words and phrases are composed of phonemic signs, which, in themselves, do not mean anything at all, but are, rather, only diacritical marks necessary to distinguish one wordsound from another according to certain patterns. Language (conceived of in this way as a phonemic system), carries within it meaning, a global reference to the whole world of experience, capable of expressing an unlimited number of things, which only gradually take on a specific sense. What the child means to say by such phonemic gesticulation is never fully expressed. There always remains an immense of subunderstood meaning, and it does so even in the most articulate, adult language, and adult speech is,

according to Merleau-Ponty, only a continuation and gradual explication of the original phonemic babbling. (Edie, p. 87)

The study of the acquisition of language leads us back to an activity that is prior to cognition, properly so called. The acquisition of language is the acquisition of an 'open system' of expression, capable of being used as the instrument to designate, denote, refer, and speak about meanings transcendent to itself. But this system has an immanent sense to the speaker prior to and independent of its categorial, semiological, functions. Language is acquired not by means of any genuine intellectual operation (which would require an awareness of language as a sign of something else), but by means of a kind of 'habituation' to others through one's own body and its phonetic possibilities.

The fact that words carry, beneath their conceptual meanings and forms, an immanent existential meaning⁹², a value of use or affective value which is not merely rendered by them but which inhabits them, leads Merleau-Ponty to question the possibility or validity of a universal grammar which could ultimately dispense with the vicissitudes of empirical speech. (Edie, p. 88)

In learning a language, the child first grasps some sound or sequence of sounds as 'opposed' to all the others; it makes the most general, abstract opposition first, and then, little by little, the more specific contrasts opposable according to the phonological rules observed in his environment. That this can be observed in the learning of all the various languages of the human race testifies why language is such a difficult and 'ambiguous' instrument for the expression of meaning.

For a comparison Edie refers to Hegel, who liked to say that *Die Sprache ist das Dasein des Geistes*. The relations between consciousness and language are such that consciousness cannot become fully conscious of itself and its world except through language. The spirit requires language to *exist*. The spirit, which exists in a natural language is not a sovereign spirit, is not a god who could view the whole of creation all at once, from every point of view, without perspective, without emphasis. The spirit which speaks is embodied, and the

⁹² See Ph P, p. 182 & 193.

problems of the relation of language to meaning are our only route of access to the problems of the relation of body to mind.” (Edie, p. 88-9)

5.4 Later writings and Conclusions

In Merleau-Ponty’s later writings language becomes a model of the whole of our experience, and linguistics the paradigm of a universal, philosophical anthropology. (Edie, p. 89) But, first of all, he returns to the role of perception:

*“The perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence. This thesis does not destroy either rationality or the absolute. It only tries to bring them down to earth.”*⁹³ (Primacy, p. 13)

Raising the question of the relationships between intellectual and perceptual consciousness, Merleau-Ponty wanted to show, already in *Phenomenology of Perception*, how perception possesses an ‘ideal of truth’ which it cannot at each moment fully account for but which is nevertheless ‘the horizon of its operations’ (Edie, p. 91) “We never cease living in the world of perception,” he reiterates in an unpublished text and prospectus of work, “but we go beyond it in critical thought—almost to the point of forgetting the contribution of perception to our idea of truth.”⁹⁴ (Primacy, p. 3)

It seems to him that knowledge and communication with others not only are original formulations with respect to the perceptual life, but also that they preserve and continue our perceptual life even while transforming it. Knowledge and communication sublimate rather than suppress our incarnation, and the characteristic operation of the mind is in the movement by which we recapture our corporeal existence and use it to symbolize instead of merely to co-exist. (Primacy, p. 7)

Perception is a nascent *logos*; it teaches us, outside all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself; it summons us to the tasks of knowledge and action. And this is “not a

⁹³Address to the *Société française de philosophie*, November 23, 1946, English translation in *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology*, here referred to as Primacy.

⁹⁴ “An Unpublished text by M. Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work”.

question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, but of assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the consciousness of rationality.“ (Primacy, p. 25)

As demonstrated, in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty speech, language and body make up a whole. To conclude, by returning to *The Phenomenology of Perception*:

My body is the seat or rather the very actuality of the phenomenon of expression, and there the visual and auditory experiences, for example are pregnant one with another, and their expressive value is the ground of the ante-predicative unity of the perceived world, and, through it, the verbal expression and intellectual significance. My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehension'. (Ph P, p. 235)

It is my body which gives significance not only to the natural object, but also to cultural objects like words ... Before becoming the indication of a concept it is first of all an event which grips my body, and this grip circumscribes the area of significance to which it has reference ... The word is then indistinguishable from the attitude it induces, and it is only when its presence is prolonged that it appears in the guise of an external image, and its meaning as thought. Words have a physiognomy because we adopt towards them, as towards each person, a certain form of behaviour, which makes its complete appearance the moment each word is given. (Ph P, p. 235-6)

At birth the child finds natural objects around him / her like meteorites from another planet. The child appropriates them, and learns to use them as others do, because the body image ensures the immediate correspondence of what he sees done and what he himself does, and because in that way the implement is fixed in his mind as a determinate manipulandum, and other people as centres of human action. There is one particular cultural object, which is destined to play a crucial role in the perception of other people: language. In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator ... we are collaborators for each other in consummate

reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world. (Ph P, p. 354)

When, at about twelve years old (as maintains Piaget), the child achieves the *cogito*, reaches the truth of rationalism by discovering himself / herself both as a point of view on the world and also as called upon to transcend this point of view, and to construct an objectivity at the level of judgment, then begins “that struggle between consciousnesses, each one of which, as Hegel says, seeks the death of the other.” But for the struggle ever to begin, and for each consciousness to be capable of suspecting the alien presences, which it negates, “all must necessarily have some common ground and be mindful of their peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood.” (Ph P., p. 355)

5.5 The Child speaks!

What has been said may pass as a summary of Merleau-Ponty’s language philosophy. But how do his theses relate to the process of growing up, and the adopted scheme of Aristotle, as it has been presented in Chapter 2? And how do his teachings concerning language, speech and body comply with what has been said on Child and World’?

With reference to the conclusions of Chapter 2 (see Fig. 2:1-3):

Learning to speak is actualization of innate and acquired potentialities by ‘doing’. It is ‘bringing to the fore a capacity inherent in a complex being’, a certain *eidōs*, the speaker, a human producer of bodily gestures that can be attributed signification and meaning.

How is that achieved? Merleau-Ponty suggests some answers:

Learning to speak is a process propelled by drive: a desire, a tending to, or ‘perceptive taking hold of’ things in the *Umwelt*, by means of acts of uttering.

The Child (in fact already the Infant Child) adopts the ‘acoustic Gestalt’ (or acoustic *eidōs*) of the speakers in the surroundings: the intonation, rhythm of speech and other characteristics of their idiom.

The Child is joining the perceptive attentiveness, or directedness towards things talked about by the speakers of its *Umwelt*.

The Child learns to make use of the discriminating phonemes of his / her mother tongue, to deal with words in acts of speaking, 'bodily gestures' exhibiting a certain and acquired style of uttering.

These are distinct moments in the process of the Child's learning to speak, which permeate each other in the forming of a whole, the process of acquisition of language. They combine to produce *imitation* as understood by Merleau-Ponty, the Child's adopting of communicative comportment in a wide sense (*langage*), as well as the speaking practice of a certain linguistic community (*langue*), that of the Child's *Umwelt*, his / her mother tongue. To imitate is for Merleau-Ponty 'not to act like others, but to obtain the same result as others'. Aiming at the global result of any gesture, not its details, it arises from the Child's directedness towards things; when circumstances make it turn its gaze in the same direction as an adult person, the look of the latter indicates a goal that the Child makes his / her own. Though how does it come that 'the aiming for some result', produces the same bodily comportment in the Child as it does in the adult? Merleau-Ponty does not elaborate this point. Is it because the aimed for result is contained in the comportment compatible with this result, and vice versa? That speaking, at least such as it can be observed in the young Child, is a goal-oriented activity containing its own goals, an example of *praxis* to speak with Aristotle: a kind of 'doing' (or behaviour), not a 'making' (*poiesis*)⁹⁵? If this is an appropriate interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's thesis concerning imitation in learning to speak, it offers an example of *habitation*: the taking on of a certain and characteristic way of doing things, a settled and more or less regular comportment that is hard to give up once it has been acquired; a bodily posture or attitude, producing more or less automatic reactions to specific situations which at the same time can be said to be a constitution of the mind, and (not the least) which—although it appears to be a 'second nature'—can be taken on or off, like a dress or piece of attire. Habituation (which will be a theme dealt with in the next

⁹⁵ As Aristotle says in *The Nichomachean Ethics*: Whereas making aims at an end different from the act of making, in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself, "doing well is in itself an end." Aristotle 1996 [1140a]

chapter) in this way also carries an idea of inclination, bent, orientation or stance towards things and other human beings in the *Umwelt*, a way of ‘having’ things.⁹⁶

When Merleau-Ponty says that the look of the adult indicates a goal that is assumed also by the Child, he implicitly refers to ‘intentionality’ as this notion has generally been understood among phenomenologist writers, as the ‘having some object’. Speaking is sharing with another human being his / her preoccupation with certain things (‘talked about’).

Learning to speak is to attune oneself to the practice of a human speech community, by adopting a certain, predominant and perceivable phonemic style of uttering. As such it is learning to make use of a system of discriminating phonemes developed within this community. Although this language (his / her mother tongue) cannot be likened to a set of hammers (or other tools), it carries within it some degree of instrumentality.

As Merleau-Ponty says (in a Paper presented at the *Colloque international de phénoménologie* of 1951), the speaking power the child assimilates in learning a language is not the sum total of morphological, syntactical, and lexical meanings. These attainments are neither necessary nor sufficient to acquire a language, because “once the act of speaking is acquired it presupposes no comparison between what I want to express and the conceptual arrangements of the means of expression I make use of. The words and turns of phrase needed to bring my significative intention to expression recommend themselves to me, when I am speaking ... only by a certain style of speaking from which they arise and according to which they are organized without my having to represent them to myself ... my spoken words surprise me myself and teach me my thought. Organized signs have their immanent

⁹⁶ Learning to speak as habituation is in fact acknowledged by Merleau-Ponty in a subsequent Sorbonne lecture, dealing with the Child’s relations with Others: “The system that is speech is learned by the child, not at all by genuine intellectual operation ... Rather, what is involved is a kind of *habituation*, a use of language as a tool or instrument.” The child’s assimilation of the linguistic system of his environment, is comparable to the acquisition of any habit whatever he contends: the learning of a structure of conduct. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 99). Further on in the lecture, he describes the acquisition of language as a phenomenon of identification. “To learn to speak is to learn to play a series of roles, to assume a series of conducts and linguistic gestures.” (Ibid., p. 109)

meaning, which does not arise from the 'I think' but from the 'I am able to do'.⁹⁷ (Phen. Lang., p. 85)

The Child speaks. In respect of what has been said in this and earlier chapters this means (see Fig. 5:1):

(1) The Child as a producer of bodily gestures has entered a relation of perceptive attentiveness towards things ('talked about') together with Others, a relation of shared 'preoccupation'. The relation between the Child as speaker and what is being talked about is one of 'intending. Mediating between Child and the thing talked about is language, a system of discriminating phonemes developed within a speech community, that of the Child's mother tongue. Phonemes combine to form linguistic tokens / words. It is words as tokens (and bodily gestures), which provide access to the things talked about, certain topics of discourse, the shared preoccupations. The function of language is accommodating for proper speech comportment, recommending a specific use of the available tokens. When Merleau-Ponty describes language as an 'instrument', it is likened to a piano. But, adopting his theses concerning the role of the body, it seems that this instrument (the language as it has been 'inbodied') includes also the speaker-the Child, as it is he / she who plays. Speaker and language, make up a whole: It is human Body-cum gestures / words that produces Speech.

(2) The Child is dealing with words in acts of saying, which are (as Heidegger says) acts of 'seeing': pointing out, predicating and / or communicating. Saying is letting someone see, a sharing with another person something that has been pointed out; as such it is taking part in discourse, an articulation of intelligibility, expressed in conformance with a totality of significations. Constitutive for discourse as seeing, is *hearing*, listening to another person. When hearing the discourse of another, the Child understands what is said, 'is with this other person'. In discourse what is said is drawn from what the talk is about. What is talked about is taken out of its hiddenness; it is discovered. If saying means to point out, to show, to let appear, to offer, to hand over, revealing and concealing, then that which is shown or handed

⁹⁷ Published in English as "On the Phenomenology of Language" in *Phenomenology, Language and Sociology: Selected Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty*, ed. by J. O'Neill, London: Heineman 1974, p. 84. Here referred to as Phen. Lang.

down to the Child by way of language is, in the final analysis, the world.⁹⁸ Acts of saying are acts of discovering things in a world as disclosed.

According to Merleau-Ponty's way of understanding language and speech, it is the body that points out, which speaks. (Ph P, p. 197) That speaking implies pointing at, showing, letting appear follows from his treatment of words (linguistic tokens) as gestures: "The spoken word is a gesture, and its meaning, a world" (Ph P, p. 184). Or, as he says in the mentioned Paper at the *Colloque international de phénoménologie*:

"Speech is comparable to a gesture because what it is charged with expressing will be in the same relation to it as the goal is to the gesture which intends it." (Phen Lang, p. 86)

"For the speaking subject, to express is to become aware of; he does not express just for others, but also to know himself what he intends." (Phen Lang, p. 87)

To resume the Heideggerian twist of the reasoning: It is through acts of saying that things in the *Umwelt* are discovered, seen, perceived. The Child does not say what it can see, but sees that which he / she can say. It is through acts of saying that the Child asserts, articulates, interprets, and, in the final analysis, understands.

If words as gestures signify—relate to the things talked about—there must be something 'signified', pointed at. Any gesture in this respect aims at something belonging to the world of the speaker, even if we do not always know at *what* it aims in this world.

(3) When the Child speaks he / she perceives ('hears and sees') *the said as uttered*. By uttering, what is said is turned into an object as it were. Due to this attained status of 'objectivity', it enters the kind of relations Husserl refers to when he describes intentionality; acts of speaking are acts of *noesis*, and as such directed at objects and containing meaning (sense / *Sinn*). The said as uttered is taken hold of (by the speaker as well as the listener) as a *percept*; it assumes the form of a type or *eidos*, it can be developed into a *concept*. In other words, the act of speaking can be attributed a content, what Husserl calls a *noema*. The said

⁹⁸ See Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Language, Meaning and Ek-sistence," in *On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1972, p. 25.

as uttered can be contemplated, questioned, charged, abrogated, vindicated, and as such it feeds on into a speaking process. As silent this process is thinking.

If things in the *Umwelt* are discovered through acts of saying, a world must have been disclosed; learning to speak gives the Child access to this totality of references and assignments which Heidegger calls *das Welt*.

Or, to apply a slightly different approach: Learning to speak allows things speak to the Child, telling him / her something about themselves in the Child's own language. And as such they detach themselves against those horizons, which following Husserl constitute the Child's personally acquired life-world of significance and meaning.

Learning to speak is learning to see. For the Child it means access to knowledge *that*, knowledge *why* and knowledge *how*, but only as this knowledge has been articulated, communicated and passed on by the members of a certain speech community. This association between speaking and seeing, speaking and knowing, follows with the phenomenological definition of intentionality as 'being conscious of': to be conscious of—to take hold of things through acts of speaking—is 'knowing with oneself and together with others'.

In a more general sense learning to speak is *acculturation*, the Child's concomitant acquiring of certain beliefs, norms and values, those of his / her fellow beings. This seems to have been acknowledged by MerleauPonty. In his Sorbonne lecture course he refers to Wilhelm von Humboldt's *innere Sprachform*: 'the reflection in language of the world view appropriate to a given culture':

Each language (*langue*) has its own way of expressing different relationships, like time and space. (CAL. p. 75-6)

It is possible to talk about a 'totality of processes and expressions', which are actualized when we are expressing our thought, or understand the thought of other people, a junction of pure thought and of language, which is differentiated according to the manner in which we speak and write, the way we address others or our selves. Between language (the totality of words) and thought there imposes itself a layer of significations, which all presuppose a

certain relationship with the language. It is this kind of non-explicit thought that accounts for the language's *style*.

“Just as an organism, far from realizing all the movements of which its structure renders it capable, adopts among all its defined postures privileged ones that conform to a fundamental organization of his behaviour. So, the systematic form of phonemes used by a linguistic community elaborated by that linguistic community is the best means of expressing its world- view.” (CAL, p. 76)

Certain words are used by the Child before he / she fully understands their signification, somewhat in the way we as adults, when learning a foreign language, use certain locutions we do not know the exact meaning of, but nonetheless feel we know how to apply in particular situations.

“All language is mind. It is a verbal melody, which presupposes an intellectual vigilance. But the mind that governs language is not mind for itself; it is paradoxically a mind that possesses itself only by losing itself in language.” (CAL, p. 77)

There is a mental landscape common to the members of a linguistic community, which the Child must grow into in order to coexist with others in a cultural milieu. (CAL, p. 77)

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6. Habitus—Habituation—Formative imagination

6.1 Introduction

Learning to speak seems to be an example of ‘habituation’, the development of a personal *habitus*, or ‘second nature’, a mode of being and appearing associated with the acquiring of practical and instrumental knowledge, though—as this process has often been understood—without one’s actual knowing. In a broader perspective habituation can be conceived of as *formative imagination*, the adoption of certain attitudes or ways of behaving towards things in the *Umwelt* by way of imitation: by (as it were) the Child’s ‘taking on of the image of an Other and making it an image of Himself / Herself’. This chapter will probe into these, in fact, old ideas. Habitus and habituation are notions appearing in the ethics of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas. Both these authors will be visited. Subsequently, the chapter will show how a contemporary scholar, Pierre Bourdieu, has dealt with habitus. In the vein of thinking of these mentioned authors, some short remarks will be made concerning the importance of style, social distinction and paradigmatic representations— for instance those offered by our contemporary mass-media—in the child’s process of becoming. Attempts will also be made to relate formative imagination to Michael Polanyi’s treatment of skilful performance, the learning of an art, the style of practical *handling* of things. The chapter concludes by trying to relate formative imagination to consciousness and *noesis*, as these notions have been dealt with by E. Husserl. Does it, or does it not contain an element of implicit discourse, a ‘knowing with Oneself and together with Others’? When answering this question Maurice Merleau-Ponty will be revisited.⁹⁹

6.2 Habitus in St Thomas and Aristotle

The idea of habitus is treated by St Thomas Aquinas, with ample references to Aristotle, ‘the philosopher’ in *Summa theologiae*, Questions 49-54. Aquinas there considers the

⁹⁹ As to the notion of habitus in the teachings of Aristotle and Aquinas, and the parallelism between the thinking of these philosophers and that of Bourdieu, I am indebted to G. Rist. Among other contemporary writers who has made use of this “‘pierre philosophale’ socio-anthropologique qui permettrait d’accéder au principe de la transmutation des pratiques sociales passées en un système générateur de pratiques nouvelles adaptée à la fonction—ou au rôle—d’un sujet (ou groupe de sujets),” Rist mentions Panovsky (Rist 1984, p. 202) For Panovsky (1951) it is the principle of a ‘mental habitus’ that links Gothic architecture and Scholasticism.

sources of human acts, the *principia actuum*, and in this way prepares the reader for the consideration of virtues and vices by an analysis of a more general concept under which both these topics fall, that means *habitus* or ‘disposition’. Aristotle is mentioned on every page. As Kenny observes in his introduction, incidental remarks in *De Anima* and *Nicomachean Ethics* are being worked up into an articulate system. (St Thomas Aquinas 1964, p. xix).

Aquinas starts by noting that the Latin word ‘*habitus*’ comes from ‘*habere*’, which means ‘to have’. But it has different senses corresponding to the uses of the verb from it is derived. ‘*Habere*’ means to have, in the sense in which a human being, or something else, possesses something, but ‘*se habere*’ means to be in a certain state, whether absolutely or relatively. (Aquinas 1964, p. 5) With reference to Aristotle, he adds that there are cases where the word stands for something which is more like an activity or a passivity, without being exactly either: “this is when one thing is the adornment or clothing by which the other is adorned or clothed; then the *having* is the relation we have to the things we *have on*.” (Ibid., p. 7)¹⁰⁰ *Habitus* / disposition is what someone has—or not has—in these senses of ‘possession’, ‘being in a certain state’ and ‘having on’. As such it is a source of action. Sources of action are also what he calls human faculties, or capacities (*potentiae*), such as the intellect, the memory, the senses and the will; a *habitus* on the other hand is “a condition of a subject which is in a state of unactualized potentiality either with regard to form or with regard to an operation.” (Ibid. p. xx)

Aquinas tells us that a *habitus* is either good or bad for its possessor. He uses the word over a wide range, including sickness and health, beauty and toughness, virtues such as justice, courage, temperance and charity, vices such as intemperance and insensibility, traits of character; it includes knowledge of principles of logic and scientific facts, knowledge of the Bible, and of foreign languages; included are also beliefs of any kind, gifts of intelligence, memory and imagination and the possession of concepts. (Ibid., p. xx-xxi). Virtues, vices,

¹⁰⁰ As Aristotle says in *Categories* 15: “*Having* is spoken of in a number of ways: having as a state and condition or some other quality (we may be said to have knowledge and virtue), or as a quantity, like the height someone may have ... or as things on the body, like a cloak or tunic ... or as a container, as with the measure of wheat or the jar of wine... or as a possession (for we are said to have a house or a field). One is also said to have a wife, and a wife a husband, but this seems to be a very strange way of ‘having’, since by having a wife we signify nothing other than that he is married to her.” (Aristotle 1984, p. 24)

and traits of character are obviously dispositions. So are also, although disputably, beliefs, including the true well-founded beliefs that constitute knowledge. “The knowledge of languages and the possession of concepts are skills which would more naturally be called capacities than dispositions; still they are clearly dispositional rather than episodic properties.” (Ibid. p. xxi) Aquinas tells us that different men have different habitus, and that animals do not have habitus, although the effects of training in them look like it. So a swallow does not need a habitus to build a nest, nor does a spider to weave the web.

Habitus / disposition is to be looked upon, says Aquinas, as an intermediate state between capacity and action. (Ibid. p. xxi) “A disposition may be connected with action either intrinsically or by reason of the subject of which it is a disposition. Intrinsically, every disposition is in some way connected with action ... [Though] a disposition is connected not only with the nature of its possessor, but also ... with an action, in so far as the action is either the goal of the nature or something leading to that goal.” (Ibid., p. 17) A disposition as an intermediate state is necessary only if the possessor of the state is distinct from the realization of the capacity—and stands to it in a relation of potentiality to actuality—if it is possible for the ‘unactualized subject’ to actualize its potentialities in more than one way, and with regard to more than one object, and if there are more than one element whose presence is necessary for the subject to actualize its potentiality in one or several ways which are open to it. (Ibid. p. 21) Hence, habitus, such as virtues and beliefs, are activity-directed dispositions. (Ibid. p. xxiii) Habitus is an intermediate state (or disposition) between potentiality and actuality, between a person’s capacity to act and his / her actual action (or practice). Habitus mediates between the person’s endowed *potentia* and demonstrated *actio*.

What is the subject, in which dispositions inhere, the possessor to which they belong? Obviously a man’s beliefs and virtues are *his* beliefs, and *his* virtues. A man’s dispositions are dispositions of a human being; what believes, or is generous, is strictly speaking a man, and not his mind or his heart or his body. To ask whether something is a disposition of the mind or of body is to ask whether it belongs to a human being *qua* intelligent being or *qua* animal of a particular constitution. If we say that dispositions of the mind belong to human beings *qua* language-users, Aquinas would probably agree. (Kenny in Ibid. p. xxiv)

The quasi-dispositions of health and beauty are dispositions of the body, and some virtues and vices are dispositions of the will. But no disposition to activity is purely bodily

dispositions. Bodily activities are either subject to voluntary control, or they are not. If not, they are natural activities and as such need no dispositions to account for them. If the bodily activities are subject to voluntary control, the dispositions, which account for them must be located primarily in the soul. There are no dispositions to activity in the senses. However, there are dispositions in the memory and in imagination (Ibid., p. xxiv).

Aquinas reminds us that, according to Aristotle, dispositions of soul and body “are activity-directed *states whose possessor has reached the term of its development*; and ... that something is fully developed *if it is in a state in accordance with its nature* “ (Ibid. p. 13). Those activities in which the body is the instrument of the soul are primarily activities of the soul and only secondarily activities of the body. (Ibid. p. 27) “A disposition ... which contains both potentiality and actuality, being as it were a third term between the two, cannot belong to the intellect, but only to the person made up of both soul and body.” (Ibid., p. 37)

Aquinas refers to the Aristotelian doctrine that every activity of a human being is in some sense an activity of the whole body; it follows that any disposition belongs not to the soul alone but to the person as a whole. (Ibid., p. 41) Beliefs—what one believes *is*, but not necessarily believe *in* or *on*—are primarily dispositions of the individual intellects of particular men; but since beliefs are acquired and applied through the work of the senses and imagination, and are affected by bodily states and changes, they must be regarded as dispositions also of the body (Ibid., p. xxv). Most dispositions are the result of the agent’s own activity. Self-evident principles act upon the intellect, and the reason acts upon the faculty of desire, we are told. The action of self-evident propositions leaves a mark on the intellect, whereas the action of the reasoning powers leaves a mark on the faculty of desire. Sometimes a single act can produce a disposition; in other cases many acts are needed. (Ibid. p. xxvi) “Whatever is acted upon by something else is affected by the action of the agent; and so, after repeated action, a certain quality is produced in the passive potentiality which is acted upon, and it is this quality which is called a disposition.” (Ibid., p. 59) As actions are the causes of some dispositions, the more actions are performed, the stronger the dispositions grow. If any action makes a disposition grow stronger, every action will make it grow stronger. (Ibid., p. 79) “A disposition is like a second nature; that is why acting according to one’s dispositions is pleasurable. But so long as a thing exists, its nature is never destroyed. Therefore a disposition cannot be destroyed as long as its possessor exists.”

(Ibid., p. 83) While (as Aristotle says) knowledge can be destroyed by oblivion or deception, virtues are produced and destroyed by actions of opposite kinds. (Ibid., p. 85)

As demonstrated, Aquinas' treatment of habitus is based on Aristotle's teachings on virtues and vices. Virtue—which is 'moral excellence' or 'goodness of character' (*areté*)—can be intellectual and moral, as Aristotle says in Book Two of *The Nicomachean Ethics*: “intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit, and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that word.”¹⁰¹ None of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature; and no natural property can be altered by habit (“it is the nature of a stone to move downwards, and it cannot be trained to move upwards, even though you should try to train it to do so by throwing it up in the air ten thousand times”). [*Nico.* 1103a14-b8] But ‘the philosopher’ adds that even if virtues are engendered in us by nature, they are not engendered in violation of nature: “nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit.” [*Nico.* 1103a14-b8] Virtues we acquire by first having actually practised them, just as we do the arts: men become builders by building houses, harpers by playing the harp. “Similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.”¹⁰²

The actions through which any virtue is produced are the same as those through which it also is destroyed. (“as you will become a good builder from building well, so you will become a bad one from building badly”). [*Nico.* 1103b8-1104a4] The social character of virtues are emphasized: It is by taking part in transactions with out fellow-men that some of us become just and others unjust ... “In a word, our moral dispositions, are formed as a result of the corresponding activities ... It is therefore not a small moment whether we are trained from childhood in one set of habits or another; on the contrary it is of great, or rather of supreme, importance.” [*Nico.* 1103b8-1104a4] The enquiry into virtues and vices carries us into the region of conduct: following Aristotle, ‘to act in conformity with right principle’ is the common ground and the basis of our discussion. [*Nico.* 1103b8-1104a4.]

¹⁰¹ The Greek for ‘habit’ and ‘character’ are probably kindred words (op. cit., note 1 to Book Two).

¹⁰² This truth is attested by the experience of states: “lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits of right action ... “ (1103a14-b8) This is, according to Aristotle the aim of all legislation.

Granting that virtue is a state of the soul, is it then an emotion, a capacity, or a disposition? [Nico. 1105a28-b27] By an emotion, Aristotle means desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure and pain. The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable of feeling anger or pain or pity. The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the emotions (“we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough”). Eliminating the possibility that they are emotions or capacities, Aristotle concludes that they are dispositions: We are said to be ‘moved’ by the emotions, whereas in respect of the virtues and vices we are ‘disposed’ in a certain way. Nor are virtues and vices capacities; we possess certain capacities by nature, but we are not born good or bad by nature. “If then the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, it remains that they are dispositions.” [Nico. 1105b27-1106a26]

Looked upon as a disposition, virtue or excellence does not only render any thing good in itself, it also causes this thing to perform its function well. As excellence in a horse makes it a good horse, and also good at galloping, virtue in a man is the disposition, which renders him both a good man and a man performing his functions well. [Nico. 1105b27-1106a26] Virtue is further a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions; it consists essentially in the observance of the *mean* relative to us—determined as the prudent man would determine it—in essence virtue is the observance of ‘not too much, nor too little’. [Nico. 1106b24-1107a21] Virtue is the middle disposition in each department of conduct that is to be praised. [Nico. 1109b8-26]

In book III of *The Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle discusses virtues in relation to choice and deliberation: Are they voluntary in the same way as are our actions? No. “Our actions we can control from beginning to end, and we are conscious of them at each stage. With our dispositions on the other hand, though we can control their beginnings, each separate addition to them is imperceptible, as it the case with the growth of a disease; though they are voluntary in that we were free to employ our capacities in the one way or the other.” [Nico. 1114b19-1115a16]

What then is a voluntary act? “A voluntary act would seem to be an act of which the origin lies in the agent, who knows the particular circumstances in which he is acting.” [*Nico.* 1111a5-33] Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. Acts done from passion seem very far from being done of deliberate choice; choice is certainly not a wish; it cannot have for its object impossibilities. No one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act; we wish rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end; we wish to be happy but it would not be proper to say that we choose to be happy. [*Nico.* 1111a33-b29] Choice seems to be concerned with things within our own control. [*Nico.* 1111b30-1112a22] So also with deliberation: “We deliberate about things that are in our control and are attainable by action.” [*Nico.* 1112a22-b16] Whereas we wish for certain ends, the means to our ends are matters of deliberation and choice; so actions dealing with these means are done by choice, and hence they are voluntary.

The activities in which the virtues are exercised deal with means, and in this respect are voluntary: “Therefore virtue also depends on ourselves. And so also does vice. For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, and where we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes; if we are responsible for doing a thing when to do it is right, we are also responsible for not doing it when not to do it is wrong, and if we are responsible for rightly not doing a thing, we are also responsible for wrongly doing it. But if it is in our power to do and to refrain from doing right or wrong ... it depends on us whether we are virtuous or vicious.” [*Nico.* 1113a34-b30]

6.3 Habituation of character in the Child and mimesis according to Aristotle

Under traditional interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics, practice is regarded primarily as a non-rational training of desires towards appropriate objects, Nancy Sherman observes in her commentaries to Aristotle’s theory of virtue. Habituation—the formation of one’s character—is looked upon as essentially separate from, and antecedent to, the development of rational and reflective capacities. But, according to Sherman, it does not issue in a mechanical theory of habituation. Aristotle’s view is rather that practice yields pleasure to the extent to which it exhibits increasingly fine powers of discernment. (Sherman 1989, p. 157-60).

What makes the allegedly mechanical theory of habituation mysterious is particularly the transition from childhood to moral maturity. Does rationality really emerge as it were in an instant? (Ibid., p. 158) Along with the animal, the child lacks the deliberative capacities for choice and action of the adult, Aristotle contends.¹⁰³ Like the slave, it requires external reason for guidance. Since it is undeveloped, the virtue of the child is not relative to itself, but only to the fully developed individual, the one who is in authority.¹⁰⁴ Though the child is not viewed statically, but as in progress toward full humanity, on the way to some end. (Ibid., p. 161) Virtuous character is acquired through habituation of the non-rational part of the soul, but it is capable of following reason in accordance with a prescriptive principle.¹⁰⁵ (Ibid., 162-3) Although the child's reason will be borrowed in varying degrees from the outside, it will also be generated internally by his / her own perceptions, beliefs, and feelings. (Ibid., p. 164).

Aristotle's explicit theory of emotion as intentional and cognitive provides us with a clue, maintains Sherman: Emotions will be educated, in part, through their constitutive beliefs and perceptions. Cultivating the dispositional capacities to feel fear, anger, goodwill, compassion, or pity appropriately will be bound up with learning how to discern the circumstances that warrant these responses. (Ibid., p. 166-7) At the early states, discriminatory activity will often take the form of *mimesis*: imitation and representation implies in fact a way of coming to identify actual objects and events through familiarity with representations and enactments of them. (Ibid., p. 167-8) For imitating is natural to humankind from childhood up and human beings differ from animals in this. Sherman refers to *The Poetics*. In 1448b4-17 Aristotle says:

"... from childhood it is instinctive in human beings to imitate, and man differs from other animals as the most imitative of all and getting his first lessons by imitation, and by instinct also all human beings take pleasure in imitations. We have evidence of this in actual experience, for the forms of those things that are distressful to see in reality—for example, the basest animal and corpses—we contemplate with pleasure when we find them

¹⁰³ Sherman refers to *The Nicomachean Ethics* 1111a25-26, 1111b8-9 & 1144b8.

¹⁰⁴ Sherman refers to *Politics* 1260a32-3.

¹⁰⁵ Sherman refers to *Eudemian Ethics* 1220b6-8, cf. 1220a5-13.

represented with perfect realism in images. For this again the reason is that the experience of learning things is highly enjoyable, not only for philosophers but for other people as well ... when they enjoy seeing images, ... it is because as they look at them they have the experience of learning and reasoning out what each thing represents, concluding, for example, that 'this figure is so and so' " (Aristotle 1982, p. 47-8)

That *this* is a *that* is—within the mimetic mode—“a classification of actual characters, ways of acting and feeling features of circumstances, etc. through familiarity with some represented form.” To figure out that this is that is a matter of broadening one’s inductive base; it is a kind of critical activity which, in the case of action, precedes the practical inference about what to do; as such it is a reasoning that is nonprocedural; it is a ‘figuring out’ by ‘improvising’, by remaining close to and affected by the concrete details.¹⁰⁶ (Sherman, p. 168) By tutoring the child’s vision of the world, by instructing him / her to attend to these features rather than those, desires become focused and controlled in specific ways. Passions are not blind promptings and urgings that merely happen to us, they are rather selective responses to articulated features of the environment. (Ibid., p. 169)

Following Aristotle’s analysis, beliefs, perceptions and imaginings are not merely causes of emotion, but partial constituents. Anger, for instance, may include a consequent desire for revenge, the prospect of which yields pleasure. Emotions thus have a cognitive element and are partially shaped and informed by these elements; they imply a mode of discriminating and registering particulars. Emotions in this way shape and colour how and what we see just as what we see refines and shapes how and what we feel. (Ibid., p. 170-1) What the parent tries to do is to bring the child to see the particular circumstances that here and now make certain emotions appropriate; the parent helps the child to compose the scene in the right way. This involves persuading the child: That the situation at hand is to be construed in this way rather than that. So the child is not an empty box in which beliefs are instilled, but an individual who has, to a greater or lesser degree, already formed certain construals and judgments, which become adjusted and revised through interaction with an adult. Education is bringing the child to more critical discriminations. (Ibid. p. 172)

¹⁰⁶ Reference is made to *The Nicomachean Ethics* 1106b15.

What is required is some dialogue and verbal exchange about what one sees (and feels) and should see (and feel); actual descriptions which articulate a way of perceiving the situation and which put into play the relevant concepts, considerations and emotions. (Ibid., p. 172) Emotions cannot be shaped without some simultaneous cultivation of discriminatory abilities, “This is included as a part of habituation.” (Ibid., p. 173)

Character is developed from habit. And excellence of character, or virtue, is to be contrasted with abilities which are innate, and which cannot be changed through habituation. But, according to Sherman, this does obviously not entail that virtue is independent of antecedent affective and cognitive capacities.¹⁰⁷ (Ibid., p. 177) Through repetition an acquired capacity becomes almost natural, or second nature, but repetition of acts does not mean doing what one did before. Rather it is such that repeating the same action will involve trying to approximate some ideal action type that has been set as one’s goal; learning through repetition is a matter of successive trials that vary from one another as they approach this ideal. The practice is more a refinement of actions through successive trials than sheer mechanical repetition of any one action. We learn to play the lyre, Aristotle says, by practising not merely with persistence, but with an eye (and ear?) toward how the expert plays and with attention to how our performance measures against that model. (Ibid., p. 179)

In her focusing on the conception of critical practice Sherman also examines Aristotle’s notion of experience (*empeiria*). Experience, Aristotle says in *The Metaphysics*, is ‘connected memory’, memory of a number of instances of a particular sort of event. Experience arises from memory. It is not merely a way of remembering the past, or of forming concepts on the basis of past impressions, but a way of managing the future in the light of the past; it organizes past feelings, perceptions, and beliefs in such a way that we gain a familiarity and imaginative feel for what may lie ahead. It thus steers us in our future encounters.¹⁰⁸ In Sherman’s reading Aristotle says that experience is displayed in our ability

¹⁰⁷ Reference is made to *Eudemian Ethics* 1220a39-b3. Here Aristotle defines character as “a quality of the part of the soul that is non-rational, but capable of following reason, in accordance with a prescriptive principle.” (Aristotle 1982, p. 17)

¹⁰⁸ Sherman refers to *The Metaphysics* 981a12-24. The somewhat opaque passages referred to run as follows: “Now the circumstances in which a skill arises are that from the many cases of thinking in experience a single general assumption is formed in connection with similar things. ... However, in regard to practice, experience is not thought to be different at all from skill. In fact, we rather observe those with experience being practically

to recognize and judge the requirements of particular situations as they arise; through familiarity with individual cases, we can make informed choices. (Ibid., p. 192)

The growth of experience requires not only that beliefs (or memories) be accumulated and consolidated, but that on occasion they be jolted—that certain connections be broken and reassessed in the light of anomalies. For the youth, this involves encounters with exceptions. These often mark a moment of puzzlement about how to proceed or understand, given past experience (Ibid. 192-3).¹⁰⁹ In all those cases in which we learn the ultimate origins or principles of a discipline we do not begin with these principles, but eventually arrive at them as part of a more advanced study: we begin with the ‘that’ and later move to the ‘because’ (Ibid., p. 194): We do not proceed from principles knowable in themselves but more inductively towards them from principles knowable to us. (Ibid., p. 195).

How do these teachings of the ancients comply with the treatment of habitus in the writings of the 20th century philosopher-anthropologist sociologist Pierre Bourdieu?

6.4 Pierre Bourdieu

The notion of habitus forms a centre-piece in Bourdieu’s writings. The cognitive structures which social agents implement in their actions are internalized, embodied social structures, working as basic perceptual schemes used to classify and qualify persons or objects in the most varied areas of practice, Bourdieu maintains. As such, they are often shared by the members of a given social formation. They are, as he says, ‘social knowledge without

[more?] successful than those who, without experience, have a theoretical understanding. This is because experience is the knowledge of particulars and skill that of universals, and practical actions, like all occurrences, are concerned with particulars ... If, then, one were to have a theoretical account without experience, knowing the universals but being ignorant of the immediate particular, he will often err in his treatment. For it is the particular that must be treated. And yet we think that knowledge and expertise belong rather to skill than to experience, and we assume that the skilled are wiser than the experienced, in that it is more in connection with knowledge that wisdom is associated with anything ... For the experienced know the ‘that’ but not the ‘because’, whereas the skilled have a grasp of the ‘because’, the cause.” (Aristotle 1998, p. 4-5)

¹⁰⁹ Youth need a certain exposure to disappointment and misfortune in order to knock them out of the naïve trust of others and over-confidence in their abilities (Ibid. p. 197) The child needs to distinguish what is and what is not within her control, what is due to her own failure and what is due to accident and an uncooperative world. It needs to be humbled by the limits of human agency. (Ibid. p. 198)

concepts', matrices of commonplaces, which find acceptance because they are also widely accepted knowledge of the social order, acquired in the confrontation with particular forms of necessity (Bourdieu 1984, p. 472). This is a central tenet of Bourdieu and a credo repeated in his studies of action and social practice.

In *The Logic of Practice* habitus (in the plural) are defined as:

“(S)ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, ‘structured structures’, predisposed to function as ‘structuring structures’, ... which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery in order to attain them”. (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 53)

Habitus is ‘a product of history, that produces individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with the schemes generated by history’. It ensures the active presence of past experiences, deposited in each of us as schemes of perception, thought and action; it guarantees the ‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time. (Ibid., p. 54) As a present past that perpetuates itself into the future by reactivation in similarly structured practices, the habitus contains the principle of social continuity and regularly. But it also stands for regulated social transformations, “that cannot be explained either by the mechanistic sociology or by the purely internal determination of spontaneist subjectivism.” (Ibid., p. 54)

The practical world, constituted in relation with the habitus, is a world of procedures to follow, paths to take, tools, institutions. (Ibid., p. 53) It is our habitus that generate all its ‘reasonable’, ‘common sense’ behaviours which are likely to be positively sanctioned because they are objectively adjusted to the logic characteristic of a particular social field, i.e. any set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or ‘capital’). (Ibid., p. 55-6 and Wacquant 1992) As Bourdieu emphasizes, practices cannot be deduced from the present conditions, which may seem to have provoked them, nor from the past which have produced the habitus; they can only be accounted for by relating the social conditions in which the habitus generating them was constituted, to the social conditions of their implementation. (Ibid., p. 56)

The anticipations of the habitus, which are practical hypotheses based on past experiences, form the basis of the perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences. (Ibid., p. 54) But the habitus is also an infinitive capacity for generating new thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions, the limits of which are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production; the conditioned and the conditional freedom that this capacity provides is as remote from creation or unpredictable novelty as it is from simple mechanical reproduction of the original conditioning. (Ibid., p. 55)¹¹⁰ The ‘unconscious’, which enables one to dispense with this interrelating is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself produces “by realizing the objective structures that it generates in the quasi-natures of *habitus*.”¹¹¹

Further, the habitus enables institutions to attain full realization: it is through the capacity for incorporation, which exploits the body’s readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the social, that the king, the banker or the priest are hereditary monarchy, financial capitalism or the Church made flesh. (Ibid., p. 57) An institution is complete and fully viable only if it is durably objectified not only in things, but also in bodies, in durable dispositions to recognize and comply with the demands immanent in the field. (Ibid., p. 58)

One of the fundamental effects of the harmony between practical sense and objectified meaning is the production of a common-sense world, whose immediate self-evidence is accompanied by the objectively provided for by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world, the harmonization of the agents’ experiences and the constant reinforcement each of them receives from expression: individual or collective (such as in festivals), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings). (Ibid., p. 58) The embodied history of habitus—which is a second nature and thus is forgotten as history—is the presence of the whole past of which it is the product. The past, enacted and acting (which functions as accumulated

¹¹⁰ “Just as a mature artistic style is not contained, like a seed, in the original inspiration but is continuously defined and redefined in the dialectic between the objectifying intention and the already objectified intention, so too the unity of meaning which, after the event, may seem to have preceded the acts and works announcing the final significance, retrospectively transforming the various stages of the temporal series into mere preparatory sketches, is constituted through the confrontation between questions that only exist in and for a mind armed with a particular type of schemes and the solution obtained through application of the same schemes.” (Ibid., p. 55)

¹¹¹ As said E. Durkheim: “In each of us... is contained the person we were yesterday.” (Ibid., p. 56)

capital) produces history on the basis of history; and so it ensures the permanence in change that make the individual agent a world within the world. (Ibid., p. 56)

The practices of the members of the same group, or the same class, are always more and better harmonized than the agents know or wish, because following only his own laws, each nonetheless agrees with the other.¹¹²

The habitus which, at every moment, structures new experiences in accordance with the structures produced by past experiences—which is modified by new experiences within limits defined by the power of selection—brings about a unique integration, dominated by the earliest experiences, common to members of the same class. (Ibid., p. 60) Hence, it contains the solution to the paradoxes of objective meaning without subjective intention (Ibid., p. 62): “a given agent’s practical relation to the future, which governs his present practice, is defined in the relationships between, on the one hand, his habitus with its temporal structures and dispositions towards the future, constituted in the course of a particular relationship to a particular universe of probabilities, and on the other hand a certain state of the chances objectively offered to him by the social world.” (Ibid., p. 64) The habitus is a matrix generating responses adapted in advance to all objective conditions identical to, or homologous with the (past) conditions of its production; it adjusts itself to a probable future which it anticipates and helps to bring about because it reads it directly in the present of the presumed world, the only one it can ever know. (Ibid., p. 64)

When dealing with such dispositions, acquired through experience—and variable from place to place and time to time—Bourdieu talks about a ‘feel for the game’. This is what enables an infinite number of ‘moves’ to be made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations, which no rule, however complex, can foresee. (Bourdieu 1994, p. 9) Action guided by a ‘feel for the game’ has all the appearances of rational action that an impartial observer would deduce; yet it is not based on reason:

¹¹² Bourdieu refers to Leibniz’ *lex insita*: The habitus is an immanent law, inscribed in the bodies by identical histories, which is the precondition not only for the coordination of practices but also for practices of co-ordination.) The correctness and adjustments the agents themselves consciously carry out presuppose mastery of a common code; undertakings of collective mobilization cannot succeed without a minimum of collective concordance of the habitus of the mobilizing prophet or leader, and the disposition of those who recognize themselves in their practices or words. (Ibid., p. 59)

“(T)he tennis player who runs up to the net ... has nothing in common with the learned construction that the coach, after analysis, draws up in order to explain it and deduce communicable lessons from it ... agents do, much more often than if they were behaving randomly, ‘the only thing to do’. This is because, following the intuitions of a ‘logic of practice’ which is the product of a lasting exposure to conditions similar to those in which they are placed, they anticipate the necessary immanent in the way of the world.” (Ibid., p. 11)

Bourdieu wants to give the habitus a social dimension: Habitus plus capital generates practices in social fields, he says. Or with a formulaic expression: Practice = f (Habitus + Capital) + Field.¹¹³

Capital, which in this context is ‘accumulated labour in materialized or incorporated / embodied form’—‘personal capital’—enables agents to appropriate social energy: reified or living labour. (Bourdieu 1986, p. 241) As such it is a force inscribed in both objective and mental structures; it underlies the immanent regularities of the social world. It takes time to accumulate and, as a potential to produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded forms, it is “inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally possible or impossible.” (Ibid., p. 242). The distribution of the different types (and subtypes) of such (personal) capital represents the set of constraints, which govern the functioning of the social world; it also determines the chances of success for any practice. (Ibid., p. 242)

Personal capital presents itself in three basic guises: as economic, cultural and social capital. While economic capital is immediately and directly convertible into money or property rights, cultural capital is embodied, objectified or institutionalized knowledge. It exists as dispositions in the mind and the body (*Bildung*), as access to cultural goods (books, pictures,

¹¹³ See Bourdieu 1984, p. 101.

dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), or as educational qualifications (diplomas, academic degrees, etc.).¹¹⁴

This capital cannot be transmitted by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange; it is acquired in “the absence of any deliberate inculcation, and therefore quite unconsciously. It always remains marked by its earliest conditions of acquisition which, through the more or less visible signs they leave ... help to determine its distinctive value. It cannot be accumulated beyond the appropriating capacities of an individual agent; it declines and die with its bearer.” But cultural capital combines the prestige of innate property with merits of acquisition; therefore it is predestined to function as symbolic capital: as recognized and legitimate competence, as authority exerting an effect of recognition (or misrecognition); as symbolic cultural capital is represented (or apprehended) in relations of knowledge, where it renders social distinction. (Ibid., p. 245) Social (personal) capital refers to obligations (or ‘connections’). It is the aggregate of actual or potential resources linked to a network of mutual acquaintances and recognition, to membership in a group. (Ibid., p. 248) It reaffirms the limits of the group, beyond which the constitutive exchange cannot take place. Through command of social capital each member is thus made a custodian of these limits. (Ibid., p. 250)

“(A) *field* is any patterned system of objective forces (much in the manner of magnetic field), a relational configuration endowed with a specific gravity which it imposes on all the objects and agents which enter it.” (Wacquant 1992, p. 17) Simultaneously it is often a space of conflict and competition, a battlefield where the participants vie for monopoly over “the species of capital effective in it—cultural authority in the artistic field, scientific authority in the scientific field, sacerdotal authority in the religious life, and so forth.” (Ibid., p. 17) In the course of such struggles, the shape and divisions of the field become a central stake, because to alter the distribution and relative weight of capital is tantamount to modifying the structure of the field. This gives any field historical dynamism and malleability. The social field (‘a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of capital’) presents itself as a structure of probabilities—rewards, gains, profits,

¹¹⁴ If cultural capital comprises dispositions of the mind and the body, how then can it be properly distinguished from ‘habitus’? I have not find in the writings of Bourdieu an explanation of this, as it seems, conceptual overlapping.

sanctions—but it always implies a measure of indeterminacy: playing with the rule is part and parcel of the rule of the game. (Ibid., p. 18)

Habitus, which is constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions, is for Bourdieu a means to evade the objectivism of structures without falling back into subjectivism. (Ibid., p. 52) “In retrospect”, Bourdieu says, “the use of the notion of habitus, an old Aristotelian and Thomist concept that I completely rethought, can be understood as a way of escaping from the choice between a structuralism without a subject and the philosophy of the subject.” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 10)

6.5 Habitus and habituation: Summing up

In the writings of Bourdieu ‘habitus’ denotes the result of an organizing action, a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body), but also a disposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination. (Wacquant 1992, p. 18) And this seems compatible with the definition of habitus / *hexis* offered by Aquinas and Aristotle: a formed and permanent habit of the mind, the result of earlier practice tending to the production of certain new actions and bound to produce them, unless external circumstances prevent it. In this sense it is also (as Bourdieu says) ‘a product of history generating new history’. In both the writings of Bourdieu and the earlier philosophers it is an intermediate state or disposition between potentiality and actuality, a capacity to act and action. Cloaked as virtues and vices in the teachings of Aquinas and Aristotle it re-appears as the ‘feel for the game’ emphasized by Bourdieu by means of examples drawn from the world of sports. (Bourdieu 1990, p. 66)

The parallelism between the scheme of thinking between Bourdieu and St Thomas is illustrated in Fig. 6:1. While for the latter habitus is a middle term between any potentiality and any actuality, any capacity and any action, for Bourdieu it combines with personal (embodied) capital to produce the agent, acting in a social field, and thus producing practice. A social dimension is added to St Thomas’ schema. The potentiality, capacity, or potentia of this agent in the schema of Bourdieu, is his / her personal (embodied) capital.

Fig. 6:1. See attachment. Habitus in St Thomas Aquinas and P. Bourdieu.

As derived from habitus, ‘habituation’ is the taking on of a certain and characteristic way of doing things, a settled and more or less regular comportment that is hard to give up once it has been acquired; a bodily posture or attitude, producing more or less automatic reactions to specific situations which at the same time can be said to be a constitution of the mind, and (not the least) which—although it appears as a ‘second nature’—can be taken on or off, like a dress or piece of attire. Although our habits are often experienced (by our selves and others) as unconscious—as knowing without saying—the notion of habituation carries with it the idea of inclination, bent, orientation or stance towards things and other human beings in the *Umwelt*, intentionality as a way of ‘having the perceived as perceived’. And, if it means adopting a certain stance towards things as perceived, it cannot be taken for granted that it precludes consciousness, a ‘knowing with oneself and together with others’. (The issue habitus and consciousness will be discussed below.)

