Fomenting Political Violence – An Introduction

Steffen Krüger with Karl Figlio and Barry Richards

Abstract: In this introduction we use a speech by Rodrigo Duterte, the president of the Philippines, which delivers the threat to commit extrajudicial killings and war crimes, as an example with which to explain the psychosocial/psychoanalytic outlook of the volume. ‘If you had raped three, I will admit it, that’s on me,’ Duterte told soldiers tasked with battling Muslim rebels on the southern Mindanao island, after having called out military rule there. In its flabbergasting frankness, this aside practically caricatures the tendencies towards impulsiveness and looseness, aggression and transgression, populism and nationalism that combine to weigh in heavily on the structure of feeling (Williams) of the current historical moment. We follow the reception of this and others of Duterte’s statements in order to map the theoretical frame laid out by the concepts of fantasy, language, media, and action and offer various interpretations and analyses of the unfolding scenes, which we subsequently contrast with other academic approaches to political violence. Finally, we introduce the volume’s chapters with reference to the theoretical frame thus set up.

[Begin chapter text]

‘If you had raped three, I will admit it, that’s on me.’ This is what Rodrigo Duterte, president of the Philippines, told soldiers tasked with battling Muslim rebels on the southern Mindanao island, after having called out military rule there (Reuters 2017). Duterte made the remark as a joke in which he contradicted – and practically disavowed – both the pleading and threatening rhetoric that went before it: ‘If you go down, I go down,’ he appealed to the soldiers in his speech, ‘But for this martial law and the consequences of martial law and the

ramifications of martial law, I and I alone would be responsible, just do your job I will take care of the rest.’ Subsequently turning to threats, he warned his soldiers: ‘I’ll imprison you myself,’ referring to any soldiers committing violations. It was at this point that he made the joking promise that soldiers would go unpunished for three rapes.

Now, this is probably one of the most direct, least euphemistically vested ways of inciting political violence of recent times – performed publicly, not only in front of soldiers but, via the media coverage of the speech, national and international audiences. In its flabbergasting frankness, it exaggerates and caricatures the tendencies towards impulsiveness and looseness, aggression and transgression, populism and nationalism that combine to weigh in heavily on the structure of feeling (Williams) of the current historical moment. As that, it can serve here as an exemplary case with which to unfold the practices, processes, and dynamics that the chapters in this book seek to shed light upon.

In keeping with existing definitions (Bosi and Malthaner 2015; Della Porta 2013), we define political violence as the infliction of physical, psychological, and/or symbolic harm on people and/or things through a variety of means so as to influence wider parts of a given public in order to achieve political goals. However, the word ‘fomenting’ is a decisive qualification here. In its sense of to rouse, stir up, excite, effect, and spread (*OED* 2018), the term directs our interest in political violence to the seismic contractions, historical movements, and shifts in social, political, and cultural constellations that lay the ground for such violence to emerge. Furthermore, the developmental aspect contained in the term points towards the psychoanalytic/psychodynamic viewpoint that the present volume takes. Such a perspective is oriented towards micro-interactions, relational styles, and dynamics between people, and pays particular attention to the inter- and *intra*-subjective dimensions of such dynamics.

This can be demonstrated by returning to the example of Duterte's aside. The jocular, self-contradicting way in which he made this statement opens an ambiguous realm of meaning and non-meaning that activates all the concepts contained in the subtitle of this volume: *fantasy, language, media and action*. Into this realm of ambiguity, fantasies can flow from various positions and perspectives. Not only will it have triggered the imaginations of the Philippine soldiers as to who they are, what their task is, and their duties and privileges, but also the wider Philippine population will have been set alight with impressions and ideas concerning their leader and themselves – let alone the female population on Mindanao thus surrendered to the wills of an army let loose – and finally, also the 'world stage.' All who witnessed Duterte's statement could find dark, brooding meaning here – to be embraced or rejected, rejoiced or feared.