6.6 Habitus and the Child

How does habitus (and habituation) apply to the Child and the process of growing up? The ideogrammes of Fig. 6:2 a & b are meant to suggest an answer.

Fig. 6:2 a. See attachment. Habitus / hexis in the Child’s coming of age according to St Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle.

Fig 6.2 b. See attachment. Habitus in the Child’s coming of age according to P. Bourdieu.

Following St Thomas and Aristotle (Fig. 6:2 a) habitus / *hexis*, which is a ‘disposition’ inherent in any man and woman, works as an intermediary between potentialities and actuality, between the Child and his / her actual action. The Child—which represents a particular sum of in-borne and (so far) acquired potentialities plus ‘disposition’—engenders *Actio* (see Chapter 2). In the process of growing up the Child pronounces itself over time by ‘learning by doing’ (*praxis*) and ‘learning by study (instruction / acquisition of ‘skills’)', i.e. by further actualization of inborne and acquired potentialities, all conducive to the *Eidos* or Character of the Child as an Adult (‘what it is on the way to be that thing of a human being in his / her becoming’). Turning to Bourdieu (Fig. 6:2 b): The Child—conceived of as ‘embodied cultural capital’ (i.e. access to institutionalized knowledge)—plus habitus in

social fields engenders practice; the Child pronounces itself over time through ‘accumulation and re-accumulation of cultural capital’ (acquired by means of study / education). In the course of the process of growing up it provides (as purports Aristotle) in this way for the Character of the Child as an Adult (‘what it is on the way to be that thing of a human being in his / her becoming’).

The disposition of habitus is acquired through the Child’s interaction with his / her social environment: parents, peers, friends and foes, other human beings representing some characters or ideals, as well as their handling of equipment (tools) in goal-oriented action. In this way it involves knowledge, experience, what one learns through taking part in life’s ordinary and not so ordinary pursuits. To the extent that the habitus of the Child is acquired through learning by study, or spoken instruction, it implies language. (At least a capacity of the Child to understand what he / she is told to do or not to do: ‘Thou shall’st not steal’, ‘If you don’t do that Allah will be angry’, ‘One has to take off one’s shoes when going into the house’, ‘Don’t talk with food in your mouth’, ‘One has to say thank you’, ‘When crossing the street, always first look to the left / the right’.)

Both these variants the notion of habitus directs the analysis backwards, from some demonstrated conduct to circumstances of acculturation. It is readily associated with causal analysis, not prediction, but rather an Aristotelian ‘retrodiction’, working one’s way backwards in time, from ‘a conception of actuality to a conception of potentiality’.¹¹⁵ Hence, to explain a person’s character, or typical conduct, by means of habitus, is to lay bare the circumstances of his / her becoming, in fact, to tell the narrative of the person’s life-history. As traditionally occupied with goodness and badness of human character, it also belongs to moral judgement of styles of conduct, something we acquire, possess and, in a sense, have ‘taken on’ (as a piece of attire). And what has been taken on can be shown to others; it can become a paradigmatic example for imitation.

6.7 Style—Mimesis—Formative imagination

The observed actions of a person related to his / her presumed habitus constitutes in the long run this person’s character (or *eidos*), i.e. something demonstrated in the public social realm

¹¹⁵ See Chapter 2, ‘Aristotle on substance, potentiality and actuality’.

of other human beings, and often taken notice of by people as *style*: a typical mode of comportment, demeanour, or conduct, which is more or less conspicuous, strikes the eye of the observer.¹¹⁶ Styles may be demonstrated by the Child; as such they are acquired (and succeed each other) in the course of his / her process of growing up; in a life-span perspective they develop into ‘what it was to be that thing of a human being’, the character / *eidōs* of an adult person.

Adopting this Aristotelian approach (presented in Chapter 2): How is this character (or *eidōs*), demonstrated as style, adopted by the child in the course of its coming of age—granted that this process implies the simultaneous development of habitus or disposition functioning as an intermediary between the Child’s potentiality and actuality? Answer: By imitation, *mimesis*, by the Child’s ‘taking on of the image of an Other and making it an image of himself / herself’.

This way of conceiving style is consistent with Bourdieu’s treatment of social distinction, discrimination, classification, attribution of character. Social categories are constituted with reference to commonly associated styles of conduct, all involving the body and its taken on peculiarities. “The body, a social product which is the only tangible manifestation of the ‘person’, is commonly perceived as the most natural expression of innermost nature”, Bourdieu contends. (1984, p. 192) “There are no merely ‘physical’ facial signs: the colour and thickness of lipstick, or expressions, as well as the shape of the face or the mouth, are immediately read as indices of a ‘moral’ physiognomy, socially characterized, i. e. of a ‘vulgar’ or ‘distinguished’ mind, naturally ‘natural’ or naturally ‘cultivated’.” (Ibid., p. 193) As inherent in the habitus of the demonstrators of style as well as the onlookers, the primary forms of classification and discrimination function below the level of consciousness and language, beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny or control by the will. Orienting practices practically they embed what some would mistakenly call values, such as, for instance, ways of walking and blowing one’s nose, ways of eating, ways of talking. Actually,

¹¹⁶ ‘Style’, tells us Oxford English Dictionary, derives from the Ancient Greek ‘stilo’, a pointed instrument, or directed object. (Cp. the stiletto knife, or the slender stiletto heel of a ladies’ shoe.) Originally, the ‘stilo’ was an instrument for writing (such as it still is in French where a ‘ball-point pen’ is *un stilo à bille*). It was in this way that the word got its meaning of *mode* of writing or talking, and it also assumed its meaning of “a particular manner of life or behavior, outward demeanor”. Styles ‘strike the eyes of other people’; they are ‘conspicuous’. And, of course, style is also kin to *stimulus*, something which evokes a response.

they engage the most fundamental principles of construction and evaluation of the social world, the division of labour, the division of the work of domination. All are read off in divisions between bodies, and relations to the body. (Ibid., p. 466)

To adopt and communicate style is to align oneself with some of one's fellow-beings, but also to distance oneself from others. For short: It is to find one's place. By means of a bodily communicative language, by means of an adopted image of oneself, in fact, by means of this very demonstrated style, a certain conduct, behaviour, demeanour. As Bourdieu says: Knowing one's place, and keeping appropriate distance is social necessity made second nature, turned into muscular patterns and bodily automatisms: a way of bearing one's body, presenting it to others, moving it, making space for it. (Bourdieu 1984, p. 474)

As illustrated in Fig. 6:3, 'formative imagination' implies a relation of intentionality (or directedness) between the Child as imitator and an Other as imitated. In the language of the phenomenologist philosophers it means a representing, having or in-habiting of this Other. The latter, offering paradigmatic examples of behaviour or conduct—paradigmatic in the sense of 'inviting imitation'—may be present in the Child's daily social environment, or only re-presented in some form or another (effigy, portrait, picture, written or told narrative, sound-track, screen-figure). Whether present, or merely re-presented, it should be possible—with some necessary qualifications—to regard the imitated Other as subjected to *noesis* (as this notion was once understood by Husserl).¹¹⁷ Metaphorically speaking, the imitated Other 'speaks to the Child in the his / her own language'. The Other does so, it can be maintained, as 'percept' or 'perceptual gestalt', and as *eidōs* or type (demonstrating certain style), but not necessarily as concept, because any conceptualization relies on the Child's language skills.¹¹⁸ To the imitated Other are often attached more or less widely known narratives and characteristics; he / she occupies this or that position in a repertory of social types (all according to the prevailing social order as it is understood by the Child). And, by virtue of these narratives and characteristics this Other functions for the Child as a model, a producer of conduct, a paradigm, an 'informer'. When used in this way the term 'formative imagination' seems to communicate much of the meaning of the German *Bildung*. This word, of course, refers to *Bild* ('image'), but it also connotes the verbal

¹¹⁷ See Chapter 3.5 *Noesis—noema—object*.

¹¹⁸ For social types as conceived of by Alfred Schutz, see Chapter 8, *The Social World*.

meaning of ‘producing, shaping, letting come forth’. The adjective ‘formative’ is meant to provide for this latter association with producing and shaping, of getting ‘informed’ in the old sense of ‘information’: the process of giving character to certain matter or the mind. (See Chapter 2, note 10.)

Fig. 6:3. See attachment. Formative imagination: ‘The taking hold of the image of an Other, making it an image of Oneself’.

Who are those other persons offering models of conduct, comportment, demeanour today, the persons imitated by the Child in his / her personal development, affected as this is by this middle term of habitus? Peers, siblings, playmates, even parents, of course, but definitely also personalities and figures not being there in the Child’s *Umwelt* in a physical sense, but only present as re-presented by various mass media. This means, one has to bring into any account of formative imagination today the multifaceted web of mass-distributed representations—found in books, magazines, pictures, films, TV-productions, videos, popular music lyrics, computer games, etc.—which constitutes, to a large extent, the daily physical environment of children and youth, what one could call, metaphorically speaking, the *texts* of the physical environment. This ‘textuality’ of the *Umwelt* relates not only to various narratives concerning children and youth, which are believed to impact on young people’s way of presenting (and understanding) themselves; probably the very forms of communication which young people engage in are crucial as well. To talk with Simmel: The process of *the life of the individual as a cultural being* is deeply affected by the processes of the world of cultural forms and *artefacts*, which are independent of individual human existence.¹¹⁹ These latter processes belong to the concrete, historically specific conditions, under which children grow up today. Hence, in Fig. 6:3, reference is made not only to the Child’s social *Umwelt* of close fellow-beings, but also this environing ‘web of mass-mediated representations’.

6.8 Formative imagination and skilful performance

It seems that formative imagination also offers a clue to art, or skilful performance, as it has been treated by Michael Polanyi in *Personal knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical*

¹¹⁹ See Frisby, in Simmel 1997, p. 5 and *passim*.

Philosophy: “The aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the persons following them”. (Polanyi 1958, p. 50) For many arts there are rules, ‘knowledge that’, which explains the practical ‘know how’ in question; but most often these are only of limited, or supplementary, importance, when the art is acquired. Polanyi mentions swimming, cycling, the touch of the pianist and hammering. He concludes that rules can be useful when learning these arts, “but they do not determine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can serve as a guide to an art only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge of the art. They cannot replace this knowledge.” (Ibid., p. 50) Often an art cannot be specified in detail, cannot be transmitted by prescription, because no prescription for it exists. It can be passed on only by example from master to apprentice. To learn in this way by example is to submit to authority. “You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyse and account in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those, which are not exactly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another.” (Ibid., p. 53)

Polanyi is particularly occupied with instrumental knowledge, the skilful use of tools. “When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, *but in a different way*. We *watch* the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to wield the hammer so as to hit the nail most effectively. When we bring down the hammer we do not feel that its handles has struck our palm but that its head has struck the nail. Yet in a sense we are certainly alert to the feelings in our palm and the fingers that hold the hammer. They guide us in handling it effectively, and the degree of attention that we give to the nail is given to the same extent but in a different way to those feelings.” The latter are not, like the nail, objects of our attention, but instruments of it. They are not watched in themselves; we watch something else while keeping intensely aware of them. We have a *subsidiary awareness* of the feeling in the palm of our hand which merges with one’s *focal awareness* of driving in the nail. (Ibid., p. 55) Our subsidiary awareness of tools can be regarded as the act of making them form part of our own body. The way we use a hammer (or play the piano) shows that we shift onwards the points at which we make contact with the things that we observe as objects outside ourselves; the tool can never lie in the field of our operations; they remain necessarily on our side of it, forming part of ourselves, the operating persons. We pour

ourselves out into them and assimilate them as parts of our own existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in them.” (Ibid., p.59)

What Polanyi says may serve as a reminder of Merleau-Ponty’s thesis concerning language acquisition (see Chapter 5). Like the Child’s learning to speak, what Polanyi treats as skilful performance is achieved by imitation, by taking on the image of the master performer. It arises from the learners’ directedness towards things, the taking on of a certain way of doing things, in order to obtain the same result as others. As such it constitutes (as does language), ‘a settled and more or less regular comportment that is hard to give up once acquired; a bodily posture, producing more or less automatic reactions to specific situations, which is also a constitution of the mind’. And if learning to skilfully handle hammer and nail or the piano (like learning the more or less skilful performance of speaking), is ‘aiming at the global result of such a handling’; ‘to obtain the same result as an other person’, ‘to take on the image of a skilfully hammering person’, is it not at the same time to adopt a certain style, the *eidōs* of the master? As would Aristotle contend, we learn to play the piano by practising not merely with persistence, but by attending to how the skilful player plays and with attention to how our performance measures against this model.

6.9 Formative imagination and consciousness

Is formative imagination—this ‘taking on of the image of an Other’, offering paradigmatic examples of conduct or ways of doing things—to be understood as conscious, deliberate acts? Or, is the Child, in fact, not conscious of his / her self-formative acts of imitation, the adoption of some (in the eyes of some onlookers) typical style of comportment, behaviour, demeanour, modes of handling things, adding over time to his / her *eidōs* (or character) as an adult?

The latter option seems to be that chosen by Bourdieu: When education is not institutionalized as a specific, autonomous practice, he says concerning habitus and the Kabyle child in *Outline of Theory of Practice*, it is the entire symbolically structured environment, which exerts an anonymous, pervasive pedagogic influence on the individual. The *modus operandi* defining practical mastery is transmitted in practice, without attaining the level of discourse. Bodily habits speak to the motor function, as a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic; they are linked to a whole system of techniques involving body and tools. In fact, children in all societies are particularly attentive to the

gestures and postures which, in their eyes, express everything that goes to make an accomplished adult—a way of walking, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, ways of sitting and of using any implement:

“But the fact that schemes are able to pass from practice to practice does not mean that acquisition of the habitus comes down to a question of a mechanical learning by trial and error. Unlike an incoherent series of figures, which can be learnt only gradually, through repeated attempts and with continuous predictable progress, a numerical series is mastered more easily because it contains a structure which makes it unnecessary to memorize all the numbers one by one: in verbal products such as proverbs, sayings, maxims, songs, riddles, or games; in objects, such as tools, the house, or the village; or again, in practices such as contests of honour, gift exchanges, rites, etc., the material which the Kabyle child has to assimilate is the product of the systematic application of principles coherent in practice ... it has no difficulty in grasping the rationale of what are clearly series and in making it his own in the form of a principle generating conduct organized in accordance with the same rationale.” (Bourdieu 1993, p. 87-8)¹²⁰

Bourdieu’s case of the Kabyle child seems to imply intentionality, but not consciousness properly speaking. The Child’s learning ‘does not attain the level of discourse’.

Is it possible to take on the image of an Other without one’s actual knowing, without an element of implicit (or outspoken) discourse? So it seems. The paramount example would be the Child’s acquisition of language, as it has been described by Merleau-Ponty. Learning to speak happens through imitation, by playing a series of *roles*, by assuming a series of conducts and linguistic gestures, but seemingly without the Child’s actual knowing (‘now I am learning to speak’). It arises from the Child’s directedness towards things in the company of Others, by way of bodily gestures aiming at the same result as those the imitated speakers. Acquisition of language carries with it the idea of inclination, bent, orientation or stance towards physical objects and other human beings in the Child’s environment, and as such a way of ‘having’ these things (to adopt the idiom of Brentano). But as a goal-oriented activity learning to speak contains its own goals; it is an example of what Aristotle called *praxis*;

¹²⁰ The French version, *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique, précédé de trois études d'ethnologie kabyle*, was published in 1972.

doing well (the very performance) is an end in itself. Besides: The Child's acquisition of language (his / her mother tongue) cannot presuppose that language is already acquired. Further possible examples are walking and smoking: would the Child learn to walk if not surrounded by grown-up walkers? Would the teenager start smoking if there were no smokers?

If formative imagination implies intentionality, but not necessarily consciousness, 'knowing with Oneself and together with Others. How then, for instance, is this image of the Adult speaker 'taken hold of' by the Child when he / she learns to speak? And how is 'image' to be understood in this context?

Let's start with the latter question. In an attempt to grasp the 'idea of imagery'—which seems to include such varied things as pictures, statues, illusions, maps, dreams, hallucinations, spectacles, projections, memories and even ideas—W.T. J. Mitchell talks about a “region occupied by a number of strange creatures that haunt the border between physical and psychological accounts of imagery: the ‘species’ or ‘sensible forms’ which (according to Aristotle) emanate from objects and imprint themselves on the wax-like receptacles or our senses like a signet ring; the *fantasmata*, which are revived versions of those impressions called up by imagination in the absence of the objects that originally stimulated them; ‘sense data’ or ‘percepts’ which (according to Mitchell) play a roughly analogous role in modern psychology; and finally those ‘appearances’ which (in common parlance) intrude between ourselves and reality, and which we often refer to as ‘images’—from the image projected by a skilled actor, to those created for products and personages by experts in advertising and propaganda.” (Mitchell 1986, p. 10)¹²¹ The idea of such mental images, Mitchell continues, has been a central feature of theories of the mind at least since Aristotle's *De Anima*, and it still functions as something of cornerstone in psychoanalysis and experimental studies of perception, as well as popular folk-beliefs about the mind, although the status of mental representation in general, and the mental image in particular, has been one of the main battlegrounds of modern theories of the mind. (Ibid., p. 14-5) Mitchell illustrates such mental images by quotes from *De Anima*. But he also refers to

¹²¹ Mitchell, W.J.T 1986, “What is an Image” in *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*. Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press.

Locke, who acknowledges the similarity between his views of perception and those of Aristotle.¹²²

Imageries as ‘species’, ‘sensible forms’, ‘sense-data’, or ‘percepts’, offer an opportunity to interpret even unconscious formative imagination in terms of *noesis*, it seems. In the Child’s perceptive attentiveness to any object it is, as developed in Chapter 3, the *noemata* which accommodate for percepts to be experienced as certain kinds of objects, as types or *eide*. The latter are eventually transformed into concepts, which means that the Child imposes on the perceived objects *significance* and *meaning*. Things announce themselves by speaking to the Child (with necessary recourse to his / her own language). ‘I am this or that kind of thing.’ The objects are signs of themselves, presenting themselves as this or that, and as something carrying certain implications. This means: *Noesis* presupposes on the part of the Child not only an ability to recognize things and persons, a familiarity with everyday items and the immediate social world, but also command of language, mastery of designations, and meanings of designations, the usual naming of things and the common meaning of these designations as applied to things. Yet, cannot it be such that when, in the case of formative imagination, the imitated Other speaks to the Child as ‘percept’, perhaps also as *eidos* / type, character or style, but not necessarily as concept. Why? Because concepts require language competence, the more or less skilful art of speaking. The reasoning requires, of course, the possibility of human communication on the level of percepts and *eide*, though without attaining the level concepts (a possibility seemingly taken for granted by political and commercial persuaders relying on various kinds of mass-media). Granted this possibility, the issue of consciousness in imitation, understood as formative imagination, boils down to the presence or not of an immanent or outspoken elements of discourse, to acts of saying.

According to Benveniste (1971, p. 208-9) discourse must be understood in its widest sense as every utterance assuming a speaker and a hearer, an intention of influencing the other in some way, from trivial conversation to the most elaborate oration; it is also the mass of writing reproducing oral discourse, or borrowing its manners of expression and purposes: correspondence, memoirs, plays, didactic works, in short, all genres in which someone addresses oneself to someone, and organizes what he / she says in the implicit language of

¹²² For Aristotle on perception and imagination, see *De Anima*, II.12, 424a, III.3, 427ab and 429a (in, for instance, Aristotle 1986, p. 187, 197-9 and 200)

‘I’ / ‘we’ and ‘you’. It is these pronouns which distinguishes a discourse from a historical narrative. To talk about immanent discourse in *noesis* is to allow for a kind of discourse where the speaker (I) addresses himself / herself (as an implicit you). The spoken to ‘you’ is the addressing ‘I’, and vice versa.

Unconscious acts of imitation—as well as communication without discourse, properly speaking—were postulated in Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of imitation: “To imitate is to perform a gesture in the image of another’s gesture—like the child, for instance, who smiles because someone smiles at him,” he says in his Sorbonne lecture course on child psychology.¹²³ (Op. cit., p. 116) With reference to Husserl’s idea of ‘intentional transgression’, the perception of others is described in general terms as a ‘phenomenon of coupling’: “This conduct which I am able to see, I live somehow from a distance. I make it mine; I recover it or comprehend it. Reciprocally I know that the gestures I make myself can be the objects of another’s intention.” (Ibid., p. 118) Communication requires a distinction between myself as communicator, and the person with whom I communicate. But there is in any communication initially a state of pre-communication, “wherein the other’s intentions somehow play *across* my body while my intentions play across his.” In this initial phase one cannot talk of one individual over against another, but rather an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated community. (Ibid., p. 119) Merleau-Ponty in this context makes use of Henry Wallon’s notion of ‘syncretic sociability’: there is in any direct communication an initial situation of in-distinction between me and the other, and a confusion common to us both. It is in this situation that the objectification of my body “intervenes to establish a sort of wall between me and the other: a partition.” (Ibid., p. 120) To the extent that a person lacks visual consciousness of his body, Merleau-Ponty contends, “he cannot separate what *he* lives from what *others* live as well as what he sees them living.” Thence comes the phenomenon of ‘transitivism’, the absence of a division between myself and others, which is the very foundation of this syncretic sociability.¹²⁴ (Ibid., p. 135) Imitation—mimesis—

¹²³ See M. Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others,” in *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. by J. M. Edie. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1964, published in French as “Les relations avec autrui chez l’enfant,” in *Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne, résumé de cours 1949-1952*. Grenoble, Cynara, 1988.

¹²⁴ “Our *Umwelt* is what we are, because what happens to us does not appear only to us but to our entire vision of the world. Transitivism is, in other words, the same notion that psychoanalysts are using when they speak of *projection*, just as mimesis is the equivalent of *introjection*.” The child’s own personality is at the same time the

mimicry is concomitantly conceived of by Merleau-Ponty as “the ensnaring of me by the other, the invasion of me by the other; it is the attitude whereby I assume the gestures, the conducts, the favourite words, the ways of doing things of those whom I confront ...” And as such it is the power of assuming conducts, or facial expressions, as my own, a power given to me with the power I have over my own body.¹²⁵ (p. 145) Consequently, the child as *person* is as it were scattered through all the images his / her actions give rise to; and it is because of this that the child is apt to recognize himself / herself in everything, Merleau-Ponty concludes. (Ibid., p. 150)

Hence, imitation on the part of the child rests on perception, but this perception implies an actual ‘informing’ (*Gestaltung*) of experience in the child. (Ibid., p. 98) And in imagination, which is an emotional conduct, we find ourselves, “as it were, beneath the relation of the knowing subject and the known object.” (Ibid., p. 98) If, following Merleau-Ponty, formative imagination implies the ‘informing’ of the Child’s experience, it can take place beneath the level of the Child’s actual knowing. This seems plausible considering the process of language competence. Granted that is only gradually and in the due course of this process that percepts and types develop into concepts, that an element of discourse enters into the Child’s relations to things in the *Umwelt*.

Conclusions: Imitation understood as formative imagination, may be conscious as well as unconscious, known or not-known to the imitator; as least consciousness cannot be defined away. In other words, formative imagination does not necessarily imply consciousness, ‘a knowing with Oneself and together with Others’. But it does not preclude ‘the state of being conscious’. Consciousness follows with learning by instruction / study to the extent that it contains elements of discourse (When you do this, you must be aware of, keep in mind, be sure that etc.!)

personality of the other; and it is this in-distinction of two personalities that makes transitivity possible. (Ibid., p. 148-9)

¹²⁵ In the perspective of Aristotle’s dictum: ‘From childhood it is instinctive in human beings to imitate, and man differs from other animals as the most imitative of all and getting his first lessons by imitation, and by instinct also all human beings take pleasure in imitations’. The power of mimicry—and the power I have over my own body: Would not these belong to what Aristotle considered ‘innate potentialities’?

It is plausible that our habits of conduct or doing things most often are acquired through conscious imitation and by instruction; we have been told to do this or that. But, once acquired, we do not always remember from whom we got these habits / instructions; they have become parts of our way of being, our 'second nature'. A major exception is the acquisition of one's (first) language, learning the more or less skilful performance of speaking; the acquisition of language cannot presuppose that language already is acquired.

However, in the course of the Child's process of growing up, there develops in the Child a discursive element, which eventually may comprise the Self. This Self will be dealt in Chapter 7.

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7. Myself and Others

7.1 Introduction

To grow up is to bring to the fore the *eidos*, or ‘immanent form’, of an adult person, a grown-up man or woman, it has been contended. It is to ‘become what you are’. The statement can be supplemented: It also implies ‘self-realization’, to become conscious of oneself as a human being related to a world including Others.

How is this notion of Self—encountered already in connection with what Heidegger calls Dasein’s in-authentic and authentic selfunderstanding—to be understood in the context of growing up? How is this Self ascertained in relations to Others, and together with Others? How does the Self relate to an individual’s ‘identity’, the question ‘Who am I’?

Dealing with these questions, the chapter starts by accounting for different modes of understanding ‘intersubjectivity’ (by visiting E. Husserl, A. Schutz, G.W. F. Hegel and J.-P. Sartre). It proceeds by considering ‘realization of Self’ with reference to growing up (by consulting D. Stern, M. Merleau-Ponty and J. Lacan; G. H. Mead, M. Heidegger and E. Tugendhat). It ends up by approaches to ‘self-identity’ (as this notion has been dealt with by A. Giddens, P. Ricoeur, D. Carr and Ch. Taylor).

Attempts will be made intermittently to apply the views of the mentioned writers to the Child, the Child in his / her ‘becoming’.

7.2 Intersubjectivity: E. Husserl—A. Schutz

In my daily dealings with things of the world, I encounter, as emphasized by Husserl, not only various physical items spatially distributed, and ‘on hand’: Other human beings are there for me too.¹²⁶ Experiencing them, I understand and accept each of them as an Egosubject, and as related to his / her natural surrounding world. I take their surrounding world and mine as one and the same, a world of which we all are conscious, only in different modes. Each of us has a place from which to see the physical things as present; accordingly,

¹²⁶ See Chapter 3.1, p. 1, and Husserl 1982 / *Ideas I*, p. 55-6 / 52.

for each of us the fields of actual perception, actual memory, etc. are different. Yet, for all that, we come to an understanding with our fellow human beings, and in common with them we posit an objective spatio-temporal actuality as our factually existent surrounding world. These are aspects of the life-world, but also of what Husserl called *intersubjectivity*, the way we experience ourselves as related to Others, a theme that preoccupied him as part of his ‘transcendental phenomenology’. Let’s see how Husserl dealt with this notion of intersubjectivity in *Ideas I* and *Ideas II*, relying on the account (and critical remarks) presented by Alfred Schutz.¹²⁷

In the first volume of *Ideas*, Husserl talks about a linking of consciousnesses and body (*Leib*), allowing for a natural, empirical unity by means of which consciousness is located in the space and time of nature, and which, by means of acts of ‘empathy’ (*Einfühlung*), makes possible reciprocal understanding between animate subjects belonging to the one and same world. (Schutz 1964a, p. 51-2) As Husserl says:

“We also recall that only by virtue of the connection joining a consciousness and an organism to make up an empirically intuited unity within Nature is any such thing as mutual understanding between animate beings pertaining to a world possible; and that only thereby can any cognizing subject find the complete world and at the same time know it as one and the same surrounding world belonging in common to him and to all other subjects.” (Husserl 1982 / *Ideas I*, p. 125 / 103)

The experiences of others ‘manifest themselves to us’; we apprehend them by virtue of the fact that they find bodily expression. (Schutz 1964a, p. 52)

“As belonging to them, we ‘view’ the mental processes of others on the basis of the perception of their outward manifestation in the organism. ... The other and his psychical life are, to be sure, given in consciousness as ‘themselves there’ and in union with his organism: but they are not, like the latter, given in consciousness as originary.” (Husserl 1982 / *Ideas I*, p. 6 / 8)

¹²⁷ A. Schutz, “Problems of transcendental intersubjectivity in Husserl,” in *Collected Papers III* (Schutz 1964a) and “Edmund Husserl’s *Ideas II*,” in *Collected Papers III* (Schutz 1964b).

Other ego-subjects are apprehended as fellowmen (*Nebenmenschen*) who (in spite of differences in perspectives and degrees of clarity) have consciousness of the objective world as I do. And it is granted that we can communicate with another. Even though mutual understanding by way of *empathy* does not in fact occur among all-ego-subjects, it is always possible in principle. Hence factually separated worlds of experience may be jointed together through interconnections of actual experience to form a single intersubjective world. This would be the correlate of a unitary world of minds (*Geisterwelt*), “the universal extension of the human community reduced to pure consciousness of the pure I”. (Schutz 1964a, p. 52)

The problem of inter-subjectivity was later made a central theme in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *The Cartesian Meditations*, and analyses of the constitution of mental reality and the cultural world through empathy are also presented in the posthumously published second volume of *Ideas*.¹²⁸ There, when developing what he calls ‘the constitution of psychic reality in empathy’, Husserl returns to his observation: Among what is originally given in space and time are also *animalia*, including men as ‘rational’ living beings. *Animalia*, particularly human beings, are realities not given to me in ‘primal presence’, because ‘subjectivities are included in them’. “They are Objectivities of a particular kind ... Human beings ... are originally given insofar as they are apprehended as unities of corporeal Bodies and Souls.” Whereas Bodies externally standing over against me are experienced in primal presence just like other things, “the interiority of the psychic is experienced in appresence.” In my physical world I encounter material things of the same type as ‘my Body’, and I apprehending them as such, “I feel by empathy that in them there is an Ego-subject, along with everything that pertains to it.” Transferred over to these other Bodies is first of all that ‘localization’ I accomplish in various sensing-fields (touch, warmth, coldness, smell, taste, pain, sensuous pleasure, including sensations of movement), “and then in a similar way there is a transfer of my indirect localization of spiritual activities.” (*Ideas II*, 172 / 163-4, § 45) To the appearance of the other person there also belongs the interiority of psychic acts. The point of departure is “here, too, a transferred co-presence; to the seen Body there belongs a psychic life, just as there does to my Body.” (*Ideas II*, 174 /

¹²⁸ E. Husserl, *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*, translated by R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer. Dordrecht, Boston & London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. Here referred to as *Ideas II*. Page number are given both to the translation and the German edition.

166, § 45) In this way gradually “a system of indications is formed, and there is finally in actuality an analogy between this system of signs ‘expressing’ psychic events, both the active and passive, and the system of signs of language for the expression of thought.” From here one can embark upon a systematic study of the ‘expression’ of psychic life “and elaborate, as it were, the grammar of this expression.” (*Ideas II*, 175 / 166, § 45)

In other words: Under the title ‘the other man’, “we have a Body and we have this Body in union with sensorial fields and, as it were, a psychic field, i.e. the union of a subject of acts.” Parts of these appendages are ‘given to me originally as regards myself’ (and, in fact, can be given to me only as regards myself); the rest is the empirical extension, a transfer in thinking based on experience. Though it is “only with empathy and the constant orientation of empirical reflection onto the psychic life which is presented along with the other’s Body ... that the closed unity, man, is constituted.” I subsequently transfer this unity in myself. In fact, “every person, in virtue of his Body, stands within a spatial nexus, among things, and to each Body for itself there pertains the person’s entire psychic life, grasped in empathy ... so that therefore if the Body moves and occupies ever new places, the soul, too, as it were, co-moves. The soul is indeed ever one with the Body.” (*Ideas II*, 175-6 / 167-8, § 46)

“As it were: ... the soul is nowhere, and its connection with the Body is founded only on functional nexus: the Body is ‘organ’ of the subject, and all appearances are related to Corporeality. ... In order to establish a mutual relationship between myself and an other, in order to communicate something to him, a Bodily relation, a Bodily connection by means of physical occurrences, must be instituted. I have to go over and speak to him. ... Body and soul form a genuine experiential unity and ... in virtue of this unity, the psychic obtains its position in space and time. It is as localized and temporalized in this way that the other subjects are there for us. (Ideas II, 176 / 168, § 46)

“So I have ... the man as inserted into Objective space, into the Objective world. I then posit with this reality an analogon of my Ego and of my surrounding world, this a second Ego with its ‘subjectivities’, its sense data, changing appearances, and things appearing therein. The things posited by others are also mine: the thing I have over and against me in the mode of appearance α with the thing posited by the other in the mode of appearance β . To this belongs the possibility of substitution by means of trading places.” (Ideas II, 177 / 168, § 46)

“Only in the manner of appresence can I have, co-given with his Body, his appearances and his ‘here’, to which they are related. But from that ‘here’ I can then consider even my own Body as a natural Object, i.e. from that ‘here’ my Body is ‘here’, just as the other’s Body is ‘there’ from my ‘here’. ... I place myself at the standpoint of the other ... and I acknowledge that each encounters every other as the natural being, man, and that I then have to identify myself with the man seen from the standpoint of external intuition. Man as Object is thus a transcendent external Object, and Object of an external intuition ... interwoven with external primally presenting perception is appresening (or introjecting into the exterior) empathy ... which realizes the entire psychic life and psychic being in a certain sort of unity of appearance, namely that of an identity of manifold appearances and states localized therein, which are united in the form of dispositions. (Ideas II, 177-8 / 169, § 46)

It is Empathy then that leads to the constitution of the intersubjective Objectivity, of man. (*Ideas II*, 178 / 169, § 47)

When dealing with the constitution of ‘the Spiritual World’ Husserl distinguishes the ‘naturalistic attitude’ from the ‘personalistic’ attitude, the Ego-subject as psychic being (or being of nature) from the Ego as person, or member of a social world. (“It is this distinction we want to investigate, and specifically by research in constitutive phenomenology.”) (*Ideas II*, 183-4 / 174-5]

The psychic, or soul, is in the Body and where the Body presently happens to be. “What also is there are such and such groups of states of consciousness, such and such representations, stirrings of thought, judgments, etc. ... The same holds for time.” Our consciousness is a genuine temporal field, a field of phenomenological time, not to be confused with ‘Objective’ time, constituted along with nature, by consciousness. But since phenomenological time (immanent in the stream of consciousness), is a uni-dimensional ‘constant’ manifold or properties that are exactly analogous to the properties of the time which presents itself (‘appears’) in the lived experiences of the perception of something physical, there is transferred to consciousness the Objective physicalistic time-measurement and time-determination which belongs exclusively to the materialistic world. “The states of consciousness then have ... a time that is measurable through primordial manifestation by the use of instruments.” (*Ideas II*, 187-8 / 178-9, § 49)

What does it mean to speak of a human being and a human soul? It means that “an ‘I think’ emerges ‘in’ him, in the man there, is a fact of nature, founded in the Body and in Bodily occurrences.” (*Ideas II*, 190 / 181) Pertaining to the psychic states are also acts in which man is conscious of himself and of his fellows and of the surrounding real actuality, “sees them in front of himself, takes cognizance of them, is related to them in a more or less lofty way of thinking, and perhaps is also related to them in the modes of affectivity and will.” Here are also acts in which he puts himself in a communicative relation with his fellow men, “speaks with them, writes them. Reads about them in the papers, associates with them in communal activities, makes promises to them, etc. A countless number of remarkable relations between the subject and his ‘surrounding world also have a place here, all of them grounded in the fact that the man ‘knows’ about himself and his fellows and about a surrounding world common to them all.” The surrounding world comprises not ‘mere things’ but use-Objects (clothes, utensils, guns, tools), works of art, literary products, instruments for religious and judicial activities, seals, official ornaments, coronation insignia, ecclesiastical symbols, etc.) “And it is comprised not only of individual persons, but the persons are instead members of communities, members of personal unities of a higher order, which, as totalities, have their own lives, preserve themselves but lasting through time despite the joining or leaving of individuals, have their qualities as communities, their moral and juridical regulations, their modes of functioning in collaboration with other communities and with individual persons.” The members of the community, of marriage and the family, the social class, the union, of the borough, the state, the church, etc. “‘know’ themselves as their members. They consciously realize that their are dependent on them and perhaps consciously react back to them.” (*Ideas II*, 191-2 / 181-2, § 49)

The ‘personalistic’ attitude is described at “the attitude we are always in when we live with one another, talk to one another, shake hands with one another in greeting, or are related to one another in love and aversion, in disposition and action, in discourse and discussion.” (*Ideas II*, 192 / 183, § 49) As a person one lives like any other person and ‘knows’ that one is always the subject of this *surrounding world*. “To live as a person is to posit oneself as a person, to find oneself in, and to bring oneself into, conscious relations with the ‘surrounding world’.” (*Ideas II*, 193 / 183, § 49)

As person I am a *subject of a surrounding world*. Ego and this surrounding world are related to one another inseparably “to each person belongs his surrounding world, while at the same time a plurality of person in communication with one another has a common surrounding world. The surrounding world is the world that is perceived *by the person* in his acts, is remembered, grasped in thought, surmised or revealed as such and such; it is the world of which this personal Ego is conscious, the world which is there for it, to which it relates in this or that way.” The personal Ego ‘relates’ to this world in acts upon which it can reflect, as in the case when it takes notice of itself as such a personal Ego. A person is precisely a person who represents, feels, evaluates, strives, and acts and who, in every such personal act, stands in relation to something, to objects in his *surrounding world*. Though the actual surrounding world of any person is the surrounding world only to the extent he / she ‘knows’ of it, grasps it by apperception and positing, or is conscious of it in the horizon of his / her existence as co-given and offered to the grasp. (*Ideas II*, 195 / 185-6, § 50) “(T)he surrounding world is not a world ‘in itself’ but is rather a world ‘for me’, precisely the surrounding world of *its* Egosubject ... As such, the surrounding world is in a certain way always in the process of becoming, constantly producing itself by means of transformations of sense and ever new formations of sense along with the concomitant positing and annullings.” (*Ideas II*, 196 / 186, § 50)

“The experienced objects, as objects of this empirical sense, excite my desire or perhaps fill needs in relation to certain circumstances constituted in consciousness, e.g. in relation to the need for food which makes itself felt very frequently ... I ‘can use it [the object ‘on hand’] for that, it is useful to me for that. Others also apprehend it in the same way, and it acquires an intersubjective use-value and in a social context is appreciated and is valuable as serving such and such purpose, as useful to man, etc.” (*Ideas II*, 197 / 187-8, § 50)

“All these are founded Objects, which, in apprehension, have been constituted for the Ego ... ” (*Ideas II*, 198 / 188, § 50)

In the *comprehensive experience of the existence of the other*, we thus understand the other, without further ado, as a personal subject and thereby as related to ‘objectivities’, ones to which we are too related: the earth and sky, the fields and the word, the room in which we dwell communally, the picture we see, etc. “We are in a relation to a common world—we are in a personal association: these belong together.” We could not be persons for others if

this common surrounding world did not stand there for us in a community, in an intentional linkage of our lives ... the one is constituted essentially with the other. Each Ego can, for himself and for others, become a person in the normal sense, a person in a personal association, only if comprehension brings about the relation to a common surrounding world.” (*Ideas II*, 201 / 191, § 51)

Persons apprehend themselves not only in ‘the certainly first, and fundamental way, as Body’, but also such that they ‘determine one another’ and are active, not just as individuals but communally, as personally united. But there is still *another* form in which persons influence persons: in their spiritual activity they direct themselves toward *one another*, they perform acts with the intention of being *understood* by the other and of determining the other. “In this way relations of mutual understanding are formed: speaking elicits response [etc.] In these relations of mutual understanding, there is produced a conscious *mutual relation* of persons and at the same time a unitary relation of them to a common surrounding world ... The surrounding world constituted in experiencing others, in mutual understanding and mutual agreement, is designated as the *communicative* one. It is ... relative to persons, who find themselves in it ...” (*Ideas II*, 202-3 / 193, § 51) Persons belonging to any social association “are given to each other as ‘*companions*’, not as *opposed objects but as counter-subjects* who live ‘with’ one another, who converse and are related to one another, actually or potentially, in acts of love and counter-love, of hate and counter-hate, of confidence and reciprocated confidence, etc.” (*Ideas II*, 204 / 194, § 51) Sociality is constituted thus by *specifically social, communicative acts*, “acts in which the Ego turns to others and in which the Ego is conscious of these others as ones toward which it is turning ...” (*Ideas II*, 204 / 194, § 51)

The subjects in communication with one another constitute personal unities of a higher level, the sum total of which makes up ‘the world of social subjectivities’. “To be distinguished from this world of social subjectivities is the world correlative to it and inseparable from it, the world *for* these subjectivities, the *world of social Objectivities*, as one might say.” (*Ideas II*, 205 / 195, § 51) Due to this communication it is possible, Husserl maintains, to constitute “the idea of a world as *world of spirit* in the form of a world of social subjects of lower and higher levels ... which are in communication with each other ...” (*Ideas II*, 206-7 / 197-8, § 51)

Spirit—the human being as a member of the personal human world— does not have a place the way things do. “Yet it does have a place; that is, it stands constantly in a functional relationship to a Body, which for its part has its place in the environing world ...” (*Ideas II*, 215 / 204, § 52)

In the ‘personalistic attitude’, “*I take myself simply as I ordinarily take myself when I say ‘I’ and as the I in any kind of ‘I think’ ... It is absolutely out of the question that I am here intending or encountering myself and my cogito as something in the Body ... It is rather the reverse: the Body is my Body, and it is mine in the first place as my ‘over and against’, my ob-ject, just as the house is my object, something I see or can see, something I touch and can touch, etc.. These things are ‘mine’, but not as component pieces of the Ego ... To be sure, I find the stratum of sensations to be localized in the Body ... [but] ... this stratum does not belong to the realm of what properly pertains to the Ego. Just as the Body in general is over and against the Ego, so is everything ‘not-I’ which makes it an object, and only in the mode of the ‘over and against’ does it appertain to the Ego, precisely as existing object of the Ego’s experience.*” (*Ideas II*, 223 / 212, § 54)

The development of a person is determined by others, by the influence of their thoughts, their feelings, their commandments. “Other’s thoughts penetrate into my soul ... Opposed to one another are my own thoughts, ones that ‘arise’ originally in my mind ... The same is true of *my own feelings*, ones that have their originary source in me, and the *feelings of others*, ones I have *assimilated* and adopted, ...” (*Ideas II*, 281 / 268-9) So, when I want to understand someone’s development, I have to describe, going from stage to stage, the surrounding world in which he / she grew up, and how this someone was motivated by things and people in environment just as they appeared were seen. (*Ideas II*, 288 / 275, § 61) “(E)very lived experience is a lived experience of an Ego, of an Ego that does not itself flow away in a stream as its lived experiences do.” (*Ideas II*, 290 / 277, § 61)

As Husserl says: We all have two interconnecting poles: physical nature and spirit and—in between them—Body and Soul. (*Ideas II*, 298 / 285, § 62) “If we think of monadic subjects and their streams of consciousness, or rather, if we think the thinkable minimum of self-consciousness, then a monadic consciousness, one that would have not ‘world’ given at all given to it, could indeed be thought—thus a monadic consciousness without regularities in the course of sensations, without motivated possibilities in the apprehension of things. In

that case, what is necessary for the emergence of an Ego-consciousness in the ordinary sense? Obviously, human consciousness requires an appearing Body and an intersubjective Body—an intersubjective understanding.” (*Ideas II*, 303 / 290, § 63)

Subjectivities cannot be dissolved into nature, for if it were so ‘what gives nature its sense would be missing’. “Nature is a field of relativities throughout, and it can be so because these are always in fact relative to an absolute, the spirit, which consequently is what sustains all the relativities.” The spirit is determined through its surrounding world, but this does not prevent its being absolute, irrelative. “If we could eliminate all spirits from the world, then there is the end of nature. But if we eliminate nature, ‘true’, Objective-intersubjective existence, there always remains something: the spirit as individual spirit. It only loses the possibility of sociability, the possibility of comprehension, for that presupposes a certain Bodily intersubjectivity. We would no longer have the individual spirit as a person in the stricter, social sense, a person related to a material and, consequently, to a social world as well. Nevertheless we still have, notwithstanding the enormous impoverishment of ‘personal’ life, precisely an Ego with its conscious life.” (*Ideas II*, 311 / 297, § 64) It is in the spirit’s course of consciousness, that in every case the spirit’s unity and individuality is manifested. (*Ideas II*, 311 / 298)

The pure Ego of any given *cogitatio* has absolute individuation, and the *cogitatio* itself is something individual in itself. However, the Ego is not an empty pole but is the bearer of some ‘habituality’, that means, it has its individual history. “The lived experiences in the flux of consciousness have an essence that is absolutely their own; they bear their individuation in themselves ... In the now, consciousness has a content of originary lived experience and a horizon of past ones which is represented in the now in the form of a lived horizon of ‘primary memory’, of retention, and the originary and the horizontal are continuously transformed into one another.” (*Ideas II*, 313-4 / 300)

What is uniquely and originally individual is consciousness. All other individuality is appearance, and has its individuation in actual and possible appearing (which, in turn, refers back to an individual consciousness). “Absolute individuation enters into the *personal* Ego. The surrounding world of the Ego acquires its individuation essentially by way of its relation to the Ego that has experience of it and that exchanges its experience with other individuals. For each Ego, any thing has the here and now as a correlate of intuition. An Ego, or an

intersubjectivity *for itself*, constitutes the surrounding world, and if it allows itself to be determined by its ‘over and against’ in the surrounding world ... then this latter has *the secondary individuation of the ‘over and against’*, whereas the *originary* individuation, the absolute one, resides in the Ego itself.” (*Ideas II*, 315 / 301)

“*What is uniquely and originally individual is consciousness, taken concretely with its Ego. All other individuality is appearance and has the principle of its individuation in actual and possible appearing, which, in turn, refers back to an individual consciousness.*” (*Ideas II*, 315 / 301, § 64)

In other words: According to Husserl the stream of experiences is dependent upon the psyche; the psyche through the animated body is dependent upon nature. The mind in its freedom moves the body and gears through the body into the external world. As observes Schutz, the appearing body with its sensations and the psyche belong to the spiritual environment and receive as such the character of a spiritual reality. “The body is, so to speak, the converter of spiritual motivations into physical causality.” (Schutz 1964b, p. 34) If all minds were eliminated from the world, there would be no nature. If, however, we eliminate Nature, the ‘true’ intersubjective-objective reality, then Mind would still remain as individual mind; it would merely lose the possibility of sociality, the possibility of comprehension, which presupposes the intersubjective constitution of the body. (Schutz 1964b, p. 35)

Summing up: Following Husserl, ‘I’ am a *‘pure ego’*, but also a *body*, ‘a converter of spiritual motivations into physical causality’. Because ‘I’ have a body, I am also endowed with psyche. Due to my intentional, bodily dealings with objects within my field of vision, I *am* also in a sense *my own world*, which comprises animate and inanimate things I am conscious of, things I know about. Further, in respect of my dealings with my fellow-beings, I am a *person* among other persons, a *member of a spiritual community*. Or, as expressed in algebraic form:

I = pure Ego + Body [animate & inanimate things] = Person / Spirit.

The pure ego can only be grasped through ‘transcendental reduction’, by performing an act of reflection upon the intentional experiences already performed. Turning back in

recollections on its previous cogitations, the pure ego can become conscious of itself as the subject of these recollected cogitations. It is then revealed as the '*sum cogitans*', as the numerically identical, undivided, and in itself unchangeable subject, constituted as a unity of inner time. As such, the pure ego is, following Husserl, the centre, the pole of all conscious life, of all cogitations in the broadest sense, including actions, affections, theoretical, evaluating, and practical attitudes; the other pole of these manifold forms of intentional relatedness are the *cogitata* of these cogitations. The objects of these cogitations are, however, always objects within an environmental field of vision. To it belongs the whole real world, included therein that of the real (empirical) 'I', mine as well as that of others. (Schutz 1964b, p. 22)

Whereas any cogitation arises and passes away, the pure ego can never do so. It functions continuously as the performing ego in its actual cogitations although it may withdraw from them in certain modifications of their actuality. Thus it makes, so to speak, its entrances and exits (*'es tritt auf und ab'*), it goes into or out of action, it may be wide awake or sleeping or at any intermediary grade. But it is always there; all data of consciousness, states of mind, and 'noetic' forms, which can be accompanied by the identical ego of an actual or possible ego, belong to such a 'monad'. (Schutz 1964b, p. 22)

As engaged in the life-time project of discovering the world, making sense of things I encounter, my pure ego, or subjectivity, is the container of my most private life history, my memories as residues of my daily perceptions, of what I have lived through. To get a grip on my own subjectivity, my pure ego—which accounts for my world constitution, my meaning-giving to animate and inanimate things in my physical *Umwelt*—I have to put all possible objectivities into 'brackets': my body, my world as the extension of my body, myself as a person and member of a spiritual community. I perform the so-called 'transcendental reduction'. My world constitution requires transcendence, my reaching out to the objectivities of my *Umwelt*. The constituting of my subjectivity requires a movement in the opposite, backwards direction, recovering the origin, my pure ego.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Though, as says M. Theunissen (1986, p. 21), this pure ego is no empty. It has its own history as bearer of its own 'habitualities'; it acquires its fullness when it is extended into its own past and future. It is this 'phenomenological subjectivity' that *projects* the world. Its vehicle is intentionality.

Intersubjectivity—as conceived of by Husserl—arises when one subjectivity (‘pure ego’) experiences another subjectivity (his / her ‘alter ego’). It seems to imply the following kind of reasoning: I am a human being. I have a body. In my everyday pursuits I deal with other, embodied human beings. Due to my bodily senses, my psyche, I experience these fellow-beings, perceiving, remembering, and anticipating them. Over there is another human body, another human being, presumably experiencing me as I do him or her. What holds for me also holds for this Other. He / she represents another another subjectivity. Together we enter into a relation of intersubjectivity. This means: One ‘subjectivity’ has encountered ‘another subjectivity’, but has done so, of course, only in ‘subjectivity’s own realm’. Is this meeting accessible to a possible third part observer? Evidently not, experientially. But, of course, it can be imputed by this observer to any observed human being.

Yet, the ego and the alter ego communicate. As Husserl says they even form interpersonal unities of a higher order. And they can do so only in a bodily sense, and as persons, belonging to this world of animate and inanimate things. Conclusion: Communication is a mundane affair, and as such it is also possible to understand intersubjectivity. The parties are ‘as persons are, as subjects of a surrounding world’, perceived, remembered and conceptually grasped—as partaking in an *Umwelt* of animate and inanimate things to which each is oriented in his / her conduct. The parties of this common communicative world ‘are to each other not objects, but counter-subjects or fellowmen, united in reciprocal social relations’. Through their communicative acts, in which they address each other, they provide for a certain sociality, created through their common preoccupation with certain things in this their common *Umwelt*.

Husserl’s approach to intersubjectivity suffers from some deficiencies, maintains Schutz. One of these concerns his views on sociality and communication. The transcendental correlate of you and I and the Other and everyone as ‘man among men’—who experience each other and whom I experience as such—is described by Husserl as a *community of monads*. (Schutz 1964a, p. 73) He even talks about ‘the cultural world’, about ‘I and my culture’. The sense ‘man’, even as individual, carries with it the sense of membership in a community: I, who experience Others and am experienced by them as an Other; I, who experience Others as oriented to Others who are oriented to me in iterative mediation. (Schutz 1964a, p. 74) It is not difficult to show, maintains Schutz, that reciprocal understanding and communication *already presuppose a community of knowledge, even a*

common surrounding world, and not the reverse. The common surrounding world and the social relation cannot be derived from the idea of communication. All communication, whether by expressive movements, deictic gestures, or the use of visual or acoustic signs, already presupposes an external event in that common surrounding world which, according to Husserl, is not constituted except by communication. It must be presupposed that 'I', as personal subject, in producing signs, orient myself to the Other, who has to interpret the signs as my communication; and that the interpreter of the signs is equally, as a personal subject, oriented to me and my communicative acts. This reciprocal orientation, which alone makes communication possible, is the fundamental presupposition of every social relationship. (Schutz 1964a, p. 72) In other words, according to Schutz intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere; it is rather a *datum* (*Gegebenheit*) of the life-world. It is, in fact, the fundamental ontological category of human existence in the world and therefore in all philosophical anthropology. As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation for all the other categories of human existence. The possibility of reflection on the self, discovery of the ego, capacity for performing any *epoché*, and the possibility of all communication and of establishing a communicative surrounding world as well, are founded on the primal experience of the we-relationship. (Schutz 1964a, p. 82) Communication presupposes a social interrelationship upon which it is founded, a relationship of being 'tuned in' one-upon-the other, of being motivated to address the other, to listen to the other. The vehicles of such communication—significant gestures, signs, symbols, language—have necessarily to belong to the common environment in order to make communication possible, and therefore do not constitute it. (Schutz 1964b, p. 38)

The 'tuning in-relationship, mentioned by Schutz as a requirement for any human communication, is dealt with in his "Making Music Together". (Schutz 1964) The social interactions connected with 'the musical process' are founded upon communication, but not primarily upon a semantic system used by the communicator as a scheme of expression and by his partner as a scheme of interpretation. (Op. cit., p. 159) Yet a study of this process may lead to insights valid for many other forms of social discourse, perhaps even to illumination of the structure of social interaction. (Ibid, p. 159-60) It contains this 'mutual tuning-in relationship', upon which all communication is founded, a relationship allowing for the 'I' and the 'Thou' to be experienced by the participants as a 'We' in vivid presence." (Ibid, p. 161) Illustrating his thesis, Schutz refers to a series of well-known phenomena in

the social world in which this pre-communicative social relationship comes to the foreground: the relationship between pitcher and catcher, tennis players, fencers; we find the same feature in marching together, dancing together, making love together. (Ibid, p. 162) The peculiarity of the musical process of communication consists in the essentially ‘polythetic’ character of the communicated content, in the fact that both the flux of the musical events and the activities by which they are communicated, belong to the dimension of inner time.” (Ibid, p. 173) Though it seems to Schutz that all communication presupposes such a relationship established by the reciprocal sharing of the Other’s flux of experiences in inner time, a living through a vivid present together, the experiencing this togetherness as a ‘We’. “Only within this experience does the Other’s conduct become meaningful to the partner tuned on him ... Facial expressions, gait, posture, ways of handling tools and instruments, without communicative intent, are examples of such a situation. The process of communication is bound to an occurrence in the outer world.” (Ibid, p. 177-8) It presupposes the simultaneous partaking of the partners in various dimensions of outer and inner time. In fact, this seems to be valid for any polythetic communication as well as that conveying meaning in conceptual terms—in which the result of the communicative process can be grasped monothetically. (Ibid, p. 178)

The kind of communicative situation Schutz has in mind is illustrated in the ideogram of Fig. 7:1. Two parties, ego and alter ego in their capacity as *persons*—constituting through their bodily intercourse and preoccupation with certain things in their physical *Umwelt*—what Husserl called ‘a common communicative environment’—are tuned-in on each other. The parties are ‘making music together’, exchanging pieces of information as partaking in ‘the dimensions of outer and inner time’. It is even plausible that they talk to each other, are engaged in ‘monothetic’, verbal interaction. Due to the communicative process, which requires by necessity some measure of mutual empathy, the situation also implies certain sociability.

Fig. 7:1. See attachment. Intersubjectivity after E. Husserl—A.Schutz: Ego and alter ego as *persons*, tuned in on each other in polythetic or monothetic communicative interaction—‘making music together’

Are the parties conscious of themselves as *Selves* in this communicate situation? It seems that Husserl does not take a stand on this notion in *Ideas II*, although, in fact, he addresses

the question of self-apperception and self-understanding. As he says (in § 60): “I know myself from experience, I know what my own character is like: I have an Egoapperception, and empirical ‘self-consciousness’. Each developed subject is not just a stream of consciousness with a pure Ego, but each has accomplished a centralization in the form, ‘Ego’.” He adds that cogitations are acts of an Ego-subject, and that “the Ego is constituted out of one’s own (active) position-taking, and out of one’s own habits and faculties, and consequently is an externally apperceptive unity, the *kernel of which is the pure Ego*.” (*Ideas II*, 278 / 265)

How would such an externally ‘apperceptive unity’ be accomplished, ‘out of a position-taking’, and due to one’s own habits and faculties? A possible answer would be: By interpreting the communicative relation between the parties in terms of *discourse*—conceived of in the most basic sense of ‘conversation’ or ‘talk’ (which requires by definition a speaker and a listener)¹³⁰. They address each other, and organize what they tell each other, by means of personal pronouns: ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’. That means: ‘I’ (the talker) distinguish myself from ‘you’ (the listener); though ‘you’, when addressing yourself to ‘me’, is another ‘I’. Hence ‘I’ am a possible ‘you’ and vice versa. But together ‘you’ and ‘me’—‘we’— are conscious of ourselves as worldly, communicating entities. *I* say, *you* say. Together *we* are parties engaged in a language game.¹³¹

To what extent is Husserl’s model of intersubjectivity applicable to the Child?

Presumably it is only the very rare child that is able to perform the kind of reasoning used by Husserl to illustrate his notion of intersubjectivity: ascribing to another, encountered body an ego-subject, ‘feeling by empathy that in it there is an other ego-subject along with everything that pertains to it’.

¹³⁰ See Benveniste 1971, p 208-9.

¹³¹ Writing space does not allow for explication of Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘language game’. Suffice it to say that it is ‘one of those games by means of which children learn their native language’, that it refers to that ‘whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven’, and that it brings into prominence ‘the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life’. See Wittgenstein 1953, § 7 and § 23.

Though it is reasonable to assume that every child is engaged in communication with others, communication in the sense of personal or social intercourse, exchange of bodily gestures, spanning from smiles and other mere facial expressions to the exchange of words, or, in more general terms, pieces of information, which evoke reaction, response, understanding.

As the Child learns to speak, he / she becomes able to talk to the Other; the Other responds. And vice versa: The Other addresses the Child. He / she responds. The parties talk to each other. 'I' (the talker) is distinguished (by the talker) from 'you' (the listener); 'you', when addressing 'me', is another 'I'. 'I' am a possible 'you' and vice versa. The Child addresses itself to someone, and organizes what he / she says by means of personal pronouns ('I', 'you', 'we'). The Child becomes conscious of itself as an historical 'I' related to any 'you', 'we', 'he /she' or 'they'.

7.3 Hegel on Self-Consciousness

With this possible reading of Husserl, we have passed on to a conception of intersubjectivity as a truly worldly affair, a communicative situation between any parties, for instance that dealt with by Hegel in the much-discussed passages of *Phenomenology of Spirit* entitled 'The Truth of Self-Certainty and Independence' and 'Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage' (which seems to have offered something like a paradigm of thinking concerning the Self and Other).

In the mentioned passages Hegel presents to us with a situation where 'one self-consciousness' encounters 'another self-consciousness', a situation that may engender 'self-knowledge' of the involved parties, may enhance their knowledge of themselves as persons.

Hegel tells us that:

"Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness." [Hegel 1977, § 175, p. 110]

"A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it." [Hegel 1977, § 177, p. 110]

“A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as ‘object’. With this, we already have before us the Notion of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent selfconsciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.” [Hegel 1977, § 175, p. 110]

“... the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle ... The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness ... just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the other’s death ...” [Hegel 1977, § 187, p. 113-4]

A terminological clarification seems necessary: As reminds us M. Inwood in his *Hegel Dictionary*, the word ‘conscious’ (*bewusst*) is generally used to distinguish conscious mental states and events from unconscious ones (i.e. ‘to be aware of’, ‘unaware of’). In philosophy it primarily indicates ‘intentional consciousness’, or consciousness of an object. *Bewusstsein* (‘consciousness’, ‘being conscious’)—coined by Wolff for the Latin *conscientia*, and later used by Kant and Hegel— denotes not only a subject’s consciousness (his / her state of being conscious), but also the conscious subject, in contrast to the object of which he / she is conscious. Adding the pronoun *selbst* (‘self’) gives *selbepewusst* and *Selbstbewusstsein*, which indicate consciousness, knowledge or awareness of oneself. “In the standard sense of eighteenth century psychology and philosophy, *Selbstbewusstsein* was knowledge of one’s own changing conscious states and of the processes occurring in oneself, together with an awareness that one’s own I or self is the bearer of these states and processes; that one has / is only one I; that this I persists throughout, and independently of, the varying succession of one’s experiences, and that one’s I stands in contrast to an external world of objects.” (Inwood 1992, p. 61) Among the German idealists, Inwood continues, it was common to conceive of the self not as sharply distinct from objects, but as permeating and embracing them. Correspondingly, to be fully self-conscious is not simply to be conscious of oneself in contrast to objects, but to see the external world as the product, the possession, or mirror-image of one’s own self. Hegel’s use of *selbepewusst* and *Selbstbewusstsein* depends on these considerations. But it also depends on the colloquial sense of these words (‘self-confident’, ‘self-assured’, etc.) (Ibid., p. 61) Hence Self-consciousness, German *Selbstbewusstsein*,

means consciousness, knowledge or awareness of oneself, but also ‘selfconfidence, self-assuredness’.¹³²

In the quotations from *Phenomenology of Spirit* above, the word ‘Selfconsciousness’ communicates both these meanings. Though it primarily stands for a person giving the impression of self-confidence or selfassuredness: One ‘self-assured’ individual encounters another ‘selfassured’ individual; each demands recognition from the other, and both are ready to engage in a life-and-death struggle to get recognition from the other. The opposition may engender self-awareness / selfconsciousness of the parties. But, Hegel’s point seems to be that it first of all (and paradoxically at first sight) may actualize Spirit, a state where ‘I’ is ‘We’, and ‘We’ is ‘I’. The parties cease fighting. They start to talk to each other.

How does that come about? For an answer, let’s turn to Tugendhat’s reading of Hegel’s statements: Self-consciousness wants to know itself, but it can only achieve this to the extent that this is confirmed for it by the ‘object’ [to wit: the other human being] confronting it ... “if selfconsciousness regards its opposing object as inessential, the confirmation that this object is capable of providing for it also becomes inessential. Thus it will gradually have the experience that it must change its conceptions; in particular, it comes to see that it can only experience itself as essential in relation to the object confronting it to the extent that it itself recognizes the latter as essential.” (Tugendhat 1986., p. 303) Selfconsciousness cannot be satisfied when it is only *itself* who attempts to confirm its essentiality in *relation* to its opposing object (an other selfconsciousness); the latter must confirm its essentiality for it. This presupposes that ‘the opposing object’ is as independent as selfconsciousness itself. Or, as Hegel says:

“Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another selfconsciousness.” [Hegel 1977, § 175, p. 110]

¹³² *Selbstbewusstsein: (a) Bewusstsein (des Menschen) von sich selbst als denkenden Wesen, (b) das Überzeugtsein von seinen Fähigkeiten, von seinem Wert als Person, das sich bes. in selbstsicherem Auftreten ausdrückt.* Duden, Deutsches Universal Wörterbuch.

It is only now that the certainty of the essential moment in the encounter can really turn into truth; it can do so only insofar and when this selfconsciousness is *recognized* by others. It will experience that its desired recognition is attained only when it recognizes others in the same way it would like to be recognized by them. In Hegel's own words:

"They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another." [Hegel 1977, § 184, p. 112]

And, with this structure,

"we already have before us the Notion of Spirit." [Hegel 1977, § 177, p. 110]

Conclusion: Self-consciousness wants to destroy its object (the encountered other person), but if it does so, it can no longer confirm the certainty of its own essentiality through its relation to this object, the other person. (Tugendhat, *op. cit.*, p. 302-3) As the object of selfconsciousness is not just any object, but is another self-consciousness, it can be claimed that what Hegel describes is essentially a situation of intersubjectivity, that the nature of self-consciousness is essentially intersubjective, that knowledge (consciousness) of oneself is intersubjective.

Hegel's account has the following features, Inwood observes: Selfconsciousness (as 'consciousness of One-self as distinguished from Others) "is not an all-or-nothing matter, but proceeds through increasingly adequate stages." As it is essentially interpersonal and requires the *reciprocal* recognition (*Anerkennung*) of self-conscious beings (the state of Spirit, where 'I' is 'We', and 'We' is 'I'), it is practical as well as cognitive: Self-consciousness involves the establishment and operation of social institutions, as well as scientific and philosophical inquiry. (Inwood, *op. cit.*, p. 63)

"The advance of self-consciousness occurs when consciousness as understanding deploys conceptions that involve a 'distinction which is no distinction' (such as the opposite poles of a magnet or of electricity): it sees both that the inner essence of things, conceptualized in terms of a vanishing distinction, is its own product, and that the concept of such a distinction is applicable to its own relation to its object." (Inwood, *Op. cit.*, p. 62) This accounts for the simplest form of self-consciousness, the 'I'. Though "this phase of self-consciousness is

deficient, since in contrast to the external world, the self-conscious I is vanishingly thin and elusive. It thus attempts by a series of manoeuvres both to remove the alien otherness of external objects and, *ipso facto*, to acquire objective content for itself.” These manoeuvres are more practical than cognitive: propelled by desire (*Begierde*)—an endless process of consuming sensory objects, the struggle for recognition by another self-consciousness, the enslavement of the vanquished by the victor. (Ibid., p. 62)

Hegel’s way of associating self-consciousness with recognition is difficult for several reasons: It attempts to answer not only the question ‘What is required for self-consciousness?’ but also ‘How did social relations originate?’ It postulates a near-Hobbesian struggle for recognition. It combines in a single narrative a variety of distinct factors. The word ‘recognition’ (*Anerkennung*) is used in more than one sense. But, emphasizes Inwood, essentially what each combatant seeks is recognition in the sense of acknowledging honour, acknowledgment of his worth, in contrast to the other’s. However, if recognition is reciprocal, this purpose is defeated. And, it is also defeated if it is unilateral, “since acknowledgment is worth only as much as the acknowledger; if *he* is not acknowledged by the recipient of his acknowledgment, his acknowledgment is worthless.” (Ibid., p. 246)

To be a self-conscious person is to be aware of oneself as an ‘I’, in contrast to one’s bodily and psychological states. It is to be ‘reflected into oneself’, and not to exist as simply as an endless proliferation of desires. (Self-consciousness’s first attempt to establish itself is to satisfy its desires by consuming one object after another.) But reflection into oneself requires that one is reflected back from something that is seen not simply as an object for one’s consumption, but as another self on a par with one’s own self. The use of ‘I’ contrasts with, and thus requires, the use of ‘he / she’, as well as of ‘it’. (Ibid., p., 246-7)

Why does my reflection into myself back from another person require that he acknowledge or take notice of me as a person, and not simply that I view him as a person? There are several possible answers, Inwood says. As mentioned, *Selbstbewusstsein* (‘self-consciousness’) also means selfconfidence, self-respect. Self-respect requires confirmation by others: people who are constantly devalued by others tend to devalue themselves.

Unless persons recognize each other in the sense of honouring each other, they lack the evidence on which to recognize each other in the sense of identifying each other as

individuals, and in the sense of realizing that they do so. To be self-conscious, one must recognize others in the sense of identifying them as particular individuals or types, or in the sense that it is so. But no one can have evidence that one does this unless one is taking notice of them. To recognize others in the sense of identifying and realizing that one does so, I must be able to think, and thus (on Hegel's view) speak a language. But I cannot acquire a language, unless I speak to others, and to speak to others is to recognize them in the sense of honouring. 'I' contrasts with, and requires, 'you'. (Op. cit., p. 247)

Hegel's belief that self-consciousness involves recognition in the sense of honouring has four sources: His conviction "that much of our conduct is 'conspicuous', motivated less by the intrinsic value to us of the conduct than by a desire to be seen in a certain way and thus to acquire unilateral recognition (in the sense of honouring)," the self-assertiveness of *Selbstbewusstsein*. His conflating of self-consciousness with the conflict in a Hobbesian state of nature. His belief that to transcend one's desire, and to be reflected into oneself as a pure I, one needs to submit to, be disciplined by, an external agent. (A key word is *Zucht*, from *ziehen*, 'to pull, draw', etc., which means education (*Erziehung*), cultivation and 'drill discipline', with associations of punishment.) (Ibid., p. 247)

To acknowledge in the sense of honouring another *unilaterally* enhances the self-consciousness both of the slave / bondsman, and of the child in the modern state. (Ibid., p. 247) Or, as says J.N. Findlay (in Hegel 1977, Analysis, § 196, p. 522): "Hegel thinks that the discipline of service and obedience is essential to self-consciousness: mere mastery would not yield it. Only the discipline of service enables the conscious being to master himself, i.e. his finite, contingent, natural self. Without this discipline formative ability would degenerate into a narrow cleverness placed at the service of personal self-will. (Hegel suggests that a period of subjection to others is essential to the highest magisterial rationality. Not to have undergone such discipline results in a trivialization of self-consciousness, which never rises above petty finite interests. It would seem that the permissive bringing-up of children is implicitly condemned, and that 'imperialism' and 'colonialism' at certain stages of development are given a justification.)" In Hegel's own words:

"Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains at the formal stage, and does not extend to the known real world of existence. Without the formative activity, fear remains

inward and mute, and consciousness does not become explicitly for itself." [Hegel 1977, p. 119, § 196]

Fig. 7:2. See attachment. The Hegel model of intersubjective self-consciousness: Selfconsciousness arises when one self-assured individual encounters another selfassured individual, when each demands recognition from the other, and both are ready to engage in a life-and-death struggle to get recognition from the other. Both are driven by desire for some object, or simply vying for 'ruling the roast'.

The ideogram of Fig 7:2 illustrates 'the Hegel model of intersubjective self-consciousness': Two self-conscious ('self-assured') parties, I and You, encounter each other in (to borrow an expression from Husserl) 'a common communicative environment'); we are joined together, not by mutual empathy, but by reciprocal quest for recognition, competing for access to some object, or simply cocksurely vying for 'ruling the roast'. In our self-assuredness I demand from the other what he / she demands from me. A struggle for life or death? No, not literally so, by necessity. But an opportunity for both parties to discover, through competitive intercourse, their relative strength, social worth, and capabilities, i.e. to attain self-consciousness—'knowledge of ourselves with ourselves and together with Others'. In the contest, one wins, the other succumbs. I am forced to recognize you, without your recognizing of me. Or, vice versa. An alternative option is possible, however. One of the parties, or both of us, realize(s) that recognition can only be reached by two mutually recognized parties. A requirement for our mutual recognition is that we speak a language. Between us there is a distinction, which is nonetheless not a distinction; together we are like the opposite poles of a magnet. 'I' contrasts with 'you', but requires 'you'. And vice versa.

Is this presumed struggle for recognition, acknowledgment, or respect, possibly giving rise to Spirit (an 'I' that is 'We', a 'We' that is 'I') a too far-fetched (not to say an awkward) assumption considering intercourse between Child and Other? No, not necessarily so, considering possible events and situation in the day-to-day life of children: quarrelling with parents over what do to, over what not to do, competing with siblings for attention, love and esteem; vying for leadership among peers; for short all these situations of competitive intercourse which most often wind up end up into reconciliation, or the Child's knowing its proper place.⁸

7.4 The Look of the Other: J.-P. Sartre

Among thinkers influenced by Hegel's 'intersubjective model of selfconsciousness' is J.-P. Sartre, particularly in his dealings with 'the Look of the Other'.¹³³

"At the origin of the problem of the existence of others", Sartre says in *Being and Nothingness*, (*L'être et le néant*) 9, "there is a fundamental presupposition: others are *the Other*, that is the self which *is not* myself. ... The Other is the one who is not me and the one who I am not." (Sartre 1958, p. 230) The Other appears to me on the occasion of my perception of a body, and this body is 'an in-itself external to my body'. (p. 230-1)¹³⁴

The statement is developed with references to Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger. The philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries seems to have understood that once myself and the Other are considered as separate substances, we cannot escape 'solipism', Sartre maintains. And that is why modern theories try "to seize at the very heart of the consciousness a fundamental transcending connection with the Other which would be constitutive of each consciousness in its very upsurge." (Sartre 1958, p. 233) When, in the *Cartesian Meditations* and the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl attempts to refute solipism "he believes that he can succeed by showing that a referral to the Other is the indispensable condition for the constitution of the world." The Other is present not only as a particular, concrete and empirical appearance, but, in fact, as a condition of the world's unity and richness. "Whether I consider this table or this tree or this bare wall in solitude or with companions, the Other is always there as a layer of constitutive meanings which belong to the very object which I consider, in short, he is the veritable guarantee to the object's objectivity." The general meaning of 'Others' is a requirement for the constitution of any 'Ego'. Each object is given as possessing systems of reference to a plurality of individual

¹³³As notes Merleau-Ponty: Among children of similar ages a frequent relation is that of the child who parades before another child who looks at him, or the one who exhibits himself while the other watches, a relation of master and slave. "What the master seeks, following Hegel's famous description between master and slave, is recognition (*Anerkennung*) of the slave to be a slave. The master is nothing without the humiliation of the slave; he would not feel alive without this abasement of the other." (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 142).

¹³⁴ Sartre, J.P., 1958, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, transl. by H. E. Barnes and with an introduction by M. Warnock, London, Routledge. Sartre, J.-P. 1937, *L'être et le néant: Essay d'ontologie phénoménologique*. Paris, Librairie Gallimard.

consciousnesses. (Ibid., p. 233) It is only in the light of the Other that experience can be interpreted. The Other is not that empirical person encountered in my experience; he is the transcendental subject to whom this person by nature refers. “Thus the true problem is that of the connection of transcendental subjects who are beyond experience.” (Ibid., p. 234)

In Hegel the appearance of the Other is indispensable not to the constitution of the world and my empirical ‘Ego’, but to the very existence of my consciousness as self-consciousness.¹³⁵ At first this selfconsciousness is pure self-identity, pure existence for itself. It is by the very fact of being *me* that I exclude the Other. “The Other is the one who excludes me by being himself, the one who excludes me by being myself ... he is the one who is other than I.” But this Other is also selfconsciousness. “As such he appears to me as an ordinary object immersed in the being of life. Similarly it is thus that I appear to the Other: as a concrete, sensible, immediate existence.” Hence Hegel takes his stand on the ground of a reciprocal relation which he defines as ‘the selfapprehension of the one in the other’. Though it is only in so far as each man is opposed to the Other that he is absolutely for himself. “Opposite the Other and confronting the Other, each one asserts his right of being individual ... (M)y appearance for myself as an individual, and this appearance is conditioned by the recognition of the Other.” The ‘moment’ of *being for the Other* is for Hegel a necessary stage of the development of self-consciousness: the road of interiority passes through the Other. “But the Other is of interest to me only to the extent that he is another Me, a Me-object for Me, and conversely to the extent that he reflects my Me—i.e., is, in so far as I am an object for him ... I must obtain from the Other the *recognition* of my being ... As I appear to the Other, so I am.” (Ibid., p. 236-7) The way I appear depends on the value of my recognition of the Other.

“In this sense to the extent that the Other apprehends me as bound to a body and immersed in life, I am myself only an Other. In order to make myself recognized by the Other, I must risk my own life. To risk one’s life, in fact, is to reveal oneself as not-bound to objective form or to any determined existence—as not bound to life.” (Sartre, 1958, p. 237)

¹³⁵ Sartre refers to the first volume of *The Phenomenology of Mind*. See *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, being Part III of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, translated by W. Wallace together with the *Zusätze* in Boumann’s Text (1845) translated by A.V. Miller and with Foreword by J.N. Findley. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976.

To pursue the death of the Other (as Hegel says) means: I wish to cause myself to be mediated by an Other, by a dependent consciousness whose essential characteristic is to exist only for another. This will be accomplished the very moment when I risk my life, “for in the struggle against the other I have made an abstraction of my sensible being by risking it.” The Other, on the other hand, “prefers life and freedom even while showing that he has not been able to posit himself as not-bound to the objective form.” Therefore he remains bound to external things in general. He is the Slave and I am the Master. Thus there appears the famous ‘Master-Slave’ relation. The Slave is the Truth of the Master. “But this unilateral recognition is unequal and insufficient, for the truth of his self-certitude for the Master is a non-essential consciousness; therefore the Master is not certain of being for himself as truth.” In order to attain this truth there is necessary ‘a moment in which the master does for himself what he does as regards the Other and when the slave does as regards the Other what he does for himself’. “At this moment there will appear a self-consciousness in general which is recognized in other selfconsciousnesses and which is identical with them and with itself.” (Ibid., p. 237) Thus Hegel makes me depend on the Other in my being. I am, he said, ‘a being for-itself which is for-itself only through another’. The Other penetrates me to the heart. I cannot doubt him without doubting myself since ‘self-consciousness is real only in so far as it recognizes its echo (and its reflection) in another’. “By proceeding from Husserl to Hegel, we have realized immense progress,” Sartre contends: “I find that being-for-others appears as a necessary condition for being-for-myself.” (Ibid., p. 238)]

With Hegel the problem was the mutual recognition of consciousnesses brought face-to-face, appearing in the world and confronting each other. But ‘to-be-with’ has an altogether different meaning; the word ‘with’ does not intend the reciprocal relation of recognition and of conflict. It expresses rather a sort of ontological solidarity or exploitation of this world. The Other is not originally bound to me as an ontic reality appearing in the midst of the world among ‘instruments’ as a type of particular object; the being by which he determines me in my being is his pure being apprehended as ‘being-in-the-world’. Our relation is not a frontal opposition but rather an interdependence. “I cause myself to be determined in my being by a being who makes the world exist as a complex of instruments for the ends of his reality.” (Ibid., p. 245)

Heidegger has discovered critical moments—inseparable except by abstraction—in ‘being-in-the-world’, which characterize human reality, the moments of ‘world’, ‘being-in’ and ‘being’. Being, Heidegger tells us in *Being and Time*, is the *Mit-sein*—that is, ‘being-with’. Human reality is its being *with* others. I do not exist first in order that subsequently a contingency should make me *encounter* the Other. I discover the transcendental relation to the Other as constituting my own being, just as I have discovered that being-in-the-world measures my human reality. “*The Other is no longer first a particular existence which I encounter in the world ... the Other is the ex-centric limit which contributes to the constitution of my being. He is the test of my being inasmuch as he throws me outside of myself toward structures which at once both escape me and define me; it is this test which originally reveals the Other to me.*” (Ibid., p. 245)

For Heidegger, to be is to be one’s own possibilities; that is, to make oneself be; the world refers to me a sort of impersonal reflection of my unauthentic possibilities in the form of instruments and complexes of instruments which belong to ‘everybody’ and which belong to me in so far as I am ‘everybody’: ready-made clothes, common means of transport, parks, gardens, public places, shelters made for anyone who may take shelter there, etc. Thus I make myself known as anybody by means of the indicative complex of instruments which indicate me as a *Worum-willen*. The unauthentic state reveals to me by ‘being-with’, not as one unique personality with other personalities equally unique, but as a total interchangeability of terms of the relation. I am not opposed to the Other, for I am not ‘me’; instead we have the social unity of the *they*.¹³⁶ (Ibid., p. 245)

The empirical image, which may best symbolize Heidegger’s intuition is not that of a conflict, but rather a *crew*. The original relation of the Other and my consciousness is not the *you* and *me*: it is the *we*. Heidegger’s being-with is ... the mute existence in common of one member of the crew with his fellows, that existence which the rhythm of the oars or the regular movements of the coxswain will render sensible to the rowers and which will be made manifest to them by the common goal to be attained, the boat or the yacht to be overtaken, and the entire world, which is profiled on the horizon. (Ibid., p. 247)

¹³⁶ For Heidegger on ‘the they’, see below 7.8.

So, now we have been given what we asked for, Sartre concludes: a being which in its own being implies the Other's being. And yet we cannot consider ourselves satisfied. (Ibid., p. 247) The Other must appear to me as *not being me*. This negation can be conceived in two ways: either it is a pure, external negation, and it will separate the Other from myself as one substance from another substance—and in this case all apprehension of the Other is by definition impossible; or else it will be an internal negation, which means a synthetic active connection of the two terms, each one of which constitutes itself by denying that it is the other. This negative relation will therefore be reciprocal and will possess a twofold interiority; this means first that the multiplicity of 'Others' will not be a collection but a totality (in this sense we admit that Hegel is right) since each Other finds his being in the Other. It also means that this Totality is such that it is on principle impossible for us to adopt 'the point of view of the whole'. "It is in the light of these few observations that we in turn shall now attack the question of the Other." (Ibid. p. 252)

For Sartre, the question of the Other is a question of the Look of the Other: It is in the reality of everyday life that the Other appears to me, and so his probability refers to everyday reality. But if the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the world as the object which sees what I see, "then my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of *being seen* by the Other. It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just as the Other is a probable object for me-as-subject, so I can discover myself in the process of becoming a probable object for only a certain subject." (Ibid., p. 256) I cannot consider the look which the Other directs on me as one of the possible manifestations of his objective being. On the contrary, "my apprehension of the Other in the world as probably being a man refers to my permanent possibility of being-seen-by-him ... 'Being-seen-by-the Other' is the truth of 'seeing-the-Other'." So if the Other is on principle the one who looks at me, then we must be able to explain the meaning of the Other's look. (Ibid., p. 257)

"But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Somebody is looking at me. What does it mean? It means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my structure—modifications which I can apprehend and fix conceptually by means of the reflective cogito." (Sartre 1958, p. 260)

I see *myself* because *somebody* sees me—as it is usually expressed. All of a sudden I am conscious of myself as escaping myself, of that I have my foundation outside myself. I am for myself only a pure reference to the Other. (Ibid., p. 260) The Other is not an object here and can not be an object, unless by the same stroke my self ceases to be an object-for-the-Other and vanishes. (Ibid., p, 261)

“I am my Ego for the Other in the midst of a world which flows toward the Other. The Other’s look makes me beyond my being in this world and puts me in the midst of the world which is at once this world and beyond this world ... To apprehend myself as seen is, in fact, to apprehend myself as seen in the world and from the standpoint of the world.” (Sartre 1958, p. 261 & 263)

As Sartre says with implicit reference to Hegel, we can consider ourselves as ‘slaves’ as far as we appear to the Other. This slavery is not capable of being surmounted: “I am a slave to the degree that my being is dependent at the center of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very condition of my being.” (Ibid., p. 267)

So, what is then the Other? In the first place, the Other is the being toward whom I do not turn my attention. “He is the one who looks at me and at whom I am not yet looking, the one who delivers me to myself as *unrevealed* but without revealing himself, the one who is present to me as directing at me but never as the object of my direction ... if I am wholly engulfed in my shame, the Other is the immense, invisible presence which supports this shame and embraces it on every side; he is the supporting environment of my being-unrevealed.” The look of the Other touches me across the world. This is not only a transformation of myself, but a metamorphosis of the world: “I am looked-at in a world which is looked-at.” (Ibid., p. 269)

The Other does not constitute me as an object of myself but does so for himself and he does not serve as a constitutive concept for the pieces of knowledge which I have of myself. (Ibid., p. 275) If in general there is an Other, it is necessary for me to be the one who is not the Other, “and it is this very negation effected by me upon myself that I make myself be and that the Other arises as the Other.” This negation which constitutes my being, and which makes me appear as the Same confronting the Other, constitutes me as ‘Myself’: My selfness is reinforced by arising as a negation of an other selfness. (Ibid., p. 283) “Thus my being-

for-others- i.e. my Me-as-object—is not an image cut off from me and growing in a strange consciousness. It is a perfectly real being, my being as the condition of my selfness confronting the Other and the Other’s selfness confronting me.” (Ibid., p. 286)

This object which the Other is for me and this object which I am for him are manifested each as a body. But, what then is my body? And what is the body of the Other? (Ibid., p. 302) Dealing with these questions Sartre distinguishes three ‘ontological dimensions’ of body: “I exist my body: this is its first dimension of being. My body is utilized and known by the Other: this is its second dimension. But in so as *I am for others*, the Other is revealed to me as the subject for whom I am an object ... I exist therefore for myself as known by the Other ... I exist for myself as a body known by the Other. This is the third ontological dimension of my body.” (Ibid., p. 351) This means—as observes A. Schutz (1962)—Sartre makes a distinction between (1) My body in its factual being, in its being-in-itself, (2) The Other’s body as used and known by me—and vice versa, and (3) My experience of myself as being known to the Other by reason of my body. “My body in its *factual being* is experienced by me first of all as the carrier of my ‘five senses’ ... I do not ‘see’ this center, however, I *am* this center. Next I experience my body as the instrument of my actions, capable of handling other instruments; I *am* my hand. ... As both, my body is experienced not merely as my physiological structure, but as everything determining my point of view and point of departure: my race, my nationality, my birth, my past. Thus, my body refers to consciousness; it is consciousness, although not reflective, but merely affective consciousness ... the pure apprehension of the self as factual existence.” (Ibid., p. 191) As to the body as used and known “I seize the Other originally as a subject for which I am an object and objectify him in a second move, thus regaining my own subjectivity ... the Other exists for me first, and I seize him only thereafter in his body.

As such it seems to me an *instrument among all other instruments*.” (Ibid., p. 192) My *experience* of my own body originates in the shock of meeting the Other, who looks at me, that the Other takes a view of it and even one which I myself am unable to take. As Schutz says: “My body, hitherto the instrument which I am and which cannot be used by any other instrument, is now experienced as being for the Other an instrument among all his instruments. Simultaneously ... it appears that the Other accomplishes with respect to me a function which I can never perform: he sees me as I am.” (Ibid., p. 193) Or, in Sartre’s own words: “... the body-for-the-Other *is* the body-for-us, but inapprehensible and alienated. It

appears to us then that the Other accomplishes for us a function of which we are incapable and which nevertheless is incumbent on us: *to see ourselves as we are.*” (Sartre, op. cit. p. 354)

Sartre’s theses on Myself and Others can be summarized in a life-world perspective, Schutz contends: “In the reality of everyday life I am surrounded by objects, some of which, so I affirm, are fellow-men. In order to clarify the meaning of such an affirmation, Sartre [in *Being and Nothingness*] analyzes the entrance of another man into my perceptual field. Before the Other appeared the objects within my perceptual field seemed to be grouped around myself as the center in certain objective measurable distances; they had properties relating to my subjectivity, although believed by me to be objective ones. With the appearance of a fellow-man [the Other], this apparent unity of my universe breaks asunder. The objects are no longer defined exclusively by measurable distances from my own position, but also from his; their properties, to be objective have to persist from his as well as from my point of view; briefly, I perceive objects from his as well by me, but also as perceived by him, the Other. To be sure, the Other at this level is still an object among other objects; but he is distinguished from all the other objects by the fact that he is the object which perceives what I perceive and which, a least as a possibility, perceives me as being an object ... In my very possibility of being an object for the Other, the Other reveals himself as a subject. My seeing an object as ‘being probably being a man’ refers to my probably being seen by him, and this rapport is taken by Sartre as an irreducible fact. The Other is he who looks at me.” (Schutz 1962, p. 1889)

When this other person looks at me, a basic change occurs in my way of being. I become conscious of myself: placed in a situation not defined by me, I suddenly am aware of my self as being an object for another, and ashamed or proud of this fact. I am no longer myself but by reference to the Other. By merely looking at me, the Other imposes limits on my freedom. “Formerly, the world was open to my possibilities; now it is he, the Other, who defines me and my situation within the world from his point of view, thus transforming my relations to objects into factors of *his* possibilities. The world and my existence within it is no longer ‘world for me’; it has become ‘world for the Other’.” By becoming an object for the Other I discover myself to be at a distance from the Other, a distance which is not of my, but of his making. The ‘Other’ may take the structure of an individual, a type, an anonymous audience or a public. (Ibid., p. 189)

But all this is merely half the story, Schutz continues. “Having once constituted the Other as a subjectivity, I can objectify him again. ... I discover him ... as being in the world, as placed in a certain situation defined by me as endowed with certain properties and characteristics, briefly as an object among other objects, as an utensil among all my other utensils ... By objectifying the Other, I, the previously objectified Me, regain my subjectivity and self.” Regaining my self, the Other becomes merely an object to me to the extent to which I am an object to him. The type of the Other’s objectification depends upon my and his situation and upon the circumstance whether he can see me and I see him. It refers, therefore, to the relationship between my and the Other’s body. (Ibid., p. 190 “By looking at me, the Other makes me an object, limits my freedom, transforms me into a utensil of his possibilities. To be sure, in a second move, I may objectify again the Other-subject, regaining, thus my own subjectivity.” (Ibid. p. 197) In this respect Sartre’s theory can be described as a refinement of Hegel’s dialectic between Master and Slave: “Either I am the object and the Other is the subject, or vice versa.”

Self-consciousness arises when, placed in a situation not defined by me, I am aware of being looked upon by an Other. I am no longer myself but by reference to the Other.

Fig. 7:3. See attachment. Sartre’s model of intersubjectivity: My trading of looks with an Other.

Fig. 7:3 illustrates Sartre’s interpretation of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is essentially a relation between bodies, between Myself as Body seen by the Other and the Body of the Other as seen by me. Consciousness of Self—knowledge of *ourselves as we are*—arises through my apprehending (perceiving, seizing, arresting or understanding) of the look of the Other, or (from the possible alternative point of view) my look at the Other as it is apprehended by this Other. I am myself only by reference to the Other, the Other is himself / herself only by reference to me. I and my fellow-man / fellow-woman are ‘jointed together’ through a trading of looks.

How does this model of intersubjectivity relate to the Child? Certainly it may happen that the Child perceives itself through the eyes of the Other, experiencing a sudden feeling of pride, or shame (to take the paramount example of Sartre himself), ‘all of a sudden hearing footsteps in the hall: Somebody is looking at me!’ (‘I have just made an awkward or vulgar

gesture ... Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed.’) The Child discovers itself *as it is* through apprehending of the look of the Other, i.e. by means of reference to this Other. But And this Other be God—He who sees everything, hears everything, even my most private thoughts, wishes, desires? If. So it would be possible to interpret Sartre’s model of intersubjectivity in terms of ‘conscience’. Conscience must be distinguished from consciousness. As says Hanna Arendt, “Even Socrates, so much in love with the marketplace, has to go home, where he will be alone, in solitude, in order to meet the other fellow ... It took language a long time to separate the word ‘consciousness’ from ‘conscience’ and in some languages, for instance, in French, such a separation never was made. Conscience, as we understand it in moral and legal matters, is supposedly always present within us, just like consciousness. And this conscience is also supposed to tell us what to do and what to repent; before it became the *lumen naturale* or Kant’s practical reason, it was the voice of God ... Conscience is the anticipation of the fellow who awaits you if and when you come home.” (Arendt 1978, p. 190-1) Or, is it the presence of the ever-present fellow who constantly watches you from above?

7.5 The ‘Experiential Child’—The ‘Verbal Child’: D. N. Stern

Intersubjectivity, in the most general sense of a communicative relation between the Child and an Other, seems to be a requirement for the Child’s experiencing itself as Self: an ‘I’ related to ‘you’, ‘we’, ‘he’, ‘she’ and ‘they’. As a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for such experiences on the part of the Child, it is the natural departure for any consideration of realization of Self in the process of growing up. This is demonstrated in the writings of the child psychologist Daniel Stern, in his dealings with what can perhaps be termed the ‘Experiential Child’ in contradistinction to the ‘Verbal Child’.

“Anyone concerned with human nature is drawn by curiosity to wonder about the subjective life of young infants,” says Stern in *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*: “How do infants experience themselves and others? Is there a self to begin with, or an other, or some amalgam of both? How do they bring together separate sounds, touches, sights, and feelings to form a whole person?” Posing these questions is like wondering what the universe might have been like the first few hours after the big bang. “The universe was created only once, way out there, while interpersonal worlds are created, in here, every day in each new infant’s mind.” (Stern 1985, p. 3-4) As we cannot know the subjective world inhabited by the very

young child, we must invent it. The aim of his book (which he describes as a working hypothesis about infants' subjective experiences of their own social life) is "to draw some inferences about the infant's subjective life from new observational data." What we imagine infant experience to be like shapes our notions of who the infant is, he says. "These notions make up our working hypothesis about infancy. (Ibid., p. 4)

"We comfortably assume that at some point later in development, after language and self-reflexive awareness are present, the subjective experience of a sense of self arises and is common to every one, providing a cardinal perspective for viewing the interpersonal world." But, actually does some kind of preverbal sense of self exist before that time? Yes, Stern contends, there is the possibility that language and selfreflection act simply by *revealing* senses of the self that had already existed in the preverbal infant. (Ibid., p. 6) In fact, he assumes that 'senses of the self' in some respects do exist long prior to self-awareness and language. There are senses of agency, of physical cohesion, of continuity in time, of having intentions in mind. "Self-reflection and language come to work upon these preverbal existential senses of the self and, in so doing, not only reveal their ongoing existence but transform them into new experiences." If we assume that "some preverbal senses of the self start to form at birth (if not before), while others require the maturation of later-appearing capacities before they can emerge, then we are freed from the partially semantic task of choosing criteria to decide, a priori, when a sense of self *really* begins. The task becomes the more familiar one of describing the developmental continuities and changes in something that exists in some form from birth to death." (Ibid., p. 6-7)

By 'sense' Stern means "simply (non-self-reflexive) awareness, not concept." By the expression 'of self' in connection with such awareness in the infant he intends "the preverbal, existential counterpart of the objectifiable, self-reflective, verbalizable self." (p. 7) He is concerned mainly with those 'senses of the self' which are essential to daily social interactions, that of agency, physical cohesion, continuity, affectivity, of creating organization ("without which there can be psychic chaos"), of transmitting meaning ("without which there can be exclusion from the culture, little socialization, an no validation of personal knowledge"), in short, those "that make up the foundation for the subjective experience of social development, normal and abnormal." (Ibid., p. 7-8) He describes, with reference to observational data, four different 'senses of the self', each defining a different domain of self-experience and social relatedness: the *emergent self*, the sense of *core self*,

the sense of a *subjective self*, and the sense of a *verbal self*. “Once formed, each sense of self remains fully functioning and active throughout life. All continue to grow and coexist. “ (Ibid., p. 11) As new behaviours and capacities emerge, they are reorganized to form organizing subjective perspectives on self and other. The result is the emergence, in quantum leaps, of different senses of the self. (Ibid., p. 26)

In sum, infants are ‘pre-designed to be aware of self-organizing processes’, Stern maintains. There is no confusion between self and other in the beginning or at any point during infancy. They are also predesigned to be selectively responsive to external social events and never experience an autistic-like phase. (Ibid., p. 10) Already during the infant’s earliest period, from birth to two months, an emergent self is in the process of coming into being, although the integrative networks that are forming are not yet embraced by a single organizing subjective perspective. That will be the task of the developmental leap into the domain of core-relatedness, a developmental transformation or creation that occurs somewhere between the second and sixth months of life, when infants sense that they and mother are quite separate physically, are different agents, have different affective experiences. (Ibid., p. 27-8) Sometime between the seventh and ninth months of life, infants start to develop a second organizing subjective perspective. This happens when they ‘discover’ that there are other minds out there as well as their own. Self and other are no longer only core entities of physical presence, action, affect, and continuity. They now include subjective mental states—feelings, motives, intentions—that lie behind the physical happenings in the domain of core-relatedness. This new sense of a subjective self opens up the possibility for intersubjectivity between infant and parent and operates in a new domain of relatedness—the domain of intersubjective relatedness—which is a quantum leap beyond the domain of core-relatedness. Mental states between people can now be ‘read’, matched, aligned with, or attuned to (or misread, mismatched, misaligned, or misattuned). (Ibid., p. 27) At about fifteen to eighteen months, yet an organizing subjective perspective about self and other develops, the sense that self (and other) has a storage of personal world knowledge and experience (‘I know there is juice in the refrigerator, and I know that I am thirsty’) (Ibid., p. 28) During the second year of the infant’s life language finally emerges. The process of the senses of self and other acquire new attributes. The infant is able to create shareable meanings about the self and the world. A *sense of verbal life* that operates in the *domain of verbal relatedness* has been formed. This is a qualitatively new domain with expanding, almost limitless possibilities for interpersonal happenings. This new sense of self rests on a

new set of capacities: to objectify self, to be self-reflective, to comprehend and produce language. (Ibid., p. 28) Now the self and the other have different and distinct personal world knowledge as well as a new medium of exchange with which to create shared meanings.

Language appears to be a straightforward advantage for the augmentation of interpersonal experience. But in fact language is a double-edged sword. It also makes some part of our experience less shareable with ourselves and with others. It drives a wedge between two simultaneous forms of interpersonal experience: as it is lived and as it is verbally represented. (Ibid., p. 162) Language, then, “causes a split of the self. It also moves relatedness onto the impersonal abstract level intrinsic to language and away from the personal, immediate level intrinsic to the other domains of relatedness.” (Ibid., p. 163) Though toward the middle of the second year (around fifteen to eighteen months), children begin to imagine or represent things in their minds in such a way that signs and symbols are now in use. Symbolic play and language now become possible. Children can conceive of and then to refer to themselves as external or objective entities. They can communicate about things and persons who are no longer present. (Ibid., p. 163)

At about eighteen months, Stern adds (with reference to Piaget) “a child may observe someone perform a behaviour that the child has never performed—say dial a telephone, or pretend to bottle-feed a doll, or pour milk into a cup—and later that day, or several days later, imitate the dialling, feeding, or pouring.” (Ibid., p. 163) There are at this age increasing evidence that children begin to see themselves objectively: Stern refers to infants’ behaviour in front of a mirror, their use of verbal labels (names and pronouns) to designate self, the establishment of core gender identity (an objective categorization of self), and acts of empathy. (Ibid., p. 165) “Prior to the age of eighteen months, infants do not seem to know that what they are seeing in the mirror is their own reflection. After eighteen months they do.” (Ibid., p. 165) Other evidences that infants are able to objectify self as though self were an external category that can be conceptualized are that they now begin to use pronouns (‘I’, ‘me’, ‘mine’) to refer to self: sometimes they even begin to use proper names. It is also about this time that the self as an objective entity can be categorized with other objective entities, either boys or girls. (Ibid. p. 166)

To act emphatically the infant must be able to image both self as an object who can be experienced by the other and the objectified other’s subjective state; the new capacities for

objectifying the self and for coordinating mental and actions schemes permit infants to ‘think’ about or ‘imagine’ about their interpersonal life. (Ibid, p. 166) The infant can now entertain and maintain a formed wish of how reality ought to be, contrary to fact. Interpersonal interaction can now involve past memories, present realities, and expectation of the future based solely on the past. All these interpersonal goings-on can now take place verbally, or at least they will be reportable to the self and others verbally. By the time babies start to talk they have already acquired a great deal of world knowledge, also about how social interactions go. (Ibid., p. 168)

Language acquisition is potent in the service of union and togetherness. In fact, every word learned is the by-product of uniting two mentalities in a common symbol system, a forging of shared meaning. With each word, children solidify their mental commonality with the parent and later with the other members of the language culture, when they discover that their personal experiential knowledge is part of a larger experience of knowledge, that they are unified with others in a common cultural base. (Ibid., p. 172)

“(T)he word, as a transitional phenomenon, does not truly belong to the self, nor does it truly belong to the other. It occupies a midway position between the infant’s subjectivity and the mother’s objectivity. “It is in this deeper sense that language is a union of experience, permitting a new level of mental relatedness through shared meanings.” (Stern, 1985, p. 172)

“Language, then, provides a new way of being related to others (who may be present or absent) by sharing personal world knowledge with them, coming together in the domain of verbal relatedness. These comings-together permit the old and persistent life issues of attachment, autonomy, separation, intimacy, and so on to be reencountered on the previously unavailable plane of relatedness through shared meaning of personal knowledge.” (Stern 1985, p. 173)

“The advent of language ultimately brings about the ability to narrate one’s life story with all the potential that holds for changing how one views oneself ... It involves thinking in terms of persons who act as agents with intentions and goals that unfold in some causal sequence with beginning, middle, and end.” (Stern 1985, p. 174)

In the narrative presented by Stern's, the basic distinction seems to be that between the 'Experiential Child' and the 'Verbal Child'.

By 'sense of self' in the preverbal Child, Stern seems to refer to 'intuitive awareness', acts of sensing either some state or condition of the body (emotions, feelings), or other persons in the environment, an ability, by use of bodily sense faculties, to experience the presence and properties of things in the physical *Umwelt*.

While the Experiential (pre-verbal) Child communicates himself / herself to the social environment as 'a coherent, wilful, physical entity with a unique affective life and history that belongs to it', the Verbal Child expresses himself / herself by means of words, particularly by means of personal pronouns: 'I', 'me', 'you', and their derivatives ('mine' and 'your').

In the Verbal Child, the infant's 'intuitive awareness'—its ability, by use of bodily sense faculties, to experience the presence of other persons, and properties of things, in the physical environment, or some state or condition of the body (emotions, feelings)—has developed into 'consciousness' properly speaking. Due to the process of language acquisition, the Child begins to 'know by himself / herself and together with Others'). It has entered the world as a person.

Although (as Stern shows) intersubjectivity on the part of the Child does not presupposes language, a distinction is due, it seems, between on the one hand side the Child's ability to intuit things in the environment and to communicate with Others, and on the other his / her self-consciousness. While the former abilities are recognizable in the pre-verbal child, conscious of self requires acquisition of language. Consciousness of Self belongs only to the Verbal Child.