Staying with Duterte's speech, in the kind of martial law to be established on Mindanao, soldiers were to become unbound, relieved, and freed from the constraints of doubt and empathy: 'My order to the troops is all people who are not authorised by government to carry arms and they resist, kill them, wipe them out,' Duterte ordered. In other words, the force by which resistance was to be met was to be immeasurably, unchallengeably stronger than the resistance it was to meet. Resistance is not merely to be met and overcome here; rather, it is to be totally 'wiped out' so that no trace of it will be found after the soldiers' work is done.

In light of this fantasy of total annihilation, the joke about going free for up to three rapes can no longer be seen as remaining enclosed in the sphere of the 'as-if.' Rather, in a situation thus defined, the joke hints at the very plausible circumstance that sexual violence becomes tolerated as a degree of collateral damage to be expected and absorbed (see Wood 2014 for a comprehensive overview of conflict-related sexual violence). Furthermore, the execution of

military force and political violence on this imagined scale becomes charged with a sexual dimension itself. Total annihilation presupposes total domination and, accordingly, total subjugation. In this respect, Duterte's joke is a way of admitting to a grotesque proportionality in the monstrous fantasy of martial law that he imposed.

Extending this line of thought, it is enlightening to assess the family relations that Duterte constructs between his soldiers and himself, how he as president and military leader binds himself to the soldiers and, in turn, makes the soldiers dependent on him personally. He takes responsibility for and ties his fate to the soldiers' actions; he threatens to personally punish them for war crimes, but at the same time offers them personal protection from such punishment – he upholds the law but informally suspends it. From the viewpoint of Freudian theory, this creates a precarious situation in which subjects are offered to let their drives (cultivated in military training) run freely by assuring them that this will not only be within the limits of what is approved of by the (externalised) superego but, moreover, *welcomed by it as being for its sake* (see Kris 1941 for an assessment of Nazi-German home propaganda along those lines). Soldiers are directly bound to the president by ties of love and are made to depend on the president's quasi-parental authority. After all, should they, by juridical standards, overshoot the mark in the way Duterte suggests and jokingly invites them to, their fate will be in his hands only. In such a paternal context, having the father's goodwill, blessing, and protection can be expected to have very concrete effects on the soldiers' actions. *Do as I please – which I know will please you too – and I have you covered.* This has been the way in which the ground for conflict-related sexual violence was laid in the Philippines in 2017. The circumstance that Mindanao is Duterte's home island adds a further troublesome familial dimension to the concessions to his soldiers. It is as though Duterte, speaking from the position of connoisseur, makes a perversely cruel, underhand compliment to the women

on the island – as though he gives his soldiers to understand that he himself knows from experience that the women of Mindanao are ‘impossible to resist.’¹

Even though Duterte made his career in local politics, having held the office of mayor of Davao City for long stretches of consecutive election periods (1988–1998 and 2001–2009; Batalla 2016), his joke is anything but a product of provinciality or naivety in national, or international politics. To the contrary, with the incident being one in a chain of similar and similarly gruesome ones, he will have been fully aware of the media attention, and even if his remarks should have come to him spontaneously and were made off-script, he will have intuitively anticipated what impact they would have. After all, in the case of the rape joke he could already draw from extensive experience with public responses. In 2016, for example, during a string of provocative anti-American statements – one in which he called US President Barack Obama a ‘son of a bitch’ – his approval ratings kept at an unambiguously positive 86 percent (Batalla 2016, p.180). Against the insight that it apparently pays nationally to show an aggressive disregard to the sentiments of international onlookers, especially as concerns the US as the Philippines’ former colonial power, Duterte could expect that the shocked responses from international news outlets would only strengthen his standing with substantial parts of the Philippine population, who – similar to the relationship his soldiers were offered in the speech – embrace him as a strong, uncompromising, and charismatic leader. Indeed, his rape joke could be expected to resound positively and impress as a token of radical independence from and disregard for an intellectual, globally oriented, liberal elite.