7.6 The 'Specular Image': M. Merleau-Ponty—J. Lacan

In his 1960 essay "The Child's Relations with Others" M. Merleau-Ponty talks about "a correlation between consciousness of one's body and perception of the other." (Merleau-

Ponty 1964)¹³⁷ To be aware that one has a body and that the other's body is animated by another *psyche* are two operations, not simply logically symmetrical but nonetheless forming a system. In both cases it is a question of becoming conscious of what might be called 'incarnation'. To notice, on the one hand, that I have a body which can be seen from the outside and that for others I am nothing but a mannequin, and, on the other hand, that also the other has a *psyche*, that the body I see before me like a mannequin is animated by another *psyche*, are two moments of a single whole. They are complementary operations; the experience of my body and the body of the other form a totality, constitute a 'form'. (Op. cit., p. 120) The perception of others and the perception of one's own body do not always go hand in hand, nor do these perceptions develop at the same pace. "On the contrary ... the perception of one's own body is ahead of the recognition of the other, and consequently if the two comprise a system it is a system that becomes articulated in time." (Ibid., p. 121) The consciousness of one's own body, fragmentary at first, gradually becomes integrated; the corporeal schema becomes precise, restructured, and mature little by little. (Ibid., p. 123)

When developing these statements (apparently stemming from his readings of Husserl) Merleau-Ponty draws not only upon the psychologists Henri Wallon and Paul Guillaume—who had discussed the cognitive implications of 'specular images'—but also Jacques Lacan's seminal paper "*The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience*". He finds that Lacan accounts for something that Wallon had noted but neglected to address: the child's jubilation on seeing itself for the first time in the mirror. When the child looks at himself in the mirror and recognizes his own mirror there, it is a matter of identification: "Dr. Lacan begins by observing ... the child's extreme amusement in the presence of his image, his 'jubilation' at seeing himself moving in the mirror. ... when the child looks at himself in the mirror and recognizes his own image there, it is a matter of identification (in the psychoanalytic sense of the word)—that is, of 'the transformation occasioned in the subject when he assumes' ... For the child, understanding the specular image, consists in *recognizing as his own* this visual appearance in the mirror ... To recognize his image in the mirror is for him to learn that *there can be a viewpoint taken on him*. Hitherto he has *never seen himself*, or he has only caught a glimpse of himself

¹³⁷ For the French edition, see "Les relations avec autrui chez l'enfant," in Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne, résumé de cours 1949-1952. Grenoble, Cynara, 1988.

in looking out of the corner of his eye at the parts of the body he can see. By means of the image in the mirror he becomes capable of being a spectator of himself ... the child notices that he is *visible*, for himself and for others. The passage from the introspective *me* to the visual *me*, from the introspective *me* to the ‘specular I’ (as Lacan still says), is the passage from one form or state of personality to another ... The mirror image makes possible a contemplation of self. With the specular image appears the possibility of an ideal image of oneself—in psychoanalytic terms the possibility of a super-ego. And this image would henceforth be either explicitly posited or simply implied in everything I see at each minute” (Ibid., p. 135-6)

At the same time that the image of oneself makes possible the knowledge of oneself, it makes possible a sort of alienation. I am no longer what I felt myself, immediately to be. I am that image of myself that is offered by the mirror. “To use Dr. Lacan’s terms, I am ‘captured, caught up’ by my spatial image ... I leave the reality of my lived *me* in order to refer myself constantly to the ideal, fictitious, or imaginary *me*, of which the specular image is the first outline ... I am torn from myself, and the image in the mirror prepares me for another still more serious alienation, which will be the alienation by others. For others have only an exterior image of me, which is analogous to the one seen in the mirror. Consequently others will tear me away from my immediate inwardness much more surely than will the mirror. The specular image is the ‘symbolic matrix’, says Lacan, ‘where the I springs up in primordial form before objectifying itself in the dialectic of identification with the other’” (Ibid., p. 136-7)

Merleau-Ponty concludes that the major fact concerning the development of consciousness of one’s own body is the acquisition of a representation or a visual image of the body itself, in particular by means of the mirror. (Ibid., p. 126) The circumstance that the image the child has of other’s bodies is acquired much more rapidly than that of its own body—that he distinguishes more quickly between the other’s specular image and the reality of the other’s body than he does in the case of his own body—, suggests that the experience the child has of the other’s specular image helps him arrive at an understanding of his own. (Ibid., p. 127) The specular image becomes for the child the subject of a game, an amusement. (Ibid., p. 130) The specular image, given visually, “participates globally in the existence of the body itself and leads a ‘phantom’ life in the mirror, which participates in the life of the child himself. What is true of his own body, for the child, is also true of the

other's body. The child himself feels that he is in the other's body, just as he feels himself to be in his visual image." (Ibid., p. 133-4)

"The human child is that being who is capable of sensitivity to others and of considering himself one among similar men long before the true state of physiological maturity ... childhood makes possible both a development unknown to animality and an insecurity that is proper to the human child. For inevitably there is a conflict between the me as I feel myself and the me as I see myself or as others see me. The acquisition of a specular image ... bears not only on our relations of understanding but also our relations of being, with the world and with others." (MerleauPonty 1964, p. 137)

"On this immediately lived me there is superimposed a constructed me, a me that is visible at a distance, an imaginary me, which the psychoanalysts call the super-ego. ...the specular image has a derealizing function in the sense that it turns the child away from what he effectively is, in order to orient him toward what he sees and imagines himself to be ... this alienation of the immediate me ... will be the 'confiscation' of the subject by the others who look at him" (MerleauPonty 1964, p. 137)

Wallon says that the child amuses himself with his image. Why is the image so amusing? It is this that the psychoanalysts have tried to understand.

Why do not give the floor to the psychoanalyst himself? As J. Lacan says in retrospect:¹³⁸

"The conception of the mirror stage that I introduced at our last congress, thirteen years ago, has since become more or less established on the practice of the French group. However, I think it is worthwhile to bring it again to your attention ... for the light it sheds on the formation of the I as we experience it in psychoanalysis ... The child, at an age when he is for the time, however short, outdone by the chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, can nevertheless already recognize as such his own image in a mirror ... as in the case of the monkey, once the image has been mastered and found empty [this act] immediately rebounds in the case of the child in a series of gestures in which the experiences in the play

¹³⁸ J. Lacan "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience Delivered at the 16th International Congress of Psychoanalysis, Zürich, July 17, 1949, published in Lacan 1977.

the relation between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality is reduplicates—the child’s own body, and the persons and things, around him.

This event can take place ... from the age of six months, and its repetition has often made me reflect upon the startling spectacle of the infant in front of the mirror. Unable as yet to walk, or even to stand up, and held as he is by some support ... he nevertheless overcomes, in a flutter of jubilant activity, the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude in a slightly leaning-forward position, in order to hold it in his gaze, brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image.

For me, this activity retains the meaning I have given it up to the age of eighteen months. ... We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term; namely the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image—whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term imago.

The jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject.”

How is this I ‘precipitated in its final form’ and ‘objectified in the dialectic of identification with an Other’? And how does it assume ‘its function as subject’? Could it be through an act of seeing which implies saying, of what Husserl called ‘categorical intuition’?¹³⁹ ‘What I see there in the mirror, that’s me! The child has become an object to itself, is all of a sudden ‘conscious of itself’.

If so, does that mean that ‘the Self of the Child’ arises from a sudden act of discovery (when perceiving its ‘specular image’, or any other possible ‘self-image’ or ‘representation’)? No, the anthropologist-sociologist G. H. Mead would say, the Self of the Child is rather

¹³⁹ See Chapter 1.2 and Chapter 3.8 and Heidegger 1985, p. 56.

something that develops in the course of his / her process of growing up. And as such it has rather something to do with the formation of an individual's personality and his / her membership of a community.

7.7 The Self: G.H. Mead

The self, G.H. Mead states in *Mind, Self, and Society*, is something which develops; "it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity." (Mead 1935, p. 135) As a reflexive, the word 'self' indicates something that can be both subject and object. But the kind of object, implied in a subject, is different from other objects. For a statement of the self, we have to look for some sort of experience in which the physical organism can become an object to itself. (Ibid., p. 137) How is it possible to step out of oneself (experientially) in such a way as to become an object to oneself? According to Mead, this is the essential problem of selfhood, or self-consciousness. His answer to the question is that individuals do not experience themselves directly, but only indirectly, from the standpoints of other individuals, most often the generalized standpoints of the social groups to which they belong.

One enters one's own experience as a self, becomes an object to oneself, only in communication with others: when one seeks an audience, or 'pours oneself out' to somebody. The importance of what we term 'communication'—"communication in the sense of significant symbols, communication which is directed not only to others but also the individual himself"—lies in the fact that it provides a form of behaviour in which the organism or the individual may become an object to itself. (Ibid., p. 138)

Communication, maintains Mead, is also a basic aspect of what we call thinking: The very process of thinking is an inner conversation that goes on. It is a conversation which implies the expression of that which one thinks to an audience.¹⁴⁰ (Ibid., p. 141-2) Therefore, our thinking always takes place by means of symbols—symbols which call out the same

¹⁴⁰ One can think something out, and perhaps write it in the form of a book; but that something is still part of a social intercourse in which one is addressing other persons and at the same time addressing one's self. That the person should be responding to himself is necessary to the self, and it is this sort of social conduct which provides behaviour within which the self appears. (Ibid, p. 142)

response in another that it calls out in the thinker. (Ibid., p. 146-7). Though there is a great deal in one's conversation with others that does not arouse in one's self the same response it arouses in others, it can be contended that a person who is saying something is saying to himself / herself what he / she says to others; otherwise the person does not know what he / she is talking about. The others do not all have to be present in the consciousness at the same time, but at some moments the individual have to have three or four other individuals present in his own attitude. (Ibid., p. 151) Granted the role of saying in thinking, and of saying to oneself what one says to others, language, or rather the language learning process, is essential for the development of the self.

"I know of no other form of behavior than the linguistic in which the individual is an object to himself, and, so far as I can see, the individual is not a self unless he is an object to himself. It is this fact that gives a critical importance to communication, since it is this type of behavior in which the individual does so respond to himself." (Mead 1934, p. 142)

The organized community, or social group, which gives the individual a self, Mead calls 'the generalized other'. The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of a community. It is through the generalized other that social processes influence upon the behaviour of the involved individuals, that the community exercises control over the conduct of its members; it is this way that the social processes of a community enter as determining factors into the individual's thinking. The self-conscious human individual assumes the organized social attitudes of the given social group or community—or of some one section thereof—to which he / she belongs.¹⁴¹ (Ibid., p. 156)

Mead distinguishes two stages in the development of the self. At the first of these, the individual's self is constituted simply by an organization of the particular attitude of other *individuals* toward the individual and toward one another in specific social acts. At the second stage, the individual's self is constituted also by an organization of the social attitudes

¹⁴¹ "It is possible for inanimate objects ... to form parts of the generalized and organized—the completely socialized—other for any given human individual, in so far as he responds to such objects ... Any thing ... toward which he acts, or to which he responds, socially, is an element in what for him is the generalized other ... the cult, for example, ... is the social embodiment of the relation between the given social group or community and its physical environment ... in this way the environment becomes part of the total generalized other for each of the individual members of the given social group or community." (Ibid, p. 154, note 7.)

of the generalized other, *the social group* as a whole to which he / she belongs. The self reaches its full development by organizing these individual attitudes of others into the organized social or group attitudes, and thus becoming an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of social or group behaviour in which it is involved together with others. (Ibid., p. 158) Here Mead lets enter the person: an individual who is a personality because he / she belongs to a community, having adopted the institutions of that community into his / her own conduct. Actually, it is through ‘taking the language of this community’ that the individual becomes a person: (Ibid., p. 162)

“What goes to make up the organized self is the organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality ... The structure, then on which the self is built is this response which is common to all, for one has to be a member of a community to be a self. Such responses ... constitute just what we term a man’s character. They give him what we term his principles, the acknowledged attitudes to all members of the community toward what are the values of that community. He is putting himself in the place of the generalized other ... “ (Mead 1934, p. 162)

Normally, “within the sort of community as a whole to which we belong”, we tend to think of a unified self. But a person's self may be split. “We often recognize the lines of cleavage that run through us. Even, you can bring about a dissociation of a person’s self. This is a process of setting up two sorts of communication which separate the behaviour of the individual.” (Ibid., p. 143) The various elementary selves which constitute, or are organized into, a complete self are the various aspects of the structure of that complete self answering to the various aspects of the structure of the social process as a whole; the structure of the complete self is thus a reflection of the complete social process. The phenomenon of dissociation of personality is caused by a breaking up of the complete, unitary self into the component selves of which it is composed, and which correspond to different aspects of the social process in which the person is involved, and within which his complete or unitary self has arisen. (Ibid., p. 144)

Mead recurrently emphasizes the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness. While consciousness simply refers to the field of experience, self-consciousness refers to

the ability to call out in ourselves a set of definite responses which belong to the others of a group. Selfconsciousness is organized about a *social* individual, because an individual's experiences of being a self derive from its actions on and with others.¹⁴² One becomes a self by taking the attitude of another and act toward oneself as others act. The taking or feeling of the attitude of the others toward oneself is what constitutes self-consciousness. (Ibid., p. 171) Through self-consciousness the individual organism enters into its own environmental field; the individual's body becomes part of the set of environmental stimuli to which it responds or reacts; to be self-conscious is to be an object to one's self.¹⁴³ (Ibid., p. 172)

Mead talks about the 'I' which is aware of the social 'me': The 'I' is not a 'me' and cannot become a 'me'. We talk to ourselves, but do not see ourselves. The 'I' reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the attitude of others. It is in memory that the 'I' is constantly in experience; the 'I' in memory is there as a spokesman of the self of the second, or minute, or day ago; it is a 'me' which was the 'I' at the earlier time. The 'I' comes in as an historical figure. It is what you were a second ago that is the 'I' of the 'me' (Ibid., p. 174)¹⁴⁴ While the 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others, the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized 'me', and then one reacts toward that as an 'I'. (Ibid., p. 175) The 'I' and the 'me' are separated but belong together as being parts of the whole; the 'I' both calls out the 'me' and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social experience. (Ibid., p. 178) The 'me' is the group of organized attitudes to which the individual responds as an 'I'.

¹⁴² "Self-consciousness [in contradistinction from 'consciousness'] refers to the ability to call out in ourselves a set of definite responses which belong to the others of the group ... A man alone has, ... access to his own toothache, but that is not what we mean by self-consciousness." (p. 163) While consciousness is answering to certain experiences such as those of pain and pleasure, self-consciousness is referring to a recognition or appearance of a self as an object. (p. 169)

¹⁴³ "Of course, we are not only what is common to all: each one of the selves is different from everyone else; but there has to be such a common structure as I have sketched ... Selves can only exist in definite relationships to other selves." (Ibid, p. 163-4)

¹⁴⁴ It is in memory that the 'I' is constantly present in experience ... So that the 'I' in memory is there as a spokesman of the self of the second, or minute, or a day ago." (p. 174) And, Mead says, we normally organize our memories upon the string of ours self (p. 135)

Mead points out the difference between the self and the body. The body can be there and operate in a very intelligent fashion without there being an involved and experiencing self. The self has the characteristic that it is an object to itself, and that characteristic distinguishes it from other objects as well as from the body.¹⁴⁵ (Ibid., p. 136) The self is not so much a substance as a process in which human communication has been internalized within an organic form; the organization of the social act is imported into the organism and so becomes the individual's mind; the process of relating one's own organism to the others in the interactions that are going on is what constitutes the self. (Ibid., p. 178-9) One is continually affecting society by one's own attitude because one does bring up the attitude of the group toward oneself, responds to it, and through that response changes the attitude of the group; we are utilizing our own attitude to bring about a different situation in the community of which we are a part; but we can do that only in so far as we can call out in ourselves the response of the community. (Ibid., p. 180)

Hence, as illustrated in Fig. 7:4, consciousness of Self arises by assuming the attitude of Others toward oneself—in Mead's words 'the Generalized Other'. Following Mead, this would also hold for the Child. He / she becomes a Self by adopting the attitudes of others and acting toward himself / herself as others act. The Self is not initially there, at birth, but arises with the Child's social experience and activity, in the process of growing up. As illustrated in Fig. 7:5, the Child discovers in the course of this process himself / herself as an historical 'I — Myself — me' related to 'You', 'We', 'He', 'She' and 'They' in communication with Others.

Fig. 7:4. See attachment. Self-consciousness following Mead: Discovering oneself as an 'I — Myself — me' by assuming the attitude of Others toward oneself.

Fig. 7:5. See attachment. Realization of Self: The Child discovers himself / herself as an historical 'I – Myself – me' related to 'You', 'We', 'He', 'She' and 'They' —in communication with Others.

¹⁴⁵ "... the eye can see the foot, but it does not see the body as a whole. We cannot see our backs; we can feel certain portions of them ... but we cannot get an experience of the whole body ... The parts of the body are quite distinguishable from the self. We can lose parts of the body without any serious invasion of the self." (p. 136)

As notes E. Tugendhat (1986): “According to Mead, the relation of oneself to oneself must be understood as talking to oneself, and this in turn must be understood as the internalization of communicative talking to others. Therefore, the relation of oneself to oneself is essentially both linguistically and socially conditioned ... Only beings that can relate themselves to themselves by virtue of their capacity to talk to themselves can speak the specifically human form of language and can have the specifically human (i.e. normative) form of sociality.” (Op. cit. p. 219)

Consciousness of self means, following Mead, to make oneself something one relates to, is able to talk about, with oneself and together with Others, a topic of discourse, or what in Latin was called a *res* (i.e. a thing, object, matter, affair, circumstance). Hence ‘self-realization’ on the part of the Child is essentially a matter of language acquisition. The Child becomes an object to itself in communication with Others; when he / she is able to talk to himself / herself in the language of the social group to which it belongs, when adopting its specific and normative form of sociability; when the organization of its social acts has been imported into the Child’s body.

Because the experiences of being a Self derive from the Child’s actions on and with others, it is about a *social* individual that its selfconsciousness is organized. Although possibly punctuated by sudden insights, realization of Self is something that develops over time (as does all learning), rather than *happens* in front of a mirror (or any other kind of replica or facsimile). As any learning, it is actualization of capabilities in a process of formation or becoming. The ‘I’ of the Child comes on stage as an historical figure, a ‘me’ and a possible object of attitudes of Others (to which the Child is obliged to respond).

7.8 Selfhood and Human Existence: M. Heidegger—E. Tugendhat

We must first of all see this one thing clearly, M. Heidegger states in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: Dasein—you and me, he and she—as existing, is there for itself, even when ‘the ego’ does not expressly direct itself to itself in some ‘inner perception’. The Self is there for the Dasein without reflection and inner perception, even before all reflection. Reflection is a mode of self-apprehension, but not the mode of Dasein’s self-disclosure. (BP, p. 159) Hence, “... the Dasein does not first need to turn backward to itself as though, keeping itself behind its own back, it were at first standing in front of things and staring

rigidly at them. Instead, it never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves, and in fact in those things that daily surround it.” It finds itself primarily and constantly in things because, tending them, distressed by them, it always in some way or other way rests in things. In other words: We are what we pursue and care for. In everyday terms, we must understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of. The Dasein finds itself primarily in things as it gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself; its own self is reflected to it from things. (BP, p. 159) It is in this manner that, primarily and daily, for the most part we are disclosed to ourselves. (BP, p. 160)

When saying that the Dasein understands its own self from the things with which it is daily concerned, “we should not rest this on some fabricated concepts of soul, person, and ego but must see in what selfunderstanding the factual Dasein moves in its everyday existence. The first thing is to fix the general sense in which the self is experienced and understood here ... [therefore] we do not [need] to dissect and rack our brains about some soul-life.” (BP, p. 160) In fact, this Dasein’s (inauthentic) understanding of itself by way of things is neither ungenue nor illusory (BP. p. 160) In the genuine, actual, (though inauthentic) understanding of self, “the self of our thoughtlessly random, common, everyday existence, ‘reflects’ itself to itself from out of that to which it has given itself over.” (BP, p. 161)

As Dasein exists in the manner of being-in-the-world it *is* for the sake of its own self. That it is, in fact, for its own sake—the sake of its own capacity to-be-in the-world—belongs to the concept of this existent being. (BP, p. 170) As this being (‘existing for the sake of its own self’) is in each case mine, the Dasein has a peculiar selfsameness with itself in the sense of selfhood; “it is in a certain way *its own*, it *has itself*, and only on that account it can *lose* itself.” Because selfhood belongs to existence, the existent Dasein can chose itself on purpose and determine its existence primarily and chiefly starting from that choice; it can exist authentically. However, it can also let itself be determined in its being by others and thus exist in-authentically as the Dasein is at the same time determined in its possibilities by the beings to which it relates as to intraworldly things. “The Dasein understands itself first by way of these beings.” (BP, p. 170-1)

In our self-understanding of ourselves by way of things, as being-in-theworld by way of the world, our self-understanding depends not so much on the extent and penetration of our

knowledge of things as such as on the immediacy and originality of being-in the world. “Even what we encounter only fragmentarily, even what is only primitively understood in a Dasein, the child’s world, is, as intra-worldly, laden, charged as it were, with world. What is important is only whether the existent Dasein, in conformity with its existential possibility, is original enough still to see expressly the world that is always already unveiled with its existence, to verbalize it, and thereby to make it expressly visible for others.” (BP, p. 171)

To understand oneself means *to project oneself upon a possibility*: “A can-be, a possibility as possibility, is there only in projection, in projecting oneself upon that can-be.”¹⁴⁶ The phenomenon of projection contains that *upon which* the Dasein projects itself as a can-be of its own self. But this projection upon something is always a projection *of*. “If Dasein projects itself upon a possibility, it is projecting itself in the sense that it is unveiling itself as this can-be, in this specific being. If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility, this understanding—this becoming manifest to itself—is not self-contemplation in the sense that the ego becomes the object of some cognition or other; “rather, the projection is the way in which I am the possibility.” Since projection unveils without making what is unveiled as such into an object of contemplation, there is present in all understanding an insight of the Dasein into itself. Understanding as the Dasein’s self-projection is, as Heidegger says, the Dasein’s fundamental mode of happening. It is the authentic meaning of action. (BP. p. 277)

Along with understanding, Heidegger summarizes, “there is always already projected *a particular possible being with the others* and *a particular possible being toward intraworldly beings*. Because being-in-the-world belongs to the basic constitution of the Dasein, the existent Dasein is essentially being-with others as being-among intra-worldly beings.” (BP, p. 278) In self-understanding there is to be understood the being-in-the-world with which the specific possibilities of being-with others and the dealing with intra-worldly beings are traced out; as such it has the intrinsic possibility of shifting directions. The Dasein understands itself primarily via the intra-worldly beings it encounters. “It can let its existence be determined primarily not by itself but by things and circumstances and by the

¹⁴⁶ See Chapter 4:8.

others ... Or again, projection can be accomplished primarily from the freedom of our own peculiar Dasein and back to it, as authentic understanding.”¹⁴⁷ (BP, p. 279)

Though *who* is it that Dasein—this ‘entity which is in each case I myself’, ‘whose Being is in each case mine’—is in its everydayness? Occupied with this question, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger brings into view a broader domain of Dasein’s everydayness, certain structures which are ‘equiprimordial’ with Being-in-the-world: Being-with Others (*Mitsein* and *Mitdasein*). (BT 149 / 114) In this kind of Being, is grounded the mode of everyday Being-one’s Self. The explication of this mode, Heidegger says, enables us to see what we may call the ‘subject’ of everydayness—the ‘they’ (*das Man*). (BT 150 / 114)

Dasein, the ‘who’, is in each case an ‘I’—not ‘Others’; it maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its experiences and ways of behaviour. As something selfsame, it has the character of the *Self*. Though, Heidegger maintains, nonetheless it could be that the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein is still not the ‘I myself’. (BT 150 / 114-5) “Along with the equipment to be found when one is at work, those Others for whom the piece of work is destined are encountered too. Similarly, when material is put to use, we encounter its producer or ‘supplier’ as one who ‘serve’s well or badly.” (BT 153 / 117) These Others, ‘encountered’ in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment, are not in some way added on in thought to some Thing which is proximally present-at-hand. “On the contrary, they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that *they are there too and there with it.*” Hence, by ‘Others’ Heidegger does not mean everyone else but me—those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself—those among whom one is *too*. This Being-there-too with Others does not have the ontological character of Being-present-athand-along’ with’ them in a world. This ‘with’ is something which belongs to the character of Dasein; “the ‘too’ means a sameness of Being as circumspectively concerned Being-in-the-world. With’ and ‘too’ are to be understood *existentially*, not categorically. By reason of this *with-like* Being-in-the world, the world is always the one that I share with Others.” (BT 154-5 / 118) The world of Dasein is a *world-with*. Being-in is *Beingwith*. Dasein is *Dasein-with*.

¹⁴⁷ See Chapter 4.14.

“When Others are encountered ... they are encountered from out of the world, in which concernfully circumspective Dasein essentially dwells ... Others are encountered environmentally (BT 155 / 119) ... even if Others become themes for study, in their own Dasein, as it were, they are not encountered as person-Things present-at-hand; we meet them ‘at work’, that is, primarily in their Being-in-the-world. Even if we see the Other ‘just standing around’, he is never apprehended as a human-Thing present-at-hand, but his ‘standing-around’ is a existential mode of Being (BT 156 / 120) ... The phenomenological assertion that ‘Dasein’ is essentially ‘Being with’ has an existential-ontological meaning ... Being-in-the-world is essentially constituted by Being-with ... Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factually no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. (BT 156 / 120) Even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-of with ... So Being-with and the facticity of Being with one another are not based on the occurrence together of several ‘subjects’ ... Even in our Being ‘among them’ they are there with us. ... Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one’s own Dasein.” (BT 157 / 120-1)

Being with one another is based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern (considerateness and forbearance – inconsiderateness). Being with Others is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. As Being-with, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of Others. “The structure of the world’s worldhood is such that Others are not proximally present-at-hand as free-floating subjects along with other Things, but show themselves in the world in their special environmental Being, and do so in terms of what is ready-to-hand in that world.” (BT 160 / 123) Being-with is such that the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of Others belongs to it; because Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with. (BT 161 / 124)

Being towards Others is ontologically different from Being towards Things which are present-at-hand (‘are there as occurring’). In Being with and towards others, there is a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. One might maintain that this relationship is already constitutive for one’s own Dasein, that the relationship of-Being one has towards

Others becomes a Projection of one's own Being-towards-oneself 'into something else, that the Other is somehow a duplicate of the Self.¹⁴⁸ (BT 162 / 124)

"We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as 'they' take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as 'they' see and judge; we find shocking what 'they' find shocking. The 'they', which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. The 'they' has its own ways in which to be. The tendency of Being-with which we have called 'distantiality' is grounded in the fact that Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with averageness. (BT 164 / 127) ... the 'they' maintains itself factually in the averageness of that which belongs to it ... This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein of 'levelling down' of all possibilities of Being ... Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein gets interpreted ... it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and this never gets to the 'heart of the matter'. By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familial and accessible to everyone ... (B)ecause the 'they' presents every judgment and decision as is own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability ... It 'was' always the 'they' who did it, and yet it can be said that is has been 'no one'." (BT 165 / 127) The 'they', which supplies the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein, is the 'nobody' to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another. (BT 166 /128) ... The 'they' is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit may change in the course of Dasein's history." (BT 167 / 129)

The Self of everyday Dasein (which Heidegger distinguish from the authentic Self) is the they-self. As such, Dasein has been 'dispersed into the they'. He / she is for the sake of the they in an everyday manner, and it is the they which articulates the referential context of significance. It is not 'I', in the sense of my own Self, that 'am', but rather the Others, whose way is that of the 'they'. I am 'given' proximally to 'myself'. (BT 167 / 129) "Authentic Being-one's Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that

¹⁴⁸ As Heidegger says in this context: Empathy does not constitute Being-with; "only on the basis of Being-with does empathy become possible: it gets its motivation from the unsociability of the dominant modes of Being-with." (BT 162 / 125)

has been detached from the ‘they’; it is rather an existentiell modification of the ‘they’—of the ‘they’ as an essential *existentiale*.” (BT 168 / 130)

Conclusions:

In each case Dasein is its Self only in existing. Man’s existence is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence. (BT 152-3 / 117)

The question of the ‘*who*’ of Dasein Heidegger answers with the expression ‘Self’. Dasein’s Selfhood is defined formally as a way of existing, and therefore not as an entity present-at-hand. For the most part I myself am not the ‘*who*’ of Dasein; its *who* is the they-self. (BT 312 / 268)

Let’s supplement these crucial passages from *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *Being and Time* with some remarks by Ernst Tugendhat concerning Heidegger’s way of understanding Selfhood and Human existence, Dasein’s relation to itself. According to Tugendhat, Heidegger displays the fundamental structure of ‘the relation of oneself to oneself’, and, as he says, all theories of Self must be integrated within in order to attain ‘structural coherence’. (Tugendhat 1986, p. 144)

Heidegger’s basic thesis, Tugendhat points out, is that the relation of oneself to oneself is a relation, not to oneself as an entity, but to one’s being. (Ibid., p. 146)] As such it is a relation implying meaning: “We speak not only of the meaning of linguistic expressions but also of the meaning of actions; correspondingly we employ the word *understanding* not merely in the sense of understanding linguistic expressions and other signs but also in the sense of understanding an action, or something produced by an action (a work), or finally a person (in his actions).” What does an agent intend by a certain action, what is he / she aiming at? Ultimately the talk of the meaning of a linguistic expression is also a special case of this talk of the meaning of an action. (Ibid., p. 148) “The life of a person is the entire connection of his action. For this reason we also ask about a meaning in relation to the life of a person, in particular, in relation to one’s own life”: Is it something aimed at. And the question is what is it that I myself intend with it. (Ibid., p., 148)

Heidegger’s answer to this question is that as long as we exist we relate ourselves to this existence, and that we relate to it as our respective future. The future, in this context is the

being that is to be carried out at the present moment, and beyond this our entire prospective being. “This being is given to us as something that we have *to be*, and that is *at issue* for us; in this respect, the relation of oneself to the being that is so can only be a practical one, that is, a voluntative and effective relation.” (Ibid., p. 159)

The thesis that man’s being is at issue for him is by no means novel, but originates with Aristotle, Tugendhat observes (Ibid., p. 159): ‘all living beings strive to preserve their being’¹⁴⁹; ‘the being (existence) of living creatures consists in their life’¹⁵⁰; ‘only a human being is consciously related to his being and what is good for him’¹⁵¹; ‘the striving is designated as the will’¹⁵²; ‘being is not only life but activity founded on deliberation, how one wants to be’.¹⁵³ Heidegger supplements Aristotle: ‘man has his being to be, whether he wants to or not’, as ‘the facticity of being delivered over, as ‘thrown into the world’; one finds oneself always in a specific situation of action, at the moment of unavoidable facticity, but there is no situation of action that does not contain a range of practical possibilities. Otherwise it would not be a situation of action: “I face a range of decisions as to which way I want to carry out my being, but the fact that I have to carry it out is given to me. “ (Ibid., p. 158-9)

“The being that is to be carried out is essentially a futural one, though this future is in a certain sense an instantaneous future; it concerns the being that is to be carried out now and not later moments that can be foreseen descriptively. Heidegger advanced this thesis ... that the future and hence temporality in general can only be understood from the situation of freedom and the to-be.” (Tugendhat 1986, p. 167)

¹⁴⁹ Tugendhat refers to *De Anima* II, 4, 415, where Aristotle deals with the most elementary of the Soul’s faculties, that of nutrition.

¹⁵⁰ Tugendhat refers to *De Anima*, II 4, 415, where Aristotle states that the soul is the ‘final and formal’ as well as the ‘motive and efficient’ cause of the living body, its growth as well as its decay.

¹⁵¹ Tugendhat refers to *Politics*, A 2, 1253, where Aristotle distinguishes man from other animals: He alone has the sense of what is good or evil, just or unjust, and it is an association of beings with this sense which makes possible a household and a state.

¹⁵² Tugendhat refers to *De Anima*, III, 11-12, the two appendices where Aristotle elucidates the concepts of desire, imagination and supposition, and puts the study of the soul in its context within the study of life.

¹⁵³ Tugendhat refers to the *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I: 6. Reference to Book III, where Aristotle deals with ‘moral responsibility and ‘the moral virtues, would be more to the point. (For Aristotle’s view on human virtues and deliberation, see Chapter 6.2 & 6.3.)

“... man relates himself to himself by relating himself to his being; thus this does not take place in a reflexive relation conceived in accordance with the subject-object model ... [yet] it seems obvious that in relating oneself to one’s future life, to one’s to-be, one relates oneself to oneself.” (Tugendhat 1986, p. 167)

“... in all doing and wanting one always also somehow relates to oneself, ... one does this in a particular way when one think one can speak of self-determination ... an adequate elucidation of the relation of oneself to oneself will also include ...’determinations’” (Tugendhat 1986, p. 168)

“The person understands himself as that which he does or wants to do, and himself here means his life. ... For Heidegger this side of the disclosure of one’s being stands under the title of ‘understanding’ (one understands oneself as the so-and-so, i.e. the one who is active in such and such a way.) ... one’s own being is disclosed in one’s emotions and moods ... The person encounters himself, his being, both in what he wants and in what he feels.” (Tugendhat 1986, p. 169)

“Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself.” (Tugendhat 1986, p. 169)

For Heidegger there are the two possibilities of openness and evasion in the face of this practical question: authentic and inauthentic existence.¹⁵⁴

(Ibid., p. 174) If the practical question is posed fundamentally, “it involves me in a confrontation with myself. For this reason evasion in the face of freedom is fleeing from oneself,” Tugendhat concludes (with reference to BT § 40). Although, according to Heidegger, selfconsciousness—the relation of oneself to oneself—has ‘at first and for the most part’ the mode of fleeing from oneself, the choice at which this question is aimed has the character of ‘choosing oneself’; it must be carried out by me myself, it cannot be

¹⁵⁴ As Heidegger himself says: “In each case Dasein *is* its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being ‘chose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so.” (BT 68 / 42) See also Chapter 4.14.

delegated to somebody else, “what I thereby chose is what I myself am: In this act I determine who (how) I should be.” (Ibid., p. 174)

The concept of self-determination and self-choice has now lost the paradoxicality afflicting it when conceived in light of the traditional model, according to which the 'self' could only be understood as an 'I' nucleus. “The activities of the person are nothing other than ways to be. But in order to be able to speak of self-determination, it appears essential that in relating himself to himself the person does not already *eo ipso* want this or that. The possibility of self-determination to one's own to-be is now envisioned, and offers the prospect of detaching the to-be as such from its concrete determinacy.” (Ibid., p. 174) The distinction of the self from its determinations now can be understood as a practical question. It does not need to assume the structure of 'a reflection into oneself'.

“We call good or better something that we prefer, wish, or in certain cases intend on the basis of deliberation. In Heidegger the concept of the good does not appear, but that of the for-the-sake-of-which nonetheless plays a role. One's own being is ultimately the for-the-sake-of which of Dasein, the object of its care or—to put it traditionally—of its will.” (Tugendhat 1986, p. 185)

“Dasein is related to its being as its for-the-sake-of-which. This being is always possible being, or potentiality for being. This disclosure of potentiality-for-being takes place in understanding. Understanding has the structure of projection, and projection is always related to meaning. Therefore, the most important terms in this context are: for-the-sake-of-which, possible being, understanding, projection, and meaning.” (Tugendhat 1986, p. 188)

For Heidegger (as it was for Aristotle) the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which of man's actions and activities is his own being. (Ibid. p. 188): We find ourselves both in relation to our being in general and in relation to our practical doings within an open range (*Freiheitsspielraum*). Hence, ‘I can do such and such, I can also refrain from it’; all being in the sense of existing is a potentiality-for-being such and such. In other words, every sentence of intention—and consequently also all doing—is always an explicit or (usually) implicit decision within the range that is disclosed to us in sentences such as ‘I can ... but I can also not ...’; ‘I know that I can either do it or not’. We are here dealing with *practical knowledge* about *oneself*,

knowledge that I have the possibility to act in such or such a way. (Tugendhat 1986, p. 190) Though Dasein is in each case already ahead of itself in its being. Dasein is always 'beyond itself', "not as a mode of relating to other entities which it is not, but as being toward the potentiality-for-being which it is itself." (Ibid. p. 198, with reference to BT, p. 236 / 191-2) Hence, the relation of oneself to oneself can only be understood as a relation of oneself to one's own future being. (Ibid. p. 198) "Thus his thesis is that through the relation of oneself to possibilities of action this being-head-of-oneself is made possible. In Heidegger's more abstract terminology, only because I relate myself to my being as possible-being can I relate myself to it all, and this at the same time implies that I relate myself to it futurally. ... (B)eing is not 'ahead-of-itself simply by virtue of being volitionally active, but this futural reference emerges first in the deliberate 'I can', that is, in the open range of action that becomes explicit in deliberation." (Ibid., p. 198-9)

Heidegger underlines the range of freedom that pertains to our activity on the basis of a yes / no polarity of our understanding: "we can only relate ourselves to our being as something impending because we relate ourselves to our actions and possibilities of action and to our being as potentiality-for-being; and it is only on this basis that a consciousness of the future emerges." (Ibid., p 200) As standing existentially in an open range of possibilities of being, we have the possibility "either to consider this range or to conceal it from ourselves, to question ourselves and to choose who we want to be or to evade this question." (Ibid., p. 206)

When distinguishing the 'I myself' from the 'they-self', Heidegger alludes to his distinction between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' existence. Existing authentically means existing in the mode of selfdetermination, in resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*).¹⁵⁵ We "are free either to be free or not ... the issue is whether the person himself decides who he is." (Ibid., p. 207) In the place of the person Heidegger puts Dasein, "which can either be itself or not itself". Dasein is not something present-at-hand, we are told, a substance, subject, or person; rather, it is existence. (Ibid., p. 208) Thus Heidegger actually makes a mistake in his approach when he assumes that the question 'who am I?' can be answered by 'I' or 'I myself'. I cannot, following Heidegger, identify myself by the use of the word I. The word

¹⁵⁵ See Chapter 4.14.

‘who’ in the question ‘who am I’ is to be used for qualitative identification, not for individual identification, for ‘what sort of person I am’. (Ibid., p. 209)

As emphasized by Tugendhat, Heidegger distinguishes two forms of self-understanding: in-authentic and authentic self-understanding. Applied to the Child (see Chapter 4:16), in-authentic self-understanding means that it discovers itself in circumspective interpretation of the available (equipment), from the things with which it is occupied, the success or failure of its commerce with things, in the light of its potential of knowledge: ‘I know how – I can do’. Authentic self-understanding means that Child discovers himself / herself in instants of ‘resoluteness’, in the perspective of its potential understanding of ‘I have been – I can be’.

A requirement for the Child’s discovering things in the *Umwelt*, and the simultaneous disclosedness of world, is, as pointed out in Chapter 4, access to language. The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world must be articulated according to signification, pointed out by way of giving things a definite character through saying (which means sharing with Others what has been pointed out).¹⁵⁶ Articulation is no less crucial, it seems, for a young person’s ability to take a stand on its own potential being, the question ‘Who do I want to be’? In other words, following Heidegger, *realization of Self* (‘I know how – I can do’ or ‘I have been – I can be’) implies making ones own being properly speaking a *re*, something the one is able to articulate, discover through saying. In this articulation of its own possibilities the Child is necessarily ‘ahead of itself’, ‘beyond itself’, because the relation of oneself to oneself can only be understood as a relation to the future. A process, or an isolated act of ‘resoluteness’, ‘a twinkling of the eye’ (in the idiom of Heidegger)? Probably both: a series of acts. ‘The Self’ arises in the process of growing up, a becoming punctuated by sudden flashes of light or insights.

How is this Self of the Child related to the world? Following Heidegger, the Child discover itself primarily and constantly in those things that daily surround it, tending them, distressed by them, ‘giving itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself’, and by doing so together with Others. The world of the Child is, ‘as intra-worldly, laden, charged as it were, with world’. Of importance is whether he / she ‘in conformity with its existential possibility’ is able ‘to see expressly the world that is always already unveiled with its

¹⁵⁶ For Heidegger on ‘discovering by way of articulation’, see Chapter 4.10.

existence, to verbalize it, and thereby to make it expressly visible for others.’ Along with all its understanding, there is always already projected a particular possible being of the Child together with these Others, and a particular possible being towards intraworldly things. If the Child discovers itself, he / she does so in a world as disclosed. Its Being is cleared in itself, ‘in such a way that it is itself the clearing’.¹⁵⁷

The question ‘Who do I want to be?’ seems to imply the equally crucial question ‘Who am I?’, a question which relates to a person’s ‘identity’. The following final sections show how this notion has been interpreted by a few distinguished scholars. Hints will be made at how the perspectives accounted for can be applied to the Child in the process of growing up.

7.9 Self-Identity: A. Giddens

To be a human being, the sociologist Anthony Giddens writes in *Modernity and Self-Identity*, “is to know, virtually all the time, in terms of some description or another, both what one is doing and why one is doing it.”(Giddens 1991, p. 35) The social conventions produced and reproduced in our every day activities are reflexively monitored as part of a ‘going on’ in the variegated settings of our lives. Hence, all human beings continuously monitor the circumstances of their activities as a feature of doing what they do; and this monitoring is discursive. “In other words, agents are normally able, if asked, to provide discursive interpretations of the nature of, and the reasons for, the behaviour in which they engage.” (Giddens 1991, p. 35)

Among the existential questions answered by everyone who ‘goes on’ in the contexts of social activity are those concerning: 1. ‘self-identity’, and 2. the existence of other persons. (Ibid., p. 50) The two questions are interrelated. Self-identity cannot refer merely to its persistence over time in the way one might speak of the identity of a physical thing. The identity of the self presumes reflexive awareness. It is what the individual is conscious ‘of’. Self-identity is to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual. (Ibid., p. 52) Though selfconsciousness has no primacy over the awareness of others (persons we denote as ‘you’, ‘we’, ‘he’, ‘she’ and ‘they’) “since language—which is intrinsically public—is the means of access to both.” This also holds for ‘intersubjectivity’,

¹⁵⁷ See Chapter 4.11.

a notion underlying many discussions on identity. It does not derive from subjectivity. Rather, it is the other way around: Subjectivity derives from intersubjectivity. (Ibid., p. 51)

“Self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits, possessed by the individual,” Giddens continues: “It is *the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography.*” (Ibid., p. 53) Identity presumes continuity across time and space; but self-identity is such continuity as interpreted reflexively by the agent. This includes the cognitive component of personhood. To be a ‘person’ is not just to be a reflexive actor, but to have a concept of a person (as applied both to the self and others). “What a ‘person’ is understood to be certainly varies across cultures, although there are elements of such a notion that are common to all cultures. The capacity to use ‘I’ in shifting contexts, characteristic of very known culture, is the most elemental feature of reflexive conceptions of personhood.”¹⁵⁸ (Giddens 1991, p. 53)

Another important aspect of personhood concerns the body: The self is embodied. “Awareness of the contours and properties of the body is at the very origin of the original explorations of the world whereby the child learns the features of objects and others ... The child learns about its body primarily in terms of its practical engagements with the objectworld and with other people. Reality is grasped through day-to-day *praxis.*” (Ibid., p. 56) To learn to become a competent agent is to be able to exert a continuous, and successful, monitoring of face and body. To be a competent agent, moreover, means not only maintaining such conditions of control, but being seen by others to do so. (Giddens 1991, p. 56) Regularised control of the body is crucial to what Giddens calls the individual's protective cocoon in situations of day-to-day interactions; it is a fundamental means whereby the biography of self-identity is maintained. The self is more or less constantly ‘on display’ to others in terms of its embodiment. In fact, all human beings, in all cultures, preserve a division between their self-identities and the ‘performances’ they put on in specific social contexts. (Ibid., p. 58)

¹⁵⁸ Giddens in this context refers to Mead. “We can agree with Mead that the infant begins to develop a self in response to the social context of its early experience. But the I / me (and I / me / you) relation is one internal to language, not one connecting the unsocialized part of the individual (the I) to the ‘social self’. ‘I’ is a linguistic

“A person with a reasonable stable sense of self-identity has a feeling of biographical continuity which she is able to treat reflexively and, to a greater or lesser extent, communicate to other people ... [hence] the existential question of self-identity is bound up with the narrative the individual ‘supplies’ about herself.” (Ibid., p. 54) In other words, a person's identity is not to be found in behaviour, not in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going, one which integrates events in the external world, sorting them out into the ongoing story about the self. (Ibid., p. 54)

7.10 Selfhood and Sameness: P. Ricoeur

The temporal dimension of the self, and the self as a person and social agent, are highlighted by Ricoeur in his explication of the difference between identity as *sameness*, and identity as *selfhood*. Selfhood (‘selfidentity’) is not the same as sameness (‘same-identity’), although sameness sometimes enters into selfhood and vice versa, he states in *Oneself as Another*. (Ricoeur 1992, p. 116) This is illustrated in his narrative approach to the notion of personal identity, an issue which can

shifter, which gets its meaning from the networks of terms whereby a discursive system of subjectivity is acquired. The ability to use ‘I’, and other associated terms of subjectivity, is a condition for the emergence of self-awareness, but not as such define it.” (Ibid, p. 52-3) be articulated only in the temporal dimensions of human existence. (Ibid., p. 114)

A weakness of sameness as a criterion of identity concerns the uninterrupted continuity between the first and the last stage in the development of the same individual: “we say of an oak tree that it is the same from the acorn to the fully developed tree ... we see photos of ourselves at successive stages of our life”. Time can be a factor of dissemblance, of divergence, of difference. The same is nonetheless not the same. (Ibid., p. 117) To overcome this problem Ricoeur suggests two models of permanence in time: the ‘character’ and what he calls ‘to keep one’s word’. Both are aspects of the permanence of a person.¹⁵⁹ (Ibid., p. 118)

¹⁵⁹ In speaking about persons we are speaking about entities that make up the world, and as ‘things’ of a particular type. (Ibid., p. 31-2) As a single referent any person is associated with two series of predicates: physical and mental predicates. “The fact that persons are bodies *too* is a possibility that is held in reserve in a

Character usually refers to a set of distinctive marks, which permit the reidentification of a human individual as being the same. (Ibid., p. 119) It designates the lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized. Character, in fact, constitutes the limit point where selfhood becomes indiscernible from sameness. (Ibid., p. 121) Here one enters the temporal dimension of the disposition of an individual, that of habit. Habit gives to a character a history; it is the sedimentation which confers on character the sort of permanence in time that overlaps selfhood and sameness: As second nature, my character is me, myself. This selfhood announces itself as sameness. Each habit, acquired and formed as a lasting disposition constitutes a trait, a distinctive sign by which a person is recognized—reidentified—as the same. (Ibid., p. 121) To the notion of disposition (which here seems to mean the same as ‘habitus’), one can relate a set of identifications; the identity of a person, as well as of a community, concerns the values, norms, ideals, models and heroes in which the person or community recognizes itself. Recognizing *in* contributes to recognizing oneself *by*, Ricoeur writes with reference to Aristotle.

Into the character can be incorporated an element of loyalty, making it turn towards fidelity, the maintaining of the self. This proves that one cannot think of the sameness of the person without considering the selfhood, even when the one covers over the other. (Ibid., p. 121) When we observe behaviour that does not correspond to the known dispositions of a person, we say that he / she is not himself / herself, or even that the person is acting completely out of character. By this stability, borrowed from acquired habits, or dispositions, as identifications, character assures a permanence in time which defines sameness; the identity of character expresses a certain adherence of the ‘what?’ to the ‘who?’. Character is truly the ‘what’ of the ‘who’. (Ibid., p. 122)

As another model of permanence in time—besides that of character, and as something which also finds expression in a narrative—Ricoeur suggests “keeping one’s word in faithfulness to the word that has been given”. (Ibid., p. 123) Keeping one's word expresses a self-consistency which cannot be inscribed (as in the case of character) “within the dimension of something in general but solely within the dimension of ‘who?’.” The

general definition of basic particulars, according to which the latter are bodies or possess bodies. Possessing bodies is precisely what persons do indeed do, or rather what they actually are.” (Ibid., p. 33)

continuity of character is one thing, the constancy of friendship is another. Here Ricoeur talks about “the polarity, in temporal terms, between two models of permanence in time—the perservance of character, and the constancy of the self in promising.” (Ibid., p. 124)

Whether one chooses one or both of these models, it is through the temporality of a narrative that a mediation between sameness and selfhood can be sought. The ‘narrative identity’ which Ricoeur arrives at in this way oscillates between a lower limit, where permanence in time expresses the confusion of sameness and selfhood, and an upper limit where selfhood poses the question of its identity without the aid and support of sameness. (Ibid., p. 124)

Identity through time amounts to a certain connectedness between events, physical or mental. (Ibid., p. 130) By means of its events the narrative provides a path of the character. “Telling a story is saying who did what and how, by spreading out in time the connection between these various viewpoints.” (Ibid., p. 146) The character draws its singularity from the unity of life considered a temporal totality which is singular and distinguished from all others; “the contingency of events contributes to the necessity, retroactive so to speak, of the history of a life, to which is equated the identity of the character.” The person, as a character in a story, is not an entity distinct from its ‘experiences’; the person shares the condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the recounted story. “The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity.” The identity of the story provides for the identity of the character. (Ibid., p. 147-8)

As to the corporeal criteria of personal identity, Ricoeur remarks that it “is not by nature foreign to the problematic of selfhood, to the extent that my body’s belonging to myself constitutes the most overwhelming testimony in the favour of the irreducibility of selfhood to sameness.” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 128) As far as one's body is a dimension of oneself, the imaginative variations around the corporeal condition are variations on the self and its selfhood that can be extended to that of the world as it is inhabited corporeally. In a very wide perspective, this feature defines the terrestrial condition as such and gives to the Earth the existential signification (attributed to it in various ways by Husserl, and Heidegger). “The Earth here is something different, and something more than the planet: it is the mythical name of our corporeal anchoring in the world.” (Ibid., p. 150)

7.11 Coherence of Life and Community: D. Carr

That the complex structure of one's life history organizes one's experiences and actions over time, is also something emphasized by David Carr. As he says in *Time, Narrative and History* (Carr 1989), it is the organizing principle by which the practical aspects of acts merge with moral and ethical aspects, aspects which all concern the question of how to live one's life as a whole. Hence, we know another person by learning his / her life-story; and one's own identity for oneself is no less a question of such a story. It can be looked upon as a story in which one is both author and principle character or protagonist (Op. cit., p. 74) So, my life is composed of all the experiences I have and the actions, small-scale and large, short-term and long, in which I engage. But like each of them singly, it is itself something temporal which unfolds and whose phases I survey prospectively and retrospectively from within an ever-changing present. I am in a way character, story-teller and audience all at once.

Narrative coherence is what we find or effect in much of our experience and action. To the extent that we do not, we aim for it, try to produce it, restoring it to the extent it is missing. In this broad sense it is possible to insist that everyday reality is permeated with narrative. (Ibid., p. 90-1) While I may not write my own story, I choose the story in which I am cast as a character, even if it has already been written, and the part I play has been played before. (Ibid. p. 93-94) To live this story is to tell it, to ourselves and possibly to others. But this does not mean that we are always telling it; "we are actively concerned at any moment now with this, now with that project or experience, large-scale or small, and concern with its wholeness is an underlying and recurring concern." Nonetheless, birth, childhood, youth, and all the intervening stages up to now are always with each of us, "unchanging and familiar, yet always subject to discovery and reinterpretation". (Ibid., p. 96) The unity of the self—as a life that hangs together—is not a pre-given condition but an achievement. (Ibid., p. 97)

But how do we proceed from the subject of the individual to the subject of the group, grasping such things as actions, attitudes, traits of character, and even emotions? Can groups be looked upon as just persons writ large? According to Carr, the simple and straightforward face-to-face encounter between individuals already contains the means for understanding groups as such; the encounter of two subjects essentially involves a third element, the

common surrounding world. We share at least the particular place in which we stand facing each other. This is, Carr contends, the simplest way of summarizing Husserl's account of intersubjectivity. (Ibid, p. 131) Common experience is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for common action; in order for collective action to occur, a group must exist whose members recognize each other as such and are aware of a common situation they all face; such a group can exist without collective action resulting: oppressed communities may be perfectly united, but only in their suffering. (Ibid., p. 135) In this context Carr refers to Hegel.

In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel describes how a genuine community might arise out of conflict and how it preserves certain elements of conflict with itself (Carr 1989, p. 137) Hegel's approach can instruct us how to move beyond the singular methodological focus of Husserlean phenomenology. He is telling us a 'likely story', not about particular historical events but one applicable as a conceptual description to many of them.¹⁶⁰ (Ibid, p. 138) The external world at issue is an object not only of perception and knowledge but also of our desire and needs. Desire is the practical side of consciousness; its object is at a distance, a distance which is to be overcome not by knowledge but by possession and consumption.

To *me* the Other may seem just a part of the surrounding world I must master to serve my own needs and maintain my independence. But trouble begins if he takes the same view towards me. The existence of each of us as an independent, or self-standing self, is challenged by this Other (Ibid, p. 140) Hegel, hence, describes a situation in which it is appropriate to use 'the we of common experience'. Each of the parties to the situation is aware of the existence of the other in relation to a third element, the common surrounding world which defines their relation to each other (Ibid, p. 140) This is, Carr points out, a situation applicable not only to the master-slave struggle of the Greek polis and other historical communities, but also to the family, and the struggle between the child / adolescent and his / her parents. (Hegel considers the Greek polis to be much like a family to be a genuine community represents it as a kind of childhood state of Western history.)

¹⁶⁰ Hegel gives us a description of a series of mistakes and of the subsequent unmasking of those mistakes, learning from our mistakes we call learning from experience. This 'phenomenology' is for Hegel the science of the experience of consciousness. (Ibid, p. 139)

Though the family is a natural, not a social, grouping, and as a child the individual is too dependent on the family, his / her identity too much submerged in it to permit him any genuine individuality (Ibid, p. 141) Independence comes not within the family but by breaking out of it.

There is a prototype of the master-slave struggle between the child adolescent and his or her parents. The familial conflict, like the struggles Hegel describes, is ultimately over mutual recognition, but it can never achieve this goal, since the difference of generations and the parent-child relation can never be overcome. The one thing parents cannot give children (or children parents, for that matter) is recognition as independent and self-sufficient persons. If we seek that, as all of us do, we must look elsewhere. (Ibid, p. 141) The fundamental social unit is not the family but the relationship that is established between members of different families; it is here that nature is transformed into culture (Ibid., p. 142) But what counts for Hegel in the establishment of society is not intermarriage but the confrontation of self-conscious individuals over the issue of dependence and independence. (Ibid, p. 142)

Without independent individuals there can be no genuine community; yet without a community there can be no genuinely independent individuals: independence is that which is legitimized and recognized by others who are equally independent. Outside the community, or in breaking away from it, individuals can only be independent-minded, can only demand independency. Only the community can give it to them. (Ibid, p. 144) Hegel believed that a genuine community was possible, if at all, only in the modern world after the individual had asserted his demand for independence (Ibid, p. 144)

A genuine community—a we-subject of an ‘I that is We, a We that is I’, i.e. what Hegel called Spirit—displays the same temporal structure of experience, action and life that is associated with the I or individual subject. To experience or act I must already be a unitary self; yet I am a unitary self only in and through my experiences and actions (Ibid, p. 149) Events of common experience and actions undertaken in common are constituted when we gather together sequences of events or sub-actions by projecting them onto a structure comprising beginning, middle and end. The group itself, as we-subject, is constituted as the unity of a temporally unfolding event-structure, we retain whatever has gone before and project what is yet to come. We act or experience in virtue of a story we tell ourselves about

what we are going through or doing; the roles of agent (we act), narrator (we tell), and audience (to ourselves) turn up again, this time in plural form (Ibid, p. 149)

Carr looks for actual groups in the contemporary social world acting as possible subjects: groups with which we identify ourselves. We identify with our families “... as adults we enter into marriage and may thereby establish or join a larger or extended family ... we distinguish 'our' family from others: they are economic units, they provide affective support and engage their members ... they are the persisting subjects of common experience and agents of common projects, including that of their own self-maintenance.” (Ibid., p. 154) Other kinds of groups for possible identification are ‘leisure and working time groups’, crafts and professions, and, for sure, nations, and religious communities. A social group allowing for identification exists wherever a narrative account exists of a *we*, which has continuous existence through its experience and activities. Saying that such an account ‘exists’, means that it is articulated or formulated, perhaps by only one or a few of the group's members, in terms of the *we*, and when it is accepted or subscribed to by the other members. It is their acceptance that makes them members, that constitutes their recognition of others as fellow members, and that determines their recognition in the action, the experience and the life of the community. (Ibid., p. 163) Where such a community exists it is constantly in the process, as an individual is, of composing and re-composing its own autobiography. Like the autobiography of the individual, such a story seeks a unifying structure for a sequence of experiences and actions. (Ibid., p. 163)

Most communities trace themselves to an origin or foundation; every community is faced with the constant possibility of is ‘death’; like the individual a community at any moment seeks to articulate its own internal coherence and integrity over time (Ibid., p. 164) At any moment we stand in a certain ‘place’ in the life of our community and from that place the future prospects and the past background make up the temporal horizons of our particular present. Like time at the personal level, these horizons are not empty; they are filled in with the events *we* (as a group) have experienced (or will experience), with the sequence of our communal actions. Since they are attached to the *we* as their subject they are part of the life of the community in question and refer ultimately to the life-story of this community encompassed by its birth and prospective death. (Ibid., p. 165-6)

The same events may figure in the life of both a community and an individual and constitute an important part of that individual's life story. Even the individual's participation in a collective action (such as enlisting and fighting in war) is an element in his own life-story. (Ibid., p. 166) The life-span of the community in many cases exceeds that of many of its members. One obvious class of communal events are those lying outside of the individual's own experience and involvement consists of those that occurred before his birth. (Ibid., p. 167) What makes events communal is not their scale but the reference to the *we*, both internally, and externally; they constitute actions or experiences, which are communal by their nature, involving a collection of mutually recognizing participants. (Ibid., p. 167)

Like the personal (or first-person-singular) temporality, the historical temporality is centred in the present: it radiates from the present, the present is surrounded by, or set by, the past and future horizons from which it stands out. (Ibid., p. 168); like narrative activity at the personal level, narrative at the collective level is above all practical in character; it has the function of constituting actions, as deliberation and planning, and in the more general function of drawing together any temporally extended sequence of actions and experiences. Discovering, or rediscovering, the story, picking up the thread, reminding ourselves where we stand, where we have been or where we are going—these are typical narrative-practical modes of discourse which are as prevalent and as important for groups as they are for individuals. (Ibid., p. 168)

7.12 The moral space and self as expression: Ch. Taylor

“The very way we walk, move, gesture, speak is shaped from the earliest moments by our awareness that we appear before others, that we stand in public space, and that this space is potentially one of respect or contempt, of pride or shame,” writes Charles Taylor in *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. (Taylor 1989, p. 15) “Our style movement expresses how we see ourselves as enjoying respect or lacking it, commanding it or failing to do so.” To clarify this statement, Taylor talks about ‘frameworks’: that in virtue of which we make sense of our lives. Not to have a framework is to live a life which is senseless. The sense of life is found through articulating it; finding sense depends on framing meaningful and adequate expressions. (Ibid., p. 18)

Looking for historical examples of such frameworks, Taylor mentions that associated with the honour ethic. The life of the warrior, or citizen, or citizen-soldier was deemed higher than the merely private existence, devoted to the arts of peace and economic well-being. To be in public life or to be a warrior, meant at least to candidate for fame. Later on higher life became ruled by reason, and reason itself was defined in terms of a vision of order, in the cosmos and in the soul. The higher life became one in which purity, order, limit, or the unchanging governed the desires with their bent to excess, insatiability, fickleness and conflict. (Ibid., p. 20) Today reason is no longer defined in terms of a vision of order in the cosmos; rather it is defined in terms of instrumental efficacy, or maximization of the value sought, of self-consistency. (Ibid., p. 21). Today perhaps the most important form of ethic is the ideal of altruism; real dedication to others or to the universal good wins our admiration and even in signal cases our awe. (Ibid., p. 22)

The dignity of a person leans on the understanding that some special value attaches to specific forms of life, or to the rank or station that some people attain—their particular distinctions. (Ibid., p. 25) These distinctions are woven into the dimensions of our moral life, into our frameworks. They provide the background for our moral judgements, intuitions and reactions. To articulate a framework is to explicate what makes sense of our moral responses. When we try to spell out what we presuppose, we judge that a certain form of life is truly worthwhile, or we place our dignity in a certain achievement or status. We then define our moral obligations in a certain manner, articulating our frameworks (Ibid., p. 26) Doing without these frameworks is impossible; living within their horizons is constitutive of human agency; stepping outside the limits would be stepping outside what we recognize as integral and undamaged personhood. This is the way Taylor approaches the question of identity: “Who am I?”

To know who I am is to know where I stand. “My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose.” It is the horizon within which I am taking a stand as an agent. (Ibid., p. 27) Where do I stand means where is my horizon. What Taylor wants to highlight is the link between identity and a kind of orientation in what he calls moral space. “To know who you are is to be oriented in ... a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what is not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and

secondary.” (Ibid., p. 28) The ‘who’ of the question ‘Who am I’, is asked to place someone as a potential interlocutor in a society of interlocutors. To be a potential object of this question is to be someone with one’s own standpoint or one’s own role, someone who can speak for him / herself. (p. 29) To be able to answer for oneself is to know where one stands, what one wants to answer. “To lose one’s orientation in moral space is not to know who one is.” (Ibid., p. 29)

Our identity is something that one ought to be true to, can fail to uphold, can surrender when one ought to; fundamentally it plays the role of orienting us, of providing the frame within which things have meaning for us, by virtue of the qualitative distinctions it incorporates. Our identity is what allows us to define what is important to us, and what is not. (Ibid., p. 30) One orients oneself in a space which exists independently of one’s success or failure in finding one’s bearings, and which makes the task of finding these bearings inescapable; the idea that we invent distinctions out of whole cloth is equivalent to that we invent the questions as well as the answers (Ibid., p. 30) So, it belongs to human agency to exist in a space of questions about strongly valued goods—the morally right or acceptable—prior to all choice or adventitious cultural change. Even people we judge shallow do have a sense of what is in-comparatively important; we may consider their commitments trivial, or merely conventional, or not deeply thought out or chosen. But a person without a framework altogether would be outside our space of interlocution; he / she would not belong to where the rest of us are. We would look upon this as pathological. (Ibid., p. 31) Hence, the aim of Taylor’s account of the self is to examine how we actually make sense of our lives, and to draw the limits of the conceivable form our knowledge of what we actually do when we do so. (Ibid., p. 32)

Speaking of people as selves, means that they are beings of the requisite depth and complexity to have an identity in the this sense (or to be struggling to find it); (Ibid., p. 32-3) that they cannot do without some orientation to the good, that people essentially are (or define ourselves by) as to where they stand. (Ibid. p. 33) We are selves in that certain issues matter for us; what I am as self is defined by the way things have significance for me. (Ibid., p. 34) We are not selves in the ways we are organisms, but we are selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to the good.

What I am as a self is essentially defined by the way things have significance to me. The self is partly constituted by its selfinterpretations. Although the self's interpretation can never be fully explicit, the issue of the good for us is articulated by means of our language. For certain, we cannot have fully articulate what we are taking as given, what we are simply counting with, in using this language. (Ibid., p. 34) Nonetheless, to study individuals as persons is to study beings who exists in, or are partly constituted by, a certain language. (Ibid., p. 35) A language exists and is maintained only within a language community. One is a self only among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround us. There is no way we could be inducted into personhood except by being initiated into a language. "We first learn our language of moral and spiritual discernment by being brought into an ongoing conversation by those who bring us up. The meanings that the key words first had for me are the meanings they have for *us*, that is for me and my conversation partners together ... in talking about something you and I make it an object for us together." (Ibid., p. 35)

I define myself by defining from where I speak: "in the family tree, in social space, in the geography of social statuses and functions, in my intimate relations to the ones I love, and also crucially in the space of moral and spiritual orientation within which my most important defining relations are lived out." (Ibid., p. 35) So I can only learn what anger, love anxiety, or the aspiration to wholeness are through my and others' experience of these being objects for *us*, in some common space. Later, I may innovate and develop an original way of understanding myself and human life, at least one which is in sharp contrast with my family and background. But such innovations can only take place from the base in our common language (35-6). This means: One cannot be a self on one's own. I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors. A self exists only within 'webs of interlocution', in discourse. In talking about something you and I make it an object for us together, not just an object for me, which happens to be one for you. It is there as belonging to our public and common space. (Ibid. p. 35) This means: For the child "everything would be confusion, there would be no language of discernment at all, without the conversations which fix this language for him ... This is the sense in which one cannot be a self in one's own." (Ibid., p. 36)

It is this situation which gives its sense to our concept of 'identity', offering an answer to the question of who I am through a definition of where I am speaking from and to whom. The full definition of someone's identity involves reference to a defining community. (Ibid.,

p. 36) We may shift the balance in our definition of identity, dethrone the given, historic community as a pole of identity; we may relate only to the community defined by adherence to the good of the saved, or the true believers, or the wise. But this doesn't sever our dependence on webs of interlocution. It only changes the webs, and the nature of our dependence. (Ibid., p. 39) It is only slowly that we grow through infancy and childhood to be autonomous agents having something like our own place relative to the good at all. And, even then, that place is constantly challenged by the new events of our lives; as constantly under potential revisions, as we learn more and mature. The issue is not where we are, but where we're going. (Ibid., p. 47)

We grasp our lives in *narratives*. In fact, my life always has a degree of narrative understanding. I understand my present action in the form of becoming and getting to somewhere: What I am has to be understood as what I have become. (Ibid., p. 47), by the story of how I got here / there. Orientation in moral space turns out again to be similar to orientation in physical space. We know where we are through a mixture or recognition of landmarks before us and a sense of how we have travelled to get there (Ibid., p. 48); as beings who grow and become we can only know ourselves through the history of our maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. Self-understanding necessarily has temporal depth and incorporates narratives. (Ibid., p. 50). A future project will often go beyond my death. I plan the future for my family, my country my cause. But there is a different sense in which I am responsible for myself—at least in what can be called the Western culture. (Ibid., p. 51)

Human societies differ greatly in their culture and values. They represent different ways of being human; perhaps there is no way of arbitrating between them when they clash; perhaps they are incommensurable. We might be forced to recognize that certain goods are only such granted the existence of humans within a cultural form. (Ibid., p. 60-1) Most of us not only live with many goods but find that we have to rank them. In some cases, this ranking makes one of them supremely important relative to others. Most of us recognize the value of selfexpression, of justice, of family life, of the worship of God, of ordinary decency, of sensitivity, and a host of others, but one of these—perhaps our relation to God, or perhaps to justice—are considered as of overriding importance. Taylor denotes such supreme goods 'hypergoods', "goods which are not only incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which the others must be weighed, judged, decided about." We

all recognize some such goods, which define the ‘moral’ in our culture: a set of ends or demands which not only have unique importance, but also override and allow us to judge others. (Ibid., p. 63)

Faced with the view that all valuation is simply projection of our subjective reactions onto a neutral world, Taylor finds recourse to what he calls ‘moral phenomenology’, something which can also be seen as an examination of ‘the inescapable features of our moral language’. (Ibid., p. 68) To move from external action descriptions to the language of qualitative distinctions is to move to the language of Clifford Geertz’ ‘thick description’: “a language which is a lot richer and more culturally bound, because it articulates the significance and point that the actions or feelings have within a certain culture.”¹⁶¹ (Ibid., p. 80)

The different understandings of the good we see in different cultures are the correlatives of the different languages, which have evolved in those cultures. In our Western culture, we tend to have a prejudice in favour of articulacy. The God of Abraham exists for us—belief in him is possible— because he has been talked about, in the narrative of the Bible but also in countless other ways from theology to devotional literature. “Universal rights of mankind exist for us because they have been promulgated, because philosophers have theorized about them, because revolutions have thought in their name; articulation is a necessary condition of adhesion; without it, the goods are not even options.” But the sense of a good finds expression also in other speech acts. “Following the example of the prayer into liturgy, we find that expression goes beyond the bounds of language as normally and narrowly conceived. The gesture of ritual, its music, its display of visual symbols, all enact in their own fashion our relation to God.” (Ibid., p. 91) Without any articulation at all, we would lose all contact with the good, however conceived. We would cease to be human.

¹⁶¹ “It is possible to know, as a child sometimes does, that a certain action is forbidden, but not to understand yet what kind of badness it exhibits. Later one may learn that it is something dishonourable, or perhaps mean-spirited, in distinction from other forbidden things, which are ruled out because they are, for instance, dangerous. ... We can get a sufficient grasp of the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill’, or can obey the order, ‘Don’t talk like that to Granddad’ before we can grasp articulations about the sanctity of human life, or what it means to respect age.” (Ibid., p. 80)

7.13 Child and Identity

The identity of the Child is found in its ability to tell itself and others ‘Who am I’, to account for the behaviour in which he / she engages, and, not the least, to keep a particular narrative going, one which integrates events in the external world and sort them out into an ongoing story.

The structure of such a narrative—where the Child is both author and protagonist—organizes its experiences and actions over time, in the process of growing up (as well as beyond). A story is chosen in which it is cast as a character: ‘even if it is has already been written, and the part he / she plays has already been played’. To the extent that the narrative is missing it is produced.

In his / her becoming the Child is the same but nonetheless not the same, although the ‘character’ of the Child assures a certain permanence in time, which renders sameness. It is in character that enters the temporal dimension of the Child’s disposition as an individual, that of habit. Habit gives character a history. It is through the temporality of this history that the sameness and selfhood of the Child are integrated. It is by way the body—the seat of all habit—and bodily experiences, that the Child in its history inhabits the world.

To the Childs identity belongs his / her social belonging to one or more we-communities. In fact, any encounter with other subjects involves a common and shared surrounding world, is such a community. What makes events communal is the reference to a ‘we’. The family is for the Child a natural, not a social community, one on which he / she is dependent. The family is the venue for struggle between the child / adolescent and his / her parents. Independence comes not within family but by breaking out of it

The identity of the Child is also defined by the commitments and identifications, which provide the frame, or horizon, within which he / she can determine (from case to case) what is good, what is to be done, what is not to be done. It is within such a frame of commitments and identifications that the Child it is taking a stand as an agent.

Raising the question ‘Who am I’ is for the Child to place itself as a potential interlocutor in a society of interlocutors. The language of moral and spiritual discernment is learnt by being

brought into an ongoing conversation by and with Others. The Child is a Self only in relation to certain interlocutors, exists only within webs of interlocution, in discourse.

The question ‘Who I am?’ is raised by the Child in order to make sense of its own life. The ability of the Child to do so is being able to articulate it—to itself and others. Identity arises in saying.

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8. The Social World—Signs and Symbols

8.1 Introduction

As emphasized by A. Schutz in *Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt* ('The Meaningful Construction of the Social World') we all live in a social world of 'intersubjectivities' and meaningful relationships with other human beings, consociates and mere contemporaries, as well as predecessors and successors. His book, published in the early 1930's¹⁶², has been described as an attempt to vindicate and deepen Max Weber's 'interpretative sociology' (*verstehende Soziologie*) by anchoring it in some central ideas of Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson. But, as says M. Natanson in his appraisal, it can also be looked upon as an effort to outline a conception of meaning, the constitutive character of which is grounded in the reality of inner-time consciousness—an anatomy of man's existence together with his fellow-men in the midst of everyday life.¹⁶³ (Natanson 1970, p. 102) This chapter highlights some aspects on the social world as presented by Schutz in the mentioned book, those seemingly most relevant with respect to the Child's acquisition of 'social knowledge', the kind of learning which implies the formation of 'social types' and acquired ability to cope with signs and symbols. It supplements his views on 'everyday semiotics' in *Sinnhafte Aufbau* by visiting his later paper 'Symbol, reality and society'¹⁶⁴. Attempts are made to locate the growing Child in the conceptual landscape presented by Schutz, a common-sense social universe of meaning providing for 'transcendencies' and symbolic 'appresentations'.

8.2 Intersubjectivity—'the We-relationships'

Schutz starts out by simply accepting the existence of the social world as it is always accepted in (what Husserl called) 'the natural attitude', avoiding, as he says, "any attempt

¹⁶² A. Schütz, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie*, Vienna: Julius Springer 1932. A new edition of the work in German was published in 1960. The following account will be based on the English translation, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, of 1972, referred to as Schutz 1972a.

¹⁶³ Natanson, M. 1970, "Alfred Schutz on Social Reality and Social Science," in *Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz*, ed. by M. Natanson. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.

¹⁶⁴ Schutz, A. 1962, "Symbol, Reality and Society," in *Collected Papers. Vol. I. The Problem of Social Reality*. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.

to deal with the problem from the point of view of transcendental phenomenology.” (Schutz 1972a, p. 97) Born into a social world, every human being comes upon his / her fellow beings and takes their existence for granted, just as the existence of any natural objects encountered are taken for granted. ‘Thou’, the other person is conscious, and “his stream of consciousness is temporal in character, exhibiting the same basic form as mine.” The other person’s lived experiences remain in principle neither inaccessible to me, nor are they meaningless to me. “Rather the point is that the meaning I give to your experiences cannot be precisely the same as the meaning you give to them when you proceed to interpret them.” (Schutz 1972a, p. 98-9) One understands the world by interpreting one’s own lived experiences of it, whether these experiences be of inanimate things, of animals, or of fellow beings, creatures like me. (Ibid, p. 108)

Schutz conceives of the social world—lived and appreciated and interpreted according to ‘common sense’—as essentially intersubjective: It is the locus of my encounter with a possible ‘Thou’, the scene of my own action directed towards this Other, and the action of the Other towards me. Our concerted action reveals the world as ‘ours’. (Natanson 1970, p. 102-3) “Once the existence of the Thou is assumed, we have already entered the realm of intersubjectivity. The world is now experienced by the individual as shared by his fellow creatures, in short, as a *social world*.” The social world is by no means homogenous but exhibits a multiform structure. Each of its spheres or regions represents both a way of perceiving and a way of understanding the subjective experiences of others. (Schutz 1972a, p. 139) The social world is historically grounded and bears the marks and signs of the activity of our ancestors; it does so through the medium of language. It has an open horizon. In its movement toward a future it is partly ours but also the possession of future generations. In sum, it provides a significative setting in terms of which individuals, events, and physical things are understood. (Natanson, p. 103-4)

Schutz talks about a ‘realm of Consociates and other Contemporaries’, and a ‘realm of Predecessors’. With our consociates “we have in common the same world of directly experienced social reality: the world surrounding me in my Here and Now and which corresponds to the one surrounding you in your Here and Now. My Here and Now includes you, together with your awareness of my world, just as I and my conscious content belong to your world in your here and Now.” (Schutz 1972a, p. 142) Just as my world of actual perception is only a fragment of the whole world of my experience, and this in turn is but a

fragment of the world of my possible experience, so likewise the social world is only directly experienced by me in fragments. Because I live from moment to moment, this directly experienced social world is segmented according to conceptual perspectives. Beyond the domain of directly experienced social reality (*die soziale Umwelt*)—to which I'm anchored by a spatiotemporal community—there are still other social realms. Some of these I have once directly experienced and *can* in principle repeatedly reexperience. “Others I can experience directly if I chose, but have not yet done so.” These realms constitute the social world of contemporaries (*die soziale Mitwelt*). (Schutz 1972a, p. 142) Though in addition to these two worlds, that of myself and that of my fellow men (*Nebemmenschen*), I can also be cognizant of a social world that existed before I myself did exist and which at no point overlaps with any part of my own life. With respect to this realm, the social world of predecessors (*die Vorwelt*), or history, I can only be an observer and not an actor. Finally, I know that there is yet another world, one also inhabited by others, which will exist when I am no more, a social world of successors (*die Folgewelt*), men and women of whom I know nothing as individuals and with whose subjective experiences I have no personal acquaintance. “In using the term ‘world’ for these domains or realms, we mean only that different people are consociates, contemporaries, predecessors or successors to one another and that they accordingly experience one another and act upon one another in the different ways in question.” (Ibid., p. 143) The range of the intersubjective world is thus far larger than is ordinarily recognized. In addition to one's contemporaries with whom one shares a face-to-face relationship, there are those with which one does not (or has not yet) shared such a relationship. But, the intersubjective social world includes those who lived before one was born, as well as those who will be born in the future. It is a mistake to limit the analysis of social action to the sphere of contemporaries, Schutz contends, although what we know of our predecessors and successors is dependent on the model of our experience of contemporaries. (Natanson, p. 109)

“(A) man experiences his neighbours even when the latter are not at all present in the bodily sense. He has knowledge not only of his directly experienced consociates but also about his more distant contemporaries. He has in addition, empirical information about his historical predecessors. He finds himself surrounded by objects, which tell him plainly that they were produced by other people; these are not only material objects but all kinds of linguistic and other sign systems, in short, artefacts in the broadest sense. He interprets these first of all by arranging them within his own contexts of experience. However, he can at any time ask

further questions about the lived experiences and meaning-contexts of their creators, that is, about why they were made.”

(Schutz 1972a, p. 109)

The starting point for Schutz's analysis of the intersubjective world is 'the We-relationship' each of us shares with our consociates, those fellow-beings with whom one participates in direct spatial-temporal encounters. (Natanson 1970, p. 109)

“I speak of another person as within my reach of direct experience when he shares with me a community of space and a community of time. He shares a community of space with me when he is present in person and I am aware of his as such, and, moreover, when I am aware of him as this person himself, this particular individual, and of his body as the field upon which play the symptoms of his inner consciousness. He shares a community of time with me when his experience is flowing side by side with mine, when I can at any time look over and grasp his thoughts as they come into being.” (Schutz 1972a, p. 163)

Persons in reach of each others experience are so in a 'face-to-face' situation, a corollary of which is the spatial immediacy of the Other. His / her body is present to me as a field of expression for some subjective experiences. The face-to-face situation is constituted from the point of view of the participants in the situation who are intentionally conscious of the persons confronting them. For this attitude, or mode, in which I am aware of another human being Schutz uses the term 'Thou-orientation'. (Schutz 1972a, p. 163). I directly experience the Other as a Thou, attributing life and consciousness to him / her. He emphasizes that we are not here dealing with a conscious *judgment*, but with a pre-predicative experience in which I become aware of a fellow human being as a person. It is precisely the being there of the Other toward which the Thouorientation is directed, not specifically the Other's specific characteristics. "In its 'pure' form the Thou-orientation consists merely of being intentionally directed toward the pure being-there of another alive and conscious human being. The Thou-orientation can be one-sided or reciprocal. The face-to-face relationship in which the partners are aware of each other is a 'pure' We-relationship." (Ibid. p. 164)

“The basic We-relationship is already given to me by the mere fact that I am born into a world of directly experienced social reality. From this basic relationship is derived the original validity of all my direct experiences of particular fellow men and also my knowledge

that there is a larger world of my contemporaries whom I am not now experiencing directly.” (Schutz 1972a, p. 165)

“... all my lived experiences of the other person ... have their origin in the sphere of the We-relationship. Attention to the We-relationship in turn broadens the objective knowledge of other people which I have gained from the interpretation of my experiences of them ...” (Schutz 1972a, p. 166)

“The We-relationship is spatial as well as temporal. It embraces the body of the other person as well as his consciousness. And because I grasp what is going on in his mind only through the medium of his perceived bodily movements, this Act of grasping is for me a lived experience that transcends my own stream of consciousness.” (Schutz 1972a, p. 166-7)

While living in the We-relationship, I am really living in a *common* stream of consciousness. When you and I are immediately involved with each other, every experience is coloured by that involvement. To the extent that we are going to think about the experiences we have together, we must withdraw from each other, stop focusing on each other. The greater my awareness of the we-relationship, the less my involvement in it, and the less I am genuinely related to my partner. “The more I reflect, the more my partner becomes transformed into a mere object of thought.” (Ibid. p. 167) The pure We-relationship is merely the awareness of the *presence* of another person. But in order to have a social relationship, we must go beyond this. What is required is that the Other-orientation of each partner become coloured by a specific knowledge of the specific manner in which he / she is being regarded by the partner. This is possible only within directly experienced social reality. (Ibid. p. 168) One cannot become aware of this basic connection between the pure Werelationship and the face-to-face relationship while still a participant in the relationship. “*One must step out of it and examine it.* The person who is still a participant in the We-relationship does not experience it in its pure form; the pure We-relationship is a mere limiting concept which one uses in the attempt to get a theoretical grasp of the face-to-face situation. (Ibid., p. 168) The partner may be experienced with different degrees of immediacy, different degrees of intensity, different degrees of intimacy. Or he / she may be experienced from different point of view. “These distinctions apply equally to orientation relationships and to social interactions, determining in each of them the directness with

which the partners 'know' each other ... It is not the object, therefore, that is experienced with greater or lesser directness; it is the *relationship* itself." (Schutz 1972a, p. 168) These different degrees of directness are important. As a matter of fact, they are the key to any understanding of the transition from direct experience of others to indirect experience, which is characteristic of the world of mere contemporaries. (Ibid. p. 169) To the encounter with the other person one brings a whole stock of previously constituted knowledge, both general knowledge of what another person is as such and specific knowledge one has of the person in question. "It includes knowledge of other people's interpretative schemes, their habits, and their language. " (Ibid., p. 169) The interlocking of glances, the thousand-faceted mirroring of each other, are among of the unique features of the face-to-face situation. They are constitutive characteristics of particular social relationships. One must remember, however, that the pure We-relationship, which is the very form of every encounter with another person, is not itself grasped *reflectively* within the face-to-face situation. It is not being observed, it is lived through. (Ibid., p 170) "The world of the We is not private to either of us, but is our world, the one common intersubjective world which is right there in front of us. It is only from the face-to-face relationship, from the common lived experience of the world in the 'We', that the intersubjective world can be constituted. This alone is the point from which it can be deduced." (Schutz 1972a, p. 171) Hence, the experience of the We is primordial. The 'We' of direct, shared, face-to-face encounters is, from the standpoint of one's *participation* in the social world, an experience *sui generis*. (Natanson 1970, p. 109)

8.3 Social knowledge—Ideal types

Within the social world thus understood, there remains the problem of *how* knowledge of other people is possible. This is both a philosophical problem and an issue for the methodology of the social sciences. (Natanson 1970, p. 110) Even in the face-to-face-relationships with a fellow being, the individual knows only aspects of the Other. Although he / she is given to me as a *person*, the mode of givenness is adumbrated. Some aspects of the Other are manifest, others are presented in shadowy form or are completely opaque. To say that one has knowledge of another is to say that one knows him / her directly in a very limited measure, but indirectly in vast degree, that is by means of typified constructs which one forms of him / her and of human behaviour generally. When moving from one's consociates to other contemporaries, a radical change is introduced: the latter is known only

by way of typifications and constructions, through one or other model of how 'someone' traditionally behaves, or is expected to behave in certain situations. One knows one's contemporaries through a complex, concatenated system of *ideal types*. (Natanson 1970, p. 110)

My mere contemporary is one whom *I know co-exists with me*, but whom I do not experience immediately. This kind of knowledge is, accordingly, always indirect and impersonal. I cannot call my contemporary 'Thou' in the sense this term has within a We-relationship. (Schutz 1972a, p. 181) How is the world of contemporaries constituted and what modifications do the concepts 'Other-orientation' and 'social relationship' undergo in that world? For certain, modifications are necessitated by the fact that the contemporary is only indirectly accessible and that his / her subjective experiences can only be known in the form of *general types* of subjective experience. (Ibid., p. 181) My knowledge of contemporaries is inferential and discursive. "It stands, by its essential nature, in an objective context of meaning and only in such. It has within it no intrinsic reference to persons nor to the subjective matrix within which the experiences in question were constituted." However, it is due to this very abstraction from subjective context of meaning that they exhibit the property of an 'again and again' character. They are typical conscious experiences of 'someone' and, as such, are basically homogenous and repeatable. (Ibid. p. 184) The subjective meaningcontext is abandoned as a tool of interpretation. It has been replaced by a series of highly complex and systematically interrelated meaningcontexts. The result is that the contemporary is anonymous in proportion to the number and complexity of these meaning-contexts; the synthesis of recognition does not apprehend the unique person as he / she exists within a living present. Instead it pictures this person as always the same and as homogenous, leaving out of the account all changes and rough edges which go along with individuality. "Therefore, no matter how many people are subsumed under the ideal type, it corresponds to no one in particular... when I am They-oriented, I have 'types' for partners." (Ibid., p. 184-5)

The use of ideal types is not limited to the world of contemporaries. It is to be found in our apprehension of the world of predecessors as well. Since ideal types are interpretative schemes for the social world in general, they become part of our stock of knowledge. As a result, we are always drawing on them in our face-to-face dealings with people. Ideal types serve as interpretative schemes even for the world of *direct* social experience.

“The typical and only the typical is homogenous, *and it is always so ... The objective meaning context defining the subjective experiences of an ideal type can be translated back into a subjective meaning whenever I apply it to an individual in a concrete situation. Thus I may say, ‘Oh, he’s one of those!’ or ‘I have seen that type before!’*” (Schutz 1972a, p. 185-6)

Schutz makes a distinction between the ideal type of another person who is expressing himself / herself or has done that in a certain way, and the ideal type of the expressive process itself, or even of the outward results which we interpret as the signs and expressive process. The former he calls the 'personal ideal type', the latter the 'course-of-action type' (Schutz 1972a, p. 182) The interpreter starts with his own perceptions of someone else's manifest act. The goal is to discover the motives behind the act. One does this by interpreting these acts within an objective context of meaning, such that the same motive is assigned to any act that repeatedly achieves the same end through the same means. (Ibid., p. 188) The conscious processes of the personal ideal types are logical constructions. They are deduced from the manifest acts and are pictures as temporally prior to the acts. The acts are seen as the regular and repeatable results of some inferred conscious processes. (Ibid., p. 189) “The analysis may begin either with the person and end with the act, or start with the act and from its typical structure work back to the construction of the kind of person capable of behaving in that way.” The perspective from which the construction will be made depends on the interpreter's point of view. In fact, the personal type “*is a function of the very question it seeks to answer.* It is dependent upon the objective context of meaning, which it merely translates into subjective terms and then personifies ... the personal ideal type is by definition one who acts in such and such way and has such and such experiences.” (Schutz 1972a, p. 190) The interpretative schemes used in understanding the other person are constantly changing with experience. However, in the face-to-face relationship a real, free, enduring human being is present in person. (Ibid. p. 191) “The direct observer, and even more the participant in a social relationship, brings to the situation a whole armoury of interpretative schemes for understanding others. Included will be schemes derived from his direct social experience, and from his experience of his predecessors. He will have on hand both personal types and course of action types. By constantly scrutinizing, shuffling, and juxtaposing these ideal types, he can keep up with many changes according in the other person and thus grasp him in his living reality.” (Ibid., p. 192) The ideal types that are

continually being constructed in everyday life are subject to constant adjustment and revision on the basis of the observer's experience, whether the latter is direct or indirect. (Ibid., p. 193) "To interpret the behaviour of a contemporary as typical means to explain it as the behaviour of 'a man like that one', of 'one of them'. Orientation toward the world of contemporaries is necessarily and always 'Theyorientation'." (Ibid., p. 194)

The they-orientation is the pure form of understanding in a predicative fashion, i.e. in terms of imputed typical characteristics. Acts of theyorientation are intentionally directed toward another person imagined as existing at the same time as oneself, but conceived of in terms of an ideal type. It is the degree of anonymity, which Schutz offers as a criterion for different levels of concretization and actualization that occur in this theyorientation. The more anonymous the personal ideal type applied in the they-orientation, the greater is the use made of objective meaning contexts instead of subjective ones; and likewise, the more are personal ideal types and objective meaning contexts pre-given. (Schutz 1972a, p. 194)

"The contemporary alter ego is ... anonymous in the sense that its existence is only the individuation of a type ... " (Schutz 1972a, p. 195)

"The personal ideal type is ... less anonymous the closer it is to the world of directly experienced social reality." (Schutz 1972a, p. 195)

Schutz adds that we often use sentences in which ideal types like 'the state', 'the press', 'the economy', 'the nation', 'the people', or perhaps 'the working class' appear as grammatical subjects. "In doing so, we naturally tend to personify abstractions, treating them as if they were real persons known in indirect social experience ... we are here indulging in an anthropomorphism ... In fact, every 'action' of the state can be reduced to the action of its functionaries..." (Ibid., p. 198-9)

Hence, the social world is constituted in large measure by 'ideal types', the construction of which involves the postulation of 'persons' and the attribution to them of typical attitudes, motives, interests, skills, and techniques. (Natanson 1970, p. 111). By means of ideal types, one is able to advance from the experience of the Thou in the We-relationships to the increasing states of anonymity, which mark its genesis and destiny as a contemporary with

other contemporaries, as a successor to predecessors, and as a predecessor to successors. (Ibid., p. 111) For a variety of reasons one cannot, of course, seize the living actuality of an Other's experience; its Here and Now is unique, its stock of knowledge is built up and utilized from his / her perspective and by his / her choice. The Other alone knows when his / her project begins and ends. However, as a fellow-being, One can share a great deal with the Other: it is possible to get direct access to him / her as a Thou in the We-relationship, to share with one's contemporaries a certain dimension of time through the fact that 'we grow old together'. But even in these immediacies, One does not 'become' the Other, nor is it possible to enter mysteriously into his / her lived experience. Sharing is not invading. "The matter does not end there, of course, because my knowledge of the Other in its greatest complexity comes with typifications and ideal types which form the matrix of social life. The description, analysis, and clarification of that matrix is nothing less than the subject matter of a phenomenology of the social sciences." (Ibid., p. 113) Although the line separating present social reality from the world of predecessors is fluid (as I may recollect a We-relationship or a They-relationship which I once had), a predecessor is a person in the past whose personal experiences do not overlap in time with mine. The pure world of predecessors is entirely made up of such persons. It existed before I was born; it is by definition over and done. It has no open horizon toward the future. In the behaviour of my predecessors there is nothing as yet undecided, uncertain, or awaiting fulfilment. "I can never set out to influence them ... they only influence me." (Schutz 1972a, p. 207-8)

"I can know a predecessor only if someone tells me about him or writes about him." (Schutz 1972a, p. 208)

"I came to know the world of my predecessors through record and monuments. These have the status of signs, regardless of my predecessors intended them as signs for posterity or mere for their own contemporaries." (Schutz 1972a, p. 209)

"... I know that every sign has its author and that every author has his own thoughts and subjective experiences as he expresses himself through signs." (Schutz 1972a, p. 209)

"My world of predecessors is, throughout, the world of other people and not my world. ... My predecessor lived in an environment radically different not only from my own but from the environment which I ascribe to my contemporaries." (Schutz 1972a, p. 210)"

8.4 Objectivations—Signs

Crucial for Schutz's treatment of the social world is his distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' meaning: "I can, on the one hand, attend to and interpret in themselves the phenomena of the external world which present themselves to me as indicators of the consciousness of other people. While I do this, I say of them that they have objective meaning. But I can, on the other hand, look over and through these external indications into the constituting process within the living consciousness of another rational being. What I am concerned with then is subjective meaning. What we call the world of objective meaning is, therefore, abstracted in the social sphere from the constituting process of a meaning-endowing consciousness, be this one's own or an other's. This results in the anonymous character of the meaning-content predicated of it." When speaking of subjective meaning in the social world, we are referring to the constituting process in the consciousness of the person who produced the objectively meaningful. (Schutz 1972a, p. 37)

In the genuine understanding of the other the interpreter starts with his / her experience of either the animate body of the other person, or the artefacts which this person has produced. In either case one is interpreting *objectivations* in which the other's subjective experiences manifest themselves. If it is the body of the other that is in question, one concerns oneself with acts-objectivations, i.e. movements, gestures, or the results of action. If it is artefacts that are in question, these may be either signs in the narrower sense or manufactured external objects such as tools and monuments. What these objectivations have in common is that they exist only as the result of action of rational beings. Because they are products of action, they are *ipso facto* evidence of what went on in the minds of the actors who made them. Not all evidences are signs, but all signs are evidences. For an evidence to be a sign, it must be capable of becoming an element in a sign system with the status of co-ordinating scheme. This qualification is lacking in some evidence. (Schutz 1972a, p. 133)

Anyone who encounters a given product can proceed to interpret it in two different ways. First, he / she can focus on its status as object, either real or ideal, but at any rate independent of its maker. Second, it can be looked upon as evidence of what went on in the mind of its maker(s) when it was made. In the former case the interpreter is subsuming the experience acts (*erfahrende Akte*) of the object under some interpretative schemes at hand. In the latter

case, the interpreter's attention directs itself to the constituting Acts of the producer(s). "We speak, then, of the subjective meaning of the product if we have in view the meaning context within which the product stands or stood in the mind of the producer ... Objective meaning, on the contrary, we can predicate only of the product as such, that is, of the already constituted meaning context of the thing produced, whose actual production we meanwhile disregard. ... Objective meaning, therefore, consists only in a meaning-context within the mind of the interpreter, whereas subjective meaning refers beyond it to a meaning-context in the mind of the producer." (Schutz 1972a, p. 133-4)

My experiences of another person's acts, consist in my perceptions of his / her body in motion. I am always interpreting these perceptions as 'body of another', with implicit reference to the 'consciousness of another'. Thus bodily movements are perceived not only as physical events but also as *signs*. (Ibid. 101) "... the Thou is that consciousness whose intentional Acts I can see occurring as other than, yet simultaneous with, my own." (Ibid. p. 104) But my lived experiences of you, as well as the environment I ascribe to you bears the mark of my own subjective Here and Now and *not* the mark of yours. I ascribe to you an environment, which has been interpreted from my own subjective standpoint, and presuming "that at any given time we are referring to the same objects ... " (Ibid., p 105) The self-explication of my own lived experiences takes place within the total pattern of my experience. It is made up of meaning-contexts developed out of my previous experiences. As such they are there to my disposal. (Ibid., p. 105) "When I become aware of a segment of your lived experience, I arrange what I see within my own meaning-context. But meanwhile you have arranged it in yours. Thus I am always interpreting your lived experiences from my own standpoint. ... *everything I know about your conscious life is really based on my knowledge of my own lived experiences.*" (Ibid., p. 106) My own stream of consciousness is given to me continuously in all its fullness but your consciousness is given to me in discontinuous segments, never in its fullness, and only in 'interpretative perspectives'. (Ibid. p. 107)

It is immaterial to the understanding of expressive acts whether they consist of gestures, words, or artefacts. Every such act involves the use of signs. Between the signs and that which signs signify there is a relation of representation. (Ibid., p. 118) When 'understanding' a sign, one focuses not on the sign itself, but upon that for which it stands, Schutz says with reference to Husserl. "The sign is indeed the 'sign for' what it means or signifies, the so-

called 'sign meaning' or 'sign function'. But the sign is also the 'sign' for what it expresses, namely, the subjective experiences of the person using the sign. (Ibid., p. 119) ... A sign is, therefore, always either an artefact or a constituted art object ... The interpreter need only 'know the meaning' of the sign ..." (Ibid., p. 120) Hence, signs are artefacts or art-objects interpreted not according to those interpretative schemes which are adequate to them as objects of the external world but according to schemes *not* adequate to them, as belonging rather to other objects. A sign system is a meaning-context which is a configuration formed by interpretative schemes. (Ibid., p. 120) A sign is meaningless only with respect to one or more established sign systems. To say that a sign is alien to one such system only means that it belongs to another sign system. (Ibid., p. 121)

Every sign system is a scheme of our experience, and it is so in two different senses. First, it is an expressive scheme ('I have at least once used the sign for that which it designates'). Second, it is an interpretative scheme ('I have in the past interpreted the sign as the sign of that which it designates'). "To master fully a sign system such as a language, it is necessary to have a clear knowledge of the meaning of the individual signs within the system. This is possible only if the sign system and its component individual sign are known both as expressive schemes and as interpretative schemes for previous experiences of the knower ... As expressive scheme and as interpretative scheme a sign is only intelligible in terms of those lived experiences constituting it which it designates. Its meaning consists in its translatability, that is, its ability to lead us back to something known in a different way." (Ibid., p. 122) The meaning of the sign must, as Schutz says, be 'discoverable somewhere in the past experience of the person making use of the sign'. "A meaning is connected with a sign, insofar as the latter's significance within a given sign system is understood both for the person using the sign and for the person interpreting it ... A sign has an 'objective meaning' within its sign system when it can be intelligibly coordinated to what it designates with that system independently of whoever is using the sign or interpreting it." (Ibid., p. 123)

8.5 Transcendencities—Appresentations: Symbols

Signs is also a topic of Schutz's later paper "Symbol, reality and society", where he deals with ('in a very sketchy way') certain basic problems of philosophical anthropology: The place of human beings in the cosmos which transcends their existence, but within which

they nonetheless find their bearings. Taking for granted that signs and symbols are among the means by which man tries to come to terms with the manifold experiences of *transcendancy*, Schutz attempts to elucidate the way the perceptible world actually given to the individual at any moment transcends the actual Here and Now, and how society in still another sense transcends the individual's actual experiences. (Schutz 1962, p. 293)

Schutz contends that the use of what he calls 'marks', 'indications' and 'signs', corresponds to particular transcendencies, all of which have in common that they are experienced within the reality of everyday life. Objects, facts, or events, are not experienced as 'selves', but 'as standing for other objects' not given in immediacy to the experiencing subjects. The object, fact or event refers to something other than itself. There is a 'pairing' or 'coupling' between something 'appresented' and 'appresenting'. Though the reality of everyday life is not the only reality of relevance. There are other realities, such as the worlds of religion, of art, and of science, which Schutz refers to as 'finite provinces of meaning'. These can be experienced only by means of a particular form of 'appresentation', a transcendency attained by means of 'symbols'. (Ibid., p. 294) If such is the case, the appresented thing may be a physical event, fact, or object which is not perceivable to the subject in immediacy; it may be something spiritual or immaterial; it may be real in the sense of common-sense reality, or a phantasm; it may be simultaneous with the appresenting entity or precede or follow it; it may even be timeless. (Ibid., p. 297) In any case the appresented is beyond my actual and potential physical reach.

The experienced world is the scene and the object of my actions. I have to dominate and change it in order to carry out my purposes. I experience the world as organized in space and time around myself as a centre. This sector of the world of perceived and perceptible objects at whose centre I am, is the world within my actual reach. Inside this field there is a sphere of things I can manipulate. This manipulatory sphere is open to my immediate interference; I can modify it either directly by movements of my body or with the help of artificial extensions of my body, by means of tools and instruments in the broadest sense of the term. (Ibid, p. 307) In order to find my bearings within this sphere and to come to terms with it in my potential manipulations and working acts, I have to single out and mark certain objects. These 'marks', which represent the simplest form of appresentational relationship, are themselves objects of the outer world; but they are intuited not as purely apperceived

'selves'. They have become for the interpreter an appresentational reference. The broken branch of the tree becomes a mark for the location of the waterhole, or a signal for me to turn left. (Ibid., p. 309) The selective function of interest organizes for me the world in strata of major or minor relevance. From the world within my actual or potential reach are selected as primarily important those facts, objects, and events which actually are, or will become, possible ends or means, obstacles or conditions for the realization of my projects; or they will become dangerous or enjoyable or otherwise relevant. (Ibid., p. 310) It is for this form of pairing by appresentation that Schutz uses the term 'indications': The indicating member is not perceived as a 'self', but as something 'calling forth' the thing indicated. To this category of appresentations belongs 'natural signs'. (Ibid., p. 311). Marks and indications (which belong to 'the world within my actual and potential reach and the manipulatory sphere'), do not necessarily presuppose the existence of other human beings and the possibility of my communicating with them. (Ibid., p. 312) It is for objects, facts, or events in the outer world, whose apprehension appresents to an interpreter the 'cogitations' of a fellow-being, that Schutz reserves the term 'sign'. (Ibid., p. 319)

The sign as used in communication is always addressed to an individual or anonymous interpreter. It originates within the actual manipulatory sphere of the communicator, and the interpreter apprehends it as an object, fact, or event in the world of actual or potential physical reach. However, it is not necessary that the interpreter's world within actual reach overlap spatially the manipulatory sphere of the communicator (Schutz refers to the telephone, television, etc.), nor that the production of the sign occur simultaneously with its interpretation (Egyptian papyrus, monuments, etc.); nor is it necessary that the *same* physical object or event used by the communicator as carrier of the communication be apprehended by the interpreter. (Ibid., p. 321) In fact, any number of human beings, or mechanical devices, might be inserted into the communicatory process between the original communicator and the interpreter. What is important is that *communication can occur only within the reality of the outer world*, and this is one of the main reasons why this world has the character of *paramount reality*. (Italics, Schutz, Ibid., p. 322) Through the use of signs, the communicative system permits us to become aware of, to a certain extent, an other human persons's cogitations and, under particular conditions even to bring our flux of inner time into perfect simultaneity with that of the other person. But fully successful communication is, nevertheless, unattainable. "There still remains an inaccessible zone of the Other's private life which transcends my possible experience". (Ibid., p. 326) The world

of everyday life is, however, the unquestioned but always questionable matrix within which all our inquiries start and end. (Ibid., p. 327) Here Schutz also brings in 'cultural objects'—signs as art-objects: "A book is an outer object, a material thing. I see it as it appears to me... but reading it, I am not directed toward it as an outer object but toward the meaning of what is written therein. I 'live in its meaning' as comprehending it. The same holds for a tool, a house, a theater, a temple, a machine. The spiritual meaning of all these objects is appresentationally apperceived as being founded upon the actually appearing object which is not apprehended as such but as expressing its meaning." (Ibid., p. 314) By the intermediary of events in the outer world, occurring on, or brought about by the Other's body, especially by linguistic expressions in the broadest sense, I may comprehend the Other by appresentation. By mutual understanding and consent, *a communicative common environment* is established, within which the subjects reciprocally motivate one another in their mental activities. (Ibid., p. 315) There are, for sure, zones within my actual reach, which are not within my fellow men's reach, and vice versa. The same holds for our manipulatory spheres. But it is a corollary of the idealization of the inter-changeability of our standpoints that the world within actual reach of another is also within my attainable (potential) reach and vice versa. (Ibid., p. 317) As to the relation comprising my contemporaries, predecessors and successors, Schutz contends that, although originating in mutual biographical involvement, it in fact transcends the existence of either of our consociates in the realm of everyday life. It belongs to a province of meaning other than that of the reality of everyday life; it can be grasped only by means of 'symbols'. (Ibid., p. 318)

To those sub-universes, or (as Schutz calls them) *finite provinces of meaning*, which are by definition beyond my world of daily life and direct experiences, and which can only be apprehended by means of symbols—the worlds of scientific theory, of arts, of religion, of politics, but also of phantasms and dreams—belong the categories of Nature and Society. In my everyday life I find myself within a world not of my own making. I know this fact, and this knowledge belongs to my biographical situation. There is, on one hand, my knowledge that the reality of my everyday life is transcended, both in time and space, by Nature:

"In time, the world of Nature existed before my birth and will continue to exist after my death. It existed before man appeared on earth and will probably survive mankind. In space, the world within my actual reach carries along the open infinite horizons of my world within potential reach, but to my experiences of these horizons belongs the conviction that each

world within potential reach, once transformed into actual reach, will again be surrounded by new horizons, and so on. Within the world in my reach there are, moreover certain objects, such as the heavenly bodies, which I cannot bring within my manipulatory sphere, and there are events within my manipulatory area, such as the tides, which I cannot bring within my control." (Schutz 1962, p. 329)

On the other hand, in a similar way Society transcends the reality of my everyday life:

"I was born into a preorganized social world which will survive me, a world shared from the outset with fellow-men who are organized in groups, a world which has its particular open horizons in time, in space, and also in what sociologists call social distance. In time there is the infinite chain of generations which overlap each other... My actual social environment refers always to a horizon of potential social environments, and we may speak of a transcendent infinity of the social world as we speak of a transcendent infinity of the natural one." (Schutz 1962, p. 330)

So, at any moment of my existence I find myself within Nature and within Society. Nature and Society constitute the framework within which I alone have the freedom of my potentialities; they prescribe the scope of all possibilities for defining my situation; they are not elements of my situation, but determinations of it. I have to come to terms with them. In spite of their transcendencies, I have to understand them in terms of an order of things and events. (Ibid, p. 330) In the common-sense thinking of everyday life we know that Nature and Society represent some kind of order; yet the essence of this order is not knowable to us. It reveals itself merely in images by analogical apprehending. The images, once constituted, are taken for granted, and so are the transcendencies to which they refer. This is possible because we find in our socio-cultural environment approved systems offering answers to our quest for the unknowable transcendencies. Devices are developed to apprehend the disquieting phenomena transcending the world of everyday life in a way analogous to the familiar phenomena within it. This is done by the creation of appresentational references of a higher order, the creation of symbols. A symbol is following Schutz (as already mentioned in Chapter 1), "an appresentational reference of a higher order in which the appresenting member of the pair is an object, fact, or event within the reality of our daily life, whereas the other appresented member of the pair refers to an idea that transcends our experience of every day life". (Ibid., p. 331)

How does it come that an object, event, or fact within the reality of our daily life is coupled with an idea transcending our experience of our everyday life? The answer given by Schutz is that there are first sets of appresentational references which are universal and hence can be used for symbolization because they are rooted in the human condition. (It is up to philosophical anthropology to study these sets of appresentational references.) There are, secondly, the particular form of symbolic systems as developed by the various cultures in different periods. These latter belong to cultural anthropology and the history of ideas. (Ibid., p. 332) Our Western culture has developed several systems of symbols, such as science, art, religion, politics, and philosophy. The coexistence of several symbolic systems which are merely loosely, if at all, connected one with another, is the special feature of our own historical situation and the result of our attempt to develop an interpretation of the cosmos in terms of the positive methods of natural sciences. (Ibid., p. 332) On the other hand, investigations of anthropologists, sociologists, mythologists, philologists, political scientists and historians have shown that in other cultures, and even in earlier periods of our own culture, man experienced nature, society, and himself as equally participating in and determined by the order of the cosmos. (Ibid., p. 333).