Carried by international media coverage, Duterte’s enactment of authoritarian populism will have further resounded with audiences with likewise authoritarian, transgressive inklings around the world. In Western societies, his joke could tap into strong anti-Political

Correctness currents that, in turn, are part and parcel of contemporary internet culture. As Angela Nagle (2017) rightly claims, this online culture must be seen as the reactionary reinterpretation of a culture of transgression that, throughout the second part of the twentieth century, had been owned by artists and intellectuals with leftist political orientations. Directly related to this intersection of Duterte's populist play with violence and transgressive internet culture, BBC News reported in November 2017 on several video games available on various app stores in which players could either play Duterte himself or his police chief, Ronald 'Bato' dela Rosa, and shoot drug addicts.

Duterte's links to urban death squads are an open secret and reach back to his time as mayor of Davao. These connections he apparently took with him into the president's office in 2016, so that already by September 2017, there had been over 8,000 extrajudicial killings by vigilante groups, in addition to the 3,900 deaths at the hand of police forces (Human Rights Watch 2018). The above-mentioned video games, boasting titles such as *Pinoy Crime Fighter* and *Fighting Crime 2* (BBC 2017), turned the killings into fun and play and, in view of their crude, two-dimensional aesthetics, into a joke once more. Indeed, one can understand the games symptomatically as confessing to and disavowing the ongoing violence in the Philippines at the same time. As with Duterte's jokes, which play 'hide and seek' with reality, making suggestions only to laugh them off, the games invite players to restage the literally thousands of killings and experience them as absurd and inconsequential and the victims as two-dimensional cutouts receiving their natural fate.

A psychosocial approach to studying political violence

As cursory as the above assessment of aspects of political violence in the contemporary Philippines is, what we hope becomes apparent from it is how the realms of fantasy, language, media, and action inform and interact with one another in a process towards fomenting violence – violence that, in addition to its often horrendous effects, is politically motivated and has political gains and losses. As shown, Duterte’s statement and its ambiguous relation to reality has a place between humour and seriousness, legality and illegality; it draws on and, in turn, triggers fantasies that are based on shared cultural imaginations, creating and recreating relations and dynamic interplays of investments, attitudes and meanings. In turn, the media coverage of the statement, circulating in the hybrid spaces (Chadwick et al. 2016) in which various media forms (mainstream news media, social networking sites, anonymous online discussion boards, etc.) overlap and contend with one another, further shapes and adds to the imaginaries and fantasies of audiences in vastly different contexts, strengthening positions, modifying and transforming them, or breaking them down. And finally, all the above will interact with existing cultures of conflict that shape dispositions and the pathways of action and, in the case of an eruption of violence, the modes and quantities of discharge.

Such an approach to the preconditions and developmental aspects of political violence shares central viewpoints with a social scientific paradigm in the study of political violence that has formed throughout the last 15 years. This paradigm took shape when social movement scholars started to research political violence in a way different from mainstream terrorism studies (Bosi and Marthaler 2015, p.3). The latter field had shown tendencies to render essential the notion of the terrorist and failed to take into consideration the specific ways in which people were becoming radicalised and drawn into insurgent groups (see Della Porta 2013). Social movement scholars, by contrast, sought to develop critical perspectives to address and counter terrorism studies’ somewhat rigid and universalistic conceptions by

shedding light on the specific *contexts, relations, processes, and dynamics* in which radicalisation and acts of violence emerge. In *Political Violence in Context* (2015), for example, Lorenzo Bosi, Niall Ó Dochartaigh, and Daniela Pisoiu use the dimensions of time, space, and milieu ‘as variables that are an intrinsic and central part of the analysis of contention’ (Bosi et al. 2015, p. 3). In *Dynamics of Political Violence* (2014), Bosi, Chares Demetriou, and Stefan Malthaner seek to develop an understanding of the buildup and development of cases of political violence by focusing on four dimensions of such dynamics: ‘state-movement interactions, intra-movement competition, meaning formation, and (transnational) diffusion’ (2014, p.5). As a last example, Eitan Y. Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou (2012) offer an approach to studying political violence that looks at its relational and processual dynamics. In the article they write:

A relational approach, ‘depicts social reality in dynamic, continuous and processual terms, and sees relations between social terms and units as preeminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substances’ (Emirbayer 1997, p.289). From this perspective, strategy, rationality, and even values and norms are always relationally embedded in space and time and gain salience in the context of social relations. (Alimi et al. 2012, pp.7–8)