Symbolization—‘an appresentational reference of higher order’—is, as Schutz says, based on ‘pre-formed appresentational references’, such as marks, indications, signs, or even symbols. (Ibid., p. 337) Each of the appresenting vehicles may be replaced by another; each appresentational meaning may undergo a series of variations; in fact, the principle of figurative transference pervades the whole appresentational structure. ”All this explains the essential ambiguity of the symbol, the vagueness of the transcendent experiences appresented by it, and the difficulty of translating their meaning into discursive terms of more or less precise denotations.” (Ibid., p. 338) Each object of our immediate or analogical apprehension is an object within a field, referring to objects of the same experiential style. We have several concurrent and competing orders of reality or provinces of meaning—that of our everyday life, that of the world of fantasy, of art, of science, etc. Among these that of everyday life is paramount, because only here is communication possible. (Ibid., p. 339) Each order of reality has its particular cognitive style, which constitutes it as a finite province of meaning. Each is characterized by a specific tension of consciousness (from full awakesness to sleep in the world of dreams), by a specific form of experiencing oneself, and finally by a specific form of sociality. (Ibid., p 341).

The outer world of everyday life is paramount because we always participate in it, because the outer objects delimit our possibilities of free action by offering resistance which can only be overcome through effort if it can be overcome at all, because it is the realm into which we can gear our bodily activities, and hence, we can change or transform; and because within this realm, and only within this realm, can we communicate with our fellow men and thus establish a 'common comprehensive environment'. (Ibid., p. 342) In all cases in which an intersubjective participation in one of the pure symbolic provinces of meaning takes place, the existence of a 'material occasion' or a 'material endowment' is presupposed. Communication occurs by objects, facts, or events pertaining to the paramount reality of the senses, of the outer world, which are, however, appresentationally apperceived. (Ibid., p. 342). The symbolic reference is characterized by the fact that it transcends the sphere of meaning of everyday life, so that only the appresenting member of the related pair pertains to it, whereas the appresented member has its reality in another sphere of meaning. The symbolic relationship is an appresentational relationship between entities belonging to at least two realms of meaning; that means, only the appresenting symbol is an element of the (paramount) reality of everyday life. (Ibid., p. 343)

Only a small fraction of man's stock of knowledge at hand originates in individual experience. The greater portion of our knowledge is socially derived, handed down to us by our parents and teachers as our social heritage. All knowledge taken for granted and beyond question is socially approved knowledge, consisting of a set of 'recipes' designed to help each member of a social group to define, in a typical way, his or her situation in the reality of everyday life. (Ibid., p. 348) In the process of transmitting socially approved knowledge the learning of the vernacular or 'mother tongue' has a particularly important function. The native language can be taken as a set of references which, in accordance with the relative natural conception of the world as approved by the linguistic community, have predetermined what features of the world are worthy of being expressed, and therewith what qualities of these features, and what relations among them, deserve attention, what typifications, conceptualizations, abstractions, generalizations and idealizations that are relevant for achieving typical results by typical means. (Ibid., p. 349)

The determination of what is worthwhile and what it is necessary to communicate depends on the typical, practical, and theoretical problems which have to be solved, and these will

be different for men and women, for the young and the old, for the hunter and for the fisherman, and, in general, for the various social roles assumed by the members of the group. Each kind of activity has its particular aspects of relevance to the performer and requires a set of particular technical terms. (Ibid., s. 349) One should also bear in mind that our knowledge is socially distributed; each of us has precise and distinct knowledge about only that particular field where we are experts. (Ibid., p. 350) The whole system of types under which any social group experiences itself has to be learned by a process of acculturation. The same holds for the various marks and indications for the position, status, role, and prestige each individual has within the stratification of the group (Ibid., p. 350) Man is indeed an *animal symbolicum*, if we understand under this term his need and capacity to come to terms with the various transcendencies surpassing the actual Here and Now. (Ibid., p. 356).

8.6 Growing into a common-sense Social world: Typifications — Transcendencies — Appresentations

In his writings on the problems social reality, Schutz articulates, as Natanson says, the meaningful structure of the everyday working world into which each of us is born, within whose limits our existence unfold, and which we transcend completely only in death.¹⁶⁵ (Natanson in Schutz 1962, p. xxv) We naively assume “that this world has a history, a past, that it has a future, and that the rough present in which we find ourselves is epistemologically given to all normal men in much the same way. In the simplest terms, we are all born into the same world, grow up as children guided by parents and other adults, learn a language, come into contact with others, receive an education, move into some phase in the business of life, and go through the infinitely detailed catalogue of human activity: we play, love hate, suffer and die.” (Ibid., xxvi)

The common-sense world is the arena of social action; within it we enter into relationships with each other and try to come to terms with each other as well as with ourselves. All of this is typically taken for granted, and this means that the structures of daily life are not themselves recognized or appreciated formally. Rather, common sense sees the world, acts in the world, and interprets the world through some implicit typifications. (Ibid., p. xxvii)

¹⁶⁵ Natanson. M. 1962, “Introduction”, in A. Schutz, *Collected Papers*. Vol. I. *The Problem of Social Reality*. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.

Individuals locate themselves in daily life in a particular manner, in the light of some 'biographical situation'. To be born into the world means first of all to be born of parents who are unique to us, to be raised by adults who constitute the guiding elements of *our* segment of experience." (Ibid., p. xxvii) Each of us continues throughout life to interpret what we encounter in the world in the perspective of our special interests, motives, desires, aspirations, and religious and ideological commitments. Among the conditions circumscribing our lives, we come to recognize two types of elements: those either within our control or capable of being brought into control and those outside of or beyond the possibility of control. Our biographical situation defines the way in which we locate the arena of action, interpret its possibilities, and engage its challenges. 'The' world becomes transposed into 'my' world in accordance with the relevant elements of my biographical situation. The individual as an actor in the social world defines the reality he / she encounters. (Ibid., p. xxviii)

The encountered animate beings and objects are perceived typically within a horizon of familiarity. What is new and different is recognized as unusual because it arises against a background of the ordinary. "But no one has to teach us that the ordinary is ordinary, that the familiar *is* familiar; the very texture of common-sense life includes these typifications which indeed make further predications possible." This 'stockpiling of typifications' is endemic to common-sense life. From childhood on, we continue to amass a vast number of 'recipes', techniques for understanding, or at least controlling aspects of our experience. The typifications, which comprise our stock of knowledge at hand are generated out of a social structure. "Here as everywhere, knowledge is socially rooted, socially distributed, and socially informed. Yet its individuated expression depends on the unique placement of the individual in the social world." (Ibid., p. xxix)

A cartographer's description of a geographic area would be quite distinct from our everyday personal awareness or remembrance of the same region. The cartographer plots his map in terms of a universally recognized system of longitudes and latitudes; his geographical position at the time of mapping is necessarily irrelevant. "But in my appreciation of a certain landscape, it is precisely *my* position in space and time which is the primary consideration. The elements of the scene *before* me, the aspects I consider marginal are marginal with regard to what I deem central, and the knowledge I possess of the surroundings is dependent on my physical placement in the world. Fore and after, to the side of, near and far, above

and below, here and there—these are all rendered intelligible by my placement in the world. Furthermore, the temporal perspectives of my now and then, earlier and later, soon or not so soon, hinge upon my placement in time. In addition, then, to the co-ordinates of mathematics and natural science there are the coordinates of immediate personal experience, and it is these personal coordinates, which are of fundamental importance to common-sense reality.” Schutz maintains that ‘the place which my body occupies within the world, my actual Here, is the starting point from which I take my bearing in space. It is the centre of my system of coordinates. The primary grounding of being in the world is in subjective space and time. “Although the individual defines his world from his own perspective, he is nevertheless a social being, rooted in an intersubjective reality ... The philosophical problem of intersubjectivity is the clue to social reality.” (Ibid., p. xxx)

Following the reasoning of Schutz, every Child enters, ‘by the mere fact of being born into a world of directly experienced reality’, a face-to-face We-relationship with a small group of consociates: parents and siblings and other family members, peers and particular grown-up persons. It takes these fellow beings and their existence for granted (just as it takes its own existence is taken for granted). All its lived experiences of other persons have their origin in these primordial We-relationships. From it is derived the validity of all later direct experiences of particular fellow beings. The Child’s relationship to these consociates is an awareness of their sheer *presence*. But step by step it steps out of this basic relationship to persons in the immediate social *Umwelt*, and begins to examine it, assuming a reflective attitude towards its consociates, ‘such that each of them becomes coloured by the specific knowledge following with the specific manner in which he / she is regarded’.

To the direct experience of a growing number of consociates are added indirect experiences of human beings the Child knows co-exist with it, although they are not known personally; he / she learns that there is a larger world of contemporaries, not experienced directly. The subjective meaning-context is abandoned as a tool of interpretation; it is replaced by a complex and systematically interrelated meaning context. A concatenated system of social types is developed: ‘The Child gets types for partners.’ The contemporary alter egos are anonymous in the sense that their existence is only the individuation of a type, though ‘this personal type is less anonymous the closer it is to the world of directly experienced social reality’. The formation of social types is not limited to the Child’s world of contemporaries. To the Child’s growing stock of knowledge are added apprehensions of predecessors,

known only to the extent that someone tells the Child about them, or it is at some age able to read about them, or becomes familiar with them through records and monuments or other signs. The world of predecessors is experienced as a world of exclusively ‘other people’, living in an environment radically different from that of the Child. Perhaps he / she forms some ideas about its successors. In a most general sense growing up is to acquire knowledge about a particular social *Umwelt*, a *Mitwelt*, a *Vorwelt* and a *Folgewelt*. Although knowledge of the social world is directly experienced only in fragments, an increasingly comprehensive grasp of it develops as the Child grows. A certain ‘life-landscape’ is being mapped out by the Child from the points of view of its particular position in time and space.

Growing up in these respects means the establishing and developing (and breaking up) of social relationships with other people; it implies experience of friendship and enmity, love and hate, individual commitments to other persons, participation in goal-oriented groups and communities, social projects and movements. In a general sense it is the experiencing of other people, reflecting upon them, identifying oneself with them or distancing oneself from them in a more or less reflective attitude; it is to develop a sense of social identity and belonging, but possibly also some kind of distinction, difference, unlikeness, and social disparity. It is to discover motives behind other people’s acts (and perhaps to some extent motives behind one’s own acts), to assess and interpret emerging diverging situations on the social scene of action.

An important aspect of the acquired social knowledge is also the ability to cope with signs and symbols. It is to know that every sign has its author and that every author has its own thoughts and subjective experiences expressed through signs. The ‘capacity to cope with signs and symbols’ is to be understood in the general sense of appresentations, such that it also refers to the Child’s language competence, his / her ability to engage in spoken discourse, to read and write, to construe meaning and to make sense of perceived action and acts of other human beings, as well as of non-verbal signs and artefacts. It includes knowledge of art-objects: To be familiar with books and other forms of written text, as well as pictures and other visual media, all related to the capacity to make use of various kinds of communication instruments and gadgets. It relates to the Child as a communicator—his / her position in a communicative network.

Fig. 8:1 See attachment. Child and ‘social universe of meaning’: Social Types (T)—Signs (s) and Symbols (S).

As illustrated in Fig. 8:1 any Child is posited in a social universe of meaning: a social *Umwelt* of consociates within actual physical reach, an environment of contemporaries within potential physical reach, and a realty sphere beyond actual and potential reach populated by predecessors and successors. Contemporaries and predecessors are known as social types. Symbols provide access to finite provinces of meaning, such as those of science, and religion, but also the Child’s *Vorwelt* and *Folgewelt* (however these are imagined); they are means by which the Child posits itself in relation to Nature and Society. Growing up is growing *into* a common sense social world allowing for typifications, transcendencies, and appresentations.

As formed by the Child—in ‘acts of typification’—Schutz’s social types seem to fulfil the function of type (or *eidos*) in *mimesis* and formative imagination: the Child’s taking on of the image (*eidos*) of another, making it an image (*eidos*) of himself / herself. The Child selectively adopts various social types offered by consociates, but also contemporaries and predecessor (as these are represented or ‘appresented’).

The social knowledge, acquired by the Child in the process of growing up, can be supposed to increase with its enhanced spatial reach, and developed capacity to cope with signs and symbols. Spatial reach is in this context to be understood in terms of bodily ‘locomotion’ (to talk with Aristotle), to walk around in the home, to explore the neighbourhood, to move to increasingly distant places, to travel (and eventually to move out of home). But it also relates to the Child’s language competence and capability to handle technical means for communication over spatial distances. Reading and writing (with or without access to a computer) is a means to bridge geographical distance, and so is also TV-watching and the use of the cell-phone. The aspect of spatiality in relation to the Child and the process of growing up requires further considerations, and it will be dealt with in a following chapter. But, first let’s consider growing up and time—and time and freedom.

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9. Time—Freedom

9.1 Introduction

Growing up, the coming of age—understood as actualization of potentialities, ‘to become what you are’, as acquisition of various kinds of knowledge, capabilities and skills (not the least language skills), as habituation and formative imagination, as realization of Self and attempts to cope with the question ‘who am I’, as learning about the social world, its ideal types, signs and symbols—implies *time*. We notice that at an early age concerning our own lives; and other people help us do so. We experience it as a fact when watching any human being as he / she grows up. So, when contemplating this process of growing up, is not time its most obvious interpretant? So it seems, although time cannot be considered apart from space, and temporality not apart from spatiality.

What then is time—*Quid enim est tempus?*—as Saint Augustine once asked in his *Confessions* (“... in our conversations, no word is more familiarly used or more easily recognized than ‘time’ ... I know well enough what it is, provided nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.”)¹⁶⁶ This chapter presents some answers to Augustine’s question, pertinent to a search for ‘theoretical interpretants’ of growing up. It starts by accounting for the observations once made by Aristotle in *Physics*. It then consults Augustine—who nonetheless arrived at some conclusions. While the former deals with ‘the time of the world’, the latter considers ‘the time of the soul’¹⁶⁷—or ‘inner time consciousness’, to talk with E. Husserl. Present, past and future—or rather ‘the present of the present’, ‘the past of the present’ and ‘the future of the present’ in the parlance of Augustine—are different modes of the life-world. By way of temporality, as dealt with by M. Merleau-Ponty and M. Heidegger, the chapter finally attempts to account for J.-P. Sartre’s treatment of temporality and freedom in *Being and Nothingness*—freedom belongs to the future, it is to choose yourself to become what you are not as yet.

¹⁶⁶ *Confessions*, Book XI, Chapter 14, in Augustine 1990.

¹⁶⁷ See Ricoeur 1988, p. 12-22 (“The Time of the Soul and the Time of the World: The Dispute between Augustine and Aristotle”).

9.2 The Time of the World: Aristotle

Does time exist? And if it does, what is its nature? The questions are raised by Aristotle in *Physics*.¹⁶⁸ He provides answers by way of a series of propositions and arguments, and also takes a stand on what is actually time: Time, he says, is the number of change, motion, movement –*kinesis*–in respect of before and after.¹⁶⁹

How does he arrive at his conclusion? Let's try to follow his reasoning:

As to what time is and what its nature is, this is ... left unclear by the recorded opinions [of earlier thinkers] ... Some say it is the change of the universe, some the [celestial] sphere itself ... Since time is above all thought to be change, and a kind of alteration, this is what must be examined. [Physics 218]

Now the alteration and change of anything is only in the thing that is altering, or wherever the thing that is being changed and altering may chance to be; but time is equally everywhere and with everything. [Physics 218]

Again, alteration may be faster or slower, but not time; what is slow and what is fast is defined by time, fast being that which change much in a short [time], slow that which changes little in a long [time]. But time is not defined by time ... It is manifest ... that time is not change. [Physics 218]

And yet time is not apart from alteration, either, he says. “When we ourselves do not alter in our mind or do not notice that we alter, then it does not seem to us that any time has passed ...” Time and change are perceived together: “even if it is dark and we are not

¹⁶⁸ The following account for Aristotle's understanding of time is based on *Aristotle's Physics, Books III & IV*, translated with introduction and notes by E. Hussey, Oxford, New York, etc., Oxford University Press, 1983. (Aristotle 1983)

¹⁶⁹ According to Hussey, Aristotle's distinction between change (*kinesis*) and alteration (*metabole*) is not very important in the relevant parts of *Physics*, where he sometimes uses these terms interchangeably. Alteration is the more inclusive term, which includes coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be as well as change. (Hussey in Aristotle 1983, p. 55.) Whenever some time seems to have passed, some change seems to have occurred too. “So ... time is either change or some aspect of change; and since it is not change, it must be some *aspect* of change.” [219]

acted upon through the body, but there is some change in the soul, it immediately seems to us that some time has passed together with the change.”

Hence time is not change, but an aspect of change.

Change, Aristotle defines as *the actuality of what is potentially*, ‘not *qua* itself, but *qua* changeable’. As he says: “That which is buildable is in actuality ... it is being built, and this is the process of building; as similarly with learning and healing and rolling and jumping and maturing and growing old.”¹⁷⁰. The actuality of what admits of qualitative change (‘*qua* admitting of qualitative change’) is *qualitative change*; of what admits of increase and decrease is *increase and decrease*; of what admits of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, is *coming-to-be* and *ceasing-to-be*, and what admits of locomotion is *locomotion*. [201] These are the kinds of change Aristotle has in mind considering time.

There is no change apart from actual things, Aristotle contends, for whatever alters always do so in respect of substance, or of quantity, or of qualification, or of place, and there is, as he asserts, “nothing to be found as a common item superior to these, which is either a ‘this’ nor a quantity nor a qualification nor of the other occupants of categories; and so there is no change either of anything apart from the things mentioned, because nothing *is*, apart from the things mentioned.” [200-1] In other words: “That which produces change will always carry some form, either ‘this’ or ‘of such kind’ or ‘so much’, which will be the principle of, and responsible for, the change, when it produces change—e.g. what is actually a human being makes, out of that which is potentially a human being, a human being.” [202]

Further, he says, it is manifest that the change that is, *is* in that which is changeable. (‘For it is the actuality of this, brought about by that which is productive of change.’) [202] Hence, as notes Hussey: “Aristotle identifies the agent’s action on the patient [what produces change] with the change on the patient. The grounds of the identification are, roughly, that the action must be taking place ‘in’ the patient (the changing thing is ‘where the action is’) and the only thing that *is* manifestly occurring in the patient is the change.”¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ On potentiality and actuality, see Chapter 2.2.

¹⁷¹ Hussey in Introduction to Aristotle 1983, p. xvii.

Considering time and change, Aristotle also introduces 'magnitude' *–megethos* (a notion used to cover physical quantities, particularly size, physical bodies or their boundaries or powers or abstract quantities).

While time 'follows' change, change 'follows' magnitude, he contends. [219]

Since what changes changes from something to something, and since every magnitude is continuous, and since change follows magnitude, change is continuous too. [219]

Since the before and the after is in magnitude, it must also be in change.

In time, too, the before and after is present, because the one always follows the other of them. The before and after in change is, in respect of what makes it what it is, change; but its being is different and is not change. [219]

Time we become acquainted with when we mark off change, marking it off by the before and after, and we say that time has passed when we get a perception of the before and after in change. [219]

As that by which we count is different from that which is counted, time is that which is counted and not that by which we count. [219]

So time is not change but the way in which change has a number.

Conclusion: Time is a number of change in respect of the before and after. And, as being the number of what is continuous, it is it-self continuous.

Into this reasoning he introduces the 'now':

Time is the number of the motion, and the now is, as the moving thing is, like a unit of number. [219]

Time is both continuous, by virtue of the now, and divided at the now—this too follows the motion and the moving thing. For the change and the motion too are one by virtue of the moving thing. [220]

- The now is always different, because the moving thing changes. [220]

It is the same time everywhere, but the before and after is not the same; time is not the number by which we count but the number which is counted, and this number turns out to be always different before and after, because the ‘nows’ are different.¹⁷² [220]

The now is a link of time, for it links together past and future time, and it is a limit of time, since it is a beginning of one and an end of another. So too the now is on the one hand a division of time, in potentiality, on the other hand the limit and union of both times; the division and the unification are the same thing. [221]

Not only do we measure change by time, but time by change also. They are defined by one another: The time defines the change, being its number, and the change defines the time. We measure the change by the time and the time by the change. “It is reasonable that this should turn out so, because change follows magnitude, and time follows change, in being a quantity and continuous and divisible: for it is because the magnitude is of this kind that the change has these properties and because change is that time does.” [220]

To be in time is either to be *when time is*, or to be in it in *the way in which we say that some things are ‘in number’*. [221] Objects are in time as they are in number. They are surrounded by time just as the things in number are so by number and the things in place by place. [221]

Moreover, they are acted upon in some respect by time, just as we are in the habit of saying ‘time wears things away’ and ‘everything grows old through time’. For time, in itself, is responsible for ceasing-to-be rather than for coming-to-be.¹⁷³ [221]

¹⁷² “The number of a hundred horses and that of a hundred men is one and the same, but the things of which it is the number are different—the horses are different from the men.” [220]

¹⁷³ “So it is manifest that the things that always are, considered as such, are not in time, for they are not surrounded by time, nor is their being measured by time ... they are not acted upon at all by time either ...” [221]

Since time is the measure of change, it will be the measure of *rest* also. “For all rest is in time ... since ... in the number of change there can also be that which is at rest ... Time will measure what is changing and what is at rest, the one *qua* changing and the other *qua* at rest.” [221]

All things of which time measures the being must have their *being in being at rest or changing*. “Now all things that admit of ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be, and generally, that at some time are and at some time are not, must be in time—there will be some greater time which will exceed both their being and that [time] which measures their being.” [221]

While changes are various and in different places, time is everywhere and the same. Because the number, too, of things equal and together is one and the same everywhere. [223]

How is time related to the soul, and for what reason is it that time is thought to be in everything—on earth and in the sea and in the heavens? Would there be time if there were no soul? No, Aristotle says: “If there is nothing that has it in its nature to count except the soul, and the soul [the part of which is] intellect, then it is impossible that there should be time if there is no soul.” [222]

Since there is locomotion, and, as a kind of locomotion circular motion, and since each thing is counted by some one thing of the same kind (units by units, horses by a horse) and therefore time too by some definite time, and since ... time is measured by change and change by time ... then uniform circular motion is most of all a measure, because the number of this is most easily known. (There is no uniform qualitative change or uniform increase in size or uniform coming-to-be, but there is uniform locomotion.) [Physics 223]

Finally he addresses the question: Why is time thought to be the motion of the celestial sphere? Answer: Time is thought to be the motion of the celestial sphere, because other changes are measured by this one, and time is measured by this change. “And for this reason too, what is commonly said turns out to be true: people says that human affairs are a cycle, and so is what happens to the other things that have a natural motion and come to be and cease to be.” [223]

As remarks Ricoeur: “Behind Aristotle stands an entire cosmological tradition, according to which time surrounds us, envelops us, and dominates us, without the soul having the power to produce it.” (Ricoeur 1988, p. 12) The time which Aristotle expounds is ‘the time of the world’: The time in which we are born, grow up, grow older, and from which we disappear, the time and world of our being and becoming, and being no more. It is the time of the clock, and the calendar. And as such it is also social time, time which we measure and reckon with in our daily pursuits. And, not the least, what is to be reckoned with considering a person’s coming of age.

If, considering growing up and the time of the world, growing up is to be in motion, movement or change—*kinesis*—from birth through childhood towards adulthood, ‘becoming what you are’, by actualizing one’s potentialities, in-born, as well as acquired (as maintained in Chapter 2), then it implies, following Aristotle, not only ‘substance’—*eidos*, but also time: Number of change in terms of before and after.

Growing up is being (in change, motion, movement) *when time is*, as well as *being* (in change) *in the way in which something is ‘in number’*. It is, following Aristotle, to be ‘surrounded by time, just as the things in number are so by number and the things in place by place’.

Growing up is to be *acted upon by time* as everyone grows old(er) through time. In this respect time is responsible for ‘coming-to-be’, but also ‘ceasing-to-be’, to be a child no more.

Fig. 9:1. See attachment. Growing up and ‘the time of the world’ according to Aristotle.

As illustrated in Fig. 9:1 growing up is coming of age with respect to movements of the celestial sphere. As such it implies ‘number of change—*kinesis*—in terms of before and after’.

9.3 The Time of the Soul—Inner Time Consciousness: Augustine—Husserl

As Augustine says: I know that if nothing passed, there would be no past time; if nothing were going to happen, there would be no future time; and if nothing *were*, there would be no present time. Of these three divisions of time, then, how can two, the past and the future, *be*, when the past no longer is and the future is not yet? “As for the present, if it were always present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be time but eternity.” (Saint Augustine 1990, Ch. 14)

The aporia is haunted through a series of apparent paradoxes:

“... we speak of a ‘long time’ and a ‘short time’ ... when we mean the past or the future ... But how can anything which does not exist be either long or short? For the past is no more and the future is not yet.” (Confessions XI, Ch. 15)

“If the future and the past do exist, I want to know where they are. I may not be capable of such knowledge, but I know that wherever they are, they are not there as future or past, but as present. For if ... they are future, they do not exist; if [they are] past they no longer exist. So wherever they are and whatever they are, it is only by being present that they are.” (Confessions XI, Ch. 18).

“... it is only possible to see something which exists; and whatever exists is not future but present. So when we speak of foreseeing the future, we do not see things which are not yet in being [that is things which are future] but it may be that we see their causes or signs, which are already in being ... they are not future but present to the eye of the beholder, and by means of them the mind can form a concept of things which are still future and thus be able to predict them” (Confessions XI, Ch. 18)

“Suppose that I am watching the break of day. I predict that the sun is about to rise. What I see is present, but what I foretell is future. I do not mean that the sun is future, for it already exists, but that its rise is future, because it has not yet happened. But I could not foretell the sunrise unless I had a picture of it in my mind, just as I have at this moment when I am speaking of it Both the dawn and my mental picture are seen in the present, and it is from

them that I am able to predict the sunrise, which is future. The future ... is not yet; it is not at all ... But it can be foretold from things which are present, because they exist now and can therefore be seen." (Confessions XI, Ch. 18)

There seems to be no ready answer to the question 'what is time', a way out of the problem. Nonetheless, in Chapter 20 Augustine arrives at something of a conclusion: Although it is abundantly clear that neither the future nor the past exist, it might still be correct to say that there are three times, a present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future things. "Some such different times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see. The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of future things is expectation. If we may speak in these terms, I can see three times and I admit that they exist ... Incorrect though it is, let us comply with this usage." (Ch. 20)

Hence, the (provisional) conclusion of Augustine is that there are in fact three times: a present of the present, a present of the past and a present of the future. The present of present things is the time of things we at any moment can perceive: see, hear, smell or feel the touch of, for short our sensuous world, the accompanying *Umwelt*. The present of past things is the time of things we (at any 'present of the present') can remember, events and situations which we are able to recollect and talk about. As Augustine says:

"My own childhood, which no longer exists, is in past time, which also no longer exists. But when I remember those days and describe them, it is in the present that I picture them to myself, because their picture is still present in my memory." (Confessions XI, Ch. 18)

The present of future things is the time of things we at any present expect, foresee, envisage, or anticipate and, of course, also are planning for and talk about:

"Whether some similar process enables the future to be seen ... I do not know. But at least I know that we generally think about what we are going to do before we do it, and this preliminary thought is in the present, whereas the action which we pre-mediate does not yet exist because it is future. Once we have set to work and started to put our plans into action, that action exists, but it is now not future but present." (Confessions XI, Ch. 18)

This means, following Augustine, that time can also be conceived of in spatial terms: The present is the space we at any moment occupy with our bodies, which is within our perceptual reach, which contains things we can manipulate, change with the help of tools and instruments, where we at any moment encounter physical objects—artefacts and elements of pure nature—but also other human beings, our embodied fellow beings. It is where we are. The past is a space we can remember but never re-enter. The future is a space we are venturing into, which we may have ideas about and are planning for but actually do not know as to its bearings.

Time imposes a ‘divide’, between the world (in the mode) of our direct perceptions and that (in the mode) of our recollections, as well as between the world of our perceptions and that of our anticipations, a boundary line between ‘where we are’ and ‘where we have been’, ‘between where we are’ and ‘where we will be’. As pointed out by Ricoeur, Augustine’s understanding of time foreshadows Husserl’s treatment of ‘inner time consciousness’ (Ricoeur 1984, p. 16) And his inquiry seems compatible with his idea of the spatio-temporality of lifeworld, our world of being and becoming, significance and meaning.

As Husserl contends, time is in our consciousness as human agents. It is related to (and can be conceived of with reference to) what we perceive, expect, recollect.¹⁷⁴ Our focus on the world of perception gives us, as far as the world is concerned, only the temporal mode of the present; but this mode itself points to its horizons, the temporal modes of past and future. Recollection—the act of recalling in mind—exercises the function of forming the past, a present which has passed. In expectation, or ‘anticipatory recollection’, understood as an intentional modification of perception, is found the meaning-formation of the future, a ‘present-to-come’. (See Chapter 3.3) The spatio-temporality of the world—‘a world in which each thing has its bodily extension and duration, and, again in respect of these, its position in universal time and in space’—belongs to its ontic meaning as life-world.

The present, constituted through perception, is, as Husserl says, a ‘flowing-static’ present. As such it provides for a horizon with two differently structured sides (described by Husserl

¹⁷⁴ The following passages on Husserl’s treatment of time is based on E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Husserl 1970), supplemented by his 1904-5 Göttingen lectures, E. Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (Husserl 1964).

as a continuum of ‘retentions’ and ‘protentions’). In other words, in this presence (which is not, like memory in the usual sense of ‘recollection’, a phenomenon which openly plays part in any object-or world-apperception) lies a continuity of what I am still conscious of, what has flowed away and is no longer intuited at all—a continuity of ‘retentions’, and, in the other direction, a continuity of ‘protentions’. (Husserl 1970, p. 160 & 168) Every ‘past now’ retentionally harbours in itself all earlier levels. In fact, every temporal appearance can be regarded as such a flux:

“A bird just now flies through the sunlit garden. In the phase which I have just seized, I find the retentional consciousness of the past shadings of the duration likewise in every fresh now. But the time-train (Zeitschwanz) is itself something which sinks back in time and has its own shadings. The entire content of every now sinks into the past; this sinking, however is no process which is reproduced ad infinitum. The bird changes its place; it flies. In every situation, the echo of earlier appearances clings to it (i.e. to its appearance). Every phase of this echo, however, fades while the bird flies farther on. Thus a series of ‘reverberations’ pertains to every successive phase, and we do not have a simple series of successive phases ... but a series with every individual successive phase.” (Husserl 1964, p. 149)

In this context Husserl talks about ‘temporal Objects, objects which not only are unities in time but also include temporal extension in themselves.’ (Husserl, 1964, p. 43) Such objects spread their content over an *interval of time*; they can be constituted only in acts, which likewise constitute temporal distinctions. (Ibid., p. 61). Temporal objects, which in this way are conceived of as sequences of events, are not only perceived, they can also be recollected and anticipated (remembered and expected); as such they are all experienced in the sense of lived-through (*erlebt*); due to their retentions and protentions, their character of ‘running-off phenomena’ (*Ablaufspenomäne*), they all have a certain breadth and duration. They are ‘objective’ when as perceived they belong to the objective enviroing world, but they are, of course, also always, and at the same time, ‘subjective’; they can never be the same for every human being. Though, as they all require ‘presentification’, they are all in a sense parts of some present: a ‘present of the present’, a ‘present of the past’, or a ‘present of the future’.

Hence growing up involves time because time is in every human being; it follows with our perceptions, recollections and expectations. There is for any human being, a past, a present

and a future. The past can be likened to a space, or terrain, surpassed and experienced (in the sense of being ‘lived through’, or *erlebt*). It represents what he / she has learnt, experienced, or gathered in the course of life so far. Here are knowledge, habits, skills, but also memories, events and situations that can be recollected, recorded and accounted for as ‘personal history’. The future is what the individual is at any instant moving into, with more or less foresight. Conceived of as a horizon of expectation—a line of perception, imagination, interest and prevision, a mark of ‘beyond’—it provides a stage for hopes and fears, projects and desires; it is what we at any moment are venturing into. While the past is closed, the future is open. You do not know what will actually happen there, even if you have certain ‘expectations’. This seems to hold for the Child as any other human being. Between the expectations directed toward the future and the interpretations oriented towards the past a complex interplay of significations that takes place. Expectation relative to the future is so to speak inscribed in the present. It is the future-become-present turned to the not-yet.

We always find ourselves in a *situation*, and it is from this point of view that every perspective opens on a vast, but limited horizon; the horizon presents itself as something to be surpassed, without being fully reached. (Ricoeur 1988, p. 220) If time is to be used as an interpretant of the process of growing up, one must also ‘make room’ for this situation, that of the *present*, a present which not reduced to a momentous now, or cutting edge between on the one hand side what these persons can remember or recollect, and on the other what they expect. It must be possible to relate what has been said to a present where ‘the complex interplay of significations *between* our expectations directed toward the future and our interpretations oriented toward the past takes place’.

As Husserl says, our focus on the world of perception (what we can see, hear, feel the touch of, etc.) gives us, the temporal mode of the present; but this mode itself points to its horizons, the modes of past and future. Recollection (i.e. the act of recalling in mind, or remember) exercises the function of forming the past, a present passed. Likewise, in expectation, or ‘anticipatory recollection’, understood as an intentional modification of perception, is found the meaning-formation of the future, a ‘present-to-come’. (Husserl 1970, p. 168-9)
Conclusion: The child as situated occupies a present that extends into a re-collectable past, as well as into an unknown (but in some way imagined) future.

In this way one has to contend that any person's experience relate to three notions of time, all involving what Husserl and his followers call 'horizons': There is 'a present of the present', a 'past of the present' and a 'future of the present'. The first is the time which the individual 'lives through' (*erlebt*) at any now, a *here*. This 'now', constituted through perception, is (following Husserl) a 'flowing-static' present; it has a horizon with two structured sides, 'known in intentional language as a continuum of retentions and protentions'. (Husserl 1970, p. 168, see also Husserl 1964, *passim*) The second is the time of a past re-actualized as a present (i.e. the personally accumulated knowledge drawn upon in any 'now'); this time refers to a *there*, occupied by the individual once but no more. The third is the time of any present expectations, a '*where which is to come*': What is there waiting for me in this 'where', beyond this here and now, this horizon I am on the move towards?

As Ricoeur remarks, by adopting such a tripartite division of time—into a 'present of the present', a 'present of the past' and 'a present of the future', expectation becomes an analogue to memory. It consists of an image that already exists, in the sense that it precedes the event that does not yet exist. However, this image is not an impression left by things past but a 'sign' and a 'cause' of future things which are, in this way, anticipated, foreseen, foretold, predicted, proclaimed beforehand (Ricoeur 1984, p. 11)

9.4 Temporality and the Living Body: M. Merleau-Ponty

"We say that time passes or flows by. We speak of the course of time," Merleau-Ponty writes in *Phenomenology of Perception*.¹⁷⁵ "The water that I see rolling by was made ready a few days ago in the mountains, with the melting of the glacier; it is now in front of me and makes its way towards the sea into which it will finally discharge itself. If time is similar to a river, it flows from the past towards the present and the future. The present is the consequence of the past and the future of the present." But this often repeated metaphor is extremely confused, Merleau-Ponty maintains. For the melting of snow and what results from this are not successive events. Or rather, the very notion of event has no place in the objective world. Because when saying that yesterday the glacier produced the water, which passes at this very moment, one tacitly assumes the existence of a *witness* tied to a certain

¹⁷⁵ Merleau-Ponty 1962, here referred to as Ph. P..

spot in the world. One compares the successive views of this witness: He / she was there when the snow melted and followed the water down. 'Events' are cut out by an observer from the spatio-temporal totality of the objective world. Though if I consider the world, there is only one indivisible and changeless being in it. Change presupposes a certain position which I take up, and from which I see before me things in procession. There are no events without someone to whom they happen and whose finite perspective provides the basis of their individuality. Time presupposes a view of time. Therefore, it is not like a river, not a flowing substance. (Ph. P., p. 411)

"It is not the past that pushes the present, nor the present that pushes the future, into being; the future is not prepared behind the observer, it is a brooding presence moving to meet him, like a storm on the horizon." (Ph. P., p. 411)

The future lies in the landscape awaiting us at the estuary, and the course of time is not the stream itself; it is the landscape as it rolls by for the moving observer. Time is, thus, not a real process, not an actual succession that I record. It arises from our relations to things; what is past or future for me is present in the world. And that is the why Saint Augustine, in his attempts to constitute time, required, besides the present of the present, a presence of the past and a presence of the future. "Past and future exist only too unmistakably in the world, they exist in the present, and what being itself lacks in order to be of the temporal order, it the not-being of elsewhere, formerly and tomorrow ... " Instances of 'now', not being present to anybody, have no temporal character and could not occur in sequence. "The definition of time which is implicit in the comparison undertaken by commonsense, and which might be formulated as 'a succession of instances of *now*' has not even the disadvantage of treating past and future as presents; it is inconsistent, since it destroys the very notion of 'now' and that of succession." (Ph. P., p. 412)

"This table bears traces of my past life, for I have carved my initials on it and spilt ink on it. But these traces in themselves do not refer to the past; they are present." (Ph. P., p. 413)

"The problem is how to make time explicit as it comes into being and makes itself evident, time at all times underlying the notion of time, not as an object of our knowledge, but as a dimension of our being." (Ph. P., p. 415)

"I do not think of the evening to come and its consequences, and yet it 'is there', like the back of a house of which I can see only the façade ... Our future is not made up exclusively of guesswork and daydreams." (Ph. P., p. 416)

"Hence time, in our primordial experience of it, is not for us a system of objective positions, through which we pass, but a mobile setting which moves away from us, like the landscape seen through a railway carriage window." (Ph. P. p. 419-20)

We would rather liken time to a fountain: the water changes while the fountain remains because its form is preserved; each successive wave takes over the functions of its predecessors. Hence the justification for the metaphor of the river lies not in that the river flows, but in that it is one with itself. (Ph. P., p. 421)

There is a temporal style of the world, and time remains the same because the past is a former future, the future a present and even a past to come; because, that is, each dimension of time is treated or aimed at *as* something other than itself and because there is at the core of time a gaze, or, as Heidegger puts it, an *Augen-blick*, someone through whom the word *as* can have a meaning." (Ph. P., p. 422)

The 'synthesis' of time is a transition-synthesis, the action of a life which unfolds, and there is no way of bringing it about other than by living that life. There is no seat of time. Time bears itself on and launches itself afresh. "What does not pass in time is the passing of time itself. Time restarts itself: the rhythmic cycle and constant form of yesterday, today and tomorrow may well create the illusion that we possess it immediately, in its eternity, as the fountain creates in us a feeling of eternity." We cannot get as far as conceiving a cycle without drawing a distinction, in terms of time, between the point of arrival and the point of departure. The fountain retains its identity only because of the continuous pressure of water. "Time exists for me only because I am situated in it, that is, because I become aware of myself as already committed to it, ... " (Ph. P., p. 423)

So, I am not the creator of time any more than of my heart-beats. "I am not the initiator of the process of temporalization. I did not choose to come into the world, yet once I am born, time flows through me, whatever I do ... time without its roots in a present and thence a past would no longer be time, but eternity. " (Ph. P., p. 427)

The analysis of time discloses subject and object as two abstract ‘moments’ of a unique structure which is *presence*. It is through time that being is conceived, because it is through the relations of time-subject and time-object that we are able to understand those obtaining between subject and world.” (Ph. P., p. 430-1)

How it is that a being, which is still to come and has passed by, also has a present, that the future, the past and the future are linked together in the movement of temporalization? Answer: It is through the experience of my *body* and through the experience of my presence in the world through my body. It is due to the fact that the existence my body is indispensable to that of my consciousness: The ‘lived through body’ incorporates the past and projects constructively the future.¹⁷⁶ (Ph. P., p 431)

So the Child is not the creator of time any more that it is of its own heart-beats. It did not choose to come to the world, yet once born, time flows through him / her, whatever he / she does. Time has its root in the Child’s body, a unique structure of presence, which incorporates the past and projects constructively the future. But is it not such that the future is a prerequisite for any past to be incorporated in the present? That the Child, driven by curiosity, ventures into the future, and thereby creating its own past which is to be actualized in the present: ‘I can do’, ‘I did’, ‘I have done’? ¹⁷⁷ If so, by way of any of its future doings (or ‘moves into the future’) the Child instantly creates its own past, a past which unavoidably conditions its ever-changing present.

¹⁷⁶ “It is as much of my essence to have a body as it is the future’s to be the future of a certain present.” (And, let’s add, as it is the essence of the past to be the past of a certain present.)

¹⁷⁷ According to A. Koyré, this was the opinion of Hegel in his Jena-lectures: “Ce n’est pas ‘du passé’ que nous vient le temps, ... C’est au contraire, de l’avenir qu’il vient à soi dans le maintenant. La ‘dimension’ prévalente du temps et l’avenir qui est, en quelque sorte, antérieur au passé.” Of this Hegelian ‘now’ (le maintenant) it is also said that it is “un instant dirigé. Mais ce n’est pas vers le passé qu’il est dirigé. C’est au contraire, vers l’avenir, C’est bien cet avenir qui, tout d’abord, se présente à nous ‘à-venir’, qui rejette vers le ‘n’est plus’ ce qui était pour nous ‘maintenant’.” A. Koyré, “Hegel à Iéna”, in *Études d’histoire de la pensée philosophique*, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1961, p. 162. (Koyré 1961)

9.5 M. Heidegger on Time and Temporality

What then is time and how does it exist? M. Heidegger repeats the questions of Saint Augustine and Aristotle, and he makes them a central concern in his dealings with ‘Dasein’s existence in the world’.¹⁷⁸ Is time only subjective, is it only objective, or is it neither the one nor the other? An unending dialectic can be developed without saying the least about the matter, just as long as it is not settled how the Dasein’s being itself is, he contends. (BP, p. 255)

Given that Dasein—this human being, being there, here and now, or there and then—exists, i.e. *is* in a world, everything that he / she encounters is necessarily intraworldly, ‘contained by this world’. And in this respect, for Heidegger, the *phenomenon of time* (‘taken in a more original sense’) is, as he says, *interconnected with the concept of the world and thus with the structure of Dasein itself*. (BP, p. 255)

Time, Heidegger says with reference to Aristotle, is the before and after insofar as something is counted. Though as counted it is not present, ‘standing there’ so to speak, in itself, because time does not exist without soul. But, if time in this respect becomes dependent on the counting of numbers, it does not follow that it is only something mental in the soul. Time is everywhere—on the earth, in the ocean, in the heaven. Though because it is everywhere—and therefore nowhere—still it is only in the soul. (BP, p. 255)

What Aristotle presents as time corresponds to the common prescientific understanding of time, an understanding which manifests itself explicitly and primarily in the use of *clocks*. (BP, p. 257) We encounter time as we count in following a movement. What is comprehended as time is the time that reveals itself in counting, as a succession of ‘nows’. What does it mean to read time from a clock? In using a clock we do not perceive the clock, but only look at it, and we do so solely in order to allow ourselves to be brought by it to something that the clock itself is not, but that it *shows as a clock*—time. (BP, p. 257)

¹⁷⁸ The following account is based on M. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Heidegger 1988), here referred to as BP. For the same topics in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962), see Part II, Chapter 6.

According to Heidegger, this 'common time', points back to an 'original time', to time in the sense of temporality: In noting the time, I am trying to determine what time it is, how much time there is till nine o'clock, so as to finish what occupies me for the time being. "The time I am trying to determine is always 'time to', time in order to do this or that, the time I need, that I can permit myself in order to accomplish my doings and makings. Looking at the clock roots *in* and springs *out* of 'taking time'." (BP, p. 258) Time reading in clock usage is founded in taking time into account, *reckoning with time*, making allowance for it. This reckoning in the form of measuring time arises as a modification from the primary comportment towards time as *guiding oneself according to it*. We invent clocks in order to shape this reckoning more economically with reference to time; the position of the clock's hand only determines the how much time there is for this or that. (BP, p. 258)

When without reflecting we look at a clock in everyday behaviour, we are not directed toward the now as such but toward that *wherefore* and *whereto* there is still time now; we are directed toward what occupies us, what presses hard upon us, what it is time for, what we want to have time for. (BP, p. 259) Therefore, saying 'now' has a different character from saying 'this window'. It is not speaking about something as a thing standing there. It is a declaration about something. The *Dasein*, which always exists so that it takes time for itself, *expresses itself*. Taking time for itself, it utters itself in such a way that it is *always saying time*. When I say 'now' I do not mean the now as such. I am *in motion* in the understanding of this now and, in a strict sense, "I am really with that whereto the time is and wherefore I determine the time". (BP, p. 259)

We do not only say 'now' but also 'then' and 'before'. "We move in a silent discourse: now, not until, in former times, finally, at the time, before that, and so forth" (BP, p. 259) When I say 'then' this means that I am expecting a particular thing which will come or happen on its own, or I *am expecting* something I myself intend to do.

When I say 'at that time' I am able to say it only if I *retain* something bygone. "It is not necessarily that I should explicitly recollect it but only that I should somehow retain it as

something bygone. The at-the-time is the self-expression of *retention* of something former”¹⁷⁹ (BP, p. 259-60)

Whenever I say ‘now’ I am comporting myself towards something present, something ‘standing there’, which is my present. This comportment toward something present, this having-there of something present, which expresses itself in the now, means the ‘enpresenting’ (*Gegenwärtigen*) of something. (BP, p. 260)

The three determinations of the *now* and the modifications of the *at-thetime* as ‘no-longer-now’ and the *then* as ‘not-yet-now’, are the exposition of comportments which we characterize as ‘expecting’, ‘retaining’, and ‘enpresenting’. Though inasmuch as each then is a ‘not-yet-now’ and each at-the-time a ‘no-longer-now’, there is implied an enpresenting in every expecting and retaining, Heidegger maintains. If I’m expecting something, I always see it in the present; if I’m retaining something, I retain it of a present. So, all expecting and retaining imply enpresenting. “This shows the inner coherence ... of these comportments in which time expresses itself”. (BP, p. 260) If time in this way ‘utters itself with these determinations’—a now, an at-the-time, a then—and if these determinations express an expecting, a retaining, and an enpresenting, then what is brought is time in ‘a more original sense’, what Heidegger refers to as *temporality*. (BP, p. 260) All the essential moments belonging to the now can be made intelligible in their possibility and necessity by way of this phenomena of temporality. And temporality in its turn provides the horizon for the understanding of being in general. (BP, p. 260)

“How must we define more precisely this enpresenting, expecting, and retaining which expresses themselves in the now, then, and at-that-time?” (BP, p. 261) A brief answer: All time we read from the clock is time to do this or that, *appropriate* or *inappropriate* time. The time we read from the clock is always the time which has as its opposite the wrong time. (BP, p. 261-2) This leads as to the question of world-time, significance and ‘datability’. When we venture into an analysis of the concept of the world we see that in it there is a whole of relations having a certain character, the character of the ‘in-order-to’, ‘for-the-

¹⁷⁹ A specific mode of retention is, according to Heidegger, *forgetting*. This is not nothing; in it is exhibited a very definite type of comportment of the self toward the bygone—a mode in which I close myself off from the bygone.

sake-of', 'for-that-purpose', and 'to-that-end'. Time as right and wrong time gets in this way the character of *significance*, and this is something that holds for the world as world in general. "It is for this reason that we call the time with which we reckon ... *world-time* ... We give time the name of world-time because it has the character of significance". (BP, p. 262)

A second factor along with the significance is its *datability*. Each now is expressed in an enpresenting of something in unity with an expecting and retaining. When I say 'now' I am tacitly adding *Now, when such and such*. When I say 'then' I always mean *then, when*. When I say 'at the time' I mean *at the time when*. To every now there belongs a 'when— now, when such and such'. By use of the term datability Heidegger refers to this relational structure of the now as now-then. Every now dates itself as 'now, when such and such' is occurring, happening, or in existence. Even if I can no longer determine exactly and unequivocally the when of an at-the-time-when, the at-the-time has this relation. It is only because of the relation of the dating that belongs to the at-the-time, now and then, that the date can be indefinite, hazy, or uncertain. The date itself does not need to be calendrical in the narrower sense. The calendar date is only one particular mode of everyday dating. The dating can be calendrically indeterminate but it is nevertheless determined by a particular historical happening or some other event. (BP, p. 262) The 'now when', 'at that time when', and 'then when' are related to an entity that gives a date to what is datable. (BP, p. 263)

One commonly thinks of 'nows' as freefloating, relationless, and "intrinsically patched on one another and intrinsically successive". In contrast to this, Heidegger says, we see that every 'now', every 'at-thattime', and every 'then' is datable by its very structure; it is always already related to something, and in its expression it is more or less definitely dated from something; by the now we mean 'now', when this or that exists or is happening. We learn this from the structure of temporality itself. (BP, p. 263)

In the expectant expression of the 'then', there is, as Heidegger says, a *spannedness* of time; any 'till then' is always to be understood from the standpoint of a 'now'. In each then, the understanding of a 'now-till-then' is tacitly involved. This *stretch* from now till then is articulated by means of the then itself. When we say 'then' as starting from a 'now', we always mean a 'definite until then'. What we usually call duration, the *during*, or the *enduring* time, lies in this meanwhile: this 'while this of that is happening'. This meanwhile

can be more exactly determined and divided by a particular ‘from then to certain thens’, which articulates the meanwhile. What becomes accessible in the articulated meanwhile of enduring is what is meant by the ‘from now till then’. Time stretches out. Any meanwhile and during implies a ‘span of time’. (BP, p. 263)

Time is intrinsically spanned and stretched. Every now, then, and at-the-time has not only a *date* but is *spanned and stretched within itself*. No now and no time-moment can be punctualized. Every time-moment is spanned intrinsically; but the span’s breadth is variable. It varies, among other things, with what in each case gives a date to the ‘now’.¹⁸⁰ (BP, p. 264)

But significance, datability and spannedness do not comprise the full structure of the now, at-the-time, and then. There is also a *publicness* of time. By this notion Heidegger refers to “the final character of time in the sense of calculated and expressed time”. Saying ‘now’ we mean ‘now, when this thing or event is happening’. When we express the dated and spanned now in our being with one another each one of us understands the others. When any one of us says ‘now’, we all understand this now, “even though each of us perhaps dates this now by starting from a different thing or event”: now in the morning, in the evening, now when it’s late, now when I am 14 years old, now when I live here instead of there. To understand the expressed now as a now we do not all have to agree in our dating of it. The expressed now is intelligible to everyone in our being with one another. Although each one of us utters his / her own now, it is nevertheless the now for everyone. The now is accessible to everyone and thus belongs to no one. Due to this character of time a peculiar objectivity is assigned to it. “The now belongs neither to me nor to anyone else, but is somehow there. There is time, time is given, it is extant, without our being able to say how and where it is.” (BP, p. 264)

¹⁸⁰ “The time which is made public by our measuring it, does not by any means turn into space because we date it in terms of spatial measurement-relations.” What is essential in *measuring time* lies in the fact that dated ‘time’ is determined numerically in terms of *spatial* stretches and in changes in the *location* of some spatial Thing. What is ontologically decisive lies rather in the specific kind of making-present which makes measurement possible. Dating in terms of what is ‘spatially’ present-at-hand is so far from spatializing of time that this supposed spatialization signifies nothing else than that an entity which is present at hand for everyone in every ‘now’ is made present in its own presence.”(BT, p. 470 / 418)

The time with which we reckon is datable, it is spanned, public, and it has the character of significance, that belongs to the world itself. But how are these structure themselves possible? (BP, p. 264) Heidegger's answer lies in what he calls the phenomenon of 'coming-toward-oneself'. Even if what we are expecting may be some event, some occurrence, still our own Dasein is always conjointly expected in the expecting of the occurrence itself. The Dasein understands itself by way of its own most peculiar capacity to be as Heidegger says *ahead of itself*. "Expecting a possibility, I come from this possibility toward that which I myself am." The Dasein, expecting its ability to be, *comes towards itself*. In this coming-toward-itself the Dasein is *futural* in an original sense. It is in this coming-toward-oneself one finds the *primary concept of the future*. (BP, p. 265)

As retaining (or forgetting) something, the Dasein always comports itself somehow towards what it itself already *has been*. It is only "in such a way that it has in each instance already been the being that it is." (BP, p. 265) In comporting ourselves toward an entity as bygone, one retains it in a certain way—or one forgets it. In retaining and forgetting, the Dasein is itself retained. He / she concomitantly retains his / her own self in *what he / she already has been*. The Dasein is precisely what it *was*. That which is as having been has not gone by, passed away, in the sense in which we say that one can shuffle off a garment. The Dasein can as little get rid of its past as it can escape death. "(E)verything we have been is an essential determination of our existence." (BP, p. 265) Forgetting, repressing, suppressing are modes in which "I myself am my own having-been-ness". (BP, p. 265-6) In other words: Dasein always comes-toward-itself from out of a possibility of itself; it always *comesback-to* what it has been. Having-been-ness, the past in the existential sense, belongs with equal originality to the future. In one with the future and the present, it is the past as having-been-ness that makes existence possible. (BP, p. 266)

The present in the existential sense is not the same as presence as 'standing there' (of any physical object). In existing, the Dasein is always dwelling with extant things, beings that are at hand. It has such things in its present. Only in enpresenting is the Dasein futural and past. As expecting a possibility Dasein always comports itself 'enpresentingly' towards something at hand, and keeps this entity as something present in its own present. As human beings we are most frequently lost in this present. (BP, p. 266) The original unity of the future, past, and present is, Heidegger maintains, the phenomenon of original time, of *temporality*. Temporality temporalizes itself in the ever current unity of future, past, and

present. “Expecting the future, retaining the past, and enpresenting the present—all these express themselves by means of the now, the then, and the at-the-time.” (BP, p. 266)

As future, the Dasein is *carried away to* its capacity-to-be; as past, it is *carried away to* its having-been-ness; and as enpresenting, it is *carried away to* some other being or beings. As temporality refers to this original outside-itself, or as Heidegger says, the ecstatic character of time, he talks about the future, past, and present as the three ‘ecstasies of temporality’.¹⁸¹ (BP, p. 267) To ecstasis in this sense belongs a peculiar openness. That toward which each ecstasis is intrinsically open in a specific way, Heidegger calls the *horizon of the ecstasis*. “The horizon is the open expanse toward which remotion as such is outside itself. *The carrying-off opens up this horizon and keeps it open*. As ecstatic unity of future, past and present, temporality has a horizon determined by the ecstases.” ‘Horizontal’ means “characterized by a horizon given with the ecstasis itself.” (BP, p. 267) Intentionality (i.e. being directed toward something and as intending being connected with something intended) has its possibility only in temporality temporality’s horizontal character. “The Dasein is intentional only because it is determined essentially by temporality. The Dasein’s essential determination by which it intrinsically transcends is likewise connected with the ecstatic-horizontal character.” (BP, p. 268)

Hence, according to Heidegger: Every now is by its nature a now-when, it is related to some being by reference to which it has its date. This character of being a now-when-this-or that is possible because the now is ecstatically open as a time-determination, having its source in the temporality. The now belongs to a particular ecstasis, the present in the sense of the enpresenting *of* something. In the enpresenting of a being the enpresenting is related to something each now, is ‘now, when this or that’. The enpresenting of a being lets that being be encountered in such a way that when the enpresenting says ‘now’, this now must have the present-character ‘now, when this or that’. Every at-the-time is an ‘at the time-when’ and every then is ‘a then-when’. (BP, p. 269) Every now and every time-determination is *spanned* within itself, has a range that varies and does not first grow by means of a

¹⁸¹ As Heidegger tells us, the common Greek expression *ekstatikon* means ‘stepping outside-self’. It is affiliated with the term ‘existence’. And it is with this ecstatic character that he interprets existence as a “unity of being-outside-self that comes toward-self, comes-back-to-self, and enpresents”. In its ecstatic character, temporality is the condition of the constitution of the Dasein’s being. (BP, p. 267)

summation of individual 'nows' as dimensional points. The now does not acquire a breadth and range by my collecting together a number of 'nows', but just the reverse: Each 'not already' has this spannedness within itself. "Even if I were to reduce the now to a millionth of a second it would still have a breadth ... the now and every time-determination has a spannedness intrinsically ... the now is nothing but the 'expression', the 'speaking out' of original temporality in its ecstatic character" Since every expecting has the character of coming toward-self and every retaining the character of back-to, temporality *qua* ecstatic is stretched out within it self. (BP, p. 270) The now and every other expressed time-determination is publicly accessible in the Dasein's being-with-one-another; in the communal being-in-the world, there is already present the unity of temporality itself as open for itself.

Heidegger offers an existential-ontological interpretation of Aristotle's definition of 'time': Time is that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later, that *expressed* time which we use, have spent, read from the sky or from the clock in our ordinary absorption in the world and which we interpret as an infinite sequence of 'nows', each related to its 'thens' and 'at-the-times'.¹⁸²

The essence of the future lies in *coming-toward-oneself*; that of the past lies in *going-back-to*; and that of the present in *staying with, dwelling with*, i.e. being-with. These characters of the *toward, back-to, and with* reveal the basic constitution of temporality. (BP, p. 267)

It is because of its character of significance, that we called the time of everyday time-understanding *world-time*. (BP, p. 270) Expressed time has *in itself the character of world*. If the Dasein's temporality expresses itself in the now, then expressed time is always something with which the Dasein is occupied. Time is always time as the right time or the wrong time. (BP, p. 271) Temporality is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being; being is to be understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time. (BP, p. 274)

¹⁸² Or, as Heidegger says in *Being and Time*: "This time is that which is counted and which shows itself when one follows the traveling pointer, counting and making present in such a way that this making-present temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity with the retaining and awaiting which are horizontally open according to the 'earlier' and 'later'." (BT, p. 473 / 420-1)

How is growing up related to time and temporality (as understood by Heidegger)? Answer: Growing up is learning reckoning with time, making allowance for it, comporting oneself according to it, expressing oneself as always ‘saying time’ (to do this or that), learning the significance, ‘datability’, ‘spannedness’ and ‘publicness’ of time—that which is measured by following a movement, ‘the before and after insofar as something is counted’; it is learning to read the clock, knowing one’s date of birth, learning to say ‘now in the morning, in the evening, now when it’s late, now when I am 14, now when I live here instead of there’. But growing up (the coming of age) is also the experiencing of the Child of its own future, present and past. Due to the ‘ecstasies of time’, the Child’s ability of ‘stepping out of itself’, there is—as illustrated in Fig. 9:2—a Child as Future, a Child as Present and a Child as Past. As (a being of the) Future, the Child is ‘ahead of itself’, is *carried away to* its capacity-to-be; as (a being of the) Past, it is *carried away to* its havingbeen-ness; as (a being of the) Present, it is *carried away to* some other beings (engaged in this or that pursuit). It is ‘coming toward’, ‘going back to’ and ‘staying with’. The Child ‘comes-toward-itself’ from out of its capabilities (to that it can be or to that it can do); it comes back to itself as what is has been. It is present as dwelling with things and other human beings. It relates itself to that which is counted in the movement which he / she encounters within the horizon of the earlier and later, to “Then, when”, “Now, then” and “At that time when” (then, when I have finished school, now, when I live with my parents, at that time when I was 6, I did not understand ‘That’, ‘How’, ‘Why’).

Fig. 9:2. See attachment. Horizons of ecstasies of time (following Heidegger): The Child as Past, Present and Future.

The Child as Past, the Child as Present and the Child as Future will reappear in the following account of Sartre’s philosophy of time and freedom.

9.6 Time and Freedom: J.-P. Sartre

As demonstrated by J.-P. Sartre, time, or rather temporality, is a possible departure for considering human freedom: “The only possible method by which to study temporality is to approach it as a totality which dominates its secondary structures and which confers upon

them their meaning,” Sartre contends in *L'être et le néant (Being and Nothingness)*.¹⁸³ What he intends is a preliminary clarification of the often obscure meaning of the three dimensions of time, past, present and future, by means of a phenomenological description, which enables us to attain an intuition of temporality as a whole: “to see each dimension appear upon the foundation of temporal totality without ever forgetting the *Unselbständigkeit* of that dimension.” (Op. cit., p. 107) One of these dimensions—a key one indeed—is freedom, the capability of ‘the for-itself’ (i.e. a conscious human being)¹⁸⁴ ‘to chose itself, to be what it is not (yet)’. Let’s start this attempted account of Sartre’s reasoning with his treatment of time: Past, Present and Future.

My Past is first of all *mine*. It exists as the function of certain being, which is bound to a certain present and to a certain future, to both of which it belongs. My past never appears isolated in its ‘pastness’; “it would be absurd even to imagine that it can *exist* as such. It is originally the past of this present. It is as such that it must be first elucidated.” (Ibid., p. 110) If my past of yesterday does not exist in the form of ‘transcendence’, behind my present of today, there is no hope of reconnecting the past with the present. (Ibid., p. 111) “There is not first a universal past which would later be particularized in concrete pasts. On the contrary, it is *particular pasts*, which we discover first. The true problem ... will be to find out by what process these individual pasts can be united so as to form *the past*.” (Ibid., p. 112)

One cannot ‘have’ a past as one ‘has’ an automobile or a racing stable. (Ibid., p. 112) In fact, one can only ‘be one’s past’: “There is a past only for a present which cannot exist without being its past—back there, behind itself.” The term ‘was’ indicates a leap from the present to the past, and it represents an original synthesis of these two temporal modes, the past and the present. “I see first that the term ‘was’ is a mode of being. In this sense I am my past. I do not have it; I am it.” (Ibid., p. 114) If I were not, my past would not exist any longer either for me or for anybody. “I am the one by whom my past arrives in this world

¹⁸³ Sartre, J.-P. 1937, *L'être et le néant: Essay d'ontologie phémoménologique*. What is here to be said on Sartre’s treatment of time and freedom will be based on the English translation by H.E. Barnes (Sartre 1958).

¹⁸⁴ Sartre makes a basic distinction between things which exist ‘in-themselves’ and human beings who exist ‘for-themselves’. What distinguishes a ‘being-in-itself’ (*un être en-soi*) from a ‘being-for-itself’ (*un être pour-soi*) is consciousness.

... It is not because I 'represent' my past that it exists. But it is because I am my past that it enters into the world ...” (Ibid., p. 115)

Though, Sartre continues, on the other hand I am *not* my past. I *am* not it because I *was* it. I can make no pronouncement on myself, which has not already become false at the moment when I pronounce it. That means I have become *something else*. (Ibid., p. 116) If I cannot re-enter into the past, it is not because some magical power puts it beyond reach but simply because it is a 'thing in-itself', whereas I am a 'being for-myself, a *conscious* human being.¹⁹ The past is what I am without being able to live it. It is memory which presents to us the being which we were.²⁰ (Ibid., p. 119) “(E)verything which can be a For-itself must be it back there behind itself, out of reach. It is in this sense that we can accept the statement of Hegel. '*Wesen is was gewesen ist*'. My essence is in the past; the past is the law of its being. The study of the Past refers us to that of the Present. (Ibid., p. 120)

In contrast to the Past which is something in-itself, the Present is for-itself, “what exists in the present is distinguished from all other existence by the characteristic of *presence*. ... *Present* is opposed to *absent* as well as to *past*.” (Ibid., p. 120-1) Presence to (this thing of that) is an internal relation between the being being present, and the being to which this being is present. Presence to (this or that) indicates existence outside oneself near to (this or that). Anything that can be 'present to' must be such in its being that there is in it a relation of being with other beings. A being which is 'present to' can not rest 'in-itself'. The For-itself 'makes itself presence to being' by ceasing to be for-itself. Actually, according to Sartre, the For-itself is defined 'as presence to being'. (Ibid., p. 121)

“But the present is not only the For-itself's non-being making itself present. As For-itself it has its being outside of it, before and behind. Behind it *was* its past; and before, it *will be* its future. It is a flight outside of co-present being and from the being it was toward the being which it will be. A present is not what it is (past) and it is what it is not (future). Here then we have referred to the Future.” (Ibid., p. 123)

The in-itself, can neither be future nor contain a part of the future. “The full moon is future only when I regard this crescent moon as 'in the world' and as revealed to human reality. In itself this quarter of the moon is what it is. Nothing in it is potentiality. It is actuality. If the future is pre-outlined on the horizon of the world, this can be only by a being which is

its own future; that is, which is to-come for itself, whose being is constituted by a coming-to-itself of its own being ... Only a being which has to be its being instead of simply being it can have a future.” (Ibid., p. 124) ¹⁸⁵

“This position which I quickly assume on the tennis court has meaning only through the movement which I shall make immediately afterward with my racket in order to return the ball over the net ... It is the future motion which, without even being thematically posited, hover in the background of the positions I adopt, so as to clarify them, to link them, and to modify them. At one throw, I am there on the court and returning the ball, I exist first as a lack of myself, and the intermediary positions which I adopt are only ways of uniting myself with that future state so as to merge with it; each position has meaning only through that future state. There is in my consciousness no moment which is not similarly defined by an internal relation to a future ... the meaning of my conscious states is always at a distance, down there, outside.” (Sartre 1958, p. 125)

We must not understand by the future a ‘now’ which is not yet, Sartre emphasizes. Doing so would be falling back into the in-itself; even worse we should have to envisage time as a given and static container. *The future is what I have to be in so far as I cannot be it.* (Ibid., p. 125) “The Future is revealed to the For-itself as that which the For-itself is not-yet, inasmuch as the For-itself constitutes itself non-thetically for itself as a not yet ... only a being which is its own revealed to itself—that is, whose being is in question for itself—can have a Future.” Such a being can be for itself only in the perspective of a ‘nothingness’ (*néant*)—as a being whose complement of being is at a distance from itself. “At a distance means beyond being. Thus everything which the For-itself is beyond being is the Future.” (Ibid., p. 126)

The future is not solely the presence of the For-itself of a being situated beyond being. It is something awaiting myself, the For-itself which I am. This means: “I project myself toward

¹⁸⁵ 20 “For that shame which I experienced yesterday was part of the for-itself when I experienced it. We believe then that it has remained for-itself today; we wrongly conclude that if I cannot re-enter it, this is because it no longer exists ... if I cannot enter the past, it is because the past *is*. ... Now that I *was* it, I can say: it was shame. It has become what it was—behind me. It has the permanence and the constancy of the in-itself; it is at its date for eternity. “ (Ibid., p. 119)

the Future in order to merge there with that which I lack; that is, with that which if synthetically added to my Present would make me what I am. Thus what the For-itself has to be as presence to being beyond being is its own possibility.” (Ibid., p. 127-8)

“... my final position on the tennis court has determined on the ground of the future all my intermediary positions and finally it has been reunited with an ultimate position identical with what it was in the future as the meaning of my movements.” (Sartre 1958, p. 128)

My Future is simply my possibility of presence to being beyond being. In this sense the Future is strictly opposed to the Past. The Past is, to be sure, the being which I am outside of myself, but it is the being which I am without the possibility of not being it. The being of the Future which I have to be is such that I can only be it; for my *freedom* gnaws at its being from below. “The Future is what I would be if I were not free and what I can be only because I am free. It appears on the horizon to announce to me what I am from the standpoint of what I shall be. ... I am my Future in the constant perspective of the possibility of not being it ...the Foritself is free, and its Freedom is to itself its own limit. To be free is to be condemned to be free. Thus the Future *qua* Future does not have to be. It is not *in itself*, and neither is it in the mode of being of the For-itself since it is the *meaning* of the For-itself. The future is not, it is *possibilized*.” (Ibid., p. 128-9)

If time, or temporality, is separation, it is a separation of a special type—a division which reunites. It is due to this fact that ‘there is a world’, connected changes and permanence in time. (Sartre 1958, p. 131)

“ *Temporality is the being of the For-itself in so far as the For-itself has to be its being ecstatically.* ” (Sartre 1958, p. 136)

“*The Future is already ... it is a ‘now’ which is not yet revealed.*” (Sartre 1958, p. 165)

“*The Present ... is apprehended in its real quality of being-there ... it is a ‘now’ which the instant brings and carries away like a costume ready made; it is a card which comes out of the game and returns to it. The passage of the ‘now’ from the future to the present and from the present to the past does not cause it to undergo any modification since in any case, future or not, it is already past.*” (Sartre 1958, p. 165)

For Sartre it is only this structure of temporality that confers on freedom its very meaning: to choose oneself, to be what one is not yet. He bases his discussion on freedom on acting and acts: "The careless smoker who has through negligence caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted. On the other hand the worker who is charged with dynamiting a quarry and who obeys the given order has acted when he has produced the expected explosion; he knew what he was doing or, if you prefer, he intentionally realized a conscious project." (Ibid., p. 433) To act is to contemplate a lack, a projection of the for-itself toward what is not: a *négativité*: "we establish that the action necessarily implies as its condition the recognition of a 'desideratum'; that is, of an objective lack or again of a *négativité*. (Ibid., p. 433)

Considering action, Sartre makes a distinction between *le motif* and *le mobile*. The word *mobile* refers to 'an inner subjective fact or attitude', the ensemble of the desires, emotions, and passions, which urge me to accomplish a certain end; it is a *motive*. For *motif* there is no true English equivalent. It stands, as Sartre says, for 'an objective apprehension of a situation which in the light of a certain end may serve as a *means* for attaining that end'.¹⁸⁶ It is the state of contemporary things as it is revealed to consciousness. This state of affairs can be revealed only to a for-itself since in general the for-itself is the being by which 'there is' a world; it can be revealed only to a for-itself which chooses itself in this or that particular way. The for-itself must of necessity have projected itself in this or that way in order to discover the instrumental implications of instrumental things. (Sartre 1958, p. 435, 448 and 'Key to special terminology'.) "No factual state whatever it maybe ... is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever. For an act is a projection of the for-itself toward what is not, and what *is* can in no way determine by itself what is not. ... No factual state can determine consciousness to apprehend it as a *négativité* or as a lack." (Ibid., p. 435-6)

Every action has for its express condition not only a state of affairs as 'lacking (a *négativité*), but also the constitution of the state of things under consideration into an isolated system; every action must be intentional; each action must have an end, and every end in turn is referred to some *means* ('an objective apprehension of a situation which in the light of a certain end may serve as a means for attaining that end'. Such is the unity of the three

¹⁸⁶ In the English translation here referred to '*le motif*' is rendered as 'cause'.

temporal *ekstases*. But the end, or temporalization of my future, implies also *motives* (desires, emotions, and passions which urge me to accomplish a certain act); it points toward my past, and the present is the upsurge of the act. To speak of an act without some means “is to speak of an act which would lack the intentional structure of every act ...” (Ibid., p. 436-7) Means and motives have meaning only inside a projected ensemble which is an ensemble of nonexistents. “And this ensemble is ultimately myself as transcendence; it is Me in so far as I have to be myself outside of myself.” (Ibid., p. 437) The motive, the act, and the end are all constituted in a single upsurge ... its upsurge as ‘the pure temporalizing nihilation’ of the in-itself is one with freedom. It is the act which decides its ends and its motives, and the act is the expression of freedom. (Ibid., p. 438)

I indeed learn my freedom through my acts, but I am also an existent whose individual and unique existence temporalizes itself as freedom. Thus my freedom is perpetually in question in my being; it is not a quality added or a property of my nature. It is very exactly the stuff of my being; and as in my being, my being is in question, I must necessarily possess a certain comprehension of freedom. It is this comprehension which we intend at present to make explicit.” (Ibid., p. 439) I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the means and the motives of my act. As Sartre says, *I am condemned to be free*. No limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself, that is, we are not free to cease to be free. To the extent that the for-itself wishes to hide its own nothingness—*le néant*, that what is not, that what is not yet — from itself and to incorporate the in-itself as its true mode of being, it is trying also to hide its freedom from itself. (Ibid., p. 439-40) “... freedom in its foundation coincides with the nothingness which is at the heart of man. Human-reality is free because it is *not enough*. It is free because it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be.” The being which is what it is, cannot be free. Freedom is precisely the nothingness, *le néant*, that which is not, and “which *is made-to-be* at the heart of man and which forces human-reality to make itself instead of *to be*.” To be is to *choose oneself*. (Ibid., p. 440) Since freedom is identical with my existence, “it is the foundation of ends which I shall attempt to attain either by the will or by passionate efforts ... Freedom is nothing but the existence of our will or of our passions in so far as this existence is the nihilation of facticity; that is, the existence of a being which is its being in the mode of having to be it.” (Ibid., p. 444)

The world gives counsel only if one questions it, and one can question it only for a well-determined end. Therefore the means, far from determining the action, appears only in and through the project of an action; the consciousness which carves out those means in the ensemble of the world has already its own structure; it has been given its own ends to itself, “it has projected itself toward its ‘possibles’, and it has its own manner of hanging on to its possibilities.” (Ibid., p. 448) Hence: “We are dealing here with a particular case of being-in-the-world: just as it is the upsurge of the for-itself which causes there to be a world, so here it is the very being of the for-itself ... which causes there to be a certain objective structure of the world, one which deserves the name of *motif* in the light of this end.” (Ibid., p. 449)

Means, motive, and end are, as Sartre says, “the three indissoluble terms of the thrust of a free and living consciousness which projects itself toward its possibilities and makes itself defined by these possibilities.” (Ibid., p. 449)

“As soon as a consciousness is made-past, it is what I have to be in the form of the ‘was’. Consequently when I turn back toward my consciousness of yesterday ... it is fixed; it is outside like a thing, since the past is in-itself. The motive ... can appear to me in the form of ‘empirical knowledge’ ... I can turn back to it so as to make it explicit and formulate it while guiding myself by the knowledge which it is for me in the present. In this case it is an object of my consciousness; it is this very consciousness of *which I am conscious*. It appears therefore— like my memories in general—simultaneously as mine and as transcendent.” (Ibid., p. 449)

Consciousness at whatever moment it is grasped is apprehended as engaged, and this very apprehension implies a practical knowing of the motives of the engagement; our past is lost in the midst of the world; it can act only if it is *recovered*; in itself it is without force. I have willed this or that: here is what remains irremediable and which even constitutes my essence, since my essence is what I have been. Past motives, past means, present motives and means, future ends, are all organized in a indissoluble unity by the very upsurge of freedom which is beyond any means, motives and ends. (Ibid., p. 450)

Sartre shows, he contends, that freedom is actually one with the being of the For-itself; human reality is free to the exact extent that it has to be its own nothingness (its not being, or not being yet) in multiple dimensions, by temporalizing itself—by being always at a

distance from itself, which means that it can never let itself be determined by its past to perform this or that particular act; by rising up as consciousness for something and (of) itself—by being presence to itself and not simply self, which implies that nothing exists in consciousness which is not consciousness of existing and that consequently nothing external to consciousness can motivate it; and finally, “by being transcendence ... a being which is originally a project, i.e. which is defined by its end.” (p. 453)

“... it is not true that I proceed by degrees from that table to the room where I am and then going out pass from there to the hall, to the stairway, to the street in order finally to conceive as the result of a passage to the limit, the world as the sum of all existents. Quite the contrary, I can not perceive any instrumental thing whatsoever unless it is in terms of the absolute existence of all existents, for my first being is being-in-the-world.” (Sartre 1958, p. 460)

“... in so far as ‘there are’ things, there is in things a perpetual appeal toward the integration which makes us apprehend things by descending from the total integration which is immediately realized down to this particular structure which is interpreted only in relation to this totality.” (Sartre 1958, p. 461)

“I choose myself as a whole in the world which is a whole. Just as I come from the world to a particular ‘this’, so I come from myself as a detotalized totality to the outline of one of my particular possibilities since I can apprehend a particular ‘this’ on the ground of the world only on the occasion of a particular project of myself ... I can project myself beyond the ‘this’ toward this or that possibility only on the ground of my ultimate and total possibility. Thus my ultimate and total possibility, as the original integration of all my particular possible, and the world as the totality which comes to existents by my upsurge into being are two strictly correlative notions. I can perceive the hammer (i.e. outline a plan of ‘hammering’ with it) only on the ground of the world; but conversely I can outline this act of ‘hammering’ only on the ground of the totality of myself and in terms of that totality ...” (Sartre 1958, p. 461)

Thus the fundamental act of freedom is discovered, Sartre concludes. This constantly renewed act is not distinct from my being; it is a choice of myself in the world and by the same token it is a discovery of the world. (Ibid., p. 461) “I can assume consciousness of

myself only as a particular man engaged in this or that enterprise, anticipating this or that success, fearing this or that result, and by means of the ensemble of these anticipations, outline his whole figure. ... I am well in advance of this hand all the way to the completion of the book and to the meaning of this book ... in my life. It is within the compass of this project (i.e., within the compass of what I am) that there are inserted certain projects toward more restricted possibilities such as that of presenting this or that idea in this or that way or of ceasing to write for a moment or of paging through a volume in which I am looking for this or that reference.” (Ibid., p. 463)

The world appears to us as we are. It is by surpassing the world toward ourselves that we make it appear as it is. “We choose the world, not in its contexture as in-itself but in its meaning, by choosing ourselves ... by denying that we are the world, we make the world appear as world, and in this internal negation can exist only if it is at the same time a projections toward a possible.” (Ibid., p. 463)

“My clothing (a uniform or a lounge suit, a soft or a starched shirt) whether neglected or cared for, carefully chosen or ordinary, my furniture, the street on which I live, the city in which I reside, the books with which I surround myself, the recreation which I enjoy, everything which is mine ... all this informs me of my choice—that is my being.” (Sartre 1958, p. 463)

To choose ourselves is to nihilate ourselves, to cause a future to come to make known to us what we are by conferring a meaning on our past. Freedom, choice, nihilation, temporalization are all one and the same thing: “... we temporalize a project which we are, and we make known to ourselves by a future the being which we have chosen; thus the pure present belongs to the new temporalization as a beginning, and it receives from the future which has just arisen its nature as a beginning. It is the future alone, in fact, which can turn back on the pure present in order to qualify it as a beginning ... Thus the present of the choice belongs already, as an integral structure, to the newly begun totality.” (Ibid., p. 46-6) The choice can be effected in resignation of uneasiness, as flight, in bad faith. We can chose ourselves as fleeing, as inapprehensible, as indecisive, etc. We can even chose not to chose ourselves. “If we have chosen humiliation as the very stuff of our being, we shall realize ourselves as humiliated, embittered, inferior, etc.” (Ibid., p. 472)

“These extraordinary and marvellous instants when the prior project collapses into the past in the light of a new project which rises on its ruins and which as yet exists only in outline, in which humiliation, anguish, joy, hope are blended, in which we let go in order to grasp and grasp in order to go—these have often appeared to furnish the clearest and most moving image of our freedom.” (Sartre 1958, p. 476)

Objections: “Can I choose to be tall if I am short. To have two arms if I have only one?” There are for sure ‘limitations’ which my factual situation imposes on my choice of myself. “It will be well therefore to examine the other aspect of freedom, its ‘reverse side’: its relation to facticity.” (Ibid., p. 481)

“I am not ‘free’ either to escape the lot of my class, of my nation, or my family, or even to build up my own power or my fortune or to conquer my most insignificant appetites or habits. I am born a worker, a Frenchman, a hereditary syphilitic, or a tubercular.” (Sartre 1958, p. 481)

“Much more than he appears ‘to make himself’, man seems to ‘be made’ by climate and the earth, race and class, language, the history of the collectivity of which he is part ... the great and small events of his life.” (Sartre 1958, p. 482)

One can be a free for-itself only as engaged in a resisting world. Outside such engagement the notions of freedom, of determinism, of necessity lose all meaning: “... ‘to be free’ does not mean ‘to obtain what one has wished’, but rather ‘by oneself to determine oneself to wish (in the broad sense of choosing).” In other words success is not important to freedom. While the empirical and popular concept of ‘freedom’ is equivalent to ‘the ability to obtain the ends which have been chosen’, the concept of freedom Sartre is considering means only ‘the autonomy of choice’. “Choice, being identical with acting, supposes a commencement of realization in order that the choice may be distinguish from the dream and the wish.” (Ibid., p. 483)

Since it does not distinguish between choosing and doing, Sartre’s description of freedom, compels us (as he admits) to abandon the distinction between the intention and the act. And the intention can no more be separated from the *language* which expresses it; “as it happens that our speech informs us of our thought, so our acts will inform us of our intentions—that

is, it will enable us to disengage our intentions, to schematize them, and make objects of them instead of limiting us to living them ...” (Ibid., p. 484) The fact of not being able not to be free is the *facticity* of freedom, and the fact of not being able not to exist is its *contingency*. (Ibid. p. 486)

“We shall use the term *situation* for the contingency of freedom in the *plenum* of being of the world inasmuch as this datum, which is there only in order not to constrain freedom, is revealed to this freedom only as *already illuminated* by the end which freedom chooses. This *datum* never appears to the for-itself as a brute existent in-itself; it is discovered always *as a motif*, since it is revealed only in the light of an end which illuminates it.” Situation and motivation are really one. The for-itself discovers itself as engaged in being, hemmed in by being, threatened by being; it discovers the state of things which surrounds it as the *motif* for a reaction of defence or attack. (Ibid., p. 487) “... there is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through freedom. Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and obstacles which it has not created, but these resistancies and obstacles have meaning only in and through the free choice which human-reality is.” (p. 489)

My place is defined by the spatial order and by the particular nature of the ‘thises’ revealed to me on the ground of the world. It is the spot in which I ‘live’. “It is not possible for me not to have a place; otherwise ... the world would no longer be manifested to me in any way at all ... although this actual place can have been assigned to be by my freedom (I have ‘come’ here), I have been able to occupy it only in connection with that which I occupied previously and by following paths marked out by the objects themselves. The previous place refers me to another, this to another, and so on to the pure contingency of my place; that is, to that place of mine which no longer refers to anything else which is part of my experience: the place which assigned to me by my birth.” To be born is *to take one’s place*, to *receive* it. And as this original place will be that in terms of which I shall occupy new places according to determined rules, my place of birth is a strong restriction of my freedom. (Ibid., p. 489-90)

We all have a past. This past does not determine our acts as a prior phenomenon determine a consequent phenomenon. The past is without force to constitute the present and to sketch out the future. “Nevertheless the fact remains that the freedom which escapes toward the future can not give itself any past it likes according to its fancy ... it can not produce itself

without a past. It has to be its own past, and this past is irremediable. ... the past is that which is out of reach and which haunts us at a distance without our ever being able to turn back to face it in order to consider it. If the past does not determine our actions, at least it is such that we can not take a new decision except *in terms of it*.” (Ibid., p. 496)

“The past is present and melts insensibly into the present; it is the suit of clothes which I selected six months ago, the house which I have built, the book which I began last winter, my wife, the promises I made to her, my children; all which I have to be in the mode of having been. ... I can not conceive of myself without a past; ... I can no longer think anything about myself since I think about what I am and since I am and since I am in the past ... I am the being through whom the past comes to myself and to the world.” (Sartre 1958, p. 496)

Since freedom is choice, it is change. It is defined by the end that it projects, by the future I have to be. “But precisely because the future is the *not-yet-existing-state of what is*, it can be conceived only within a narrow connection with what is. ... The end illuminates what is. But to go looking for the end to come in order by means of it to make known that-which-is, requires being already beyond what-is in a nihilating withdrawal which makes what-is appear clearly in the state of an isolated system.” What-is takes on its meaning only as *surpassed* toward the future. Therefore ‘what-is’ is the past. The past as ‘that which is to be changed’ is indispensable to the choice of the future; no free surpassing can be effected except in terms of the past. In fact, the very *nature* of the past comes to the past from the original choice of the future. And “if the past is that in terms of which I conceive and project a new state of things in the future, then the past itself is that which is left in place, that which consequently is itself outside all perspective of change ... It is possible for me not to exist; but if I exist, I can not lack having a past.” (Ibid., p.497)

“... a Past which was only Past would collapse in an honorary existence in which it would have lost all connection with the present. In order for us to ‘have’ a past, it is necessary that we maintain it in existence by our very project toward the future; we do not receive our past, but the necessity or our contingency implies that we are not able to choose it. This is what it means ‘to have to be one’s own past’.” (Sartre 1958, p. 497)

“... while freedom is the choice of an end in terms of the past, conversely the past is what it is only in relation to the end chosen.” (Sartre 1958, p. 497)

“ ... by projecting myself toward my ends, I preserve the past with me, and by action I decide its meaning.” (Sartre 1958, p. 498)

“Who shall decide whether the period which I spent in prison after a theft was fruitful or deplorable? I—according to whether I give up stealing or become hardened. ... It is I, always I, according to the ends by which I illuminate these past events. ... Thus my past is here passing, urgent, imperious, but its meaning and all the orders which it gives me I choose by the very project of my end.” (Sartre 1958, p. 498)

The only force of the past comes to it from the future. No matter how I live or evaluate my past, I can do so only in the light of a project of myself toward the future. The order of my choices of the future is going to determine an order of my past, and this order will contain nothing of the chronological. “There will be first the always living past which is always confirmed ... a certain picture of myself to which I am faithful.” (Ibid. p. 499) Human reality is condemned to make-itself-past and hence to wait forever for the confirmation, which is expected from the future. “Thus the past is indefinitely in suspense because human-reality ‘was’ and ‘will be’ perpetually expecting.” (Ibid., p. 501) Like place, the past is integrated with the situation when the for-itself by its choice of the future confers on its past facticity a value, an hierarchical order, and an urgency in terms of which this facticity *motivates* the act and conduct of the foritself. (Ibid., p. 504)

“My environment is made up of the instrumental-things which surround me, including their peculiar coefficients of adversity and utility ... in occupying my place, I prepare the ground for the revelation of my environment ... my environment can change or be changed by others without my having any hand in the change ... a single modification of my place involves the total change of my environment while it would be necessary to imagine a total and simultaneous modification of all my environment in order to be able to speak of a modification of my place.” Thus my field of action is perpetually traversed by the appearances and disappearances of objects with which I have nothing to do. The coefficients of adversity and utility of complexes does not depend solely on my place but on the particular potentiality of the instruments. Though “as soon as I exist I am thrown into the midst of ‘existencies’ different from me, for and against me.” (Ibid. p. 504)

“Let my tire be punctuated, and my distance from the next town suddenly changes; now it is a distance to be counted by steps and not by the revolutions of the wheels.” (Sartre 1958, p. 505)

To be free is to-be-free-to-change. Freedom implies in this way the existence of an environment to be changed: obstacles to be cleared, tools to be used. (Ibid., p. 506) “... the very project of freedom in general is a choice which implies the anticipation and acceptance of some kind of resistance somewhere ... freedom’s very project is in general to *do* in a resisting world by means of a victory over the world’s resistances. Every free project in projecting itself anticipates a margin of unpredictability due to the independence of things precisely because this independence is that in terms of which a freedom is constituted.” (Ibid., p. 507)

Every project of freedom is an *open project*. “Although entirely individualized, it contains within it the possibility of its further modifications. Every project implies in its structure the comprehension of the *Selbständigkeit* of the things of the world.” (Ibid., p. 507) My belonging to an inhabited world of fellowmen refers to the fact of the Other’s presence in the world, a fact which cannot be deduced from the ontological structure of the for-itself. He / she exists in fact among the factual characteristics of this ‘facticity’; there is the existence-in-the-world-in-the-presence-of-others. In respect of techniques of appropriating the world, the very *fact* of the Other’s existence results from the fact of the collective ownership of these techniques. Hence facticity is expressed in this respect “by the fact of my appearance in a world which is revealed to me only by collective and already constituted techniques which aim at making me apprehend the world in a form whose meaning has been defined outside of me. These techniques are going to determine my belonging to collectivities: to the *human race*, to the national collectivity, to the professional and to the family group ... the only positive way which I have to exist my factual belonging to these collectivities is the use which I constantly make of the techniques which arise from them.” Belonging to the human race is defined by the use of very elementary and very general techniques: to know how to walk, to know how to take hold, to know how to pass judgment on the surface and the relative size of perceived objects, to know how to speak, to know how in general to distinguish the true from the false, etc. We do not possess these techniques in an abstract and universal form: To know how to speak is not to know how to pronounce and understand words in general; it is to know how to speak a certain language and by means of

it to manifest one's belonging to humanity on the level of a national collectivity. (Ibid., p. 512)

To know how to speak a language is not to have an abstract and pure knowledge of the language as it is defined by academic dictionaries and grammars: it is to make the language one's own across the peculiar changes and emphasis brought by one's province, profession, and family. The reality of our belonging to the human is our nationality; the reality of our nationality is our belonging to the family, to the region, to the profession; the reality of speech is language; the reality of language is dialect, slang, jargon. (Ibid. p. p. 513) "... my factual existence—i.e. my birth and my place—involves my apprehension of the world and myself through certain techniques. Now these techniques which I have not chosen confer on the world its meanings ... I am not only thrown face to face with the brute existent. I am thrown into a worker's world, a French world, a world of Lorraine or the South, which offers me its meaning without my having done anything to disclose them." (p. 514)

Sartre's example of speech is only the example of one social and universal techniques. It is the blow of the axe which reveals the axe, it is the hammering which reveals the hammer. (Ibid., p. 519) Human skill is never anything by itself alone: it exists only *potentially*; it is incarnated and manifested in the *actual* and concrete skill of the actor. "... it is its effort to choose itself as a personal self that the for-itself sustains in existence certain social and abstract characteristics which make it a man (or a woman); and the necessary connections which accompany the essential elements of man appear only in the foundation of a free choice. ... Each for-itself, in fact, is for-itself only by choosing itself beyond nationality and race just as it speaks only by choosing the designation beyond the syntax and morphemes. This beyond is enough to assure its total independence in relation to the structures which it surpasses." (Ibid., p. 520) It is in this world and no other that the freedom of the for-itself comes into play; it is in connection with his / her existence in this world that it puts itself into question. "For to be free is not to chose the historic world in which one arises ... but to chose oneself in the world whatever this may be." (Ibid., p. 521)

The Other's existence brings a factual limit to my freedom. Because of the fact that by means of the upsurge of the Other there appear certain determinations which I am without having chosen them: "Here I am— Jew, or Aryan, handsome or ugly, one-armed, etc. All this I am *for the Other* with no hope of apprehending this meaning which I have *outside* and,

still more important, with no hope of changing it. Speech alone will inform me of what I am; again this will never be except as the object of an empty intention; any intuition of it is forever denied me.” (Ibid., p. 523-4)

“I exist in a situation which has an outside and which due to this very fact has a dimension of alienation which I can in no way remove from the situation any more than I can act directly upon it. This limit to my freedom is ... posited by the Other’s pure and simple existence ... my freedom on this [new] level finds its limits also in the existence of the Other’s freedom.” (Sartre 1958, p. 525)

“I do not choose to be for the Other what I am, but I can try to be for myself what I am for the Other, by choosing myself such as I appear for the Other.” (Sartre 1958, p. 529)

Summarizing: To attain freedom is to become what one is not (as yet), by being *conscious* of what one is not (as yet): knowing with oneself and others what one is not. Freedom implies contemplating, discovering, realizing what one ‘lacks’. Hence, in a growing up perspective, freedom is consciously actualizing one’s own potentialities, innate as well as those acquired. It is to choose oneself as an “I can be” or “I can do”. Freedom is realized by acting—through motives, means and ends. That means through desires, emotions, and passions, *motives* urging me to accomplish certain ends, but also an apprehension of my situation which in the light of certain ends may serve me as *means* in attaining these ends.

Since freedom is choice it is change. (Dare we say ‘motion, movement *kinesis*’?) It is defined by the *ends* that it projects, by the future one has to be.

How does that relate to the Child? Fig 9:3 is meant as a cue. There is the Child as Present, the Child as Past and the Child as Future. The Child as Present *is* presence (‘I am’), a being-for-itself (‘*un être-pour-soi*’), a conscious human being, occupied with things in the world. The Child as Past is a thing in itself (‘*un être-en-soi*’), something the Child can remember, contemplate, talk about (‘I was’). The Child as Future is what he / she *can* be but is not yet (‘*un néant*’), by deliberately actualizing his / her in-born and acquired potentialities, i.e. in acts of choosing (“I am not, but I can be!”)

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10. In-betweenness—Acculturation

10.1 Introduction

As individuals, reminds us the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurô, we are all inescapably immersed in a space-time world together with others. Conceived of in isolation from our social contexts, we do not exist except as abstractions. In fact, our way of being in the world “is an expression of countless people and countless actions performed in a particular ‘climate,’ which together have shaped us as we are.” (Carter 2004, p. 10) A human being can indeed be looked upon as a unified structure of past, present, and future, an intersection of past and future in the present ‘now.’ But there is nonetheless no possibility of the isolation of the human individual, although many write as though there were. They are able to make a case of it, in part because they ignore the spatiality of human beings, focusing on the aspect of temporality. According to Watsuji, it is more difficult to consider a human being as a pure individual, when thought of as a being in space rather than in time. “Spatially, we move in a common field, and that field is cultural in that it is criss-crossed by roads and paths, and even by forms of communication such as messenger services, postal routes, newspapers, flyers, broadcasts over great distances, all in addition to everyday polite conversation.” (Ibid., p. 10). Following Watsuji “we are inescapably born into social relationships, beginning with one’s mother, and one’s caregivers. Our very beginnings are etched by the relational interconnections which keep us alive, educate us, and initiate us into the proper ways of social interaction.” (Ibid., p. 10) This chapter will consider this social ‘in-betweenness’ of human beings by visiting one of Watsuji’s major works, *Rinrigaku*, or *Ethics* (Watsuji 1996). It also highlights some aspects of his understanding of climate, or ‘culture’, developed in *Fûdo* (Watsuji 1961). Finally, with reference to the thinking of Watsuji, an attempt will be made to explicate the meaning of growing up as ‘acculturation’.

10.2 Ningen sonzai

The centre of Watsuji’s ethics, which he conceives of as ‘the science of the person’, lies his analysis of the *ningen*. By way of an etymological analysis he starts by displaying the important complexity of this Japanese word. It is composed of two characters, *nin* (‘person’ or ‘human being’), and *gen* (‘space or ‘between’). It can be translated as ‘human being’, ‘person’ or ‘man’, but it also carries the meaning of ‘betweenness of human beings’.

According to Watsuji the locus of ethical problems lies not in ‘the consciousness of the isolated individual’, but precisely in this ‘in-betweenness (*aidagara*) of person and person’. (Watsuji 1996, p. 10) He tells us that the Japanese word for ethics—*rinri*—consists of *rin* and *ri*. *Rin* signifies ‘fellows’, or a system of relations, which a definite group of persons have with respect to each other; at the same time it signifies individual persons as determined by this system. In ancient China, parent and child, lord and vassal, husband and wife, young and old, friend and friend, and so forth, constituted the ‘grand *rin* of human beings’, the most important kinds of human fellowship. “The relation between parent and child is one of these. Now it is not the case that father and son first of all exist separately, and then come to relate to each other in this way later on. But rather, only through this relationship does the father obtain his qualification as father, and the son his qualification as son ... only by virtue of the fact that they constitute ‘one fellowship’, do they become respectively father and son ... ‘fellowship’ is nothing but a manner of interaction through which people have definite connections with each other.” Hence *rin* signifies fellows in general, and, at the same time, a specific form of practical interconnection among human beings. It is as, as Watsuji says, ‘ways of *ningen*’. (Ibid., p. 10-11)

Ethics is, for Watsuji, the study of *ningen*, the human being who is also a member of a society. As the literal meaning of the Chinese characters of *ningen* indicate, it also signifies the ‘betweenness’ of human beings, that is, the ‘public’: the *ningen* is the public and, at the same time, the individual human beings living within it. It refers not merely to an individual ‘human being’, nor merely to ‘society’. What is recognized here is a dialectical unity of those double characteristics that are inherent in human being. Oneself and others are separate. “Nevertheless, insofar as *ningen* also refers to the public, it is also through and through that community which exists between person and person, thus signifying society as well, and not just isolated human beings. Precisely because of its not being human beings in isolation, it is *ningen*. Oneself and the others are separated from each other but become one in communal existence. Individuals are basically different from society and yet dissolve themselves into society. “*Ningen* denotes the unity of these contradictories. Unless we keep this dialectical structure in mind, we cannot understand the essence of *ningen*.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 14-15)

In connection with the word *ningen* Watsuji frequently uses the word *sonzai* (existence), composed of *son* (‘to preserve, to sustain over time’), and *zai* (‘to stay in place’, and to

persevere in one's relationship'). As he says, *sonzai* is 'self-subsistence in 'in-betweenness', 'interconnection of acts of *ningen*', 'a self which is maintained in the form of body, life, or records'. (Watsuji 1996, p. 21) Hence, as notes Carter: "*Ningen sonzai*, then, refers to human nature as individual yet social, private as well as public, with our coming together in relationship occurring in the betweenness between us, which relationships we preserve and nourish to the fullest." (Carter 2004, p. 13) And the business of ethics as the study of *ningen* is for Watsuji to solve the problems here by appealing to the basic structure of the *sonzai* of *ningen*. (Watsuji 1996, p. 27)

Watsuji illustrates his idea of betweenness with reference to the intentionality of seeing: One's activity of seeing, is a seeing determined by its being seen by the Other. "Oneself and the other act upon each other while being mutually determined by the partner. The various ways of seeing (such as seeing each other, staring, looking angrily at, glimpsing, looking at nervously, seeing while pretending not to see, gazing on in rapture, and so forth) show without exception that the activity of seeing is already determined by the other's seeing. They are not simply one-sided activities but relationships of reciprocal activity ..." (Ibid., p. 33)

Betweenness consists in the fact that Self and Other are divided from each other, and at the same time that what is thus divided becomes unified. In order that they may be divided from each other, they had to be one *originally*; and in order that they may become unified, they must be absolutely *separated* from each other. Hence, betweenness, as the practical interconnection of acts, consists in a connection of division and unity. (Ibid., p. 35)

"Not only gestures, facial expressions, demeanor, and so forth but also language, custom, ways of living, and so on are all expressions of betweenness; and they make up the moments that constitute it." (Watsuji 1996, p. 35)

The practical interconnection of acts, as a practical unity in division, are already expressed in various forms within the realm of practice. In particular, they are given the most detailed expression in *language*, not primarily as theoretical statements, but as moments constituting the interconnection of acts of speech. (Ibid., p. 35)

There is, as says Watsuji, no mine so rich as that of the everyday experience of human beings. "Walking along the street we can find various goods on display shelves ... there are none of these goods that does not give expression to *ningen's sonzai* in one way or another. ... There are also transport facilities such as streetcars and automobiles, informational and advertisement facilities such as radios, posters, newspapers, and so on. Each provides particularly strong expression to the *sonzai* of *ningen*. ... what we call things of daily life all offer passage to *ningen's sonzai*." (Ibid. p. 39) In its everydayness, *ningen's sonzai* constantly manifests itself in the practical connections of life, expressions and understanding. (Ibid., p. 43) The essential feature of *betweenness* lies in the fact that my intentionality is from the outset prescribed by that of my counterpart, and vice versa. (Ibid. p. 51)

"A writer is a writer by virtue of being determined by his readers, and a reader in turn is a reader by virtue of being determined by the writer." (Watsuji 1996, p, 52)

"A school is represented by the existence of a group of buildings and other facilities. But they are not the school itself ... A school consists of human relationships that are given expression to, by, and within these buildings. And the most basic element constituting these human relationships is the relationship between teacher and student. ... it is not we ourselves but the school that sets up specific 'capacities' or roles. To become a student of this school, you are obliged to enrol. I also acquire the status of teacher by accepting a job at this school ... [one's] existence is determined by those human relationships that are collectively called a school." (Watsuji 1996, p. 53-4)

"In your house, you are either a son or an elder or a younger brother ... this status is determined by the body called family ... one gives expression to this different status by assuming a rather specific attitude. One's facial expressions, ways of speaking and expressing concern vary accordingly, depending on whether one encounters one's parents as a son or a younger sister or brother as an elder, or one's elder brother and sister as the younger sibling ... Although the roles of parents, brothers, and sisters are prescribed by the family, the family itself is constituted by parents, brothers, and sisters." (Watsuji 1996, p. 55)

" ... a child is a 'child' in that it possesses the capacity of being a 'child of its parents'."
(Watsuji 1996, p. 56)

One cannot act out one's role as child or brother while living in a private boarding house or in a dormitory. There you are either a resident, occupying a room under contract, or a boarding student subject to the authority of a supervisor, with definite rules in place. "But if you were to enter this house at your pleasure, without this contractual right to do so, then you commit a crime." (Ibid., p. 56)

We always act with a certain capacity and this capacity is prescribed by something whole—the relationship we construct by means of possessing a certain capacity. Simply speaking, we exist in our daily life in the being in betweenness; betweenness is constituted 'among' individual persons; the individual members who composing this betweenness are determined by it as its members. (Ibid., p. 57) Betweenness is in this way a unity of contradictories (Ibid., p. 58)

"Even if one person's hand touches another person's hand, it is contact between two persons who possess specific qualities beyond the purely physiological ... a mere physical body is itself an artificial abstraction." (Watsuji 1996, p. 61)

"A mother and her baby can never be conceived of as merely two independent individuals ... A mother's body and her baby's are somehow connected as though one." (Watsuji 1996, p. 61-2)

"Bodily connections are always visible wherever betweenness prevails, even though the manner of connection may differ." (Watsuji 1996, p. 62)

"... when we stand together, exposed to the scorching heat of sun, we share the heat. When we are exposed to a cold wind, we feel the cold together." (Watsuji 1996, p. 63)

Insofar as betweenness is constituted, one human body is connected with another.