Paying attention to dynamic and relational aspects becomes particularly important in view of the strong rationalistic orientation that dominated a substantial part of terrorism and insurgency studies. In *Why Terrorism Works*, for example, Alan Dershowitz (2002) argued that terrorism is ‘an entirely rational choice to achieve a political objective’ (Dershowitz 2002, p.89). This argumentative line has been a mainstay in terrorism studies of the 2000s and has been extended even to suicide bombers. For example, Robert Pape (2005) contends that

‘over the past two decades, suicide terrorism has been rising largely because terrorists have learned that it pays’ (Pape 2005, p.343, quoted in Abrahms 2006, p.45).

Now, whereas we by no means want to rule out that a strong belief in the effectiveness of one’s actions on the part of the (surviving) insurgents plays an important role in spawning further such acts, we do not think that conceiving of the rationale of terrorist acts as outcomes of sober decision-making processes, in which pros and cons are meticulously weighed against one another, is a fertile path to understanding insurgencies. Thus, we strongly agree with Alimi et al.’s (2012) above point that political violence cannot sufficiently be captured in and understood merely through notions of strategies, tactics, aims, and calculations of gains and benefits (see also Bosi et al. 2015, p.6). As Barry Richards argues in the present volume about a case of Islamic State propaganda, even though this propaganda might appear to offer the recruit a rational choice between in-group and out-group, or right or wrong, ‘There is no real choice of any kind here, since the terms of the dichotomy have pre-empted that: would you choose the only right path, which leads to paradise, or (the only alternative) sin and eternal hellfire?’ (Richards, this volume, p. TO BE INSERTED). Far from considerations of rational choice, Richards understands the act of joining IS along the lines of Sandor Ferenczi’s (1949) concept of ‘identification with the aggressor’ – that is, ‘a way of seeking safety through merger with the boundless power and will of god’ (Richards, this volume, p. TO BE INSERTED). In our opinion, this interpretation of the motives and circumstances of joining IS – a step offering a makeshift solution to painful insecurities about one’s place and identity – is significantly more orienting and socially enabling than that of a rational weighing of options.

What a psychoanalytic perspective can thus bring to existing approaches to political violence is its theoretical richness and sophistication in analysing and interpreting the inter- and intra-subjective dimensions of social relations and cultural constellations. This sophistication is oriented towards finding the irrational in the supposedly rational and, vice versa, the rational in the supposedly irrational. Referring back to the above reading of Duterte's speech, a psychoanalytic orientation can unfold the affective, 'sticky' qualities in the relation between the president and his soldiers that are mixed into the more explicit relations in the scene. As shown, the formal relationship between soldiers and their leader can be understood along these lines as permeated by a radically informal, libidinous dimension in which Duterte enacts a paternal authority who is known to be brutal and violent, but who shows himself to be benign towards and understanding of his (soldier) sons' needs.ⁱⁱ In this way, the context of his official speech is coextensive with another context of male bonding, specifically: subjection under and initiation into a paternal structure which needs female victims to counter its homo-erotic implications. This initiation will thus have unfolded a catastrophic dynamic on Mindanao, inflicting gruesome violence on the island's female population. While as of today, independently verified figures are missing, the Philippine government has stated that the counterinsurgency cost 1,112 lives, all but destroyed the Muslim city of Marawi, and displaced more than 400,000 residents (Human Rights Watch 2018). Against these numbers, one can only surmise what the women of Mindanao had to suffer – silently and off the record.

The chapters in this volume

Invariably, in the psychosocial approaches to fomenting of political violence we have gathered in this volume, psychoanalytic considerations of inter- and/or intra-subjective

dynamics, such as the above, are combined with and checked against the social, cultural, and political dimensions (and to a lesser degree economic ones) that might be less directly perceivable in a given constellation, but are nevertheless fundamental to it.

Vera King's chapter, which opens the main part of the volume, represents an 'in-depth hermeneutic' approach (Lorenzer 1986), which, faithful to its historical-materialist origins, conceives of the psychic and the social as dialectically interrelated. Her synopsis of findings from research projects on adolescents with immigrant backgrounds in Germany shows how the socioeconomic and sociopolitical realities of migrant families in their host country, as well as the ways in which these realities come in conflict with the families' hopes and expectations, prepare the ground for relational dynamics between family members that can (but by no means *must*) lead to rigid identity formations on the part of the adolescents which might then foment acts of violence.

Barry Richards (chapter 2) offers an understanding of IS and its appeal to (particularly Western) recruits through his reading of *Dabiq*, IS's official, glossy magazine that was published monthly for over two years, until the 'caliphate's' demise. Drawing on Ferenczi's concept of the 'identification with the aggressor' (1949), Richards suggests that surrendering to the absolutist and persecutory superego of IS's vision of Allah has a liberating effect in that the recruit is freed from all ambivalence and ambiguity, all doubts and insecurities as to her/his existence and role in life. This escape from ambivalence and insecurity thus continues on from what King observes as rigid modes of self-fashioning caused by a state of comprehensive disorientation.

In the chapters following Richards's, we will turn to discursive phenomena and their violent dynamics. Maria Brock (chapter 3) analyses the widespread public calls, circulating in Russian mainstream and social media, for harsh physical punishment of the female members of the band Pussy Riot, following their satirist performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow in 2012 and their subsequent imprisonment. What she finds in the language and rhetoric used in these calls are residues of a linguistic repertoire of Stalinism. Using Freud's concept of the 'return of the repressed' as a means with which to understand the significance of this discursive afterlife of Stalinism in contemporary Russia, Brock suggests that language which is 'uprooted and retrieved from a previous historical context ... can retain a violent charge that comes back to haunt the speaking subject.' What this charge entails, as well as the fruits it has borne, can be witnessed today, six years after Pussy Riot's notoriety, in the Russian government's repressive treatment of journalists, activists, and the political opposition. While these repressions are widely known, the Putin government nevertheless has the support of the majority of Russians and especially young adults (Troianovski 2018).

Continuing on Brock's path, Steffen Krüger's analysis (chapter 4) of anti-asylum, anti-migration Facebook pages in Germany offers a similar connection between language and violence. Applying Alfred Lorenzer's (1986) interactionist paradigm to the posts on those pages, Krüger identifies two main *forms of interaction* becoming established there. Firstly, news reports about crimes committed by foreigners throughout Germany and Austria are condensed into a coherent, agonistic reality. Secondly, the intolerableness of this reality is emphasised time and again. In this way, a disposition towards violence is gradually built up and, by implicitly making the users and audiences of the Facebook pages responsible for the ongoing injustice, ways of violent discharge are tacitly suggested. *How can you be a witness*

to such injustice without doing something? can the disposition created on the pages be paraphrased.

The repeated complaints of an ongoing injustice done to the German people, which Krüger finds in the posts of right-wing German Facebook pages, are traced back to their historical roots in Roger Frie's chapter on the present state of Holocaust remembrance in Germany (chapter 5). What Frie finds in the memory discourses advanced in German families and closely knit communities is people's tendency to perceive of themselves as victims of World War II. In elongation to Krüger's observation of the rhetoric of 'endless suffering,' Frie finds that such suffering is put on a par with that of the Nazi regime's victims. Right-wing extremism, Frie warns, is able to profit from such perceived victimhood and from Germans' aggressive rejection of their role as perpetrators.

While Brock, Krüger, and Frie thus point to the ways in which a violent charge can seep into and be built up in everyday exchanges, James Martin (chapter 6) puts forth the question of what can be done with such charges and the language which bears them. Approaching the 2015 controversy over anti-Semitism in the British Labour Party, Martin argues for a view of political speech (including hate speech) as a means to *sublimate*, rather than *overcome* violence. Whereas rhetorics of hate tend to distract from the satisfactions that the haters draw from them, it is important that we identify and analyse the desires that drive them. Our task cannot be to eliminate hate altogether, writes Martin, but, rather, to find 'better ways to let our hate speak.'

Martin's identification of a particularly harmful form of hateful speech – one that acts as 'a refusal to accept any symbolic mediation with one's opponent' – prepares the ground for Karl

Figlio's argument (chapter 7). In his contribution the author offers an understanding of fundamentalism by way of acts upon objects that have lost – again in Martin's words – 'any symbolic mediation.' Reconstructing an incident in which an agitated mob attacked the house of a paediatrician, smearing 'paedo' on the windows of the doctor's house, Figlio interprets this expletive, 'paedo,' as the object of/for the attack itself. Staking out the wider bearings of this claim, Figlio takes a theoretical detour to Freud's concept of primary narcissism (1914). From the first, Figlio states, narcissism creates a tension and, ultimately, a rift in the ego due to the ego's desire to take itself as object and, at the same time, its fear of being replaced by such an object. The higher the perceived degree of sameness between ego and object, the higher the fear of replacement by that object and, consequently, of extinction. Subsequently, Figlio claims, there exists within us a drive towards *making a difference* which can then help us *create the object upon which our worst fears can be projected*. He uses historical analyses of the establishment of anti-Semitism at state level in Nazi Germany to illustrate this claim of the difference that begs to be made.

Figlio's observation that, under extreme stress and in near psychotic states, people's use of words can begin to act as objects builds a bridge to Deborah Wright's concept of spatialisation (chapter 8). Spatialisation, Wright argues, is a psychic mechanism by which intolerable, anxiety-provoking feelings and thoughts, which cannot be contained in the self, are projected onto, and placed inside, objects in the physical world, such as buildings, parts of landscapes, furniture, but also people and animals. These objects are manipulated and modified, moulded and marked, so as to inscribe into them the charge that the subject is unable to bear. This concept represents a fertile extension of Melanie Klein's notion of projective identification (1946). Like the latter, spatialisation projects intolerable feelings into an Other that then becomes identified with these feelings. In spatialisation, however, this

Other is also physically modified so as to fit the projection. This modification in turn facilitates the transmission of unconscious feelings in that the object is made to bear the stigma that the self is unwilling to accept.

Wright's concept of spatialisation, in turn, offers a fertile tool with which to approach the conflicted and embattled politics of remembrance in contemporary Hungary, analysed by Jeffrey Murer (chapter 9). The four memorials and a funeral site, which Murer refers to in his chapter's title, are all positioned in walking distance from one another in Budapest's city centre. They all can be understood as the material renderings of the Hungarians' struggle with their unfinished, conflicted past. Contending interpretations of this past are thus inscribed into the urban space, where they disseminate undigested affective states amongst Budapest's inhabitants. In this way memorials can be seen to play an active role in Hungary's ongoing authoritarian turn.

Finally, in the volume's last chapter, we take an evolutionary perspective to the theme of fomenting political violence. While such universalising, 'big' narratives of the root causes of political violence have fallen out of favour – and rightly so (see Bosi et al. 2015, pp.1–2) – our psychoanalytic viewpoint justifies the present attempt in that it helps us uncover an invariable aspect inherent in the manifold manifestations of political violence analysed in this volume. Thus, in chapter 10, Jim Hopkins integrates psychoanalytic theories of identification and projection with recent advances in computational and affective neuroscience and Darwin's (1871) concept of *in-group cooperation for out-group competition and conflict* ('the competition of tribe with tribe'). The problem of political violence, writes Hopkins, can be seen as arising from this evolutionary arrangement:

For insofar as we cooperate in groups only to compete in groups, we cannot cooperate as a single group, however important the shared interests that might impel us to do so. ... Attempts at species-wide cooperation thus constantly regress to forms of *all of us against the foreigner*. (Hopkins, this volume, p. TO BE INSERTED)

Confronted with the recent turn to authoritarianism in various parts of the world, Hopkin's claim rings painfully true – and so does Karl Figlio's argument of the 'difference that begs to be made.' With James Martin, then, we must conclude that it cannot be our aim to *overcome* hatred, but rather to find ways to 'hate better' so that aggression becomes sublimated into symbolic contention and not fomented into violence.

References

Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. *International Security*, 31(2), 42–78.

Alimi, E. Y., Bosi, L., & Demetriou, C. (2012). Relational dynamics and processes of radicalisation: a comparative framework. *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 17(1), 7–26.

Batalla, E. V. C. (2016). The early Duterte presidency in the Philippines. *Journal of Current Southeast Asia Affairs*, 35(3), 161–186.

Bosi, L., & Malthaner, S. (2015). Political violence. In D. Della Porta & M. Diani (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of social movements* (pp. 439–451). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bosi, L., Demetriou, C., & Malthaner, S. (Eds.). (2014). *Dynamics of political violence: A process-oriented perspective on radicalization and the escalation of political conflict*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing.

Bosi, L., Ó Dochartaigh, N., & Pisoiu, D. (2015). *Political violence in context: Time, space and milieu*. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Chadwick, A., Dennis, J., & Smith, A. P. (2016). Politics in the age of hybrid media: Power, systems, and media logics. In A. Bruns, G. Enli, E. Skogerbø, A. O. Larsson, & C. Christensen (Eds.), *The Routledge companion to social media and politics*, (pp. 7–22). London & New York: Routledge.

Darwin, C. (1871). *The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex*. London: John Murray.

Della Porta, D. (2013). *Clandestine political violence*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Dershowitz, A. (2002). *Why terrorism works: Understanding the threat, responding to the challenge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Ferenczi, S. (1949). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 30, 225–230.

Freud, S. (1914). On narcissism: An introduction. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 14, pp. 68–102). London: Hogarth Press.

Human Rights Watch. (2018). *Human Rights Watch World Report 2018*. Retrieved 2 May 2018 from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/201801world_report_web.pdf

Kreutzer, P. (2009). Private political violence and boss-rule in the Philippines. *Behemoth: A Journal on Civilisation*, 2(1), 47–63. <https://ojs.ub.uni-freiburg.de/behemoth/article/view/721/647>

Kris, E. (1941). The ‘danger’ of propaganda. *American Imago*, 2(1), 3–42.

Lorenzer, A. (1986). Tiefenhermeneutische Kulturanalyse. In A. Lorenzer (Ed.), *Kulturanalysen* (pp. 7–96). Frankfurt: Fischer.

Nagle, A. (2017). *Kill all normies: Online culture wars*. Winchester & Washington: Zero Books.

Oxford English Dictionary online. (2018). Foment (v). Retrieved 2 May 2018 from <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/72587?rskey=BCUrNY&result=2#eid>.

Pape, R. A. (2005). *Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism*. New York: Random House.

The Guardian. (2016, April 19). Philippines presidential candidate apologises for comments on Australian rape victim. Retrieved 4 May 2018 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/19/philippines-apologises-rape-comments-rodrido-duterte-jacqueline-hamill>.

Reuters. (2017, May 27). Rodrigo Duterte jokes to soldiers that they can rape women with impunity. Retrieved 2 May 2018 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/27/rodrido-duterte-jokes-to-soldiers-that-they-can-women-with-impunity>

Troianovski, A. (2018, March 9). The Putin generation: Young Russians are Vladimir Putin's biggest fans. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved 2 May 2018 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/03/09/feature/russias-young-people-are-putins-biggest-fans/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4b1770865afb

Wood, E. J. (2014). Conflict-related sexual violence and the policy implications of recent research. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 96(894), 457–478.

ⁱ This reading is supported by Peter Kreutzer's (2009) analysis of Duterte's political rhetoric: 'Duterte makes abundantly clear that there can be security, but only he himself can provide it. Security is provided according to his personal ideas of justice and adequateness. In his political symbolism, Duterte clearly is above the law. It is him, who indicts, passes judgement and orders the executioners to do their job. It is a personalized fight between those who do not follow the rules and the rightful vigilante whose rules reign supreme. It is boss-rule in pure form' (p.59).

ⁱⁱ Indeed, in an earlier incident from 2016, Duterte joked about the rape and murder of an Australian woman, Jacqueline Hamill, during a prison riot in the Philippines in 1989, that 'I was mad she was raped but she was so beautiful. I thought, the mayor [i.e. Duterte himself] should have been first' (*The Guardian* 2016).