My seeing *You* is already determined by your seeing me, and the activity of my loving *You* is determined by your loving me. Hence my becoming conscious of *You* is inextricably

interconnected with your becoming conscious of me. “This interconnection we have called betweenness is quite distinct from the intentionality of consciousness. Activity inherent in the consciousness of ‘I’ is never determined by this ‘I’ alone but is also determined by others.” (Ibid., p. 69)

We directly perceive phenomena already named by our native language, such as ‘daybreak’, ‘the sun’, ‘fine weather’, ‘rain’, ‘wind’, ‘evening’, ‘night’. In the perception of these phenomena, we are already conscious of the communality of identical contents of consciousness. “In combination with language, common sense, and those scientific theories prevalent in an age, all play a role, providing a number of prism facets that affect the contents of consciousness.” (Ibid., p. 74)

“Human desires are already characterized by specific social forms ... an appetite makes its appearance as a desire for bread, rice, a meat dish, or seafood specifically, all instances peculiar to the cultural location where this appetite arises.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 74)

“Fashion makes its appearance within the modes of clothing, food, and housing already historically and nationally fixed as more detailed common favourites.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 74)

“When an idea comes in vogue, it tends to be regarded as excellent on the ground that it belongs to some majority’s way of thinking ... “ (Watsuji 1996, p. 75)

“ [Even] the fire alarm is a societal expression.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 78)

The agency that thinks within a human being is not ‘he’ or ‘she’ as an individual but the social group. Not the individual but rather the social group is the thinking, feeling, and tasting subject; an individual’s consciousness is a product of the social environment and a reflection of social consciousness. “An individual thinks, feels, and acts only in the way prescribed by a social group. “ (Ibid, p. 86)

No matter how sociologists try to understand a society or a group or how unavailable a definite concept of society may be ... we cannot deny that something social or related to a group operates actively in the realm of practice. “Let me take into account *ka-zoku* (‘a

family’) ... As the word *ka* (which means, in Japanese, ‘a house’) indicates, the notion of family is here expressed in terms of ‘a house’. A house is a definite space, partitioned by a roof and several walls, and divided into a kitchen centering around a cooking range, a sitting room with a table as its center, a bedroom provided with beds ... and so forth. And in each of these distinctive realms, communal cooking, eating, taking one’s rest ... is conducted. Here the ‘whole’ called a *family* makes its appearance. Individual members are also given, within this ‘whole’, their respective roles ... According to ancient Japanese custom, every household must have a Buddhist shrine at which one’s ancestors are worshipped ... Even a living parent must behave as a child before the shrine of a dead parent ... he is ... under the control of his ancestors ... In traditional Japanese society, this kind of force was strong enough to control the members of a family in the name of its ancestors or under the authority of the family name.” (Ibid., p. 87-8)

Individual members exist only because the whole is manifesting itself through its parts. Parents somehow know what they ought not to do as parents, children as children, and brother and sister as brother and sister. “If a parent has sexual relations with his child, then the qualifications required for being a parent, or of the child of being the child of a loving parent, are absent ... If parents stop behaving as parents, children as children, wives as wives, and husbands as husbands, then the family will be dissolved ... Members of a family still preserve their individual existence even after they cease to be its members, but the wholeness of a family loses its existence when a family loses its members.” (Ibid., p. 89)

“The whole is ... nothing more than a force that sets restrictions on these individuals.”
(Watsuji 1996, p. 91)

The person is at once many persons and one person. The total person’s wholeness cannot be found except in the unity of many persons. Each has independence and individuality as the focus of his / her activities, but all are unified, even though independent of each other. “The significance of this wholeness lies in the negation of this independence of individuals.” (Ibid., p. 95) Community consists in different things becoming the same; the whole consists of difference becoming the same. “The wholeness in this whole is the sublation (*aufheben*) of discrimination and the realization of nondiscriminateness.” (Ibid. p. 98) When it is said that the whole arises in the negation of the independence of individuals, there is already a recognition of the independence of individuals who are thus negated and restricted. Hence,

individual persons subsist in their relationship with wholeness. “Likewise, when it is said that the independence of individuals is established through the negation of community, there is already recognized that wholeness thus negated and rebelled against. Hence, the whole must be regarded as subsisting in its relationship with the independence of individuals ... both individuals and the whole subsist not in themselves, but only in the relationship of each with the other.” (Ibid., p. 101)

An individual’s individuality should be negated for the sake of the whole to be established; the whole is that ground against which an individual rebels in establishing itself. The one exists in relation to the other by negating the other and by being negated by it as well. (Ibid, p. 101-2) “What I have described as a human being’s existence as betweenness is that which renders individuals and societies capable of occurring in their reciprocal negations. Therefore, for human beings, we cannot first presuppose individuals and then explain the establishment of social relationships among them. Nor can we presuppose society and there explain the occurrence of individuals. Neither the one nor the other has ‘precedence’.” (Ibid., p. 102)

Fundamentally, association and coercion illustrate contradictory states of affairs. From the subjective standpoint, ‘association’ consists of subjects, which as the many, collectively terminate in the one. On the contrary, ‘coercion’ consists of forcing separated individual subjects to subordinate themselves to the whole. It cannot occur except at a place where a subject stands opposed to the whole as its other. Coercion is the power of bringing separated agents back to oneness. (Ibid., p. 114)

The association between oneself and another is a negation of their separation. “The union of love consists of merely the fact that the self and the other become unified ... in the relationship of *I* and *Thou*, the *Thou*, as the agent who accuses and is angered by the betrayal of *I*, retains the authority to end the betrayal from the outset ... what is at stake here is not the *Thou* itself, but the ‘connection’ that operates through *Thou*.” It is only through the authority of this connection that *Thou* is able to accuse *I*. Where there is an *I / Thou* relationship, there is at work the power that obliges *I* and *Thou* to act in specific ways. (Ibid., p. 115-116) The negative structure of a being is the fundamental law that renders a human being capable of continuously forming itself. Were we to deviate from this law, we would cease to exist. An individual revolts against the fact that nothing exist independently; he /

she becomes an individual by negating this very fact. But an individual returns to the fact 'that everything exists only dependently', through engaging in association of whatever sort'. (Ibid., p. 117) "We can describe the basic principle of ethics in terms of 'the movement in which absolute negativity returns back to itself through negation'." (Ibid., p. 119)

"The original meaning of the word *ningen* is *seken* or *yo no naka*, whose meaning is quite ordinarily understood to connote an extended realm of life interaction. This is clearly shown by such phrases as *seken og wataru* ('to get through the world'), *yo no naka ni de te yu ku* ('to get out into the world'), *hiro yo no naka* ('the large world'). By saying this ... we do not mean that the world is here understood as something similar to physical space. When it is said that something is 'to be made public' or that 'a secret is leaked into the world', the term word refers to a realm on which something becomes public or comes to light." (Ibid., p. 145)

The narrow or large distinction of the world depends on whether we are known or not. The more we become known, the narrower the world becomes. This extendedness signifies the intensity of our being known. The characteristic of the world as 'a scene in which something comes to light' can be described in terms of publicity." (Ibid., p. 146)

In the perspective of society at large, publication and communication are intimately connected with spatial extendedness. In a primitive form of publication, a notice board was set up at important points where traffic converged. What should be conveyed might be shared by as many persons as possible. In this sense, *traffic* is a spatial expression of human intercourse, and traffic patters gave birth to roads on becoming fixed. "Roads stretch out in a spatial manner and are further intersected spatially at certain places." (Ibid., p. 155)

To communicate information to the public means that information is spread spatially. Watsuji notes that this is true in the present world. "The most outstanding characteristic of the progress of the communication media, specifically newspaper and radio, lies in strengthening and extending the capacity to spread information spatially. Written words are rapidly carried to every corner of the country by the railroad. Spoken words are spread spatially even more rapidly by means of radio waves. Thus, for something to be disclosed to the public is nearly equivalent to is being spread spatially. Here we can find an essential difference between 'to be disclosed to individual consciousness' and 'to be disclosed to the public'." (Ibid, p. 155-6) *Thou* is capable of existing outside of and in opposition to me. This sort of spatiality is not the same as space in the world of nature. "It is not a form of intuition,

but rather the manner in which relations such as ‘far and near, wide and narrow’ are mutually transformed into one another. In a word, it is the betweenness of subjective human beings.” (Ibid. p. 156-7)

10.3 Subjective spatiality

With emphasis placed on the contention that the essential characteristic of *ningen*’s *sonzai* is this ‘betweenness between humans’, we have, in fact, already arrived at *subjective spatiality*. All expressions indicating the interconnection of acts of human beings—intercourse, fellowship, transportation, communication—can be understood only with a subjective spatiality of this sort. Spatial extendedness, evident in publication, communication, and so forth is an expression of subjective spatiality. “I regard this subjective spatiality as the essential characteristic of human beings. Without it, the systematic relationships between persons could not be understood.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 157) The public, or society, is a space connected by practical forms or communication or the news. All facilities of spatial connection, the means of transportation or communication, are to be looked upon as significant expressions of human beings. “Without means of transportation or communication, there would be no society. Metaphorically speaking, these constitute the nervous system of society.” (Ibid, p. 160)

“A means of transportation is in essence a ‘road’, where people associate with each other and are united by moving upon it.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 160)

“The intensity of social connections is given expression to by the intensity of railway lines, as well as the frequency of trains. I am sure that this tendency will be strengthened even further through the emerging facilities of communication such as the automobile and the airplane. Air travel is completely emancipated from the institutional form of ‘a road’. In spite of this, however, it most typically expresses the essential significance of a road; that is, ‘a spatial connection’.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 162)

All ‘things’ constitutive of facilities for transportation or communication are things in the same sense that the human body is a thing, and they are also subjective in the same sense that the human body is subjective. The subjective human being is brought into expression in and through facilities of transportation and communication. Here the spatial connections

are expressed in their various forms—forms, which express social connections based on spatial connection. (Ibid., p. 165) “... it is not so much that *ningen*’s *sonzai* is constructed in space as that space comes to be found in the field of subjective *ningen sonzai*. From this viewpoint we can argue that subjective extendedness constitutes basic space.” (Ibid., p. 166)

“Without taking into consideration spatial extendedness, we are unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the personal relationship between the self and other.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 166)

“Society cannot consist of merely those non-spatial ‘meanings’ held in consciousness. Society can arise only between one subject and another in and through practical communication and, hence, through dialogue, communication, and transportation.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 166-7)

“... what is extended is not the subject itself but rather the physical body. The point is that only in that space regarded as a form of intuition is the extendedness of a physical body possible.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 168)

In this context Watsuji refers to Heidegger: As *ningen*’s spatiality consists in the subjective betweenness of human beings, the spatiality that constitutes the structure of existence of a *Dasein*, “must be based fundamentally on that meaning of spatiality presently under consideration. A subjectivity based on a concern with tools is possible only if tools are already established in human relationships.” (Ibid., p. 175)

To inquire into the origin of space, is to comply with *ningen*’s dual existence as individual and social being. Space is not a merely theoretical or contemplative issue; it must be comprehended in connection with the individual subject. Subjective extendedness, inherent in the activities of *ningen*, is the characteristics of spatiality of *ningen sonzai*. From this originates all the kinds of space. “The extendedness is a ‘tension’ within the interconnection of the acts of subjects, which changes its strength and degree of inclusiveness in accordance with the multiplying and unifying of subject ... the spatiality characteristic of *ningen sonzai* is subjective through and through. It cannot be objectified.” (Ibid., p. 177)

Subjective spatiality is inherent in the structure of *ningen sonzai*. The possibility of the objectification of subjects lies in their spatiality.”Only the spatiality of the subject renders possible the opposition between *I* and *Thou* ... only the opposition between *I* and *Thou* can establish ‘an object as *Thou*’” What is at issue here is the primordial element through which things can be found as objects. The natural environment, “consisting of such things as mountains and rivers, grass and trees possesses a ‘*Thou*’ characteristic in its primitive features. This has been ... clarified by research into the consciousness of primitives and children, but it is also a matter that can be proved ontologically in the actualities of human existence.” The spatiality of the subject is already at work as the form through which something is found as objective. “(T)hat subjects stand opposed to *I* by becoming *Thou* or *He* or *She* is, in general, the result of that primordial element that renders any object capable of coming into being.” Environmental space arises when one eliminates the tension spread over subjective spatiality and then one takes a stand on the standpoint of the individual. (Ibid. p. 177-8)

“... the origin of space lies in the betweenness of subjects, that contradicts the standpoint of the individual. Then, through the negation of this latter standpoint, perspective disappears and homogenous space arises. This homogenous space is the abstraction of subjective space carried to its extreme. At issue here is the natural world, which arises in an intersubjective way; and hence it arises within consciousness in general.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 178-9)

10.4 Temporality

Spatiality implies temporality, and both these notions must be related to betweenness, Watsuji contends:

“That ningen sonzai is spatial at once means that it is also temporal.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 181)

“ ... spatial connections give expression to the activities of the human subject.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 181)

“ ... moving and standing still are ... temporal developments of human communication.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 181)

When, for instance, we begin to walk, the walking activity is already determined by a definite ‘place to go’.” The place to go, as the *terminus ad quem* to go—and which is determined beforehand—determines the present walking, whether or not the walker is conscious of it at any present moment. “(T)hose human relationships that are supposed to occur at the place to which one is going already exist within the present walking, ‘beforehand’, in spite of not yet having actually happened ... the essence of this walking consists in the realization of possible human relations ... this walking is determined by this possibility ... [or rather], the walking itself is the possibility.” Those human relationships that determine the present walking beforehand are the authentic ‘future’, ‘the destination to which to go’. In this way the ‘future’ is, in every kind of practical activity, “the possible betweenness that gives this activity its direction; that is, its possible *ningen sonzai*.” (Ibid., p. 182-3)

Then what does the term *already* mean? Those human relationships that exist within the present walking beforehand cannot determine it, unless they *already* subsist one way or another. One goes to one’s place of work, or pays a visit to one’s friend, only because a definite state of labour or of friendly relationships ‘already’ exists; a betweenness exists in one’s present attendance at the office or in one’s visit to the friend and in turn it determines one’s present walking in the form of those relationships to occur. In fact, “... we find ourselves burdened with human existence in which what is possible ‘beforehand’ is ‘already’ determined. The already established human existence that belongs to the future is its authentic ‘past’; that is, its ‘bygones’. The present walking I determined by the future that exists in the form of the past and thereby reveals the manner of transportation characteristic of *ningen*.” (Ibid., p. 183-4)

Those human relationships, which the simplest types of transportation exhibit, possess a temporal structure where past and future are united in the present. The established betweenness determines the direction of one’s present activities. “But this determination does not mean that the past betweenness is repeated just as it is in the future. It is possible for a walker to destroy entirely the betweenness of yesterday in her destination. However, this sort of destruction is possible only because she is nonetheless burdened with this past betweenness. Only those who shoulder a burden are able to relieve themselves of it.” (Ibid., p. 184) Movements give expression to the dynamic structure of human relations; they are

determined in their present movement beforehand. (Ibid., p. 185) The characteristic of 'beforehand already' differs from 'anticipation' and 'memory', which are reflected on from the standpoint of an individual's consciousness. The already established betweenness is not merely of *I*, but rather socially established *ningen sonzai*. "The 'customer' to whom the delivery boy brings a package, exists outside of this delivery boy's memory, in definite relationship with his shop." (Ibid., p. 185)

That social relations are already socially determined beforehand is clearly observed in that transport facilities, for instance, move in accordance with plans prescribed beforehand, and within a definite budget. The anticipation in question is not an anticipation within individual consciousness alone but is also a social one. A railroad schedule is a scheduled plan of traffic services and expresses an 'anticipation' of the movement of people. This anticipation is a social anticipation of possible human relationships. Anticipation of the future exists not only in individual consciousness but also within society itself. (Ibid., p. 185)

Communication facilities which express the spatial connection of *ningen zonzai*, at the same time express its temporal structure; subjective extendedness is temporal in structure; the temporal structure of *ningen sonzai* is the basic structure of *ningen sonzai*. "Now, *ningen sonzai* is characterized in terms of the incessant movement from an established betweenness to a possible one. An established betweenness is the community from which an individual separates herself, and a possible betweenness is the community to be realized." (Ibid., p. 186)

"Why do we constantly head for a possible betweenness ... why are we determined 'already beforehand'?" (Watsuji 1996, p. 188)

"The reason why people look for connection of whatever sort is because absolute wholeness is authentic possibility for a human being." (Watsuji 1996, p. 188)

"The terminus ad quem is, for a human being, an authentic' place ... the ground out of which she comes forth..." (Watsuji 1996, p. 188)

The wholeness reveals its basic unity in the movement that realizes the 'identity' inherent in the non-duality between the self and Other through the standpoint of the 'difference'

immanent in the opposition between them. 'To return to the ground' occurs from within the standpoint of the non-duality between the self and other but not in that of the mere 'Self'." The standpoint of the 'Self' is that of the opposition between self and other that has departed from authentic wholeness, that it is a standpoint of 'in-authenticity'. This sort of in-authenticity 'presents itself' at the very movement of 'returning to the home ground'. It is not inappropriate that to 'return' to the home ground, understood in this way, is called the *future*. "Authenticity, although realized in various communities of human beings under the guise of 'alreadyness', has not yet come. As 'futuraity', it always lurks behind the present between the self and other and subsists there as the direction of a non-dual relationship between them. This direction can never disappear, no matter what tightly organized community may be actualized. Rather, to the contrary, we can say that this direction is strengthened as the tight organization of community is increased ... as futurity, authenticity signifies an infinite direction. Only in infinity, that is in the absolute negativity, can a human being be a whole." (Ibid., p. 189) Likewise, it is also not inappropriate to call the 'home ground' out of which we come forth, the *past*. This 'home ground' is, at present, something that demands realization from us infinitely; it is something that does not yet exist. "If the meaning of the past lies in its having once existed and now is nonexistent, then authentic wholeness is the past. Even though being the authentic countenance of a human being, it is precisely the 'past' because of its being the 'future'." (Ibid., p. 189) It is also appropriate in terms of the 'present' to call a place where the future and the past are unified a *field* where one is 'about to come' to the 'home ground', which is the past. "It is *ningen sonzai* existing in the present that ... reveals this negation in the present under the guise of the opposition between self and other." (Ibid., p. 189)

Therefore, it is never inappropriate to grasp *ningen sonzai* as the unified structure of past, present and future. In other words, the structural unity of *ningen sonzai* 'comes to the home ground in the present'. It 'comes' to authentic wholeness in non-duality, in the direction of the future. It comes from wholeness in the past, as well, in that it, too, is the 'home ground' of *ningen sonzai* in its authentic countenance. The present discloses the movement of coming to the ground, in the present opposition between Self and Other. (Ibid. p. 190)

According to Watsuji: "... there is no such 'thing' as 'space' [of *ningen sonzai*], but rather 'spatiality ... there is no 'thing' called 'time' [of *ningen sonzai*], but rather temporality." It is not the case that *ningen sonzai* exists 'in time'. Time emerges from *ningen sonzai*.

Because what exists in a spatio-temporal fashion is basically the human being, “we must again consider *ningen sonzai* in our attempt to come to grips with the essential features of space and time.” (Ibid. p. 190)

The concept of time most commonly used refers to each moment of human relationship, which aims to the future while shouldering the past: of the time when one was born, the time of marriage, or that of death, the time of seeing someone, or of departing, the time when one left one’s house. “Such ‘time’ is not something measured. Instead, it is an ‘occasion’, or an opportunity in human relationship.” (Ibid., p. 191)¹

10.5 Spatiality in Temporality and vice versa

Spatiality is established through the interconnected acts of human, but it depends of the temporal structure of these acts. On the other hand, temporality, as the movement that unites human beings as opposed to one another, cannot arise apart from their spatial structure. Consequently, *the structure of ningen sonzai is spatial because it is temporal and temporal because it is spatial.* (Ibid., p. 223) The structure of *ningen sonzai* as betweenness consists in spatiality when looked upon statically: *ningen sonzai* spreads out in subjectivity as the subjective realm in which things manifest themselves. “Now this spreading out is the movement of negation through which authentic unity is negated as to result in the opposition of self and other and through which the latter negation is itself further negated to result in a non-dual unity between self and other. For this reason, when viewed dynamically, the structure of *ningen sonzai* is a temporality that allows past authenticity to arise non-dually as the future, in and through present dualistic activities, and that consists of the self and other.” Oppositions and unities that are spatial, motivate time to arise. Space and time are two ways of grasping the same structure, and do not subsist independent of one another. This is why we succeeded in interpreting both of them out of the phenomena of transport, communication, and so forth. (Ibid. p. 223) It is only by appealing to this mutual relation of spatiality and temporality that the structure of *ningen sonzai* can be clarified. “The opposition of the self and other cannot be conceived of apart from the subjects standing in opposition to one another spatially.” (Ibid., p 224)

Temporality is the dynamic manifestation of the dialectical structure of spatiality: “Hence it can be said that the real feature of temporality is spatiality ... Mere temporality falls short

of enabling us to grasp the individual / social dialectical structure of *ningen sonzai*.” The importance of bringing temporality into accordance with spatiality lies in that it enables us to eliminate the difficulties of grasping the interconnection of acts. (Ibid., p. 233) “Interconnections of acts consists of the subjects launching the movement of coming back to themselves through their extendedness, that is, through the countless disruption / oppositions between self and other ... the act is, first of all, an interactivity between subjects [as it is the spatiality of *ningen sonzai* that establishes the act]. No act occurs in a place where the opposition between self and other does not occur ... the act, shouldering established human relations by itself, nonetheless operates in the direction of possible human relations as well. These are the two indispensable elements of an act.” (Ibid., p. 235)

To illustrate his reasoning Watsuji refers to the Japanese phrase *mi no mochi kata* (“the way in which one behaves oneself”), which is a mode of relationship one assumes over against another subject, and thus implies spatiality:

“The manner of our eating is socially prescribed ... If none eats something with one’s fingers instead of with chopsticks, by choice, then this is itself an expression of some attitude already directed toward other subjects... even a manner of eating in which one finishes eating ahead of others expresses an attitude that refuses to allow a relationship with others.” (Watsuji 1996 p. 236-7)¹⁸⁷

“... setting a fire in a place where there is danger becomes an act by virtue of its relationship with other persons ...” (Watsuji 1996, p. 237)

“To open a window is not a mere motion, if it occurs in a place where one has a relation with others [for instance, on the train or in a café]” (Watsuji 1996, p. 237)

Attempts to describe an act by means of volitional choice or decision and by reference to characteristics such as “being conscious, volitional, and intellectual, while keeping an eye on its relation with objective things, are all beside the point.” (Ibid., p. 238) It is not the elements of individual consciousness but the spatiality inherent in *ningen sonzai* that established the act.

¹⁸⁷In the chapter on time and temporality Watsuji visits Aristotle, Bergson, Heidegger, Brentano, and Husserl.

On the other hand, as the dynamic relations of *ningen*, the act is not dependent merely on spatiality:

“Our manner of speaking is determined by the past. Even when one speaks to a person with whom one has had no contact in the past, the past in which there was no contact determines her way of speaking...” (Watsuji 1996, p. 240)

“As soon as one is born, one is involved in a definite social system ... one always stands in some relationship to other persons.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 240)

“... it is obvious that the act is burdened with the mutual relationships of the past.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 241)

An act is occasioned not only by the spatiality of *ningen sonzai* but also by its temporality:

“There is no such thing as an isolated act ... this act arises from countless other acts.” (Watsuji 1996, p. 243)

“We live in the midst of acts. And each act stands within the context of manifold and inexhaustible connections.”(Watsuji 1996, p. 244)

Here Watsuji brings in trust and truth. What does *trust* mean? What is the ground of trust? The phenomenon of trust does not exist merely in placing one's trust in another person. It also means that one assumes in advance a decided attitude toward the future, which lacks definiteness with respect to the relationship between self and other. The ground of trust lies in the spatio-temporal structure pertinent to *ningen sonzai*; “the law of *ningen sonzai*, which develops spatio-temporally, renders trust capable of existing ... human relations are those of trust; and at a place where human relations prevail, trust is also established.” (Ibid, p. 271)

The real feature of *ningen sonzai* cannot be found in an individual being. It is found in the individual / social dual characteristic of a human being, in the movement of negation through which *ningen sonzai* comes back to authentic wholeness: “... *ningen sonzai*'s real feature of truth occurs in the movement of a spatio-temporal coming back but has nothing to do

with what occurs non-spatially and non-temporally.” (Ibid., p. 272) Provided that truth occurs spatio-temporally in this way, it is an actor-oriented truth: truthfulness / trust relationship (or *makoto* in Japanese). (Ibid., p. 272) “Human trustfulness occurs between one person and another. It does not exist ideally and statically in the form of something completed, but occurs constantly anew, as what ought to occur. Hence, it is possible that it does not occur.” (Ibid, p. 279)

As we have seen, following Watsuji, one becomes an individual (as R. E. Carter observes in his interpretative essay accompanying the English translation of *Rinrigaku*), “by negating the social group or by rebelling against various social expectations or requirements. To be an individual demands that one negates the group. On the other hand, to envision oneself as a member of a group is to negate one’s individuality. From the Eastern perspective ... this is an instance of poor logic! One can remain an individual and as such join as many groups as one wishes. Or one can think of oneself as an individual and yet as a parent, a worker, and artist, a theater goer, and so forth. Watsuji understands this, but he argues that it is possible to think in this way only if one has already granted logical priority to the individual *qua* individual.” (Carter in Watsuji 1996, p. 331) To extricate ourselves from one or another socio-cultural inheritance, one has to rebel against this socio-cultural form by affirming one’s individuality in such a way as to negate its overt influence on oneself. This is to negate an aspect of one’s history by affirming one’s individuality. But a negation also occurs when one becomes a truly ethical human being, when one negates one’s individual separateness by abandoning one’s individual separateness from others, and some tradition. The latter is ‘a negation of negation’. (Ibid., , p. 332) “One can decide to join a specific group ... but one is already historically connected with one’s ancestors, with a common language, with a common network of transportation and communication, with common residential and workplace architecture and supporting services, with common culinary tastes, with a common family and community structure, and with common morality that makes possible the distinction between goodness and badness in such a way as to make group existence both possible and pleasant.” To deny such an interconnection makes as much sense as to deny that we have bodies with which we act in morally acceptable or unacceptable ways. In fact, the denial of spatiality and the dominance of temporality in ethical analysis is tantamount to just such a denial. “Although thoughts may be temporal alone, actions are necessarily spatial and usually involve others.” (Ibid., p. 333)

As Yuasa Yasuo says, Watsuji's 'betweenness' consists of the various human relationships of our *life-world*. (Yuasa 1987, p. 37) It is the network which provides the interconnected meanings of the life-world. To live as a person means to exist in this betweenness. That we live our lives within a network of betweenness implies that we exist in a definite, spatial *basho*, a place, *topos*, or 'conceptual field' within which our experiences take place. This *basho* is the *life-basho* in which we find the interconnected meanings of the life-word. To exist in this *life-basho* is the primordial fact, the primary significance, of being human. Watsuji speaks of betweenness as the extension of [embodied] subjective space. (Ibid., p. 38) We can call such an intersubjective space our 'life-space', that which we experience and discover everyday within the life-world in its interconnected meanings. To exist in a spatial *basho* means to exist as a human being by virtue of one's *body*; I exist in my body, occupying the *basho* of here and now. "Watsuji does not offer any explicit account of the body. But when we delve into the implicit assumptions behind Watsuji's insight, the spatial existence of the body has a decisive relevance to his understanding of the nature of humanity." (Ibid., p. 40) The body is a part of the human subject's spatial experience. It can be understood to be the spatial experience closest to the self. One is born in the life-space under various structural interconnections of meanings, and it is by growing up in them, that one becomes a human subject. (Ibid., p. 41)

10.6 The In-Betweenness of Ningen the Child

Ningen the Child is inescapably immersed in a space-time world together with Others.

Born into social relationships, initially represented by parents and other caregivers, he / she grows up in a common spatial field, 'criss-crossed by roads and paths, and even by forms of communication such as messenger services, postal routes, newspapers, flyers, broadcasts over great distances, all in addition to everyday polite conversation' (not to mention the spatiality represented by television, cell-phones, and other more contemporary communication gadgets).

He / she is not merely an individual human being, nor a member of a society. There is a dialectical unity of these double characteristics.

The Child's 'gestures, facial expressions, demeanour, adopted customs and way of living' are all expressions of his / her in-betweenness.

The Child's practical interconnections with others through acts find their most detailed expression in language. He / she perceives phenomena named by his / her native language. (Through the use of words such as 'daybreak', 'sun', 'fine weather', 'rain', 'wind', 'evening', and 'night'.)

The agency that accounts of the thinking, feeling and tasting on the part of the Child is actually that of the social to which he / she belongs. The Child becomes simultaneously one person and many persons.

Child and society occur as reciprocal negations: The social whole is that against which he / she rebels and establishes itself. It envisions itself as a member of a group by negating its individuality.

The Child is seeing, but he / she is simultaneously seen by Others.

The Child learns how one behaves oneself ('one does not eat with one's fingers but by chopsticks').

The Child grows up in a spatial *basho*, a conceptual field within which his / her experience takes place—the life-*basho* in which it encounters the interconnected means of the life-world. The Child is born in this lifespace under various structural interconnections of meaning, and it is by growing up in them that he / she becomes a human subject.

10.7 Climate—Culture

In *Fûdo*—the title literally means 'wind and earth ... the natural environment of a given land'—Watsuji understands 'climate' as a geographical, cultural and social clustering of attitudes and expectations which relate to a specific region of the earth, populated by a particular people sharing a great deal in common. Properly understood, "climate does not exist apart from history, or history apart from climate" (Watsuji 1961, p. 8) Climate is associated with spatiality, while history is associated with temporality. Though climate and

human history are mutually determining each other. They form one of many identities of self-contradiction that abound in the work of Watsuji:

“... it is in climate that man apprehends himself. The activity of man’s self-apprehension, man, that is, in his dual character of individual and social being, is at the same time a historical nature” (Watsuji 1961, p. 8)

Any human being is both a product of a certain environment and a shaper of that environment. We are individuals, and yet we are in society. (Carter in Watsuji 1996, p. 336) “To the extent that we are environmentally conditioned, we are not shapers of our environment. To the extent that we are shapers of our environment, we are not environmentally conditioned. Although the affirmation of one is a denial of the other, the one cannot exist apart from the other.” (Carter in Watsuji 1996, p. 336)

We are individuals and we have individual personalities and unique histories. (Carter in Watsuji 1996, p. 338) Yet we are inextricably connected to many, relationally, because we exist communally. “We cannot be separated from social relationships except for the one-sided purposes of abstract thinking, for as individuals we use a common language, walk along common paths and roads, eat food grown and prepared by others, and so on. We are private and public at the same time. We enter the world already within a network of relationships and obligations, not unlike the network of roads, railways, and communication facilities that we share ...” Betweenness implies spatial distance separating thing from thing; it indicates both that we can come to meet in ‘the between’, and that we are at a distance from one another. A self-contradictory tension exists. But betweenness is spatial, whatever else it might be, and so we exist within a definite space. “Therefore, to exist in space is an evident fact of human existence, to be added to our evident temporality. *Ningen sonzai* is doubly dual in nature and therefore doubly self-contradictory, referring to human existence as individual and social, in time and in space.” (Carter in Watsuji 1996, p. 338)

According to Watsuji, “we are all inescapably environed by our land, its geography and topography, its climate and weather patterns, temperature and humidity, soils and oceans, its flora and fauna, in addition to the resultant human styles of living, related artifacts, architecture, food choices, and clothing. This is but a partial list, but even this sketchy list makes clear that Watsuji is calling attention to the many ways in which our environment,

taken in the broad sense, shapes who we are from birth to death.” (Carter 2004, p. 6) He was among the very first to read Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*. And as he points out in *Fûdo*, Heidegger’s emphasis was on time and the individual, while dealing too little with space and the social dimensions of human beings. “When we add to our sense of climate as including not only the natural geographic setting of a people and the region’s weather patterns, but also the social environment of family, community, society at large, lifestyle, and even the technological apparatus that supports community survival and interaction, then we begin to glimpse what Watsuji had in mind by climate, and how there exists a mutuality of influence from human to environment, and environment to human being which allows for the continued evolution of both.” Climate is the entire interconnected network of influences that together create an entire people’s attitudes and values.

We apprehend ourselves in climate, revealing ourselves to ourselves as both social and historical beings. Here is (as Carter says) the crux of Watsuji’s insight, and of his criticism of Heidegger’s *Zein und Zeit*: to emphasize our being in time is “to discover human existence on the level only of individual consciousness” (Watsuji 1961, p. 9). As temporal beings, we can exist alone, in isolative reflection. On the other hand, if we recognize the ‘dual character’ of human beings as existing in both time and space, as both individuals and social beings, “then it is immediately clear that space must be regarded as linked with time” Space is inextricably linked with time, and the individual and social aspects of ourselves are inextricably linked as well, and our history and culture are linked to our climate. And while change is constant, and hence all structures are continuously evolving, this evolution is inextricably linked to our history, traditions, and cultural forms of expression.

Climate is, as Watsuji says, the agent by which human life is objectivised, and it is here that man comprehends himself; there is selfdiscovery in climate. (Watsuji 1961, p. 14)

“When we feel cold, we ourselves are already in the coldness of the outside air. That we come into relation with the cold means that we are outside in the cold ... our state is characterized by ‘ex-sistere as Heidegger emphasized, or, in our term, by intentionality. We ... face ourselves in the state of ‘ex-sistere’. Even in cases where we do not face ourselves by means of reflection or looking into ourselves, our selves are exposed to ourselves ... When we feel the cold, we are ourselves already out in the cold ... in feeling the cold, we discover ourselves in the cold itself ... The instant that the cold is discovered, we are

already outside in the cold. Therefore, the basic essence of what is 'present outside' is not a thing or object such as the cold, but we ourselves. 'Exsistere' is the fundamental principle of the structure of ourselves, and it is on this principle that intentionality depends. To feel the cold is an intentional experience, in which we discover our selves in the state of 'exsistere', or ourselves already outside in the cold." (Watsuji 1961. p. 3-4)

Feeling cold it is 'we, not 'I' alone that experience the cold. We feel the same cold in common. It is not 'I' alone but 'we', or more strictly, 'I' as 'we' and 'we' as 'I' that are outside in the cold. Accordingly, 'ex-sistere' is to be out among other 'I's' rather than 'to be out in the thing we call the cold'. (Watsuji 1961, p. 4)

As remarks Yuasa Yasuo with reference to Watsuji: "History and nature, like man's mind and body, are in an inseparable relationship" (Yuasa 1996, 168, quoted from Carter 2004)). Culture is that mutuality of influence, recorded over eons of time past, which continues to effect the cultural present of a people. "Who we are is not simply what we think, or what we choose as individuals in our aloneness, but is also the result of the climatic space into which we are born, live, love, and die."

Watsuji's conception of 'climate-culture' seems to be a possible departure for considering growing up as a process of 'acculturation'.

10.8 Acculturation

Growing up is a process of *acculturation*, it has been maintained, a more or less conscious adoption of a certain style of life, a 'habitus', a lifeworld, a sense of self-identity, imageries and expectations concerning the world at large and the future brought to the fore in speech and other action as well as sheer comportment, for short a personal mode being and becoming developed in the daily intercourse with other human beings. The meaning of this assumption has been demonstrated, hopefully, in the course of the preceding chapters,

'Acculturation', of course, derives from 'acculturate, i.e. 'to adapt to or adopt a certain culture, or to cause it to do this'. Hence, it would imply the Child's adoption of, or accommodation to, some 'culture' or 'cultures'. But how would the word culture be

understood in this respect? And would it not require us to take a stand on the use of this word?

‘Culture’, writes Williams, is one of the two most complicated words in the English language, partly because its intricate historical development in several European languages, “but mainly because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought.” (Williams 1988, p. 87). The word derives, of course, from Latin *cultura*, and its root meaning is *colere*: ‘to inhabit, cultivate, protect and honour with worship’. Some of these meanings separated with occasional overlapping in the derived nouns. ‘Inhabit’ developed (by way of *colonus*) into colony, while ‘honour with worship’ became cult. Culture also assumed the meaning of ‘cultivation’ or ‘tending’. By way of French the word entered into English in the first part of the 15th century. At that time the primary meaning was in the tending of natural growth (such as crops and animals), but ‘culture’ was later extended to human development, including understanding and mind.

As an independent noun ‘culture’ is not important before the late 18th century and not common before the middle of the 19th, Williams continues. At that time it adopted the sense of a general social process and a definite stage of human development; then it also acquired definite social class associations. In French *culture* emerged as an independent noun together with ‘civilization’. In German, *Cultur* (and later *Kultur*) was first used in the sense of a general process of becoming civilized or cultivated, including the sense established for civilization by the historians of the Enlightenment. An important change occurred with Herder, who—attacking the assumption of the universal history of civilization or culture as a unilinear process, leading to the high and dominant point of 18th century European culture—was the first to speak of culture in the plural: the specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods, and also the specific and variable cultures of social and economic groups within a nation. As an alternative to the orthodox and dominant ‘civilization’, this sense developed in the Romantic movement. It was also used to emphasize national and traditional cultures, including the new idea of ‘folk-culture’, to attack abstract rationalism and the inhumanity of industrial development, to distinguish human development from material development. Politically it fused elements of both radicalism and reaction. From the 1840s, however, *Kultur* was used in very much the same sense as civilization in universal history.

In the complex modern development of the word it is possible to distinguish the sense which marks a literal continuity of physical process (as in ‘sugar-beet’ and ‘germ culture’), Williams notes. Though beyond such physical references culture is also used to describe a process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development, or as an indication of a particular way of life—of a people, a period, a group or humanity in general); there is also the possible independent and abstract reference to works and practices of intellectual and artistic activity.

Facing this complex and still active history of the word, “it is easy to react by selecting one ‘true’ or ‘proper’ or ‘scientific’ sense and dismissing other senses as loose or confused”. However, although within a discipline any conceptual usage of the word has to be clarified, it is according to Williams the range and overlap of meanings that is significant. “The complex of senses indicates a complex argument about the relations between human development and a particular way of life, and between both and the works and practices of art and intelligence.”¹⁸⁸ (Ibid, p. 91) Hence, *culture* is definitely what Morris Weitz calls an ‘open concept’. It invites different approaches and explications; though there may be in any instance definite criteria for the use of the word, ‘none of these criteria is necessary or sufficient and each is intelligibly rejectable’.¹⁸⁹ As notes Bourdieu, the use of the word ‘culture’ can perhaps be defined, but if so only within the theoretical system it is intended to constitute, not in isolation (Bourdieu 1992, p. 96).

However, while it is difficult to agree on how to define culture it can be taken for certain that we are all ‘cultured’ in the sense of being ‘bred’, ‘grown in(to)’ some social *Umwelt(s)*. We grew up in one of more places on earth which (*in-*)formed us, which contributed to our

¹⁸⁸ While in archaeology and cultural anthropology reference is primarily to material production, in history and cultural studies the word refers primarily to signifying or symbolic systems. “This often confuses but even more conceals the central question of the relations between ‘material’ and ‘symbolic’ production, which ... have always to be related rather than contrasted.” (Ibid., p. 91) This point is relevant also to uses of the word in other languages than English, where there is considerable variation, Williams concludes.

¹⁸⁹ This also holds if the inventory of offered definitions of culture as a basic concept is narrowed down to its use in modern anthropology, sociology and psychology. In their critical review of the concept in the early 1950s A. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn were able to document several hundreds of definitions. (See Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952 and Singer 1968). Probably the number of suggested definitions has increased substantially since they made their investigation.

‘becoming what we are’ (through actualization of our in-norm ac acquired potentialities), that means which shaped us as conscious human beings by providing our horizons of significance and meaning as doers and makers, speakers and imitators.

Hence, the word ‘culture’ can also be used in its sense of a verb, to cultivate, shape, breed, shape or generate (‘to maintain in conditions suitable for growth’) We are all ‘bred and born’ through a mutuality of constantly changing influences, recorded over time, which effect the present of the social community to which we belong in one way or another. ‘We are not simply what we think, or what we choose as individuals in our aloneness, but also the result of the social space into which we are born, live, love, and die’, as says Watsuji. In our process of growing up we are conditioned by our natural geographic setting, but primordially by our social *Umwelt* of consociates, contemporaries and (by means of various representations) our predecessors (to talk with A. Schutz), that means, by ‘family, community, society at large, lifestyle, and even the technological apparatus that supports community survival and interaction’ (to recur to the thinking of Watsuji). As human being we are both products of a certain social environment and as ‘shapers’ of this same environment. ‘We are individuals, and yet we are in society’. As environmentally conditioned, we are not ‘shapers’ of our social *Umwelt*, its traditions, artefacts, physical infrastructure, symbols and not the least its language. To the extent that we are ‘shapers’, we are not environmentally conditioned. ‘Although the affirmation of one is a denial of the other, the one cannot exist apart from the other.’ Or to apply the thinking of Husserl considering the life-world: *The Child is his / her own situation!* The Child is situated, and grows up, in-between some consociates, but also contemporaries and predecessors represented by messages and artefacts, traditions, accepted knowledge, for short some beliefs, norms and values, that means culture(s). If the Child is a monad: he / she is a living mirror of the universe, but of its *Umwelt*. Or, to refer to the thinking of Aristotle: In retrospect, ‘what it was to be that thing of the Child’ was a matter of the specific situatedness in which his / her growth was taken place; there were some conditioning circumstances, which affected the actualization of the Child’s potentialities. That means: ‘As soon as one is born, one is involved in a definite social system and one stands in some relationships to other persons.’

Culture (as a noun), would then be what is cultivated, bred in human beings—in and through human ‘entelechy: intrinsic possession of end, completions, perfection’ (to talks with

Aristotle). Received and transmitted in this ongoing mutuality of influences is beliefs, norms and values, knowledge *that* and knowledge *why*, as well as knowledge *how* to cope with things; it is not the least language competence and skills, ideas about one's consociates and contemporaries, predecessors and successors, about the world within actual and potential reach, as well as various realities beyond any possible physical reach, provinces of meaning which can only be apprehended by means of symbols, that means, in the language of Schutz, 'appresentational references of a higher order in which the appresenting member is an object, fact, or event within the reality of our daily life, whereas the appresented member refers to an idea transcending our experience of every day life'.

Adopting this way of reasoning culture (understood as a noun) would be what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it and make our adjustments felt upon it, by our doing, making and acting.

Due to people's spatial movement and ongoing technological change (new and more efficient means of transportation and communication, means to reach out to outer people and 'make oneself known in the world'), culture—in this basic sense of human in-betweenness—is not static, but constantly in change. The newly born Child (or Infant) is a receiver. But growing up also is to become someone who *transmits* old and new knowledge, skills and ideas.

What accommodates for this mutuality of influences seems to be most of all language. As notes Husserl: "Everything has its name, or is nameable in the broadest sense, i.e. linguistically expressively. The objective world ... presupposes men, understood as men with a common language." (See Chapter 3:8) Language is correlatively related to the world, the universe of objects which is linguistically expressible in its *being* and its being *such*; world and language are in-separately intertwined. He also emphasizes the function of written, documenting linguistic expression making communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address. As inserted into a society of other human beings and occupying some place within it, the Child is and will be endowed with certain language skills and knowledge—with access to a system of significance and meaning—but also contained in this respect due to his / her situatedness: "place of birth and upbringing, class and wealth of parents, prevailing aspirations, norms and values among those socially most close to it, not to mention various mediated modes of conceiving and representing the world.

Its acquired stock of knowledge at hand is socially derived and only a small part of it derives from his / her personal experience as an individual. Due to its access to a *particular* system of knowledge *that* and knowledge *why*, the Child will be ‘informed’ in the sense of given form, ‘acculturated’ through its adopted, shown and specific language competence and skills. Language acquisition is thus a requirement for ‘consciousness’ on the part of the Child—in the sense of its ‘knowing by itself and together with others’. As part of a social system of equally conscious ‘co-speakers’ the Child relates to things talked about, various topics of discourse. The inbetweenness of the Child is that of a speech and knowledge community. If, thus, culture is knowledge, it is knowledge acquired by the Child, for itself and as shared in his / her consciousness with other conscious human beings. Though, following Heidegger, knowledge is also an acquired ability to cope with things, through the proper use of equipment, tools and instruments in goal-oriented acts of making. Things talk to the Child through their possible use ‘for the purpose of’, as available in this or that purpose. In this knowing *how*, objects assume the character of instrumentality.

Into this context of mutual interaction and in-betweenness it would also be possible to bring in the Ancient Greek understanding of ‘education’, *paideia*, the process by which a community preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual character (see Jaeger 1965). While individuals pass away, their ‘types’(or *eide*) remain. The social and intellectual qualities of human beings can be transmitted only by exercising these very qualities, through reason and conscious will. *Paideia* relates to individuals, but it is essentially a function of the community; the community is the source of all behaviour; its formative influence on its members is constantly active in its endeavour to educate each new generation, so as to make them in its own image. What characterizes education understood in this way is the alleged importance of *paradeigmata*, examples that invite imitation: proverbs, lore, narratives and enacted drama, but also demonstrated behaviour, conduct and action as part of communicated lifestyles (see Jaeger 1965, p. 34). It conceives growing up as education, and education as acculturation; acculturation is crucially imitation, ‘mimesis’ or ‘formative imagination’. For education in this sense—as ‘the formation of character’ through *paradeigmata*— Plato in, for instance, the *Republic*, uses the metaphor of a physical *moulding*:

“Then are you aware that in every work the beginning is the most important part, especially in dealing with anything young and tender? For that is the time when any impression which one may desire to communicate is most readily stamped and taken.

Precisely so.

Shall we then permit our children without scruple to hear any fables composed by any authors indifferently, and so to receive into their minds opinions generally the reverse of those which, when they are grown to manhood, we shall think they ought to entertain?

No, we shall not permit it on any account.

Then apparently our first duty will be to exercise a superintendence over the authors of fables, selecting their good productions and rejecting the bad. And the selected fables we shall advise our nurses and mother to repeat to their children, that they may thus mould their minds with the fables even more than they shape their bodies with the hand. But we shall have to repudiate the greater part of those which are now in vogue”. (Plato, Republic 377b¹⁹⁰)

Jaeger indicates the connection between this Ancient way of conceiving education and the German word *Bildung* (Jaeger 1965, p. xxiii). As mentioned in connection with ‘formative imagination’, *Bildung* refers to *Bild* (‘image’), but it also connotes the verbal meaning of ‘producing, shaping, letting come forth’.¹⁹¹

But, what about the Child’s capacity to choose itself, to become what he / she is not (as yet)? To stage itself as Self? Does human freedom mean to define oneself as Self merely by choosing among what is offered on some ‘identity market’? By taking on the images of some others—making them images of oneself? So it seems adopting the reasoning of Watsuji.

¹⁹⁰ Quoted from Plato, *Republic*, transl. by J. L. Davis & D. J. Vaughan, with an introduction by S. Watt. Ware Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997

¹⁹¹ Here it would also be proper to mention the role of *manners* in the history of European civilization. See Elias 1994.

Though, as Sartre says, one can be a free only as engaged in a resisting world. Outside such engagement the notion of freedom loses all meaning: ‘To be free’ does not mean ‘to obtain what one has wished’, but ‘by oneself to determine oneself to wish. To attain freedom is to become what one is not as yet, by being *conscious* of what one is not as yet: knowing with oneself and others what one is not. In a growing up perspective, freedom is consciously actualizing one’s own potentialities, innate as well as those acquired. It is to choose oneself as an ‘I can be’ or ‘I can do’.

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11. Attachment: Figures and Other

1. Theorizing Growing up

Fig. 1:1. Inter-relationships between ‘words’ (signs), things (objects) and *concepts* (interpretants) as ‘implied predications’: *signification* and *meaning—sense*.





Fig. 1:2 Theorizing Growing up: Looking for concepts—interpretants—predications, which ‘impose a vision of division’:



Appendix

“Es scheint mir hilfreich, jetzt an den ursprünglichen, griechischen Sinn von Theorie, *theoria*, zu erinnern. Das Wort meint Beobachten, zum Beispiel von Sternkonstellationen, Zuschauer sein, zum Beispiel bei einem Schauspiel, oder Teilnehmer an einer Festgesandtschaft sein. Es meint nicht ein blosses >Sehen<, das Vorhandenes feststellt oder Informationen speichert.

Contemplatio verweilt nicht bei einem bestimmten Seienden, sondern in einem Bereich. *Theoria* ist nicht so sehr der einzelne augenblickliche Akt als eine Haltung, ein Stand und Zustand, in dem man sich hält. Es ist >Dabeisein< in dem schönen Doppelsinne, der nicht nur Anwesenheit meint, sondern auch dies, das der Anwesende >ganz dabei< ist. So ist einer Teilnehmer an einer rituellen Prozedur oder an einer Zeremonie, wenn er in der Teilnahme an derselben aufgeht, und das schließt immer auch ein, daß man mit anderen oder möglichen anderen am Gleichen teilhat. >Theorie< ist also nicht in erster Linie ein Verhalten, durch das man sich eines Gegenstandes bemächtigt oder ihn sich durch Erklärung verfügbar macht. Sie hat es mit einem Gut anderer Art zu tun.” (Gadamer 1987, p. 48).

2. Becoming—the Child as ‘Substance’

Fig. 2:1a. Growing up as ‘motion’ (*kinesis*)—actualisation (*energeia*) of in-born and acquired ‘potentialities’; substance as ‘inherent formal cause residing in compound beings’: ‘what-it-was-to-be-that-thing of human being’, the *eidos* / character (of a grown-up person) as actuality (brought to the fore):




Fig. 2:1b. The child as substance: What-it-was-to-be-that-thing of a thing, a grown-up person.




Fig. 2:2. The child as monad, attributed 'drive': growing up by virtue of *perceptio / appetitus*:




Fig. 3:2. *Noesis, noemata*, world—Child, objects, horizons:





Fig. 3:3 Temporal division of experience / *Erfahrung*—Past, present and future:



4. The World of Being and Becoming: Equipment—Projecting—Understanding

Fig. 4:1 Dasein-The Child and the worldly character of the available:




Fig. 4:2a. The Child and in-authentic self-understanding: 'I know how—I can do':





Fig. 4:2b. The Child and authentic self-understanding: 'I have been—I can be'.



5. Speech—language—body

Fig. 5:1. The Child speaks: A Heideggerian / Husserlian interpretation of M. Merleau-Ponty's teachings on the child's acquisition of language

**The Child as producer of bodily gestures
has entered a relation of 'perceptive attentiveness'
towards 'things talked about' together with
Others.**

**The Child is dealing with words (phonemic 'tokens')
in acts of saying,
which are acts of 'seeing': pointing out, predicating
and communicating, discovering things in a
world as disclosed.**

**Through acts of saying,
the Child asserts, articulates, interprets and understands, he /
she 'knows'.**

**The Child perceives the said as uttered:
What is uttered is taken hold of as a *percept*;
it assumes the form of an *eidos*,
can be developed into a *concept*.
Acts of speaking are acts of *noesis*.**

6. Habitus—Habituation—Formative imagination

Fig. 6:1. Habitus in St Thomas Aquinas and P. Bourdieu:




Fig. 6:2 a. Habitus / hexis in the process of growing up according to St Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle:




Fig. 6:2 b. Habitus in the process of growing up according to P. Bourdieu:





Fig. 6:3. Formative imagination: ‘The taking hold of the image of an Other, —making it an image of Oneself’:



7. Myself and Others

Fig. 7:1. Intersubjectivity after E. Husserl—A.Schutz: Ego and alter ego as *persons*, tuned in on each other in polythetic or monothetic communicative interaction:




Fig. 7:2 The Hegel model of intersubjective self-consciousness: Self-consciousness arises when one self-assured individual encounters another self-assured individual, when each demands recognition from the other, and both are ready to engage in a life-and-death struggle to get recognition from the other. Both are driven by desire for ‘ruling the roast’:




Fig. 7:3. Sartre's model of intersubjectivity: My trading of looks with an Other:




Fig. 7:4. Self-consciousness after Mead: Discovering oneself as an 'I—Myself—me' by assuming the attitude of Others toward Oneself:






Fig. 7:5. Realization of Self: The Child discovers himself / herself as an historical ‘I – Myself – me’ related to ‘You’, ‘We’, ‘He’, ‘She’ and ‘They’—in communication with Others:



8. The Social World—Signs and Symbols

Fig. 8:1. Child and 'social universe of meaning': Social Types (T)—Signs (s) and Symbols (S):



9. Time—Freedom

Fig. 9:1. Growing up and 'the time of the world' according to Aristotle:




Fig. 9:2 Horizons of ecstasies of time (after Heidegger): The Child as Past, The Child as Present and The Child as Future:

Horizons of 'ecstasies of time': Past—Present—Future




Fig. 9:3 Time and Human Freedom, according to Sartre in Being and Nothingness:

